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Imperial Ambitions: The new political economy in Ethiopia

This blogpost explores the conflicted nature of Ethiopian political economy since the change of leadership in 2018, the fall of the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front from power, and the rise of Abiy Ahmed. Wyatt Constantine looks at the country’s second city, Dire Dawa, to examine the complicated and opaque nature of Ethiopia’s new ambitions.

By Wyatt Constantine

Ethiopia has found itself the centre of international attention, as the armed forces under the direction of Prime minister Abiy Ahmed have entered and nearly fully occupied the northern region of Tigray, home of the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front, whose two year long feud with Ahmed has exploded into open war. Roughly one year after Ahmed was awarded the Nobel Prize for his peace deal with Eritrea, the prime minister is now embarking on a brutal conquest of his most vehement domestic opposition, and the image he had cultivated as a liberal reformer who was once naively claimed to be opening Ethiopia’s “path to economic prosperity” by economist Paul Collier seems to have been all but shattered.[1]

Since assuming leadership early in 2018, Prime minister Abiy Ahmed has embarked on numerous reforms, releasing political prisoners, easing restrictions on internet use, and pushing for vast economic reforms for the Ethiopian economy. Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2019, Ahmed elaborated on Ethiopia’s ambitious plans for “Unleashing to potential of the private sector”, “Reforming State-Owned-Enterprises” and “Opening the economy.”

Ethiopia has experienced tremendous GDP growth over the past decade, and has seen a marked rise in FDI inflows, over 85% of which has gone into manufacturing.[2] Optimistic claims from the World Bank that “Ethiopia’s industrial parks are making jobs a reality” and the Economist that Ethiopia is “Africa’s new Manufacturing hub”, contradictions underlay Ethiopia’s growth narrative as well as that of its political transformation. Despite the high GDP growth, amongst the highest in Africa, and the inflow of foreign investment, Ethiopia’s growing economy has been a highly inequitable affair. Manufacturing remains overwhelmingly concentrated in the capital, with Addis Ababa alone playing host of over 35% of Ethiopia’s manufacturing, more than that of every other region in Ethiopia combined excluding Oromia. While industrial parks in cities such as Hawassa, Mekele, Bahir Dar have indeed created jobs, these jobs generally pay wages so low and have such poor health outcomes that they are largely treated as alternatives to informal sector and agricultural work, with turn-over in some parks reaching as high as 100% annually.[3] Ethiopia has also experienced a massive increase in internally displaced persons in the last few years, with over 3.1 million IDPs, the highest number in the world. While Ahmed’s ‘Medemer’ reforms preach a narrative of pan-Ethiopian unity, the reality is that modern Ethiopia was forged in the fires of imperial conquest. Indeed, Addis Ababa, borne as an imperial capital, maintains characteristics of its imperial origins, sucking in capital, investment, political power, and wealth in amounts no other Ethiopian city can attempt to rival.

With these divergent narratives in mind, one of Ethiopia as a “Growth miracle” and the other as a fragile post-empire in state of unrest, economic precarity, and great uncertainty, the case study material from my research in Dire Dawa attempts to make explicit the complicated and opaque nature of Ethiopia’s political economy, and to showcase how Ethiopia’s growth is being experienced from outside its centre.

Dire Dawa is Ethiopia’s second largest city, and as an urban area in Ethiopia, stands out as relatively unique. It is only one of two chartered cities in Ethiopia, the othering being Addis Ababa, and the city has a reputation as being a somewhat cosmopolitan metropolis. It is not uncommon for those borne in Dire Dawa to refer to themselves as a Dire Lij, or a child of Dire. Constructed around the French built Chemin de Fer Ethiopien early in the 20th century, Dire Dawa has the distinction of being Ethiopia’s first planned city, and from very early in its history found itself the home of a large expatriate community of Greeks, French, Arabs, Somali, Amhara, and Oromo peoples. The old railway station, located in the central neighborhood of Kezira, was a central node in a transregional network of trade and commerce. Even until the late 1980s in the last years of the Ethiopian civil war, Dire Dawa had a reputation as a boomtown and a centre of opportunity. This was due in large part to trade in contraband goods such as cattle and chat, that made their way through Dire Dawa not only to the rest of Ethiopia, but also to nearby Djibouti and Somalia. Older residents speak fondly of this time, speaking of Dire Dawa B’dero, meaning ‘long ago’ or ‘back then’ in Amharic, reminiscing in a manner like that of residents in the American Rustbelt of a time when Dire Dawa was a good place for business and life was easier. Today the old railway station sits mostly unused, playing home to a ticket office for a regional bus company, and home to small and rather rundown museum.

The new Addis Djibouti railway, which has a terminal near Dire Dawa, has been one of several massive infrastructure projects undertaken in the last decade by the Ethiopian government. As opposed to Dire Dawa’s old station which sits in the middle of town, Dire Dawa’s new station is not even found in the city, but almost 5 km at the edge of the village of Melka Jebdu, at the border to the Somali zone. Close to a new multi-million-dollar industrial park under construction, it is curious that the new construction has bypassed the city almost entirely.

Railway Roundhouse in Dire Dawa Train Station (21 December 2019).

Dire Dawa captures some of the contradictions of the Ethiopian political economy, and highlights the degree to which caution should be exercised in making grand claims regarding Ethiopia’s economy and structural transformation. Though Dire Dawa is the largest city in Ethiopia after Addis Ababa, its infrastructure remains remarkably underdeveloped. Only 44% of its households are estimated to be connected to the power grid, and despite a new paved road connecting it to Addis Ababa, many of the city’s roads remain unpaved and turn into nearly impassable mud tracks during heavy rains.[4]

More than one interviewee mentioned the prevalence of Kulalit Bashita, meaning kidney sickness, and said to be wary of the municipal water supply. A 2012 study found that 85% of water sources in Dire Dawa tested positive for faecal bacteria, compared to a massive study in Addis Ababa which found that only 10% of sources were contaminated.[5] Over 5 private water bottling companies can be found in the city, and more than one resident mentioned, in conspiratorial fashion, that Dire Dawa’s water infrastructure had remained intentionally underdeveloped due to pressure from the private bottling companies, though this was impossible to prove.

Dire Dawa remains a site of intense rural to urban migration, and it is seen as a place of opportunity. During my two-month fieldwork stay, multiple interviewees who had migrated to the city, principally young men, did so with the idea that Dire Dawa was a place where a future could be built, and opportunity existed, or simply fleeing rural poverty: ‘I came here from a rural area, as there is little work in my village.’ One young man explained early in the morning in the central neighbourhood of Saido, where day-laborers wait hoping to get work at the construction site of Dire Dawa’s new industrial park: ‘The payment is not so good. I can make maybe 50 ETB (US$1.3) a day as a labourer, and it is not every day that you can get work.’

Despite Dire Dawa’s reputation as a place of opportunity, it has the highest record of unemployment in the entire country, 25.3% as of 2018, compared to a national average of 19.1%.[6] Though the recipient of FDI inflow, this investment does not seem, as of yet, to have been accompanied by structural transformation. Despite being Ethiopia’s second largest city, the perception of Dire Dawa as a site of economic opportunity seems to be rooted more in its past glory days as a railroad and contraband hub, rather than the current reality. The cost of living and food has increased dramatically, with even a one room of poor quality and no facilities costing a minimum of at least 500 ETB a monthly (US$13). A single room in a condominium or stone tenant house is unlikely to be had for anything less than 1000 ETB monthly, and that is at the low end. For Dire Dawa’s thousands of informal laborers and street vendors, the latter of whom average an income of only 988 ETB a month, housing is all but unaffordable.[7]

Residents of Dire Dawa also pay some of the highest food prices in the country, with a kilo of beef costing over 400 ETB (US$10.5). ‘What has changed for us? We are only eating mot shiro’, claimed one young clothes vendor in the neighborhood of Gendekore, referring to a common Ethiopian dish made of pea powder and served on the traditional flatbread injera, except mot shiro contains ‘no onion, no meat, no butter, no tomato, only shiro powder and water.’ Lending credence to this claim is evidence from the Central Statistics Agency. Between April 2018-19, Dire Dawa’s food specific inflation index saw the highest increase of any city in the country, rising to 24.7%.[8] While Ahmed has championed investment and the role of the private sector in helping to fuel Ethiopia’s growth miracle, the reality is that even as GDP has risen, so has fear, suffering, and violence.

While the new administration has without doubt proven its commitment to market-oriented reform and economic liberalism, going so far as to pursue the de-monetization and reissuance of the Ethiopian birr in the middle of the corona pandemic, a potential disaster for Ethiopia’s vast impoverished and un-bankable population, it has proven itself equally ruthless in attempting to centralize power. The ongoing full-scale mobilization of the Ethiopian military to invade and occupy the region of Tigray, home to the TPLF cadre who previously ran the country until 2018, has been chilling in its swiftness and brutality, with horrific humanitarian consequences. While embracing the neo-liberal language of Davos, Ahmed has proven he is unafraid to pursue internal control in a manner reminiscent of his imperial predecessors, no matter the suffering it might cause, and no matter who might be left behind.

Wyatt Constantine is currently a PhD candidate at the University of Leipzig in the department of African studies working on the political economy of labour in the horn of Africa.

Featured Photograph: Station of the Djibouti-Ethiopia Railway in Dire Dawa (12 March 2006).

Notes

[1] Collier, Paul. ‘Ethiopia’s path to prosperity is opening up under Abiy Ahmed.’ Financial Times. October 26, 2019.

[2] Heinemann, Thomas. Ethiopia in 2025: an up-and-coming industrial hub in Africa? KFW research. March 2019.

[3] Blattman, Christopher and Dercon, Stefan. The impacts of industrial and entrepreneurial work on income and health: Experimental evidence from Ethiopia. June 2017.

[4] Moges, Mesay. Ethiopian Electric utility. A case of Electrical access rate in household level. In case of Dire Dawa Administration. 2017. p.11.

[5] Amenu, Desalegn. Microbiological quality of drinking water sources in rural communities of Dire Dawa Administrative council. Science, Technology and Arts Research Journal. Oct-Dec 2012. p.35.

[6] Belay Feku. ‘Assessment of Unemployment in Dire Dawa Administration: Trends and Current Conditions.’ European Journal of Business and Management. Vol.12. 2020.

[7] Esayas, Engida, and Solomon Mulugeta. ‘Analysis of socioeconomic vulnerability of street vendors: Case study for Dire Dawa city. Eastern Ethiopia.’ Theoretical and Empirical Researches in Urban Management, vol. 15, no. 2, 2020, pp. 49–65.

[8] The Federal democratic republic of Ethiopia. Central Statistical Agency. ‘Country and regional level consumer price indices.’ April 2019.

The Tigray War

Unpicking the war that has broken out in Ethiopia between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the central authority represented by Prime Minister Abiy, Martin Plaut explains the background and devastating consequences of the war for all Ethiopians.

By Martin Plaut

The war that erupted in the northern Ethiopian region of Tigray on 4  November had been a long time coming. Prime Minister Abiy, who came to power in 2018, attempted to reduce the power of the Tigrayans, who had previously ruled the country. Control of the powerful Northern Command of the army, based in the Tigrayan regional capital, Mekelle, became a critical issue.

The Northern Command is the best armed unit in the Ethiopian army. It was entrenched along the country’s border with Eritrea after the disastrous border war of 1998 – 2000 that cost 100,000 lives. It was provided with Ethiopia’s most formidable weapons systems – including heavy artillery and missile systems. Prime Minister Abiy attempted to end Tigrayan dominance of the Command and ordered that some of its the heavy weapons should be redeployed to the centre of the country. The Tigrayans mobilised their people to block the roads, preventing this from happening. Then the Tigrayan authorities insisted that it would hold their own elections (even though the Federal authorities said this could not be done, given the Covid pandemic). Despite this the elections were successfully held in September this year, with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front [TPLF] winning over 90% support.

The immediate cause for the conflict was the refusal of the Tigrayans to accept Brigadier General Jamal Mohammed as the new commander of the Northern Command on 29 October, forcing him to return to Addis Ababa. It put the Tigrayans on a collision course with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and the war erupted on 4 November, with fighting at the Command headquarters in Mekelle. Although Prime Minister Abiy said he was only launching a limited, policing operation against the TPLF leadership, it is now apparent that a long-planned offensive began involving Ethiopian Federal forces, Amhara militia and the Eritrean military.

Ethnic Federalism

At the heart of the dispute is the question of the nature of the Ethiopian state. Is it one unitary state, in which some 80 nationalities have their place, or should it be a federation of ethnicities, loosely united at the centre? To this there is no obvious answer.

After the TPLF seized power by overthrowing Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991 they controlled the country, despite being only around 6% of the population through the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front [EPRDF]. The Front was the brainchild of the TPLF’s leader, Meles Zenawi.

He was the architect of a system known as “ethnic federalism”. This suggested to each of Ethiopia’s ethic groups that they had the right to autonomy and self-government. In reality it was not possible to have so many regional states, and they were grouped into 10 states. Each was apparently given autonomy in legislative, executive and judicial functions, and the unconditional right to secession. The reality was very different. The Tigrayans established parties that were in controlled by the TPLF, even though they were run by people from the ethnicity they were meant to represent. They came together in Addis and the EPRDF, which the TPLF dominated.

As time passed the regional parties grew in strength and independence. They also developed police forces and para-military forces that became almost as powerful as the security forces of the Ethiopian state. Regional interests gradually predominated and in 2018 Abiy Ahmed was elected Prime Minister. It was the first time that someone from an Oromo background (representing approximately a third of the 114 million people) had ruled the country in its long history. Most Oromo had only been included in the Ethiopian empire when the Emperor Menelik II swept down from the highlands, including vast new territories at the end of the nineteenth century. He did so just at the time of the Western Scramble for Africa, and brought a predominantly Muslim and animist population into a Christian empire. Oromo had been called “galla” a derogatory term, implying that they were slaves. Slavery continued in Ethiopia until the 1930’s.

