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‘A sunny place for shady people’: South African involvement in the 1986 Seychelles coup plot

The Seychelles lie on the major trade routes between Asia, Africa and Europe, and they have been of interest to all the major powers for decades. In an investigation by Martin Plaut, based on files accessed in the National Archive in the UK, he reveals the murky involvement of the South African government in the destabilisation of the Seychelles in the 1980s.

By Martin Plaut

If ever there was a place for which Somerset Maugham’s epithet about a “sunny place for shady people” was apposite, it is the Seychelles.[1] As a recent study remarked: “Seychelles, a thousand miles from anywhere, is an offshore magnet for money launderers and tax dodgers.” Situated in the Indian Ocean, the 115 islands are 1,500 kilometres east of Africa. They lie on the major trade routes between Asia, Africa and Europe, and are also strategically near the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. No wonder they have been of interest to all the major powers. At the same time the Seychelles authorities have normally turned a blind eye to questionable financing. The most recent example of this saw a British businessman threatened with losing his castle after a judge questioned the probity of his Seychelles registered company.

During the apartheid era, the South African government saw the Seychelles’ potential as a means of finding a loophole to avoid the increasingly severe economic sanctions being imposed by the international community. At least one coup attempt was launched by the South Africans, although the apartheid government went on to make its peace with the Seychelles government after it failed.

This blogpost outlines the apparent coup attempt of 1986 and considers material discovered in the British National Archive which throws fresh light on these events.

The South African government’s interest

The Seychelles has been unstable since the run up to independence in the 1970’s. There was a deep political divide between James Mancham, leader of the Seychelles Democratic Party (who initially campaigned for the islands to be integrated with the United Kingdom) and France-Albert René’s more socialist Seychelles People’s United Party (which campaigned for full independence, with the support of the Organisation of African Unity).[2] At independence on 29 June 1976 the two parties came to a compromise and formed a government of national unity, with Mancham and President and René as Prime Minister. It did not last. On 5 June 1977 René’s party had staged a coup and installed their leader as President and turning the country into a one-party state. The pattern of unconstitutional transfers of power by coup and counter coup had been established.[3]

Seychellois exiles plotted against the René government in London – a fact revealed by a tape recording handed to the British press in 1982, after the bugging of an hotel room by a private detective, hired by a René associate.[4] The South African government and its secret services had developed links with Mancham during his brief presidency, with agents delivering to him “[bags full] of bribe money to secure South African interests.”[5] In 1978, when P. W. Botha ascended to the South African presidency, Seychelles became woven into a comprehensive policy of resisting threats to apartheid, described as a ‘total onslaught.’[6] Links were developed with the Botha security services by pro-Mancham exiles in South Africa.[7] This resulted in a bungled coup-attempt by Mike Hoare, an Irish mercenary, who landed at Seychelles international airport on 25 November 1981 with a contingent of 45 men disguised as a drinking club, the Ancient Order of Frothblowers.[8] Following a shoot-out at the airport the men were arrested and Hoare was returned to South Africa, to the embarrassment of the authorities in Pretoria.

First President of Seychelles James Mancham (left), second President France-Albert René (right) and former President of Seychelles (2004-2016) James Michel (center) in Victoria’s State House at René’s 78th birthday party (Mervyn Marie/Seychelles News Agency, 13 November 2013).

As the years progressed the South African government reversed its policies and developed links with the René government. A South African secret policeman, Craig Williamson established ties with a close René associate, Mario Ricci.[9] Williamson made his role in the secret service public when he testified before the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission about his role in covert operations. He said that he joined the Security Police in 1971 and admitted to his role in the killing of four members of the ANC and Communist Party. Among them was Ruth First, who helped found the Review of African Political Economy. He was granted an amnesty by the Commission.

In an email to the author, Williamson confirmed his relationship with Ricci, saying that he had come across Ricci in late 1984 or early 1985 after “reports came in of another recruitment exercise for an attempt at a coup in the Seychelles.”[10] Williamson says that he had considered leaving the police force, but in January 1986 was given a senior position responsible for the covert collection of information from Africa north of a line from Angola to Mozambique. Williamson explained in an email to this author how his work developed:

One of the first tasks I had was to report on Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean area and particularly on the then close relationship between India and the Soviets and their naval cooperation.  Obviously Soviet or surrogate Indian naval operations on the east coast of South Africa (SA) could interfere with SA naval operations, particularly those in support of Renamo. The use of the airport in Mahe [the largest island in the Seychelles archipelago] by Soviet aircraft flying to Mozambique was also a priority task.

I decided to run my African operation under cover of a private commercial intelligence organisation with a British-SA flavour. First, I had to establish a base in Africa, and I arranged to visit Mario Ricci in the Seychelles. We got on well. I explained my idea and as René was paranoid about a mercenary or other coup attempt, especially one launched from or supported by SA, it was soon proposed that I should have a contract to detect and counter security threats to the René regime which were mainly centred in Durban or London. Thereafter I went to Jersey in order to set up a company. I bought a shelf company from a company management group and was given a list of names to choose from. One name on the list was Longreach which I thought was apt and so Longreach came about.

Williamson was also appointed managing director of Ricci’s South African company, GMR, which had interests worldwide. The company assisted the South African government to avoid the economic sanctions that the country was facing from the mid-1980’s. This may have included using the Seychelles to avoid oil sanctions.[11] What happened next is directly related to the current story. This was the British historian, Stephen Ellis’s explanation of what took place.[12]

By this time, South Africa’s relationship with Seychelles was thoroughly ambiguous. Seychelles was often represented in the South African press, and the Western press generally, as pro-Soviet and anti-apartheid. In reality, Pretoria had developed closer relations with the government in Victoria [the capital of the Seychelles] in the months after the 1981 mercenary coup attempt and had expelled Seychellois opposition leaders from South Africa, but the South African secret services at the same time conspired with a group of coup-plotters based in Britain through a diplomat at the South African Embassy in London. The South African secret services eventually betrayed the coup plot to the Seychelles government in August 1986 and in effect aborted the plan. It seems that the South African strategy was to cultivate all sides in Seychelles with a view to cementing its own influence. After the August 1986 coup plot, South Africa’s Military Intelligence had the Seychelles government under effective control, largely through Williamson and the relationship he had established with Ricci. GMR South Africa shared its Johannesburg office with another company controlled by Williamson, namely Longreach, which acquired responsibility for government security in Seychelles after 1986. Years later, after the African National Congress had come to power, Williamson was to admit that Longreach was in fact owned by Military Intelligence. Seychelles was all the more useful as a Military Intelligence asset because of its government’s pro-Soviet reputation.

The coup plot of 1986 has received limited attention beyond Stephen Ellis’s article. However, a number of websites provide an insight into what took place, which was given the name ‘Operation Distant Lash’ (see here and here). These suggest a coup attempt by the Seychelles Minister of Defence, Ogilvy Berlouis, involving some 30 mercenaries and 350 Seychellois. An Indian naval vessel, the INS Vindhyagiri had fortuitously arrived in the capital, Victoria, in July 1986. As one of the authors of the website puts it: “A few weeks earlier, Indian intelligence agencies had learnt of Operation Distant Lash, organised by high-ranking Seychellois ministers to oust René.” Delhi decided to act to protect René, who is reported to have retreated to his Presidential palace, protected by North Korean bodyguards. The INS Vindhyagiri remained at Port Victoria for 12 days, “making great use of its Sea King to provide public displays of helicopter commando ‘slithering’ and assaults. The ship regularly trained its 4.5-inch gun on power mode as a demonstration to the coup plotters. By mid-June the planned coup had been averted. Seychelles authorities – with the likely assistance of Indian security services – arrested six men (but not Berlouis).”

Williamson provides a rather different perspective on these events:

In mid-1986, Indian intelligence alerted the René government of a so-called Operation Distant Lash whereby a 350 strong mercenary group would attempt to overthrow the government. This information came conveniently when an Indian naval vessel with a detachment of marines was docked in the Mahe harbor. We were apprehensive that the marines would be deployed into Mahe but fortunately things didn’t go that far.

We managed to survive the fallout from that incident, probably due to Ricci’s close relationship with Berlouis and René and to the lack of any real evidence of such a plan. We ascribed the Operation Distant Lash incident to a Soviet active measure designed to discredit Ricci/Berlouis/Longreach in René’s eyes. We noticed increased connection between the local Soviet embassy (Ambassador Orlov?) and Lt. Col James Michel Berlouis’ deputy. Michel was clearly hostile towards Longreach.

Later that year, during René’s attendance at a Non-aligned nations conference in Harare. Rajiv Ghandi warned him of a coup plan to be carried out during his absence and lent René his aircraft to fly directly back to Mahe. The upshot was that Berlouis was dismissed as Minister of Defence and head of the armed forces and was replaced by James Michel.

Due to our close connection to Berlouis at the time we know that he had no intention of ousting René.  He was concerned at that time with some unrest in the army due to some ethnic tensions and to dissatisfaction with the North Korean troops.

Williamson says that by this time his role in the South African secret police was coming to an end. He stood for the 1987 general election, although maintaining some links with Ricci, who – Williamson explains – “appointed me as Managing Director of the GMR Group in South Africa and financed my 1987 election campaign.”

That is as far as the story went, but files released to the National Archive following lengthy freedom of information requests throws a new light on the events.[13] It is to these that we now turn.

The ANC plot and the Seychelles coup

The three Foreign and Commonwealth Offices files that are now available in the National Archive revealed some extraordinary events. They provided an insight into two interwoven plots. One described an attempted coup against the government of the Seychelles. The second was a plan to seize and torture three members of the ANC in London – including Thabo Mbeki. Both involved South African security personnel. The ANC plot has been explained in a recent newspaper article and is the subject of a forthcoming article in the Journal of Southern African Studies.

The story involves two Norwegians who had lived in Britain for years under the alias of “Larsen” – father and son, who pretended to be British. They made links with a former member of the Parachute Regiment and the RAF. Some had served in what was then Rhodesia, before joining the South African armed forces. There were allegations that the entire plan was the brainchild of one of the most notorious and secretive of the South African security agencies – the Civil Cooperation Bureau. Attempts to prosecute those involved blew up in the faces of the British authorities, with the Attorney General, Sir Patrick Mayhew, having to explain before a sceptical parliament why the cases were dropped.[14] The timing could hardly have been less fortunate for Sir Patrick, coming as it did shortly after a particularly fractious meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government, when Mrs Thatcher was at loggerheads with fellow leaders over sanctions against South Africa.

Apartheid spy and killer Craig Williamson, Pretoria, South Africa 1998 (Jillian Edelstein).

It is interesting to see just how seriously the British took the Seychelles which are, after all, no more than a collection of 115 islands in the Indian Ocean. In 1987 its population stood at no more than 65,000. It is clear that the location is among the most important issues for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: they are strategically located between India, Africa and the Gulf and they are the site of important rebroadcasting facilities for the BBC World Service. The documents show that the FCO – just like the South African view noted above – had come to the conclusion that the René government was in their best interests, despite being of an apparently left-wing hew. As a memo marked “secret” from the British diplomat William Marsden to the Africa Minister, Linda Chalker’s private secretary put it on 15 July 1987:

The department’s view, endorsed by Ministers, is that our and Western interests in the Indian Ocean are adequately served by President René’s government, particularly in the denial of the Soviet Union of military facilities in the islands. This is also the US and French analysis as reported to us. A South African puppet regime would almost certainly not in in our interests, as it would inter alia raise the profile of the currently quiescent issue of militarisation of the Indian Ocean with negative effects for our management of Diego Garcia.

The memo goes on to say that it was not clear what kind of regime would replace René, since “possible candidates are not very impressive people.” It was also not clear how the Soviet Union would react if the neutrality of the Seychelles was challenged – and that it would “certainly be hostile.” All in all, the FCO was happy to try to maintain friendly relations with René. Replacing him was not going to receive the support of Whitehall.

Much of the attention focussed on two individuals from the Seychelles opposition who are based in London. They were David Joubert and Peter Ferrari, members of the Seychelles Democratic Party’s ‘government in exile’. The two had been plotting against the René government for many years. Another memo on 22 October 1987 talks of evidence of “Mr Joubert’s readiness to plot coups with mercenaries in the UK” – something the FCO had noted as early as 1982. The FCO also assessed possible alternatives to René – both ‘insiders’ who might mount what they termed a ‘palace coup’ and ex colleagues. None appeared particularly attractive to Britain.

The discovery of the plot came at a particularly sensitive time for Britain. Gérard Hoarau an exiled opposition leader from Seychelles and head of the Mouvement Pour La Resistance,  had been assassinated on 29 November 1985 by an unidentified gunman, on the doorstep of his home in London. Hoarau had been spied on by President René (who denied having a hand in the murder), but who had ensured that his London phone was tapped. The FCO memos talk of Seychelles secret service operations in the UK (something the British regarded as “unacceptable”) and had raised these issues with the acting High Commissioner for Seychelles in London, Robert Delpech. The FCO had lunch with Delpech at which these issues were raised and there are records of what was discussed.

As the case against the plotters developed, the FCO spent a good deal of time considering how much to tell René of what they knew. In the end he was briefed, but minimal information was provided to the president, who “bemoans” the lack of action against the opposition in the UK, but accepts that the British ambassador can only give him limited information. In the end the case against Peter Ferrari collapsed. Although he admitted participating in attempts to overthrow the René government, he strenuously denied having any hand in the ANC plot. His attempts to end the René government had – the authorities decided – not contravened any UK laws. For this reason, when the case came to court no evidence was led against Ferrari, and he was freed.

The links to South Africa were never conclusively established by the FCO, although other secret service papers held by the Home Office, to which were not granted access, may have a much clearer view of what took place. A final assessment by the FCO in June 1988 came to the conclusion that evidence of South African involvement was “highly suggestive.” These papers, and the information cited earlier, throws some light on these murky events.

Small states are susceptible to dictatorial control by elites, who share power within a narrow circle of friends and relations. They are also open to outside interference from external forces both public and private. The Seychelles has suffered from all of these tendencies, as evidenced by the 1986 coup plot. It is difficult to envisage a future for the islands that will ensure that they escape such activities in the future.

Martin Plaut is currently Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at the University of London and a regular contributor to ROAPE. For years Martin worked as a journalist and researcher focusing primarily on southern Africa and the Horn of Africa. He was until 2013 Africa Editor, BBC World Service News, but since his retirement he has published a series of books, including Understanding Eritrea (2016, Hurst), Understanding South Africa, (2019, Hurst) and Dr Abdullah Abdurahman: South Africa’s first elected black politician, (Jacana, 2020)

Featured Photograph: South African mercenaries involved in the coup attempt in the Seychelles in 1981 being interviewed by local journalist (Tony Mathiot, 1981).

Notes

1 Somerset Maugham’s remark was about the Riviera. Strictly Personal, Doubleday, Doran and co., New York,  1941, p. 136

2 Liam Campling, Hansel Confiance and Marie-Therese Purvis, Social Policies in Seychelles, Commonwealth Secretariat, London 2011

3 Stephen Ellis, Africa and International Corruption: the strange case of South Africa and Seychelles, African Affairs, Vol. 95, 1996, p. 169

4 Stephen Ellis, Africa and International Corruption, p. 170

5 Stephen Ellis, Africa and International Corruption, p. 171

6 R. Davies, and D. O’Meara, ‘Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional Policy Since 1978’, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, April 1985, p. 186.

7 Stephen Ellis, Africa and International Corruption, p. 171

8 Stephen Ellis, Africa and International Corruption, p. 173

9 Stephen Ellis, Africa and International Corruption, p. 175.

10 Email to author, 31st January 2021

11 Stephen Ellis, Africa and International Corruption, p. 184

12 Stephen Ellis, Africa and International Corruption, p. 176

13 The National Archives (hereafter TNA), African National Congress (ANC) and the Seychelles conspiracy, FCO 31/5277 1987, FCO 31/5278 1987, FCO 31/5691 of 1988. It took sixteen months for the FCO to make these available following a Freedom of Information Request. Further evidence could be found in other British government files – particularly those belonging to the Home Office, which deals with the intelligence and security agencies – but we were denied access to these.

14 Hansard, Volume 120, column 1093, 23 October 1987.

Getting food and drink in the Nigerian Civil War

This is the final post from a joint memoir written by Selina Molteno and Robin Cohen about their period in Nigeria, September 1967–September 1969, which was framed by the Nigerian Civil War. The chapter tells a personal story and also provides some more general insight into those tumultuous years. They were both working at the University of Ibadan, Selina in African Studies, and Robin in Political Science. Here they describe how they managed to get food and drink, acknowledging that whatever little travails they experienced, many others were struggling to survive.

