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‘One Who Preferred Death to Imperialism’

On the anniversary of the assassination of the Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba on 17 January 1961, Brooks Marmon argues that the impact of the murder reverberated most strongly in the white settler dominated territories of southern Africa. The nationalists of Southern Rhodesia (today’s Zimbabwe) were disgusted by Lumumba’s death and the involvement of the officially departed colonial power. 

By Brooks Marmon

The political crisis that broke out in the Congo (today’s Democratic Republic of the Congo) almost immediately after independence from Belgium in 1960 has been widely invoked as a formative Cold War catastrophe that remade international diplomacy.  A series of seismic events in the early 1960s directed the attention of the world to the Congo, including the Katangese breakaway, the deployment of the first major UN peacekeeping force, and the mass flight of white colonials.  However, the assassination of Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba by the authorities of the self-proclaimed secessionist Republic of Katanga, with US and Belgian complicity, may have been the most consequential event within this sordid saga.

Lumumba’s violent demise stoked global outrage.  As Keisha Blain wrote, the killing of Lumumba backfired as it ‘drew worldwide attention to the evils of colonialism and neo-colonialism.’  Newly independent African capitals like Lagos and Accra erupted in condemnation of the murder while protestors stormed the United Nations in New York.  However, the impact of neo-imperialist machinations in the Congo arguably reverberated more strongly in the white settler dominated territories of southern Africa than in the capitals of the Cold War’s main protagonists.[1]

The nationalists of Southern Rhodesia (colonial Zimbabwe) were particularly influenced by Lumumba’s death and the visible hand of the US and the nominally departed colonial power.  At the time, Southern Rhodesia was the dominant member of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which linked it politically with Northern Rhodesia (contemporary Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi).  Through this body, Southern Rhodesia shared a lengthy border with the Congo.  Notably, the Congo was the first country in the vicinity of this Federation to attain independence under majority rule.

This geopolitical arrangement and the strength and influence of the era’s ‘wind of change’ ensured that Zimbabwe’s anti-colonial nationalists were deeply attuned to the successes and struggles of the Congo.  The impact of this fixation was a double-edged sword.  Congolese independence and Lumumba’s attempts to resist Western machinations made Zimbabwe’s nationalists more uncompromising in the pursuit of their struggle.  This militant turn was particularly timely.  Zimbabwe’s nationalist leadership had been resoundingly condemned by its members for initially agreeing to a new British brokered constitution that did not provide for a universal franchise less than a week before news of Lumumba’s death broke.[2] At the same time, Lumumba’s execution at the hands of the Western-backed Republic of Katanga contributed to the development of an emphasis on pan-African unity and a political culture that continues to cast a shadow over Zimbabwean politics.

Lumumba is Dead! Long Live Gizenga!  

Joshua Nkomo, the leader of the National Democratic Party (NDP), Southern Rhodesia’s main nationalist movement from 1960-61, met Patrice Lumumba at the first All Africa People’s Congress (AAPC) in Accra in late 1958.  The independence of the Congo a year and a half later was closely monitored by the NDP. Although the NDP does not appear to have been represented at the Congo’s independence festivities, the Party held a meeting to celebrate the occasion in Salisbury, the Southern Rhodesian capital.  After one particularly rousing speech, the audience erupted with cheers of, ‘long live Lumumba! Long live his supporters!’[3]

The abrupt dashing of this enthusiasm ensured that Lumumba’s death had profound resonance. When the ex-Premier’s death was cryptically revealed on 13 February 1961, several weeks after his actual murder, the NDP swiftly issued a strongly worded statement of condemnation.  Implicating ‘all major Western powers’ in the act, the Party called ‘for the instant dismissal of Mr. Hammarskjöld [UN Secretary-General] and simultaneously, the evacuation of the United Nations forces from the Congo.’[4]  February 19, the first Sunday after the announcement of the killing, was proclaimed Lumumba Day.

Democratic Voice, the NDP’s occasional broadsheet, released an issue on Lumumba Day.  It contained three articles and an editorial lamenting Lumumba’s passing, as well as an epitaph which read, ‘here lies the magnanimous soul of one who preferred death to Imperialism.’ [5] In one of the few articles in the periodical to be attributed to a specific NDP leader, NDP Secretary- General George Silundika spoke glowingly about Lumumba’s lasting contributions. He announced the NDP’s recognition of the government of Antoine Gizenga, a Lumumba deputy operating his own government in the Congo’s northeast. Silundika wrote that Lumumba’s legacy ‘survives as the most dynamic symbol, the greatest and purest inspiration of determination defiant of all forms of imperialism.’[6]

To mark Lumumba Day, the NDP convened at least seven meetings across the country, attended by thousands.[7] In Bulawayo, the colony’s second city, the NDP declared that the main nationalist meeting ground, Stanley Square, would be renamed Lumumba Square.[8] Members of the Party’s Women’s League observed Lumumba Day clad in all black, while representatives of its Youth Council sported black armbands and waved banners denouncing ‘Western Imperialism.’ The US was singled out for particularly vehement criticism.  Enos Nkala, NDP Deputy Secretary- General, bluntly proclaimed, ‘the death of Lumumba was caused by the American Government and their NATO allies under the guise of UNO [United Nations].’  He added that following independence, the US consulate in Salisbury would be closed.[9] This anti-American strand continued to flourish in the NDP’s successor, the Zimbabwe African People Union. Nkomo invoked the American role in Lumumba’s killing in 1963 when faced with the formation of a breakaway group, the Zimbabwe African National Union (Zimbabwe’s current ruling party) that he thought was supported by the US.[10]

The other main target of the NDP’s ire was Moise Tshombe, the Katangese leader ultimately responsible for Lumumba’s elimination. Tshombe’s contrived explanation that Lumumba had escaped from his care and was killed by local vigilantes after several days on the run was believed by no one. In an open letter to Tshombe, William Takavarasha, a leading official of the NDP’s Gwelo Branch, asked, ‘are you not ashamed of uttering such an unbelievable story which is at the same time stupid and senseless?’ [11] Other letters to the editor of the Central African Daily News, the paper of record for black political opinion in the Federation, piled on the criticism. ST Swazvo of Salisbury warned, ‘If nothing is done to punish Tshombe and his henchmen…I am certain many Africans will not be happy.’[12]

Pan-African convocations provided additional opportunities for Zimbabwe’s nationalists to commemorate Lumumba and partake of wider continental solidarity that denounced the neo-colonial machinations on the Federation’s border. At the third meeting of the AAPC in Egypt in March 1961, Lumumba’s portrait decorated every corner of the conference hall.[13] The NDP was represented by a high-ranking delegation of seven. Party Vice-President Moton Malianga opened his remarks by lamenting the ‘sad story of the assassination of the illustrious son of Mother Africa, the late Premier Patrice Lumumba.’[14] Leopold Takawira, the NDP’s Director of External Affairs, then based in London, ‘appalled‘ his white British friends with praise of the USSR’s Africa policy and denunciation of the US role in Lumumba’s murder upon his return from Cairo.[15]

Conclusion

The disappointment and angst resulting from the failure to hold anyone in the Congo (or in the West) accountable for Lumumba’s death ultimately exerted a destabilising influence on Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle and its democratic aspirations. Following Lumumba’s death, the NDP and its successor movements became increasingly obsessed with ‘unity’, a concept the NDP saw as being one of Lumumba’s ideals. As the editorial in the Lumumba Day issue of the Democratic Voice stated following a fervent denunciation of Tshombe, ‘we have, therefore, learnt this one useful lesson, that any divisive tendencies within a party or its people must be nipped in the bud…’[16]  This lesson was violently applied several months later when the first significant splinter nationalist political party in Southern Rhodesia was violently repressed by the NDP.

The relatively brief, but intense flourish of preoccupation with Lumumba’s death among Zimbabwean nationalists and its centrality in their political activism also played a more positive role. Lumumba’s slaughter ensured that the pan-African momentum that accelerated the struggle from the time of the first AAPC was maintained. While overt discussions of Lumumba receded amidst the Congo’s continued instability, contemporary Zimbabwean interest in the slain leader remains. The administration of Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa recently announced that a major thoroughfare in Harare’s central business district would be renamed Patrice Lumumba Street.

Ultimately, Zimbabwe’s nationalists may not have properly commemorated Lumumba’s legacy with their violent intolerance of political dissent. However, the pan-African solidarity that eventually facilitated Zimbabwe’s independence, particularly the support from its neighbours, the Frontline States, certainly did.

Brooks Marmon is a PhD candidate at the University of Edinburgh.  His research examines the impact of pan-Africanism on Southern Rhodesian politics in the era of decolonisation.  He can be found @AfricaInDC

Featured Photograph: Patrice Lumumba in Brussels on 26 January 1960 during the Round Table Conference that set the date for independence on 30 June, 1960. In the photo Lumumba is showing the press bandages from injuries he received while in prison in the Congo (Herbert Behrens).

Notes

[1] For the impact of Lumumba’s death in South Africa see Passemiers, L., Decolonisation and Regional Geopolitics: South Africa and the ‘Congo Crisis’, 1960-1965 (London, 2019), pp. 197-200.

[2] Day, J. ‘Southern Rhodesian African Nationalists and the 1961 Constitution,’ p. 225.

[3] Chetham’s Library, John Reed Diary, 30 June 1960.

[4] Central African Daily News, “NDP Will Mourn Lumumba’s Passing.”  14 February 1961.

[5] Democratic Voice, “Lumumba’s Epitaph.”  19 February 1961.

[6] Democratic Voice, George Silundika, “The Late Lumumba – A Summary and Best Reflection of African Nationalism.”  19 February 1961.

[7] US Archives II, RG 59, Box 1691, 745c.00/1-361, Salisbury to Secretary of State, 21 February 1961.  The likely locations of the Lumumba Day meetings were Bulawayo, Salisbury (two meetings), Umtali, Mrewa, Penhalonga, and Gwelo.

[8] Central African Daily News, “Lumumba Square.”  23 February 1960.  The name did not appear to stick.

[9] Central African Daily News, “Severe Attacks on USA at NDP Meetings.” 20 February 1961.

[10] US Archives II, RG 59, Box 4023, Pol Rhod and Nyas, Salisbury to Department of State, 10 September 1963.  ZANU leadership had been in close dialogue with the US at the time of its launch.

[11] Central African Daily News, “Open Letter to Moise Tshombe.”  20 February 1961.

[12] Central African Daily News, “The Good Lumumba Did Will Live Forever.” 22 February 1961

[13] Democratic Voice International, “Patrice Lumumba.” May 1961.

[14] Democratic Voice International, “Deputy President of the National Democratic Party of Southern Rhodesia Mr. Moton Malianga Speaks.”  May 1961.

[15] University of York, Borthwick Institute, CSAS/CAP, File 34, Crookenden to Vernon, 12 April 1961.

[16] Democratic Voice, “Voice’s Opinion.”  19 February 1961. The editorial was likely written by Robert Mugabe, the periodical’s primary editor.

A Year of Record Climate Disasters in Africa

Nnimmo Bassey calls for us to pay attention to the disastrous impacts of climate change already being experienced in Africa. The need for action demands that the continent breaks with the futile dash to be like the rich, industrialised and polluting nations and interrogate the notion of development and growth in a finite world. Real action must start now.

By Nnimmo Bassey

While the world literally burns from climate and political turmoil, it is possible for Africa and other vulnerable regions to be overlooked. In an age where powerful leaders and corporations are wilfully in denial of the unfolding climate catastrophe, the news media could be drawn to focus more on assassinations, upcoming elections and the warmongering triggered by the petro-military complex. It is critically important that the world pays attention to the disastrous impacts already being experienced in Africa, and other vulnerable territories.

2019 was a year of extreme weather events across the world. Sweltering heat hit much of the world. Raging wildfires were recorded in Brazil, Bolivia, Australia and the United States of America. Massive floods ravaged even cities like Venice, famed to be able to handle floods.

Climate change was implicated in exposing over 33 million Africans (spread across Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Sudan, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya) to food insecurity emergencies. The food situation has been compounded by the erosion of food sovereignty due to the loss of biodiversity. Violent conflicts and poverty add another dimension to the dire situation and raises the number of those vulnerable to over 52 million.

Southern Africa warmed at two times the global rate and experienced two massive cyclones in March and April leading to a loss of over 1000 lives. Having two cyclones in one season was a record. The intensity and upward reach of the cyclones on the South Eastern coastline also broke the records. Cyclones Idai and Kenneth impacted close to 3 million persons. Some researchers tie the cyclones to the warming of the Indian Ocean. If this is true, we can expect more cyclones as well as the devastation of marine ecosystems in the region.

