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Capitalism did not die: rethinking a failed liberation struggle

ROAPE’s John Saul writes about who won and who lost in the apparently seismic transition to a liberated South Africa in the early 1990s. He sees a parallel recolonization of South Africa both by global capital and by the self-interested actions of local political elites.

By John Saul

In one of the best of recent books assessing the outcome of the South Africa freedom struggle, Are South Africans Really Free? a volume written by South African author Lawrence Hamilton in 2014 he proceeds forcefully to argue that the answer is a resounding NO! This may, of course, be a startling answer for many both in Africa and around the world who supported the South African liberation struggle and celebrated its “victory” in 1994 but Hamilton argues his case convincingly. The book bears careful reading and cannot easily be reduced to some quotable quote. Arguing that “although South Africans are freer than they were under apartheid they are a lot less free than they might otherwise have been had they instantiated institutions that enabled freedom as power” across a much wider range of fronts.

Note in particular, Hamilton writes, such realities as the fact that “the existing skewed forms [of] economic and political representation reproduce the power and interests of elites rather than generate economic opportunity for all” or that South Africa’s “existing macroeconomic policy [has failed] to address the dire conditions of poverty, inequality, unemployment, inadequate education and thus [ensure] the provision of freedom as power for all South African.” True, he continues, the changes necessary would demand “courageous leadership, active citizenship, new forms of representation and a macroeconomic policy that offers radical redistribution of actual and potential wealth.”

But the fact that all too little along such lines has occurred in South Africa leads Hamilton to conclude his book several hundred pages later by again underscoring the fact “that the failure to overcome South Africa’s long legacy of racial oppression and devastatingly high levels of inequality, unemployment and poverty have been the most serious indictment of the African National Congress (ANC) in government.” Here, in short, is post-apartheid South Africa seen as a businessman’s society – at best a “free market” society – rather than as some very “free,” “liberated” or “democratic” society in any more expansive and people-centred sense.

Setting the Agenda: Steve Biko Projects a Range of Possible Futures

The truth is Steve Biko had much earlier worried that the very denouement to the struggle might indeed be his country’s fate and he very clearly said as much. Biko was of course a brilliant Black Consciousness militant, at his most prominent in the 1960s and in the 1970s when, in fact, he was assassinated (in 1977) while being held in custody by the apartheid police state. As a principled adherent to and leader of the Black Consciousness Movement and as holder of a firmly black-centred perspective on the world, Biko saw the racist mind-set that characterized white South Africa as being virtually unshakable, with the dominant European minority frozen, by privilege, prejudice and apartheid, into one unbudging social mould as befitted their sense of themselves as a self-consciously “dominant white race.” As for the majority African population Biko felt it could, under these grim circumstances, most effectively and lastingly mobilize itself to fight back along primarily racially conscious, rather than along merely class,  or nationally conscious, lines: this was the politics that Biko principally advocated.

True, this was not the sole vector of Biko’s insight (albeit the one at the core of his reading of South Africa’s past and present). For he was also a close student of, among others, Frantz Fanon, with Fanon’s work, in particular, pushing him to consider the possible weight of other attendant social realities. And this in turn led him, in a valuable 1972 interview, to make to Gail Gerhart some particularly striking statements about the complex interplay between race and class in his native South Africa.

Asked by Gerhart to reflect on the situation in South Africa and to identify “what trends or factors in it…you feel are working towards the fulfilment of the long term ends of blacks,” he suggested that the regime’s deep commitment to a racial hierarchy had actually acted as “a great leveler” of class formation amongst the black population and dictated “a sort of similarity in the community”, such that the “constant jarring effect of the [apartheid] system” produced a “common identification” on the part of the people. Indeed, as Biko saw it, the racial structure of the South African system was what was central, and, for him, it was the emergence of a new confidence and anti-racist/racial consciousness – Black Consciousness – on the part of the mass of the country’s oppressed blacks (African, Coloured and Indian) population that could most readily open the revolutionary door to a new South Africa.

This, as we know, was precisely the politics of Black self-assertion that he himself would follow in the few remaining years of his life then granted him by the apartheid regime. Nor can there be any doubt as to broad resonance of such a “Black Consciousness” emphasis – one evident in the events of Soweto (1976) and beyond – that combined with other currents of resistance to fuel, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a mass movement for dramatic change in South Africa.

However, Biko was astute enough – he was, as suggested, a careful reader of Fanon – to also recognize the theoretical possibility of other, less savory, outcomes. For, as he also told Gerhart, he saw that in the more liberal system envisaged by South Africa’s Progressive Party of the time “you would get stratification creeping in, with your masses remaining where they are or getting poorer, and the cream of your leadership, which is invariably derived from the so-called educated people, beginning to enter bourgeois ranks, admitted into town, able to vote, developing new attitudes and new friends…a completely different tone.”

This is, of course, precisely what would soon transpire in South Africa’s transition to a post-apartheid future although for Biko it had been precisely because the whites were so “terribly afraid of this” that apartheid South Africa would continue instead to represent, for Biko, “the best economic system for revolution.” For “the evils of [the apartheid system] are so pointed and so clear [that they] therefore make the teaching of alternative methods, more meaningful methods, more indigenous methods even, much easier under the present sort of setup.” But how would he have reacted if he had lived to see global capitalism and a black middle class actually reshaping the meaning of the liberation struggle for which he was prepared to give his own life?

Anglo Plays to Win: Co-opting the ANC as its Partner in Crime

This is also where the Progressive Party alluded to by Biko also fits into the picture. True, this party – the “White” party was most drawn, in the 1970s, to an understanding of what genuine capitalist-led reform might hope to accomplish – was nowhere near taking political power at that point. Nor were capitalists in general nearly so reform-minded in the 1970s as Biko apparently felt the most enlightened of Progressive Party supporters (including, significantly, Harry Oppenheimer himself) already to be.

For, as we know, the entire history of twentieth century South Africa had been one that was much more defined by an alliance between racists and capitalists to ensure both racial and class advantage than one defined by any deep contradiction between the two camps. As suggested above, the dawning awareness of the political dangers that the very baldest form of “racial capitalism” now evoked came pretty unevenly to those within the capitalist class even if some fractions of capital did feel themselves to be more economically constrained by apartheid than others. Moreover, as a more complex capitalism also emerged, the various racial discriminations within the job market – even though the apartheid system was often rather more flexible about them in practice than in theory – could also be felt as a constraint upon the capitalists’ effective deployment of all labour, regardless of its pigment.

Enter, then, the aforementioned Oppenheimer who, as chairman of the Anglo-American Corporation, South Africa’s largest single business enterprise, was to be an especially key player. Moreover, Oppenheimer was also a leading supporter and financial backer of the still small Progressive Federal Party. He was thus well placed to put the key points clearly in the 1970s, this in the first instance with respect to the issue of labour supplies but having also much wider implications. It was a position towards which many more capitalists would gravitate throughout the following several decades.

By the 1970s and then into the 1980s, Oppenheimer and his cronies had begun to feel that apartheid was becoming too crude and politically dangerous a system of exploitation upon which to gamble capitalism’s future. As he told journalists (in 1981), P. W. Botha(the last Prime Minister from 1978 to 1984) and the National Party had “squandered too much time,” so much so that “time is running out and unless substantive changes are made by the mid-1980s, South Africa could face a violent revolution.”

As seen, this was increasingly considered to be a plausible reading of things because the rising temperature of internal resistance so markedly evident in the Durban strikes and in the Soweto uprising had, quite simply, continued to rise in the 1980s. Nor was this “revolutionary threat” tightly linked to work of the country’s ostensible liberation movement, the African National Congress and the ANC. But in some important ways the movement’s exile-status had also opened up opportunities for the South Africa’s largely black population to find additional and often more imaginative sites and styles of struggle than had hitherto been available to it.

Baruch Hirson in 1979 and others were giving strong accounts of the diverse currents that gave rise to dramatic levels of “township unrest” in Soweto and beyond in the 1970s and the 1980s. For Hirson too notes the extent to which the fresh struggles of students in schools and college that began to erupt in “periodic boycotts, strikes and arson” took place in a context in which “it was not even possible to find any traces of formal black students’ organization in the schools before the late 1960s …despite the conflict situations that [had] developed year after year.”

Here were clear signs that the epoch of “undisputed white rule” was really coming to an end. Soweto demonstrated, Hirson adds, “the ability of the black population [really] to challenge the control of the ruling class,” while it also served as a spring-board for the mass unrest that became so much more widely tangible by the 1980s. Small wonder that other capitalists – including even Afrikaner ones – began slowly but surely to share Oppenheimer’s insight that South Africa’s “racial capitalism” was now nurturing, for the 1980s, the threat of a genuine popular revolution! True, the apartheid state would remain a source of on-going and overt repression, but Anglo-American spokespersons and others were set ever more forcefully a different tone – and even Afrikaner capitalists were also prepared to listen.

Small wonder that at about the same time an even more central Anglo player, Gavin Relly – successor to Oppenheimer from the early-1980s until 1990 as the corporation’s chairman – took on a more prominent role in helping to shape a Fanon-style “false decolonization,” one that envisaged and would eventually achieve the putting into place in post-apartheid South Africa of the kind of hegemonic capitalist socio-economic system that had, we have seen, been one of Biko’s worst nightmare. Thus, in 1985 and just before a fateful meeting in Lusaka between leading capitalists and senior ANC leadership, Relly would affirm to the Mail and Guardian that

there is a coherent sense for businessmen to want to find out if there is common ground…that a free enterprise society is demonstrably better at creating wealth than some type of Marxist socialism. I would have thought it was self-evident… that nobody wants to play a role in a country where the economy…was destroyed either by a sort of Marxist approach to wealth creation or by a revolution.

Then, after the Lusaka meeting, Relly felt he could affirm to the South African Broadcasting Corporation that “he had the impression that the ANC was not “too keen” to be seen as “Marxist” and that he felt they had a good understanding “of the need for free enterprise.”

From “magic elixir” to Marikana

The ANC had gone into exile after the Sharpeville massacre and based in Tanzania and Zambia in the sixties, had difficulty in that decade in gaining momentum for the liberation struggle in South Africa. True, it had begun, with assistance from the Eastern Bloc, to develop a military force, Umkhonto We Sizwe but, with “Portuguese Africa” and “white-settler dominated” Rhodesia still firmly in place, the main force of the movement remained some distance away from what was meant to be the chief site of struggle: South Africa itself. Moreover, the ANC/SACP also did retain some underground presence inside the country but the fact remains that, by the 1970s, a whole new surge of revolutionary energy had begun to emerge inside South Africa, driven by activists very conscious of the ANC’s historic role to be sure but often also skeptical about it.

It was in exile, however, that the seeds were being sewn for the fateful alliance between global and local capital on the one hand and the ANC on the other, this constituting a united front that would become crucial to the fate of freed South Africa. Thus, wielding the mantle of Nelson Mandela and the partially mythic liberatory past of the ANC as potent symbols, the ANC/SACP (African National Congress/South African Communist Party) contrived to draw the trade union movement (as represented by Congress of South African Trade Unions) into a partnership – albeit a junior partnership – within the newly-conceived Tripartite Alliance. And the ANC/SACP also succeeded (by both fair means and, some have argued, foul) in convincing the popularly driven United Democratic Front (UDF) to disband itself, leaving in its place only a very weak South African National Civic Organization (SANC0).

For the grim fact was that, like the doyens of capital, prominent ANC leaders were rethinking their strategic options and also switching sides. Never a terribly left-wing force in any case this leadership now had begun to drift towards the embrace an ever more distinctly pro-capitalist tilt of its own. Even Mandela – for all the extraordinary heroism he demonstrated during his 27 years of incarceration by the apartheid state – manifested such a shift. It is true that, on his release from Pollsmoor prison in 1990, he proclaimed to a massive Cape Town crowd that: “There must be an end to white monopoly on political power and a fundamental restructuring of our political and economic systems to ensure that the inequalities of apartheid are addressed, and our society thoroughly democratized.” Yet only four years later (in 1994) he could be found suggesting, as an invited speaker at a special meeting of the American Congress, his openness to the idea that:

[t]he success of your [American] entrepreneurs, and with it the capacity of your society to give work to your citizens, rests on the fact of the elevation of every person, anywhere in the world, to the position of a free actor in the marketplace.

There was actually little room for debate on this issue in the leadership team that Mandela forged once in power – with Thabo Mbeki as Vice-President, Trevor Manuel as head of the ANC’s Department of Economic Planning in the transitional period and ultimately the country’s powerful Minister of Finance, Tito Mboweni as Governor of the South African Reserve Bank. It was such men who now acted as a self-conscious cutting-edge for the deepening of the new regime’s commitment to a fully capitalist future for South Africa.

What also bears underscoring here is the extent to which the ANC (and SACP!) had actively plotted, in making such a deal with ‘reform capitalism”. Thus, in exile, Mbeki – soon to be Mandela’s successor as president – was (with others) a key participant in various meetings with South African power-wielders. After all, Mbeki himself had already made his position quite clear earlier in the 1980s when he affirmed that, in his view, “the ANC is not a socialist party. It has never pretended to be one, it has never said it was, and it is not trying to be. It will not become one by decree or for the purpose of pleasing its ‘left’ critics.”

Left Turns: The critical perspectives of Ben Turok, Ronnie Kasrils and Neville Alexander   

There were veterans of the struggle who were intolerant of the continuing rightward creep of the movement once it was in power. Ben Turok – a veteran ANC/SACP hand, a then sitting ANC member of parliament, and, as it happens, a personal friend of mine from our shared Dar es Salaam days in the 1960s – was prepared to strike a critical note in 2008, one that did not come easily to so fiercely loyal a long-time ANC activist as he remained. Thus, in what was one of his more recent writings, he would confess to having some difficulty in maintaining quite the same loyalty to the ANC incumbents as he once did. For, as he put it, he had reached “the irresistible conclusion … that the ANC government has lost a great deal of its earlier focus on the fundamental transformation of the inherited social system.” Moreover, he asserted, “much depends on whether enough momentum can be built to overcome the caution that has marked the ANC government since 1994. This in turn depends on whether the determination to achieve an equitable society can be revived.”

Even more startling has been the line taken by Ronnie Kasrils in recent years, Kasrils even admitting in 2014 that he could not comfortably urge others to vote for the ANC anymore – this from a man who had been a long-time Central Committee Member of the SACP, a member of the Executive Committee of the ANC, a one-time head of military intelligence for Umkhonto we Sizwe, the ANC’s armed wing, and an MP and senior minister in the post-apartheid ANC government. The key for Kasrils was what he chose to call the ANC’s “Faustian moment,” a moment when, in his words, “the battle for the ANC’s soul got under way and was eventually lost to corporate power; we were entrapped by the neoliberal economy – or, as some today cry, we ‘sold our people down the river.’”

And finally, there was the rather less surprising political posture taken up by the late and much-lamented left warrior Neville Alexander – once a Robben Island prisoner himself and an exemplary lifer as a progressive South African activist albeit one always operating well outside the ANC fold. Writing some years into the transition to a “new South Africa” and the country’s new “right turn,” he published a book in 2002 entitled, somberly, An Ordinary Country. This is, in truth, a book absolutely crucial for understanding where South Africa is now in the 21st century, one that states clearly that “[t]he post-apartheid state is a capitalist state.” As he continues:

The most unexpected phenomenon has been the breath-taking ease with which the ANC has accepted the most unpalatable of compromises and retreats. Almost everything that had formerly been propagated as sacred cows has proved to be expendable. Most notable among these was the policy of nationalization of the mines and of monopoly companies. This is no longer even mentioned in the ANC; instead, rearguard actions have to be fought inside and outside the Congress Alliance against the ANC leadership’s willingness to undertake wholesale privatization of state property (euphemistically called the “restructuring of state assets”).

More generally, Alexander observed that “the real situation is that hardly any change has taken place in the relations of economic power and control.” True, a growing number of black people have entered the ranks of the economic privileged but as Alexander notes:

Today the movement of history is becoming increasingly discernible. There is a clear shift in power in various sectors from exclusive white ownership and control to increasingly black – token and real – managerial control. This is indicative of the fact that the black middle class, which had been kept in confinement artificially through the policy of apartheid has liberated itself. As indicated above, there is no doubt that this rapidly growing class of people are the real beneficiaries of the compromise reached in 1993…the promotion of the capitalist ethos and practices …as well as the accumulation of capital assets by black middle-class individuals.

It is also true that this quasi-capitalist class is still the main social base of the ANC leadership itself – with its extreme misbehaviour having been most dramatically embodied by the scandalous actions in power of now-deposed President Jacob Zuma.

Capitalism did not die

There have, of course, been efforts in recent years to promote new options beyond those offered by the ANC and the “exhausted nationalism” it embodies. True, the grim, corrupt and divisive presidency of Jacob Zuma that cut short and then displaced Mbeki’s presidential regime was a strong sign of further rot in the ANC’s rule. Cyril Ramaphosa’s similar replacement of Zuma as President (also before the end of the latter’s own full term) was an additional signal of distemper, even if Ramaphosa, a corporate giant in his own right, could at least offer South Africans a rather more rational and less blatantly corrupt – albeit still frankly and aggressively pro-capitalist – governing model. After all, when still in the private sector, Ramaphosa had been one of the principal architects of the gruesome Marikana Massacre that signaled so clearly the brutality of South Africa’s now hegemonic black-and-white capitalist class.

But there has also been on-going resistance from below, with South Africa consistently being in the top-3 of the world’s leading hot-spots for the manifestation of popular demonstrations and violent defiance at the local level and there have also been more organized expressions of alternative left-political assertions: Julius Malema’s otherwise rather unconvincing Economic Freedom Fighters (EEF) has had some fledgling electoral success for example, although other momentarily promising initiatives like the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa-driven “United Front and Movement for Socialism” have tended to founder on the rocks of too bald a brand of vanguardism or other failures of political imagination and craft.