By Selina Molteno and Robin Cohen

When one is in the midst of a civil war, getting potable water and a secure supply of food, particularly food that is familiar, does become something of a preoccupation. To save scarce foreign exchange, the federal government had banned all but essential imports. Enough then to buy guns, but not imported rice. The basics of life were available. For example, there were lots of yams, root vegetables usually pounded and boiled and served in a large ball. Though they are related to sweet potatoes, the ones we could get hold of were very fibrous and bland. Nigerians, particularly poorer Nigerians, would tuck into big portions of yam. A dimple in the ball would be filled with a peppery gravy mixed with gooey okra, other vegetables, chicken or meat. The extent of the dimple and the meatiness of the filling depended on income. Robin managed the dish better, but Selina struggled to swallow and digest yams – her years as a nimble ballet dancer had led her to live on a variety of lighter meals and snacks (not to mention coffee and cigarettes), though these hardly provided adequate nutrition for a pregnant, then breast-feeding, mother.

Cassava was another popular tuber – imported from South America originally, Nigeria had, by 2018, become the biggest producer of cassava in the world. There are two kinds, sweet and bitter, and although the resultant dishes could be nutritious and filling, cassava contains toxins, notably cyanide, that has to be washed, soaked and boiled out, before one can safely eat it. We received a bewildering array of instructions about preparing cassava, with dire warnings and bland assurances in equal measure. In some confusion, we abandoned any attempt to use it. We were, to be sure, very inexperienced and unconfident cooks – nowadays, with the help of Google, we might have persisted. In fact, we were surprised to learn recently that the familiar dessert, tapioca, is made from reprocessed cassava. Given our ignorance, our starches were largely confined to potatoes, when we could get them – not very often – and local rice. Here another hazard presented itself. More often than not the rice from the market was full of stones, to be more precise quartz, which looked just like rice grains. Friday Etukudo, who worked for us in the mornings, took on the tedious task of discarding the stones without resorting to our indignant rantings about it, saying simply, ‘they put stones in the rice to bring the weight up.’ We could barely believe his account and are still not sure if that is a valid explanation for our stone-supplemented rice.

Water

We have described in another chapter of our book how we had to boil and then filter our water to ensure it was safe to drink. We could rely, most of the time, on a supply of water from the tap, but perhaps twice in every ten weeks the supply gurgled then stopped. That meant standing outside with our friendly neighbours with buckets and a watering can waiting for the bowser. We carefully stored the boiled and filtered water in the refrigerator. The sudden loss of water from the taps without warning was a nuisance, so we followed the practice, suggested by our neighbours, of leaving the bathplug in and the cold-water tap turned on. You can anticipate the result. One New Year’s Eve when we were out at a party – we must have taken our baby, Miranda, with us – the Ibadan water authorities decided to give everyone a New Year treat by switching the taps on. We had forgotten to turn the bath tap off and the place was flooded. Robin’s research notes, a few books and a sturdy copy of the Oxford English Dictionary were ruined, though the dictionary remained with us for many years with its bent covers and crinkly pages.

The flooding was a one-time only event. Another was an extraordinary wartime incident supposedly affecting the source of Ibadan’s main water supply, the Eleyele Dam. We have to diverge considerably from the narrative to explain why this had a particular salience for us. Selina has some relatives from Perth in Scotland, one of whom, Penelope Molteno, had married a member of the Swedish royal family. When Selina was a ballet dancer at the Malmö Stadsteater in 1960, Penelope invited her to a posh dinner with her husband and some other notables, including one called Count Carl Gustaf Ericsson von Rosen, with whom she engaged in animated conversation. He was a swashbuckling and somewhat crazy character who identified with the Biafran cause and having fitted some Malmö Flygindustri MFI-9 Junior aircraft with rockets, he formed a squadron called the ‘Biafra Babies’. They targeted undefended airfields, including Ibadan Airport, which was very close to where we were living. They were successful elsewhere in destroying a number of federal aircraft on the ground, but all they hit in Ibadan were a few cows that had strayed onto the grassy verge of the runway. However, a persistent and insistent rumour had it that von Rosen’s squadron circled back via the Eleyele dam and dropped off capsules filled with a toxic cocktail. Our water, it appeared, had been poisoned by Selina’s fellow dinner guest!

We were inclined to ignore this tale, but when Friday Etukudo confirmed it, we did get the wobbles. He was always calm and discounted the raft of rumours that spread in the face of, and perhaps because of, the rather crude propaganda of the federal government. We had a few bottles of purified water in the fridge, but this would only last a short time. Fortunately, the rumour turned out to be total nonsense and our water supplies resumed their usual erratic glug-glug stop glug-glug routine. We were grateful for any supply.

Eating out

Street food was available and often quite delicious. Deep-fried plantains were enjoyable, and some stalls served fufu, cubes made from cassava and plantain flour. These were picked up with one’s fingers and dipped into very gooey soup, called ‘draw soup’. The name was certainly indicative – with a cube of fufu one drew up some highly viscous soup made from jute and okra. ‘Just like phlegm’, Selina shuddered. Robin had to travel to various parts of Ibadan and to Lagos and the north in pursuit of his research and found himself buying and sharing street meals with his respondents. After a couple of acute experiences of diarrhoea, he forswore the practice of eating street food. Somewhat more successful were meals at the ‘Executive De’, a workers’ restaurant in Lagos. Peter Waterman tells an amusing story of meeting Robin there:

I was working for the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions in Prague. And I was in Lagos to run a one-month course for its local affiliate, the NTUC [Nigerian Trade Union Congress] … Now the Executive De was the ‘movement’ restaurant. In other words, it had been set up by the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party with money from the Communist world. It catered to movement people and office workers. So, I was actually somewhat miffed at the appearance at the Executive De of a tallish, red-haired South African who was also clearly Jewish (it takes one to recognize one). Previously I had considered myself a Communist Dr Livingstone, boldly going where no white man had gone before. However, if I was not Dr Livingstone then he was not Henry Stanley either. Robin Cohen turned out, more usefully, to be a South African socialist doing PhD research on Nigerian trade unionism, whilst based at the University of Ibadan.[1]

The choice of eating out in Ibadan itself was very limited. We indulged in the occasional meal at the University Staff Club but did not like to get pigeon-holed as core members of the expatriate sub-group who dominated the restaurant. Much more fun were the rowdy dinners at the Westend café in the centre of Ibadan. The café was near the Mbari Club (a cultural meeting place for writers, artists, poets, musicians and dramatists) and owned by a culturally tuned-in member of the Lebanese community, Mr Hadad. Mr Hadad had never really finished the building. Ugly rusty stirrups, steel loops used to reinforce concrete, stuck out above the roof, where the restaurant area was located. The choice of meal was disarmingly simple: ‘Meal’ or ‘meal with special’. ‘Meal’ was a delectable kebab, served with cous-cous and salad. The ‘special’ was identical, with a substantial portion of beef brain (maghz) on the side, which Robin favoured, and Selina abjured. At one point, we decided we liked the Westend sufficiently to take the anti-diarrhoea medicine, Entero-vioform, before we set out for our meal. Though the medicine was then freely available, it has now been banned because of an array of nasty side-effects. It seems it can kill.

Routine supplies

Rather surprisingly, we were able to get fresh milk delivered. The milk was supplied in floppy plastic bags tossed onto our little veranda by a bicyclist. The milk was sent in refrigerated lorries from Vom (near Jos), 800 km away, which we visited, partly to allay our curiosity about where our milk came from. The area was cool with luscious grassland, quite unlike the landscape of the rest of Nigeria and, all these years on, a flourishing dairy industry has developed, seeded from the government dairy of our years. The milk tasted more or less normal, but had a curious grey colour, which was oddly disturbing. This led to a weak joke of which we never tired. Vom became ‘vomit’, as in ‘would you like some vomit with your tea?’ Once the Vom diary sent us a customer satisfaction survey, which included the question ‘would you like your milk yellow, white, or just as is?’ We replied ‘just as is’, as we didn’t want to be difficult.

Our supply of bread was also delivered, by a very persistent street hawker. Either she was called Gloria, or the brand name of the bread was ‘Gloria Bread’, we can’t now remember. However, Robin recalls with shame how roughly-spoken he was with her when she unexpectedly stuck her head through the burglar bars of the lavatory, which he happened to be inhabiting. ‘Buy bread’, she demanded and when Robin shouted at her she plaintively responded, ‘But it’s Gloria’. She clearly was desperately dependent on our custom, but there was only so much of her sweetened yellowish bread we could handle.

We also had access to chicken and meat. The chickens were bought live from time to time by Selina in Dugbe market, but (poor pun) she was too chicken to cut their heads off, so she left them, with air and water (we hasten to add) on the back seat of the car. It was Etukudo’s job to dispatch them. They tasted strong and stringy compared with the birds one now buys in supermarkets. Before they reached their end, they had often rather messed up the back seat – it was Robin’s responsibility to clean that up.

The meat we acquired was also red in tooth and claw. It came from a newly opened ‘meat shop’, near the campus. ‘Butcher’ would have been far too genteel a description for this establishment. It was more a slaughterhouse with a retail counter. Sometimes we saw the animal – normally a cow brought to Ibadan by a patient Fulani herder from the north – walking about before it was crudely guillotined and wrapped for our delectation. After this experience we can heartily recommend a skilled butcher and appropriately hung beef and lamb. But, at the time, we were happy enough to get this supply.

There were two other items in our routine diet. We were able to get tinned sardines from a corner store, actually more like a large shed in someone’s garden, an outlet that out of discretion we will call ‘Kemi’s corner’. It was quite difficult to get hold of sardines elsewhere and squashed sardines on Gloria’s bread was one of our standbys. Kemi seemed to have an unlimited supply, which she would replenish from time to time by a trip to her nearby house. As we explained in another chapter of this book, when Selina gave birth to Miranda she was fed on sardines and Guinness. She, like many of the other mums in the hospital, needed the nutrition this diet provided. The sardines looked similar to the ones served in the hospital, but we suspected nothing until a tell-tale neighbour upset us by saying that Kemi obtained her supplies by having an affair with one of the senior doctors in the hospital. Reluctantly, we decided that we could not sanction this rip-off of hospital food by continuing our purchases. The story of Kemi’s romantic life could, of course, have been a malicious lie.

Somebody also gave us a great tip. Pawpaw (the light-yellow sort, not the more orange papaya) was easily available in season and, in addition to the ones we could get at the market, we had three productive trees, planted by Selina, alongside the house. Picked raw then boiled, the green pawpaws tasted a bit like marrow, and we used them often as a substitute for a fibrous vegetable.

Exotic items

On several occasions, hawkers came around with gigantic land snails (Archachatina marginata), offering them as a delicacy. ‘Gigantic’ is not a misnomer – the snails could measure up to 25 cm across and weigh up to 700 grams. We tried them a couple of times, but somehow could not get the snails to taste of anything more than chewy bits of old leather. We really did not know what we were doing, and we gather these snails have now become an internationally-recognized and highly-valued foodstuff.

Getting familiar items for breakfast was difficult. Gloria’s bread could be toasted, we had soluble coffee grains and a little jam, but no marmalade. Cereals appeared sometimes in the university shop on campus, but they were a rare item and would disappear for long periods. Once, Robin was in town interviewing trade union leaders when a Lebanese trader beckoned him into his shop. He produced Post Toasties, cornflakes with blueberries. Post was a formidable rival to Kellogg in those days. The temptation was too great, even though Robin surmised that the corn flakes must have been smuggled into the country. We stretched out tiny portions, savouring the cereal for three or four weeks.

The tale of the pig’s head

On another occasion, Robin got the idea that we could make brawn, an echo, though in a decidedly non-kosher way, of a favourite Jewish dish called ptcha that Robin’s mother, who was of Polish heritage, had made for the family. Usually it was made of lambs’ or cows’ feet, but Robin had been offered a pig’s head one day at the meat shop and impulsively went for it. It was an impossible task to get the accompanying ingredients in full (including carrots, celery, garlic, bay leaves, onions, leeks, lemons, wine vinegar), but he spent days tracking down some of them. Whole black peppercorns were a triumphal find. Meanwhile, the pig was placed in the refrigerator with its whiskers and ears freaking Selina out. At one point she refused to open the fridge door. The idea of pig’s brawn is to cook it very slowly for about 17 hours, discarding the oodles of fat and gradually breaking off the chunks of meaty cheeks and ears. The bones would generate a gelatine. After discarding the bones, and adding sliced hard-boiled eggs, the meat and egg would set in the liquor making a mould that could be sliced into pieces for about a two-week supply of cold meat.

That was the theory. In practice, the gas cooker blew out at a low setting and in trying to keep the show on the road it was turned up too high. The head boiled dry and burnt and in rushing to retrieve the situation Robin dropped the head on the somewhat unsanitary concrete floor. Recriminations followed and it was clear that even if it had all gone smoothly, Selina was not going to eat it anyway. The miserable pig’s head disappeared at her orders. For Robin, this was a silent reprimand from his mother sent via the ether – ‘don’t mess with your Jewish heritage’!

A sombre conclusion

In closing this chapter, it is only appropriate to record that at the end of the civil war in January 1970 experienced Quaker and Lutheran aid workers from the US estimated that some 50,000 children in Biafra had died of starvation.[2] This was far fewer than had been suggested during the course of the war when Biafran sources or sympathisers with the breakaway republic used the estimate of two million starving children. Whatever the number, we ate while others could not, and this should be solemnly recorded here. That said, our anxiety about getting a regular supply of food was real enough. It was made worse by our inexperience as chefs and the limitations on Selina’s diet after her gall bladder was removed. We also cannot avoid the conclusion that, despite our aspirations to cosmopolitanism in all matters, there was a certain cultural resistance to unfamiliar foods that we failed to overcome. When we left Nigeria, Selina weighed just over 6½ stones, about 42 kilos. She desperately needed feeding-up.

Selina Molteno and Robin Cohen’s book, titled An Expatriate Family in the Nigerian Civil War, is available here.

Their book will be launched at the African Studies Seminar, University of Oxford, on 11 February, at 1700, UK/GMT. All are welcome (no registration required). The Microsoft Teams link is here.

Selina Molteno lives in Oxford in the UK where she founded a publishing service. With over 35 years’ experience in publishing, she has piloted many books and articles from manuscript to successful publication. Robin Cohen is an established scholar in development studies and sociology, known best for his writings on migration, diasporas and globalization. His books include Migration: Human movement from prehistory to the present (2019) and Refugia: Radical solutions to mass displacement (co-author, 2020). 

Featured Photograph: Dugbe market in Ibadan in the 1960s.

Notes

[1] Peter Waterman ‘If I wasn’t Dr Livingstone, he wasn’t Henry Stanley’, in Nicholas Van Hear et al. Retrospective for Robin Cohen, Oxford: Oxford Publishing Services, 2016, p. 19.

[2] ‘Starvation toll in Biafra revisited’, New York Times, 12 April 1970, p. 19

Africa, extractivism and the crisis this time

From the editorial of the latest issue of ROAPE, Elisa Greco provides an excoriating denunciation of Africa’s underdevelopment in the context of the pandemic. Unpicking the political strategy of neo-extractivism, she argues that every global recession, or primary commodity prices downturn, African economies which bought into this model succumb to crisis and recession.

By Elisa Greco

In April 2020, Macky Sall, the president of Senegal, called for a new global order, asking for the cancellation of Africa’s debt in the context of the current pandemic. His argument was based on a lucid assessment of the extractive nature of the productive structures on the continent.

While broad generalisations about a region composed of highly diverse countries runs the risk of repeating neo-colonial tropes, extractivism is the dominant feature of most African economies. The absence of processes of structural transformation and the persistence of primary commodity dependence creates highly porous extraverted economies, organised around extractive cores. Foreign exchange earnings on the continent largely accrue from primary commodities and the extractive sector: mining, oil and gas extraction and export-oriented agriculture.

The colonially inherited pattern of agrarian and mining extractivism has been reinforced by post-colonial patterns of uneven and combined development and capital accumulation, sustained by a global trend of growth in extraction of natural resources, which went up from 27 billion tonnes in 1970 to 92 billion tonnes in 2017. The rapid urbanisation and industrialisation of Asian countries that led to the commodity boom of 1993–2003 meant that extractives have attracted increasing investment. Since 2000, the sector has grown at an annual average rate of growth of 3.2%. Until 2014, the hike in global commodity prices – involving mining, oil and gas but also food and agricultural commodities – led to an increase in foreign direct investment in extractives and agriculture in Africa and Latin America.

Compounded by financialised investments after the global financial crisis of 2007-08, agrarian extractivism through land grabs (McKay 2017) and an increase of investment in mining and energy led to a renewal of the debate on extraction and imperialism (Veltmeyer and Petras 2014). Especially in the mining and energy sectors, it also led to new political responses, dubbed ‘neo-extractivism’, based on a return of the developmental state in its functions of rent appropriation and redistribution. In Latin America, neo-extractivism pictured extractives as carriers of development through strong developmental states, which reinvested extractive rents in social programmes and structural transformation (Gudynas 2010). Its politics had the ambition of defining themselves as post-neoliberal, while retaining capital’s trend of exploitation of workers, dispossession of land and unmitigated environmental destruction (Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington 2011).

