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Marxism, Pan-Africanism and the International African Service Bureau

One of the most remarkable black radical formations of the twentieth century was the International African Service Bureau, which was active in Britain during the 1930s and 1940s. Theo Williams writes about an astonishing activist group and argues that the left of today has much to learn from this Pan-Africanist and Marxist organisation.

By Theo Williams

The International African Service Bureau (IASB) — along with its predecessor, the International African Friends of Ethiopia, and successor, the Pan-African Federation — included within its ranks some of the most notable figures in the history of anti-imperialism, such as Amy Ashwood Garvey, C.L.R. James, Jomo Kenyatta, Kwame Nkrumah and George Padmore. This activist formation played the central role in organising the famous Fifth Pan-African Congress, which was held in Manchester in October 1945.

The IASB was shaped by the currents of radical internationalism that developed over the early decades of the twentieth century. By 1900, almost the entire world was divided into European colonies and semi-colonies. The world’s three independent black-ruled states — Ethiopia, Haiti and Liberia — would all have their sovereignty challenged by Western powers in the coming years. In the United States, the promise of the Reconstruction era was followed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by the enactment of Jim Crow laws and widespread racial violence, including lynching. In this context, the First Pan-African Conference met in London in 1900. At this meeting, the African American activist-intellectual W.E.B. Du Bois famously and prophetically declared: ‘the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line.’

During the First World War (1914-18), Britain and France, which were the world’s largest colonial powers, drew extensively on the resources of their colonies, including their peoples. Hundreds of thousands of African Americans participated in the US war effort. Yet, despite this contribution to the Allied victory, black people across the world continued to face imperialist and racist violence and oppression at the war’s conclusion. During the years following the war, Du Bois organised four Pan-African Congresses, and Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association reached a membership purportedly in the millions.

The First World War and its aftermath was accompanied by shockwaves and revolts throughout the colonial world, from Ireland to India. Nowhere, however, were the effects of the war more keenly felt than in Russia. The Bolsheviks took power in the October Revolution of 1917, and spent the next half decade fighting a bloody civil war. However, the Bolsheviks did not just look inwards, but instead looked outwards in order to promote world revolution. The Communist International was formed in 1919. The Comintern’s Second Congress, held the following year, declared that Communists should support national liberation movements in the colonies.

The militant anti-imperialism of the Comintern attracted many black radicals, such as Cyril Briggs and Claude McKay, to the movement. For the first time, it became possible to speak — albeit with qualifications — of a world-revolutionary movement for socialism and colonial liberation. The commitment of the Comintern apparatus to anticolonialism waxed and waned; under Stalin, the movement’s strategy and objectives were always at the mercy of Soviet foreign policy. Nevertheless, Marxism (and especially Leninism) provided a crucial theoretical tool for thinking about imperialism, and the Comintern itself often provided important resources for colonial activists who wanted to organise and fight for their liberation. Most significantly for black activists, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, held in 1928, led to the creation of the International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers (ITUCNW).

Various currents of early twentieth-century radical internationalism converged in the ITUCNW. The organisation combined the Pan-Africanist idea that Africans and people of African descent held common interests that spanned seas and oceans with the revolutionary proletarian politics of Marxism and the Bolsheviks. The ITUCNW’s most important theorist was George Padmore. Padmore was born in Trinidad in 1903. He studied in the United States during the 1920s, where he joined the Communist Party of the USA, before moving to Moscow and then eventually to Hamburg, where the ITUCNW was based.

Padmore’s 1931 book, The Life and Struggles of Negro Toilers, articulated a Pan-Africanist Marxism that set an important precedent for future black radical struggles. In Padmore’s analysis, the ‘Negro toilers’ were the most oppressed people in the world. His use of the word ‘toiler’, encompassing both workers and peasants, expanded on the Leninist idea that the peasantry could be a revolutionary class, and, in a way, prefigured the Maoism that animated Third-Worldist movements during the second half of the twentieth century. In Padmore’s vision, the European proletariat and the colonial peoples would work together to overthrow capitalist-imperialism. By arguing for the revolutionary potential of African peoples, Padmore reconceptualised the revolutionary subject. Lenin’s analysis of imperialism focused primarily on its implications for revolution in Europe — the ‘super-profits’ extracted from the colonies were used to bribe a ‘labour aristocracy’ and thereby retard the European socialist movement. Padmore elaborated on this theory in order to examine the formation and prospects of the African working class and peasantry. Padmore was acutely aware of the racism that plagued much of the European labour movement, but his Marxist analysis meant that he understood the building of international socialist solidarity to be central to both African and European proletarian liberation. Borrowing a quotation from Marx, he urged that ‘labour in the white skin cannot free itself while labour in the black is enslaved.’

Padmore and the Comintern split acrimoniously in 1933-34. The Comintern accused Padmore of ‘nationalism’, while Padmore accused the Comintern of moderating its anticolonialism in order to allow the Soviet Union to seek anti-German alliances with Britain and France. What is absolutely crucial about this split is that Padmore did not denounce Marxism, but instead argued that the softening of Comintern anticolonialism was a betrayal of Marxism — he left the Comintern in order to uphold the true Leninist position. After the split, Padmore arrived to live in London in 1935. He was immediately thrust into the fervour of the British socialist and anti-colonialist movement that accompanied the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-36).

In October 1935, fascist Italy invaded the independent African nation of Ethiopia, sparking an international outcry and mobilising unprecedented Pan-Africanist sentiment. Kwame Nkrumah, who was in London at the time of the invasion, later recalled that upon seeing a newspaper headline announcing the invasion that ‘it was almost as if the whole of London had suddenly declared war on me personally.’ The invasion had been some time coming, and in July 1935, Amy Ashwood Garvey and C.L.R. James founded the International African Friends of Ethiopia in order to promote the cause of Ethiopian sovereignty. The group held rallies across London, including at Trafalgar Square. At one such meeting, Ashwood Garvey declared that, ‘No race has been so noble in forgiving, but now the hour has struck for our complete emancipation. We will not tolerate the invasion of Abyssinia.’ At another, James, using the language of the African American abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, said that Ethiopians would ‘die free rather than live enslaved!’

The IAFE lost much of its momentum after Italy declared military victory in May 1936, but the crisis had brought together the most radical black activists in Britain. Padmore formed the International African Service Bureau out of the remnants of the IAFE in the spring of 1937. Its most important members included Amy Ashwood Garvey (from Jamaica), C.L.R. James (from Trinidad), Chris Jones (from Barbados), Jomo Kenyatta (from Kenya), Ras Makonnen (from British Guiana) and I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson (from Sierra Leone). The IASB was the most radical black organisation in Britain and stood in contrast to Britain’s more moderate black-led organisations, the League of Coloured Peoples and the West African Students’ Union (although the IASB occasionally collaborated with these groups). Not every member of the IASB was a Marxist, but every member was, broadly speaking, a socialist who believed that colonial liberation would come through revolution. Moreover, James’s and Padmore’s intellectual and political leadership of the group meant that their collective statements and strategies were undergirded by a Pan-Africanist Marxism.

Following the analysis that Padmore had developed as a member of the Comintern, the IASB sought to forge transnational links between the metropolitan and colonial labour movements. In the Caribbean, a series of labour disturbances culminated in a number of violently repressed revolts in the late 1930s. In the context of these revolts in particular, and of developing colonial trade unionism more generally, the IASB wrote to the British Trades Union Congress: ‘At the present moment Africans and West Indians are struggling for their elementary democratic rights. What are you going to do about it?’ For the IASB, the level of engagement with anticolonial struggle was the most important index of European proletarian class consciousness. Their 1938 ‘Manifesto Against War’ stated that the coming world war was one of rival imperialisms. Colonial peoples suffered under conditions almost identical to that of European fascism — why, then, should black people fight to defend a ‘democracy’ they had never known? Instead, they should use the war to strike for independence. They ended the manifesto with a plea for global anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist solidarity: ‘White brothers, do not be misled. Our freedom is a step towards your freedom. In the common effort for the independence of the colonial peoples and the emancipation of the European workers, the black and white workers will rid humanity of the scourge of Imperialism and open a new future for humanity.’

The Second World War (1939-45) severely disrupted Pan-Africanist networks. Nevertheless, at the war’s end the IASB reconstituted itself as the Pan-African Federation and played the leading role in organising the 1945 Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester. While claiming the heritage of Du Bois’s interwar congresses, the 1945 congress placed greater emphasis on the centrality of labour to African liberation. Kwame Nkrumah, one of the congress’s main organisers, said the congress was attended by ‘practical men and men of action’, while Padmore called it an ‘expression of a mass movement.’ The congress’s ‘Challenge to the Colonial Powers’ declared: ‘We condemn the monopoly of capital and the rule of private wealth and industry for private profit alone. We welcome economic democracy as the only real democracy.’

The Pan-Africanist movement underwent a realignment in the post-war years. Many of its members retained a commitment to Marxism, but greater emphasis was placed on building anticolonial movements in Africa rather than seeking alliances with the European socialist movement. This was because of a variety of factors, including the onset of the Cold War and the increasing maturity of African liberation movements. Nkrumah led Ghana to independence in 1957, but both he and Padmore saw this national independence as a prelude to the Pan-Africanist transformation of the continent.

Padmore died in 1959, and Nkrumah was overthrown by a right-wing coup in 1966. What, then, were the successes and failures of this movement? It is clear that the process of decolonisation did not bring about the collapse of global capitalism and the emergence of world socialism, as Pan-Africanist Marxists had hoped. Nevertheless, when the IASB was formed in 1937, mainstream political opinion would have scoffed at the suggestion that black Africa would become independent in only two decades. The end of European empires — even if the promises of independence have not been fully met — was perhaps the global left’s most significant victory of the twentieth century.

The left of today has much to learn from the IASB’s politics. On the back of accumulating economic crises, much of the world has lurched into nativist populism. The solution lies not with the neoliberal technocrats who created the conditions for this situation, nor with the nationalist ‘left’ who pander to the right on issues of race and foreign policy. Instead, we must look towards the international socialism of figures like James and Padmore, and understand that grasping the nettle of capitalism and imperialism is the only way of achieving human liberation.

Theo Williams is a lecturer in twentieth-century British history at Durham University, and specialises in the history of anticolonialism and black radical politics. His book Making the Revolution Global: Black Radicalism and the British Socialist Movement before Decolonisation is forthcoming with Verso.

Featured Photograph: In July 1935, Amy Ashwood Garvey and C.L.R. James founded the International African Friends of Ethiopia in order to promote the cause of Ethiopian sovereignty. The group held rallies across London, including at Trafalgar Square (C. L. R. James making a speech in defence of Ethiopia in London).

ROAPE in 2021: Looking Back, Forging Forward

For five years ROAPE’s website has tried to reinvigorate scholar activism in and about Africa. We continue to be an important resource for radical political economy in Africa, and to build deeper connections with activists and researchers. In a new initiative this year, we are launching a bimonthly Newsletter, run by Ben Radley, and offering a roundup of all the fresh content posted on the site in the previous two months.

By Ben Radley and Leo Zeilig

The Review of African Political Economy was established in 1974, with the aim to ‘examine the roots of Africa’s present condition’ through an emphasis on critical issues such as dependency and inequality. As a fraternal voice of the new movements that were sweeping the continent at the time, the Review attempted to analyse the progressive politics of the new forces of liberation that were emerging, and interrogate already existing radical projects. The Review did not seek to promote scholarly research for its own sake, but instead sought to engage with the actions required for transformation. The first generation involved in ROAPE were scholar-activists rather than career academics and were a committed (and diverse) political community seeking to assist the continent’s radical transformation.

More than 40 years later, the Review remains committed to this project, and in 2015 launched a new website to help reinvigorate scholar activism in and about Africa, and to involve new communities on the continent and elsewhere in a host of ROAPE activities, projects, workshops and events. The twin aims were and remain to become a leading online resource for radical political economy in Africa, and to build deeper connections with scholars, students, activists and institutions who work in and on Africa.

To these ends, over the last five years, the Review website has: posted interviews with scholars and activists (including video interviews); launched a series of debates (including on Capitalism in Africa and on Popular Protest and Class Struggle); offered reports on radical and progressive conferences taking place across the continent (including some video reports), and; provided information about popular and democratic movements and campaigns.

In October 2020, the website also become an online hub to previous journal issues of the Review. In our publishing agreement with Taylor and Francis, the company has exclusive access to the last seven years of our issues (available here), while roape.net now has the full back-catalogue to all other issues since the founding issue in 1974. This is an extremely valuable resource, covering the continent’s political-economic developments and the shifting terrain of struggle over four decades. The archive was finally launched in October last year, and we hope it will be used widely across Africa, and elsewhere – freely accessible outside of paywalls and publishing agreements.

Elsewhere during 2020, the Review’s website offered coverage of Covid-19 (including through this ROAPE/BIEA webinar in May to discuss the reaction of Africa’s ruling classes to the virus), and added a range of new, important voices to the site, including those of Lai Brown, Gbenga Komolafe and Amandla Thomas-Johnson. In the last two months of 2020 alone, we published more than 20 new posts, including long reads on Covid-19 and Kwame Ture, a series of short eulogies to the radical economist and militant activist John Loxley, and a reflection to mark the tenth anniversary of the death of Mohamed Bouazizi, the iconic martyr of the Tunisian revolution.

To help keep our readers informed about this high volume of new content, and to further the website’s original aims, this year we are launching a bimonthly Newsletter, offering a roundup of all the new content posted on the site in the previous two months. Run by Ben Radley, the Newsletter will deliver six issues each year, sent out during the first weeks of January, March, May, July, September, and November. To subscribe, simply enter your email address at the top of the home page and hit the ‘Subscribe’ button. A sample of the first issue, which will be sent out to subscribers this week, can be viewed here.

This year we want to continue our focus on the unfolding of the environmental emergency on the continent, following on from a number of posts by radical campaigners and socialists last year (see Hamza Hamouchene and Nnimmo Bassey). We will also be marking major anniversaries – including the murder of Patrice Lumumba on 17 January in 1961. This is part of our efforts to commemorate major radical historical events and figures, including a post on the International African Service Bureau, the remarkable black radical formation in the twentieth century. We do not post these pieces for reasons of nostalgia – we see radical history as a key element of our efforts to unlock a frequently forgotten past, so our movements and politics can learn from these experiences.

And there is, as always, much learning to put into action this year. Zambia and Ethiopia, both in the media spotlight in recent months, are set to hold elections. While corporate media coverage of Zambia’s default in November 2020 laid the blame firmly at the door of ‘high-octane borrowing and misrule’ – in other words, the tired old trope of government corruption and mismanagement – research has documented how recent outflows of wealth likely driven by transnational mining corporations have far exceeded the $3 billion Eurobonds that were the focus of the default. The August Presidential elections present an opportunity for Zambia to move away from an externally-oriented model of extractivist dependent development. Will the opportunity be taken?

In Ethiopia, the political leadership in the northern region of Tigray went forward with regional elections in August 2020, which the federal government under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed promptly declared illegal. This sparked the full unravelling of the internal tensions underpinning the developmentalist agenda pursued by former President and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, leading in November to the outbreak of war in Tigray. These are deeply worrying times for the continent’s second most populous country, yet the possibility to hold elections this year provides a potential opportunity for the warring parties to come to the table and move towards resolving their longstanding differences.

Attracting less media attention towards the end of last year, particularly in the Anglophone press, were several political moves by President Felix Tshisekedi to undermine the Kabila family’s two-decade long hold on political and economic power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Citizens’ movements such as Lutte pour le Changement (LUCHA) and Filimbi have played a critical role in forcing this shift, in particular by contributing to the political climate which made it impossible for Joseph Kabila to secure himself a third presidential term. Will President Tshisekedi seize the moment to forge a nationalist agenda, in the vision of his late father and opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi?

In 2021, we will continue to provide coverage and analysis of these and other developments across the continent – both past and present – in accordance with the Review’s founding task of examining the roots of Africa’s present condition, and engaging with the struggles and actions required to secure the continent’s emancipatory transformation. Subscribe now, and stay informed.