Though it is important to also see the writings of a range of scholar activists that focus on the bold assertions of the Anti-Privatization Forum and other promising fronts for engagement (see, for example, Marcelle Dawson and Luke Sinwell’s 2014 book) – including, more recently, new flare-ups that have also given hope of on-going struggle, (the dramatic “Rhodes Must Fall/Fees Must Fall” student initiatives of recent years, for example, requiring further study in this respect).

To conclude, I’ll cite another good source, this time a book by the estimable Australian-born leftist commentator John Pilger. His appropriately titled, Freedom Next Time contains a strong extended chapter on South Africa entitled “Apartheid Did Not Die.” The chapter documents the fact that White Power did not completely die when Mandela and the ANC took power in 1994. Nonetheless, an equally accurate title for this chapter might have been “Capitalism Did Not Die,” this because what Pilger confirms is that South Africa has witnessed a class – both white and black in its constitution – of privileged South Africans that has together actually reaped the prizes of struggle at least for the moment. Thus, Pilger writes,

In the 1970s, the ANC declared: “It is a fundamental feature of our strategy that victory must embrace more than formal political democracy. To allow the existing economic forces to retain their interests intact…does not represent even a shadow of liberation.” In 2001, however, George Soros told the Davos World Economic Forum that “South Africa is in the hands of international capital.” [For the fact is that] the most basic freedom – to survive and to survive decently – has been withheld from the majority of South Africans, who are aware that had the ANC invested in them and in the “informal economy” by which most barely survive, it could have actually transformed the lives of millions…[Instead, under capitalism, South Africans will have to] suffer many more years of “tears and blood” in a struggle for freedom not yet won.

The task for ROAPE is to take this truth as a starting point and then explore just how a meaningful resistance – one that advances a successful “struggle for freedom not yet won” – can still be realized by the vast majority of South Africans (and Africans). In short, this essay has tracked a course from Hamilton’s ‘Are South Africans Really Free?’ to Pilger’s new title, ‘Capitalism did not die’. Our struggle is set against global capital and against a new South African elite (both black and white), and is now more pressing than ever.

John S. Saul, a founding editor of ROAPE, is Professor Emeritus, York University, Canada and has also taught at the University of Dar es Salaam, the Universidade de Eduardo Mondlane, and the University of the Witwatersrand. A long-time solidarity activist, Saul has published more than twenty books on southern Africa, including, later this year for Cambridge University Press, Race, class and the thirty years war for southern African liberation, 1960–1994: a history.

Featured Photograph: Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk during the transition to the 1994 political transition in South Africa.

References

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Alexander, N., 2002. An Ordinary Country: Issues in the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy in South Africa. Pietermaritzburg, SA: University of Natal Press.

Basson, A. and du Toit, P, 2017. Enemy of the People: How Jacob Zuma stole South Africa and how the people fought back. Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball.

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Bernstein. R, 2007. “From the ‘best days’ of the struggle to ‘present-day political circumstances’”: a letter from Rusty Bernstein to John S. Saul.” Transformation 64.

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The Generational Populism of Bobi Wine

Discussing the recent elections, Luke Melchiorre argues that Uganda’s Bobi Wine is a symbol for a generation’s desire for political change. However, his power has often distracted attention from the underlying politics of his People Power project. Melchiorre explains that Wine did not disavow the country’s underlying neoliberal moorings, but instead fixated on the ruling party’s history of ‘poor governance’. 

By Luke Melchiorre

In many respects, Uganda’s recent presidential and parliamentary elections unfolded predictably. As in previous election years, the country’s incumbent president, Yoweri Museveni, was successfully able to utilize state violence and intimidation, amid allegations of widespread electoral fraud, to secure another term, his sixth, in office.

Yet, while Museveni’s victory was long considered a foregone conclusion, in other respects, the 2021 election was far from a historical repeat.  On the contrary, the formidable challenge posed to the incumbent by his upstart opponent, the 38-year-old popular musician-turned-parliamentarian, Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, aka Bobi Wine, would have been almost unthinkable just a few years ago.

As late as mid-2020, few experts predicted that Kyagulanyi, a man with no formal political experience prior to 2017, would displace Dr. Kizza Besigye, Museveni’s main challenger in the previous four elections, as the new face of the country’s opposition. Yet in spite of facing unprecedented state repression during the campaign, Kyagulanyi performed well, garnering just over 35% of the popular vote in a highly disputed election.  Perhaps even more impressively, his party, the National Unity Platform (NUP), the successor of his pressure group, People Power, won 61 seats in parliament, becoming the country’s official opposition.

Kyagulanyi’s rapid political rise and the international attention that it has garnered, particularly among Africa’s younger generation, has placed the content of his message and the methods of his political movement under intense scrutiny. In particular, in an era of international politics dominated by the supposed rise of populist politicians across the globe, Kyagulanyi’s repeated calls for the people of Uganda to rightfully reclaim control of the country’s democracy from the hands of its corrupt political elite, raises important questions about his own relationship to populism.

In my research, I argue that the 2021 election reveals both the possibilities and limits of Kyagulanyi’s unique brand of populism. While NUP’s electoral successes demonstrate how populist appeals in African democracies, like Uganda, are capable of building impressive political coalitions across ethno-regional lines, the emphasis placed on the power of Kyagulanyi as a political symbol, has often distracted from a deeper analysis of the limitations of his own underlying political economic agenda.

“A Populist Without an Agenda”?

In the run-up to the 2021 polls, Kyagulanyi’s political project has been referred to as populist both by domestic critics and international observers alike. Speaking less than a week before the election, for example, Museveni, who had already accused his main opponent of being backed by foreigners and “homosexuals”, dismissed Kyagulanyi as a populist without an agenda.

International observers have also described Kyagulanyi’s political appeals as populist, though in a far less derogatory manner. Writing in November in Time magazine prior to the election, for example, Aryn Baker suggested that Uganda’s “upcoming election is a test of the limits of populism when stacked against the entrenched powers of dictatorship.”

Such Western mainstream media descriptions of an avowed pro-democratic candidate like Kyagulanyi as a populist are notable, because they veer away from common depictions of populism in such spaces as an almost exclusively negative phenomenon, which is regularly said to pose an existential threat to democracies across the world.

While the term populist in the analysis of Kyagulanyi has been deployed with different meanings and intentions, it is important to note there is some truth to this label. There is no question that his use of populist discourse, for example, has effectively forged a new collective sense of identity among his mostly youthful supporters around the nodal point of “the people” and in antagonistic opposition to the country’s political elite.

Moreover, the Ugandan opposition leader does conform to some other conventional ideas of populist politicians.  When, for example, Kyagulanyi first ran in a parliamentary by-election in Kyadondo East in June 2017, he was a famous, but inexperienced political outsider. His candidacy was rejected by both of the then main opposition parties, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) (the party of his political mentor, Besigye) and the Democratic Party (the party of his father).

In his rhetoric of this time, Kyagulanyi embraced his outsider status, rejecting the label ‘politician’ and instead describing himself as a “servant” and “leader” of ‘the people’.  He also positioned himself in opposition to the political establishment, brandishing both government and opposition MPs as ‘eaters’ for asking for salary increments, and promising “not to represent any political party or any particular politician but the views and aspirations of the people of Kyadondo East.”

Kyagulanyi’s commitment to what he called ‘politics unusual’, reflected in his embrace of a unique door-to-door campaigning strategy, represented an explicit rejection of Uganda’s political status quo.  It also clearly resonated with voters, who elected him as an independent candidate for the MP position in the Kyadondo East by-election in a landslide.

In other important ways, however, Kyagulanyi’s brand of populism is also novel. While his conception of ‘the people’ has always been heterogenous and inclusive, including market women, ghetto youth, journalists, teachers, and even those who are “struggling to run a business”, there is no denying that, for Kyagulanyi, ‘the people’ are largely defined in generational terms. Indeed, in his populist discourse, he calls for a generational transfer of power in Uganda, pitting the ‘Facebook generation’ of his supporters against Museveni’s ‘facelift generation’.

This is not surprising given the fact that Uganda has, with approximately 77% of its population below the age of 30, one of the world’s youngest populations. Still, it does distinguish his brand of populism from right-wing populist politicians in Europe and the United States, who have tended to define ‘the people’ in ethno-nationalist terms, or left-wing populists in Latin America, Southern Europe and the US, who often conceive of ‘the people’ in socioeconomic terms.

The ‘Umbrella wave’, as NUP’s electoral successes have been christened (referring to the party’s official symbol) has lent credence to the effectiveness of Kyagulanyi’s populist appeals. NUP was able to embarrass Ugandan opposition stalwarts, like the FDC and the DP, while winning decisive electoral victories in traditional strongholds of the ruling party, Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM), in Buganda (Kyagulanyi’s home region) and Busoga.

These impressive electoral results also offer evidence that Kyagulanyi’s brand of generational populism has the potential to build political coalitions across ethno-regional lines, incorporating previously excluded social groups (particularly young people) into the political process, while placing new emphasis within popular political discourses on common socioeconomic, political, and generational grievances. For this reason, NUP’s populist success could serve as a political model in African countries that share similar demographic characteristics and where opposition parties confront shared domestic political obstacles.

The Limits of Populism

For many youths in Uganda, Bobi Wine, dressed in a slim-fitting suit with a trademark red beret atop his head, has come to be a portent symbol of their own desire for generational political change.  The power of Kyagulanyi as a signifier, however, has often distracted attention away from discussions of the underlying politics of his People Power project.

Comparisons have been drawn between the 38-year-old Ugandan presidential candidate and radical African political figures of yesteryear, like Burkina Faso’s former president, Thomas Sankara, who appears on a mural on the wall of NUP’s political headquarters in Kamwokya.  While Kyagulanyi’s bravery, charisma, and popularity with youth across the continent certainly calls to mind Sankara, the former does not appear to subscribe to a similar brand of radical politics.

On the contrary, Kyagulanyi’s critiques of Museveni’s regime do not necessarily disavow its underlying neoliberal moorings, but instead fixate on the NRM’s recent history of ‘poor governance’.  This and Kyagulanyi’s repeated espousals of his commitment to the rule of law, service delivery, and a people-centred government operating within a liberal democratic institutional framework highlight the possible limits of his populist project. They suggest that while Kyangulanyi may be committed to creating a more pluralistic, democratic future for Uganda, where, how and if his promises of democratic reform will ultimately diverge from the neoliberal orthodoxy that has come to characterize Museveni’s Uganda, in the decades since the NRM came to power in 1986, remains uncertain.

Luke Melchiorre is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá, Colombia. His research engages in cutting edge debates that straddle Africanist political science and historiography.

Featured Photograph: At Jinja station, Uganda, 14 September 2010 (taken by John Hanson).

Democracy promoters and the Western Media in Uganda’s 2021 Elections

Moses Khisa argues that by making January’s election in Uganda about Bobi Wine, the Western media and democracy promoters handed the government a handy tool to smear and discredit Wine, as nothing more than an agent of foreign interests. Khisa states that the forces that can take down president Yoweri Museveni, in a manner that advances the cause of genuine democracy and freedom, must emerge from Ugandans.

By Moses Khisa

In the past few months, Western media and academia have placed unprecedented, and somewhat bewildering, focus on Uganda’s 2021 general elections. The exact source of the rather inordinate interest remains a little puzzling. The key issue at stake though is the military dictatorship of Yoweri Museveni, draped in civilian garb for 35 uninterrupted years. As a routine ritual, Museveni purports to seek legitimation every five years through elections, which are scarcely free, fair or credible. This has been the case since at least 2001 when Museveni first faced a serious challenge to his stay at the helm, a challenge from very close quarters – an in insider and heretofore member of the status quo, Kizza Besigye, dared step forward to take on Museveni and test his rhetorical belief in democracy.

In the 2021 elections, many among the community of ‘pro-democracy’ advocates and activists in Africa found reason to overtly and proactively support Museveni’s main challenger for the presidency, the popstar and Member of Parliament Robert Kyagulanyi, more popularly known as Bobi Wine. I want to argue here that the obsession with Bobi Wine is problematic as it fails to grasp the complex conditions around Museveni’s stay in power and the daunting dilemma of freeing the country from the firm grip of a ruler whose primary source of power is the bullet not the ballot.

Exposing Museveni’s democratic pretensions

Since he captured power as leader of the second successful postcolonial African guerrilla rebel group, after Hissen Habre in Chad, Museveni has repeatedly claimed he fought the 1981–1986 war to restore democratic governance and respect for human rights. In the initial years of his rule, at least up until the mid-1990s, he superintended modestly progressive reforms that gave voice to the citizenry through local level political participation and robust public accountability. Museveni projected himself as a ‘security president’ who had fundamentally transformed the role of the armed forces from being predatory to protective, from serving as a source of insecurity to guarantors of security of person and property.

In the main, Museveni’s democratic credentials appeared credible and compelling to Ugandans and foreigners precisely because he had not been tested yet. Western political and diplomatic actors saw him as representing the ‘new breed of African leadership’ and as a ‘beacon of hope’ for the continent.[1] All seemed rosy and reassuring until Museveni faced a real test of his democratic credentials as the country returned to the conduct of general elections in 1996, ten years after he came to power. At this first time of asking, he had a relatively easy ride as he still enjoyed broad goodwill and popular appeal in much of the country, except the war-afflicted northern Uganda. The tougher test lay ahead.

It was during the 2001 elections, and subsequent electoral cycles in 2006, 2011 and 2016, that Kizza Besigye fully exposed Museveni’s pretensions and hollow promises of a reformer and progressive incumbent who had earned plaudits from Western capitals. In earnest in 2001, Museveni resorted to state brutality and all manner of underhand machinations to beat back the surprising challenge from his former personal physician and senior cabinet member. From 2001 and on, state organised violence and blatant repression against opposition parties and politicians became the mainstay of Uganda’s electoral landscape.[2]

Having served him at a very close personal level, it appears that Besigye had formed an accurate conclusion of Museveni’s intentions and predispositions. True to Besigye’s prediction, Museveni engineered a dubious constitutional amendment process in 2005 that included removal of presidential term limits to hand him the latitude to rule for life. The only other remaining constitutional huddle, the 75-year age-limit, also got thrown out of the constitution in 2017 in a manner that included violent scenes on the floor of parliament when the military stormed the House to arrest opponents of the amendment.

Museveni’s steady slide

Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, Western media and at least sections of the academia, either painted a positive image or at worst maintained a largely lukewarm interest in the deepening tenor of Museveni’s authoritarian rule. With the exception of a few media houses that traditionally report on Africa, and therefore have bureaux in African capitals, not many Western media outlets took any interest in Museveni’s vicious assaults on his opponents and the gross erosion of democratic institutions in his singular quest to rule for life.

On their part, Western academics often wrote about Museveni’s electoral victories as though they were proven to be credible and indisputable. For example, after the 2011 elections in which Museveni literally raided the national treasury to buy his way to remain in power, which led to the near collapse of Uganda’s economy under the weight of inflation, two American-based academics wrote a fanciful but hugely flawed paper, published in the well-respected Journal of Modern African Studies, arguing that money did not matter in the election![3] The post-election phenomenon in fact magnified just how money had mattered in securing Museveni’s continued stay in power. An election that had passed with little incident produced an explosive post-election atmosphere during which Museveni faced his first toughest challenge on the streets.

Excessive spending in the 2011 elections, a fact that may have embellished and sanitised Museveni’s electoral victory but wrecked the economy, triggered runaway inflation and deep economic hardships that fuelled street protests. Wary and jittery of a possible contagion and cascade from North Africa’s ‘Arab Spring’ where Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gaddafi had all been deposed in quick succession and humiliating circumstances, Museveni swiftly summoned the full force of the state’s coercive arsenal to beat back the ‘Walk-to-Work’ protest movement’.

The method and theme of the protest movement was simple yet innovative: it sought to assert the basic and fundamental right to walk to work since people could not afford transportation in the face of high fuel prices and dire financial conditions. Opposition leader Kizza Besigye was the defacto ‘chief walker’ and the primary target of state repression. In one encounter with the police and military, he was pepper-sprayed to the point of partial blindness as to need immediate medical evacuation to the Kenyan capital, Nairobi.

From the Walk to Work protests in 2011, Uganda’s political landscape deteriorated quite rapidly with Museveni’s regime getting ever more repressive, and political engagement becoming patently confrontational and less constructive. Uganda’s ongoing political malaise is a consequence of the collapse of the minimum elite consensus forged in the early 1990s and laid down in the 1995 constitution. The collapse of this consensus stemmed in part from Museveni’s cavalier moves to chip away at some of the crucial provisions of the constitution, primarily the cap on presidential eligibility. His singular focus on ruling for life gradually spawned a hardened political confrontation, thereby making electoral contests binary fights about defending him versus defeating him. Every election is a referendum on his continued stay at the helm and not so much a contest over policy and programmes.

In this chequered political environment, particularly starting in the early 2000s through to 2019, the main opposition leader, Besigye, suffered enormous personal pain at the hands of the police, for long commanded by a highly partisan police chief, General Kale Kayihura, plucked from the military to lead Museveni’s stay in power using the coercive arsenal of the state. Besigye’s trial and tribulations, which spanned a whole two decades, rarely attracted the kind of Western media interest as we have seen over the past year or so. What is more, seldom did we see Western academics assiduously and aggressively speak out ‘in solidarity’ with those in the trenches against Museveni’s brutal rule as they have so forcefully claimed to be doing in the current phase in which Bobi Wine is the singular attraction and primary source of interest.

The West’s half-hearted and often approving stance towards Museveni’s rule derived from his favourable standing at the Pentagon as an invaluable ally in the war on terror, especially countering the spread of perceived Islamist threats under the tutelage of Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir, and of course the situation in Somalia. He was also for long seen as an outstanding student of neoliberalism and the Washington consensus, who undertook thoroughgoing reforms making Uganda’s economy arguably the most liberalised and privatised in Africa.