Following the Latin American example of neo-extractivism, many African governments have experimented with resource nationalism, although with considerable national-level variations. At the regional level, the African Union’s Africa Mining Vision (AMV) 2030 is an attempt to propose stronger rent extraction from the mining sector and use it to finance programmes of structural transformation in the continent (Bush 2018). However, contemporary neo-extractivist policies in Africa nowadays are nowhere near as ambitious as those once attempted by African socialist governments. These aimed at regulating the global market for extractives, like in Kenneth Kaunda’s Zambian initiative of the Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), or Julius Nyerere’s nationalist ban on extractives, aimed at keeping resources in the soil until the nation could develop the productive forces to manage extractives for national development. These politics often attacked multinational corporations in extractives, banning their operations or heavily regulating them in a way that neo-extractivism has not managed to do. Most African countries have moved away from national control over natural resources, towards a more modest agenda aiming at increasing ‘local content’ in extractive policies, not only in mining but also in oil and gas extraction (Ovadia 2016).

While the African Mining Vision proves African agency, it also lives under the shadow of the failures of resource nationalism of the 1970s. And how could they not? The Latin American experience carries considerable significance to the African one, showing that the appropriation of ground rent mediated by state policies tends to create ‘a structural dependence upon the magnitude of ground rent available for appropriation’ (Purcell, Fernandez and Martinez 2017, 924) even when these same policies support and incentivise small capitals, and use rents for social protection and redistributive social policies.

The effects of global recessions on extractive economies are well known: as global commodity demand decreases, extractive economies quickly fall in a recession, their rents fall, and so do the programmes of redistribution based on them – as shown throughout the last commodity prices downfall, started in 2014. In this analysis, African miners and farmers remain firmly inscribed in global value relations through their integration in the world market (Araghi 2003) and in capitalism as a totality – the world economy being more than just ‘the sum of its parts’ (McNally 2009: 43).

For Marx, the world market expressed ‘the primacy of the concrete corporeality of the sum total of the vast multitude of labours living under the geographies of capitalist society, before it assumes distorted forms in international political relations and inter-capitalist competition’ (Arboleda 2020: 52). The utter dependence of the ‘successes’ of this neo-extractivism on ground rent from primary commodities, tied as these are to the fluctuations of the world market and inscribed in global value relations, have already failed to pass the test of decreasing commodity prices. At every global recession, or primary commodity prices downturn, the political strategy of neo-extractivism shows its limits, and African economies which bought into this model are likely to succumb to the current recession.

The crisis this time

The pandemic has indeed triggered a global recession and, as a consequence, Africa has entered its first recession since 1995. Foreign exchange earnings coming from extractives have fallen due to the decline of consumption in Europe, the US and China caused by the pandemic, and the global recession that is unfolding, with global trade drastically reduced and primary commodity prices in a downward trend. The economy of remittances has also been affected by the pandemic. While the formal service sector, structured around patterns of real estate and financial speculation, is likely to be less affected, the social reproduction of the majority of people will be more impacted, dependent as it is on farming and artisanal mining (will suffer as a result of the global recession) and circulation activities (petty trade, transport and services), many of which largely escape GDP calculations. The World Bank regional report estimates the contraction at 3.3% in 2020, underlining that this is the first recession in Africa in the last 25 years.

On the basis of these estimates, shrinking GDPs will bring real per capita GDP back to 2008 levels, and about 40 million people will be very possibly pushed into extreme poverty on the continent. Africa is also the region with the highest number of countries (39) which, since April, have been receiving emergency debt relief from the International Monetary Fund to cope with the pandemic, alongside 28 countries which have joined the World Bank/G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI). However, as of 2018 about a third of African governments’ public debt was owed to private financial investors, thus falling outside the mandate of the DSSI. For their part, private financial groups remain unwilling to renegotiate debt with African governments to ease the impact of the pandemic and responded to public criticism by creating a public relations agency, the Africa Private Creditor Working Group (2020).

The first 10 months of this pandemic have made clear that many governments have taken an extremely pragmatic approach: if the economy cannot afford the losses, workers have to keep on working to put food on the table. The ‘grim calculus’– how many people governments decide can be considered as disposable – and sheer pragmatism have informed many decisions on economic policies.

The pragmatism of governments that cannot afford to pay for a crisis is epitomised by President John Magufuli’s stance in Tanzania. Tanzania is to date the only African country which has stopped submitting official reports on Covid-19 cases and mortality to the World Health Organization denying the presence of the virus in the country. While presidential declarations blended a dubious anti-scientism (coming from a president with a PhD in biology) and religious sentiment, in the run-up to presidential elections Magufuli left all the street vendors on the streets, did not close shops and schools, nor did he prohibit religious gatherings, securing himself popular support. While this response has largely been portrayed as an extreme example of authoritarian populism, it can also be interpreted as pragmatism of a poor, highly donor-dependent nation which is about to be hit by a global recession. Policy covers up with populist actions the pragmatic acknowledgment that its government cannot afford the slightest disruption in production – especially agrarian, on which millions depend for sheer survival – nor can it fund social protection programmes and a lockdown to protect people’s lives.

But is this position a departure from the norm? I would argue that this is more of an extreme position than an exceptional one. Many governments in the global North have implicitly admitted defeat to capital, faced with a pandemic that threatened to disrupt the circuits of capital, hitting both production and consumption and grinding them both to a halt. A global recession causes unemployment and hunger that can, if unmitigated by public policy, kill more than the virus; and only a minority of countries have responded with Keynesian interventions.

Crises in capitalism cause at once ‘immense suffering and hardship for the world’s workers’ and also open up moments in which ‘new spaces of resistance can be pried open’ (McNally 2009: 72). As before the pandemic, semi-privatised health services prove to be good for business, and the long legacies of structural adjustment in Africa are at their most visible in the failure of basic health service provision. What unifies governments across the globe lies in what the pandemic did not do: questioning the role of the state in public health service provision in any fundamental way. While demand-side Keynesian policies have been put in place to rescue capital – from large companies to small and medium-sized enterprises– political discussions on the necessity of public health service provision during a pandemic have been conspicuous by their absence (see  Peter Lawrence’s editorial to ROAPE, Vol. 47, Issue 165, ‘Global capitalism and Africa after Covid-19’).

The deadly conservative political climate makes any redistributive proposal look like a radical step, as suggested by the neo-Keynesian plans put forward by the Transnational Institute – to tax the rich and use the wealth for a pandemic response and concluding by quoting exhortatory words spoken by the African revolutionary Thomas Sankara.

What the pandemic did do, in fact, is to prove once again that illness and death can be very good business for capital. The pandemic opened up opportunities for huge private gains, deriving mostly from speculative ventures in health and technology on the stock market. This led to an increase in total billionaire wealth, which reached US$10.2 trillion in July 2020, from US$8.9 trillion at the end of 2017, divided among 2189 billionaires. Dead labour triumphs over living labour, and the class implications of this triumph are mortally clear.

To read Elisa’s full editorial for Volume 47, Issue 166 (2020) click here and to access all of the articles in the issue, which are freely available, click here.

Elisa Greco is an editor on the Review of African Political Economy and teaches at the European School of Political and Social Sciences, Lille Catholic University, Lille, France.

Featured Photograph: Abandoned street in Uganda during the lockdown in the Covid-19 crisis (Derrick Ndahiro, 14 April 2020).

Notes

Araghi, F.  2003. “Food Regimes and the Production of Value.” Journal of Peasant Studies 30 (2): 41–70.

Arboleda, M.  2020. Planetary Mine: Territories of Extraction Under Late Capitalism. London: Verso.

Bebbington, A., and D. Humphreys Bebbington.  2011. “An Andean Avatar: Post-neoliberal and Neoliberal Strategies for Securing the Unobtainable.” New Political Economy 16 (1): 131–145.

Bush, R. 2018. “Africa: A Political Economy of Continued Crisis.” Afrika Focus 31 (2): 23–46.Gudynas, E.  2010. “The New Extractivism of the 21st Century: Ten Urgent Theses about Extractivism in Relation to Current South American Progressivism.” Americas Program Report, January 21. Washington, DC: Center for International Policy.

McKay, B. 2017. “Agrarian Extractivism in Bolivia.” World Development 97 (September): 199–211.

McNally, D. 2009. “From Financial Crisis to World-slump: Accumulation, Financialisation, and the Global Slowdown.” Historical Materialism 17: 35–83.

Ovadia, J. 2016. “Local Content Policies and Petro-development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative Analysis.” Resources Policy 49: 20–30.

Purcell, T. F., N. Fernandez, and E. Martinez, E. 2017. “Rents, Knowledge and Neo-structuralism: Transforming the Productive Matrix in Ecuador.” Third World Quarterly 38 (4): 918–938.

Veltmeyer, H., and J. Petras. 2014. The New Extractivism: A Post-neoliberal Development Model or Imperialism of the Twenty-first Century? London: Zed Books.

Entrepreneurs and Business in Rwanda: The Model Pupil Paradox

Based on his new book, David Poole exposes the Rwandan paradox: that despite extensive efforts to support a new entrepreneurial class and the formation of a small and medium enterprise private sector, the Rwandan economic landscape remains dominated by a vast number of informal micro-enterprises. All assumptions, he argues, by the leading development agencies have been proved wrong.

By David Poole

Vision 2020, the government of Rwanda’s economic development plan, set the ambitious aim of achieving middle-income status by 2020. It envisioned transitioning from an agricultural to a knowledge-based economy, spearheaded by the emergence of a new class of domestic entrepreneurs and a dynamic small and medium enterprise (SME) sector. It is a plan that is fully consistent with the entrepreneurship and SME development prescription advocated by leading development agencies including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and major donor nations.

Billions of dollars have been injected in order to facilitate Rwanda’s economic transformation but, paradoxically, the dynamic entrepreneur-led SME sector that was anticipated remains conspicuous by its absence. It comprises just 2.3 percent of private commercial enterprises. Instead, the commercial landscape is dominated by a vast number of informal micro-enterprises, typically household level subsistence enterprises comprising own-account workers who are, if anything, supported by unpaid family workers. Adjusting for inconsistencies between successive census data additionally suggests that the SME sector employs just 100,000 workers — a mere fraction of the 1.8 million non-agricultural jobs that the entrepreneurship and SME sector prescription was expected to deliver.

The paradox is not though due to any lack of effort by the government and people of Rwanda, who have diligently followed the prescription advanced by the major development institutions. Twenty years on, Rwandans thus have every right to ask why it has not worked – it is a question that my new book seeks to answer.

Surprisingly little is known about how or why entrepreneurs in developing economies come into existence, or the structures required to support them. As a consequence, policymaking is based on straight-line extrapolations from developed economies. One might expect such extrapolations to be drawn from a widely accepted body of knowledge about entrepreneurs in developed economies. Yet instead of a well-integrated body of knowledge, one is confronted by an ever-expanding range of inconsistent and competing theories.

One school of thought claims that entrepreneurs emerge, in an act of spontaneous combustion, in response to a favourable economic and institutional context. An alternative argument holds that their emergence is conditioned by access to various forms of capital, particularly finance (and especially microcredit) and investment in human capital. In a developing economy context these translate into a generalised belief in the existence of a sea of entrepreneurs-in-waiting who will emerge in response to a favourable institutional context, access to credit and the provision of business skills training. It is typified by Muhammad Yunus, the Bangladeshi economist’s implausible assertion that ‘every single human being, even one barefoot and begging in the street, is a potential entrepreneur’. In contrast to this belief in the ubiquitous nature of entrepreneurial capabilities, is the view that entrepreneurship is a minority capability determined by the presence of certain individual psychological characteristics, particularly the so-called ‘Big 3’ of need for achievement, internal locus of control and preparedness to embrace risk.

The Rwandan case

The Government of Rwanda has successfully fashioned an institutional framework that is fully consistent with what most economists claim should be conducive to entrepreneurship. It has created a competent and independent banking system, taken effective steps to establish a good governance climate, secured property rights, minimised corruption and streamlined the process for setting up an enterprise. This supportive context has provided a platform for programmes designed specifically to catalyse entrepreneurship and SME formation. These measures include significantly enhanced access to credit, the development of a large-scale business plan competition designed to identify and support potential entrepreneurs, business skills training, a major regional cluster strategy based on the American academic, Michael Porter’s theories of regional competitive advantage and the incorporation of ‘entrepreneurship teaching’ into the national curriculum.

Taken together it is clear that the Rwandan enterprise paradox is not explained by fundamental weaknesses in institutions or a lack of investment in financial and human capital. To find an explanation one must look beyond the unfounded assumptions that underpin the entrepreneurship and SME development prescription. This can only be achieved by talking to individuals who are navigating the so-called entrepreneurial journey.

Interviews with successful entrepreneurs in Rwanda reveal narratives that are antithetical to key elements of the theory that underpins the entrepreneurship and SME sector development prescription. Demands for increased access to credit, founded on the premise that entrepreneurs in developing economies struggle to obtain the finance they need, are thoroughly undermined. Despite widespread access to credit, the successful entrepreneurs in Rwanda did not want, nor indeed need it. They preferred to use their own money. If this proved to be insufficient they were remarkably adept at finding other ways to get their businesses started. Credit was not a binding constraint.

The economic argument that entrepreneurs seek to capture the entrepreneurial rents on offer were also found to be invalid. Successful entrepreneurs were driven by a desire to take control of their own lives and were prepared to sacrifice financial gains as a trade-off. The popular perception that entrepreneurs have a heightened propensity for taking risks was also found to be invalid. Instead, the successful Rwandan entrepreneurs went to considerable lengths to mitigate the risks they might face. Assumptions that learning how to write a business plan would help individuals to realise their entrepreneurial ambitions were also found to be erroneous. Instead of formal plans, the successful entrepreneurs preferred diving in and acting contingently, as circumstances dictated. This did not mean, though, that their behaviour was in any way cavalier. On the contrary, being risk averse, they sought reassurance that their commercial concepts were viable and were prepared to invest considerable time and effort in validating their business ideas. They were in no rush to get started and their businesses could consequently have a gestation period that could be measured in years.

Setting the findings from interviews with successful entrepreneurs against insights gained from interviews with aspiring entrepreneurs revealed some similarities but also significant differences. Aspiring entrepreneurs also planned to use a range of funding mechanisms for their businesses, but a significant number planned to use credit exclusively. A clear majority of the accounts also featured unambiguous references to financial motives for setting up a business, which clearly deviated from the successful entrepreneurs’ rejection of financial considerations. The aspiring entrepreneurs’ more overt financial orientation was often linked to the hope of generating an income in response to a weak labour market and the need to create some form of ‘job’ where none existed. Exploring risk propensity revealed a spectrum of attitudes, which ranged from individuals who were decidedly predisposed to taking risks, and reflected the popular conception of entrepreneurs as risk-takers, through to a small number that mirrored the successful entrepreneurs’ aversion to risk. The proclivity for diving in and acting contingently, which was favoured by successful entrepreneurs, was reflected in only a small minority of accounts and was outweighed by a clear majority who expressed a preference for formal business planning.

Synthesising the findings from the two sets of narratives revealed the presence of a small cluster of proto-entrepreneurs, who appear to be relatively well equipped for the entrepreneurial journey. While this does not guarantee their success, it does enhance the prospect of a positive outcome. However, the relative paucity of proto-entrepreneurs and the lengthy gestation period associated with how they will validate the viability of their enterprise concepts directly challenges underlying assumptions of both the entrepreneurship and SME development prescription and the Vision 2020 economic transition goal. There was no pre-existing massive reservoir of entrepreneurs-in-waiting that could be called forth, at will, by government policy.

The corollary to the low incidence of proto-entrepreneurs is an overrepresentation of individuals who have been seduced by the forceful promotion of entrepreneurship as a career choice. They are, perversely, exactly what the development agencies are seeking: individuals who can write a rudimentary business plan, have a high tolerance for risk and want to take on credit to fund setting up an enterprise. Unaware that they are ill-equipped for success, they will be gambling on an uncertain future where the odds are stacked against them. Their businesses will tend to lack commercial viability and be short-lived. Perniciously, these individuals will be left poorer than when they started — risk capital invested in a failed business will have been dissipated and collateral used to secure credit forfeited.

The narrative accounts of those actively engaged in the entrepreneurial journey reveal that the entrepreneurship and SME development prescription, which dominates development thinking, is fundamentally flawed. Based on false premises, the Rwandan enterprise paradox is consequently an unsurprising outcome. Other developing economies would do well to heed the experience of the development industry’s model pupil.

David Poole’s book Entrepreneurs and SMEs in Rwanda: The Model Pupil Paradox has just been released.

David L. Poole holds a PhD from SOAS, University of London, and an MBA from Imperial College Business School. He had a successful career as a marketing consultant and entrepreneur. The experience of heading a team of volunteers providing support to businesses in Rwanda sparked his interest in the country’s efforts to catalyse economic development through entrepreneurship and SME sector creation.

