ROAPE Journal
Home Blog Page 18

Southern Africa’s workers movement on fire – the South African & Namibian strikes

In 1973, fifty years ago, South Africa experienced a historical turning point. From 9 January 1973, workers of the Coronation Brick and Tile factory in Durban came out on strike. Eighteen months before workers and students in South Africa’s colony South West Africa (today’s Namibia), took dramatic and radical action. Heike Becker writes about how workers made their demands heard across Southern Africa in the early 1970s.

By Heike Becker

50 years ago, South Africa witnessed a historical turning point. On 9 January 1973, workers of the Coronation Brick and Tile factory in Durban came out on strike. Immediately thereafter they were joined in strike by workers from small packaging, transport and ship repairs companies, and women working in the textile and clothing sector.

Between January and March 1973 almost 100,000 workers were on strike in Durban. Through songs and marches workers made their demands heard – the first public mass action in South Africa since the anti-apartheid activism of the 1950s. This was labour action, and at once a political revolt, where workers exercised the power of factory-based mass action. The strikes signalled both militant non-racial trade unionism and an invigorated spirit of rebellion.

What led to this seemingly sudden eruption of resistance during the heyday of apartheid rule?

The upsurge of defiance was not very surprising. Despite brutal repression in the 1960s, circles of anti-apartheid activists had continued forging links in underground networks (Suttner 2008). ‘New-left’ Marxist thinking was resurging among a new generation of intellectuals and activists. Lastly, there was also a significant influence of the Black Consciousness movement in what became known as the ‘Durban moment’; the expression coined by academic and activist Tony Morphet (1990) to suggest a convergence of different radical movements and intellectual activists in the city in the early 1970s.

New repertoires of student and community activism

During the late 1960s and early 1970s Southern Africa saw the emergence of new repertoires of resistance. They first became apparent in student protests that combined counter-cultural forms of activism with more overtly political protests, from the sit-in occupation of a campus building at the University of Cape Town (UCT) through to the public burning of neck-ties at the University of the Western Cape (UWC). Ideologically, the Black Consciousness movement and a renewal of Marxist approaches stand out in the South African student movements, which became significant in the resurgence of broader resistance and left politics (Becker 2018).

Central to these developments were links between young activists and intellectuals. Of special significance for the events that unfolded in Durban was the political, intellectual and personal friendship between Steve Biko, the intellectual and activist leader of the radical 1970s Black Consciousness movement and co-founder of the South African Student Organisation (SASO), and Richard (‘Rick’) Turner, a lecturer in political philosophy at the then University of Natal (UND). Turner was a researcher into labour issues, and a community and labour organiser who had also been involved in student protests in Cape Town after his return, in 1966, from Paris where he had completed a doctoral thesis on the political works of Jean-Paul Sartre.

Biko and Turner signify the importance of the conversation of increasingly radical Black Consciousness ideas, and new-left non-sectarian Marxist thought for the resurgence of resistance politics. In the early 1970s both Biko and Turner were based in Durban, where they influenced student politics, labour and community organising in creative, new ways.

In an extensive interview with their friend and comrade, the activist and photographer Omar Badsha, I learnt that from 1970 Biko, ‘Indian’ black consciousness activists, as well as Turner, and Badsha himself, worked together in running community-based ‘work camps’ at Phoenix Settlement in Durban. This settlement, originally founded by Gandhi in the early 1900s had been a site of experiments with communal living, social and economic justice and nonviolent action. In the early 1970s Kamla Pillay, a resident of Phoenix Settlement, initiated a series of community ‘camps’. Among others, Biko and Turner, who according to Turner’s biographer William Hemingway Kenniston (2010: 87) did not view Black Consciousness and working class activities as incompatible, were for some time both involved in an associated study group for young political leaders. This community-based mobilisation contributed to a groundswell of defiance. And then there were new alliances forged between black workers and a few radical white students in Durban.

Student-worker alliances

Rick Turner was an extraordinary teacher. He challenged the entrenched patriarchal notion and practice in South African universities, that teaching would mean imparting knowledge. He insisted on asking questions. This made him popular with those students who were already leaning towards anti-apartheid and anti-establishment thinking. He thus helped them to develop an understanding of capitalism and a commitment to involve themselves in opposing South Africa’s racist political economy (Kenniston 2010: 85).

Turner encouraged his all-white students to get involved with the black working class, which he saw as the key factor of change. In 1971 students formed the Student Wages Commission (SWC) in Durban. They started interviewing workers at the university about wages and labour conditions. Then they called a well-attended meeting of the workers at UND. The aim was to assist workers to advocate for better conditions of employment (Kenniston 2010: 88).

Soon the students took their commitment to support Black workers beyond the university. Together with organisers from the then legal (white, Indian and Coloured) unions, students became active in the establishment of the ‘General Factory Workers’ Benefit Fund’ that attracted workers into a mutual social benefit association where workers contributed a small monthly payment and could access financial support in the event of sickness, death or firing. The Benefit Fund has been described as “a proto-union and brilliant organizing tool in an environment in which unionism was not yet possible” (Cole 2018: 116). SWC students also established a newspaper, mostly written in isiZulu, called Isisebenzi (‘The Worker’).

Importantly, students started getting involved in challenges to the institution called the ‘Wages Board’. As black (African) workers were not allowed to unionise, this government board set the wages of workers for specific industries. Students involved in the Wages Commission presented their research findings to the Board to advocate for a raise of wages. More importantly even, they encouraged Black workers to attend meetings of the Board in their hundreds and speak for themselves (Cole 2018: 118).

Similar alliances emerged in the early 1970s in several South African urban centres, where small, but vocal numbers of ‘new left’ students and intellectuals engaged a radical critique of the multi-racial liberal politics that had previously dominated (white) opposition. They assessed ‘race’ and its relation to class in apartheid society and explored different forms of Marxist and socialist critiques (Moss 2014: 150). In Durban however, their connections with workers and other new radical movements were stronger than anywhere else in South Africa and made a significant contribution to the turning-point of January 1973.

In Durban underground mobilisation resurged in 1971 and 1972. When I interviewed Badsha, he emphasised the cross-fertilizing energies of the different players in the Durban moment. This was, he said, a moment of tremendous fluidity and convergence. Durban’s mostly young worker and student activists were part of a wider resurgence of mobilisation in the early 1970s.

Namibia: ‘Breaking the Wire’

Eighteen months before the Durban strikes, a reinvention of protest and labour action had already erupted into full public view in South Africa’s colony South West Africa (today’s Namibia). As early as June 1971 (high school) students in northern Namibia took up political mobilisation. More protests and walk-outs happened from August 1971. Students also played an important part in what became the massive Namibian contract labour strike of December 1971 and January 1972.

On 13 December 1971, more than 10,000 contract workers went on strike with the key slogan, “Odalate Naiteke” (“Break the wire”, ie., break the contract system that ties the workers to their bosses – like a wire (odalate, oshiWambo, from Afrikaans ‘draad’). By January 1972, the strike involved about 13,000 to 13,500 workers in 21 towns and 11 mines. These were about half of all Namibian migrant workers at the time.

Collective resistance of Namibian contract labourers against dreadful labour conditions and inhuman treatment had a long history. A key complaint was the essentially forced labour conditions. No hours of daily or weekly work were stipulated; instead, the worker was required “to render to the master his services at all fair and reasonable times” (cited in Ngavirue 1997: 234). Workers did not see their families for 18 months. Meanwhile women in the rural north had to take care of agricultural production and raise families on their own.

Resistance against the contract labour system had been at the heart of the formation of SWAPO in 1960. Following the brutal repression in the 1960s, the flight into exile by many of SWAPO’s founding generation, and the 1967-68 ‘Terrorism Trial’ in Pretoria, where many of the remaining internal leadership were sentenced to long-term incarceration on Robben Island, the spirit of resistance had seemingly been broken.

Upsurge of mobilisation against the contract labour system

In the early 1970s things changed. A young South African who worked as a journalist at Namibia’s then only English-language daily, the Windhoek Advertiser, Stephen Hayes, commented that in 1970 black Namibians had appeared fearful, subservient or bewildered. By late 1971, however, he wrote: “Blacks are becoming conscious of their humanity, and they are walking tall in the streets. …, and the word ‘baas’ has disappeared from their vocabulary.”

Political developments had contributed to the enhanced confidence. In June 1971 the International Court of Justice declared South African occupation of Namibia illegal. This ruling encouraged a sense of impending change.

Central to this upsurge of mobilisation were high school students. As the court sat in The Hague to ponder its ruling, students from the Anglican high school at Odibo near the Angolan border wrote a petition addressed to the International Court of Justice. Thirty Odibo students, together with about 680 from a government school took part in a demonstration at the northern government offices at Ongwediva, and handed over the petition to representatives of Jannie de Wet, then the Commissioner General of Ovamboland.

According to Antoinette (Toni) Halberstadt, in 1971 a young South African teacher at Odibo, plain-clothed policemen circulated among the students, interrogated them and took photos, then bombarded them with tear gas and rubber bullets.

Widespread student demonstrations in northern Namibia exhibited heightened defiance in August 1971. In their aftermath numerous activists who were expelled from government high schools for ‘talking politics’, took up labour contracts. They immediately set out to mobilise against the contract labour system and, cooperating with local worker activists and SWAPO branches, established contact with students and contract workers across Namibia.

The energetic student activists became a key factor in the mobilisation. Mobilisations laid groundwork, however the walkouts happened without a hierarchical leadership, and workers refused to identify individual leaders. Instead, they met and expressed their demands collectively in mass meetings, calling for the abolition of the contract worker system and an end to influx control.

In Owambo the strike turned into an open revolt. It shifted from being merely a challenge to the contract labour system to addressing other issues, such as apartheid, the homeland policy and the Bantustan authorities. Rallies were held in many locations. School strikes continued. For the first time women actively participated, and started attending and addressing rallies. Government’s cattle vaccination points were burnt down since people suspected that the vaccinations administered by the colonial apartheid state, rather than protecting from disease, killed their animals.

Implications of the Namibian strike for South Africa

The Namibian strike played a critical role in the revival of radical politics and resistance. Observers, such as the Namibian political scientist André Du Pisani (1985: 215) noted that, “the political implications of the strike were also felt in the Republic of South Africa when a series of strikes broke out in Natal”. The Namibian strike was widely reported in the South African press. Activists in South Africa keenly picked up this news.

Omar Badsha told me that the workers in the Namibian harbour of Walvis Bay had particularly impressed the Durban dockworkers, especially the refusal of the Namibian workers to name individuals as representatives to speak with the bosses. They insisted that everyone was present during negotiations, where the workers shouted their demands collectively. Badsha said that this strategy was then also adopted by the Durban strikes in January 1973.

These were close links. In the early 1970s Namibia was never far from the minds of South African activists. When ‘new-left’ (white) students at the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) started a campaign for the release of all political prisoners, they even invited a recently released former Namibian Robben Island prisoner, Gerson Veii, to speak on the Johannesburg campus (Moss 2014: 121-146). The Black Consciousness South African Students Organisation (SASO) also officially condemned the presence of the Apartheid forces in Namibia (Becker 2018).

The legacy of 1973

While the Durban strikes of 1973 have been widely credited for the upsurge of trade unionism in South Africa, the new forms of activism employed by students and workers in South Africa and Namibia, deserve more attention. Of special interest seem the spontaneity and, even experimental forms of activist mobilisation, such as the insistence on tactics of ‘flat leadership’, to use a term employed more recently by the ‘Fallist’ movements of the 2010s.

Both by necessity and choice, the movements that erupted onto the political scene in the early 1970s were non-sectarian and typically of a remarkable openness in their social and political strategies and alliances. Unsurprisingly, their politics could not be sustained due to the brutal repression exerted by the regime. Activists were ‘banned’ from public life, teaching and publishing. Steve Biko and Rick Turner were murdered in 1977 and 1978 respectively.

So, what could be considered the legacy of the strikes and resurging resistance movements 50 years later?

A conference on 50 years of the Durban strikes

A fitting point of departure for considering the legacy of the Durban strikes was a three-day conference that took place in Durban in January 2023. The event’s tight programme included presentations by researchers and activists, among those some who had been part of the 1973 moment.

Inspired by Omar Badsha, the conference was hosted on the campus of the Durban University of Technology. The venue of the conference, skirting the Durban CBD, was well chosen. As some of the veteran activists remarked, we congregated close to where some significant strike action took place 50 years ago.

The conference brought together the generation of 1973 with academics and activist-academics, as well as activist organisers and trade unionists of different generations. Young Black researchers and activists were a minority among the attendees, which was noted with some regret. However, young Black women certainly made their voices heard clearly. June Rose Nala, described by Badsha as “one of the most militant of our [1973] comrades” could not attend the conference due to ill health but sent her United Kingdom-based daughter instead. Younger Black women researchers, such as Lebogang Mokwena (UWC) and Bianca Tame (UCT), presented some of the most inspiring papers.

The three conference days moved from the past to the present and the future. An opening roundtable brought together memories, nostalgia and numerous controversies about 50 years of South African trade unionism and politics. Speakers included former activists whose political trajectories had taken divergent routes. There was Alec Erwin, an activist in the early trade union movement who served post-1994 as an ANC government minister. There was also David Hemson, an activist with the Student Wages Commission, a lifelong self-defined socialist, who voiced fiery critique of the neoliberal directions of post-apartheid governance. Women trade union activist speakers of the later 1970s and 1980s, Nomonde Mgumane and Nomarashiya Caluza, made poignant critical observations about the current state of trade unionism and politics, and also raised relevant concerns about gender issues in the labour movement.