The Wine fetish

By contrast, Bobi Wine became a fetish, valorised and sensationalised in ways that betrays an ahistorical understanding of Uganda’s political landscape, and somewhat counterproductive if antithetical to the struggle against Museveni’s nearly four decades rule. Suddenly, academics who always downplayed the severity of Museveni’s blunt authoritarianism now see the regime as nothing short of brutal, deserving unequivocal denunciation and being deposed one way or the other. Within Western academic circles, some who previously argued that Museveni was genuinely popular and had ‘won’ elections despite allegations of rigging have turned around to denounce this year’s election result in very strong terms. Yet, there is not much qualitative difference between Museveni’s conduct this time and previous election cycles.

Quite remarkably, a flurry of advocates and promoters of democracy in Africa have been hard at work on the streets of Twitter and Facebook, urging their respective home governments in Europe and North America to call out Museveni’s excesses, to issue tough statements and take a hard stance against him. Unwittingly, some academics and activists participated in spreading mis/disinformation originating from Bobi Wine’s fans, in one case retweeting a picture from the 2016 election to show how the vote was being stolen on 14 January 2021!

In a particularly instructive ‘show of solidarity,’ they challenged their governments and embassies in Kampala to, literally, order Museveni to lift the military/police siege on the house of Wine, who was effectively placed under house arrest on the night of the polls.  This proposed nostrum, of their governments issuing some kind of order to Museveni to behave and leave power, apparently draws from the justification that Museveni is a net beneficiary of Western foreign aid who should be reined in by his benefactors in the face of supposedly helpless Ugandans. This, of course, is grossly problematic on many fronts.

Museveni’s dependence on Western aid has declined over the years even as the repressive tenor of his rule has held steady or even accelerated. Since the early 1990s when his government overwhelmingly depended on donor funding, Museveni’s government bettered internal revenue collections but also diversified external aid dependence to include China and Japan and not just the traditional West. At any rate, why it is morally justified to use aid as the basis for pressuring Museveni today and not 10 years ago is an open question, but at a minimum it shows something not right with the current urgency to ‘save’ Ugandans from a ruler of long standing.

In the broader scheme of things, the aid argument sits on a decidedly shaky normative and empirical foundation. First, it is faulty to assume that aid by Western powers is a benevolent and selfless gesture, free of strategic and self-serving interests of the benefactors. Aid is not and has never been a purely charitable resource. It is true that there are nations and governments (such as the Scandinavian countries) that disburse aid resources with little clear and apparent national interests of their own, but even in this category we know that the aid industry has its own logics and self-reinforcing dynamics which have little to do with the officially stated aims. Ironic as it may sound, aid to Africa has grown into a business and a profession that operates with a powerful feedback loop driven by interests and ambitions that are external to the ostensible aid beneficiaries.

Second, the assumption that the aid leverage wielded by Western powers can be used to influence behaviour and actions of incumbent rulers runs against the unhealthy empirical picture from similar approaches in the recent past. As Jimi Adesina and co-authors argued on this website, the experience and lessons of Structural Adjustment conditionalities should disabuse us of faith in externally demanded political reforms because this approach either yields only superficial results or tends to fall flat. It is also a glaring assault on the sovereign existence of a people.

Resisting and defeating an entrenched authoritarian ruler like Museveni is no walk in the forest and is not reducible to the fiat of pressure from Western powers fuelled by media and democracy promoters. The forces and fuel that can prudently take down Museveni, in a manner that advances the cause of genuine democracy and freedom, must necessarily evolve and emerge from Uganda and among Ugandans. The oversized role of external agitators, quite hypocritical in many ways, in fact might work to hurt than help the struggle for liberation from a decayed, moribund and personalised system of rule now cruising to the fourth floor.

By making January’s election about Bobi Wine as a person, and not what is critically at stake for Uganda and Ugandans, the Western media and democracy activists handed Museveni a handy tool to smear and discredit Wine, portraying him as nothing more than an agent of foreign interests, a front for the same old imperial interests that seek to weaken Africa, Museveni repeatedly claimed. Wine himself tended to lend currency to Museveni’s charges by openly appealing to Western audiences and uncritically wallowing in the glamour of Western media sensationalism and splendour. On the eve of the January polls, for example, he bemoaned the refusal by the Ugandan government to accredit foreign journalists and election observers. It is difficult to see why he felt a free and fair election in Uganda depended on the presence of foreign media personnel and election observers. An election in a country like Uganda is not necessarily rigged on polling day!

Obviously, Museveni has zero credibility and moral authority to accuse his challengers of working with and benefiting from Western actors, as he in fact has been a leading agent of foreign interests not just in Uganda but on the continent. The point here though is that external agitation and pressure may sound like a benign and welcome ingredient to take down a brazen dictator; in practice, however, it can lend succour for nationalist mobilisation and jingoism precisely in the service of entrenching the dictatorship as happened in Zimbabwe when Robert Mugabe dug in deeper to hold on for so long.

Which way Uganda

For ‘friends’ of Africa keen to advance democracy and freedom, who want to ‘help’ the forces countering a runaway authoritarian ruler like Museveni, the starting point is to take in the lessons of history. Externally instigated regime change is a hard sale as it tends to not happen the way it is expected and often leads to perilous outcomes. After 35 years in power, Museveni has taken Uganda down a dangerous path. Bringing about meaningful change is not as simple as chasing out an autocrat and installing a new messianic figure with a populist appeal. It is also wrong to construe opposition figures as angels embodying democracy and deserving uncritical embrace. To see Museveni as a devilish dictator and his opponents as angelic democrats is a misleading dichotomy. Today’s ‘pro-democracy’ opposition figures can easily turn into tomorrow’s authoritarian rulers.

Uganda is a deeply socially complex society. The enormity of the country’s socioeconomic problems and crisis of its politics cannot be overemphasised. It may well be an easier job to overthrow Museveni in a popular process, but it is a herculean task forging a new Uganda of peace and prosperity. The issue is not merely one of saving Ugandans from a ruthless dictator, as Western democracy promoters appear bent on, it is also about understanding how a post-Museveni Uganda can be viably pursued and prudently implemented. Here, the Western journalist, the academic, the democracy advocate and activist, the diplomat and politician need to pause and appreciate that principled partnership with Ugandans might help, but old-type paternalism won’t. The agency of Ugandans is what can make a true and durable difference.

For foreign actors who are genuinely concerned and fired up for freedom and liberation of suffering Ugandans, I propose more humility and less hubris. Uganda is at grave political crossroads and the possibility of social disintegration is real. The country’s social fabric is fragile. The youth bulge presents a daunting task. Land conflicts easily portend the most important source of social disharmony and violence. The country’s democratic experiment requires a total rethink. To start tackling these and other endemic problems, the country urgently needs a candid and concerted conversation to turn the corner away from Museveni’s misrule, to reimagine a new Uganda.

The country wants to free itself from Museveni’s mess, but Museveni too needs to be liberated from his own trap of power. There is a delicate and difficult negotiation to be navigated here. It needs thoughtfulness and perceptiveness, not just fancy slogans and foreign pressure. The prospects for forging a post-Museveni Uganda anytime soon may very well be undercut by actions of overzealous and overbearing foreign actors. There is no magic wand of a popular figure that will easily sweep away Museveni without the efforts of coherent, coordinated and combined change-seeking forces inside the country.

A version of this article appeared as ‘Museveni’s Rhetorical Belief in Democracy and the 2021 Elections in Uganda’ in CODESRIA Bulletin Online, No.3, January 2021 and can be accessed here.

Moses Khisa teaches politics and political development in contemporary Africa. Moses is currently Assistant Professor of Political Science and Africana Studies at North Carolina State University, in the United States.

Featured Photograph: Kampala, Uganda, 19 August 2014 (taken by Rob Waddington).

Notes

[1] It was President Bill Clinton who used the phrase ‘beacon of hope’ while his Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, talked about a ‘new breed of African leadership.’ Both referred to Museveni and his peers Laurent Kabila in Congo, Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia, Isaias Afwerki in Eritrea and Jerry Rawlings in Ghana.

[2] Anders Sjögren, 2018, ‘Wielding the Stick Again: The Rise and Fall and Rise of State Violence During Presidential Elections in Uganda, In Violence in African Elections: Between Democracy and Big Man Politics, edited by Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs and Jesper Bjarnesen, London: Zed Books, pp.47–66.

[3] Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz and Carolyn Logan, 2012, ‘Museveni and the 2011 Ugandan Election: Did the Money Matter? The Journal of Modern African Studies, pp.625-655.

Commemorating our fallen comrades: Patrice Lumumba, Amilcar Cabral, Rosa Luxemburg and Titina Silla

Ezra Otieno reflects on a recent meeting in Nairobi celebrating the lives of important revolutionaries and activists. On 29 January at the Kenya National Theatre, the politics, theories and lessons of Patrice Lumumba, Amilcar Cabral, Rosa Luxemburg, and Titina Silla were remembered.

By Ezra Otieno

Commemorations of revolutionary moments in human history are rare and spread evenly throughout the year but the month of January is considered one of the most revolutionary months. With the commemoration of the Haitian Revolution in 1804, the Cuban revolution in 1959, the Zapatista uprising in Mexico in 1994, the month at the beginning of the calendar year signifies its importance to revolutionary struggles all over the world.

January also saw the demise of several revolutionary comrades like Lenin who died of natural causes, Patrice Lumumba, Rosa Luxemburg, Amilcar Cabral, and Titina Silla, who were murdered by their respective retrogressive regimes. It is for this reason that those of us in Kenya, more specifically in the Revolutionary Socialist League together with Ukombozi Library and All African People’s Revolutionary Party, saw fit to commemorate these four comrades. This gathering was also an opportunity for us to politically educate our new comrades and the public at large about the lives and politics of these revolutionaries.

The Event

The event was well attended, and the audience was eager, ready to listen and learn. All through the event, the audience engaged the speakers with questions and comments and at the end of the meeting they were satisfied and stimulated with the day. It began with a brief introduction and a background of why we were having this commemoration. It was then followed by presentations on each revolutionary. These were preceded by short documentaries about each of them.

Titina Silla (1943 –1973) was remembered as a brave heroine who joined the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) in her home of Guinea-Bissau. In the early 1960s at a very young age, she was already struggling alongside others for independence and socialism. Amongst others she was deployed by the PAIGC in northern Guinea Bissau for health awareness campaigns. She even visited the Soviet Union and trained as a nurse also gaining political experience, then quickly rose within the party to become one of the most influential members of the PAIGC. She was killed on 30 January by Portuguese soldiers while traveling to attend Amilcar Cabral’s funeral. To date, her legacy is celebrated not only in Guinea Bissau but all around the world. Her courage and determination show how women can break the shackles of patriarchy and lead the struggle.

Next was a presentation about Amilcar Cabral. The speaker emphasized the fact that Cabral during his lifetime (1924–1973) championed for a cultural revolution of the people. Cabral insisted on the ideological development of the masses for the permanence of the revolution to be ensured. He urged his people to change their mindset which according to him was the most powerful tool used by the Portuguese to colonize the people of Africa. The speaker hailed Cabral as one of the greatest revolutionaries of his time as he had analyzed Marxism and put it in the African context. He also had studied abroad in Portugal but chose to commit himself to the independence struggle in Guinea Bissau. Cabral used his knowledge to help the masses rather than exploit them. He was assassinated on 20 January 1973, just after he had begun to form peoples’ assembly in preparation for the independence of Guinea Bissau. His legacy lives on today and his works are used as a guide to revolutionaries all over the world. The speaker urged the audience to read Cabral’s writings, citing Return to the Source as an insightful read. We then watched a short documentary about Cabral to supplement the presentation.

Then there was a presentation on Rosa Luxemburg (1871-1919), who was murdered on 15 January, 1919, executed by the paramilitary, proto-fascist Freikorps together with her comrade Karl Liebknecht. A lot was said about how she championed ideological clarity in the movement. In her book, Reform or Revolution, she took on comrades within the party who opted for the path of so-called gradual reforms. She insisted that the only way to push for real change was through the hammer blows of revolution. She believed that the collapse of capitalism was not inevitable and meaningful change could only be secured through revolution – the alternative was, she argued, either socialism or barbarism. She was testimony that women must stand on the frontline in the struggle, as Titina did decades later. We also learned that crushing capitalism goes hand in hand with crushing patriarchy.

Finally, there was a presentation on Patrice Lumumba (1925-1961) brutally murdered on 17 January. He was the leader of Congolese independence, a Pan-Africanist revolutionary, who was killed by other Congolese nationalists in coordination with imperialist forces.  The people of the Congo and Africa were robbed of a visionary leader who would have likely fuelled widespread change all over the continent and perhaps even the ultimate defeat of the imperialists.

Reflections

The meeting emphasized the importance of learning and celebrating our true heroes and heroines especially in a system that thrives on ‘mis-education’ and the pacification of its people.  These four comrades – each murdered in the struggle against capitalist brutality – dedicated their lives to the oppressed and dreamt of a better society free of exploitation, poverty, and ignorance.  In their different ways, they each sought a world of critical thinkers, an educated and confident population, and a people who control the means of creating wealth and community for themselves.

From these comrades, I learned the spirit of internationalism. Rosa clashed with her compatriots because she believed in internationalism and revolution while they sought compromise. The key to a permanent revolution is internationalism. A socialist country in isolation is bound to fail.  All revolutionaries worldwide should look for like-minded partners to connect struggles across the globe.

More so, the importance of women in the struggle cannot be understated. There can be no true liberation without the liberation of women and Rosa Luxemburg and Titina Silla lived by this saying. Likewise, we realize that patriarchy is a creation of capitalism and for it to be crushed, classes too must be abolished completely.

We should also continue with the fight against imperialism since it remains as brutal as it was during Patrice Lumumba’s brief period as the leader of the Congo. Imperialists, with local supporters, businessmen and politicians, may kill progressive leader and replace them with dictatorships to facilitate their continued plunder. One of the most effective forms of propaganda has been to associate dictatorships with individual figureheads. This hides the fact that capitalism is not only the dictatorship of the rich but also a brutal and intricate system of small dictators who control our societies, often with a veneer of democracy.

Conclusion

We offer our tributes to these comrades as their lives, writings, struggles, and thoughts are as relevant today as they were during their lifetime. They continue to sharpen and inspire our revolutionary ideals as we struggle towards a socialist society. May we continue to honor them through our actions and live by their commitment. Let us not be deterred by the oppressors or even death for we have nothing to lose but our chains.

Long Live the Struggle!

Ezra Otieno is a member of the Revolutionary Socialist League Central Committee in Kenya.

‘A sunny place for shady people’: South African involvement in the 1986 Seychelles coup plot

The Seychelles lie on the major trade routes between Asia, Africa and Europe, and they have been of interest to all the major powers for decades. In an investigation by Martin Plaut, based on files accessed in the National Archive in the UK, he reveals the murky involvement of the South African government in the destabilisation of the Seychelles in the 1980s.

By Martin Plaut

If ever there was a place for which Somerset Maugham’s epithet about a “sunny place for shady people” was apposite, it is the Seychelles.[1] As a recent study remarked: “Seychelles, a thousand miles from anywhere, is an offshore magnet for money launderers and tax dodgers.” Situated in the Indian Ocean, the 115 islands are 1,500 kilometres east of Africa. They lie on the major trade routes between Asia, Africa and Europe, and are also strategically near the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. No wonder they have been of interest to all the major powers. At the same time the Seychelles authorities have normally turned a blind eye to questionable financing. The most recent example of this saw a British businessman threatened with losing his castle after a judge questioned the probity of his Seychelles registered company.

During the apartheid era, the South African government saw the Seychelles’ potential as a means of finding a loophole to avoid the increasingly severe economic sanctions being imposed by the international community. At least one coup attempt was launched by the South Africans, although the apartheid government went on to make its peace with the Seychelles government after it failed.

This blogpost outlines the apparent coup attempt of 1986 and considers material discovered in the British National Archive which throws fresh light on these events.

The South African government’s interest

The Seychelles has been unstable since the run up to independence in the 1970’s. There was a deep political divide between James Mancham, leader of the Seychelles Democratic Party (who initially campaigned for the islands to be integrated with the United Kingdom) and France-Albert René’s more socialist Seychelles People’s United Party (which campaigned for full independence, with the support of the Organisation of African Unity).[2] At independence on 29 June 1976 the two parties came to a compromise and formed a government of national unity, with Mancham and President and René as Prime Minister. It did not last. On 5 June 1977 René’s party had staged a coup and installed their leader as President and turning the country into a one-party state. The pattern of unconstitutional transfers of power by coup and counter coup had been established.[3]

Seychellois exiles plotted against the René government in London – a fact revealed by a tape recording handed to the British press in 1982, after the bugging of an hotel room by a private detective, hired by a René associate.[4] The South African government and its secret services had developed links with Mancham during his brief presidency, with agents delivering to him “[bags full] of bribe money to secure South African interests.”[5] In 1978, when P. W. Botha ascended to the South African presidency, Seychelles became woven into a comprehensive policy of resisting threats to apartheid, described as a ‘total onslaught.’[6] Links were developed with the Botha security services by pro-Mancham exiles in South Africa.[7] This resulted in a bungled coup-attempt by Mike Hoare, an Irish mercenary, who landed at Seychelles international airport on 25 November 1981 with a contingent of 45 men disguised as a drinking club, the Ancient Order of Frothblowers.[8] Following a shoot-out at the airport the men were arrested and Hoare was returned to South Africa, to the embarrassment of the authorities in Pretoria.

First President of Seychelles James Mancham (left), second President France-Albert René (right) and former President of Seychelles (2004-2016) James Michel (center) in Victoria’s State House at René’s 78th birthday party (Mervyn Marie/Seychelles News Agency, 13 November 2013).