If parts of Africa warm at double the global average, it means that if the global 1.5 degrees Celsius target of the Paris Agreement is achieved, we can expect a 3 degrees scenario in Africa. And, if the ‘well below’ 2 degrees Celsius temperature increase above preindustrial level is the result of lack of ambition, Africa will be cooked at over 4 degrees Celsius. We note also that the global lack of ambition or readiness to seriously tackle global warming and the aggregation of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) already points at over 3 degrees Celsius temperature rise – condemning parts of Africa to a calamitous roasting.

Within the year, the continent experienced a high level of climate induced refugees and migrations. Some of these refugees are internally displaced while many, seeking to escape the clutches of the disaster, lost their lives in the Sahara Desert or in the Mediterranean Sea.

The shrinkage of Lake Chad and the attendant social upheavals are already very well known. From a size of over 25,000 square kilometres in the 1960s, the lake measures a mere 2,500 square kilometres today. What caught the attention of the world towards the end of 2019 is the shrinkage of Victoria Falls to mere trickles due to disastrous droughts in the region.

In addition to the floods, droughts, deforestation, food shortages, violence complicates and escalates the problems. Floods displaced hundreds of thousands in Somalia within the year. It is known that disasters happen when hazards meet vulnerability. Things cannot get worse than when you live in an unstable society, with violence knocking on the door and then climate change steps in.

In the same year, Nigerians, though warned of impending floods, could do nothing to stem the tide when they arrived. Storms and cyclones brought deadly floods that hit Angola, Namibia, Uganda, South Africa, Burundi, Rwanda, Madagascar, Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo-Brazzaville. More than half a million people were affected by floods in Ethiopia and in South Sudan. According to reports, entire communities were submerged by floods, destroying basic services, markets and farms. Floods between August and October affected more than 420,000 people in Sudan with 78 people dead and 49,500 homes destroyed.

There are genuine reasons for anger at the inability of the multilateral system to address the climate challenge in a serious manner. Things have gone so bad it has taken the rising of kids to call out dithering adults before they could even come up with fictive false solutions. Vulnerable nations, including those in Africa were forced into a deadlock over Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. That article is the sword that fossil fuel interest groups foisted on the Planet.

The Article 6 promotes approaches that will help governments to implement their NDCs through voluntary international cooperation. The Article seeks to establish a policy foundation for a carbon emissions trading system, that allows polluters to buy the license to continue polluting from less polluting nations. The fossil fuels industry and partner nations love this article because it would require nothing but a monetary exchange for their climate sins. The point is this: the polluters have the cash and the vulnerable could receive the cash, but the Planet will suffer. The first step is to halt extracting and burning new fossil fuels. Next step is a planned systemic change. The alternative will be a chaotic change for those that may survive!

Science informs that the world cannot afford to open new fossil fuel mines or fields. This sector is responsible for 80 percent of all carbon dioxide pumped into the atmosphere since the industrial revolution. Rather than halt the extraction of the climate harming fuels, the industry is set to invest US$ 1.4 trillion in new oil and gas projects between 2020 and 2024. It is estimated that this will yield 50 percent more fossil fuels by 2030 and would drive the world to a 2 degrees Celsius temperature rise.

A combination of factors places African nations in a tight corner and requires critical examination of the route forward. First is the fact that while African nations have contributed little to the depletion of the carbon budget, and have been quite ambitious in the NDCs, they are trapped in the catch-up narrative where they make the futile dash to be like the rich, industrialised and polluting nations. They push for serious climate mitigation actions while ensuring high economic growth and development. Considering that economic growth and development in the current capitalistic and neoliberal framework propel climate change, it should be obvious that this is the wrong way forward.

2020 presents us with an opportunity to look back, hopefully not in anger. It presents us with a moment to interrogate the notion of development and growth in a finite world. It also gives us a moment to deliberate on means of halting fossil fuels proliferation and how to secure a just cooperative future for our peoples. Oilwatch International has proposed that a group of Annex 0 nations be created in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a means of promoting real climate action. Countries like Belize, Costa Rica, France, New Zealand can already be grouped here as they have halted fossil fuels extraction. Ogoniland can also be recognised as a community that has taken this action within Nigeria. A fossil fuels non-proliferation treaty has been proposed for the halting of a disaster that is more likely to happen than what triggered the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

We can be sure that 2020 will be even more challenging than 2019 in terms of climate impacts. There will be more climate disasters and accompanying displacements. It is time for global solidarity demanding real climate action — starting from divestments and halting of new fossil fuels projects. It is time for all to raise our voices while we have the opportunity. Tomorrow may be too late for any planned transition if system change and radical socioecological transformation is not birthed quickly.

Nnimmo Bassey is a Nigerian environmentalist activist, author and poet, who chaired Friends of the Earth International from 2008 through 2012 and was Executive Director of Environmental Rights Action for two decades. He is director of the ecological think-tank, Health of Mother Earth Foundation (HOMEF), based in Nigeria.

Featured Photograph: Nnimmo Bassey photographed by Babawale Obayanju

The Atbara Moment – A radical website in 2019

ROAPE’s Leo Zeilig looks at a year that has seen two astonishing uprisings in Africa, and protest movements that have rippled across the globe. The first, in Sudan, started in the small city of Atbara in December last year. The second major event of the year was the climate strikes around the world. Though these protests were smaller in Africa, the continent remains deeply affected by the consequences of human-made climate change. Zeilig asks what a radical journal and website like ROAPE can do?

By Leo Zeilig

Two major events stand out in 2019. The first has been the almost frenzied protests and uprisings we have seen – linked, in one way or another, to a rejection of the existing order. Inchoate, unfocused, frequently ‘unorganised’, these protests have yet again highlighted the inherently unstable nature of our period. Spreading like a great arch from Sudan in December 2018, to Algeria in February 2019, and then to a series of astonishing protests in Hong Kong and later in the year rippling across South America, Columbia, Chile, Lebanon and Iraq.

By any measure, the balance sheet has already been extraordinary. By April in Sudan an entire government and National Legislature had been dissolved, and the president ‘removed’; in Algeria, ruled since independence from France in 1962 by a one-party state, the National Liberation Front or FLN,  saw the president replaced, and then, under pressure from the streets, the arrest of Algeria’s richest businessman and three billionaires on the grounds of corruption. Protestors in the streets rallied under the slogan, ‘The system must go.’

Inevitably the dynamics vary enormously, but these complexities should not prevent us from seeing some striking commonalities – the ties of national exhaustion at the variations and forms of austerity, corruption and adjustment. These are common features – to which no appeal to complexity, careful analysis and ‘national factors’ – should be allowed to blind us.

Take Sudan. The country’s economic troubles, were in large part the result of excessive military spending, which intensified following the secession of South Sudan in 2011 (with the country losing 75% of its oil revenue). The regime responded by stepping up austerity measures, encouraged by the IMF. The privatization of public resources and the cutting of food and fuel subsidies contributed to social turmoil.

Events started in the country on 18 and 19 December last year in the small city of Atbara, but soon spread across Sudan. An astonishing movement emerged in early 2019 against an entrenched class with a stake in maintaining the regime: importers, wholesale merchants, bankers, military and security officers, large landowners, sharia scholars and preachers embedded in Islamic banks.

The country and its peoples have been subject to deep and dramatic socio-economic changes of which the wave of protest was a symptom, but, as Magdi el Gizouli commented on roape.net, beyond a ‘superficial’ transition a deep and thorough-going revolution would be needed. To dismantle the power of the rich and to fulfil the promise of the Atbara moment would require a revolution in Leninist terms.

Responding to the escalation of protest in Khartoum, and in other towns and regions, on 11 April, the generals deposed Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir. The pressure to replace the president was both a direct reaction to the protests and a gamble that a coup would appease the protestors and avoid a collapse of the army – a vital seat of the regime’s power.

In the first of her series of reports on the uprisings in Sudan and Algeria, Emma Wilde Botta quoted the Sudanese activist, Mohamed Mustafa Diab, ‘The Sudanese people understand that the enemy is not a single man; it is the whole regime and everything it represents…“A civilian government or an eternal revolution.” That is one of the most popular slogans right now. As long as we maintain pressure, we — the Sudanese people — will have the final say.’

But as the year draws to a close, and despite astonishing sacrifices and bravery by the protesters, the ‘neighbourhood committees’ – that were on the frontline of the uprisings in Sudan – have not been able to translate their revolutionary zeal into mass political action that has been able to unite rural and urban discontent and challenge the regimes hold on power. Yet mention must be made of the active and often leading role played by women rebels in Sudan, when so many uprisings in Africa are the stage for young men.

By February, the wave of protest spread to Algeria – one of the oldest and most entrenched regimes in North Africa. Fixed, hard-frozen, as the Algerian ‘pouvoir’ was in early 2019, by 2 April Abdelaziz Bouteflika had been removed. The huge weekly protests continued after Bouteflika was forced from office, which saw at their height nearly 10 million people demonstrating, approximately a quarter of the entire population. The street action has witnessed jubilant celebrations of opposition, week after week, month after month, though the participation of organised workers has been weak – the mid-May call for a five-day general strike went largely unheeded. The relative absence of the organised presence of the working class has been a feature of the protest movements in both Algeria and Sudan. In both countries, though particularly Sudan, it was the educated and aspirant, though squeezed, ‘middle classes’ who were frequently at the forefront of the protests.

While there is a continuity of action and protest across the continent, and increasingly the globe, there remains a common set of problems. These can be named, broadly, as organisational and political. These issues remain unavoidable in any serious analysis of the uprisings themselves.

Some essential questions raised by authors in a collection of comments on the uprisings halfway through the year were: What elements have been frustrated in the uprisings? Are we witnessing revolutionary movements? Will the lives of the people involved in these rebellions be fundamentally transformed? How are these uprisings learning from the failed revolutions of the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) spring?

In her comments on the Algerian uprisings in May this year, Tinhinan El Kadi pointed to some of the central questions. Khadi noted that the Russian revolutionary, Leon Trotsky, spent the first months of 1917 in New York. When the large Russian emigre population in the city celebrated the fall of the Tsar – in what became the first revolution in February that year – only Trotsky and a few radicals around him, remained sceptical. El Kadi reminded us that again and again Trotsky argued that the biggest challenges for the revolution still needed to take place, the real transformation in people’s lives remained elusive. Lenin, in different circumstances, had reached the same conclusion; both men made arguments that were unusual even among experienced revolutionaries at the time.

We return then to Magdi el Gizouli’s challenge, that fulfilling the promise of the Atbara moment will require a revolution in Leninist terms. These terms are organisational and political. The common factor in the struggles in Algeria and Sudan, and the movements and rebellions breaking out elsewhere in the world, is the divided, fragmented and dispersed forces of the radical left. Rebuilding these politics (and organisations) on a national and international stage is a task of the greatest importance.

The decade is ending as it began, on the streets, in occupations and in revolutionary possibilities. The constant grind of capitalism ensures that nothing settles for long. No counter-revolution is secure, but nor is – surely, we have learnt this by now? – the mighty political riposte from below.

The movements of popular classes across Africa that roape.net have analysed this year, have taken place in societies riven by economic, political and increasingly ecological crises, that not only generates terrible human misery but recurrent rebellions. As Wilde Botta stated in the final declaratory blogpost in her series, ‘We have little control over the objective conditions necessary for revolutionary crisis. We do have control over what we do to prepare for such a moment. And, sometimes, in some circumstances, the agency of the left can play a decisive role.’

Perhaps the arch of protest we are seeing at the end of the decade, emerging first from Sudan, then Algeria, and breaking out elsewhere, will not generate the new organisations and politics that the radical left need. As we have seen repeatedly in the past, they may, at best, only yield a recycled elite – a renewal of austerity, under new leadership. Though maybe not, and if not, this will require action, agency and intervention.

ROAPE’s efforts and hopes have always been centred, from our first editorial in 1974, on developing arguments and analysis so that a radical left can be constructed, or an existing one strengthened. This continues to be our lodestar.

Climate Emergency

The second major moment, not unconnected to the first, is the explosion of climate activism in 2019. September this year saw seven million people strike together to insist on action to save the world from a climate emergency. While the major protests were in the Global North, activists also mobilised across the continent. From 20 – 27 September, there were protests in Nairobi, Cape Town, Kampala and Lagos. Demonstrators marched and petitioned in their hundreds, and occasionally thousands.

