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Striking Back!

In a passionate defence of the strike action of university workers in the UK, ROAPE’s Rama Salla Dieng describes the intolerable pressures on teaching staff and the gender and ethnic inequalities within the academy. Dieng writes, ‘We are on strike to resist the marketisation of our knowledge and lives, and to build radical solidarities with our students.’

By Rama Salla Dieng

The ROAPE #TalkingBack interview series on ‘African feminism in Dialogue’ will be cancelled this week and next. This is to support the 43 Universities in the UK and Scotland, members of the University College Union (UCU) that are taking industrial action over pensions, pay and work conditions from 25 to 29 November, and from 2 to 4 December.

Pay and conditions need to be urgently addressed especially of early career researchers who are more likely to experience precarious employment and mental health issues due to the daunting and increasing pressures in the neoliberal academia. From REF-able content (Research Excellence Framework), high quality publications, citations counts, not-so-useful university-league tables, Early Career Researchers (ECRs) and more senior researchers, have to publish high quality academic publications and obtain competitive grants while still facing an increasing administrative burden.

But did you know that there are intersections of vulnerability that worsen pay and conditions in the academia? Did you know women in UK universities were paid a mean hourly wage that was, on average, 15.9 per cent lower than their male colleagues? Did you know that Asian academic staff have a 9% pay gap compared to white academic staff? Did you know that black academic staff are paid 14% less than white academic staff? Did you know that BME (Black and Minority Ethnicity) staff are underrepresented in senior positions and over-represented in more junior roles? As an African female lecturer in the UK, I believe that such systemic gender and ethnic inequalities must be challenged.

Indeed, there have been much evidence on how:

Low pay and inhumane conditions such as heavy workloads, short-term contracts and de-or under-valuation of academic work remain the main tool to casualise university staff (including support staff). The toll of casualisation is not only economic, it also has an impact on work-life balance, mental and physical health. According to UCU, over two-thirds of their respondents (71%) said they believed their mental health had been damaged by working on insecure contracts and almost half (45%) said it had impacted on their physical health.

Gender, not children, hold women academics back. Many racialised international academics face gendered stigma and prejudice in academia, including bias in student evaluations. At a personal level I have experienced gender-based violence and racism on many occasions throughout my short academic career.

The hostile environment is adversely affecting international academics,  professional staff, PhD students and their families. My family and I have continuously experienced the effects of the hostile environment on many occasions as well. The last events to date were, i) not being able to travel back home for two weeks last month after losing my sister as I was waiting to receive the outcome of my Indefinite Leave to Remain and ii) visa rejection for a close family member to visit us this December. A lot of international colleagues won’t be on the picket line because of fears of retaliation regarding their immigration status in the UK. This is because their jobs and for most, the livelihoods of their families they support back home, depend on them. On the picket lines, a lot of international students were crossing because of the threats they have received regarding their Tier-4 visa.

Racism remains a systemic issue in academia which has an impact on the number of  Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) students going for PhDs as well as the number of Black (and mostly female) academics in the UK. As a result, this affects the gendered toll of emotional labour performed by BAME academics and its invisibilisation in academia, as well as the rise of mental and physical health issues.

Homo and Transphobia and ableism remain key threats to academics.

I feel particularly privileged to have been offered tenure less than a year after being appointed considering the increasingly deteriorating terms and condition of employment in academia. Yet, there are thousands of equally, if not more, qualified young black academics that I know personally who are still facing the brunt of precarity and casualisation. Therefore, universities offering humane and secure working contracts to their academic and professional staff should be the norm, not the exception, considering the shared values that are at stake, and the highly stressful nature of academic labour.

Therefore, we are on strike because we wish fairer conditions and pensions for everyone in academia. We are on strike so that we can continue to practice our teaching and research as a labour of love. We are taking industrial action to speak truth to power. We are on strike to teach the values of social justice to our students. We are on strike to resist the marketisation of our knowledge and lives, and to build radical solidarities with our students. We are standing on picket lines, both physical and digital, because they are our ultimate line of defence to save what is left of the soul of academia.

This is the reason why the ‘Talking Back’ series on ‘African feminisms in Dialogue’ will be on hold during the eight days of the strike.

Rama Salla Dieng is a Senegalese writer, academic and activist. She is currently a Lecturer in African and International Development at the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh. Rama is the editor of the Talking Back series on roape.net, a member of ROAPE’s editorial working group and a UCU member.

Featured Photograph: UCU members taking action at the University of Warwick (25 November, 2019).

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Letter of support that one of our Edinburgh students, Suzie Loader, addressed to the Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Edinburgh, Peter Mathieson.

Dear Mr Peter Mathieson,

I am writing to you to express both my solidarity with the upcoming industrial action beginning on the 25 November, but also to articulate my concerns about the impact that this will have on my studies.

Having come from the education sector myself, I understand the difficulties staff have had in making the decision to strike, as they will be acutely aware of how this impacts their students.  However, I do not see how staff can stand by and do nothing with the continuing issues of insufficient pay, poor quality contracts, the prevalence of inequality with regards to gender and BME pay gaps, an ever-increasing workload and a proposed rise in pension contributions.

The proposed strikes are to take place in the weeks leading up to my final essays for this semester. This means that I will not have access to the support offered by my lecturers, nor will I have lecture content that will assist me in my exams and essays.  As you can imagine, this is a significant cause for concern for me, as it has undermined my confidence in the modules I have undertaken, and I am frustrated that I am missing contact hours that I enjoy.

I would like it noted, however, that whilst the strike action will undoubtedly affect my studies, the system as it stands is already having a negative impact on my progress.  I am fortunate to be surrounded by an enthusiastic, innovative and determined body of staff and my lecturers’ passions are present in abundance in each lecture I attend. With their significant workloads, however, it has become increasingly difficult for me to meet with them during their contracted office hours, as to put it simply, they have too many students and not enough time.  I cannot in good faith ask my lecturers to see me outside of their office hours, as they are not contracted to do so, although I know that many offer additional hours to see their students when they are under no obligation to do so. With so many other contracted duties, however, I am sure that you can appreciate that this approach is unsustainable and requires addressing at a systematic level. I left the teaching profession as a result of an unmanageable workload and I would hate to see such brilliant staff as the lecturers in the School of Social and Political Science do the same.

I urge you to address the terms of the strike so that industrial action can be avoided, and the welfare of both your staff and students can be protected.

Yours Sincerely,

Suzie Loader

South Africa’s Liberation Struggle Revisited

Peter Jacobs reviews two new books on the history of South Africa’s unfinished liberation struggle. He celebrates books that debunk the one-sided and sanitised histories of how South Africa’s black majority fought for their emancipation from political and socioeconomic subjugation.

By Peter Jacobs

South Africa’s liberation struggle historiography is well-established and longstanding. In the 1970s, for example, an intellectual insurgency erupted against the hegemonic versions of past struggles in which the ruling classes feature as protagonists. The insurgents, branded social historians, were thinking and writing in opposition to mainstream historiography, debunking countless myths about how social conflicts and classes have shaped South African society since the late-1800s. Whilst dominant narratives celebrated the civilising role of colonialism, counter-narratives of the social historians unearthed incontestable evidence of dispossession, oppression and exploitation inherent to colonisation. Moreover, how the dispossessed and disenfranchised social classes fought to emancipate themselves remained a major preoccupation of these insurgent intellectuals. This historiography also interrogated past struggles as means to new ends, underscoring the contemporary relevancy of the country’s liberation struggle history (see Shula Marks’ discussion of these ‘insurgent historians’).

Examining post-1994 socioeconomic revolts exhibit remarkable continuities and discontinuities with the decades of mass protests before the 1990s. Continuity with past struggles has sharper visibility in the forms than in the substance of current protests. Evidently, types of grassroots movements and methods of township, student and workplace protests replicate what had happened in the 1970s and 1980s. The discontinuity, by contrast, is prominent in the substance sparking and fuelling contemporary struggles. Worsening socioeconomic hardships have ignited new waves of mass struggles in which demands for alternatives to neoliberalism and post-1994 social injustices dominate. Woven into these battles are renewed campaigns against political alienation in a country promoted as a model of liberal democracy.

Against this backdrop, questions are being asked about what that contemporary protest movements can learn from past anti-systemic revolts. Two new books demonstrate why these questions have not lost their relevance while drawing attention to struggles that have received scant attention in voluminous histories of South Africa’s liberation movements.

The National Question: Multiracialism versus Non-racialism

In Cape Radicals (WITS University Press, 2019), Crain Soudien suggests that every socio-political struggle against oppression and injustice pivots on a battle of ideas. The struggle for ideological principles or principled politics is a sine qua non for successful revolutionary action in any freedom struggle! This message is arguably the chief strength of this book. The book pays tribute to the activism of the New Era Fellowship (NEF), an organisation dedicated to the spread and advancement of radical left politics since the early 1930s through the 1960s. Through regular public discussion forums and publications, the NEF was at the forefront in the battle for ideological clarity and nurtured generations of fighters devoted to full democratic rights for the disenfranchised majority. This NEF trained intelligentsia became the founders and builders of the NEUM, the Non-European Unity Movement (renamed the Unity Movement of South Africa in 1964).

Through their efforts to solve South Africa’s national question, Soudien argues, the ‘Cape Radicals’ made incisive and lasting breakthroughs, shifting the quest for liberation onto a far-reaching revolutionary path. Accordingly, rival organisations, particularly the ANC and SA Communist Party, diluted and misrepresented the national question. For example, the Freedom Charter promotes multiracialism, which is indistinguishable from the veiled racism of liberals. By contrast, the NEF and Unity Movement rejected, from the outset, that multiracialism or multinationalism were a solution to South Africa’s national question. The Unity Movement’s motto ‘We Build A Nation’ advocated a tenacious devotion to non-racialism in outlook and action.

There is a tendency to overemphasis in Cape Radicals cultural identities, in isolation from how political economy shapes segregated societies. Similarly, confusing the policy of non-collaboration with abstention from politics is probably as a result of Soudien’s erroneous reliance on ill-informed denigrators of the Unity Movement. Contrary to this misrepresentation, this policy meant conscious and independent action for revolutionary change by the disenfranchised in their own interests. Soudien has not sufficiently explored South Africa’s tradition of emancipatory politics but opens an agenda for further reflections on a history that ‘has in effect remained a closed book to mainstream history, sociology and politics.’

Scholar-Activism Against Capitalism

The other important book is simply titled Archie Mafeje (HSRC Press, 2019). In this book, Bongani Nyoka, a young South African sociologist, has assembled and edited seven articles that Archibald Boyce Monwabisi Mafeje (1936-2007) wrote between the early 1970s and late 1990s. After completing his Masters’ degree at the University of Cape Town (UCT) in the early 1960s, Mafeje enrolled for doctoral studies at Cambridge University, graduating in 1968. Subsequently, when UCT refused Dr Mafeje’s appointment as a senior lecturer in 1968, a rejection based on racist prejudice rather than scholarly credentials, he moved onto become a celebrated professor of Anthropology/Sociology at in the University of Dar Es Salaam, The Hague and Cairo.

Nyoka’s introduction offers a captivating background to the articles, tracing how Mafeje evolved into an esteemed social scientist and what animated his prolific scholarly work. But the book covers more than just Mafeje’s remarkable academic accomplishments. The volume’s introduction is in effect an abbreviated history of the Unity Movement, understandably limited to the moments when Mafeje actively participated in it.

Before he went abroad, Mafeje belonged to several organisations that were Unity Movement affiliates. Stalwarts of the Movement, particularly Nathaniel Tshuthsa Honono, educated Mafeje in Unity Movement politics during his high-school years in the former Transkei. This education coupled with his formative political training in the Society of Young Africa (SOYA) and the Cape Peninsula Students Union (CPSU) both Unity Movement affiliates alongside student/youth groups in Durban and Johannesburg, aided Mafeje to become a towering intellectual figure with recognition beyond Africa.

The imprint of Unity Movement ideology on Mafeje’s thinking was indelible as is evident from this collection – notwithstanding his paradoxical aloofness from organised political involvement during his decades abroad and, since 2002, his residency in Pretoria where he took up an academic position at the University of South Africa (UNISA). Unity Movement ideology is prominent in the topics Mafeje worked on and, far more profoundly, in the method of scientific reasoning subtly woven into his arguments. Mafeje advocated a militant defence of dialectical logic and historical materialism whenever he dealt with hegemonic theories, methodologies and epistemologies in the social sciences. His critique of anthropology (including its origins as a bourgeois social science subservient to positivism), and Harold Wolpe’s mechanistic uses of modes of production and reflections on the 1976 Soweto student revolt illustrate his mastery of dialectics.

As a renowned scholar on the political economy of agrarian transitions, Mafeje dissected the dynamics of agrarian class formation and unmasked how anachronistic tribal despots serve capitalist accumulation. It is common knowledge that in the Unity Movement tradition, resolving the agrarian question was regarded as central, as is evident from the involvement of its cadres in building peasant movements that became instrumental in the Pondoland revolt. In a semi-colonial country like South Africa, mobilising the landless peasantry as a revolutionary ally of the working class was regarded as crucial for liquidating capitalist property and social relations.