Panels on the politics and legacy of the Durban strikes, on trade unions, power, popular politics and policy in the 1980s and post-1994 raised intense debates, especially where memory turned into contested nostalgia. In contrast, presentations engaging the everyday, masculinities, and the intersection of workers’, students’ and intellectuals’ struggles convinced with future-oriented vibrancy. The conference was at its most exciting, moving, and forward-looking in moments of personal story telling, and the themes that connected performance, arts and culture.

A highlight was an inspiring musical performance. ‘1973: The Story of a Strike’ gathered storytellers, performers, and musicians. They included Sazi Dlamini, described as ‘Durban’s living musical legend’, and the guitarist Reza Khota, currently artist in residence at the University of the Western Cape, who has played rock, classical music and jazz. Tina Schouw, Malika Ndlovu, Mpume Mthombeni and Lungile Dlamini brought to voice the narrative meticulously researched and written by Ari Sitas and Sazi Dlamini. The play focused on three women who worked in Durban’s once foremost clothing and textile industry. Their stories drew on the oral histories and memories of at least 13 women who decided in January and February 1973 to say “enough is enough”.

Exhibitions of photographs and documents from the 1973 action were on display at the conference venue (curated by David Hemson) and at the Kwa Muhle Museum (curated by Omar Badsha). Also included were items from the Namibian general strike, including a poster featuring the portraits and names of the Namibian strikers who were charged in the Windhoek magistrate’s court as so-called ‘ringleaders’ with ‘intimidating’ the workers to stayaway from work.

The poster offered a robust reminder of the resistant solidarity that connected the resurging struggles across Southern Africa in the early 1970s. While the transnational ties of solidarity later declined, younger activists in both countries have recently raised thought-provoking voices against the perpetuated coloniality and inequality in their post-apartheid homelands, from the South African student-led Fallist movements to the intersectional decolonial activism by young Namibians (Becker 2018, 2020, 2022a; 2022b; Mushaandja 2021; Van Wyk 2023).

The present and future of trade unionism, social movement activism, and related (activist) research loomed large during the conference. Repeatedly, the question was raised by speakers: “who is a worker?” in “the world [that] has changed”. The industrial labour force that played the key role in 1973 has shrunk by three decades of neoliberal politics in South Africa. One participant emphasised that the idea of ‘the working class’ was “last century nostalgia”. Many discussants seemed to concur. What about the new precariat, one incisive panel investigated, from the informal sector and domestic labour through to, the widespread consultancy work in the public sector? What about young people, their “gigs, hustles and hope beyond the wage” (Cooper and Dubbeld 2023)?

The parting question thus was: What now? Provisional propositions included delinking activism from (party) politics, and responding actively to young people’s vibrant interests in arts and culture. In the end conference participants strongly agreed that it was critical to attract young people to join and renew South Africa’s labour movement.

Heike Becker is an activist and writer focusing on the politics of memory, popular culture, digital media and social movements of resistance in southern Africa (South Africa and Namibia). Heike teaches at the University of the Western Cape (UWC) and is a regular contributor to roape.net.

A version of this article with first published as ‘50 years of the Durban strikes‘ by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in South Africa

Featured Photograph: Graffiti in Kayamandi, Stellenbosch, South Africa (25 October 2014).

References

Becker, Heike. 2018. Dissent, disruption, decolonization: South African student protests, 1968 to 2016, International Socialist Review, Issue 111 (Winter 2018-19): 31-47.

Becker, Heike. 2020. ‘#ShutItAllDownNamibia: Young Namibians are hitting the streets against gender-based violence and colonial legacies’. Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, Online Dossier Namibia@30, 27 October 2020.

Becker, Heike. 2022a. ‘‘A Curt Farewell’: decolonizing public space in Namibia’. Review of African Political Economy website, 3 November 2022.

Becker, Heike. 2022b. “Youth speaking truth to power”: intersectional decolonial activism in Namibia. Dialectical Anthropology.

Cole, Peter. 2018. Dockworker Power: Race and Activism in Durban and the San Francisco Bay Area. Urbana, Chicago, and Springfield: University of Illinois Press.

Cooper, Adam; Bernard Dubbeld. 2023. ‘Gigs, hustles and hope: work for young South Africans beyond the wage’. Presentation, Durban, 28 January 2023.

Du Pisani, André. 1985. SWA/Namibia: the politics of continuity and change. Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball.

Kenniston, William Hemingway. 2010. ‘Richard Turner’s contribution to a socialist political culture in South Africa 1968-1978’. Bellville: University of the Western Cape (MA History Thesis).

Morphet, Tony. 1990. Rick Turner Memorial lecture. University of Natal.

Moss, Glenn. 2014. The New Radicals: A Generational Memoir of the 1970s. Johannesburg: Jacana Media.

Mushaandja, Nashilongweshipwe. 2021. Critical Visualities & Spatialities: Protest, Performance, Publicness and Praxis. Namibian Journal of Social Justice Vol 1 (July 2021): 192-201.

Ngavirue, Zed. 1997. Political Parties and Interest Groups in South West Africa (Namibia): A Study of a Plural Society. Basel: Schlettwein Publ.

South African History Online. 2014. ‘1973 Durban Strikes’.

Suttner, Raymond. 2008. The ANC Underground in South Africa to 1976: A Social and Historical Study.Johannesburg: Jacana.

Van Wyk, Bayron. 2023. ‘#ACurtFarewell & inclusive Namibian memory landscapes’. 11 January 2023. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Southern Africa.

Interview

Omar Badsha, 18 September 2019, Woodstock, Cape Town

Making Tunisia non-African again – Saied’s anti-Black campaign

Since last week, there has been a vicious campaign against sub-Saharan Africans in the streets of Tunisia, following comments by the president. Shreya Parikh writes how anyone who fits the category of ‘African’ – sub-Saharan students and documented or undocumented workers, as well as Black Tunisians are being harassed on the streets by police and civilians, and many attacked, stabbed, and forced into hiding.

By Shreya Parikh

On 21 February 2023, President Kais Saied called a meeting with the National Security Council to take urgent measures “to address the phenomenon of the influx of large numbers of irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to Tunisia.” According to the statement published by the Tunisian Presidency on their Facebook page, Saied “pointed out that there is a criminal arrangement that has been prepared since the beginning of this century to change the demographic composition of Tunisia and that there are parties that received huge sums of money after 2011 in order to settle irregular immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa in Tunisia.” The goal of this migration, according to Saied, is to make Tunisia “a purely African country with no affiliation with the Arab and Islamic nations.” The statement adds that Saied “stressed the need to put an end to this phenomenon [of irregular migration] quickly, especially since hordes of irregular immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa are still continuing with the violence, crimes and unacceptable practices they lead to, in addition to being legally criminalized.”

This statement, which French far-right politician Eric Zemmour has supported and linked to the “Great Replacement” theory,  launched a state- and civilian-supported mass violence to rid Tunisia of ‘Africans’- on the streets, in private spaces, and on the social-media. Many Tunisians on already-proliferating anti-sub-Saharan online groups declared themselves the protector of Tunisia’s so-called Arabo-Muslim identity in the face of the fear of Tunisia becoming ‘too African.’ For them, to be Tunisian is to be Arab and Muslim, all of which are antonymous to being African. In the Tunisian social imagination, to be African is to be Black, economically, and culturally poor, prone to all forms of excess and vice, needing to be controlled and (if need be) annihilated. By extension, to be Tunisian is to not be Black.

“Africans eat too much!” Blaming the other for the escalating socio-economic crisis

Since January 2022, rice has disappeared from the shelves of Tunis’ supermarkets. One of the popular explanations that has emerged for this disappearance is that the ‘Africans’ in Tunisia are ‘eating away all the rice,’ as pointed out to me by Yasmina, a 41-year-old Black Tunisian woman who has been active in denouncing all forms of racism in Tunisia.[1]

Les Africains,’ in the Tunisian vernacular, refers to the sub-Saharan migrant populations, who are estimated to number around 57 thousand.[2] Most of them are undocumented guest-workers, while a small proportion of them are university students. Many are hoping to make their way to the Global North. ‘Les Africains’ as a racializing category also includes the Black Tunisian population who are estimated to be make up between 10 and 15 percent of the population; Black Tunisians are assumed to be sub-Saharan migrants or assumed to trace their ancestry to enslaved families, even though a complex variety of migrations from other African regions brought their ancestors to Tunisia.[3]

The rice-crisis is not the first time that populations racialized as ‘African’ are blamed for a social and economic disaster in Tunisia, which in reality is a direct consequence of the state’s abandonment of marginalized communities and the pressures of global capitalism. Back in June 2021, while I was doing my fieldwork in the city of Sfax, protests were held by a group of unemployed Tunisians, calling for expulsion of ‘African’ migrant workers whom they accused of ‘taking away Tunisians’ jobs.’

The anti-African discourse has now infected President Kais Saied’s regime, finally reaching the words of the president himself. In the past few months, an ex-minister as well as members of Saied-supporting Parti nationaliste tunisien(Tunisian Nationalist Party) have openly made racist and xenophobic comments, calling for expulsion of ‘Africans’ from Tunisia. Saied, who took on authoritarian powers with a coup d’état on 25 July 2021, has increasingly relied on a populist discourse that blames a constructed ‘other’ for the social and economic crisis facing Tunisia; this ‘other’ has included political opponents, NGOs, and civil society figures, and recently, the ‘Africans.’

The state’s official adoption of the most violent form of anti-‘African’ discourse, which places itself in the genealogy of the dangerous Great Replacement ideology, has unleashed a massive anti-Black and anti-migrant hatred that was previously kept to racist remarks or occasional cases of anti-Black violence. What we have in Tunisia, as I write these words, is a vicious pursuit for anyone who fits the social imagination of ‘African.’ sub-Saharan students and undocumented guest workers, as well as Black Tunisians are being harassed on the streets by police and civilians; many are being stabbed and robbed; Tunisian activist Saif Ayadi has called this an “extermination war” against the migrants.[4]The police are arresting those whom they see as ‘African,’ putting most into detention under inhumane conditions, without any clear reason. Adama, a young Ivorian man living in Tunis with a resident permit, told me in a voice that edged towards a cry, that many (like himself) who are arrested are being forced to sign false attestations in Arabic (that most cannot read) that declare that they were trying to make their way ‘illegally’ to Italy – a punishable crime under Tunisian law. A Black Tunisian woman activist was harassed in Tunis city-center because someone thought that she was a migrant.

Men pretending to be police are kidnapping sub-Saharan migrants and raping women, as Joseph, a 23-year-old Congolese student in Tunis mentioned during our conversation. Sub-Saharan migrants are being kicked out of their homes, their valuables burnt or robbed by Tunisian mobs, and many are finding themselves homeless; shelters funded by state money have orders not to house them. Sub-Saharan migrants are being fired from their jobs and are being replaced suddenly by Tunisians from whom they are accused of ‘stealing jobs.’ Many are being refused groceries at stores because ‘Africans eat too much,’ as an Ivorian interlocutor in Sfax recounted her experience. Others are being refused medical support that they are in urgent need of. Everyone who falls under the socially constructed category of ‘African’ – those with or without jobs, those with university classes to attend – are too scared to leave their homes because the racist violence has spread to every street in Tunisia.

On 23 February, the president went on to (partly) backtrack his speech, reassuring sub-Saharan migrants ‘legally’ residing in the country that he never wished to target them, that he is only targeting the ‘illegal’ migrants. Most sub-Saharan migrants (like Western European migrants) enter Tunisia as legal migrants because of 3-month visa-free policies; but the Tunisian state forces all migrants to become illegal by its refusal to deliver legal documentation. This means that Tunisia also has European migrants living ‘illegally.’ But in the social and political construction of the ‘illegal migrant,’ white bodies never fit. It is the Black and dark-skinned bodies that are assumed to be illegal and criminal, as is clear from arrests of sub-Saharan migrants who carry residence permits, as well as absence of arrests of European ‘illegal’ migrants. The hunt for ‘illegal’ migrants has never been about the undocumented status, even before Saied’s speech –  black and dark-skinned migrants (including myself), irrespective of their documentation status, have continuously faced police intimidation and state surveillance.

Externalizing (and internalizing) borders

The externalization of European Union borders onto its southern Mediterranean shores has meant that both Tunisian and sub-Saharan migrants seeking to exercise their right to mobility North find their mobility constrained and controlled by so-called securitization apparatus. Many Tunisians, like sub-Saharan Africans, who attempt to make their way to the North via the sea are murdered by this securitizing apparatus.

Yet, this collective oppression by the Global North and the collective humiliating experience of being immigrants in another land has unfortunately not generated a mass solidarity movement in Tunisian society for their sub-Saharan co-habitants. On the contrary, the fact of Tunisian migration (through both ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ means) is used to fuel the Great Replacement conspiracy theory, with many Tunisians arguing that their country is being ‘emptied’ of the so-called Arabo-Muslim population and being ‘replaced’ instead by ‘criminal Africans’ with many saying that they fear that the country will be 100 percent Black in a few years.[5]

While the European Union’s violent securitization apparatus is indeed responsible for the oppression and murder of sub-Saharan migrants (and Tunisians) in Tunisia, the Tunisian state also contributes to their oppression and murder. For example, the migration laws in Tunisia date from 1968 and are too outdated to respond to the current local and global migration regimes. In addition, the practice of migration governance is no longer controlled by these laws; rather, a sub-Saharan migrant’s legality or illegality is determined by the individual interpretation of the municipal, traffic, or border police that the migrant finds in front of her.[6]

Many of my sub-Saharan interlocutors living in Tunisia have told me repeatedly that they have “never wished to be sans-papiers, but [were] made so by the state.” Almost every sub-Saharan migrant I spoke with has tried to acquire legal documentation, and most have been refused after years of paperwork and payment of bribes.