Many made the fundamental point, that although Africa has caused little of the climate crisis it is extremely vulnerable to its effects. The Canadian activist and writer, Naomi Klein, is correct when she wrote earlier this year that the economic system of ‘limitless consumption and ecological depletion’ is at the heart of the climate crisis. Yet this is a story that begins, she argues, ‘with people stolen from Africa and lands stolen from indigenous peoples, two practices of brutal expropriation that were so dizzyingly profitable that they generated the excess capital and power to launch the age of fossil fuel-led industrial revolution and with it the beginning of human-driven climate change.’

Yet while the continent remains marginal to the struggle on the climate, it is central to its consequences. Africa accounts for barely 2–3 per cent of the world’s carbon emissions from energy and industrial sources, yet is impacted by the droughts, famines and rising sea levels which reflect the global catastrophe. Africa’s per capita carbon emissions in the last twenty years were 0.8 metric tons per person, this compared with a global figure of 3.9 tons per person. We have reported how Africa is in the frontline of climate catastrophe – already unravelling on the continent, often intersecting with class, gender and racial cleavages.

As inspiring as the protests on the continent were, outside Johannesburg, Cape Town and Nairobi, they were small, the activist groups lively but narrow. Across the continent, in North Africa, in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco – only a few dozen activists took to the streets during the global climate strike. One pressing challenge for these groups and activists, is expanding their networks and growing the links across the continent. Crucially also linking the demands of the mass movements we have seen in Sudan and Algeria against austerity and poverty, with issues of climate justice.

Yet there is another challenge. While roape.net has covered the uprisings on the continent, tried to track the dynamics of the movements, and their emerging class dynamics, we have failed to make links with climate activists and researchers. On climate action and environmental change, we have drawn a blank on one of the defining moments in our century (though the work of the Algerian campaigner and writer, Hamza Hamouchene, who has written and worked for our journal, is an important exception). This must be corrected in 2020.

Blogposts in 2019

In other areas we have provided cutting edge radical coverage of developments on the continent. On 13 August the Financial Times reported on Rwanda’s poverty statistics which have been the subject of considerable controversy. They wrote that ‘analysis of government statistics has found that the data looks to have been misrepresented … casting doubt on both the strength of the proclaimed economic miracle and the integrity of Rwanda’s relationship with its biggest donors.’

Their investigation  confirmed World Bank involvement in the statistical fraud and credited ROAPE for publishing and posting the research that has led to the investigation: ‘a small number of academics first challenged Rwanda’s poverty statistics in 2015, leading the country to revise its analysis in 2016 and the World Bank to publish its own response last year. The academics’ findings, some of which have been published by the Review of African Political Economy, are compelling, independent experts say, but have been drowned out by the strength of Rwanda and the World Bank’s comprehensive denials.’

Roape.net, with others, including Belgian academic Filip Reyntjens, has been instrumental in exposing Rwandan poverty data and World Bank complicity in covering for the government. The entire developmental model represented by Rwanda – economic growth, development, anti-corruption (and the ruthless murder of opponents), has been undermined (A recent Briefing in the journal has underlined the main arguments).

In other posts, Lena Grace Anyuolo’s original blog titled, ‘Kenya’s Hunger Games’ was a striking denunciation of media and ruling class sponsorship of the poor, exemplified in the region’s popular TV game show, East Africa’s Got Talent. Sam Broadway wrote on Uganda and how Bobi Wine’s movement, known as People Power, has become a formidable political force in the context of mass unemployment; while Alex Caramento and Richard Saunders investigated the social forces currently shaping resource nationalism in Southern Africa.

We have also had a series of fascinating posts that look at the legacy and writing of Walter Rodney – a debate that we are featuring on roape.net. This includes a critique of Chinedu Chukwudinma’s blogpost on Walter Rodney by the Caribbean Marxist Cecil Gutzmore. Chinedu argued that Rodney’s version of dependency theory presented a flawed analysis of imperialism, and his 1972 book, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, is considerably weaker for it. In a spirited piece, Gutzmore refuted these claims.

Finally, ROAPE’s Rama Salla Dieng has been curating a series of interviews with African feminists. The interviews draw our attention to the role woman have played in recent months in the upheavals in Sudan and Algeria, taking to the street to reclaim a fairer and more just world. In interviews conducted by Dieng, African feminists discuss how they are theorising their practice and philosophies. Kenya’s Lyn Ossomo argues that the façade of stability across Africa rests on the super-exploitation, repression and violation of women and gendered bodies more broadly.

ROAPE is more than what we publish – since we were founded, we have brought activists and researchers from the continent together. We recently organised a series of three workshop on radical political economy – the first was held in Accra, at the end of 2017. The second in Dar es Salaam in April and the final meeting in Johannesburg in November, 2018. The workshops linked analysis and activism in contemporary Africa from the perspective of radical political economy – the sine qua non of ROAPE. This year we put a film together of the three workshop and we encourage our readers to watch and share it.

ROAPE – the journal and website – is only as good as our contributors. Where there are gaps in our analysis – and there are immense ones – these need to be filled. We appeal to our readers in 2020 to help us continue and improve our analysis of issues and social processes in Africa, to counter neo-liberal dogma, confront the environmental emergency and provide a framework for understanding the contours of capitalism on the continent. Our assistance to the movements and activists in Africa can only proceed from a close and militant study of what is actually happening, and for that we need the support and contributions of our readers.

Leo Zeilig is editor of roape.net. Please contact roape.net if you want to contribute, or have an idea for a blogpost website.editor@roape.net.

Plunder and Resistance in the Congo

One year ago, in December 2018, the Democratic Republic of Congo went to the polls after a delay of two years. The election saw president Joseph Kabila cede office to his opponent Felix Tshisekedi in a shift that was widely interpreted to be a compromise deal cut to exclude his popular rival. Zoë Marriage describes how international interventions, donors and the international mineral markets are deeply linked to the extension of presidential power, and to the shaping of conditions for violence. Despite resistance, and the new government, the international political economy built on four centuries of violent extraction in the Congo remains in place. Altering power relations at an international level is essential.

By Zoë Marriage

Since the end of the Second Congo War, the Democratic Republic of Congo has consolidated its formal peace, rapidly liberalised the economy, including the mining trade, and held three contested presidential elections. Joseph Kabila remained president through the peace process, transition and two election cycles; a third election – due in 2016 – was delayed for two years. When it was held, in December 2018, Kabila ceded office to his opponent Felix Tshisekedi in a shift that was widely interpreted to be a compromise deal cut to exclude his popular rival Martin Fayulu.

Alongside the military, economic and political developments, there has been widespread violence, including army abuses against civilians, militia activity, sexual violence and generalised destitution. In explaining these forms of violence, many accounts identify national or sub-national origins, but there are reasons to take a broader perspective. International donor aid, political and diplomatic pressure to adopt liberal-democratic politics and economics as has taken place alongside relentless manipulation, financial irregularity and institutional opacity.

The contradictions involved in efforts to impose democracy and liberalise by illiberal means indicate the need to investigate whose interests are pursued and how by donor policy and implementation. In turn, this investigation provides inroads into questions of how international interventions are linked to the extension – and now contortion – of presidential power, and to the shaping of conditions for violence. Two mechanisms are detectable that combine to extend presidential power and reinforce violence, and which are operated largely by northern – European and North American – donors.

The first mechanism extracts control over political and economic resources from Congo. This was achieved by the mode of liberalisation that lacked transparency and took place in the post-war moment when capacity in Congo was low and decisions were dominated by a handful of northern donors. Similarly, donor control over the timing and organisation of presidential elections dispensed with political debate in-country. The rapid liberalisation and the lack of national management had political ramifications as the peace-time distribution of political and economic resources (including mineral concessions) was negotiated between a tiny political coterie in Congo and their international sponsors. With the political and economic transitions being mutually constitutive, the negotiation of power was ultimately defined by the competitive elite interests in the global North and those in China, to the exclusion of the vast majory within Congo.

The second mechanism is the oversight of violence for political ends – including state violence to intimidate any opposition, and military and militia-led violence – in pursuit of nominal political milestones. Pushing through and beyond the transition period involved donors tolerating ten years of war-violence in the east of the country, particularly in the Kivus, after the peace was signed. There were other forms of violence, including election violence in the capital Kinshasa, and the debilitating violence of generalised destitution inflicted on much of the population. Adhering to the aid and diplomatic schedule involved overlooking these forms of violence and in doing so stymying the mobilisation of opposition voices or groups.

The two mechanisms facilitated the extension of presidential power by granting wealth and impunity to the political elite, and then prompting further violence to control and undermine an increasingly frustrated and excluded population. What are the implications for the analysis of the conflict in Congo? It is clear that elite interests – in Congo and internationally – are incompatible with, and pitted against, those of the population. Adopting a perspective that includes northern donors’ decisions, interests and power into the analysis places the violent conflicts over minerals in-country (a line of investigation that has attracted particular attention) in the context of an international political economy.

The international minerals market is characterised by secrecy jurisdictions and off-shore companies, and the post-war implementation of donor policies strengthened links between the lawless domestic situation and the anarchic international market. Identifying an international conflict over the political and economic resources as a cause of violence in Congo presents the international conflict as the turbulence that gives rise to violent manifestations in necessitating and normalising violence. This perspective complements other research – into land, cattle and identity – that looks beyond the ‘conflict minerals’ work. It also makes clear that due diligence at source is impracticable for as long as the mineral trade is serviced through shell companies. There have been several attempts to identify and control mineral extraction at source, but exposing the lack of distinction between legality and illegality of international transactions and the fact that they are marked by anonymity and secrecy indicates that these attempts are neither feasible nor relevant.

Kabila held onto his presidency for two years after the 2016 election was due. The compromise deal resulting from the 2018 election highlights a measure of political resistance galvanised by the violence the population had experienced. The Catholic Church and informal political groups, principally LUCHA (Lutte Pour Le Changement), asserted themselves in the face of direct violence to mobilise domestically and make alliances with the diaspora and other observers from outside the country.

The political pressure that these groups of people brought to bear wrong-footed the President in his evident plan to hand over to his ‘dauphin’ Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, but the resistance movement could not cancel the economic conditions that enabled Kabila to maintain significant power through the arrangement with Tshisekedi. There has been some shift in domestic office holders, but the structures that maintain an exclusive political sphere remain in place. These structures are supported not by the electorate but by involvement in liberalised illiberal mineral sales.

The conclusion of this line of argument is that until northern countries, and notably the UK, which has a host of little island hide-outs for shell companies – exert legal authority over operations taking place in their territories, the international political economy built on four centuries of violent extraction remains in place. This is a conflictual context (in which the Congolese population is structurally disadvantaged) in which powerful actors compete over their incompatible goals. Real change in the dynamics of conflict, which find violent expression in Congo, involves reformulating policy to one that alters power relations at an international level. With this comes the possibility of making a break from the abuse of the past that is continued in the present.

Zoë Marriage teaches security and international development at SOAS University of London.

Featured Photograph: Luc Nkulula being arrested during a demonstation in Goma in 2016.

Stop Collaboration with Egypt’s Military Regime

As roape.net has reported, Egypt’s military regime wants to use the collaboration with UK universities to provide cover to a deeply repressive human rights record. The credibility of UK universities helps to hide the constant abuse of academic freedoms in Egypt.

Researchers whose work and teaching is being leveraged to maximise transnational student revenues and whitewash human rights abuses are speaking out in protest at UK HE senior management’s collusion with the Egyptian regime. Over 200 academics have launched an open letter condemning the crackdown against the regime’s critics and calling for an end to ‘business as usual’ for UK Higher Education institutions operating in Egypt, following the decision by Coventry University, University of London, University of Hertfordshire and others to work with private education providers to offer their degrees in Egypt’s New Administrative Capital.

Last year, the University of Liverpool came under fire for agreeing in principle to open a campus in Egypt, but backtracked after hundreds of academics wrote to the Guardian condemning the move.

What you can do:

Read more on the background to this campaign here, here and here.

Sign the letter online here.

Write to the Egyptian embassy in the UK calling for the release of all political prisoners

ROAPE urges our readers to support the campaign

Featured Photograph: An agreement being signed between the University of Liverpool and Egypt (25 June, 2018).

Financialisation and Illegal Capital Flight

For years illegal capital flight from South Africa has resulted in a staggering loss of wealth for the country. For roape.net Ben Fine investigates efforts to curb these flows of wealth. He argues that capital flight not only shifts resources elsewhere as is commonly presumed, it also shifts speculation elsewhere – capital flight is financialised.