Beyond Historical Curiosity

Soudien and Nyoka must be commended for their thoughtful introductions to the history of South Africa’s unfinished liberation struggle and countering the falsification of past struggles. The two books debunk one-sided and sanitised histories of how South Africa’s black majority fought for their emancipation from political and socioeconomic subjugation. On the whole, the core strengths of these books eclipse their shortcomings. Though both volumes cast the spotlight on the historical relevancy of the Unity Movement until the 1960s, the authors hesitate to step beyond academic curiosity and research. So, they are both silent on how this organisation contributed to the liberation struggle over decades since the 1960s.

Since the mid-1960s, for instance, the Unity Movement leadership in exile fought tirelessly to garner support for an uninterrupted South African revolution. Another significant turning point was the ‘Terrorism Trial’ of 14 members of APDUSA – the African People’s Democratic Union of Southern Africa – in 1971/2, with 13 of them eventually sentenced to lengthy imprisonment on Robben Island. With the gradual revival of this ideological tradition throughout the 1980s, cadres of young workers, students and intellectuals joined the movement to fight for its political vision. The political re-orientation of APDUSA in the early 1990s, saw the adoption of a set of anti-capitalist transitional demands for unity with progressive forces and to resist the neoliberal onslaught of the post-1994 state.

Peter T Jacobs is a research director at the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in South Africa, based in the Cape Town office. He is also member of the national executive of the African People’s Democratic Union of Southern Africa (APDUSA).

Featured Photograph: Unity Movement leadership in Lusaka, circa 1964.

Björn Beckman: Comrade, Researcher and Friend

Björn Beckman was one of the most influential Marxist scholars who worked in Nigeria where he was a lecturer in Ahmadu Bello University from 1978. His engagement with Nigeria and Africa lasted to the end. His contribution to radical movements and scholarship was immense. Jibrin Ibrahim and Tunde Zack-Williams celebrate a comrade, friend and scholar.

A Life of Struggle and Friendship

By Jibrin Ibrahim

My good friend, mentor and teacher, Björn Beckman died peacefully in his home on 6 November. He was surrounded by his lovely wife, Gunilla, son Petter and daughter Malin as he departed. Professor Beckman was one of the most influential Marxist scholars that worked in Nigeria where he was a lecturer in Ahmadu Bello University from 1978 to 1987. His engagement with Nigeria and Nigerians however lasted to the end. I had the privilege of visiting him in April this year to wish him the best in the great beyond as well as discuss what to do about his Nigerian legacy. We spent the time with his family at their country house by the Baltic sea in the Swedish archipelago.

Björn was above all a good friend who I had been close to for over forty years. His family and mine have spent considerable time together both in Nigeria and Sweden over the period. He had great social skills and had a huge network of friends all over Nigeria who he kept in close contact with over the period. He valued friendship and invested considerable time and resources maintaining these friendships. It’s for this reason that a lot of us feel directly bereaved by his passing away.

My generation was already immersed in Marxist political economy by the time Björn arrived in Nigeria in 1978 when I was just starting my masters degree programme. Nonetheless, Björn electrified the learning of Marxist political economy with his vast knowledge of the classics and current literature. He was above all a profoundly knowledgeable Marxist theoretician with deep knowledge of its methodology. This enabled him to make all of us better students and teachers of the discipline. He had the capacity to guide his students to do research that was both empirically grounded and theoretically sound. For four decades, Beckman played the role of revolutionary mentor, academic supervisor, guide for rigorous Marxist-Leninist analysis and link to Africanist and internationalist radical scholarship and action. He was an excellent academic supervisor but never limited himself to that role.

During the numerous fellowships he secured for me at his base, the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University, I was astonished to see that he had additional networks of students he trained, both Swedish and other nationalities. He was a very disciplined person who worked hard for his students and associates virtually every day. Not surprisingly, everybody wanted to be supervised by him and he never said no to anyone. During his 70th anniversary, a Festschrift (a celebration in honour of a colleague) was organised for him in Stockholm where his wider circle of comrades and academic associates came to pay homage.

Björn Beckman was important to us because of his deep commitment to Nigeria. He immersed himself in the successive radical struggles of the 1980s and 1990s and beyond. He was a central pillar in the coterie of comrades that defined pathways for resistance to imperialism, neo-colonial and national exploitation and oppression. By the same token, he was a determined comrade engaged in the struggle for liberation, workers’ rights and women’s rights.

He and his wife, Gunilla Andrae, had particular interest from different angles in agricultural production and its value chains in industry. As Nigeria once again makes another effort at import substitution to produce the rice and wheat we import to eat, it’s worthwhile recalling their book – The Wheat Trap: Bread and Underdevelopment in Nigeria. They traced the journey of Nigeria from self-sufficiency in food production in the 1960s to complete dependence in the 1980s. One Muhammadu Buhari, Head of State, in his 1984 budget announced increases in tariff except for wheat because as he explained, ‘bread has become the cheapest staple for our people’. Countries who want to combat food dependency develop value chains for local rather than imported staples.

Björn Beckman had always planned to write a book on his intellectual contribution, political engagement and his own direct participation in the radical movements that were active during his Nigeria tenure since 1978. In 1987, the authorities of Ahmadu Bello University had refused to extend his work contract for political reasons, and he was obliged to return to Sweden but his engagement with academia and the radical movement in Nigeria never waned. At seventy-five years old, when he finally had the time to settle down and write the book, illness came, and it took years to even diagnose his condition. He therefore did not have the strength and peace of mind to write this important book that so many of his Nigerian comrades would have loved to see. He however left extensive dairies that could be mined for information and insights on the struggle for a progressive Nigeria.

Beckman was a key player in the 1983 Marx Centenary Conference where a major battle developed between different Marxist and radical schools with Bala Usman and Claude Ake amongst others. Some of us self-defined as pure Marxist Leninists seeing others as mere radicals, but that’s a story for another time. He was an important adviser to the Students’ Movement and was really moved by the issues around ‘Ali Must Go’ and the killing of students in Ahmadu Bello University in 1986. It was not surprising that he was forced out of the university one year later. Beckman was also very engaged with trade unions and he and his wife did extensive research on the textile unions during the leadership of Adams Oshiomhole and beyond. Finally, in the post 1986 period, he worked closely with the Centre for Research and Documentation and Mambaiyya House – Aminu Kano Centre for Democratic Research, both in Kano.

Rest in peace Björn.

A version of this celebration of Björn Beckman first appeared in Nigeria’s Daily Trust (15 November, 2019). 

Jibrin Ibrahim is a political scientist, development expert and writer. He writes a weekly column ‘Deepening Democracy’ in the Daily Trust, a Nigerian daily newspaper.

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Björn Beckman, 1938-2019: Remembering a ROAPE comrade

By Tunde Zack-Williams

Björn Beckman, who died on the 6 November 2019, age 81, was a renowned Swedish political scientist, Marxist and a regular contributor to the Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE). For several years he taught at the Department of Political Science, Amadu Bello University, (ABU) Zaria in Northern Nigeria. By the time Björn arrived in Nigeria in the late 1970s, ABU had been transformed into one of the most radical campus in the country.  This transformation was in part driven by the growing popularity of the dependency paradigm, with its emphasis on capital drain from the peripheries (Africa) to the metropolitan centres, North America and Europe. This paradigm sat well within Northern Nigerian social structure with the Hausa concept of the talakawa, the poorest class in society, those who had been rendered landless.

In his time at ABU, Björn (as he was known to his colleagues and students alike) found like-minded people both on the staff and among his students, who always wanted a conversation, the manner of continuing the lecture away from the lecture theatre. There were regular seminars and conferences in ABU, as was the case in other Northern universities, such as Kanu and Jos, some organised by departments and faculties others organised by the students.

Those who knew Björn, worked with him or were taught by him in institutions in Nigeria and Sweden, or on the Review of African Political Economy, always point to his generosity, his intellectual depth and rigour, which he was always ready to share, particularly with his students. He was passionate about African’s development as was demonstrated in an attack he unleashed on the late Claude Ake. At the conference (entitled ‘Marx and Africa’) held in ABU to mark the centenary of the death of Marx in 1883, Björn criticised his friend Claude Ake, asserting that his book, Revolutionary Pressures in Africa, contributed nothing to our knowledge of the African revolution. This was a strong attack, which stunned some in the audience. Unfortunately, for me I had just written a review of Ake’s two recent books, which were published in the weekly journal, West Africa’, including The Political Economy of Africa. In the conference hall of over 500, Ake retorted that Björn had completely misread the text and pleaded with the Chair to ask someone person in the hall who had read and understood the book to comment on it. I was pleased to note that the Chair did not invite me to speak, for as the saying goes: when elephants fight only the grass suffers.

On another occasion, I recall a visit to Sweden, this time on ROAPE business with Giles Mohan and Jan Burgess, the wonderful reception we received from Björn and his wife Gunilla for which I have always been grateful. I left with a handful of book presents, which Björn gave me.

Finally, Björn’s contributions to ROAPE’s debates and discussions have been immense: from his article on the liberation of civil society with the warning that the raison d’être of neo-liberalism is to ‘de-legitimise the state, the main locus of nationalist aspirations and resistance to the neo-liberal project.’ In order to buttress his point, he pointed out that the state ought to play a central role in the constitution of civil society. He pointed out that the neo-liberal project draws on theories of patrimonialism, rent seeking and state autonomy, yet neo-liberalism masks its enormous utilization of state power, while still suppressing existing civil society.

In one of his early writings (‘The Military as Revolutionary Vanguard: a Critique’) he cautioned young Nigerian comrades, who because of the crisis in Nigerian ruling class politics, were beginning to put their hopes on the ‘military vanguardism’, as they have failed to ‘identify the social and political forces and conditions that can sustain such revolutionary military role’. He warned that military vanguardism will only invite adventurism, with potentially serious consequences for the left.

Perhaps this the message Beckman has left for his young Nigerian followers, that the military cannot betray its petty bourgeois origin by ‘committing class suicide’, and that changes will only occur when the urban and rural masses are organised for them to assume the leadership. Finally, those who knew him or were taught by him were deeply appreciative of his warmth, kindness, generosity and intellectual depth.

Rest in peace!

Tunde Zack-Williams is Emeritus Professor of Sociology at the University of Central LancashireHis books include Tributors, Supporters and Merchant Capital: Mining & Underdevelopment in Sierra Leone (1995); The Quest for Sustainable Peace: The 2007 Sierra Leone Elections (2008); Africa Beyond the Post-Colonial: Politics & Socio-Cultural Identities (with Ola Uduku) (2004); Africa in Crisis: New Challenges & Possibilities (2002). He is an editor of the Review of African Political Economy.

The Revolutionary Left in Africa

In a report on a recent conference in Dakar on the Revolutionary Left in sub-Saharan Africa, Adam Mayer celebrates a gathering of activists and researchers, which could not have been more different from the mega-conferences of academia today. The conference examined the extraordinary vibrancy of left politics and movements across the continent in the 1960s and 1970s.

By Adam Mayer

A report on the workshop, ‘Revolutionary Lefts in sub-Saharan Africa (1960s-1970s): a political and social history to be written’ (Université Cheikh Anta Diop 30 October – 1 November, 2019)

Dakar based independent researcher Pascal Bianchini, aided by committed organizers such as Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung’s Ndongo Samba Sylla, and a scientific advisory body that included representatives of ROAPE, Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone, the Sorbonne and others, successfully overcame the logistical nightmare of bringing 30+ international researchers on the left’s history in Africa to Dakar for an intensive three day workshop (30 October – 1 November). A small number could not make it, sending their contributions instead. Academics from Canada to South Africa, from the UK to Iraq, from Sierra Leone to Madagascar came together in Dakar to take part in the proceedings.

We met not only each other but a stellar cohort of Senegalese and Mauritanian activists – frequently, retired workers, journalists, teachers, NGO workers, academics, most of them octogenarians, some of them women – who had represented various strands of socialism in the region in the 1960s and 1970s, and beyond. In many cases, uncharacteristically for our neoliberal times in academia, the borders between activists and academics were less than clear: most of us present were committed academics, comrades, women and men of the left in our respective countries. Analysis and testimony intersected in magnificent ways in contributions by Jean Copans, Baba Aye, Fatou Sarr Sow, and many others. Participants voted unanimously for expressing our solidarity with refugees under ongoing xenophobic attack in South Africa, an initiative by Heike Becker of the University of the Western Cape in Cape Town.

As the workshop took place in an already wintery Dakar – a place of uncommon beauty – among a lively group of old and new friends from afar, it could not have been more different from the dreaded mega-conferences of today’s bottom-line driven academia. Without the least reference to academic hierarchies, we debated in the conference rooms, in the lobby, at cafes, in restaurants, in each other’s hotel rooms, on the dance floor, in the taxi, en route to the airport, all in a spirit of our best years as organizers, students, enthusiastic and caring souls, with a thirst for finding and contesting truths.