Featured Photograph: Daniel Ntakirutimana, a cyclist “taxi-rider”, waits for passengers in a rural area of Northern Rwanda (26 February 2020).

Riots, Protests and Global Adjustment: an interview with David Seddon

Continuing our series of interviews with scholar-activists from around the world, David Seddon reflects on popular struggles, politics and global adjustment in Africa and the world. Reflecting on the tenth anniversary of the North African revolutions, he argues that struggle takes place when the structural contradictions and inadequacies of the prevailing economic, social and political system are starkly revealed – the current period is one of these junctures.

Can you tell roape.net readers a little about yourself, your life, upbringing and early politicisation and activism?

I was born in London in 1943, during the Second World War. My parents had been married for ten years at that point, so I came as a surprise; sadly, I remained an only child, and my father died when I was eight, leaving my mother and me on our own. She remains the dominant influence on my ethics and my politics.

She came from a working-class family in Halifax (Yorkshire), left school at 13 and worked in a factory, while also going to night school to ‘improve’ herself. She married upwards. My father, who she met on a walking holiday in the Lake District, lived near Leeds and came from a ‘petty bourgeois’ background (his father, the son of a coal miner, had ‘bettered himself’ and become a baker and shopkeeper). My father won a scholarship and went to Batley Grammar School; he then became the first in his family to go to university, at Leeds, where he gained a first-class degree in physics, then went on to get a PhD and a lectureship at Sheffield University. My father died in December 1951.

My mother had to struggle to make ends meet. She sold our house in Blackheath and we moved to a flat; she learned to drive and got a job as an administrator in the local hospital, gradually working her way up to a senior position with the Woolwich Group of Hospitals, which she retained until she retired. In my school vacations, I worked in a variety of jobs, including as a hospital porter.

In the summer of 1961, having managed to get a place at Cambridge to read archaeology and anthropology, my mother arranged that I should spend a couple of months in Uganda, based at Makerere College with an old family friend from Sheffield who was Professor of Botany there. It was an extraordinary and transformative experience.

Although Uganda was still under colonial rule, there was excitement among Ugandans  about the future. Uganda gained independence the next year. At Cambridge, I enjoyed the freedom of university and also the intellectual challenge of my programme of studies. But now I wanted to travel. In my final year, I was torn between doing a PhD in archaeology or securing a job. I applied for several jobs and was delighted to be offered a junior lectureship in the School of African Studies at the University of Cape Town (UCT). My mother was less delighted, but was amazingly supportive.

Can you talk about your early research and work – as a scholar-activist? You had a varied trajectory, traveling to Cape Town, and to Morocco on research. How were you radicalised by a world that seemed to be rapidly radicalising and changing under your feet?

In August 1964, not long after my 21st birthday, I sailed from Southampton. Two weeks later, we docked in Cape Town. It was the start of an extraordinary and critical period of my life. Already alerted to the social divisions of a colonial society by my brief visit to Uganda, I was totally unprepared for the impact of life under apartheid. I had been largely uninterested in politics in Britain, and only marginally aware of class and racial inequality and discrimination more generally. But from my first day in Cape Town to my last day flying out of Johannesburg – on the day Dr Vervoerd, the so-called architect of apartheid was stabbed to death (6 September 1966) – I was now confronted by something unavoidable.

By the time I arrived in Cape Town in late 1964, the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the NCL (National Committee of Liberation), later the African Resistance Movement (ARM) ) had all initiated various forms of ‘armed struggle’ and had all been effectively repressed and crushed by the Special Branch, Bureau of Sate Security (BOSS) and other agencies of the state apparatus. Robben Island, where only a few months before (June 1964), Nelson Mandela had been incarcerated together with so many other ‘non-white’ political prisoners, was directly opposite UCT as a reminder. I was all too aware, furthermore, that some of my colleagues and friends were directly affected.

On campus, the main concern was the fall-out from the disintegration of the ARM and particularly the role played in that by former National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) leader, Adrian Leftwich. Some UCT students and members of staff were involved, either directly or indirectly. Some had been arrested and detained; some had already left the country, to go into exile, to study or take jobs abroad; others were soon to depart. It was the low ebb of the struggle. But even at this point there was considerable political activity at UCT and in Cape Town more generally. I was unavoidably drawn into this.

In the meanwhile, I also continued to be involved in teaching and in archaeological research. But I was beginning to consider my position, and when it came to a choice between a post as a field archaeologist or as a full lecturer at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, I chose the latter as a way of keeping open the direction of my future career. I was veering increasingly towards social anthropology as I struggled to make sense of contemporary social and political realities.

On arrival at the (London School of Economics (LSE), in September 1966, I decided to pursue research in Tanzania, as this was now an independent state with a growing reputation for progressive government policies and a centre for African political activists, from South Africa and Mozambique among other countries. I started learning Swahili. I joined the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Institute of Race Relations.

I was turned down for a visa to carry out research in Tanzania, ironically enough because I had lived for two years in South Africa. This was a major blow. While desperately exploring other possible field sites for my research, however, an opportunity arose to join a research project in Morocco, that would involve social anthropological fieldwork. I applied and was accepted. I started learning Arabic at once and re-registered for a PhD, with Professor Ernest Gellner, whose own thesis had been on Morocco and was about to be published as Saints of the Atlas, as my supervisor.

In the course of your early research you were influenced by E.P. Thompson’s ‘The Making of the English Working Class’ (1968), the writings of the French Marxist anthropologists, and the work of André Gunder Frank on ‘Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America’ (1969) and, of course, Walter Rodney’s work. Can you describe the influence of these writers on your own work, political development and teaching?

I had already become familiar with some of the work of the new French Marxist anthropologists, like Clause Meillassoux and Maurice Godelier, and I began to try to apply some of their thinking to my own field data, but to be honest, although it was helpful in trying to make sense of Moroccan economy and society in the pre-colonial period, as in its own way was Gellner’s own distinctive approach, it seemed about as useless as the other, more ‘traditional’ anthropological approaches and paradigms when tackling colonialism and the radical transformation of local economy and society during the 20th century.

It was not until I had read E. P. Thompson’s ‘The Making of the English Working Class’ (1968) and a Danish anthropologist lent me a copy of André Gunder Frank’s ‘Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America’ (1969) that I was able to see how the whole study of ‘economic and political change in the Eastern Rif of Morocco’ could be framed in a way that combined neo-Marxist theories of underdevelopment with a historical Marxist class analysis of agrarian change.

In the early 1970s, I translated a short work on the ‘Berbers of Morocco’ by Robert Montagne (a French colonial administrator and anthropologist) which was published in 1973 and then became involved in putting together a collection of work by the French Marxist anthropologists. This led to a collaboration with French Marxist anthropologist Jean Copans (with whom I wrote a joint introduction) and with translator and Middle East anthropologist Helen Lackner (author of several excellent books on Yemen). The collection eventually was published, after inordinate delays, in 1978, as Relations of Production: Marxist approaches to economic anthropology).

Sometime later, you moved to Development Studies at the University of the East Anglia. Can you explain why ‘development studies’ was an important and original (and in some hands) radical endeavour? How did your work progress through this period?

I always found the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at SOAS, and indeed SOAS itself, to be generally conservative – a place where even an attempt to form a branch of the Association of University Teachers was regarded by the management as threatening. One of my colleagues was nearly sacked for producing a pamphlet which analysed SOAS as a ‘Byzantine bureaucracy’, and I personally was reprimanded by my Head of Department for wearing jeans in the senior common room ‘because I might have been mistaken for a student’.

When I saw an advertisement for a range of posts in the School of Social Studies at the University of East Anglia (UEA) in Norwich, with a view to working together to build a new School of Development Studies, it seemed very attractive.

I was much taken from the outset by the ‘openness’ of UEA, which had been part of the wave of ‘new’ universities set up in the 1960s. I was also impressed by the fact that the Professor who was to head the new School wore jeans and a roll-neck pullover! Several colleagues were members of the International Socialism Group (IS) – later, in January 1977, to become the Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP). I was impressed with the personal and political commitment of these comrades to the cause and with their intellectual rigour and became in effect a kind of fellow-traveller – as I suppose I continue to be.

The first year (1972) was very exciting as we planned for a whole new interdisciplinary undergraduate degree programme in Development Studies, with foundation courses in ‘natural resources’ and ‘social sciences’ as well as ‘development studies’. Our first intake was in 1973 and a small group of us taught a radical development studies course together. Key texts included works by A. G. Frank and Walter Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, which had just been published (1972). Exciting times.

During the heady political period of the 1970s – in the UK and in Africa – many far-reaching questions where being raised about Marxist political economy. A generation saw in Tanzania – and elsewhere – and the largely top-down project of transformation as signalling a possible dawn for socialist change. How did you understand what was happening in the radical movements at the time? Where did you put your activist energies? 

In 1974, Harold Wilson became Labour prime minister for a second time with a radical agenda for change; he also initially appointed a Cabinet Minister for Overseas Development. It began to look as though Labour might take a more radical approach to ‘overseas development’. I joined the Labour Party and became active in local politics, eventually becoming chair of my local branch and standing (unsuccessfully) in 1979 for district council. I was also active in trade union politics within the university.

As regards our practical involvement in what was still called The Third World, the UEA had already approved the formation (in 1967) of a not-for-profit international consultancy group, called the Overseas Development Group (ODG), which provided specialist advice and short-course training to governments and to non-governmental organizations, and fed the income earned into maintaining a level of staffing well above that funded by the University and into providing scholarships for students and trainees from Asia, Africa and Latin America.

During the 1970s, the ODG provided training courses for cadres from various organizations struggling for independence now but also looking to the future when they might spear-head new governments. These organizations included The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), South-West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) and the Mozambique Liberation Front  (FRELIMO) from southern Africa. From 1976 onwards, I personally developed relations with the organization representing the Saharawis in their struggle for independence from Moroccan occupation, the POLISARIO Front and began to write about the Western Sahara and Morocco (including articles in the Review of African Political Economy). I also began to develop links with the PLO, particularly with the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), links which would become more significant in the 1980s when I visited Israel/Palestine several times with the covert support of OXFAM and Christian Aid.

In 1973, the ODG landed a major research grant from the Ministry of Overseas Development to undertake an evaluation of the impact of road construction in Nepal, where British aid was contributing to the building of the East-West Highway. The team working on developing the proposal into a viable research project was lacking a sociologist and social anthropologist, so I was drafted in to assist, although I knew nothing about Nepal and was still struggling with my PhD thesis. The differences and similarities with Morocco were fascinating, and needed more perspective on my theoretical framework.

So, in February 1974, I flew out to Nepal with one other member of the team and his family and we established our base in Pokhara, in the west central region, where several roads had been recently built or were in the process of construction. In March, our families joined us. We lived and worked in Nepal on the ODG Roads Research Project, on and off for two years. We learned Nepali, the children learned Nepali, and we walked and drove over a vast region, including mountains, hills and plains, to assess ‘the effects of roads in west central Nepal’ (the title of our main three volume report in 1976 and our summary in 1977).

As this interview is for ROAPE I shall keep this section relatively short, but suffice it to say that my evolving theoretical framework for my Moroccan thesis proved very effective as an overall framework for our research project in Nepal, although the canvass was far larger and our capacity for data collection immensely greater than for my solo study. Our approach was inter-disciplinary – the team included a geographer, an economist, an agricultural economist, a sociologist and a social anthropologist – and we tried to combine different levels and modes of analysis in a mutually complementary fashion.

Our final report, with its political economy approach and its conclusion that road construction does not necessarily bring about progressive economic development, created waves in the Ministry, which had now become subordinate to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The promise of a radical approach to ‘overseas development’ had not materialised and the Wilson government was in trouble. We were hauled before various committees, and our own ODG management, and roundly criticised. It was not until a mandarin actually commended our initiative and originality, that the row eventually subsided.

Vindicated, we felt, by this eventual outcome, and with funds from the ESRC and the OECD we took our studies in Nepal further, returning several times to the same region. We produced a number of publications as a result of our work there: Centre & Periphery: Social and Spatial Relations of Inequality in Nepal (1977), The Struggle for Basic Needs in Nepal (1979), Peasants and Workers in Nepal (1979), and, finally, Nepal in Crisis: growth and stagnation at the periphery (1980). All bore the hallmark of the neo-Marxist and Marxist approach we had now adopted. Nepal in Crisis (which was published in India to increase its availability on the sub-continent) was banned for a decade by the government of Nepal, and the British Ambassador vowed we would never work in Nepal again.

It still gives me pride to learn from Nepali comrades that this book (which was widely smuggled into the country) inspired them in their opposition to the party-less ‘panchayat’ democracy of the king of Nepal. I even have a copy signed by Babu Ram Bhattarai, one of the leaders of the Maoist movement which would lead a People’s War in Nepal during the late 1990s and early 2000s, while he was living ‘underground’, and dedicated to his “guru, David Seddon”. Amusingly, we met secretly in the garden of a hotel in Kathmandu mainly frequented by foreign development consultants!

Inspired by a workshop on ‘modes of production’ that I attended in Turkey in late 1979, I spent six months in 1980 teaching at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara and carrying out research funded by the Population Council with Turkish colleagues on ‘paths of rural transformation in Turkey’. I was able to contribute to the on-going debate on the left at the time regarding the nature of agriculture (feudal or capitalist?) and the appropriate strategy for socialist and communists as a result of my familiarity with the Indian ‘modes of production’ debate (which had informed our work in Nepal) and the wider debate on these issues now taking place in many parts of the world and being published in such journals as the Journal of Peasant Studies.

In 1983 I went to the University of Bir Zeit in the occupied West Bank, not just to give lectures at Bir Zeit but also to secretly tour the Palestinian universities in the West Bank and Gaza with funds from OXFAM and Christian Aid to assess the potential for ‘development under occupation’.  I went again, under the same auspices and as a member of the Middle East Committees of both these NGOs, in 1984; and then again in 1986. These visits led to the development of several enduring friendships with Palestinian comrades, particularly those associated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). I continue to have a very special relationship with the Palestinian struggle for self-determination.

During the 1980s, the School of Development Studies, where you were teaching in Norwich, had appointed André Gunder Frank as Professor of Social Change. Can you talk about the experience of working Gunder Frank – and discuss briefly, some of the strengths and weaknesses in his work?

André Gunder Frank’s ideas on development and underdevelopment started gaining circulation and influence after Salvador Allende was elected president in 1970, though when Frank, already persona non grata in the US for his support of the Cuban revolution, arrived in 1968, Allende, then president of the senate, had to meet him at the airport to prevent him being deported. Following General Pinochet’s military coup in September 1973, Frank became a political exile again. He dedicated the next two decades to analysing the global crisis and the failures of neo-liberalism and Reagan-omics, with posts first at the Max Planck Institute (1973-78) and then UEA (1978-83).

I had the privilege of being on the selection committee that appointed Gunder, as we called him, in 1978 to a Chair in Social Change, and of co-directing with him during the early 1980s a Masters programme in Development Studies, whose core course was on Contemporary World Development, and drew heavily on his own work, including Crisis in the World Economy and Crisis in the Third World, although the list of readings also included Nepal in Crisis. He tended to see ‘the big picture’ – at the global ‘world systems’ level – but was also prepared to see ‘development’ and ‘under- development’ as an issue of inter-national ‘exploitation’ and was, I felt, weaker on the articulation of modes of production and associated class struggle, which is where I felt in a stronger position, having done fieldwork at the grass roots and having been involved in political action at the local level. We complemented each other well, we thought, combining Neo-Marxist and Marxist perspectives.

Teaching with Gunder was an extraordinary and exciting experience, for his teaching style was unorthodox – using the daily newspapers to thread together an analysis of developments across the world in each session and demanding that the students try to make their own sense of ‘contemporary world development’ using ‘the news’ as a basic text rather than a range of academic works. In 1983, we jointly wrote a full description of the Contemporary World Development Course in the 4th edition of Peace and World Order Studies: a curriculum guide.

He was generous and friendly to his students, but intolerant of university bureaucracy and hierarchy, and many colleagues found him ‘difficult’. I managed to maintain a warm relationship with him and his wife and children while they lived in Norwich. His wife, Marta Fuentes, had been an influential activist in the women’s movement in Chile, where they met, and had a profound influence on Frank’s own political and economic thinking. They left the UEA and Norwich in 1983, after a disagreement with the University administration over his joint position at UEA and the Free University of Amsterdam, and he continued to teach, travel, lecture and write while based in Amsterdam until 1994, a year after the death of Marta his wife. Gunder died in 2005.

You also co-authored, in 1994, a pioneering book on Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment – that placed popular resistance at the heart of development in the ‘third world’. Specifically, you saw how ‘global adjustment’ had altered the developing world, but also triggered an explosion of protest. More recently, in the last two decades, you have worked on political movements in Africa. What was your objective and motivation in carrying out this work?