Ben Radley teaches in International Development at the University of Bath. His work centres on the political economy of the extractive industries with a regional focus on Central Africa. 

Leo Zeilig is editor of roape.net. Please contact roape.net if you want to contribute or have an idea for a blogpost: website.editor@roape.net.

Featured Photograph: Miners in 1991 on a wildcat strike in Republic of Bophuthatswana, an artificial country created by South Africa’s apartheid-era rulers in 1977 (Robert Gumpert).

Mohamed Bouazizi and Tunisia: 10 years on

This blogpost marks the 10th anniversary of the death of Mohamed Bouazizi, who on 17 December 2010 set himself alight at Sidi Bouzid in an act of self-immolation that made him the iconic martyr of the Tunisian revolution.

By Habib Ayeb

Mohamed Bouazizi’s name is familiar to all; less so is his background, although the facts of his story are well known and documented. This blogpost will explore the links between the different sequences of ‘protest’ processes in Tunisia, from the 2008 strikes in the minefields, to the most recent (2017-20) El Kamour protests in the country’s south-east. It will also consider the concept of socio-spatial class solidarity, both in turning an individual suicide into the spark for a major uprising, and in facilitating collective resistance and its role in long revolutionary processes.

Two key questions arise: what in Bouazizi’s profile, life and circumstances was of such significance that his suicide sparked a huge popular uprising whose impact, direct and indirect, was felt worldwide. And what can he teach us about the origin, scale and longevity of the Tunisian revolution?

We must therefore examine the suicide of Mohamed Bouazizi within its familial and personal context, but also within the more general context of the political protests against the Ben Ali dictatorship, and especially against the processes of dispossession, impoverishment and exclusion. Sidi Bouzid was clearly a focus of the protests and resistance then spreading throughout Tunisia’s marginalised regions. The prolonged mining strikes of 2008 were a key stage in the actions.

Born into poverty, Mohamed Bouazizi was raised by his mother after he lost his father at the age of three. As the eldest son he grew up with a moral ‘obligation’ to support his mother, to the detriment of his education, and he left school without qualifications. Some time before his dramatic act, he acquired a barrow and scales and started selling vegetables but his informal business attracted endless administrative hassles and police harassment. Finally, on 17 December 2010, the police seized his meagre equipment to put a stop to his trading. Angry, frustrated and desperate, he turned to the only act of resistance that still appeared open to him and thereby unwittingly triggered the countdown to Ben Ali’s fall, scarcely one month later, on 14 January 2011.

‘Individual’ suicide and class solidarity

Between the prolonged mining strike of 2008 and the shows of solidarity unleashed by Bouazizi’s self-immolation, many social movements were active across Tunisia. Among them were the protests made in Sidi Bouzid in June and July 2010 by peasant farmers whose demands focused on a number of issues: access to natural resources such as agricultural land, and water for drinking and irrigation purposes, state aid, and the complex problem of indebtedness.

According to several witnesses interviewed in Sidi Bouzid, as well as two family members, Mohamed Bouazizi took an active part in these demonstrations. Whether or not this is so, I would identify a clear link between the peasant ‘protests’ of summer 2010 and those that followed Bouazizi’s desperate act – a link that explains why this particular case, in contrast to other suicides, sparked a popular uprising across the country. First to take to the streets after Bouazizi’s self-immolation were other peasant farmers’ children identifying with his fatal act of resistance and despair.

Here was a clear example of ‘class solidarity’ among local populations directly affected by the region’s multiple social and economic problems.[1] Over the next few days that same class solidarity also found expression nationwide, moving from the ‘rural’ zones (including ‘rural towns’), to the popular quarters of larger towns, and finally to the big urban centres, including Tunis. [2] The progress of the protests suggests the existence of a distinct class consciousness embracing all the ‘popular’ classes, rural and urban.

Since the early 1980s, the governorate of Sidi Bouzid has been the site of a rapid, state-initiated intensification of farming, designed to create a modern, export-oriented agricultural hub based on exploiting deep underground water reserves and attracting private and public capital. Over the past four decades Sidi Bouzid has been transformed: from a semi-arid desert fringe with an extensive agriculture based on olives, almonds, pasture and winter cereals, it has become Tunisia’s leading agricultural region, producing over a quarter of the nation’s total output of fruit and vegetables.

But behind this undoubted technical success lies a real social and ecological failure. Socially Sidi Bouzid remains one of Tunisia’s four poorest regions (of 26 in total), while ecologically the level of the water table is plummeting, water for irrigation is increasingly saline, and soil damage is visible, even to non-specialist eyes.

Here investors – who are mostly outsiders, often called ‘settlers’ by the local population – accrue capital and profits; meanwhile peasant farmers accumulate losses, tragedies and suicides. Without this huge socio-spatial fault, which divides Tunisia between a dominant centre and dependant periphery, Mohamed Bouazizi’s death would scarcely have merited a mention. And that same divide also lies at the heart of several other shocks which will be discussed below.

After the Sidi Bouzid uprising ended with the fall of the Ben Ali dictatorship, several more protest movements arose, all forming part of the same resistance processes in the social and spatial periphery. In the rest of this blogpost I will revisit two of the largest of these movements, examining their historical, social and spatial contexts to delineate their origins, evolution and links to overall political developments in Tunisia from the 2008 mining strikes to the present day. The Jemna oasis movement began in 2011 and concerned rights to land and resources, while the El Kamour movement (2017-20) also involves rights to local resources and in particular to ‘development’: two different struggles each of which constitutes a key moment/sequence in the same process of dissent.

At Jemna and El Kamour, as in other cases, the key to mass mobilisation lies in the processes and dynamics of socio-spatial class solidarity: ‘This is where I come from, I belong to this region and this social group, I am being deprived of resources materially and/or symbolically, so I support those who dare to say “no” and resist’. In summary, this is what you can hear in Kebili-Jemna, Tataouine-El Kamour and elsewhere; what you can read in the media reports of declarations made by local populations. And underlying it all, ‘driving’ resistance and ‘cementing’ solidarity, lie profound feelings of injustice and demands for dignity.

Jemna: rights versus law; a disruptive legitimacy

Following the Sidi Bouzid episode and the fall of the dictator, in 2011 an oasis was ‘discovered’ that was probably new to the majority of Tunisians. Situated in the desert, midway between Kebili and Douz, the Jemna oasis owed its sudden appearance on the map to a significant new collective action, stemming directly from specific elements of colonial history that resurfaced after the wall of silence placed around them had been breached (See Ayeb, 2016, ‘Jemna, ou la résistance d’une communauté dépossédée de ses terres agricoles’ and Krichen, 2016, ‘L’affaire de Jemna; question paysanne et revolution démocratique’).

While most French colonists chose to settle in north or north-west Tunisia and created big cereal farms and/or stock-raising enterprises, and even vineyards and orchards, others preferred to head south and specialise in date farming – in particular the Degla variety, whose export market in France and Europe was virtually guaranteed. Among this latter group was one Maus De Rolley, who in 1937 created a new date-palm plantation around the core of the ancient Jemna oasis. The plantation today covers some 306 hectares, including 185 hectares planted with approximately 10,000 date palms.

Although local populations had held these lands as common and indivisible (tribal) property, they were dispossessed without compensation on the pretext that nomadic herding (pastoralism) was not a genuine productive activity, and that the land therefore was uncultivated. At independence, these populations – who had battled against the occupiers – held great expectations that the new authorities would return their stolen lands.

When the colonial lands were nationalised in 1964, however, the government decided to place them under state control, confiding their management to the body that administered the state’s agricultural land, the Office des Terres Domaniales (OTD), which thereby became Tunisia’s biggest agricultural landowner. Bolstering this strategy was the collectivisation policy of the 1960s, which aimed to reorganise agricultural land and create state ‘socialist’ cooperatives (see Bush and Ayeb’s 2019 book). Yet the real argument against the redistribution of the nationalised lands lay elsewhere: small peasant farmers were judged too ignorant and archaic, too lacking in the necessary financial and technical means, to develop a modern intensive agricultural sector – a stigmatisation that still recurs today whenever discussion returns to this subject and/or to questions of agricultural models and political choices related to farming and food.

Over the following decades, the heirs made some efforts to reclaim these lands, but it was not until early 2011 that the first organised occupations of OTD lands were launched by local populations describing themselves as the legitimate successors. Among them was Jemna’s local population, who occupied the former De Rolley plantation, claiming rights of property and of exploitation. The authorities demanded an end to the occupation, and the resulting impasse lasted for several years. The government argued that the occupation was illegal, while the occupiers countered that they held a legitimate right to resources and especially to community assets, including the indivisible and inalienable commons.

After a long period of tension a compromise was reached. By mutual agreement, the state ceded full management of the palm plantation to the local population while retaining ownership of the land. Might the latter have believed this negotiated settlement to be the only viable compromise?

Underlying the government position was the fear that any solution implying the grant of freehold to the legitimate heirs might create a legal precedent and set an example that would unleash a torrent of other land claims, all drawing on the same colonial and post-colonial past. But the occupation alone had set that example already, inciting other local populations to reclaim – with some attempts at occupation – the lands snatched from their grandparents during colonisation. Furthermore, I would argue that the Jemna case also served to fuel claims of a legitimate right to other local ‘natural’ resources such as water, minerals (for example, phosphates) and oil that mobilised populations in the Tatouine region.

El Kamour: the ‘will of the people’

Resistance entered another phase, not without success, at El Kamour – a locality situated in the barren steppes of south-eastern Tunisia, south of the town of Tatouine, on the tarmac road leading to the oil-fields in the extreme south of the country. The ‘dispossession pipeline’ carrying crude oil to the port of Skhira, 50 kilometres north of Gabes, runs through here, and this geographical position close to the pipeline is the immediate reason for El Kamour’s sudden appearance on political maps of Tunisia, as well as in the media.

Behind El Kamour, however, lies the governorate and town of Tataouine (Tataouine is the capital of the governorate of the same name), with over 180,000 inhabitants. Arid and barren, this region contains most of Tunisia’s oil reserves, producing 40 per cent of its petrol and 20 per cent of its gas. Yet Tataouine also records some of the nation’s highest levels of poverty: in 2017, for example, 28.7 per cent of its active population were unemployed (compared with a national average of 15.3 per cent), while for graduates the rate rose as high as 58 per cent.

Events in El-Kamour, 2017-2020: a brief chronology

The El Kamour movement began on 25 March 2017, with protests in various localities in the governorate, all converging on the town centre of Tataouine (for further details see here). The protesters were demanding a share of local resources, particularly oil, as well as greater employment opportunities and infrastructure development. Met by silence from the government, on 23 April they organised a sit-in at El Kamour. Tensions mounted on both sides, and an escalation became inevitable after the prime minister visited Tataouine and met the protesters. His plans to calm the situation with a few token promises came to naught and the discussions ended in deadlock. On 20 May the pumping station was occupied for two days before being cleared by the army, and tensions remained high.

Eventually, on 16 June 2017, an agreement was signed with the government through the mediation of the Union générale tunisienne du travail (UGTT), which acted to guarantee its implementation. The terms of the agreement promised the creation of 3,000 new jobs in the environmental sector by 2019, and 1,500 jobs in the oil industry by the end of 2017. A budget of 80 million dinars was also earmarked for regional development. But, to the frustration of the local population, the agreement was never implemented. The government simply bided its time, gambling that the militants would tire and the movement run out of steam.

On 20 May 2020, however, the El Kamour activists resumed their protests and sit-ins in several places, piling on the pressure and blockading several routes to bar them to oil-industry vehicles. On 3 July they organised a new general strike throughout the public services and the oilfields, and on 16 July they closed the pumping station, blocking the pipelines carrying petroleum products north. But the El Kamour militants had to wait until 7 November 2020 before they could reach an agreement with the government’s representatives, in return for which petrol producers and other oil-sector enterprises were to resume operations immediately. Signed by the head of government on 8 November 2020, the agreement contains a number of key points, including several that had previously featured in the 2017 accord but had not been implemented. These included, dedicated 80-million-dinar development and investment fund for the governorate of Tataouine; credit finance for 1,000 projects before the end of 2020; 215 jobs created in the oil industry in 2020, plus a further 70 in 2021; 2.6 million dinars for local municipalities and 1.2 million dinars for the Union Sportive de Tataouine.

Conclusion

The big social movements discussed above all have several points in common. Firstly, they are very largely located in southern, central, western and north-western Tunisia, the same marginalised and impoverished regions that between 17 December 2010 and early January 2011 saw huge protests in support of Bouazizi and against current social and economic policies. Secondly, while differing in detail, the principal demands of these movements all relate essentially to the right to resources, services and a decent income. None, or virtually none, are linked to ‘political’ demands (political rights, individual freedom). Thirdly, in their choice of language, and of several ‘spectacular’ actions, these social movements display a radicalism that marks a clear break with the political games played in and around the centres of power. Finally, almost all these movements are denounced and accused of regionalism and tribalism, sometimes even of separatism and treachery. Protesters are suspected of being manipulated, of being puppets in the hands of a political party or foreign power.

Yet these movements have enjoyed some, albeit relative, success – a success impossible without the class solidarity shown in the three examples discussed above, and the ties of domination and dependency that for decades have characterised the relationship between Tunisia’s centre of power (the east coast) and its deprived and impoverished periphery. Finally, these same examples, and other more recent cases, demonstrate that the ‘revolutionary’ processes launched in early 2008 are still active in Tunisia and will probably remain so for many years to come.

Habib Ayeb is a Geographer and filmmaker. He is president and founder of l’Observatoire de la Souveraineté Alimentaire et de l’Environnement (OSAE) and a regular contributor to ROAPE.

The blogpost is being co-hosted by OSAE and available in French on their website here. This version was translated by Maggie Sumner.

Featured Photograph: Paris, 15 January 2011 – A French protest in support of Mohamed Bouazizi, “Hero of Tunisia” (Antoine Walter).

Notes

[1]. See Ayeb H. 2017. 2017. ‘Food Issues and Revolution: The Process of Dispossession, Class Solidarity, and Popular Uprising: The Case of Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia’. Cairo Papers in Social Science. 34, no. 4: 86– 110

[2]. The population of the region is very largely rural: 70 per cent of the inhabitants of the town of Sidi Bouzid are employed in a job linked with the agricultural sector (farmers, agricultural labourers, seasonal workers etc.)

Becoming Kwame Ture

Amandla Thomas-Johnson writes about how Kwame Ture played an important part in the life of newly independent Guinea, then led by Ahmed Sékou Touré. Ture became perhaps the foremost Pan-Africanist of his day and co-founded (with Kwame Nkrumah) the All-African People’s Revolutionary Party, at the time the most significant Pan-African political party. Yet so little is known about Ture’s life. In these extracts from his book, Thomas-Johnson writes about Ture’s life in Guinea, and an extraordinary event in 1970.

By Amandla Thomas-Johnson

In Guinea, doors fly open at the mere mention of Kwame Ture’s name. A senior government minister met me within a few hours’ notice. And when I arrived at Villa Syli to meet a member of Sékou Touré’s old party, the PDG (Parti démocratique de Guinée), I was unexpectedly ushered into a luxurious salon, where I was instead met by Hadja Touré, the former president’s wife. Now in her eighties, she sat on a red and gold wooden carved chair, at the centre of a discussion with three men dressed in expensive fabrics cut in traditional styles. I recognised one of the men as the brother of the Senegalese radical Omar Blondin Diop. Hadja Touré acknowledged me with a deft nod of the head, as I tried to find the most appropriate French expression for the occasion.

Now used by the former first lady, Villa Syli was for several years the residence of Kwame Nkrumah. And it is easy to imagine Nkrumah and Kwame Ture seated on the red upholstered chairs around the dark wooden table at the far end of the room discussing his return to Ghana.

