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Displacing Hierarchies: Nation and Universities in India and Africa

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By Amrita Pande, Faisal Garba and Ruchi Chaturvedi

We are academics raised and educated in various parts of the world, and now living and working in South Africa. The predicaments of its higher education landscape and society mark our work and thought. In this article, we approach that story from our other locations: the rest of the African continent and India.  

In both spaces, a critical encounter between higher education, student protests and movements, broader society and polity has been playing itself out. Student movements have challenged authoritarian governments in many African countries and continue to take centre stage there. Currently in India, in the name of nationalism, a divisive and increasingly totalitarian state is leading an aggressive attack on universities. Last month saw a concerted attack on Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU)—a university community renowned for its egalitarian ethos and thoughtful, incisive critical inquiry. This week University of Hyderabad’s students and teachers have been at the receiving end of police brutality.

Against this backdrop, we briefly chart the pre-history of the clash between wilful states, market logics, narrow nationalisms on the one hand and, on the other hand, progressive politically conscientious student protesters and movements in India and various parts of the African continent. These histories mirror each other and we believe juxtaposing them against each othe can be generative for the South African context.

Students and State: Clashes on the Continent

‘Modern’ higher education in Africa took off in the dying days of colonialism. In the British colonies regional universities were set-up to service sub-regions: the University of Ibadan and Fourah Bay College for West Africa, Makere University College (as it was then known) for East Africa. In the French colonies, identified potential local collaborators with demonstrable amount of ‘manners’ – the èvoluès – were sent to some of the best institutions in France. Children of local elites especially benefitted from this arrangement.

Confronted by the reality of stark racism in 20th century France most of the evolues began reassessing their place in society. Gradually they began to resist and renounce the ‘rational’ system they had been schooled to serve under the rubric of mission civilisatrice. Thus was born pan-African (in the broad sense) anti-colonialism under the aegis of Federation des Etudiants d’ Afrique Noire en France (FEANF). A similar process was taking placing with the students in England, Portugal and Belgium and the USA. From Nkrumah, Nyerere, Cabral, Senghor, Kenyatta to Mondlane one can draw a line of students who later opposed the system they were groomed to maintain.

Fast-forward to the post-colonial moment. Universities were established across the continent as vehicles to staff the new states, as incubators of ideas in the service of a national project and as symbols of nationhood. The going got off to a good start. Free education and lavish accommodation became available and students became a special layer, which the nascent nations invested in. For example soon after earning his first degree Chinua Achebe went on to head external broadcasting at the then Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation.

With time this uplifted social segment taught to think and question turned their critical eye towards the political structure. Sections of the student movement became strident critics of the numerous one-party state and presidencies for life. Increasingly leaders saw them as rival politicians preparing the ground for their own political careers. Gagging orders were put in place with the presence of police informants across campuses. Progressive leaders such Julius Nyerere of Tanzania banned political organizations and publications under the pretext that they propagated foreign ideology. Criticism is supposedly un-African, if directed at the state. Universities lost their darling status.

The road map to crush the universities was laid out in the wake of the structural adjustment program when following the debt crisis of the 1970’s the IMF and World Bank insisted that Africa does not need higher education as part of its economic recovery package. Africa only needs basic education! Compared to basic education, the rate of return relative to investment in higher education was said to be sub-optimal. Henceforth higher education must be outsourced to the West. Africa provides basic education, the west provides higher education. The decay in facility, teacher exodus and rising authoritarianism further distanced the erstwhile chosen students from regimes.

But the so-called second independence struggle against dictatorships and one-party states once again galvanized students across the continent. Underlying the overthrow of Hastings Banda in the first multi-party elections of 1994 was the synthesis between between struggling students at the University of Malawi and larger masses. Student struggles contributed in no small measure to the fall of Abdou Diouf in Senegal, Mobutu in then Zaire, and the challenge to Paul Biya’s continuing dictatorship in the early 1990’s in Cameroun. In neighboring Zimbawe however, as Brian Raftoplous reminded us in his recent talk at the University of the Western Cape, the state mobilised an exclusionary language of nationalism and engaged in an aggressive politics of othering as it sought to contain the ferment on its campuses.

Today education is commodified in differing degrees across Africa. Student protests against fees, mal-administration and levies are a constant. Their ability to connect with popular discontents could be a defining moment in the struggle against the continent-wide neoliberal consensus. As students, teachers and universities challenge the rising global plutocracies in the name of the market, can they also counter the cultural fundamentalism that the state has deployed in places such as Zimbawe (and is doing so now in India) to crush dissent?

In India, this state backed identitarian claim to culture and nation has placed significantly subaltern student population, leaders and teachers of universities such as JNU, University of Hyderabad and others under siege. But despite many attempts at slandering student leaders their supporters and teachers, the students have spoken back to cultural fundamentalists and the state in eloquent, incisive and inspiring ways. And, the whole country as well as many across the world have been listening. We contextualise and explain.

The Indian Encounter

In 2014 a new Indian government came to power. It was the third time that a government led by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP was coming to power. It came to power on the back of an estimated billion dollar advertising campaign projecting its leading man, Narendra Modi, as pragati purush or “development man.” At the time many (including two authors of this article) questioned the development claims of the growth model that the campaign espoused. We also recalled the 2002 pogrom in Gujarat that took place under Mr. Modi’s watch leaving nearly 1000 peope largely from the minority Muslim community dead.

The Gujarat pogrom was the culmination of a violent polarizing politics that has a long, unfortunate history in India. In the late colonial period as the freedom movement began to come into its own, an image of the Indian nation also emerged. The search for recognition and an affirmative identity that would heal the colonial wound turned into aggressive nationalism. For members of Hindu nationalist groups the Indian nation should be cast in the glow of a robust Hindu culture whose dominance may not be questioned. The exclusionary and masculine character of such a majoritarian culture especially relegates minorities to the status of social and political minors.

Indeed the last seven decades of independent India have seen socio-economic marginalization of the minority Muslim population, continued atrocities against the so-called untouchable groups or Dalits, and well-documented state repression in regions that have seen struggles for self-determination—from Kashmir, to Punjab, to the North-East. The Hindu nationalist BJP, its parent body, the Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, and affiliates have not been the sole agents of this state of affairs. Far from it! They have however been extremely complicit in some of the worst expressions of the majoritarian ideology and culture underwriting the many tragedies of the Indian nation, and its violence.

India became a nation on the back of a violent partition that killed at least a million people. When the BJP came to power in 2014 many antincipated a new wave of violent polarizations this time backed with state force. However few could imagine that this force would strike so crudely but repeatedly at young students from some of the most marginal groups in the country engaged in generating emancipatory thought and politics at some of the country’s best educational institutions. Their teachers are also not being spared. For the story of India is not just the story of aggressive nationalism, marginalization of minorities and repressive laws. India’s story in the last seven decades of independence is also the story of internationally respected institutions like JNU and University of Hyderabad (UOH).

Such institutions are respected for the excellent research and many outstanding students they have produced; they are respected for the safe space they provide to youths from across the country to learn, debate, discuss and dissent. Importantly they are respected for the immense contribution that their students and faculty have made to formulating socially and economically just, inclusive visions of India that counter its divisive, violent forces, and for repeatedly interrogating Indian society and polity when it fails to live up to them. Faculty and students have carried out these robust interrogations in classrooms, in academic writings, in the public domain, as journalists, as members of social movements and political parties, and in the country’s everyday life.

At this moment in time, this socially just vision, the students, faculty and institutions that embody them are under siege. They are under siege due to the actions of a university administration and police force that crackdowns on students demanding inquiry against practices which discriminate against Dalits; they are under attack from a state that has readily imposed charges of sedition punishable with life imprisonment against students who had allegedly raised slogans questioning the nature of Indian nationalism. Some like Rohith Vemula have been driven to suicide.

At the same time sections of the media have been fostering suspicions and jingoistic passions against entire student bodies and teachers for instance at JNU for disagreeing, dissenting and critiquing the ruling party and its’ affiliates view of India. Any and every critique of an aggressively homogenizing nationalist ideology, market driven state policy or the state’s armed forces is now being dubbed ‘anti-national.’ Consequently much loved and respected institutions, their progressive members, and critique itself are being minortized and criminalized.

Just Belonging? Some Questions for South Africa

Closer home, in South Africa, the Anti-Apartheid movement gained inspiration and sustenance from school and university students. Ideas, muscles and tactics were exchanged between campus and factory. Protest action is not new to South Africa; but for many “born-free”, young South Africans born after apartheid, student politics has just started becoming a familiar space. Right now however, the combined weight of private security on campuses and criminal charges threaten to demobilize a nationwide movement that was, last year, asking hard questions about the nature of the polity, society, economy and education.

Students are also asking questions of each other. Three weeks ago, the Trans Collective at UCT stridently reminded us about the ways in which they have been written out of the student movement. They reminded us about the closures that can and have come to mar many movements. These closures may emanate from patriarchal attitudes leaving little space for women and those who do not identify with predominant gender categories; they can also emanate from majoritarianism and cultural fundamenatlism. The situation prevailing in India, and what transpired in nearby Zimbawe and some other parts of the continent gives us pause and compels us to ask: how can university communities’ articulate forms of just belonging, which counters new hierarchies and old—the hierarchies generated by the market, by feudal and caste relations, and by sexual preferences, gender, race and religion? If a majoritarian culture threatens a space such as JNU in India, how can black students and staff on the African continent, where they constitute a majority, rally against the dominance of the market-economics in higher education and their societies without turning majoritarian themselves?

We look forward to students and university movements in South Africa and on the rest of the continent taking a course, which can draw upon and engage with the many small insurgencies across their respective countries while abiding by the most inclusive version of pan-Africanism. Universities and students on the African continent might then offer a notion of just belonging and citizenship that is not narrow, and does not go down the violent divisive path that India has, which many there are trying to counter. They may then be able to undo the legacies of colonialism and the inequalities of a growth-based model not in a way that simply overturns old hierarchies to place the ones on bottom on the top, but in a way that possibilities of such stratification are themselves displaced.

Amrita Pande’s research focuses primarily on globalisation, reproductive labour and new reproductive technologies, she is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of Cape Town. Faisal Garba is completing his PhD on African migrant workers in Germany at the University of Cape Town, he also teaches courses on social theory, society and change, globalization and inequality, and challenges to Eurocentrism at UCT and the University of Freibrug, Germany. Ruchi Chaturvedi is a Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of Cape Town and her work primarily focuses on cultures of democracy, popular politics and violence in postcolonial contexts.  

Featured photograph: Jim Ankan Deka

The Gupta Coup: Arrested Democracy

By Elizabeth Cobbett

South Africans fought hard for their democracy! They resisted Apartheid power, were tortured, deported and died in order to be able to vote for the African National Congress (ANC) and Nelson Mandela in 1994. Now, 22 years on, Zuma is making a mockery of their struggles for democratic accountability as he allows the Gupta brothers to direct the country’s economic policy.

The recent explosion of evidence of the power of the Gupta brothers at the heights of South Africa’s government, in the executive, reveals the serious breach of democracy perpetrated by the country’s president. While the Gupta family’s manoeuvrings have been documented for many years, the extent of the brothers’ influence over Zuma came to light when former Minister of Finance Nhlanhla Nene was sacked in December 2015. Deputy Finance Minister Mcebisi Jonas confirmed that he had been offered the position of finance minister by a member of the Gupta family. This well-reported fiasco reveals the extent of Zuma’s (and the ANC’s) irresponsibility to the South African people as the Guptas proceed in the appointment of cabinet ministers.

Financial ministers are highly strategic executive positions in a world of globalised capital. The Ministry of Finance is the linchpin of South Africa’s economic and fiscal policies. Trevor Manuel, Minister of Finance 1996 – 2009, stated that in South Africa ‘we’ve taken some very tough decisions to provide a climate for certainty. The Constitution, the legal framework, the macro-economic framework, all add up to certainty and predictability. South Africa has created a climate that investors need.’

Manuel (2016) argued that Nene’s removal as finance minister led to a breakdown in trust within the ANC, between the government and the people of South Africa and between the government and business. Small Business Development Minister Lindiwe Zulu answered: ‘I don’t agree. I completely don’t agree. I don’t even think trust has been broken in my view, because I don’t think it can be broken by one unfortunate event.’

The “one unfortunate event” is actually the moment when the Guptas’ coup became visible. Conventional wisdom recognises coups as usually being carried out by armed forces and practically never by anyone else. But understanding the coup as a decisive exercise of force in politics which alters the existing government by a small group leads me to qualify the sacking of Nene as a coup.

South Africa: Gupta Farm

Who are the Guptas? Ajay, Atul and Rajesh Gupta are three brothers from the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. They arrived in South Africa in 1993 as the country was transiting to democracy. Coming to South Africa with money made out of IT business, they went on to invest in mining, tourism, and media outlets. See figure below.

 

TableGupta

 

This is the same old same old relations between the state and capitalism. Seemingly nothing new here. Fernand Braudel’s work on capitalism and civilisation reminds us that capitalists use the state to mould the economy to their interests and will. Capitalism, for Braudel, is about more than making profits from production; capitalism is about connections and succeeds when it becomes part of the state, indeed when it becomes identified with the state. For the Guptas this means links not only to Zuma but also to other members of his family. The above diagram showing how Zuma’s son is knitted into Gupta family business structures. The links also extend to Bongi Ngema-Zuma, one of the president’s wives, who worked for the Gupta-controlled JIC Mining Services as a communications officer and Duduzile Zuma, Zuma’s daughter, who was a director at Gupta’s Sahara Computers.

A ‘soft’ coup d’état?

Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) leader Julius Malema (2016) sees the Gupta influence as ‘colonisation’ of the country by a family. I think this gets closer to what is happening than the idea of a simple ‘state capture’ by business. This is not either patronage as qualified by Mmusi Maimane, leader of main opposition Democratic Alliance. While he is right that the Guptas get extraordinary privileges from the president, this is not patronage as conventionally used in the African context. Rather this is the rise of an oligarchy through family dynasties. Monopolies and oligarchies, as I believe is increasingly the case of South Africa, are a function of the state. So while this all looks like what we expect from a capitalist state – to protect the interests of an elite – I think a different type of capitalist elite is trying to take root in South Africa.

In the 1990s, the ANC government and a new black capitalist elite were set on reinforcing South Africa as an international financial centre along the lines of neoliberal ideology and reforms. This was evident under Thabo Mbeki’s leadership 1999-2008 where the preferred means to domestic development were through privatisation of services, money raised on capital markets through public debt, and a widening and deepening of national credit markets for individual responses to structural poverty.

Zuma is doing something different from the Mbeki era, something that frightens even the neoliberal capitalist crowd in Sandton. The powerful group of capitalists who historically controlled the mines, energy, big industry, and finance worked to ensure that the transition to democracy would not change this cluster of power and that the new government would create the kind of macroeconomic stability that would facilitate their activities. Zuma, however, is not playing ball. He is making seemingly stupid financial decisions that spin the Rand down, deflate stock markets and downgrade the county’s rating on global markets. This is not capitalism as normal. This is not the capitalism inherited from British financiers during the last century. This is ceding power at the heart of the state in favour of family dynastic interests.

The Guptas are not part of the new ‘Black Diamond’ elite such as the Cyril Ramaphosas– who was close to ANC power through historical struggles, or the Patrice Mostepes – rags to riches stories of economic ambition in a new South Africa. The Guptas are not aligned to ANC history and they don’t give a damn about the ordinary South African waiting to see her life improve in the post-apartheid era. 

 No, I believe that what is effectively taking place is a ‘soft’ coup. ‘Soft’ because it is not military but rather an ‘oligarchical coup’ carried out by wealthy families. Successes of coups depend on the passivity of the existing state apparatus and, in the case of the ANC, an inability to confront Zuma and his allies. The Gupta family’s power to replace key ministerial positions is given by Zuma and endorsed through the passivity of the ANC. This sham is worthy of impeachment. Zuma makes a mockery of South Africans’ ongoing struggles for change, economic justice and accountability via elections.

Zuma cons the public into believing that he is their representative and voice, working for a better country.  He is not. He is feathering his own nest egg. He is jeopardising the still fragile democracy of only 20 years. Using the 1998 Executive Ethics Act, opposition parties and the public must call for an investigation to see if Zuma breached the code of ethics governing the conduct of members of the Cabinet. The move to a control of the few for the few, an oligarchy, must be blocked.  The work then needs to continue to tackle the enormous issue of systemic poverty and unemployment in the country. South Africa has no time to waste.

Elizabeth Cobbett is based at the University of East Anglia, UK. Her focus is on finance in Africa.

Notes

Manuel, Trevor. 2016. “Trevor Manuel responds to Lindiwe Zulu”, City Press. Available from http://city-press.news24.com/Voices/trevor-manuel-responds-to-lindiwe-zulu-20151220 (Accessed March 24, 2016)

Malema, Julius. 2016. “Meet the Guptas: Indian family ‘ruling’ South African President Jacob Zuma”, http://www.emirates247.com/news/meet-the-guptas-indian-family-ruling-south-african-president-jacob-zuma-2016-02-10-1.620474 (Accessed March 24, 2016).

Pather, Ra’eesa. 2015. “Lindiwe Zulu tackles fall-out with Manuel after business comments”, Mail & Guardian. Available from http://mg.co.za/article/2015-12-21-lindiwe-zulu-trust-between-anc-and-market-not-broken (Accessed March 25, 2016)

South African Info. 2010. “Alive with Investment Possibility”, http://www.southafrica.info/business/investing/vignette.htm. (Accessed August 30, 2010)

 

A Prison Notebook: Mhanda’s Treatise on Zimbabwe’s Liberation

Introduction by David Moore

Dzinashe ‘Dzino’ Machingura (aka Wilfred Mhanda) wrote his A Treatise on Zimbabwe’s National Liberation Struggle: Some Theoretical Problems in the late 1970s while in a Mozambican prison camp. He and his comrades in the vashandi (‘peoples’’ or ‘workers’’) tendency of the Zimbabwean People’s Army had been relegated there by the Mozambican state in co-operation with Robert Mugabe and the leaders of the Zimbabwean African National Union and the Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army who had emerged after a conflictual mid-1970s interregnum in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. It began with the ‘détente’ exercise of late 1974 and the Chitepo assassination of March 1975, persisted as the young vashandi cadres tried to unite the armies of the two main Zimbabwean liberation movements and imbue the struggle with radical Marxist and democratic principles, and ended with their incarceration in early 1977. Machingura’s A Treatise is a prison notebook of sorts, although much more focused on a particular struggle than Antonio Gramsci’s wide-ranging ones. The document is as much a reflection on why Machingura and his comrades, who had hoped to move the Zimbabwean liberation struggle to a definitive new stage, ended up in prison camps as it is on the nature of the liberation struggle in general: in other words it is a chronicle of how a ‘revolution’ can devour its children, written from immediate experience and within the framework of theories of third world liberation struggles and ‘national democratic revolution’ on offer in the bookstores of Dar es Salaam and from the largesse of Soviet and Chinese publishing mills.

A Treatise is referenced in John Saul’s review article on Mhanda/Machingura’s autobiography Dzino: Memories of a Freedom Fighter (Harare: Weaver, 2011) which will appear in the Review of African Political Economy later this year.  A Treatise had been entrusted by Mhanda to me in the hope that it would be disseminated widely, because it had been deemed by the publishers as too large to be included in the autobiography. It is placed on ROAPE’s website in the hope that it will help deconstruct Zimbabwe’s ‘patriotic history’.

David Moore has been Professor of Development Studies at the University of Johannesburg since mid-2008. His Phd is from York University in Toronto. He has taught in Canada, Australia, and at the University of KwaZulu-Natal before moving to Johannesburg.

 

A Treatise on Zimbabwe’s National Liberation Struggle: Some Theoretical Problems

Dzinashe ‘Dzino’ Machingura (Cabo Del Gado, Mozambique: April-May 1978)

1) Introduction

The Zimbabwean national liberation struggle has been beset by monolithic problems ever since the advent of African nationalism which assumed a definite form in the mid 1950’s. These problems have hitherto arrested the full development of the liberation struggle. Little or insignificant development has been made in terms of concrete realisation of the basic goals of African nationalism; political power has not been transferred to the nationalists nor have any significant compromises been made to increase their representation and participation in organs of power and the decision making process. The only political achievement worthy of mention that could be directly attributed to the efforts of the African nationalists was the entrenchment in the 1961 Constitution and the subsequent Constitution of Rhodesia of a provision for the election of a handful of Africans (15) into Parliament. This concession by the British Government left the political status quo intact without any meaningful change for the Africans.

The Zimbabwe African nationalist movement has, since its inception, been characterized by intense political inertia punctuated by a series of setbacks manifest in the frustrated hopes of the nationalists and periodic dislocation of action programmes. The gains that have so far materialized have been incommensurate with the costly human and material sacrifices. The movement has also been rocked by factional recriminations that have only served to misdirect and dissipate efforts. Consequent on these setbacks, the nationalist movement has shown great pliability to manipulation by imperialists, falling victim to one imperialist manoeuvre after another, with costly and unpalatable consequences for the development of the nationalist struggle.

It is important to grasp the characteristics of Zimbabwe’s nationalist struggle – past and present, and its general effect on the development of the national liberation struggle. An understanding of the fundamental weaknesses underlying the nationalist movement and of the problems currently bedeviling Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle can be gained from a historical analysis and outline of the development of the national liberation struggle ever since the settler occupation in 1890.This has to be discussed against the background of a brief analysis of the social character of Zimbabwe; the principal determinant of the nature of the struggle to be waged to achieve victory. It is only by gaining a broad conception of the problems of the nationalist struggle in their proper historical perspective, that a realization of the direction in which the subjective efforts of the national liberation struggle have to be channeled to achieve victory can be made. Indeed the awareness creates an objective platform from which a critical, sober and scientific analysis of the current course of the liberation struggle can be made.

The Social Character of Zimbabwean Society

Any meaningful analysis of the Zimbabwe national liberation struggle and of the character of the nationalist movement has to be done within the context of an analysis of the social character of colonial Zimbabwe. Such an analysis provides an objective basis for scientific and purposive summing up of experiences that will promote the development of the national liberation struggle along the correct revolutionary path. Failure to grasp the social character of present day Zimbabwe would inevitably result in the liberation movement groping in the dark and in the dissipation of precious effort in a fruitless exercise. The social analysis of Zimbabwe will present an objective basis for the formulation of the correct strategy and tactics that will guide the struggle to final victory. The prosecution of the struggle without an objective analytical base will be more of a trial and error process that will inevitably lead the nationalist movement to staggering from blunder to blunder in search of an elusive victory. Prospects of victory will continue to be gloomy with the goal of liberation moving farther and farther away.

Zimbabwe was invaded and reduced to a colony in 1890 by an occupation force organized by the arch monopolist Cecil John Rhodes. Colonial occupation was consummated on 12th September, 1890 by the hoisting of the union jack on Salisbury kopje of what was to become known as Fort Salisbury. Zimbabwe thus formally became a British colony but with control of the territory falling into the hands of Cecil John Rhodes. That fateful day marked the beginning of the political domination, economic subservience, cultural enslavement, social degradation and military subjection of the peace loving people of Zimbabwe by British colonialism a phenomenon that has pervaded Zimbabwean society up to this day. These colonial features underline Zimbabwe’s social character. It is however noteworthy that, unlike other British colonies in Africa, Zimbabwe was a mandated colony with the British Government maintaining only formal and nominal control over its Rhodesian colony. Zimbabwe was mandated to the British South Africa Company (BSAC) through a royal charter of 1899 on the basis of a fraudulently extracted Rudd Concession of 1888.

However by 1923 the British South Africa Company had begun to experience some administrative problems and suffered serious economic setbacks. These problems were against the background of contradictions that had developed between monopoly capital represented by the BSAC and the emergent domestic bourgeoisie amongst the white settler community. These developments led to the transfer of Rhodesia’s colonial mandate from the BSAC to the white settler minority through the Responsible Government Act of 1923. This followed a referendum in the same year in favour of responsible government as opposed to being appended to the Union of South Africa. Rhodesia remained with the legal status of a responsible government until 1965 when Ian Smith’s Rhodesia Front government declared unilateral independence on 11th November of that year. Britain’s control over her Rhodesian colony has always been indirect. At no time did the British government exercise direct control over Rhodesia or intervene in Rhodesia’s internal affairs despite the presence of an entrenched clause within both the 1923 and 1961 Rhodesia constitutions providing for the British government’s intervention in the event of the violation of the “interests of the African people of Rhodesia”.

To all intents and purposes, Britain has ruled Zimbabwe through political surrogates first the BSAC from 1890 to 1923 and the white settler minority after 1923. Britain thus virtually bestowed her surrogates with all the powers and authority to rule over Zimbabwe whilst retaining only formal and nominal control. This has practically made the white settler minority the defacto rulers of Zimbabwe. It is therefore the white settler minority who are perpetrating the colonization of Zimbabwe. This has given rise to endogenous colonialism commonly referred to by the African nationalists as “settlerism”. Technically of course we talk in terms of British colonialism but the problem is essentially that of endogenous colonialism – the settler factor. It is the white settler minority that indeed is the colonizing agent but of course on behalf of and with the blessing of the British government.

Ever since 1923, and more so after 1965 the successive Rhodesian regimes have continued to cater for British and other imperialist interests in much the same way an independent white minority regime would have done. As far as the African people of Zimbabwe are concerned, it is immaterial whether the minority regime oppressing them is independent or not as it does not change their political or social status; it does not mitigate their domination and oppression in any material way. In practical terms therefore, in contradistinction to technical legalities, it is the white racist settler regime that constitutes the principal enemy of the people of Zimbabwe. Indeed it is the racist white minority regime that is the object of removal in Zimbabwe’s national liberation struggle as it constitutes the impediment to the attainment of the legitimate aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe.

The central aim of the British occupation force of 1890 was to subjugate Zimbabwe and deprive its inhabitants of their political power. This was progressively realized through innumerable acts of provocation and aggression between 1890 and 1902 and paved the way for the establishment and subsequent consolidation of colonial power under the British South Africa Company. The consummation of this evil colonialism saw the people of Zimbabwe become the political subjects of foreigners in the land of their birth. Ever since that time, the African people of Zimbabwe have been excluded from the political process in their country of birth. Decision making in all political matters became not only the prerogative, but an exclusive preserve of the white settler minority. The Africans had no representation whatsoever in the state’s decision making organs from 1890 till 1961 when a provision for a token number of Africans in the Southern Rhodesia Parliament was entrenched in the 1961 Constitution. This token concession was made to dampen the effects of the wave of the African nationalism that was sweeping across the African continent and was now poised to threaten white minority in Rhodesia. It is noteworthy that this concession represented no qualitative change in the political status of the Africans. The African people of Zimbabwe continued to suffer political domination by a handful of white settlers who at no time exceeded 3% of the population. The white minority maintained effective control of all the instruments of state power which they used effectively to suppress the African people and to perpetrate their narrow reactionary interests.

The white minority has always had and still has the vote thanks to the qualified franchise with which they elect their representatives to parliament. The settler minority has always had and still has a parliament that they dominate and through which they enact, with a semblance of democracy, whatever legislation is deemed necessary to promote their racial and economic interests, to control and restrict the activities and movement of Africans and to check and suppress any opposition and resistance to their rule.  They have always had and still have firmly under their control the reactionary repressive and coercive apparatus with which to impose their draconian laws against the will of the Africans; they have always had and still have at their disposal an exclusively white judiciary thoroughly schooled in the philosophies of capitalism and racism with which to confer a stamp of legality and justice on the imprisonment, restriction, detention and execution of their opponents.

Finally, the white settler minority has always commanded and still commands a formidable array of penal institutions including the gallows with which to incarcerate, neutralize, dehumanize and permanently silence or eliminate African political activists and freedom fighters in a desperate endeavour to perpetuate and entrench their reactionary white minority rule.

It is this elaborate maze of political repression in the service of white minority interests that has literally thwarted and suffocated the political aspirations of the broad masses of the African people of Zimbabwe. It is no wonder therefore, that Zimbabwean society continues to be characterized by the domination of the overwhelming majority of the people of Zimbabwe by a handful of reactionary minority of racist settlers. So long as the vital instruments of political power remain vested in the hands of the reactionary white minority settlers, it is difficult to imagine how the broad masses of the people of Zimbabwe can meaningfully become active participants in the Zimbabwean political process. They will continue to be victims of political domination by the racist settler minority and the political dispensation in Zimbabwe will continue to be reflective of white minority interests that are completely incompatible with the legitimate aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the people of Zimbabwe.

The economic subservience of the people of Zimbabwe

Among other strategic considerations, the desire to colonise Zimbabwe was primarily motivated by the craving to exploit the rich mineral wealth of Zimbabwe. It was Rhodes’s dream of another Rand in the heartland of Rhodesia which drove him to illegitimately extort the Rudd Concession from King Lobengula in 1888. The Rudd Concession purportedly granted him exclusive mineral rights over Zimbabwe. By the end of the succeeding year, Rhodes had secured a mandate from the British Government through a royal charter to dispatch an occupation force. Each member of the invading force was promised fifteen gold claims and a vast tract of land ranging between 3 – 5000 acres.

The desire of the British South Africa Company to exploit the mineral riches of Zimbabwe and the enticement of white settlers through promises of gold claims and land holdings created the economic dimension of the colonization of Zimbabwe which underlies the social character of Zimbabwe up to this day. The revenues and royalties from the mining industry and agricultural produce, whose history lies embedded in the original motives of the colonial occupation of Zimbabwe, today constitute the principal foreign exchange earners for Rhodesia. It is not an exaggeration that the question of land in Zimbabwe and landed wealth is the hotbed of political contradictions between the African people and the white minority settlers.

Zimbabwe’s economic destiny is wholly controlled by the white minority settlers with the lion’s share falling in the ambit of international finance capital, the original colonizers and the rest under the white domestic bourgeoisie that germinated from the white settler occupation force. The authors of international finance capital literally control the lifeline of Rhodesia’s economy ranging from mineral and agricultural production to manufacturing industries, distribution centers, exchange and control of commodity circulation, transport and communication with the domestic bourgeoisie only playing an accessory and supplementary role in the economy. The companies that operate both the primary and secondary industries are basically monopolies that have pillaged and plundered Zimbabwe’s economic wealth since 1890.

The exploitation of Zimbabwe’s wealth by the monopolies takes very crude forms and continues with intensity with each succeeding year. Rhodesia, being essentially an economic enclave of imperialism has most of her mineral and agricultural produce exported raw or half-processed to the imperialist countries in order to service, sustain and complement their secondary industries. This naturally deprives the country of the high revenue that could be earned by exporting finished goods and fully processed products. Furthermore, the country is forced to import not only some of the goods she could produce locally through the promotion of local secondary industries, but also finished goods from the country’s raw and semi-processed products exported to the imperialist countries.

The international monopolies are, on account of their economic might, in the strategic position to determine, promote or retard the growth of both the primary and secondary industries based on the primacy of their narrow economic interests that service their parent industries in their home countries. The monopolies are also in an excellent position to regulate the growth of the country’s economy at a pace which enables them to eliminate competition from domestic industries. The commanding position of international capital furthermore enables them to reap super profits from Rhodesia and make the country economically subservient to international finance capital. Each year, astronomic sums of money are criminally drained to their sanctuaries in Europe and America, making the country most unjustifiably an unwilling victim of imperialist plunder and exploitation.

The domestic bourgeoisie only dominate the scene in those sectors that are less profitable to the international monopolies and hence only required to service and complement international monopolist enterprises. This is especially applicable to the agricultural and farming industries with the exception of estate and plantation farming and extensive ranching that are in the hands of the multinationals. Consequently, the greater proportion of the white domestic bourgeoisie is landed and it is no surprise that the white agrarian bourgeoisie forms the backbone of white nationalism.

The African majority are the principal victims of exploitation by both international finance and domestic capitalists who are plundering and pillaging their national wealth. The exploitation is further exacerbated through institutionalised racism in the national economy that discriminates against Africans and restricts the circulation of capital in the hands of the non-African international and domestic bourgeoisie. Furthermore, no material or social benefits accrue to the benefit of the African masses from the royalties and revenue collected by the state from the business operations of international monopoly and domestic enterprises. Instead, the African masses are further impoverished and bled white through a complex system of innumerable forms of direct and indirect taxation. This is against the background of the dispossession of their land, their only source of livelihood, subsistence and dignity. Aside of the Crown land under state control, 50% of the remainder has been misappropriated specifically for 6000 white farmers, leaving the seven million Africans crowded in the other infertile and barren half.

The land designated for white farmers was specifically selected in order to guarantee high yields and productivity for them. Moreover, the white farms are adequately serviced by an efficient and elaborate network of communication services that facilitates easy access to the urban markets. Legislation was passed to protect the agricultural interests of the white farmers and eliminate competition from African farmers especially with regard to the sale of their produce (Maize control Act of 1935).

It is quite clear that the overwhelming majority of African masses are victims of double economic domination primarily by international finance capital and secondarily by the white domestic bourgeoisie. Both of them pillage and plunder national wealth of the African people and cruelly exploit their labour power. The economic interests of the African people are subordinate to those of imperialism and the white settlers. The miserable economic plight of the African people should be viewed against the background of the contradiction between imperialism and the colonial and dependent countries. Ever since the settler occupation of Zimbabwe, the economic relations in colonial Rhodesia have been characterized by economic injustices in favour of imperialism and the white settlers with a strong bias against the overwhelming majority of the labouring masses of the African people. As a consequence of this economic disparity, the broad masses of the African people tenaciously struggle on the lifeline between survival and extinction all year round.

Cultural enslavement                        

Long before the physical occupation of Zimbabwe in 1890, inroads had already been made by the cultural agencies of western countries into Zimbabwe in the form of missionary and exploration forays. Their primary task, as it later turned out was to lay the preparatory groundwork to facilitate the subsequent colonisation of Zimbabwe. They accomplished their mission through the denigration of Zimbabwe’s African religion and the depersonalization of the indigenous African people. This was achieved gradually by overwhelming the Africans with technical superiority and western way of life. The “higher” cultural order that was preached by the Christian missionaries overawed the Africans and made them feel inferior and helpless.