In 1984, largely in response to economic reforms introduced as part of the increasingly pervasive influence of the IMF and the World Bank and their ‘structural adjustment’ programmes, there were major movements of popular unrest in Morocco and Tunisia (which were widely referred to as ‘bread riots’); and these were followed in 1985 by a popular movement in Sudan that led to the overthrow of President Nimeiry. I spent some time following the detail of these movements and started to write about them, in ROAPE, among other publications.

This interest in ‘popular movements’ became a major strand of my academic work over the next couple of decades, and eventually led to a collaboration with John Walton, a Latin American specialist, on what seemed to be a ‘wave’ of popular protest – a global phenomenon – reminiscent of the wave of riots and popular protest by the ‘English crowd’  in response to the rise of the market at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, so well described by E.P. Thompson and by Eric Hobsbawm and George Rudé. The book, Free Markets and Food Riots: the politics of global adjustment, was published in 1994 at the height of the Western ‘globalization’ project.

The book started with a couple of theoretical chapters, setting out our understanding of political economy, moral economy and class struggle, and then explored the dynamics and contours of popular protest largely on a region by region basis, covering Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East, and South Asia, as well as a chapter on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union/Russia, but with a special chapter written by myself and my partner, on women’s protest. In Africa, between 1990 and 1994, popular protest movements and strikes had brought down more than 30 regimes and led to multi-party elections for the first time, in some cases, in a generation.

What was striking, even at the time, was the relative lack of popular protest in three main regions – the oil rich states of the Gulf and Libya, South East Asia, and East Asia. These were, in effect, the regions most insulated against the Western project of globalisation, with its emphasis on ‘open-ness’ to foreign investment, on privatization and on ‘the rule of markets’. Indeed, there had been growing recognition, particularly on the left, that an alternative to the neo-liberal ideology of the ‘free market’ – which many referred to as ‘state capitalism’ – had been effectively maintained over several decades in many of the countries of South East and East Asia – something that was grudgingly recognised even by the IMF and World Bank by the mid-1990s.

But, this was to change with what was referred to as the Asian ‘melt-down’ or financial crisis that started in July 1997 in Thailand, and had serious repercussions throughout the region. The IMF stepped in, with its usual conditionalities, and by the end of the decade, the crisis was over and globalization continued apace, until the banking and financial crisis of 2007-2008. This decade saw the effective consolidation of the conditions for rapid economic growth, particularly in East Asia, and notably in China. Some countries in Asia, however, and even more in sub-Saharan Africa, remained poor.

Though your focus has long been on African political economy, you never limited yourself to the continent – and you have ‘strayed’ across the global. As we have seen, for example, you have worked on Nepal, and it’s astonishing movements and politics. Can you take us through this work, and your hopes – and disillusionment – with the Maoist movement?

By 2001, the People’s War had expanded from a local movement based largely in the remote hill areas of Western Nepal to have a presence and an impact across the whole country; also, whereas it had been seen mainly as a law and order problem in the late 1990s, to be dealt with by the armed police, towards the end of 2001, the Royal Nepalese Army became involved and the conflict intensified. For the next four years, I was employed as a part-time ‘conflict’ adviser and had good access to both civilian and military government officials, as well as to the British civilian (DfID) and military advisers.

At the same time, I was also engaged with different groups on the left, both those that had remained within the mainstream of party politics, like the United Marxist-Leninist Party (UML) and the Workers and Peasants’ Party, and with the Maoists, many of whom were now operating ‘underground’. I also started working closely with a UML-oriented NGO, called Rural Reconstruction Nepal (RRN) whose director was a former PhD student and now a UML civil society leader. RRN gained a reputation, during the People’s War, of being one of the very few NGOs that was able to operate effectively even in Maoist-controlled areas. This was largely because of the political sophistication of the RRN’s director – who was able to maintain close contact with the Maoist leadership throughout the conflict and ensure that RRN’s project activities were always undertaken with the approval or at least acquiescence of the Maoists.

Through my close relationship with this individual, I was able to meet several members of the Maoist leadership, including Dr Babu Ram Bhattarai, whose PhD thesis (1986) on development and underdevelopment in Nepal had been strongly influenced by our own work, especially Nepal in Crisis. His thesis was subsequently published as a book The Nature of Underdevelopment and Regional Structure of Nepal – a Marxist Analysis. In 2003, the director of RRN and I published a collection of essays – The People’s War in Nepal: left perspectives’ – which included pieces by Bhattarai and other Maoists, including the veteran leader of another Maoist faction, M.B. Singh, and various independent left intellectuals, as well as an introduction by ourselves. Later, in 2008, with another Nepali colleague, I edited a second collection of essays, this time by a combination of Nepali and foreign intellectuals, called In Hope and in Fear: living through the People’s War in Nepal.

The success of the Maoists in transforming the armed conflict into a political movement, was in part the result of an attempt by the king in February 2005 to concentrate all power into his own hands, engineering a coup d’état, banning all political and civil society organizations, controlling the media, and taking command of the army and security forces. This prompted a strong adverse reaction from a number of influential states, including India, the US and the UK; it also led to an alliance between the main political parties in support of democracy and against the king. For a while, it was unclear how the triangular balance of forces – Maoists, monarchists and political parties – would come to rest, but the Maoists managed to persuade the political parties of their good faith, and in November 2006, a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) was signed that brought an end to the conflict and effectively ousted the king from power.

Shortly afterwards, an interim government was formed, Nepal was declared a republic and planning for elections to a Constituent Assembly began. After some difficulties, including popular unrest in parts of the country that felt left out of the highly centralised decision-making in Kathmandu, a Constituent Assembly was elected in April 2008, through a combination of first-past-the-post and proportional representation, with an unprecedented number of seats filled by women and ethnic minorities. When a government was eventually formed, it was headed by the Maoist leader ‘Prachanda’ (Pushpa Kamal Dahal), with Dr Babu Ram Bhattarai as Minister of Finance. It seemed for a short time in 2008 that Nepal was poised for the promised revolution, under an elected Marxist-dominated government.

Sadly, it was not to be. For reasons that have yet to be fully analysed, the Maoists failed to capitalise on their extraordinary success as a political movement, and, instead, became bogged down in the petty politics of what they had always complained was typical of ‘parliamentary democracy’. Personal rivalries, venality and corruption, plain incompetence and foreign interference have all been seen as reasons for the failure to implement that economic, social and political transformation for which the Maoists and their supporters had fought and died for; the difficulties associated with re-orienting a movement of military and political cadres into a democratic political party should also not be under-estimated. But fail they did.

In recent years, however, particularly after I took early retirement from the School of Development Studies in 2006, I have tended to re-focus my efforts on local politics in the UK, and on the relationship between popular protest, social movements and class struggle in Africa.

You have been very much involved over the years in debates regarding the relevance and pertinence of Marxism as an approach to African studies. You were forthright and original in your own response – refusing to follow ‘fashionable’ formulations, without careful and close study yourself. For our readers, please explain what was going on and how you responded.

I have been involved with ROAPE for many years and, in the early 1990s, co-edited several issues of the journal – with Peter Lawrence on ‘The Price of Economic Reform’ (1990), with Lionel Cliffe on ‘Africa in a New World Order’ (1991), and with Pepe Roberts on ‘Fundamentalism in Africa: Religion and Politics’ (1991). During the 1990s and early 2000s I was very involved with work in Nepal.

But towards the end of the decade, I began to develop a new working relationship with some of those working on sub-Saharan African politics. While still at UEA, I had supervised the PhD thesis of Peter Dwyer (one of very few students to go directly from a BA Hons to a PhD) on social movements in South Africa, and in April 2002, he and I presented a paper at the 8th International Conference on Alternative Futures and Popular Protest on entitled ‘The New Wave: A Global Perspective on Popular Protest’, which in part took up some of the themes of the ‘Free Markets and Food Riots’ book with John Walton, and also tried to break new ground in the light of the new international ‘anti-capitalist’ Social Forum movement that started in Seattle in 1999, then in Genoa in 2001.

Moving from a global perspective on popular protest to consider Africa in particular, where there were a number of Social Forum meetings in 2003 and 2004, Leo Zeilig and I published an article on ‘Class and Protest in Africa: new waves’ in ROAPE (2005). This was followed up by chapters ‘Marxism, Class and Resistance in Africa’ and of ‘The History of Class Struggle in Africa’ in a book edited by Leo Zeilig on Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa (Haymarket, 2009). In the meanwhile, Leo Zeilig and I had collaborated with left historian David Renton, to produce a book on the Congo (published by Zed Books in 2006). This work put ‘class struggle’ in the broadest sense at the centre of the analysis and, while recognising the structural constraints of the wider political economy, focused on grass-roots social movements and popular protest.

I have always been committed to the idea that ordinary men and women can make a difference and contribute to revolutionary change. I reject the idea that there is a set and prescribed ‘revolutionary path’ in which certain social actors and agencies must lead ‘the revolution’, and believe that Marx was right when he said, in effect, that ‘men and women make history albeit not under conditions of their own choosing’. This inevitably leads to a commitment to political activism as well as to analysis.

This month as you know (January 2021) sees the anniversary of the Tunisian revolution and the start of the Egyptian one. Given that your entire work has focused on popular struggle and resistance, within a global perspective and reach, and much interest and research in particular from North Africa, can I ask you about the North Africa revolutions of 2011. Briefly, how can we understand the immense hope and the defeats of this revolutionary wave? What are the lessons to be learned for popular and revolutionary struggles today from this period of revolt?

What you refer to as ‘the North Africa revolutions of 2011’ were part of a wave of popular struggle that has become known as ‘the Arab Spring’. Born out of a combination of desperation and hope for better things, this extraordinary uprising – involving everything from demonstrations to riots to armed rebellion – affected almost every country in the Arabic-speaking world. Given my long-standing interest in the region, I followed the development of this phenomenon very closely.

It began with popular protest in Tunisia following the death on 4 January of a Tunisian street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, who had set himself on fire in response to the harassment and humiliation inflicted on him by municipal officials. Horror and outrage at this incident turned into popular protest against the petty bureaucracy and corruption of the authoritarian regime of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. A month later, after 23 years in power, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia, to be replaced initially by an interim government and then, after elections, by an Ennahda Islamist government.

The protests in Tunisia were widely reported in the Arabic social and main-stream media and provoked mass demonstrations across the Arab world, from the Maghreb to the Mashreq. In a number of states, the protests transformed themselves into anti-government movements. In addition to Tunisia, these movements developed in Libya, in Egypt, in Bahrain, in Yemen, in Kuwait and in Syria to the point where they achieved significant purchase and brought about real political change.

For example, in Libya, the government crack-down on protestors sparked a civil war; in Egypt, Cairo’s Tahrir Square was the site of three weeks of mass protests that eventually forced President Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled for 30 years, out of office and he was replaced, after elections, by Mohamed Morsi, an Islamist affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. In Syria, also, popular protest drew on widespread opposition to the authoritarian regime of President Bashir al Assad and included a significant number of Islamist groups. As in Libya, this led to a civil war. In Yemen, massive protests sparked a political crisis and forced President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had led Yemen for 33 years, to step down, eventually in 2012.

While hailing ‘the Arab Spring’ initially as a positive ‘democratic’ development, the West was also, from the outset, concerned both at the importance of radical Islamist groups in the opposition movements and also at the risk of instability in a volatile region. There was particular concern when Mubarak was replaced by Morsi in Egypt, when Islamic State (ISIS) emerged as one of the major groups fighting against the Assad regime in Syria, and when the government led by Saleh’s former vice president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, in Yemen struggled to fend off threats both from Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and from Houthi militants who were increasingly supported by Iran.

Early Western military intervention against the Assad regime in Syria proved increasingly problematic, given steadfast Russian support for the regime and its characterisation of most opposition groups as ‘terrorists’; but reluctant Russian acquiescence to Western military intervention in Libya and support for the opposition militias enabled the overthrow of President Gaddafi and his assassination. Both Syria and Libya descended over the next few years into chaos and civil war. There is much more to say, but this would require more time and space and perhaps another interview!

Finally, in terms of your lifelong commitment to radical social change, in the UK and in the ‘developing world’, what prospects and hopes to you see for this type of change today? What is the role of an activist-scholar in the movements we have seen and specifically in the context of Black Lives Matter?     

These are hard times, as humanity struggles against covid-19. But, as always with crises, this struggle takes place at a turning point when the structural contradictions and inadequacies of the prevailing economic, social and political system are starkly revealed. The unacceptable inequalities that result from various forms of exploitation and repression ‘of the many by the few’ are shown to be not inevitable but the result of modes of production and ways of life that must change dramatically if we are all to emerge from the pandemic and have any prospect of sustainable development in a world whose resources we have so mercilessly and recklessly exploited and degraded in our greed and lack of concern for the consequences of our actions. There must be a better way!

In this context, our role as activist-scholars, as you put it, is to combine theory and practice, recognising our own position – in my case as a white middle-class older male – in the prevailing social, economic and political context (at local, national and international levels) and to assess when, where and how best to contribute to progressive movements and organisations. Those of us with a particular historical and on-going involvement with ‘Africa’ need to make sure that we work as closely as possible with African intellectuals and political activists on the left and provide whatever appropriate input we can.

But we also need to recognize that ‘Black Lives Matter’ provides us with new personal and political challenges, as well as opportunities for contributions in our own countries and specific local locations – in my case in Norfolk and south London, in England, the UK and Europe – which investigate and interrogate the complexity of both European and British imperialism and colonialism, and their heritage in Britain as well as other parts of the world, and also their contemporary features.

This interview was compiled, edited and conducted by ROAPE’s Peter Dwyer and Leo Zeilig.   

David Seddon is a researcher and political activist who has written extensively on social movements, class struggles and political transitions across the developing world. David is a regular contributor to roape.net and a former member of the Editorial Working Group of ROAPE.

Featured photograph: Children participating in protests in Egypt during the 2011 revolution (H. Elrasam, 1 August 2013).

The World Bank and Covid-19: the private investment broker of the Global South

Despite cosmetic rebranding, the World Bank continues its decades-long work of pushing power into the hands of private capital. Sean Taylor explains how the Covid-19 response is being used to further the Bank’s role of acting as a private investment broker in the Global South.

By Sean Taylor

For decades, it has been documented that World Bank operations have advanced capitalist restructuring in the Global South, and that it is institutionally wedded to the language and ideology of neoliberalism: deregulation, privatisation, marketisation, and commercialisation. This institutional fixation with neoliberal ideology remains almost unchanged in the face of rapidly changing global economic and political circumstances.

The 2010s were set against the backdrop of the 2007/8 financial crisis, which posed a severe threat to neoliberalism. This decade also saw the coming-of-age of alternative economic models, in the form of the ‘developmental state,’ or ‘retro-liberalism,’ offered by the likes of China and Brazil. This has furthered the ideological challenge to neoliberalism. Yet, the Bank – rather than updating its economic doctrine for the 21st century – spent the 2010s transferring power into the hands of private capital, as it has always done. For example, its Maximising Finance for Development (MFD) scheme, one of its flagship policies of the decade, is presented as an innovative new way of financing sustainable development in the Global South. Though presented as part of the Bank’s rebranding as a ‘solutions Bank,’ ostensibly void of ideology, in practice it operates according to the same neoliberal logic long promoted by the institution.

This tunnel vision is guiding the Bank’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic, despite the potential for global economic transformation. That this commitment to neoliberal orthodoxy should remain steadfast, in the face of such challenges, suggests that the Bank enters the 2020s doing the same fundamental job it has done since the 1980s: transferring power to private capital.

The World Bank and Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism has not, of course, been the sole preserve of the World Bank. Since the 1970s the global economy has undertaken a process of capitalist restructuring, in which the fundamental tenets of a capitalist economy have been expanded: free markets, private property, exchange relations across society, and power shifts in favour of capital over labour (I understand neoliberalism to be essentially a project of capitalist restructuring, and that it should be understood in this context). This has been an almost universal phenomenon, yet the Bank has been crucial in advancing this programme in the Global South.

Since the late 1970s the Global South has become dependent on capital in the form of loans, contingent on neoliberal reforms such as tax cuts, lower regulations, lower financial costs, and privatisation of public services. Societies in the Global South have been profoundly reorganised as a result. I appreciate that this is not new territory for readers of roape.net, and it should be noted that much of ROAPE’s coverage of the continent in the 1980s examined in detail the consequences for African societies and economies of World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes (see the archive for back issues of the review). There has been no lack of critique of this neoliberal model, but dependence on Western capital, and lack of credible alternative economic models (since 1989 and the collapse of the Berlin Wall) has meant near ideological hegemony in international development. Without challenge, it is of little surprise that the Bank continued to vigorously promote neoliberal reforms in the developing world.

The landscape has, however, changed rapidly since 2008. Alternative economic models are being offered in countries such as China and Brazil. Neoliberal logic assumes the state, its regulatory powers, and ownership of industries, are impediments to free market efficiency. By contrast actors such as China and Brazil see the state as an imperative actor for directing capital towards appropriate projects. The ‘developmental state’, as this model is often known, is an active participant in development, not a bureaucratic frustration whose frontiers are to be rolled back. This model is sometimes also referred to as ‘retro-liberalism,’ for its similarities with Western models of the 1950s. As well as offering a viable alternatives to neoliberalism, more Southern actors – China, Brazil, India, Venezuela and South Africa, for example – are acting as development lenders and investors, reducing dependency on Western capital, and thus the associated contingencies.