By Ben Fine

At the end of March 2011, a High-Level Panel was appointed at the 4th Joint Annual Meeting of the African Union/Economic Commission of Africa Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development. It was tasked with investigating illicit financial flows and chaired by Thabo Mbeki who had served as South African President from 1999 to 2008, when he was deposed and replaced by Jacob Zuma. As ironic chance would have it, this was precisely the moment when colleagues and I published our assessment of illegal capital flight from South Africa, covering much of the period that Mbeki had been President (Ashman et al, 2011). Our intervention was prompted by the South African Reserve Bank’s declaration of an amnesty, upon voluntary declaration and payment of a token fine, for those corporations that had engaged in such illegal activity, with capital flight, much of it illegal, amounting to a staggering 23% or so of GDP at its height in 2007. We suspect few guilty parties have handed in their smoking guns, not least as past investigations in search of culprits, let alone attention to the issue at all, have been notable for their absence. And, in any case, policy has remained committed to a continuing programme of easing capital controls. In short, as far as the Panel is concerned, it might be thought to be a case of too little, too late, especially with regard to the Chair’s home turf.

In the event, the Panel published its Report early in 2015, AU/ECA (2015). It summarises its own findings as follows, p. 63

1: Illicit financial flows from Africa are large and increasing

2: Ending illicit financial flows is a political issue

3: Transparency is key across all aspects of illicit financial flows

4: Commercial routes of illicit financial flows need closer monitoring

5: The dependence of African countries on natural resources extraction makes them vulnerable to illicit financial flows

6: New and innovative means of generating illicit financial flows are emerging

7: Tax incentives are not usually guided by cost-benefit analyses

8: Corruption and abuse of entrusted power remains a continuing concern

9: More effort needed in asset recovery and repatriation

10: Money laundering continues to require attention

11: Weak national and regional capacities impede efforts to curb illicit financial flows

12: Incomplete global architecture for tackling illicit financial flows

13: Financial secrecy jurisdictions must come under closer scrutiny

14: Development partners have an important role in curbing illicit financial flows from Africa

15: Illicit financial flow issues should be incorporated and better coordinated across United Nations processes and frameworks

This is acceptable as far as it goes but it does not go far in explaining why capital flight has become so extensive, why little has been done about it, and what are its effects. For the latter, there is a presumption that capital flight is as damaging as it is unethical (as if it would be ok if corresponding financial movements were legal – or absolved through payment of a fine?).[1] Significantly, the scale of capital flight is often set against other financial flows and aid, with the implication that it could make a comparable contribution to development, neatly overlooking that the role of such legal and official flows is not always considered positively. For Boyce and Ndikumana (2012, p. 1):

The group of 33 SSA countries covered by this report has lost a total of $814 billion dollars (constant 2010 US$) from 1970 to 2010. This exceeds the amount of official development aid ($659 billion) and foreign direct investment ($306 billion) received by these countries.

Similarly, the flight is set against indebtedness such that, p. 1:

Assuming that flight capital has earned (or could have earned) the modest interest rate measured by the short-term United States Treasury Bill rate, the corresponding accumulated stock of capital flight from the 33 countries stands at $1.06 trillion in 2010. This far exceeds the external liabilities of this group of countries of $189 billion (in 2010), making the region a ‘net creditor‘ to the rest of the world. The stereotypical view that SSA is severely indebted and heavily aid-dependent is not fully consistent with the facts.

These are invaluable points and are complemented by analyses of (proximate) causes:  that, ‘Econometric analysis indicates that for each new dollar of external borrowing by African countries, as much as 60 cents exits Africa as capital flight in the same year’; for Boyce and Ndikumana (2012, p. 8), ‘Oil-rich countries account for 72 percent of the total capital flight from the sub-region ($591 billion). The escalation of capital flight over the last decade coincided with the steady increase in oil prices prior to the global economic crisis’; and Ndikumana and Sarr (2016, p. 1) observe, ‘While the literature has established that external borrowing fuels capital flight … relatively little attention has been paid to the possibility that foreign private capital flows may also finance capital flight.’

Boyce and Ndikumana (2012, p. 14) also offer six reasons why capital flight is damaging; it drains resources for development, raising indebtedness, reducing poverty alleviation, serving as both cause and effect of governance breakdown, worsening income inequality, and consolidating the power of autocratic elites. Implicit in such postures, however, is the presumption of some sort of counterfactual in which capital flight, and its underlying determinants, are reduced with correspondingly beneficial consequences. This is apparent by playing the role of neoliberal devil’s advocate, surprisingly absent from the literature if probably due to the opprobrium attached to illegal activity especially against an ill-defined national interest (and the weaknesses of the attempts to address this and so better for corporates to stay shtum in case licit flight is interrogated as well).[2] For is it not possible to see capital flight as a beneficial attempt to thwart the distorting effects of capital controls? And do not the beneficial effects follow the resources elsewhere but for, or because of, some implicit reliance upon an ill-specified form of dependency theory?

In short, the phenomenon of capital flight needs to be situated in broader and historical analysis. For the former, a start can be made by looking at financial flows more generally, something that is now increasingly understood in terms of financialisation, see Karwowski et al (2018) and corresponding special issue and Bonizzi (2016). Within orthodox circles, especially since, but not originating with, the Global Financial Crisis, two issues have come to the fore. One has been to contemplate the use of capital controls (which should surely extend to illicit movements) although this has been tentative, limited (to targeting short-term inflows so that they cannot become rapidly reversed) and heavily deterred in practice. As Gallagher et al (eds) (2012, p. 47) put it:[3]

the IMF and other ‘establishment’ institutions have not completely abandoned their old ways … the IMF has proposed gaining more influence over the conditions under which capital controls are used; … a web of bilateral and multi-lateral so-called ‘free-trade’ agreements have structured a global ‘capital liberalization regime’ that create barriers for countries to implement capital account regulations even as economists at the IMF say they are useful.

Whilst the IMF’s shifted position on capital controls, described as revolutionary by some, reflects shifted circumstances (the need to prevent contagion from national financial crises rather than merely to prevent or to remedy them through austerity), Gallagher et al conclude that, ‘the transformational, the macroeconomic, and the developmental roles of capital outflow regulation need not and, indeed, are usually not mutually exclusive’, p. 50.

Such broader considerations – than simply viewing favourably the retention of resources otherwise lost by capital flight – leads to the second ‘revolutionary’ shift in orthodox thinking, namely the questioning of the so-called finance-growth (or finance-development) nexus, the presumption that the relationship between the growth of finance and development is unambiguously positive. Unsurprisingly, in the wake of the GFC, such mainstream nostrums have been found to be empirically unreliable or ‘non-linear’, a rather obscure way of accepting that too much finance can become harmful above a certain threshold.[4]

In short, (discussion of) capital flight has become embroiled in an increasingly complex and extensive web of financial developments. This is also important historically. For the incidence of capital flight (and, indeed, the means by which it at least in major part tends to be measured) is through attention to transfer pricing and the presumption that corresponding illicit financial flows are primarily directed at tax avoidance (or the corresponding movement of profits to the jurisdictions where they will attract the lowest taxation). No doubt this remains important but it now dovetails both with the movement of assets for the purposes of speculative activity and with the corresponding proliferation of assets by which this can be achieved. It is not just that capital flight shifts resources elsewhere as is commonly presumed; it also shifts speculation elsewhere.

Thus, capital flight is financialised, and contextualised as both cause and effect. Each of incidence and impact is marked by contemporary differentiated and complex global and national structures, relations, processes and agencies that go beyond elite capture and safe-havening of natural resource revenues or foreign (public or private) inflows. And these need to be specified for the specific post-apartheid condition of South Africa.[5] In this light, as this piece was first being penned, the Zuma Presidency was already under fatal threat as charges of corruption to the extent of ‘state capture’ were coming to the fore. At the centre of such systemic scandals, was the relationship between President Zuma and the Gupta family, the so-called Zupta syndrome. It led to machinations around the coming and going of the stoic neoliberal Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, not so much from tragedy to farce as continuing ricochets between them and, leading at one  point with one of his successor, Malusi Gigaba,[6] announcing a huge state-funded nuclear power programme with the Russians,[7] that presumably had been blocked by his predecessor. Financialisation’s own watchdog soon delivered its verdict, with Moody’s downgrading government long-term issues to Baa3, one grade above junk status.

As chance would have it, these events also coincided with the eruption of a scandal around collusion over traders fixing the rand exchange rate. The relatively independent Competition Commission announced it was charging eighteen banks one of which, Citibank, had already agreed to pay a fine of R70 million, and another, Barclays Africa (Absa) admitted culpability, begged forgiveness, sacked two traders and was to be spared prosecution for cooperation.[8]

There are, however, some remarkable aspects of this increasingly globally acknowledged incidence of collusion around foreign exchange trading. First is that the Competition Commission alleges that the collusion had lasted from at least 2007. Second, named individuals involved in the collusion had already been disbarred from trading elsewhere. Indeed, on these two points:

In January, the US Federal Reserve permanently banned Jason Katz, who worked for BNP Paribas, Standard New York, and Barclays during the period of the commission’s investigation, from participating in the forex market due to his role in manipulating forex prices. This followed an earlier $342m penalty against Barclays for control deficiencies related to forex trading. JP Morgan and Citigroup, which are named in the Competition Commission’s complaint, were among banks that agreed to pay $2.5bn in penalties to the US department of justice for currency rigging. Later that same month, Citibank’s Christopher Cummins pled [sic] guilty to conspiring to fix prices in the department of justice’s long-running investigation into currency rigging.

Third, the Competition Commission had begun its investigations two years previously alongside its other responsibilities for competition across the whole economy, not just finance which are the responsibility of specialised institutions, most obviously the Reserve Bank. Fourth, some of the banks concerned had appealed the actions against them on grounds of its not lying within the jurisdiction of the Competition Commission. Fifth, then, in conclusion, is the staggering inaction of the South African Reserve Bank. In its response to the Commission’s actions, it stated that:

At the time of the launch of the Competition Commission’s investigation, a joint SARB and Financial Services Board (FSB) process was already underway to review foeign [sic] exchange operations of authorized foreign exchange dealers in the domestic market. This review was not informed by any allegations or whistle-blowing, but represented a proactive step on the part of the authorities in response to various other investigations that were being undertaken by international regulators …The review found no evidence of serious and widespread misconduct in the South African foreign exchange market, but saw scope for the improvement in overall market conduct and made several recommendations in this regard. A number of these recommendations are currently being implemented. At the conclusion of the review, it was stated that should any irregularities be revealed as part of the Competition Commision’s [sic] investigation, which link violations in other international financial centres to operations of local authorised dealers, the matters would be followed up and appropriate action would be taken by regulators.  The SARB sees the allegations in a serious light. The SARB will allow the legal processes now initiated to run their course, and will continue to monitor developments closely to inform any action that we may need to embark upon in accordance with our mandate and jurisdiction.[9]

In short, this might be thought to be too little, too late, and the Reserve Bank simply seemed to allow events to run their course in the hands of the Competition Commission without being pro-active itself in a matter that should have been of its vital concern! Given its record over capital flight, this might be thought to be par for the course. It remains to be seen whether the Ramaphosa Presidency leads to any difference…

Ben Fine is professor of economics at the Department of Economics at the School of Oriental and Africa Studies (SOAS), University of London. Ben was a contributor to ROAPE’s workshop in Ghana in 2017.

Featured Photograph: ‘Le manque cruel de capitaux en Afrique Noire’ by Sanou Mbaye (November, 2004).

References

Arcand, L., Berkes, E. and Ugo, P. (2015) “Too Much Finance?”, Journal of Economic Growth, vol 20, no 2, pp. 104-148, previously IMF Working Paper, Research Department, June.

Ashman, S., B. Fine and S. Newman (2011) “Amnesty International?: The Nature, Scale and Impact of Capital Flight from South Africa”, Journal of Southern African Studies, vol 37, no 1, pp. 7-25.

AU/ECA (2015) Illicit Financial Flows: Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, Commissioned by the AU/ECA Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development.

Bonizzi, B. (2016) “The Changing Impact of Finance on Development”, Fessud Working Paper, no 124.

Boyce, J. (2015) “Capital Flight from Africa: What Is to Be Done?” Statement to the Joint Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council on Illicit Financial Flows and Development Financing in Africa, United Nations Headquarters, 23 October.

Boyce, J. and L. Ndikumana (2011) Africa’s Odious Debts: How Foreign Loans and Capital Flight Bled a Continent, London: Zed Books.