                                              Baba Aye speaking from the conference floor

It is unusual in a conference to bring together (former) activists as a group, in an effort to relate their struggles and legacies to today’s academic research and also to today’s political needs. On the 1 November, this resulted in the Senegalese PAI’s  – Parti africain de l’indépendance from Senegal, a socialist party which played an important role in the struggles for independence and was based in the working class centres of the country – belated ‘me too moment,’ when Fatou Sarr Sow called out the machismo of the underground left in the 1970s, with some male activists taking offence and retorting that, ‘Some of you women of the movement even found husbands in our ranks,’ a startling ‘intervention’ and a poignant reminder of how some in the old left’s most diehard segments have not internalized lessons of 1968. Women could be incarcerated in Senegal for leaving the family until the 2000s. Pascal Bianchini drew parallels with how Algeria’s FLN, once in power, threw women under the carpet, dismissing feminist concerns, underlining the idea that it is wrong to discuss sub-Saharan Africa in separation from the North.

As many warned, today the dangers come from creeping Islamization of family law in the country. Some comrades displayed fascination with Mao Zedong’s and Stalin’s achievements in building true socialism (the latter sentiment is a privilege of the populist right in Eastern Europe today!) But it was to the issue of the socialist content of Burkina Faso’s ‘revolution’ and Sankara that our debates also returned on multiple occasions (Ibrahim Abdullah talked of leftist opportunism to Sankara), and emotions ran high on both sides of the argument. Was Sankara’s revolution even a revolution? How do we make sense of the arrest and repression of trade unionists in the country during the Sankara years?

Despite thoughtful calls by Ibrahim Abdulla, bourgeois objectivity was meticulously avoided by most participants, including the author of the present reflection. Definitions that would have been crafted to rigorously define or artificially unite different composite units within the lefts of Africa were intentionally not crafted. In terms of temporality, it made sense for most participants to extend the signposts to include the longue durée of the left on the continent.

So, Issa Ndiaye’s presentation on Mali included the 1940s and the early 2000s, while Ibrahima Wane started his discussion in the 1950s in discussing Senegal’s cultural movements and stretched well into the 1980s with the Front culturel sénégalais. Becker focused on the late 1960s and early 1970s with such unique precision that her presentation provided an inspiring exercise in temporal and intersectional sensitivity, whilst Moussa Diallo traced the development of left politics in Burkina Faso from the 1960s and linked them with the better known developments of the 1980s, while others put the focus on either the 1960s or the 1970s, as topics demanded.

Behind the palpable dislike of exact definitions by most of us lay the following factors. First, as organizer Pascal Bianchini concluded, although ‘normally in sociology we are supposed to precisely define the object we are studying – according to Durkheim. This approach applies when you write a book or a thesis. But when you try to embark on a new topic by way of organizing a symposium, starting with definitions is not necessarily the best approach. At a symposium, it is not certain that you will find an acceptable definition that is suitable for all and there is a risk of excluding a number of contributions which are of major interest.’

These ideas were pursued by others. We do not choose the historical circumstances of our actions as Marx warned, and ‘setting out to organize a socialist revolution’ is not a precondition of African revolutions. Non-Marxist movements such as pan-Africanism were objectively revolutionary ideologies. As Francoise Blum warned, ‘a failed (leftwing) guerilla is still a guerilla’ and excluding her from history would mean effectively buying into mainstream narratives with their ‘might makes right’ and mindless celebration of ‘winners.’ Any revolution that happens in Africa is an African revolution, irrespective of labels.

Another aspect behind the reluctance to employ strict categorization was the enormous historical differences between Francophonic West African revolutionary movements, and the English-speaking African Marxists for whom the experience of slavery, trans-Atlantic diaspora, and race, are evidently as important as class. Theory – with the fantastic exception of Zeyad El Nebolsy’s analysis on A.M Babu and Dani Wadada Nabudere’s East African take on Lenin’s theory of Imperialism – generally followed the methodologies of a ‘history of ideas’ and ‘event history’, with anthropology (including, in Copans’ case, auto-anthropology), political economy and culture/literary criticism a close second, third and fourth (all these included feminist examples). George Kieh was an exception as he used political science as a preferred method for his analysis. As Michele Leclerc-Olive stressed with the help of a Bambara saying, ‘You can’t pick up a stone with one finger,’ thus different theoretical approaches and methodologies were welcomed by the organizers.

As Kanylie Mlotshwa – who unfortunately could not attend but sent his contribution nevertheless – stressed on Zimbabwe’s liberation organisation ZAPU, and many others did with other movements from Nigeria to Senegal, the main technical problem of unearthing the histories of the African left is the purposely brutal destruction of relevant documents. These records have been frequently destroyed by right wing dictatorships and neoliberal democracies, by the inadequate condition of public archives, and the dangers that private archives face from negligent (or simply worried) family members holding documents on illegal movements, even long moribund ones. Original primary sources are hard to find.

The author of this blogpost hails from a former state socialist state under Soviet tutelage, the Hungarian People’s Republic. From my personal vantage point, it was impossible not to notice that – by chance or by design – the overwhelming majority of presentations in English or French (the organizers made sure that we had excellent interpreters) dealt with movements that influenced subsequent political history in indirect ways rather than through directly governing. My fellow Eastern European presenter Patrick Norberg focused on the Marxist-Leninist opposition to Ujamaa in Tanzania (a movement that has given us Issa Shivji!)

The focus was decidedly not on precursors to say Guinea Bissau’s, Cape Verde’s, Congo Brazzaville’s, Mozambique’s, Angola’s, Benin’s and Ethiopia’s ‘scientific socialisms,’ although Irene Rabenoro analyzed the run-up to Madagascar’s ‘1975’ –  when the Democratic Republic of Madagascar was formed, an explicitly socialist regime that existed until 1991 – and Leclerc-Olive dealt with Guinea’s political economy of the 1960s briefly in her presentation. In the case of Kieh’s presentation on MOJA (Movement for Justice in Africa) in Liberia, a movement that was unable to propel itself into state politics was the focus of the enquiry.

                              Discussing movements from the revolutionary left in francophone West Africa

The workshop’s main direction was in (re-)discovering the multitudes of potentialities that appeared with the African revolutionary left, not least as those movements influenced the reappearance of democracy in the 1980s and 1990s on the continent. Human rights movements, women’s movements, and civil society movements have absorbed the effects of Marxist organizing all over Africa since the 1970s. As Thierno Diop put it in a QA debate, the aim of the conference was to ‘relativize the history of failure’ as far as neoliberal Senegal and most of the continent are concerned. Leo Zeilig pinpointed the focus of the conference as panel chair as on hidden and forgotten histories. This was true even for the most high-profile presentation of the conference. Harris Dousemetzis’ work on Dimitris Tsafendas, the lone revolutionary assassin who killed Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, the architect of South African apartheid in 1966. Tsafendas’ legacy was far from exposed or celebrated on the arrival of democracy in the country in 1994, and the publication of Dousemetzis’ detailed biography is a signal of the shifting ground in the country’s relationship with capitalism itself.

The best historians ferret out unexpected linkages, connections and precursors, and this was demonstrated by Becker and her exposition of the years leading to the Durban strikes in 1973, with events such as the public burning of neckties by students. Tatiana Smirnova linked study groups and revolt in Niger, and perhaps most unexpectedly (for the author of this blogpost) Nicki Kindersley drew attention to radical and Marxist thinkers in the South of Sudan from as early as 1963. Mousa Bicharra focused on Chad, Gabriele Siracusano on the role of the Italian Communist Party in Congo and Cameroon. Amandla Thomas-Johnson presented on Stokely Carmichael’s years in Guinea where he defended the revolution, on occasion armed. Jean Liyongo examined student movements in Congo Kinshasa.

                                 A mural at Université Cheikh Anta Diop (Heike Becker, 30 October, 2019)

The history of the PAI is of course better known to many in West Africa, but new ways of problematizing the party’s history were present in Fatou Sarr Saw’s, Ibrahima Wane’s, and even Issa Ndiaye’s presentations, in Mor Ndao’s introductory remarks and debate contributions, and in numerous spirited contributions by former activists (see the excellent series of interviews conducted by Yannek Simalla with activists). Baba Aye’s well deserved attack on armchair Marxists and their animosity towards civil society organizing and ideologically open labour work in Nigeria today as well as the 1980s, built on his illuminating presentation that focused on one period in Nigeria  from 1963 (when a Marxist-Leninist party was formed) to 1978 when unions were forcibly amalgamated. In my own presentation, I started with the 1930s, ended with today’s struggles, and included the most visible achievements by Naija Marxists abroad as well as within the country. Adrian Browne’s take on Uganda’s Chango Machyo and Nabudere and revolutionary pedagogies was read to the hall by Nicki Kindersley.

Beyond enriching me with incredibly valuable knowledge on the revolutionary left in the 1960s and 1970s in Africa, the workshop reinforced two important lessons that historians of African politics should remember when a coherent continent wide history of the revolutionary left in Africa is written (perhaps, if we are lucky, the first will be an edited volume on contributions to this very workshop – as promised by Pascal Bianchini). First, the form and even analysis that different movements took (from Hoxhaism to democratic socialist and human rights centered feminist) is determined by local contexts. It is dangerous to view them through the prism of the foreign historian’s own commitment, rooted in her own history. Even frameworks as outdated as ‘Marxism-Leninism’ of the Stalinist variety might have provided inspiration to real revolutionary initiatives. The second important lesson is that combined and uneven development manifests itself in genuine theoretical achievements, and that global Marxism is as African as it is Peruvian, European or Japanese. I have published earlier on the lessons that post-transition Eastern Europe’s social thinkers have to draw from reading Nigerian authors on being subjected to capitalist corporations. Revolutionary thinkers from Frantz Fanon through Walter Rodney to Samir Amin and our workshop’s many historians, have lessons to teach progressive thinkers in every region of the world. This exceptional workshop was a powerful demonstration of this fact.

Adam Mayer is the author of Naija Marxisms: Revolutionary Thought in Nigeria published by Pluto Press in 2016. He teaches at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kurdistan Hewlêr.

Conference presentation abstracts are available on the website here (designed by the researcher Florian Bobin).  

The conference was organised by Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Dakar, Université Cheikh Anta Diop and ROAPE

Talking Back: Hilina Berhanu and Aklile Solomon

In the second interview in the series, Talking Back, Rama Salla Dieng speaks to Hilina Berhanu and Aklile Solomon about the feminist movement in Ethiopia. Founders of The Yellow Movement at Addis Ababa University, they speak about Ethiopia’s patriarchal society, the momentary hope in the new government and their continued activism across the country.

Rama: Can you tell us about yourself? And what led you to your activist work?

Hilina: I am a native of Addis Ababa, and I grew up in a multicultural, idea-driven household that mostly embraced fluidity in self-expression. I have always been an advocate for social equity and justice, not just in school or formal spaces but even at home, in sharing the tiniest of household chores among siblings. I am the first born, and that naturally requires braving the first set of social expectations thrown at you either from your parents or the community at large. Speaking out and defiance were very much part of my upbringing. Activism in a way was an extension of my normal lived experience. I started activism in public spaces in my third year of law school in response to a gender-based violence case. I got frustrated with the short-lived social outrage which typically and ultimately ends up in blaming the survivor. It was both reactionary and action-oriented because although I wanted to challenge the collective wilful blind eye and deliberate ignorance, which also biased the justice system at the time, I was determined to carry the activism consistently beyond defending that particular case.

                              Aklile Solomon

Aklile: Like Hilina, I also grew up in Addis Ababa in a family that discusses and argues social and political issues. While I have always questioned the injustice in the community, I did not see how I could change it. My activist work started when I began my third year at Addis Ababa University law school after the Aberash Hailay case. I think I found a community that was motivated to do something about the injustice and inequality which inspired my activism.

Rama: Please tell us why you chose to organise as a movement and why the colour yellow?

Hilina: As Aklile just mentioned, the Aberash case was a critical moment. In October 2011, an Ethiopian Airlines flight attendant named Aberash Hailay lost her eyesight after her ex-husband stabbed both of her eyes with a wine opener. Her case seized the attention of many, eliciting a national outrage with repeated calls for justice and pledges that her name would never be forgotten. Despite the uproar, the outrage was short lived. We realized that our collective response to violence against women, often heard of on a daily basis, had become habitual. As law school students at the time, along with our gender and law lecturer, we started our activism in breaking down the court hearing and sharing the information with the wider public. We decided to initiate a consistent conversation in wanting to draw attention to issues of violence against women in Ethiopia. The name yellow came to be used because of the optimism of the colour, and our work that is grounded in the possibilities of change and positive disruption.

                              Hilina Berhanu

Aklile: For us we are aiming at changing the society and moving it towards equality. Our unique way of organizing fits more into a movement. This is partly because the colour yellow was not attached to another cause but also because yellow is bright and the colour of the sun which really speaks to why we organise.

Rama: Why was the movement formed at the Addis Ababa University? And what has inspired your main campaigns such as Valentine’s Day, and the distribution of stationery and sanitary pads?

Hilina: We were based in Addis Ababa University at the time as students of the School of Law. Hence, it only made sense that we try and impact the community we exist in first before reaching out to others. Activities like that of Valentine’s Day fundraisers are only complementary to what we set out to do initially. We see ourselves as the small but consistent voice that speaks up for gender equality on a regular basis. A voice that challenges accepted but harmful practices on dispute resolution, ideas of violence, gender roles and social expectations on sexuality, success and performance of women.