Hadja and Sékou Touré married in 1953. In the run-up to independence, Guinea was the only territory of France’s West African colonies to opt out of joining the French Community in 1958, which would have meant everything from foreign affairs to currencies to higher education would be effectively managed from Paris. When then French president Charles De Gaulle arrived in Guinea in August that year to try to persuade its leaders otherwise, Sékou Touré, then the vice president of Guinea’s government council, famously told him: “We will prefer poverty in freedom to riches in slavery.”

“He was very angry,” Hadja said of De Gaulle’s reaction. “The French tried everything to make us change our mind.”

By the time Guinea declared its independence on 2 October 1958, becoming the second independent Sub-Saharan African nation after Ghana, the sabotage had already begun. Days earlier, French troops had arrived and discreetly emptied the central bank, carrying off its contents by boat to France. Departing French officials then went on a bout of vengeful vandalism, cutting telephone wires in state offices, looting barracks and burning army uniforms. A non-interest loan from Nkrumah’s Ghana was a saving grace. But later, when Guinea adopted a new currency, the French flooded the country with counterfeit banknotes, crashing the economy.

“They tried everything to destroy Guinea. But those who have good intentions always succeed. We did not give up.”

But Guinea would suffer for years to come. Did her husband have any regrets?

“Regret what?” she snapped back. “He always wanted independence and he got it.”

Bordered by pro-French Senegal and Ivory Coast as well as colonial Portugal, Guinea felt increasingly adrift. The overthrow of Modibo Keita in Mali and Nkrumah in Ghana, its closest allies, compounded the sense of isolation. Sékou Touré would in time come to feel perpetually under threat and the paranoia would result in deadly political purges.

It was into this febrile atmosphere that Ture and his wife the singer Miriam Makeba moved to Guinea in 1969, where they were welcomed by the Tourés. “He was very close to Sékou,” Hadja said, “almost like a relative. We appreciated him a lot.” For his part, Ture admired the character and the politics of the Guinean president as much as he did Nkrumah and referred to them both affectionately as “his two fathers.”

And by inviting him to Guinea, Sékou Touré had saved his life. A raft of measures had been taken by the J. Edgar Hoover-led FBI against Ture as part of its efforts to prevent the rise of a “Black Messiah”. One rumour floated by the FBI was that Ture was in fact a CIA operative, putting him in mortal danger from other Black nationalist groups. And American authorities would continue to pay close attention to him while he was in Guinea.

Guinea was under the one-party rule of Sékou Touré’s PDG. With Touré, a former trade unionist, at the helm, the party had dominated the pre-independence political landscape, appealing to worker solidarity and Islam, the dominant religion, as a way to rise above ethnic differences.

Touré sought to expand the public sector and promote agricultural collectivisation along socialist principles and as a revolutionary Pan-Africanist, he sponsored liberation movements, from South Africa to the Cape Verde islands. Touré’s Guinea also attempted to chart a non-aligned course through the choppy waters of the cold war. The Soviets were invited in to exploit Guinea’s vast bauxite deposits, but the country also remained open for business with the US.

As Kwame Ture travelled through the country on PDG business, he was moved by the humility and hospitality of ordinary Guineans, and by the traditional dances and the griots. Makeba incorporated the sounds of the local instruments, the balafon and the kora into her own music. The verdant landscapes and what Ture called the people’s “African humanism” made a strong enough impression for them to build a house in a lush valley in the Fouta Djallon mountains.

But it was a major incident just a year into his time in Guinea that left an indelible impression. Just as Ture and Makeba were retiring to bed at their beachside Conakry home, he heard loud gunfire and detected movements across the sand as men disembarked from ships. Suspecting a coup, he immediately informed the president.

Uncertain of what to do and without a rifle, having left it at Nkrumah’s residence, they waited anxiously by the radio for news. A Portuguese invasion was underway. They left the house at 4 a.m. and headed for the residence of the Tanzania ambassador, so that Makeba, who carried a Tanzanian passport, could get to safety.

“It was hair-raising because you couldn’t tell exactly what was going down. The streets were deserted, but you could hear gunfire everywhere,” Ture later recalled. A firefight had escalated at the headquarters of Amilcar Cabral’s party, the PAIGC, which led the independence movement against Portuguese rule in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau from Conakry and was the target of the invasion. As Ture drove past the party’s headquarters, he put his foot down on the accelerator, and ducked as bullets flew above his head.

Women, children as well as men poured onto the streets to defend the revolution, eyewitness accounts say, as Sékou Touré mobilised private citizens and militia to fight the invaders. The angry masses hunted down the suspects, some of them dissidents who were attempting to blend back into the population. After a seven-day manhunt the people’s justice won out.

“Sékou Touré said let the people try them. So the party members set up people’s courts and convicted many of them. Some were hung. So much for their welcome as liberators,” Ture later wrote.

The events of 22 November 1970 marked Ture to such an extent that his dying wish, nearly 30 years later, was to be buried on the anniversary of the attack. He saw it as no less than an African nation repelling a European invader. But it also drove home the manifold threats that Guinea faced. By raising the alarm, Ture had helped save the revolution, Sékou Touré loyalists said. Djibril Camara, a PDG member, said that Kwame Ture’s heroics strengthened the mutual admiration between him and Sékou Touré’s party.

Ismail Conde, one of the few remaining members of Sékou Touré’s inner circle, said that Guinea’s one-party system was crucial to thwarting the invasion and more than 20 plots during more than two decades of Sékou Touré’s rule. “Guineans were united as though it was one man and that’s why they succeeded in eluding all plots against them,” said Conde, a party ideologue with bushy eyebrows and two pens stuffed in his shirt pocket.

Despite the success, Sékou Touré, who escaped yet another assassination attempt during the invasion was shaken. He began to think there was a permanent conspiracy hanging over his head. Political purges and executions followed. Camp Boiro, an internment camp in the centre of Conakry became synonymous with torture, execution and starvation. Estimates vary, but a former US official claimed around 5,000 people died at the camp. Amnesty International puts the number at 50,000. Hundreds of thousands fled, among them a disproportionate number of ethnic Fulanis.

Was this a price worth paying to defend the revolution?

Under the eyes of a dusty portrait of “Comrade Sékou Touré” perched high on a shelf in his Conakry living room, Conde swears that it was. But for many, including Abbas Bah, a former political prisoner, it was too high a price.

Then a 24-year-old hydrologist, Bah was arrested at Conakry airport in 1971 as he made his way to Mali, and accused of involvement in a Western-backed plot to kill the president. He was sent to Camp Boiro. After eight days without food, he was brought to a room and electrocuted repeatedly until he signed a forced confession.

“At the third time, I agreed, and they gave me a paper with writing, and I signed it. I went on the public radio and confirmed that I was guilty of the accusations they put upon me.”

Bah and I sat on the terrace of his home in a Conakry suburb, in the dark, amid the whir of crickets and sounds of playing children.

Bah spent seven years inside Camp Boiro. He shared a 3 x 3.5 m cell with seven other prisoners. They had just one chamber pot between them. Nourishment was a handful of rice and a litre of water served once a day.

Stokely Carmichael organizing for the Lowndes County Freedom Organization in 1966 (Courtesy of Birmingham Public Library archives). 

Bah would see people led out one by one, never to return and he feared that his day would soon come. “Each second, I was thinking that they would take me out of prison to kill me.”

Bah’s family have for 400 years served as the Imams of Labé—the capital of the predominantly ethnic Fulani region in central Guinea. Other family members, including his brother and sisters were also imprisoned at the camp. Touré and the PDG wanted to destroy influential families like his, Bah said.

After his release Bah was ordered to meet Touré at his office. “I told him that God sent me into prison and God released me. Today I am free and safe.” Bah, who is head of an association representing the survivors of Camp Boiro, said he has forgiven his captors, but still wants accountability. He expressed disappointment towards Ture for not speaking out.

“Kwame came from the United States and was defending human rights and Black people. How could he know that Sékou was unjustly killing people and remain his friend?” he asked. Ture biographer’s Peniel E. Joseph said his silence, despite such proximity to the ruling elite, was “a moral failure as well as a political one”.

But till the very end, Kwame Ture was unequivocal in his defence of Sékou Touré and his regime. While acknowledging “that conditions in Boiro were harsh” he dismissed many of the stories that came out of the camp as “either deliberate fabrications or grossly exaggerated.” Borrowing a phrase popularised by Malcolm X, he was adamant that the revolution had to be defended “by all means necessary”.

Attempts to destabilise Guinea began before independence and continued for years after, as the country struggled to survive in a sea of hostility. Maurice Robert, the head of the powerful SDECE (Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage), France’s foreign intelligence service, during Sékou Touré’s time, later admitted to training Guinean dissidents to “create a climate of security” in the country. “We had to destabilise Sékou Touré, make him vulnerable, unpopular and facilitate the seizure of power by the opposition,” Robert said in an interview in 2004.

Having wrestled a knife-wielding assailant to the floor before, Sékou Touré knew the grisly fate that awaited anti-colonialists of his kind. Amilcar Cabral had been assassinated right under his nose in Conakry. And others, such as Keita and Nkrumah had been ousted.

Having read Fanon and Nkrumah, Kwame Ture interpreted the purges as being justified forms of revolutionary violence even if there was collateral damage. In many ways, Guinea becomes the embodiment of the existential battle at the heart of his politics, between the forces of empire, neo-colonialism and white supremacy on one side, and Pan-Africanism, Black Power and anti-imperialism on the other. As far as he was concerned, you had only two options: you were for the revolution or you were against it. Ture also personally acknowledged the difficulties faced by families of purge victims and in some cases supported them materially, even if he did not speak out.

Nevertheless, Bah’s case raises important questions about some of the tensions inherent in political power, where states can exercise a monopoly on violence while at the same time claim to be working for the greater good.

It also raises the issue of accountability, and the human costs involved in defending state-led ideological projects. When is enough, enough? Bah’s torture and the lack of due process in his case suggests that it went beyond just defending a revolution.

***

In 1979, Stokely Carmichael, as he had until then been called, changed his name to Kwame Ture, in honour of his two African mentors. Joseph suggests that this represented a transformation from Stokely Carmichael, the American grassroots organiser, to Kwame Ture, the African revolutionary. “If Carmichael’s past vision of a liberated future rested on the grassroots, Ture’s beliefs leaned more toward the power of vanguard parties and the genius of African statesmen,” he writes.

This supposed optimism proved to be short-lived. In 1984 Sékou Touré suddenly passed away. A military coup led by Colonel Lansana Conte followed days later. The PDG was banned and 90 percent of its central committee executed.

Ture, now with a new wife and a baby boy, was in mortal danger and considered leaving. His decision to stay, however, perhaps represents one of the defining moments of his Guinea years. It showed that he was not just there for Nkrumah or Sékou Touré, but was committed to the country, its people, and was willing to fight without his governmental privileges. Ture would face an uphill struggle, but his decision to stay would endear him to ordinary Guineans for years to come.

Ture began to work in secret to rebuild the PDG, despite the risks. “It was tough, a complete and sudden reversal,” he wrote in his memoir. “From being the party of the government, we went back to being outlaws, hunted and repressed. And not by white racists, either, but by black reactionary puppets this time.” Kwame Ture may have gone global, as Joseph suggests, but Stokely Carmichael the grassroots organiser was also still there. And that’s when they came for him.

His arrest and imprisonment in August 1986 sparked a global campaign. The All-African People’s Revolutionary Party (A-APRP) quickly activated their networks. Protestors picketed outside the Guinean embassy in Washington DC and at the homes of black mayors. The Palestine Liberation Organisation and the Cubans also tried to intervene, and civil rights activists Jesse Jackson and Ambassador Andrew Young lobbied hard for his release. And after four days Ture was once again a free man. It was the 40th arrest of his political career. Ismael Conde, by now working in the presidential office, was arrested, as was Hadja Touré, who recalls appreciatively that Ture drove hundreds of kilometres just to visit her. Both were eventually released.

Guinea turned to the West, bringing much-needed investment but also a spike in corruption. Back in its sphere of influence, France in 1990 mandated the country to open to a multiparty system or else lose French aid, a twist of irony that would lead to the re-emergence of the PDG.

Ture and Conde led the party’s re-emergence in 1993.

Ture joined the party’s central committee and was appointed the liaison with the Cuban embassy. His role in rebuilding the party is recognised in PDG documents where his name appears alongside Kwame Nkrumah and Sékou Touré as one of the “illustrious Pan-Africanists” who have enriched PDG ideology. Conde described him as an “unstoppable revolutionary who believed in the liberty, dignity and pride of the black race and that imperialism in Africa was a shame for the black race”.

Sekou Mbacke, by this time living in Guinea and involved in the PDG’s youth wing, recalls travelling with Ture from neighbourhood to neighbourhood building work-study circles and “preaching the PDG doctrine to the masses”. For a time, things began to look up for the party as talk of the old president returned to the streets, despite government efforts to dirty his name, claims Mbacke. Ture’s own party, the A-APRP, pinned its continental hopes on a PDG comeback. Disappointment soon followed, however. In 1996, while Ture was away in the US, the PDG went into a political alliance with the regime of President Lansana Conte. Ture saw this as a betrayal and a turn away from its revolutionary objectives.

“He was surprised, he was mad. He could not hide that from me,” Mbacke said.

Looking out across the continent in 1995, Ture saw one counter-revolutionary setback after another. “There was very little good news,” he wrote. “The reports coming into Conakry from cadres in the field as well as from allies across the continent were almost all grim. Month after month, report after report, there were setbacks.”

Ture decried what he said was “neoliberalism brazenly resurfacing” and “arrogant military dictatorships puffing themselves up”, normalising opportunism, naked corruption and greed. Ture put this down to the delayed effects of the demise of the Soviet Union, the mere existence of which had acted as a bulwark against rampant neo-colonialism and imperialism in the Black world (though he admits that the Soviets were the lesser of two evils).

“In the liberation struggles of Africans and all oppressed and exploited peoples—some unfolding over generations, even centuries—there are low points and reverses. That’s all. The struggle continues.

Becoming Kwame Ture by Amandla Thomas-Johnson is published by Chimurenganyana Series and can be purchased here.  

Amandla Thomas-Johnson is a British-born writer of African-Caribbean descent. He is based in Dakar, Senegal, and has reported from a dozen countries, including Trinidad and Tobago, Chile and Mauritania. He has worked for Middle East Eye, the Daily Telegraph, BBC, The Guardian, Al-jazeera, and Channel 4, among others.

Egypt 2020: A Journey to the abyss

The 2020 parliamentary elections in Egypt were held on 24–25 October and 7–8 November to elect the House of Representatives. For weeks, even in the smallest village, the streets and squares were again wallpapered with the smiling, photo-shopped portraits of the same people, with the same slogans, as if nothing had changed in this country since the uprising almost a decade ago.

In summary

– The economy is on the verge of collapse, insolvency, inability to service the debts, not to mention paying them off.

– There is no strategy whatsoever to deal with the expected water shortage after the complete failure of negotiations on the construction of the “Renaissance Dam” in Ethiopia.

– Except for propaganda and data manipulation, there is no strategy to counter the escalating Corona crisis. On the contrary, at a time when all countries affected by Corona are trying to alleviate the economic burden of the crisis on the lowest strata of society through subsidies and financial injections, the Egyptian government is raising the prices of all items that painfully affect the weak, bread, electricity, fuel, public transportation, a flood of new taxes and price increases on all government services, let’s not even talk about education and health care. Even before Corona, these had become a privilege of the rich.

– Education is the basis of all development. The estimated amount needed to solve the problem of class overcrowding is EGP150 billion. What does this amount mean in terms of government spending in other areas?

Prime Minister Madbouly has announced that state projects have been implemented at a cost of more than 4 trillion pounds over six years, which means that the amount needed for the development of education is only 0.004% of this expenditure. So, the problem is not lack of resources, but misuse and waste of resources. It is due to the economic and social policy in favour of a certain class.

– According to the Central Bank, Egypt’s foreign debt increased by almost 12.2 percent in the last three months of fiscal year 2019/2020 and stood at US$123.49 billion at the end of June, compared to US$111.29 billion in March, an increase of US$12.2 billion.