The school curricula provided by the missionaries was subtly calculated to cow African masses into submission and into discarding their own socio- cultural order encompassing their own religion, cultural traditions, social values and habits that constituted their very personality. It is noteworthy that, whatever positive spin-offs of western cultural influence accrued to the Africans, it was more of something incidental than design on the part of the colonisers as in the final analysis it served to promote western cultural norms at the expense of indigenous ones. The educated Africans therefore served merely as agents of cultural transformation and the entrenchment of the new socio-cultural order.

The episode of settler occupation of Zimbabwe began soon after the missionaries had taken root among a significant section of the African population. It is little wonder that men of cloth like Reverend Helm played a prominent role in extorting the Rudd Concession from King Lobengula that provided the legal pretext for the dismemberment of Zimbabwe. This is not very surprising since men of the church had gained the confidence of the African people and acted as interpreters in all dealings between the settler scouts and African leaders. It could be safely concluded therefore that, the honourable men of the cloth, who came with the bible in one hand, were an interested party in the colonization of Africa and served as the reconnaissance personnel and the harbingers who heralded the beginning of Africa’s colonization. As elsewhere in Africa, the church in Zimbabwe was notorious for facilitating and conferring sanctity on colonialism. They painted the images of the colonizers favourably depicting them as the liberators of the African people from the forces of evil and backwardness.

The advent of colonialism saw the establishment of a host of educational and cultural institutions by the state and the church. These institutions have a dual function, first to train a large literate army of cheap labour to serve the international and domestic capitalist enterprises. Secondly, they designed to educate the African masses into submission. As already pointed out earlier on, whatever benefits accrued to the African people were purely incidental and came about involuntarily as a concomitant price for the realization of the grand scheme of colonialism. The cultural offensive launched by the colonial authorities had therefore a dual function; first serving as an essential and integral component of the capitalist economic cycle and secondly to facilitate the perpetuation and consolidation of colonial rule.

All colonial education has hitherto been aimed at proving to the African people that they have no history of their own to boast of; all they have is a dark past and a precariously uncertain future. Had it not been for the colonialists who rescued them from cultural obscurity, they would have continued to be victims of the vicissitudes of the evil forces of nature that doomed them to inevitable extinction. Conversely, the history and cultural background of the colonialists is extolled and the colonisers themselves favourably painted as condescending saviors. Innumerable and persistent campaigns have been launched to bring about the cultural assimilation of the African people into the ambit of western civilisation. They strive to do this through constantly discrediting, discouraging and pooh-poohing the cultural traditions, practices and all social values and habits of the African people, irrespective of whether or not they have a progressive social content. This is tantamount to training their cultural guns at the very foundation of African being and personality.

The sole criterion for all cultural and social values is given as Western standards regardless of the numerous flaws and social ills prevalent in western society manifest in moral decadence. There is incontestable evidence that the moral decadence and the concomitant social ills of capitalism highlight a politically reactionary society founded on economic injustice. This is a society replete with retrograde and decadent social and moral values devoid of all progressive social content, which the African masses are taught to espouse and emulate. All liberal and philanthropic talk about the well-being of the people, “human rights”, “benevolent societies”, etc is nothing more than spurious talk calculated to dupe the African masses into cultural submission. If one casts a quick glance at the Rhodesian society, social disparity and polarisation between urban and rural areas becomes evident at once; the cities with their advanced and better social amenities and the countryside with its social stagnation. The imbalance evident in the concentration of schools, hospitals etc. for Africans in the urban areas and the scarcity of corresponding institutions in the countryside where the majority of the Africans, live reflects the desire by the capitalists, completely regardless of humanitarian consideration, to adequately service their economic enterprises so as to reap higher profits in contradistinction to uplifting the masses of the African people.

Basically the desire to apprentice the Africans to western civilization is calculated to lead to depersonalisation of the Africans and to gradual loss of cultural identity which makes them amenable to foreign domination. It is the cultural enslavement of the Africans that forms the foundation stone for the political and economic edifice of settler domination in Rhodesia.

Social degradation of the African people

Racism permeates the political and socio-economic fabric of Rhodesian society. It has been used as an instrument for the social degradation of the African people relegating them to a position of inferiority in the land of their birth. Furthermore, it has served as an economic lever mollifying the contradiction between both international and domestic bourgeoisie on the one hand and the white workers on the other. The exploitation of the white workers is mitigated and partially set off by the compensation given to them in the form of higher salaries reaped from the super exploitation of masses of the black labouring people who get miserable and meager wages as remuneration for their indefatigable services to the entrepreneurs. The white workers constitute a kind of labour aristocracy. The economic advantages that accrue to them, thanks to racism, push them together with the white intellectuals and the petty bourgeoisie onto the pole of the ruling classes thereby pitting them against the overwhelming majority of the masses of the black people. The white workers appear to have no alternative but to lend political support to the Rhodesian national bourgeoisie that constitute the ruling class in return for the security of the affluent standard of living they enjoy.

The social degradation of masses of the African people finds concrete expression in the devaluation of their human worth that is manifest in their subordinate role in political, economic and cultural spheres. The Africans have been reduced to mere objects of social ridicule. The phony concepts of white supremacy and black inferiority have subjected the entire black population of Rhodesia to untold social indignities since advent of settler occupation. The Africans have become unwilling victims of white supremacy in a number of ways.

First, besides the segregation of all educational institutions save the University of Rhodesia, the racist white settler minority have devised an inferior, cumbersome and backward system of education especially designed to retard the blacks mentally and to cultivate servility of the African school child. A department of African education is dedicated to this exclusive purpose despite having a single ministry of education which could easily cater for the same standard of education for both blacks and whites. This discrimination against Africans and their low quality of education at primary and secondary levels gives their white counterparts an unfair advantage at institutions of higher learning where blacks and whites share the same educational system and standards. It therefore requires considerably greater effort on the part of the black student to catch up and march in step with their fellow white students, this not arising from inherent mental inferiority but from a deliberately downgraded educational background.

Besides the general inferiority of African education, the number of educational institutions and corresponding facilities, teacher training and technical colleges set aside for the Africans is severely limited catering only for an insignificant proportion of the African population in stark contrast to the universal and compulsory education for whites up to secondary level. The number of secondary schools for whites more than trebles that for Africans despite the fact that whites constitute less than 3% of the population.

This disparity and inequality applies to other social fields as well. For instance, the size, quality and location of African residential areas in the urban areas is hardly comparable to those for whites. The so-called African townships comprise nothing more than dinghy little hovels and overcrowded hostels that are the polar opposites of the affluent white suburbs. African housing averages two rooms for marriage quarters and five occupants per single male hostel room. These living quarters are inadequately furnished lacking basic modern amenities and facilities such as adequate lighting, cooking, heating, laundry, toilet facilities and telephone services which abound lavishly in the white suburbs. Moreover, the African townships that are in essence more of slums are poorly located with respect to sanitation being situated adjacent to industrial area where industrial and noise pollution overburdens them.

The condition of social amenities and recreational facilities for the African people are just pathetic, being reflective of the racial segregation of sporting and recreational facilities with those for whites getting the lion’s share from the national cake. Health facilities are similarly segregated as are cemeteries with only a handful of state hospitals confined to the urban centers. Holiday facilities and resorts, hotels, motels and restaurants are likewise segregated along racial lines with the Africans, the indigenous people of the land, occupying the place of underdogs.

It is this humiliating and dehumanizing social degradation of the blacks, a permanent feature of life in present day Rhodesia that constitutes the phenomenal expression of the political, economic and cultural domination and oppression of the African people in Rhodesia.

Military subjection of the African people

The subjugation of Zimbabwe by British colonialism in 1890 was imposed by force of arms and duly resisted by the heroic people of Zimbabwe. It is therefore clear that from the very inception of Zimbabwe’s colonisation, there was an imperative need for setting up and maintaining a coercive state apparatus without which colonial rule would have been vulnerable to overthrow by the embittered African people. Ever since that time, successive Rhodesian minority regimes have paid great attention to the creation of a formidable military machine as the basic guarantee of invincibility in the face of resistance against their rule from the African people. Consequently, for the past 88 years, the African people have been and are still living under military control and subjection. The Rhodesian army has been ostensibly projected as a security force poised to ward off external aggression.  In reality it was created as a strategic force braced against African resistance to racist white minority rule. Its sole purpose has and still is the perpetration of racist white minority rule through the brutal suppression of the broad masses of the black people. It is inconceivable, given the geo-political situation prevailing in southern Africa prior to 1960, to imagine that the threat of external aggression prompted successive racist white minority Rhodesian governments into building and expanding the Rhodesian army. The real material threat to white minority rule came from black opposition to their domination.

Before the emergence of African nationalism, the Rhodesian terrorist army, though on permanent military alert against possible civil disobedience by African masses, remained largely in the background with the notorious Rhodesian terrorist police force in the forefront of repressing Africans. However with the escalation of racial conflict engendered by African demands for majority rule and self-determination, the Rhodesian terrorist army began to play an increasingly prominent role in the suppression of black revolt. The onus of enforcing law and order today now rests largely with the Rhodesian terrorist army with the police also being groomed for military action through its transformation into a paramilitary force close behind its heels.

In the face of increasing repression by the Rhodesian terrorist army, Rhodesia has to all intents and purposes been literally transformed into a military dictatorship, from being a national detention camp for Africans during the peak of African nationalism to a national concentration camp during the current peak of the national liberation war. Rhodesia has developed from the permanent state of emergency of the days of African nationalism to martial law at the peak of the liberation struggle characterized by courts martial and rigid enforcement of strict day and night curfews with the indiscriminate butcher of black civilians being the order of the day.

It is noteworthy that in all its repressive operations, the Rhodesian terrorist army operates above and independently of the Rhodesian draconian laws that in themselves leave little room for peace for the African people. The Rhodesian terrorist army demonstrably has no need for a cloak of legality and justice in its repressive operations. With all their democratic rights whittled away and being under constant molestation and harassment and with the threat of torture and murder by the so-called security forces being a daily reality, Rhodesia has, in so far as the African people are concerned, to all intents and purposes been transformed to a hell on earth for black people.

Such is the social character of Zimbabwe: political domination, economic subservience, cultural enslavement, social degradation and military subjugation of the African people by the racist white minority settlers. This has been the daily order of life in Rhodesia since the advent of colonialism in 1890. It is these inhuman circumstances that have awakened national consciousness of the African people and heightened their political awareness. This national and political consciousness has now been transformed into a formidable material force with which to overthrow national oppression and restore the democratic rights of the people of Zimbabwe and pave the way for the creation of a new Zimbabwe free from oppression and exploitation of man by man and founded on economic justice and social security for all.

2) A brief historical outline of the development of the national liberation struggle in Zimbabwe

The development of the national liberation struggle in Zimbabwe stretches from the wars of resistance of the 1890’s to the current national liberation war in the late 1970s. For convenience of analysis the whole period may be broken into four major phases as follows:

1890 to 1902  –  armed resistance against the colonial invaders

1902 to 1945 –  period of relative lull in the struggle against colonialism and the phase of consolidation of colonial rule in Zimbabwe

1945 to 1970  –  reformist nationalism stretching from passive reformism of  1945 to 1956 through active reformism of 1957 – 65 to militant reformism of 1966  – 1970

1970 onwards – militant nationalism characterized by the armed national liberation struggle and forging closer links with the progressive international community.

The tracing of the historical development of the Zimbabwe national liberation struggle which follows is largely a political evaluation rather than a historical analysis of the development of the national liberation struggle. This is largely on account of the absence of relevant authoritative reference material at the time of writing. Rather than being descriptive and explanatory the account only serves to outline the development of the national liberation struggle with special reference to the circumstances surrounding the emergence of African nationalism in Zimbabwe which is the subject of this treatise. The brief revisiting of the political developments prior to the emergence of African nationalism is especially important as it facilitates a full appreciation of the essence of African nationalism in Zimbabwe and concomitantly, the sources of its weaknesses. The brief historical outline of the development of the national liberation struggle has been starved of factual detail and consequently cannot serve as a standard historical account of the national liberation struggle. However, there is a strong contention that it lies within the broad framework of the historical development of the national liberation struggle and therefore, the evaluation of the political development may be safely taken as valid.

National Resistance: 1890 – 1902

Cecil John Rhodes secured a British Royal Charter on the basis of the Rudd Concession of 1888 that was illegitimately extorted from King Lobengula which granted him nominal possession of the present day Rhodesia. The Charter enabled him to set up his British South Africa company which invaded Zimbabwe in 1890. The Rudd Concession had ostensibly granted Rhodes only mineral rights over Lobengula’s political domain as distinct from territorial rights over the whole of Zimbabwe. However the nature of the invasion force organized by Rhodes euphemistically dubbed the “pioneer column” transcended the limits and provisions of the Rudd Concession. It was not surprising therefore, that as soon as the pioneer column set foot in Zimbabwe clashes began with the local inhabitants especially the Shonas as the invasion force had deliberately skirted Matebeleland to avoid a premature clash with the dreaded King Lobengula’s Amajaha. Every one of the invasion force, the so-called pioneer column was promised fifteen gold claims and vast land holdings of between 3 – 5000 acres. This naturally set the invasion force on a collision course with the local inhabitants from the very beginning. Rhodes’s grandiose promises to the settlers could certainly not materialize without provocation of the local inhabitants and clashes with them.

As soon as the settlers got to their respective destinations, they began setting up an administrative apparatus at once and carved out vast tracts of land for themselves through forcible eviction of the Africans. They went on to reserve land for prospecting minerals and press-ganged Africans into unpaid labour contracts. They systematically subverted and undermined traditional authority and institutions with the ultimate aim of controlling the black population.

The situation was further aggravated by the institutionalisation of various measures designed to induce the employment of Africans by the settlers. All these provocations coupled with innumerable acts of aggression were completely incompatible with the wishes and aspirations of the local inhabitants who quickly reached the end of their forbearance and braced themselves for an all-out struggle against the occupying force. This was for the Africans a just struggle as the provocative activities of the settler forces had undermined the traditional social order, trampled underfoot their sovereign rights and whittled away their basic freedoms and made them slaves in the land of their birth.

It is therefore not surprising to see that the settler occupation of Zimbabwe provoking the bitter resistance of the people of Zimbabwe that took armed form, beginning as isolated incidents in 1890 and gathering momentum and growing in proportions that culminated in the well-chronicled Wars of Resistance of 1893 and 1896. The heroic resistance against heavily armed settler forces demonstrated the ruthless determination of the African people of Zimbabwe to ward off settler occupation, regain their freedom, recover land that had been robbed and reassert their right to self-determination and national sovereignty.

The Wars of Resistance by the people of Zimbabwe are, in the light of the overwhelming odds against them eloquent examples of supreme courage and heroic and sublime sacrifice. The settlers had a well organised conventional force that was armed to the teeth with modern and superior weapons that included cannons and heavy machine guns pitted against poorly organised indigenous forces equipped with only spears, bows and arrows.

Overwhelmed by superior technology and well organised settler forces, with a sense of purpose and everything to lose, the people of Zimbabwe stood little chance of defeating the settler aggressors. However, their sublime heroism and relentless determination to resist settler occupation wrote glorious pages of valour and ingenuity in the annals of Zimbabwe’s history. Their supreme sacrifices are a shining example to all Zimbabweans and continue to inspire all Zimbabwean freedom fighters of today’s national liberation war.

Despite all the heroic determination to drive off the settler invaders, the people of Zimbabwe were defeated but however they only regarded the defeat as temporary, with the resistance continuing in other forms. They could not reconcile themselves to the defeat as final and sealing the fate of Zimbabweans forever and accordingly pledged that future generations would eventually re-conquer the fatherland and once again become masters of their own destiny.

The main reasons for the defeat of the African people lay on the one hand, in the superiority of the technology and organisation and military art of the of the settler forces and in disunity, poor organisation, absence of central direction and command of the resistance and the inferiority of armaments and fighting methods of the local inhabitants on the other. It took up to about 1902 for the settler forces to eliminate the last pockets of resistance and fully assert their authority over the local inhabitants. After the crumbling of their resistance, the people of Zimbabwe were left with no option but to submit to the colonial authority. It is however important to note that total submission in the form of harmonious cooperation with the settler authorities was long drawn and gradual, varying according to areas. It is incontrovertible that even after the military defeat of the African people; generalised hostility against colonial authority continued to be widespread and sometimes took the form on non-cooperation with the administrative steps by the settler authority such as the collection of taxes etc.

Relative Lull in Resistance: 1902 – 1945

The period stretching from 1902 – 45 represents both a relative lull in resistance by the Africans to racist white minority domination, and the entrenchment and consolidation of settler minority rule. After the defeat in the wars of resistance of the 1890’s, the African people realised that it would be sheer adventurism to continue with their armed resistance against settler minority rule. Given the superiority of the settler minority forces, perpetration of armed resistance would have only served to exact a heavy toll of lives of the African people without achieving the desired result of driving away the settlers. Consequently, in line with the dictation of the objective conditions, the resistance against minority settler rule subsided and as it were, went underground. It was during this period that capitalism firmly took root in Zimbabwe and initiated the differentiation of the traditional social order. Urban areas sprang up where settler communities were concentrated, mining establishments developed, modern agriculture was introduced, manufacturing and other industries started in the urban centers, schools and other educational institutions were set-up and an administrative infrastructure took a definite form.

The Africans no longer had only to contend with forced evictions from prime agricultural land and dispossessions and de-stocking of their livestock in the rural areas, but with the brutal exploitation of their labour and dehumanising working conditions as well. This was superimposed on forced labour on railway and road infrastructure and taxation to induce rural to urban migration to provide cheap labour for the mines and factories.  Furthermore, and with far reaching implications for the future, the hitherto unstructured African society gave birth to a working class and the petit bourgeoisie in addition to the peasant subsistence farmers residing in the now re-designated African reserves and the so-called tribal trust lands.

The organisation and subsequent consolidation of the administrative and economic infrastructure had a profound effect on the social organisation of the traditional order. Its consequence was the stratification of traditional society to meet the demands of the emergent capitalist relations of production that was superimposed on the existing traditional order. This marked the beginning of the proletarianisation of the peasantry that proceeded simultaneously with the emergence of the petty bourgeoisie from the rich peasants together with petty traders and intellectuals in the urban areas.

The emergence of these social groups, strata and classes was concomitant with the development of capitalist relations of production and destined to become a threat to the monopoly of political power and the economic interests of the racist settler minority. The agrarian bourgeoisie who controlled political power in Rhodesia were fully aware of the threat posed by the emergence of the new social groups amongst the Africans and took practical steps to safeguard their rule and economic interests through the introduction of draconian laws such as the Land Apportionment Act, the Industrial Conciliation Act, the Preservation of Constitutional Government Act and the Pass Laws etc. However, most importantly, the settler minority regimes barred the broad masses of the African people from participating in the political process through a racially qualified franchise.

These developments engendered a struggle on two fronts i.e. the urban front for the emerging working class, the struggle for better wages and the rural front for the peasant farmers in defense of their land rights and livestock. As had happened elsewhere throughout the world, the struggle by the working class soon gave rise to organised resistance in the form of strikes in the mid1940s. The promulgation of the Land and Animal Husbandry Act of 1950 saw the peasant farmers rise up in sporadic acts of defiance and non-cooperation characterised by isolated attacks on dip tanks. The Land and Animal Husbandry Act limited the size for individual peasant land holdings and the number of cattle they could own. Urban dwellers were particularly affected as they were deprived of the right to own land contrary to traditional African custom  It also had a provision for small holder farmers.

We have already seen that the introduction of capitalism in Zimbabwe destabilized the traditional social order, and accelerated the differentiation of African society resulting in the emergence of new social groupings among the African people that corresponded with the new capitalist relations of production. Gradually, the new social groups became partially alienated from the traditional society and accepted the new social order albeit reluctantly. They became acclimatized to capitalist relations of production and through labour, familiarized themselves with the Europeans whom they had hitherto feared, revered and considered to be endowed with supernatural powers.

This familiarization cracked the myth of white supremacy as the Africans discovered that the Europeans were just ordinary human beings like themselves without any special endowments deriving from their race. The Africans thus began to view the white settlers in a different light. This eventually awakened the African workers, intellectuals and petty bourgeoisie to the consciousness of social injustices brought about by the racist white minority rule. They became averse to social degradation and racial discrimination perpetrated by the Europeans. This awareness generated popular discontent among the African elite and organisations championing the cause of the African elite and workers were formed as early as 1911.

The formation of these organisations varied according to phases in the development of capitalism and the relative development of the urban areas. The Africans demanded social equality, better working and living conditions, better salaries and wages and above all involvement in the decision making process. What is noteworthy about the nature of this movement is that it was largely confined to the struggle for economic and social rights and better working conditions. It lacked a popular character and championed only the cause of the African elite and workers. The movement lacked a national character and operated within the context of the capitalist society unlike the wars of  resistance that preceded it that were waged on a national plane and within the framework of traditional society.

The struggles deriving from this new wave of consciousness was not based on the mobilization of the broad masses of the people and had only a peripheral political character. It is therefore not surprising that little was achieved in terms of material gains or the amelioration of social conditions during this phase. However, its great positive achievement was the cracking of the myth of white supremacy that laid a firm basis for the subsequent emergence of African nationalism. This whole period was therefore essentially a period of gestation for the emergence of African nationalism.

Passive African Nationalism: 1945 – 1970

The fundamental political contradiction between the racist white minority rule and the broad masses of the African people that had been forced onto the background with the defeat of the wars of resistance resurged with a definite political character with the emergence of African nationalism following the end of the Second World War. As was the case with the rest of Africa, the end of the world war in itself played a prominent role in resuscitating the struggle against colonialism in those countries like Zimbabwe where it had subsided. This is not surprising since the major European colonial powers emerged weakened after the war, with the United States of America and the Soviet Union surfacing as the two major world powers. The emergence of African nationalism in Zimbabwe also benefited immensely from the more radical sister movements in neighbouring countries like South Africa, Malawi and Zambia were African nationalism had taken root much earlier.

The rise of African nationalism, which stretched between 1945-56 was associated with sharpening economic struggles, increasing demands by Africans to participate in decision making processes, the struggle against the formation of the Central African Federation (1953-63) and against repressive and racist legislation such as the Land Apportionment Act and the Land Husbandry Act, and the struggle for social equality. It was during this period that amorphous political organisations such as urban residents associations, the African Youth League and the British Voice Association that championed the rights of the African people were formed.

African labour unions also mushroomed and became active in agitating for the improvement of working and living conditions and wages for the African workers. The incipient struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie took the form of workers strikes in urban centres. This was a new form of struggle for Zimbabwean workers and the semi-proletariat. Industrial strikes assumed greater proportions and with time embraced larger numbers of workers. Workers strikes played a very important role in the emergence and shaping of African nationalism. They became an essential component of the African nationalist movement, especially in the era of reformism.

In spite of its lofty aims and objectives, African nationalism in its initial stages failed to make considerable strides as its efforts were not channeled through a well-organised political movement. The African nationalist movement was still essentially reformist in character that focused on appealing to the conscience of the white racist settlers. Another peculiar feature of the movement was that it was led by the petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals resident in the urban areas. It is therefore not surprising that the movement was confined to the urban areas without taking root among the masses of the peasantry, the bulk of the African population. Though workers in some urban centres were mobilized to participate in the nationalist movement this was never on a national scale and no links were established with the peasantry.

This brief phase however ushered the struggle of the African people against racist minority rule onto a higher plane of African nationalism which culminated in the formation of the African National Congress in 1957. For the first time the struggle against racist minority rule became identified with a mass movement. The African National Congress became the first nationally organized detachment to spearhead African nationalism in Zimbabwe long after sister organisations had established themselves in South Africa, Malawi and Zambia.

Active Reformist Nationalism: 1957-70                 

The period stretching from 1957 – 70 may be termed the era of reformist nationalism. The reformist nature of this general period arises out of the general essence and orientation of the nationalist movement during this period as manifest in central objectives and the political methods and tactics employed to secure the realization of the political objectives of the nationalist movement. In concrete and practical terms, the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe during this period never transcended the limits of bourgeoisie narrow nationalism. It was nothing more than the equivalent of white nationalism that reached its zenith during roughly the same period. Active reformist nationalism, like its predecessor, passive nationalism was under the leadership of the petty bourgeoisie resident in the urban centres. Reformist nationalism, was closely linked to the development of the labour movement within big towns like Salisbury and Bulawayo.

The African National Congress (ANC) was formed at the end of 1957 under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo and was closely linked to its sister movements in Malawi and Zambia under Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda and Harry Nkumbula respectively within the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. As has been pointed out earlier, at this point in time, these fraternal organisations were definitely more militant and took the lead in the development of African nationalism in Central Africa.

Unlike the preceding political organisations that had a largely amorphous and para-political character, the African National Congress had a distinct, definite and national political character with a concrete organisational form. It advanced definite and clear political slogans that became the rallying point for the African masses. Its cardinal political demands were the enfranchisement of the African people, their active participation in the political process and the dissolution of the Central African Federation, the struggle for the proscription of racial discrimination and better working conditions and wages for the African workers. The struggle against destocking of domestic animals and re-allocation of land also featured prominently amongst the ideals of the ANC.

It was the struggle for these lofty ideals that formed the basis of nationalist consciousness during the era of reformist politics. The African nationalists at this stage acknowledged the superiority of western standards and values to which they themselves aspired. This greatly influenced their political approach and notwithstanding their grievances against the racist white settler community, the ANC hoped to fulfill their political objectives on the basis of harmonious cooperation between Africans and the Europeans. This was basic nationalist policy for which the ANC campaigned vigorously. Herein lies the reformist essence of the early nationalist movement which continued to cast a dark shadow on the revolutionary commitment of the African Nationalists.

The ANC achieved quite a measure of success in its agitational work, especially in the urban centres where a number of workers’ strikes for better working conditions and better wages were associated with the political activities of the ANC. It also managed to make inroads into the rural areas where it began to mobilize the peasantry especially with regard to destocking of cattle, dipping fees and grievances on land. The successes achieved by the ANC in arousing political consciousness though limited, greatly alarmed the settler authorities who proscribed it in 1959 and rounded up its main leaders before it could consolidate itself nationally and extend its political tentacles into the countryside where the bulk of the black population lived. The political activities of the ANC between1957-59 revealed both organisational inexperience and political immaturity of the nationalist leadership that would haunt the nationalist movement for a long time to come.

The nationwide propagation of the gospel of African nationalism was left to the National Democratic Party (NDP) which was formed in 1960 as the successor to the ANC again under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo. Unlike the ANC, the National Democratic Party had a broad based mass character that also encompassed the peasants. Influenced by the wave of independence sweeping across the African continent to the north, the National Democratic Party, for the first time in the history of African nationalism in Zimbabwe advanced clear and categorical demands for national independence and majority rule under the all-conquering slogans of “one man one vote” “no independence before majority rule” and “mwana wevhu”. These slogans had a tremendous effect on the development and re-awakening of national consciousness of the African masses who responded with massive enthusiasm. The NDP imparted the political dimension of national independence to the earlier struggles against racial discrimination, for the dissolution of the Central African Federation, for social equality and better working conditions and wages for the Africans. National independence remains to this day the clarion call for the nationalist movement.

The National Democratic Party made great strides in arousing the political consciousness of the African masses that was manifest in the increasing number of industrial strikes and demonstrations that assumed a definite political character and numerous acts of civil disobedience that were widespread in the rural areas. There were for example industrial strikes in Salisbury and Bulawayo in June, July and October of 1960. Molotov cocktails popularly known as petrol bombs were used for the first time in demonstrations in June, July, October and November of 1960. In the rural areas the African peasants refused to cooperate with agents of settler authority, the notorious “Native Commissioners”. They resisted displacement from their farmlands, refused to cooperate with tax collectors, destroyed agricultural produce in neighbouring white farms; smashed cattle dip tanks and engaged in various other non-conformist activities. It was on account of nationalist pressure and civil disobedience in the rural areas that the derogatory title of “native commissioner” was subsequently changed to the less offensive district commissioner.

All these activities occurred within the framework of peaceful political struggles which the NDP had vowed to follow. At this stage, it was the declared intention of the African nationalists to follow the parliamentary route to majority rule or independence. All the urban political strife and civil turmoil that was rampant in the rural areas were calculated to bring pressure to bear on both the minority settler regime and the British Government who were both expected to yield to the demands for majority rule. The political violence of 1960s should therefore be viewed as a component of composite tactics of pressure and leverage to influence the minority settler regime and the British.  Both were not very responsive, with only a token concession made in the 1961 Constitution to provide for fifteen African members of parliament in a legislative assembly of fifty, with the rest being white.

However, the nationwide political activities of the NDP and the mounting national consciousness of the African masses alarmed the racist settler authorities, who proceeded to ban the party on 9th December, 1961. It was the activities of the NDP that gave birth to the notorious Law and Order Maintenance Act of 1960 that has become instrumental in the repression of political activity in Rhodesia to this day. It allowed for the arrest, detention and restriction of political activists without trial.

Much to the chagrin of the minority settler authorities, a new political organisation the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) again under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo was formed a few days later on the ashes of the NDP. The formation of ZAPU did not bring anything new with regard to the basic orientation of the nationalist movement. More or less the same tactics were adopted to intensify pressure for the negotiation of a constitutional settlement on the basis of majority rule. There was however an introduction of sabotage as a new weapon in the struggle that saw isolated incidents occurring in the urban centres. It was out of the desire to acquire the requisite skills in sabotage warfare that the nationalist movement began to recruit African youths for training outside the country as early as 1962.

It is important to note that the introduction of sabotage activities onto the political scene did not represent a shift to the strategy of confrontation with the settler authorities but only served to accentuate the pressure in search of a constitutional settlement. In addition to the element of sabotage, there was an increase in the number of industrial strikes, protest marches, political demonstrations and more civil disobedience in both the urban and rural areas. ZAPU achieved extensive nationwide mobilization of the African masses. It became a household name throughout Zimbabwe and far exceeded the achievements of its predecessors, the ANC and the NDP. Echoes of “one man one vote” reverberated from every corner of the country and support for the nationalist movement mounted considerably. The African people demonstrated that they were prepared to go to any length in support of the struggle for majority rule.

The heightened political consciousness of the African masses and the increasing militancy of the nationalist movement as evidenced by the sabotage activities sent the racist settler authorities into panic mode and proceeded to proscribe ZAPU in September, 1962, after less than one year of the organisation’s existence. The nationalist organisation, which was by now already a mass movement went underground after the ban but most unfortunately by mid-1963, a serious rift had developed within the ranks of the nationalist movement that most regrettably led to the formation of a rival organisation in August 1963, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) under the leadership of Rev Ndabaningi Sithole.

There is no evidence to suggest that the split was a consequence of any major differences in political strategy other than personality differences and minor difference in emphasis in tactics within the general framework of pressure and leverage strategy against the racist settler minority rule. Any claim to the contrary, suggestive of deep seated ideological contradictions or any fundamental difference in strategy are completely without foundation and not borne by subsequent developments. Up to this moment in the national liberation struggle, the two organisations have an identical ideological outlook and the development of their strategic concepts has closely followed the same pattern corresponding in both time and content. The formation of ZANU was answered with the formation of the People’s Caretaker Council (PCC) which was in essence the continuation of ZAPU under the new circumstances of political rivalry within the nationalist movement. This presented ZAPU with a legal platform (following its proscription in September 1962) with which to challenge ZANU.

The emergence of the two organisations, ZANU and PCC, did not herald any new or radical political developments on the political scene other than mutual hostilities and bloody vendettas that characterized relations between the two rival organisations and threatened to paralyse the nationalist movement and engulfed it in bitter political recriminations. Rather than concentrating on the pursuit of the central goal of attaining national independence, political energy and attention of the African masses were now diverted to partisan political squabbles. This naturally played into the hands of the racist settler authorities who watched with glee and folded arms as the two sides slugged each other in the African townships. This was indeed a sad episode for the nationalist movement.

Notwithstanding the political confusion and rivalry, isolated incidents of sabotage activities and the recruitment of youth for training in sabotage warfare outside the country continued unabated. Capitalising on the disorder and internecine violence within the nationalist movement, the racist Smith regime of the right wing Rhodesia Front that came to power in 1962, outlawed both organisations in mid-1964. It is ironic that the degeneration of the nationalist movement coincided with the hardening intransigence of the racist Smith regime whose party had come to power on the ticket of also demanding immediate independence for Rhodesia from Britain within the context of white nationalism.

Ian Smith went on to declare Rhodesia unilaterally independent from Britain in November, 1965 which complicated the situation for the African nationalists. The silencing of both ZANU and PCC and the subsequent unilateral declaration of independence by Smith in 1965 marked the end of the first phase of active reformism by the African nationalists. Judging by the achievements of other nationalist movements elsewhere in Africa, the Zimbabwean nationalist movement had been a remarkable failure which called for a review of strategy in political struggle given the peculiarity of the Rhodesian situation. The racist settler authorities had employed the strategy of not permitting nationalist organisations to take root among the people by outlawing them whenever they posed a serious threat. The measures that were taken by the Smith regime to outlaw and suppress the nationalist movement eventually forced it underground and to resort to clandestine activities and intensify sabotage activities with the hope of reversing the unfavourable political situation in their favour.

The African nationalists continued to pursue their constitutional struggle regardless of the deteriorating political situation in Rhodesia and the intransigence of the Smith regime. The declaration of unilateral independence by Ian Smith constituted a major blow and impediment to their hopes of an amicable constitutional settlement and their hopes of an early political victory began to recede. UDI partially awoke the African nationalists to the realities of settler intransigence and they began contemplating an armed struggle as a form of struggle that could tilt the balance in their favour. However, lacking confidence in the prospects of victory for an armed liberation struggle at this point in time, the nationalists only viewed the armed struggle as a lever for influencing political developments to a point when constitutional negotiations with the British Government could be resumed.