As the years progressed the South African government reversed its policies and developed links with the René government. A South African secret policeman, Craig Williamson established ties with a close René associate, Mario Ricci.[9] Williamson made his role in the secret service public when he testified before the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission about his role in covert operations. He said that he joined the Security Police in 1971 and admitted to his role in the killing of four members of the ANC and Communist Party. Among them was Ruth First, who helped found the Review of African Political Economy. He was granted an amnesty by the Commission.

In an email to the author, Williamson confirmed his relationship with Ricci, saying that he had come across Ricci in late 1984 or early 1985 after “reports came in of another recruitment exercise for an attempt at a coup in the Seychelles.”[10] Williamson says that he had considered leaving the police force, but in January 1986 was given a senior position responsible for the covert collection of information from Africa north of a line from Angola to Mozambique. Williamson explained in an email to this author how his work developed:

One of the first tasks I had was to report on Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean area and particularly on the then close relationship between India and the Soviets and their naval cooperation.  Obviously Soviet or surrogate Indian naval operations on the east coast of South Africa (SA) could interfere with SA naval operations, particularly those in support of Renamo. The use of the airport in Mahe [the largest island in the Seychelles archipelago] by Soviet aircraft flying to Mozambique was also a priority task.

I decided to run my African operation under cover of a private commercial intelligence organisation with a British-SA flavour. First, I had to establish a base in Africa, and I arranged to visit Mario Ricci in the Seychelles. We got on well. I explained my idea and as René was paranoid about a mercenary or other coup attempt, especially one launched from or supported by SA, it was soon proposed that I should have a contract to detect and counter security threats to the René regime which were mainly centred in Durban or London. Thereafter I went to Jersey in order to set up a company. I bought a shelf company from a company management group and was given a list of names to choose from. One name on the list was Longreach which I thought was apt and so Longreach came about.

Williamson was also appointed managing director of Ricci’s South African company, GMR, which had interests worldwide. The company assisted the South African government to avoid the economic sanctions that the country was facing from the mid-1980’s. This may have included using the Seychelles to avoid oil sanctions.[11] What happened next is directly related to the current story. This was the British historian, Stephen Ellis’s explanation of what took place.[12]

By this time, South Africa’s relationship with Seychelles was thoroughly ambiguous. Seychelles was often represented in the South African press, and the Western press generally, as pro-Soviet and anti-apartheid. In reality, Pretoria had developed closer relations with the government in Victoria [the capital of the Seychelles] in the months after the 1981 mercenary coup attempt and had expelled Seychellois opposition leaders from South Africa, but the South African secret services at the same time conspired with a group of coup-plotters based in Britain through a diplomat at the South African Embassy in London. The South African secret services eventually betrayed the coup plot to the Seychelles government in August 1986 and in effect aborted the plan. It seems that the South African strategy was to cultivate all sides in Seychelles with a view to cementing its own influence. After the August 1986 coup plot, South Africa’s Military Intelligence had the Seychelles government under effective control, largely through Williamson and the relationship he had established with Ricci. GMR South Africa shared its Johannesburg office with another company controlled by Williamson, namely Longreach, which acquired responsibility for government security in Seychelles after 1986. Years later, after the African National Congress had come to power, Williamson was to admit that Longreach was in fact owned by Military Intelligence. Seychelles was all the more useful as a Military Intelligence asset because of its government’s pro-Soviet reputation.

The coup plot of 1986 has received limited attention beyond Stephen Ellis’s article. However, a number of websites provide an insight into what took place, which was given the name ‘Operation Distant Lash’ (see here and here). These suggest a coup attempt by the Seychelles Minister of Defence, Ogilvy Berlouis, involving some 30 mercenaries and 350 Seychellois. An Indian naval vessel, the INS Vindhyagiri had fortuitously arrived in the capital, Victoria, in July 1986. As one of the authors of the website puts it: “A few weeks earlier, Indian intelligence agencies had learnt of Operation Distant Lash, organised by high-ranking Seychellois ministers to oust René.” Delhi decided to act to protect René, who is reported to have retreated to his Presidential palace, protected by North Korean bodyguards. The INS Vindhyagiri remained at Port Victoria for 12 days, “making great use of its Sea King to provide public displays of helicopter commando ‘slithering’ and assaults. The ship regularly trained its 4.5-inch gun on power mode as a demonstration to the coup plotters. By mid-June the planned coup had been averted. Seychelles authorities – with the likely assistance of Indian security services – arrested six men (but not Berlouis).”

Williamson provides a rather different perspective on these events:

In mid-1986, Indian intelligence alerted the René government of a so-called Operation Distant Lash whereby a 350 strong mercenary group would attempt to overthrow the government. This information came conveniently when an Indian naval vessel with a detachment of marines was docked in the Mahe harbor. We were apprehensive that the marines would be deployed into Mahe but fortunately things didn’t go that far.

We managed to survive the fallout from that incident, probably due to Ricci’s close relationship with Berlouis and René and to the lack of any real evidence of such a plan. We ascribed the Operation Distant Lash incident to a Soviet active measure designed to discredit Ricci/Berlouis/Longreach in René’s eyes. We noticed increased connection between the local Soviet embassy (Ambassador Orlov?) and Lt. Col James Michel Berlouis’ deputy. Michel was clearly hostile towards Longreach.

Later that year, during René’s attendance at a Non-aligned nations conference in Harare. Rajiv Ghandi warned him of a coup plan to be carried out during his absence and lent René his aircraft to fly directly back to Mahe. The upshot was that Berlouis was dismissed as Minister of Defence and head of the armed forces and was replaced by James Michel.

Due to our close connection to Berlouis at the time we know that he had no intention of ousting René.  He was concerned at that time with some unrest in the army due to some ethnic tensions and to dissatisfaction with the North Korean troops.

Williamson says that by this time his role in the South African secret police was coming to an end. He stood for the 1987 general election, although maintaining some links with Ricci, who – Williamson explains – “appointed me as Managing Director of the GMR Group in South Africa and financed my 1987 election campaign.”

That is as far as the story went, but files released to the National Archive following lengthy freedom of information requests throws a new light on the events.[13] It is to these that we now turn.

The ANC plot and the Seychelles coup

The three Foreign and Commonwealth Offices files that are now available in the National Archive revealed some extraordinary events. They provided an insight into two interwoven plots. One described an attempted coup against the government of the Seychelles. The second was a plan to seize and torture three members of the ANC in London – including Thabo Mbeki. Both involved South African security personnel. The ANC plot has been explained in a recent newspaper article and is the subject of a forthcoming article in the Journal of Southern African Studies.

The story involves two Norwegians who had lived in Britain for years under the alias of “Larsen” – father and son, who pretended to be British. They made links with a former member of the Parachute Regiment and the RAF. Some had served in what was then Rhodesia, before joining the South African armed forces. There were allegations that the entire plan was the brainchild of one of the most notorious and secretive of the South African security agencies – the Civil Cooperation Bureau. Attempts to prosecute those involved blew up in the faces of the British authorities, with the Attorney General, Sir Patrick Mayhew, having to explain before a sceptical parliament why the cases were dropped.[14] The timing could hardly have been less fortunate for Sir Patrick, coming as it did shortly after a particularly fractious meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government, when Mrs Thatcher was at loggerheads with fellow leaders over sanctions against South Africa.

Apartheid spy and killer Craig Williamson, Pretoria, South Africa 1998 (Jillian Edelstein).

It is interesting to see just how seriously the British took the Seychelles which are, after all, no more than a collection of 115 islands in the Indian Ocean. In 1987 its population stood at no more than 65,000. It is clear that the location is among the most important issues for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: they are strategically located between India, Africa and the Gulf and they are the site of important rebroadcasting facilities for the BBC World Service. The documents show that the FCO – just like the South African view noted above – had come to the conclusion that the René government was in their best interests, despite being of an apparently left-wing hew. As a memo marked “secret” from the British diplomat William Marsden to the Africa Minister, Linda Chalker’s private secretary put it on 15 July 1987:

The department’s view, endorsed by Ministers, is that our and Western interests in the Indian Ocean are adequately served by President René’s government, particularly in the denial of the Soviet Union of military facilities in the islands. This is also the US and French analysis as reported to us. A South African puppet regime would almost certainly not in in our interests, as it would inter alia raise the profile of the currently quiescent issue of militarisation of the Indian Ocean with negative effects for our management of Diego Garcia.

The memo goes on to say that it was not clear what kind of regime would replace René, since “possible candidates are not very impressive people.” It was also not clear how the Soviet Union would react if the neutrality of the Seychelles was challenged – and that it would “certainly be hostile.” All in all, the FCO was happy to try to maintain friendly relations with René. Replacing him was not going to receive the support of Whitehall.

Much of the attention focussed on two individuals from the Seychelles opposition who are based in London. They were David Joubert and Peter Ferrari, members of the Seychelles Democratic Party’s ‘government in exile’. The two had been plotting against the René government for many years. Another memo on 22 October 1987 talks of evidence of “Mr Joubert’s readiness to plot coups with mercenaries in the UK” – something the FCO had noted as early as 1982. The FCO also assessed possible alternatives to René – both ‘insiders’ who might mount what they termed a ‘palace coup’ and ex colleagues. None appeared particularly attractive to Britain.

The discovery of the plot came at a particularly sensitive time for Britain. Gérard Hoarau an exiled opposition leader from Seychelles and head of the Mouvement Pour La Resistance,  had been assassinated on 29 November 1985 by an unidentified gunman, on the doorstep of his home in London. Hoarau had been spied on by President René (who denied having a hand in the murder), but who had ensured that his London phone was tapped. The FCO memos talk of Seychelles secret service operations in the UK (something the British regarded as “unacceptable”) and had raised these issues with the acting High Commissioner for Seychelles in London, Robert Delpech. The FCO had lunch with Delpech at which these issues were raised and there are records of what was discussed.

As the case against the plotters developed, the FCO spent a good deal of time considering how much to tell René of what they knew. In the end he was briefed, but minimal information was provided to the president, who “bemoans” the lack of action against the opposition in the UK, but accepts that the British ambassador can only give him limited information. In the end the case against Peter Ferrari collapsed. Although he admitted participating in attempts to overthrow the René government, he strenuously denied having any hand in the ANC plot. His attempts to end the René government had – the authorities decided – not contravened any UK laws. For this reason, when the case came to court no evidence was led against Ferrari, and he was freed.

The links to South Africa were never conclusively established by the FCO, although other secret service papers held by the Home Office, to which were not granted access, may have a much clearer view of what took place. A final assessment by the FCO in June 1988 came to the conclusion that evidence of South African involvement was “highly suggestive.” These papers, and the information cited earlier, throws some light on these murky events.

Small states are susceptible to dictatorial control by elites, who share power within a narrow circle of friends and relations. They are also open to outside interference from external forces both public and private. The Seychelles has suffered from all of these tendencies, as evidenced by the 1986 coup plot. It is difficult to envisage a future for the islands that will ensure that they escape such activities in the future.

Martin Plaut is currently Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at the University of London and a regular contributor to ROAPE. For years Martin worked as a journalist and researcher focusing primarily on southern Africa and the Horn of Africa. He was until 2013 Africa Editor, BBC World Service News, but since his retirement he has published a series of books, including Understanding Eritrea (2016, Hurst), Understanding South Africa, (2019, Hurst) and Dr Abdullah Abdurahman: South Africa’s first elected black politician, (Jacana, 2020)

Featured Photograph: South African mercenaries involved in the coup attempt in the Seychelles in 1981 being interviewed by local journalist (Tony Mathiot, 1981).

Notes

1 Somerset Maugham’s remark was about the Riviera. Strictly Personal, Doubleday, Doran and co., New York,  1941, p. 136

2 Liam Campling, Hansel Confiance and Marie-Therese Purvis, Social Policies in Seychelles, Commonwealth Secretariat, London 2011

3 Stephen Ellis, Africa and International Corruption: the strange case of South Africa and Seychelles, African Affairs, Vol. 95, 1996, p. 169

4 Stephen Ellis, Africa and International Corruption, p. 170

5 Stephen Ellis, Africa and International Corruption, p. 171

6 R. Davies, and D. O’Meara, ‘Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy Since 1978’, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, April 1985, p. 186.

7 Stephen Ellis, Africa and International Corruption, p. 171

8 Stephen Ellis, Africa and International Corruption, p. 173

9 Stephen Ellis, Africa and International Corruption, p. 175.

10 Email to author, 31st January 2021

11 Stephen Ellis, Africa and International Corruption, p. 184

12 Stephen Ellis, Africa and International Corruption, p. 176

13 The National Archives (hereafter TNA), African National Congress (ANC) and the Seychelles conspiracy, FCO 31/5277 1987, FCO 31/5278 1987, FCO 31/5691 of 1988. It took sixteen months for the FCO to make these available following a Freedom of Information Request. Further evidence could be found in other British government files – particularly those belonging to the Home Office, which deals with the intelligence and security agencies – but we were denied access to these.

14 Hansard, Volume 120, column 1093, 23 October 1987.

Getting food and drink in the Nigerian Civil War

This is the final post from a joint memoir written by Selina Molteno and Robin Cohen about their period in Nigeria, September 1967–September 1969, which was framed by the Nigerian Civil War. The chapter tells a personal story and also provides some more general insight into those tumultuous years. They were both working at the University of Ibadan, Selina in African Studies, and Robin in Political Science. Here they describe how they managed to get food and drink, acknowledging that whatever little travails they experienced, many others were struggling to survive.

By Selina Molteno and Robin Cohen

When one is in the midst of a civil war, getting potable water and a secure supply of food, particularly food that is familiar, does become something of a preoccupation. To save scarce foreign exchange, the federal government had banned all but essential imports. Enough then to buy guns, but not imported rice. The basics of life were available. For example, there were lots of yams, root vegetables usually pounded and boiled and served in a large ball. Though they are related to sweet potatoes, the ones we could get hold of were very fibrous and bland. Nigerians, particularly poorer Nigerians, would tuck into big portions of yam. A dimple in the ball would be filled with a peppery gravy mixed with gooey okra, other vegetables, chicken or meat. The extent of the dimple and the meatiness of the filling depended on income. Robin managed the dish better, but Selina struggled to swallow and digest yams – her years as a nimble ballet dancer had led her to live on a variety of lighter meals and snacks (not to mention coffee and cigarettes), though these hardly provided adequate nutrition for a pregnant, then breast-feeding, mother.

Cassava was another popular tuber – imported from South America originally, Nigeria had, by 2018, become the biggest producer of cassava in the world. There are two kinds, sweet and bitter, and although the resultant dishes could be nutritious and filling, cassava contains toxins, notably cyanide, that has to be washed, soaked and boiled out, before one can safely eat it. We received a bewildering array of instructions about preparing cassava, with dire warnings and bland assurances in equal measure. In some confusion, we abandoned any attempt to use it. We were, to be sure, very inexperienced and unconfident cooks – nowadays, with the help of Google, we might have persisted. In fact, we were surprised to learn recently that the familiar dessert, tapioca, is made from reprocessed cassava. Given our ignorance, our starches were largely confined to potatoes, when we could get them – not very often – and local rice. Here another hazard presented itself. More often than not the rice from the market was full of stones, to be more precise quartz, which looked just like rice grains. Friday Etukudo, who worked for us in the mornings, took on the tedious task of discarding the stones without resorting to our indignant rantings about it, saying simply, ‘they put stones in the rice to bring the weight up.’ We could barely believe his account and are still not sure if that is a valid explanation for our stone-supplemented rice.

Water

We have described in another chapter of our book how we had to boil and then filter our water to ensure it was safe to drink. We could rely, most of the time, on a supply of water from the tap, but perhaps twice in every ten weeks the supply gurgled then stopped. That meant standing outside with our friendly neighbours with buckets and a watering can waiting for the bowser. We carefully stored the boiled and filtered water in the refrigerator. The sudden loss of water from the taps without warning was a nuisance, so we followed the practice, suggested by our neighbours, of leaving the bathplug in and the cold-water tap turned on. You can anticipate the result. One New Year’s Eve when we were out at a party – we must have taken our baby, Miranda, with us – the Ibadan water authorities decided to give everyone a New Year treat by switching the taps on. We had forgotten to turn the bath tap off and the place was flooded. Robin’s research notes, a few books and a sturdy copy of the Oxford English Dictionary were ruined, though the dictionary remained with us for many years with its bent covers and crinkly pages.

The flooding was a one-time only event. Another was an extraordinary wartime incident supposedly affecting the source of Ibadan’s main water supply, the Eleyele Dam. We have to diverge considerably from the narrative to explain why this had a particular salience for us. Selina has some relatives from Perth in Scotland, one of whom, Penelope Molteno, had married a member of the Swedish royal family. When Selina was a ballet dancer at the Malmö Stadsteater in 1960, Penelope invited her to a posh dinner with her husband and some other notables, including one called Count Carl Gustaf Ericsson von Rosen, with whom she engaged in animated conversation. He was a swashbuckling and somewhat crazy character who identified with the Biafran cause and having fitted some Malmö Flygindustri MFI-9 Junior aircraft with rockets, he formed a squadron called the ‘Biafra Babies’. They targeted undefended airfields, including Ibadan Airport, which was very close to where we were living. They were successful elsewhere in destroying a number of federal aircraft on the ground, but all they hit in Ibadan were a few cows that had strayed onto the grassy verge of the runway. However, a persistent and insistent rumour had it that von Rosen’s squadron circled back via the Eleyele dam and dropped off capsules filled with a toxic cocktail. Our water, it appeared, had been poisoned by Selina’s fellow dinner guest!

We were inclined to ignore this tale, but when Friday Etukudo confirmed it, we did get the wobbles. He was always calm and discounted the raft of rumours that spread in the face of, and perhaps because of, the rather crude propaganda of the federal government. We had a few bottles of purified water in the fridge, but this would only last a short time. Fortunately, the rumour turned out to be total nonsense and our water supplies resumed their usual erratic glug-glug stop glug-glug routine. We were grateful for any supply.