With elevated overstay penalties (20 dinars per week, equivalent to around US$6.5) imposed by the Tunisian state on undocumented migrants seeking to legally leave the country, many sub-Saharan migrants tell me that it is financially cheaper to ‘take the boat’ (make the clandestine journey) to Italy. Sub-Saharan migrants are being forced to choose between continuing to live in Tunisia where they have been facing inhumane working and living conditions for the past decade, and where they now face the state supported virulent hatred, versus potentially facing death in the Mediterranean as they make their way to Italy.

Mobilizing solidarity and resistance

On 24 December 2016, three Congolese students were near-fatally attacked with a knife by a Tunisian man in the Tunis city-center. This led to a large-scale mobilization by both sub-Saharan and Black Tunisian civil society organizations who denounced racial discrimination and violence faced by sub-Saharan migrants as well as Black Tunisians. Their mobilization culminated into then-Prime Minister Youssef Chahed’s support for a law criminalizing racial discrimination – a law for which the civil society had been lobbying since 2011 revolution. In 2018, Tunisia became the first country in the so-called Arab region to have a law criminalizing racial discrimination; on the basis of this law, a legal demand to remove a discriminatory family name, which contains the vestiges of the cruel history of enslavement of Black families in Tunisia, was granted in 2020.

There has been a massive mobilization by Tunisian civil society (especially by Black Tunisian organizations) to support sub-Saharan migrants by organizing medical, legal, and housing support. Around a thousand protestors joined a solidarity march in Tunis on 25 February 2023. Journalists and informal groups continue to report the violence on the ground. As with the December 2016 incident, these current moments of immense hatred and violence may become a site to push for reforms, especially in the migration laws in Tunisia. I hope that this moment of economic and social crisis, of rising cost of living, of hunger and debt across the Global South nurtures solidarity on our collective condition as the wretched of the earth, irrespective of the borders, our nationalities and skin-colour.

Shreya Parikh is a Ph.D. candidate, and her dissertation research focuses on the constructions and contestations of race, and racialization in Tunisia through a focus on the study of racialization of Black Tunisians and sub-Saharan migrants. Parikh grew up in Ahmedabad in India, and currently resides in Tunis in Tunisia.

Featured Photograph: Mnemty team at the solidarity march denouncing racial discrimination and violence against sub-Saharan migrants in Tunis on 25 February 2023. Mnemty is a civil society organisation headed by Black Tunisian activist Saadia Mosbah (in photo holding the yellow sign in Arabic) who has been at the forefront of fighting all forms of anti-Black racism in Tunisia (Mahmoud Rassaa).

Notes

[1] All names of those I interviewed have been changed to protect their identity.

[2] I am aware that the use of the term ‘sub-Saharan African’ itself contributes to homogenization and possible marginalization of the group it categorizes. I have chosen to use it here because many of my interlocutors who come from ‘sub-Saharan Africa’ use the term to categorize themselves and those from their region of origin.

[3] Complex migrations processes, including enslavement from the North, also brought to Tunisia the ancestors of many non-Black Tunisians. Migration has always been at the core of population histories in Tunisia, both historically as well as in the present.

[4] The reports on anti-Black violence in this article relies on my telephonic conversations with sub-Saharan migrant interlocutors in Tunisia and social-media posts by activists and researchers reporting incidents of harassment.

[5] This type of discourse can be found on Facebook groups like “تونسيون ضد الوجود الأجصي (افارقة جنوب الصحراء)بتونس” (Tunisians against sub-Saharan African presence in Tunisia). See here (last accessed on 28 February 2023)

[6] Many of my sub-Saharan interlocutors living in Tunisia have told me that they have faced police searches and arrests without reason and declared “illegal” even when they were in possession of temporary residence permits. This has also been my case; in December 2022, while I was exiting Tunisia at Tunis-Carthage airport, I was declared “illegal” by the border police even though I was in possession of valid temporary residence permit.

“Problem Has Changed Name” – infrastructure, citizenship and the state in Nigeria

On February 25, Nigerians go to the polls to elect a new president. Daniel Jordan Smith discusses the politics of the provision (or lack) of public services and infrastructure in Nigeria. Most Nigerians adapt to the reality that they must provide for themselves, cobbling together fundamental service provision in the context of state failure. But as the country goes to the polls, Smith argues questions of infrastructure are central to both citizenship and state power in Nigeria.

By Daniel Jordan Smith

On February 25, 2023, Nigerians go to the polls to elect a new president. It is impossible to predict with certainty who will win or how Nigerians will receive the results. Inevitably, popular sentiments will run the gamut from hopeful optimism to seasoned cynicism. By the time RAOPE viewers read this blog post, perhaps the election’s outcome will be settled; just as likely, it will be contested, either formally and publicly, or behind the scenes.

While I would not venture to forecast the winner of Nigeria’s presidential election, I can say with considerable confidence that the next president, as well as countless other elected officials and the government they control, will be judged by the Nigerian people, perhaps above all, by whether they deliver improvements to the country’s woeful infrastructure and related services.

No doubt people all over the world judge their governments and politicians based, at least in part, on whether they provide adequate infrastructure. But in Nigeria, the transition to democracy in 1999, after three decades of mostly uninterrupted military rule, created especially high expectations that the government would improve its performance. In the minds of most Nigerians, civilian leaders have disappointed them. As a result, withering criticism of politicians—including presidents—for their failure to fulfill their promises is a mainstay of popular discourse, often in the form of biting humor.

For example, when Nigeria’s first civilian president after the return to democracy, former general Olusegun Obasanjo, ran for a second term in 2003, he made improvement in the production and distribution of electricity a major plank in his promised agenda. Obasanjo won reelection. As part of his reform of the electric power sector, he reorganized the parastatal in charge, then known as the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA). NEPA had long been the object of Nigerians’ derision and the brunt of popular jokes—including that NEPA stood for Never Expect Power Anytime, and other variations on the theme. Importantly, in addition to the organization’s reform, Obasanjo also changed its name. At the time, I imagined the president and his advisors huddled in a conference room eager to find a new name for which the acronym could not be so readily transposed into the kind of mockery long associated with NEPA. The new organization was given the name Power Holding Company of Nigeria, with the acronym PHCN. What could critics possibly do with that, I imagined Obasanjo and his cronies asking with self-satisfaction. But, in their inimitable way, Nigerians immediately invented critical appellations for the new entity. The first I heard was “Please Hold Candle Now.” Soon after came perhaps my all-time favorite example of Nigerians’ incisive critical political humor. PHCN was said to stand for “Problem Has Changed Name.”

There is no end to the jokes, popular sayings, satirical anecdotes, rumors, and conspiracy theories that illustrate both Nigerians’ discontents and their political acumen regarding the failure of their government to provide fundamental infrastructure. The condition of Nigeria’s state-supported infrastructure—be it for the provision and distribution of water and electricity, the quality and safety of roads, or the capacity of law enforcement to safeguard citizens’ everyday security—is so poor that nearly every Nigerian knows the popular refrain “every household is its own local government.” As the saying suggests, Nigerians must cobble together fundamental infrastructure where the state fails.

My recently published ethnography, Every Household Its Own Government: Improvised Infrastructure, Entrepreneurial Citizens, and the State in Nigeria, offers an up-close account of how Nigerians cope with the shortcomings of government-provided infrastructure. I was motivated to do the research for the book because over the 30 years I have worked in Nigeria, efforts to cope with inadequate infrastructure constantly preoccupied people, often on a daily basis, without relief. What is more, since I first arrived in Nigeria in 1989 nearly every domain of basic infrastructure and associated services has deteriorated. Frustrations with this situation have resulted in a prevalent and already-mentioned discourse of complaint, pointing to the political salience of infrastructure. It became apparent to me—as it has long been to Nigerians—that not only were the country’s infrastructural woes holding back both individual advancement and national development, the very substance of state-society relations was also at stake.

Nigerians adapt to the state’s failures to provide adequate infrastructure through a combination of entrepreneurship, informal economic enterprise, and sheer hustle. Given the extent of their ingenuity and self-reliance, one might be tempted to conclude that with regard to infrastructure, Nigerians have rendered the state irrelevant. But in reality, all of these ostensibly private efforts to address infrastructural deficiencies involve regular state-society interaction. Further, these dealings are among the most common experiences of everyday citizenship in Africa’s most populous country and, paradoxically, they constitute a primary arena for the consolidation of state power.

As highlighted in the anecdote about PHCN, when it comes to the way that powerful people benefit at the expense of ordinary citizens, Nigerians are not fooled. They commonly blame the country’s infrastructural shortcomings on political elites who steer the state. But in my book I argue and try to show how citizenship and state power are constituted in more mundane interactions between the people and their government, not least, ironically, as they regularly encounter low-level government officials in their private, entrepreneurial efforts to create reliable access to clean water, steady electricity, safe transportation, and protection from crime, not to mention decent health care, effective education, and affordable housing. To fully understand how Nigerians’ responses to infrastructural deficiencies shape the experience of citizenship and contribute to the constitution of state power, it is necessary to illustrate and explain the prevalence and salience of these routine, mundane, seemingly administrative and bureaucratic encounters with government. These dealings are, in fact, highly political interactions, mirroring and reproducing the dominant dynamics of citizen-state relations in Nigeria.

Although Nigerians’ cynical assessments of the country’s political elites are by and large quite accurate, it is through this more routine administration, in which government bureaucrats and ordinary citizens interact, negotiate, cooperate, and even collude, that much of the work of reproducing state power is accomplished. In these encounters, the complex interplay of formal and informal and official and unofficial rules and their associated moral economies are revealed, navigated, and often reinscribed. All of this means that as Nigerians pursue their needs and desires for better infrastructure, they often unwittingly further enable the power of an only-apparently-absent state.

A couple of cases will illustrate how private entrepreneurs managing informal infrastructure-related enterprises constantly run into (and often inadvertently reinforce) state power. My book, based on long-term research in southeastern Nigeria, has chapters about six domains of infrastructure: water, electricity, transportation, communication, education, and security. I could have selected evidence from any of these spheres, but for the sake of brevity I describe examples only from the water and transportation sectors.

Entrepreneurial enterprises to address deficiencies in government-provided water infrastructure include, among others, private boreholes constructed by small-scale entrepreneurs who sell water in the neighborhoods where they reside because there is little or no municipal piped water service; cart pushers who transport multiple 50-liter containers of water to paying customers in urban neighborhoods with few other options; and manufacturers of “pure water,” the ubiquitous half-liter clear plastic sachets of drinking water available for sale on nearly every street corner. While borehole vendors, cart pushers, and pure water manufacturers all launch their businesses in response to the government’s failures to deliver water, ironically, each endeavor leads to extensive engagement with the state as officials draw upon laws and regulations to compel entrepreneurs to pay fees for licenses, registrations, inspections, and numerous other formalities required for government approval. Or conversely, state officials sometimes solicit bribes in order to exempt entrepreneurs from having to obey the rules. Once water-selling businesses are established, similar dynamics unfold regarding the payment of taxes—especially value-added taxes (VAT). At seemingly every turn, the same state apparatus that appears incapable (or unwilling) to organize the provision of water finds it no problem to mobilize itself to collect fees and taxes (or bribes in lieu of them).

The situation regarding transportation is similar. Among the plethora of private entrepreneurs and enterprises that provide “public transportation” in Nigeria, two examples will suffice to convey the ways that these businesses are entangled with the government, like it or not.  Motorcycle taxis (known in southeastern Nigeria as okada) provide a popular form of urban mass transportation that is completely private. But the many thousands of motorcycle taxi drivers, most of whom are in business for themselves, face periodic efforts to regulate and tax them through various short-lived measures related to registration, licensing, uniforms, helmet use, and much more. In addition, the police are a source of constant harassment, looking for any excuse to extract a portion of okada drivers’ meager earnings. The police are also the main source of governmental contact, control, and plain and simple extortion for the minibus drivers and their conductors who ferry commuters to and from town as well as between nearby cities. Known in Nigeria as danfo, these minibuses are a major target at ubiquitous police checkpoints, where drivers are expected to hand off some cash in order to be allowed to pass without major delay.

These are but a few of the countless ways in which Nigerians’ private, entrepreneurial, and informal economic efforts to address the state’s failure to provide basic infrastructure and related services ironically result in deep entanglements with government officials. These experiences are the most tangible interactions that many citizens have with the state, reminding them of the state’s power, even as it fails with regard to providing them what they most need and expect.

Whether all of this makes the Nigerian state weak or strong depends upon whose interests it is designed to serve. Except for elites whose households are better equipped than many local governments, for most Nigerians the fact that every household must be its own local government is not a reality they prefer. The vast majority of people want the state to do better. Whoever the next president is, if he is able to deliver improved state-supported infrastructure, he will be applauded for doing more about the problem than changing its name.

Daniel’s book Every Household Its Own Government: Improvised Infrastructure, Entrepreneurial Citizens, and the State in Nigeria is published by Princeton University Press.