Aklile: Yes, as Hilina mentioned, the simple answer to that is because those of us that initiated the movement were at Addis Ababa University. The celebration of Valentine’s day was becoming increasingly popular in Addis Ababa and at the same time there were several flower farms in Ethiopia so we thought if those flower farms could donate some flowers to us and we sold them, that would be a great way to raise some funds. We wanted to fundraise, and support students  so they could afford their basic needs because as students on the campus we saw that there were several students that couldn’t afford sanitary pads, soap, pen….so we decided to lift some of the stress from those students so they can focus on their studies.

Rama: How are you using the law in your activism, especially in the current political context?

Hilina: Following the talk of legal reform in the new administration, a working group has been formed and we are working with members of the group and the media in highlighting the need for a gendered approach in legislative drafting. We have made direct suggestions, hosted external meetings in support of those in the working group, written articles in magazines and co-hosted talk shows in breaking down patriarchal barriers in law. As the great South African activist and judge Albie Sachs once said, ‘While one should always be sceptical about the law’s pretensions, one should never be cynical about the law’s possibilities.’ I am aware that law in its current form serves as both a symbol and a vehicle of male authority, but I am also hopeful with the right feminist lens, that can be changed.

Aklile: I concur with Hilina, the law shapes the social structure especially in the current political context there are several legal reforms that are being undertaken which is why we review laws, comment and make efforts to make them gender responsive. Even when our recommendations are not being considered we use that to problematize the issue and show a lack of commitment from the state. The law also shows the intention of the government which is something we use to show the much bigger structural problem.

Rama: There has been a lot of optimism with the coming to power of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and the fact that he has appointed feminists in key positions. In addition, Ethiopia is being hailed as a ‘developmental state’. How are women’s rights faring in this context?

Hilina: It is true that there has been a lot of optimism following the appointment of women in different positions of power, and the government deserves recognition, rightfully. However, the patriarchal structure that has characterized Ethiopian politics in the past appears to still be in control, and we are back to business as usual. Women are largely considered as silent actors to be appointed by the mercy of the ruling party or the Prime Minister. This is so because such rights are yet to be fully guaranteed via law and policy changes. Hence, we are under constant fear of reversibility of past gains. Furthermore, female voices in politics continue to be questioned for merit and mere existence in such a space, while their male counterparts are considered as natural power holders in politics. Although the impact of the appointment is too early to tell and better explained through research, I believe the government is under the impression that its push for parity is no longer needed, which is quite dangerous for the progress ahead.

Aklile: Indeed, there was optimism, I don’t think it lasted that long. When some feminists were elected in key position, there was hope that they would make change from within. At the same time, it meant that the Prime Minister wanted their perspective and there was hope that he may also have the commitment and political will. That optimism and hope has gradually declined so it is now almost non-existent. The decisions that have been undertaken have really placed much doubt on that hope. Ethiopia has been following the developmental state model for a while now, I don’t think that is a new development with the Prime Minister. Sadly, on women’s rights the situation remains the same.

Rama: What are the aspirations for your movement and how are you mentoring a new generation of younger Ethiopian feminists?

Hilina: I aspire to see the movement grow through the establishment of sister chapters in all public universities across Ethiopia. I would like for us to engage in hosting public discussions at municipal to national levels and in the mainstream media too. A more productive, consistent and positive disruption is what I want the Yellow Movement to be known for. My activism on Facebook is almost exclusively designed to appeal to the younger feminist base, and that is how I meet many of my mentees. Although informal, I am able to mentor others through experience sharing and providing guidance on project undertakings.

Aklile: My aspiration for the Yellow Movement is for it to grow bigger and become a national movement. I want it to be a place where young people find their voice. As a senior member of the movement, I mentor young women joining the movement. We have a structured mentorship program where I guide young members not only in activism but also their personal journey.

Rama: What are your personal and professional projects?

Hilina: I have many personal and professional feminist projects at the moment; both ambits are labours of love, passion-driven spaces in my life. I am currently working on a platform called Temsalet.org along with a male partner in featuring the stories of exemplary women of Ethiopia and hosting a Ted Talk-format platform designed exclusively for women. I have been developing visual contents along with biographies in Amharic and English for our Temsalet Monday featurette. I am also running a merit-based scholarship program under the Yellow Movement to financially support and mentor female students  in different departments. I have been involved in setting up feminist libraries in Mekelle University and Addis. I am also overseeing two research projects professionally, both with a gender lens and angle. I am engaged in developing a gender training manual for those in higher educational institutions, while simultaneously engaging in giving training myself.

Aklile: I am currently working on the expansion of the Yellow Movement nationwide. It will be starting in Hawassa University soon and I am supporting that process. Outside the Yellow Movement, I am working on a research project studying the history of women’s resistance within recent armed and non-armed struggles.  I am also supporting other projects which I will hopefully share soon.

Rama: Which feminist books are you reading at the moment and what are your thoughts on them?

Hilina: The reformist administration of my home town Addis is planning on introducing a new law on sex work that prohibits sex workers from operating in public streets. Accordingly the past month, I have been reading extensively on sex work and feminism in an effort to navigate the space of activism in an informed manner. I am currently reading a book of essays by those in the sex industry called Whores and Other Feminists. The book has allowed me to re-frame and expand my feminism and understand gender oppression in a deeper and at times uncomfortable manner. For someone whose first introduction to sex work was through reading the bible, I have yet to grasp the complexities of the choices women make every day. In reading the book, I am learning of the need for a paradigm shift in better understanding of women’s and men’s lives—not to forget male sex workers too, that we tend to forget, in our feminist work.

Aklile: Living a Feminist Life by Sara Ahmed and the Bluest Eye by Tony Morrison. Living a a Feminist Life was shared to me by a colleague who is working on the research project with me. Also, with the passing of Tony Morrison, I heard a conversation on a podcast discussing body image especially with black skin and this book was discussed which inspired me to read it.

Rama: What are your acts of radical self-care?

Hilina: As an activist who operates in a highly conservative and oppressive environment, venting is top of the list. Over the years, I have developed a conscious habit of venting to male friends about the fact of living in a ‘female body’. I know women can relate to these experiences more, but I don’t want to engage them in the labour of suffering with me. I do, however, want men to understand how common and mundane it is to experience misogyny, and I want to hold them accountable for helping me heal from it. Switching off my phone and staying indoors is another one. The nature of my work means I travel a lot so turning off my phone gives me time to disconnect.

Aklile: Self-care is essential in this environment – it is good for the work and for me personally. I am privileged enough to be able to travel which gives me time to be away from all of it and it heals me so that is the biggest self-care measure. However, with work and financial restraints of course travel is not always possible so I write a journal. Journaling is a healing experience for me. Deactivating or staying away from social media accounts is also a radical measure that gives you time to recover.

Hilina Berhanu is a feminist academic and activist, responsible for the founding of The Yellow Movement at Addis Ababa University, a youth-led feminist movement based in higher educational institutions of Ethiopia. Aklile Solomon is an activist with a background in human rights law who is the co-founder of The Yellow Movement at Addis Ababa University.

Rama Salla Dieng is a Senegalese writer, academic and activist. She is currently a Lecturer in African and International Development at the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh. Rama is the editor of the Talking Back series on roape.net and a member of ROAPE’s editorial working group.

Featured Photographs: pictures show activists from the Yellow Movement across Ethiopia.

This series is dedicated to Ndeye Anta Dieng (1985-2019).

Leadership, Politics and Class in Algeria and Sudan

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Concluding her discussion on the revolts in Sudan and Algeria, Emma Wilde Botta argues that we are seeing a new surge of global revolt against authoritarianism and austerity. Revolutionaries are grappling with questions of strategy and organization as the forces of conservation come into conflict with the forces of transformation.

By Emma Wilde Botta

The outbreak of the Sudanese and Algerian uprisings in early 2019 marked the next wave of revolution in North Africa. In Sudan, President Omar al-Bashir was ousted in a coup following months of protests, strikes, and sit-ins. An opposition coalition negotiated with the military to form a new constitution and transitional government. In Algeria, weeks of mass protests forced President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to resign. The popular movement continues to demand fundamental political change as a ruling clique of army generals and businessmen cling to their decades-long grip on power.

In both countries, the uprisings forced the military high command to sacrifice the regimes’ figureheads. But the generals, who are materially tied to the existing political order, have an interest in retaining the essential structure of the regimes. The next round of struggle brings the forces of conservation into conflict with the forces of transformation. Whether the regimes or popular forces emerge victorious depends, in part, on strengthening workplace struggle, developing revolutionary leadership, and deepening the cracks in discipline among the military rank and file.

With a new surge of global revolt against authoritarianism and austerity, revolutionaries are grappling with questions of strategy and organization. Drawing lessons from Sudan and Algeria can strengthen our perspectives. This blogpost will lay out some initial, broad ideas with a focus on the subjective agency of the left.

Struggle from below as a challenge to authoritarianism 

The movements in Sudan and Algeria are powerful reminders that forms of struggle outside the bounds of acceptable, legal political channels pose an effective challenge to authoritarianism. Protest, civil disobedience, and strikes accomplished what voting, lobbying, and individual acts of defiance could not. Mass participation from all layers of society, united in a deep rejection of the status quo, brought down two long-time autocratic presidents and forced the ruling class to make concessions.

The self-activity of the masses – people in motion, in the streets, in conversation with one another, in the workplace – is transformative, allowing people to feel their own power. Incipient social revolutions were glimpsed in the temporary utopias created by the sit-ins and the high level of women’s participation and leadership. Through struggle, people’s ideas change, and this is an indispensable part of fighting for a better world. It is also mass struggle from below that forces the wavering middle classes and the rank and file of the military to choose a side.

Revolutionary tactics with reformist trajectory  

The uprisings successfully toppled presidents and posed a significant challenge to the existing order. In one of the most significant victories of the MENA uprisings, Sudan’s movement won a path to parliamentary democracy and a new constitution that enshrines civil rights. However, the demands for system change that rang out in the streets will require the rebuilding of society on the basis of an entirely new order. So far, the movements have been satisfied with reforms to capitalism.

Algerian activist Hamza Hamouchene explains the contradiction this way, writing, ‘These uprisings, like most revolutionary situations in history, released enormous energy, an unparalleled sense of renewal, and a shift in consciousness. In terms of popular movement and mass mobilization, the MENA uprisings were revolutionary, but in terms of strategy and vision they have had a reformist trajectory.’ This phenomenon has been identified and studied by a number of scholars.

What contributed to the development of revolutionary tactics alongside reformist strategy and vision in Sudan and Algeria?

We can begin to understand this dynamic by examining three factors: the ‘non-ideological’ orientation of these uprisings, the weakness of organized labor and rank and file activity, and the absence of revolutionary organizations and politics.

‘Non-ideological’ orientation of the uprisings

In Sudan, the broad opposition coalition, the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), led by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), became the identifiable leadership of the uprising. The SPA adopted a sort of ‘non-ideological‘ attitude. As Sudanese academic Magdi El-Gizouli explains, the organization ‘claims no political orientation and it speaks a universal functional language of freedoms and rights to which every citizen is entitled,’ framing the struggle in patriotic terms and compelling people to act based on their commitment to (an idealized) national unity. The perceived absence of political persuasion likely appealed to a population tired of corrupt politicking, but it left the SPA susceptible to adopting reformist strategy.

The FFC entered into negotiations with the Transitional Military Council (TMC) with clear demands from the Declaration for Freedom and Change and the weight of a popular movement behind it. Several times, when negotiations reached an impasse, the FFC called for a show of force from the movement to pressure the TMC. The most notable example was the SPA’s call for protests and a general strike following the 3 June massacre by paramilitary and security forces that left over 125 protesters dead.

Despite an energized, militant mass movement, the main organizations within the FFC compromised on key demands as the negotiation process unfolded. They shifted from demanding the military immediately transfer power to civilians to agreeing to a power-sharing deal. A transitional governing sovereign council would be composed of five civilian members and five military members with an eleventh member chosen through consensus. The FFC would appoint a new prime minister and propose a list of ministers to be confirmed by the prime minister.

The negotiated deal demonstrates the reformist trajectory of the leading opposition groups. Resolving the crisis through an interim government of neutral technocrats largely aligns with a neoliberal conception of politics. The military generals, viewed as partners in this process, are assumed to have compatible interests with the popular movement. The transitional government’s civilian leaders, who were proposed by the FFC, have accepted the horizons of neoliberal reform. Proposed solutions to the crises facing the country have taken free markets, property relations, and the state for granted. Newly appointed Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdouk and Finance Minister Ibrahim Elbadawi are developing a plan for economic reforms in concert with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This process is complicated by the United States’ longstanding designation of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism.

In Algeria, the main slogans of the uprising reflect a profound rejection of the political system that produced a puppet president. As with all popular movements that involve many layers of society, the ideas in the streets are mixed and sometimes contradictory. The zeitgeist of the movement centers around broad political issues of corruption, political accountability, and legal reform. Nadir Djermoune, a leading member of the Parti Socialist des Travailleurs (PST) in Algeria, argues, ‘The criticism of the regime is at a moral level with legal implications and avoids a profound critique of the neoliberal economic system.’

The movement stands at an impasse as weekly street protests continue and the clique of ruling generals and businessmen, known as le pouvoir (the power), attempt to delay fundamental change to the regime. Particularly since Bouteflika’s stroke in 2013, the behind-the-scenes rule of le pouvoir has become increasingly obvious to the people. Now, with Bouteflika gone, it has been difficult for Army Chief Ahmed Gaïd Salah and interim President Abdelkader Bensalah to present themselves as a break from the old regime.