Boyce, J. and L. Ndikumana (2012) “Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan African Countries: Updated Estimates, 1970-2010”, Political Economy Research Institute, PERI Research Report, October.

Gallagher, K. and J. Ocampo (2013) “IMF’s New View on Capital Controls”, Bretton Woods Project.

Gallagher, K., S. Griffith-Jones and J. Ocampo (eds) (2012) Regulating Global Capital Flows for Long-Run Development, The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Boston University.

Goodson, S. (2014) Inside the South African Reserve Bank: Its Origins and Secrets Exposed, London: Black House Publishing.

Karwowski, E., S. Ashman and B. Fine (2018) “Introduction to the Special Section ‘Financialization in South Africa’”, Competition & Change, vol 22, no 4, pp. 383-87.

MACE (2016) “Report of the Ministerial Advisory Council on Energy (MACE) Working Group on Analysis and Recommendations on the Assumptions and Methodologies Adopted in the IRP 2016 Base Case Scenario.

Ndikumana, L. and M. Sarr (2016) “Capital Flight and Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: An Investigation of the Role of Natural Resource Endowment”, WIDER Working Paper, no 2016/58.

Reynolds, J., B. Fine and R. van Niekerk (eds) (2019) Race, Class and the Post-Apartheid Democratic State, Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Thomas, S. (2017) “A Review of the , November 2016 Integrated Resource Plan Update: The Role of Nuclear Power”.

Notes

[1] Thus, for Boyce (2015, p. 4):

Debts that fuel capital flight can be considered ‘odious’ under international law. Selective repudiation of odious debt … can prevent the diversion of scarce public resources into debt service payments on loans from which the public derived no benefit. Repudiation of odious debts also would change the incentive structure for creditors, encouraging due diligence and helping to improve the quality of future lending.

[2] Or adopt a strategy of riding out the storm, and making nominal payments, as in recent prominent scandals around tax avoidance in the UK and elsewhere by Apple, Amazon, Starbucks and Google.

[3] See also Gallagher and Ocampo (2013).

[4] See Arcand et al (2015) for example.

[5] See my (co-authored) contributions to Reynolds et al (eds) (2019).

[6] Himself having ploughed his way around state enterprises and other well-placed ministerial posts.

[7] Or within anyone else for that matter, with letters of agreement having been signed, and often renewed, for nuclear cooperation, not only with Russia but also South Korea, China, the USA, Canada and Japan, primarily concerning reactor designs which have not been completed anywhere because of continuing delays and with multiple cost over-runs, Thomas (2017) for a comprehensive overview. See also MACE (2016), the government’s own advisory board on energy provision, which advises against nuclear as more expensive than alternatives and especially renewables, and essentially pointing to an illogical pursuit of nuclear despite its increasing disadvantages. Note also that the Western Cape High Court ruled in April, 2017, that the nuclear agreements with Russia, South Korea and the USA were illegal for lack of constitutionally-required public consultation, see the ‘Court finds nuclear deals unconstitutionalGroundUp (26 April, 2017).

[8] Following statement from Maria Ramos, Chief Executive of Absa, who is both previous Director-General of Finance (top civil servant in the Treasury) and current wife of Trevor Manuel, erstwhile Minister of Finance. See ‘Standard Bank in talks with competition commission in rand-rigging probeEyewitness News (23 February, 2017).

[9] For reports of some juicy, possibly implausible, scandals of (in)actions involving the Reserve Bank, see Goodson (2014).

Getting Away with Mass Killings in Africa

Thomas MacManus discusses the issues of corporate crimes and killings in Africa. Focusing on the 2006 case of Trafigura – a multinational oil trading company – who offloaded hazardous waste in Côte d’Ivoire which was then dumped causing death, and suffering to thousands. MacManus argues that this case is illustrative of many instances of contemporary corporate crime, with African victims painfully let down by international legal systems.

By Thomas MacManus

Impunity for corporate harm is particularly striking when it comes to crimes committed by multinational corporations on the African continent. Domestic legal systems outside Africa purposefully turn a blind eye (by refusing jurisdiction or otherwise) to the extraterritorial behaviour of criminal organisations. This, combined with the legal protections afforded to corporations in the world’s financial centres, leads to a lack of public knowledge and understanding of the suffering meted out on Africans by Western companies. This ignorance ultimately leads to a lack of justice. And impunity leads to recidivism. The case of Trafigura’s toxic waste dumping is emblematic and helps to shed light on some of the reasons for a stark lack of accountability for the crimes of powerful corporations.

In August 2006, at least 16 people were reportedly killed, and thousands were injured by exposure to toxic waste that had been dumped in the city of Abidjan in the Ivory Coast (also known as ‘Côte d’Ivoire’). The dumping was orchestrated in the UK, just off Oxford Street, London, on the PCs of staff in the offices of Trafigura Ltd. Internal documents and emails between Trafigura employees and agents (including the CEO, traders, subsidiaries and the captain of the chartered ship ‘Probo Koala’), leaked by Wikileaks, gave an insight into a fatal crime that would undoubtedly otherwise have been hidden.

Purifying cheap low-grade oil by mixing with caustic soda to make a quick and impressive profit, but frustrated by a lack of low-cost solutions to the resultant toxic waste problem and a failed attempt at offloading in Amsterdam, the corporation engaged a ‘two-bit’ Ivorian company called Société Tommy (known as ‘Tommy’) to ‘get rid of’ the waste in Abidjan. In a handwritten note of their agreement, Tommy promised to do ‘a good job’ and to provide all the ‘necessary documents’ to Trafigura’s agents to shield the company from responsibility for ‘environmental accidents’. Despite the, quite frankly, obvious lack of local capacity to deal with the waste, bearing in mind the Port of Amsterdam was unable to do so, Trafigura agents offloaded the waste to Tommy’s trucks, which then proceeded to dump the dangerous cargo at a landfill dump and in open ditches around the city. A 2009 UN investigation confirmed that the dumping of toxic waste in Abidjan by Trafigura’s ‘Probo Koala’ caused the reported deaths and life-changing injuries .

The Cover-up and Impunity

You may not have heard some, or any, of the details of this crime before now. Since the dumping, the corporation has deployed a wide range of measures to deny, neutralise and cover up any evidence pointing towards its involvement in the poisoning – including an infamous super-injunction in 2009 . Trafigura’s legal firm Carter-Ruck, in pursuit of its policy to cover up, applied to court for an injunction on 12 October 2009 to prevent the Guardian newspaper from reporting on a parliamentary question by Paul Farrelly (Labour MP). The injunction further stipulated that the Guardian could not report on the question’s existence. This extreme form of censorship has led such legal interventions to be known as ‘super-injunctions’. Alan Rusbridger, then editor of the Guardian, argued that the development was a regression of free speech versus censorship.

At around noon on 13 October 2009, the day after the super-injunction was obtained, Trafigura (via Carter-Ruck) withdrew its claim that the Guardian reporting on the parliamentary debate revealing the injunction’s existence would be contempt of court. This climb-down was as a result of Farrelly’s question having been released into the public domain by bloggers and microbloggers, who are not subject to the same restrictions as mainstream media, and as Rusbridger recalls, ‘the Twitter-sphere had gone into meltdown.’.

Despite this early ‘Twitter-win’, Trafigura’s cover-up strategy has been largely successful, and to date the company has encountered no significant legal sanctions for its actions. In 2007, Laurent Gbagbo’s Ivorian government shook down the commodities’ trader, imprisoning two of the company executives and refusing to release them until the firm agreed to pay US$200 million. No charges were processed against the executives. No other jurisdiction has successfully prosecuted the crime.

How can we understand the processes through which a mass killing in Africa by a powerful European-based corporation attracts almost total impunity under criminal and civil legal justice systems? The fractious nature of jurisdiction-based systems is part of the problem and a 2006 European Parliament motion acknowledges the enforcement vacuum with a multi-trans-national crime of this nature:

the toxic waste was dumped by a Greek-owned, Panamanian-flagged tanker, leased by Trafigura Beheer B.V., a Netherlands-based company, and whereas such sharing of responsibilities creates a systematic, and unacceptable, problem with regard to the enforcement of EC legislation.

Criminal Justice

Domestic criminal law systems are not well adapted to deal with crimes that are organisational in nature. International criminal law too applies in practice only to individuals. The standard test of legal criminal liability in common law systems can be summed up by the phrase ‘actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea’, which means ‘the act is not guilty unless the mind too is guilty’. From this well-established principle we get the two requisite legal elements of a crime: ‘mens rea’, the mental element of the crime, which must usually coincide with the ‘actus reus’, the offending act.  The ‘actus reus’ is generally uncontroversial because it is much more easily located in the physical world. ‘Mens rea’, requiring a ‘mind’, is a more troublesome concept for the study of corporate crime as it can only usefully be ascribed to individuals. The legal concept of ‘mens rea’ is thus a major factor in attributing impunity for serious harm to organisations. The first US case of a corporation being tried for murder (more specifically, reckless homicide) was the 1979 Ford Pinto case (State of Indiana vs. Ford Motor Company). There was a complete failure of the US criminal justice system to appreciate the organisational nature of the crime. In the UK, a 1990 case against P&O for the Herald of Free Enterprise collapsed for similar reasons, the court struggled to identify a ‘corporate mind’.

The deficiency in our domestic and international criminal law may not simply be an oversight or mere technicality. The capitalist state, to survive in a competitive, globalised system cannot afford to discourage companies from taking risks. It would be counter-productive to enforce a strong regulatory regime that may deter the world’s big corporate players. Thus, criminal justice systems have an inherent tendency to avoid the prosecution of powerful organisations for corporate and state-corporate crimes.

In March 2014, Amnesty International (AI) called on the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and the London Metropolitan Police to investigate Trafigura’s role in the dumping, alleging that the actions of Trafigura’s directors and employees may have amounted to a corporate conspiracy to dump waste abroad under the UK’s Criminal Law Act, 1977. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) responded that the case was ‘not for the Crown Prosecution Service’ and passed the buck to the Environment Agency (EA). The EA conceded that if the allegations against Trafigura were true, ‘a serious offence was committed with relevant aspect of the conduct taking place within the jurisdiction’ but refused to investigate as it has ‘limited experience of complex investigations’ and lacked the ‘appropriately skilled and experienced staff.’ The agency further admitted that due to cuts it was under ‘immediate financial pressures’ and said that Trafigura would probably ‘take any and every procedural opportunity to challenge steps taken in a further investigation, thus contributing to the anticipated extensive costs.’ As such, the EA concluded, ‘the cost-benefit balance is strongly against the conduct of an investigation’.

The EA’s fears are not irrational. The UK’s legal system appears to be particularly protective of criminal corporations. The use of libel laws and aggressive lawyers has been a success for Trafigura in suppressing information about the dumping. Caroline Lucas, the first Green Party member to be elected to the UK parliament, in her first speech to the House, took the opportunity to raise the case and noted the continuing media ‘blackout’ on the dumping:

A single MP can raise issues that cannot be raised elsewhere. Last year, hon. Members from both sides helped to shine a light on the actions of the international commodities trading group, Trafigura, and the shipping of hazardous waste to the Ivory Coast. There was particular concern that the media in this country were prevented from reporting the issues fully and fairly. That remains the case, for new legal actions concerning Trafigura have been launched in the Dutch courts and are being reported widely in other countries but not here.

Civil Justice

African victims cannot rely on civil justice systems either to compensate for the deficiencies of the criminal justice system. For instance, in the UK about 30,000 victims of the 2005 dumping sued Trafigura in a civil case known as Motto & Ors v Trafigura, the largest personal injury claim ever filed with England and Wales Courts. However, in September 2009, Trafigura reached an out-of-court settlement agreement which included payment to victims and their families of about USD$1,000 each. This settlement precluded any legal sanction for wrongdoing being applied to Trafigura by ensuring that the facts of the dumping were not considered by a court of law and therefore not exposed to public scrutiny. Furthermore, it included a joint statement by both sides denying the liability of Trafigura for the dumping as well as including a confidentiality agreement which swears the claimants’ lawyers, Leigh Day , to secrecy. The agreement contained the following phrase: ‘the claimants now acknowledge that the fumes could, at worst, have caused only a range of short term relatively low level flu-like symptoms and anxiety’. In the end, very little of the compensation reached the victims as it was extorted soon after bank transfer to Ivory Coast.

The system is woefully broken. In the case of Trafigura and the Probo Koala, one that is illustrative of many instances of contemporary corporate crime, African victims have been painfully let down by the UK and international legal systems. States may find it difficult to stand up to corporations that are richer, more powerful and a vital source of investment but an international system without accountability promises more suffering and inevitably on a grander scale.