– Due to the economic policies imposed on Egypt by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the poverty rate rose from 25.2% in 2010/2011 to 26.3% in 2012/2013 and 27.8% in 2015, then jumped to 32.5% in 2017/2018, which means that 32.5 million Egyptians are poor according to the “national poverty line” (EGP736 per month and person, about US $45). The national poverty line is about 60% of the UN-defined limit (Poverty Line).

– The Severe Poverty Line also decreased from 4.8% in 2010/2011 to 4.4% in 2012/2013, then rose to 5.3% in 2015 and reached 6.2% in 2017/2018, which means that 6.2 million Egyptians – according to the national severe poverty line of 491 EGP (about US$25) per month and person – are extremely poor and not able to meet their basic needs.

– According to the World Bank, the percentage of the world’s poor, calculated on the basis of the severe poverty line of US$1.9 per person per day, fell from 36% in 1990 to 10% in 2015. By contrast, it has risen steadily in Egypt, so that the official poverty rate reported in Egypt is currently more than three times the global poverty rate.

– On several occasions, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) has called on the Egyptian government to limit the excessive use of the death penalty and to adhere to the Egyptian Mission’s proposal at the 36th session of the Human Rights Council to suspend the death penalty-albeit only temporarily-until a broader social debate on its abolition. However, the reality of the death penalty in Egypt is getting worse and worse. The number of persons whose death penalty was carried out in October 2020 (53 persons) exceeds the sum of all executions in the last three years.

– In an escalation against the EIPR, the public prosecutor’s office ordered the imprisonment of its head. Mohamed Bashseer was arrested by security forces on November 15 after midnight from his home and held. There was subsequently the arrest and release of two more EIPR workers and there is the continued incarceration of more than 10 months of Patrick Zaky. These detentions are a new link in a series of targeted intimidation measures against human rights activists. This is not separate from the overall authoritarian and oppressive climate that affects all of the constitutionally and internationally guaranteed rights and freedoms. The allegations are based on general, and misleading terms enshrined in Egyptian law.

The Constitution of 2014

In January 2014, the new constitution was adopted by a large majority (98.1%) of voter turnout (38.6%). And although I have some criticism of some articles of this constitution (too much space for clergy and military), one has to admit objectively that this was the best constitution Egypt ever had. It reflected the balance of power in 2014 between revolution and counterrevolution.

Unfortunately, this balance of power in favour of the democratic forces at the time did not last. Immediately after the presidential election, which Sisi won with practically no real competitors, the military leadership began dismantling the constitution. After a revolutionary surge, which began with the uprising of 25 January 2011, the construction of a dictatorship first requires the complete disregard of the constitution. Especially the articles guaranteeing freedoms were disregarded.

Although nothing can remain hidden in the digital age, a “democratic” image is needed for the outside world. To this end, Egyptian voters were twice chased to the ballot boxes with the whip, all numbers were fudged, and all “public” and private media were mobilized for a show. In March 2018 for the Sisi re-election, and in April 2019 for the referendum on the constitutional amendments.

The first re-election showed the political decision of the state leadership to stop any political debate, i.e., to conduct election campaigns without any debate on any issue, zero discussion in the whole society, although many issues have stretched society to the limits. This is only possible by preventing a real election campaign. And this is how it was done.

The five brave candidates were eliminated immediately after their candidacy was declared – between arrest and threat. Then a tailor-made candidate was pulled out of the sleeve who had campaigned for Sisi in his own election campaign. With a voter turnout of 41.16%, Sisi won with 97.08% and thanked the people. 

The second farce was the referendum for constitutional changes. With a turnout of 44.33%, the Egyptians – allegedly – reversed the most important achievements in their constitution of five years before. Suddenly, the president is not only allowed to remain in office for two legislative periods, but until 2030, the president appoints the boards of all courts and the attorney general, extensive expansion of the powers of the military in state leadership, the economy and military justice, including completely unfounded immunity, and much more.

This happened in the following scenario:

  • Sisi began to criticize the constitution in strange statements that completely contradicted his earlier statements in which he praised the constitution.
  • The youth of the revolution at that time and also public figures were suddenly arrested on terrorism charges and mistreated in the prisons. These people had absolutely nothing to do with terrorism, but the regime decided to punish them for their courage to express their opinions. The regime has pursued two goals: Firstly, to launch a pre-emptive strike against them so that they do not object to any manipulation of the constitution, and secondly, to make an example of them to those who dare to object to Sisi’s will to change the constitution.
  • Since the secret services completely control the media, only hypocrites and charlatans could be seen on the television channels. They directly demanded the amendment of the constitution, others begged President Sisi to remain in office for further periods until he completed his successes (!), while the president himself announced that the constitution is not a holy book and that it is only natural that it be completely supplemented or amended.

The elections 2020

For the first time, elections are being held under a new electoral law adopted after the 2019 constitutional amendments. The Egyptian parliament consists of 568 members, of which 284 are elected directly and 284 in closed ballot lists. The closed electoral list system means that if 4-5 lists compete in a constituency, the list with the majority wins all seats, no matter how many votes the other lists have received (i.e., the winner takes it all). The President of the Republic has the right to appoint up to 5% of the MPs.

The parliamentary elections, which began their first phase on October 24 and lasted until mid-November 2020, coincided with the outbreak of the Corona pandemic and the stagnation of the national economy. On this occasion, however, the treasury of the “Long Live Egypt” fund set up by Sisi will be revived and padded with approximately EGP 10 billion (approx. US$640m). These are the “donations” imposed on the candidates, who receive support from the state apparatus, which guarantees their seat in Parliament and grants them the immunity and many other privileges resulting from it.

In fact, on the first day of the elections, the government seemed to instruct, even force, the employees and servants in the administrative apparatus to vote to increase the percentage of voters. The “National Security Agency” – formerly State Security (SS) – instructed its networks of extended families, mayors and village leaders to mobilize voters.

The extremely conservative “Future of the Nation” party, loyal to the regime, held the lion’s share of seats in parliament. It took the lead in the scene to accept direct election candidates and list candidates in all constituencies of the Republic. It called on all candidates who wished to enlist its support to “donate” contributions of between EGP 5 and 25 million, depending on their chances of success. In the competitive struggle, many have far outbid or had to outbid this amount.

Since the only criterion for inclusion in the circle of beneficiaries is the amount of financial contributions, this resulted in an overwhelming majority of deputies from the rich and super-rich, at the expense of natural leaders and public figures.

The Political Money

In almost all constituencies, political money or the purchase of votes from the poor played a decisive role. This took place under the eyes, indeed with the participation, of all the relevant authorities. In the second phase of the parliamentary elections, the price of a vote in some districts in Cairo reached EGP 500 (about US$31), and the trend was rising toward the end of the vote.

In these second parliamentary elections since the fall of the late President Morsi, according to observations in the press and parties, as well as on videos in social media and also from our own observation, there is confirmation that “political money” dominated these elections.

The first form: Distribution of money to every voter who votes for candidates on the “Patriotic List”, which includes 12 parties led by the government-affiliated “Future of the Nation” party. These are sums of 50 to 200 pounds (US$3.2 to 8.8) from people who call themselves representatives of a candidate.

The second form of this political money went into the distribution of boxes of food such as rice, sugar, oil and tea, on which “The Future of the Nation Party” is written. This was repeated in the 2015 parliamentary elections and the recent Senate elections, as well as in the presidential elections and votes on constitutional amendments.

The Economist published a report on October 22 under the title ‘Another sham election highlights Egypt’s problems’. It stated that ‘Even by the standards of Egypt, where votes are routinely bought and opposition candidates imprisoned, this contest seems especially undemocratic.’ The regime has eliminated most of its critics, with candidates competing only to see who supports the regime most, while wealthy businessmen pump money into state-supported parties.

The Economist added that ‘some seats on the electoral lists were sold for millions of Egyptian pounds (tens of thousands of dollars), so much so that even one of the pro-state newspapers ridiculed this payment in a cartoon depicting a member of parliament carrying his own chair to parliament because the seats in it were too expensive for him.’

If the candidacy is only for the richest, the vote only by the poorest, paid for by donations or bribes, and the middle class is absent or increasingly reduced, a parliament, with its two chambers, will emerge, as an expression of the imbalance in government policy, which will drastically widen and deepen the gap between rich and poor. By corrupting a more just legal system originally provided for by the new constitution, the new rulers have created a hopeless situation, socially, politically, economically and legally. Egypt stands at the abyss.

Why does the West support the Sisi regime?

The Egyptian regime is pursuing an economic strategy that inevitably leads to a collision between urgently needed domestic demands for democratization and international interests. In other words, the Sisi regime is pursuing an unwavering policy that is rooted in the global financial system in order to combine its stability with the economic interests of international organizations, Western countries and big corporations.

Although the regime merchandises itself internationally as a bulwark against terrorism and illegal immigration flows, this interpretation often obscures its economic strategy. It is a policy based on heavy indebtment, which involves international parties in the repression practiced by the regime and leads to deepening of the poor-rich polarization and, consequently, destabilization and violent extremism.

Due to strong support for the global financial system, the regime in Egypt finds protection in many ways, but is also in an extreme state of dependence:

First, increasing dependence on external loans to finance government operations and major infrastructure projects. This includes an increase in long and short-term government bonds and “hot money”. Second, a huge increase in arms deals since 2014, making the regime the third largest arms importer in the world between 2015 and 2019. Finally, the high level of foreign direct investment in the Egyptian oil and gas sector has linked long-term Western investment to the stability of the regime.

These factors are directly responsible for Egypt’s repression of the population and constitute obstacles to democratization. Ultimately, this economic strategy exacerbates long-term challenges with profoundly destabilizing effects. If international capital flows are used to finance military control over the Egyptian economy, the security apparatuses can gain greater control of the state, which in political terminology means dictatorship.

Egypt relies heavily on debt to create forms of financial dependence between the regime and international parties. The regime has borrowed enormous sums. This sharp rise in debt was accompanied by an accelerated increase in foreign holdings of short-term Egyptian government bonds, which rose from US$60 million in mid-2016 to US$20 billion in October 2019.  The regime was able to attract this short-term capital through interest rate offers that are the highest of any financial market in the world among other emerging markets. The yield on these funds, financed by international borrowing from the Egyptian government, reached about 13% in July 2020. Egypt thus deserves the title of “Emerging Markets Favourite”, as reflected in investor demand for a US$5 billion Eurobond issue. This is considered the largest public spending in Egyptian history.

Heavy borrowing has serious consequences for Egypt and the international community. On the one hand, in the global financial system, there is an urgent need for the survival of the Egyptian system, as the repayment of its high international debt depends on it. Therefore, the regime is to a certain extent immune to international pressure to reduce its repression, because turbulence in Egypt would have a direct impact on government revenues, increasing the likelihood of its default.

In other words, international creditors thus indirectly bear responsibility for the use of public funds to enrich the military elite through mega-infrastructure projects. These projects are financed both directly and indirectly by international financial actors (including regional allies such as the Gulf States and international organizations such as the IMF).

Egypt is economically shaken, not threatened militarily by any country and has one of the largest armies in the world. For military-strategic reasons, there is therefore no need at all for further development of its military clout. Nevertheless, the regime is pursuing a policy in the opposite direction. The regime’s expenditures for huge arms purchases from 2014 onward play a key role in consolidating its international security network. The volume of arms imports tripled between 2014 and 2018 compared to the period 2009-2013, an increase of 206%. There are no signs that this wave of arms purchases has subsided, as the regime held talks with Italy in June 2020 to conclude a major arms purchase contract worth US$9.8 billion. The Western arms industry is the main source of arms Egypt receives. At the top of the list are France, Germany, Russia and the USA. France alone covered 35% of the regime’s arms requirements between 2015 and 2019.

The arms deals include not only conventional weapons, but also the purchase of surveillance equipment and crowd control devices that are used to directly suppress protests. It is difficult to verify the sources of funding for these transactions, as they are not included in the official figures of the defence budget. However, there is evidence of the use of external loans, partly for this purpose.

In 2015, for example, an arms deal worth €5.2 billion, which included 24 Rafale fighter planes, was partly financed by a €3.2 billion loan from the French government. This means that French taxpayers lent €3.2 billion to the Egyptian regime, which Egypt’s poor will pay back including interest, i.e. Egyptian public funds were spent to finance the profits of the French arms industry.

The arms deals have made the regime one of the main customers of Western arms manufacturers, effectively linking the survival or protection of the regime with the interests of the Western arms industry.

In summary, the transformation of the regime into a major arms importer has two main consequences: the oppression of the Egyptian people by its regime and the futility of international humanitarian efforts to democratize Egypt.

First, the entanglement and accountability of Western countries and their arms industry, as the main supplier of surveillance and mass control, in suppressing popular protests. Second, the potential of Western countries to condemn and address human rights violations is thus automatically prevented.

There is a very sad and enlightening example of this, among countless others: Italy continued to supply weapons to the Egyptian regime, even after suspicions rose in December 2018 that five members of the Egyptian security forces were involved in the torture and death of the Italian student Giulio Regeni in 2016. This well-founded suspicion was substantiated by an official demand of the Italian public prosecutor’s office. Nevertheless, Italian arms sales to Egypt tripled in 2019, and the planned arms deals between Italy and Egypt for 2020 amount to €11 billion.

Other factors in international  tolerance of undemocratic conditions in Egypt are the increasing foreign direct investment in the Egyptian oil and gas sector. The Egyptian regime is currently the first target for foreign direct investment in Africa. The value of these investments reached US$9 billion in 2019.  Most of the investment is in the oil and gas sector, which received a major boost following the discovery of the Zohr gas field in 2015, the largest in Egypt and the Mediterranean region.

The Zohr field is jointly owned by the Italian state-owned company Eni, BP (UK) and Russneft (Russia). The share of Eni is 50%. Eni’s total investments in this sector between 2015 and 2018 amounted to US$13 billion.  These steadily increasing foreign investments in the oil and gas sector reflect a deliberate policy of the regime. On August 31, President Sisi announced his support for the expansion of Eni’s investments. In view of these investments, international energy companies have a greater interest in the survival of the Egyptian regime, so investments in the billions are linked to the continuity of the regime.

As a result of this calculated policy, the regime becomes the main beneficiary of the transfer of wealth to the military elite. The middle and lower classes, the normal citizens of this state, fall by the wayside and do not benefit from the enormous financial flows. The military elite accumulates profits through interest on loans, arms deals, corruption in the mega-infrastructure projects – mostly wasteful and unnecessary – and oil and gas revenues, while the national debt is financed by the Egyptian taxpayer.

It is therefore clear that international humanitarian demands for democratization collide with international financial interests, which in turn ensure the survival of the Egyptian regime of injustice through their abundant support.

A version of this blogpost originally appeared on the Tlaxcala website (the international network of translators for linguistic diversity) and can be found here.

Imperial Ambitions: The new political economy in Ethiopia

This blogpost explores the conflicted nature of Ethiopian political economy since the change of leadership in 2018, the fall of the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front from power, and the rise of Abiy Ahmed. Wyatt Constantine looks at the country’s second city, Dire Dawa, to examine the complicated and opaque nature of Ethiopia’s new ambitions.

By Wyatt Constantine

Ethiopia has found itself the centre of international attention, as the armed forces under the direction of Prime minister Abiy Ahmed have entered and nearly fully occupied the northern region of Tigray, home of the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front, whose two year long feud with Ahmed has exploded into open war. Roughly one year after Ahmed was awarded the Nobel Prize for his peace deal with Eritrea, the prime minister is now embarking on a brutal conquest of his most vehement domestic opposition, and the image he had cultivated as a liberal reformer who was once naively claimed to be opening Ethiopia’s “path to economic prosperity” by economist Paul Collier seems to have been all but shattered.[1]

Since assuming leadership early in 2018, Prime minister Abiy Ahmed has embarked on numerous reforms, releasing political prisoners, easing restrictions on internet use, and pushing for vast economic reforms for the Ethiopian economy. Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2019, Ahmed elaborated on Ethiopia’s ambitious plans for “Unleashing to potential of the private sector”, “Reforming State-Owned-Enterprises” and “Opening the economy.”