They particularly hoped to secure British intervention in Rhodesia by fomenting internal disorder through widespread sabotage activities and isolated military action. It is noteworthy that the African nationalists still had complete faith and confidence in the impartiality of the British Government to honestly broker a constitutional settlement in Rhodesia in their favour. They had faith that the British Government could easily reverse Smith’s UDI. The misguided and erroneous views of the African nationalists were not helped by their gullibility to the British assurance that they would only intervene in Rhodesia if there was a break down in law and order. On their part, the British Government continued to raise the hopes of the African nationalists through vaguely worded proposals on unimpeded progress to majority rule and the so-called ”six principles”.

The exiled nationalists stepped up their recruitment campaigns and organized the training of large numbers of black youths in military art in anticipation of British intervention. Quite a number of African youths received military training in friendly African countries such as Ghana, Tanzania and Algeria and in socialist countries as well. By the beginning of 1966, preparations for launching military operations were already advanced. The whole period from April 1966 to 1970 was characterized by sporadic military operations by both nationalist organisations in an atmosphere of rivalry confined to the northern half of the country.  The wave of these military operations conducted during this period took the form of sabotage of railway and power lines and on other economic targets and guerrilla attacks on outlying and isolated military and police posts. On some occasions preemptive attacks were made by the Rhodesian forces on guerilla bands before they got to their targets inflicting heavy losses on them.

At this stage in the national liberation struggle, the guerillas had inadequate military training and were poorly equipped and lacked combat discipline with combat security leaving a lot to be desired. The strength of the guerilla bands varied from sections to platoons in the case of ZANLA combatants and companies in the case of ZIPRA as the ZAPU fighters generally operated in larger combat units than ZANLA. Another characteristic feature of these military operations was the absence of political work among the local population in the rural communities.  Little pains were taken to mobilize and organize the masses of rural peasants with the result that they became vulnerable to attacks by the better trained and equipped Rhodesian army. All the military operations carried out during this period were not based on any strategic military plan and were essentially sporadic and uncoordinated. Their sole objective was to sow seeds of terror in Rhodesia with the hope of provoking British intervention.

Any claim or attempts by African nationalists to elevate the military skirmishes of 1966-70 to strategic military endeavour to destroy enemy forces with the objective of toppling the racist Rhodesian regime would be misleading, unjustified and completely without foundation and devoid of any factual basis. Such claims would be an unscrupulous attempt to disguise and mask the political naivety of the nationalists that drove these adventurist operations at a high cost of lives. It is however in place to pay tribute to the early freedom fighters for their courage and determination and commitment to the cause of liberation. They fought gallantly against the Rhodesian forces in the face of overwhelming odds.

The military skirmishes in northern Zimbabwe did not achieve the intended objective of provoking British intervention in Rhodesia. Though Britain had imposed economic sanctions on Rhodesia it did not do much to reverse the unilateral declaration of independence, UDI. It was only after the British premier, Harold Wilson had amply demonstrated in practice his bias in favour of the Smith regime by sidelining the African nationalists in both the HMS Tiger Talks of 1966 and the HMS Fearless Talks of 1968 to resolve the constitutional impasse caused by UDI.  The nationalists began to realize that avenues for their involvement in constitutional negotiations had been effectively blocked.

The hopes for peaceful struggle that had up to now been entertained by the nationalists were smashed by the open treachery of the British who went on to suggest the HMS Fearless proposals to resolve the Rhodesian impasse without even consulting the African nationalists as before. This put the last nail in the coffin of nationalist reformist politics in Zimbabwe that had continued to linger on despite the worsening political situation in Rhodesia as evidenced by the suppression of nationalist activities and Ian Smith’s UDI. The nationalists lost confidence in the British Government and began to contemplate seriously, armed struggle as a viable alternative to the hitherto pursued constitutional avenue to independence.

The armed struggle of 1966-70 was designed to play only a supplementary role to the constitutional struggle being waged by nationalist organisations that lacked a background in military affairs. Consequently the armed struggle could not have been expected to achieve much in the circumstances. Notwithstanding, the role played by guerilla fighters, the unwilling victims of political opportunism and military adventurism of the nationalist leadership were exemplary and heroic in facing the vigorous challenge by the Rhodesian counter-insurgency and in their readiness to accept the supreme sacrifice.

Up to this day, the remarkable role played by forerunners of the modern freedom fighters provides an unfathomable source of inspiration to all the liberation fighters engaged in the current phase of the armed struggle. The experience acquired by the guerilla fighters during this period was invaluable in as much as it laid a firm base for subsequent better planned and organised military operations. These took the form of classical guerrilla warfare following a critical strategic re-appraisal of the methods and forms of struggle. It is little wonder that the guerilla fighters themselves in both nationalist organisations were instrumental in the shift in strategy to adopt armed struggle as the principal from of struggle to achieve self-determination for the people of Zimbabwe.

The era of reformist nationalism which had stretched from 1957 – 70 constituted a major defeat for the nationalist movement. Majority rule was nowhere in sight after all those years of struggle and elsewhere in Africa most national movements had attained their goal of national independence. There were a number of reasons and a variety of factors that contributed to the failure of the nationalist movement at this stage. Principal among these was the incorrect and subjective appraisal of both the domestic and international situation in relation to their struggle for self-determination.

The nationalists viewed the problem of Zimbabwe’s independence as similar to that of Britain’s other colonies where the settler factor was either insignificant or practically non-existent. This led the nationalists to expend most of their efforts in lobbying the international community to exert moral pressure on the British Government so that she could affect the transfer of power from the racist settler minority to the nationalists. The African nationalists erroneously believed that political change in Rhodesia could only be effected by the British Government. Little did they appreciate the role of the settler factor in the whole political equation which counter-poised white nationalism against African nationalism. Nor did they perceive Britain’s thinly veiled machinations to promote and support white nationalism for what it really was: recognition that the white settlers constituted the only reliable custodian of her vested colonial and imperialist interests in Rhodesia.

The political strategy and tactics of reformist nationalism failed basically because it was based on the false premise that all that was required was to bring pressure to bear on the British Government to convene a constitutional conference and discharge her colonial obligations to the satisfaction of the nationalists as she had done elsewhere. Such a subjective approach no doubt emanated from failure to fully appreciate the essence of colonialism and imperialism which were in Rhodesia compounded by the settler factor. The British Government and the racist minority regime on their part capitalised on the political immaturity and inexperience of the nationalist leadership and continued to give false hopes that lured them further into reformism.

The political and organisational inexperience of the nationalist leadership was particularly manifest in their failure to put forward a sound political programme that embraced the struggle for national independence; in their inability to formulate a correct political line to guide the broad masses of the people in their just struggle for national self-determination and in their inability to constantly sum up political experiences so as to create an objective basis for future progress. All their tactical and strategic planning appeared to arise more from enthusiasm rather than from a sound analysis of the objective conditions. The incompetence of the nationalist leadership was also reflected in their failure to give political and organisational direction to their followers. It is therefore little wonder that the nationalists fell prey to the political deception of the more seasoned British politicians. The weaknesses of the nationalist movement were further compounded by political disunity arising from power struggles, the corrupt practices of leading officials of the nationalist movement and the occasional degeneration into tribal feuding.

The weaknesses of the nationalist movement should be viewed within the framework of the bourgeois context of African nationalism which played a decisive role in fettering the development of the national liberation struggle. Notwithstanding these weaknesses, reformist nationalism in Zimbabwe made a positive contribution, on balance, to the development of the national liberation struggle in particular with regard to resuscitating national consciousness and keeping the flame of liberation burning in the hearts and minds of the African masses. The nationalists’ inclination towards violence in the latter 1960’s sowed the seeds for the revolutionary consciousness of the African masses that became easily receptive to and firmly supported the arduous and protracted armed struggle that unfolded in the 1970’s. It may therefore be safely concluded that the era of reformist nationalism was a necessary stage in the development of the national liberation struggle and served as a gestation period for the sustained guerilla campaign that is currently raging in Rhodesia.

Militant Nationalism: 1970 –

It was earlier on pointed out that the disenchantment of the nationalists with the British Government engendered a re-examination of the methods of struggle and the general strategy hitherto employed in the struggle for independence. The bankruptcy of securing British intervention in Rhodesia was laid bare by the negative responses of the British Government to the military activities of the nationalist guerillas. This left the armed struggle as the only principal form of struggle for the nationalists and the only viable alternative of continuing the struggle for liberation in the circumstances. The shift to armed struggle represented a leap from reformism which had sought to bring about political change through constitutional means to armed confrontation with the racist Smith regime as the basic strategy in the national liberation struggle. The reformism of 1957-70 was thus transformed into militant nationalism that began around 1970.  This leap marked a positive development of African nationalism though regrettably, the movement continued to be plagued by most of its earlier weaknesses.

The new strategy of the nationalist movement came to fruition with the launching of guerilla operations in North Eastern Zimbabwe in 1972 by the ZANLA, the military wing of ZANU. This was closely followed by ZIPRA operations in North Western Zimbabwe. The military operations by the ZAPU guerillas in the north western operations did not immediately develop into a full scale war as did the north eastern front operated by ZANU guerillas. The ZANLA guerillas operating on this front employed the strategy of guerilla warfare based on the people’s war which entailed extensive mobilization and organisation of the masses in the operational areas.  In no time they had secured a foothold inside Zimbabwe and firmly rooted themselves among the masses of rural peasants in the area. Within two years the war waged on the basis of mobilization and organisation of the masses had developed to deal shattering blows on the morale of the Rhodesian forces. It disrupted the Rhodesian economy and way of life and threatened the stability of the Smith regime.

The Smith regime responded by tightening the security laws, instituting call ups for military service, imposing collective fines for collaboration with the freedom fighters and herding the masses into concentration camps to stop them from supporting the nationalist guerillas. All these measures proved ineffective to contain or stop the war. The ZANLA forces in the North Eastern area numbered about four hundred guerrillas at the end of 1974 with about one thousand two hundred trained guerillas poised to join the from the rear. This situation was aggravated by the decolonisation of Mozambique following a military coup in Portugal in April 1974. This development changed the strategic balance of forces in southern Africa tilting it against the racist minority regimes in southern Africa.

The strides made in the guerilla war in Rhodesia and the decolonisation of Mozambique left the racist minority regimes in southern Africa extremely vulnerable and threw them into a state of panic. In response to this unfavourable development, the imperialists conceived a major détente exercise for Southern Africa with the aim of stemming the tide of revolution in Zimbabwe. Following the developments in Portugal, that set in motion the decolonisation of its African colonies, it was resolved to stop the radicalisation of the Zimbabwe liberation movement by bringing to an end the liberation war. The key players in the détente exercise were the South African premier John Vorster and the Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda. John Vorster was to prevail over Ian Smith, the Rhodesian rebel leader to release the nationalist leaders on condition that they would bring the guerilla war to an end. Kenneth Kaunda on the other hand was to persuade his fellow African leaders to put pressure on the liberation movement to bring the war to an end in return for the release of their nationalist leaders. With the end of the guerilla war, a new political dispensation would then be negotiated to resolve the Rhodesian political impasse with the involvement of both the African nationalists and the leaders of the African frontline states comprising Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Angola and Mozambique.

As it turned out, both Vorster and Kaunda delivered on their undertakings with Ian Smith releasing all the detained nationalists in December 1974. Kaunda on his part ensured that all the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders renounced the armed struggle and agreed to pursue the path of negotiations under the umbrella of the United African National Council headed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa. An agreement to this effect was signed by all the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders under the Lusaka Unity Accord of 9 December 1974. This is how the nationalist leaders like Ndabaningi Sithole the leader of ZANU, Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU, Robert Mugabe and others secured their freedom from Smith’s prisons.

The détente exercise had serious consequences for the liberation struggle with the external leadership of ZANU and the ZANLA fighters based in Zambia bearing the brunt of its effects. Admittedly, the incarcerated nationalist leadership was now free but at what cost. The détente exercise succeeded in destabilizing the Zimbabwean liberation movement and practically brought the liberation war to an end, to the satisfaction of Ian Smith and John Vorster and their imperialist masters. Not a single shot was fired at the Rhodesian forces by the nationalist guerillas for close to a year, thanks to the détente exercise. Détente came to an end a year later following the initiative by ZANLA and ZIPRA combatants on their own to form the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) on 25th November, 1975 as a united front of the two armies to resuscitate the armed liberation struggle.

The formation of ZIPA consigned the détente exercise to the dustbin of history. The liberation struggle made great strides, within a few months of the formation of ZIPA sent shock waves within imperialist circles. By June 1976, evidence of the successes scored by ZIPA was manifest in the desperate manoeuvres of the embattled Smith regime to thwart the advance of the liberation war. Guerilla operations covered more than half the country with the Smith regime resorting to massive call ups for the war, prolongation of the period of national service, instituting convoy system for transportation, introducing the curfew system and mobile martial courts to deal with guerilla supporters. The Rhodesian forces changed their counter-insurgency strategy from that of clear and hold, to a general offensive. All these desperate attempts to stop the revolutionary advance of the people’s war under ZIPA failed dismally.

By September 1976, the people’s war waged under the leadership of ZIPA based on extensive and thoroughgoing mobilization and organisation of the masses had aroused the national consciousness of the people of Zimbabwe to unprecedented levels and dealt crippling blows to the Rhodesian army and to his sanctions battered economy. The entire eastern half of the country was now practically a war zone and a semi-liberated zone with more than five thousand ZIPA forces operating there. Another twenty thousand forces under arms were waiting to join them from the rear. By October 1976 the Soviet Union had also pledged to meet ZIPA military requirements including the training of up to 5000 fighters. The Tanzanian government had at this time also offered Frelimo’s former training camp Nachingwea for the training of ZIPA forces in conventional warfare. ZIPA’s plans to set up liberated zones that it could defend from enemy attacks were at an advanced stage and scheduled to come into effect in early 1977. To this end, ZIPA had embarked on leadership training of a core of military cadres at its Whampoa Academy in Chimoio, Mozambique.

The stability of the Smith regime was severely threatened and security of the economic interests of imperialists could no longer be guaranteed. Under pressure from the revolutionary advance of the people’s war waged by ZIPA, the imperialists were forced once more to resort to counter-revolutionary dual tactics in a desperate bid to safeguard their vested economic interests in Rhodesia. The Americans and the British concocted the Kissinger proposals to end the war in Rhodesia and save the Smith regime from collapse. For the first time in history, Ian Smith unconditionally accepted the principle of majority rule in his life time which he had previously scorned declaring that there would be no majority rule in a thousand years. However, the imperialist machinations and dirty intrigues were exposed and foiled by the liberation movement at the Geneva Conference of October, 1976. The imperialist manoeuvres, as before were aimed at thwarting the legitimate aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe by sabotaging the development of the liberation struggle and hijacking the revolutionary gains of the people’s struggle. Their central aim was the installation of a reactionary neo-colonial puppet regime to take care of their vested interests in Rhodesia.

The imperialist schemes were frustrated by the advanced stage the liberation struggle had attained under the leadership of ZIPA. Both the Zimbabwe people and the international community had been fully mobilized and exposed to the reactionary essence of the imperialist maneuvers. It was through ZIPA’s efforts that the Patriotic Front was formed in October 1976 between ZANU and ZAPU to confront the Kissinger proposals in Geneva. ZIPA was actually advocating for an even broader united front that would encompass all the Zimbabwean nationalist organisations but unfortunately both the leadership of ZANU and ZAPU and some of the Frontline states leaders were opposed to this at the summit of Frontline Heads of State held at the end of September 1976. ZIPA’s strategy was to unite all the nationalists so as to prevent the imperialists and the Smith regime from exploiting the divisions among Zimbabwean nationalists to their own advantage. These fears were eventually borne out with the subsequent developments that culminated in the internal settlement agreement of March 1978 between the Smith regime and some of the nationalist leaders like Muzorewa of the UANC, Chikerema of FROLIZI and  Ndabaningi Sithole of ZANU Ndonga, the former leader of ZANU.

However, most regrettably, at this critical juncture, ZIPA’s revolutionary thrust was emasculated through the arrest of its core leadership in Mozambique. It was certainly not a coincidence that these development occurred at this critical juncture of the liberation struggle as had happened earlier in Zambia during détente in 1974. It was now the turn of the young ZIPA commanders who had earlier foiled the détente machinations to make way for the nationalist leaders released by Ian Smith two years earlier.

The dismemberment of ZIPA fully revived the age old nationalist rivalry between ZANU and ZAPU. This transported the national liberation struggle to the pre-ZIPA days characterized by confusion within the ranks of the nationalist movement. Faced with the failure of the Kissinger proposals that were thwarted in Geneva in December 1976, yet more sinister plans were contrived in 1977. After ZIPA’s demise, content that its threat was no longer an obstacle to their diabolical manoeuvres, the imperialists came up with the half-hearted Anglo-American Proposals whilst Ian Smith was simultaneously hammering out an Internal Settlement agreement with some of the nationalists leaders. These twin diabolical manoeuvres are now casting a dark shadow over the development of the national liberation struggle at this critical stage. Plans for the installation of a neo-colonial puppet regime within the framework of the internal settlement agreement have now reached an advanced stage.

It is precisely at this critical juncture – when the development of the national liberation struggle is seriously threatened by the imminent successes of the imperialist manoeuvres to halt the revolutionary tide of the liberation struggle and deprive the people of Zimbabwe of their legitimate aspirations through the installation of a neo-colonial puppet regime – that we should carry out an exhaustive analysis of the Zimbabwean nationalist struggle with the aim of thwarting imperialist manoeuvres. It is now more than ever before incumbent upon all revolutionary forces to steer the national liberation struggle into its correct revolutionary orbit that will ensure final victory.

3) Character of the Zimbabwe nationalist struggle

The development of the Zimbabwe’s national liberation struggle from 1890 was traced in the preceding section against the background of a general analysis of Rhodesia’s social character. Special attention was given to the rise and development of African nationalism from passive reformism after the Second World War through active reformism to the current militant reformism.  This was done to facilitate the comprehension of problems confronting the nationalist movement, since most of its weaknesses are deep rooted with a long history, having been inherited from the earlier stages of the nationalist struggle. Without such a background, the weaknesses of the nationalist movement can neither be appreciated in the proper historical context nor can African nationalism be viewed in its totality as a phenomenon embracing various stages of the struggle. Such an approach gives continuity to the development of African nationalism and enables the consideration and evaluation of the current phase of nationalism in relation to the preceding developmental phases. It also makes it possible to make a correct and objective appraisal of the weaknesses of the nationalist movement which cannot be considered in isolation from the earlier weaknesses of the movement.

The transition of the national liberation struggle from reformism to militant nationalism is evident in that the struggle is no longer being waged within the framework of a constitutional process, but has now assumed the form of armed struggle. As nationalism forms the general context of the liberation struggle, it is of paramount importance to examine its nature and impact on the struggle. Whatever problems beset the national liberation struggle cannot be divorced from the general context of African nationalism.

Militant nationalism in Zimbabwe today takes the outward form of advanced nationalism or as it were revolutionary nationalism, but on closer examination, it reveals itself as conservative, narrow and bourgeoisie in essence. The outward revolutionary projection of African nationalism is based on the external nationalist propaganda couched in progressive and revolutionary ideas that conform to an anti-imperialist stance that seeks to identify with the world struggle against imperialism. This is based on the nationalist posturing of waging a genuine national liberation struggle to overthrow national oppression and restore the democratic rights of the people of Zimbabwe. The African nationalists further maintain that the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe is under the influence of proletarian ideology and has the basic interests of the workers at heart. They also avow that the basic contradiction in Zimbabwe can only be resolved through armed struggle.

This is what constitutes the phenomenal appearance of militant nationalism in Zimbabwe today, giving the impression of revolutionary nationalism. However, this outward appearance does not give the correct reflection of the essence of African nationalism in Zimbabwe which is essentially conservative, narrow and bourgeois in content. For the convenience of revealing the essence and content of militant nationalism the major features of the nationalist movement will now be examined. This will entail the evaluation of the nationalist movement’s fundamental approach to the question of national liberation, its political programme, political line and its organisational principles and leadership

Nationalist approach to the political problem in Zimbabwe

To begin with, the Zimbabwean nationalist struggle was and is based on a faulty foundation that emanates from a subjective analysis of the Rhodesian society. The subjective analysis is indicative of the nationalists’ inability to thoroughly grasp the character of the struggle to be waged and to chart out the revolutionary course to guide the national liberation struggle. It is only through an objective appraisal of the character of society that the nature of the liberation struggle to be waged can be correctly determined, that a political programme commensurate with the scope of the liberation struggle can be drawn and that a correct political line to guide the struggle can be formulated.

The principal error that arose from the nationalists’ subjective analysis of the character of Rhodesian society was the perception of the foreign element as the principal feature of white domination in Rhodesia, which then overshadows the need to struggle resolutely against the domestic forces of reaction under the guise of settlerism. This led to the erroneous strategy of directing efforts at the British Government “the legal colonial power” to the neglect of resolute struggle against the Smith regime. An attempt was made to correct this error at the beginning of the 1970’s but most regrettably the hangover continues to haunt nationalist politics in Zimbabwe to the extent that the overall political strategy of the nationalist movement takes into account Britain’s prominent role in any negotiated settlement.

An earlier analysis of the social character of Rhodesia demonstrated that that it is the racist white settler community that is the de facto political force in Rhodesia and not the British Government whose role continues to be exaggerated out of proportion. The continued assigning of a prominent role of the British Government in any negotiated settlement is fraught with serious consequences for the national liberation struggle. It is completely at variance with a consistent revolutionary approach to the national liberation struggle and leaves a loophole through which the imperialists will continue to manipulate the nationalist movement through deceptive and treacherous schemes that seek to provide a neo-colonial settlement in Rhodesia. This same loophole also serves as safety valve for pressure outlet for the racist white settler minority whenever the pressure of the liberation struggle becomes unbearable.

Any sober analysis of Rhodesian society which takes into account the reality of racist settler domination clearly reveals that basing the liberation strategy on Britain’s responsibility as the colonial power in Rhodesia, other than for purely diplomatic consideration of tactical significance only, is a futile exercise which in the final analysis militates against the genuine and thoroughgoing liberation of Zimbabwe. Given such a loophole, the British Government will always be in an excellent position to prevent with relative ease a complete military defeat of the Smith regime by diverting attention from the armed struggle to political negotiations at all critical junctures of the struggle as she is assured a prominent role at all times. This places the British Government in strategic position to forestall the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the people of Zimbabwe for which precious blood has already been sacrificed. So long as this loophole remains, the genuine liberation of Zimbabwe, which can only come through the complete and total seizure of political power, will never be realised and all the war cries of the nationalist movement will lose revolutionary significance and degenerate into empty sloganeering. The dangers of a counter-revolutionary hijack of the revolution will become more material with each stride in the liberation war.

In this sense, the age old weakness of the nationalist movement has not yet been rectified but has only been slightly mitigated by changing only in form but not in content. This fundamental weakness of the nationalist movement stems from a subjective analysis of the character of the present day Rhodesian society. It can therefore only be rectified by an objective and scientific analysis of the social character of Rhodesia which will reveal the essence of racist settler oppression. Without grasping this simple fact, the scope of the liberation struggle will continue to be limited and it will neither realize its full dimension nor attain its lofty objectives. The threat of a neo-colonial settlement will continue to loom over the heads of the people of Zimbabwe.

Another important feature of the Zimbabwean nationalist struggle that emanates from the subjective analysis of the Zimbabwean society is the counter-posing of African nationalism against White nationalism. The black nationalists directed the efforts of their struggle to Britain in total disregard of the reality of the white settler factor. The White settlers on their part also directed their struggle for “independence” within the context of settler domination to Britain. This resulted in the emergence of two parallel nationalist movements in Rhodesia, one black and the other white. The Black nationalist movement to all intents and purposes discounted and dismissed the white nationalist movement as inconsequential.

The source of two nationalist movements in the same country lies in the unique character of the British colony of Rhodesia which had two racially segregated mutually exclusive racial groups one black and the other white, each with its own brand of nationalism. The two communities felt independently affiliated to the British government and held that government responsible for them. The white community felt dependent on Britain but at the same time claimed the right, as a superior race to rule over the Africans whilst the Africans also felt dependent on Britain but sought the right from the British government to rule over the whites as they were the rightful owners of the country. This dichotomous political situation arose out of the complicating settler factor in Zimbabwe’s colonisation that had the blessing of the British government.

Whilst the two nationalist movements directed their struggles to Britain, the reality on the ground was that here were two political armies that to all intents and purposes were poised against each other. Given this reality, and the entrenched white settler rule and its economic interests based on capitalism, it becomes ludicrous to conceive of genuine liberation that could result from counter-posing African nationalism against white nationalism both of which are bourgeois in essence.

Substituting African nationalism for white nationalism in a country with an entrenched capitalist socio-economic order will not result in the genuine social and national liberation of the people of Zimbabwe and the concomitant socio-economic transformation that will buttress that liberation. It will only result in a change in form but not in content. Besides, counter-posing African nationalism against white nationalism reduces the two to a mere racial struggle making both the African and white nationalists guilty of racism. The only correct solution in the given circumstances is to counter-pose a revolutionary struggle that transcends the bounds of African nationalism against white nationalism. Unlike Zimbabwe, Britain’s other African colonies did not have the complicating white settler factor. This left African nationalism directed at the British government and its surrogate rule in their countries. Their nationalism had no racial connotations since it championed the legitimate demands of the African people to free them from British colonial rule and not from white settler rule.

It becomes obvious that in Zimbabwe’s case, only a revolutionary struggle will provide the correct solution to the problem of white settler domination and bring about the requisite transformation needed to attain genuine national and social liberation of the broad masses of the people of Zimbabwe. Only a genuinely revolutionary struggle can effectively combine the displacement of the racist and reactionary white minority rule with the revolutionary transformation of Zimbabwean society. As far as the Zimbabwean liberation movement, as it currently stands is concerned, it is a purely nationalist movement that is completely incapable,  by its very nature, of carrying out a radical  transformation of the Zimbabwean society, the only guarantee for genuine  and sustainable liberation. The best it can achieve is substitution of black for white nationalism within the context of rabid capitalist development which only serves to perpetuate the bondage of the people of Zimbabwe.

The moment the need for elevating the nationalist struggle to a revolutionary struggle is realised, the more obvious it will become that genuine liberation of the people of Zimbabwe can only be guaranteed by a relentless armed struggle given the prevailing political circumstances. Without the realisation of the need to elevate the nationalist struggle onto a revolutionary orbit, the revolutionary significance of the armed struggle will not be fully appreciated. A peaceful settlement of the Zimbabwean political impasse at this stage can only serve the interests of nationalism and never transcend the limits thereof to achieve revolutionary transformation of society. It will leave the existing socio-economic order with its attendant structures and institutions; the bedrock of our oppression, intact. The revolutionary forces in the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe should firmly grasp this point. Only consistent and thoroughgoing revolutionary action can bring about genuine national liberation and the social emancipation of the heroic people of Zimbabwe.

In the first place, the white settler regime cannot stand on its own feet economically; it has to be propped by imperialists, without whose support it cannot survive as Rhodesia is still a fledgling capitalist formation. It similarly follows that any African nationalist government cannot ever hope to attain economic independence and would inevitably be forced to rely on imperialist support for economic survival if it rests on the same capitalist foundation bequeathed to it by the racist regime.  Any nationalist government resting on the same capitalist foundation would have to be dependent on imperialist support for economic and political survival, culminating in a neo-colonial situation. Such a course of events would be inevitable as long as the path of revolutionary armed struggle is not adopted and pursued to its logical conclusion. All indications at present are that even an armed struggle within the context of nationalist politics will not realize complete victory because the nationalist struggle appears bent on crowning the armed struggle with peaceful negotiations as the consummation of the liberation struggle.

The problems bedeviling the Zimbabwean nationalist movement are rooted in the subjective approach of nationalism to the quest for liberation. This subjective approach constitutes the foundation that determines the political programme, the political line and the strategy and tactics of the nationalist struggle. Whatever flaws characterise the political programme and political line as well as the strategy and tactics of the liberation struggle, they are merely a reflection of the weaknesses and shortcomings in the fundamental approach to the liberation struggle that is rooted in the subjective appraisal of the domestic and international alignment of forces against genuine liberation.

The political programme of the nationalist movement

Of fundamental importance to any revolution or liberation struggle is its political programme which reflects the essence of the revolutionary process. The political programme of a political movement serves to state the basic aims and objects of the struggle and outlines the central goals of the revolution and the means of fulfilling them in the light of the domestic and international socio-political situation. It follows that without grasping the social character of the society undergoing revolution, the nature of the revolution or struggle to be waged in order to effect revolutionary change cannot be correctly determined. Neither can a political programme corresponding to the prevailing socio-economic situation be drawn.

With respect to the political programmes of the nationalist organisation in Zimbabwe, they define national independence as the goal but stop short of a deep social analysis that would facilitate the articulation of the basic political demands in clear and concise terms. The programmes state in general terms about overthrowing settler minority rule and replacing it with a socialist oriented Zimbabwe where the political rights of all Zimbabweans will be guaranteed. The political programmes are replete with glowing Marxist-Leninist terms mechanically transplanted from Marxist literature completely out of touch with the social realities in Zimbabwe. The nationalists plagiarise Marxist literature in order to feign themselves Marxist revolutionaries whereas in reality there are pseudo-revolutionaries. This is a fashionable trend among the petty bourgeoisie.

The political programmes of the Zimbabwean nationalist organisations know of no maximum or minimum demands of the struggle and closely resemble election manifestos of western political parties. They are basically aimed at hoodwinking the broad masses of the people into supporting one or the other of the prominent nationalist organisations. They are designed more to impress the broad masses and the progressive international community than reflecting the basic demands of the liberation struggle. Where sections of the programmes correspond to the needs of the struggle other than the demand for national independence, it is more a question of coincidence than design. In the majority of cases, the nationalists themselves do not fully understand the actual meaning of the decorative Marxist terms interspersed in their political programmes.

It simply will not do to state only in general terms about the interests of the people and the aims and objects of the struggle. They have to be spelt out in clear and concise terms if the conscious support of the masses is to be won and their enthusiastic participation in the struggle guaranteed. The basic demands of the liberation struggle should emanate from the concrete needs of the people and not mechanically borrowed from other revolutions and struggles. Furthermore, the respective stages of the struggle should be clearly outlined and so should the demands corresponding to the stages of the revolutionary struggle. These are the basic requirements for the formulation of a scientific political programme that accords with the objective needs of a revolutionary struggle.

As the situation stands, the Zimbabwean nationalist movement lacks such a programme and has as its fundamental political documents the so called policy statements and programmes that are no more than stereotypes devoid of revolutionary content that corresponds to the objective situation in Zimbabwe. This is typical of petty bourgeois nationalists and betrays their half-hearted commitment to the revolutionary struggle. These nationalists are insincere to their Marxist pronouncements and lie in ambush waiting for an opportune moment to hijack the revolutionary struggle and lead it along the bourgeois path. What they actually aspire and strive for is to step into the shoes of the white settler minority and continue to exploit the broad masses in pursuit of their selfish ends and insatiable avarice. But they are careful not to reveal their true nature to the people and instead masquerade as revolutionaries during the course of the struggle.

The political line of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement

Given the absence of a sound political programme, it is little wonder that the nationalists lack a correct basic political line required to lead the liberation struggle to total victory. In the absence of a correct political line, a clear distinction between friends and foes of the revolution cannot be made nor can the broad masses of the people be firmly united behind a common political programme that leads the struggle. It is the revolutionary organisation’s political line that should define the nature of the revolution, its tasks, objects, targets, perspectives and the motive and leading forces of the revolution.

Without a clear understanding of these cardinal aspects of a revolutionary struggle, that constitute the fundamental question of any revolution,  a political organisation will at worst  indulge in senseless unnecessary sacrifices of the revolutionary forces and grope about in the dark, staggering from blunder to blunder. On the other hand, without grasping the nature and scope of the revolution to be undertaken and the laws governing it, without grasping its tasks, targets, perspectives, the motive and leading forces, engaging in a revolutionary struggle will at best be an exercise in trial and error without any objective basis for the proper subjective direction of the struggle. Victory will be difficult to achieve under such circumstances and neither can the revolutionary struggle be thoroughgoing and the danger of defeat and hijacking the struggle will continue to haunt the liberation movement.

For the nationalist movement, the nature of the revolution to be waged has not been completely defined and is in the least clearly understood by the nationalist leaders. Only the objective of national independence has been clearly articulated. As for the task, the targets, the motive forces, scope and perspectives of the struggle, they are either half known or unknown or have been left to posterity to define. Notwithstanding the revolutionary Marxist terms that abound in the political literature of the nationalist movement, it is difficult to imagine whether they have at all grasped the fundamentals of articulating a correct basic political line required to guide the struggle to complete victory.

All indications are that otherwise they have only a rudimentary idea of the need for revolutionary political line or have no idea at all as to what it entails. An analysis of the nationalist movement confirms this assertion. The nationalist movement is characterised by incessant splits, power struggles, antagonisms and hostilities between various political factions, rivalry and competition in diplomatic activity aimed at the total exclusion and paralysis of sister organisations, misdirection of efforts to political infighting within the movement, superficial and divisive organisational and propaganda work among the masses, degeneration into the parochial pursuit of tribal interests etc.

The foregoing weaknesses that bedevil the nationalist movement are a clear manifestation of the absence of a correct general political line to guide the struggle. They constitute a political syndrome symptomatic of political immaturity and political degeneracy; a reflection of political undernourishment that only serves to confirm the assertion that the Zimbabwean nationalists either have only a rudimentary idea of the requirements of leading and waging a successful revolutionary struggle or have completely no idea of what a revolution is. It is definitely not a dinner party as some experienced revolutionaries have stated.