The movement faces significant organizational challenges. Ten months into the uprising, no clearly identifiable leaders or political structures have emerged. The lack of a cohered opposition coalition has hindered efforts to coordinate actions or present a way forward. As Ahmad Al-Shioli explained in April, ‘Some popular organization has to emerge now and present a roadmap that the masses could rally around, giving them a chance to catch their breath. The ruling regime is desperate to draw a red line against the protests and is intent on engaging in mass arrests.’

Weakness of organized labor and rank and file activity

The mass movements in Sudan and Algeria effectively mobilized millions of people. Yet, the myriad workers who participated in the uprisings did so principally in their role as citizens, rather than as workers. The key sites of rebellion were the streets and public spaces, rather than the point of production.

Though organized labor intervened in the movements, it was unable to seize the full possibilities of the moment. Decades of regime infiltration and corruption had significantly weakened official trade unions. However, the upheaval gave new strength to independent unions, particularly in Sudan.

The FFC opposition coalition was led by workers – the doctors, lawyers, engineers, and journalists of the SPA – and included many workers’ organizations. In late May, the country participated in an impressive 2-day general strike in order to pressure the TMC to cede power to civilians. In June, a multi-day general strike to demand an investigation into the 3 June massacre showed a highly engaged, militant populace. Despite this, the strike was cut short by the SPA following the announcement of a power-sharing deal between the FFC and the TMC.

Throughout the uprising and the negotiation process, political and economic concerns were largely separated. The movement was unable to put forward concrete economic demands to influence negotiations. The new constitution lacks any specific measures to address working conditions or wages. Though prior to the uprising the SPA had campaigned for a living wage and the introduction of a minimum wage, they did not raise these demands in the Declaration of the Forces for Freedom and Change or in negotiations.

Beyond the leadership of the FFC, handfuls of rank and file workers took initiative to demand permanent contracts, independent unions, and the firing of managers tied to the regime. Though relatively isolated, these instances of workers’ self-activity offer a glimpse of the type of rank and file action that could advance the struggle. The fight for the return of legitimate trade unions brings workers directly into contact with the corrupt bureaucracy appointed by al-Bashir. Dr. Sara Abdelgalil, president of the Sudan Doctors’ Union, UK branch, emphasizes that this struggle with the ‘deep state’ is part of the ongoing movement.

In Algeria, organized labor is key to the process of deepening the radicalization. Labor unions are participating in the current revolutionary dynamic, but unlike in Sudan, their role has been very limited. Early in the movement, an anonymous call for a general strike yielded low participation, but did include workers at the state’s massive oil and gas companies. The possibility of future strikes likely hastened the general’s decision to oust Bouteflika.

The movement has vitalized independent trade unions, in particular the Confederation of Independent Unions (CSA) that organizes in the civil service. From the start, the CSA has supported and participated in the protests. On 10 April and 1 May, the CSA organized strikes that echoed the political demands in the streets, but failed to meld these with additional socio-economic demands. Since then, the leadership of the union has neglected to initiate further actions.

With a deepening political crisis, labor has an opportunity to turn the tide and bring the movement from the streets into the workplaces. In a promising sign, twelve independent trade unions announced a plan to launch nationwide strikes and sit-ins to oppose the elections. This would further incapacitate an already struggling economy, at a time when the government is soliciting foreign financial help for the first time in more than a decade. As Al-Shioli explains, ‘Algerians have significant industrial leverage to wield against their ruling class. What happens next depends on how this power is channeled to transform Algeria.’

Absence of revolutionary organizations and politics

The revolts of the 2011 Arab Spring and the Sudanese and Algerian uprisings displayed the relative weakness of revolutionary organization and politics. In the assessment of Algerian activist Hamza Hamouchene, ‘The MENA uprisings are lacking the kind of radicalism that marked earlier revolutions of the fifties, sixties, and seventies, where anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist sentiments were expressed very clearly through well-articulated visions.’ Revolution, in the sense of transforming the economic system to fundamentally change society, remains a marginal idea, and few organizations approach today’s crises with that long-term strategic vision.

Despite the rebellious zeal in the streets, the traditional organizations of the revolutionary left in Sudan and Algeria have been unable to cohere a revolutionary wing of the movement. No new organizations are seriously contending for influence in the movement, even on a relatively small scale. In both countries, political demands have been largely divorced from economic demands. The movements have yet to motivate workers to join based on their class position.

The most prominent leftist organization in Sudan is the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), which was once regarded as the largest such party in the Arabic-speaking world and carried significant influence among a section of Sudanese workers. Sudanese activist Mohammed Elnaiem attributes the SCP’s declining influence to anti-communism campaigns, a stagnant Stalinist outlook, and a pattern of political concession for the sake of expediency.

Nevertheless, the SCP played a valuable role in the uprising as a member of the FFC and demonstrated the challenge and possible benefit of a revolutionary current. The SCP criticised the 17 July political agreement and later rejected the power-sharing deal with the military, alongside the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) – an alliance of three prominent rebel groups. The SCP called for ongoing struggle until demands for a civilian government were met, in an effort to bind left opposition to the compromise. Though the attempt was unsuccessful, the movement and process of radicalization benefited from the SCP staking out this position.

In Algeria, the interim government has been pushing elections in order to reproduce the regime with new faces. Simultaneously, Army Chief Gaïd Salah has been angling to increase his power. The movement views the interim government as an illegitimate continuation of the regime and refuses new elections organized by Bouteflika-era officials. Twice, plans for new elections have been thwarted. On 1 November, tens of thousands of demonstrators surged into the streets to mark the fight for independence from France and reject the planned 12 December elections, chanting, ‘Dump the generals in the garbage!’

Protesters have called for the end to le pouvoir but, so far, no organizations have presented a convincing alternative. Over the past decades, traditional political parties have lost legitimacy, and none are leading the current movement. Leftwing forces remain scattered, disorganized, and marginal. The task of rebuilding revolutionary organization is complicated by the military elite’s roots in an anti-colonial struggle and the regime’s co-optation of the language of the left.

The December elections have provided a focal point of resistance for the nearly year-long movement. Growing calls for civil disobedience suggest a possible escalation of tactics to include sit-ins and strikes. In the next few months, leftwing forces and independent trade unions have an opportunity to strengthen these efforts, by inserting a class analysis into the broad movement and supporting rank and file struggles to democratize unions.

Conclusion 

It is inevitable that so long as capitalism is the dominant world system, economic and political crises will reappear. What is not predetermined is how the left will respond, how organized we will be, what strategies and what visions we will have to offer. We have little control over the objective conditions necessary for revolutionary crisis. We do have control over what we do to prepare for such a moment. And, sometimes, in some circumstances, the agency of the left can play a decisive role.

The new wave of global revolt from Iraq, to Lebanon, to Chile, and beyond offers a chance for the rebirth of revolutionary politics. New space has been opened up for alternative worldviews. As people participate in sit-ins, strikes, and protests, they develop radical ideas. The movements are creating new leaders. The left is being reconstituted in a process that is largely taking place outside of its traditional organizations.

A key task for revolutionaries today is to develop a current that organizes the radical layer within this movement by articulating a clear break with reformism.

Emma Wilde Botta is socialist activist and writer based in Oakland, California. She has written extensively on the Arab Spring, the Gulf States, Iran, and US imperialism. Her writing has appeared in TruthOut, the International Socialist Review, roape.net and Socialist Worker.

Featured Photograph: Taken by Khirani Said in Algeria on 15 March 2019.

Talking Back: a conversation with Lyn Ossome

In a wide-ranging interview with Lyn Ossome, Rama Salla Dieng and Françoise Kpeglo Moudouthe discuss her politics and activism. Ossome argues that the maintenance of a façade of stability across Africa rests on the super-exploitation, repression and violation of women and gendered bodies more broadly.

Françoise: Can you briefly introduce yourself, Lyn?

Lyn: I am a researcher and educator from Kenya, presently living and teaching at Makerere University in Uganda. My primary interest both inside and outside of the academy has been in understanding the production, nature and manifestations of inequality in society. The historical question of violence and the function it plays in societies preoccupies me a great deal. I am also interested in questions of difference. I decided quite early on that I wanted to understand these issues in a deeply theoretical sense, and because gradually this path has compelled me on to more structural critiques, this has meant at the same time making sense of them in a lived and existential sense. That path has led me into a kind of activist-scholarship which bridges my work as an educator with movements and practice beyond the academy and guided me nearly two decades ago towards feminism. I am also a daughter, sister, lover, aunt, friend and comrade.

Rama: You have written extensively on women’s land rights in Africa (in Feminist Africa, Agrarian South Journal, or Feminist Economics). Why is it important to you, as a feminist political economist, to focus on this issue? What have been the contributions of African feminists to land issues, and what would be your main critique of the dominant discourses on this topic?

Lyn: The predominant discourses on land insist on linking it to questions of economic development (the industrialization myth). Our critiques have on the contrary tried to show the unrealistic basis of this insistence. Most of the world is simply not going to be lifted out of poverty on the basis of access to land, and yet the peasant path remains relevant and needs to be defended today more than at any other time. For millions of people existing under capitalism’s utterly immiserating conditions, access to land and the commons is the only recourse they have for survival. It is no longer even feasible to think of wage labour and petty commodity production in isolation from peasant livelihoods, as all three are intertwined and necessary for the survival of most households in the global south. In this regard, feminist agrarian scholars have focused on exposing the fallacies built into some of the women’s land rights discourses that continue to hold great sway.

I want to highlight two in particular that have been extensively critiqued in the more radical feminist political economy scholarship. First is the discourse on titling as the quintessential basis for securing women’s land rights. This discourse was popularised by the World Bank from the late 1980s, entrenched by prominent neoclassical economists of the north, and has remained unsurprisingly influential, given the predatory and unequal funding structure of NGO-driven activism. In Uganda for instance, the World Bank literally will not fund grassroots organisations speaking against the grain of this argument. Yet empirical evidence shows us that titling is less likely to favour poor and effectively landless women, who are likely to dispose of their assets including land at the first sign of economic distress. The market orthodoxy that underlines the titling discourse needs debunking.

The second discourse is the one that continues to tie the question of women’s land demands to accumulation and development. The reality is that for the majority of semi-proletarianised households with a net supply of surplus labourers (compared to the effectively employed) most of whom are land poor or effectively landless, land forms the primary basis for the social reproduction, is not a basis for accumulation but rather part of a cornucopia of livelihood strategies which are primarily geared toward survival. Even as agriculture’s contribution to the GDP of most African countries has steadily declined, the relevance of land and landed resources, especially access to the commons, has continued to rise – but for reasons other than those justified in neoclassical economic thinking.

There has been a relatively small but significant voice of African feminist scholars countering this conservative thinking, including Dzodzi Tsikata, Marjorie Mbilinyi, Dede Amanour-Wilks, Rama Salla-Dieng, Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, Ambreena Manji among others. I am also inspired by the work of grassroots women’s organizations such as the Land and Equity Movement Uganda (LEMU) that are magnificently challenging the dominant discourses around titling, re-engaging debates on customary tenure, and of course, paying the price for it in terms of funding opportunities. Part of our feminist strategies in support of such progressive thinking/praxis has to be imagining alternative ways of resourcing these local movements. It is their practical illustrations of possibility among local communities that strengthen and challenge the dominant discourses that are only doing the work of obscuring much of reality.

Françoise: The continuous shrinking of civic space for feminist organizing has been a source of increasing concern for African feminists – you recently wrote about it in an article for BUWA!  in relation to women’s work. What do you think African feminists can do to adapt to, or, if possible, fight to reverse the closing civic space?

Lyn: As I said in that piece, growing unrest, protest in all forms, and demands for recognition and representation are among the more immediate signs of the distress that African women are experiencing, and also reflect the fact that many feminist demands actually exceed the civic space. That civic spaces are shrinking in response is therefore not surprising. But the larger question with which we must grapple is the extent to which these spaces can address issues such as the agrarian distress and dispossession that continues to place significant strain on women’s productive and reproductive labour, pushing millions of rural women out of common lands and restricting their use of communal land, compelling women into tenuous informal, low-status and low-wage work. We must also deal with the contradiction that while under neoliberal capitalism, more women than ever before have entered the labour force, their terms of entry remain highly unequal and exploitative compared to men, partly because women’s participation in the labour force has failed to ease their historical burden of reproduction at the level of the family and household.

With regards to what paths of struggle are available to African women in the face of shrinking civic space, I posed a number of questions that I think we ought to consider: firstly, whether the state has been successful in its not so hidden objective of divorcing women’s rights activism from the structural bases of women’s oppression; second, whether and which alternative paths for social organising are possible in contexts where authoritarianism dominates civic space; and thirdly, whether the role of civil society organisations in mediating social change is, in fact, an exaggerated one.