Daniel Jordan Smith is the Charles C. Tillinghast, Jr. Professor of International Studies and professor of anthropology at Brown University. His other books about Nigeria include A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria and To Be a Man Is Not a One-Day Job: Masculinity, Money, and Intimacy in Nigeria. 

Featured Photograph: Protests in Nigeria against the police force called (SARS) Special Anti-Robbery Squard (31 October 2020).

Thorn in the Flesh – the unreformable Kenyan police

Kenyan activists Faith Asina and Gathanga Ndung’u deliver powerful and sharp criticism of the role of the Kenyan police as the oppressor of the masses. They explain in detail how police terror has manifested itself on issues such as the crackdowns on activists, the aftermath of elections, state-led campaigns against terrorism and informal settlements. They also take the time to commemorate fallen activists and inform us about ongoing grassroots movements against the violence of the police, which they believe needs radical surgery or a total overhaul.

By Faith Kasina & Gathanga Ndung’u

In the 21st century, the police have become the law enforcer, jury, and executioner of the people. For the rich, the police are the protector of their assets and wealth, whereas, for the poor, they are criminals in uniforms sanctioned by the state against them. It appears as though the police were created by the rich to police the poor. Police misconduct and abuse of power have been an ongoing debate for a long time due to the series of cases reported worldwide ranging from arbitrary arrests, harassment, torture, enforced disappearances (EDs) and extrajudicial executions (EJE), among other criminal activities. The police have long been used to oppress the masses rather than maintain peace and order. These traits of police abuse of power have manifested themselves in developed and developing countries, from the US, where the issue is intertwined with racism, to China, Nigeria and Kenya.

A brief history of the Kenyan police state

In Kenya, the first formal police unit was created by the British Government in 1907 as the British Colonial Police Force. This unit was created to protect The Crown’s commercial interests in the vast region covering Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and some parts of Tanzania. Kenya Railways introduced its police units in 1902 to protect its main infrastructural project – Kenya-Uganda Railway.

This police unit evolved over the years as the British Government continued with their rule in the region. To effectively subdue the population, they used divide and rule whereby they recruited one community to serve under their units as home guards and set them against other communities. The successive independence regimes that followed maintained these units without reforming them. They used the police to protect their newly acquired wealth and also to repress any dissident voices that questioned their authority. Through them, several arrests were made, and some enforced disappearances and deaths.

Kenya’s first post-independence assassination was the killing of General Baimunge who was a general in Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KFLA) and one of Dedan Kimathi’s confidants who led the KFLA battalions on the East side of Mount Kenya Forest covering Meru and Embu. His death was carried out by the police who were under the instructions of the first Kenyan Prime Minister, Jomo Kenyatta. This was the first betrayal committed by the first government on its war heroes. Under Moi’s rule, they were empowered even more with the creation of special units for the torture of political detainees during his authoritarian rule that went for 24 years. Prisoners of consciousness such as Maina Wa Kinyatti, Koigi Wamwere, Karimi Nduthu, GPO Oulu and Oscar Kamau King’ara among many others.

Assassinations of activists during Arab Moi’s era 

Karimi Nduthu was a renowned activist during Moi’s regime. He was the Secretary General of the Release Political Prisoners (RPP) pressure group and also served as the Mwakenya National Coordinator. Karimi was initiated into radical politics by the December 12 Movement (DTM) literature which included Pambana, Cheche and later Mwakenya materials. Karimi was from Molo and he investigated the Molo massacre and ethnic clashes during the Moi regime. Moi was a ruthless dictator who never hesitated to silence any dissident voices that seemed to oppose his iron fist rule. He made organizing a challenge for political activists and university students. This forced many of them to organize in hiding. Karimi was expelled from the University of Nairobi for his activism as a student leader in February 1985 before he could complete his degree in engineering. He was arrested in 1986 for being a member of Mwakenya and was jailed for six years at the dreaded Naivasha Maximum Prison.

He was later released in 1992 after Mothers of Political Prisoners piled pressure on the Moi regime to release political prisoners. Immediately after his release from prison, he went straight to All Saints Cathedral where mothers of political prisoners and members of Release Political Prisoners had camped. They continued to pile pressure by camping at the cathedral until all the prisoners were released. On the night of March 23 1996, Karimi was brutally murdered at his Riruta home by the infamous Jeshi la Mzee murder squad – a vicious youth militia run by the Moi government and the then ruling party, KANU. Neighbours recounted how the police, who appeared immediately at the murder scene seemed to have been there to confirm the activist’s death. To make it look like a burglary and or a theft scene, they took his possessions including books and cassettes and manuscripts. His murder is among many questionable murders and assassinations carried out by Moi’s regime through the help of his secret police squads.

The subsequent murders of human rights activists, George Paul Oulu and Oscar Kingara, in 2019 show how Extra Judicial Executions are deep-rooted and systemic in Kenya. The denial of justice to the victims to date shows how the justice system has been rigged against a section of Kenyans.

The police force has been maintained to this date to serve the ruling class and their interests in the country without any regard for the poor majority in Kenya. The fundamental structures of the police force haven’t changed since the colonial era despite the many calls for reforms in training, service delivery, maintenance of law and order, impartiality in carrying out their duties, professionalism, attitude and relationship with the public. The Kenyan set-up shows a force that has been trained to protect the elite in a country with glaring economic disparity between the ultra-rich that have controlled the country since independence and the malnourished poor populations who survive on meagre daily wages. To control these hungry and angry masses, the police force has been concentrated in the poor urban informal settlements and slums such as Mathare, Kibera, Kayole, Dandora, Kayole, Mukuru and Kariobangi. These areas that harbour the majority of the poor in Nairobi are highly policed not to offer protection but to pacify and repress them into submission. It is from these areas that many cases of extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and extortions are reported every week.

Police violations and abuses disguised as special operations and crackdowns

File:GSU - Uhuru Park.jpg

Special operations and crackdowns in Kenya have provided ample justification for use of force, coercion, mass arbitrary arrests with subsequent disregard for the rights of arrested persons, extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances. From the crackdown on multi-party democracy crusaders, Marxist-Leninist ideologues, Mungiki, the 2007/08 Post-Election Violence, Mombasa Republican Council, the anti-terrorism fight, crime in informal settlements to the Covid-19 lockdown, the state has always flexed its muscles on unarmed civilians and created fear in communities through the police force.

In 2006 and 2007, the state launched an operation to crack down on the outlawed Mungiki Sect which had taken hold of Nairobi, Central and some parts of the Rift Valley region. This group incorporated aspects of religious, cultural and political issues. They kept dreadlocks just as the Mau Mau rebels did to show their ties to the country’s freedom fighters. Their oath-takings which were rumoured to involve the use of human blood and subsequent killings that were linked to the group invited the government to start a crackdown. Mathare and other slums in Nairobi and other regions in Central Kenya suffered a huge blow as hundreds of youths were killed by police and many others disappeared during the same time. According to a report released by a group of lawyers, more than 8040 young Kenyans were executed or tortured to death since 2002, during the five-year police crackdown on the outlawed Mungiki Sect under President Mwai Kibaki’s reign.

During the 2007-2008 post-election violence, around 1,200 Kenyans lost their lives and the police were used to kill people from the zones termed as opposition. The majority of these killings happened in informal urban settlements in Mombasa, Nairobi and Kisumu with most of the deaths being as a result of police brutality. To date, the National Police Service has never been held accountable for the atrocities committed against its own people. In Kenya, the police force has also been bashed for being impartial in their work more so during election periods.

Mombasa Republican Council was an organization formed in 1990 by separatists who wanted secession of the coastal part of Kenya. They claimed that it was time to form their own republic. The movement subsided over the years only to be revitalized in 2008 with their vocal leaders pointing to the thorny issue of land in Kenya, marginalization and skewed development. Under the Pwani Si Kenya (Coast region is not part of Kenya) slogan, they rallied residents to join them with instances of oath-taking in coastal forests being reported. The government responded by deploying contingents of police officers who used excessive force on citizens including women and children. Most of the leaders were detained and some were forced to denounce their stand. With the creation of a decentralized government in 2013 after the first election under the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, the movement waned as the creation of county governments gave the coastal people a sense of control of their issues through local governments.

When the Kenyan army entered Somalia to help the Somali Government fight the Al-Shabaab terrorist outfit, there were increased cases of terrorist activities in the country as a retaliatory response from the outfit. This led to a crackdown on citizens of Somali origin and the Muslim populations at large in Kenya. Mombasa and Nairobi became hotbeds of police crackdown by the dreaded Anti-Terrorist Police Unit (ATPU) which rounded up and arrested hundreds of suspects, some of whom were innocent, and held them in different stations for more than 24 hours. Many Muslim male residents of Eastleigh and Majengo in Nairobi fled as searches were being carried out in mosques and homes. In Mombasa and other coastal areas, young Muslims and clerics were reported murdered during this operation with some being abducted by plain-clothed police officers, never to be seen again. Some of these abductions and arrests have been carried out in front of families and friends.

The fight against crime in the informal settlements seems to be a war against the poor young black males in the Kenyan ghettos. Their poverty has criminalized them with their dreadlocks and sense of fashion used to profile them while labelling them as criminals. This has led to the execution and disappearance of many at the hands of the police. Each informal settlement has a renowned killer police officer who seems to be backed by the state to help with its covert operations of cleansing alleged crime suspects. Kayole, Mathare and Dandora all have these serial killers in police uniforms who have taken the role of the judiciary to issue instant ‘justice’ to alleged lawbreakers. Despite the overwhelming evidence against these officers, the state seems unwilling to act on them and the only action taken is the transfer and re-shuffling of officers from one area to another.

The realization that what the government was doing was cleansing young people in the informal settlements led to the mushrooming of community-based organizations to fight this injustice and bring to light and call out the massacre of the ghetto people by their government.

Social movements and the fight against extrajudicial executions (EJE)  

The Social Justice Centres Working Group (SJCWG) is the decision-making body of the Social Justice Centres Movement which is the umbrella body that brings together all the social justice Centres in Kenya. These social justice centres act as human rights defenders’ centres based in the communities. They are formed by the members of the community to find solutions to the pertinent challenges in the communities. SJCWG has over 60 centres spread across the country organizing on different political, socio-economic and cultural issues.

The social justice centres movement continues to organize against extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. To document these cases, different partners came up with The Missing Voices website and so far, 1226 Extra Judicial Execution cases and 275 Enforced Disappearance cases have been documented since 2007. The Missing Voices website is supported by Amnesty International-Kenya, Peace Brigades International-Kenya, International Justice Mission, HAKI Africa, MUHURI, Defenders Coalition, ICTJ, International Commission of Jurists, Kituo Cha Sheria, Kenya Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Watch, CODE for AFRICA, Heinrich Bӧll Stiftung, ODIPODEEV, Protection International-Kenya and SJCWG. These partners help to document, provide legal aid to victims and their kin, and offer psycho-social support among other services. Documenting helps to fill the gaps in evidence by layering victims’ testimony with quantitative data. It also creates a platform where one can report, sign petitions and follow trials of such cases as well as offer support.

The social justice centres working group operates under committees and the Mothers of Victims and Survivors Network (MVSN) is one of the pillar committees. The MVSN brings together mothers of victims and survivors of police brutality to provide a platform where they can share their experiences. This also acts as a social circle to enable the survivors to start the healing process as they offer each other a shoulder to lean on. They actively engage in the documentation and follow-up of EJE’s and ED’s cases in the community and then offer referrals to the right organizations. They have also been involved in publicizing their work and creating awareness about the government’s role in the protection of the dignity of human life as enshrined in Article 26 of our constitution.

Licensed to Kill

The Kenya Police seems to have been licenced by the state to do a mass cleansing of youths in the slums. In Nairobi Eastlands, “innocent till proven guilty” seems to be a preserve for the rich as the police kill without any regard for the law. More than fifty years after independence, our police force still borrows heavily from the colonial police service in its mode of operation.

During our struggle for independence, the colonial police used the media as a propaganda tool to create fear and panic among the natives. Whenever a fighter was captured or killed, the images of their mutilated bodies would be published on the front pages of the local papers to demoralize fighters. One of the images that were highly circulated was that of Dedan Kimathi lying on a stretcher handcuffed. This was to bring the Mau Mau to its knees as they believed that he was the main leader of Mau Mau. Today, social media has taken the role of the local papers. The killer police use Facebook pages to spread their propaganda leading to the self-exiling of youths due to fear. The police have become bold in their nefarious activities as they issue warnings on their targets on Facebook with the photos of the target which they then go ahead to actualize without any fear of repercussion. Just like the colonial police, they post the badly mutilated bodies with warnings to other youths involved in crime.

The government has invested heavily in arming the police force while still spending very little on social security programs, job creation and provision of social services which would drastically reduce the crime rate. The state has also neglected the well-being of its police officers as mental health issues and low wages demoralize the force from within amongst other challenges such as poor working conditions. These problems compounded have in a way contributed to the many suicide cases in the force, the increased cases of homicides among police officers, misuse of firearms and involvement in illegal activities such as robbery with violence and collaboration with criminal networks.

The threat the police pose to the public is immense and Kenyans seem to be sitting on a time bomb ready to explode when you imagine a fully armed police officer, underpaid by the government, working in poor and harsh conditions, traumatised by work, being oppressed by the seniors with no psycho-social support systems in the force and trying to survive the harsh economic conditions. These conditions create an environment for mental instability among the junior officers.