It would appear that the guiding principle of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement is the pursuit of personal and clique power and not the attainment or revolutionary ideals. As far as the nationalists are concerned, national independence and liberation can only be conceived of within the context of the political domination of a given political clique and not otherwise. Innumerable cases are ample testimony that the nationalists regard political guise as a matter of expediency  pertinent to the pursuit of power that can be freely traded with another when convenient, without regard to the fundamental aims of the struggle, as long as the guise serves the objective of gaining political dominance  for the individual or related clique. There are numerous examples of the nationalists switching from one political platform overnight to the other purely out of power considerations. The political stance of nationalist cliques can never really be taken for granted as it is subject to modification according to the prevailing circumstances of the power balance, and influence within the nationalist movement and the power configuration in the future independent Zimbabwe.

In the light of these characteristics of the nationalist movement, where the general political line is governed by considerations of pursuit of personal power, it would be ridiculous and intellectually dishonesty to give prominence to talk of the existence of a sound and objective basic political programme that could steer the liberation struggle to complete victory. The unhappy chapter of political divisions, squabbles and power struggles since the emergence of African nationalism in Zimbabwe, is eloquent testimony of the absence of such a line to guide the struggle. Political opportunism and naivety are characteristics of Zimbabwe’s brand of African nationalism which in turn reflects the superficial character of the nationalists’ degree of political and national consciousness.

The political blunders that have been committed by the nationalists thus far border on being politically reactionary. Their only redeeming feature has been keeping the flame of nationalism burning in the hearts and minds of the people of Zimbabwe. Otherwise, the nationalists would have been worthy of total condemnation as they are now more of a liability than an asset to the liberation struggle; their leadership is virtually now holding the liberation struggle to ransom  on account of the pursuit of personal and clique power.

The organisational features of the nationalist movement

The Russian leader Lenin said that organisation is the strongest weapon for the working class in its struggle for political power. The same applies to any oppressed people who rise up in struggle for their emancipation. Any oppressed people who wish to overthrow oppression have no alternative but to organise themselves into a revolutionary movement and rise up in struggle for their liberation. It is only through organised activity that the revolutionary consciousness of the people can gain full expression and be transformed into a formidable political force capable of overwhelming the enemy. Without organisation, the consciousness of the masses and their revolutionary feelings against the enemy cannot be harnessed and into a dynamic force capable of defeating the enemy. Organisation lays a solid basis for victory. It facilitates the coordination of the forces against the enemy and guarantees the smooth development of the people’s struggle thereby making victory a reality.

It is critical that the forms of organization and the organisational line of a revolutionary movement correspond to the objective conditions obtaining in the country. This enables the movement to meet the demands of the revolution and facilitates the accomplishment of these twin lofty tasks of overthrowing oppression and transforming society.

The question of organisation remains one of the thorniest problems arresting the development of the   Zimbabwean liberation movement. The nationalist organisations are controlled by the petty bourgeoisie which determines their organisational form which is essentially bourgeois. The nationalist organisations are founded on bourgeois organisational principles and attuned to a bourgeois style of work that militates against the development of the liberation struggle. Their organisational features are out of touch and discordant with the objective situation as they are best suited for bourgeois parliamentary struggles. Though they pose as political parties, they are nothing more than mass organisations with a heterogeneous class composition. Technically speaking, a political party can only be an organisation with a definite class character that serves as the nucleus of its class and has the class as its base. A political party is a product of class struggle and an instrument of class struggle in the service of a given class. All this is quite at variance with Zimbabwe’s nationalist organisations that are masquerading as political parties.

The nationalist organisations have an amorphous character without organisational rules or strict discipline binding all the members. Consequently, they lack internal cohesion and organisational solidity which are indispensable conditions for a revolutionary vanguard to steer the national liberation struggle to victory.  Internally, the nationalist organisations lack uniformity, standardisation and unity in political outlook and political action. This renders them vulnerable to infiltration and manipulation by enemy forces that capitalise on the internal disunity and confusion to sow seeds of further discord and derail the revolutionary course of the liberation movement.

The nationalist organisations, being petty bourgeois in character, lack a mass character. Their leadership of the liberation struggle has stifled the initiative of the masses who, lacking a proper political orientation, are left at the mercy of the politically misguided leadership of the nationalists. No thoroughgoing and painstaking work is done to organise and educate the masses and train a core of cadres to serve as the backbone of the liberation struggle.  Consequently, the majority of the members of the nationalist organisations are inexperienced and lack theoretical and practical guidance, have a low political consciousness and are incapacitated to carry out effective political and agitational work among the people. They lack a firm grasp of the content, direction and perspectives of the revolution which in essence should form the basis for organisational work among the people. Given this reality, it becomes evident that neither the full weight of the nationalist organisations nor of the masses themselves can be thrown into the struggle against the enemy. The conscious participation of the masses cannot be realised either.

Another particular feature of the nationalist movement is the lack of organisational continuity and coordination between the guerrilla forces and inside the country and the masses inside the operational zones. This stems from the absence of the political and organisational link at the local level between the internal branches of the externally based nationalist organisations and the guerrilla forces. The link between the internal and external wings of the nationalist organisations only exist at the national level and not at the local level casting doubt on the existence of underground structures of nationalist organisations at the grassroots level. Furthermore, the guerrilla fighters do not set up internal branches of the nationalist organisations in the operational zones.

As a result, in the absence of organisational continuity between the guerrilla fighters and the internal organisations of the nationalist organisations the national liberation war cannot realize its full potential and the full expression of its popular character on the one hand and the internal branches of the nationalist organisations (if at all they exist) cannot serve as organs of the national liberation war. It is the internal branches or local party committees that should eventually replace the reactionary organs of settler power in the countryside and serve as the organs of the people’s revolutionary power with the responsibility to support national liberation war effort in defense of the revolutionary gains of the peoples’ struggle to overthrow settler oppression.

The organisational weaknesses that characterise the nationalist movement also find expression within the nationalist armies as well. It will be recalled that nationalist armies emerged in the course of the development of the nationalist struggle to become the principal form of struggle in the quest for national liberation. Though the nationalist military wings are organisationally dovetailed into their respective parent organisations at the political level, they are regarded as organisationally distinct from the nationalist organisations themselves without party structures being present in the armies. In other words, the fighters of the nationalist armies are not technically card carrying members of the nationalist organisations themselves except at very highest level.

The nationalist armies are taken as instruments in the service of the nationalist organisations and not as extensions of the parent organisations. In contradistinction to revolutionary armies elsewhere, the nationalist leaders have not extended the nationalist organisation’s structures into their military wings by setting up party branches and political committees within the armies. Consequently, the broad masses of the fighters are in reality not politically interred into the nationalist organisations. They have no say in the political affairs of the organisation and are not consulted in the decision making machinery nor can they ever hope that their views could prevail within the nationalist organisations.

Organisationally therefore, the masses of the fighters are not members of the nationalist organisation, they are members of the nationalist armies. This reduces them to the level of bourgeois armies that are apolitical. It is only the leading cadres that are so to speak politically integrated into the nationalist organisations. Unlike the broad masses of the guerrilla fighters, they have a say in the affairs of the organisations at the political level. In a revolutionary situation such relations between the army and the political organisation are ironic and can only be counter-productive; as the denial of democracy to the guerrilla forces fighting for democracy sows seeds of discord that could give rise to political instability within the organisation. Politically, the army, as the instrument in the service of the nationalist organisation should be imbued with the political line of the parent organisation. However, the fighters are given only the minimum of political education required to make them loyal and faithful instruments of the leadership. Beyond this, further political education is discouraged as it could lead the fighters to interrogate the political line of the nationalist organisations and bring their leadership under scrutiny.

All revolutionary political literature is anathema to the nationalist leadership and considered to be subversive as it might influence and incite the fighters to rise against authority. The cases of earlier Cuban trained guerrilla fighters within the nationalist armies are eloquent cases in point. However, out of historical circumstances, given the West’s aversion to armed struggle, the nationalist organisations had no alternative but to develop friendly relations with socialist countries. The nationalists recognised the need for military violence to influence political developments within Rhodesia, but without support from the West, they themselves lacked a military background without any military know how whatsoever. This left them with no other option but to turn to the East. This entailed sending their fighters to socialist countries for military training where they came into contact with Marxism-Leninism. This is how the seeds of revolutionary ideology were sown into the ranks of the nationalist fighters. All that was left was their germination.

Though revolutionary ideas are incompatible with the world outlook of the nationalist leaders, they have no choice but to tolerate the presence of these revolutionary seeds amongst their fighters as the price they have to pay for getting military assistance from the socialist community. The best they can hope for, is to progressively and timely weed out revolutionary elements who are perceived to be a challenge or a threat to their authority.

Consequently, though the nationalist fighters are under the political and organisational leadership and influence of the nationalist leadership, ideologically the guerrilla fighters were exposed to a Marxist – Leninist world outlook at variance with that of the nationalists. In the course of time, this ideological outlook develops to the point of influencing the organisational and political views of the guerrilla forces. This inevitably sets the guerrilla forces on a collision course with the nationalist petty bourgeois political leadership. With the latter lacking a correct general political line and the requisite military know how this contradiction will eventually develop to hamper the qualitative development of the national liberation struggle itself.

Furthermore, the restriction of internal democracy within the ranks of the nationalist armies inevitably becomes a hotbed of tension within the nationalist organisations with the stringent internal organisation within the guerrilla forces limiting the combat effectiveness of the army and arresting the initiative of the masses as there is no tolerance of alternative approaches. The military leadership with close links to the nationalist leadership decrees what has to be done and how.

It is self-evident that the organisational forms and characteristic of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement fetter the development of the liberation struggle politically and militarily. Without overhauling these organisational forms, principles and the organisational line governing the political and military activity of the nationalist movement, it will be difficult nay impossible for the revolutionary forces to unfetter the development of the liberation struggle hamstrung by these constraints. Political and military setbacks will continue to mount and blur the image of victory that is dimly looming at the horizon. Given the crafting of a correct basic political line and determination of the people to overthrow national oppression, the organisational line of the liberation movement will become the decisive factor in winning final victory. Waging the struggle without a sound organisational base will only serve to complicate the path to victory thereby unnecessarily protracting the people’s liberation struggle.

The Leadership of the Nationalist Movement

The leadership of the Zimbabwean nationalist organisations is an important element of the nationalist movement. In any revolution, the question of leadership is a key factor with an important bearing on the development and outcome of the revolutionary struggle. Leadership can influence the development of a revolutionary struggle quite independently of the maturation of the objective factors in the country of struggle. Even when the objective conditions are ripe for victory, leadership can be decisive in determining the fate of the revolution by leading it to complete defeat. Leadership acts as the nucleus for the subjective direction of the liberation struggle and plays an important role in influencing the development of the subjective factors of the revolution. Generally speaking, the leadership of a revolutionary struggle should be the embodiment and compendium of the ideological, political and organisational outlook of a revolutionary movement and should be reflective of the aspirations of the broad masses of the people and the basic aims of the struggle.

Experience has shown that the class composition as well as the political and ideological outlook of the leadership of a political movement is a reflection of the general orientation of the struggle and of the measure of the scope and degree of maturity of the subjective forces of the revolution with a bearing on the extent of the conscious participation of the broad masses of the people in the revolutionary struggle. The erroneous lines and views that sometimes characterise revolutionary movements are nothing more than a manifestation of the weaknesses and political immaturity of the leadership.

The struggle of ideas within the ranks of the leadership of a revolutionary movement are a manifestation of class struggle within it and expresses itself outwardly as a struggle between two lines, the struggle between correct and incorrect ideas with a bearing on victory or defeat of the revolutionary struggle depending on which side prevails. A close examination of the composition and personalities of the leadership of the nationalist movement will reveal the sources of its weaknesses.

It will be recalled that African nationalism in Zimbabwe began as a movement led by intellectuals and the petty bourgeoisie against racial inequality in the political, economic and cultural domains. Ever since that time, the leadership of the nationalist movement has remained in the hands of the African petty bourgeoisie and the emergent African national bourgeoisie. The nationalist movement began as a genuine movement embracing the entire spectrum of the social strata of the Africans.  African nationalists in Zimbabwe have been characterised by a number of opportunist tendencies. Opportunist trends particularly played a prominent role in attracting the petty bourgeoisie into the leadership ranks of the nationalist movement. Only a few elements of the petty bourgeoisie have been motivated by a genuinely patriotic desire into the ranks of the nationalist movement. Consequently, the majority of the petty bourgeois elements within the nationalist movement have an opportunistic character. This opportunism has given rise to the emergence of career politicians within the movement. Up to this day very few elements from the stratum of intellectuals, petty and national bourgeoisie have voluntarily joined active service within the liberation movement. The majority of them join the struggle in search and anticipation of political fortunes.

The preponderance of the petty bourgeois elements within the leadership ranks of the nationalist movement, with their half-hearted commitment to the revolution, explains the source of the subjectivist ideas and mistakes which plague the political and organisational lines and the ideological outlook of the nationalist movement. Furthermore, the presence of career politicians in large numbers within the leadership ranks explains the source of the incessant power struggles which is so characteristic of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement.

In common with the petty bourgeoisie elsewhere, the Zimbabwean petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals, the current helmsmen of the nationalist movement, share the same weaknesses. They display marked individualistic tendencies and are very subjective in their approach to problems of the revolution and look down upon the broad masses of the people whom they despise as being ignorant and backward. They show only half-hearted commitment to the liberation struggle, displaying excessive revolutionary zeal during moments of victory and hope but become downhearted and disillusioned in moments of despair and hardships, leading to their wholesale desertion of the liberation struggle at critical junctures. They are especially good at phrase mongering and sloganeering with often great disparity between what they preach and what they practice. They can only conceive of their active participation in the revolution within the context of their leading role and never in the position of the led.

Their opportunistic character, their subjective approach, and lack of faith in the masses of the workers and peasants, places the revolution in jeopardy, leading it through unpredictable vicissitudes engendered by their inherent weaknesses. This is particularly so given their leading role in the liberation movement. However, the weaknesses of the petty bourgeoisie, though they are an integral part of their class nature, are not beyond redemption. They can be gradually overcome through their integration with the masses and through their prolonged participation in an arduous struggle with the masses, sharing weal and woe with them and through acceptance of the working class ideology. Without fulfilling these basic requirements, they will continue to be a burden to the revolution, more so because of the leading positions they occupy.

With respect to the Zimbabwe nationalist movement, the petty bourgeois leadership has not met any of these basic requirements through which they could remold their world outlook and play a useful role in the liberation struggle. Because of their airs of superiority, individualistic tendencies, their subjective approach to the question of national liberation and their half-hearted commitment to the revolutionary struggle, the Zimbabwe petty bourgeoisie, the leading force of the nationalist movement, have not succeeded in lowering themselves to the level of the masses. They have not fully integrated themselves into the liberation struggle. Their aloofness from the struggle became especially manifest after leaps from the reformist and exclusively political form of struggle to a revolutionary struggle embracing both political and military forms of struggle. They lagged behind and failed to keep pace with the development of the struggle on account of their aloofness.

The political outlook and approach of the nationalist leadership has remained essentially reformist whilst the broad masses of the people and the fighters who have been actively engaged in the struggle all along, have acquired a revolutionary outlook and familiarised themselves with the military aspects of the struggle. The disparity in outlook between the nationalist leadership and the broad masses of the people and the guerrilla fighters has led to the alienation of the nationalist leadership from the revolutionary struggle and exacerbated the contradiction between the leadership’s subjective direction of the struggle and the objective course of the revolution.

With the leadership being divorced from the actual military struggle and the fighters and the masses actively participating in it, a common language no longer exists between the leadership and the fighters and the masses. Rather than taking timely and practical steps to rectify the situation by lowering themselves to the level of the masses and fully integrating themselves into the struggle, the nationalist leadership continues to look down upon the masses and despise military activity as cumbersome, inferior and beneath their dignity. They overemphasise the division of labour between political and military work in order to justify their non-participation in military training and operations. They are unaware that in a revolutionary situation such as is prevailing in Zimbabwe, political and military affairs are inseparably bound together and constitute a single integral approach to the problem of liberation. It is imperative for all revolutionaries to familiarise themselves with both political and military affairs and be good at both if they are to fully grasp the laws governing the development of the revolutionary war and correctly handle the relationship between politics and military affairs in the course of the struggle.

Without a thorough grasp of both political and military affairs, one can hardly acquire an all-round conception of the revolution let alone lead one to victory. In the concrete revolutionary situation of Zimbabwe, where only the broad masses of the guerrilla fighters  have military know how, and are alone together with the rural masses actively engaged in the liberation war while the leadership has no knowledge of military art and is in practical terms completely divorced from direct involvement in the liberation war, it is difficult to even imagine how the direction of the struggle by the nationalist leadership could correspond to the war situation and create conditions conducive to the proper development of the national liberation war. In the circumstances, it becomes difficult to justify their positions as leaders of the revolution when they are actually trailing behind it.

The more the revolutionary war develops and gains in complexity, the less the positive role the nationalist leadership can play and the more they lag behind the pace of the revolution. Such a situation will inevitably exacerbate the disparity in revolutionary outlook between the leadership and the broad masses of the fighters giving rise to the potentially antagonistic relations between them. The uneven development of these political forces of the nationalist movement will eventually and inexorably lead to political differentiation within the nationalist movement. The moment the nationalists perceive the beginning of the process of differentiation, they interpret it as a threat to their authority and their grip on power and react by resolutely weeding out, isolating and neutralising all those fighters perceived as potentially threatening to their entrenched positions.

In order to further safeguard and consolidate their leading positions, the nationalist leaders invariably resort to tribalism so as to divide the ranks of the fighters and proceed to place candidates of their choice in key positions without regard to merit. These characters either happen to be tribally loyal to them or to be political sycophants seeking promotion through obsequious service and servility. The nationalist leaders resort to all sorts of corrupt practices in a bid to secure the loyalty of leading cadres especially the military. The majority of the hand-picked appointments chosen without any regard to merit, turn out to be ignoramuses without any political or military competence to write home about. The resultant depreciation and devaluation of the political and military leadership sets brakes to the momentum and development of the struggle culminating in inexorable political degeneration of the movement and the deterioration of the entire war effort.

Furthermore, the cognition by nationalist leaders of the scope of the challenge posed to their leadership by the emergent political and military cadres, armed with considerable leadership qualities acquired in the course of revolutionary practice, gives rise to capitulationist tendencies within the nationalist leadership. They consider the elimination of revolutionary elements to be only a stop gap measure that in no way guarantees the security of their grip on power. They begin to lose confidence in the future development of the armed struggle which they perceive as a hotbed of rebellion threatening their authority. In their opinion, prospects of an outright military victory would push military cadres to the fore and pave the way for their ascendance. A complete military victory becomes a nightmare spelling their political doom. In order to avert the unpalatable situation, to which they can never reconcile, the nationalist leaders become conciliatory in their approach to the liberation struggle and covertly wish and strive to strike an early compromise with imperialist powers.

They begin to prefer peaceful struggle and constitutional negotiations to a relentless armed struggle. In essence, the nationalists become political dualists. However, they take special care not to reveal their apprehension of a victorious armed struggle and their conciliationist posturing. Instead, they intensify revolutionary rhetoric outwardly while inwardly they wait in ambush for the seizure of a favourable opportunity to strike a compromise with the imperialists; the only guarantee for their continued relevance as political leaders. Such political behaviour on the part of the nationalist leadership is only but an expression of the weaknesses underlying their class nature and a manifestation of their lack of revolutionary thoroughness. It underscores their opportunist character and their unreliability as the leading force of the revolution.

The role that has been played by the petty bourgeois nationalists in the liberation struggle thus far has revealed the ideological, political and organisational inadequacies of their leadership. Their opportunist character leads them to aspire for leading positions. Their concomitant half-hearted commitment to the revolutionary struggle, their subjectivist and individualist approach to the struggle prevent them from integrating with the masses and actively participating in the struggle and more importantly from giving proper subjective guidance to the struggle. This makes it difficult for them to sum up their experiences and draw lessons from their mistakes and failures. Their inevitable consequent and subsequent alienation from the struggle gives rise to the political differentiation within the ranks of the nationalist movement discussed earlier, which culminates in the brutal suppression of progressive revolutionary elements desirous and capable of unfettering the revolutionary development of the national liberation struggle. These features of the nationalists, coupled with their class character and interests, disqualify them from the responsibility to lead the revolution and instead requires of them long and patient apprenticeship in the revolution under worker-peasant influence. This is the basic condition for overcoming their inherent weaknesses and transforming them into revolutionary activists.

Ultimately, the opportunism of the nationalist leadership and their lack of revolutionary thoroughness reveals itself in their proneness to compromise with imperialists. In view of the necessity the national democratic revolution to uninterruptedly develop into the socialist revolution, the ideological backwardness, political unreliability and organisational incompetence of the petty bourgeois nationalist leadership comes to fetter the uninterrupted development of the revolution. This brings into question the desirability of the continued petty bourgeois leadership of the national liberation struggle. The nationalist leadership is at this juncture confronted with two choices; either they conform with the laws governing the development of the revolution or they will be swept aside by the tide of national liberation struggle and get overtaken by events.

The brief examination of the fundamental aspects of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement relating to the fundamental approach to the question of liberation; the political programme; the basic political line; organisation and the problem of the leadership of the liberation struggle has revealed the content of Zimbabwe’s brand of African nationalism. On contrasting this content of African nationalism with its outward form typified by the struggle against national oppression, the struggle for the democratic rights of the people of Zimbabwe, all within the context of the world struggle against imperialism, it would appear that the liberation struggle is advanced in form but discordant with the content discussed above. It is revolutionary in form but narrow and short on content and inconsistent with a thoroughgoing revolutionary struggle.

The liberation struggle is strongly nationalistic in character and not aimed at transforming the social base of oppressive and exploitative relations in Zimbabwe.  In this sense, it stops short of being a revolutionary struggle. In as much as the nationalist struggle is not fundamentally aimed at transforming the social character of present day Rhodesia, and is at present not showing any signs to the contrary, it cannot but be bourgeois, conservative and narrow in content without any positive contribution to the world struggle against imperialism. The best that they could achieve is the removal of white minority rule in Rhodesia, which in itself is not enough as it only clears the ground for imperialist neo-colonialist designs in Zimbabwe.

Without a revolutionary and thoroughgoing transformation of present day Rhodesian society, Zimbabwe will never break free from the vicious network of imperialist control, plunder and exploitation. This militates against the highest interests of the people of Zimbabwe that find expression in genuine national liberation, complete sovereignty, and democratic rights in the realm of politics, the economy and culture. So long as the attainment of these lofty ideals cannot be guaranteed, the nationalist struggle will remain bourgeois, conservative and narrow in content in spite of peoples’ expectations to the contrary. The determining factor of the essence of the nationalist struggle is the class nature of the leading force of the nationalist movement that governs the development, scope and perspectives of the national liberation struggle. It should be borne in mind that the current struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe is nothing more than militant nationalism and has not yet developed to become a revolutionary struggle.

4) The general effect of nationalism on the national liberation struggle

Ever since the nationalist movement adopted armed struggle as the principal form of struggle at the beginning of the 1970’s, great progress and significant strides have been made in the quest for national liberation but the struggle has not achieved the objective of overthrowing white settler rule and attaining national liberation. Militant nationalism increased the Smith regime’s isolation and shattered the morale of the regime’s political and military forces to the point of losing confidence in the sustainability of white minority rule. It has weakened the country already crippled by the sanctions battered economy, over-taxed the regime’s manpower, won great sympathy and support from the international community, greatly aroused the enthusiasm of the broad masses of the people for national liberation, forced Ian Smith to resort to one political manoeuvre after another, and obliged the British Government to come up in desperation with one neo-colonial scheme after another but final victory remains elusive. Militant nationalism has managed to weaken the enemy and push him to a point of desperation without defeating him. It has only realized quantitative growth without the attendant qualitative development required to topple the enemy.

The major weaknesses of the nationalist movement discussed in the earlier sections of this work have played a decisive role in crippling the development of the national liberation struggle and have prevented the realisation of final victory. Consequent of these weaknesses, the national liberation struggle has now ground to a strategic stalemate where neither the Smith regime nor the liberation forces can hope for outright military victory. This situation enhances the possibilities of a neo-colonial solution to the problem of Zimbabwe’s struggle for independence. It has now become evident that, in as far as the further development of the struggle is concerned, nationalism has generally come to play a negative role that militates against the realisation of genuine national liberation. The following analysis makes this abundantly clear beyond any shadow of doubt.

Effect on the mass character of the liberation struggle

Political fragmentation and continued political bickering within the nationalist movement and the erroneous political line pursued by the nationalist leadership have constrained the national liberation struggle and prevented it from realising the full potential of its mass character. The revolutionary forces have been split behind various political factions resulting in the misdirection of their efforts that are now expended in faction fighting. In such an unfortunate situation the full weight of the broad masses of the people cannot be applied against the enemy nor can their deep hatred for settler oppression and the concomitant revolutionary enthusiasm be transformed into a material force capable of destabilising white minority rule. Furthermore, the dissemination of factional propaganda among the masses to the neglect of propaganda work against national oppression, retards the development of political and national consciousness of the masses and the fighters. Consequently the masses have failed to appreciate the significance of national unity.

The ideological importance of national unity has been blurred and forced into the background leaving the masses blinkered with a parochial approach to the question of national liberation. The erroneous political and organisational lines pursued by the nationalist organisations have limited the scope for mobilisation and organisation of the masses. As a result, the nationalist organisations have failed to draw large numbers of workers, intellectuals and the petty bourgeoisie into active participation in the liberation war.  The only exception has been the peasant masses and students who have been motivated more from patriotic desire into joining the ranks of the national liberation struggle.

The nationalist movements have thus far failed to control and exercise leadership over the broad masses of the workers, peasants, intellectuals and the petty bourgeoisie despite a formidable array of  mass organisations operating and existing legally in Rhodesia such as trade unions, teachers associations, youth movements to name but a few. They have failed to give political direction to these organisations and utilize them to support the war effort. Up to now, the broad masses of the people consider their role in the liberation war as being purely supportive and subsidiary to the guerrilla fighters. They have not yet been educated to understand that the national liberation war is a people’s war, their war. To them the liberation war is a war fought exclusively by the guerrilla forces but of course with their logistical support and assistance.  It is axiomatic to all revolutionaries that a revolutionary war is essentially a mass undertaking. Most regrettably, this has not yet dawned on the nationalist leadership. Broad and united participation of the masses in a revolutionary war is an indispensable condition for victory. To the extent that this is not realised in practice, military victory will continue to be an elusive distant goal beyond the reach of the nationalist movement.

Effect on the development of the war

The major weaknesses of the nationalist organisations discussed above find their concrete and material expression in the conduct of the national liberation war. On account of its highly dynamic and complex character and the concentrated activity associated with it, the liberation war effort serves as an ideal barometer for evaluating the maturity of the subjective forces of the revolution. The weaknesses of the nationalist leadership have become acutely manifest in their subjective direction of the liberation war. Their political immaturity, organisational incompetence and lack of military know how and the absence of a military line corresponding to the war situation in Rhodesia, have arrested the development of the national liberation war to higher and meaningful levels. The only developments that have been achieved to speak of are geographical coverage and quantitative growth. The war has stagnated and not gained in scope since its re-launch in January 1976. It has marked time at the level of scattered, isolated, sporadic and uncoordinated operations of a guerrilla character conducted by small units.

In the absence of a strategic plan, the war has virtually failed to develop to the stage of semi-mobile warfare and let alone mobile warfare proper. With the initial launching of guerrilla activity over an extensive and fluid front, the initial objective of guerrilla warfare of dispersing enemy forces and building of a large nationalist armed force have been adequately realised. However the effective weakening of the Rhodesian forces and the thoroughgoing mobilisation and organisation of the masses has not been accomplished with the attendant effect of the war remaining static and circling about the initial stage. This has exposed the guerrilla fighters and made them vulnerable to piecemeal elimination by the well-equipped Rhodesian forces. The problem is compounded by substandard and incompetent military commanders appointed solely out of loyalty considerations and not military prowess. In the circumstances, the guerrilla forces cannot give full play to their tactical and strategic advantages nor can they effectively implement elementary guerrilla tactics encompassing, ambushes, surprise attacks and sabotage warfare.

It would be wishful thinking to expect the war under these circumstances to develop to the stage of establishing liberated zones characterised by the liberation movement’s organs of political power within the country. The liberated zones should serve as the backbone for sustaining the war effort. It requires concerted, thoughtful planning and sustained military and political effort to attain this level of development. Without building a powerful army, without the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare, without the organisation of the revolutionary political power of the masses, it would be inconceivable to dream of establishing liberated areas as was the case in Vietnam and China. Equally, it would be inconceivable to hope for military victory without setting up liberated zones and organs of revolutionary power in the liberated areas as the guerrilla fighters will be deprived of a stable and reliable rear to serve as sources of manpower, logistical support and as the battlefield for annihilating the enemy forces in large numbers.

The four main pre-requisites for setting up liberated zones or base areas are:-

  • Strengthening the national liberation forces
  • Inflicting military defeats on enemy forces in the projected liberated zone
  • Arousing and organising the masses in the area
  • Setting up people’s revolutionary organs of political power.

None of these conditions have been fulfilled to satisfy the requirements of setting up liberated zones that would serve to consolidate revolutionary gains and serve as a launch pad for further attacks on the enemy.

It is a strategic weakness to rely exclusively on external bases in the neighbouring countries as this exposes the liberation movement to political pressure from their backers. If liberated zones are not established and developed, it will eventually become difficult to sustain the guerrilla operations on a large scale within the contested zones.

Given the erroneous political line of the nationalist organisations, full play cannot be given to the resourcefulness and creative potential of the broad masses of the people and the fighters in the liberation war. The people and the fighters have been oriented to rely wholly on foreign assistance.  Such an approach to the fundamental problems of logistical support for the war is counter-productive and completely at variance with the needs of a revolutionary people’s war which is essentially protracted and ruthless. This emanates from the enemy’s military strategic advantage given his superiority in arms and technical equipment. A revolutionary people’s war should be in a position to continue raging and gaining momentum even in the situation of a total blockade as exemplified by the heroic examples of the Soviet Union during the Civil War (1918-20), the people of China during their Anti-Japanese War of Resistance (1935-45) and the Vietnamese people during their War of Resistance against the French (1945-54) and against the military adventures of the US aggressors in Indo China up to 1974.

Without relying on their own efforts, the revolutionary forces cannot persevere in a ruthless, protracted and arduous struggle to win final victory. They should primarily rely on their own efforts, improvise, make and produce their own materials and equipment wherever and whenever possible and seize every opportunity to capture enemy weapons and materials to sustain the war. As the situation stands, the production of war materials and equipment by the masses and the fighters is not under consideration while capturing weapons from the enemy is anathema. The fighters and the broad masses of the people have not been educated to grasp the ideological importance of self-reliance while poor military art, lack of an indomitable spirit of fearing no sacrifice makes it difficult for the fighters to capture weapons from the enemy. The moment foreign assistance is not guaranteed; sustaining the liberation war will become difficult.

It requires intensive ideological and political education among the masses and the fighters to raise their consciousness to the level of understanding and appreciating the problems associated with a ruthless and protracted war waged by a small, weak and poorly equipped army against a strong and powerful enemy with the advantage of superior arms and technical equipment. Without grasping this point, the fighters and the masses will not appreciate the importance of relying on their own efforts and of fearlessly and artfully fighting against the enemy so as to capture his weapons and materials. The material efforts of the masses and the fighters should form the basis for victory in the national liberation war.

Another chronic problem bedeviling the development of the war is poor organisation and management of both the army and the war. This problem exists at all levels and in all aspects of work ranging from political to administrative work within the army and permeates all levels from the highest to the lowest. Basically, the root of the problem can be traced to inappropriate organisational principles of the nationalist organisations and their retrograde work style that has harmful influence in the army. There is widespread laxity in carrying out orders on the part of both the commanders and the fighters that stems from a low political consciousness and lack of a firm political and military discipline within the army. Generally speaking, most of the military cadres are incapable of formulating correct and effective plans for guiding and directing military work and combat operations.

In most cases, their approach to military problems is highly mechanical, dogmatic and stereotyped. Some of the military ideas are often based on foreign experiences that may not necessarily conform to the conditions in the country. Lack of practical experience and the requisite competence on the part of the senior commanders hampers the formulation of an independent general military line that corresponds to the concrete and particular circumstances prevailing in the country. Revolutionary experience elsewhere, has demonstrated that mechanically clinging to foreign military concepts, which may in some cases be already obsolete, brings great harm to the struggle. Only after the revolutionary forces have discovered the laws governing the development of their revolutionary war can they creatively apply the revolutionary experiences of other countries and further enrich the wealth of revolutionary experience and lead their revolutionary struggle to victory. Without such an approach, their revolutionary war will not make headway and will continue to be beset by seemingly insurmountable problems. The emergence of a correct military line can only come about on the basis of practical experience in the national liberation war itself.

As things stand at present, there is no active participation by leading political and military cadres in military operations. They prefer to direct the war from the shelter of offices in foreign countries. Furthermore, the supervision of the war and checking on the accomplishments of military assignments is very slack and has given rise to the anarchical development of the war. If progress is to be made in the national liberation war, both the leading political and military cadres of the liberation movement have to grasp the fundamentals of sound administration and practically engage in the military work so as to create an objective basis for their correct guidance of the war. This would help enhance their organisation and management skills not only of the liberation war, but also of the revolution in general and subsequently of the projected independent Zimbabwe.

Effect on the revolutionary transformation of society

All revolutionary struggles shoulder a twofold task: the destruction of the old society so as to pave the way for building a new one and the construction of a new social order on the basis of the destruction of the old society. These twin tasks are both complementary and mutually compatible and constitute an integral feature of all thoroughgoing revolutionary processes. They should permeate the revolutionary struggle from beginning to end. At the beginning of the revolution, the task of destroying the old social order is primary while that of building a new society will be secondary. However with the development of the struggle the two processes will come to be in equilibrium until finally the construction of a new social order overtakes that of destruction as the revolution marches on relentlessly to a triumphant outcome. After nationwide victory, the building of a new society will gain further momentum and be elevated to a higher plane, whilst that of destruction will persist for some time in a subordinate role in order to obliterate the remnants of the old social order. Such a process constitutes revolutionary transformation; the essential element of a genuine and thoroughgoing revolutionary struggle.