Thomas MacManus is Lecturer in State Crime at Queen Mary University of London School of Law and Acting Director of the International State Crime Indicative. He is author of State-Corporate Crime and the Commodification of Victimhood: The Toxic Legacy of Trafigura’s Ship of Death, (Routledge, 2019).

Featured Photograph: taken from a UN press release on ‘UN Environment releases independent audit of sites affected by toxic waste dump in Côte d’Ivoire’ (30 January, 2018).

Economic Fraud in Neoliberal Africa

ROAPE’s Jörg Wiegratz introduces a special issue on economic fraud in capitalist Africa. He encourages us to delve deeply into a critical analysis of fraud, its causes, characteristics, and repercussions, in the context of the long history of the relationship between capitalism and economic crime on the continent. This week we will publish two further blogs in our series on economic trickery, fraud and crime in Africa.

By Jörg Wiegratz

Global capitalism has never been more advanced and aggressive than now. A key feature of this intensively global capitalist world is the staggering level, variety and institutionalisation of fraud and other economic crimes, across economic sectors. Wherever you look, the extensive societal restructuring of the last 30 years, that is ‘neoliberalism’, has produced structures and conditions that are fraud enabling. The production, trade, finance, social services and entertainment sectors are all affected by routine fraud.

These processes have also taken place in Africa. Corporate irregularities have received considerable attention since the 2010s, for instance, illicit financial flows including tax evasion of transnational corporations (TNCs). This focus is part of the long aftermath of the report of the African Union/United Nations Economic Commission for Africa which estimated that illicit flows from Africa could be around US$50 billion a year. Faced with widespread economic crimes a number of states in Africa and elsewhere have recently started to acknowledge more formally that there is an issue with economic irregularities that needs tackling. They have undertaken explicit countermeasures in the name of detecting and reducing fraudulent activities in their economies. After two decades of light-touch regulation of the economy during the rise and height of neoliberalism, these initiatives are advanced in the name of fostering product quality, consumer confidence, competitiveness, exports, and ultimately economic growth, and include attempts to restrict a range of economic, financial and environmental crimes. These regulatory initiatives to ‘clean up’ the economy are sometimes complemented by the activities of consumer protection organisations demanding regulation of problematic business practices and these organisations occasionally form anti-fraud coalitions with business associations and donor agencies such as USAID. Even the World Bank releases reports about ‘ill-gotten money and the economy’ and anti-competitive practices in African economies in the context of the prevalent misuse of market power by monopolies or oligopolies. While the UK Department for International Development (DFID) currently funds an ongoing large-scale research programme that investigates ‘private sector corruption’ in various African countries. Cartels are now formally recognised by authorities (e.g. COMESA) as a widespread phenomenon in East Africa for instance and investigations into various sectors are ongoing.

Recent headline news include cases concerning, ‘essay factories’ that link Kenya, China and countries elsewhere in the Global South to the ‘top-of-the-education-league-tables’ nations such as Britain and the US for example, with fast and convenient money transfer systems in-between. This is a good example of the institutionalised nature of fraud in the current era. Check out the websites of the buy-your-essay websites, one advertises its services to students in beautiful business speak:

Be very aware of writing services that offer extremely cheap prices, that have poorly designed websites, and promise essays in only a couple of hours. These are red flags that indicate the company is run by an offshore company that does not hire English speaking writers, or it is a front that has been set up to take your money and potentially your identity. Keep reading to learn more about the reasons why you can and should trust UK Writings with your important essay assignments. Why should You Order Essay or Paper Online from UK Writings? To put it simply, we are the best UK based writing service that there is. Our competitors cannot match our level of quality writing and customer service. We have top quality writers who have education and work histories that qualify them to write on a variety of topics, even for the most high level and elite students. Not only do we have the team of writers to help you, we also have a great customer service team, and wonderful support staff to keep things running smoothly. The result of all of this effort and teamwork is that you will always receive your essay on or before the due date. It also means that every paper is written from scratch by one of our talented writers and fully customized according to your instructions. We can even match your personal writing style if you send us a sample with your order. How’s that for custom essay writing? Finally, your privacy and financial security is important to us. We will never provide your personal information to another party without your consent. To keep your financial information secure, we have contracted with a third-party payment processing system to keep your financial data safe and secure. We employ the same security protocols and policies that you would encounter at any major online retailer.

Next, the fisheries sector remains another key example of the multi-national (north-south and south-south) co-production of economic crimes (with European corporate actors being prominent here as well), with devastating consequences for affected populations.

In a ROAPE special issue on fraud in Africa, I thus argue that existing research needs to be consolidated, expanded and deepened; there is need for a strengthened and more intensive critical political-economic analysis of fraud in the ‘private sector’, its causes, characteristics, and societal repercussions. The issue is set against the background of the recent phase in the long history of the relationship between capitalism and economic crime. One of the starting points of the issue is the observation that African Studies has not yet sufficiently engaged with and mobilised the relevant global, critical criminology literature (including its conceptual tool kit) to analyse how economic crimes are bound to global and local capitalism.

By contrast, African studies has rather a lot to say regarding state criminality, including corruption, and also about smugglers, tricksters, violent gangs, but relatively little to say, especially from a criminological perspective, regarding corporate criminality. Relatively few criminologists study African corporate crime cases, much of the existing research on corporate crime is on South Africa, with legal studies dominating. Donors have to-date not been at the forefront of funding research into corporate criminality. Further, a significant share of the data and analysis in the African context is published not by academic scholars, but by national or inter-national bodies, activist groups, think tanks, NGOs, corporate analysts, independent researchers and investigative journalists. What is the state of exchange, networking, dialogue and cooperation between these different groups of analysts, writers and activists? The issue picks up on some of these points, observations, and concerns. In particular, it responds to the imperative to advance the analysis of the link between capitalism and crime in Africa, and to locate capitalism more centrally in the analysis of economic crimes.

The issue is alive to relevant themes and debates in African studies and branches of economics and development studies; for example, this include research on underground/parallel economy, organised crime, trade in drug/weapons/human beings, smuggling; financial crimes, creative accounting, illicit finance, capital flights, off-shore/tax heavens, tax evasion; irregularities in the minerals and forestry sectors (roape.net has covered some of these debates over recent years). Terms commonly used in some of the respective debates in African studies include patronage, patrimonialism, kleptocracy, plunder, spoil politics, primitive accumulation, grabbing, rent capture. A number of debates are concerned with how crime affects matters of state building, political (dis)order, violence, political institutions, stability and (economic) development in Africa.

We are still left with a couple of questions. First, what are the under researched themes currently? Here, the political economy of health and safety crimes of corporations, the role of banks and accounting firms in facilitating fraud, and the regulation of corporate crimes seem to get little research coverage. Under-explored are also the legal privileges that (criminal) corporations enjoy in African countries. One major issue that is yet to be more fully researched and discussed is what exactly makes the neoliberal period of fraud distinct from earlier periods, and how has the shifting character of neoliberalism in its different phases over the last three decades affected the scale, character and dynamics of fraud in particular regions, countries, sectors and professions in Africa. Secondly, how would a corporate crime research agenda that is informed by critical (and Marxist) criminology look like? The research tells us that tracing and understanding relevant social relations of power including the sources and mechanisms of the power of the corporation is one of the key tasks here.

That said, the issue sheds light on some of the major political-economic characteristics of the fraud, and on what fraud has to do with, and can tell us about, relevant aspects of state–business relations, regulation and regulatory agencies, capitalist transformation and the corporation. It investigates fraud as a phenomenon of neoliberal reform and unpacks fraud as a social phenomenon under capitalism. The issue extends some of the debates in Africa and beyond about present-day economic fraud, particularly regarding the political character of fraud, and of anti-fraud measures, the relationship between neoliberal reform and fraud, the relationship between power, class and fraud, and the social making or co-production of fraud by a wide range of social actors who are enabling fraud. More specifically, the research articles cover topics such as the political economy of cartels, fake medical drugs, music piracy, microcredit sector fraud, and procurement/contract fraud and kickbacks, while a briefing gives an overview of anti-fraud measures that have become more prevalent in the last decade.

Overall, the analyses shows the fruitfulness of focusing on corporate crime, gathering data especially on the powerful, following the broader set of actors, interests and ideas that allow corporate crime. The issue shows that fraud is a political and social phenomenon uniting various classes as well as state, political and professional organisations. In the discussion of the microcredit industry case for instance, Milford Bateman argues there is evidence that key actors in the international aid sector are entangled with corporate criminality and gangster capitalism, at the expense of the poor. In partnerships of the powerful, some of the donor/aid state agencies, in collaboration with some state agencies, are enablers, backers and defenders of criminal capital. In this case, high profile frauds in the industry get deliberately overlooked or downplayed by officialdom (see also Mary Serumaga’s analysis on similar issues concerning IFIs and corporate tax evasion).

One line of future enquiry that comes out of the issue is to explore the link between economic fraud and public-sector dynamics and investigate how the state becomes internally restructured and incapacitated, with the aim of facilitating corporate fraud. To ‘follow the state’, to explore the political economy of the relationship between economic fraud and political corruption, might add to our debate about the special relationship between capital and state under neoliberalism. The pro-corporate-criminality effect of some of the ideologies and operations of sections of the international aid/development sector requires further research too.

To introduce the issue (and the debates) on economic fraud in capitalist Africa to roape.net readers this week we will publish two further blogs in our series on ‘Economic Trickery, Fraud and Crime in Africa’. These blogposts, by Ben Fine and Thomas MacManus, cover the crucial issues of illegal capital flight from South Africa and Trafigura’s dumping of toxic waste in West Africa. We invite contributors to contact us and send us their ideas for blogposts. We are keen to continue our coverage and debate about the crimes of capitalism, and its political economy, also because, last but not least, this is vital in the age of the climate emergency and the role of the capitalist corporation in the unfolding catastrophe.

Jörg Wiegratz is a Lecturer in the Political Economy of Global Development at the University of Leeds and a member of the editorial board of RoAPE. His recent books include Neoliberal Moral Economy: Capitalism, Socio-cultural Change and Fraud in Uganda (Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016), Uganda: The Dynamics of Neoliberal Transformation (co-edited with Giuliano Martiniello and Elisa Greco, Zed, 2018), and Neoliberalism and the Moral Economy of Fraud (co-edited with David Whyte, 2016). His is a regular contributor and editor of roape.net.

Featured Photograph: Taken from the Progress in Political Economy website at the Department of Department of Political Economy at the University of Sydney.

Talking Back: a conversation with Divine Fuh

In the third interview in the series, Talking Back, Rama Salla Dieng speaks to Divine Fuh. Divine Fuh talks about his research on the economic, political, religious and social crises in Cameroon and how young men have been forced to create new criteria for endorsement as ‘successful men’ with the collapse of salaried achievement. In a wide-ranging interview he also discusses his work with CODESRIA in Dakar, fathering, feminism, masculinity, Afrophobia and social anthropology.

Rama: Hello Divine, please introduce yourself.

Divine: My name is Divine Fuh. I come from Cameroon. Specifically from the Kingdom of Bafut in what is referred to in the literature as the Cameroon Grassfields, or the Cameroon Grasslands. I am the son of two amazing humans, and the child of many people. That is why after my Mi (coming of age ceremony) at which I became a Bafut noble, I was renamed Abongnela – that is, made by society, the child of community, or the product of people. I am a loyal friend, a husband, a father, a brother, a colleague, and I am sure to some, a spoilt and annoying brat, even though I would say that I am a person who likes to bring a smile to other people.

But I guess, you need me to tell you that I am an anthropologist based at the University of Cape Town in South Africa, but currently on secondment at the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) where I am the Head of Publications and Dissemination Programme. I studied Journalism and Mass Communication and Political Science at the University of Buea in Cameroon where I obtained a bachelor degrees in 1999, before completing an MA in Development Studies [Sociology] at the University of Botswana in 2004, and then a PhD in Social Anthropology at the University of Basel in Switzerland in 2009. My long-time research interests are on the politics of suffering and smiling, particularly how young people seek ways and strategies of smiling in the midst of their suffering. I have conducted research in Botswana, Cameroon, South Africa and Senegal. I haven’t really published as I should, but hoping to fulfil that dream in the next several years when I return to the university in 2020 following the end of my first contract here at CODESRIA. But this hasn’t stopped me from being generous with my ideas. Knowledge production is a collective project, and good ideas are borne out of interdependency, openness and genuine collaborations to which I remain committed.