The role of women in the fight against extrajudicial killings 

Social Justice Movement HRDs protesting in Mathare

Movements have always arisen up to deal with human rights abuse by the state. Women have been part and parcel of organizing and confronting the ills in the community as well as upsetting the status quo. Women in Kenya have participated in all aspects of the struggle, and they continue to do so to this day.

During the Moi regime when the government arrested young people and put them in prisons, mothers of those political prisoners and other women camped at Uhuru Park and piled pressure on the government to release the political prisoners. The government was adamant and this led to the women stripping and going on silent strike until Moi’s government started releasing the prisoners. The women fought for their sons until they were all released.

From the defiance of Mekatili wa Menza and Muthoni Nyanjiru against the colonial police during the invasion of our territories to Field Marshal Muthoni Kirima who fought alongside men during the Mau Mau years, to second liberation heroes such as Wangari Maathai, women led by showing bravery and defiance against the skewed system being enforced through the police. This baton has been passed to MVSN which continues to organize against atrocities being committed by the police in poor neighbourhoods. Being victims, survivors and witnesses of police injustices, these women chose to rise above their pain and setbacks and channel their energy and efforts by creating awareness in the community and supporting others who have been or who would have been victims. Instead of giving up, these women have transformed themselves from being victims to community human rights defenders in the different settlements they come from. They now stand as the vanguard of the communities against rogue police officers and the system that creates and supports them.

The Social Justice Movement has organized the communities against these injustices to try and force the state into accountability. Instead of initiating the investigations, the state has in recent times responded by intimidation, surveillance and a crackdown on human rights defenders. This use of excessive force was witnessed during the annual Saba Saba (July 7 2020) March For Our Lives by the Social Justice Movement when more than sixty activists, human rights defenders and members of the community were arrested for participating in this peaceful protest commemorating the activities of the second liberation struggle in Kenya.

The Kenyan police and stalled reforms

The National Police Service is not a service but a violent squad. The change in name from ‘force’ to ‘service’ did not solve its underlying issues. The police force that was inherited at independence in 1963 has largely remained the same in function, operation, and culture among other aspects. The police service was supposed to be citizen-centric in the way it handles complaints from the public. This is far from what Kenyans are used to in our local police stations. The reforms on uniforms and change of names haven’t brought about any transformation to the police culture in Kenya.

The Kenya Police Force needs radical surgery or a total overhaul and the system that created it. The many years of reform seem to have hit a brick-wall and the changes are no longer effective. The curriculum used by the Kenya Police College needs to focus more on instilling patriotism, dignity for human life and professionalism while the recruiters should focus on passion to serve rather than the physical prowess that are long outdated.

As Human Rights Defenders from Kenya, it is our prerogative to join hands with the rest of the international movements and apply pressure on our governments to defund our police forces and redirect the resources to the reduction of unemployment, provision of social services and creation of a social safety-net for vulnerable families. These efforts would go a long way in solving crime and insecurity since reforms is not a viable solution anymore.

Until we uproot the system that created this police force, it shall continue to be a ‘force’ rather than a ‘service’, the issue of mental health among the police shall continue to be a thorn in the side and cases of suicide among the force shall continue to rise. Until a radical surgery is applied, professionalism will be an alien vocabulary to our police officers; until we cut the stem that supports the moribund system that is the Kenyan Police, Kenyans and the citizens of the world shall continue to suffer in the hands of these police forces.

This article is an edited version of the post that has appeared under the title Unreformable Police Force

Gathanga Ndung’u is a community organiser with Ruaraka Social Justice Centre which is under the Social Justice Centres’s Working Group. He is also part of the Revolutionary Socialist League brigade that organizes political education in different political cells in the respective centres in Nairobi. Away from this, he is a biotechnologist with great enthusiasm for ecological justice, food sovereignty and security. Above all, Gathanga is a Pan-Africanist and a socialist.

Faith Kasina is the coordinator of Kayole Community Justice Centre. Through this organisation, she aims to promote social justice in informal settlements through community engagement and the use of social movement platforms.

Photographs: Social Justice Centre Working group

Black liberation after racial inclusion

Marcel Paret’s new book, Fractured Militancy, illuminates connections between processes of formal racial inclusion and the popular resistance that emerges in its wake – from South Africa to the United States, from service delivery protests to Black Lives Matter. Paret introduces an extract from his book for roape.net.

By Marcel Paret

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, shortly after the transition from apartheid to democracy, rosy images of South Africa as a progressive beacon and a harmonious “rainbow nation” predominated. Nearly three decades after the democratic transition, however, such optimistic descriptions are long out of favor. Extreme and racialized inequality, rampant unemployment and poverty, reoccurring xenophobic attacks against foreign-born residents, government corruption scandals, and rolling electricity blackouts tarnish the country’s image.

Two alternative narratives of South Africa have emerged. One narrative portrays the democratic transition as a failure, reflecting how the post-apartheid state caters to the narrow interests of either capital or political elites. A second narrative highlights the political agency of the Black poor and working class, finding hope in widespread protest and resistance.

In Fractured Militancy: Precarious Resistance in South Africa After Racial Inclusion (Cornell University Press, 2022), I affirm these alternative narratives while seeking to move beyond an opposition between flawed elites and a virtuous Black working class. I do so by showing how the logics and practices of the former infiltrate the latter. Rather than glorify struggles from below, I aim to demonstrate their political complexity as well as their limitations.

My account draws on more than a decade of ethnographic fieldwork in the impoverished townships and informal settlements around Johannesburg, including 287 interviews with activists and ordinary residents. Focusing on precisely those areas where so-called “service delivery protests” were taking place, I found that resistance was rampant but also shot through with divisions. Local organizing reinforced cleavages based on wealth, urban geography, nationality, employment, and political views. I refer to this duality – the simultaneous proliferation and fragmentation of resistance – as fractured militancy.

To explain the simultaneous reemergence of popular mobilization and its fragmentation, I emphasize the dynamic interaction between class struggles from above and class struggles from below within the process of formal racial inclusion. My central argument is that the elite-led reorganization of South African capitalism, secured through racial inclusion and the transition from apartheid to democracy, both animated popular frustration and sowed the seeds of division. The reorganization failed to bring about fundamental changes to the distribution of wealth and income. For most Black residents, economic insecurity persisted, and feelings of betrayal provided a common foundation for the explosion of local protests. At the same time, though, the politics of capitalist reorganization encouraged narrow and competitive struggles over access to state resources. Residents isolated themselves from each other, antagonized workers and migrants within their own neighborhoods, and pursued divergent political projects.

In developing this argument, I draw on Antonio Gramsci’s theory of passive revolution, which refers to an elite-led reorganization of society that preserves the existing order through demobilization and limited reform. In South Africa, passive revolution took place through the process of racial inclusion. Racial inclusion facilitated passive revolution, encouraged strong feelings of betrayal, and ultimately helped to both generate and fragment popular resistance.

Scholars have increasingly deployed the concept of passive revolution to understand how elites absorb and thwart radical challenges. Rather than focus primarily on elites, however, I show how passive revolution represented both an elite response to popular mobilization under apartheid, and a source of fractured militancy in the post-apartheid period. On the one hand, passive revolution produced resistance by dangling the possibility of deeper change and then preserving economic inequality and insecurity. On the other hand, passive revolution fragmented resistance by demobilizing popular organizations and redirecting popular aspirations toward the government delivery of public resources.

Emphasizing a view from below, this is a story about precarious resistance, which has a double meaning. Against pessimistic accounts, I show that economically insecure groups do have the capacity for autonomous collective action. Their struggles, however, are often weak, localized, or fragmented, and they may waver between inclusionary and exclusionary positions. In short, if agency may emerge from precarious living conditions, that agency itself often remains precarious.

In the following passage from the “Preface” of the book for roape.net, I draw a parallel between racial dynamics in South Africa and the United States. In both places, formal racial inclusion brought continued economic insecurity and Black resistance. In the Conclusion of the book (not shown here), I argue that the “passive revolution through racial inclusion” took different forms in the two places and, in turn, produced divergent movements. Indeed, the persistent, localized, and fragmented community protests in South Africa look very different from the national Black Lives Matter movement that exploded in 2020 following the killing of George Floyd.

*

Preface” from Fractured Militancy: Precarious Resistance in South Africa After Racial Inclusion (Cornell University Press, 2022)

By Marcel Paret

Black liberation implies a world where Black people can live in peace, without the constant threat of the social, economic, and political woes of a society that places almost no value on the vast majority of Black lives. —Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, #BlackLivesMatter to Black Liberation

So you’ve come to see our horrible lives. This horrible place. This dirty place. It’s a pigsty. — Passerby in Motsoaledi informal shack settlement, Soweto, Johannesburg, South Africa, 2013

South Africa is a hotbed of protest. In April 2013, residents of the Elias Motsoaledi informal shack settlement—situated in the heart of Soweto, a previous epicenter of antiapartheid resistance—took to the streets. They demanded the provision of a formal housing development, which government officials had promised but failed to deliver. Later that year, residents of Bekkersdal, a township on the West Rand, followed with their own protests. Here the upsurge was a response to various grievances, including high grave tariffs, poor sewer infrastructure, and infrequent waste collection. The following April, residents of Tsakane Extension 10 (Tsakane10)—an informal shack settlement located on the East Rand—protested as well. They wanted the government to develop the area, and especially to relieve severe overcrowding. Three months later, back in the south of Johannesburg not far from Motsoaledi, residents of the Thembelihle informal shack settlement barricaded roads after the state removed their illegal electricity connections, which they relied on to cook, watch television, and light their shacks.

All four episodes took place along the historic Witwatersrand, a fifty-six-kilometer rock scarp where prospectors discovered gold in the late nineteenth century. The gold mining industry laid the foundation for what eventually became a massive metropolitan area of more than eight million residents, including the city of Johannesburg.[1]  Stemming from the colonial and apartheid legacy, extreme and racialized inequality define the area. It is marked by a contrast between rapidly diversifying affluent neighborhoods on the one hand and almost exclusively Black poor neighborhoods on the other.[2] Each of the episodes described above revolved around slightly different specific grievances, but they shared one fundamental similarity: they all emanated from predominantly Black urban residential areas ravaged by poverty and unemployment.

Far from aberrations, the protests reflected a much broader surge of popular resistance throughout South Africa. Local protests accelerated dramatically in the wake of the 2008–2009 global economic recession. Media outlets reported an average of close to one local protest per day, and police incident reports suggest that the true numbers were much higher.[3] The dramatic increase in South African protest resembled the rise in protest globally between 2009 and 2014. Following the Arab Spring, which included revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt and uprisings through-out the Middle East and North Africa, the global protest wave spawned anti-austerity protests in Greece, Spain, and Portugal; the Occupy movement in the United States; and popular revolts in Ukraine, Brazil, and Turkey. Some scholars likened the global protest wave to previous surges in 1848, 1905, and 1968.[4] In 2011, Time magazine declared “The Protester” its Person of the Year.

There were important parallels between South Africa’s protests and those taking place elsewhere.[5]  Unemployment and economic insecurity loomed large, as did frustration with government institutions that protected elites at the expense of ordinary people. Further, in South Africa as elsewhere, traditional organizational vehicles, such as trade unions and political parties, often played only peripheral roles. Beyond these similarities, however, a comparison is more of a stretch. One clear difference was their class basis. Scholars often traced the global protest wave to the declining fortunes and frustrations of middle classes and educated youth. Conversely, in South Africa the protesters were more economically insecure. They often scraped by through survivalist activities, small government cash transfers, and sharing through kinship networks. In South Africa, as well, the historical legacy of apartheid and national liberation shaped protests in a way that did not have a clear parallel in the iconic examples of the new global protests.[6]

Protests by Black residents in Ferguson and Baltimore, which shook the United States in 2014–2015, represented a closer parallel to South Africa’s local protests. Police killings of Black men—Michael Brown in Ferguson, Freddie Gray in Baltimore—provided the immediate triggers for resistance. The killings activated long-standing resentment, frustration, and anger. Like local protests in South Africa, the Ferguson and Baltimore protests emanated from Black residential areas marked by concentrated poverty and disproportionate levels of unemployment. The Ferguson and Baltimore protests also reflected a parallel history of racial inclusion, marked by the abolition of legalized and state-sanctioned racial exclusion. The shared images and memes that circulated through the networks of Egyptian revolutionaries, Spanish indignados, and American Occupy protesters hardly penetrated the townships and informal shack settlements surrounding Johannesburg. Neither were they major reference points in Ferguson and Baltimore. What mattered more in Johannesburg, Ferguson, and Baltimore was the failure of racial inclusion to deliver liberation.

Scholars have long emphasized parallels between the United States and South Africa with respect to racial domination and resistance.[7] In both places, the state implemented explicit and overt systems of legalized racial exclusion in the twentieth century, which in turn spawned vibrant Black movements for racial inclusion. In the United States, the civil rights movement challenged the legalized racism of Jim Crow, while in South Africa popular struggles challenged the racist apartheid state. The civil rights and anti-apartheid movements were, of course, very different, as were their targets and their eventual consequences. In South Africa, where Black residents represent approximately 80 percent of the total population, racial inclusion led to a major racial transformation of the state. The predominantly Black African National Congress (ANC) assumed power in 1994 and remains in power today. Conversely, Black residents in the United States, who only account for about 13 percent of the total population, never achieved the same measure of political power. Despite these contrasts, however, the parallels are instructive.