As the liberation war develops, the reactionary organs of state power should be destroyed and be replaced by the people’s revolutionary power. The new organs of the people’s revolutionary power should mark the beginning of social progress in the new society and initiate and direct the transformation of the old way of life into a new order. The transformation of the old society, should embrace the political, economic and cultural aspects of people’s lives. The broad masses of the people should become masters of their political destiny, occupy the commanding heights of economic life and foster unfettered cultural expression.

The political domination of the settler reactionary organs of power, the concentration of economic power in the hands of monopolies and domestic entrepreneurs and the cultural enslavement of the African people should be brought to an end and be replaced by a new popular and just socio-economic order that guarantees the democratic rights of the people by placing political power in their service so as to release and set in motion their creative and innovative potential. Such is a reflection of a thoroughgoing revolutionary process. However as things stand today, the nationalist leaders are either unaware of the need for such a revolutionary course or they are totally opposed to traversing such a thoroughgoing revolutionary course. There are no concrete plans for the subsequent transformation of present day Rhodesia other than overthrowing white minority rule. The broad masses of the people and the guerrilla fighters are not conscious of their role as builders of a new society, thanks to the erroneous political line pursued by the nationalist leadership. They only conceive of themselves as destroyers of the old society.

As the war develops inside the country, no efforts are being made to set up bases of people’s revolutionary power to serve as bastions and active agents in the transformation of the old society into a new one. The national liberation struggle remains unable to cross the threshold to develop into a revolutionary struggle that would lay a solid foundation of a new progressive social order. It remains merely a struggle with the exclusive objective of substituting Black nationalist majority rule for white minority rule. Such a struggle can by no means be termed a revolutionary struggle. It would be a misnomer to term it so as it remains a mere armed struggle  devoid of revolutionary content as the present struggle is not in a position to realise the lofty ideals of the national democratic revolution.

Even within the rear bases in the neighbouring countries, where the nationalist leaders have every opportunity to instill revolutionary ideas of the new society without hindrance, no effort has been made to imbue the fighters and the refugee population with the ideas of a new Zimbabwe. One would have expected the essentials of the new society to be reflected in the people’s daily lives within the rear bases where every opportunity exists to educate the fighters and the people on the kind of society that they are fighting and sacrificing for. No steps have been taken to even cultivate and develop revolutionary cadres to serve as the backbone for the construction of the new Zimbabwe. All the masses and the fighters know is that they are fighting to overthrow settler oppression. This is not enough.

The fighters and the masses should be educated to appreciate and understand that, whilst they are fighting to overthrow settler oppression, they are also simultaneously fighting to build a new society that guarantees all democratic freedoms and rights for all Zimbabweans without the exploitation of man by man. The struggle to build a new society is just as important as overthrowing national oppression. It is equally important for the masses and fighters to fully grasp the fundamentals of the struggle to create a new society as it is to grasp the methods of fighting to defeat the enemy, otherwise fighting loses its revolutionary significance and degenerates into a means of mechanically substituting one oppressive system for another.

So long as the basis for the new society is not firmly laid in the course of the liberation struggle, and the masses and the fighters are not educated to understand this, victory in the national liberation struggle will be devoid of revolutionary significance. It will be more difficult to commence building the new society after liberation as there will be great resistance from reactionary and retrograde forces. It will also be difficult to arouse the enthusiasm of the of the masses to support and actively participate in the  building of the new society and resolutely struggle against reactionary forces as they will lack the requisite political consciousness that they should have otherwise acquired in the course of the liberation struggle.

Worse still, commencing reconstruction only after nationwide victory is fraught with serious consequences for the survival of the revolution. That would pave the way for the defeat and hijacking of the revolution by opportunists, and pro-capitalist petty bourgeois elements within the ranks of the nationalist movement. These counter-revolutionary forces will capitalise on the ignorance and low political consciousness of the masses and the fighters to hijack the revolution and perpetuate the old system by stepping into the shoes of the former white minority oppressors to the detriment of the masses.

That is why it is of utmost importance to nurture and cultivate a strong backbone of revolutionary cadres in advance. The leading cadres would then spearhead the construction of the new society in the liberated zones and rear bases during the course of the struggle so as to ensure and invest in the security of the revolution and guarantee its uninterrupted development to final victory. Only such a revolutionary approach could frustrate all counter-revolutionary hopes by opportunist elements within the nationalist movement and help nip them in the bud. The people should become their own masters during the course of the struggle.

Fundamental and thoroughgoing reforms affecting people’s lives should be effected within the liberated areas in the course of the struggle. The reforms could take the form of self-defence units, the introduction of people’s democracy, equitable land re-distribution, fair exchange of commodities, setting up schools of a new type consistent with the revolutionary thrust. Such revolutionary activities will arouse and boost the enthusiasm of the masses to defend and consolidate the gains of the revolution and spur them to fight with greater determination and all conquering enthusiasm till final victory.

So long as the nationalist movement does not transform itself and develop into a genuine revolutionary movement, so long as the masses and the fighters are not educated  to understand the significance of transforming the old society into a new one, the thoroughgoing execution of the people’s national democratic revolution cannot be guaranteed.

Effect on expanding the scope of the struggle.           

One important effect of nationalism on the national liberation struggle is that it has prevented the utilisation of all forms of struggle in the quest for liberation. A revolutionary struggle is not an all out military struggle against the enemy. It is at one and the same time a political, economic, cultural and diplomatic struggle against the enemy. A truly revolutionary struggle is an integral form of all these aspects of the struggle. As long as these various forms of struggle are not well coordinated, integrated and woven into a single dynamic movement against the enemy, the path to final victory will be unnecessarily prolonged and needless losses and sacrifices will be sustained by the revolutionary movement in vain. Though armed struggle may be the principal form of struggle, it has to be supplemented and complemented by other forms of struggle if it is to realise its full effectiveness. Absolute reliance on the military struggle to the neglect of other forms of struggle is a leftist error tantamount to militarism and could bring great harm to the struggle. Revolutionary violence does not only compromise military violence but encompasses political violence as well.

In the course of a revolutionary struggle, armed struggle has to be supported by political violence which could take varied forms like protest marches, demonstrations and labour strikes.  The revolutionary movement should capacitate the masses to give full play to their initiative in the employment of political violence in support of the armed struggle. It should excel in organising and guiding the masses through ruthless exposure of the settler regime’s crimes against the people.  Political violence serves to push the enemy into the defensive politically, enhances his notoriety and increases his isolation internally and externally.  Political violence has been successfully employed in other victorious struggles with remarkable results especially in Vietnam where it was closely interwoven with the military struggle against the US aggressors and th  puppet regime in Saigon. Political violence is an important weapon in the hands of the oppressed and should continue to be a glorious tradition for the struggling masses of oppressed peoples who should further develop and enrich it with new creative experiences.

Economic struggles should also be closely aligned to and coordinated with political struggles in order to get maximum mileage in the fight against the enemy. Economic strikes can be effectively employed to paralyse the enemy’s economy and create favourable opportunities for the military defeat of the enemy by sowing seeds of economic confusion within his rear and nerve centers. Strikes that are isolated from the political struggle are ill-timed and inopportune and can achieve very little. Their effectiveness can be greatly enhanced by imparting a political character to them and coordinating them with the political activity of the masses.  Economic strikes that are well coordinated both with each other and with political violence can have a powerful impact on the enemy and contribute to exacerbating the general crisis within his ranks and facilitate his military defeat.

Furthermore, the revolutionary movement should be good at employing both open and clandestine forms of struggle and at utilizing both the legal and illegal forms of struggle. The liberation movement should employ all forms of struggle at its disposal and apply the maximum possible strength of the broad masses of the people in the struggle against the enemy. The utilization of diverse forms of struggle weakens the enemy and throws his forces into disarray and confusion and creates favourable opportunities for the effective use of the liberation movement’s principal forms of struggle.  Revolutionary forces should not only understand the importance of employing every means of struggle at its disposal, but should be good at implementing them to achieve maximum effectiveness.

The possibilities of utilising diverse forms of struggle in the national liberation struggle in Zimbabwe are great and limitless but little has been done to exploit them. The reasons behind this are the weaknesses, inexperience and incompetence of the nationalist leadership. The nationalists fervently pin all their hopes on the armed struggle as the sole form of struggle and hope that it will deliver victory on its own. This is a mistaken view with a negative impact on the struggle as it increases the human cost of the liberation struggle and prolongs the realisation of victory. The human cost to the liberation struggle could be mitigated by coordinating and supplementing armed struggle with other forms of struggle which in turn creates favourable opportunities for the accelerated development of the armed struggle and brightens prospects of victory.

Furthermore, the nationalist movement has failed to pursue a correct policy of disintegrating enemy forces and exploiting contradictions within the enemy ranks. It has already been pointed out that victory in the national liberation struggle is not dependent on military operations alone but on the combination with other forms of struggle as well. Besides, the other forms of struggle discussed above, disintegration of enemy forces also plays a contributory factor to defeating the enemy. It is of prime importance for the liberation movement to implement the policy of dividing and isolating the hardcore enemy diehards. This can be accomplished by employing correct political tactics such as giving lenient treatment to prisoners of war and carrying out propaganda work amongst the enemy forces and their supporters.

Currently, the nationalist forces pursue a hardline policy based on mass elimination of enemy agents and their dependents, indiscriminate victimisation of whites including missionaries, elimination of supporters of the Smith regime, adoption of a hostile attitude towards enemy forces as a whole without taking into account the class contradictions among them, intimidation of the masses into submission and the adoption of a militarist attitude towards the civilian population. All the erroneous practices are typical of the activities of the nationalist forces within the war zones.  Such malpractices do not only retard the development of the war but also alienate the people from the liberation fighters, hardens white feelings against a nationalist take-over, unites and closes the enemy ranks and offers an objective basis for undermining and discrediting the integrity of the liberation fighters in the eyes of the people and the international community.

These erroneous and decadent excesses play directly into the hands of the enemy and are capitalised on and fed into the enemy’s propaganda machine. They militate against the interests of the struggle and ultimately retard the development of the liberation war. So long as the liberation movement does not  pursue a correct  policy of  disintegrating enemy forces and winning  them over to their side in large numbers, closely aligning itself with the masses, distinguishing between diehard reactionary forces and the white population in general, dividing enemy ranks and isolating the diehards, the national liberation struggle cannot make rapid progress.

The successes that have been scored by the guerrillas on the battlefield have inflicted considerable losses on the enemy forces politically, militarily and economically. These losses have in turn given rise to contradictions and division within the ranks of the enemy. Rather than exploiting these contradictions that are a direct fruit of their efforts, the nationalist forces have set back with folded arms and continued to view the enemy as a monolithic granite block without a single crack in it. Such an attitude reflects political naivety. The nationalist leaders, enmeshed in power intrigues, fail to perceive these contradictions and cannot grasp the given opportunities which might persist for a long time before they eventually slip out and slide down the drain when the enemy makes belated amends.

The disintegration of enemy forces and the exploitation of contradictions within their ranks are both important weapons at the disposal of the liberation forces that can produce miracles when properly handled. Revolutionary forces in other countries have successfully utilised these weapons with marvelous results for their struggles.  Opportunities for disintegrating enemy forces and exploiting contradictions within their ranks are great and ever present awaiting exploitation by liberation forces.  Enemy forces, just like the nationalist forces cannot thrive without contradictions within their ranks. It however requires considerable political skill to identify and single out the contradictions for exploitation to own advantage. There is no doubt that the Smith regime itself practices the same policy towards the nationalist movement. Unlike the Smith regime that exploits such opportunities to its advantage, rather than utilising such opportunities and divisions within their own ranks and exploiting divisions within their ranks to the advantage of the enemy, the nationalists are experts at weakening their own ranks.

The Nationalist Movement and Imperialist manoeuvres

The struggle for national liberation waged by the people of Zimbabwe poses a direct threat to the economic interests of both the white settler minority and imperialist powers. Their determination to cling to political power is driven by the need to safeguard these economic interests. The victory of the national liberation struggle poses a serious threat to both the white settler minority and imperialist powers. In a desperate bid to ward off and neutralise the threat posed by the liberation struggle to their interests, they conceive diabolical schemes that aim at installing a neo-colonialist puppet regime in Zimbabwe that would safeguard their interests. They are especially concerned about the continued development of the armed struggle as this radicalises the masses that they want to continue exploiting and oppressing. Besides retarding the development of the national liberation, the nationalist leadership renders the liberation struggle vulnerable to manipulation by imperialists in the face of their feverish activity to safeguard their vested interests. The nationalists have proved to be readily gullible to deceptive manoeuvres by imperialists and have shown remarkable pliability to their neo-colonial designs.

The nationalist movement has suffered innumerable setbacks through the Smith regime’s diabolical machinations and imperialist sponsored neo-colonial schemes. Already, a significant section of the nationalist forces has lined up with the Smith regime in the so-called “internal settlement scheme”. This is a direct consequence of the weaknesses inherent in the nationalist movement that the Smith regime is exploiting with the support of its imperialist backers. Failure by the nationalist leadership to handle contradictions among themselves in the correct manner has exposed them to the enemy. The situation has now developed to dangerous proportions and poses a very serious threat of a neo-colonial settlement. It is thanks to the weaknesses of the nationalist movement that has made the liberation struggle conducive to imperialist machinations. The Achilles heel of the nationalist movement is its disunity on which the enemy forces have capitalised.

Whenever the nationalists sense imperialist manoeuvres in the offing, rather than fervently working on contingent counter manoeuvres, they patiently wait for the schemes hoping to exploit them to their advantage and propel themselves into power. Such a way of doing things is not good for the struggle and easily renders the liberation movement passive with complete loss of initiative and thereby seriously compromising the security of the revolution. Such an opportunistic attitude paves the way for hijacking the revolution and setting up a neo-colonialist puppet regime in Zimbabwe. The imperialist powers on their part are fully aware of the political impotence of the nationalist movement and of the great confusion rife within its ranks. They can afford to patiently work out their diabolical schemes with ease and self-assured confidence. The nationalist attitude of looking to Britain to broker a solution to the crisis is not helpful either. In a way Britain is made a reluctant referee in its own cause. The people of Zimbabwe fight hard for their liberation only to hand over the results of their sweat to Britain again. What amazing logic!

The brief appraisal of the general effect of African nationalism on the national liberation struggle and particularly the effect of the nationalist leadership reveals the negative role they are playing in the liberation struggle. It is evident that nationalism has now developed to become a fetter retarding the development of liberation struggle in a number of aspects. They have now reached their limit and exhausted their revolutionary potential and the best that they could do is to sustain the struggle at the current level without any prospects for further development. However, even the current stagnation is temporary and could with time decline into defeat if timely amends are not made. More importantly, the stagnation could be easily exploited by imperialist powers to further their neo-colonial designs for setting up a puppet regime in “independent” Zimbabwe.

Radical changes are necessary if the struggle is to develop further beyond the current stage of stagnation. To conceive of further development of the struggle into a revolutionary struggle capable of leading the struggle to final victory under the auspices of nationalist leadership would be a contradiction in terms given their retrograde essence. Clearly the development of the national liberation struggle into a revolutionary struggle cannot be realised within the context of the nationalist movement given its inherent chronic limitations.

The nationalist movement has made a great contribution to the national liberation struggle from the beginning but they are now at the deep end when it comes to transforming the liberation struggle into a revolutionary struggle. It has now overburdened itself with weaknesses that can no longer be rectified with an African nationalist framework. The demands of the liberation struggle have now outgrown its limits. Given the entrenched and deep rooted monopoly capitalist interests, there is need for a thoroughgoing struggle to achieve real victory. Only a sustained revolutionary struggle is the basic guarantee for the victory of the national democratic revolution in Rhodesia’s particular circumstances.

5) Transformation of the nationalist movement into a revolutionary mass movement

a) The emergence of revolutionary forces within the nationalist movement

As the situation stands, the Zimbabwe nationalist movement has reached the limit of its potential and is now gradually sliding into a negative role by fettering the further development of the national liberation struggle to the degree necessary for the attainment of final victory. It can no longer measure up to this responsibility and has demonstrated in practice that this task is beyond their ken thanks to its inherent weaknesses. The analysis of the social character of Zimbabwe has revealed that national oppression is based on a well-entrenched capitalist order which cannot be re-shaped to serve the interests of the people of Zimbabwe by reformist nationalism or the military struggle of militant nationalism. The forcible overthrow or peaceful replacement of white minority settler rule will in itself do nothing to change its socio-economic base, the real root cause and source of national oppression, exploitation, domination, dehumanization and all other kinds of sufferings of the people of Zimbabwe.

Settlerist oppression and imperialist plunder of our resources are inseparable from the capitalist order prevailing in Rhodesia. It requires nothing short of thoroughgoing and dynamic revolutionary action to overthrow the settler minority oppression and simultaneously transform the social base of that dehumanising oppression. This is the minimum requirement and basic guarantee for genuine national liberation and the complete realisation of the people’s democratic rights. This calls for the transformation of the nationalist movement into a revolutionary mass movement with a thorough grasp and mastery of the laws governing revolutionary struggles to accomplish this lofty task. Thorough mastery of the laws and ideology governing revolutionary struggles will enable the revolutionary mass movement to maintain its bearings in the course of an arduous struggle amid the maze of social contradictions and machinations characteristic of an oppressive system.

The transformation of the nationalist movement into a revolutionary mass movement has become a necessity if the challenges of the national liberation struggle are to be met and complete victory is to be assured. The incapacity of the nationalist movement to promote the further development of the struggle necessitates the emergence of a revolutionary force capable of steering the liberation struggle to final victory. Such a force is already present in embryonic from within the womb of the nationalist movement; its period of gestation is rapidly coming to a close with the objective conditions for its maturation already ripe. The active participation of the fighters in the struggle and their intercourse with the revolutionary experiences of other people’s struggles gave rise to the emergence of the embryonic revolutionary forces within the liberation struggle. It comes about as a product of struggle and is historically determined by the circumstances of struggle and expresses itself outwardly as uneven political development within the nationalist movement. The uneven political development polarises the political forces within its ranks thereby laying a concrete basis for the subsequent transformation of the nationalist movement.

The polarized political forces within the nationalist movement coexist peacefully for some time, but in the course of the struggle, a point is subsequently reached when they can no longer exist in harmony and promote the further development of the struggle. The relations between the two poles come to a head when on the one hand, the old guard nationalist political forces can no longer cope with the struggle and fail to direct its further development in the required direction and on the other, when the emergent political forces gather in strength and for all practical purposes no longer exclusively rely on the old guard leadership in the prosecution of the war. At this stage, the uneven political development precipitates a crisis. The old guard nationalist leadership begins to fetter the development of the struggle whilst at the same time, the emergent revolutionary forces are filled with revolutionary enthusiasm and become intolerant of the stagnation of the struggle and fervently desire to carry it to its logical conclusions.

The struggle between the old guard nationalist political forces and the emergent revolutionary forces is an inevitable process in the course of the development of the nationalist movement and the national liberation struggle. It arises from the heterogeneity of class forces within the nationalist movement and from the circumstances of struggle that bring the class contradictions of the diverse political forces within the movement to the fore. The crisis within the nationalist movement can, at this point in time be defused by the peaceful transformation into a revolutionary movement with the emergent revolutionary forces gaining the upper hand or it may develop into open antagonism which can only be resolved by precipitate revolutionary action. The revolutionary transformation of the nationalist movement cannot be expected to be a spontaneous process devoid of subjective direction. It can only come about as result of conscious effort. Subjective forces can play an active role in the transformation process by either accelerating or retarding it.

Though it is historically inevitable, the objective course of the transformation of the nationalist movement develops independently of the will of subjective forces. In this regard, it is incumbent upon the emergent revolutionary forces to bring their efforts into correspondence with the objective conditions if they are not to suffer unnecessary losses and setbacks.  From a historical point of view, the subsequent triumph of the emergent revolutionary forces is inevitable.  However, they may suffer defeats and setbacks, not because their ideas are incorrect, but because in the balance of forces engaged in the struggle, they may not be as powerful for the moment as the forces of reaction. They may therefore be temporarily defeated but are bound to triumph subsequently, sooner or later. Their subsequent victory over the forces of reaction is historically determined when the objective conditions have ripened.

b) The revolutionary vanguard

The scenario of the revolutionary development and transformation of the nationalist movement into a revolutionary vanguard discussed above may be specifically applicable to nationalist movements that have a heterogeneous class character and are currently locked in protracted liberation struggles against endogenous, colonial or imperialist forces of oppression during the era characterised by the integration of national liberation struggles into the worlds struggle against imperialism and the general decline and retreat of the forces of imperialism into a defensive shell the world over. With specific regard to the revolutionary transformation of the nationalist movement into a revolutionary vanguard, three schools of thought have emerged as possible routes to the transformation.

The first school, with strong adherents within the ranks of the nationalist forces, does not view the current stagnation in revolutionary development of the national liberation struggle as a crisis point for the nationalist movement itself. They regard it as a temporary setback emanating from the shortcomings of the current leaders of the nationalist movement. They assert that the shortcomings of the current leadership are not beyond redemption and continue to be optimistic of bright prospects of the liberation struggle within the context of the nationalist movement with all its attendant weaknesses.

The second school, with strong adherents within the fighting forces, views the current crisis as signaling the complete failure of the nationalist movement and any other projected political forms that lack a definite class character. With particular regard to the situation in Rhodesia, they consider all mass movements without a class character as outmoded and not up to the task of accomplishing a thoroughgoing revolution in Zimbabwe. They assert that the crisis in the liberation struggle is a reflection of the sharpening of the contradiction between labour and capital in Rhodesia. In their view, such a contradiction can of necessity only be resolved by a proletarian party and not by a mass movement. For the national liberation struggle to achieve victory, they argue, it should be brought under the leadership of a proletarian vanguard.

There is yet another school of thought, the third, also with strong adherents within the fighting forces, which views the current stagnation in the development of the national liberation struggle as being engendered by the decadence of nationalism which they say has outlived its days. However, unlike the second school, they don’t view the stagnation as a reflection of the maturation of the contradiction between labour and capital in Rhodesia. While taking note of the great level of the contradiction between labour and capital, and acknowledging its profound effects on both the objective and subjective factors in Rhodesia, and while further acknowledging the important role of the working class in the liberation struggle, they assert that it is not only still possible but that it is the only correct route to continue waging the struggle within the context of a heterogeneous mass movement that transcends the limits of moribund nationalism. They regard the call for the emergence of a proletarian party as adventurous and premature at this point in time given the prevailing alignment and relative strengths of class forces at present.  They view the emergence of a revolutionary mass movement as the necessary next stage in the liberation struggle in the light of the prevailing political situation.

Advocating the formation of a proletarian party would only serve to alienate the revolutionary forces from the masses, split up the motive forces of the national liberation struggle and reinforce the ranks of the enemy, thereby rendering the struggle vulnerable to defeat. The adherents of this school therefore advocate for the transformation of the liberation movement into a revolutionary mass movement as being appropriate and not into a proletarian vanguard.

c) The case against the formation of a proletarian vanguard

The third school of thought, that has quite a considerable following amongst the fighters, appears to offer the only viable alternative to the continued stagnation of the liberation struggle. Before examining the nature of the proposed revolutionary mass movement envisaged by this school, it is necessary to clarify its position further in relation to second school. The arguments against the first school have been adequately dealt with in the main body of this treatise.

The emergence of a proletarian vanguard is considered premature for a number of important and valid reasons that have to be fully taken into account before embarking on that path. Though the working class in Rhodesia, like its sister proletariat elsewhere is endowed with immense leadership potential and has an historic duty to deliver humanity from oppression, it cannot stand as a viable independent political force at this point in time for a number of reasons. Primarily, capitalism in Zimbabwe has only realised a low level of development as yet. It only took root in Zimbabwe at the beginning of this century and its pace of development has been retarded by monopoly capital which regulates the development of capitalism in accordance with its needs and interests. Monopoly capital takes special care to reduce competition from domestic capital so as to prevent the duplication of industries catered for by its subsidiaries elsewhere.

Though the capitalist socio-economic order is well entrenched in Rhodesia, it has not had much time to produce a sizeable force of workers. The working class is still numerically small and inferior to the relative strengths of the working classes in advanced capitalist countries where a strong proletarian contingent exists. The numerical strength of the industrial workers in Rhodesia is still far below a million and therefore still weak to constitute a viable and independent political force. Furthermore, the Rhodesian working class is still unorganised and more of “a class in itself “than a “class for itself”.  It still has not seriously embarked on an economic struggle to improve working conditions and fight for its rights not even to talk about a workers movement worthy of significance. Trade union organisation is still embryonic and caters for the interests of a small section of the working class in Rhodesia.

Before the Zimbabwean workers present themselves to the stage of history as an independent revolutionary force, they first should organise themselves as a class. Their consciousness has to be aroused and their aspirations channeled into a workers movement with a definite form. It is only after the workers movement has assumed a definite form that it can be linked with the struggle for socialism. As the situation stands today, there is neither a workers movement nor a movement for socialism of any significance.

Besides, there are several other factors that still militate against the constitution of the Rhodesian workers into an independent political force. They have as yet not been steeled in struggle. They lack experience in class struggle especially in comparison with the working classes elsewhere where strong proletarian parties have emerged. They have never participated in economic struggle on a wide scale where they could have gleaned the requisite experience. Very few major strikes have been staged in Zimbabwe and still less have produced significant results. In the absence of experience in class struggle, the workers of Zimbabwe have no other school than to actively participate in the national liberation struggle to acquire the requisite experience in struggle. They should actively participate in the liberation struggle to steel themselves and acquire a revolutionary outlook. Furthermore, the Rhodesian workers still have a very low cultural, literacy and technical level when compared to the petty bourgeoisie. A high cultural and literacy level is an important asset in class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The working class parties in other countries make great efforts to acquire high cultural and literacy endowments.

Additionally, the current alignment of forces militates against the emergence of a worker’s party at this point in time. Firstly, the broad masses of the people are not receptive to proletarian revolutionary ideas at this stage because of the prevalence of a strong wave of anti-communist propaganda propagated by the Smith regime that depicts the guerrilla forces as communist agents. Any dissemination of communist revolutionary ideas will simply play into the hands of the enemy and result in the alienation of the freedom fighters from the masses. This would serve to complicate the development of the struggle and diminish the prospects of victory. Secondly, careful note should be taken of the relative strengths of the petty and national bourgeois elements within the ranks of the liberation movement. They are currently its leading force and therefore constitute its backbone though the workers, peasants and students are the main motive forces.

True to its class nature and interests, the Zimbabwean petty bourgeoisie is not enthusiastic for socialism and instead wishes to inherit, albeit in modified form, the present socio-economic base in Zimbabwe. Overlooking the relative strengths of the nationalist and petty bourgeois forces and their leading role with the nationalist movement, their ideological orientation and vested interests and proceeding to organise a proletarian party regardless of the strength of their aversion to it, will not only split the liberation movement but could also result in an ill-fated liberation project.

At the current stage of our struggle, the national democratic revolution, and the specific circumstances and nature of our struggle, national unity is indispensable and should be tirelessly striven for by all revolutionary and patriotic forces rather than be thrown into jeopardy through reckless and shortsighted ultra-leftist tactics. Such an approach would not only bring about the danger of defeat for the liberation struggle but would also be counter-productive to the cause for socialism. The national democratic character of the liberation struggle is determined by the tasks of that struggle which are to overthrow national oppression by the white settler minority as a guise of British colonialism and restore the peoples’ democratic rights in the realm of politics, the economy and culture.

The task is not to overthrow capitalist relations of production and capitalist private property. Such a task would require a socialist revolution that resolves the contradiction between labour and capital. But the principal contradiction underpinning Zimbabwean society today is not that between labour and capital but that of the political domination of the black indigenous people of Zimbabwe and British colonialism under the guise of white settler minority rule. Therefore, from a purely political technical point of view, calling for the working class to form a political vanguard and lead the liberation struggle within the context of the struggle between labour and capital would be tantamount to calling for a proletarian socialist revolution in Rhodesia which does not correspond to the social character of Rhodesia at present.

The weaknesses of the Zimbabwe working class discussed above militate against their constitution as an independent political force. What is called for at this point in time is an alliance of the working class with other progressive and patriotic forces that are in favour of fighting for genuine national liberation that restores the people’s inalienable rights. That alliance should take the form of a revolutionary mass movement that will consummate the national democratic revolution. Without such an alliance, the working class, having no organisation of its own, lacking the requisite revolutionary experience and aptitude and being extremely fragile at this stage, cannot hope to emerge as an independent and viable political force capable of leading the revolutionary struggle without the close cooperation of the other progressive forces in Zimbabwe. It is therefore imperative for the revolutionary and progressive forces to reconcile themselves to this reality and actively work for the emergence of a revolutionary mass movement.

d) The revolutionary mass movement

The basis for the emergence of the revolutionary mass movement has already been laid within the nationalist movement as has already been discussed. The projected mass movement should take the form of a political front of all social classes and strata of the oppressed masses of Zimbabwe. The envisaged revolutionary transformation and development of the nationalist movement into a revolutionary liberation movement should be ideological, political and organisational. This would ensure all round transformation of the nationalist movement and the birth of revolutionary mass movement rich in revolutionary content. The mass movement should be the driving force of the national liberation struggle and guarantee the complete overthrow of national oppression and the concomitant restoration of the people’s sovereignty and democratic rights in a thoroughgoing consummation of the national democratic revolution.

e) the ideological plane

Ideologically, the revolutionary mass movement should be imbued with and fall under the guidance of a revolutionary ideology. In the struggling third world countries and dependent colonies, the principal contradiction characterising their societies is the struggle between the broad masses of the people on the one hand and colonialism and imperialism that takes the form of monopoly capital on the other and not that between socialism and capitalism. However, the struggles for national liberation of the oppressed masses of the world is inextricably linked to the struggle for socialism in a sense as both are struggling against capital with the former locked in the struggle against monopoly capitalism in the form of imperialism and the latter against capitalism in general.

Without the support from the world forces of socialism, the struggles for national liberation against the forces of colonialism and imperialism cannot be thoroughgoing and without the guidance of their revolutionary experiences genuine victory cannot be a reality. The revolutionary experiences of the forces for socialism give solid guidance to struggles for national liberation that enables them to correctly handle and resolve the maze of social contradictions that characterise the oppressive system obtaining in Zimbabwe in the face of imperialist manoeuvres and intrigues designed to derail national liberation struggle and hijack it into neo-colonialist settlements. However, although the revolutionary mass movement might draw freely from the experiences of successful struggles of socialist countries, that does not elevate or equate it to a communist or socialist party of the proletariat.

The revolutionary mass movement differs from a party of the proletariat on the one hand in that:

i) It has a mass character and has no definite class character in contrast to a workers’ party

ii) It has as its goal the attainment of thoroughgoing and complete national liberation and not the establishment of a socialist state. The focus of its struggle is colonialism and imperialism, monopoly capitalism and not national capital and differs from the nationalist movement in that:

iii) It falls within the revolutionary orbit of consistent anti-imperialism and wages a resolute struggle against imperialism and is not confined to narrow nationalism

iv) It spearheads a struggle that is genuinely an integral part of the progressive world’s struggle against imperialism

v) It has as its content the ideal of transforming the Rhodesian state complete with its institutions and attendant structures into a new Zimbabwe reflecting the will and serving the interests of the majority of its formerly oppressed people and not just the form which typifies nationalism bent on substituting white with black nationalism.

vi) In other words, the revolutionary mass movement would have an enriched content of anti-imperialist struggle in comparison to a nationalist movement. It also assumes a revolutionary internationalist standpoint in practice which materially links it to the struggling masses of the people the world over.

The foregoing ideological content of the projected revolutionary mass movement distinguishes it from moribund nationalism on the one hand and the party of the proletariat on the other. It is this ideological outlook and thrust that enables the revolutionary mass movement to lead the national liberation struggle to complete victory. Such an ideological outlook capacitates the liberation movement to timely expose and frustrate all imperialist maneuvers, rally all progressive forces within the country against the enemy and march in step with revolutionary forces elsewhere in the struggle against imperialism. It is the primary duty of progressive forces within the liberation movement to cultivate this revolutionary ideology amongst both the masses and the fighting forces. In the final analysis, it is the ideological awareness of the masses and the fighters that lays a concrete basis for the revolutionary transformation of the nationalist movement.

f) political plane

Politically, the liberation movement should undergo the revolutionary transformation to become the revolutionary vanguard to lead the national liberation struggle through a complex and tortuous political course to final victory. To rise up to the occasion, the revolutionary mass movement should craft a revolutionary political programme, formulate a correct basic political line to guide the liberation struggle on the basis of an objective appraisal and understanding of the concrete situation in Zimbabwe and lead the broad masses of the people in struggle for their national liberation. The political programme and the basic political line should be a reflection of the objective laws for the development of the national liberation struggle in Zimbabwe.

The brief social analysis of the situation in present day Rhodesia made earlier, basically determines the course of the revolutionary struggle to be followed in order to resolve and sweep away the principal contradiction underlying the Rhodesian society. From it follows that the national liberation struggle in Zimbabwe is for the exclusive purpose of overthrowing national oppression and bestowing the democratic rights of the people of Zimbabwe. Herein lies the national democratic character of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. The liberation struggle is national because it overthrows national oppression, democratic because it bestows the hitherto suppressed and stifled democratic rights of the people of Zimbabwe, revolutionary because it is transformational in nature as it destroys the old oppressive system and replaces it with a new progressive social order. Overthrowing national oppression and bestowing democratic rights are thus two sides of the same coin in Zimbabwe’s national democratic revolution. They together constitute an integral feature of the national democratic revolution in Zimbabwe.

The primary task of the national democratic revolution is the liberation of the people of Zimbabwe and the attainment of full democracy and not overthrowing capitalist relation of production i.e. the task of the socialist proletarian revolution. As already discussed, the full appreciation of the objective course of  development of the revolution in Zimbabwe in the light of  the contemporary world situation should form the basis of the movement’s revolutionary programme and the formulation of the general political line to guide the liberation struggle to victory. Both the immediate and higher objectives of the liberation struggle should be taken into account the respective stages of the struggle clearly stipulated and the requirements of the struggle at each stage clearly defined. A revolutionary political programme that charts out and maps the whole course of the liberation struggle should be consistent with this approach. The liberation movement should fully mobilise the broad masses of the people to unite behind the revolutionary programme whose realization is their duty.