The alliance with President Isaias

At first Prime Minister Abiy was enormously popular. He instituted a series of reforms: releasing thousands of political prisoners, allowing rebel movements to return to the country and relaxing censorship (from 2014 an unprecedented protest movement shook Ethiopia to its core forcing the pace of reforms, see ROAPE’s coverage here). He announced that anti-terrorism laws were draconian and would be reformed. For these developments he won international support. But his crowning achievement came on 8 July 2018, when he flew into Asmara, the capital of neighbouring Eritrea. His arrival marked the end of nearly two decades of hostility between the two countries – the result of the inconclusive end to the border war. Prime Minister Abiy received a rapturous welcome from the people of Asmara and President Isaias Afwerki. When President Isaias visited Addis Ababa within weeks he was equally warmly received. For ending the ‘no-war, no-peace’ stalemate with Eritrea and for his domestic reforms, Prime Minister Abiy was awarded the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize.

But beneath the surface troubles were bubbling up.

The alliance between Prime Minister Abiy and President Isaias was based on a shared perception: power had to be removed from the Tigrayans. For Abiy this was part of an attempt to wrest power from the states, end ethnic federalism and restore power at the centre. It was a re-assertion of the traditional view of the Ethiopian state – that its people were Ethiopians first and that their ethnicities came second. It was popular with sections of the Amhara community, who had frequently been the traditional rulers of Ethiopia.

This was resisted by the other ethnicities and led to increased tensions between ethnic groups. It is worth noting that 1.2 million Ethiopians had been displaced by conflict even before the Tigray war erupted.

For Isaias dealing a mortal blow to the Tigrayans had been his ambition since the 1980’s. Although the TPLF and President Isaias’s liberation movement – the EPLF (now the PFDJ) had sometimes worked together, they had frequently clashed over ideology and tactics. In essence, Isaias saw the Eritreans as the ‘big brothers’ in the Horn of Africa – a view the Tigrayans resisted. When the 1984 – 85 Ethiopian famine struck, the EPLF closed the route for supplies of aid into Tigray from Sudan. The TPLF were forced to march 100,000 people into Sudan to survive. Many died along the way.  For the Tigrayans this was nothing short of a crime. Despite this, the TPLF and EPLF settled their differences and found a means of co-operating. When the Tigrayans marched into Addis in 1991, they did so with the Eritreans at their side. For a few years this alliance lasted, but slowly grievances arose and differences accentuated. This led to the 1998 – 2000 border war, which ended with Eritrea in full retreat. President Isaias, furious that he was unable to trounce the Tigrayans on the battlefield, plotted their destruction.

With Abiy in power he and Isaias planned their strategy. It is worth noting that their last reciprocal meetings prior to the current Tigrayans war were held in each other’s military bases. Removing the TPLF leadership is now a key goal in both Addis Ababa and Asmara. Until it is achieved neither is likely to rest. This is why the present war is unlikely to be ended by mediation, by the African Union, or anyone else. A visceral hatred exists between the leaders of the Tigrayans, Eritreans and Ethiopia’s ruling party. This is not (at present) reflected in animosity between their peoples, but as the fighting continues, this may be on the cards.

Regional implications

What began as a “police operation” between the Ethiopian Federal authorities and the Tigray region has already had implications for the rest of the Horn of Africa. Some 3,000 Ethiopian troops have been withdrawn from Somalia to fight in Tigray. This is destabilising Somalia, just as President Trump has ordered the US military to leave the country.

Other Ethiopian ethnic groups are watching nervously as the Federal forces and Eritreans attack Tigray and wonder if they might face a similar fate in due course. Why would a Somali or Oromo family wish to see their children sent to die in the highlands of Ethiopia (that many have never visited) for a ‘greater Ethiopia’ that could extinguish their own autonomy? Fighting has already erupted in Oromia. It could spread to other regions. Prime Minister Abiy and President Isaias have lit the fuse – what will follow?

When the war began the US Foundation of Peace issued a warning – endorsed by senior American Africanists. It is as apposite today as it was on the 5 November.

While many of the facts remain unclear, the risks of escalation are certain: Intrastate or interstate conflict would be catastrophic for Ethiopia’s people and for the region and would pose a direct threat to international peace and security. The acceleration of polarization amid violent conflict would also mark the death knell for the country’s nascent reform effort that began two years ago and the promise of a democratic transition that it heralded.

As we cautioned in the study group’s Final Report and Recommendations released on October 29, the fragmentation of Ethiopia would be the largest state collapse in modern history. Ethiopia is five times the size of pre-war Syria by population, and its breakdown would lead to mass interethnic and interreligious conflict; a dangerous vulnerability to exploitation by extremists; an acceleration of illicit trafficking, including of arms; and a humanitarian and security crisis at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East on a scale that would overshadow any existing conflict in the region, including Yemen. As Ethiopia is currently the leading Troop Contributing Country to the United Nations and the African Union peacekeeping missions in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia, its collapse would also significantly impact the efforts by both to mitigate and resolve others conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

When the Tigrayans last challenged the Ethiopian state, the fighting lasted from 1976 until 1991. The cost in suffering and life was immense. One can only hope that this time scale will not be repeated and that the African Union offer of mediation will be allowed to proceed, but the prospect does not look optimistic.

Martin Plaut is currently Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at the University of London and a regular contributor to ROAPE. For years Martin worked as a journalist and researcher focusing primarily on southern Africa and the Horn of Africa. He was until recently Africa Editor, BBC World Service News, but since his retirement he has published a series of books, including Understanding Eritrea (2016, Hurst).

Featured Photograph: Fighters ride to the frontline to face troops from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (Tiksa Negeri).

So many ‘Africanists’, so few Africans

Zack Zimbalist asks who produces knowledge on ‘African politics’? Within political science, our understanding of politics in Africa is overwhelmingly shaped by non-Africans who spend most of their time far removed from Africa. Based on his paper in ROAPE, Zimbalist argues that this reality has serious consequences for the academic community, policymakers, students and citizens across the world.

By Zack Zimbalist

Within the discipline of political science, scholarship and teaching on Africa faces a serious problem that demands urgent attention and redress. The problem is straightforward: the producers of knowledge on ‘African politics’ are overwhelmingly non-African academics located thousands of miles from the contexts about which they write.

As a non-African researcher based outside of Africa, I have come to realise more acutely the glaring inequality and inequity within the current system of knowledge production. As a graduate student preparing for courses and comprehensive exams in African studies and comparative politics, I became aware of the utter scarcity of African and Africa-based scholars in most of the assigned material. I also became well versed in the grand (hegemonic) theories in the ‘African politics’ literature (e.g. ‘neopatrimonialism’, the ‘rhizome state’), whose exclusive provenance was North American and European scholars based outside of Africa. Later, while conducting research in Mozambique and South Africa and then writing my dissertation, I discovered that most of the conceptual, theoretical and interpretive frameworks I employed were created by non-Africans. At the same time, as I interviewed and chatted with locals and read through materials written by Mozambican and South African academics, it was readily apparent to me that they possessed more revelatory theories and insight into how local politics worked in their communities and countries.

Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that only African or Africa-based scholars should speak to ‘African politics’. That would preclude me and many other dedicated researchers from conducting research and teaching on the topic. Instead, the aim of this blogpost (and my corresponding article which is available to read here) is to raise  awareness and motivate actions to rectify the large underlying power asymmetries existing within the system of scholarly production, which clearly disadvantage African and Africa-based scholars from producing and spreading knowledge.

What is ‘African politics’ and who are the ‘Africanists’?

In my article, I discuss how the category ‘African politics’ and the label ‘Africanist’ perpetuate the power asymmetries in knowledge production. For decades, writing oriented towards an artificial unitary ‘African politics’ has impeded a more accurate and granular understanding of political systems and behaviour across varied African contexts. This practice is linked to an ignominious history in which Africa and its diverse political and social configurations were homogenised, essentialised and distorted by Europeans and other Westerners. During this time, African voices and rich oral traditions and histories were locked out of knowledge production pertaining to their own complex societies and indigenous systems of local governance.

While much progress has been made in correcting these biased and misleading portrayals (owing to the work of Africans and non-Africans alike), the continued production of hegemonic theories speaking to ‘African politics’ remains deeply problematic. First, the dominant knowledge produced by non-African ‘Africanists’—of highly complex and historically contingent processes—is often simplified, incomplete, and loaded with external concepts and paradigms (not to mention languages). Second, it is largely disconnected from debates and research within African research institutes as well as other local African intellectual and political initiatives. As a result, African scholars and other African voices are at a substantial disadvantage to counter or refine the dominant discourses about politics on the continent.

The widespread use of the label ‘Africanist’ by North American and European scholars (but not by Africans) augments the power of such discourses and claims of Africa-wide expertise. Strikingly, many of these hegemonic theories and authoritative arguments about ‘African politics’ are generalised to all of Africa based only on single-country ‘field’ research or, increasingly, a field, survey or ‘lab experiment’ conducted within one African country. Note, for example, the stacks of books and articles published in leading academic presses and political science journals titled using the formula: ‘Democracy/Citizenship/Political Struggle in Africa: A Study of Country B’.

By contrast, there are troves of unpublished (or not widely available) research produced by Africans in Africa that demonstrate a detailed and sophisticated understanding of local political realities. Despite the superb quality of this work, it almost certainly does not reach top outlets or institutions of higher education outside of Africa, where students wish to gain exposure to diverse African perspectives as well as new concepts, theories, and epistemologies. What if, by analogy, students were required to study ‘American politics’ (nearly) exclusively from the perspectives and paradigms constructed by Africans (and written in African languages) who are based far from America? It would be equally startling and unedifying. Yet, this is the reality for the study of ‘African politics’ in many of the top universities and colleges in North America.

Quantitative data from undergraduate course syllabi and PhD reading lists

The ROAPE article that this blogpost is based on analyses authorship data from 1260 ‘readings’ (including academic and media articles, reports, book chapters, books, films and TED talks) from 24 undergraduate course syllabi for courses on African politics or Africa and international relations taught between 2014 and 2019 in the US and Canada. I find that only 15% of readings are written by Africans and only 9% of the readings are written by authors based in Africa. Also striking is the exclusion of women from course readings; only 15% of source materials are authored by women. These core findings illustrate the dramatic under-representation and exclusion of the scholars, researchers and activists who are closest to (and most familiar with) the political battles and actions being carried out across Africa. This stark hegemony (and exclusion of African voices) does not vary on whether the instructor is African or non-African, or by whether the course is taught by a man or a woman.

In parallel, the descriptive analysis of PhD comprehensive exam reading lists in comparative politics from a small sample of top US universities is also biased heavily against African and Africa-based scholars. For various topics within the graduate comparative politics reading lists, there are zero (or at best a few) books or articles based on African cases or written by Africans or Africa-based scholars. In addition, the relatively few books or articles about African cases are predominantly written by non-African academics based in the US or the UK.

Efforts to address the problem and how to strengthen them

In the ROAPE article, I conclude by highlighting some actions that North American and European academics and institutions could undertake to correct some of the inequities in the current research and publication system as well as in the classroom.

On an individual level, one first step we can all take is to critically examine our approaches to teaching and studying political dynamics in Africa. This examination should include questions such as who guides our research questions and designs, what methods do we employ to answer our questions, who do we interview and how, which documents do we review, which theoretical frameworks do we rely on, how do we interpret our findings and how do we seriously engage with external validity to other African countries. As teachers, we should also carefully weigh how we select materials and structure discussions so that African voices play a central role in shaping discourses about politics and governance. This process requires us to reflect on the institutions to which we belong and the resources at our disposal, as well as how we are positioned to contribute to knowledge production vis-à-vis other scholarly communities.

Apart from research and teaching, we can help change the nature of the publication system and how we execute our tasks as journal board members, editors and reviewers so that we remove structural barriers that disadvantage African voices and scholarly output (such as the privileging of particular epistemologies and methods prominent in the US and European academies and the incentivising of generalised proclamations about ‘African politics’, which Africa-based authors are less likely to make).

We can also leverage our individual actions to support and develop existing institutional efforts. Organizations such as the Working Group in African Political Economy (WGAPE) and the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) network could expand opportunities for Africans and Africa-based researchers and institutions to shape research projects. In parallel, additional assistance could be provided to enlarge social science training opportunities for African researchers, through initiatives like the Partnership for African Social and Governance Research, the Mawazo Institute’s PhD Scholars program, and the Center for Effective Global Action’s (CEGA) East Africa Social Science Translation Collaborative (EASST). Finally, greater support could be provided to institutions within Africa, such as the Dakar-based Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), which has several initiatives and is a leading publisher for research by African scholars in and outside the continent.

While these are some small piecemeal efforts aiming to address this problem, what is needed is a large-scale collaborative effort and the infusion of far greater resources (time, energy and financial) to correct for the substantial biases in who generates knowledge about ‘African politics’ and how it is generated. The system of knowledge production must be transformed so that Africans and Africa-based academics are driving research agendas and questions while shaping the theoretical frameworks, methods and data sources we use to answer them. Such an effort would extend the range of possibilities for learning about Africa, which are all heavily circumscribed because of the status quo hegemony of non-African academic institutions and scholars. In doing so, we can all help reconstruct the epistemological underpinnings of such knowledge in a way that is Africa-centred and grounded in the dynamic aspirations of Africans across the continent.

The full article can be accessed for free until the end of December here.

Zack Zimbalist is a visiting foreign professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Tecnológico de Monterrey in Mexico. His research interests focus broadly on economic development, governance, political behaviour, and public opinion in developing democracies, mainly in Africa.

We encourage our readers also to listen to the LSE Citing Africa podcasts. There are two series both which explore knowledge production, decolonisation, data extractivism and development in Africa – the first series can be accessed here and the second here.  

Featured Photograph: Katrina Daly Thompson opens DAY IN AFRICA with a keynote address (Catherine A. Reiland/UW-Madison).

The Ominous Rise of African Financial Centres: The Case of Mauritius

Pritish Behuria writes how Mauritius has long impressed observers. In July this year, the country was officially categorised as a high-income country. Yet alongside impressive growth, Mauritius’ financial sector has developed into a globally renowned low-tax jurisdiction.

By Pritish Behuria       

The Mauritian response to several urgent challenges, Covid-19 or the oil spill, over the past few months has drawn global praise. Observers have begun to call for other countries to learn from Mauritius, as part of a welcome call to encourage and highlight the impressive implementation of policies in the Global South. Mauritius, of course, has long impressed observers. In July this year, Mauritius was officially categorised as a high-income country. Alongside impressive growth, successive governments have been committed to retaining a welfare state with impressive social spending for decades.