Ethiopia has experienced tremendous GDP growth over the past decade, and has seen a marked rise in FDI inflows, over 85% of which has gone into manufacturing.[2] Optimistic claims from the World Bank that “Ethiopia’s industrial parks are making jobs a reality” and the Economist that Ethiopia is “Africa’s new Manufacturing hub”, contradictions underlay Ethiopia’s growth narrative as well as that of its political transformation. Despite the high GDP growth, amongst the highest in Africa, and the inflow of foreign investment, Ethiopia’s growing economy has been a highly inequitable affair. Manufacturing remains overwhelmingly concentrated in the capital, with Addis Ababa alone playing host of over 35% of Ethiopia’s manufacturing, more than that of every other region in Ethiopia combined excluding Oromia. While industrial parks in cities such as Hawassa, Mekele, Bahir Dar have indeed created jobs, these jobs generally pay wages so low and have such poor health outcomes that they are largely treated as alternatives to informal sector and agricultural work, with turn-over in some parks reaching as high as 100% annually.[3] Ethiopia has also experienced a massive increase in internally displaced persons in the last few years, with over 3.1 million IDPs, the highest number in the world. While Ahmed’s ‘Medemer’ reforms preach a narrative of pan-Ethiopian unity, the reality is that modern Ethiopia was forged in the fires of imperial conquest. Indeed, Addis Ababa, borne as an imperial capital, maintains characteristics of its imperial origins, sucking in capital, investment, political power, and wealth in amounts no other Ethiopian city can attempt to rival.

With these divergent narratives in mind, one of Ethiopia as a “Growth miracle” and the other as a fragile post-empire in state of unrest, economic precarity, and great uncertainty, the case study material from my research in Dire Dawa attempts to make explicit the complicated and opaque nature of Ethiopia’s political economy, and to showcase how Ethiopia’s growth is being experienced from outside its centre.

Dire Dawa is Ethiopia’s second largest city, and as an urban area in Ethiopia, stands out as relatively unique. It is only one of two chartered cities in Ethiopia, the othering being Addis Ababa, and the city has a reputation as being a somewhat cosmopolitan metropolis. It is not uncommon for those borne in Dire Dawa to refer to themselves as a Dire Lij, or a child of Dire. Constructed around the French built Chemin de Fer Ethiopien early in the 20th century, Dire Dawa has the distinction of being Ethiopia’s first planned city, and from very early in its history found itself the home of a large expatriate community of Greeks, French, Arabs, Somali, Amhara, and Oromo peoples. The old railway station, located in the central neighborhood of Kezira, was a central node in a transregional network of trade and commerce. Even until the late 1980s in the last years of the Ethiopian civil war, Dire Dawa had a reputation as a boomtown and a centre of opportunity. This was due in large part to trade in contraband goods such as cattle and chat, that made their way through Dire Dawa not only to the rest of Ethiopia, but also to nearby Djibouti and Somalia. Older residents speak fondly of this time, speaking of Dire Dawa B’dero, meaning ‘long ago’ or ‘back then’ in Amharic, reminiscing in a manner like that of residents in the American Rustbelt of a time when Dire Dawa was a good place for business and life was easier. Today the old railway station sits mostly unused, playing home to a ticket office for a regional bus company, and home to small and rather rundown museum.

The new Addis Djibouti railway, which has a terminal near Dire Dawa, has been one of several massive infrastructure projects undertaken in the last decade by the Ethiopian government. As opposed to Dire Dawa’s old station which sits in the middle of town, Dire Dawa’s new station is not even found in the city, but almost 5 km at the edge of the village of Melka Jebdu, at the border to the Somali zone. Close to a new multi-million-dollar industrial park under construction, it is curious that the new construction has bypassed the city almost entirely.

Railway Roundhouse in Dire Dawa Train Station (21 December 2019).

Dire Dawa captures some of the contradictions of the Ethiopian political economy, and highlights the degree to which caution should be exercised in making grand claims regarding Ethiopia’s economy and structural transformation. Though Dire Dawa is the largest city in Ethiopia after Addis Ababa, its infrastructure remains remarkably underdeveloped. Only 44% of its households are estimated to be connected to the power grid, and despite a new paved road connecting it to Addis Ababa, many of the city’s roads remain unpaved and turn into nearly impassable mud tracks during heavy rains.[4]

More than one interviewee mentioned the prevalence of Kulalit Bashita, meaning kidney sickness, and said to be wary of the municipal water supply. A 2012 study found that 85% of water sources in Dire Dawa tested positive for faecal bacteria, compared to a massive study in Addis Ababa which found that only 10% of sources were contaminated.[5] Over 5 private water bottling companies can be found in the city, and more than one resident mentioned, in conspiratorial fashion, that Dire Dawa’s water infrastructure had remained intentionally underdeveloped due to pressure from the private bottling companies, though this was impossible to prove.

Dire Dawa remains a site of intense rural to urban migration, and it is seen as a place of opportunity. During my two-month fieldwork stay, multiple interviewees who had migrated to the city, principally young men, did so with the idea that Dire Dawa was a place where a future could be built, and opportunity existed, or simply fleeing rural poverty: ‘I came here from a rural area, as there is little work in my village.’ One young man explained early in the morning in the central neighbourhood of Saido, where day-laborers wait hoping to get work at the construction site of Dire Dawa’s new industrial park: ‘The payment is not so good. I can make maybe 50 ETB (US$1.3) a day as a labourer, and it is not every day that you can get work.’

Despite Dire Dawa’s reputation as a place of opportunity, it has the highest record of unemployment in the entire country, 25.3% as of 2018, compared to a national average of 19.1%.[6] Though the recipient of FDI inflow, this investment does not seem, as of yet, to have been accompanied by structural transformation. Despite being Ethiopia’s second largest city, the perception of Dire Dawa as a site of economic opportunity seems to be rooted more in its past glory days as a railroad and contraband hub, rather than the current reality. The cost of living and food has increased dramatically, with even a one room of poor quality and no facilities costing a minimum of at least 500 ETB a monthly (US$13). A single room in a condominium or stone tenant house is unlikely to be had for anything less than 1000 ETB monthly, and that is at the low end. For Dire Dawa’s thousands of informal laborers and street vendors, the latter of whom average an income of only 988 ETB a month, housing is all but unaffordable.[7]

Residents of Dire Dawa also pay some of the highest food prices in the country, with a kilo of beef costing over 400 ETB (US$10.5). ‘What has changed for us? We are only eating mot shiro’, claimed one young clothes vendor in the neighborhood of Gendekore, referring to a common Ethiopian dish made of pea powder and served on the traditional flatbread injera, except mot shiro contains ‘no onion, no meat, no butter, no tomato, only shiro powder and water.’ Lending credence to this claim is evidence from the Central Statistics Agency. Between April 2018-19, Dire Dawa’s food specific inflation index saw the highest increase of any city in the country, rising to 24.7%.[8] While Ahmed has championed investment and the role of the private sector in helping to fuel Ethiopia’s growth miracle, the reality is that even as GDP has risen, so has fear, suffering, and violence.

While the new administration has without doubt proven its commitment to market-oriented reform and economic liberalism, going so far as to pursue the de-monetization and reissuance of the Ethiopian birr in the middle of the corona pandemic, a potential disaster for Ethiopia’s vast impoverished and un-bankable population, it has proven itself equally ruthless in attempting to centralize power. The ongoing full-scale mobilization of the Ethiopian military to invade and occupy the region of Tigray, home to the TPLF cadre who previously ran the country until 2018, has been chilling in its swiftness and brutality, with horrific humanitarian consequences. While embracing the neo-liberal language of Davos, Ahmed has proven he is unafraid to pursue internal control in a manner reminiscent of his imperial predecessors, no matter the suffering it might cause, and no matter who might be left behind.

Wyatt Constantine is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Leipzig in the department of African studies working on the political economy of labour in the horn of Africa.

Featured Photograph: Station of the Djibouti-Ethiopia Railway in Dire Dawa (12 March 2006).

Notes

[1] Collier, Paul. ‘Ethiopia’s path to prosperity is opening up under Abiy Ahmed.’ Financial Times. October 26, 2019.

[2] Heinemann, Thomas. Ethiopia in 2025: an up-and-coming industrial hub in Africa? KFW research. March 2019.

[3] Blattman, Christopher and Dercon, Stefan. The impacts of industrial and entrepreneurial work on income and health: Experimental evidence from Ethiopia. June 2017.

[4] Moges, Mesay. Ethiopian Electric utility. A case of Electrical access rate in household level. In case of Dire Dawa Administration. 2017. p.11.

[5] Amenu, Desalegn. Microbiological quality of drinking water sources in rural communities of Dire Dawa Administrative council. Science, Technology and Arts Research Journal. Oct-Dec 2012. p.35.

[6] Belay Feku. ‘Assessment of Unemployment in Dire Dawa Administration: Trends and Current Conditions.’ European Journal of Business and Management. Vol.12. 2020.

[7] Esayas, Engida, and Solomon Mulugeta. ‘Analysis of socioeconomic vulnerability of street vendors: Case study for Dire Dawa city. Eastern Ethiopia.’ Theoretical and Empirical Researches in Urban Management, vol. 15, no. 2, 2020, pp. 49–65.

[8] The Federal democratic republic of Ethiopia. Central Statistical Agency. ‘Country and regional level consumer price indices.’ April 2019.

The Tigray War

Unpicking the war that has broken out in Ethiopia between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the central authority represented by Prime Minister Abiy, Martin Plaut explains the background and devastating consequences of the war for all Ethiopians.

By Martin Plaut

The war that erupted in the northern Ethiopian region of Tigray on 4  November had been a long time coming. Prime Minister Abiy, who came to power in 2018, attempted to reduce the power of the Tigrayans, who had previously ruled the country. Control of the powerful Northern Command of the army, based in the Tigrayan regional capital, Mekelle, became a critical issue.

The Northern Command is the best armed unit in the Ethiopian army. It was entrenched along the country’s border with Eritrea after the disastrous border war of 1998 – 2000 that cost 100,000 lives. It was provided with Ethiopia’s most formidable weapons systems – including heavy artillery and missile systems. Prime Minister Abiy attempted to end Tigrayan dominance of the Command and ordered that some of its the heavy weapons should be redeployed to the centre of the country. The Tigrayans mobilised their people to block the roads, preventing this from happening. Then the Tigrayan authorities insisted that it would hold their own elections (even though the Federal authorities said this could not be done, given the Covid pandemic). Despite this the elections were successfully held in September this year, with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front [TPLF] winning over 90% support.

The immediate cause for the conflict was the refusal of the Tigrayans to accept Brigadier General Jamal Mohammed as the new commander of the Northern Command on 29 October, forcing him to return to Addis Ababa. It put the Tigrayans on a collision course with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and the war erupted on 4 November, with fighting at the Command headquarters in Mekelle. Although Prime Minister Abiy said he was only launching a limited, policing operation against the TPLF leadership, it is now apparent that a long-planned offensive began involving Ethiopian Federal forces, Amhara militia and the Eritrean military.

Ethnic Federalism

At the heart of the dispute is the question of the nature of the Ethiopian state. Is it one unitary state, in which some 80 nationalities have their place, or should it be a federation of ethnicities, loosely united at the centre? To this there is no obvious answer.

After the TPLF seized power by overthrowing Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991 they controlled the country, despite being only around 6% of the population through the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front [EPRDF]. The Front was the brainchild of the TPLF’s leader, Meles Zenawi.

He was the architect of a system known as “ethnic federalism”. This suggested to each of Ethiopia’s ethic groups that they had the right to autonomy and self-government. In reality it was not possible to have so many regional states, and they were grouped into 10 states. Each was apparently given autonomy in legislative, executive and judicial functions, and the unconditional right to secession. The reality was very different. The Tigrayans established parties that were in controlled by the TPLF, even though they were run by people from the ethnicity they were meant to represent. They came together in Addis and the EPRDF, which the TPLF dominated.

As time passed the regional parties grew in strength and independence. They also developed police forces and para-military forces that became almost as powerful as the security forces of the Ethiopian state. Regional interests gradually predominated and in 2018 Abiy Ahmed was elected Prime Minister. It was the first time that someone from an Oromo background (representing approximately a third of the 114 million people) had ruled the country in its long history. Most Oromo had only been included in the Ethiopian empire when the Emperor Menelik II swept down from the highlands, including vast new territories at the end of the nineteenth century. He did so just at the time of the Western Scramble for Africa, and brought a predominantly Muslim and animist population into a Christian empire. Oromo had been called “galla” a derogatory term, implying that they were slaves. Slavery continued in Ethiopia until the 1930’s.

The alliance with President Isaias

At first Prime Minister Abiy was enormously popular. He instituted a series of reforms: releasing thousands of political prisoners, allowing rebel movements to return to the country and relaxing censorship (from 2014 an unprecedented protest movement shook Ethiopia to its core forcing the pace of reforms, see ROAPE’s coverage here). He announced that anti-terrorism laws were draconian and would be reformed. For these developments he won international support. But his crowning achievement came on 8 July 2018, when he flew into Asmara, the capital of neighbouring Eritrea. His arrival marked the end of nearly two decades of hostility between the two countries – the result of the inconclusive end to the border war. Prime Minister Abiy received a rapturous welcome from the people of Asmara and President Isaias Afwerki. When President Isaias visited Addis Ababa within weeks he was equally warmly received. For ending the ‘no-war, no-peace’ stalemate with Eritrea and for his domestic reforms, Prime Minister Abiy was awarded the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize.

But beneath the surface troubles were bubbling up.

The alliance between Prime Minister Abiy and President Isaias was based on a shared perception: power had to be removed from the Tigrayans. For Abiy this was part of an attempt to wrest power from the states, end ethnic federalism and restore power at the centre. It was a re-assertion of the traditional view of the Ethiopian state – that its people were Ethiopians first and that their ethnicities came second. It was popular with sections of the Amhara community, who had frequently been the traditional rulers of Ethiopia.

This was resisted by the other ethnicities and led to increased tensions between ethnic groups. It is worth noting that 1.2 million Ethiopians had been displaced by conflict even before the Tigray war erupted.

For Isaias dealing a mortal blow to the Tigrayans had been his ambition since the 1980’s. Although the TPLF and President Isaias’s liberation movement – the EPLF (now the PFDJ) had sometimes worked together, they had frequently clashed over ideology and tactics. In essence, Isaias saw the Eritreans as the ‘big brothers’ in the Horn of Africa – a view the Tigrayans resisted. When the 1984 – 85 Ethiopian famine struck, the EPLF closed the route for supplies of aid into Tigray from Sudan. The TPLF were forced to march 100,000 people into Sudan to survive. Many died along the way.  For the Tigrayans this was nothing short of a crime. Despite this, the TPLF and EPLF settled their differences and found a means of co-operating. When the Tigrayans marched into Addis in 1991, they did so with the Eritreans at their side. For a few years this alliance lasted, but slowly grievances arose and differences accentuated. This led to the 1998 – 2000 border war, which ended with Eritrea in full retreat. President Isaias, furious that he was unable to trounce the Tigrayans on the battlefield, plotted their destruction.

With Abiy in power he and Isaias planned their strategy. It is worth noting that their last reciprocal meetings prior to the current Tigrayans war were held in each other’s military bases. Removing the TPLF leadership is now a key goal in both Addis Ababa and Asmara. Until it is achieved neither is likely to rest. This is why the present war is unlikely to be ended by mediation, by the African Union, or anyone else. A visceral hatred exists between the leaders of the Tigrayans, Eritreans and Ethiopia’s ruling party. This is not (at present) reflected in animosity between their peoples, but as the fighting continues, this may be on the cards.

Regional implications

What began as a “police operation” between the Ethiopian Federal authorities and the Tigray region has already had implications for the rest of the Horn of Africa. Some 3,000 Ethiopian troops have been withdrawn from Somalia to fight in Tigray. This is destabilising Somalia, just as President Trump has ordered the US military to leave the country.