Corresponding to each of the principal stages of the liberation struggle, the liberation movement should draw up a minimum and maximum programme that clearly defines the political content and limitations of the respective stages. Corresponding to each of the stages of the struggle, the mass movement should also formulate a basic political line to lead and guide the success of the respective stages. The general political line of each stage should clearly define the nature, task, motive and leading forces, the targets and perspectives of the revolutionary stages. The general political line should serve as the political means of all the policies and tactics adopted in the course of the struggle against the enemy.

It is the task of the liberation movement to educate the people to understand the full content of the national democratic revolution. It is the task of the national democratic revolution to totally and thoroughly overthrow white minority settler domination and completely restore the democratic rights of the people. The revolutionary forces should actively and resolutely lead the broad masses of the people and the fighters in a relentless struggle against the erroneous political line of the old guard nationalist leadership. They should seize every opportunity to influence the political line of the liberation movement so as to consolidate its transformation into a revolutionary movement. They should spare no effort to mobilise political forces for the transformation process. The revolutionary forces should pay constant attention to enhancing their ideological outlook, strengthen their ideological unity and elevate their political consciousness to the level of grasping all the important aspects and problems of the national democratic revolution. This would put them in an ideal position to influence the revolutionary transformation of the liberation movement in the correct direction.

The revolutionary forces should pay special attention to educate the broad masses of the people and the fighters to understand the significance and importance of national unity within the liberation struggle. They should fully appreciate the negative role of the current political fragmentation within the liberation movement which for opportunist reasons is ascribed to presumed differences in political and ideological outlook. All attempts to perpetuate the factional existence of nationalist organisations should be ruthlessly exposed as reactionary and retrogressive and be opposed resolutely. The principal victims of disunity are none other the masses themselves whose emancipation would be unduly prolonged with precious efforts and sacrifices being misdirected to serve narrow partisan interests.

All the Zimbabwean nationalist organisations have identical class composition which precludes grounds for the presumed “irreconcilable ideological differences” and “incompatible political approaches” between organisations that have the same class character and are fighting for the same goal. In essence, all these organisations are alike with a pronounced petty bourgeois character.  Consequently, there is no justification whatsoever for an antagonistic relationship between them, especially during this important stage of national liberation. It is therefore necessary and important for the revolutionary forces within the liberation movement to close ranks and join hands in the resolute struggle for both the unification and revolutionary transformation of the liberation movement. These two lofty tasks are equally important, mutually reinforcing and complementary to each other. They can be realised ether simultaneously within the liberation movement or successively. Efforts should be put in both directions simultaneously in order to achieve maximum results.

With regard to the revolutionary transformation on the political plane, the process should culminate in the emergence of a revolutionary vanguard capable of making a clear distinction between friend and foe and uniting the broad masses of the people in the relentless struggle against the enemy and leading it to complete victory.

g) the organisational plane

Organisationally, the leadership and composition of the revolutionary mass movement should reflect its revolutionary content. To give expression to its revolutionary content, the organisational line of the movement should be based on the tried and tested mass line and the principles of democratic centralism. Organisationally, it should be composed of elements from the working class, the peasantry and revolutionary intellectuals as its main motive forces with a revolutionary core as its vanguard. Sections of the national and petty bourgeoisie should also be part of the motive forces although they cannot be firmly relied on to persevere and prosecute the struggle to complete victory.

There should be a significant swing within the leadership ranks in favor of revolutionary elements from the working class and progressive intellectuals. Class origin, political background, revolutionary experience and competence should be the key criteria for leadership within the transformed liberation movement in contradistinction to decadent nationalist practices where leading cadres are appointed on the basis of ethnic compatibility, social status, family background, academic qualifications and political servility.

True revolutionary leaders are a product of struggle: they develop and get transformed through struggle, and get tested and steeled in the course of the struggle. The transformed liberation movement should strictly adhere to this revolutionary principle and desist from giving responsibility to individuals without or having little experience. They might not persevere in times of hardship and could let down the struggle and desert at critical moments when the going gets tough and becomes unbearable for them. The revolutionary struggle is full of twists and turns and revolutionary movements are advised to shape their leadership accordingly. All leading cadres should be equal to their responsibilities and promote the development of the struggle and not become a hindrance to it.

The leadership of the transformed liberation movement by progressive and revolutionary elements is fundamental and the basic guarantee for consolidating and maintaining the revolutionary character of the movement. Without this leadership, the thoroughgoing execution of the national liberation struggle cannot be guaranteed and the danger of hijacking the revolution will be ever present.  Revolutionary elements should persevere in the struggle and display revolutionary qualities fearing neither hardships nor sacrifices so as to establish themselves as the leading force and be worthy of that historic role. Revolutionary elements from progressive classes and social strata especially the working class, the peasantry and revolutionary intellectuals who prove themselves in the struggle not to be narrow-minded and not to be careerists or opportunists but to be reliable and dependable should be promoted into positions of responsibility. This is a question of fundamental importance of the revolution as it is the basic guarantee for retaining and maintaining the revolutionary character of the liberation movement.

So long as careerist and opportunist elements continue to occupy leading positions within the liberation movement, its revolutionary transformation will be greatly retarded. If the revolutionary transformation does eventually materialise, and opportunists continue to occupy leading and key positions, the revolutionary character of the liberation movement will not be guaranteed and the danger of a relapse into the retrogressive past will remain material. It has already been shown that petty bourgeois elements are currently at the helm of the liberation movement. This however should not be interpreted to mean the need for their wholesale riddance to ensure a smooth transformation into a revolutionary movement. The replacement of undesirable elements should be phased out till the balance is eventually shifted in favour of revolutionary elements. So long as there is an effective critical mass of revolutionary cadres within the ranks of the liberation movement, the revolutionary character of the movement can be guaranteed.

In addition to strengthening the organisational representation of revolutionary elements within the liberation movement, the revolutionary mass movement should adhere to correct organisational principles and adopt a democratic style of work that gives full play to the initiative, resourcefulness and creative capabilities of the broad masses of the people and the fighters. A democratic style of work enhances the revolutionary character of the liberation movement and serves to motivate both the masses and the fighters to participate in the liberation struggle with heightened enthusiasm.

Without the adequate organisational representation of revolutionary elements within the leadership ranks of the liberation movement, and without a sound organisational line to give expression to its revolutionary character, the transformation of the liberation movement in the ideological and political planes would lose its purpose and significance. It is critical to have strong organisational representation of progressive and revolutionary elements within the leadership ranks of the liberation movement so as to give material effect to the ideological and political transformation of the movement.

The emergence of a revolutionary vanguard capable of leading the currently stalled national liberation struggle to its logical conclusion can only come about as a result of transformation of the nationalist movement ideologically, politically and organisationally as discussed above. Without embracing these three pivotal aspects, the transformation of the liberation movement will be incomplete and the continued development of the liberation struggle in the right direction cannot be guaranteed. It is incumbent upon the revolutionary forces to actively and consciously accelerate the transformation process. The continued development and transformation of the revolutionary forces themselves is an objective law of social development in the service of the cause of revolutionary forces. Since all political movements and political parties are themselves agents of social transformation it is important therefore for the revolutionary forces to employ the laws of social development in their service and achieve the transformation of the political movements and parties themselves to higher forms.

h) The Intensification of the National Liberation Struggle

The transformation of the liberation movement into a revolutionary movement is not an end in itself but a means to an end. It does not in itself provide magic solutions to the thorny problems of the national liberation struggle. All it does is to release the subjective forces capable of giving proper direction to the struggle. Once the liberation movement has undergone revolutionary transformation, the stage will have been set for the further development of the liberation struggle and its intensification to win final victory. The revolutionary transformation of the liberation movement and unification of the political forces create an objective basis for the intensification of the liberation struggle politically, militarily and diplomatically. While putting emphasis on the armed struggle, the liberation movement should strive to coordinate to the maximum possible all forms of struggle at its disposal and give full play to the initiative, resourcefulness and creative capabilities of the masses so as to create favourable conditions for victory.

Taking advantage of the excellent domestic and international situation, which is decidedly in their favour, the revolutionary forces should escalate the struggle in the military, political and diplomatic spheres. The white minority regime is in disarray, the broad masses of the people are desirous of genuine liberation, with the progressive international forces doing their best to frustrate the neo-colonial manoeuvres for the so-called internal political settlement engineered by the British and American imperialists. This is an excellent opportunity for intensifying the liberation struggle. The liberation movement should strive to increase the isolation of the forces of reaction internally and externally by employing the correct revolutionary tactics. It should arouse the masses to rise up against the enemy in their millions and extensively mobilise the progressive international forces to render all possible assistance to the struggle.

While hoping for foreign assistance, the revolutionary forces should spare no effort to rely on the resourcefulness of the broad masses of the people and the fighters to come up with novel improvisations to support the struggle. The liberation movement should regard foreign assistance as only serving the purpose of creating a material base for self-reliance, and for the promotion of self-reliance in the prosecution of the struggle. The liberation movement should utilise every opportunity to train a large army of political and military cadres to serve as the backbone of the revolutionary struggle. The cadres should be educated to understand the theoretical problems of the revolutionary struggle so as to capacitate them to lead the masses and the fighters to victory in the struggle and in the creation of a new progressive Zimbabwe. They should grasp that a revolutionary war is a war of the masses that can only be waged by fully mobilizing and organizing the masses and relying on them.

The military cadres should have a thorough grasp of the theoretical problems of the national revolutionary war and military administration and organisation. They should actively apply their theoretical knowledge to the concrete conditions of the Zimbabwean struggle. They should continuously sum up their experience in the war and elevate their subjective ability to direct the development of the war from the current guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare. The fighters should be given broad and varied military training ranging from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare and specialized technical training in the use of advanced military equipment.

The liberation movement should, on the basis of sound political training of both the commanders and the fighters, adherence to self-reliance, material assistance from fraternal countries intensify the struggle to establish revolutionary base areas in the form of liberated zones. Once established, these revolutionary base areas should give effect to the popular character of the liberation war and serve as the organs of national liberation. Particular attention should be paid to the establishment of these zones of liberation as they enable the liberation movement not only to give full play to its superiority but to apply their full strength against the enemy and guarantee the retention of the initiative even in the face of political or military hardships.

So long as the liberation movement has its own secure base areas it will be in a position to pursue an independent policy and retain the initiative even in the face immense pressures from any quarter and successfully smash one imperialist manoeuvre after the other. The establishment of these revolutionary base areas is therefore an indispensable condition for political and military victory and the basic guarantee for the independence and initiative of the liberation movement.

Furthermore, the establishment of liberated zones gives the liberation movement the opportunity to give material effect to its revolutionary policies. The character of the liberation movement will be easily judged from the policies and the actions it pursues in the liberated zones. The masses will be in a position to judge for themselves whether the liberation movement is for their genuine empowerment and liberation or for their continued exploitation and oppression. Liberated zones are in a sense, the material expression of the triumphant march of the liberation struggle.

6) Conclusion

The situation in Zimbabwe is currently characterised by the stagnation and profound confusion within both the ranks of the enemy and the liberation movement. It has developed into a political and military strategic stalemate. In the face of possible defeat by the liberation forces, the racist Smith regime has come up with an internal political settlement scheme with the support of the British and American imperialists. This is a diabolical scheme to Zimbabweanise the war and entails splitting up the ranks of the nationalist forces. The objective of the so-called Salisbury Agreement is to install a neo-colonial puppet regime in Salisbury with a superficial transfer of power to black puppets and real power remaining in the hands of the racist white settler minority Smith regime.

The internal settlement scheme falls short of satisfying the political aspirations of the broad masses of the people of Zimbabwe and hence is doomed to fail. However, the liberation movement is facing a severe test given frantic efforts by imperialist forces to prop up the puppet government in Salisbury. Sadly, the Patriotic Front now spearheading the liberation struggle is failing to exploit the current confusion in the enemy ranks and deliver decisive blows to paralyse the diabolical scheme. The nationalist movement is hamstrung by disunity, competition and instability within the nationalist organisations themselves. These weaknesses stem from the nature of the nationalist movement itself which is conservative and narrow in its approach to the struggle. The confused situation within the nationalist movement does not bode well for the future and holds gloomy prospects for the national liberation struggle and is potentially fraught with serious political consequences for the people of Zimbabwe.

Wilfred Mhanda was often known by his nom de guerre, Dzinashe Machingura, acquired during the war against the white settler regime in Rhodesia in the 1960s. He was born on 26 May 1950 and he died on 28 May 2014. He was a commander within the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and became a trenchant opponent of Robert Mugabe’s during and after the liberation struggle; in post-independence Zimbabwe he remained a harsh critic of the new regime. He formed the Zimbabwe Liberator’s Platform which criticised Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) led government after the 2000 so-called Third Chimurenga. Mhanda’s book Dzino: Memories of a Freedom Fighter was published in 2011 and condemned by ZANU but recognised as a vital part of the critical and untold story of Zimbabwe’s fraught and problematic liberation. Unsurprisingly he was not conferred ‘hero’ status on his death in 2014.

South African Community Leader Murdered

compiled by Ashley Fataar

Transworld Energy and Minerals (TEM) is a South African company. It is a subsidiary of the Australian mining company, MRC Mineral Commodities. For several years TEM has been trying to mine titanium. Titanium is a metal that has both military and commercial uses. They want to mine it in a 22 kilometre stretch of coastal shoreline along the Eastern Cape province’s northern-most coast. TEM was granted mining rights for one of five areas in Xolobeni in July 2009. There were many objections to it on the basis that mining would destroy the ecology of the area and the livelihoods of the people who live there. On this basis the mining rights were revoked in November 2011.

In early 2015 TEM re-applied for the mining rights. The local community in the area and environmentalists were outraged. Realising that the local community would not move from their refusal to have their land turned into a mine, representatives from TEM decided to ignore democratic processes and use violence.

In May representatives from TEM (including company directors) visited the area supposedly to have door-to-door “discussions” with community members. It was discovered during this visit that they were in fact armed with machetes, clubs and guns. In the process of these “consultations” a 61 year old woman was stabbed in the arm and two men were shot and injured, one on the side of his head. Following a court application, an interim interdict was issued in May 2015 barring directors of MRC’s from bringing firearms into the coastal Amadiba communities.

The following month a community meeting reinforced the popular decision that no mining activity would be allowed in the land that they have lived on for centuries. But TEM was not prepared to accept this. The Amadiba Crisis Committee, which was formed to stop the mining venture in the area stated that the mining lobby had tried to access the proposed mining dunes by force – typically by trying to drive through road blockades mounted by the community – and that people are defending their land and livelihood.

TEM’s parent company MRC then began a campaign of lies. In November 2015 MRC began feeding lies to its share-holders in Australia. It claimed that a school had been built in Xolobeni for the community when in fact the local municipal council had blocked the building of the school claiming it was too expensive.

In a December 2014 report the Eastern Cape Department of Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism stated that “Surrounding communities are unanimous in their opposition to the mine, as it would require moving communities away from the area, destroying their livelihoods in the process, and potentially causing irreparable damage to the surrounding environment and curtailing any hopes of developing a viable ecotourism industry in the region over the medium to long term.” Yet MRC falsely claimed that the environmental impact assessment report was successful, i.e. no environmental damage would occur.

In further misinformation, MRC has claimed to have consulted the Chief (Lunga Baleni) and his family, when in fact the Chief was appointed as a director of Xolco – a partner of TEM. Lunga Baleni is not a Chief of Amadiba coastal but of Amadiba inland, a neighbouring area. According to the Amadiba Crisis Committee, MRC’s CEO Mark Caruso of MRC has support from friends and business partners at high levels of the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) and in the ANC. His connections have allowed him and the MRC to continue to operate in complete defiance of the law.

Realising that physical attacks were not enough, TEM then began with death threats. Early one Sunday morning in December 2015 shots were fired from a car towards the house of the Head Woman of the coastal Amadiba community, Cynthia Duduzile Baleni. On 18 December, a man with binoculars asked for the location of the Head Woman’s house and waited for her until dusk. The second shooting took place at about 01.00 on 21 December. A group of men were then observed searching for the Head Woman at her homestead. They went into the hastily evacuated houses and then fired two shots in the air, obviously in an effort to chase people out from where they were hiding.

In investigations, police discovered that Lunga Baleni was one of those who had taken part in a shooting in May 2015 when they tried to break through a community blockade. Baleni has also attempted to dismantle a community authority structure that has been in place for 70 years. Cynthia Baleni is the head of this authority.

Lunga Baleni has also issued several public threats to the Amadiba coastal community that violence would be used to ensure that MRC is able to mine. He is able to do this because TEM has openly stated that it only recognises Lunga Baleni’s authority. Further to this, Baleni now also represents SANRAL, a company that operates toll roads. The plan is to also open the area up to eco-tourism. Either way Baleni wins.

When death threats did not work, TEM then carried out the threats and moved on to more devastating measures. The chair-person of the Amadiba Crisis Committee, and a community leader opposed to the mining, Sikhosiphi Bazooka Rhadebe, was murdered in the early evening of 22 March 2016.

Sikhosiphi Bazooka Rhadebe’s assassins drove up to his house in a car with a blue light. Two people got out and knocked on the door’s house. They stated that they were policemen. When Siphokazi opened the door he was shot eight times in the head. His wife and young son, who witnessed the murder, are both in hospital with gunshot wounds.

Australian mining company MRC, its South African subsidiary TEM and the South African government, police and ruling party are all involved in this case. The Amadiba coastal community has released a statement stating that they still refuse to be intimidated into submission and appeals to democratic people to support their community and stand by them in this terrible moment.

This report was put together by Ashley Fataar from Amadiba Crisis Committee press statements and reports in the South Coast Herald

Solidarity and Support

The campaign for justice needs support please contact:

Amadiba Crisis Committee (ACC):

Nonhle Mbuthuma +27763592982

Mzamo Dlamini +27721940949

Email: amadibacrisiscommittee@gmail.com

The family of Siphokazi require assistance please make a donation to:

Bank: First National Bank

Branch: Randburg

Branch Code:  254005

Account Number: 621 579 976 39

Account Name: Sustaining the Wild Coast

Reference: Bazooka Cause

* Payments from outside South Africa require the Swift Code: FIRNZAJJ

Phone calls or emails of protest can be directed to:

Mr Mosebenzi Zwane, Minister of Mineral Resources

Phone: +27 12 444 3999

Fax: +27 12 444 3145

Email: queen.poolo@dmr.gov.za (Personal Assistant)

Mr Godfrey Oliphant, Deputy Minister of Mineral Resources

Phone: +27 12 444 3956

Fax: +27 12 341 2228

Email: kefilwe.chibogo@dmr.gov.za (Personal Assistant)

Mr David Msiza, Acting Director-General, Dept of Mineral Resources

Phone: +27 12 444 3000

Fax: +27 12 341 2228

Email: david.msiza@dmr.gov.za (Personal Assistant)

The ACC are represented by Richard Spoor Inc. in Johannesburg and LRC in Cape Town and Pietermaritzburg. For legal issues in the coastal Amadiba community struggle against mining: Henk Smith +27832661770, Thabiso Mbhense +27711099340 and Richard Spoor +27836271722.

 

 

Microcredit – South Africa’s New Gold Rush

By Milford Bateman

The end of apartheid in South Africa in the early 1990s was an historic achievement. It was widely seen as presaging the decisive end to all forms of race- and state-based oppression and exploitation of the majority black population. However, this was not to be. In the guise of helping to improve the situation of the black majority in the new South Africa, I would argue that an even more venal market-driven economic system was maneuvered into place. One of the most important reasons for this adverse development lies with the supposedly poverty-reducing and empowering concept of microcredit. Lauded by its South African supporters, the World Bank, and by most other international development agencies, microcredit was seen as one of the keys to sustainable employment and wealth generation in the post-apartheid era. Instead, the rise of microcredit in South Africa has turned out to be one of the most destructive, divisive and, ultimately, one of the most fraudulent development interventions.

The general idea of microcredit sounded simple enough: provide tiny microloans to the very many South Africans in poverty and without a job and you open up for them the enticing possibility of establishing an informal income-generating microenterprise or self-employment venture. The end result, so the argument ran, would be an individual escape from poverty, plus a ‘bottom-up’ wealth creation dynamic taking hold in the local economy.

The reality of microcredit in South Africa, however, has been something else entirely. Since many of the existing petty informal microenterprises and self-employment ventures tolerated under apartheid were already struggling to survive, the arrival of microcredit simply added to the supply of simple items and services for which there was little to no additional local demand (especially thanks to the austerity program implemented by the South African government in the immediate aftermath of apartheid under World Bank advice). South Africa’s poor were soon pitted against each other in an even more desperate struggle than ever to attract the attention and spending power of equally poor neighbors. Hyper-competitive local economies began to emerge all across post-apartheid South Africa wherein margins, wages and profits in the informal microenterprise sector were inevitably competed downwards, often to bare survival levels. Figures produced by Oxford University economists, for example, show that incomes of the informal self-employed fell by an astonishing 11 per cent per year over the period 1997-2003, thus leaving the vast bulk of those engaged in informal sector activities probably worse off than even under apartheid. Such pure markets hardly ever work well for the poor in practice as they appear to do in theory.

But there is also an even more disturbing aspect to this tragic story. This is the fact that those individuals and institutions that set themselves up to supply microcredit to South Africa’s poor were allowed – If not encouraged – to generate stratospheric levels of wealth for themselves quite irrespective of the fact that their clients were descending into deeper poverty, insecurity and extreme over-indebtedness. The central problem here was that the CEOs in the main microcredit institutions were given the freedom and opportunity to pursue their own enrichment strategies instead of focusing primarily upon helping the poor to escape their poverty. When the CEO turns his or her employer into a vehicle primarily geared up to his or her own enrichment this is known as a form of ‘control fraud’. Famously defined by William K Black as the legal, before often turning to illegal, looting of one’s own financial institution by the CEO, the South African microcredit sector was to become one of the most egregious global examples of this important concept in operation.

Two microcredit institutions in particular stand out as manifest examples of a control fraud in operation. The first is that of Capitec Bank. Started by a group of Stellenbosch businessmen, Capitec Bank was essentially mainly about ensuring the spectacular enrichment of its CEO, Riaan Stassen. This unstated ambition required Capitec Bank to engage in reckless lending – the off-loading of as much microcredit into the community as possible no matter how unsuitable and risky the clients, and even if the institution might eventually explode into the longer term. Capitec’s growth was indeed spectacular, and it was soon one of the two largest microcredit institutions in the country. And even as South Africa entered into difficult economic territory in the aftermath of the meltdown on Wall Street in 2008, and many of its desperate clients were taking on dangerously high levels of debt, there was no stopping its upward growth trajectory.

Capitec became supremely skilled at pushing microcredit onto the most vulnerable of individuals. Notably this included those in the mining sector, when Capitec Bank established its own branches on the actual premises of several mines, including the now infamous Marikana mining complex. The Marikana mine is, of course, the scene in 2012 of the worst state violence since the apartheid era, when 34 unarmed striking miners were fatally gunned down by the police. One of the problems the miners were protesting was the high level of micro-debt they had gotten into, admittedly ill-advisedly, but the aggressive marketing and client recruitment tactics used by such as Capitec Bank and other supposedly ‘pro-poor’ microcredit institutions clearly did a fine job too. As intended, Capitec’s CEO was massively rewarded for all this anti-social activity, going from middle management obscurity in the early 2000s to his entry by 2010 on South Africa’s list of its top fifty richest individuals. Other senior management and shareholders also did well too, which, inevitably, helps to account for the lack of resistance to the aggressive tactics used by the CEO.

A second, and even more brazen, example of control fraud is that of South Africa’s largest microcredit bank for many years, African Bank. Like its main competitor Capitec Bank, African Bank started out as a legal control fraud operating under the firm command of its CEO, Leon Kirkinis. Kirkinis claimed altruistic motives for founding African Bank and that he was ‘on a mission to lend money to those shut out by the apartheid state’. But what happened after this confirmed beyond all shadow of a doubt that African Bank’s strategy was really all about rewarding the CEO as much as possible, and by whatever means were felt necessary. Like Capitec Bank, for example, African Bank adopted a reckless lending strategy in order to bring in impressive revenues in the short-term, the better to inflate the share price and maintain high salaries and bonuses, and even though this jeopardized the long-term functioning of the bank. Also like Capitec, no client was operationally – or ethically – found to be out of bounds; no matter how desperate and likely to be damaged by easy access to microcredit, even the most hapless individuals were aggressively targeted by African Bank. It is telling that African Bank established the most outlets on the premises of the main mining companies in South Africa, including on the Marikana mining complex. Thanks to these and many other unethical techniques, African Bank soon became South Africa’s largest microcredit bank, while, just as in the case of Riaan Stassen, Leon Kirkinis was elevated into the top ranks of South Africa’s richest individuals.

However, unlike Capitec, which went for the cheaper and less risky route of mobilising savings deposits to fund its lending activities, African Bank preferred the much quicker but hugely risky option of obtaining its funds from short-term institutional lenders. African Bank also completely failed to set aside sufficient reserve funds for likely future bad debts. It was thus almost inevitable that African Bank would eventually run into serious trouble, though its CEO clearly hoped – as many control frauds so often do – that the day of reckoning could be postponed until it was possible to quietly walk away with a vast fortune. Such an approach, known as ‘facilitating bankruptcy for profit’, is the most unethical and destructive control fraud strategy.

As matters at African Bank came to a head, legal control fraud by the CEO inevitably began to morph into the illegal variety. Numerous legal transgressions were registered as the embattled CEO sought to keep African Bank alive against all the odds. On the edge of total collapse in late 2014, and with the entire South African financial system at serious risk from ‘contagion’, Leon Kirkinis was forced out of African Bank and the South African government then agreed to grant a bail-out of as much as $US1.6 billion to keep it alive. African Bank was split into two parts – a ‘good’ bank and a ‘bad bank’. Kirkinis initially claimed to have lost much of his personal wealth when African Bank’s collapsed (he was a major shareholder), though it later transpired that over the years he had quietly invested a large amount of the wealth he extracted from African Bank into land, housing, and other assets. The final word on this story lies with the Reserve Bank of South Africa, however, which is still finalizing a report that is supposed to pave the way for criminal charges to be laid against Kirkinis and other senior directors at African Bank. The final reckoning thus awaits.

All in all, the coming to South Africa of the microcredit model was not the hoped-for harbinger of recovery and progress for South Africa’s black majority, but the beginning of an ‘anti-development’ market-driven process leading to their continued, if not extended, exploitation, dis-empowerment and immiseration. Even worse, with regulations and oversight deliberately minimized in post-apartheid South Africa, the stage was set for an inevitable wave of control fraud within the microcredit sector. As the acclaimed South African essayist, T.O. Molefe, was forced to conclude, South Africa in the new millennium was thus plunged into its very own sub-prime-style financial crisis. Although South Africa’s sub-prime crisis did not involve US-style securitization, derivatives, CDOs and other exotic financial instruments, but was instead a product of its immoral and unethical CEOs bent on achieving their own dreams of spectacular wealth, the economic and social damage that resulted was pretty much of the same order.

Milford Bateman is a freelance consultant on local economic development. He is also Visiting Professor of Economics, Juraj Dobrila University of Pula, Croatia and Adjunct Professor of Development Studies, St Marys University, Halifax, Canada.

Mozambican Workers and Communities in Resistance (Part 2)

By Judith Marshall

Part 2: Old and New Forms of Popular Protest

The chill effect from the Mozal strike notwithstanding, the first decades of the 21st Century have seen a growing number of popular protest actions at workplace and community levels, both urban and rural. Work stoppages and wild cat strikes involving small numbers of workers have been frequent, neither organized nor sanctioned by the unions.  Workers were faced with a government intent on luring foreign investors by offering implicit, if not explicit, promises of cheap, compliant labour. Noted Mozambican economist Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco captures succinctly how the labour system was, and is, negatively articulated to the broader political economy.

… the dominant political economy of Mozambique is focused on three fundamental and interlinked processes, namely the maximization of inflows of foreign capital – FDI or commercial loans – without political conditionality; the development of linkages between these capital inflows and the domestic process of accumulation and the formation of national capitalist classes; and the reproduction of a labour system in which the workforce is remunerated at below its social cost of subsistence and families have to bear the responsibility for maintaining (especially feeding) the wage-earning workers by complementing their wages… (Castel-Branco: 2015)

Major bread riots again put thousands of citizens on the streets of Maputo, the national capital and smaller regional centers in 2008 and 2010. Only massive police presence and blocked cell phone communication averted another major street protest in 2012. (Chaimite 2014; de Brito et al 2014; Bertelsen 2014) These cell-phone organized street demonstrations were triggered by government decisions to increase the costs of basic foods, fuel and/or transport.  The main participants were the poor and excluded, trapped in endemic poverty with growing murmurs of resentment against the luxurious life-style of the elite.

The street demonstrations in 2008 were sparked by a government decision to raise the prices of diesel and gasoline. The prospect of higher transport costs brought an immediate response at community level. While the Mozambique government touted impressive economic growth indicators, much of it based on aluminum exports from Mozal, the situation for most Mozambicans was a daily grind of poverty and exclusion.  The government responded rapidly, condemning the demonstrators and sending in army and police to restore order.  It also made concessions with withdrawal of the new tariffs and promises to make some compensation to the Chapa 100 owners in return for their cooperation in regularizing licenses. 

In September 2010, messages began to circulate about another major street protest, this time triggered not by fuel prices but by increases in the prices of basic products.  There was a 17% increase in the price of bread alone plus higher costs for water, electricity, and basics like rice, onions and tomatoes. The text message mobilizing people to go to the streets referred to the protest as a “general strike.”

Mozambicans, prepare yourselves for the general strike 01/09/2010.  We protest at the rise in the price of bread, water, electricity and others.  Send to other Mozambicans.  Wake up. (Text message of 31/08/2010)

This time government responded quickly, finding ways to channel subsidies to bakery owners and transporters. Clearly the uprisings got responses.  Early in 2011, government even announced a basic food basket for those at poverty level because of rising grain and fuel prices. The bill was publicly criticized as inconsistent and unsustainable, with no viable eligibility study.  It would benefit urban areas, focal points of the protests, while rural poverty remained untouched.  In the end, the measure was dropped. (de Brito 2014:32)

While most demonstrators were peaceful, the street actions in 2010 also entailed violence. Barricades were set up using tree trunks and garbage containers.  Demonstrators set fire to cars, burned tires, and threw rocks at police cars. Demonstrators looted shops taking home sacks of rice and other food.  In some case, the police, also underpaid, joined in the looting. (de Brito 2014: 21)  Government sent in repressive forces, ill-trained and equipped, unprepared for a volatile situation with their own neighbours on the streets. In 1993, one person died and 50 were injured.  In 2008, at least three people died and more than 200 were injured.  In 2010, more than a dozen people lost their lives and more than 500 were injured.

Popular musician Azagaia was accused of instigating the demonstrators with his song “Povo no Poder” (People in Power), recorded after the 2008 demonstrations and sung again in 2010.  The weekly paper, Savana, criticized the Public Prosecutor’s office for trying to suppress the protest song and published the lyrics in full.

Mr. President, you left the luxury of your palace

You finally noticed that life’s not easy here

Only now did you call a meeting of your Council of Ministers

But the people haven’t been sleeping

We came together a long time ago

We’ve barricaded the streets

We’ve halted the minibuses

No one is getting past

Even the shops are shut

If the police are violent

We’ll respond with violence.  (Savanah 3/9/2010)

By 2012, there were rumblings of another bread riot.  OTM  – the Mozambique Workers’ Organization – had come to the 2012 tri-partite discussions on minimum wage with a study costing basics for a family of five at 8,021 MT/month. Yet business and government continued to insist on taking sectoral productivity indices as the predominant reference point and established minimum wages per sector that averaged only 3,305 MT/month or 41% of what the unions considered an adequate basic wage. (de Brito 2014: 14).   The minimum wage for large-scale mining was set at 3525 MT/month.  In a round of bargaining with Vale that year, the company lauded itself for paying more than the minimum wage when it established a monthly minimum salary of 6305 MT/month for Vale employees. While this was considerably more than the government minimum, it was still a good deal less than what labour economists had calculated to be a living wage, i.e. 8021 MT/month.

On November 15 and 16, 2012, increases in transport fares were announced causing immediate tension and a flurry of texting about street action. This time government took rapid measures to avert the protests, mobilizing phone companies to restrict texting communications and ordering a massive police presence. (de Brito 2014: 20)   Only a few barricades were mounted and the protest ended quickly.

The weak and deformed Mozambican unions at the beginning of the 21st century were inadequate instruments for a new generation of workers contending with the power of transnational investors.  An extensive international study on the nature and state of union organization in Mozambique was carried out in 2002.  It characterized the situation as follows:

While retaining a residual presence in many workplaces, Mozambican unions have battled to cope with changes in the external labour market and a greatly altered political climate.  In most cases, they have proved equally incapable of challenging the authority of management and of articulating viable alternatives to the neo-liberal orthodoxy.  There is a need to enhance the quality of unionism and the service provided at existing workplaces…. (Webster 2005: 258)

The study, based on a sample of 177 workers in Maputo and Beira, revealed that less than half those interviewed had a local union executive actually elected by the members while 35% were in workplaces where management itself had appointed the members of the union executive.  Only 41% came from work places where unions were actually recognized as the bargaining agents for the members and only 25% reported that their employers actually complied with all or a large extent of what was in the collective agreement. (Webster 2005: 267-270)

Union membership had declined dramatically from 300,000 members in the early 1980s to only 90,000 in 2003 (Webster 2003:262).  As the Webster study points out, however,  “a more serious, but insidious, problem to that of union decline in numerical terms is ‘residual’ or ‘hollow’ unionism; where for historical-institutional reasons, a union retains a presence, but is no more than a passenger in an enterprise driven by autocratic managerialism.” (Webster 2005: 258)

As the 21st century unfolded even more obscene levels of rich-poor disparity came to prevail, and new groups of citizens took up the quest for social justice. Government service delivery of the basics like health and sanitation and transport decreased, while corruption grew. Workers throughout the country continued to fight back with wildcat strikes and work stoppages, with the union’s only role being one of pacification.  The “autocratic managerialism” of big mining companies did indeed dominate labour relations. The new investors were quick to take advantage of the “hollowness” of the existing trade unions.