Currently my research interests have gradually shifted to the intersections between knowledge production and Pan-Africanism, especially given the pertinence of the re-current debates about decolonisation. That said, I am a passionate teacher. I teach social anthropology and will end this introduction by saying that I am a feminist ally.

Rama: Okay, as a feminist ally, how do you walk the talk Divine?

Divine: It is not so simple, especially as a man enjoying the many privileges generously distributed to men by patriarchy. I try my best, but perhaps I should leave this assessment to feminists. I was recently considered for the Interim headship of the African Gender Institute at UCT – a thought that haunted me for months until I was informed of a change of heart by the AGI board. I think feminism and being a feminist is something you live rather than talk about. I want to believe that in the midst of my patriarchal privileges, it is something I try everyday to live…

Rama: You mentioned you were also a husband and a father to a daughter I had the pleasure to meet in Dakar. What has been your experience of ‘fathering’ her?

Divine: Fatherhood is amazing and I am addicted to it, even though it is also daunting. After every sleepless night, we wake up to her ensnaring smile. Everyone should be given an opportunity to experience it where possible. When I learned that we were having a boy, I wept, and then when we then learned that it was a girl, I wept again, and then it seems God and the ancestors decided we needed the full joy and challenge, and then they blessed us with both a son and a daughter. It is important to understand the uniqueness of each, but also not treat them as radically enslaved by gender expectations. The greatest gift we try to give both of our kids is the capacity to smile, to sustain that smile, to distribute it to others, and then the importance and power of respect. Fatherhood is a blessing and a unique privilege. My daughter is my buddy. She has grown to be an independent but very intelligent social being with a strong character and sense of humour. I am just a vehicle to accompany her through this beautiful, tough and complicated life journey. She is the first child, like her mother and me, and it comes with responsibilities – of course no pressure. She is fully integrated in the household and encouraged to actively contribute in chores. Her father loves cooking, and happy that she’s found the creative meaning, therapeutic experience and collective interaction that it enables. She is exposed to and meets diverse people. But, I am just one person, and we are just one family. She is made and empowered by people and society, and I believe it is going to be ups and downs. But what we have tried to imbibe in her is resilience and the spirit of moving forward – to keep walking, even after stopping.

In a misogynist and toxic patriarchal world my daughter needs to learn how and when to be generous and selfish, but also to stand up for herself, and especially for others. But, who knows what we are doing? Who knows? Children make us, and I am the father she made of me. She and her brother have further defined love for me – unconditional, selfless, playful, forgiving. Through them, I have learned to be human again – to be playful, to laugh, to miss them, to cry, to say thank you, to say sorry; and you know to notice or pay attention to some of the most minute details in life such as the patterns on this table which we adults ignore, the pores on your skin, etc. It is hard to describe, you have to experience it to know how special it is.

Rama: I recently read about your fascinating research on ‘the prestige economy’, urban youths and masculinities in Cameroon. What motivated you to concentrate your PhD research on this topic and can you tell us a bit more about your main findings?

Divine: I believe it is a project that has always lived inside me and was somehow realised in the course of my PhD studies at the University of Basel. I often joke that when I began to negotiate my PhD research, one of my advisors was uncomfortable about introducing me at meetings as ‘my colleague who is an expert on sex.’ So, an ethnography of youth and men’s associational life in Cameroon was a good compromise, but also this description just emerged from a preliminary field visit, during which my friend Jude Fokwang introduced me to the group he was researching. The research on the prestige economy bridges the gaps on young men’s experiences of gender and masculinity, particularly in urban Cameroon. It examines alienated and underprivileged young men’s relationship with the crises that is so much talked about in urban studies, and the crisis in masculinities discussed in gender studies. I explore the ways in which young men live their masculinities amid precarity, thus examining their struggles to come of age, to be seen and how they make themselves visible as valuable social adults.

One question addressed relates to how urban young men explore the space and resources available to them in collective encounters and social groups of men to activate and renovate their masculinities. I mean, don’t forget that research demonstrates that while men, particularly African youth, are considered dangerous individually, they are portrayed as even more vicious when in groups or collectives, as we can see in the various depictions of them as gangsters, and fearless immigrants. While this project takes these portrayals seriously, it also attempts to understand other aspects related to their relationship with place, identity and future imaginaries. Thus, I focus on the strategies used by young men to ‘manage impressions’ and win the respect of other men (especially their peers) and the communities in which they are located. Despite the advantages offered to male youth by the Cameroon Grassfields strong patriarchal context, young men in this region, especially in the city of Bamenda, feel undervalued by the loss of old predictabilities and, overburdened by underachievement provoked by an endless quest to come of age, and the heavy burden to prove respectable masculinity. With little possibility of accumulation and redistribution – two important qualifiers of manhood, young men create myriad spaces to navigate and enhance their positions as men. In what I refer to as competing for attention, young men engage in performative acts, seeking each other’s attention and subsequent confirmation as strongmen, and therefore accomplished adults. Amongst these cadets, the need to authenticate manhood provokes dramatic performances that aim to position them as ‘accomplished’ despite being stuck in a transition to adulthood. This production, circulation and consumption of being is what I refer to as the prestige economy.

You asked about findings. Yes, I mainly argue that the combo of this ‘crisis’ in masculinities, economic, political, religious and social crises in Cameroon has created a more intense competition for attention amongst young men in the cities. This competition is engineered by the elongated transition to manhood, which obliges young men to create new replacements for salaried achievement and new opportunities and criteria for endorsement as ‘successful men’. Thus, all-male or male-only associational life allows young men to confront the predicament of individual and collective devaluation, helping them to re-define ‘being’ in a society where ‘becoming’ is increasingly difficult. Through the prestige economy and performance of masculinities, young men strategically re-position themselves in relation to each other and, also in relation to other men, women and their communities. Performances are not only framed as a conscious effort to produce or represent artificial hybrid selves, but also a tool or coping mechanism to smile through repositioning the self and to effectively deal with uncertainty. The prestige economy offers young people the opportunity to smile in the midst of suffering inflicted by the state and the ongoing process of neoliberal globalisation. God! I cannot believe I have been trying to finish this book forever. I am finishing the book on this, by the way!

Rama: You have lived and worked in Bamenda, Gaborone, Dakar, Basel and Cape Town. What has been your experience in these cities and what can you tell us about the similarities and differences of experiences you know youth(s) face in these cities?

Divine: Lol! My sweet Bamenda. Bamenda is the capital city of the North West Region of Cameroon. There are memories of my childhood and growing up buried in that city, and it is the place where family – friends, aunties, uncles, cousins, siblings, parents, etc – live, and so you can imagine how special it is for me. The sounds of taxis and hawkers mixed, and the jumble of church bells and calls from the mosque. Unfortunately, it is currently the centre of conflict, changing the totality of the experience of that creative, lively and humane space. It has become a place of drama, pain and trauma. That said, Bamenda is a place of cultures.

What connects all the cities where I have lived is a resilient spirit amongst its inhabitants to continuously forge convivial and interdependent spaces in spite of all the odds. The generosity of its peoples, and the wealth of its cultural and intellectual economy. I just love Dakar. It is a special place and it has successfully created a truly and unapologetically cosmopolitan global space. Gaborone took care of my soul and during the time I lived there, had distinguished itself as a Pan-African place of encounters, with people from across the continent and the world. Cape Town is unique. It is Cape Town. It is probably the most beautiful city on earth, and also the most painful to live in. Right now it is one of my homes. But I should add that I lived in Basel, probably longer than any of these other cities, interconnected by their contradictions as places of closures and overtures. While one is assured by the energy, passion and commitment of young people in these cities to imagine alternative futures, it is clear that to be young and to grow up in these cities can also be tough. These cities turn some good youth into beasts. The violence destabilises young people, in fact pushing some to make long and dangerous journeys to find comfort in distant places abroad, especially across the Mediterranean. I have seen young people spend an entire day, sometimes an entire week or many months hawking through streets, markets and other spaces just to sell 50grams of cashew nuts, so they can buy a loaf of bread to eat and drink tea to survive another night to continue the business of hoping in hopelessness. Suffering and smiling, pain and pleasure, crime and safety, beautiful and ugly – I mean, these are the contradictions of being African, living Africa, or perhaps any place. But young people never give up! You cannot keep up with them. They keep walking!

Rama: What does ‘belonging’ mean to you? And what do the recurrent waves of ‘Afrophobia’ (to paraphrase Mbembé) in South Africa evoke to you?

Divine: Belonging? This is basically about recognition as valuable humans deserving of exclusive ethics regimes. It is about the politics of inclusion and exclusion into what Francis Nyamnjoh has referred to as ‘ever-diminishing circles of inclusion.’ Or the privilege to be made part of specific terms of recognition as humans. For me, belonging, each time activated, is exclusively about exclusion, hence its use every time there are struggles over identity resources. Fanon was a key reading for the #RMF [Rhodes Must Fall] movement and the ongoing struggle for decolonisation in South Africa, and we may need to reread his critical and insightful reflections on ‘the pitfalls of national consciousness’ to collectively reflect on and address this nervous condition. Firstly, South Africa as a state and South Africans as a people have travelled a long journey, which continues to appear longer each day for everyone, particularly if you are black. This Afrophobia or phobia for other Africans is perhaps an insight into an impending politics of autochthony [the ‘original inhabitants’] . Of course, the dehumanisation that continuously emerges out of these incidents is gruesome and reminds us of the savage brutality that humans are capable of perpetuating. The ‘Afrophobic’, ‘xenophobic’ or ‘criminal’ incidents in South Africa, is perhaps a reminder that one of our greatest weaknesses is our incapacity or inability to deal with difference. It is important to note that after apartheid, South Africa is at war with itself. This is echoed by politicians and various reports demonstrating the atrocious state of respect for life and human dignity in South Africa, which cannot be understood without the near insurmountable violence of apartheid on South Africans and those who live in it, especially if you are woman. In the same week of the Afrophobia violence, there was savage violence against women, leading to a march to parliament in Cape Town and also to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Cape Town is now ranked one of the most violent cities in the world, a notoriety that used to be held by Johannesburg. In everyday life, the violence is not mainly targeting foreigners, but everyone and anyone who finds themselves in specific situations. But this is not unique to South Africa, and also now seems to overshadow the lived experience of South Africa as a welcoming society.

Though Afrophobia is a global phenomenon. Show me one place on this continent and worldwide where Africans are welcome with open arms? In Libya, we have seen horrific stories about African migrants being violated. Even within countries, look at the violence in Cameroon, Nigeria, Somalia, Burkina Faso, DRC, Chad, Mali, Niger, Libya and others. Each country has a derogatory construct to describe foreigners from other African countries whom they consider to be more savage than wild animals. Often these constructs are used to describe ‘foreigners’ or ‘outsiders’ in a way that makes them worse than the lowest categories – hence, the justification to violate them.

Fanon used the example of similar occurrences across the continent to reinforce the point that Afrophobia is the work of elites in a rapidly evolving post-independence and postcolonial context. Examples include the deportation of Nigerians from Ghana in the 1950s, the Ivorian attacks against Togolese, Dahomians and Nigerians, anti-Sudanese and Mauritanian reprisals in Senegal, anti-Senegalese deportations in Mauritania, and early Congolese retaliation against Senegalese. Remember that infamous 1983 executive order by Nigerian President Shehu Shagari forcing over 2 million mainly West African immigrants to flee the country, immortalised in what we now know today as Ghana Must Go? And Idi Amin’s Uganda and the attacks on Indians? What about Equatorial Guinea’s recent expelling of ‘illegal’ Cameroonians? Francis Nyamnjoh’s seminal work Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Southern Africa is very instructive in this sense, with examples from Botswana, Zimbabwe and other countries. Look, in Botswana I was demeaned as a Makwerekwere, the same in South Africa, and now in Senegal I am derogated as Niak.

There is a fundamental reflection that we need to do collectively about this nervous condition that seems to underpin our everyday lives. I mean, to borrow an expression from Mbembe, we need to ‘come out of this great darkness’ (‘sortir de la grande nuit’), or ‘come out of the great harm’ (‘sortir de la grande nuire’). Think about it – in 2019, close to sixty years after ‘independence’ we are still discussing visas, and borders on this continent. In 2019, it is still legal to be persecuted and prosecuted for crossing borders. Speechless! Shame on us all.

Rama: Thanks so much for these profound thoughts. You have recently discussed your experience of opportunities that have become ‘toxic’ due to restrictions to fundamental individual rights, including to mobility as discussed in this report and this one. You have described living this unsettling experience while trying to build sustainable partnerships as ‘bending over backwards’ in a special issue on ethical partnerships: What are in your opinion are the main challenges of building sustainable and equitable partnerships across continents?