As there are increasing calls to emulate Mauritius, it is worth analysing how the country’s meteoric rise was achieved. At independence, James Meade, who later won the Nobel Prize, famously argued that prospects for development in Mauritius were bleak. Mauritius’ problems appeared insurmountable: the country was sugar-dependent, ethnically diverse and densely populated. Meade predicted a population boom, with no prospect for job creation. It appeared Mauritius was headed into disaster.

The Defiance of Mauritian Growth

Mauritius defied Meade’s pessimistic predictions. Since then, much ink has been spilled evaluating the determinants of the Mauritian miracle. Early Mauritian governments successfully committed to diversifying its economy, despite sugar enjoying preferential access to European markets. The government also made successful investments in tourism and industry (including textiles and garments). Mauritians enjoyed the fruits of their own mini-industrial revolution while also retaining the political freedom of voting in multi-party elections. Mauritius was the ultimate ‘democratic developmental state’, a term aspirationally applied by so many African governments to legitimise less-democratic systems of rule.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, political analysis of Mauritius growth showed how wealthy Franco-Mauritian sugar planters, who controlled much of the wealth, gave up political power to the majority population (of South-Asian descent from varied backgrounds), who arrived as indentured labourers in the country. Geographical isolation and threat of internal revolt combined to commit a new ruling political-economic elite to developing pillars of economic transformation: sugar, tourism and industry. However, in analysing Mauritius’ growth success, there is relatively limited attention (aside from some passing mentions) of the most important pillar (and dark side) of Mauritius’ growth success: the offshore financial sector.

The Unstoppable Rise of African Financial Centres

Late development requires governments to position their economies in relation to the global political economy to reduce their economic subordination to industrialised countries while diversifying their sources of revenue. Most African countries have now liberalised their financial sectors to varying degrees and invited foreign capital into their domestic commercial banking sectors. East Asian countries retained national ownership of their financial sectors, as they industrialised. Instead, many African countries first liberalised their economies, with some choosing to re-shape their financial sectors to increasingly present themselves as financial hubs. Many African countries have adopted global financial standards (like Basel), which were not intended for them. Even OECD countries have resisted adopting them.

Reforming financial sectors to become a hub is often accompanied by signing double taxation avoidance agreements (DTAAs). Through DTAAs, governments promise to reduce taxes to an extent that invites investors to base their companies in their countries rather than in their home countries or in the countries they wish to invest. This comes with the promise of reduced taxes in comparison to the tax rates prevailing in their home countries. Countries including Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda have increasingly pursued such strategies while others like Botswana and Morocco have had these in place for much longer. As the pandemic exposes the unreliability of some services-based growth (like tourism), it is likely that offshore strategies (which provide a source for foreign exchange for cash-strapped countries) will appear more attractive.

Offshore in Mauritius

Mauritius’ example on the continent is dangerously alluring. The evolution of Mauritius’ financial sector into a globally renowned low-tax jurisdiction occurred because of the government’s strategic engagements with the global financial sector at opportune moments. In the 1980s, the government began establishing the infrastructure required for supporting its financial sector strategies. Since the Indian economy was still ‘closed’ to the outside world, the Indian government approached the Mauritian government to establish a DTAA to provide a channel for foreign investments into India. According to some key government officials, Mauritius was actually more intrigued by the potential of South African capital in the 1980s, with the end of apartheid likely to result in an influx of capital. However, after India liberalised its economy in the 1990s, the Mauritian government, aided by British lawyers, established the legal systems to signal that Mauritius was a secure base for potential investments into India. The influx of capital to India was enormous, as were the revenues for Mauritius: Between 1994 to 2017, 37% of FDI into India came from Mauritius, as well as 27% of all foreign portfolio investment from 2001 to 2016. The India segment of Mauritius’ offshore financial sector remains the most significant source of revenues for Mauritius and has been infamous for examples of ‘round tripping’ . There have also been examples of equally nefarious activity among Indian and African nationals (but the net is much wider than that).

Mauritius’ offshore financial centre has had a seismic effect on Mauritian political economy. There is the enormous foreign exchange that comes with being an offshore financial centre, which is the envy of any low-income non-oil producing country. The growth of offshore finance has led to what many observers highlight as a democratisation of wealth in the country. Historically, the wealthiest Mauritians comprised the descendants of Franco-Mauritian sugar plantation owners, which now take the form of large Franco-Mauritian Conglomerates that dominate the economy today. Some Mauritians of South Asian descent can also count themselves as the richest Mauritians. The growth of the financial sector contributed to a rising middle class (including lawyers, accountants and bankers) employed around it.

However, there have been significant domestic dangers associated with Mauritius’ offshore success. Despite its social spending, Mauritius remains an extremely unequal society, as well as ethnically segregated. The growing value of real estate and its services-based development trajectory created new opportunities for a burgeoning middle-class. However, the decline of its industrial sector has contributed to few opportunities for secure employment for others. Mauritius’ development path has also historically depended on the government’s strategic use of preferential treaties with others. Whether it was markets for Mauritian sugar or the DTAA with India, the vulnerability of Mauritian dependent development had contributed to the government’s sustained commitment to new areas for economic diversification. However, over the past decade, the government has not sustained this commitment to diversification. Attention to capitalising on an ocean economy has so far been slow and less-intensive than previous diversification attempts.

Learning from Mauritius?

The Mauritian response to Covid has drawn increasing calls for others to learn from Mauritius. There is clearly much to learn from Mauritius. But with all calls for emulating others, we must be clear how supposed ‘models’ of development are emulated. Often, these models are misunderstood, selectively appropriated or presented incorrectly. We are all too familiar with how Western countries have presented their own past of economic transformation in the ‘Do as I say’ of market-led development rather than ‘Do what we did’ of state-led structural transformation.

Similarly, the World Bank misinterpreted East Asian development as being based on market-led policies and presented this version around the world. Within African countries, a call to emulate Singapore or Rwanda has been likened to emulation of their  authoritarian characteristics rather than the realities of how economic growth has been sustained. Mauritius has actually actively advised governments consistently over the past few decades on various aspects of its development: from special economic zones to high-value, low-quantity tourism. Equally though, Mauritius’ offshore financial centre has drawn attention.

As the pandemic rumbles on and treasuries dry up, some service-based strategies like tourism seem increasingly misdirected but other services sectors (despite the global scrutiny) like offshore finance may appear to be a potential source of revenues. But even considering the negative effects such strategies have in addressing global inequalities, governments should consider the negative domestic inequalities that may ensue if such strategies are pursued. Offshore financial sectors foster external dependence. Additionally, double taxation treaties and the construction of new regulatory authorities is difficult and not even enough. Mauritius remains at the low-end of offshore financial sectors. Most financial evasion continues to be driven by industrialised countries in Europe or East Asia, with stronger capacities to protect evasion. As the search for foreign exchange drives economies to develop offshore financial sectors, it is worth remembering that few strategies of sustained transformation have occurred through radical attempts at financialisation.

Pritish Behuria is a Lecturer in Politics, Governance and Development at The University of Manchester’s Global Development Institute. His research focuses primarily on the politics of economic transformation in India and sub-Saharan Africa. 

Featured Photograph: ‘Keeping off the rain’ – Colourful umbrellas at Caudan Waterfront Mall, Port Louis, Mauritius (Martin Falbisoner, 9 September 2015).

Unearthing Hidden Histories: an interview with Ian Birchall

ROAPE’s Leo Zeilig interviews the historian and socialist Ian Birchall. Birchall speaks about his life, activism, and historical and political work. His work has involved discovering relatively unknown activists and revolutionaries, many from Africa, while championing Marxism as a powerful but flexible tool of analysis and criticism. Birchall argues that the idea of social transformation, the hope for a world based on the satisfaction of human needs, has lost none of its power.

For readers of roape.net can you tell us a little about yourself. What were some of your earliest political steps?

I have been involved in left-wing politics for something over sixty years. This began with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, then Anti-Apartheid and the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign, later the Anti-Nazi League and more recently Stop the War. For some fifty years I was a member of the Socialist Workers Party [SWP – previously the International Socialists] but left in 2013 after a very bitter internal dispute. I still think of myself as a Marxist and revolutionary socialist. I’ve also written quite widely, especially on the history of the socialist movement; books on Babeuf, Sartre and Tony Cliff [the founder of the SWP]. And I’ve translated some of the works of Alfred and Marguerite Rosmer and Victor Serge, people who were among the earliest supporters of the Russian Revolution, but later became intransigent anti-Stalinists [some of Ian’s work can be found here and here].

My own evolution was necessarily slow. I was born in 1939 and grew up in the aftermath of World War II. Britain was still at the head of the biggest colonial empire in the world, though it was beginning to disintegrate. In my childhood home we had a large map of the world above the fireplace, with the British Empire coloured red. I remember a friend of my father’s telling me “We should never have given India away”. As a child I was required to collect money for missionaries, to bring the “true” religion to those who had other beliefs. This included Muslims, whom we were taught – ignorantly and offensively – to call “Mohammedans”.

Very slowly I began to question things. I opposed the Suez invasion in 1956, which led to a débâcle that was the end of the road for the British Empire. It was largely a gut reaction against jingoism rather than any sophisticated understanding of what was happening. I was also increasingly aware of racism, though not through direct experience – there was not a single black pupil in my very middle-class grammar school. But I was aware of the discussion about immigration – and also of the arguments about South Africa. I was very influenced by reading Alan Paton’s Cry the Beloved Country when I was about seventeen, which left me with a hatred of racism.

It was when I left home to go to university that I became more deeply involved. I joined the Labour Party and supported the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament which briefly won a majority in the Labour Party. In the 1959 election I heckled Prime Minister Harold Macmillan when he spoke at a rally in my hometown in Yorkshire; I shouted, “How About Nyasaland?” [Malawi]. This was reported in the local press. While in Oxford I picketed the South African cricket team.

After completing my first degree I spent a year teaching in France in 1961-62. This was the final year of the Algerian war, and I have ever since been fascinated by that period. I was in a remote rural region and was not directly involved in any activity, but I was aware of the situation and the rumours of impending civil war. I talked to people who had served in the army in Algeria. I came to realise that not all politics developed through the peaceful framework of British parliamentary democracy.

You described some years ago how if it hadn’t been for your politicisation with the International Socialists in the early 1960s you might have disappeared into academic obscurity. Can you describe the environment and experience of those early years in the radical left?

I joined the International Socialists at the end of 1962, as a post-graduate student. It was just after the Cuba Crisis, which had been a powerful reminder that the whole future of humanity was at risk, and I was anxious to be involved in some form of action.

I had been a supporter of the Labour Party left [as embodied in the weekly paper Tribune and MPs like Michael Foot] and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament [CND]. I was committed to the politics, but often found their arguments intellectually inadequate – superficial or moralising.

For two or three years I had known individuals and publications from a Trotskyist background. There were two groups – the Socialist Labour League [SLL] and the International Socialists [IS]. The SLL was in some ways impressive, and I was briefly attracted to it. But it was sectarian, seeing itself as the sole bearer of the “correct” position, and had a grossly exaggerated overestimation of revolutionary prospects in the 1960s.

I was much more impressed when I attended a meeting addressed by Michael Kidron, one of the IS leaders. I came away thinking “this man really understands how the world works”. A few weeks later I joined the organisation – though I was fairly vague about what I had joined.

The group was led by Kidron and Tony Cliff. Cliff was known above all for his work arguing that Russia, Eastern Europe and China were not in any sense a form of socialism, however degenerated or distorted, but “state capitalist”. It took me a little time to come to terms with this. Kidron’s work was primarily on the contemporary economy. He argued that the post-war economic boom in capitalism was real [something denied by many on the left], but that it was impermanent and would come to an end.

It was a tiny group – just over a hundred members when I joined. But the Cliff-Kidron duo had drawn some interesting people around them. There were writers and intellectuals like Peter Sedgwick and Alasdair MacIntyre. Among recent recruits of my own generation were people such as Chris Harman, Nigel Harris and Colin Barker, who would go on to become distinguished Marxist writers, as well as Paul Foot, one of the finest journalists of his time. I was in particular friends with Colin Barker, and together we thrashed out some of our ideas. See my obituary of Colin here.

The Marxism I learned from Cliff and Kidron was a powerful but flexible tool of analysis and criticism. Concepts of class, capitalist contradiction and the inadequacy of reformism were used to illuminate the modern world. But it was always stressed that we must look at the reality of the world as well as the theory – as Cliff put it many years later “If you sit on Marx’s shoulders you see far, but if you sit on Marx’s shoulders and close your eyes, you don’t see very far at all.” There were no sacred texts; arguments could not be resolved by citing the “great teachers”. Trotsky had been wrong about Russia, Lenin’s theory of imperialism was out-of-date. It was an intellectually stimulating environment, and one which contrasted with the academic milieu I was also getting to know, where all too many people knew little – and cared less – about anything outside of their academic specialism.

We were a very small group and there was no pretence that we were the “leadership”, or even the embryo of it. There was no claim to a monopoly of truth; I remember Colin Barker enthusing about CLR James and Victor Serge. And the group was marked by a sense of humour. Cliff was notorious for using jokes to make political points. In general, we didn’t take ourselves too seriously; there was a widespread use of self-deprecating humour.

Yet at the same time comrades did, in a sense, take themselves seriously. In my long evolution away from Christianity, one of the things that struck me was the way in which most self-proclaimed Christians didn’t take their beliefs seriously. Thus I was repeatedly told that the passages in the Gospels where Jesus said the rich would go to hell shouldn’t be “taken literally”. Now in IS I met people who put their money where their mouths were, who devoted enormous time and energy to the cause they believed in without hope of personal reward. I’m not saying they were saints or ascetics. But I remember the young Paul Foot, a very talented journalist with great prospects ahead of him, who devoted many unpaid hours to the IS publication Labour Worker, with a tiny circulation, when this was a positive diversion from his journalistic ambitions.