This threat to neoliberalism’s ideological and geostrategic dominance rapidly accelerated following the global financial crash of 2007/8 – largely blamed on deregulation of global finance. The countries which had most embraced neoliberalism in the decades prior – such as the UK, where this blogpost is being written – entered a recession followed by a decade of austerity. By contrast, developing countries offering alternative, ‘retro-liberal’ models came out of the crash in a position of relative strength, having maintained high, if decelerated, growth rates.

Together this posed an existential crisis for neoliberalism. The model’s failures had been exposed in the West where it wreaked economic havoc and was subsequently rebuked from all sides; both right-wing and left-wing politicians attacked what was commonly labelled neoliberal globalisation. In some parts of the Global South alternative models were providing high growth rates and appeared to offer a preferable route for smaller developing countries. The capital dependency upon which the West had relied on in order to strong-arm neoliberal reforms on to the Global South was being weakened.

Sham reforms

In terms of the game, it would have made sense at this point for the World Bank to have adapted to remain relevant. Even the IMF appeared to recognise its limitations, in admitting that elements of the neoliberal project “have not delivered as expected.” Yet, the Bank’s adaptations to this new world in which neoliberalism was losing the ideational battle have been merely cosmetic thus far.

As early as 2012 there was talk of a “new strategic identity,” growing into a “solutions bank.” Arguably, one implication of becoming a ‘solutions bank’ is an admission that the Bank was previously not focused on perfecting solutions, but ideology. Was the Bank tacitly suggesting it would be repositioning itself at a further distance from neoliberalism?

If so, the Bank’s rhetoric did not match its actions. The flagship announcement of the 2010s, the MFD scheme, ultimately follows the same logic as its previous work in the Global South. MFD is described by the Bank as an opportunity to bridge the US$2.6 trillion per year gap between development aid and what is necessary to end global poverty. The Bank sees developing countries as a US$12 trillion ‘market opportunity,’ into which it seeks to attract private capital investment using subsidies and guarantees, and legal, policy, and regulatory changes. This sets up securitisation markets in the financial sector, and proliferates the use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP).

In practice, this equates to the deregulation of domestic finance sectors, in order to incorporate global financial institutions and shadow banking institutions in the economy. Foreign investment is enticed through further deregulation of labour, land, environmental, and social laws. In other words, a wholesale reconfiguration of the economy in order to access private debt.

For example, in Indonesia where the MFD scheme is being used for geothermal exploration, the Bank seeks to use US$150m from the government, US$175m in concessional climate finance, and US$325m in Bank loans to unlock US$4bn in private capital investment to put towards geothermal exploration. The Bank itself provides “advice on how to structure the facility to align with the needs of the private sector.” Rather than Bank or state-led investment adapting to the needs of Indonesia’s energy sector, the Bank explicitly states that Indonesia must make adaptations to the needs of private sector investors. There are plenty of similar instances in Kenya and Nepal where MFD is underway, and the Bank states that “MFD is about prioritizing private sector solutions and optimizing the use of scarce public resources.”

Development is reduced, then, to being dependent on neoliberal reforms which expand the private sector and weaken the power of the state over its domestic economy. This is ‘development’ as a power-grab by global finance. The Bank’s reinvention of itself amounts to little more than becoming a private investment broker in developing economies.

Covid and the Bank

Today the world faces a fresh challenge to the neoliberal model, with the Covid-19 pandemic graphically illuminating its deficiencies. In particular, the reduction in state-planning capacity left countries ill-equipped for the logistical challenges the pandemic posed, with the so-called efficiencies of the market found wanting.

This has been particularly exposed in the distinction between the failure of the neoliberal West’s test, trace and isolate systems – which were often contracted out to the private sector – compared to those of Asian countries. Just-in-time supply chains and large supranational free trade areas and political bodies begin to look outdated in a world where borders are being closed and the nation-state confirmed as a real political and sovereign entity.

Public-private-partnerships have been a hallmark of neoliberalism, often supplying public services. These have been long-criticised, but the collapse in demand for some of these services during periods of lockdown has left some states with huge bills being paid to private companies just so they can maintain profit margins. The World Bank’s failure to produce data on exactly how much is being spent only serves to make it look like a shady racketeering scheme. Profit margins remain too sacred to be touched, whilst states will no doubt be forced to make cuts to public services in order to pay for them.

At the same time as the virus have ripped through communities and societies demand has increased for healthcare. In much of the developing world, public healthcare systems are underfunded and of poor quality, and much provision is private – again this is the legacy of structural adjustment programmes and reforms from the 1980s. The role of global finance, and its need for returns on investment, in funding private healthcare means that profit is often put before a universal quality of care. The result is grotesque health inequalities. Rather than a ‘great leveller,’ the pandemic shows that the greater role of private companies and global finance in healthcare systems results in higher death rates among those in a worse socioeconomic position.

Despite these fundamental flaws, inherent to the neoliberal model, the Bank has refused to change course. Of the World Bank’s initial US$14bn disbursement to mitigate the effects of the pandemic, US$8bn (57%) was channelled through the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the Bank, representing an increase on its historic average of 17%. Of the IFC funding, 68% went to financial institutions rather than ‘real sector’ businesses, such as agribusiness, healthcare, and tourism; 50% of funding to these sectors went to companies that are, or are owned by, international conglomerates. Therefore, the Bank’s Covid response was primarily an exercise in rescuing global finance.

Funding allocated by the IFC to the ‘real sector’ continues to support this notion. To take one example, the IFC and the International Development Association (another arm of the WB) are raising US$4m in blended concessional finance (private investment) to support a project by Ciel Healthcare, Uganda’s largest private healthcare provider. Given the health inequalities inherent to the financialisation of health systems, this is not an optimum project for protecting Ugandans, which would be to improve universal public healthcare systems, rather than brokering private investment.

This is part of a wider trend in the developing world. Spending on public health briefly increased when the pandemic first surged, but the focus quickly returned to private provision, with the IFC announcing a US$4bn Public Health Platform with the explicit purpose of “support[ing] the private sector’s ability and capacity to deliver healthcare products and services.”

Taking other examples, an emergency Bank loan to Ecuador in May, the Bank demonstrates a commitment to the wider principles of neoliberal economics to stimulate economic growth. The loan was conditional on removing certain sectoral minimum wages and increasing exemptions for taxes on financial transactions. A loan to Nigeria’s energy sector in June last year was completed with the explicit purpose of de-risking investment for the private sector. In these instances, the Bank is acting to hand power to private capital, effectively making the success of Ecuador and Nigeria’s domestic economies dependent on the rampant desire for profits motivating global financial institutions.

These are not isolated examples. The Bank declared in one blogpost last year that its Covid-19 response is part of their “integrated approach to help mobilize private sector financing.” It goes on to discuss the central role PPPs will play in their future economic plans, despite the way they have locked in profits for private investors.

This is the future offered by the Bank. It continues to advocate for neoliberal reforms in the Global South even as this model faces, what would appear to be, an existential challenge. There remains the possibility in the long run that the Bank could fade into irrelevance as other international players, primarily China, reshape the global economy. But what is certain is that the Bank has entered the Covid-19 world with the same mission as it had in the 1980s: advance capitalist restructuring and push power into the hands of private capital.

Sean Taylor is a politics graduate from the University of Leeds, with particular interests in radical political thought and political economy.

Featured Photograph: A member of the Boston Direct Action Project dressed as vampires to impersonate public relations associates of the World Bank, Washington DC (Justin McIntosh, April 2005).

Reflections on aid and regime change in Africa: a response to Cheeseman

In a response to Nic Cheeseman’s call for strengthening patron-client relations between western donors and African governments, Jimi O. Adesina, Andrew M. Fischer and Nimi Hoffmann argue his approach is ahistorical, counterproductive, and morally indefensible. They explain that Cheeseman ignores the destructive, anti-democratic role of western-backed regime change and policy conditionality across the Global South.

By Jimi O. Adesina, Andrew M. Fischer and Nimi Hoffmann

In a blogpost, published on 22 December 2020, that he describes as the most important thing he wrote in 2020, Nic Cheeseman penned a strong criticism of what he calls the ‘model of authoritarian development’ in Africa. This phrase refers specifically to Ethiopia and Rwanda, the only two countries that fit the model, which is otherwise not generalisable to the rest of the continent. His argument, in a nutshell, is that donors have been increasingly enamoured with these two countries because they are seen as producing results. Yet the recent conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia shows that this argument needs to be questioned and discarded. He calls for supporting democracy in Africa, which he claims performs better in the long run than authoritarian regimes, especially in light of the conflicts and repression that inevitably emerge under authoritarianism. His argument could also be read as an implicit call for regime change, stoking donors to intensify political conditionalities on these countries before things get even worse.

Cheeseman’s argument rests on a number of misleading empirical assertions which have important implications for the conclusions that he draws. In clarifying these, our point is not to defend authoritarianism. Instead, we hope to inject a measure of interpretative caution and to guard against opportunistically using crises to fan the disciplinary zeal of donors, particularly in a context of increasingly militarised aid regimes that have been associated with disastrous ventures into regime change.

We make two points. First, his story of aid dynamics in Ethiopia is not supported by the data he cites, which instead reflect the rise of economic ‘reform’ programmes pushed by the World Bank and IMF. The country’s current economic difficulties also need to be placed in the context of the systemic financial crisis currently slamming the continent, in which both authoritarian and (nominally) democratic regimes are faring poorly.

Second, we reflect on Cheeseman’s vision of aid as a lever of regime change. Within already stringent economic adjustment programmes, his call for intensifying political conditionalities amounts to a Good Governance Agenda 2.0. It ignores the legacy of the structural adjustment programmes in subverting deliberative governance on the continent during the 1980s and 1990s.

Misleading aid narratives distract from rebranded structural adjustment

On the first point, Cheeseman establishes his argument early on by stating ‘that international donors have become increasingly willing to fund authoritarian regimes in Africa on the basis that they deliver on development’. In support of this assertion, he cites a table from the World Bank that shows net Official Development Assistance (ODA) received by Ethiopia surging to USD 4.93 billion in 2018, up from just over USD 4 billion in 2016 and 2017, and from a plateau oscillating around USD 3.5 billion from 2008 to 2015.

These aggregated data are misleading because ODA received by Ethiopia from western bilateral donors in fact fell in 2018 (and probably continued falling in 2019 and 2020). The World Bank data that he cites are actually from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) statistics, which refer to all official donors (but not including countries such as China). If we restrict donor assistance to DAC countries – which is relevant given that Cheeseman only refers to the US, the UK and the EU in his piece – disbursed ODA to Ethiopia fell from USD 2.26 billion in 2017 to USD 2.06 billion in 2018 (see the red line in the figure below).

Figure: ODA to Ethiopia (millions USD), 2000-2019

OECD.stat, last accessed 30 December 2020.

There was a brief moderate increase in DAC country ODA starting in 2015 and peaking in 2017. Cheeseman might have been referring to this. However, contrary to his argument, it was likely that the reason for this increase in aid was primarily humanitarian, responding to the refugee influx from South Sudan that began in 2015 and to the severe drought and famine risk in 2016-17. It was also probably related to attempts to induce incipient political reform following the major protests in Oromia in 2014, which Cheeseman would presumably condone given that conventional measures of democracy and freedom improved in 2018. Indeed, it is notable that committed ODA from DAC donor countries fell even more sharply than disbursed aid in 2018, from USD 2.49 billion in 2017 to USD 2.07 billion, reflecting the context in which these countries were negotiating hard with the Ethiopian government at the time.

Instead, the sharp increase in ODA in 2018 came entirely from the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group, which increased its mixture of grants and loans to the country from USD 1.1 billion in 2017 to USD 2.1 billion in 2018. This subsequently fell to USD 1.8 billion in 2019 (the dashed green line in the figure).

Such ODA has been explicitly tied to the World Bank’s long-standing goal of liberalising, privatising and deregulating the Ethiopian economy, thereby ‘reforming’ (or disassembling) many of the attributes that have allowed the Ethiopian state to act in a developmentalist manner. These attributes include state-owned enterprises, state control over the financial sector, and relatively closed capital accounts, in strong distinction to most other countries in Africa (including Rwanda).

For instance, in October 2018 it approved USD 1.2 billion from the IDA in support of ‘a range of economic reforms designed to revitalize the economy by expanding the role of the private sector… to gradually open up the economy and introduce competition to and liberalize sectors that have been dominated by key state-owned enterprises (SOEs)’. The support aimed to promote public-private partnerships in key state-owned sectors such as telecoms, power and trade logistics as key mechanisms to restructure these sectors, as well as broader deregulation and financial liberalisation. It is also notable that the World Bank prefaced this justification by emphasising the political reforms that had already been embarked upon, and the promotion of ‘citizen engagement social accountability’ in Ethiopia.

In other words, contra the idea that western donors have been increasing their support for an authoritarian development model, they have been gradually withdrawing aid since 2017. The World Bank pulled up the slack in 2018, and in December 2019 both the World Bank and IMF promised more funding in support of ongoing economic reforms. The economic liberalisation has in turn undermined political liberalisation and has been a key source of political destabilization.

The bargaining hand of these donors has been reinforced by the economic difficulties faced by the Ethiopian economy – in particular, a hard tightening of external foreign-exchange constraints. Balance of payments statistics reveal that the government had effectively stopped external borrowing after 2015, a policy that it was advised to adopt in its Article IV consultations with the IMF in 2016 and 2017 as its external debt distress levels were rising. As a result, the government became excessively reliant on donor grant money as a principal source of foreign financing. Yet the country continued to run deep trade deficits, in large part because its development strategies, as elsewhere in Africa, have been very import and foreign-exchange intensive (e.g. think of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, requiring more than USD 4.6 billion to build, the bulk in foreign exchange). Significant capital flight appears to have taken place as well; for example, errors and omissions reported on the balance of payments were -USD 2.14 billion in 2018. In order to keep the ship afloat, the central bank burnt through over USD 1 billion of its reserves in 2018 alone.

This severe tightening of foreign-exchange constraints needs to be understood as a critical structural factor in causing the development strategy to stall. Along with non-economic factors, this in turn put considerable strain on the government’s ability to stabilise political factions through the deployment of scarce resources, of which foreign exchange remains among the most important, especially in the current setting. Again, the point is not to apologise for authoritarianism, but rather to emphasise that the current situation is rooted deeper within a conjuncture of systemic crises that go far beyond any particular form of political administration.

Indeed, Cheeseman commits a similar oversight in ignoring the previous systemic crisis that the present is in many ways repeating. Later in his piece, he asserts: ‘The vast majority of African states were authoritarian in the 1970s and 1980s, and almost all had poor economic growth.’ This is an ahistorical misrepresentation of the profound global crisis that crippled Africa from the late 1970s for about two decades and which was the source of the poor growth he mentions. Then, as now, economic crisis was triggered throughout the continent by the severe tightening of external constraints, which neoliberal structural adjustment programmes exacerbated in a pro-cyclical manner despite being justified in the name of growth. The combination crippled developmentalist strategies across the continent regardless of political variations and despite the fact that many countries were performing quite well before the onset of the crisis. Such historical contextualisation is crucial for a correct assessment of the present.

In this respect, there is a danger of putting the cart before the horse. Most countries that descend into deep protracted crises (economic or political) generally stop being nominally democratic, and yet this result becomes attributed as a cause, as if authoritarianism results in crisis or poor performance. Cheeseman cherry-picks two papers (one a working paper) on democracy and development performance in Africa (which like all cross-country regressions, are highly sensitive to model specification and open to interpretation). However, drawing any causality from such studies is problematic given that states tended to become more authoritarian after the global economic crisis and subsequent structural adjustments of the late 1970s and 1980s, not the other way around. For instance, 16 countries were under military rule in 1972, compared with 21 countries in 1989 during the height of adjustment. Faced with crippled capacity under the weight of severe austerity and dwindling legitimacy as living standards collapsed, many states responded to mass protests against the harsh conditionalities of adjustment with increasing force. As such, economic crisis and adjustment plausibly contributed to the rise of political instability and increasingly authoritarian regimes. Other factors include the Cold War destabilisation, which western countries fuelled and profited from. In other words, the political malaise across Africa at the time was driven by as much by external as internal factors.

Aid as a lever of regime change

This leads us to our second point concerning Cheeseman’s vision of aid as a lever of regime change. Cheeseman is at pains to emphasise that rigged elections and repression of opponents have contributed to the recent emergence of conflict in the Tigray region. While these are important features, Ethiopian intellectuals have also emphasised that conflicts in contemporary Ethiopia have taken place against a history of imperial state formation, slavery and debates about the ‘national question’, or what has sometimes been called ‘internal colonialism’. These conflicts are shaped by the system of ethnic federalism, in which ethnically defined states control their own revenues, social provisioning and security forces. They have been affected by foreign agricultural land grabs, which interact with older histories of semi-feudal land dispossession. Most recently, there have been concerns that regional tensions over the Renaissance Dam and agricultural land may help draw neighbouring countries into the conflict.