During the civil rights movement, Martin Luther King famously dreamed of liberation from racial oppression in his 1963 “I Have a Dream” speech in Washington, DC. Half a century later, in places such as Ferguson and Baltimore, the daily realities of unemployment, economic insecurity, police surveillance, and mass incarceration demonstrated the gap between the ideal of liberation and the realities of everyday life. As Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor puts it, “The young people of Ferguson had great reverence and respect for the memory of the civil rights movement, but the reality is that its legacy meant little in their everyday lives.”[8] In his classic poem “Harlem,” published in 1951, Langston Hughes famously posed the question: “What happens to the dream deferred?” In Ferguson and Baltimore, the deferred dream of liberation exploded in protest, as Hughes prophetically anticipates: “Maybe it just sags like a heavy load? Or does it explode?” [9]

In South Africa, the transition from apartheid to democracy brought a new constitution that abolished legalized racism and treated Black residents as full citizens with equal rights. On top of these legal changes, the ANC’s promise to provide a “better life for all” encapsulated the dream of Black liberation. As inequality and economic insecurity deepened, however, the better life proved elusive for many Black residents. With apartheid-era restrictions on movement lifted, the Black poor increasingly concentrated in peripheral urban areas where unemployment, poverty, informal housing, and limited access to water and electricity marked everyday life. For these residents, racial inclusion had severe limits. In the South African case, deferred liberation proved even more explosive. Widespread local protests became a staple of the post-apartheid landscape, and they show little sign of disappearing. The struggle for liberation continues, just as it did in Ferguson and Baltimore.

A further parallel revolves around the role of previous movement heroes. In the Ferguson protests, and later in the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement that they helped to spawn, young Black activists sometimes clashed with such established Black American leaders as Al Sharpton, Jesse Jackson, and representatives of the Congressional Black Caucus. Some BLM activists felt that the older generation had sold them out and had little understanding of their everyday struggles. This dynamic loomed even larger in South Africa, where former heroes of the anti-apartheid movement led the government. A deep sense of betrayal permeated the impoverished Black townships and informal settlements. Many resented that politicians appeared to pursue their own narrow interests, while the Black poor continued to await the promised better life. In South Africa, feelings of betrayal and resentment underpinned the consistent surge of local protests.

Police surveillance and mass incarceration did not define life in South Africa’s impoverished Black urban areas in the same way that they did in the United States. Issues of police brutality certainly arose in South Africa’s local protests, most often in response to police repression, but they were less central. Whereas the protests in Ferguson and Baltimore emerged through opposition to state violence, local protests in South Africa called on the state to provide resources, such as housing and electricity—what residents called “service delivery.” Race represented another crucial difference. Protests in Ferguson and Baltimore thrust racial disparity to the forefront. They highlighted how law enforcement disproportionately targeted and attacked Black residents and communities. Race did not figure as prominently in South Africa’s local protests, even if it always lurked just beneath the surface. Protesters referenced class identities as often as racial ones. References to “the poor” were prominent.[10] To be sure, racial inequality remains extreme in democratic South Africa. The urban poor are well aware that poverty remains concentrated among Black residents. In a situation, however, where Black politicians dominate the state, and where the Black middle class outnumbers the white middle class, race does not illuminate the challenge at hand in quite the same way.

The differences between the struggles for Black liberation in the two places came into focus in 2020, as the coronavirus crisis swept across the globe. In the United States, the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis reignited the BLM movement. Following the local uprising in Minneapolis, in which protesters burned down a police station, protests quickly spread across the country. Marking possibly the greatest mobilization in US history to date, the BLM protests of summer 2020 were remarkable for the wide geographic scope, the extension of protests beyond major cities and into small conservative towns, the widespread participation of fifteen to twenty-six million people, and the racial diversity among protesters.[11] Indeed, white participation in the protests surpassed what it had been during the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Each protest had its own inflections, and specific demands varied. Still, the resistance suggested a shared national opposition to police killings of Black residents and to what those killings implied about the unfinished character of Black liberation in the United States.

Meanwhile, in South Africa, local protests continued to proliferate. By one estimate, there were more than six hundred local protests in 2020.[12] In contrast to the American case, however, they remained highly localized and isolated from each other. There was no evidence of converging national resistance around a project of Black liberation. The following chapters attempt to explain the fragmentation of resistance in South Africa and, in turn, the lack of a broader social movement to address unfinished Black liberation. In South Africa, where the transition from apartheid to democracy was so dramatic and where economic inequality is so extreme, it is impossible to understand popular struggles separately from capitalism and the legacy of struggles for national liberation. My account emphasizes the importance of capitalism and its articulations, or entanglements, with the politics of national liberation and racial inclusion. I place specific emphasis on political dimensions of class struggle, from the compromises and maneuvers of elites to the collective formations of the economically marginalized. Three decades into the democratic period, these class struggles have continued to operate on the terrain of racial inclusion.

This book is about the ongoing quest for liberation, after racial inclusion. The quest for Black liberation in South Africa began long before apartheid and continued in its wake. Local protests for service delivery carry on the legacy of Black liberation struggle by asserting that Black lives matter and have value, even if protesters do not frame their struggles in racial terms. I tell this story through the lens of the four residential areas that feature in the opening paragraph—Motsoaledi, Bekkersdal, Tsakane10, and Thembelihle. My account is not celebratory. It is as much about the challenges that confront Black movements in South Africa as it is about their valiant resistance. History is crucial. The ways in which South Africa resolved—only partially—the contradictions of apartheid capitalism help us to understand why current struggles remain so fragmented. I draw a comparison to the United States not to suggest South Africa’s essential similarity. My aim, rather, is to highlight the historical dimension of racial inclusion. The advances and limits associated with racial inclusion shape Black movements today, from Ferguson to Johannesburg. They often do so in contradictory, and not necessarily fruitful, ways. Nonetheless, the struggle for liberation persists, seeking to realize dreams deferred.

Marcel Paret is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Utah and Senior Research Associate in the Centre for Social Change at the University of Johannesburg. He is co-editor of Southern Resistance in Critical Perspective and Building Citizenship from Below.

Featured Photograph: Housing Protest in Cape Town (19 September, 2012).

Notes

[1] This includes the Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni (East Rand), and West Rand municipalities.

[2] Owen Crankshaw, “Race, Space and the Post-Fordist Spatial Order of Johannes-burg,” Urban Studies 45, no. 8 (2008): 1692–1711.

[3] Peter Alexander, Carin Runciman, Trevor Ngwane, Boikanyo Moloto, Kgo-thatso Mokgele, and Nicole van Staden, “Frequency and Turmoil: South Africa’s Com-munity Protests 2005–2017,” South Africa Crime Quarterly 63 (2018): 35

[4] Mike Davis, “Spring Confronts Winter,” New Left Review 72 (2011): 5–15.

[5] For a comparison of South African and global protest, see Marcel Paret, Carin Run-ciman, and Luke Sinwell, Southern Resistance in Critical Perspective: The Politics of Protest in South Africa’s Contentious Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2017); Marcel Paret and Carin Runciman, “The 2009+ South African Protest Wave,” Journal of Labor and Society 19, no. 3 (2016): 301–319.

[6] For more on the contrast, see Marcel Paret, “The Politics of Local Resistance in Urban South Africa: Evidence from Three Informal Settlements,”International Sociology 33, no. 3 (2018): 337–356.

[7] George Reid Andrews, “Comparing the Comparers: White Supremacy in the United States and South Africa,” Journal of Social History 20, no. 3 (1987): 585–599; John W. Cell, The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); George M. Fredrickson, White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Anthony Marx, Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of the United States, South Africa, and Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Howard Winant, The World Is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy Since World War II (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

[8] Taylor, From #BlackLivesMatter, 161.

[9] Langston Hughes, “Harlem” (1951), accessed September 13, 2018, original emphasis.

[10] Ashwin Desai, We Are the Poors: Community Struggles in Post-Apartheid South Africa (New York: Monthly Review, 2002); Prishani Naidoo, “Struggles around the Com-modification of Daily Life in South Africa,” Review of African Political Economy 34, no. 111 (2007): 57–66.

[11] Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui, and Jugal K. Patel, “Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. History,” New York Times, July 3, 2020; Douglas McAdam, “We’ve Never Seen Protests like These Before,” Jacobin, June 20, 2020.

[12] This estimate refers to the number of protests by “residents,” as calculated by Kate Alexander and Lefa Lenka using the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) database and provided via personal communication. See figure 1 in the introduction for further details.

Varieties of rentier capitalism in Africa

In a contribution to ROAPE’s long-standing debate on Capitalism in Africa, Thomas Bierschenk and José-María Muñoz foreground the concept of rentier capitalism as a useful analytic for the case of Africa. While the empirical range of this concept has to this point retained a strong focus on the global North, Bierschenk and Muñoz introduce a collection of open access, free-to-download papers that suggest its relevance for understanding ongoing dynamics related to capitalist development on the continent.

By Thomas Bierschenk and José-María Muñoz

Recently, there has been a lively debate generated in Marxist-inspired political economy around the concept of rentier capitalism – an economic formation dominated by rentiers, rents, and rent-generating assets. This debate has concerned the Global North but – taking inspiration from recent empirical work that we have curated – we propose that the concept of rentier capitalism is a useful analytic for the case of Africa as well. In fact, few figures have captured global imaginations around the prowess of entrepreneurship in the African continent as Aliko Dangote. Yet, the irony that Dangote’s fortune was built on an economic sector where anticompetitive behaviour has been so prevalent and gross profit margins routinely reach 50% is often lost in popular portrayals of the Nigerian magnate.

Authors such as Piketty, Mazzucato, and Christophers argue that Marx underestimated the long-term importance of rents in capitalism, and that he was mistaken (as was Keynes) when he predicted that their importance would decline over time under the increasing influence of the market and competition. This literature understands rent as income derived from the control of scarce assets under conditions of no competition, and a rentier is the recipient of this income. The definition of rent and its distinction from what it is not – capitalist profit produced under conditions of free market competition – have been central to Western economic thought.

A Dangote outpost in Yagoua, a border town in northern Cameroon, May 2021. Copyright, José Munoz Martin.

Marx considered only landed property and interest-bearing capital as sources of rents; however, other rent-bearing assets have evolved and grown in importance over time: intellectual property rights, mineral resources, platform assets, long-term service contracts and infrastructures for the delivery of communication, energy, transportation, and similar services. With the growing importance of these rents, the economies of the Global North contain rentier capitalist elements to varying degrees; in extreme cases, they dominate to such an extent that entire economies, such as the UK’s, have been described as rentier capitalisms, characterised by a proprietary rather than an entrepreneurial ethos.

Rentiers are in a position to extract long-term payments for the use of scarce resources in the absence of relevant competition. They are inclined to sit on and sweat their income-generating assets rather than innovate, and in this regard they are not entrepreneurs in the Schumpeterian sense. Therefore, it is not surprising that, in spite of prominent efforts to identify contexts in which rents can be productive not only politically but also economically, the term continues to carry a stigma with it. Few people would like  to be characterised as a rentier.

While in the Global North it is companies that hold the bulk of society’s rent-generating assets, in Africa individuals play a relatively larger role, perhaps unsurprisingly given the comparatively low numbers of incorporated businesses there. Also, not all the types of rents mentioned are equally relevant to African economies. On the other hand, many African economies evolve around rents that are not given prominence by authors writing on the Global North or are mentioned only in passing. We are thinking here of financial transfers in the context of so-called development aid and of relational capital.

By this term, we mean privileged access to political elites who decide, for example, on the privatisation of state enterprises and on infrastructure contracts. Christophers refers to asset creation here as “simply knowing how to win contracts”. He also distinguishes analytically between “protecting assets” (e.g. from taxation, customs fees, and bribes), which is often a function of relational capital, in African countries and elsewhere, and “active lobbying by major owners of rental stock”. Lobbyists are thus key individuals in rentier capitalist contexts.

These theoretical considerations would also widen the empirical range of the “varieties of capitalism” debate which so far has retained a strong focus on the Global North. Many of the businesspeople’s practices dissected in our recent special issue of the journal Anthropologie et Développement can readily be related to the concept of rentier capitalism. For example, during Mozambique’s transition to a liberal market economy and the privatisation of state enterprises, the state became highly dependent on development aid. It is in this context that the national employer’s association (CTA) was founded with the help of development agencies. This is an institution in which the interests of the ruling political elite, businesspeople and donors intersect, and which predominantly creates opportunities for national business elites and international capital, with little spillover into the rest of the private sector.

Anésio Manhiça proposes the term “entrepreneur-broker”, which he translates from the emic Portuguese term homens de contacto (contact men), to designate actors who use their political contacts to gain privileged access to business opportunities. These contact men often have no equity and little business knowledge; they react opportunistically to business openings produced by state policy and the programmes of development agencies. For their part, the vast majority of small and medium entrepreneurs feel excluded from these networks and complain that their interests are poorly represented by the CTA.

Gérard Amougou describes a similar conflict between insiders and outsiders in Cameroon. The policy context here is one of “emergence”, a term used locally to encapsulate the ambition to make Cameroon an industrial, middle-income country by 2035. The resources and rhetoric of “emergence” as a platform are captured by state operators allied with a certain type of economic elite, which Amougou, adopting a term inspired by Jean-François Médard, labels entrepreneur-politiciens, actors who “straddle” the economic and political domains.

In other words, “emergence” does not represent a rupture. Rather, continuities with pre-existing political practices prevail, the central aim of which is to maintain the hegemony of the regime. However, many small and medium-sized entrepreneurs are excluded from these networks and demand a different definition of emergence that is more in line with their own interests.