In 1964 I moved to London and met more of the IS group’s working-class members. Again the milieu was marked by intellectual curiosity and open debate. A number of those I knew later took advantage of the expansion of higher education to get formal qualifications – but it was the IS which first awakened their intellectual interests.

I don’t want to romanticise. We made many mistakes and misjudgements, there was sometimes friction and personal antagonism. But overall, I am very glad to have been in IS at that time. It gave me an education I could not have found in any university.

Much of your work as a historian has been unearthing hidden, or at least lesser known histories of the revolutionary left and some of its important activists. One figure who you have long championed is Jean-Paul Sartre. Can you describe your work and interest in Sartre, and his contribution to Marxism? I am thinking in particular of his astonishing support and involvement in Algeria’s war against French occupation between 1954-62.

You are right to point to one of my main preoccupations, discovering relatively unknown activists. Sheila Rowbotham coined the phrase “hidden from history” to refer to the history of women, but I have been interested in both women and men who have been neglected by historians, often because of the appalling divisions within the left. Stalinism obliterated whole sections of history that were inconvenient to its narrative, and often sections of the far left have only told the story of their own currents. [More on this under question 6].

Sartre, of course, is hardly hidden. He had been important for my political evolution since I first read him at the age of sixteen. He affected my political evolution alongside my membership of IS – and I was sometimes criticised for it. But it was Chris Harman, editor of International Socialism, who first encouraged me to write at length about Sartre.

My concern, in my book Sartre Against Stalinism, was twofold. Firstly, to rescue Sartre from his many critics who accused him of being sympathetic to Stalinism. Certainly, he made some serious misjudgements, but the main thrust of his political activity was anti-Stalinist. And secondly I wanted to use Sartre and the various controversies he was involved in to bring back into the history of the French intellectual left a number of figures often forgotten or marginalised – Colette Audry, Daniel Guérin, Jean-René Chauvin, Pierre Naville, the young Claude Lefort and others.

I’ll say a bit more about Sartre and Marxism under question 4. As for what you call his “astonishing support and involvement” in the Algerian war for independence, it is certainly true that Sartre’s role was very creditable, but it was far from unique. Because of his fame it is easy to overstate his role. There was a small but significant number of women and men – perhaps a thousand at most –  who gave practical support to the National Liberation Front [FLN], by smuggling money, distributing publications, supporting Algerian workers in factories like Renault, and even organising jail-breaks. These were the so-called “suitcase-carriers”. Some had been inspired by Sartre, and his public declarations were of value to them. Sartre himself, precisely because of his prominence, could not engage in such work, and his contribution was largely journalistic. I think it’s important to remember the whole group of very determined and courageous people, and not focus on the individual Sartre.

Sartre raised major theoretical questions for Marxism, many of these were read and taken up by Frantz Fanon in his last book, The Wretched of the Earth. What do you think we have to learn from Sartre’s work and life today?

For me the central question in all of Sartre’s work is the relationship between theory and practice. His theatre and fiction focus on questions of choice and responsibility. When I worked at Middlesex Polytechnic, I taught an interdisciplinary course on Sartre. It provided a fascinating opportunity to discuss a range of political questions, notably racism, and it deeply engaged the students who took up positions for or against Sartre.

Having said that, I think it is important to stress the limits of Sartre’s work. As you say, he certainly “raised major theoretical questions” for Marxism. Whether he answered them is quite a different matter. I find Sartre much more interesting for the questions he asks than for the answers he gives.

Perhaps the fundamental question that Sartre poses, in a variety of ways, is that of the relation between the historical process and individual action. For Sartre history is open – there is no guaranteed future, and we are responsible to the extent that our actions prepare that future. In that sense Sartre stands in the classic Marxist tradition of Marx’s “Men [sic] make their own history, but they do not make it as they please” and Luxemburg’s “socialism or barbarism”. In his biographical writings – Baudelaire, Genet, Flaubert – he tries to show how individuals choose themselves in specific social conjunctures.

So, I think Sartre remains very relevant. The question of how I, as an individual, relate to the historical process is a vital one, especially in a time when there is no easy answer in the form of “Join the party”. In recent years there have been some important studies which opened new perspectives on Sartre – Sam Coombes: The Early Sartre and Marxism, and Paige Arthur: Unfinished Projects: Decolonization and the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre – and I think Sartre will continue to make a contribution to political debate for some time to come.

Social movements – and revolutions – has rippled across Africa in recent years – in particular in Algeria and Sudan in 2018/9. Elements in these struggles have fought to transform the ‘revolutions’ into meaningful transformations of the political and economic structures. Some authors have pointed to the ‘failure’ or lack of organisation that could have helped in cohering movements and propelling them beyond a ‘circulation of elites.’ Do you think we have anything to learn today from the contribution of Lenin’s work and activism on questions of organisation and politics?

Lenin was a great Marxist, and his life and writings repay study. Above all his State and Revolution is a work of enormous importance, which thoroughly demolishes the idea that socialism can be equated with state ownership and control. Indeed, Lenin was criticised by contemporary Marxists for having come too close to anarchism. Its value is not lessened by the fact that the realities of life in Russia after 1917 proved more complex than Lenin had foreseen.

So Lenin should be studied. Of course, there are competing accounts, and I would particularly recommend the presentations of Lenin by Alfred Rosmer, Victor Serge and Clara Zetkin. But we have to be careful what learning from history means. History does not repeat itself. I would prefer to say that by studying how revolutionaries have confronted unique circumstances in the past we can prepare ourselves to confront unique circumstances in the future.

That Lenin’s political leadership and the role of the Bolshevik Party which he had built over preceding years were a vital element in the success of the Revolution of October 1917 is not in doubt. In the aftermath of 1917 it was natural that revolutionaries elsewhere would try to imitate the methods which had brought success in Russia – although Lenin, in his last speech to the Communist International, warned powerfully against slavish imitation of Russian methods. When Stalinism began to crumble in the 1950s and 1960s, it seemed natural for the anti-Stalinist left to think in terms of a return to Leninism. For example, we in the International Socialists predicted in 1968 that we faced a period of heightened struggle. We were right – in 1974 strike action by miners brought down a Tory government, and a little later Portugal moved to the brink of revolution. We needed a more interventionist form of organisation, and the only model we had, imitated flexibly, was that of the Bolshevik Party.

But now it is clear we failed. We are further from the goal of “building the party” than we were in 1968. Certainly, there will be social upheavals and crises in the future – it is in the nature of capitalism that this should be so. But whatever revolutionary situations may arise – and all revolutions are surprises [as was 1917] – it is clear that they will be very different from the October Revolution.

It has been a widespread practice on the far left to explain all failures of revolution with the over-simplified formula “there was no revolutionary party”. There is an element of truth in this but in itself it is inadequate. Any analysis of the factors in a revolutionary conjuncture will show that the state of the far left can only be understood as part of the total situation. It will not do to see it simply in terms of a failure of effort – we didn’t sell enough papers, recruit enough members.

That any challenge to capitalist power will require organisation is undoubtedly true. What form that organisation will take I am certainly not in any position to predict. All I would say is that in the present period, when revolutionary upheaval seems relatively remote, building “the party” [especially when the chosen organisation is built in opposition to all other organisations] is less of a priority than making socialist propaganda – through publications, websites etc. – and winning people to the ideas of socialism; those people will have to resolve the problems of organisation as the situation develops.

For me, some of your work on Algerian [and French] revolutionaries in the 1910s and 1920s [and the 1950s] is particularly interesting.  Taking a figure like Robert Louzon for example, he seemed to edge the early communist movement in Algeria to a more radical position – which saw the political struggle of Algerian workers, as equal to the role of French workers. These efforts were snuffed out by the Stalinisation of the Soviet Union, and communist parties around the world, but there were many positives signs. How do you interpret this period and some of its astonishing figures?

The whole historical experience of Stalinism has meant that it is only comparatively recently that we have begun to get an accurate picture of the early years of the Communist International. Stalinist historians simply wrote out of history people and events that did not fit their narrative. And histories from the Left Opposition often lapsed into an opposite error, of romanticising the period of the “first four congresses” of the Communist International – the period 1919-22, when Lenin and Trotsky were the dominant figures. Only towards the end of the last century, with the work of historians such as Pierre Broué, have we begun to get a more balanced and better documented account of the early period.

In the example I know best, the French Communist Party, it is only in the last few years that two histories of the Party’s origins, by François Ferrette and Julien Chuzeville, have radically revised previous accounts, drawing out the important part played by revolutionary syndicalists in the founding and early years of the party, and giving more prominence to such figures as Alfred and Marguerite Rosmer, Pierre Monatte and  Boris Souvarine.

You are right to draw out that this first period of the international Communist movement, a period of great hope and radical aspirations, deserves to be rescued from obscurity and studied without being overshadowed by the subsequent history of Stalinism.

Thus you mention Robert Louzon. Louzon was a remarkable activist over many years. Radicalised as a teenager at the time of the Dreyfus case, he was involved, in Tunisia in 1921, with launching the first Arabic-language Communist daily paper – rapidly suppressed by the authorities. In 1937, at the age of 55, he fought at the front in the Spanish Civil War. And in 1960, aged 78, he signed the Manifesto of 121, supporting those who took illegal action in opposition to the French war in Algeria. As you say, an “astonishing figure”. But I have never found a biography or even a substantial article analysing his life and work, nor any collection of his extensive writings.

There are a number of other activists and events from this period who have been largely ignored by historians. The French Communist Party [PCF] showed a vigorous commitment to anti-imperialism, on the part of at least a section of its membership. The young Ho Chi Minh, who was a founder-member of the PCF, launched and edited a paper called Le Paria [the Pariah], aimed at immigrants and readers in the colonies. He built up a whole team of militants and writers of colonial origin, whose activities and development deserve further study. One of these was Lamine Senghor; if he had not died before he was forty, Senghor would undoubtedly have become one of the first great black working-class leaders in France. Verso is promising us a full biography of Senghor. [See Jacobin here] Le Paria ceased publication in 1926, but it had successors, as shown by Hakim Adi in his excellent book Pan-Africanism and Communism [2013].

Another figure largely ignored by historians is Hadj-Ali Abdelkader [there is one biography, published in Algiers, but little else]. Born in Algeria, he came to Paris and was a founder-member of the PCF; in 1924 he became a member of the Central Committee – while continuing to be a practising Muslim. [Some years ago there was a bitter controversy in the French Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste when a hijab-wearing woman was selected as an election candidate. The comrades who objected seemed to have forgotten an episode from their own tradition.] He played an important rôle in the emergence of a movement for Algerian independence and helped to draw in Messali Hadj, often seen as the founder of Algerian nationalism.  [See Ian’s article on Abdelkader here].

There is further work to be done on anti-imperialism in the early years of the Communist International, and the rôle of activists of colonial origin. Michael Goebel’s interesting book  Anti-Imperial Metropolis [2015] has made a useful contribution, but there is much more to be said.

For a journal like ROAPE – committed to ‘radical analyses of trends, issues and social processes in Africa, adopting a broadly materialist interpretation of change’- it’s important to emphasis non-European Marxist traditions and diverse socialist histories. In 2014, in the journal, Biko Agozino did this for Marx’s own writings [see his article here]. Your political education was in an organisation established by a ‘unorthodox’ Marxist, Tony Cliff, originally from Palestine. In the 1960s and 1970s, some of the greatest events took place in parts of the world far from the capitalist centre – in Chile, Cuba, parts of Africa and Asia. Can you speak a little about this period and how the left you were a part of negotiated the extremely variegated movements and struggles around the world?

The story is complex and sometimes contradictory. Internationalism was obviously central to the IS group – as was shown by its very name. We believed that since capitalism was a single world system it could only be replaced by an international – and internationalist – alternative. The idea of permanent revolution, and in particular the rejection of “socialism in one country” was one of the most fundamental things we took from Trotskyism.

Cliff, of course, played a crucial role in establishing the style of the organisation. His Jewish identity – and notably his love of Jewish jokes – was a central element of the image he projected. As a speaker he exploited brilliantly his imperfect grasp of the English language.

The specific question of Palestine was less prominent. We knew Cliff had been jailed – by the British authorities – and that was obviously something to his credit. But he spoke relatively little about the Middle East – until 1967 when the Six Days war reawakened his interest in the struggle against Zionism. But though he subsequently wrote and spoke a good deal about contemporary events, he still said relatively little about his own activity in Palestine. It was only when I was writing his biography after his death that I began to be aware of the full story – or at least parts of it.

But the positions of the IS group have to be placed in the context of the development of the world after 1945. There were two main developments in the post-war world which did not fit the previous perspectives of revolutionaries. Firstly, Western capitalism entered a period of boom and expansion; for many workers in the prosperous capitalist countries this meant full employment and rising living standards. And this meant a decline in revolutionary aspirations on the part of workers.

At the same time came a deep crisis for Western imperialism. In 1945 the British and French empires still dominated large parts of the world. Within twenty years they were more or less gone. France in particular suffered two disastrous wars in Indochina and Algeria, and Britain and France were humiliated by the Suez adventure in 1956. This was complemented by revolution in China and later in Cuba.

This was the context for the so-called “Third-Worldism” which was widespread on the international left. The concept of a “Third World” was short-lived; the term was coined 1952; by 2007 it was described by the Guardian style guide as “outdated” and “objectionable”. But for a brief period in the 1960s there was a widespread tendency on the left to believe that the locus of revolutionary change had shifted from those countries in which capitalism was most highly developed to the territories of the so-called “Third World”.

The IS group kept its distance from Third Worldism. There were two elements to this. One was the theoretical work of Michael Kidron. Whereas most tendencies on the Marxist left, whether Communist or Trotskyist, still saw Lenin’s Imperialism as providing a theoretical framework, Kidron argued that Lenin’s account did not fit the reality of capitalism in the 1960s. So he concluded that “to believe nowadays that the short route to revolution in London, New York or Paris lies through Calcutta, Havana, or Algiers, is to pass the buck to where it has no currency.” [See Kidron’s articles “Imperialism – Highest Stage but One” and “International Capitalism”]

Alongside Kidron’s theoretical analyses there was a more practical argument. Tony Cliff could get very indignant about the “vicarious pleasure” derived by sections of the left from revolutions in other parts of the world, which he saw as reflecting the fact that they had no roots in struggle in their own home territory. To some extent this drew dividing lines between us and other currents on the left. Thus Tariq Ali was very friendly to the IS group in the 1960s – but refused to join us because he believed we were “Eurocentric”.