I have argued in that piece and in much of my work that the separation between what is considered ‘political’ and ‘economic’ under neoliberal orthodoxy constrains interpretations of women’s structurally defined positions in the global political economy. In this regard, the attack on civic space mirrors the purported divergence between cultural oppressions, with their basis in gender, and oppression emanating from the political economy, with their basis in class struggles. While the former is trivialised, the latter is regarded as the ‘subject of politics proper’. The effect has been to privatise and render the embodied nature of the domination and exploitation of working women invisible to law, policy and public discourse. But as is becoming apparent now with not just protest but actions being taken by women in response to the war on our bodies, these spaces shall be demanded and claimed if they are not readily available. Our personal and political resources are neither infinite nor beyond further harm, but they are powerful tools that do not always bend to the magnanimity and disciplining of civic authority.

Rama: In your 2018 book, Gender, Ethnicity and Violence in Kenya’s Transitions to Democracy: States of Violence, you state that ‘the prevalence of gendered and sexualised forms of violence against women observed in Kenya’s democratic politics has far-reaching implications for the country’s democratisation as a whole.’ Can you please tell us if this is specific to Kenya, or if this is relevant in other African countries?

Lyn: The link between democracy and violence is no longer a tenuous one, and is now more acknowledged in the literature, even by liberal and mainstream theorists of democracy. What, however, is less readily acknowledged is how much, historically and at present, the maintenance of a façade of stability of society has depended on the exploitation, super-exploitation, discrimination and violations of women and gendered bodies more broadly. This was as true of Europe’s transition to capitalism as it was its colonising mission and present-day theatre of regular political contestations (elections) that is a normative marker of democratization. So yes, in this regard, the theoretical lens through which I examined the case of Kenya could apply just about anywhere in Africa and the colonised world including Asia and Latin America. The interpretative difference would of course emerge from the historical and structural specificities of each context, but the attachment of political violence to gendered bodies would be a common denominator across these countries. Women’s experiences with the democratization project have been remarkably similar – which places the imperative for interrogation on the liberal variant of democracy rather than on its casualties. Liberal democracy is an inherently violent mode of organising politics, not because one disagrees with liberalism’s idealised notions of freedom, equality, liberty, rights and so on, but rather because our histories of slavery, colonialism, and imperialism and their attendant legacies (of racism, politicized ethnicity, and violence) that need to be accounted for have remain marginalised in the mainstream discourse and treated as an aberration.

Françoise: In March 2019, you took part in a fascinating panel about ‘decolonising the university and the curricula’ at the LSE in London. What would a decolonized academia look like? And what would it take for all the talk there has been around this issue to lead to tangible change in the academic world?

Lyn: That was a fascinating discussion, and of course, one whose demands are invariably determined by the contexts in which it is being held. The issues that concern young people under the common banner of decolonization are as diverse as the contexts in which people experience the weight of the colonial academy. A number of interesting questions/ comments emerged from that audience, on which I am still reflecting. There are also many views on this issue that have been made available to me in discussion with my students, colleagues and friends.

For instance, one of the things I pointed out was that the colonised curriculum has turned away from reality, obscures it, and is in fact dependent on the denial of reality. The work of decolonization in this regard has to deal with this fact. In all of the difficult spaces we encounter within the academy, part of our commitment has to be in insisting on a version of the world that reflects our own experiences of it, that approximates our daily realities of the world. There is a reality that is constantly imposed on us but that is based on the experiences of the coloniser – be it through the disciplines, curriculum content, the world of publishing, in pedagogical approaches, and in hierarchies of recognition and tenure. The colonial university is also a patriarchal, phallic structure in which the presence of particular women, queer bodies and colonised races remains very offensive to the status quo.

So, the work of challenging this structure and superstructure is an exercise invariably fraught with threats, intimidation and sometimes just plain bullying as I have come to discover. Decolonization is and will remain an exercise that goes against the grain. A question therefore that we need to seriously pose and re-pose as we go along is this: how much are we willing to lose? What price are we willing to pay? Furthermore, if all this talk of decolonization remains in the ivory tower and ignores the broader social and political milieu that necessitates it then it will be for nothing.

A friend who is a creative also recently reminded me that it is in the locations where one spends most of their time that education takes place. The academy is a miniscule part of those locations. Meaning that even as we challenge the curricula within the academy, we must pay attention to the voices, practices and struggles beyond it (or cynically, marginal to it).

Rama:  In your opinion, which research areas deserve more attention from feminist academics, and why?

Lyn: There is actually nothing of importance that feminist academics are not already critically engaging and interrogating. So, for me it is not as much about a lack of attention as it is about the readiness to deliberately modify our approaches as and when the conditions and circumstances (what might be termed as the problem space) demand. That said, I think that a lot of what our attention has been trained on does not emerge organically from below: as suggested above, a lot of the research questions to which we are responding travel to us from outside, from the colonising world. Whatever the questions may be that we prioritise, they need to be ones which we ourselves formulate out of our own understanding of our social and political contexts. They need to be relevant to us, and they need to take our own histories seriously. This is an additional challenge that must be posed to the issue of decolonization.

Françoise: There has been much debate recently, especially on social media, about whether African feminists should anchor their activism in feminist theory or in their personal/collective experiences. As an academic, what would you say to those who question the importance of feminist theory?

Lyn: My own eventual self-recognition as a feminist, and acceptance of its centrality in my political orientation came through a concrete engagement with feminist theory. Through it I discovered a long and consistent history of African women in challenging oppression of all forms. I learnt that I was not inventing anything, and that feminism offered a vantage point to the world that was distinct and meaningful and powerful. There is something very empowering about stepping into the proverbial room full of feminists who have literally, and sometimes with very little at their disposal, changed the course of history and knowing that all one had to do was acknowledge those earlier struggles as well as learn from them, and then renew them based on the present challenges. In short, feminist theory has for me also been an encounter with history, with thought, with politics, with lived realities, and with the necessity to question everything. That said, I believe we must eschew the kind of intellectual narcissism that convinces us of the correctness of our positions just because we can articulate them in certain complex ways. The disarticulation between the rural urban/elite and grassroot element of feminist movements across the continent is symptomatic of this. We need to understand the field as also a space of theorising.

Françoise: In another interview, you stated: ‘activist work is dangerous when we are isolated or insular’, and added that solidarity was the best protection. Can you tell me more about how feminist sisterhood has been a source of strength and protection for you personally?

The sense of community has been important for me, the knowledge that my struggles are not singular or isolated occurrences. It is, for instance, from within feminist sisterhood and networks of solidarity that I understood that every other woman I encountered in trust and friendship had also suffered some form of abuse or another. There is a lot of gaslighting when it comes to our life experiences. This is usually half the trauma, being compelled to exist in one’s head. Feminist sisterhood has been for me an important place of sublation, of rejecting the constant pressure to remain silent or question or modify my reality to suit the status quo or dominant perceptions. If I have found this solidarity in obvious spaces and sometimes also in the most unexpected ones, it is precisely because of the work that solidarity does – enabling encounters with freedom as diverse as the people with shared commitments who we meet every day.

Rama: What acts of radical self-care do you practice?

Lyn: Exercise – I have been faithful to yoga for a couple of years now. It taught me to breathe deeply and I am physically stronger for it. Sleep – every once in a long while I allow myself very long stretches of ‘death’ sleep whenever my body needs it. Music has always felt healing to me, and nowadays so does cooking. I embrace silence and solitude, but also seek the company and inspiration of spirited people everywhere.

Françoise: Allow me to ask you the final question I ritually ask my Eyala guests: what is your feminist life motto?

Lyn: Stand in your power. For Black and queer women, because so much of our histories have deprived us of formal and institutionalised power, substantive power for us has taken a variety of forms that remain marginalised and devalued – spiritual, mental, emotional, corporeal, intuitive and so on. We have been taught to distrust and turn away from these sources, and those who nurture them are labelled all sorts of things. But power for me in this regard means recognizing the fact that ultimately, none of our personal and political struggles against injustices of all kinds – against violence, abuse, exploitation – make sense outside of the (very feminist) self-recognition that we are worthy of respect, of dignity, of love and of happiness. There is no power in ceding decisions over these aspects of our lives to others. Nothing good comes out of that. An individualising and manipulative mentality will read this as self-serving. A collective and healing one will read it as the basis for self-renewal and the necessary repository of strength and perception from which to recognise both those forces that are arrayed against us and the power that it will take to wage our battles against them. Ironically, morbidly, I think that the only point at which the question of power actually resolves itself is in death. In life, it re-inscribes itself in a constant dialectic of renewal, both for and against us. But we cannot keep fighting simply in order to survive. Our struggles are meaningless and certainly not revolutionary if they don’t also offer us the serious possibility to thrive as human beings.

Lyn Ossome  is a Senior Research Fellow at Makerere Institute of Social Research, Makerere university in Uganda. 

Interview by Françoise Moudouthe and Rama Salla Dieng. Françoise is curator of the feminist blog Eyala, a researcher and a consultant. Rama is a Senegalese writer, academic and activist. She is currently a Lecturer in African and International Development at the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh. Rama is the editor of the Talking Back series on roape.net and a member of ROAPE’s editorial working group.

This series is dedicated to Ndeye Anta Dieng (1985-2019)

Ending collusion with Egypt’s military regime

Far from being a vehicle to advance higher education in the country, Egypt’s military regime wants to use the collaboration with UK universities to provide cover to a deeply repressive human rights record. Anne Alexander argues that the credibility of UK universities helps to hide the constant abuse of academic freedoms in Egypt.

By Anne Alexander 

On the face of it, Egypt shouldn’t be an attractive destination for UK universities looking to expand their transnational education provision by opening a branch campus or allowing a locally-based franchisee to teach their degree courses. The current military regime has an appalling human rights record – according to Amnesty International, thousands have been arrested in the latest crackdown – and is responsible for the systematic violation of academic freedoms. In April this year, academic rights watchdogs Scholars at Risk and the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression called for a ‘global response’ to the ‘attacks and pressures on higher education in Egypt’, including new laws reducing university autonomy, mass arrests and violence by state security forces against students and staff.

These pressures have been in general directed at Egyptian citizens, whose rights to study, teach and research without fear perhaps have not figured greatly in the calculations by UK HE senior managers looking for additions to their investment portfolio. Yet students from foreign universities, conducting research or undertaking language courses with the full knowledge and support of their institutions, have also been targeted by the Egyptian security services. The case of Cambridge PhD student, Giulio Regeni, who was kidnapped, tortured and murdered while doing fieldwork in Cairo in 2016, sent shock-waves through his home country of Italy, and the academic community around the world. Italian prosecutors have named senior members of the Egyptian security services as suspects in his murder. In October this year, two Edinburgh University students were arrested in Cairo, prompting the University to withdraw all students from Egypt.

Despite this, over the past two years, a string of UK universities have announced their intention to open for business in Egypt, mostly in the regime’s grandiose ‘New Administrative Capital‘, a huge new city housing ministries and other government institutions alongside a business-park style academic quarter. A campaign led by the UCU branch at the University of Liverpool and concerned academics from around the country forced the abandonment of plans for a branch campus in 2018. However, since then, Coventry University, University of Hertfordshire and University of London have announced deals with Egyptian partners to open branches or offer degrees in the New Administrative Capital.

The backdrop to this flurry of activity is a campaign by the governments of Egypt and the UK to promote ‘cooperation‘ in the area of higher education and scientific research. In 2015, during the visit of Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to the UK, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry and then Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the topic. Over the following years, a number of initiatives have emerged, attempting to develop deeper links at institutional level between UK HEIs and Egypt. These have included a fund for collaborative research (administered jointly by the Newton Trust and an Egyptian body) and PhD studentships.

Since late 2017, however, a new strand of activity has emerged with Universities UK’s international arm taking a leading role in brokering relationships between UK HEIs and the Egyptian regime with the goal of securing partnerships in the area of transnational education, specifically focused on opening branch campuses in some of the new urban development projects sponsored by the regime as a mechanism for attracting foreign investment. In late 2017, Middle East Eye reported that Egyptian ministers were falsely giving the impression that several Canadian universities had committed to opening branch campuses in the NAC to prospective partners at a presentation set-up by UUK.

The local partners chosen by UK universities attracted to the NAC by the Egyptian regime’s slick promotional videos and determined sales pitch are not part of Egypt’s public university system. Nor are they drawn from the newer private universities which have sprung up since the 2000s. Coventry University’s branch campus is run by El Sewedy Education, a private provider set-up by an electrical cable manufacturer. University of London’s ‘recognised teaching centre’ in Cairo is run by another new, private HE provider, European Universities in Egypt (EUE).

According to the University of London website, EUE is ‘a university institution hosting academic degrees from European top-ranked universities with state of the art technologies, research and advanced teaching practices’ which is located in the New Administrative Capital. EUE’s Founder and Chairman of the Board of Trustees is Professor Mahmoud Hashem. Professor Hashem was previously the president of the German University in Cairo (GUC), a private university established in 2002. Students at GUC repeatedly protested over the failure of GUC’s leadership to uphold their rights to freedom of expression on campus and the university’s refusal to allow them to organise a student union for the first eight years of the university’s existence. Professor Khaled Fahmy, who is now at the University of Cambridge, and is one of the signatories to our letter, outlined in a blogpost in 2012 his concerns over this issue after the GUC took disciplinary action against students for organising a commemoration of a GUC student killed during the tragic events in Port Said football stadium in 2012 where over 70 football fans died.

Even more worryingly, Dr Hashem himself was captured on camera in 2015 apparently instructing his driver to run over students who were protesting over the GUC’s response to the death of 19 year old Yara Negm who was killed in an accident involving two of the university’s buses.