In both Mozambique and Cameroon, the conflict between rentier capitalists and a group that feels excluded from political access lies at the centre of the analysis. Access is also the key concept for Sidy Cissokho. In his finely grained ethnography, he is interested in members of a regional organization at the interface of the public and private sector that aims to set the agenda for regional trade and transport in West Africa.

In a nod to Sylvain Laurens’ “brokers of capitalism”, Cissokho calls them courtiers de libre échange (brokers of free trade). Membership of this organization and participation in its regular meetings create a social proximity between entrepreneurs and state representatives; this entre-soi élitaire (a notion also used by Charlotte Vampo, which could be translated as the secluded sociability of elites) enables the former to fabriquer son accès (conjure one’s access), as Cissokho’s interviewees put it.

Meetings are occasions that make it possible to establish contacts with well-positioned public-sector actors and international development agencies that can then be used for personal goals, for example, in case of problems with customs or other authorities. The association and its meetings provide the opportunity for collective lobbying and propagation of the principles of free trade frontstage, while in the wings, they also allow for private lobbying.

In her analysis of the Association des Femmes Chefs d’Entreprises du Togo (AFCET), which was founded in 2001 with impetus from the International Labour Office (ILO), Vampo identifies a very similar tension between discourses and social dynamics. The members’ presentation refers to internationally fashionable progressive discourses on empowerment and defines their association’s goal as the promotion of women in the economy and society. De facto, however, the women active in the association are an economically, sociologically and ethnically restricted circle of well-connected entrepreneurs who are the heirs of an older generation of Nana Benz traders. They use their membership to gain and safeguard access to the government and guarantee their own economic interests as well as promoting the economic visibility of women. Despite all their discourses on the innovative character of entrepreneurship, therefore, these entrepreneurs are politically and socially rather conservative – their main concern is not to rock the boat with regard either to the government or to conventional gender roles.

The Chamber of Commerce in Douala, Cameroon, May 2021. Copyright, José Munoz Martin.

Agnès Badou and Thomas Bierschenk point to a similar collusion politico-économique in their analysis of the sprawling landscape of business associations of all shapes and sizes in Benin, where the larger business associations in particular follow the political strategies of their leaders rather than a logic of services for the benefit of their members. These organizations are in effect actors in regime politics, in la politique politicienne, as the government seeks to control them through a policy of divide and rule and co-optation to generate party political support and minimise opposition.

This continues a historical tradition to which we referred above, whereby successive governments have sought to capture and control the private sector, a continuity that is also observed by Amougou in Cameroon and Manhiça in Mozambique. In addition, it reveals a comparable tension between the official policy objective of developing the private sector and the government’s manoeuvres to control it, which ultimately greatly weakens these associations’ function of representing collective interests.

The numerous smaller associations, on the other hand, are closely interwoven into the social arena of international development policy. The establishment of these associations is often supported by development agencies (as described by Vampo for Togo and Manhiça for Mozambique, and alluded to by Cissokho in the case of regional trade organizations). In Benin, this has resulted in a high degree of fragmentation and thematic overlap. In addition, the limited duration of development programmes means that associations lose momentum when projects end, while others lose state support with a new government.

The concept of rentier capitalism competes with other terms with which it forms an overlapping discursive field. In recent decades, in addition to Polanyi’s overarching concept of “embedded capitalism”, terms such as “political capitalism”, “crony capitalism”, and “patrimonial capitalism” have been proposed. Political capitalism describes an economic and political system in which the economic and political elite cooperate for their mutual benefit – an exchange relationship that benefits both sides. The term political capitalism has been used primarily to describe Eastern European transformation processes after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Crony capitalism was initially associated to South-East Asian contexts but Cissokho, Manhiça and Vampo apply it (or rather, its French equivalent of capitalisme de connivence) to the African countries they are studying to underscore the role of social networks among political and economic players. Recently, there has also been mention of patrimonial capitalism, meaning a type of political economy in which power over it is highly personalised and economic exchange is particularistic and involves a high degree of relational capital.

We argue for the relative advantages of the concept of rentier capitalism when studying the economies of Africa. It is less colloquial than crony capitalism and does not have as strong normative associations as the alternatives. Crucially, it is not part of a typology that fundamentally sets Northern and Southern capitalisms apart, insofar as variants of rentier capitalism are found everywhere. Furthermore, it offers obvious connecting points to older debates on the rentier state and neo-patrimonialism.

Whichever one ultimately prefers, it should in any case be understood as an analytical term (an ideal type in the Weberian sense) that depicts aspects of a dynamic reality and does not claim to fully capture this reality within the framework of an essentialising, totalising and static typology. With these reflections, which can only be very brief here, we hope to open up a space for debate, to bring different research traditions into dialogue and to inspire further research perspectives.

However, we also would like to add a note of caution: As ethnographers, we remain sensitive to the difficulty of deciding empirically in given structural and situational contexts where exactly the boundary between capitalist profit and rent lies. Alexander Bud’s analysis of the commodification of domestic space in Nigeria and its coalescence with the hotel scene, on the one hand, and with film production, on the other hand, is a case in point, as he adds a welcome nuance to the theses on African variants of rentier capitalism.

He shows that in a rent dominated economy such as Nigeria’s, there may well be sectoral cases of entrepreneurial innovation and autonomous capitalist development. The innovative entrepreneurs being addressed in no way need to be found in manufacturing, as expected and demanded by supporters of active industrialisation policies. Rather, the focus on industrialisation policy may block the view of a potential interplay between consumer tastes and producer techniques that can be understood as genuinely capitalist while taking us away from a purely production-oriented understanding of economic value.

Abiriba, one of the most celebrated rural towns in Abia state, southeastern Nigeria. Copyright, Alex Bud.

Bud traces how film producers in Nigeria linked Nollywood with the housing and hotel sectors, and describes the innovative potential of these entanglements. This has produced a popular new architectural style for Nollywood houses, the transformation of homes and hotels into film locations and infrastructure, a star culture that enabled business activities in hotel bars and the emergence of entirely new types of space that merge film sets and residences in novel ways.

Remarkably, these dynamics have played out independently of state and international funding; in Bud’s account, this is a private sector developed without an active policy to promote it, comparable to the development of cocoa production in West Africa in
the early 20th century
, which happened, as it were, in a blind spot of colonial policy. Bud thus challenges the frequently cited thesis that there has been no significant economic structural change in Africa since 1973, and he invites us to reconsider traditional understandings of economic sectors. He also challenges widespread views on houses and hotels as unproductive assets and shows them to be integral parts of such celebrated drivers of economic transformation as the film industry.

However, as Helmut Asche points out in his afterword to this special issue, whether the dynamics in the Nigerian film and hospitality sector represent a better escape route from an economic environment that, in spite of recent ambitious investments by Dangote and others, is still marked by a lack of manufacturing and agricultural diversification remains an open question. We may also wonder whether experiences akin to that of the creative industries in Nigeria can be found or reproduced elsewhere in the continent.

Ethnographies of entrepreneurs, business associations, and rentier capitalism in Africa‘, Anthropologie et développement (Volume 52, 2021).

Thomas Bierschenk is Professor of Anthropology and Modern African Studies at the Gutenberg-University Mainz, Germany. He has published widely on development and the state in French-speaking countries of West and Central Africa.

José-María Muñoz is a senior lecturer at the University of Ediburgh’s Centre of African Studies. Throughout his career, he has put his training in anthropology and law to the service of a better understanding of economic dynamics in West and Central Africa.

Featured Photograph: The Chamber of Commerce in Douala, Cameroon, May 2021. Copyright, José Munoz Martin.

What is the role of the radical intellectual in Uganda ?

In early January 2019, Ugandan activist, and University of Cornell doctoral student Bwesigye Mwesigire was violently attacked on a bus in Uganda and sent into a three-day coma because of his political work. Four years later, he explains what led to the attack and makes some observations on the role of the intellectual in the Ugandan situation. Through this piece, he informs us about the importance of international solidarity, the challenges facing opposition to dictatorship in Uganda, and how radical intellectuals can potentially relate to the masses.  

Bwesigye Bwa Mwesigire

The Beginnings

In autumn 2017, during the first semester of my PhD at Cornell, I began to seriously think about the role of the intellectual in revolutionary times while partaking in the Post-colonial Studies and the Black Radical Imagination course. My comrade Zeyad and I were assigned with preparing a presentation on that topic for that class. We read C.L.R James’ wonderful Montreal Lectures, You Don’t Play With Revolution and secondary material about him. At the same time, we looked at how Gramsci’s concept of Organic intellectual or Grant’s Vernacular intellectual could help us better understand the life and work of black revolutionaries like CLR James. More importantly, as a PhD student committed to “making revolution”, the course led me to ask myself what does it mean to not play with revolution, today?

A year later, this line of questioning drew me to the practice of left-wing international solidarity. On one occasion, Zeyad, who had become my friend, asked me to give a talk at the Geneva (New York) Branch of the Party for Socialism and Liberation after I told him about the arrest of my friend and comrade Dr Stella Nyanzi. The purpose of the conversation would be to raise international awareness about Dr Stella Nyanzi’s incarceration and persecution. The party held a monthly “Peace Talk” series. After he had consulted with his comrades, it was confirmed that I would address the Geneva branch of the party about “United States Imperialism and Uganda”. I would weave Stella Nyanzi’s incarceration into the larger narrative of the US exploitation of Uganda through the puppet presidency of Yoweri Museveni. In the talk, I mentioned the mass-based formations of the People’s Government then led by Kizza Besigye, and the then new People Power movement led by Robert Kyagulanyi, alias Bobi Wine. I sought to put Stella Nyanzi’s persecution and these movements in conversation but more importantly, to frame them as Left-leaning, or worthy of the ideological solidarity of the Western Left and the Black International Left.

I understood my role, as a PhD student located in the United States, as that of mobilizing solidarity with the mass movements of the Ugandan people. Stella Nyanzi, as an incarcerated intellectual and writer-activist figure, was an entry point to dissecting how contemporary tyranny in Uganda is still primarily about United States Imperialism. One could say that the Marxist anti-imperialist analysis of the Uganda situation was an entry point for seeking solidarity with the cause to free Stella Nyanzi, from the International Black and Western Left. That peace talk was delivered on November 30, 2018. I went home to Uganda, about a week after that.

The Attack in Uganda 

The attack came as I travelled by bus from home in the southwestern part of the country, to the capital, to arrange my return to the United States for the Spring 2019 semester. Over a hundred people from all walks of life who knew about me and my anti-dictatorial work in Uganda and abroad mobilised a support fund to cater for my medical costs. Some people who have never met me in person, but knew of my political work, of the conditions in which the attack happened were very essential in drumming up support for my treatment. I emphasise this because we started with the role of the intellectual in a situation ripe for revolution. Correct or incorrect, I had seen my role as a PhD student in the United States as seeking solidarity with the struggle in Uganda, from that location. I believe the attacks I suffered on January 19, 2019, were because of this work. 

After I physically recovered, on a visit to Stella Nyanzi in jail, she was so convinced that the reason I was attacked was because of my cultural and intellectual work. She particularly noted that my work bringing together artists, academics, writers, and other intellectual and cultural workers was a threat to the Museveni tyranny. As I further recuperated, I stayed in Uganda and coordinated an online and offline solidarity movement around Stella Nyanzi’s persecution and incarceration. With many comrades, I will list as many as I can, elsewhere, we continued to talk about her imprisonment. We wrote we petitioned, and we agitated. We spread her words, including releasing poems she had written while in jail. First to celebrate her birthday, and second in a collection that came out ahead of her eventual acquittal and release.

The question of the role of the intellectual in a situation ripe for revolution didn’t go away when Stella Nyanzi was released. I was already in the United States, and it was the early days of the Covid19 pandemic when Stella Nyanzi was released. After a brief hesitation, it was announced that the 2021 periodic Ugandan national elections would happen despite the pandemic. It was obvious to every eye, ear, nose, skin and tongue that Museveni would lose if the election were fair, even if his main opponent was a cow or even a rock. The point of periodic elections in Uganda is to satisfy the nominal requirements of liberal democracy. They are a staged spectacle and not a measure of the people’s will or the majority’s choice of who to lead them.

A Tyrant’s Massacre 

Ugandan police arrest and detain radio presenter overnight - Committee to Protect Journalists

Even by their own macabre standards, Museveni’s tyranny outdid itself in cracking down on the masses during the election. When Bobi Wine was arrested on allegations that he had flouted COVID-19 guidelines, protests erupted and to contain them, Museveni ordered (overtly or by omission) a massacre of protesting and non-protesting civilians. The actual number of the dead and injured in the massacre is unknown. Museveni says they killed about 50 people. The numbers are much higher. This massacre happened in November 2020. A lot of violations had taken place before the massacre. Slightly over a year before the massacre, Makerere university students staged a strike protesting tuition fee increment. They called the protest #FeesMustFall. It was led by women students. The leader was not only brutalized into a coma but also expelled from the university. Male-only student halls of residence were raided by the military and hundreds of residents were beaten, to the point most were hospitalized. 

Beyond question, the winner of the 2021 election was Bobi Wine just as Kizza Besigye won 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016 elections and Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere could have won the 1996 election. The choice of the masses, the majority of Ugandans, has never been Museveni. It doesn’t matter the qualities and attributes of the alternative. Even a cow or a rock can poll better than Museveni. The masses can’t forget about decades of murder and brutalisation, not to mention enabling the economic exploitation of the country, even the continent when it comes to polling day. If we consider the use of Museveni family-owned security companies in Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States, the geographical scale of the complicity becomes transcontinental. The masses know of this reach of his brigandage. He can never win over the masses. He can never get earnest domestic favour. The masses are not stupid. The masses are wise. The collective is always right. The masses know that Museveni is not good for them. They have suffered the direct brunt of his tyranny. 