Nonetheless a certain number of international questions were of great importance. One was South Africa. I remember IS comrades being involved in a very vigorous demonstration in Oxford against the South African ambassador immediately following the jailing of Nelson Mandela. The recent book Apartheid is Not a Game by Christian Hogsbjerg and Geoff Brown shows how important the campaign against the South African sporting teams was in radicalising a generation of activists, including a number of IS members.

Vietnam was even more important. I and a number of IS members were on the very first demonstration against the Vietnam war, in February 1965, after Malcolm X had visited the London School of Economics. Yet it should also be said that Cliff and Kidron were a bit slow to get involved in the Vietnam movement. They thought our priority should be the industrial struggle in Britain and did not see how central Vietnam was to the crisis of American imperialism. It was the younger comrades, notably Chris Harman, who argued for IS involvement in the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign [VSC]. The VSC was set up by another Trotskyist group, the International Marxist Group, but we participated from the outset. Again Vietnam was vital in the radicalisation of a generation of activists.

But although we called for victory to the Vietnamese, and participated enthusiastically in VSC activities [often chanting “Ho Ho Ho Chi Minh” along with the others] we also made it clear that we did not believe that the Vietnamese leadership was about to establish socialism; we considered them essentially Stalinist in their politics. After independence came the military conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia and the appalling revelations about atrocities in Pol Pot’s Cambodia. For some on the left this led to disillusion, but for IS comrades it did not go against our analysis.

Likewise, we did not join in the enthusiasm for Cuba widespread on the left [though of course we defended Cuba’s right to independence from American imperialism]. Thus when Che Guevara was murdered in 1967 I wrote a brief critical assessment. I was sharply criticised by another comrade, Peter Sedgwick.

Sedgwick was absolutely right to criticise the tone of my article, the self-satisfied dogmatism of a young comrade who has just learnt the line and is claiming a monopoly of truth. Yet I persist in thinking that the historical experience has shown that, contrary to what was then the dominant view on the far left, Guevarism did not offer a way forward for Latin America.

So, in general I would argue that the IS current did make a contribution to the debate on revolutionary internationalism and the revolution in the Third World. Perhaps at times we lapsed into Eurocentrism, but I think we did grasp some important features of the dynamics of the revolutionary process. And we laid the basis for our intervention at the end of the century, when imperialist wars took on a new form.

Reflecting on an earlier period of political activism in the 1970s, especially around the question of Black liberation and Black Power, what do you think are some of the important historical lessons for today, especially in the context of the Black Lives Matter movement?

I’m going to be very cautious in responding to this. Because of my age and health, I haven’t been involved in any recent activity, and I have to rely entirely on second-hand information. But even if I were better informed, I should be reluctant to draw “lessons”. I don’t think it is for those of my generation to try to recruit the new generation of activists to organisations or programmes, or to try to identify patterns of historical development. We should always be ready to recognise the originality of the experience of a new generation.

To take an example. I am very suspicious of the use of the term “fascism” as applied to current events. Thus Donald Trump was evil and dangerous – but he was not a fascist, and calling him one made it more difficult to develop a strategy to fight him.

So just a few observations.

As someone who has been involved in anti-racist activity over sixty years, I believe that we have made real progress. In comparison with the 1960s racism is less blatant, more on the defensive. Yet at the same time I hardly expect the victims of racism to be very impressed with the argument that things were even worse sixty years ago. There is still a long fight ahead.

The sheer scale of the Black Lives Matter movement has been remarkable. According to Priti Patel, some 137,500 people attended protests in Britain over the weekend of 6-7 June, more than took part in the biggest Vietnam demonstration in 1968. And within a week of the first demonstrations in the USA the movement had spread to at least a dozen other countries. Such rapid growth of activism is undoubtedly something very positive.

I would also mention Extinction Rebellion, which has also far outstripped the traditional far left in radicalising and mobilising new activists.

I am also delighted at the way that the enemies of Black Lives Matter keep calling it “Marxist” in an attempt to discredit it. In fact, the result will be to get more people asking questions about what “Marxism” actually is. I remember in 1958, when I was very young, a building workers’ strike on London’s South Bank was widely denounced as inspired by “Trotskyists”. I had barely heard of Trotsky, but I immediately started to try to find out more about him.

In the period that opened up in 1968, racism and imperialism were central questions. In 1968 we were inspired by Vietnam and the French general strike, but it was Enoch Powell’s “rivers of blood” speech that really confronted us with the dangers and responsibilities of our own situation. Numbers of trade unionists, including London dockers, took strike action in support of Powell. The Labour Party response to the Powell speech was appalling – for a fortnight Wilson and the other Labour leaders remained silent.

Terry Barrett was a London docker who had joined the International Socialists. When the dockers voted to strike in support of Powell, Barrett gave out a leaflet pointing out that Powell had called for mass sackings on the docks. Barrett showed great courage but was totally isolated.  But the fact that IS took a firm anti-racist position helped to attract some of the people who would build the Anti-Nazi League a few years later.

In the French student movement of 1968, and the ensuing general strike of ten million workers, a number of activists were people who had been radicalised by opposition to the war in Algeria. For example, Yvon Rocton had been a conscript in Algeria and was disciplined for opposing the use of torture. In 1968 at the Sud-Aviation aircraft factory in Nantes he led a factory occupation which was to be the first in France, and sparked off a national wave of occupations.

How BLM [and XR] will develop as organisations, I don’t know. But the most important thing is that there are thousands of people, many young, who must be thinking, arguing and reading, working out a way forward. In a way it reminds me of the nuclear disarmament movement of the early 1960s. Again there were thousands of us, asking fundamental questions about strategy. Should we work inside the Labour Party – or outside? Was non-violence a moral principle or just a useful tactic? CND as an organisation had largely disappeared by about 1965. But many of those thousands of activists reappeared in a variety of other struggles.

The activists of BLM will work out their own future. But they will undoubtedly learn from history. For history always proceeds with both continuities and discontinuities. As Victor Serge put it, future struggles will be fought by people who are “infinitely different from us, infinitely like us”.

Walter Rodney, the Guyanese scholar and activist, explained in 1975 that his political model was CLR James, a man who was already, at that point, in his mid-70s, and that he hoped – if he lived long enough – that he would remain as steadfast and revolutionary in his old age as James, so no one who say, seeing him walk past, ‘there was a revolutionary, but I have no idea what he is doing now’. This is something you have managed to do – to remain constant. In a conversation we had a few weeks ago, you said when I explained that I was in my late 40s, ‘well, watch it, the decades go past in a whirlwind …’ How do we manage our grand narratives, and political projects, in lives that are so short? How do we sustain ourselves?

Perhaps you do me too much credit. I have always believed in Rosa Luxemburg’s formulation that the future of humanity is a choice between socialism or barbarism. When I look at the world today, I can envisage barbarism very clearly. Climate change threatens the whole future of the human species. The population movements it will enforce will lead to the rise of a nationalistic right, determined to close frontiers. And increasing friction between nations will make the possibility of nuclear war ever greater. But a transition to socialism in the present period is much more difficult to envisage. Despair is very much an option.

But I’ll try to end on a more cheerful note.  My generation of socialists is beginning to die out – so I have quite often attended funerals and read obituaries. And I have maintained contact with a number of old comrades. And one thing that strikes me is how many of those I was active alongside half a century and more ago have remained in political activity of some sort. Of course, there have been partings of the ways, often marked by hostility and sometimes very painful. And many of those who once called themselves total revolutionaries are now immersed in single issues, from trade unionism to a range of campaigns – or even the Woodcraft Folk. But they remain committed to socialist values, to an aspiration for greater equality and cooperation. I am sure that it was the power of the ideas we encountered in our youth that has shaped our whole lives since then. Socialist ideas are very tenacious, and though there have been renegades, they have been few in number. How things will work out for the generation now emerging I don’t and can’t know – but I don’t think the idea of social transformation, the hope for a world based on the satisfaction of human needs and genuine democratic control by those who perform the labour required by society, has lost its power.

Ian Birchall is an author of numerous articles and books, a former lecturer in French at Middlesex University, and his research interests include the Comintern, the International Working Class, Communism and Trotskyism, France and Syndicalism. He has been a lifelong socialist and activist.

Featured Artwork: Colin Fancy – his work can be viewed here: Artivists at Work.

Statement in Support of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR)

Recent weeks have seen a crackdown by Egyptian authorities against civil society organizations. ROAPE urges our readers to support the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights which faces a clampdown on its senior personnel.

The following statement was issued by a group of scholars and human rights advocates in support of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), which currently faces an escalating crackdown by authorities with the arrest its senior personnel, including its executive director:

We, the undersigned scholars and human rights advocates, express our deep concern at the escalating crackdown that Egyptian authorities have launched against civil society organizations in recent weeks. In an unprecedented move, on 15 November security forces arrested Mohamed Basheer, the administrative manager of EIPR, one of the most prominent and reputable civil society organizations in Egypt.

Despite strong international condemnation of that action, on November 18 authorities arrested Karim Ennarah, the director of the criminal justice unit at EIPR, while launching a vicious campaign against EIPR in state-owned media and levelling false accusations against its personnel. A day later, authorities arrested EIPR Executive Director Gasser Abdel-Razek. They also directed terrorism-related charges against Mr. Ennarah and Mr. Basheer, adding their names to a legal case that includes numerous human rights advocates.

Most concerning is that this escalation comes after EIPR hosted senior diplomats from 14 countries, including Canada, the UK, Norway, several European Union (EU) member states, as well as the EU delegation to discuss the implications of the outcome of the United States elections for the human rights situation in Egypt.

We call on the Egyptian government to immediately release EIPR’s personnel and halt all politically motivated investigations against civil society organizations in the country.

If you wish to add your name to the statement, you can do so via the following link.

Featured Photograph: Karim Ennarah, head of the EIPR’s criminal justice unit, was arrested hours before Gasser Abdel-Razek, EIPR chief (Jess Kelly).

A Dictator’s Best Friend: Corporate Media Covers for Kagame’s Crimes

ROAPE has long published the latest and most damning scholarship concerning Rwanda and the crimes of President Paul Kagame and the RPF. In this blogpost, Sam Broadway follows on from the work of Reydams, Reyntjens and others previously published by ROAPE, taking issue with the work of mainstream journalism in establishing and reinforcing the historical record. 

By Sam Broadway

In the most recent reporting on Rwanda, corporate journalists have once again proven themselves – in as few words as possible – to be little more than perfect, strategic allies of the country’s dictator, President Paul Kagame.

These reports, particularly those found in Al Jazeera, the Guardian and the New York Times, center on the arrest of Paul Rusesabagina, whose heroic acts during the 1994 genocide inspired the 2004 Don Cheadle film, Hotel Rwanda and who has since become one of President Kagame’s earliest and most outspoken critics. Rusesabagina is charged with founding and financially supporting the National Liberation Forces (FLN), an armed wing of the MRCD opposition party responsible for multiple attacks in the southern and western districts over the past few years.

While Rusesabagina has maintained that the FLN is not a terrorist organization—as it has been argued by the prosecution—he has confessed to supporting the MRCD (Rwanda Movement for Democratic Change) as well as its armed wing. However, it must be emphasized that this confession followed his (likely) illegal abduction from Dubai and nearly a month in jail without access to family or a lawyer of his choosing during which he required medical attention on multiple occasions. But while the details of Rusesabagina’s case are decidedly interesting in and of themselves, it is really the manner by which this story has been reported that is—at least to those acquainted with the mounting evidence for the emerging truth about the events before, during and after 1994—most significant.

The mainstream, corporate press has been somewhat fair in their framing of the circumstances of Rusesabagina’s arrest. But it is not the presentation of the ‘new’ that is troublesome in these latest reports, rather it is the old. Corporate outlets have taken entirely for granted the official, government narrative of the 1994 genocide, ignoring the outpouring of scholarship that points to a refutation of this narrative, and have misrepresented—with as few words as possible—what a growing few already know about Rwanda under Paul Kagame and his RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front).

Mainstream reporters and their editors have been extremely selective in their recounting of the events of 1994. With near unanimity, major outlets, including the New York Times, the Guardian, and CNN have employed language that necessarily reinforces the historical, ethnic and political dynamic preferred by the RPF as illustrated by the government’s official narrative. Admittedly, CNN followed suit with Al Jazeera stating that ‘800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus died,’ lumping the two groups together; though, unlike Al Jazeera, they added that the genocide was ‘led by extremist Hutus,’ mitigating any dialectical difference inherent to this more vague reading. Much worse, were the other media house’s use of the words ‘and some‘ preceding ‘moderate Hutus.’

The description of Hutu victims as being predicated on their being ‘moderate’ is, to those better informed, quickly becoming particularly irrelevant. It is, rather, the diminution–bordering on complete erasure–affected by ‘some’ that is most condemnatory as it serves perfectly to maintain a narrative generated for the benefit of an entrenched president that the press simultaneously and quixotically refers to as an authoritarian. While the ledes of workaday journalists only leave a little something to be desired, their nut grafs are both morally and ethically abysmal. Perhaps, this is not a surprising nor a unique opinion, as those who are experts in the field certainly recognize the obvious reality that mainstream journalism is largely, if not entirely, disarticulated from scholarship concerning the countries for which they are ostensibly scribbling the first lines of history.

Journalists, such as Jason Burke, Alan Cowell, and David McKenzie, are clearly oblivious to the past several years of scholarship and even the investigative journalism done by one of their own colleagues, Judi Rever. Perhaps, it is folly to expect this of those individuals writing so many short pieces on such extensive geographic expanses to bother with any light reading on the locations they are tasked to cover. (Keeping this in mind, resource starvation and subsequent overwork can be thought of as a mechanism by which contemporary journalism in its corporate manifestation perpetuates a neoliberal worldview). Had these reporters, or their editors, been familiar with the work of such individuals as Filip Reyntjens, Luc Reydams or Judi Rever, they would have thought twice, or perhaps even engaged in a newsroom debate (if they were blessed with the time required to do so), about the figures they so ritualistically quote.