Other Ethiopian ethnic groups are watching nervously as the Federal forces and Eritreans attack Tigray and wonder if they might face a similar fate in due course. Why would a Somali or Oromo family wish to see their children sent to die in the highlands of Ethiopia (that many have never visited) for a ‘greater Ethiopia’ that could extinguish their own autonomy? Fighting has already erupted in Oromia. It could spread to other regions. Prime Minister Abiy and President Isaias have lit the fuse – what will follow?

When the war began the US Foundation of Peace issued a warning – endorsed by senior American Africanists. It is as apposite today as it was on the 5 November.

While many of the facts remain unclear, the risks of escalation are certain: Intrastate or interstate conflict would be catastrophic for Ethiopia’s people and for the region and would pose a direct threat to international peace and security. The acceleration of polarization amid violent conflict would also mark the death knell for the country’s nascent reform effort that began two years ago and the promise of a democratic transition that it heralded.

As we cautioned in the study group’s Final Report and Recommendations released on October 29, the fragmentation of Ethiopia would be the largest state collapse in modern history. Ethiopia is five times the size of pre-war Syria by population, and its breakdown would lead to mass interethnic and interreligious conflict; a dangerous vulnerability to exploitation by extremists; an acceleration of illicit trafficking, including of arms; and a humanitarian and security crisis at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East on a scale that would overshadow any existing conflict in the region, including Yemen. As Ethiopia is currently the leading Troop Contributing Country to the United Nations and the African Union peacekeeping missions in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, its collapse would also significantly impact the efforts by both to mitigate and resolve others conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

When the Tigrayans last challenged the Ethiopian state, the fighting lasted from 1976 until 1991. The cost in suffering and life was immense. One can only hope that this time scale will not be repeated and that the African Union offer of mediation will be allowed to proceed, but the prospect does not look optimistic.

Martin Plaut is currently Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at the University of London and a regular contributor to ROAPE. For years Martin worked as a journalist and researcher focusing primarily on southern Africa and the Horn of Africa. He was until recently Africa Editor, BBC World Service News, but since his retirement he has published a series of books, including Understanding Eritrea (2016, Hurst).

Featured Photograph: Fighters ride to the frontline to face troops from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (Tiksa Negeri).

So many ‘Africanists’, so few Africans

Zack Zimbalist asks who produces knowledge on ‘African politics’? Within political science, our understanding of politics in Africa is overwhelmingly shaped by non-Africans who spend most of their time far removed from Africa. Based on his paper in ROAPE, Zimbalist argues that this reality has serious consequences for the academic community, policymakers, students and citizens across the world.

By Zack Zimbalist

Within the discipline of political science, scholarship and teaching on Africa faces a serious problem that demands urgent attention and redress. The problem is straightforward: the producers of knowledge on ‘African politics’ are overwhelmingly non-African academics located thousands of miles from the contexts about which they write.

As a non-African researcher based outside of Africa, I have come to realise more acutely the glaring inequality and inequity within the current system of knowledge production. As a graduate student preparing for courses and comprehensive exams in African studies and comparative politics, I became aware of the utter scarcity of African and Africa-based scholars in most of the assigned material. I also became well versed in the grand (hegemonic) theories in the ‘African politics’ literature (e.g. ‘neopatrimonialism’, the ‘rhizome state’), whose exclusive provenance was North American and European scholars based outside of Africa. Later, while conducting research in Mozambique and South Africa and then writing my dissertation, I discovered that most of the conceptual, theoretical and interpretive frameworks I employed were created by non-Africans. At the same time, as I interviewed and chatted with locals and read through materials written by Mozambican and South African academics, it was readily apparent to me that they possessed more revelatory theories and insight into how local politics worked in their communities and countries.

Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that only African or Africa-based scholars should speak to ‘African politics’. That would preclude me and many other dedicated researchers from conducting research and teaching on the topic. Instead, the aim of this blogpost (and my corresponding article which is available to read here) is to raise  awareness and motivate actions to rectify the large underlying power asymmetries existing within the system of scholarly production, which clearly disadvantage African and Africa-based scholars from producing and spreading knowledge.

What is ‘African politics’ and who are the ‘Africanists’?

In my article, I discuss how the category ‘African politics’ and the label ‘Africanist’ perpetuate the power asymmetries in knowledge production. For decades, writing oriented towards an artificial unitary ‘African politics’ has impeded a more accurate and granular understanding of political systems and behaviour across varied African contexts. This practice is linked to an ignominious history in which Africa and its diverse political and social configurations were homogenised, essentialised and distorted by Europeans and other Westerners. During this time, African voices and rich oral traditions and histories were locked out of knowledge production pertaining to their own complex societies and indigenous systems of local governance.

While much progress has been made in correcting these biased and misleading portrayals (owing to the work of Africans and non-Africans alike), the continued production of hegemonic theories speaking to ‘African politics’ remains deeply problematic. First, the dominant knowledge produced by non-African ‘Africanists’—of highly complex and historically contingent processes—is often simplified, incomplete, and loaded with external concepts and paradigms (not to mention languages). Second, it is largely disconnected from debates and research within African research institutes as well as other local African intellectual and political initiatives. As a result, African scholars and other African voices are at a substantial disadvantage to counter or refine the dominant discourses about politics on the continent.

The widespread use of the label ‘Africanist’ by North American and European scholars (but not by Africans) augments the power of such discourses and claims of Africa-wide expertise. Strikingly, many of these hegemonic theories and authoritative arguments about ‘African politics’ are generalised to all of Africa based only on single-country ‘field’ research or, increasingly, a field, survey or ‘lab experiment’ conducted within one African country. Note, for example, the stacks of books and articles published in leading academic presses and political science journals titled using the formula: ‘Democracy/Citizenship/Political Struggle in Africa: A Study of Country B’.

By contrast, there are troves of unpublished (or not widely available) research produced by Africans in Africa that demonstrate a detailed and sophisticated understanding of local political realities. Despite the superb quality of this work, it almost certainly does not reach top outlets or institutions of higher education outside of Africa, where students wish to gain exposure to diverse African perspectives as well as new concepts, theories, and epistemologies. What if, by analogy, students were required to study ‘American politics’ (nearly) exclusively from the perspectives and paradigms constructed by Africans (and written in African languages) who are based far from America? It would be equally startling and unedifying. Yet, this is the reality for the study of ‘African politics’ in many of the top universities and colleges in North America.

Quantitative data from undergraduate course syllabi and PhD reading lists

The ROAPE article that this blogpost is based on analyses authorship data from 1260 ‘readings’ (including academic and media articles, reports, book chapters, books, films and TED talks) from 24 undergraduate course syllabi for courses on African politics or Africa and international relations taught between 2014 and 2019 in the US and Canada. I find that only 15% of readings are written by Africans and only 9% of the readings are written by authors based in Africa. Also striking is the exclusion of women from course readings; only 15% of source materials are authored by women. These core findings illustrate the dramatic under-representation and exclusion of the scholars, researchers and activists who are closest to (and most familiar with) the political battles and actions being carried out across Africa. This stark hegemony (and exclusion of African voices) does not vary on whether the instructor is African or non-African, or by whether the course is taught by a man or a woman.

In parallel, the descriptive analysis of PhD comprehensive exam reading lists in comparative politics from a small sample of top US universities is also biased heavily against African and Africa-based scholars. For various topics within the graduate comparative politics reading lists, there are zero (or at best a few) books or articles based on African cases or written by Africans or Africa-based scholars. In addition, the relatively few books or articles about African cases are predominantly written by non-African academics based in the US or the UK.

Efforts to address the problem and how to strengthen them

In the ROAPE article, I conclude by highlighting some actions that North American and European academics and institutions could undertake to correct some of the inequities in the current research and publication system as well as in the classroom.

On an individual level, one first step we can all take is to critically examine our approaches to teaching and studying political dynamics in Africa. This examination should include questions such as who guides our research questions and designs, what methods do we employ to answer our questions, who do we interview and how, which documents do we review, which theoretical frameworks do we rely on, how do we interpret our findings and how do we seriously engage with external validity to other African countries. As teachers, we should also carefully weigh how we select materials and structure discussions so that African voices play a central role in shaping discourses about politics and governance. This process requires us to reflect on the institutions to which we belong and the resources at our disposal, as well as how we are positioned to contribute to knowledge production vis-à-vis other scholarly communities.

Apart from research and teaching, we can help change the nature of the publication system and how we execute our tasks as journal board members, editors and reviewers so that we remove structural barriers that disadvantage African voices and scholarly output (such as the privileging of particular epistemologies and methods prominent in the US and European academies and the incentivising of generalised proclamations about ‘African politics’, which Africa-based authors are less likely to make).

We can also leverage our individual actions to support and develop existing institutional efforts. Organizations such as the Working Group in African Political Economy (WGAPE) and the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) network could expand opportunities for Africans and Africa-based researchers and institutions to shape research projects. In parallel, additional assistance could be provided to enlarge social science training opportunities for African researchers, through initiatives like the Partnership for African Social and Governance Research, the Mawazo Institute’s PhD Scholars program, and the Center for Effective Global Action’s (CEGA) East Africa Social Science Translation Collaborative (EASST). Finally, greater support could be provided to institutions within Africa, such as the Dakar-based Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), which has several initiatives and is a leading publisher for research by African scholars in and outside the continent.

While these are some small piecemeal efforts aiming to address this problem, what is needed is a large-scale collaborative effort and the infusion of far greater resources (time, energy and financial) to correct for the substantial biases in who generates knowledge about ‘African politics’ and how it is generated. The system of knowledge production must be transformed so that Africans and Africa-based academics are driving research agendas and questions while shaping the theoretical frameworks, methods and data sources we use to answer them. Such an effort would extend the range of possibilities for learning about Africa, which are all heavily circumscribed because of the status quo hegemony of non-African academic institutions and scholars. In doing so, we can all help reconstruct the epistemological underpinnings of such knowledge in a way that is Africa-centred and grounded in the dynamic aspirations of Africans across the continent.

The full article can be accessed for free until the end of December here.

Zack Zimbalist is a visiting foreign professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Tecnológico de Monterrey in Mexico. His research interests focus broadly on economic development, governance, political behaviour, and public opinion in developing democracies, mainly in Africa.

We encourage our readers also to listen to the LSE Citing Africa podcasts. There are two series both which explore knowledge production, decolonisation, data extractivism and development in Africa – the first series can be accessed here and the second here.  

Featured Photograph: Katrina Daly Thompson opens DAY IN AFRICA with a keynote address (Catherine A. Reiland/UW-Madison).

The Ominous Rise of African Financial Centres: The Case of Mauritius

Pritish Behuria writes how Mauritius has long impressed observers. In July this year, the country was officially categorised as a high-income country. Yet alongside impressive growth, Mauritius’ financial sector has developed into a globally renowned low-tax jurisdiction.

By Pritish Behuria       

The Mauritian response to several urgent challenges, Covid-19 or the oil spill, over the past few months has drawn global praise. Observers have begun to call for other countries to learn from Mauritius, as part of a welcome call to encourage and highlight the impressive implementation of policies in the Global South. Mauritius, of course, has long impressed observers. In July this year, Mauritius was officially categorised as a high-income country. Alongside impressive growth, successive governments have been committed to retaining a welfare state with impressive social spending for decades.

As there are increasing calls to emulate Mauritius, it is worth analysing how the country’s meteoric rise was achieved. At independence, James Meade, who later won the Nobel Prize, famously argued that prospects for development in Mauritius were bleak. Mauritius’ problems appeared insurmountable: the country was sugar-dependent, ethnically diverse and densely populated. Meade predicted a population boom, with no prospect for job creation. It appeared Mauritius was headed into disaster.

The Defiance of Mauritian Growth

Mauritius defied Meade’s pessimistic predictions. Since then, much ink has been spilled evaluating the determinants of the Mauritian miracle. Early Mauritian governments successfully committed to diversifying its economy, despite sugar enjoying preferential access to European markets. The government also made successful investments in tourism and industry (including textiles and garments). Mauritians enjoyed the fruits of their own mini-industrial revolution while also retaining the political freedom of voting in multi-party elections. Mauritius was the ultimate ‘democratic developmental state’, a term aspirationally applied by so many African governments to legitimise less-democratic systems of rule.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, political analysis of Mauritius growth showed how wealthy Franco-Mauritian sugar planters, who controlled much of the wealth, gave up political power to the majority population (of South-Asian descent from varied backgrounds), who arrived as indentured labourers in the country. Geographical isolation and threat of internal revolt combined to commit a new ruling political-economic elite to developing pillars of economic transformation: sugar, tourism and industry. However, in analysing Mauritius’ growth success, there is relatively limited attention (aside from some passing mentions) of the most important pillar (and dark side) of Mauritius’ growth success: the offshore financial sector.

The Unstoppable Rise of African Financial Centres

Late development requires governments to position their economies in relation to the global political economy to reduce their economic subordination to industrialised countries while diversifying their sources of revenue. Most African countries have now liberalised their financial sectors to varying degrees and invited foreign capital into their domestic commercial banking sectors. East Asian countries retained national ownership of their financial sectors, as they industrialised. Instead, many African countries first liberalised their economies, with some choosing to re-shape their financial sectors to increasingly present themselves as financial hubs. Many African countries have adopted global financial standards (like Basel), which were not intended for them. Even OECD countries have resisted adopting them.

Reforming financial sectors to become a hub is often accompanied by signing double taxation avoidance agreements (DTAAs). Through DTAAs, governments promise to reduce taxes to an extent that invites investors to base their companies in their countries rather than in their home countries or in the countries they wish to invest. This comes with the promise of reduced taxes in comparison to the tax rates prevailing in their home countries. Countries including Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda have increasingly pursued such strategies while others like Botswana and Morocco have had these in place for much longer. As the pandemic exposes the unreliability of some services-based growth (like tourism), it is likely that offshore strategies (which provide a source for foreign exchange for cash-strapped countries) will appear more attractive.

Offshore in Mauritius

Mauritius’ example on the continent is dangerously alluring. The evolution of Mauritius’ financial sector into a globally renowned low-tax jurisdiction occurred because of the government’s strategic engagements with the global financial sector at opportune moments. In the 1980s, the government began establishing the infrastructure required for supporting its financial sector strategies. Since the Indian economy was still ‘closed’ to the outside world, the Indian government approached the Mauritian government to establish a DTAA to provide a channel for foreign investments into India. According to some key government officials, Mauritius was actually more intrigued by the potential of South African capital in the 1980s, with the end of apartheid likely to result in an influx of capital. However, after India liberalised its economy in the 1990s, the Mauritian government, aided by British lawyers, established the legal systems to signal that Mauritius was a secure base for potential investments into India. The influx of capital to India was enormous, as were the revenues for Mauritius: Between 1994 to 2017, 37% of FDI into India came from Mauritius, as well as 27% of all foreign portfolio investment from 2001 to 2016. The India segment of Mauritius’ offshore financial sector remains the most significant source of revenues for Mauritius and has been infamous for examples of ‘round tripping’ . There have also been examples of equally nefarious activity among Indian and African nationals (but the net is much wider than that).

Mauritius’ offshore financial centre has had a seismic effect on Mauritian political economy. There is the enormous foreign exchange that comes with being an offshore financial centre, which is the envy of any low-income non-oil producing country. The growth of offshore finance has led to what many observers highlight as a democratisation of wealth in the country. Historically, the wealthiest Mauritians comprised the descendants of Franco-Mauritian sugar plantation owners, which now take the form of large Franco-Mauritian Conglomerates that dominate the economy today. Some Mauritians of South Asian descent can also count themselves as the richest Mauritians. The growth of the financial sector contributed to a rising middle class (including lawyers, accountants and bankers) employed around it.