In the face of this highly complex and rapidly changing context, no one person can identify the optimal response. It plausibly requires regular collective deliberation by people who are deeply embedded in the context. In particular, the brief political liberalisation of 2018 was followed by a sharp uptick of political violence on all sides, rooted in fundamental tensions between different visions of statehood. Such situations cannot be solved simply by ‘adding democracy and stirring’; they require deliberative governance.

Yet, Cheeseman’s piece seeks a reimposition of the very political conditionalities that were a primary factor in subverting deliberative governance on the continent during the first wave of structural adjustment and its attendant Good Governance agendas. Such conditionalities work by constraining the open contestation of ideas and the process of informed consensus-building. They undermine the sovereignty of key institutions of the polity and the economy. And by doing so they degrade the historical meaning of development as a project of reclaiming social and economic sovereignty after colonialism.

Indeed, as Thandika Mkandawire has argued, the previous wave of political conditionalities and democratisation reduced democracies to formal structures of elections and, by wedding and subordinating them to the orthodox economic policy frameworks established under structural adjustment, led to what he called ‘choiceless democracies’. Such ‘disempowered new democracies’ are incapable of responding to the substantive macroeconomic demands of voters and thereby undermining substantive democracy, deliberative governance and policy sovereignty.

In particular, the idea of a democratic developmental state is meaningless in the absence of policy sovereignty. The institutional monocropping and monotasking of the type that Mkandawire wrote about does not merely prevent key institutions, such as central banks, from using broader policy instruments to support the developmental project. It also involves the deliberate creation of unaccountable policy vehicles, such as Monetary Policy Committees (MPCs), which operate outside of democratic oversight, but have considerable hold on the levers of economic policy. MPCs are in turn wedded to neoliberal monetarism. The message to such disempowered new democracies is that ‘you can elect any leader of your choice as long as s/he does not tamper with the economic policy that we choose for you.’ Or as Mkandawire wrote in 1994, ‘two or three IMF experts sitting in a country’s reserve bank have more to say than the national association of economists about the direction of national policy.’

In such contexts, the prospect of a democratic developmental state is severely diminished. Ensuring significant improvements in people’s wellbeing is important for the legitimacy of democracies. Yet the subversion of policy sovereignty significantly constrains the ability of new democracies to do so, setting them up for a crisis of legitimacy.

If democracy is to be meaningful it should involve the active engagement of citizens in a system of deliberative governance. Civil society organisations, in this context, are meaningful when they are autonomous institutions of social groupings that actively engage in boisterous debate and public policymaking in articulating the interest of their members. Yet, donor clientelism in Africa has wrought civil society and advocacy organisations that are manufactured and funded by, and accountable to, donors, not the citizens. This is a substantive subversion of democracy as a system of deliberative governance.

In this respect, we can call the kind of intrusive donor clientelism that Cheeseman is recommending Good Governance 2.0. His advocacy for strengthening patron-client relations between western donors and African governments, and his urging that donors use crises as a way of forcing regime change and policy conditionalities, is ahistorical, counterproductive and morally indefensible. In particular, it does not take into account the destructive, anti-democratic role of western-backed regime change and policy conditionality across the Global South during the era of flag independence. Even recently, these donor countries have disastrous human rights records when pushing for regime change in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Their support for military dictatorships, such as in Egypt, has been a central pillar of foreign policy for decades. And several of these donor countries worked hard to uphold apartheid in South Africa. They have no moral high ground to push for regime change, and little record to ensure that they could do so without causing more harm than good.

Moreover, external actors attempting to enforce their narrow view of democratisation in contexts of deeply polarised and competing visions of statehood, and in the midst of economic instability reinforced by already burdensome economic conditionalities, austerity and reforms, could well be a recipe for disaster. As a collective of intellectuals from across the Horn has emphasised, the people of Ethiopia in particular and the Horn in general must be at the forefront of developing a lasting peace. This would likely require a developmental commitment to supporting state capacity and deliberative governance, not undermining it through external interference and conditionalities.

This blogpost was originally posted by CODESRIA Bulletin Online, and has been reposted by The Elephant, Developing Economics blog and other websites.

Jimi Adesina is professor and holder of the South African Research Chair in Social Policy at the College of Graduate Studies, University of South Africa, South Africa. Andrew Fischer is associate professor in Social Policy and Development at the International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Hague, The Netherlands. Nimi Hoffmann is lecturer at the Centre for International Education at the University of Sussex, United Kingdom.

Featured Photograph: Senegalese women cast their votes in the presidential elections in 2019 (Nic Bothma, 24 February 2019).

Patrice Lumumba: Revolution, freedom, and the Congo today

In a powerful defence of the legacy and politics of Patrice Lumumba, murdered 60 years ago today, Charles Gimba Magha-A-Ngimba asks what his death mean for Africa and the Congo? Lumumba’s name has become a passport to power, but the question remains how do we revert to his real legacy?

By Charles Gimba Magha-A-Ngimba

We must move forward, striking out tirelessly against imperialism. From all over the world we have to learn lessons which events afford. Lumumba’s murder should be a lesson for all of us” — Che Guevara, 1964.

On 17 January 1961, the African leader and first head of government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Patrice Lumumba, was brutally murdered. Yet Lumumba’s legacy endures and continues to resonate among all peoples in Africa and the world.

Lumumba led the DRC to independence on June 30, 1960. The African leader wanted the decolonisation of his country but even more, he wanted to totally eradicate European colonialist power present in Africa, and to remove plunders from the continent and the Congo. As a gifted party organiser, Lumumba’s ambitious aspirations for independence were inspired by pro-independence groups across Africa and notions of African unity emanating from Ghana which has achieved independence in 1957.

Lumumba’s resolute position on independence made him an enemy for Europe and the United States, who, according to several analysts, played a role in his death. The murder of Lumumba was the most significant assassination of the 20th century due to the global context in which it took place, and its impact on Congolese politics. War, disorder and plunder have plagued the DRC’s people since, despite the Congo being one of the world most mineral-rich countries.

Lumumba died fighting for the Congo’s unity and autonomy, in the context of the country’s colonial past and its rooted mechanisms. Against the backdrop of such a violent history in the DRC, in the 1950s groups emerged with a pro-independence determination for a free and sovereign Congo. One of these groups was the Congolese National Movement (MNC), in which Lumumba became the best-known face and from 1958 its leader.

In 1958, inspired by the independence movement of Africa after attending the All-African Peoples’ Conference in Ghana, Lumumba was determined to fight for the decolonisation of the DRC, despite the limited possibilities of social action due to the Belgian colonial system – an empire of silence, as it was known. Lumumba was in favour of creating an independent and secular state, whose unitary political structures would help to overcome tribal differences and feed into the creation of national sentiment.

After protests and a rising wave of decolonisation over several years, a round-table conference was called in Brussels in January 1960. At this conference, the Congolese strongly rejected the guidelines drawn up by Belgium, and under the leadership of Lumumba and the MNC they insisted on the immediate transition to independence and elections. Elections were called for May of that year and Lumumba was elected the first Prime Minister, while Joseph Kasa-Vubu was appointed as the first President of the newly independent state. The country became officially independent on 30 June 1960, later changing its name to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

However, independence immediately triggered major difficulties. Lumumba was unable to prevent widespread disturbances, mainly in the provinces of Katanga and South Kasai, where both states, in mineral rich areas of the Congo, seceded with the support of the Belgian government. The Katanga region was (and still is) the heart of the country’s mining wealth, where large-scale industrial mining had started in the early 20th century, mainly through the system of colonial companies, closely aligned with the Belgian state.

Huge profits were stolen from the Congolese people filling the pockets of the colonial industrial and political elite; something that after independence, the former colonial power was not willing to sacrifice. It was inevitable that the construction of a legacy based on brutal colonial exploitation and political authoritarianism would not vanish overnight. After July 1960, the uprisings and breakaway of Katanga grew in strength with the mutiny of military forces supported by the US and Belgium.

As a strategic ally to Belgium, the US maintained a close interest in DRC’s affairs, given their interest in uranium, mined in the Congo. Lumumba’s determination to use Congo’s natural resources for the benefit of the people, meant he was immediately perceived as a threat to Western interests, which led them to use all possible strategies to remove him. After the separatist revolts in Katanga supported, Lumumba demanded before the UN the rights of sovereignty and inviolability of its territory and called for the immediate expulsion of Belgian troops. However, the UN ignored the request and Lumumba sought the support of the Soviet Union, which for many was a defining point in the Congo crisis.

After his murder on 17 January 1961 Lumumba’s body – together with two comrades murdered with him, Joseph Okito and Maurice Mpolo – was dissolved in acid in an attempt to erase his legacy, his thoughts and the importance of his struggles for the liberation of African peoples. Without any physical burial, a gold-capped tooth is all that remains of Lumumba. It was wrenched from his skull after he was executed and taken to Belgium as a human trophy. After 60 years, the tooth is finally heading home. A Belgian judge has ordered it to be sent back to Lumumba’s family in the DRC, where it can be laid to rest.

In Lumumba’s famous letter to his wife, written two months prior to his murder, he wrote:

The day will come when history will speak. It will not be the history which will be taught in Brussels, Paris, Washington or the United Nations. It will be the history which will be taught in the countries which have won freedom from colonisation and its puppets. Africa will write its own history and in both the north and south it will be a history of glory and dignity.

Dead, living, free, or in prison on the orders of the colonialists, it is not I who counts. It is the Congo, it is our people for whom independence has been transformed into a cage where we are regarded from the outside…

Would the people of Africa be drowning in the Mediterranean in search of a better life in Europe if Lumumba’s vision and leadership had been fulfilled? Today, people in Africa and the Congo are still angry about Lumumba’s murder. Nevertheless, how long shall we continue discussing his death, while the circumstances of our lives remain unchanged? For Africans, Lumumba remains alive as an idea, even if these thoughts are not implemented into a party programme or a political strategy today.

Neither Africa nor the Congo has written the history that Lumumba forecast. Lumumba fought for the Congo’s independence and a united Africa, freed from imperialism and external control. Yet his greatest legacy to his fellow Congolese and Africans remains the ideal of national (and continental) unity, particularly in the DRC where it is still an important weapon in the defence of Congolese territory from Balkanisation supported by foreign powers and international businesses.

Lumumba was also an African revolutionary leader whose Pan-Africanist vision of a united continent gained him many enemies from the outside world. Together with Kwame Nkrumah, Lumumba sought a continent where the wealth of resources would benefit not only the Congo but also African people as a whole.

In his famous independence speech, as the newly elected Prime Minister he stood up and denounced the humiliation and brutality of colonialism. He remained through the crisis in 1960 determined to defend Congo’s independence, territorial integrity, and a programme of reforms that Congolese leaders have completely failed to achieve since his murder. Perhaps it is the current generation’s responsibility to remember Lumumba’s legacy in order to be able to return to his real vision. The cycle of repression, poverty and corruption in the Congolese state illustrates the failure of leadership, and the legacy of exploitation and foreign involvement in Africa and the Congo that continues unabated today.

In the DRC, evoking Lumumba’s name and ideology for political means has become a political strategy to earn people’s trust and their ballots. More than 95% of Congolese politicians label themselves as Lumumbist or Lumumba’s disciples. Yet, the proliferation of Lumumbist political parties is nothing other than a trick which consists of using his name in order to access political office. Lumumba’s name grants political citizenship which has been used to quench personal ambitions and fulfil an imperialist agenda.

We are still forced to ask ourselves what does Lumumba’s death means for African and Congolese people? What are the lessons to be drawn from it? And what are we doing to perpetuate Lumumba’s vision? Today in the Congo, Lumumba’s name has become a passport to power, but the question remains how do we revert to Lumumba’s real legacy?

Charles Gimba Magha-A-Ngimba has a PhD in International Studies and Social Sciences from Coventry University. Gimba teaches at the University of Kikwit in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and is a Research Fellow at the School of Business and Law at Aston University, England.

Featured Photograph: Ituri Province, DRC, a man wears a jacket with the image of Patrice Lumumba (13 September 2015).

Patrice Lumumba and the unfinished business of liberation

On 17 January 1961 Patrice Lumumba, the Congo’s first leader, was murdered. In this celebration of his life and work, the Congolese scholar and activist, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, writes about the All-African People’s Conference (AAPC) that Lumumba attended in 1958, and the years of his leadership of the nationalist movement before his murder. Nzongola-Ntalaja argues that liberation has yet to take place in much of postcolonial Africa which is the failure to follow a revolutionary path.

By Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

When the First All-African People’s Conference (AAPC) took place under the leadership of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah between December 5 and 13, 1958, I was a teenager in the Belgian Congo. I was a student in the first year of a Presbyterian-Methodist secondary school, which eventually expelled me in April 1960, two months before our independence, for my anticolonial activism. These American missionaries had somehow forgotten that they had played a role in our political awakening, not only in provoking our anger by echoing the racist colonial propaganda that Africans could not govern themselves, but also by furnishing our student center with a powerful radio from which we could get news from international broadcasters such as the Voice of America and the BBC plus all the major newspapers published in Kinshasa (then Léopoldville), including those of the principal Congolese political parties.

The Political Rise of Patrice Lumumba

Patrice Lumumba, who was just emerging as a nationalist leader following his election as president of a new and multiethnic political party, the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) or Congolese National Movement in October 1958, spoke to his first Pan-African audience on December 11 at the Accra Conference. He and two other MNC colleagues made the trip to Accra thanks to financial support from the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa (PAFMECA) obtained on their behalf by A.R. Mohamed Babu of Zanzibar (Tanzania) and Tom Mboya of Kenya.[1]

The Accra conference took place at a very propitious moment in Lumumba’s life. Having left his 12-year civil service career as a postal employee and a leader in African elite organizations fighting to gain better entitlements and privileges in the colony, he was then employed as the publicity director of the second largest brewery in Kinshasa, but was contemplating working fulltime as a leader in the national struggle for independence. Nearly two weeks in Accra interacting with progressive heads of state and leaders of radical liberation movements involved in armed struggle helped solidify his volte-face or total rupture with the assimilationist positions of middle-class African évolués.[2] As Frantz Fanon has described them, these gentlemen had “a wish to identify permanently with the bourgeois representatives from the metropolis.”[3]

The rupture with Lumumba’s earlier ideas was evident in his speech to the Accra conference. He no longer perceived colonialism as a harbinger of Western civilization in Africa. It was, on the contrary, a system of exploitation and injustice. Colonial invaders like Henry Morton Stanley – the Welsh-American adventurer – and their successors were no longer heroes to be admired, but racists with an idiotic superiority complex. As for the objective of the political struggle undertaken by the Congolese people, it was no longer a fight for racial equality in a Belgo-Congolese community, but for their total liberation from colonialism and the attainment of full independence.

Thanks to Accra, the notions of freedom and development that Lumumba had been wrestling with since July 1956 became very clear in December 1958. Independence did not mean the embourgeoisement of the so-called educated Africans: the assimilated of French or Portuguese colonies, the “black Englishmen” of the newly independent Ghana, Nigeria and other British colonies, or the Congolese évolués. It meant freedom or liberation for all from economic exploitation, political repression and cultural oppression or racism in all its forms. This independence was not to be granted on a silver platter like Charles De Gaulle did in 1960, in repudiation of his own French Community of 1958. Africans were to rise up to seize independence on their own initiative. While the ultimate aim was and still is the establishment of the United States of Africa, the most immediate task then was the implementation of a national project of democracy and development through self-determination politically, self-reliance economically, and pan-African solidarity throughout the continent and including the African diaspora worldwide.

This is the message with which Lumumba returned to Kinshasa, and one he delivered to the people at a public rally on the AAPC on Sunday, December 28, 1958. On January 4, 1959 – the following Sunday – after the refusal by the Belgian mayor of Kinshasa to authorize a rally called by the Alliance of Bakongo (ABAKO) of Joseph Kasavubu, who was frightened of losing the leadership of the independence struggle to Lumumba’s MNC, an urban rebellion shook the city for four days. A week later, on January 13, both the Belgian king and his government made two separate declarations announcing that they were ready to start discussions on the independence of the Congo. Thanks to the AAPC, January 4, 1959 is commemorated in the Congo today as Independence Martyrs Day, and Lumumba, whose own martyrdom occurred two years later, on January 17, 1961, is our country’s national hero. His effective tenure as prime minister lasted for two months and a half, from June 30 to September 14, 1960, and he was assassinated in the Katanga province, which had declared its independence with Belgian support on July 11, 1960.