Of course, I am not here challenging the historical fact of the genocide against the Tutsis; I am in concurrence with those scholars to which I referred to above, having based my views on their research, which merely challenges the singularity of the 1994 ‘Genocide Against the Tutsis’ narrative, broadening the discussion to more fully include the quantity and quality of Hutu death and suffering, to raise questions regarding the allocation of responsibility for the ignition of the genocide, i.e. the shooting down of the presidential plane on 6 April, 1994, as well as investigating those deadly events tangential to the infamous three months of that year.

Each of the three scholars listed above (Rever, Reydams and Reyntjens) offer unique contextual contributions to our, greater, understanding of Rwanda, the RPF and President Kagame himself. Through numerous interviews in addition to materials leaked to her from the ICTR’s (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) own investigation into the RPF’s war crimes, Rever meticulously documents the untold story of what can be described–though it is quite contentious to say–increasingly as a double, or parallel, genocide of Rwanda’s Hutu population by the RPF, beginning around the same time and, in some cases, lasting well after June 1994. I will not bother quoting the numerous instances by which the RPF orchestrated the culling of rural Hutus; it is sufficient to emphasize from her findings, which suggest, as her various sources attest, that as many as several hundred thousand and as many as one million Hutus lost their lives. But whereas the FAR’s (the Forces armées rwandaises was the national army of Rwanda until July 1994) actions appear to have been as chaotic as they were widespread, the actions of their rebel counterparts appear to have been highly organized and systematic.

In a recent article, Rwanda scholar, Susan Thomson, writes that ‘legal and scholarly evidence to support a claim of a double genocide is nonexistent.’ In contrast, Rever’s work clearly, and reliably, shows that, rather than merely being unfortunate collateral damage, Hutus were indeed singled out in numerous mass killings for which documentation undeniably exists, which is certainly enough to support a claim despite falling short of definitely proving that a double genocide did in fact happen. Thomson refers to those espousing a ‘double genocide’ theory as ‘fringe academics and journalists,’ lumping them together with the fascist Hutu Power group; she is right to say so, excepting that certain hypotheses always remain fringe until adequate evidence accumulates to support it, a trend that the ‘parallel genocide’ hypothesis seems to be following.

Citing census data, Luc Reydams challenges the official Tutsi death toll estimate (i.e. of 800,000 to 1,000,000), arguing that the real figure is likely closer to half this amount, meaning that the remainder of the unidentified, likely mostly Hutu, dead roughly concurs with those figures presented by Rever. Rever does not explicitly challenge the 800,000 Tutsis figure as her task is restricted to the crimes of the RPF, whereas Reydams challenges both the overall and Tutsi total.

Thirdly, the scholarship of Dr. Filip Reyntjens of the University of Antwerp demonstrates the existing, and considerable, evidence of the RPF’s role in the shooting down of President Habyarimana’s plane. Again, for sake of brevity, I will abstain from quoting his research, sufficing to summarize three of his main points: 1) only the RPF was in possession of the specific type of weaponry used, 2) this weaponry was transported from RPF headquarters in Mulindi (a village in the north of Rwanda) to Kigali and 3) the most likely site of the firing of this weaponry was from territory controlled by the RPF and not the Hutu government forces. (In light of reading Reyntjens’s work, the RPF’s accusation that Hutu extremists were responsible for assassinating not one but two Hutu presidents seems nearly politically oxymoronic.) Moreover, Reyntjens points out that while the RPF has repeatedly fought to end, as expediently as possible, all investigations into the assassination, the (FAR) has only asked for their continuation.

Taken together, the research of Rever, Reydams and Reyntjens, points to the necessity, at an absolute minimum, of questioning the validity of those disastrously few words which corporate journalists use to inform their readers about Rwanda. By excluding even a brief gloss of that work which goes beyond what typical mainstream journalists are able and expected to do, journalism utterly fails to have a cumulative, or even essential, effect. Through sheer ignorance–or perhaps an unconscious, hopeful commitment to merely avoid the unnecessary rocking of the boat–journalists defeat their own purpose by failing to adequately inform their audience and, by in doing so, engage a greater international audience concerned about the goings-on in Rwanda; though, of course, the problem is not restricted to this tiny East African country alone.

It would seem that, in the minds of most journalists covering Rwanda today, that things really only started to deteriorate in 2015 when the constitution was successfully amended to allow President Kagame a third, fourth and even fifth term; though, even this event does not seem to be squarely on the press’s collective radar. Without a more mainstream debate about the true history of Rwanda, one cannot expect new straws, like the abduction and arrest of Rusesabagina, to ever break the camel’s back.

As Reyntjens writes in response to the July ruling of the Paris Court of Appeals, ‘the ‘court of history’ can and must continue its work.’ With all their faults, being it ignorance, a dearth of courage or worse, the mainstream press has, in the case of Rwanda, abdicated their role in such a court. Given its rote reproduction of a narrative utterly lacking in historical dynamism—and therefore containing little of any use to anyone other than the very dictator at whom their work is ostensibly aimed—contemporary corporate journalism cannot be viewed as simply a benign entity. Indeed, it is a rather dangerous amnesiac.

Sam Broadway worked in Rwanda from 2013 to 2015. His primary academic interests are sub-Saharan African politics, socialism, and documentary photography, particularly in Ghana, Uganda, and Rwanda.

Featured Photograph: Paul Kagame at the 8th East African Community summit held in November 2006.

African Economies, Societies and Natures in a Time of Covid-19

ROAPE’s Reginald Cline-Cole provides an analytically rigorous understanding of the differentiated spread and impact of Covid-19 around the world. In so doing he returns us to what ought to be our core concern: the political economy of uneven incorporation of African economies, societies and natures into the world economy.

By Reginald Cline-Cole

Several correspondents of mine have suggested that it makes a nice and welcome change that something this big, this bad, this scary and this seemingly predictable is not coming out of Africa. ‘This’ and ’it’ being, of course, the all-encompassing and still evolving phenomenon of Covid-19 or coronavirus, which ROAPE has been covering in the journal and online. And with good reason for, as others have already observed, the time of coronavirus is not just leaving an indelible mark on the year 2020 but might well be transforming neoliberal capitalism in previously unimaginable ways. The virus continues its inexorable advance  and, having taken some time to reach Africa from Europe and Asia, has spread rapidly since its reported arrival in mid-February, with confirmed cases numbering some 4300 people spread across  (African Arguments 2020), and more than 9000 people in  (ACSS 2020). As elsewhere, increasing infection numbers (and, sometimes, rates), imploding economies and disrupted social interactions have fuelled mutually reinforcing health and economic crises, precipitating sometimes (Zeleza 2020).

And this despite, or sometimes because of, high-level policy and other discussions about, and adoption of, frequently exceptional measures which aim to slow the transmission and spread of the virus (Ciakudia 2020; Richards 2020), and prevent the worsening of what is already considered by many as a global crisis of unprecedented threat, impact and uncertainty (Elliott 2020; Freedland 2020; Jayaram et al. 2020). In the process, as Bird and Ironstone (2020) note, ‘[p]ower structures are being radically re-arranged in our societ[ies] right now and if we lose our capacity to criticize the future may be beset by new, even more damning ones.’ It is thus vital that Theophanidis (2020) clarifies that his call for ‘distancing’ aims to create space for critical thinking and careful reflection, notably in a context in which digital, mostly social, media connectivity is helping to counter the isolation of ‘physical social distancing’. As numerous and varied examples of radical digital activism and solidarity which have emerged demonstrate, it would be regrettable if far-reaching lessons were not learned from crises precipitated by the pandemic and the varied responses to them (Giordano 2020; Zeleza 2020).[1]

Does Covid-19 discriminate?

Available data on age–sex distribution of confirmed cases for the WHO African Region indicate that, overall, older men would appear to be disproportionately affected by Covid-19 (WHO 2020a), with a preponderance of males (1.7:1 male-to-female infection ratio) across all age groups and a median age of 36 years (range of 0–105) (WHO 2020b). Further instances of disproportionate impact based on religion, class, occupation or ethnicity will no doubt emerge in time, notably as readily available details on the demographics of coronavirus victims extend beyond the fundamentals of age, sex, nationality, residence and travel history. In the UK and USA, of course, such metrics have been invaluable in identifying the overrepresentation of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) health and care workers and volunteers among coronavirus fatalities (Malik 2020; Marsh 2020). Similar racial and ethnic disparities characterise wider BAME community and hospital in-patient infection and death data from coronavirus (Hirsch 2020a, 2020b), with black people (four times), Bangladeshi and Pakistani (three and a half times) and Indians (two and a half times) more likely to succumb to Covid-19 than white people in England and Wales (The Guardian 2020b). The phenomenon has attracted extensive media and other coverage which has focused on health inequalities and risk factors, deprivation, affluence and racial discrimination (Hirsch 2020b; The Guardian 2020b), and in the absence of acceptable causal explanations for the overrepresentation (Cook, Kursumovic and Lenanne 2020). But it has been left to organised labour and popular mobilisation to extract hard-won concessions from state actors and the public–private healthcare complex to institute an official enquiry, provide adequate supplies of personal protective equipment (PPE) for frontline health, care and allied workers and expand coronavirus testing opportunities for these workers and their families (NHS Confederation 2020). Special compensation programmes for families of NHS staff (and, in England, social care workers) who die from coronavirus have also been announced, although the level of compensation is considered inadequate by some, and labour unions, among others, have called for the scheme to be extended to cover all key workers who die from the disease. And yet, as tardy, reluctant, inadequate and reactive as these state interventions have undoubtedly been, it is social mobilisations which have ‘forced the state to take on its responsibilities’ (Cox 2020). These have included medical professionals and cross-party campaign MPs ‘breaking silence’ over Covid-19’s disproportionate impact on particular sections of society, which itself speaks to the promise of social action and emancipatory politics in influencing (post-)Covid-19 politics and realities (Swartz and Valeske 2020).

But as the coronavirus BAME casualties and fatalities include Africans and people of African descent whose remittances are often integral to the livelihoods and survival strategies of family at home (Einashe 2020), their existential struggles have not been lost on Africans at home and in the diaspora. Indeed, as social media exchanges were quick to indicate, for countries like Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, among others, the earliest known coronavirus deaths were of their (often dual) nationals in the diaspora rather than at home, where the continent’s first fatality was a German tourist in Egypt (Kazeem 2020). For many, family, friends, colleagues and casual acquaintances would eventually succumb to the virus, in my case across three continents. Thus one of my acquaintances regretted what he saw as a ‘lamentable waste’ of African medical and health expertise which was going to be both sorely needed and badly missed on the continent, if the worst predictions of Covid-19 were ever realised. A second drew a comparison between these coronavirus deaths and the often tragic demise of undocumented migrants along trans-Saharan and Mediterranean routes to Europe, suggesting that both groups had paid the ultimate price in their respective attempts to escape the poverty of opportunity in Africa. Meanwhile, in Zimbabwe, frontline medical staff followed up on a protest strike which had been observed jointly by the Hospital Doctors Association (ZHDA) and Professional Nurses Union (ZPNU) in mid-March to highlight the shortage of PPE for health workers in the country’s hospitals (Chingono 2020a). The Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR) sued the government in the High Court in early April to compel it to provide adequate equipment and supplies to enable frontline medical practitioners and healthcare workers to tackle the Covid-19 crisis safely and professionally and, in the process, to significantly improve public access to functioning quarantine and isolation facilities (Mavhinga 2020).

Similar protests have been widespread across the continent, many representing a continuation of long-running dissatisfaction with public health provision predating coronavirus. In one of the more recent of these, coronavirus frontline workers in Sierra Leone who announced they were going on strike in early June were joined at the start of July by doctors refusing to treat coronavirus patients in quarantine or isolation facilities in protesting government failure to pay outstanding bonuses, ‘hazard pay’, promised as incentive to persuade health workers to agree to treat Covid-19 patients during the outbreak, often with inadequate PPE, diagnostic and therapeutic equipment and supplies (Al Jazeera 2020; BBC 2020b; Inveen 2020a, 2020b). Thus, a government with the foresight and presence of mind to draw up a Covid-19 response plan before the outbreak of the pandemic, and probably earlier than anybody else on the continent, stands accused of not only reneging on the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed in April with the Sierra Leone Medical and Dental Association (SLMDA) to facilitate this Covid-19 response, but also of failing to renew the MOU before it lapsed three months later (Inveen 2020a). Recalling that disasters like pandemics are influenced by human ‘decisions, attitudes, values, behaviour, and activities’ (Kelman 2020), one cannot but wonder whether there is indeed merit to the SLMDA’s claim that the government does not appear to be particularly interested in resolving the dispute (Inveen 2020b), and if so what the political reasoning behind such a choice might be.

Clearly, the ZHDA/ZPNU, SLMDA and NHS struggles share more than just a generic similarity. There are recognisably Zimbabwean and Sierra Leonean names on published lists of NHS and care worker coronavirus fatalities. And in all three cases, albeit in noticeably different ways, the struggle to pressure the state to assume its responsibility in relation to public health and wellbeing is rooted in austerity, long predates Covid-19 and is fuelled by perceptions of official inefficiency, neglect and corruption. In addition, as recent SARS and Ebola epidemics have shown, potential risks and opportunities for corruption are significantly increased during major health crises, most commonly in drug and equipment procurement, leading to calls for increased oversight, accountability and transparency during the coronavirus pandemic (Transparency International 2020). Thus, a major grievance of the SLMDA, for example, is a perceived ‘misuse of funds for the coronavirus response’, a reaction to official procurement priorities which have seen 20% of Sierra Leone’s total coronavirus budget being spent on new SUVs and motorbikes, with only a tenth as much on medical equipment or drugs, leaving PPE in constant short supply and contact tracers seemingly unaffordable (Al Jazeera 2020). The national Coronavirus Response Team, for its part, justifies the delay in disbursing promised bonuses by citing the necessity to both establish the identity of frontline health workers and ensure that hazard pay went only to those entitled to receive it (Inveen 2020b). But as improperly disbursed hazard pay was one of several examples of mismanagement of funds by public officials during the Ebola crisis with its high health worker mortality rates (Dupuy and Divjak 2015), SLMDA impatience and suspicion do not appear entirely unfounded. And, at nearly 11%, Sierra Leone’s ratio of health worker infection to total reported infections is among the highest on the continent (WHO 2020b).