The government in Egypt is clearly keen to associate the global reputation of University of London institutions as centres of excellence in research and teaching with the New Administrative Capital. On 11 September this year the Ministry of Foreign Affairs put out a press release claiming that the London School of Economics was opening a ‘branch campus’ in the NAC, prompting LSE to issue a clarification contradicting the Ministry’s statement.

The incident illustrates the propaganda value of such partnerships for the Egyptian government. Far from being a vehicle to advance academic collaboration or enhance higher education in Egypt, they are providing PR copy for a deeply repressive military regime which wants to use the credibility of UK universities to help cover up its appalling human rights record and persistent abuse of academic freedoms and the right to expression.

Academics whose research and teaching is being leveraged to maximise transnational student revenues and whitewash human rights abuses are speaking out in protest at UK HE senior management’s collusion with the Egyptian regime. Over 200 academics, including many from the University of London, have launched an open letter condemning the crackdown against the regime’s critics and calling for an end to ‘business as usual’ for UK Higher Education institutions operating in Egypt.

‘UK universities are showing their willingness to put potential revenue from student fees before commitment to human rights and academic freedoms, by pursuing partnerships with private educational firms running “branch campuses” or offering UK degrees in Egypt,’ the letter states.

‘We call on UK universities operating in or planning to open for business in Egypt to suspend these projects until the human rights situation improves enough to ensure that academic freedoms are protected and to join us in a public statement calling on the regime to release political prisoners, respect human rights and protect freedom of expression.’

Sign the letter online here.

Anne Alexander is a founder member of MENA Solidarity Network, the co-editor of Middle East Solidarity magazine and a member of the University and College Union. She has written the recent article on the uprisings in Sudan and Algeria, ‘Living on revolution time’

Featured Photograph: ‘Vice-Chancellor welcomes first students to study for Coventry University degree in Egypt’ (30 September, 2019).

Talking Back: African Feminisms in Dialogue

Rama Salla Dieng introduces a series of interviews with African feminists that roape.net will be posting in the coming weeks. In recent months across Africa we have witnessed women taking to the street to reclaim a fairer and more just world. In these protests and movements woman have often played a leading role. In interviews conducted by Rama, young African feminists will discuss how they are theorising their practice and philosophies.

By Rama Salla Dieng

In recent years, various forms of feminist organising have emerged from ‘Cape to Cairo’. We have seen South African students demonstrate to resist gender-based violence and denounce structures of economic oppression (#feesmustfall) and coloniality which survived colonialism (#Rhodesmustfall) on campus. We have witnessed Egyptian and Sudanese women taking to the street to reclaim a fairer and more equitable society, and denounce the violence with which their organising has been meet. The same stories have happened in Uganda where scholars such as Stella Nyanzi are facing imprisonment because of speaking truth to power, Kenya and Botswana where queer activists are pushing for the decriminalisation of same-sex relations in their countries.

This series discusses such issues with young African feminists who are theorising their feminist practice. The series focuses on the connections and disruptions in African feminist thought and practice. It asks a simple question: How are young feminist scholars using their experiences and lives as a source and resource for theorising their feminism? In attempting to answer this question, a deliberate effort will be made to reflect on the politics of gender, ‘belonging’, and knowledge production since delineating these concepts also require a focus on the power dynamics at play.

Genealogies of ‘African feminisms’

African feminism(s) do not start with colonialism, yet, similar to the history of African societies, they are still conflated with the encounter with ‘others.’ The rich legacies of feminist ancestors such as Njinga Bandi of seventeenth century Angola, Yennega of 14th Century Burkina Faso, The Kahina of Algeria and Lingeer Ndate Yalla Mbooj of the Waalo Kingdom in Senegal, who led in public life in pre-colonial times have been acknowledged. Yet, this focus on exceptional women have led to feminist fables and gender myths and many other herstories that have been erased if not omitted deliberately and there are many other women who are not of royal blood who would today qualify as feminists. There has been a deliberate erasure of generations of women from Africa, The Caribbean, India and Latin America because they contest mainstream feminism so their voices should also be heard, the specificities and nuances of their diverse struggles acknowledged.

Feminist African scholars also theorised gender in social sciences in Africa (Imam, Mama & Sow 1997), while reclaiming African sexualities (Tamale 2011) and queer Africa (Ekine and Habbas 2013, Matebeni 2014). This was a pivotal moment consisting in infrastructuring African feminist organising and scholarship with platforms to discuss feminism on the continent (for peer-reviewed journals see, for example, Agenda founded in 1987, also in South Africa, JEnDA: A Journal of Culture and African Women Studies and Feminist Africa Journal founded in 2002 at the Africa Gender Institute in Cape Town. As for funding and developing the capacities of women’s organising we have the AWDF (The African Women’s Development Fund) founded in 2001, Akina Mama wa Africa established in 1985, to name a few. Platforms such as the African Feminist Forum (AFF) and its Charter of Feminist Principles for African Feminists helped define and articulate the many shades and shapes of feminist engagement on the continent.

The centrality of women’s groups self-identifying as feminists is illustrated in the pioneer work of PAWO (Pan-African Women’s Organisation) created in 1962 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and which might have constituted the ‘building block’ for women’s political activism at a continental level shaping Pan-African consciousness which led to the creation of the Organisation of African Unity the following year. In addition, there was also significant contributions of female scholars such as Zenebework Tadessa, Teresa Cruz e Silva, Dzodzi Tsikata, Shhida el Baz, Fatou Sow, Amina Mama and Ayesha Imam to the development of CODESRIA (The Council of Social Science Research in Africa) founded in 1973 by Samir Amin, most of them also took part in the founding of AAWORD (The Association of African Women for Research and Development) created in 1977.

Seminal works by African feminists contributed to a shift in feminist scholarship internationally to acknowledge difference and context. These issues include the structures of sexism, domination, patriarchies, oppression and inequalities, which vary according to the social structures which engender them. Some of these works sought to question the very colonial lens through which ‘Southern’ and African feminisms were being theorised, claiming for instance the fluidity of gender (Amadiume 1987) or that age/seniority is more important in power relations than sex before colonialism/Christianity in Africa (Oyèwùmí 1997) or even questioning the relevance of gender for understanding African societies (Nzegwu 2006). Other feminists have claimed that Yorùbás did do gender, questioning the selective use of language in defence of a matriarchy which was in fact profoundly patriarchal (Nzegwu 1998, Bakare-Yusuf 2003).

Attempts to promote and celebrate feminisms rooted in African cultural realities echoed similar transatlantic efforts: these can be labelled afro-centric feminism(s). Womanism (Walker 1983) was a response to second wave feminism to give visibility to the experience of black women and other women of colour whose work and contribution to feminism was rendered invisible in mainstream media and historical texts. Womanist theories have been further theorised in Africa by writers such as Ogunyemi (1985) and Kolawole (1997) who rejected ‘Black feminism’ and ‘lesbianism’ for more ‘representative’ views of African women’s experience.

However, not all African feminists embraced womanism. For instance, Oqundipe-Leslie and Acholonu promoted different variants of feminism. The former coined Stiwanism (social transformation including women of Africa) in her 1994 book Re-Creating OurselvesAfrican Women & Critical Transformations  based on indigenous African cultures. The latter developed an ‘Afrocentric alternative to feminism’ (1995) based on motherhood – ‘motherism’ put African women centre stage as the basis of families, communities and nations. Nnaemeka’s (2004) expression of ‘nego-feminism’ seems particularly accurate as the focus is on proactivity not on reactiveness, on building and ‘negotiating’ to advance on crucial social issues while acting collectively. This line of thought is close to Pumla Dineo Gqola’s (2001) suggestion that postcolonial black and African theories on feminism are seeking to define innovative ways to address their own issues rather than just defining themselves as what they are not.

From the 2000s, diverse variants of feminisms have blossomed on the African continent and in the diaspora. For Mina Salami, three main strands have emerged since the 2000s to complement postcolonial feminisms (radical, Afrocentric and grassroots). These are liberal feminisms which focuses on individual choices and freedoms, on issues such as sexual rights, equality in the workplace and gender gaps, and internal household dynamics but have failed to address the consequences of neoliberalism.

Then there is the millennial or fourth wave African Feminism which is represented by young women organising across the continent from marches to student protests, blogging, vlogging and artivism etc. A further strand is listed by Salami as Afropolitan Feminism and Afrofuturist Feminism. Afropolitan is a fusion of the words ‘African’ and ‘cosmopolitan’, it was coined in Taiye Selasi’s 2005 ‘Bye-bye Babar’ to refer to the Africans of the diaspora (born and living outside of Africa  more generally), and further developed by Mbembe (in Njami 2005) as a ‘poetic of the world, of being in the world …but also a cultural and political stance.’ In the feminist literature, it gained popularity with Minna Salami’s pan-African feminist blog MsAfropolitan, ‘which connects feminism with contemporary culture from an Africa-centred perspective.’ These feminisms are forward-looking and propose a transnational approach to feminism that is inclusive of the African diaspora. The use of the term has however been criticised here and there.

Feminism has gained momentum globally and increasingly African feminists are being recognised for their work including Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie whose TED talk, ‘We should all be feminists’ (2014) and short book Dear Ijeawele (2017) have had a worldwide resonance. Social media has also contributed to new platforms of creativity, dialogue and activism on feminist issues such as africanfeministforum.com, msafropolitan.com, holaafrica.org, africanfeminism.com, adventuresfrom.com to name a few.

Currently, the #MeToo movement, which started a decade ago with Tarana Burke, an American civil rights activist (and a victim of sexual violence herself), has sparked a worldwide movement to break the silence around sexual violence and harassment. Feminists in Africa and the Global South have asked whether #MeToo was a West-only Movement and have engaged in and from spaces such as churches (#ChurchMeToo), mosques (#MosquesMeToo), and in the international development sector.

This series

The African Feminist Charter has beautifully highlighted the centrality of creating an inclusive, plural and political definition of what it means to embrace feminism as African women:

By naming ourselves as Feminists we politicise the struggle for women’s rights, we question the legitimacy of the structures that keep women subjugated, and we develop tools for transformatory analysis and action. We have multiple and varied identities as African Feminists. We are African women, we live here in Africa and even when we live elsewhere, our focus is on the lives of African women on the continent. Our feminist identity is not qualified with `Ifs`, `Buts’, or `Howevers’. We are Feminists. Full stop (Charter: 4)

While there are as many (African) feminisms as there are African feminists, in this series, we use the term ‘feminisms’ to acknowledge this pluralism and diversity and seek to theorise it and reclaim it from our various standpoints. Not all of us, who took part in the European Conference of African studies (ECAS 2019) panel – from which the initiative on roape.net derives – in June 2019 in Edinburgh, are academic, yet we reclaim our various activities as sites from which we conceptualise and embody our feminist activism.  In addition, this series seeks to highlight how each of us seeks to define our feminism on our own terms and talk back to patriarchies, oppression and capitalist domination. In doing so, we take a political as well as an ideological stance – identifying as such is a way of acknowledging, showing solidarity with, and placing ourselves in the continuity of previous generations of women fighting back against the sexism and patriarchy forcefully imposed on them. This series is a way for us, as African feminists, to reclaim the intersectionality of our struggles. The interviews address a wide range of topics.

This allows us to (re-)claim feminism awayafrom the exclusive territories and vocabularies (and policing) of academia, to allow ourselves to colour outside the lines, re-locate or just re-claim feminisms in the interstices of our daily realities and solidarities, feminisms that are inclusive. This series focuses on the very connections and disruptions of African feminisms today, in particular on the various contemporary issues that are at the heart of young/emerging feminist scholars and activists. More specifically, some of the questions explored in this series include, how African feminists are using their own lives as a source and a resource for their feminist theorising? What are the contemporary issues of young and emerging African scholars and activists?  How do feminists organise and connect online and offline to resist patriarchies, sexism, and capitalism? Finally, and more specifically, to what extent are they organising differently and what is the place of digital platforms for African feminism?

In the coming weeks roape.net will be hosting different interviews in the series. These will be ranging from:

  • Land and political violence in Kenya and decolonising the curricula (with Lyn Ossome Makarere and Francoise Moudouthe);
  • Young women feminists organising at Addis Ababa University who speak about why they became activists (with Hilina Berhanu and Aklile Solomon);
  • Youth, masculinities and belonging in Cameroon (with Divine Fuh)

Upcoming interviews will involve reactions to rape and violence in South African Universities, teaching women and gender studies in Africa today, digital activism and analysing dominant feminist themes in selected fiction and non-fiction, in novels and movies and digital performance.

Rama Salla Dieng, is a Senegalese writer, academic and activist. She is currently a Lecturer in African and International Development at the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh. Rama is also a feminist activist who has collaborated with several feminist organisations on agrarian change, gender and development, and social reproduction.  She is the Lead Editor of a collective anthology on Re-thinking Feminist Parenting: Perspectives from Africa and Beyond, Demeter Press, forthcoming 2020. Rama is a member of the editorial working group of ROAPE.

Featured Photograph: Rama S. Dieng with her daughter during a recent protest in Dakar, Senegal.