However, there have been significant domestic dangers associated with Mauritius’ offshore success. Despite its social spending, Mauritius remains an extremely unequal society, as well as ethnically segregated. The growing value of real estate and its services-based development trajectory created new opportunities for a burgeoning middle-class. However, the decline of its industrial sector has contributed to few opportunities for secure employment for others. Mauritius’ development path has also historically depended on the government’s strategic use of preferential treaties with others. Whether it was markets for Mauritian sugar or the DTAA with India, the vulnerability of Mauritian dependent development had contributed to the government’s sustained commitment to new areas for economic diversification. However, over the past decade, the government has not sustained this commitment to diversification. Attention to capitalising on an ocean economy has so far been slow and less-intensive than previous diversification attempts.

Learning from Mauritius?

The Mauritian response to Covid has drawn increasing calls for others to learn from Mauritius. There is clearly much to learn from Mauritius. But with all calls for emulating others, we must be clear how supposed ‘models’ of development are emulated. Often, these models are misunderstood, selectively appropriated or presented incorrectly. We are all too familiar with how Western countries have presented their own past of economic transformation in the ‘Do as I say’ of market-led development rather than ‘Do what we did’ of state-led structural transformation.

Similarly, the World Bank misinterpreted East Asian development as being based on market-led policies and presented this version around the world. Within African countries, a call to emulate Singapore or Rwanda has been likened to emulation of their  authoritarian characteristics rather than the realities of how economic growth has been sustained. Mauritius has actually actively advised governments consistently over the past few decades on various aspects of its development: from special economic zones to high-value, low-quantity tourism. Equally though, Mauritius’ offshore financial centre has drawn attention.

As the pandemic rumbles on and treasuries dry up, some service-based strategies like tourism seem increasingly misdirected but other services sectors (despite the global scrutiny) like offshore finance may appear to be a potential source of revenues. But even considering the negative effects such strategies have in addressing global inequalities, governments should consider the negative domestic inequalities that may ensue if such strategies are pursued. Offshore financial sectors foster external dependence. Additionally, double taxation treaties and the construction of new regulatory authorities is difficult and not even enough. Mauritius remains at the low-end of offshore financial sectors. Most financial evasion continues to be driven by industrialised countries in Europe or East Asia, with stronger capacities to protect evasion. As the search for foreign exchange drives economies to develop offshore financial sectors, it is worth remembering that few strategies of sustained transformation have occurred through radical attempts at financialisation.

Pritish Behuria is a Lecturer in Politics, Governance and Development at The University of Manchester’s Global Development Institute. His research focuses primarily on the politics of economic transformation in India and sub-Saharan Africa. 

Featured Photograph: ‘Keeping off the rain’ – Colourful umbrellas at Caudan Waterfront Mall, Port Louis, Mauritius (Martin Falbisoner, 9 September 2015).

Unearthing Hidden Histories: an interview with Ian Birchall

ROAPE’s Leo Zeilig interviews the historian and socialist Ian Birchall. Birchall speaks about his life, activism, and historical and political work. His work has involved discovering relatively unknown activists and revolutionaries, many from Africa, while championing Marxism as a powerful but flexible tool of analysis and criticism. Birchall argues that the idea of social transformation, the hope for a world based on the satisfaction of human needs, has lost none of its power.

For readers of roape.net can you tell us a little about yourself. What were some of your earliest political steps?

I have been involved in left-wing politics for something over sixty years. This began with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, then Anti-Apartheid and the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, later the Anti-Nazi League and more recently Stop the War. For some fifty years I was a member of the Socialist Workers Party [SWP – previously the International Socialists] but left in 2013 after a very bitter internal dispute. I still think of myself as a Marxist and revolutionary socialist. I’ve also written quite widely, especially on the history of the socialist movement; books on Babeuf, Sartre and Tony Cliff [the founder of the SWP]. And I’ve translated some of the works of Alfred and Marguerite Rosmer and Victor Serge, people who were among the earliest supporters of the Russian Revolution, but later became intransigent anti-Stalinists [some of Ian’s work can be found here and here].

My own evolution was necessarily slow. I was born in 1939 and grew up in the aftermath of World War II. Britain was still at the head of the biggest colonial empire in the world, though it was beginning to disintegrate. In my childhood home we had a large map of the world above the fireplace, with the British Empire coloured red. I remember a friend of my father’s telling me “We should never have given India away”. As a child I was required to collect money for missionaries, to bring the “true” religion to those who had other beliefs. This included Muslims, whom we were taught – ignorantly and offensively – to call “Mohammedans”.

Very slowly I began to question things. I opposed the Suez invasion in 1956, which led to a débâcle that was the end of the road for the British Empire. It was largely a gut reaction against jingoism rather than any sophisticated understanding of what was happening. I was also increasingly aware of racism, though not through direct experience – there was not a single black pupil in my very middle-class grammar school. But I was aware of the discussion about immigration – and also of the arguments about South Africa. I was very influenced by reading Alan Paton’s Cry the Beloved Country when I was about seventeen, which left me with a hatred of racism.

It was when I left home to go to university that I became more deeply involved. I joined the Labour Party and supported the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament which briefly won a majority in the Labour Party. In the 1959 election I heckled Prime Minister Harold Macmillan when he spoke at a rally in my hometown in Yorkshire; I shouted, “How About Nyasaland?” [Malawi]. This was reported in the local press. While in Oxford I picketed the South African cricket team.

After completing my first degree I spent a year teaching in France in 1961-62. This was the final year of the Algerian war, and I have ever since been fascinated by that period. I was in a remote rural region and was not directly involved in any activity, but I was aware of the situation and the rumours of impending civil war. I talked to people who had served in the army in Algeria. I came to realise that not all politics developed through the peaceful framework of British parliamentary democracy.

You described some years ago how if it hadn’t been for your politicisation with the International Socialists in the early 1960s you might have disappeared into academic obscurity. Can you describe the environment and experience of those early years in the radical left?

I joined the International Socialists at the end of 1962, as a post-graduate student. It was just after the Cuba Crisis, which had been a powerful reminder that the whole future of humanity was at risk, and I was anxious to be involved in some form of action.

I had been a supporter of the Labour Party left [as embodied in the weekly paper Tribune and MPs like Michael Foot] and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament [CND]. I was committed to the politics, but often found their arguments intellectually inadequate – superficial or moralising.

For two or three years I had known individuals and publications from a Trotskyist background. There were two groups – the Socialist Labour League [SLL] and the International Socialists [IS]. The SLL was in some ways impressive, and I was briefly attracted to it. But it was sectarian, seeing itself as the sole bearer of the “correct” position, and had a grossly exaggerated overestimation of revolutionary prospects in the 1960s.

I was much more impressed when I attended a meeting addressed by Michael Kidron, one of the IS leaders. I came away thinking “this man really understands how the world works”. A few weeks later I joined the organisation – though I was fairly vague about what I had joined.

The group was led by Kidron and Tony Cliff. Cliff was known above all for his work arguing that Russia, Eastern Europe and China were not in any sense a form of socialism, however degenerated or distorted, but “state capitalist”. It took me a little time to come to terms with this. Kidron’s work was primarily on the contemporary economy. He argued that the post-war economic boom in capitalism was real [something denied by many on the left], but that it was impermanent and would come to an end.

It was a tiny group – just over a hundred members when I joined. But the Cliff-Kidron duo had drawn some interesting people around them. There were writers and intellectuals like Peter Sedgwick and Alasdair MacIntyre. Among recent recruits of my own generation were people such as Chris Harman, Nigel Harris and Colin Barker, who would go on to become distinguished Marxist writers, as well as Paul Foot, one of the finest journalists of his time. I was in particular friends with Colin Barker, and together we thrashed out some of our ideas. See my obituary of Colin here.

The Marxism I learned from Cliff and Kidron was a powerful but flexible tool of analysis and criticism. Concepts of class, capitalist contradiction and the inadequacy of reformism were used to illuminate the modern world. But it was always stressed that we must look at the reality of the world as well as the theory – as Cliff put it many years later “If you sit on Marx’s shoulders you see far, but if you sit on Marx’s shoulders and close your eyes, you don’t see very far at all.” There were no sacred texts; arguments could not be resolved by citing the “great teachers”. Trotsky had been wrong about Russia, Lenin’s theory of imperialism was out-of-date. It was an intellectually stimulating environment, and one which contrasted with the academic milieu I was also getting to know, where all too many people knew little – and cared less – about anything outside of their academic specialism.

We were a very small group and there was no pretence that we were the “leadership”, or even the embryo of it. There was no claim to a monopoly of truth; I remember Colin Barker enthusing about CLR James and Victor Serge. And the group was marked by a sense of humour. Cliff was notorious for using jokes to make political points. In general, we didn’t take ourselves too seriously; there was a widespread use of self-deprecating humour.

Yet at the same time comrades did, in a sense, take themselves seriously. In my long evolution away from Christianity, one of the things that struck me was the way in which most self-proclaimed Christians didn’t take their beliefs seriously. Thus I was repeatedly told that the passages in the Gospels where Jesus said the rich would go to hell shouldn’t be “taken literally”. Now in IS I met people who put their money where their mouths were, who devoted enormous time and energy to the cause they believed in without hope of personal reward. I’m not saying they were saints or ascetics. But I remember the young Paul Foot, a very talented journalist with great prospects ahead of him, who devoted many unpaid hours to the IS publication Labour Worker, with a tiny circulation, when this was a positive diversion from his journalistic ambitions.

In 1964 I moved to London and met more of the IS group’s working-class members. Again the milieu was marked by intellectual curiosity and open debate. A number of those I knew later took advantage of the expansion of higher education to get formal qualifications – but it was the IS which first awakened their intellectual interests.

I don’t want to romanticise. We made many mistakes and misjudgements, there was sometimes friction and personal antagonism. But overall, I am very glad to have been in IS at that time. It gave me an education I could not have found in any university.

Much of your work as a historian has been unearthing hidden, or at least lesser known histories of the revolutionary left and some of its important activists. One figure who you have long championed is Jean-Paul Sartre. Can you describe your work and interest in Sartre, and his contribution to Marxism? I am thinking in particular of his astonishing support and involvement in Algeria’s war against French occupation between 1954-62.

You are right to point to one of my main preoccupations, discovering relatively unknown activists. Sheila Rowbotham coined the phrase “hidden from history” to refer to the history of women, but I have been interested in both women and men who have been neglected by historians, often because of the appalling divisions within the left. Stalinism obliterated whole sections of history that were inconvenient to its narrative, and often sections of the far left have only told the story of their own currents. [More on this under question 6].

Sartre, of course, is hardly hidden. He had been important for my political evolution since I first read him at the age of sixteen. He affected my political evolution alongside my membership of IS – and I was sometimes criticised for it. But it was Chris Harman, editor of International Socialism, who first encouraged me to write at length about Sartre.

My concern, in my book Sartre Against Stalinism, was twofold. Firstly, to rescue Sartre from his many critics who accused him of being sympathetic to Stalinism. Certainly, he made some serious misjudgements, but the main thrust of his political activity was anti-Stalinist. And secondly I wanted to use Sartre and the various controversies he was involved in to bring back into the history of the French intellectual left a number of figures often forgotten or marginalised – Colette Audry, Daniel Guérin, Jean-René Chauvin, Pierre Naville, the young Claude Lefort and others.

I’ll say a bit more about Sartre and Marxism under question 4. As for what you call his “astonishing support and involvement” in the Algerian war for independence, it is certainly true that Sartre’s role was very creditable, but it was far from unique. Because of his fame it is easy to overstate his role. There was a small but significant number of women and men – perhaps a thousand at most –  who gave practical support to the National Liberation Front [FLN], by smuggling money, distributing publications, supporting Algerian workers in factories like Renault, and even organising jail-breaks. These were the so-called “suitcase-carriers”. Some had been inspired by Sartre, and his public declarations were of value to them. Sartre himself, precisely because of his prominence, could not engage in such work, and his contribution was largely journalistic. I think it’s important to remember the whole group of very determined and courageous people, and not focus on the individual Sartre.

Sartre raised major theoretical questions for Marxism, many of these were read and taken up by Frantz Fanon in his last book, The Wretched of the Earth. What do you think we have to learn from Sartre’s work and life today?

For me the central question in all of Sartre’s work is the relationship between theory and practice. His theatre and fiction focus on questions of choice and responsibility. When I worked at Middlesex Polytechnic, I taught an interdisciplinary course on Sartre. It provided a fascinating opportunity to discuss a range of political questions, notably racism, and it deeply engaged the students who took up positions for or against Sartre.

Having said that, I think it is important to stress the limits of Sartre’s work. As you say, he certainly “raised major theoretical questions” for Marxism. Whether he answered them is quite a different matter. I find Sartre much more interesting for the questions he asks than for the answers he gives.

Perhaps the fundamental question that Sartre poses, in a variety of ways, is that of the relation between the historical process and individual action. For Sartre history is open – there is no guaranteed future, and we are responsible to the extent that our actions prepare that future. In that sense Sartre stands in the classic Marxist tradition of Marx’s “Men [sic] make their own history, but they do not make it as they please” and Luxemburg’s “socialism or barbarism”. In his biographical writings – Baudelaire, Genet, Flaubert – he tries to show how individuals choose themselves in specific social conjunctures.

So, I think Sartre remains very relevant. The question of how I, as an individual, relate to the historical process is a vital one, especially in a time when there is no easy answer in the form of “Join the party”. In recent years there have been some important studies which opened new perspectives on Sartre – Sam Coombes: The Early Sartre and Marxism, and Paige Arthur: Unfinished Projects: Decolonization and the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre – and I think Sartre will continue to make a contribution to political debate for some time to come.

Social movements – and revolutions – has rippled across Africa in recent years – in particular in Algeria and Sudan in 2018/9. Elements in these struggles have fought to transform the ‘revolutions’ into meaningful transformations of the political and economic structures. Some authors have pointed to the ‘failure’ or lack of organisation that could have helped in cohering movements and propelling them beyond a ‘circulation of elites.’ Do you think we have anything to learn today from the contribution of Lenin’s work and activism on questions of organisation and politics?

Lenin was a great Marxist, and his life and writings repay study. Above all his State and Revolution is a work of enormous importance, which thoroughly demolishes the idea that socialism can be equated with state ownership and control. Indeed, Lenin was criticised by contemporary Marxists for having come too close to anarchism. Its value is not lessened by the fact that the realities of life in Russia after 1917 proved more complex than Lenin had foreseen.

So Lenin should be studied. Of course, there are competing accounts, and I would particularly recommend the presentations of Lenin by Alfred Rosmer, Victor Serge and Clara Zetkin. But we have to be careful what learning from history means. History does not repeat itself. I would prefer to say that by studying how revolutionaries have confronted unique circumstances in the past we can prepare ourselves to confront unique circumstances in the future.

That Lenin’s political leadership and the role of the Bolshevik Party which he had built over preceding years were a vital element in the success of the Revolution of October 1917 is not in doubt. In the aftermath of 1917 it was natural that revolutionaries elsewhere would try to imitate the methods which had brought success in Russia – although Lenin, in his last speech to the Communist International, warned powerfully against slavish imitation of Russian methods. When Stalinism began to crumble in the 1950s and 1960s, it seemed natural for the anti-Stalinist left to think in terms of a return to Leninism. For example, we in the International Socialists predicted in 1968 that we faced a period of heightened struggle. We were right – in 1974 strike action by miners brought down a Tory government, and a little later Portugal moved to the brink of revolution. We needed a more interventionist form of organisation, and the only model we had, imitated flexibly, was that of the Bolshevik Party.

But now it is clear we failed. We are further from the goal of “building the party” than we were in 1968. Certainly, there will be social upheavals and crises in the future – it is in the nature of capitalism that this should be so. But whatever revolutionary situations may arise – and all revolutions are surprises [as was 1917] – it is clear that they will be very different from the October Revolution.

It has been a widespread practice on the far left to explain all failures of revolution with the over-simplified formula “there was no revolutionary party”. There is an element of truth in this but in itself it is inadequate. Any analysis of the factors in a revolutionary conjuncture will show that the state of the far left can only be understood as part of the total situation. It will not do to see it simply in terms of a failure of effort – we didn’t sell enough papers, recruit enough members.