Meanwhile, Zimbabwean health professionals have also embarked on the latest in a series of strikes, partly to protest at the erosion of local purchasing power and living standards by hyperinflation and demand payment of their salaries in US dollars, but also to highlight both police harassment of striking nurses and the perennial shortage of PPE at a time of rising incidence of Covid-19 (BBC 2020c). But whereas SLMDA appear to be contending with seemingly misplaced procurement priorities, their Zimbabwean counterparts are confronted with alleged criminality, which has seen the sacking of the country’s minister of health, who has also been charged with corruption and abuse of office for the illegal award of a large contract (since revoked by government) for PPE, testing kits and drugs to a company which would deliver these supplies at hugely inflated cost (Chingono 2020b). The combination of a worsening economic crisis and sharply increasing coronavirus infection totals (including of health workers) has seen opposition politicians make common cause with the media and popular forces to decry corruption and demand greater accountability, while calling for a national day of protest against ‘corruption and political challenges’ at the end of July (Cassim 2020). The authorities refused permission for the 31 July protests to take place, on the grounds that it would be subversive, unconstitutional and anti-democratic (BBC 2020d), as well as violating Covid-19 pandemic regulations at a time when there has been a spike in coronavirus infections. As a result, they claimed, a dusk-to-dawn curfew and tighter restrictions on movement had to be imposed (BBC 2020d). It is presumably also in the common good that leading organisers/supporters of the proposed protest have been arrested, charged to court and refused bail (Reuters 2020). The example of state officials rewriting coronavirus reality to suit a favoured narrative is a recurrent and intensely political one, to which we return later.

Philanthro-capitalism in coronavirus times

An earlier prolonged doctors’ strike over pay and conditions in Zimbabwe had been called off only in January this year, when the ZHDA accepted an offer of funding for a fellowship programme for its members which would guarantee a monthly subsistence allowance of up to three times their salary for a period of six months from Strive Masiyiwa, the country’s wealthiest individual. Following the PPE protests in March, funding to cover the cost of PPE for doctors and other health workers was added to the original offer, which was also extended to all nurses, as well as doctors in non-state hospitals, and expanded to include health and life insurance cover with cash or lump-sum benefit in the event of ‘hospitali[sation], … permanent disability or death from the virus’ (Ndlovu 2020). Although he is Zimbabwean born, Strive Masiyiwa presides over his Econet Group from London, where he currently lives and from where he has undoubtedly been monitoring the wide variety of local responses to the pandemic worldwide, or at least in those world regions in which Econet has a presence. But while nothing in the way of private donations to Sierra Leone’s coronavirus response effort is likely to have come anywhere near the sums certain to have been involved above, reports from Nigeria indicate that Masiyiwa’s fellow billionaires have also been making substantial donations to the (federal) Nigerian Private Sector Coalition Against COVID-19 (CACOVID) and their state equivalents, as have corporate entities (often fronted by the same individuals). Is it likely, then, that we might have a case of transnational capital ostensibly contesting state in/action as part of a wider coalition while still acting in its own long-term interest?

Masiyiwa’s conglomerate Econet, for example, combines telecom, mobile phone, fintech and power distribution enterprises which operate across large parts of Africa, but also in the Americas, Asia Pacific, Middle East and Europe. The funding/fellowship programme for health workers is to be established and run by the Higherlife philanthropic family foundation, while Ecosure, the insurance arm of one of the Econet Group companies, will underwrite the insurance component of the offer. Similarly, Nigerian media reporting of the private coronavirus response donations by individuals and corporate entities gives as much prominence to the identities of donors and their net worth as to the size/purpose of their donations and sources of wealth, thereby fulfilling invaluable public relations and/or corporate social responsibility (CSR) functions, as well as playing a commercial advertising role. Consequently, while donor state of origin or residence tends to be the primary beneficiary of private philanthropy, corporate donations often favour populations and institutions in states and regions of direct commercial importance. Thus Aliko Dangote, Africa’s richest individual, has provided a fully-equipped and staffed Covid-19 testing facility, as well as part-funding a wide range of vital public interventions in coronavirus prevention and containment via private and corporate donations in his home state of Kano (and, to a lesser extent, Lagos State, where the Dangote Industries group has its head office). He also assumed shared national leadership of CACOVID’s quest to raise funds from private and corporate sources for federal and state Covid-19 response; and, by making the largest corporate donation to the fund to date via the Aliko Dangote Foundation (ADF), triggered something of a ‘giving war’ of donations and pledges among his fellow billionaire donors. He also made a further multi-million-dollar donation to the Nigeria UN COVID-19 Basket Fund which aims to provide support to individuals and households trying to rebuild livelihoods disrupted and/or undermined by the coronavirus pandemic (UNDP 2020). In the end he and his fellow donors are publicly thanked by President Muhammadu Buhari (who encourages other high-net-worth individuals – HNWIs – to follow their example). Dangote is also thanked by the governor of Kano State for his services to coronavirus prevention and response, with which his name becomes inextricably linked in media reports, which almost invariably also mention his equally sterling contributions during the earlier Ebola epidemic. Like Strive Masiyiwa, with whom he earlier collaborated on regional and continent-wide Ebola response efforts, then, this enhances his reputation as one of Africa’s biggest philanthropists and, as CEO of ‘Nigeria’s most profitable company’ (Augie 2020), one of the continent’s most successful business people. Is this what capitalist philanthropy in a time of coronavirus looks like? And is it as accommodating in its business practices as it is in its public giving?

While philanthropy is not restricted to wealthy individuals and profitable corporations, their role can be strategic and decisive. UBS and TrustAfrica (2014), in a jointly published study, document and seek to analyse how and why this is the case for African philanthropists/philanthropy during ‘normal’ times. But as the Dangote and Masiyiwa examples and numerous others like them illustrate, this is also largely the case during the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, with its varied, changing and often expanding demands/appeals and frequently inadequate – if improving – philanthropic responses (Julien 2020). Experience with previous epidemics and pandemics, supplemented by emerging insights from Covid-19, have informed the design and implementation of emergency coronavirus plans and strategies worldwide, including for dealing with voluntarism and managing donations (Alexander 2020). In emergency coronavirus planning scenarios, responsibility for external donations and government/state resource commitments is routinely combined with administrative oversight for internal donations of various kinds. In practice, this creates a pressing, possibly overwhelming, need to coordinate appeals for assistance while managing a diversity of resources earmarked for coronavirus response in an accountable and transparent way (Transparency International 2020). Notably, the circumstances surrounding the previously mentioned sacking of Zimbabwe’s minister of health, and ongoing legal and media challenges to UK government officials against the lack of transparent and competitive tendering in the award of Covid-19 related contracts (Monbiot 2020) remind us that expectations of resource governance, transparency and accountability are not just ethical and moral, but frequently political and legal too. And that, like the good governance agenda as a whole, these expectations can be heavily neoliberal in tone and intent, and as process. Significantly, however, expectations of transparency and accountability in how donations are managed or used have not historically been routinely extended to how the wealth which makes corporate and HNWI Covid-19 philanthropy possible is generated in the first place. How best to explain such imbalances in what has been described as the power of process and practice in philanthropy (Mahomed and Moyo 2013)? And how best to prevent its use in, say, ‘offset[ing] reputational damage or exploitative practice’ (Mahomed 2014)?

The point is that African philanthropy is increasingly seen as indispensable to the emergence of a self-reliant continent, with corporate philanthropists looking to strengthen links between business and philanthropy, considering ‘investments with a social impact’ a suitable means for achieving this. Aliko Dangote Foundation  and Higherlife Foundation, for example, thus function as CSR units of Dangote Industries Ltd and Econet, respectively. Their donations or pledges in both cash and kind undoubtedly give a significant boost to the overall coronavirus response effort, to include staff recruitment, training and remuneration. Equally, and particularly noticeably, they also impact directly on local and import markets in specialised medical equipment and supplies, as well as in two- and four-wheeled motor vehicles, among other commodities. Yet, these markets might well be dominated by manufacturers and/or intermediary suppliers which are subsidiaries of corporate partner organisations to the charity foundations through which philanthropy is dispensed by conglomerates in the first place. More directly, how have corporate philanthropists reacted to the disruptive effects of Covid-19 and the varied responses to it on the factory floor, behind the bank counter, at the plantation gate and in front of the computer screen? Specifically, were business practices adequately adjusted to reflect the new normal in a time of coronavirus? Did they readily and effectively incorporate workplace Covid-19 preparedness planning and response strategies, including testing facilities where appropriate? Were adequate supplies of PPE, relevant equipment, water, soap, sanitisers, etc. made available to employees? And where, as with several of the corporate donors in question, their businesses operate across national boundaries, were common standards maintained across the board or did arrangements differ between ‘home’ and ‘foreign’ sites and workforces (and, if so, why and with what consequences for workers)? Overall, do philanthro-capitalists lead by example here in a way reminiscent of their public giving and pledging? As Mahomed (2014) notes, ‘the ethics of how philanthropy money is made (especially if made in an endeavour that disadvantages those it now seeks to support) must be called into question.’ That we are in the middle of a pandemic is no reason not to at least raise the question of the often differentiated nature of the process by which donated wealth is made or, indeed, of how coronavirus has been (or is likely to be) exploited for capitalist investment and profit accumulation.

But the lesson of Covid-19 need not involve either depoliticising philanthropy (it has after all contributed actively to the long-term process of privatising and commercialising formerly public health systems on the continent) or underestimating the complex dynamics of emergent solidarity between often conflicting and competing class interests. Take the following two parallel and competing but interrelated phenomena. On the one hand we had Donald Trump’s largely futile attempts to encourage wider use of the labels ‘Wuhan Virus’ and ‘Chinese Virus’; his still unfounded but periodically repeated claim that SARS-CoV-2 was developed in a Wuhan laboratory; his insistence that the WHO is so severely compromised by links to China that its handling of the pandemic was tardy, grossly inadequate and ineffective, as well as lacking transparency; and his threat to withhold American funding for the organisation – a political stance which has not won widespread or unqualified support from other major WHO donors who have publicly supported the agency and its director-general, if not necessarily China’s reported handling of the initial stages of the virus outbreak (Kelland and Nebehay 2020).

On the other hand, there are official Chinese state objections, denials and counter-accusations; and the skilful ‘weaponisation’ of the material and symbolic significance of its carefully cultivated (self-)image of generosity to, and solidarity with the world’s needy and oppressed, particularly in coronavirus times. So, alongside Chinese government support in cash, kind and personnel provided to selected African and other countries under threat from coronavirus (Asiedu 2020), we also have worldwide donations of medical equipment and supplies in support of Covid-19 response efforts by private philanthropic foundations linked to Jack Ma, China’s wealthiest man, and member of the Chinese Communist Party (Hatton 2020). Ma’s corporate philanthropy has extended to donations to New York authorities and the WHO in the wake of Trump’s de-funding threat, as well as to all of Africa, and has included an online training manual for clinical treatment of coronavirus based on first-hand experience of doctors in Zhejiang and the Global MediXchange for Combating Covid-19 programme with its International Medical Expert Communication Platform (Alizila 2020). But while Jack Ma’s donations have been widely celebrated in Africa as promptly and efficiently delivered, Chinese government donations have not been universally welcome (Asiedu 2020; Patrick 2020), partly because of reported poor quality and questionable reliability of donated supplies and equipment.

Ma’s philanthropy has made him as newsworthy at home and abroad as President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party leadership, who see Chinese state and private Covid-19 philanthropy as part of a wider coronavirus diplomatic strategy designed to distract attention from Chinese state contribution to the initial ‘escape’ or spread of the virus, while positioning their country as champion of the fight against the pandemic. This assumes heightened significance in places like Europe and Africa where, in contrast to Jack Ma and his private foundations, the Chinese state has suffered Covid-19-related reputational damage (Asiedu 2020). Indeed, the arrival of Nigeria’s allocation from Jack Ma’s Covid-19 donation to African countries via the African Union’s Centres for Disease Control and Prevention was a major prompt to local media and popular commentators to challenge local HNWIs to emulate Ma’s philanthropy. In contrast, the Nigerian Medical Association, Trade Union Congress and main opposition party strongly opposed federal government approval for a team of Chinese medical professionals funded by the state-owned China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation to provide direct support for the government’s Covid-19 response efforts, citing rumours of an upsurge in coronavirus infection and mortality in other countries following the arrival of Chinese medical personnel (Ayitogo 2020). There was also residual popular resentment at the widely reported scapegoating of African migrants in China at the outbreak of the pandemic which had drawn official protests from the Nigerian and other African governments. But as the donation which also included a consignment of medical equipment and supplies had been announced as a fait accompli, government officials and spokespersons would spend media appearances trying to justify the decision, pacify local doctors, rebut opposition claims and win public support through a fascinating mix of obfuscation, mendacity, petulance, deflection and insinuation in a desperate attempt to deliberately downplay Chinese state involvement and thus avoid a diplomatic incident. So in their different ways, and like the Zimbabwe government’s desperate bid to silence internal dissent and protest which we encountered earlier, Trump’s assault on WHO handling of the pandemic, official Chinese and Nigerian government public relations and propaganda assaults on their respective (and wider) publics indicate active involvement in what Carrie Gracie (2020) has described, with specific reference to the Chinese ruling class, as rewriting Covid-19 facts to suit their narrative.

Politics must not be allowed to stand

The world is still in the grip of a coronavirus pandemic; that Africa might or might not be its current epicentre; and that nobody knows for sure how Africa’s many ‘other’ or local epidemics will evolve over the next few weeks, months or even years. Yet this has not stopped multilateral institutions and multinational corporations from outlining a variety of options for exiting lockdowns and, ultimately, the entire or whole pandemic; or indeed predicting and modelling the contours of post-coronavirus ‘new normal’ continental and/or global economies. As an increasing number of countries exit lockdowns (and enter new ones), this should awaken an urgent desire among progressive forces to redirect the focus of attention to a determined pursuit of an analytically rigorous understanding of the differentiated spread and impact of, and state and other responses to Covid-19 – and in so doing to return also to what ought to be our core concern: the political economy of uneven incorporation of African economies, societies and natures into the world economy, the accompanying implications for social, spatial, structural and other forms of differentiation, and the latter’s manifestation within and between population, place and space/territory. For, as Philip Alston (2020) reminds us, ‘[t]he coronavirus has merely lifted the lid off the pre-existing pandemic of poverty. Covid-19 arrived in a world where poverty, extreme inequality and disregard for human life are thriving, and in which legal and economic policies are designed to create and sustain wealth for the powerful, but not end poverty. This is the political choice that has been made.’ For ROAPE it is a political choice that cannot and must not be allowed to stand unchallenged either in the current coronavirus times or in a post-Covid-19 world.