Eating out

Street food was available and often quite delicious. Deep-fried plantains were enjoyable, and some stalls served fufu, cubes made from cassava and plantain flour. These were picked up with one’s fingers and dipped into very gooey soup, called ‘draw soup’. The name was certainly indicative – with a cube of fufu one drew up some highly viscous soup made from jute and okra. ‘Just like phlegm’, Selina shuddered. Robin had to travel to various parts of Ibadan and to Lagos and the north in pursuit of his research and found himself buying and sharing street meals with his respondents. After a couple of acute experiences of diarrhoea, he forswore the practice of eating street food. Somewhat more successful were meals at the ‘Executive De’, a workers’ restaurant in Lagos. Peter Waterman tells an amusing story of meeting Robin there:

I was working for the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions in Prague. And I was in Lagos to run a one-month course for its local affiliate, the NTUC [Nigerian Trade Union Congress] … Now the Executive De was the ‘movement’ restaurant. In other words, it had been set up by the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party with money from the Communist world. It catered to movement people and office workers. So, I was actually somewhat miffed at the appearance at the Executive De of a tallish, red-haired South African who was also clearly Jewish (it takes one to recognize one). Previously I had considered myself a Communist Dr Livingstone, boldly going where no white man had gone before. However, if I was not Dr Livingstone then he was not Henry Stanley either. Robin Cohen turned out, more usefully, to be a South African socialist doing PhD research on Nigerian trade unionism, whilst based at the University of Ibadan.[1]

The choice of eating out in Ibadan itself was very limited. We indulged in the occasional meal at the University Staff Club but did not like to get pigeon-holed as core members of the expatriate sub-group who dominated the restaurant. Much more fun were the rowdy dinners at the Westend café in the centre of Ibadan. The café was near the Mbari Club (a cultural meeting place for writers, artists, poets, musicians and dramatists) and owned by a culturally tuned-in member of the Lebanese community, Mr Hadad. Mr Hadad had never really finished the building. Ugly rusty stirrups, steel loops used to reinforce concrete, stuck out above the roof, where the restaurant area was located. The choice of meal was disarmingly simple: ‘Meal’ or ‘meal with special’. ‘Meal’ was a delectable kebab, served with cous-cous and salad. The ‘special’ was identical, with a substantial portion of beef brain (maghz) on the side, which Robin favoured, and Selina abjured. At one point, we decided we liked the Westend sufficiently to take the anti-diarrhoea medicine, Entero-vioform, before we set out for our meal. Though the medicine was then freely available, it has now been banned because of an array of nasty side-effects. It seems it can kill.

Routine supplies

Rather surprisingly, we were able to get fresh milk delivered. The milk was supplied in floppy plastic bags tossed onto our little veranda by a bicyclist. The milk was sent in refrigerated lorries from Vom (near Jos), 800 km away, which we visited, partly to allay our curiosity about where our milk came from. The area was cool with luscious grassland, quite unlike the landscape of the rest of Nigeria and, all these years on, a flourishing dairy industry has developed, seeded from the government dairy of our years. The milk tasted more or less normal, but had a curious grey colour, which was oddly disturbing. This led to a weak joke of which we never tired. Vom became ‘vomit’, as in ‘would you like some vomit with your tea?’ Once the Vom diary sent us a customer satisfaction survey, which included the question ‘would you like your milk yellow, white, or just as is?’ We replied ‘just as is’, as we didn’t want to be difficult.

Our supply of bread was also delivered, by a very persistent street hawker. Either she was called Gloria, or the brand name of the bread was ‘Gloria Bread’, we can’t now remember. However, Robin recalls with shame how roughly-spoken he was with her when she unexpectedly stuck her head through the burglar bars of the lavatory, which he happened to be inhabiting. ‘Buy bread’, she demanded and when Robin shouted at her she plaintively responded, ‘But it’s Gloria’. She clearly was desperately dependent on our custom, but there was only so much of her sweetened yellowish bread we could handle.

We also had access to chicken and meat. The chickens were bought live from time to time by Selina in Dugbe market, but (poor pun) she was too chicken to cut their heads off, so she left them, with air and water (we hasten to add) on the back seat of the car. It was Etukudo’s job to dispatch them. They tasted strong and stringy compared with the birds one now buys in supermarkets. Before they reached their end, they had often rather messed up the back seat – it was Robin’s responsibility to clean that up.

The meat we acquired was also red in tooth and claw. It came from a newly opened ‘meat shop’, near the campus. ‘Butcher’ would have been far too genteel a description for this establishment. It was more a slaughterhouse with a retail counter. Sometimes we saw the animal – normally a cow brought to Ibadan by a patient Fulani herder from the north – walking about before it was crudely guillotined and wrapped for our delectation. After this experience we can heartily recommend a skilled butcher and appropriately hung beef and lamb. But, at the time, we were happy enough to get this supply.

There were two other items in our routine diet. We were able to get tinned sardines from a corner store, actually more like a large shed in someone’s garden, an outlet that out of discretion we will call ‘Kemi’s corner’. It was quite difficult to get hold of sardines elsewhere and squashed sardines on Gloria’s bread was one of our standbys. Kemi seemed to have an unlimited supply, which she would replenish from time to time by a trip to her nearby house. As we explained in another chapter of this book, when Selina gave birth to Miranda she was fed on sardines and Guinness. She, like many of the other mums in the hospital, needed the nutrition this diet provided. The sardines looked similar to the ones served in the hospital, but we suspected nothing until a tell-tale neighbour upset us by saying that Kemi obtained her supplies by having an affair with one of the senior doctors in the hospital. Reluctantly, we decided that we could not sanction this rip-off of hospital food by continuing our purchases. The story of Kemi’s romantic life could, of course, have been a malicious lie.

Somebody also gave us a great tip. Pawpaw (the light-yellow sort, not the more orange papaya) was easily available in season and, in addition to the ones we could get at the market, we had three productive trees, planted by Selina, alongside the house. Picked raw then boiled, the green pawpaws tasted a bit like marrow, and we used them often as a substitute for a fibrous vegetable.

Exotic items

On several occasions, hawkers came around with gigantic land snails (Archachatina marginata), offering them as a delicacy. ‘Gigantic’ is not a misnomer – the snails could measure up to 25 cm across and weigh up to 700 grams. We tried them a couple of times, but somehow could not get the snails to taste of anything more than chewy bits of old leather. We really did not know what we were doing, and we gather these snails have now become an internationally-recognized and highly-valued foodstuff.

Getting familiar items for breakfast was difficult. Gloria’s bread could be toasted, we had soluble coffee grains and a little jam, but no marmalade. Cereals appeared sometimes in the university shop on campus, but they were a rare item and would disappear for long periods. Once, Robin was in town interviewing trade union leaders when a Lebanese trader beckoned him into his shop. He produced Post Toasties, cornflakes with blueberries. Post was a formidable rival to Kellogg in those days. The temptation was too great, even though Robin surmised that the corn flakes must have been smuggled into the country. We stretched out tiny portions, savouring the cereal for three or four weeks.

The tale of the pig’s head

On another occasion, Robin got the idea that we could make brawn, an echo, though in a decidedly non-kosher way, of a favourite Jewish dish called ptcha that Robin’s mother, who was of Polish heritage, had made for the family. Usually it was made of lambs’ or cows’ feet, but Robin had been offered a pig’s head one day at the meat shop and impulsively went for it. It was an impossible task to get the accompanying ingredients in full (including carrots, celery, garlic, bay leaves, onions, leeks, lemons, wine vinegar), but he spent days tracking down some of them. Whole black peppercorns were a triumphal find. Meanwhile, the pig was placed in the refrigerator with its whiskers and ears freaking Selina out. At one point she refused to open the fridge door. The idea of pig’s brawn is to cook it very slowly for about 17 hours, discarding the oodles of fat and gradually breaking off the chunks of meaty cheeks and ears. The bones would generate a gelatine. After discarding the bones, and adding sliced hard-boiled eggs, the meat and egg would set in the liquor making a mould that could be sliced into pieces for about a two-week supply of cold meat.

That was the theory. In practice, the gas cooker blew out at a low setting and in trying to keep the show on the road it was turned up too high. The head boiled dry and burnt and in rushing to retrieve the situation Robin dropped the head on the somewhat unsanitary concrete floor. Recriminations followed and it was clear that even if it had all gone smoothly, Selina was not going to eat it anyway. The miserable pig’s head disappeared at her orders. For Robin, this was a silent reprimand from his mother sent via the ether – ‘don’t mess with your Jewish heritage’!

A sombre conclusion

In closing this chapter, it is only appropriate to record that at the end of the civil war in January 1970 experienced Quaker and Lutheran aid workers from the US estimated that some 50,000 children in Biafra had died of starvation.[2] This was far fewer than had been suggested during the course of the war when Biafran sources or sympathisers with the breakaway republic used the estimate of two million starving children. Whatever the number, we ate while others could not, and this should be solemnly recorded here. That said, our anxiety about getting a regular supply of food was real enough. It was made worse by our inexperience as chefs and the limitations on Selina’s diet after her gall bladder was removed. We also cannot avoid the conclusion that, despite our aspirations to cosmopolitanism in all matters, there was a certain cultural resistance to unfamiliar foods that we failed to overcome. When we left Nigeria, Selina weighed just over 6½ stones, about 42 kilos. She desperately needed feeding-up.

Selina Molteno and Robin Cohen’s book, titled An Expatriate Family in the Nigerian Civil War, is available here.

Their book will be launched at the African Studies Seminar, University of Oxford, on 11 February, at 1700, UK/GMT. All are welcome (no registration required). The Microsoft Teams link is here.

Selina Molteno lives in Oxford in the UK where she founded a publishing service. With over 35 years’ experience in publishing, she has piloted many books and articles from manuscript to successful publication. Robin Cohen is an established scholar in development studies and sociology, known best for his writings on migration, diasporas and globalization. His books include Migration: Human movement from prehistory to the present (2019) and Refugia: Radical solutions to mass displacement (co-author, 2020). 

Featured Photograph: Dugbe market in Ibadan in the 1960s.

Notes

[1] Peter Waterman ‘If I wasn’t Dr Livingstone, he wasn’t Henry Stanley’, in Nicholas Van Hear et al. Retrospective for Robin Cohen, Oxford: Oxford Publishing Services, 2016, p. 19.

[2] ‘Starvation toll in Biafra revisited’, New York Times, 12 April 1970, p. 19

Africa, extractivism and the crisis this time

From the editorial of the latest issue of ROAPE, Elisa Greco provides an excoriating denunciation of Africa’s underdevelopment in the context of the pandemic. Unpicking the political strategy of neo-extractivism, she argues that every global recession, or primary commodity prices downturn, African economies which bought into this model succumb to crisis and recession.

By Elisa Greco

In April 2020, Macky Sall, the president of Senegal, called for a new global order, asking for the cancellation of Africa’s debt in the context of the current pandemic. His argument was based on a lucid assessment of the extractive nature of the productive structures on the continent.

While broad generalisations about a region composed of highly diverse countries runs the risk of repeating neo-colonial tropes, extractivism is the dominant feature of most African economies. The absence of processes of structural transformation and the persistence of primary commodity dependence creates highly porous extraverted economies, organised around extractive cores. Foreign exchange earnings on the continent largely accrue from primary commodities and the extractive sector: mining, oil and gas extraction and export-oriented agriculture.

The colonially inherited pattern of agrarian and mining extractivism has been reinforced by post-colonial patterns of uneven and combined development and capital accumulation, sustained by a global trend of growth in extraction of natural resources, which went up from 27 billion tonnes in 1970 to 92 billion tonnes in 2017. The rapid urbanisation and industrialisation of Asian countries that led to the commodity boom of 1993–2003 meant that extractives have attracted increasing investment. Since 2000, the sector has grown at an annual average rate of growth of 3.2%. Until 2014, the hike in global commodity prices – involving mining, oil and gas but also food and agricultural commodities – led to an increase in foreign direct investment in extractives and agriculture in Africa and Latin America.

Compounded by financialised investments after the global financial crisis of 2007-08, agrarian extractivism through land grabs (McKay 2017) and an increase of investment in mining and energy led to a renewal of the debate on extraction and imperialism (Veltmeyer and Petras 2014). Especially in the mining and energy sectors, it also led to new political responses, dubbed ‘neo-extractivism’, based on a return of the developmental state in its functions of rent appropriation and redistribution. In Latin America, neo-extractivism pictured extractives as carriers of development through strong developmental states, which reinvested extractive rents in social programmes and structural transformation (Gudynas 2010). Its politics had the ambition of defining themselves as post-neoliberal, while retaining capital’s trend of exploitation of workers, dispossession of land and unmitigated environmental destruction (Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington 2011).

Following the Latin American example of neo-extractivism, many African governments have experimented with resource nationalism, although with considerable national-level variations. At the regional level, the African Union’s Africa Mining Vision (AMV) 2030 is an attempt to propose stronger rent extraction from the mining sector and use it to finance programmes of structural transformation in the continent (Bush 2018). However, contemporary neo-extractivist policies in Africa nowadays are nowhere near as ambitious as those once attempted by African socialist governments. These aimed at regulating the global market for extractives, like in Kenneth Kaunda’s Zambian initiative of the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), or Julius Nyerere’s nationalist ban on extractives, aimed at keeping resources in the soil until the nation could develop the productive forces to manage extractives for national development. These politics often attacked multinational corporations in extractives, banning their operations or heavily regulating them in a way that neo-extractivism has not managed to do. Most African countries have moved away from national control over natural resources, towards a more modest agenda aiming at increasing ‘local content’ in extractive policies, not only in mining but also in oil and gas extraction (Ovadia 2016).

While the African Mining Vision proves African agency, it also lives under the shadow of the failures of resource nationalism of the 1970s. And how could they not? The Latin American experience carries considerable significance to the African one, showing that the appropriation of ground rent mediated by state policies tends to create ‘a structural dependence upon the magnitude of ground rent available for appropriation’ (Purcell, Fernandez and Martinez 2017, 924) even when these same policies support and incentivise small capitals, and use rents for social protection and redistributive social policies.

The effects of global recessions on extractive economies are well known: as global commodity demand decreases, extractive economies quickly fall in a recession, their rents fall, and so do the programmes of redistribution based on them – as shown throughout the last commodity prices downfall, started in 2014. In this analysis, African miners and farmers remain firmly inscribed in global value relations through their integration in the world market (Araghi 2003) and in capitalism as a totality – the world economy being more than just ‘the sum of its parts’ (McNally 2009: 43).

For Marx, the world market expressed ‘the primacy of the concrete corporeality of the sum total of the vast multitude of labours living under the geographies of capitalist society, before it assumes distorted forms in international political relations and inter-capitalist competition’ (Arboleda 2020: 52). The utter dependence of the ‘successes’ of this neo-extractivism on ground rent from primary commodities, tied as these are to the fluctuations of the world market and inscribed in global value relations, have already failed to pass the test of decreasing commodity prices. At every global recession, or primary commodity prices downturn, the political strategy of neo-extractivism shows its limits, and African economies which bought into this model are likely to succumb to the current recession.

The crisis this time

The pandemic has indeed triggered a global recession and, as a consequence, Africa has entered its first recession since 1995. Foreign exchange earnings coming from extractives have fallen due to the decline of consumption in Europe, the US and China caused by the pandemic, and the global recession that is unfolding, with global trade drastically reduced and primary commodity prices in a downward trend. The economy of remittances has also been affected by the pandemic. While the formal service sector, structured around patterns of real estate and financial speculation, is likely to be less affected, the social reproduction of the majority of people will be more impacted, dependent as it is on farming and artisanal mining (will suffer as a result of the global recession) and circulation activities (petty trade, transport and services), many of which largely escape GDP calculations. The World Bank regional report estimates the contraction at 3.3% in 2020, underlining that this is the first recession in Africa in the last 25 years.

On the basis of these estimates, shrinking GDPs will bring real per capita GDP back to 2008 levels, and about 40 million people will be very possibly pushed into extreme poverty on the continent. Africa is also the region with the highest number of countries (39) which, since April, have been receiving emergency debt relief from the International Monetary Fund to cope with the pandemic, alongside 28 countries which have joined the World Bank/G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI). However, as of 2018 about a third of African governments’ public debt was owed to private financial investors, thus falling outside the mandate of the DSSI. For their part, private financial groups remain unwilling to renegotiate debt with African governments to ease the impact of the pandemic and responded to public criticism by creating a public relations agency, the Africa Private Creditor Working Group (2020).

The first 10 months of this pandemic have made clear that many governments have taken an extremely pragmatic approach: if the economy cannot afford the losses, workers have to keep on working to put food on the table. The ‘grim calculus’– how many people governments decide can be considered as disposable – and sheer pragmatism have informed many decisions on economic policies.

The pragmatism of governments that cannot afford to pay for a crisis is epitomised by President John Magufuli’s stance in Tanzania. Tanzania is to date the only African country which has stopped submitting official reports on Covid-19 cases and mortality to the World Health Organization denying the presence of the virus in the country. While presidential declarations blended a dubious anti-scientism (coming from a president with a PhD in biology) and religious sentiment, in the run-up to presidential elections Magufuli left all the street vendors on the streets, did not close shops and schools, nor did he prohibit religious gatherings, securing himself popular support. While this response has largely been portrayed as an extreme example of authoritarian populism, it can also be interpreted as pragmatism of a poor, highly donor-dependent nation which is about to be hit by a global recession. Policy covers up with populist actions the pragmatic acknowledgment that its government cannot afford the slightest disruption in production – especially agrarian, on which millions depend for sheer survival – nor can it fund social protection programmes and a lockdown to protect people’s lives.