Divine: Two days ago, I held a meeting with a northern publisher who ‘was in town’ and decided it was important to meet with us to discuss partnership. In the generosity of spirit that we have, I scheduled an appointment for the said day at 11:00am. At 9.45am I received a call from their driver informing me that they were on their way to CODESRIA for the 10.00am meeting. I protested, but they then used the next 30 minutes to force me to provide live directions to our building located on the main Cheikh Anta Diop avenue. They ended up arriving at 11.50am, no calls to inform us they were running late. This person came straight into my office, sat and delved into what looked like an interrogation, and thereafter, a lecture on the standards of knowledge production, publishing and distribution in Africa. Then the person insistence that it would be beneficial for us to to distribute their books and co-publish with them. All this, after this person indicated that they know nothing about my organisation [CODESRIA], and have never read, and did not care to read after insisting they had come to discuss collaboration.

This wasn’t the first time a potential partner walked into our offices discussing partnership, without knowing or reading anything about us. Of course, I acknowledge the challenges with our website, but at least read the mission statement and the Charter, to be sure that there is convergence for partnership.

The key challenges to ethical partnerships? Respect, Respect and Respect. Simple. It is respect that makes you take time to understand the other person. It is respect that allows two parties, even when unequal to find ways of speaking to each other in ways that acknowledges the existence of each other. It is respect that prevents us from imposing abstract agendas and projects on others. It is respect that stops us from just seeking signatories so as to fulfil the requirement of simply adding an African into a project. But unfortunately, being African is an affliction, and a kind of affliction that transforms the body it occupies into an undignified aberration.

Rama: What acts of radical self-care do you practice to keep going as the busy Head of Publications at the continent’s most famous Pan-African research organisation?

Divine: Hehehe. Radical? Invest in smiling as a political act and a commitment to keep walking. But you need a good heart and a lot of patience, and a high capacity to not take things personally. The knowledge production environment is a highly political playing field. The best medicine: laughter! When you have a backlog of 1000 manuscripts to clear, you try to have a plan but also tell yourself that you are not a Messiah. Someone called Jesus already sacrificed himself for others, and I am not planning to be the new Messiah. Secondly, the workplace is not my mother’s or father’s house. Learn to say thank you. Each time you receive a criticism, say thank you. Most times, even the person who contributed the criticism doesn’t understand why you are thanking them. In the end, you all learn. Remember that you work to earn a salary to support yourself and your family, rather than building a family to support work. Family first! Every researcher believes they have made a breakthrough and every author thinks their article just won the Nobel Prize. Be transparent, try not to please people and remain true to yourself. The world is already full of secrets, and I am sure you have many of your personal secrets to deal with.

Divine Fuh is Head of the Publications and Dissemination Programme at CODESRIA in Dakar, Senegal. He joined CODESRIA in February 2017 from the University of Cape Town, South Africa. His research questions relate to youth, urbanity and uncertainty, especially with respect to how people seek ways of ‘smiling’ in the midst of ‘suffering’.

Interview is by Rama Salla Dieng who is a Senegalese writer, academic and activist. She is currently a Lecturer in African and International Development at the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh. Rama is the editor of the Talking Back series on roape.net and a member of ROAPE’s editorial working group.

Experimental Neoliberalism and Refugee Survival in Kenya

Kenya hosts about half a million refugees in its camps and urban areas. Increasingly, these camps are also sites of finance, debt, and neoliberal-led forms of experimentation. Ali Bhagat situates refugees as a new population for neoliberal experimentation as camps are transformed into spaces of untapped profit.

By Ali Bhagat

Refugee survival in Kenya is inseparable from the dynamics of inequality, finance, and debt embedded in capitalism. This blogpost draws much inspiration from Kevin Sieff’s excellent article in the The Washington Post that looks at how debt-ridden refugees are being forced to return to a warzone in Somalia. I am most interested in the ways that capital – in its money form – supersedes, intervenes, and invades the humanitarian sector. At the site of the refugee camp and in cities like Nairobi, capital claims to free the refugee from the passivity of shelter and assistance through entrepreneurialism. This post explores neoliberal experimentation in the context of refugee survival in Kenya. I argue that refugees represent an experimental population. Their various sites of survival are opened up to financial penetration – a last ditch and piecemeal market-led solution to alleviate poverty.

Kenya hosts approximately half a million refugees in its camps and urban areas and has done this for nearly three decades. Dadaab and Kakuma, two of the world’s largest refugee camps, have become sites of increased xenophobia and structural violence where the Kenyan government continues to threaten their closure in the face of diminished global aid. Contrastingly, these camps are also sites of finance, debt, and neoliberal-led forms of experimentation. Neoliberalism – ideological and material power of private interest through the dismantling of state-led solutions for welfare – is highlighted here as a way to understand a global stance and policy focus on self-reliance. In so doing, I situate refugees as a new population for experimentation. Experimentation is a market-oriented solution to alleviate refugee poverty. It is hinged on self-reliance and propagates the financial interests of the private sector. The intentions of capital accumulation are hidden under the guise of choice and liberty where refugees can use credit to escape poverty and transform themselves into entrepreneurs. Self-reliance is a façade.

Mastercard and the U.S Agency for International Development (USAID) announced a public-private coalition to transform refugee settlements into digital communities in 2018. This strategy seeks to ‘bring together technology, solutions, and experience from multiple sectors to transform refugee settlements into digitally-connected communities’ thereby, providing infrastructure-based innovations in terms of mobile phone and internet access vis-à-vis key dimensions of survival such as safety, food, shelter, and water.

Mastercard along with Western Union announced a new digital infrastructure model hinged on mobile money, digital vouchers, and card-based solutions that promote refugee ‘self-reliance’. Digitizing the refugee camp thereby transforming it from an arena of passive aid and shelter to a marketplace allows refugees to access formal financial services. This form of neoliberal experimentation also transforms the camp, previously understood in the logic of the development industry as a forgotten barren space, into one of untapped profit.

For example, as the Mastercard and Western Union report states, ‘…refugees are responsible for payment…For example, children can go to school, but the family must pay for uniforms and books. It becomes vital to access convenient, easy-to-use financial services. Foreign and domestic remittances received via Western Union or hawalas [a remittance channel that takes place outside of the banking system] are a major source of income.’ Interestingly, the logic of empowerment described in this report, is equated to providing a wider array of financial service access – not actually addressing the fact that refugees have to pay for some essential survival services such as healthcare and basic goods.

Actors like Mastercard and Western Union – by diversifying access to financial services – are able to capitalise on financial transactions by providing cheaper rates for remittances in the name of smart city development. The same report goes on to highlight that Equity Bank holds 15,000 refugee accounts in their Kakuma branch and most remittances are either received through Western Union or hawala agents—needless to say, there is profit to be had if so-called passive aid recipients are transformed into entrepreneurs who are self-reliant actors.

The transformation of refugees into self-reliant entrepreneurs relies on the logic that these people are complex economic actors who need more diverse financial choices. Missing from this reasoning is the recognition that refugees receive little global attention and constantly face reductions in essential services pushing them to precarious forms of income-generation in order to survive. Interventions by private sector actors fall into age-old neoliberal adages of efficiency, accountability, and freedom of choice. State and international human rights actors such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Kenyan government, in the face of global austerity, are more than happy to have private actors step-in and takeover responsibility for refugee survival.

In contrast, the threats of closure, particularly in Dadaab, have not disappeared and the camp sizes are slowly shrinking. In 2011, Dadaab’s population was 421,000 and this number has been reduced to 230,000 in 2018. While Kakuma represents an experimental avenue for profit, Dadaab – home to predominantly Somali refugees – is framed by the Kenyan government as an unaffordable space both in terms of the security threat and financial burden. The return of Somalis, through their scapegoating as terrorists, is justified on a national level in order to quell social disruption. 36.8 percent of Kenya’s population lives on $1.90 USD a day placing Kenya 8th on the list of top 10 African countries experiencing extreme poverty.

There are apparent tensions regarding refugee hosting. Many of the participants interviewed for my research suggest that the Kenyan government supports encampment because it absolves itself from welfare responsibilities. Looking at this more broadly, it was the forces of structural adjustment in the 1990s that coincided with refugee encampment that prevented the Kenyan state from developing long-term welfare capabilities in the first place.

Nevertheless, the new Comprehensive Refugee Programme (CRP) highlights that refugees should have adequate avenues for job creation, entrepreneurship, and integration in camps and urban settlements. This is a key divergence from previous strategies of encampment – refugees are now a new experimental population who must harness the force of the market.

While self-reliance is the policy du jour, the militaristic arm of the state that seeks to prevent migration is also alive and well. Biometric Identity Management (BIM) through fingerprinting and iris scans are surveillance technologies indicative of state organisations (along with UNHCR) seeking to prevent new or circulatory migrants. For example, Somalis who are ‘voluntarily’ repatriated -as Sieff points out, just to relieve their own state of indebtedness in Dadaab – seek return to Kenya as Somalia remains unstable. BIM prevents this from occurring thus attempting to make repatriation permanent. Indeed, as one interview participant notes, if UNHCR and the government are claiming that refugees are able to return to Somalia, then – within this flawed logic – they can actually no longer accept Somali refugees. If they did, then Somalia would no longer be considered a safe country for return so both international and national actors are complicit in the violence that Somalis face in their struggle for survival.

Much attention is given to refugee survival in camps; however, with the constant threat of their closure, many refugees are permanently relocating to Nairobi and its surrounds – a move that is illegal without a permit. Since welfare programmes for urban refugees are virtually non-existent, these groups must rely on piecemeal forms of assistance from NGOs and their own communities in the form of cash grants, entrepreneurial training, and microfinance within the ambit of experimentation and self-reliance.

Self-reliance as a solution for assistance is hindered by xenophobia too. For example, many Somali refugees relocate to Eastleigh which has become an area targeted by the police in light of terrorist attacks in Nairobi. Somalis are unfairly rounded-up and sent back to camps or deported while other non-Somali refugees are left to  survive in Nairobi in the informal sector. A participant from a government department noted in my research that, ‘If a refugee wants to stay in Nairobi then they can fend for themselves…the camps are equipped to care for them so if they are in Nairobi it is by choice and they ideally should have a transit permit from the government.’ Self-reliance is thus inherent in the national attitudes towards refugees which simultaneously ignores the circumstances of violence, health issues, and poverty in refugee camps.

Since no welfare support systems exist, many NGOs offer some sort of business training and loan assistance programmes – another example of ‘disciplinary entrepreneurialism.’ In order to access these loans or grants, refugees must go through a training programme where they learn the necessary business skills to set-up shop. They must learn how to make a profit so that they can repay the loan, because these loans, in fact, are frequently used for other refugees in the context of shrinking services. NGOs also recognize that refugees are a flight risk for loans because the cash on hand is used for basic consumption needs – a key issue identified in the literature on microfinance.

In short, the usage of loans under the spirit of entrepreneurialism dovetails with the security-maximization arm of the state that prevents refugees from entering its territory. These strategies coincide with two central aspects of neoliberalism – austerity and accumulation. As the story goes, the Kenyan government along with international actors prevents refugees from entering the country. These refugees are framed as threats to state security and an unaffordable risk. In turn, refugees that already exist in camps are either sent back to their country of origin or transformed into entrepreneurs where the camp becomes a space of experimentation. Refugees in urban areas are also meant to become entrepreneurs in order to survive without any state-led assistance. Importantly, these strategies have little to no empirical evidence further pointing to the experimental nature of entrepreneurialism as a key strategy for survival upon relocation (for a greater exploration of these themes see my article here).

The Kenyan case reveals that exclusion and violence continue to facilitate capital accumulation while also preventing long-term refugee survival. The notion of experimentation, briefly sketched here, allows us to frame neoliberalism as an ambivalent process. Capital permeates these spaces of poverty and the logics of entrepreneurialism facilitate some form of accumulation either through debt or through micro-transactions in the form of remittances. Importantly, refugees in the development of so-called smart communities also produce data and this data can be used for the purposes of capital accumulation in other contexts.

Ali Bhagat is a Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of Manchester. He is currently working on his book manuscript Displacement in Racial Capitalism: Governing Refugees in Paris and Nairobi.  

Featured Photograph: Refugees in Kenya receiving food from USAID (11 July, 2011).

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For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
We use cookies to collect and analyse information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customise content. By clicking into any content on this site, you agree to allow cookies to be placed. To find out more see our