The assassination of Patrice Lumumba

The strategic importance of the Congo to the Western powers was such that unlike other martyrs of the liberation struggle who were assassinated directly by their respective colonial powers, the demise of Patrice Lumumba, had to involve the leader of these powers, the United States of America. In the Congo case, what was at stake in 1960 concerned more than the interests of the former colonial power. Lumumba became a victim of a counterrevolution involving the whole African subcontinent from Katanga to the Cape of Good Hope. Mining companies and white settlers in this region were reluctant to cede their political power and economic privileges to the forces of pan-Africanism and African nationalism. For as long as they could, they retained power with the support of Western powers, most of whom were convinced that Europeans and their descendants were better protectors of Western economic and strategic interests than Africans.

Geographically and economically, the Katanga area of the Copperbelt has long been an integral part of the Southern African economic complex, a relatively interdependent region of world capitalism with a highly developed industrial structure in South Africa and an abundance of mineral resources in all major countries. South African capital had been invested in nearly all countries of the region through corporations such as the British South African Company (BSAC), Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. (Tanks or TCL), Anglo-American, Consolidated Gold Fields and De Beers. The development of mining and related industries in Katanga attracted white South Africans and Rhodesians to the Belgian Congo. With these hardcore racists as their reference groups, Belgian settlers sought to create a colonial settler system comparable to the apartheid and other white minority systems of Southern Africa.

The prospects of independence under a radical nationalist government led by Lumumba brought a rapprochement between the corporate leaders, led by the top management of the Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), the largest corporation in the colony and a subsidiary of the Belgian corporate giant, the Société Générale de Belgique (SGB). With the support of the Belgian government and its NATO allies, plus lobbying efforts of right-wing circles in Western countries, particularly the United States and Britain, mining companies and white settlers felt that their time to seize power had come.

Since Brussels was not willing to set up a government of white settlers on the models of South Africa and Rhodesia and Nyasaland (now Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe), the solution was to set up a fake government with black politicians, but one actually run by Belgian civil servants and military officers. The first Belgian shadow government was known as the Belgian Technical Mission in Katanga (Mistebel), which administered the province from July 22 to August 26, 1960. It was led by Count Harold d’Aspremont Lynden, a nephew of Count Gobert d’Aspremont Lynden, the grand marshal of the royal court or chief of staff of the Belgian King Baudouin I. As minister of African Affairs after leaving Katanga, the younger d’Aspremont Lynden became the supervisor of his successor, Dr. René Clemens, professor of sociology at the University of Liège, who served as head of the Katanga Advisory Office, the second Belgian shadow government in Katanga. Katanga under Moise Tshombe and Godefroid Munongo was nothing but a caricature of a state (un État d’opérette).[4]

As it is widely known today, Lumumba was assassinated on orders from US president Dwight Eisenhower and the Belgian government, acting mostly through Minister of African Affairs Harold d’Aspremont Lynden and his “advisory” team in Katanga. Both the Americans and the Belgians abandoned their earlier assassination plots, the CIA plan to have cobra venom injected in Lumumba’s food or toothpaste, and the Belgian’s Barracuda Plan of hiring a European crocodile hunter to shoot Lumumba.  The two countries decided to go along with a more practical idea from Lawrence Devlin, then CIA station chief in the Congo, who thought that collaborating with the moderate Congolese leaders who were against Lumumba and associating them to the crime would yield the desired result quickly. With the approval of the US National Security Council, the CIA mounted a Project Wizard by which Congo president Joseph Kasavubu, military chief Joseph Mobutu, security police chief Victor Nendaka and others took unknown quantities of US dollars to sacrifice the life of their former comrade in the fight for independence.

Other participants in the abduction and the murder of Lumumba, either directly or indirectly include the Tshombe government; the United Nations, whose Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld had “given de facto protection to the Katanga secession;”[5] and MI6, the British foreign intelligence service. Baroness Daphne Park, who served as the MI6 officer in Kinshasa between 1959 and 1961, admitted to a fellow House of Lords peer that she had “organized” the British role in the assassination of Lumumba.[6]

Lumumba was captured on December 1 at Lodi, on the left bank of the Sankuru River, and denied UN protection by the Ghanaian contingent under British military officers at Mweka the next morning. Whatever reasons President Nkrumah had for maintaining senior British military officers in top command positions in the Ghanaian army for more than three years after independence, it was a mistake to assume that these officers would be politically neutral in a crisis like the one in the Congo. Major General Henry Alexander, the Chief of Defence Staff of the Ghanaian army was among the top commanders within the UN force whose anti-Lumumba views were well-known, and he did not get along with the Ghanaian ambassador in the Congo. Nkrumah did dismiss all the British officers in September 1961, but the damage was already done.

After Mweka, Lumumba was taken to Ilebo (then Port Francqui) and flown to Kinshasa where, after enduring more humiliation and torture at the Binza parachutist camp in Mobutu’s presence, he spent a miserable night in Nendaka’s garage. The next day, he was transferred to the élite armored brigade garrison at Mbanza-Ngungu (then Thysville). Even in prison, Lumumba continued to pose a threat to the moderate leadership in Kinshasa, as the Lumumbist government in Kisangani began expanding its control and authority in the eastern part of the Congo and encouraged Lumumba’s followers all over the country to continue the struggle for genuine independence, national unity and territorial integrity. US and Belgian officials were greatly alarmed by these developments, with the US embassy in Kinshasa preoccupied by rumors of a pro-Lumumba coup d’état and the moderate Congolese leaders worrying that the soldiers guarding Lumumba at Mbanza-Ngungu might free him. For Washington and Brussels, the time to get rid of Lumumba physically had arrived. Brussels ordered his transfer to Katanga, where it was certain that he will be killed.

Lumumba and his two companions, youth and sports minister Maurice Mpolo and Senate vice-president Joseph Okito were severely beaten on the plane ride to Katanga, in the presence of two Luba-Kasai members of the college of general commissioners: defense commissioner Ferdinand Kazadi and internal affairs commissioner Jonas Mukamba. Not too far from Luano airport in Lubumbashi (then Elisabethville), Lumumba and his companions were tortured at the Brouwez villa some 8 km from downtown, personally assaulted by Munongo, other Katanga leaders and Belgian officers; and shot by a Belgian execution squad under the command of captain Julien Gat. The next day, police commissioner Gerard Soete and his brother removed the bodies from the burial site, cut them into small pieces and dissolved them in sulfuric acid.

Lessons from the assassination

What are the lessons of the Congo crisis and Lumumba’s assassination for the African continent? The Algerian revolutionary, Frantz Fanon, noted two mistakes: Lumumba’s request for UN intervention in his attempt to expel Belgian troops from Katanga, and the willingness of African countries to send peacekeeping troops under UN cover.  At the time of the first Congo crisis, the UN Secretary General and his chief collaborators shared a common Cold War outlook with Western policymakers and saw their mission in the Congo as that of preserving the then existing balance of forces in the world.

Even now, after the Cold War, Fanon’s words are correct in the assertion that “the UN is the legal card used by the imperialist interests when the card of brute force has failed.”[7] The lesson learned here, according to Fanon, is Nkrumah’s well-known dictum: Africa must unite. Instead of relying on the United Nations and remaining blind in the face of the hidden agendas of the major powers, progressive Africans must rely on their own resources and organizations to meet the challenges of peace and security.

Leadership needed for the African Revolution

That reconstruction and development are yet to take place in much of postcolonial Africa is an indication of the fact that most of our leaders have refused to follow the revolutionary path advocated by Fanon by opting for the easier road of enrichment within neocolonial structures.[8] The major consequences of this option include the emergence of an African oligarchy whose main aim is to use state power as a means of personal enrichment; the deepening of underdevelopment in most of our countries; and the impoverishment of the popular masses. Instead of establishing democratic developmental states, we are faced with predatory states and their political economies of plunder.

The first and second generations of African leaders have failed to deliver on the people’s expectations of independence. We need new leaders, and these should come from social movements of women, workers and the youth. Such movements ought to be people-centered, and not elite organizations in which ordinary members are simply cheerleaders for ambitious leaders. Their agenda is crystal clear: (1) repair the betrayal of pan-Africanism by pursuing the goal of pan-African unity and solidarity in Africa and the diaspora; (2) transform the structures of the state and the economy in order to meet the people’s expectations of independence, which were and still are freedom and material prosperity; (3) improve the administration of our states to provide more peace and security to our people; and (4) follow the revolutionary path advocated by Fanon to free our continent from neocolonialism and to strengthen ties with Africans in the diaspora.

This blogpost is part of a keynote address made by Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja at the conference, ‘Revisiting the 1958 All-African People’s Conference – the unfinished business of liberation and transformation’ organized by the Institute of African Studies at the University of Ghana, Legon, in collaboration with the Ghana Trades Union Congress (TUC), the Socialist Forum of Ghana, the Third World Network Africa and Lincoln University Pennsylvania (USA), and hosted by the University of Ghana in Accra, December 5-8, 2018.

Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja is Professor of African and Global Studies in the Department of African, African American, and Diaspora Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (USA). He is also a member of the African Academy of Sciences (AAS), former president of the African Studies Association (ASA) of the United States and   the author of many books, including The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History and Patrice Lumumba.

Featured Photograph: Patrice Lumumba arrives in New York (24 July 1960).

Notes

[1] Personal communication from Mohamed Babu, London, September 1987.

[2] Kwame Nkrumah and Gamal Abdul Nasser were among the leaders who befriended Lumumba, with Nkrumah taking an active role in Congo affairs until his overthrow in 1966, and Nasser providing support to Lumumba’s followers and having his children grow up in Egypt. As a member of the permanent committee of the AAPC, Lumumba used the committee’s meetings in Conakry to develop a great relationship with President Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea, who provided support, including political advisers, to the Congolese leader. With respect to African liberation movements, the leaders he met in Accra included Amilcar Cabral of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), Frantz Fanon of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FNL), and Dr. Félix-Roland Moumié of the Union of the Populations of Cameroon (UPC).

[3] Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2004), p. 122.

[4] Ludo De Witte, L’assassinat de Lumumba (Paris : Karthala, 2000), p. 83. The English version of this book, The Assassination of Lumumba was published by Verso in London in 2001.

[5] Ibid., p. 381. Emphasis added.

[6] Gordon Corera, “MI6 and the Death of Patrice Lumumba,” BBC News, April 2, 2013; Jean Shaoul, “Britain’s Involvement in Assassination of Congo’s Lumumba Confirmed,” Africa and the World, April 28, 2013.

[7] Frantz Fanon, “Lumumba’s Death: Could We Do Otherwise?” in Frantz Fanon, Toward the African Revolution: Political Essays (New York: Grove Press, 1988), p. 195.

[8] Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, pp. 97-144.

Bobi Wine and hope for a better life in Uganda

Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu – better known to the public as Bobi Wine – is a singer turned politician who is currently campaigning in the general election to oust Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni who has been in power for more than 30 years. Pitasanna Shanmugathas looks at the elections and the hope for a better life in Uganda.

By Pitasanna Shanmugathas

Bobi Wine, with a widespread following and popularity among a significant segment of the Ugandan population, has emerged as a strong challenger to Museveni. As a musician, many of Wine’s songs take a socially conscious tone by speaking out against poverty, and in favor of freedom and democracy for Ugandans. Wine grew up in one of the nation’s poorest neighborhoods in the capital city of Kampala and his rise from poverty to being a successful singer, and then an elected Member of Parliament, has been viewed as an inspiration to many of his followers who regard him as ‘the Ghetto President’.

Since Wine’s election as Member of Parliament in 2017, he strongly opposed authoritarian measures imposed by Museveni such as the President’s decision to remove the Presidential age limit and Wine publicly rallied against the President’s decision to impose a social media tax to stifle opposition towards him on WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter. During this time, Wine also created a national movement called “People Power” – a movement consisting of, as The Economist describes, “a messy coalition of established politicians, frustrated graduates, and the hustlers of his ghetto hinterland.” The purpose of the movement is to bring awareness to Museveni’s rule and to challenge conventional politics. In response to Wine’s public demonstrations against Museveni, Wine has been subjected to state-sanctioned torture and repeated arrest.  Most notably, in August 2018, allegedly on the orders of President Museveni, the Ugandan Security Forces fired live bullets into a crowd of Wine supporters, killed Wine’s personal driver, invaded the hotel that Wine was staying in and proceeded to arrest and subsequently torture him and his colleagues.

On 24 July, 2019, Wine announced his bid to run for president in the 2021 general election. In July 2020, Wine announced himself as the leader of the rebranded and previously obscure political party, the National Unity Platform (NUP). The formation of such a party, with its conventional structure and authority over candidates, comes in contradiction with the spirit of Wine’s People Power movement aimed at challenging conventional politics. In addition, it has been reported that Wine’s new party has engaged in transactional politics. For instance, Derrick Ssonko, who is a mechanic, felt inspirited to run for local councilor, “but the party ticket went to a rival who paid a bribe. He worries that the NUP is ‘old wine in new bottles’ even though everyone he knows will vote for it.”

During his Presidential campaign, supporters of Wine have been met with police violence. In November, 54 people were killed as supporters called for the release of Wine from detention. Wine had been arrested at a campaign rally. Uganda’s security forces have routinely prevented Wine from attending his campaign rallies and the President has prevented Wine from appearing on TV and radio stations.

Most recently, the United States’ Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, publicly condemned tactics within Uganda to suppress free and fair elections. In addition, Eliot Engel, the chairperson of the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, has requested that the US impose sanctions on several Ugandan security officials in response to “a worsening of human rights in the country.” There are serious doubts as to whether Uganda can legitimately hold a fair election given the overwhelming control that Museveni wields over public institutions.

The European Union (EU) in November 2020 said it would not deploy an observer mission to monitor the Ugandan elections due to the Ugandan government’s refusal to implement recommendations previously made by the EU which would “make the poll body more independent,” result in the  “elimination of excessive use of force by the armed forces and more transparency in tallying.”  Chrispin Kaheru, a Kampala-based political analyst, asserted that “what the EU observers do is to add an international flavour of scrutiny, that element now will not be there in 2021.”

Bobi Wine, in order to ensure greater transparency in the upcoming elections, has launched an app called “U Vote” designed to monitor the election results and aid “in their personal tallying of the votes.” The app, U Vote, Wine has stated “was developed with sophisticated technology and can be downloaded [from the Play Store] by all voters to make sure that votes are seen as they come from various polling stations.” On 2 January, 2020, during the end of year address at his home, Wine asserted that Ugandans “have experienced a lot of vote rigging for a long time and now we want to be in charge of everything. All polling agents will just have to take a picture of the DR form and upload it there and then. We shall do our own vote tallying”

Uganda consists of a nation where 80% of the population is under the age of 35, and for these individuals, Bobi Wine brings a great deal of hope for a better life. The disparity in the demographics has created a generational divide whereby Museveni is viewed as unpopular among the youth but is viewed as popular among older rural voters who view regime change as “a hauntingly perilous idea”— linking such change to the years of bloody horror that preceded Museveni. However, it must be met with cautious optimism whether, as a politician, Wine would be able to deliver on his promises or whether Wine’s victory would mean a continuation of corrupt politics.

In Wine’s campaign manifesto he states, “Our promise to the youth of Uganda, we shall ensure we find meaningful employment for you. We want to create at least 5 million jobs. We shall invest in technology and a massive scale of industrialization……A vote for NUP is an assurance that citizens will never be persecuted for disagreeing with the government. A vote for NUP is a vote for the protection of our natural resources as a country which Gen. Museveni now treats as his personal wealth. A vote for NUP is a vote for the closing of the income gap between the rich and the poor…. Our promise to all Ugandans is that we shall safeguard their land. We shall put an end to the enormous scale of land grabbing. If it is done, justice must prevail… The National Unity Platform is committed to working with all Ugandans to improve their lives. We believe that immediately after taking over government, every Ugandan from Kaabong to Kisoro, from Yumbe to Busia will experience meaningful change in their way of life……”

Despite such progressive electoral promises, it remains publicly unclear as to how Bobi Wine proposes to accomplish them. Wine’s political headquarters has images of pan-African heroes like socialist leader Thomas Sankara, but Wine has also been known to collaborate with free-market thinktanks. Wine said that his goal is to rebuild public institutions and end decades of personalized rule, but Wine himself has also said, “I don’t have a very radical programme.”

In 1992 President Museveni published a book entitled, What’s Africa’s Problem?—in which he stated, “The problem of Africa, in general, and Uganda in particular, is not the people but leaders who want to overstay in power.”  Bobi Wine’s call for freedom, democracy, and prosperity for Ugandans were the same political views that Museveni had once politically embraced long ago, but gradually, with time, Museveni became an authoritarian leader—if  Bobi Wine won, would he be capable of ending the repetition of that cycle?

Pitasanna Shanmugathas is post-graduate student in Global Affairs at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy.

Featured Photograph: In January last year Ugandan police arrested Bobi Wine (6 January 2020).

For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
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For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
We use cookies to collect and analyse information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customise content. By clicking into any content on this site, you agree to allow cookies to be placed. To find out more see our