But is this position a departure from the norm? I would argue that this is more of an extreme position than an exceptional one. Many governments in the global North have implicitly admitted defeat to capital, faced with a pandemic that threatened to disrupt the circuits of capital, hitting both production and consumption and grinding them both to a halt. A global recession causes unemployment and hunger that can, if unmitigated by public policy, kill more than the virus; and only a minority of countries have responded with Keynesian interventions.

Crises in capitalism cause at once ‘immense suffering and hardship for the world’s workers’ and also open up moments in which ‘new spaces of resistance can be pried open’ (McNally 2009: 72). As before the pandemic, semi-privatised health services prove to be good for business, and the long legacies of structural adjustment in Africa are at their most visible in the failure of basic health service provision. What unifies governments across the globe lies in what the pandemic did not do: questioning the role of the state in public health service provision in any fundamental way. While demand-side Keynesian policies have been put in place to rescue capital – from large companies to small and medium-sized enterprises– political discussions on the necessity of public health service provision during a pandemic have been conspicuous by their absence (see  Peter Lawrence’s editorial to ROAPE, Vol. 47, Issue 165, ‘Global capitalism and Africa after Covid-19’).

The deadly conservative political climate makes any redistributive proposal look like a radical step, as suggested by the neo-Keynesian plans put forward by the Transnational Institute – to tax the rich and use the wealth for a pandemic response and concluding by quoting exhortatory words spoken by the African revolutionary Thomas Sankara.

What the pandemic did do, in fact, is to prove once again that illness and death can be very good business for capital. The pandemic opened up opportunities for huge private gains, deriving mostly from speculative ventures in health and technology on the stock market. This led to an increase in total billionaire wealth, which reached US$10.2 trillion in July 2020, from US$8.9 trillion at the end of 2017, divided among 2189 billionaires. Dead labour triumphs over living labour, and the class implications of this triumph are mortally clear.

To read Elisa’s full editorial for Volume 47, Issue 166 (2020) click here and to access all of the articles in the issue, which are freely available, click here.

Elisa Greco is an editor on the Review of African Political Economy and teaches at the European School of Political and Social Sciences, Lille Catholic University, Lille, France.

Featured Photograph: Abandoned street in Uganda during the lockdown in the Covid-19 crisis (Derrick Ndahiro, 14 April 2020).

Notes

Araghi, F.  2003. “Food Regimes and the Production of Value.” Journal of Peasant Studies 30 (2): 41–70.

Arboleda, M.  2020. Planetary Mine: Territories of Extraction Under Late Capitalism. London: Verso.

Bebbington, A., and D. Humphreys Bebbington.  2011. “An Andean Avatar: Post-neoliberal and Neoliberal Strategies for Securing the Unobtainable.” New Political Economy 16 (1): 131–145.

Bush, R. 2018. “Africa: A Political Economy of Continued Crisis.” Afrika Focus 31 (2): 23–46.Gudynas, E.  2010. “The New Extractivism of the 21st Century: Ten Urgent Theses about Extractivism in Relation to Current South American Progressivism.” Americas Program Report, January 21. Washington, DC: Center for International Policy.

McKay, B. 2017. “Agrarian Extractivism in Bolivia.” World Development 97 (September): 199–211.

McNally, D. 2009. “From Financial Crisis to World-slump: Accumulation, Financialisation, and the Global Slowdown.” Historical Materialism 17: 35–83.

Ovadia, J. 2016. “Local Content Policies and Petro-development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative Analysis.” Resources Policy 49: 20–30.

Purcell, T. F., N. Fernandez, and E. Martinez, E. 2017. “Rents, Knowledge and Neo-structuralism: Transforming the Productive Matrix in Ecuador.” Third World Quarterly 38 (4): 918–938.

Veltmeyer, H., and J. Petras. 2014. The New Extractivism: A Post-neoliberal Development Model or Imperialism of the Twenty-first Century? London: Zed Books.

Entrepreneurs and Business in Rwanda: The Model Pupil Paradox

Based on his new book, David Poole exposes the Rwandan paradox: that despite extensive efforts to support a new entrepreneurial class and the formation of a small and medium enterprise private sector, the Rwandan economic landscape remains dominated by a vast number of informal micro-enterprises. All assumptions, he argues, by the leading development agencies have been proved wrong.

By David Poole

Vision 2020, the government of Rwanda’s economic development plan, set the ambitious aim of achieving middle-income status by 2020. It envisioned transitioning from an agricultural to a knowledge-based economy, spearheaded by the emergence of a new class of domestic entrepreneurs and a dynamic small and medium enterprise (SME) sector. It is a plan that is fully consistent with the entrepreneurship and SME development prescription advocated by leading development agencies including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and major donor nations.

Billions of dollars have been injected in order to facilitate Rwanda’s economic transformation but, paradoxically, the dynamic entrepreneur-led SME sector that was anticipated remains conspicuous by its absence. It comprises just 2.3 percent of private commercial enterprises. Instead, the commercial landscape is dominated by a vast number of informal micro-enterprises, typically household level subsistence enterprises comprising own-account workers who are, if anything, supported by unpaid family workers. Adjusting for inconsistencies between successive census data additionally suggests that the SME sector employs just 100,000 workers — a mere fraction of the 1.8 million non-agricultural jobs that the entrepreneurship and SME sector prescription was expected to deliver.

The paradox is not though due to any lack of effort by the government and people of Rwanda, who have diligently followed the prescription advanced by the major development institutions. Twenty years on, Rwandans thus have every right to ask why it has not worked – it is a question that my new book seeks to answer.

Surprisingly little is known about how or why entrepreneurs in developing economies come into existence, or the structures required to support them. As a consequence, policymaking is based on straight-line extrapolations from developed economies. One might expect such extrapolations to be drawn from a widely accepted body of knowledge about entrepreneurs in developed economies. Yet instead of a well-integrated body of knowledge, one is confronted by an ever-expanding range of inconsistent and competing theories.

One school of thought claims that entrepreneurs emerge, in an act of spontaneous combustion, in response to a favourable economic and institutional context. An alternative argument holds that their emergence is conditioned by access to various forms of capital, particularly finance (and especially microcredit) and investment in human capital. In a developing economy context these translate into a generalised belief in the existence of a sea of entrepreneurs-in-waiting who will emerge in response to a favourable institutional context, access to credit and the provision of business skills training. It is typified by Muhammad Yunus, the Bangladeshi economist’s implausible assertion that ‘every single human being, even one barefoot and begging in the street, is a potential entrepreneur’. In contrast to this belief in the ubiquitous nature of entrepreneurial capabilities, is the view that entrepreneurship is a minority capability determined by the presence of certain individual psychological characteristics, particularly the so-called ‘Big 3’ of need for achievement, internal locus of control and preparedness to embrace risk.

The Rwandan case

The Government of Rwanda has successfully fashioned an institutional framework that is fully consistent with what most economists claim should be conducive to entrepreneurship. It has created a competent and independent banking system, taken effective steps to establish a good governance climate, secured property rights, minimised corruption and streamlined the process for setting up an enterprise. This supportive context has provided a platform for programmes designed specifically to catalyse entrepreneurship and SME formation. These measures include significantly enhanced access to credit, the development of a large-scale business plan competition designed to identify and support potential entrepreneurs, business skills training, a major regional cluster strategy based on the American academic, Michael Porter’s theories of regional competitive advantage and the incorporation of ‘entrepreneurship teaching’ into the national curriculum.

Taken together it is clear that the Rwandan enterprise paradox is not explained by fundamental weaknesses in institutions or a lack of investment in financial and human capital. To find an explanation one must look beyond the unfounded assumptions that underpin the entrepreneurship and SME development prescription. This can only be achieved by talking to individuals who are navigating the so-called entrepreneurial journey.

Interviews with successful entrepreneurs in Rwanda reveal narratives that are antithetical to key elements of the theory that underpins the entrepreneurship and SME sector development prescription. Demands for increased access to credit, founded on the premise that entrepreneurs in developing economies struggle to obtain the finance they need, are thoroughly undermined. Despite widespread access to credit, the successful entrepreneurs in Rwanda did not want, nor indeed need it. They preferred to use their own money. If this proved to be insufficient they were remarkably adept at finding other ways to get their businesses started. Credit was not a binding constraint.

The economic argument that entrepreneurs seek to capture the entrepreneurial rents on offer were also found to be invalid. Successful entrepreneurs were driven by a desire to take control of their own lives and were prepared to sacrifice financial gains as a trade-off. The popular perception that entrepreneurs have a heightened propensity for taking risks was also found to be invalid. Instead, the successful Rwandan entrepreneurs went to considerable lengths to mitigate the risks they might face. Assumptions that learning how to write a business plan would help individuals to realise their entrepreneurial ambitions were also found to be erroneous. Instead of formal plans, the successful entrepreneurs preferred diving in and acting contingently, as circumstances dictated. This did not mean, though, that their behaviour was in any way cavalier. On the contrary, being risk averse, they sought reassurance that their commercial concepts were viable and were prepared to invest considerable time and effort in validating their business ideas. They were in no rush to get started and their businesses could consequently have a gestation period that could be measured in years.

Setting the findings from interviews with successful entrepreneurs against insights gained from interviews with aspiring entrepreneurs revealed some similarities but also significant differences. Aspiring entrepreneurs also planned to use a range of funding mechanisms for their businesses, but a significant number planned to use credit exclusively. A clear majority of the accounts also featured unambiguous references to financial motives for setting up a business, which clearly deviated from the successful entrepreneurs’ rejection of financial considerations. The aspiring entrepreneurs’ more overt financial orientation was often linked to the hope of generating an income in response to a weak labour market and the need to create some form of ‘job’ where none existed. Exploring risk propensity revealed a spectrum of attitudes, which ranged from individuals who were decidedly predisposed to taking risks, and reflected the popular conception of entrepreneurs as risk-takers, through to a small number that mirrored the successful entrepreneurs’ aversion to risk. The proclivity for diving in and acting contingently, which was favoured by successful entrepreneurs, was reflected in only a small minority of accounts and was outweighed by a clear majority who expressed a preference for formal business planning.

Synthesising the findings from the two sets of narratives revealed the presence of a small cluster of proto-entrepreneurs, who appear to be relatively well equipped for the entrepreneurial journey. While this does not guarantee their success, it does enhance the prospect of a positive outcome. However, the relative paucity of proto-entrepreneurs and the lengthy gestation period associated with how they will validate the viability of their enterprise concepts directly challenges underlying assumptions of both the entrepreneurship and SME development prescription and the Vision 2020 economic transition goal. There was no pre-existing massive reservoir of entrepreneurs-in-waiting that could be called forth, at will, by government policy.

The corollary to the low incidence of proto-entrepreneurs is an overrepresentation of individuals who have been seduced by the forceful promotion of entrepreneurship as a career choice. They are, perversely, exactly what the development agencies are seeking: individuals who can write a rudimentary business plan, have a high tolerance for risk and want to take on credit to fund setting up an enterprise. Unaware that they are ill-equipped for success, they will be gambling on an uncertain future where the odds are stacked against them. Their businesses will tend to lack commercial viability and be short-lived. Perniciously, these individuals will be left poorer than when they started — risk capital invested in a failed business will have been dissipated and collateral used to secure credit forfeited.

The narrative accounts of those actively engaged in the entrepreneurial journey reveal that the entrepreneurship and SME development prescription, which dominates development thinking, is fundamentally flawed. Based on false premises, the Rwandan enterprise paradox is consequently an unsurprising outcome. Other developing economies would do well to heed the experience of the development industry’s model pupil.

David Poole’s book Entrepreneurs and SMEs in Rwanda: The Model Pupil Paradox has just been released.

David L. Poole holds a PhD from SOAS, University of London, and an MBA from Imperial College Business School. He had a successful career as a marketing consultant and entrepreneur. The experience of heading a team of volunteers providing support to businesses in Rwanda sparked his interest in the country’s efforts to catalyse economic development through entrepreneurship and SME sector creation.

Featured Photograph: Daniel Ntakirutimana, a cyclist “taxi-rider”, waits for passengers in a rural area of Northern Rwanda (26 February 2020).

Riots, Protests and Global Adjustment: an interview with David Seddon

Continuing our series of interviews with scholar-activists from around the world, David Seddon reflects on popular struggles, politics and global adjustment in Africa and the world. Reflecting on the tenth anniversary of the North African revolutions, he argues that struggle takes place when the structural contradictions and inadequacies of the prevailing economic, social and political system are starkly revealed – the current period is one of these junctures.

Can you tell roape.net readers a little about yourself, your life, upbringing and early politicisation and activism?

I was born in London in 1943, during the Second World War. My parents had been married for ten years at that point, so I came as a surprise; sadly, I remained an only child, and my father died when I was eight, leaving my mother and me on our own. She remains the dominant influence on my ethics and my politics.

She came from a working-class family in Halifax (Yorkshire), left school at 13 and worked in a factory, while also going to night school to ‘improve’ herself. She married upwards. My father, who she met on a walking holiday in the Lake District, lived near Leeds and came from a ‘petty bourgeois’ background (his father, the son of a coal miner, had ‘bettered himself’ and become a baker and shopkeeper). My father won a scholarship and went to Batley Grammar School; he then became the first in his family to go to university, at Leeds, where he gained a first-class degree in physics, then went on to get a PhD and a lectureship at Sheffield University. My father died in December 1951.

My mother had to struggle to make ends meet. She sold our house in Blackheath and we moved to a flat; she learned to drive and got a job as an administrator in the local hospital, gradually working her way up to a senior position with the Woolwich Group of Hospitals, which she retained until she retired. In my school vacations, I worked in a variety of jobs, including as a hospital porter.

In the summer of 1961, having managed to get a place at Cambridge to read archaeology and anthropology, my mother arranged that I should spend a couple of months in Uganda, based at Makerere College with an old family friend from Sheffield who was Professor of Botany there. It was an extraordinary and transformative experience.

Although Uganda was still under colonial rule, there was excitement among Ugandans  about the future. Uganda gained independence the next year. At Cambridge, I enjoyed the freedom of university and also the intellectual challenge of my programme of studies. But now I wanted to travel. In my final year, I was torn between doing a PhD in archaeology or securing a job. I applied for several jobs and was delighted to be offered a junior lectureship in the School of African Studies at the University of Cape Town (UCT). My mother was less delighted, but was amazingly supportive.

Can you talk about your early research and work – as a scholar-activist? You had a varied trajectory, traveling to Cape Town, and to Morocco on research. How were you radicalised by a world that seemed to be rapidly radicalising and changing under your feet?

In August 1964, not long after my 21st birthday, I sailed from Southampton. Two weeks later, we docked in Cape Town. It was the start of an extraordinary and critical period of my life. Already alerted to the social divisions of a colonial society by my brief visit to Uganda, I was totally unprepared for the impact of life under apartheid. I had been largely uninterested in politics in Britain, and only marginally aware of class and racial inequality and discrimination more generally. But from my first day in Cape Town to my last day flying out of Johannesburg – on the day Dr Vervoerd, the so-called architect of apartheid was stabbed to death (6 September 1966) – I was now confronted by something unavoidable.

By the time I arrived in Cape Town in late 1964, the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the NCL (National Committee of Liberation), later the African Resistance Movement (ARM) ) had all initiated various forms of ‘armed struggle’ and had all been effectively repressed and crushed by the Special Branch, Bureau of Sate Security (BOSS) and other agencies of the state apparatus. Robben Island, where only a few months before (June 1964), Nelson Mandela had been incarcerated together with so many other ‘non-white’ political prisoners, was directly opposite UCT as a reminder. I was all too aware, furthermore, that some of my colleagues and friends were directly affected.

On campus, the main concern was the fall-out from the disintegration of the ARM and particularly the role played in that by former National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) leader, Adrian Leftwich. Some UCT students and members of staff were involved, either directly or indirectly. Some had been arrested and detained; some had already left the country, to go into exile, to study or take jobs abroad; others were soon to depart. It was the low ebb of the struggle. But even at this point there was considerable political activity at UCT and in Cape Town more generally. I was unavoidably drawn into this.

In the meanwhile, I also continued to be involved in teaching and in archaeological research. But I was beginning to consider my position, and when it came to a choice between a post as a field archaeologist or as a full lecturer at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, I chose the latter as a way of keeping open the direction of my future career. I was veering increasingly towards social anthropology as I struggled to make sense of contemporary social and political realities.

On arrival at the (London School of Economics (LSE), in September 1966, I decided to pursue research in Tanzania, as this was now an independent state with a growing reputation for progressive government policies and a centre for African political activists, from South Africa and Mozambique among other countries. I started learning Swahili. I joined the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Institute of Race Relations.

I was turned down for a visa to carry out research in Tanzania, ironically enough because I had lived for two years in South Africa. This was a major blow. While desperately exploring other possible field sites for my research, however, an opportunity arose to join a research project in Morocco, that would involve social anthropological fieldwork. I applied and was accepted. I started learning Arabic at once and re-registered for a PhD, with Professor Ernest Gellner, whose own thesis had been on Morocco and was about to be published as Saints of the Atlas, as my supervisor.

In the course of your early research you were influenced by E.P. Thompson’s ‘The Making of the English Working Class’ (1968), the writings of the French Marxist anthropologists, and the work of André Gunder Frank on ‘Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America’ (1969) and, of course, Walter Rodney’s work. Can you describe the influence of these writers on your own work, political development and teaching?

I had already become familiar with some of the work of the new French Marxist anthropologists, like Clause Meillassoux and Maurice Godelier, and I began to try to apply some of their thinking to my own field data, but to be honest, although it was helpful in trying to make sense of Moroccan economy and society in the pre-colonial period, as in its own way was Gellner’s own distinctive approach, it seemed about as useless as the other, more ‘traditional’ anthropological approaches and paradigms when tackling colonialism and the radical transformation of local economy and society during the 20th century.