A full, unedited version of this article appeared as the editorial ‘Socially distanced capitalism in a time of coronavirus’ in ROAPE (Issue 164 – Vol 47).

Reginald Cline-Cole is an editor of ROAPE and teaches at the Department of African Studies and Anthropology, School of History and Cultures, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK.

Featured Photograph: Taken in Gauteng, South Africa during the pandemic by Kate Alexander.

References

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Notes

[1] For examples of such activism see, among others, Interface journal’s Social movements in and beyond the COVID-19 crisis: sharing stories of struggles for cases of such digital activism in various parts of the world outside Africa; the Transnational Institute’s (TNI) webinars in response to Covid-19; Alliance for African Partnership’s (AAP) webinar dialogue series ‘Universities and the COVID-19 Pandemic’; the joint British Institute in East Africa (BIEA) and ROAPE webinar on Covid-19 in Africa; and the co-hosted ROAPE and Walter Rodney Foundation webinar, ‘Overthrowing the weight of history: slavery, colonialism and Black Lives Matter today’.

A Year of Revolt

Last year a wave of militant protests spread across North Africa and West Asia, in a sustained, historic series of popular struggles. Emma Wilde Botta reviews A Region in Revolt: Mapping the Recent Uprisings in North Africa and West Asia edited by Jade Saab.

By Emma Wilde Botta

With so much going on in 2020, it’s easy to forget that just last year the world saw an upsurge in global rebellion. From Hong Kong to Chile to Ecuador to Spain and beyond, people took to the streets to oppose austerity and authoritarianism and to demand radical change. A wave of mass protest spread across North Africa and West Asia, called by some ‘the second Arab Spring.’ In April of 2019, months of mass protest forced Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to abdicate. Later that month, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was ousted in a military coup. In October, massive demonstrations emerged in Iraq challenging the sectarian political system. Similarly, Lebanon saw an October revolution sparked by a bill that would tax apps like whatsapp. Both countries forced the resignation of their respective governments. In November, people in Iran responded to an increase in fuel prices with mass protests that represented unprecedented opposition to the regime.

These five countries saw militant, sustained, historic popular struggle. The uprisings were a response to decades of political repression, neoliberalism, corruption, patriarchy, and sectarianism. In a notable shift from the 2010-2011 struggles, these revolts shared an understanding that a fundamental restructuring of society is needed to truly address the crises. However, despite their revolutionary character, these movements have received considerably less attention than the 2010-2011 ‘Arab Spring.’

A Region in Revolt: Mapping the Recent Uprisings in North Africa and West Asia edited by Jade Saab is the first and, to my knowledge, only comprehensive review of the uprisings that took place in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran. Each chapter is written by activist-scholars from the respective country who provide an overview of each country’s specific political and economic conditions. They show that, far from being ahistoric spontaneous events, the 2019 uprisings built upon past struggles, by tracing the legacies of resistance in each country and showing how they have impacted the newly emerged movements.

The authors raise a number of important questions: How do we understand the 2018-2019 revolts? As revolutions? As uprisings? How are these recent movements linked to previous struggles? What will it take to sustain and develop the movements? What tactics were effective? How do socialists relate to protest movements in countries outside of the U.S. sphere of influence? How do we build cross-border solidarity? As we face common global foes, how can we strengthen our interconnected struggles?

This collection of essays provides an account of the 2019 wave of regional struggle from a socialist perspective that centers the agency of ordinary people. The authors model an approach to analyzing social movements and uprisings that takes as its starting point the workers and oppressed in each country, the ordinary millions who – when in motion – make revolt possible. Detailed exploration of various social forces and their historical development lays the foundation for understanding the power structure of each state.

In the case of Algeria and Sudan, the military has played a particular role in political life, and this shaped the trajectory of the uprisings. Following a bloody anti-colonial struggle against France, Algeria was left with the military as the only organized force in society. Sudan’s now deposed president Omar al-Bashir had come to power in a military coup in 1989. In both countries, the military high command had essentially ruled the state behind the façade of democracy for decades. Thus, when the presidents were toppled in April, the movements recognized this as insufficient to fully transform the state. In Sudan, madaniya (civilian rule) became the rallying cry. In Algeria, the protesters called for ‘a civilian state, not a military one.’

The confessional systems of government in Lebanon and Iraq have different origins but similar effects on ruling class formation. The establishment of an identity-based political system in Iraq following the 2003 U.S. invasion drove major sectarian violence. The government’s failure to address unemployment, poverty, and ongoing instability fueled the October revolution, as poor workers and the unemployed youth from the slums of Baghdad called for systemic change. Lebanon’s 1943 National Pact, which allocated government positions on a confessional basis, produced sectarian political parties that have long defended the sectarian political system. In this context, protesters calling for the resignation of all members of the government, chanting kellon yani kellon (all of them means all of them), represented a rejection of sectarianism. The uprisings in Lebanon and to a certain extent in Iraq were notable for their ability to overcome social divisions that had long been used by the governments to foster divisions.

Following the 1979 Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers established the Islamic Republic, which differed from the previous Pahlavi regime in important ways but maintained the statist character of the economy with strong ties between military and industry. Today, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) led by Ayatollah Khamanei controls 80% of the Iranian economy, making it the de facto state despite the nominal authority of President Hassan Rouhani. While the regime historically used oil wealth for infrastructure projects and social welfare, more recently oil revenue has been funneled into military pursuits and weapons programs, with the rest embezzled by government leaders and their beneficiaries. This left ordinary Iranians in a dire economic situation, the conditions under which they revolted.

In all of the five countries surveyed, the Left was relatively weak prior to 2019 due in large part to regime repression. Official trade unions had long been co-opted. Most Left political parties and politicians had lost legitimacy due to decades of corruption and compromise. In the recent upheavals, people moved into action largely outside of the traditional organizations of the working class and the Left, and sometimes in opposition to them. The authors draw out initial thoughts on lessons learned from these experiences particularly on the questions of organization and strategy.

Arguably, Sudan’s uprising posed the greatest threat to the state. Azza Mustafa and Sara Abbas argue that Sudan’s primary lesson is ‘the importance of organizing and communication between different levels of the movement, the importance of building not one nucleus of leadership, but several.’ On a national level, the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), an alliance of labor, community, and rebel groups led by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), forced the military into negotiations, resulting in a sort of dual power situation. Additionally, the main innovation of the December Revolution were the Resistance and Change Committees, neighborhood-level grassroots organizations that coordinated with the SPA/FFC and mobilized for protests, strikes, and mutual aid. The development of these committees was driven in large part by youth who distrusted political parties and elites.

ROAPE’s webinar on ‘Sudan’s Revolution in a World on Fire’ (22 June 2020)

In the four other cases, no single political entity representing the movement emerged. Hamza Hamouchene and Selma Oumari point to the leaderlessness and looseness of the Algerian uprising as its Achilles’ heel and argue for the necessity of coherent revolutionary organizations. In Lebanon, Jade Saab and Joey Ayoub identify sustained decentralized resistance as essential to continuing the movement and point to the need for coalitions that extend beyond electoral politics. Zeidon Alkinani explains that the lack of an organized movement coalition in Iraq was both the greatest strength and greatest weakness of the uprising. On the one hand, a horizontal, decentralized organizing method assuaged fears of a dominating leader, but, on the other hand, unity and collective action were impaired without an overarching united front.

In general, the experiences of 2019 point to the necessity of building long-term infrastructures of resistance to sustain social movements.

The anti-imperialist analysis put forward in the essays is a contribution to a vibrant debate on the international Left about how to understand and fight imperialism. The uprisings in Algeria, Iraq, and Iran explicitly took on questions of imperialism and colonialism. The historical background presented by the authors contextualizes each state’s relationship to international capital and military superpowers.

The Algerian uprising was deeply anti-colonial. Hamouchene and Oumari examine the contradictions that developed as the post-independence governments of Ben Bella and Boumediene pursued state socialist attempts at economic sovereignty. This strategy ultimately produced a state bourgeoisie with strong ties to the military. The authors show how the 2019 movement is ‘a continuation of the decolonial struggle, to fully realize its aims.’ As part of this phenomenon, the movement rejected a proposed hydrocarbon law that would allow multinational corporations greater access to Algeria’s resources. Unsurprisingly, counter-revolutionary attempts to curtail the uprising have been regionally supported by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

The 2019 October uprising in Iraq was not the first protest after the 2003 U.S. invasion, but it was qualitatively different from previous efforts. It represented not only a struggle against the sectarian confessional system installed after the 2003 U.S. invasion, but also a rejection of foreign intervention in Iraq, especially by the United States and Iran, in a struggle for self-determination. The movement also saw a new Shiite Iraqi generation distance itself from Iranian political and military proxies.

Similarly, the Iranian protesters condemned Iranian regional intervention. Ayatollah Khamenei and his followers have long used anti-U.S. imperialist rhetoric to justify their rule and destroy opposition. But the economic strain of Iran’s military ventures has taken a toll with U.S. sanctions only compounding the misery. In this context, it is significant that Iranian protesters took up the demand for Iranian foreign interventions to end, echoing the call of popular protests in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

This cross-border solidarity among workers and the oppressed has lessons for the international Left, sections of which have been silent on the crimes of the Iranian regime or even openly supported it as a supposed bulwark to U.S. hegemony. In the volume, Frieda Afary emphasizes the importance of an internationalist approach that offers solidarity to social forces struggling against authoritarianism and despotism regardless of the state’s place in the world order.

A Region in Revolt captures all of the hope and inspiration of the 2019 uprisings. One of the most significant achievements of these movements is that, in the words of Hamouchene and Oumari, ‘people discovered their political will and realised they are in control of their own destiny.’ These were undeniably class revolts, fueled by anger over poverty, unemployment, austerity, and corruption. Yet, the people in the streets largely imagined themselves as citizens. The challenges of how to bring people into motion as workers, how to develop independent working-class organizations, and how to develop a political alternative to capitalism continue to be pressing. The COVID-19 pandemic has thrown another obstacle in the way. But there is no doubt that future struggles are on the horizon. A Region in Revolt helps us answer the question of what we can do now to prepare for them.

Emma Wilde Botta is socialist activist and writer based in Oakland, California. She has written extensively on the Arab Spring, the Gulf States, Iran, and US imperialism. Her writing has appeared in TruthOut, the International Socialist Review, roape.net and Socialist Worker.

Featured Photograph: Train arriving from Atbara about 300km from the capital Khartoum (Osama Elfaki, 17 August 2019).

Decolonising Pandemic Politics

If the consequences of the current pandemic are global, discussions about alternatives have not lived up to this reality, failing to learn from the non-Western world and from indigenous and popular struggles in the Global South. Join a roundtable discussion on pandemic politics with Rob Wallace, Hamza Hamouchene and Lin Chun.

It’s been widely discussed how the COVID-19 pandemic could have long lasting effects on urban life. Much less has been said about how urban life has changed in the 21st century, when for the first time in history a majority of the world’s population lives in cities. In Big Farms Make Big Flu (2016), the evolutionary biologist Rob Wallace largely predicted the current pandemic, showing how contemporary agribusiness has become an incubator of deadly pathogens that spiral over into humans in big cities only a few days out of their bat cave, spreading diseases along global chains of value. If the consequences of the current pandemic are global, COVID-19 is widely seen as intensifying the hegemonic crisis of the United States and the rise of China. But discussions about alternatives have not lived up to this reality, failing to learn from the non-Western world and from indigenous and popular struggles in the Global South. And yet, as the recent wave of revolts in North Africa and West Asia shows, crossing bridges between rural and urban struggles is key to building a post-pandemic future. Join this roundtable to discuss all this with Prof Lin Chun (London School of Economics), Hamza Hamouchene (Transnational Institute, and founding member of Algeria Solidarity Campaign and Environmental Justice North Africa) and Rob Wallace (Pandemic Research for the People).

Roundtable discussion with Lin Chun, Hamza Hamouchene and Rob Wallace on 25 November 25 at 16:30 pm in London.

Lin Chun (Cambridge, PhD) is a Professor in Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics. She is on the executive committee of China Quarterly and on the editorial committee of The Socialist Register. She is the author of several books, including, more recently, Reflections on China’s Reform Trajectory (2008) and China and Global Capitalism (2013). She is currently working on a new book on Revolution and Counterrevolution in China.

Hamza Hamocuhene is a London-based Algerian researcher-activist, coordinator of the Transnational Institute’s programme on North Africa, and a founding member of Algeria Solidarity Campaign (ASC) and Environmental Justice North Africa (EJNA). He is the author/editor of The Struggle for Energy Democracy in the Maghreb (2017) and The Coming Revolution to North Africa: The Struggle for Climate Justice (2015). He recently contributed to A Region in Revolt: Mapping the Recent Uprisings in North Africa and West Asia (2020).

Rob Wallace is an evolutionary biologist with the Agroecology and Rural Economics Research Corps, and a founder of Pandemic Research for the People. He is the author of Dead Epidemiologists: On the Origins of COVID-19 (2020) and Big Farms Make Big Flu: Dispatches on Infectious Disease, Agribusiness and the Nature of Science (2016). He co-authored, more recently, Clear-Cutting Disease Control: Capital-Led Deforestation, Public Health Austerity, and Vector-Borne Infection (2018).

Organised by King’s Decolonizing Working Group and the Seminar in Contemporary Marxist Theory – if you want to attend please click here.

For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
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For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
We use cookies to collect and analyse information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customise content. By clicking into any content on this site, you agree to allow cookies to be placed. To find out more see our