 “Strikes” predominated in the form of wildcat strikes and work stoppages; almost none of them were carried out by workers in a “legal” strike position with organizational support from their union.  They “strikes” were led by small groups of workers, fed up with “autocratic managerialism” in companies where the unions were simply “passengers”. 

The dispossession experienced by peasant farmers in the face of land grabs by mining, oil and agro-business was certainly the most blatant.  Workers and the urban poor, however, had a more subtle but equally acute sense of dispossession.  All the gains of the first years of independence were now a distant memory.  On my first visit to liberated Mozambique in 1976, I had spent evenings with the Dinamizing Group in the urban neighbourhood where I was living, preparing for Independence Day celebrations on June 25.  We were painting huge cloth banners of the victories of the first year of independence.  They included land, housing, access to schooling and health care, price controls on basic commodities (later Consumer Coops), along with the more intangibles of respect and dignity and solidarity.   These banners were later festooned on the lamp-posts along Eduardo Mondlane Avenue, Maputo’s principal thoroughfare.  By 2000, government commitment to a basic needs agenda that encompassed all citizens was only a distant memory. There were only much deteriorated public services for workers and the poor while a government/military/business elite now had access to private education and clinics, luxury homes and vehicles and consumer goods.

At moments of prices increases for food or fuel or public transport, there were food riots, characterized by government as hooliganism and met with police repression but understood as acts to defend rights by the protesters.  Michael Sambo and Kajsa Johansson in their article “Bread Riots: Exercise in Citizenship?” probe the concept of citizenship and how immediate causes like prices increases are merely the tinder to cause a conflagration. The rapid conflagration is fueled by a generalized sense of being fed up with living in a society where ordinary people have no voice and where the sufferings of the general population are worsening while the ostentatious living of the political and economic elite is on the increase. (Johansson, K. & M. Sambo: 2014)

Whatever the immediate cause of a work stoppage or a street demonstration, the larger context was a general sense of dispossession and latent discontent.  In addition to strikes and work stoppages, there were all kinds of other protest actions. Barricades, whether of rocks and trees or of human beings, effectively brought ore trains to a halt or prevented access to a mine site.  There were also moments of global protest with Mozambican organizations increasingly involved in larger global civil society initiatives.

The table below, while still far from complete, gives some indication of the range of protest actions from year to year. 

Table 1: Strikes and Protest Action in Mozambique 2000-2016

Data/Place  Action Protagonists Targets Issues
2001        
Feb   Maputo work stoppage 200 Mozal workers BHP-Billiton high expat salaries, racism
Oct  Maputo strike/lockout Mozal workers BHP-Billiton salary & benefit levels/respect
2005
Nov  Maputo classes boycott university students UEM admin bursary conditions
2006
Oct  Ilha de Mocambique work stoppage Municipal workers Moz gov 2 month salary arrears
2007
Mar  Moma work stoppage/riot Kentz construction workers Kentz/Kenmare salaries, severance, racism
Aug   Xinavane work stoppage sugar cane cutters Acucareira de Xinavane salaries, working conditions
2008
Feb 5 Maputo Chokwe bread riots urban poor, youth, unemployed Moz gov transport price hikes
2009
Mar  Moatize wildcat strike 1200 construction workers Odebrecht/Vale salaries, working conditions, severance
May  Moatize work stoppage construction workers Odebrecht/Vale hrs of work, ex-pat salaries & benefits
Aug  Marromeu work stoppage seasonal cane cutters Sena Sugar salaries, transport, labour relations
Sept  Marromeu general strike 3000 seasonal workers Sena Sugar salaries, work conditions, ex-patriate salaries
2010
June  Maputo open SOS letter civil society (JA, LDH, CTV, CIP etc.) Mozal, Moz gov environmental hazards
July  Nampula work stoppage plantation farmers Corredor Agro wages, health care, dismissals
Sept 1,2 Maputo bread riots urban poor, youth, unemployed Moz gov price hikes, rich/poor gap
2011
April  Moma wildcat strike Kenmare workers Kenmare salary scale, job classifications
Sept  Maputo official letter of protest Justica Ambiental in name of resettlers Vale Cateme resettlers w/out land, water, etc.
Dec  Moatize official letter of protest Cateme resettlers Vale, Moz gov land, houses, water, livelihoods
2012
Jan 10  Moatize rail road blockade 700 resettled  families in Cateme Vale, Moz gov broken promises and silence from Vale & gov
July  Moma strike notice Kenmare bargaining committee Kenmare wages, health care, foreign workers
Sept  Nacala wildcat strike Kentz construction workers Kentz severance, Labour law implementation
Nov  Maputo food riots urban poor, youth, unemployed Moz Gov cost of living, corruption
Nov  Changara work stoppage, attacks on ex-pats Jindal workers and affected community Jindal, Moz Gov no enviro study, insults, no resettlement plan
Dec  Maputo legal strike retail workers Shoprite low pay, no
2013
Jan  Maputo doctors/nurses strike Moz. Medical Assn Moz Gov salary and work conditions
Apr  Moatize mine blockade 800 block makers Vale, Moz Gov loss of livelihoods
May  Moatize railway blockade Cateme block makers Vale compensation for loss of small business
May  Maputo open letter against ProSavana land grab 23 Nat’l and 43 int’l civil society orgs Moz, Brazil and Japanese Govts land grabs, agricultural policies
June  Maputo work stoppages doctors, nurses Moz Gov salary, work conditions
July  Changara Demonstration Jindal workers and community Jindal, Moz Gov work conditions, abuse, pollution
Aug  Maputo open letter against ProSavana 20 Moz orgs Moz, Brazil and Japanese govt land grabs, agricultural policy
Aug  Moatize demonstration at Vale offices block makers Vale response to new compensation proposal
Oct  4 cities peace and security march 30,000  civ society & NGOs Moz Gov, Frelimo & Renamo parties no war resumption, security from kidnaps
Dec Moatize mine blockade 25 de September resettlers Vale compensation for lost livelihoods
2014
May  Moatize blockade threats block makers Vale no Vale response
July  Maputo II Triangular People’s Conference civil society reps  Brazil, Japan and Mozambique Moz, Japanese & Brazilian Govts land grabs for agro-industry, dispossession
Sept  Moatize mine blockade resettlers and block makers Vale land grabs, dispossession
Oct  Maputo III Intl Conference on Land & Seeds UNAC and other civil  society orgs Moz Gov lands grabs, genetically modified seeds, agricultural policy
Dec  Maputo march of Men against violence Men General public rape, harassment of women
2015
|Jan  Changara work stoppage Jindal mine workers Jindal, Moz Gov “slave labour” conditions, racism
Mar  Maputo protest march 3000 students and civil society Moz Gov drive-by shooting of law professor Gilles Cistac
Apr  Maputo World March of Women international mtg 300 international delegates Moz and other governments Impact on women of land, forest and mineral resource grab
May, Changara Mine blockade 500 families of four affected villages Jindal,  Moz gov’t False promises of land, resettlement,  jobs and better living conditions
June, Moma Work stoppage 900 Kenmare miners Kenmare, Moz gov’t Lay-offs, reduction of night shift bonus
2016
February Work stoppage 1,400 operators and processors Vale Salary and bonus reductions

Sources: Compiled by author from Noticias, A Verdade, CIP, ADECRU, O Pais, Meusalario.

As indicated in the table, only 6 of the 19 strikes were actually organized by the union.  In the cases of Mozal and Kenmare, strong local union leadership assumed a role in engaging directly with BNP Billiton and Kenmare that led to legal strike positions, while the provincial and national union bodies dragged their feet and eventually sided with government and the companies, distancing themselves from the elected worker representatives. Fourteen of the strike actions were wildcats, organized at the base to pressure companies to respond to specific demands. These ranged from salary arrears to racial discrimination, from non-compliance with labour laws to arbitrary dismissals and demands for severance pay. In many cases, the company was forced to make enough concessions to get people to resume work. The informal leadership had advantages. When strike leaders could be identified, they were usually demoted or dismissed.

There were six instances of blockades, all related to coal mining operations in Tete province. These included the Cateme resettlement community blocking the railway line and worker/community protests against both Vale and Jindal that included blockading the entrances to the mines. There were three instances of major food riots in urban centres and a variety of protest actions from major marches for peace as well as a boycott action by university students and many “we the undersigned” letters of protest.

Worker and Community Protests at the New Mines: Odebrecht/Vale, Kenmare and Jindal

BHP’s aluminum smelter was the first extractive sector project but the new millennium quickly saw the arrival of more investors including SASOL (natural gas), Kenmare (mineral sands), Vale/Odebrecht (coal), Riversdale (coal) and Jindal (coal). Riversdale later sold to Rio Tinto and in 2014, Rio Tinto sold the mine to ICVL, a joint venture of five Indian state companies endeavouring to guarantee coking coal for Indian steel production.  One of the partners, state company Coal India has subsequently withdrawn.  Case studies of these mining companies reveal the dynamics of contemporary labour protests.[1] Not surprisingly, the big mining companies exhibited all the tendencies of “autocratic managerialism” already identified, often using their Mozambican Human Resource directors to work out a modus vivendi with their trade union “passengers” who guaranteed labour peace.

Mining Case Study 1: Workers’ Struggles Against Vale

Brazilian mining giant Vale with construction giant, Odebrecht, its regular partner for ventures in Africa, was the company that initiated the coal boom in Tete.  Vale had morphed over the years from the state-owned mining company, CVRD (Sweet River Valley Company) founded in 1942, to the privatized CVRD of 1997.  A state auction whose legality is questioned to this day put CVRD’s grossly undervalued assets into private hands. Today we have the sleek 21st century Vale, seen by the elite in Brazil as a success story that epitomizes Brazilian competitiveness in the global economy and the growing power of the BRICS. (Marshall:2015)  Vale ranks as the third largest mining company in the world with operations in 13 states throughout Brazil and 27 countries around the globe.

During Lula’s first presidential visit in 2003, conversations with then President Joaquim Chissano included the possibility of Vale’s winning the bid to operate Mozambique’s first coal mine.[2] Vale won the competition to carry out feasibility studies in 2004, got an operating license in 2007 and in 2011, officially went into production, after a glittering opening with several plane loads of Mozambican government and business leaders being jetted from Maputo to Tete for the celebration.  Odebrecht, the Brazilian construction giant, was responsible for the construction of the mine.   

In 2010, groups in Brazil took the initiative to organize an International Articulation of People Affected by Vale. Vale had acquired nickel mines in Canada whose workers were affiliated with the USW. The Steelworkers became active participants in the network in their own right and also supported active participation by union and community groups from Mozambique, New Caledonia and Indonesia.  In the ongoing hands-on collaboration with SINTICIM, the training team was expanded to include trade unionists from Vale operations in Canada and Brazil and a South African health and safety activist. On-line follow-up with the trainers for further information and support was encouraged. The skype and email topics ranged from puzzlement about the concept of “ergonomics” to advice about how to respond to the Vale HR Director’s offer of a company credit card.  One skype call conveyed shock and horror at company cover-up of the death of a young heavy equipment operator, left pinned for three hours under his over-turned compactor without rescue or first aid.

These new mining projects resulted in both old and new forms of protest.  As with Mozal, the construction phase was marked by labour conflicts. In 2009, there were two work stoppages in less than two months, the second involving 1200 workers.  Their main issues were low salaries, working conditions, hours of work, loss of week-ends off and management arrogance. The labour law stipulated a norm of eight hour days, 42 hour work weeks and week-ends free but also provided flexibility for alternative patterns by individual employers.  The construction consortium of Odebrecht, Vale and sub-contractors quickly took full advantage of the flexibility, intent on rapid construction of the new mine. Locally-based construction workers, contracted project by project, had enormous difficulties interpreting their rights in the midst of the rapidly shifting context.

The new mining projects were touted by the Mozambique government as creators of jobs and economic development and poverty eradication. Yet the agreement with Vale included a quota of 15% foreign workers, ostensibly with a training component. The Provincial Director of Labour complained to a union delegation from Canada in 2011 that the mining companies were inundating her with work permit requests for people without training capacity like a cook from Brazil.  

In 2012 Lula Ignacio da Silva, esteemed labour leader and ex-president of Brazil, travelled to Mozambique with Vale President Murilo Ferreira.  While there Lula gave a public lecture on “The Struggle Against Inequality’ and urged Brazilian investors to contribute to poverty alleviation in Mozambique.  He also joined the Vale president, however, in lobbying Helena Taipo, Minister of Labour,  to allow higher quotas of foreign workers for Vale’s future projects – which she refused to do. (Verdade 2012).

During construction, Kentz, a Vale sub-contractor, brought in several hundred Filipino construction workers who were housed in an encampment surrounded by barbed-wire while they carried out short-term contracts.  Complaints about the wage differences between the Mozambican and foreign technicians were a constant irritant.  The perception was that local Tete residents were left out while jobs went to foreigners, illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe and Zambia and the sons and nephews of the elite in Maputo.    

The wildcat strikes at Odebrecht also used texting to organize, making identification of leaders elusive.  During the 2011 work stoppage, messages circulated urging workers to congregate in the dining hall two days later.  They gathered, without coherent demands but with a generalized sense of frustration that quickly turned into random destruction of company property.  The Provincial union head was called in to pacify, along with government labour officers and armed police.

At Mozal, a decade earlier, the newly formed Union Committee had quickly created a strong, collective voice in defence of the rights and interests of the workers.  Employees of the foreign mining companies in Tete had no strong Union Committees to channel their demands.  One of Vale’s first actions in Tete was to offer a vehicle to the provincial head of the construction and mining workers union.  When members criticized him, the SINTICIM leader justified his acceptance saying it would allow him to visit workers in remote mining sites. Yet when Vale workers from Brazil and Canada taking part in a tri-national health and safety training programme met with the Moatize District Administrator in 2010, the Administrator spoke openly of the mining companies’ practice of buying off local government, labour and community leaders. He offered the SINTICIM vehicle from Vale as an example.

According to workers in the Odebrecht/Vale Consortium that was formed in the construction phase before workers had direct contracts with Vale, this same provincial SINTICIM head rigged the election of the first Union Committee. (Sekame 2013)  After calling a workers assembly he instructed each department to meet and elect its representative to the Union Committee.  When the official list circulated, however, elected candidates from two departments had been dropped.  They were replaced with two men who had worked with the provincial union head in the Carbomoc mine during the 1970s.  One was named as head the Union Committee and the other as treasurer. The two proceeded to make the air-conditioned union office into their personal lunch room and used the local union bank account as their personal social fund. (Sekame 2013)

The technical workers elected a well-qualified civil engineering technician who, to the surprise of many, took the task seriously.  Shortly after the local Union Committee was formed, the technician was asked to participate in a tri-partite meeting with Labour Inspectorate, company, and union.  The Vale Human Resources director accosted the technician on his way to the meeting, praising his work, promising future contracts and suggesting that during the meeting, the technician keep his mouth shut.  When the Labour Inspectors asked for union input, the Provincial Secretary opted for silence, despite recent wildcats. The project was ending without definition of severance pay or recall rights for future projects.  There was simmering discontent about salaries, overtime pay and arbitrary disciplinary measures and dismissals.   

The technician chose to break the silence with a long list of worker concerns.  His intervention was met with hostility on all sides, including that of the government.  Many Labour Inspectors supplemented their inadequate government salaries by waiving fines in return for cash payments from the companies which they pocketed.  Union leaders actually putting labour issues onto the agenda of official meetings cut off their under the table deals. 

After the meeting, Odebrecht demoted the technician and accused him of fomenting strikes.  Not long after, Odebrecht dismissed him on trumped up charges related to a heated verbal exchange when he unmasked the ongoing pilfering of local union funds. Despite complete exoneration both from the provincial court and from a petition process through the National Assembly, Odebrecht refused reinstatement and shunted the case to a regional court.  Clearly Mozambican workers attempting to defend their members through use of labour law and existing union and government structures found themselves up against not just the power of the transnational companies but also the weight of government – and union – indifference and corruption. [3]  

While good labour laws existed on paper, with both union and government structures set up to enforce their implementation, there were other logics and practices that prevailed within a porous world of favours and loyalties and under the table arrangements.  Indeed the practice of labour inspectors being bribed into waiving fines was so endemic that the new labour minister, Vitoria Diogo, called attention to it during her first meetings with her staff in March 2015. (Noticias: 2015)  

 African states generally, due to structural adjustment and within the prevailing discourse of neoliberalism, have been hollowed out to the point of leaving few qualified people and inadequate budgets for salaries or programmes. Mozambique falls readily into this category. Government officials no longer govern.  They trade, using whatever wherewithal their particular position in the state apparatus allows. At the bottom, traffic police trade fines for bills inserted in a driver’s license, bureaucrats trade influence or information or priority treatment for cash, teachers trade marks for sexual favours. At the top government and army officials trade in arms and drugs and high-stakes deals with foreign mining companies.  

Alongside, and interpenetrated  with, the formal institutions of the state, informal networks of officials, local power brokers or warlords, arms traders and international  firms in many countries form… a “shadow state” that leaves the formal institutions of government little more than an empty shell. (Ferguson 2006: 39)

“Residual” union leaders articulated readily with officials of the “shadow state” and the “autocratic” mining companies in highly promiscuous relationships with both, all to the detriment of workers and mining communities. 

The same company director who had bribed the provincial union head with a vehicle micro-managed the inexperienced local Union Committee eventually formed at Vale.  He allocated an office on company property with a computer and three hours/week for union matters.  Hours could not be used simultaneously, however, ruling out collective planning and problem solving.  Elected leaders still had to meet full production quotas, another deterrent to taking time away from production to make the union function. 

While workers readily voiced their discontents privately with Vale’s arbitrary disciplinary actions and dismissals and with the higher salaries and benefits enjoyed by foreign workers, the Union Committee at Vale has been slow to carry out protest actions. The mine operators and processors have also expressed little solidarity with the many community protests against Vale. (See below)  In 2015, Vale signalled the need for massive lay-offs in Moatize in the face of low prices of minerals on world markets.  The irrelevance of the union as an instrument to defend workers’ rights was all too clear. The Tete provincial government and Vale negotiated a strategy to avoid the lay-offs through a 25% reduction in the salaries of Vale’s workforce.  Provincial governor Paulo Auele claimed that the Vale workers were earning “astronomic salaries”.  According to Auele, “We negotiated with Vale Mocambique to reduce from 18 monthly salaries to 13, and the company is already making arrangement to reduce the lay-offs and dismissals” (DW:2015). Despite a duly negotiated and signed collective agreement between Vale and the workers valid until 2017, the massive salary cut agreed to by government and company elicited little reaction from the workers apart from a public statement claiming the grounds for the reduction were dubious.

Eight months later, in February 2016, the workers did responded to Vale’s abrupt announcement of a further cut in a variable benefit tied to company profit levels. More than 1400 workers carried out a work stoppage in protest, with leaders of both the Vale Union Committee and the provincial SINTICIM office giving public support. (Club of Mozambique: 2016)

Mining Case Study 2: Community Struggles Against Vale

Protests against the new mining investments by workers have been far outpaced by the actions from the surrounding community, where people have lost their lands and their livelihoods. The land grabs linked to the new mining projects have created situations of desperation for peasant producers. The recurrent protest actions from the 1360 families resettled by Vale in 2009/2010 have been well documented. (Mosca & Selemane:2011; JA, ADECRU 2013; HRW 2013)   Perhaps the most dramatic action was the first railway blockade.  In December 2011, the community in Cateme, Vale’s rural resettlement, had once again made a list of all of their demands. They found themselves, almost two years after resettlement, still without land suitable for farming, still without water, still in houses that had started cracking after the first rainy season, and still without full compensation. Visitors were taken to the Vale show pieces in Cateme, a well-landscaped clinic and school, and a model farm which was an oasis of green, thanks to daily tending by Vale agronomists and tubed irrigation.  Meanwhile, life for the resettlers in their rows of match box houses and treeless streets was desperate.  They had lost not only land and livelihoods but also their independence.  They now found themselves wards of a foreign mining company and their own government, neither of whom exhibited any political will to resolve their situation.

The community handed in their demands to Vale and government December, 2011, giving January 10 as deadline for a response.  None was forthcoming.  To the surprise of Vale and the Mozambique government, the Cateme community took direct action and blockaded the road and railway lines, effectively stopping transport of coal to the port in Beira. The government reaction was swift and excessive, sending in an armed police rapid response unit.  Fourteen community members were imprisoned, one of them blind and another lame. Five were rapidly released but four of the nine who spent time in prison were brutally beaten. Vale acknowledged that there were problems and promised solutions within six months. A hostile climate prevailed, with strong police and security presence making contacts between the settlers and their NGO advocates very difficult. The most tangible Vale response was forcing the resettled families into tents while the houses were patched up. Three months after the railway blockade, Vale offered three vehicles to local government authorities in Moatize, two of which went to the District Administrator and the police commander. (JA 2014: 12)   

Since 2012, there have been further strong protests and repeated blockades.  These have occurred despite the passage of new legislation on resettlements on August 8, 2012. The new law states that those directly affected by economic projects have the right to be re-established at a level of income and in living conditions (house, physical space, and social infrastructure) equal or superior to their former situation. (Bila 2015). 

Many of those resettled had lived for generations making building bricks from local clays. They constructed small kilns close to the clay deposits where they formed and fired their bricks.  Some introduced a small quantity of cement into their bricks; some used moulds for decorative bricks. In 2009, Vale had paid compensation of 60,000 MT for each functioning kiln and gave access to the Vale concession to remove previously produced bricks.  The brick makers had understood this as an initial payment, however, and continued to demand more. Neither Vale nor government was sympathetic. At one bargaining session, a government official had cynically queried why bother with inferior local bricks when Moatize now boasted a “Builder’s Warehouse” full of high quality building supplies from South Africa. 

In May 11, 2013, the brick makers met Vale again, armed with new proposals based on what they could have expected in life-time earnings from their businesses. They presented a formula for calculating compensation which took annual production (102,000 bricks) x price (2 meticais) x years of productive life for a brick maker (50 years).  Vale dismissed the new demands as illusory and said the matter was definitively closed. The response of the brick makers came two days later when they blockaded the railway line again. (O Pais 2013) 

At the end of 2013, the families in 25 de Setembro, Vale’s peri-urban resettlement took action. With total disregard for any sociological appreciation of African culture, Vale had carried out a “divide and rule” strategy (Selemane: 2010). Those with informal sector livelihoods were placed in a rural resettlement in Cateme. Those with formal sector jobs were rehoused in a resettlement on the outskirts of Moatize, the district capital. In reality, even households with a member in formal sector employment depended on agriculture to supplement low wages.  Since neither Vale nor government had responded to repeated communications from the town dwellers  demanding compensation for land losses, the families cut down branches and set up blockades on major access roads to the Vale mine, effectively paralyzing production.  None of the issues around resettlement has yet been settled, the 2012 legislation notwithstanding. Seemingly neither Vale nor the Mozambique government has the political will to do so. (ADECRU 2013).

Mining Case Study 3: Workers Struggles Against Kenmare

 Moma Titanium Minerals opened in Nampula province in 2007, becoming the first major mining project. Kenmare Resources is an Irish mining company with its head office in Dublin.  Its principal activity is operation of the mineral sands complex at Moma with mining carried out through a dredging operation and immediate transport to ships carrying the minerals to global markets. The mine is located in a remote area of the province. Many workers have permanent homes in other parts of Nampula and intersperse lengthy periods of consecutive shifts at the mine site with long blocks of time off.

Kenmare, like all the extractive companies, presented itself to both government and community leaders as a source of local employment for both direct employees and suppliers, as well as a bearer of local development.[4] Even during construction, hopes faded with the arrival of sub-contractors, all bringing foreign workers. The problems in the construction phase were similar to those at Mozal. On March 23, 2007, for example, Mozambican construction workers employed by one of Kenmare’s sub-contractors,  Kentz Engineering, rioted violently at the remote mine site. The main issue was non-compliance with Mozambican labour law on severance pay.  Workers had contracts for indeterminate periods and, by law, were owed severance on project completion. Another issue was retention of white workers while higher-qualified Mozambicans were terminated. Responses by company, government and union were predictable. The Kenmare director urged Kentz to comply with Mozambican labour law. The provincial Ministry of Labour sent investigators. The government sent armed troops. (WAMPHULA 2007)  SINTICIM, the construction workers union, was silent.

Workers in the remote Kenmare mine had created their own independent union to deal with work issues, only later affiliating with SINTICIM. The Kenmare workers carried out two rounds of bargaining with the company in which they made significant gains. They also carried out a work stoppage in April 2011 with demands around salary scales, job classifications and compliance with Mozambican labour law.  The workers only agreed to suspend the action after a tri-partite commission of three members each from company, union and government was formed to resolve the issues.

The union’s 2012 bargaining proposals were prepared with care, including skype consultations with a Brazilian health and safety expert met at one of the earlier tri-national exchanges. The proposals included a 40% salary increase, a 13th month salary, a medical plan and a phased replacement of foreign workers with Mozambicans.  The SINTICIM General Secretary made last minute contact ordering postponement until his arrival.  The union bargaining committee opted to proceed as planned, briefing the SG on arrival but limiting his role to advisor only.  Bargaining reached an impasse and the union took a strike vote, all as prescribed under labour law. Kenmare came back to the table. After several tense days with the strike threat hovering, a settlement was reached with workers gaining much more than Kenmare’s initial offer.  Meanwhile, the Mozambican government had ordered armed police to the mine site.  

The Kenmare workers were jubilant about their victory, won entirely through their own efforts.  They began to question continued dues payment to a union that offered them nothing in return. The dues were being deducted at source and sent directly by Kenmare to SINTICIM.  Ninety percent stayed with national and provincial SINTICIM offices with only ten percent reverting to the union at plant level, and even that arrived only sporadically.  Meanwhile  the SINTICIM national and provincial offices provided no services, no legal support to defend against disciplinary charges and dismissals, no economic studies to support bargaining, no training except when a foreign donor financed a course, no information or communication tools.

The Kenmare Union Committee decided to instruct the company to start paying the dues into a newly-opened Kenmare Union Committee account.  They collected the more than 300 signatures necessary to ratify their decision to terminate their affiliation with SINTICIM. The ratification signatures were sent to the Ministry of Labour, Kenmare and SINTICIM.  There was no immediate reaction – nor has there been since.

Shortly thereafter, however, the SINTICIM Secretary General expelled two of the elected executive members of the Union Committee at Kenmare. The SINTICIM SG informed the mining company of the expulsions, and claimed that the local union Secretary’s participation in a conference and training programme with Canadian Steelworkers six months earlier had actually been a clandestine visit, unauthorized by SINTICIM.  Furthermore, he accused the Secretary of deceiving the company and stealing union dues. Finally he accused the Secretary of “contacts and involvements with a foreign organization which has shown itself to be manifestly against the implementation of the investment projects for the economic and social development of Mozambique and for its fight against poverty. This foreign organization makes use of emails and Facebook to carry out its intentions, including recruitment of foreigners coming from Canada, Brazil and…South Africa.” (Timana: 2012).  

These were thinly veiled references to the Steelworkers, with whom SINTICIM had had cooperation projects for more than a decade.  The “foreigners” were, in fact, the trade unionists from Canada, Brazil and South Africa who had participated in the tri-national health and safety seminars from 2010 – 2012 as a gesture of international solidarity.  In the same way that Numsa’s collaboration with the new Union Committee at Mozal was labelled as foreign interference and rejected by SINTIME in 2001, the collaboration of Canadian and Brazilian and South African unions to strengthen the new unions in the mines was labelled as foreign interference by SINTICIM in 2012.

Kenmare promptly dismissed both the local union head and the treasurer, presumably grateful to SINTICIM for providing ammunition for dismissal of worker leaders who had just won some victories in a round of tough bargaining. The remaining elected leaders were threatened with further dismissals if they questioned SINTICIM’s actions, including its arbitrary appointment of substitutes for those dismissed.  With their jobs on the line and the combined forces of company, government and union all aligned against them, the Kenmare workers backed down, leaving an atmosphere of resentment and fear at the mine. 

Mining Case Study 4: Worker and Community Struggles Against Jindal

The tumultuous history of Jindal Steel and Power, the Indian transnational working the newest of the big coal mines in Tete, began even before its formal opening in August 2013. Jindal is a diversified industrial conglomerate which has operations in 13 countries in Africa. Jindal Africa is headquartered in Johannesburg.  Like Vale, Jindal is a flagship company of one of the BRICS and tries to portray its investments within the framework of South-South solidarity.

There was widespread labour unrest in November 2012, even prior to Jindal’s opening, which resulted in intervention by the Ministry of Labour and expulsion of two Indian directors.

Mozambique’s Minister of Labour, Helena Taipo, has cancelled the work permits of two Indian citizens, Manoj Kumar Pandey and Ram Many Pandey, with immediate effect….  The two men were the director of human resources and the coordinator of operations of the company MGC, which has been subcontracted by the Indian company, Jindal Steel and Power, for work on its coal mining concession…. The two Indians are accused of repeated violations of the Labour Law and of the Mozambican Constitution. … they mistreated and insulted the 250 Mozambicans working at the company.  They also made “false promises” to the Mozambican workers, and failed to provide them with work contracts and with protective equipment.  No record was kept of overtime worked, and neither the company not its workers were registered with the National Social Security Institute (INSS).  Furthermore, the company did not provide any clean drinking water for its workers. The behaviour of the MGC management led to a strike last week…. The two Indians even denied access to the company premises to the brigades sent by the provincial government and the police who were attempting to reach a solution to the workers’ grievances. (Club of Mozambique; 2012)

Less than a year later, on July 22 and 23, 2013, the issues of the Jindal workers and the residents of the rural community around the mine erupted.  People from four communities congregated at the Jindal office. Two of these communities were directly affected by the open mine pit. The crowd attacked the Jindal staff members, wounding one in his office and three in their homes.  Neither the Jindal security guards nor the three adjacent police posts could calm the agitated crowd.

Jindal was accused of broken promises. On arrival in 2008, Jindal had promised no coal extraction before resettlement but resettlement location and date were still pending. Jindal had promised no farm occupation without negotiation but had, in fact, occupied land with crops ready for harvest. Jindal had promised a full environmental impact assessment.  None had been done. Jindal had promised to build wells and water supply. None had been built. People found themselves prisoners in their own land, locked inside the mining concession, suffering the dangers and pollution of living within a functioning open pit coal mine. All of this notwithstanding, President Armando Guebuza presided over the formal opening on August 13, just a month later.

In January 2015, the workers carried out their third work stoppage since the mine opened. Some 250 workers decided to shut down the mine to force Jindal and government to deal with a series of alleged labour injustices. The grievances against Jindal and its lack of compliance with Mozambican labour law were many.  The issues included contracts of only six months duration, salaries incompatible with those in other coal mines in Tete, huge distinctions between Mozambican and expatriate salaries, unequal pay for equal work among the Mozambicans, irregularities in social security payments, no health and safety equipment, no registration of overtime hours, abusive behaviour by management, hiring illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe and Zambia for lower pay, sub-standard housing, food and sanitary conditions for workers, just to name a few. A recent lengthy report on Jindal in the Mozambican weekly, Savana, quotes an Indian manager as having said aloud that the Mozambicans had nothing to complain about because they lived in a poor country with few alternatives for survival and should be thanking God for what they were earning. (Savana 2015)

Raul Senda, the Savana reporter, likened the situation he found at Jindal to modern slavery.  Jindal representatives were unavailable for comment and the provincial labour department said it was writing a report on the situation. (Savana 2015) If the reporter had asked the Jindal workers about the union’s role, he would have learned that, in fact, the Jindal workers have refused to have anything to do with the SINTICIM provincial secretary and resisted all his efforts to form a local Union Committee affiliated to SINTICIM in their mine.

21st Century Strikes and Protests

Can workers in contemporary Mozambique actually look to trade union structures and the instruments enshrined in the labour law like collective bargaining and strikes to defend themselves from the arbitrary power of multinational investors, all with strong government backing?  An astute observer of labour history in Mozambique offers insights into the nature of trade unions in Mozambique and even suggests that the “fascist unions” of the colonial era and the “socialist unions” had much in common.

Neither was formed through demands from the workers acting to protect their interests. Both were the fruits of public policies of regimes which, although different…sought total control over workers’ actions….Both the so-called fascist unions and the so-called socialist unions  felt the weight of the state on top of them with rigid control mechanisms and lack of worker autonomy that impeded any flowering of real trade unionism in the classic sense….The workers themselves always remained distant from the decision-making processes of the unions since all the union leaders and their ability to function depended on the state (colonial fascist and post-colonial socialist). (Colaco 2001:105)

Are the unions in neoliberal Mozambique any different?  The new freedom of trade union organization law adopted in 1991 came about not because of demands by workers at the base but because the IMF and World Bank made political pluralism a conditionality for financial assistance, including greater trade union freedom. Three of the affiliates of the existing central, OTM, did break away to form a second central, CONSILMO. Despite widespread notions of the new central as being more independent from – or even anti-government, both centrals have maintained the practices of the earlier eras. As the case studies of Mozal and Kenmare illustrate, neither SINTIME, an OTM affiliate, nor SINTICIM, a CONSILMO affiliate, was prepared to back a new generation of workers trying to use existing union structures to defend themselves and further their interests. Both aligned themselves with the now neoliberal government to defend multinational investors.