It was not until I had read E. P. Thompson’s ‘The Making of the English Working Class’ (1968) and a Danish anthropologist lent me a copy of André Gunder Frank’s ‘Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America’ (1969) that I was able to see how the whole study of ‘economic and political change in the Eastern Rif of Morocco’ could be framed in a way that combined neo-Marxist theories of underdevelopment with a historical Marxist class analysis of agrarian change.

In the early 1970s, I translated a short work on the ‘Berbers of Morocco’ by Robert Montagne (a French colonial administrator and anthropologist) which was published in 1973 and then became involved in putting together a collection of work by the French Marxist anthropologists. This led to a collaboration with French Marxist anthropologist Jean Copans (with whom I wrote a joint introduction) and with translator and Middle East anthropologist Helen Lackner (author of several excellent books on Yemen). The collection eventually was published, after inordinate delays, in 1978, as Relations of Production: Marxist approaches to economic anthropology).

Sometime later, you moved to Development Studies at the University of the East Anglia. Can you explain why ‘development studies’ was an important and original (and in some hands) radical endeavour? How did your work progress through this period?

I always found the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at SOAS, and indeed SOAS itself, to be generally conservative – a place where even an attempt to form a branch of the Association of University Teachers was regarded by the management as threatening. One of my colleagues was nearly sacked for producing a pamphlet which analysed SOAS as a ‘Byzantine bureaucracy’, and I personally was reprimanded by my Head of Department for wearing jeans in the senior common room ‘because I might have been mistaken for a student’.

When I saw an advertisement for a range of posts in the School of Social Studies at the University of East Anglia (UEA) in Norwich, with a view to working together to build a new School of Development Studies, it seemed very attractive.

I was much taken from the outset by the ‘openness’ of UEA, which had been part of the wave of ‘new’ universities set up in the 1960s. I was also impressed by the fact that the Professor who was to head the new School wore jeans and a roll-neck pullover! Several colleagues were members of the International Socialism Group (IS) – later, in January 1977, to become the Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP). I was impressed with the personal and political commitment of these comrades to the cause and with their intellectual rigour and became in effect a kind of fellow-traveller – as I suppose I continue to be.

The first year (1972) was very exciting as we planned for a whole new interdisciplinary undergraduate degree programme in Development Studies, with foundation courses in ‘natural resources’ and ‘social sciences’ as well as ‘development studies’. Our first intake was in 1973 and a small group of us taught a radical development studies course together. Key texts included works by A. G. Frank and Walter Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, which had just been published (1972). Exciting times.

During the heady political period of the 1970s – in the UK and in Africa – many far-reaching questions where being raised about Marxist political economy. A generation saw in Tanzania – and elsewhere – and the largely top-down project of transformation as signalling a possible dawn for socialist change. How did you understand what was happening in the radical movements at the time? Where did you put your activist energies? 

In 1974, Harold Wilson became Labour prime minister for a second time with a radical agenda for change; he also initially appointed a Cabinet Minister for Overseas Development. It began to look as though Labour might take a more radical approach to ‘overseas development’. I joined the Labour Party and became active in local politics, eventually becoming chair of my local branch and standing (unsuccessfully) in 1979 for district council. I was also active in trade union politics within the university.

As regards our practical involvement in what was still called The Third World, the UEA had already approved the formation (in 1967) of a not-for-profit international consultancy group, called the Overseas Development Group (ODG), which provided specialist advice and short-course training to governments and to non-governmental organizations, and fed the income earned into maintaining a level of staffing well above that funded by the University and into providing scholarships for students and trainees from Asia, Africa and Latin America.

During the 1970s, the ODG provided training courses for cadres from various organizations struggling for independence now but also looking to the future when they might spear-head new governments. These organizations included The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), South-West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and the Mozambique Liberation Front  (FRELIMO) from southern Africa. From 1976 onwards, I personally developed relations with the organization representing the Saharawis in their struggle for independence from Moroccan occupation, the POLISARIO Front and began to write about the Western Sahara and Morocco (including articles in the Review of African Political Economy). I also began to develop links with the PLO, particularly with the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), links which would become more significant in the 1980s when I visited Israel/Palestine several times with the covert support of OXFAM and Christian Aid.

In 1973, the ODG landed a major research grant from the Ministry of Overseas Development to undertake an evaluation of the impact of road construction in Nepal, where British aid was contributing to the building of the East-West Highway. The team working on developing the proposal into a viable research project was lacking a sociologist and social anthropologist, so I was drafted in to assist, although I knew nothing about Nepal and was still struggling with my PhD thesis. The differences and similarities with Morocco were fascinating, and needed more perspective on my theoretical framework.

So, in February 1974, I flew out to Nepal with one other member of the team and his family and we established our base in Pokhara, in the west central region, where several roads had been recently built or were in the process of construction. In March, our families joined us. We lived and worked in Nepal on the ODG Roads Research Project, on and off for two years. We learned Nepali, the children learned Nepali, and we walked and drove over a vast region, including mountains, hills and plains, to assess ‘the effects of roads in west central Nepal’ (the title of our main three volume report in 1976 and our summary in 1977).

As this interview is for ROAPE I shall keep this section relatively short, but suffice it to say that my evolving theoretical framework for my Moroccan thesis proved very effective as an overall framework for our research project in Nepal, although the canvass was far larger and our capacity for data collection immensely greater than for my solo study. Our approach was inter-disciplinary – the team included a geographer, an economist, an agricultural economist, a sociologist and a social anthropologist – and we tried to combine different levels and modes of analysis in a mutually complementary fashion.

Our final report, with its political economy approach and its conclusion that road construction does not necessarily bring about progressive economic development, created waves in the Ministry, which had now become subordinate to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The promise of a radical approach to ‘overseas development’ had not materialised and the Wilson government was in trouble. We were hauled before various committees, and our own ODG management, and roundly criticised. It was not until a mandarin actually commended our initiative and originality, that the row eventually subsided.

Vindicated, we felt, by this eventual outcome, and with funds from the ESRC and the OECD we took our studies in Nepal further, returning several times to the same region. We produced a number of publications as a result of our work there: Centre & Periphery: Social and Spatial Relations of Inequality in Nepal (1977), The Struggle for Basic Needs in Nepal (1979), Peasants and Workers in Nepal (1979), and, finally, Nepal in Crisis: growth and stagnation at the periphery (1980). All bore the hallmark of the neo-Marxist and Marxist approach we had now adopted. Nepal in Crisis (which was published in India to increase its availability on the sub-continent) was banned for a decade by the government of Nepal, and the British Ambassador vowed we would never work in Nepal again.

It still gives me pride to learn from Nepali comrades that this book (which was widely smuggled into the country) inspired them in their opposition to the party-less ‘panchayat’ democracy of the king of Nepal. I even have a copy signed by Babu Ram Bhattarai, one of the leaders of the Maoist movement which would lead a People’s War in Nepal during the late 1990s and early 2000s, while he was living ‘underground’, and dedicated to his “guru, David Seddon”. Amusingly, we met secretly in the garden of a hotel in Kathmandu mainly frequented by foreign development consultants!

Inspired by a workshop on ‘modes of production’ that I attended in Turkey in late 1979, I spent six months in 1980 teaching at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara and carrying out research funded by the Population Council with Turkish colleagues on ‘paths of rural transformation in Turkey’. I was able to contribute to the on-going debate on the left at the time regarding the nature of agriculture (feudal or capitalist?) and the appropriate strategy for socialist and communists as a result of my familiarity with the Indian ‘modes of production’ debate (which had informed our work in Nepal) and the wider debate on these issues now taking place in many parts of the world and being published in such journals as the Journal of Peasant Studies.

In 1983 I went to the University of Bir Zeit in the occupied West Bank, not just to give lectures at Bir Zeit but also to secretly tour the Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza with funds from OXFAM and Christian Aid to assess the potential for ‘development under occupation’.  I went again, under the same auspices and as a member of the Middle East Committees of both these NGOs, in 1984; and then again in 1986. These visits led to the development of several enduring friendships with Palestinian comrades, particularly those associated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). I continue to have a very special relationship with the Palestinian struggle for self-determination.

During the 1980s, the School of Development Studies, where you were teaching in Norwich, had appointed André Gunder Frank as Professor of Social Change. Can you talk about the experience of working Gunder Frank – and discuss briefly, some of the strengths and weaknesses in his work?

André Gunder Frank’s ideas on development and underdevelopment started gaining circulation and influence after Salvador Allende was elected president in 1970, though when Frank, already persona non grata in the US for his support of the Cuban revolution, arrived in 1968, Allende, then president of the senate, had to meet him at the airport to prevent him being deported. Following General Pinochet’s military coup in September 1973, Frank became a political exile again. He dedicated the next two decades to analysing the global crisis and the failures of neo-liberalism and Reagan-omics, with posts first at the Max Planck Institute (1973-78) and then UEA (1978-83).

I had the privilege of being on the selection committee that appointed Gunder, as we called him, in 1978 to a Chair in Social Change, and of co-directing with him during the early 1980s a Masters programme in Development Studies, whose core course was on Contemporary World Development, and drew heavily on his own work, including Crisis in the World Economy and Crisis in the Third World, although the list of readings also included Nepal in Crisis. He tended to see ‘the big picture’ – at the global ‘world systems’ level – but was also prepared to see ‘development’ and ‘under- development’ as an issue of inter-national ‘exploitation’ and was, I felt, weaker on the articulation of modes of production and associated class struggle, which is where I felt in a stronger position, having done fieldwork at the grass roots and having been involved in political action at the local level. We complemented each other well, we thought, combining Neo-Marxist and Marxist perspectives.

Teaching with Gunder was an extraordinary and exciting experience, for his teaching style was unorthodox – using the daily newspapers to thread together an analysis of developments across the world in each session and demanding that the students try to make their own sense of ‘contemporary world development’ using ‘the news’ as a basic text rather than a range of academic works. In 1983, we jointly wrote a full description of the Contemporary World Development Course in the 4th edition of Peace and World Order Studies: a curriculum guide.

He was generous and friendly to his students, but intolerant of university bureaucracy and hierarchy, and many colleagues found him ‘difficult’. I managed to maintain a warm relationship with him and his wife and children while they lived in Norwich. His wife, Marta Fuentes, had been an influential activist in the women’s movement in Chile, where they met, and had a profound influence on Frank’s own political and economic thinking. They left the UEA and Norwich in 1983, after a disagreement with the University administration over his joint position at UEA and the Free University of Amsterdam, and he continued to teach, travel, lecture and write while based in Amsterdam until 1994, a year after the death of Marta his wife. Gunder died in 2005.

You also co-authored, in 1994, a pioneering book on Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment – that placed popular resistance at the heart of development in the ‘third world’. Specifically, you saw how ‘global adjustment’ had altered the developing world, but also triggered an explosion of protest. More recently, in the last two decades, you have worked on political movements in Africa. What was your objective and motivation in carrying out this work?

In 1984, largely in response to economic reforms introduced as part of the increasingly pervasive influence of the IMF and the World Bank and their ‘structural adjustment’ programmes, there were major movements of popular unrest in Morocco and Tunisia (which were widely referred to as ‘bread riots’); and these were followed in 1985 by a popular movement in Sudan that led to the overthrow of President Nimeiry. I spent some time following the detail of these movements and started to write about them, in ROAPE, among other publications.

This interest in ‘popular movements’ became a major strand of my academic work over the next couple of decades, and eventually led to a collaboration with John Walton, a Latin American specialist, on what seemed to be a ‘wave’ of popular protest – a global phenomenon – reminiscent of the wave of riots and popular protest by the ‘English crowd’  in response to the rise of the market at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, so well described by E.P. Thompson and by Eric Hobsbawm and George Rudé. The book, Free Markets and Food Riots: the politics of global adjustment, was published in 1994 at the height of the Western ‘globalization’ project.

The book started with a couple of theoretical chapters, setting out our understanding of political economy, moral economy and class struggle, and then explored the dynamics and contours of popular protest largely on a region by region basis, covering Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East, and South Asia, as well as a chapter on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union/Russia, but with a special chapter written by myself and my partner, on women’s protest. In Africa, between 1990 and 1994, popular protest movements and strikes had brought down more than 30 regimes and led to multi-party elections for the first time, in some cases, in a generation.

What was striking, even at the time, was the relative lack of popular protest in three main regions – the oil rich states of the Gulf and Libya, South East Asia, and East Asia. These were, in effect, the regions most insulated against the Western project of globalisation, with its emphasis on ‘open-ness’ to foreign investment, on privatization and on ‘the rule of markets’. Indeed, there had been growing recognition, particularly on the left, that an alternative to the neo-liberal ideology of the ‘free market’ – which many referred to as ‘state capitalism’ – had been effectively maintained over several decades in many of the countries of South East and East Asia – something that was grudgingly recognised even by the IMF and World Bank by the mid-1990s.

But, this was to change with what was referred to as the Asian ‘melt-down’ or financial crisis that started in July 1997 in Thailand, and had serious repercussions throughout the region. The IMF stepped in, with its usual conditionalities, and by the end of the decade, the crisis was over and globalization continued apace, until the banking and financial crisis of 2007-2008. This decade saw the effective consolidation of the conditions for rapid economic growth, particularly in East Asia, and notably in China. Some countries in Asia, however, and even more in sub-Saharan Africa, remained poor.

Though your focus has long been on African political economy, you never limited yourself to the continent – and you have ‘strayed’ across the global. As we have seen, for example, you have worked on Nepal, and it’s astonishing movements and politics. Can you take us through this work, and your hopes – and disillusionment – with the Maoist movement?

By 2001, the People’s War had expanded from a local movement based largely in the remote hill areas of Western Nepal to have a presence and an impact across the whole country; also, whereas it had been seen mainly as a law and order problem in the late 1990s, to be dealt with by the armed police, towards the end of 2001, the Royal Nepalese Army became involved and the conflict intensified. For the next four years, I was employed as a part-time ‘conflict’ adviser and had good access to both civilian and military government officials, as well as to the British civilian (DfID) and military advisers.

At the same time, I was also engaged with different groups on the left, both those that had remained within the mainstream of party politics, like the United Marxist-Leninist Party (UML) and the Workers and Peasants’ Party, and with the Maoists, many of whom were now operating ‘underground’. I also started working closely with a UML-oriented NGO, called Rural Reconstruction Nepal (RRN) whose director was a former PhD student and now a UML civil society leader. RRN gained a reputation, during the People’s War, of being one of the very few NGOs that was able to operate effectively even in Maoist-controlled areas. This was largely because of the political sophistication of the RRN’s director – who was able to maintain close contact with the Maoist leadership throughout the conflict and ensure that RRN’s project activities were always undertaken with the approval or at least acquiescence of the Maoists.

Through my close relationship with this individual, I was able to meet several members of the Maoist leadership, including Dr Babu Ram Bhattarai, whose PhD thesis (1986) on development and underdevelopment in Nepal had been strongly influenced by our own work, especially Nepal in Crisis. His thesis was subsequently published as a book The Nature of Underdevelopment and Regional Structure of Nepal – a Marxist Analysis. In 2003, the director of RRN and I published a collection of essays – The People’s War in Nepal: left perspectives’ – which included pieces by Bhattarai and other Maoists, including the veteran leader of another Maoist faction, M.B. Singh, and various independent left intellectuals, as well as an introduction by ourselves. Later, in 2008, with another Nepali colleague, I edited a second collection of essays, this time by a combination of Nepali and foreign intellectuals, called In Hope and in Fear: living through the People’s War in Nepal.

The success of the Maoists in transforming the armed conflict into a political movement, was in part the result of an attempt by the king in February 2005 to concentrate all power into his own hands, engineering a coup d’état, banning all political and civil society organizations, controlling the media, and taking command of the army and security forces. This prompted a strong adverse reaction from a number of influential states, including India, the US and the UK; it also led to an alliance between the main political parties in support of democracy and against the king. For a while, it was unclear how the triangular balance of forces – Maoists, monarchists and political parties – would come to rest, but the Maoists managed to persuade the political parties of their good faith, and in November 2006, a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) was signed that brought an end to the conflict and effectively ousted the king from power.

Shortly afterwards, an interim government was formed, Nepal was declared a republic and planning for elections to a Constituent Assembly began. After some difficulties, including popular unrest in parts of the country that felt left out of the highly centralised decision-making in Kathmandu, a Constituent Assembly was elected in April 2008, through a combination of first-past-the-post and proportional representation, with an unprecedented number of seats filled by women and ethnic minorities. When a government was eventually formed, it was headed by the Maoist leader ‘Prachanda’ (Pushpa Kamal Dahal), with Dr Babu Ram Bhattarai as Minister of Finance. It seemed for a short time in 2008 that Nepal was poised for the promised revolution, under an elected Marxist-dominated government.

Sadly, it was not to be. For reasons that have yet to be fully analysed, the Maoists failed to capitalise on their extraordinary success as a political movement, and, instead, became bogged down in the petty politics of what they had always complained was typical of ‘parliamentary democracy’. Personal rivalries, venality and corruption, plain incompetence and foreign interference have all been seen as reasons for the failure to implement that economic, social and political transformation for which the Maoists and their supporters had fought and died for; the difficulties associated with re-orienting a movement of military and political cadres into a democratic political party should also not be under-estimated. But fail they did.

In recent years, however, particularly after I took early retirement from the School of Development Studies in 2006, I have tended to re-focus my efforts on local politics in the UK, and on the relationship between popular protest, social movements and class struggle in Africa.

You have been very much involved over the years in debates regarding the relevance and pertinence of Marxism as an approach to African studies. You were forthright and original in your own response – refusing to follow ‘fashionable’ formulations, without careful and close study yourself. For our readers, please explain what was going on and how you responded.

I have been involved with ROAPE for many years and, in the early 1990s, co-edited several issues of the journal – with Peter Lawrence on ‘The Price of Economic Reform’ (1990), with Lionel Cliffe on ‘Africa in a New World Order’ (1991), and with Pepe Roberts on ‘Fundamentalism in Africa: Religion and Politics’ (1991). During the 1990s and early 2000s I was very involved with work in Nepal.