This series is dedicated to Ndeye Anta Dieng (1985-2019)

References

Amadiume, Ify. 1987. Male Daughters, Female Husbands: Gender and Sex in an African Society. London: Zed Publications,223 p.

Bakare-Yusuf,Bibi, “Yoruba’s don’t do gender: A Critical Review of Oyeronke Oyewumi’s, The Invention of Women: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses” in Steady, F.C. African Gender Scholarship: Concepts, Methodologies and Paradigms CODESRIA; 61-81. 200

Bakare-Yusuf, Bibi, “Beyond Determinism: the Phenomenology of African Female Existence” in Feminist Africa, Issue 2, 2003

Dineo Gqola, Pumla. 2001. “Ufanele Uqavile: Blackwomen, Feminisms and Postcoloniality in Africa”. Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity,(50), 11-22.

Kolawole, Mary E.M. 1997. Womanism and African Consciousness. New Jersey: African World Press

Matebeni, Zethu (curator). 2014. Reclaiming Afrikan: queer perspectives on sexual and gender identities

Njami, Simon (curator)  Durán, Lucy; Gallery, Hayward. 2005. Africa remix: contemporary art of a continent

Nnaemeka, O. 2004. Nego‐Feminism: Theorizing, Practicing, and Pruning Africa’s Way. Signs,29(2), 357-385. doi:10.1086/378553

Nzegwu, Nkiru .1998. Review: Chasing Shadows: The Misplaced Search for Matriarchy, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 32 (30): 594-622.

NzegwuN 2006. Family Matters: Feminist Concepts in African Philosophy of Culture. State University of New York Press, New York. 2006

Ogundipe-Leslie, Molara. “Stiwanism: Feminism in African Context”. In African Literature: An Anthology of Criticism and Theory. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2007. Print

Ogunyemi, Chikwenye Okonjo. (1985): “Womanism: The Dynamics of the Contemporary Black Female Novel in English.” Signs 11, no. 1 (1985): 63-80.

Oyèwùmí, Oyèrónké The Invention of Woman: Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1997

#RevolutionNow: Fanning the embers of revolt in Nigeria

Baba Aye describes the birth of an impressive new movement in Nigeria. He sees the #RevolutionNow campaign as a spark around which national structures are being built. The blogpost draws lessons from earlier popular struggle in the country and argues that the new movement is fanning the embers of revolts, as part of the revolutionary struggles sweeping across the world.

By Baba Aye

On 5 August, the #RevolutionNow campaign was unfurled with protests in 14 cities and towns across the country. Most of these involved just a handful of people, with the largest having barely a hundred protesters. But this was because the state rolled out its full arsenal of coercion. Armed to the teeth, men (and a few women) of the secret police, elite squads of the police, the army and air force took over the venues designated for demonstrations across 23 states of the federation.

In an era where mass anti-systemic demonstrations have not been witnessed for seven years, it took determination for action to have been taken by those who dared. Truncheons, gun butts, jackboots and bullets drew blood from protesters. Fifty-seven people were arrested and detained. These included some journalists. Two days before the demonstration, Omoyele Sowore, National Chair of the African Action Congress (AAC), the central party in the Coalition for Revolution (CORE) – along with the Take It Back movement which is the flip side of the same coin with AAC – was arrested in an attempt of the government to truncate mobilisation.

He has subsequently been charged for treason. The federal government has made the process for him to secure bail as tedious as possible, and this only after loud outcry against his continued incarceration after an arrest that was more of an abduction in the dead of the night. Arraigned along with him is Olawale ‘Mandate’ Bakare who turned 22 years in prison. Another CORE activist is being tried in the coastal city of Calabar.

Despite this, TIB/AAC/CORE members remain unfazed. They have organised a series of protests and mass awareness programmes over the last few months and continue to meet, including within wards of several states of the federation, building new layers of activists.

This blogpost puts #RevolutionNow in historic perspective. Contextualising it as a spark, around which a national organisation is being built, the post further draws lessons from earlier popular struggle in the country.

Take It Back/African Action Congress: re-calibrating politics

The Take It Back (TIB) movement was launched at the beginning of 2018. It was the campaign platform of Omoyele Sowore, for president in the general elections that were scheduled for the first quarter of 2019. It was made clear from the onset that this would be a campaign with a difference. TIB declared itself as a fighting platform, interested in much more than just the votes of the electorate. It aimed to help the ‘inconsequential masses’ to take back their destiny, rights and future, which the ruling class had squandered.

TIB’s radical-reformist politics came with a liberal programme which included support for public private partnerships. Many on the left were quick to point out, the discrepancy of the aim of taking back the better life for the poor masses and any concession to privatisation in the movement’s programme. But behind this contradiction lay the different forces that came together to establish the movement.

These included the right-wing of former moderate-reformists students’ union leaders who are now part of professional middle-class. There was also the  expelled National Secretary of the party who subsequently formed a faction, Dr Leonard Nzenwa. A centre, comprising some more radical politics than the right wing for sure, and which comprised the bulk of the early personnel of the movement. And on the left, which was the more radical end of the radical-reformist tendency of the movement. None better personified this than the Convener, Omoyele Sowore.

The greatest influence on policy formulation at the time was in the hands of the centre and the right-wing. As the party’s membership grew, being increasingly swelled by working-class youth and students, its politics developed considerably while Marxists, who dwell only on the purity of programme, kept away from the flourishing renewal of popular politics which TIB/AAC brought to bear on the 2019 general elections.

By April 2018, TIB already had over 10,000 listed members. Public meetings it organised were so crowded that people were forced to stand by windows outside the room to take part. What is more, unlike the normal case with political parties in the country in recent decades, these were not paid attendees. On the contrary, they were ready to and did contribute money to further mass mobilisation. There was the general mood of ‘enough is enough’ and a feeling in the air that yes, we can take back our fate from the traditional politicians.

However, Take It Back could not be the platform for electoral contestation. It had to be part of an officially registered party. After several discussions with a number of left-leaning parties (particularly the National Conscience Party) failed, TIB took its fate in its hands and registered the AAC. It received its certificate of registration on 15 August last year and the campaign moved on to another level.

Within four months, the membership of the party had gone beyond 20,000 people. Whilst the bulk of these were in Nigeria, a sizeable number were Nigerians residing in different countries across the world. These supporters organised several fundraising activities as well as contributed to propagating the party through the internet.

In what is definitely a record for any left-leaning party, almost half a million US$ was raised as contributions for the party in the course of its campaigns and these monies were transparently accounted for on social media. This shows how an inspiring presentation of a radical programme could to a reasonable extent address the recurring problems of financial resources. Working class people and youth are sick and tired of the present situation of things, but connecting with their feeling of anger requires sincerity and creativity.

Coalition for Revolution, #RevolutionNow and the socialist left

The Coalition for Revolution (CORE) started as a coalition of the Alliance for the Masses Political Alternative (AMPA) and the TIB. The Alliance was essentially one between the Socialist Workers and Youth League (SWL) and the Socialist Vanguard Tendency. Both groups had worked closely together as a socialist bloc within the NCP and understood the need for independence of socialists within a united front.

AMPA expanded as a loose alliance. The Federation of Informal Workers Organisation of Nigeria (FIWON), the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights and the National Conscience Party swelled its ranks. In addition, TIB/AAC moved further and further to the left, leading several communities in struggle for electricity rights, against demolition and to challenge police brutality. It was also central to giving support to workers at the Lagos State Polytechnic embroiled in fightback against a draconian registrar. The need for what effectively was a two-layered coalition, was superseded.

In July, CORE issued its 5-core demands for Revolution Now, thus:

  • An economy that works for the masses. No to an economy which throws 90 million people into poverty, while just five people own N11 trillion!
  • An effective and democratic end to insecurity. Poverty, discrimination, repression by government and manipulation of ethnic differences by the rich elite are the roots of perpetual insecurity – we must end all these!
  • An end to systemic corruption and for total system change. The bosses’ system is inherently corrupt. We must overthrow them and build a new society based on solidarity and democracy from below!
  • The immediate implementation of the N30,000 minimum wage. Workers deserve living wages. All salary arrears must be immediately paid. Politicians must be placed on civil service salary scale. Even the N30,000 is not adequate, negotiations for upward review by 2021 must start now!
  • Free and quality education for all. Education is a right and not a privilege. Massive investments must be made to develop public schools’ infrastructure. Curriculum must be reviewed to promote critical thinking. Independent student unionism must be respected!

Towards pressing home its demands, CORE announced 5 August as commencement of #DaysOfRage. On that day, whilst the state tried its best to suffocate the #RevolutionNow campaign at birth, over five million Nigerians searched the word ‘revolution’ on the internet. In some of the areas where pockets of demonstrations took place, persons that were afraid to join, because of the state’s siege supported the action in several ways.

Some sent water, and other refreshments and some stood up with the protesters against the state. Probably the most graphic example is that of Sariyu Akanmu, a woman in her seventies. She was hawking her wares  when she heard the message of revolution being confronted by the bayonets of security personnel. She joined the side of struggle and was beaten up by shameless policemen.

In the aftermath of 5 August, there have been debates on the Nigerian Left about the significance of the ‘Revolution Now!’ campaign. Some mocked the whole campaign of the 5 Augustand ridiculed the limited numbers that eventually protested. Others describe the whole idea of #RevolutionNow as exuberance on the part of some youthful comrades, while others dismiss it for supposedly not being driven by Marxist organisation or aiming at a clearly defined socialist revolution.

The aim here is not to address these criticisms, most of which I regard as being baseless. What we can say is that those groups and activists that have conducted work within the working-class have welcomed #RevolutionNow. With CORE at its centre, they are coalescing into a ‘broad left’ platform.

There are lessons to be drawn from an earlier phase of long-lasting struggle in the recent history of Nigeria, which speak to CORE’s role at this historic moment.

Learning from campaigning for democracy

Between flag independence on 1 October 1960 and the end of the 20st century, the civilian wing of the ruling class was in power for less than ten years. The first and second republics collapsed in the wake of elections in 1966 and 1983 respectively. A transition programme draped in the garb of a third republic ended in a fiasco when the military annulled the presidential elections held on 12 June 1993.

The military government reaped a whirlwind, with the annulment. For six years revolutionary pressures stirred by the pro-democratic movement was in contention with reaction personified as Sani Abacha, a thieving dictator.

Well before the ‘June 12’ elections and subsequent struggles around it, the socialist left and liberal democrats had separately or in temporary alliances, taken on different juntas of the military dictatorship. In 1991, the Campaign for Democracy (CD) was formed as a united front which brought together reformist and revolutionary groups. CD decried the transition programme for what it was and called for a boycott of the elections.

Despite bringing the left together, CD lacked any real influence on the masses up to that point in time. Indeed, at least twice before June 12, it had declared that it would convoke a Sovereign National Conference, the last of these being barely six months before the annulled elections. It is instructive that, apart from not being able convoke any conference sovereign or not, CD never had the capacity to organise a national demonstration before June 12.

Yet the fact that it was nurtured as a coalition with a national spread made it invaluable for seizing the steam of mass anger at the annulment of the elections and transform itself into a mass movement in the opening moments of the June 12 struggle. #RevolutionNow is not only a spark. The concerted organisation across several states, and several cities across the world including London, New York, Geneva, Toronto, Berlin, Rome, Johannesburg and Madrid demonstrate that the scaffolding of TIB/AAC/CORE is raising up the house of popular struggle.

Conclusion

The dialectical approach of Marxism is one of totality, in brief it is impossible to fully understand the particular without grasping its relations with the whole. Thus, it is impossible to fully understand national political phenomena without grasping the international context which it is both part of and shaped by. Indeed, when we cast our minds back to our recent history, this seems clearer.

For example, the call for a Sovereign National Conference and pro-democratic struggle spread across many countries in the early 1990s. It captured the spirit of anti-military/one-party dictatorships in a world where the collapse of the Soviet Empire appeared to justify a so-called ‘end of history’ with socialism consigned to the dustbin of that history (Matters were not helped in some African countries where the call was most strident were state-capitalist dictators had passed their regimes off as being ‘Marxist-Leninist’).

Similarly, and more recently, the 2012 January uprising in Nigeria, was dubbed ‘Occupy Nigeria’ precisely because it was part of a moment of revolt, which the imagery of the 99% occupying everything the 1% had held dear including Wall Street – the high throne of global capitalism.

As some of the critics of #RevolutionNow point out (being correct only in part) ignition points of revolutions are spontaneous. However, apart from the fact that spontaneity is never absolute, it is not after such spontaneity that a nationwide structure for taking the revolutionary moment can be built. Nor will it be built simply on the shoulders of a handful of Marxists.

With #RevolutionNow activists – including many coming into political struggle for the first time – are fanning the embers of simmering revolts, as part of the revolutionary awakening sweeping across the world – in Sudan, Algeria, Catalonia, Chile, Lebanon, Haiti, Hong Kong and Iraq.  Our day shall come!

Baba Aye is a member of the Socialist Workers & Youth League (SWL) and Co-Convener of the Coalition for Revolution (CORE).

For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
We use cookies to collect and analyse information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customise content. By clicking into any content on this site, you agree to allow cookies to be placed. To find out more see our
For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
We use cookies to collect and analyse information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customise content. By clicking into any content on this site, you agree to allow cookies to be placed. To find out more see our