While the Union Committee representing workers at the BHP aluminum smelter has managed over the years to gain control over a significant part of the monthly dues payments which are used, among other things, to retain a group of lawyers to defend workers faced with disciplinary charges or dismissals, other groups of workers gain nothing from their union affiliation. As noted previously, Kenmare workers got so fed up that 300 of them signed a document affirming a desire to disaffiliate. Although duly received by Kenmare, Ministry of Labour and SINTICIM, the document was never acknowledged, much less acted upon. Two of the elected Union Committee leaders were dismissed shortly thereafter on trumped up charges.

For many workers, then, availing themselves of the formal union structures has proved fruitless. Random work stoppages organized through cell phones and text messages with no visible leadership tend to give more results. Recently the Minister of Labour recognized a new union central in the extractive sector, SINTEL. While its statement of principles includes more power in the hands of the Union Committees at workplace level and stronger links with other social movements, it is finding itself up against formidable foes. These include not only the triumvirate of transnational companies, the Mozambican state and the “residual” unions, all of whom will be quick to react negatively to a new union vigorously defending workers’ rights and interests. They will also be hampered by their own inexperience of genuine trade unionism and the lack of a strong labour and social movement culture to draw from and give them support. 

Mozambique state commitment to a development strategy based on wooing TNC investors is unwavering.  The rights of workers and peasant farmers cannot be allowed to get in the way. Past revolutionary credentials notwithstanding, the liberation movement leaders in power in 21st century in Mozambique, and indeed in the other countries in southern Africa, exemplify the failings of post-independence leaders in Africa as captured so scathingly by Algerian psychologist Frantz Fanon in 1961:

The national middle class discovers its historic mission: that of intermediary.  Seen through its eyes, its mission has nothing to do with transforming the nation; it consists prosaically, of being the transmission lines between the nation and a capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the masque of neo-colonialism. The national bourgeoisie will be quite content with the role of the Western bourgeoisie’s business agent, and it will play its part without any complexes in a most dignified manner.  But the same lucrative role, this cheap-jack’s function, this meanness of outlook and this absence of all ambition symbolize the incapability of the national middle class to fulfill its historic role as a bourgeoisie.  (Fanon 1966: 124)

Mere Survival Strategies or a New Citizen Protagonism?

Most Mozambicans are among the poor and dispossessed of the planet, disposable to make way for the mega-projects that siphon out finite resources for world markets. Mozambican peasant farmers are apparently invisible to their own government as it colludes with foreign investors for land grabs of “unoccupied” areas for mines and agro-industry.

Yet despite all of the obstacles, the 21st century has seen a growing resistance in Mozambique. A new generation of workers has tried to make use of the existing unions, despite the heavy weight of corrupt and inept residual structures and the closeness of union-government relationships.  Several young union leaders have lost their jobs for doing so. When legal strikes do not work, the workers revert to wildcat strikes and impromptu work stoppages. When the levels of injustice and arbitrariness get too much, they revert to destroying company property or products.  Communities of peasant producers throughout rural Mozambique who have been robbed of their lands and livelihoods and independence in order to make way for megaprojects in mining and agri-business are also inventing practical ways to say “enough is enough”. They stop the trains carrying coal to the port for export. They block roads and rails and entrances, forcing production to a halt in the mines and plantations. They internationalize their situation through social media and global civil society events and counter-events.

Amidst the changing patterns of protest and discontent, a broader spirit of resistance and vision of alternatives is beginning to emerge. The sense of dispossession may be most acute for those subjected to land grabs for mines and agro-exports, but there is a growing awareness of dispossession on the urban streets which is felt as much in Maputo as in São Paulo or Athens.  The pervasive neoliberal ideology has persuaded governments everywhere to adopt austerity, which means cuts in social sector spending and abdication of responsibility for the basic needs of its citizens for jobs, food, housing, health care and transport.  In Mozambique, the post-independence gains in schooling, health and housing are now a distant memory. For many, having a job just means joining the “working poor” rather than the “jobless poor”.  Free, universal education has come to mean overcrowded schools, underpaid teachers and constant demands for money from home. Some of it is for books, uniforms and pencils but there are also demands for money for everything from the school electricity bill to student outings. Many parents understand these requests to be coming from teachers-turned-traders. The money extracted from parents supplements the teachers’ inadequate incomes. The doctor’s examination is futile when there is no means of buying the prescribed medications. The sense of abandonment by the state is profound. It is exacerbated in Maputo by dispossession from the streets themselves, all forced to scramble for safety from cavalcades of expensive cars with sirens marking the passage of a member of the elite, moving from government office to palatial home to international conference centre.    

An important new aspect of these contemporary forms of resistance in Mozambique is that they are not neatly understandable within what may be referred to as a “vertical topography of power”.  The 20th century view of resistance tended to pit ‘local’ unions and communities with “authentic” leaders organizing at the “grassroots” against a repressive state encompassing both imperial capitalism and local dominant classes.  Resistance was played out within national boundaries. (Ferguson 2006: 106).  

This image of resistance from below and repression from above, however, misses the horizontality of the contemporary world.  Transnational corporations today exercise their global power through horizontal flows rather than the more vertical concepts of nation states.  The enclaves of the extractive sector, far from promoting national development, tend to disorganize national economic spaces as they create more horizontal global ones with their supply chains and their self-sufficient operational networks linking various continents and supra-national trade and banking institutions. 

Civil society organizations have also begun to work these horizontal spaces, thereby creating new instruments of governmentality. The nation-state is not replaced; instead it now co-exists and interacts with this new apparatus of global civil society which, for its part, invents new forms of struggle. Organizations and movements with global images and links to global networks create mechanisms of governmentality operating outside and/or parallel to the national state. While they may represent grass roots concerns, the power they exercise goes beyond the local. Through claims related to such issues as stewardship of the planet or protection of universal human rights, they operate from a wider global spatial and moral purview than just that of a national state. 

Mozambican organizations now have connections, whether operating alone, or in networks, or as part of civil society organizations with a global presence. These range from Friends of the Earth to Via Campesina to Amnesty International to UN civil society platforms.  These new structures of horizontal governmentality tackle the supra-national institutions that today buttress neoliberal capitalism, from transnational corporations themselves to trade and investment agreements, the transnational apparatus of banks, international agencies and other  lobbying and market institutions.

As we have seen, the workers and communities affected by Vale are venturing into these horizontal structures to take their resistance forward. Organizations in Mozambique are connected to the International Articulation of People Affected by Vale, for example. This means giving and receiving information regularly with other workers and communities affected by Vale in Brazil itself but also in Canada, New Caledonia, Peru and Indonesia. The network members write counter reports to Vale’s annual Sustainability Report, they intervene in Vale Annual General Meetings with its directors and shareholders, they campaigned globally to have Vale named the Worst Company in the World at Davos in 2012.  

The resistance to ProSavana is being propelled forward partly through Via Campesina, a global structure linking agricultural producers.  Mozambique has already hosted an international Via Campesina meeting in Maputo. Strong connections with Brazil’s powerful Landless People’s Movement already existed when ProSavana came onto the agenda of struggle.  This helped in organizing a new form of resistance, the Triangular Peoples Conferences involving civil society groups from Brazil. Japan and Mozambique, the three countries whose governments are supporting the project.

Pope Francis’ extraordinary initiatives through the Pontifical Justice and Peace Commission constitute a new part of this emerging global apparatus of governmentality.  Mozambican activists were among the more than 100 representatives of the poor and excluded at the first World Meeting of Popular Movements in October 2014 in Rome. A second meeting was held in July 2015 in Bolivia with 1500 activists. In August, there was another gathering in Rome co-organized with the Churches and Mining network. The Pope’s message included a call for a paradigm shift in global mining. In the same month, 60 mayors were invited to Rome to strategize about climate change and how to urge national governments to take stronger positions. 

Through these initiatives, Pope Francis is establishing a new supranational moral discourse around economic institutions and financial systems that create widespread poverty and discard the poor that promote mindless consumerism and a throw-away culture while destroying the earth, our common home. These initiatives with their universal moral imperative create new, horizontal spaces of contestation. The claims transcend national states and engage with institutions where power is being exercised from transnational corporations themselves to market and banking institutions and investment protection treaties.

The challenge is to invent new discourses that capture 21st century realities and find forms of protest that target the points where power is being exercised with greatest impunity and where inequality and destruction of the planet are being exacerbated most blatantly. These resistance strategies may be triggered by desperation and survival strategies. They gain momentum, however, from a wider sense of dispossession in contemporary capitalism. It may be most acute through the increasing land grabs by aggressive mining, oil and agro-business investors. As Occupy Wall Street revealed, however, there is also a strong sense of dispossession among the 99% more generally. In Mozambique, it may focus on the loss of the post-independence entitlements for all to citizenship, dignity, land, housing, education and health care. These hard-won rights are now being given away to foreign companies by a government that has ceased to assert national sovereignty. In Canada, it may focus on remembered securities of the post-war welfare state with life time jobs and cradle to grave social programmes and secure pensions.  Wherever the resistance is rooted, it points to the urgent need to question the supremacy of the market as determinant of global well-being and halt the corporate insistence that tries to commodify everything. 

While the resistance strategies may be triggered by the need to survive, they also carry in them the seeds of a different approach to building more democratic compassionate societies with more popular protagonism and more effective ways to care for the planet. The 21st century strikes, bread riots and blockades in Mozambique can take their place proudly as part of the broader panoply of global resistance at a moment in history characterized by grotesque rich-poor disparities and unregulated corporate power.

Judith Marshall is a Canadian labour educator, writer and global activist who has traveled extensively in Africa and Latin America.  She worked in the Ministry of Education in Mozambique for 8 years and on her return to Canada, wrote her doctoral thesis on a literacy campaign in a Mozambican factory. She has recently retired after working for 20 years in the Department of Global Affairs and Workplace Issues of the Canadian Steelworkers union.

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Notes

[1] The mini-case studies of worker and community resistance that follow are based on situations  that I monitored closely in my role as coordinator of the Steelworkers Humanity Fund’s programme in Africa from 1993-2013.  The Steelworkers international development and solidarity fund gave annual support to training projects with SINTICIM, the construction and mining union, starting in the mid-1990s.  In 2009, SINTICIM requested hands-on collaboration from USW in health and safety training with a focus on the new mining unions. This placed me in a “participant-observer” position during a crucial period. The depiction of resistance in the new mining communities draws heavily on these experiences.

[2] Former President Joaquim Chissano is mentioned frequently as one of the unidentified Mozambican shareholders in the Vale project. .

http://www.pambazuka.net/pt/category.php/development/55527/print

[3] For a fuller account, see Marshall 2014

[4] For a more comprehensive study of the Kenmare mine, see Brynildsen, Oygunn Sundsbe and Dioniso Nombora (2013) in their report entitled ‘Mining without development’.

 

Congo Binga: Notes on Burri’s Grande Sacco

By Meredeth Turshen

According to Emily Braun, curator of the Burri retrospective at the Guggenheim Museum in New York (October 9, 2015–January 6, 2016), this painting (a collage of burlap sacks – see below) was created in 1961 to commemorate thirteen Italian airmen murdered in the chaos of Congolese power struggles that followed independence from Belgium.  This account can be traced to a review of an exhibit of Alberto Burri’s work at the Houston Museum of Fine Arts in 1963.  The massacre occurred in mid-November 1961 in Kindu, a town in South Kivu, an eastern province of DR Congo that sits just above copper-rich Katanga. ONUC, the United Nations Operation in Congo, sent the Italians there to deliver supplies to a unit of Malaysian troops. Congolese soldiers loyal to Antoine Gizenga, who supported Patrice Lumumba (assassinated on January 17, 1961 in Lubumbashi), apparently mistook the Italians for parachutists fighting with Moïse Tshombe, leader of the Katanga secession.

Burri

 Alberto Burri’s Grande Sacco: Congo Binga was a commemoration to thirteen Italian airmen murdered in Kindu, 1961

The pieces of burlap are arranged in quadrants to create a central cross. The patch on the lower right is stamped Congo Binga, the name of a plantation town on a tributary of the Congo River in Equateur Province, some 850km northwest of Kindu where the murders occurred. How ironic that a sack from a Congo plantation, the sort of workplace where millions of Africans had died at the hands of Belgian colonists, should be used to memorialize thirteen Italian pilots!

Binga plantation belonged to the Lever palm oil monopoly. Jules Marchal, writing about colonial exploitation in Congo, notes that the war years, 1940-45, were the apogee of forced labour on such plantations. The Belgian Congo concluded an agreement with London to supply palm oil, which was at the top of their list of necessary raw materials to produce cooking oil, soap, margarine and cosmetics. To get the palm nuts, Africans had to scale trees 15-20 metres in height; they were expected to cut fruit and supply 150 crates monthly, each weighing 35 kilos. They were paid derisory sums for this arduous and dangerous work; even the Belgians admitted that the men were underpaid. Cutters were also compelled to cultivate certain crops (cotton, foodstuffs, palm trees); failure to meet the quotas was punished with prison sentences, and in prison the chicotte (rawhide whip) was still in use in 1959.

Alberto Burri (1915-1995) dropped out of school in 1935 to enlist in Benito Mussolini’s campaign to expand the Italian empire in Africa (Asab, 1869; Massawa, 1885; Somalia, 1888; Eritrea, 1890; Libya, 1894; Ethiopia, 1936). Burri fought in Ethiopia, a campaign that illegally used mustard gas and phosgene and claimed the lives of three-quarters of a million Ethiopians by the end of the world war – an estimated 7 per cent of the population. After completing his medical degree in 1940, Burri went on to fight in the 102nd Black Shirt Battalion’s invasion of Albania (annexed by Italy in 1939) and the Axis campaign in North Africa. He was captured in Tunisia by the British in May 1943; Mussolini was deposed 25 July 1943 and died 28 April 1945. Turned over to the Americans, Burri was shipped to a POW camp in Hereford, Texas. There he took advantage of arts and crafts classes and learned to paint.  The Americans urged the imprisoned Italians to sign a pledge of allegiance to the Allies, but Burri was one of some 900 officers who refused to change sides.

There is no account of how a burlap sack from Binga came into Burri’s hands; he usually obtained his materials from a mill in his hometown Città di Castello, a city located in the north Umbrian province of Perugia.  In 1960, the plantation would have been producing palm oil, coffee, cocoa and rubber—perhaps a sack of Binga coffee beans made its way to Rome. Mobutu Sese Soko acquired the site following his ‘Zairianization’ of foreign enterprises in 1974, one of fourteen that made up CELZA (Cultures et élévages du Zaïre). The plantation was still productive in January 1999, during the Second Congo War, when Jean-Pierre Bemba (Mouvement pour la libération du Congo) and General James Kazini (a Ugandan army officer who served as commander of the Uganda People’s Defense Force 2001-2003) organized a large operation to confiscate tons of coffee beans, an example of the stripping of Congo assets by Uganda and Rwanda. Binga was all but defunct by the time its current owner acquired it in 2004; he is an American named Elwyn Blattner who heads the Groupe Blattner Elwyn, a vast enterprise of palm oil, rubber and forestry businesses based in Kinshasa.

Alberto Burri went on to become a major figure in postwar art. In 1955 he married the American dancer Minsa Craig (sister-in-law to Studs Terkel, the popular American oral historian) and lived in both the US and Italy. In the late 1950s Burri shifted from sacks to materials fabricated for shelter, critical to economic infrastructure: cheaply manufactured wood veneer, industrial plastics, sheet metal and Celotex insulation board.  Through this use of architectural materials Burri’s art is close to architecture. Architecture had played a seminal role in the advancement of Fascist ideologies, and many art critics have speculated on the meaning of Burri’s use of an oxy-acetylene torch to destroy these materials.

Congo Binga is neither the most imaginative nor the most lyrical of Burri’s sacchi. It does, however, speak eloquently of Italian, African and colonial history.

Meredeth Turshen is a Professor in the Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy at Rutgers University. Her research interests include international health and she specializes in public health policy. She has recently published Gender and the political economy of conflict in Africa: the persistence of violence.

 

 

Chiadzwa Diamond Fields: Unprecedented Plunder

By Raymond Sango

In 2008 at the height of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe thousands of unemployed youths flooded the Chiadzwa mining area in what was a dramatic ‘diamond rush’ following the expiration of DeBeers mining licence in 2006 and the cancellation of Africa Consolidated Resources’ mining licence. DeBeers had plundered diamonds at Chiadzwa for roughly 13 years using its ‘Exclusive Prospecting Orders’ (EPOS). The international diamond mining company covertly expropriated thousands of tonnes of diamonds under the guise of exploration samples, crushed rock samples and kimberlitic rock samples.

The unemployed youths who later descended on Chiadzwa in 2008 to pan for diamonds were brutally massacred by the military and police as the government moved in to create a ‘formal looting format’ ,  partially in response to the World Diamond Council which pressured the government to curb the smuggling of diamonds. Approximately four hundred miners were killed in 2008 through indiscriminate volleys of gunshots fired by mounted police accompanied by dogs and helicopter.

Soon afterwards seven private entities began operations at the mine: Marange Resources, Anjin Investments Ltd, Diamond Mining Company, Gyn Nyame Resources, Jinan Mining Ltd, Kusena Diamonds, and Mbada Diamonds. Ownership of these companies was a joint venture with the state. Chiadzwa is a devastating exposé of the reality of Mugabe’s so-called radical pan-Africanism while displaying the regimes commitment to international business. Hundreds of unemployed youths were massacred and thousands driven away to pave the way for an ‘efficient’ model of capital accumulation.

It has been estimated that the Chiadzwa diamond fields account for 13 percent of global rough diamond supply and that the aggregate worth of all the diamonds at the field is between US$60 billion and US$70 billion. Government estimations have spoken of diamond production earning the state US$600 million in monthly revenue in the aftermath of the Kimberly Process Certification in 2012. Rough projections on diamond production at Chiadzwa by the Ministry of Mines put a figure of US$1 billion in diamond revenue for the year 2012 alone and an increase in subsequent years to US$3 billion. Diamonds have the potential, the government claimed, to produce enough capital to generate employment and fund education, health and retool industries. The truth is very different.

Yet the ‘looting’ partnership between government bureaucrats, Chinese and other foreign companies has limited the potential of diamond production to improve the lives of ordinary Zimbabweans. At one point Minister of Mines, Walter Chidhakwa responded to the rampant pillaging of diamonds, explaining that he would ‘rather halt mining operations if mining companies continue to fleece government through understating of the stones.’ In February this year Chidhakwa argued that during the brief period of artisanal mining at Chiaadzwa which was soon broken by repression, diamond mining had a significantly larger multiplier effect on the economy than during the period of joint ventures between the state and the Chinese firms. This is quite an admission.

There have been a number of noticeable and recorded encounters to illustrate the depth of the plunder of diamonds such as the disappearances of sacks full of diamonds and inconsistencies between the price the diamonds have been sold at and the figures sent to the government. In 2015 Lovemore Kirotwi, the Director of Core Mining and Minerals and Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Diamond Technology Centre was charged with defrauding US$2 billion through covert and underhand dealings in the diamond industry. Transfer pricing, trade mis-invoicing, and capital flight through the repatriation of profits by Anjin Investments Ltd, one of the leading companies in the area. Undeclared profits were repatriated to China and local elites to secret bank accounts in South Africa, Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands and other areas. Far from the vision of diamond mining being used to improve the lives of the poor.

Conservative estimates of the loot drained by government bureaucrats working in concert with Chinese companies repeat the figure of US$16 billion, which is money lost to corruption, an amount which surpasses the US$11 billion in debts Zimbabwe owes to both domestic and internal creditors. The history of Chiadzwa diamond fields and other nearby areas such as Chimanimani is replete with deep-seated pillaging by both foreign and domestic capitalist elites. From the secret theft of diamonds by DeBeers from the 1990s to the sophisticated looting by Chinese companies working in concert with the state and elites in the army and ZANU PF.

Realizing the possibility of resistance emerging in Chiadzwa and as part of the regimes’ Indigenization and Economic Empowerment policy, the mining companies and the state launched the Zimunya-Marange Community Share Ownership Trust. This was an effort to win over the poor seething with anger as they helplessly watch billions being made and expropriated from their own land as they were forcibly relocated to other areas.

The recent ‘realization’ of the extent of the pillage occurring at Chiadzwa by the state and the threat of a halt to mining operations has been provoked by the current political dynamics inside ZANU PF and  the global price of  diamonds. We have seen the recent annihilation by a faction calling itself the G-40 of two groups within ZANU PF, one of these factions has now created a party using the name, Zimbabwe People First, led by former Vice President Joyce Mujuru and the other faction is led by Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa.  This expresses the power struggles which are at play at the Chiadzwa diamond fields.

Although there is systematic corruption at Chiadzwa, as we have seen, this is being used by factions in the government to justify the ejection of corrupt companies. The forced amalgamation of all the firms under the Zimbabwe Diamond Mining Corporation, is part of a concerted effort by the state and ruling elites, aligned to the First Lady, Grace Mugabe, to wipe clean the diamond fields of all their enemies and to enfeeble the internal rebellion in the party by cutting the source of funding to their feeding trough. So state intervention under the pretext of addressing corruption is not genuine.

Another dynamic which is at play is the global commodity price fluctuations which have hit the diamond industry hard. As an extractive industry it has been the core force in recent years of ZANU PF electioneering strategy and also at the centre of its patronage system. The fall in the demand of diamonds has among other reasons meant a curtailment of investment in Chiadzwa. This has led to reduced output of diamonds. The fall in demand has increased demands made by ZANU PF for the ‘lions share’ in diamond mining, as President Robert Mugabe has explained in a recent interview. Faced with an unrelenting economic crisis the thinking within the state has shifted towards a greater level of nationalisation to stimulate the economy and derail the impending decisive economic explosion.

If there is acknowledgement that there has been serious plunder at Chiadzwa diamond fields, a commission of inquiry should be opened to investigate and expose those who were responsible with appropriate legal measures being instituted against the criminals. Civil society, trade unions and community organisations should unite in their demand for an end of corruption at Chiadzwa but also the nationalization and appropriation of all the properties of those who were involved in the looting. The failures of private capital have been laid bare and there is currently a pressing need to insist on the public ownership of Chiadzwa, placing the mines under the control of the miners themselves. If the Minister of Mines agrees that artisanal mines fared better than private capital, as he stated in February, then a lot more can be achieved by organized workers running Chiadzwa. Perhaps this is the only way real justice can be found for those massacred in 2008.

Raymond Sango is an activist and writer from Zimbabwe, he carries out research on the country’s political economy for the Zimbabwe Labour Centre. He was a participant at last years joint ROAPE/JSAS conference in Zambia and an interview with him can be found here.

Featured photograph: Julien Harneis

Radical Engagement: an interview with Issa Shivji

An interview with Issa Shivji

ROAPE: Firstly, could you briefly tell me what was your role in the Review and in what context?

Issa Shivji: A good number of comrades who started ROAPE, then called RAPE, were from Dar es Salaam or had passed through Dar es Salaam. We had participated together in intellectual and ideological struggles on the University of Dar es Salaam Campus. I was a student in law from 1967-1970 and then a young faculty member in the Faculty of Law.

I did not have a direct role in the founding of ROAPE but was closely connected with the founders and we often exchanged notes. I remember that I encouraged my students who had done brilliant work on the post-Mwongozo working class struggles to send their papers to ROAPE which were published. Similarly, reporting and analysis of the struggle of students in the late seventies was also published in ROAPE. In that sense, ROAPE played an important role in disseminating intellectual work and struggles across the continent and to progressive audiences outside Africa.

ROAPE: How would you assess the contribution of ROAPE in the last forty year? Considering the powerful and clarion appeal to action, practice and radical analysis in the first issue.

IS: The Editorial in the first issue was undoubtedly a clarion call for concrete analysis of concrete conditions for concrete action. It came from the womb of the struggles from which the founders had come. In hindsight, it was perhaps ambitious, even naïve, but, then, sounded real, feasible and an honest illustration of theoretical praxis. I didn’t see anything wrong with it then or now.  It also unabashedly proclaimed that the Journal will not be eclectic nor pander to bourgeois intellectual fashions; rather it will be guided by Marxist theory – certainly not in any dogmatic or “partisan” fashion – yet maintaining a class stand and outlook of the working people.

But a Journal based in Europe, unconnected with real-life social struggles on the ground in any direct way, obviously could not consistently do what it set out to do. Over a period of time, it did become and has become a left academic journal, broadly progressive, nonetheless eclectic in the content of articles it publishes. This is not to say that it has not made a worthwhile contribution. The Journal carried fine analytical pieces bearing directly or indirectly on struggles. In its debating and reporting pages it gave exposure to accounts of struggles which helped in forging solidarities and mutual support.  I doubt though if it has, or even, could participate fully in the ideological debates taking place on the continent, say, for example, in the 1980s.

ROAPE: ROAPE covered both the development of structural adjustment and the economic crisis in the late 1970s and 1980s, but also the resistance to it. In this period the radical liberation movements of the 1970s became marginalised, under multiple and ultimately irresistible pressures. How would you chart the developments in African political-economy since the journal was founded? To what extent is such a project for transformation relevant today?

IS: To answer your last question first: yes, because the “project of transformation”, as you call it, does not ever become irrelevant! But I chuckled on reading that phrase of yours: in the 1960s and 1970s we would have called it by its true name, ‘Revolution’, not as a project, but real life struggles of the working masses. It seems to me that much of the language and vocabulary – imperialism, revolution, liberation, etc. – became “profane” words with the onslaught of neo-liberal ideology on the right, and post-modernism on the left. Some of that vocabulary is still lingering on ….

I guess I have partly answered the first part of the question. Under neo-liberalism, radical political economy also went out of the window – instead many of us, radical intellectuals, were swallowed up by human rights, policy analysis, poverty reduction, etc on the theoretical/ideological plane, and by NGO-type activism on the terrain of practice and struggle.  During this period any analysis grounded in a rigorous theoretical framework even in the academia was dismissed by neo-liberals as irrelevant and star-gazing while by some post-modernists as mega-narratives that had overstayed their usefulness.

On the whole, though, as neo-liberalism teeters towards its end, methods of radical political economy, albeit, of course, in a more creative fashion, are coming back. I think the younger generation is groping for answers and mainstream bourgeois economics and political prescriptions do not give them answers. It is the bigger picture they want to understand. By definition, mainstream bourgeois theories in the era of financial capitalism are incapacitated from dealing with the bigger picture. The ideologists of the financial oligarchy have so much ideologised the bigger picture that their theoreticians have become prisoners of their own ideology.

ROAPE: What is the project of radical political economy on the continent in 2016? How should ROAPE and its contributors and supporters engage with such a project?

IS: The answer to this will be too prescriptive, perhaps presumptuous and self-indulgent. Like others, I am trying to find my feet in the new, post-liberal environment and that can only be done in real life struggles, not in theoretical speculation.

ROAPE: What should the relationship, in a publication like ROAPE, be between academic analysis and study and activist engagement?

IS: Hunh! Aren’t you already positing a dichotomy, (between academic analysis and practical social struggles), which should be problematic for a radical perspective? It would sound cliché for me to say that academic analysis itself is, or should be, an activist engagement and activist engagement should flow from it.

ROAPE: Is it still feasible to envisage a project, as ROAPE did in the 1970s, of radical, continental transformation and a pan-African socialist future?

IS: Why not? Just as we have not seen the predicted “end of history”, we have not witnessed the “disappearance of imperialism”. African liberation and working people’s emancipation is very much on the agenda and so long as that is the case revolution is very much on the cards. One who thinks revolution is not feasible is not a revolutionary. When, how, where of course are questions at a different level. Those are not the kind of questions that you and me can truthfully answer in an interview, or in ROAPE, for that matter.

ROAPE: ROAPE.net, based in South Africa, is an attempt develop an online platform that can reach a new audience, including a large one in Africa who may not have access to the print issue. How do you envisage this initiative developing?

IS: I believe it is a good initiative. Perhaps it should move in the direction of a debating forum. We need to bring on board a lot of issues both of the theoretical and practical kind. My hope is that people involved on the ground would be attracted and would participate and share their experiences.  

Issa Shivji taught for years at the University of Dar es Salaam, Public law Department, and has written more than twenty books on Pan-Africanism, political economy, socialism and radical change in Africa. He is a longstanding member of ROAPE.

 

Uganda 2016: the Struggle to Win Acholi Minds

By Gabrielle Lynch

President Yoweri Museveni’s recent re-election in Uganda has prompted significant debate. According to official results, Museveni of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) won in the first round with 60.62 % of the popular vote. However, international election observers and diplomats have criticised the uneven playing field and house arrest of principal opposition candidate Kizza Besigye of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC); while the latter – who officially secured 35.61% – insists that he won.

However, most analysts assumed that, one way or the other, Museveni would be announced the victor. Thus, while an uneven playing field – together with various problems with the process (from the late opening of polling stations in Kampala to the opaque tallying process), repeated arrest of Besigye, and strategically placed security services – are a source of popular anger and frustration, they are not particularly surprising. As one man in Gulu lamented: ‘This is how elections are in Uganda.’

More surprising than Museveni’s grip on power, is the strength of the political opposition. It is widely accepted that FDC ran a lacklustre campaign in 2011, and just six months ago it was unclear whether Besigye would contest for a fourth time. However, once the FDC leader stepped forward, he quickly became the obvious choice for those tired of Museveni’s thirty year long rule.

Besigye’s resurgence was particularly striking in the Acholi sub-region of northern Uganda (made up of Agago, Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum, Lamwo, Nwoya and Pader districts). In 2006, Besigye secured 79.22% of this vote. However, in 2011, his support dropped to a mere 17.38% behind both Museveni (40.83%) and Norbert Mao of the Democratic Party (DP) (26.39%). In 2016, Mao opted to support Amama Mbabazi’s candidacy on a Go Forward ticket. Nevertheless, Besigye secured 42.03% of the sub-regional vote, as compared to Museveni’s 41.10% and Mbabazi’s 10.91%; and if the opposition’s claims of widespread malpractice are true, his share could be even higher.

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Photograph: Gabrielle Lynch

Clearly, NRM held on to much of the ground that they had won in 2011. However, they expended vast amounts of time and energy trying to improve on the same – a task in which they failed. Candidates and supporters spent more money than ever before – with money spent on posters, t-shirts, public address systems and mobilisers, but also on direct handouts to individuals, groups and associations. The NRM campaign also promised further goodies if the region voted for NRM candidates, and threatened economic marginalisation and even a military takeover in the case of an opposition victory; the latter constituting no idle threat in an area that is still recovering from a long and vicious war that involved abuses by both the Ugandan military and the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). Such intimidation was then reinforced by a visible security presence, and by the looming threat of potential violence at the hands of security officers, but also by Crime Preventers – a partisan community policing initiative. Finally, but not least, NRM claimed credit for bringing peace and stability to the region, and for various development projects – from the electrification of many rural areas to new roads and hospitals.

This campaign clearly persuaded significant numbers of people to vote for Museveni, but Besigye nevertheless edged ahead in the polls. This was despite the fact that FDC candidates and mobilisers had little money, and enjoyed none of the benefits of incumbency. So why did NRM’s money and threats fail to sway the local majority, and why did Besigye regain much of the ground he had lost in 2011?

In short, Besigye benefited from the force of the opposition’s principal campaign message; namely, that Museveni had overstayed, and that NRM was trying to use money and threats to impose weak leaders on the community. In turn, opposition politicians insisted that people should stay firm and brave, and elect strong leaders that could defend people’s interests. People were thus encouraged to take money from NRM candidates, but to view such gifts as something that should not buy five year’s in office. The idea, summarised in one Acholi saying, was simply that, while you can play with someone’s stomach, you cannot play with their brain.

In making this argument, opposition leaders pointed (amongst other things) to a series of land disputes, which they cast as attempted land grabs by well-connected individuals. The implication was that weak leaders would not only fail to improve on local service delivery, but would also facilitate further land grabs. This sense of impending threat was then interwoven with a narrative of past injustice where people from the west of Uganda were alleged to have reaped disproportionate benefits from Museveni’s rule, while the north had suffered gross injustices during the war and ongoing economic marginalisation. Local opposition leaders in turn calling for affirmative action, reparations and accountability.

Such reasoning resonated with popular understandings of the past and possible futures, and was bolstered by communal narratives of ‘good character’ – with emphasis placed on attributes such as honesty and bravery.

This message also benefited from shortcomings of the NRM’s campaign. Particularly problematic was the fact that, in clear breach of electoral laws, much of the gift giving was associated with a serving military officer. Worse still, with an officer who was widely disliked and alleged to have killed a prominent opposition activist back in 2002. The fact that the officer was also supporting a number of family members and an alleged lover, helped opposition politicians to present NRM efforts as a “family affair” that sought to entrench the interests of a few over and above the majority.

But why was it Besigye, and not Mbabazi, who gained ground, even though the latter was backed by the popular local leader Norbert Mao? First, Mbabazi’s character was also in question due to his association with grand corruption scandals. At the same time, Mao’s support proved half-hearted as he encouraged people to vote for Mbabazi, but also recognised that they might want to vote for Besigye, and insisted that the most important thing was that they reject Museveni. In addition, while FDC had taken time to develop party structures and to engage party mobilisers, Mbabazi’s Go Forward platform lacked an active presence on the ground. In this context, and as the reception of the FDC leader at rallies across the country suggested a two-horse race, Besigye emerged as the embodiment of a popular rejection of the status quo.

Such local level dynamics are interesting in and of themselves. However, they also highlight the inability of an overly simplistic notion of patron-client relations to explain local voting patterns. Ugandans did not simply reward the candidate who channelled the most resources down to the local level. Instead, campaigns were a matter of persuasion whereby candidates had to convince people that they were best placed to protect and further individual and collective interests. In this endeavour, NRM campaigned on a platform of incumbency – they had the power to distribute and deny resources, and to ensure peace and security. In contrast, the opposition campaigned on the need for change, and for strong leaders that could defend and promote community interests. Persuasive messages that left the Acholi vote divided.

Gabrielle Lynch is Associate Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Warwick in the UK

For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
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For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
We use cookies to collect and analyse information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customise content. By clicking into any content on this site, you agree to allow cookies to be placed. To find out more see our