But towards the end of the decade, I began to develop a new working relationship with some of those working on sub-Saharan African politics. While still at UEA, I had supervised the PhD thesis of Peter Dwyer (one of very few students to go directly from a BA Hons to a PhD) on social movements in South Africa, and in April 2002, he and I presented a paper at the 8th International Conference on Alternative Futures and Popular Protest on entitled ‘The New Wave: A Global Perspective on Popular Protest’, which in part took up some of the themes of the ‘Free Markets and Food Riots’ book with John Walton, and also tried to break new ground in the light of the new international ‘anti-capitalist’ Social Forum movement that started in Seattle in 1999, then in Genoa in 2001.

Moving from a global perspective on popular protest to consider Africa in particular, where there were a number of Social Forum meetings in 2003 and 2004, Leo Zeilig and I published an article on ‘Class and Protest in Africa: new waves’ in ROAPE (2005). This was followed up by chapters ‘Marxism, Class and Resistance in Africa’ and of ‘The History of Class Struggle in Africa’ in a book edited by Leo Zeilig on Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa (Haymarket, 2009). In the meanwhile, Leo Zeilig and I had collaborated with left historian David Renton, to produce a book on the Congo (published by Zed Books in 2006). This work put ‘class struggle’ in the broadest sense at the centre of the analysis and, while recognising the structural constraints of the wider political economy, focused on grass-roots social movements and popular protest.

I have always been committed to the idea that ordinary men and women can make a difference and contribute to revolutionary change. I reject the idea that there is a set and prescribed ‘revolutionary path’ in which certain social actors and agencies must lead ‘the revolution’, and believe that Marx was right when he said, in effect, that ‘men and women make history albeit not under conditions of their own choosing’. This inevitably leads to a commitment to political activism as well as to analysis.

This month as you know (January 2021) sees the anniversary of the Tunisian revolution and the start of the Egyptian one. Given that your entire work has focused on popular struggle and resistance, within a global perspective and reach, and much interest and research in particular from North Africa, can I ask you about the North Africa revolutions of 2011. Briefly, how can we understand the immense hope and the defeats of this revolutionary wave? What are the lessons to be learned for popular and revolutionary struggles today from this period of revolt?

What you refer to as ‘the North Africa revolutions of 2011’ were part of a wave of popular struggle that has become known as ‘the Arab Spring’. Born out of a combination of desperation and hope for better things, this extraordinary uprising – involving everything from demonstrations to riots to armed rebellion – affected almost every country in the Arabic-speaking world. Given my long-standing interest in the region, I followed the development of this phenomenon very closely.

It began with popular protest in Tunisia following the death on 4 January of a Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, who had set himself on fire in response to the harassment and humiliation inflicted on him by municipal officials. Horror and outrage at this incident turned into popular protest against the petty bureaucracy and corruption of the authoritarian regime of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. A month later, after 23 years in power, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia, to be replaced initially by an interim government and then, after elections, by an Ennahda Islamist government.

The protests in Tunisia were widely reported in the Arabic social and main-stream media and provoked mass demonstrations across the Arab world, from the Maghreb to the Mashreq. In a number of states, the protests transformed themselves into anti-government movements. In addition to Tunisia, these movements developed in Libya, in Egypt, in Bahrain, in Yemen, in Kuwait and in Syria to the point where they achieved significant purchase and brought about real political change.

For example, in Libya, the government crack-down on protestors sparked a civil war; in Egypt, Cairo’s Tahrir Square was the site of three weeks of mass protests that eventually forced President Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled for 30 years, out of office and he was replaced, after elections, by Mohamed Morsi, an Islamist affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. In Syria, also, popular protest drew on widespread opposition to the authoritarian regime of President Bashir al Assad and included a significant number of Islamist groups. As in Libya, this led to a civil war. In Yemen, massive protests sparked a political crisis and forced President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had led Yemen for 33 years, to step down, eventually in 2012.

While hailing ‘the Arab Spring’ initially as a positive ‘democratic’ development, the West was also, from the outset, concerned both at the importance of radical Islamist groups in the opposition movements and also at the risk of instability in a volatile region. There was particular concern when Mubarak was replaced by Morsi in Egypt, when Islamic State (ISIS) emerged as one of the major groups fighting against the Assad regime in Syria, and when the government led by Saleh’s former vice president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, in Yemen struggled to fend off threats both from Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and from Houthi militants who were increasingly supported by Iran.

Early Western military intervention against the Assad regime in Syria proved increasingly problematic, given steadfast Russian support for the regime and its characterisation of most opposition groups as ‘terrorists’; but reluctant Russian acquiescence to Western military intervention in Libya and support for the opposition militias enabled the overthrow of President Gaddafi and his assassination. Both Syria and Libya descended over the next few years into chaos and civil war. There is much more to say, but this would require more time and space and perhaps another interview!

Finally, in terms of your lifelong commitment to radical social change, in the UK and in the ‘developing world’, what prospects and hopes to you see for this type of change today? What is the role of an activist-scholar in the movements we have seen and specifically in the context of Black Lives Matter?     

These are hard times, as humanity struggles against covid-19. But, as always with crises, this struggle takes place at a turning point when the structural contradictions and inadequacies of the prevailing economic, social and political system are starkly revealed. The unacceptable inequalities that result from various forms of exploitation and repression ‘of the many by the few’ are shown to be not inevitable but the result of modes of production and ways of life that must change dramatically if we are all to emerge from the pandemic and have any prospect of sustainable development in a world whose resources we have so mercilessly and recklessly exploited and degraded in our greed and lack of concern for the consequences of our actions. There must be a better way!

In this context, our role as activist-scholars, as you put it, is to combine theory and practice, recognising our own position – in my case as a white middle-class older male – in the prevailing social, economic and political context (at local, national and international levels) and to assess when, where and how best to contribute to progressive movements and organisations. Those of us with a particular historical and on-going involvement with ‘Africa’ need to make sure that we work as closely as possible with African intellectuals and political activists on the left and provide whatever appropriate input we can.

But we also need to recognize that ‘Black Lives Matter’ provides us with new personal and political challenges, as well as opportunities for contributions in our own countries and specific local locations – in my case in Norfolk and south London, in England, the UK and Europe – which investigate and interrogate the complexity of both European and British imperialism and colonialism, and their heritage in Britain as well as other parts of the world, and also their contemporary features.

This interview was compiled, edited and conducted by ROAPE’s Peter Dwyer and Leo Zeilig.   

David Seddon is a researcher and political activist who has written extensively on social movements, class struggles and political transitions across the developing world. David is a regular contributor to roape.net and a former member of the Editorial Working Group of ROAPE.

Featured photograph: Children participating in protests in Egypt during the 2011 revolution (H. Elrasam, 1 August 2013).

The World Bank and Covid-19: the private investment broker of the Global South

Despite cosmetic rebranding, the World Bank continues its decades-long work of pushing power into the hands of private capital. Sean Taylor explains how the Covid-19 response is being used to further the Bank’s role of acting as a private investment broker in the Global South.

By Sean Taylor

For decades, it has been documented that World Bank operations have advanced capitalist restructuring in the Global South, and that it is institutionally wedded to the language and ideology of neoliberalism: deregulation, privatisation, marketisation, and commercialisation. This institutional fixation with neoliberal ideology remains almost unchanged in the face of rapidly changing global economic and political circumstances.

The 2010s were set against the backdrop of the 2007/8 financial crisis, which posed a severe threat to neoliberalism. This decade also saw the coming-of-age of alternative economic models, in the form of the ‘developmental state,’ or ‘retro-liberalism,’ offered by the likes of China and Brazil. This has furthered the ideological challenge to neoliberalism. Yet, the Bank – rather than updating its economic doctrine for the 21st century – spent the 2010s transferring power into the hands of private capital, as it has always done. For example, its Maximising Finance for Development (MFD) scheme, one of its flagship policies of the decade, is presented as an innovative new way of financing sustainable development in the Global South. Though presented as part of the Bank’s rebranding as a ‘solutions Bank,’ ostensibly void of ideology, in practice it operates according to the same neoliberal logic long promoted by the institution.

This tunnel vision is guiding the Bank’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic, despite the potential for global economic transformation. That this commitment to neoliberal orthodoxy should remain steadfast, in the face of such challenges, suggests that the Bank enters the 2020s doing the same fundamental job it has done since the 1980s: transferring power to private capital.

The World Bank and Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism has not, of course, been the sole preserve of the World Bank. Since the 1970s the global economy has undertaken a process of capitalist restructuring, in which the fundamental tenets of a capitalist economy have been expanded: free markets, private property, exchange relations across society, and power shifts in favour of capital over labour (I understand neoliberalism to be essentially a project of capitalist restructuring, and that it should be understood in this context). This has been an almost universal phenomenon, yet the Bank has been crucial in advancing this programme in the Global South.

Since the late 1970s the Global South has become dependent on capital in the form of loans, contingent on neoliberal reforms such as tax cuts, lower regulations, lower financial costs, and privatisation of public services. Societies in the Global South have been profoundly reorganised as a result. I appreciate that this is not new territory for readers of roape.net, and it should be noted that much of ROAPE’s coverage of the continent in the 1980s examined in detail the consequences for African societies and economies of World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes (see the archive for back issues of the review). There has been no lack of critique of this neoliberal model, but dependence on Western capital, and lack of credible alternative economic models (since 1989 and the collapse of the Berlin Wall) has meant near ideological hegemony in international development. Without challenge, it is of little surprise that the Bank continued to vigorously promote neoliberal reforms in the developing world.

The landscape has, however, changed rapidly since 2008. Alternative economic models are being offered in countries such as China and Brazil. Neoliberal logic assumes the state, its regulatory powers, and ownership of industries, are impediments to free market efficiency. By contrast actors such as China and Brazil see the state as an imperative actor for directing capital towards appropriate projects. The ‘developmental state’, as this model is often known, is an active participant in development, not a bureaucratic frustration whose frontiers are to be rolled back. This model is sometimes also referred to as ‘retro-liberalism,’ for its similarities with Western models of the 1950s. As well as offering a viable alternatives to neoliberalism, more Southern actors – China, Brazil, India, Venezuela and South Africa, for example – are acting as development lenders and investors, reducing dependency on Western capital, and thus the associated contingencies.

This threat to neoliberalism’s ideological and geostrategic dominance rapidly accelerated following the global financial crash of 2007/8 – largely blamed on deregulation of global finance. The countries which had most embraced neoliberalism in the decades prior – such as the UK, where this blogpost is being written – entered a recession followed by a decade of austerity. By contrast, developing countries offering alternative, ‘retro-liberal’ models came out of the crash in a position of relative strength, having maintained high, if decelerated, growth rates.

Together this posed an existential crisis for neoliberalism. The model’s failures had been exposed in the West where it wreaked economic havoc and was subsequently rebuked from all sides; both right-wing and left-wing politicians attacked what was commonly labelled neoliberal globalisation. In some parts of the Global South alternative models were providing high growth rates and appeared to offer a preferable route for smaller developing countries. The capital dependency upon which the West had relied on in order to strong-arm neoliberal reforms on to the Global South was being weakened.

Sham reforms

In terms of the game, it would have made sense at this point for the World Bank to have adapted to remain relevant. Even the IMF appeared to recognise its limitations, in admitting that elements of the neoliberal project “have not delivered as expected.” Yet, the Bank’s adaptations to this new world in which neoliberalism was losing the ideational battle have been merely cosmetic thus far.

As early as 2012 there was talk of a “new strategic identity,” growing into a “solutions bank.” Arguably, one implication of becoming a ‘solutions bank’ is an admission that the Bank was previously not focused on perfecting solutions, but ideology. Was the Bank tacitly suggesting it would be repositioning itself at a further distance from neoliberalism?

If so, the Bank’s rhetoric did not match its actions. The flagship announcement of the 2010s, the MFD scheme, ultimately follows the same logic as its previous work in the Global South. MFD is described by the Bank as an opportunity to bridge the US$2.6 trillion per year gap between development aid and what is necessary to end global poverty. The Bank sees developing countries as a US$12 trillion ‘market opportunity,’ into which it seeks to attract private capital investment using subsidies and guarantees, and legal, policy, and regulatory changes. This sets up securitisation markets in the financial sector, and proliferates the use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP).

In practice, this equates to the deregulation of domestic finance sectors, in order to incorporate global financial institutions and shadow banking institutions in the economy. Foreign investment is enticed through further deregulation of labour, land, environmental, and social laws. In other words, a wholesale reconfiguration of the economy in order to access private debt.

For example, in Indonesia where the MFD scheme is being used for geothermal exploration, the Bank seeks to use US$150m from the government, US$175m in concessional climate finance, and US$325m in Bank loans to unlock US$4bn in private capital investment to put towards geothermal exploration. The Bank itself provides “advice on how to structure the facility to align with the needs of the private sector.” Rather than Bank or state-led investment adapting to the needs of Indonesia’s energy sector, the Bank explicitly states that Indonesia must make adaptations to the needs of private sector investors. There are plenty of similar instances in Kenya and Nepal where MFD is underway, and the Bank states that “MFD is about prioritizing private sector solutions and optimizing the use of scarce public resources.”

Development is reduced, then, to being dependent on neoliberal reforms which expand the private sector and weaken the power of the state over its domestic economy. This is ‘development’ as a power-grab by global finance. The Bank’s reinvention of itself amounts to little more than becoming a private investment broker in developing economies.

Covid and the Bank

Today the world faces a fresh challenge to the neoliberal model, with the Covid-19 pandemic graphically illuminating its deficiencies. In particular, the reduction in state-planning capacity left countries ill-equipped for the logistical challenges the pandemic posed, with the so-called efficiencies of the market found wanting.

This has been particularly exposed in the distinction between the failure of the neoliberal West’s test, trace and isolate systems – which were often contracted out to the private sector – compared to those of Asian countries. Just-in-time supply chains and large supranational free trade areas and political bodies begin to look outdated in a world where borders are being closed and the nation-state confirmed as a real political and sovereign entity.

Public-private-partnerships have been a hallmark of neoliberalism, often supplying public services. These have been long-criticised, but the collapse in demand for some of these services during periods of lockdown has left some states with huge bills being paid to private companies just so they can maintain profit margins. The World Bank’s failure to produce data on exactly how much is being spent only serves to make it look like a shady racketeering scheme. Profit margins remain too sacred to be touched, whilst states will no doubt be forced to make cuts to public services in order to pay for them.

At the same time as the virus have ripped through communities and societies demand has increased for healthcare. In much of the developing world, public healthcare systems are underfunded and of poor quality, and much provision is private – again this is the legacy of structural adjustment programmes and reforms from the 1980s. The role of global finance, and its need for returns on investment, in funding private healthcare means that profit is often put before a universal quality of care. The result is grotesque health inequalities. Rather than a ‘great leveller,’ the pandemic shows that the greater role of private companies and global finance in healthcare systems results in higher death rates among those in a worse socioeconomic position.

Despite these fundamental flaws, inherent to the neoliberal model, the Bank has refused to change course. Of the World Bank’s initial US$14bn disbursement to mitigate the effects of the pandemic, US$8bn (57%) was channelled through the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the Bank, representing an increase on its historic average of 17%. Of the IFC funding, 68% went to financial institutions rather than ‘real sector’ businesses, such as agribusiness, healthcare, and tourism; 50% of funding to these sectors went to companies that are, or are owned by, international conglomerates. Therefore, the Bank’s Covid response was primarily an exercise in rescuing global finance.

Funding allocated by the IFC to the ‘real sector’ continues to support this notion. To take one example, the IFC and the International Development Association (another arm of the WB) are raising US$4m in blended concessional finance (private investment) to support a project by Ciel Healthcare, Uganda’s largest private healthcare provider. Given the health inequalities inherent to the financialisation of health systems, this is not an optimum project for protecting Ugandans, which would be to improve universal public healthcare systems, rather than brokering private investment.

This is part of a wider trend in the developing world. Spending on public health briefly increased when the pandemic first surged, but the focus quickly returned to private provision, with the IFC announcing a US$4bn Public Health Platform with the explicit purpose of “support[ing] the private sector’s ability and capacity to deliver healthcare products and services.”

Taking other examples, an emergency Bank loan to Ecuador in May, the Bank demonstrates a commitment to the wider principles of neoliberal economics to stimulate economic growth. The loan was conditional on removing certain sectoral minimum wages and increasing exemptions for taxes on financial transactions. A loan to Nigeria’s energy sector in June last year was completed with the explicit purpose of de-risking investment for the private sector. In these instances, the Bank is acting to hand power to private capital, effectively making the success of Ecuador and Nigeria’s domestic economies dependent on the rampant desire for profits motivating global financial institutions.

These are not isolated examples. The Bank declared in one blogpost last year that its Covid-19 response is part of their “integrated approach to help mobilize private sector financing.” It goes on to discuss the central role PPPs will play in their future economic plans, despite the way they have locked in profits for private investors.

This is the future offered by the Bank. It continues to advocate for neoliberal reforms in the Global South even as this model faces, what would appear to be, an existential challenge. There remains the possibility in the long run that the Bank could fade into irrelevance as other international players, primarily China, reshape the global economy. But what is certain is that the Bank has entered the Covid-19 world with the same mission as it had in the 1980s: advance capitalist restructuring and push power into the hands of private capital.

Sean Taylor is a politics graduate from the University of Leeds, with particular interests in radical political thought and political economy.

Featured Photograph: A member of the Boston Direct Action Project dressed as vampires to impersonate public relations associates of the World Bank, Washington DC (Justin McIntosh, April 2005).

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For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
We use cookies to collect and analyse information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customise content. By clicking into any content on this site, you agree to allow cookies to be placed. To find out more see our