That any challenge to capitalist power will require organisation is undoubtedly true. What form that organisation will take I am certainly not in any position to predict. All I would say is that in the present period, when revolutionary upheaval seems relatively remote, building “the party” [especially when the chosen organisation is built in opposition to all other organisations] is less of a priority than making socialist propaganda – through publications, websites etc. – and winning people to the ideas of socialism; those people will have to resolve the problems of organisation as the situation develops.

For me, some of your work on Algerian [and French] revolutionaries in the 1910s and 1920s [and the 1950s] is particularly interesting.  Taking a figure like Robert Louzon for example, he seemed to edge the early communist movement in Algeria to a more radical position – which saw the political struggle of Algerian workers, as equal to the role of French workers. These efforts were snuffed out by the Stalinisation of the Soviet Union, and communist parties around the world, but there were many positives signs. How do you interpret this period and some of its astonishing figures?

The whole historical experience of Stalinism has meant that it is only comparatively recently that we have begun to get an accurate picture of the early years of the Communist International. Stalinist historians simply wrote out of history people and events that did not fit their narrative. And histories from the Left Opposition often lapsed into an opposite error, of romanticising the period of the “first four congresses” of the Communist International – the period 1919-22, when Lenin and Trotsky were the dominant figures. Only towards the end of the last century, with the work of historians such as Pierre Broué, have we begun to get a more balanced and better documented account of the early period.

In the example I know best, the French Communist Party, it is only in the last few years that two histories of the Party’s origins, by François Ferrette and Julien Chuzeville, have radically revised previous accounts, drawing out the important part played by revolutionary syndicalists in the founding and early years of the party, and giving more prominence to such figures as Alfred and Marguerite Rosmer, Pierre Monatte and  Boris Souvarine.

You are right to draw out that this first period of the international Communist movement, a period of great hope and radical aspirations, deserves to be rescued from obscurity and studied without being overshadowed by the subsequent history of Stalinism.

Thus you mention Robert Louzon. Louzon was a remarkable activist over many years. Radicalised as a teenager at the time of the Dreyfus case, he was involved, in Tunisia in 1921, with launching the first Arabic-language Communist daily paper – rapidly suppressed by the authorities. In 1937, at the age of 55, he fought at the front in the Spanish Civil War. And in 1960, aged 78, he signed the Manifesto of 121, supporting those who took illegal action in opposition to the French war in Algeria. As you say, an “astonishing figure”. But I have never found a biography or even a substantial article analysing his life and work, nor any collection of his extensive writings.

There are a number of other activists and events from this period who have been largely ignored by historians. The French Communist Party [PCF] showed a vigorous commitment to anti-imperialism, on the part of at least a section of its membership. The young Ho Chi Minh, who was a founder-member of the PCF, launched and edited a paper called Le Paria [the Pariah], aimed at immigrants and readers in the colonies. He built up a whole team of militants and writers of colonial origin, whose activities and development deserve further study. One of these was Lamine Senghor; if he had not died before he was forty, Senghor would undoubtedly have become one of the first great black working-class leaders in France. Verso is promising us a full biography of Senghor. [See Jacobin here] Le Paria ceased publication in 1926, but it had successors, as shown by Hakim Adi in his excellent book Pan-Africanism and Communism [2013].

Another figure largely ignored by historians is Hadj-Ali Abdelkader [there is one biography, published in Algiers, but little else]. Born in Algeria, he came to Paris and was a founder-member of the PCF; in 1924 he became a member of the Central Committee – while continuing to be a practising Muslim. [Some years ago there was a bitter controversy in the French Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste when a hijab-wearing woman was selected as an election candidate. The comrades who objected seemed to have forgotten an episode from their own tradition.] He played an important rôle in the emergence of a movement for Algerian independence and helped to draw in Messali Hadj, often seen as the founder of Algerian nationalism.  [See Ian’s article on Abdelkader here].

There is further work to be done on anti-imperialism in the early years of the Communist International, and the rôle of activists of colonial origin. Michael Goebel’s interesting book  Anti-Imperial Metropolis [2015] has made a useful contribution, but there is much more to be said.

For a journal like ROAPE – committed to ‘radical analyses of trends, issues and social processes in Africa, adopting a broadly materialist interpretation of change’- it’s important to emphasis non-European Marxist traditions and diverse socialist histories. In 2014, in the journal, Biko Agozino did this for Marx’s own writings [see his article here]. Your political education was in an organisation established by a ‘unorthodox’ Marxist, Tony Cliff, originally from Palestine. In the 1960s and 1970s, some of the greatest events took place in parts of the world far from the capitalist centre – in Chile, Cuba, parts of Africa and Asia. Can you speak a little about this period and how the left you were a part of negotiated the extremely variegated movements and struggles around the world?

The story is complex and sometimes contradictory. Internationalism was obviously central to the IS group – as was shown by its very name. We believed that since capitalism was a single world system it could only be replaced by an international – and internationalist – alternative. The idea of permanent revolution, and in particular the rejection of “socialism in one country” was one of the most fundamental things we took from Trotskyism.

Cliff, of course, played a crucial role in establishing the style of the organisation. His Jewish identity – and notably his love of Jewish jokes – was a central element of the image he projected. As a speaker he exploited brilliantly his imperfect grasp of the English language.

The specific question of Palestine was less prominent. We knew Cliff had been jailed – by the British authorities – and that was obviously something to his credit. But he spoke relatively little about the Middle East – until 1967 when the Six Days war reawakened his interest in the struggle against Zionism. But though he subsequently wrote and spoke a good deal about contemporary events, he still said relatively little about his own activity in Palestine. It was only when I was writing his biography after his death that I began to be aware of the full story – or at least parts of it.

But the positions of the IS group have to be placed in the context of the development of the world after 1945. There were two main developments in the post-war world which did not fit the previous perspectives of revolutionaries. Firstly, Western capitalism entered a period of boom and expansion; for many workers in the prosperous capitalist countries this meant full employment and rising living standards. And this meant a decline in revolutionary aspirations on the part of workers.

At the same time came a deep crisis for Western imperialism. In 1945 the British and French empires still dominated large parts of the world. Within twenty years they were more or less gone. France in particular suffered two disastrous wars in Indochina and Algeria, and Britain and France were humiliated by the Suez adventure in 1956. This was complemented by revolution in China and later in Cuba.

This was the context for the so-called “Third-Worldism” which was widespread on the international left. The concept of a “Third World” was short-lived; the term was coined 1952; by 2007 it was described by the Guardian style guide as “outdated” and “objectionable”. But for a brief period in the 1960s there was a widespread tendency on the left to believe that the locus of revolutionary change had shifted from those countries in which capitalism was most highly developed to the territories of the so-called “Third World”.

The IS group kept its distance from Third Worldism. There were two elements to this. One was the theoretical work of Michael Kidron. Whereas most tendencies on the Marxist left, whether Communist or Trotskyist, still saw Lenin’s Imperialism as providing a theoretical framework, Kidron argued that Lenin’s account did not fit the reality of capitalism in the 1960s. So he concluded that “to believe nowadays that the short route to revolution in London, New York or Paris lies through Calcutta, Havana, or Algiers, is to pass the buck to where it has no currency.” [See Kidron’s articles “Imperialism – Highest Stage but One” and “International Capitalism”]

Alongside Kidron’s theoretical analyses there was a more practical argument. Tony Cliff could get very indignant about the “vicarious pleasure” derived by sections of the left from revolutions in other parts of the world, which he saw as reflecting the fact that they had no roots in struggle in their own home territory. To some extent this drew dividing lines between us and other currents on the left. Thus Tariq Ali was very friendly to the IS group in the 1960s – but refused to join us because he believed we were “Eurocentric”.

Nonetheless a certain number of international questions were of great importance. One was South Africa. I remember IS comrades being involved in a very vigorous demonstration in Oxford against the South African ambassador immediately following the jailing of Nelson Mandela. The recent book Apartheid is Not a Game by Christian Hogsbjerg and Geoff Brown shows how important the campaign against the South African sporting teams was in radicalising a generation of activists, including a number of IS members.

Vietnam was even more important. I and a number of IS members were on the very first demonstration against the Vietnam war, in February 1965, after Malcolm X had visited the London School of Economics. Yet it should also be said that Cliff and Kidron were a bit slow to get involved in the Vietnam movement. They thought our priority should be the industrial struggle in Britain and did not see how central Vietnam was to the crisis of American imperialism. It was the younger comrades, notably Chris Harman, who argued for IS involvement in the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign [VSC]. The VSC was set up by another Trotskyist group, the International Marxist Group, but we participated from the outset. Again Vietnam was vital in the radicalisation of a generation of activists.

But although we called for victory to the Vietnamese, and participated enthusiastically in VSC activities [often chanting “Ho Ho Ho Chi Minh” along with the others] we also made it clear that we did not believe that the Vietnamese leadership was about to establish socialism; we considered them essentially Stalinist in their politics. After independence came the military conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia and the appalling revelations about atrocities in Pol Pot’s Cambodia. For some on the left this led to disillusion, but for IS comrades it did not go against our analysis.

Likewise, we did not join in the enthusiasm for Cuba widespread on the left [though of course we defended Cuba’s right to independence from American imperialism]. Thus when Che Guevara was murdered in 1967 I wrote a brief critical assessment. I was sharply criticised by another comrade, Peter Sedgwick.

Sedgwick was absolutely right to criticise the tone of my article, the self-satisfied dogmatism of a young comrade who has just learnt the line and is claiming a monopoly of truth. Yet I persist in thinking that the historical experience has shown that, contrary to what was then the dominant view on the far left, Guevarism did not offer a way forward for Latin America.

So, in general I would argue that the IS current did make a contribution to the debate on revolutionary internationalism and the revolution in the Third World. Perhaps at times we lapsed into Eurocentrism, but I think we did grasp some important features of the dynamics of the revolutionary process. And we laid the basis for our intervention at the end of the century, when imperialist wars took on a new form.

Reflecting on an earlier period of political activism in the 1970s, especially around the question of Black liberation and Black Power, what do you think are some of the important historical lessons for today, especially in the context of the Black Lives Matter movement?

I’m going to be very cautious in responding to this. Because of my age and health, I haven’t been involved in any recent activity, and I have to rely entirely on second-hand information. But even if I were better informed, I should be reluctant to draw “lessons”. I don’t think it is for those of my generation to try to recruit the new generation of activists to organisations or programmes, or to try to identify patterns of historical development. We should always be ready to recognise the originality of the experience of a new generation.

To take an example. I am very suspicious of the use of the term “fascism” as applied to current events. Thus Donald Trump was evil and dangerous – but he was not a fascist, and calling him one made it more difficult to develop a strategy to fight him.

So just a few observations.

As someone who has been involved in anti-racist activity over sixty years, I believe that we have made real progress. In comparison with the 1960s racism is less blatant, more on the defensive. Yet at the same time I hardly expect the victims of racism to be very impressed with the argument that things were even worse sixty years ago. There is still a long fight ahead.

The sheer scale of the Black Lives Matter movement has been remarkable. According to Priti Patel, some 137,500 people attended protests in Britain over the weekend of 6-7 June, more than took part in the biggest Vietnam demonstration in 1968. And within a week of the first demonstrations in the USA the movement had spread to at least a dozen other countries. Such rapid growth of activism is undoubtedly something very positive.

I would also mention Extinction Rebellion, which has also far outstripped the traditional far left in radicalising and mobilising new activists.

I am also delighted at the way that the enemies of Black Lives Matter keep calling it “Marxist” in an attempt to discredit it. In fact, the result will be to get more people asking questions about what “Marxism” actually is. I remember in 1958, when I was very young, a building workers’ strike on London’s South Bank was widely denounced as inspired by “Trotskyists”. I had barely heard of Trotsky, but I immediately started to try to find out more about him.

In the period that opened up in 1968, racism and imperialism were central questions. In 1968 we were inspired by Vietnam and the French general strike, but it was Enoch Powell’s “rivers of blood” speech that really confronted us with the dangers and responsibilities of our own situation. Numbers of trade unionists, including London dockers, took strike action in support of Powell. The Labour Party response to the Powell speech was appalling – for a fortnight Wilson and the other Labour leaders remained silent.

Terry Barrett was a London docker who had joined the International Socialists. When the dockers voted to strike in support of Powell, Barrett gave out a leaflet pointing out that Powell had called for mass sackings on the docks. Barrett showed great courage but was totally isolated.  But the fact that IS took a firm anti-racist position helped to attract some of the people who would build the Anti-Nazi League a few years later.

In the French student movement of 1968, and the ensuing general strike of ten million workers, a number of activists were people who had been radicalised by opposition to the war in Algeria. For example, Yvon Rocton had been a conscript in Algeria and was disciplined for opposing the use of torture. In 1968 at the Sud-Aviation aircraft factory in Nantes he led a factory occupation which was to be the first in France, and sparked off a national wave of occupations.

How BLM [and XR] will develop as organisations, I don’t know. But the most important thing is that there are thousands of people, many young, who must be thinking, arguing and reading, working out a way forward. In a way it reminds me of the nuclear disarmament movement of the early 1960s. Again there were thousands of us, asking fundamental questions about strategy. Should we work inside the Labour Party – or outside? Was non-violence a moral principle or just a useful tactic? CND as an organisation had largely disappeared by about 1965. But many of those thousands of activists reappeared in a variety of other struggles.

The activists of BLM will work out their own future. But they will undoubtedly learn from history. For history always proceeds with both continuities and discontinuities. As Victor Serge put it, future struggles will be fought by people who are “infinitely different from us, infinitely like us”.

Walter Rodney, the Guyanese scholar and activist, explained in 1975 that his political model was CLR James, a man who was already, at that point, in his mid-70s, and that he hoped – if he lived long enough – that he would remain as steadfast and revolutionary in his old age as James, so no one who say, seeing him walk past, ‘there was a revolutionary, but I have no idea what he is doing now’. This is something you have managed to do – to remain constant. In a conversation we had a few weeks ago, you said when I explained that I was in my late 40s, ‘well, watch it, the decades go past in a whirlwind …’ How do we manage our grand narratives, and political projects, in lives that are so short? How do we sustain ourselves?

Perhaps you do me too much credit. I have always believed in Rosa Luxemburg’s formulation that the future of humanity is a choice between socialism or barbarism. When I look at the world today, I can envisage barbarism very clearly. Climate change threatens the whole future of the human species. The population movements it will enforce will lead to the rise of a nationalistic right, determined to close frontiers. And increasing friction between nations will make the possibility of nuclear war ever greater. But a transition to socialism in the present period is much more difficult to envisage. Despair is very much an option.

But I’ll try to end on a more cheerful note.  My generation of socialists is beginning to die out – so I have quite often attended funerals and read obituaries. And I have maintained contact with a number of old comrades. And one thing that strikes me is how many of those I was active alongside half a century and more ago have remained in political activity of some sort. Of course, there have been partings of the ways, often marked by hostility and sometimes very painful. And many of those who once called themselves total revolutionaries are now immersed in single issues, from trade unionism to a range of campaigns – or even the Woodcraft Folk. But they remain committed to socialist values, to an aspiration for greater equality and cooperation. I am sure that it was the power of the ideas we encountered in our youth that has shaped our whole lives since then. Socialist ideas are very tenacious, and though there have been renegades, they have been few in number. How things will work out for the generation now emerging I don’t and can’t know – but I don’t think the idea of social transformation, the hope for a world based on the satisfaction of human needs and genuine democratic control by those who perform the labour required by society, has lost its power.

Ian Birchall is an author of numerous articles and books, a former lecturer in French at Middlesex University, and his research interests include the Comintern, the International Working Class, Communism and Trotskyism, France and Syndicalism. He has been a lifelong socialist and activist.

Featured Artwork: Colin Fancy – his work can be viewed here: Artivists at Work.

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For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
We use cookies to collect and analyse information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customise content. By clicking into any content on this site, you agree to allow cookies to be placed. To find out more see our