But the question remains, what is the role of the intellectual in this situation? A situation where there’s extreme suppression of the masses, and extreme exploitation of their resources, is a situation ripe for revolution. What is the intellectual’s role in this situation?

The role of the intellectual

Does the intellectual, on paper draw out the plan for the perfect revolution? Does the intellectual counter the efforts of those seeking to end tyranny by pointing out how imperfect they are? Does the intellectual agonise over the ideological correctness or incorrectness of the rock or cow that the masses vote for?

Bobi Wine has shown himself to be allied with US imperialism through his “ill” or arguably well-calculated gestures on the international scene. The first note of this ideological leaning was obvious after he endorsed Juan Guaidó, US puppet-in-chief in Venezuela. The second of these loud declarations was his endorsement of the NATO and Ukrainian side in the current conflict with Russia. It takes no rocket scientist to see that Bobi Wine’s strategy for ending Museveni’s tyranny is a US-backed revolution. 

A US-backed revolution was earlier attempted during and after the 2011 election by Besigye who directly used Gene Sharp’s From Dictatorship to Democracy as a key text for political education among activists of the age. It didn’t work. The radical intellectual in the C.L.R James model discerns an ideological crisis with US-backed revolutions. No change that directly involves the masses or that works to their benefit could occur through such a revolution. Exploitation is bound to persist. They do not resolve the primary contradiction. It would only be a matter of time before the direct military brutalisation returns or worse. Some may say that a US-backed revolution would give them a minute to catch their breath as superficial reforms would happen to prove the liberalism of the US-supported revolution. 

However, the idea that a US-Backed revolution provides short-term relief is a dangerous one. I think that there’s a need for mass political education at all layers of society so that connections between the Museveni tyranny and the United States Imperialism it serves are made and contended with. The intellectual, therefore, needs to create study groups, to popularise radical ideology, and other such activities that can constitute what Gramsci called a counter-hegemony. 

The difficulty for the radical intellectuals operating in the current circumstances concerns relating to Ugandans oppressed by Museveni’s regime, incarcerated, disappeared, brutalised, and murdered. Far too often political mobilisation by intellectuals has slipped into a shallow political contest of who has the best buzzwords, slogans and ideological line. But this contest fails to address that people bear physical scars. People are still suffering symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. We have lost friends, comrades, colleagues, and relatives. The ideological analysis is important as it enables us to understand the nature of our problem and guides us towards action. However, opposition to Museveni has too often slipped into sloganeering by those who pose as the real representative of the masses while failing to take the question of imperialist intervention in the country seriously. The intellectual who engages in phrase-mongering in the face of the mourning masses further gets alienated from them. The masses know when intellectual criticisms serve no revolutionary purpose. 

Before radical intellectuals proselytise, they should engage in concrete action to relate to the masses. Can they first get life-saving medicines and treatment for their suffering? Can those under direct threat from the regime first get out of the country? Can the traumatised get therapy to deal with their PTSD? And then perhaps get into a program of political education and consciousness-raising. Finally, can radical intellectuals pause and listen to what the masses are demanding? 

Does it take an intellectual to know that someone who was fired from a job because they are a threat to tyranny has no source of income and needs actual financial support? I do not think so. It takes a human being. Che Guevara said everyone who trembles at injustice is his comrade. Let us first be humane comrades, and then intellectuals later. We must remain informed about the stage of the struggle from those most impacted and react accordingly. The wounds are still bleeding. Let us do what is necessary. The struggle continues.

Bwesigye Bwa Mwesigire was born in Uganda. He is an instructor in the Institute of African Studies at Emory University, while working towards defending his PhD (English) dissertation titled “Afro-Nationalism: The Transcontinental Poetics of New African Diaspora Fiction” at Cornell University. He is a member of the Ubuntu Reading Group publishing collective.

Lessons to Africa from Africa – reclaiming early post-independence progressive policies

ROAPE’s Ray Bush reviews a collection of essays which grapple with early post-independence development projects and policies in Africa. Bush argues that the lessons in this collection are relevant for understanding the constraints and opportunities for radical African transformation in the 21st century.

By Ray Bush

The new year ushered in the usual array of tropes on Africa.  They include why the continent is failing, what it should be doing better and why it has so much resilience in dealing with its own frailty. One recent ‘take’ that does little more than repeat tired mantras of the international financial institutions comes from Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Displaying limited astuteness, the EIU notes the challenges ahead for Africa in terms of internal and external shocks although most of the continent will ‘weather the storm and continue to grow’.  It seems that the limited number of resource rich economies will benefit from high commodity prices but the usual list of chaotic consequence for the continent remains – somewhat undifferentiated – high debt servicing costs, political instability because of election cycles, geopolitics and war, and food insecurity ‘caused by conflict and adverse weather conditions’.

It is a great pity that the EIU, and other western organisations, ignore the analysis of African scholar-activists and the historical backdrop to the continents contemporary crises. Wilful neglect of such analysis leads to the failure to understand why and how different African countries are in the mess that they are and why the mess has structural continuities and conjunctural discontinuities.

The antidote to western ‘think tanks’ and journalists is the superb collection of essays in the quarterly bilingual journal of CODESRIA. The issue emerges from the Post-Colonialisms Today project that is a research and advocacy initiative ‘recovering insights from early post-independence Africa, and mobilising them through a feminist lens to address contemporary challenges’. The project began in 2017 with a collective of African activist intellectuals from across the continent. There were six in the working group, six advisors, eight researchers and three in the secretariat. The outcome of the collective, its range and insight is difficult to capture in a short review but there are two continuous themes among contributors: the importance of revisiting the historical past and the significance of sovereignty, or the absence of it.

The collection challenges ‘the continued hegemony of neoliberalism in policymaking in Africa’ (p. 4). The detailed and expansive introduction by  Tetteh Hormeku-Ajei, Aishu Balaji, Adebayo Olukoshi and Anita Nayar notes the amnesia about how early post-independence leaders tried to secure the ‘newly-won freedom of their countries through policies that were designed…to promote autonomous development processes anchored on the demands and needs of a home market’ (p. 1).

Julius Nyerere, for example, rebuked the International Financial Institutions (IFI) when they accused him of failure, noting that at independence, Tanzania had just two trained engineers, 12 medical doctors and 85 per cent of the country were illiterate – after 43 years of British colonial rule. Tanzania under Nyerere’s leadership, in contrast, ensured 91 per cent literacy, all kids were in school and per capita income grew dramatically.  After reluctantly accepting IFI diktats, key social and economic indices plummeted. Nyerere had asked the IFI representatives to have some humility yet as the authors here remind us, the heart of the neoliberal project was to discredit the first 20 years of African post-independence development.

In discrediting the early policy and strategy of many African states, the IFIs provided a narrative to explain the importance of what became the ruinous years of structural adjustment. The IFIs critiqued the foundational values of autonomous and autochthonous development. Yet while the neo-liberal project discredited African strategy and practice, often to try and disengage from the deleterious consequences of post war international capital, this collection highlights that the idea of African post-independence failure was manufactured and ‘deliberately misleading’ (p. 2).

Compared to the lost development decades of structural adjustment in 1980s and 1990s, the first twenty years of post-independent Africa had promise and was influential in trying to reverse the colonial inheritance. African, mostly radical leaders, Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah, Ahmed Ben Bella, Kenneth Kaunda, Hastings Banda and Jomo Kenyatta were often successful, although sometimes for only a brief period of time, in addressing political and economic fragmentation and especially reliance on primary commodity exports for income generation.

The authors in the six chapters of this collection explore how several African leaders recognised their country’s subordinate position in the global system and understood the importance of assembling African agency to address and change that relationship. A unifying theme in the collection is that ‘Decolonisation across Africa brought about historical changes; it was a moment of solidarity, optimism, and radical rethinking of political and economic systems’ (Sara Salem, p. 160). That contemporary rearticulation of colonial relationships has reproduced the problem of earlier independence leaders.

Yet the early leaders deployed different approaches to reduce dependence upon former colonial powers and did so by promoting nation building, industrialisation, economic and agricultural diversification, pan-Africanism and the development of a new economic order. Ultimately, however, as Nkrumah noted the new ‘independent’ state may have had the trappings of power but it was independent only in theory.  It did not have meaningful sovereignty that could confront the externalisation of policymaking and prevent the stalling of industrialisation. The newly independent states were hollowed out vehicles for the extraction of Africa’s wealth and resources to enrich the global north.

One vehicle to challenge northern economic imperial domination was the emergence of a pan-African agenda. This theme is examined by Jimi Adesina who reviews variations and similarities of Léopold Sédar Senghor, Julius Nyerere and Kwame Nkrumah in their approaches to socialism, pan-African unity, nationhood, economic development, epistemology and democracy.  He concludes that there was the need in the early post independence period, and again today, to develop and mobilise the full range of domestic resources to reduce dependence on external interests. In doing this it is crucial to generate a ‘macro vision’ to coordinate resources and maintain sovereignty. In their different ways the three African leaders discussed by Adesina tried to do this, with variable success.

Adesina’s review is important and necessary. He reminds us of the crucial Nyerere leitmotif  ‘unity’ (p. 49) and the obstacles to it. These include the variable capacity across the continent to challenge imperialism. He also reminds us of the importance of not reifying African leaders and the importance of the ‘diversity of postcolonial imaginations’ and quoting Nyerere again, ‘the sin of despair would be the most unforgivable’ (p. 54). So too however, would be an equally foolish optimism that is not grounded in material analysis of existing radical social forces and the power of imperialism. This latter is not a much used term in African studies but it is clear that unless imperialism is understood and challenged, new agendas for pan-Africanism or the reconstitution of sovereign national projects and policy autonomy will wither on the proverbial vine.

Attempts to formulate a national project that might challenge imperial interests is explored by Kareem Megahed and Omar Ghannam. They review Gamal Abdel Nasser’s attempts to industrialise Egypt’s economy.  Despite many achievements they argue that the project was limited by the amount of cultivated land and the needs for increased investment. Much of the undeveloped industrial sector needed to be built from scratch and the capitalist class was weak. They do concede that Nasser’s land reform and new tenancy laws transformed large sections of rural Egypt empowering the fellahin even though the reforms did not erase the power and influence of old feudal elites. Their main argument, however, is that while the new incumbents of Nasserist state often used words like ‘socialism’ and ‘planning’ they did ‘not actually, as is commonly believed, implement a central planning nor a socialist approach’ (p. 67). Capitalist property and the rights for the bourgeoisie were untouched.  The domestic capitalist class was weak in the pre-1952 period and dominated by imperialism. The failure of the local capitalist class to make long-term investments in productivity accelerated a state-led strategy to industrialisation.

Megahed and Ghannam provide a useful reflection on the external and internal limitations of Nasser’s post-colonial project. They note Samir Amin’s observation regarding the difficulties of effective planning if there are a number of independent centres of power and the various centres of decision-making, resulting in the prevalence of different criteria of implementation and quality’ (p. 88).  The inherited and restricted industrial base limited the development of broad-based industrial strategies and there was only a limited stock of skilled cadres.

The biggest critique however, and probably the most controversial, although not entirely new, is that Nasser ‘attempted to give workers a measure of economic freedom and progress without giving them the political means to protect these very gains’ (p. 89). One of the reasons why the project fell apart, despite many gains in productivity and improvement in the well being of the poor ‘was the lagging of democratic workers’ representation, which allowed the project to be highjacked’ (p. 92). But perhaps here was a real bind for Nasser, soimprovement in living standards for farmers and the industrial working class may not have been possible at the pace it was achieved without the strong arm of the Egyptian state amid the challenging global and regional context that threatened Nasser’s Egypt. Nasser tried to break from the imperialist system but he failed. Upon his death in 1970 economic liberalisation accelerated and this leads to an important conclusion: ‘if we seek to overturn or to merely reshape the capitalist totality, created and maintained by imperialist powers, we cannot fight it piecemeal’ (p. 91).

Akua Britwum draws attention to the still under-researched importance of agricultural transformation in challenging uneven incorporation into global capitalism and in trying to plot a strategy for sovereignty. She explores this topic in the cases of Ghana and Tanzania reflecting on the need for national self-sufficiency and development planning as a mechanism linking all sectors of the economy. She reminds readers of not only the historical significance but also contemporary relevance of the key strategic potential of the state in production, distribution and employment creation. She notes the problem in Ghana and Tanzania, that stretches across Africa, of dependence upon cash crop production for (limited) income creation and the marginalisation of women. The contrast between Nkrumah’s seven year development plan and Nyerere’s Arusha Declaration raises questions of what was seen to constitute development. It also begged the question whether the rhetoric deployed by both leaders that viable development alternatives were possible based on ‘a brand of socialism that they identified as African’ (p. 110).

Britwun’s analysis goes beyond her detailed case studies. She makes important observations about contemporary constraints on development in Africa.  She effectively notes how the absence of sovereignty continues, and this is evident in the ‘failure to fully delink national economies from the global capitalist political economy that [had] positioned African countries as primary producers’ (p. 128). This meant there was no end to the dependence on ‘earnings from cash crop exports to finance development expenditure’ and any influence the state may be able to exert over productive resources was limited by the way national economies were part of the broader capitalist system.

Britwun is scathing about the failure of independence to reduce patriarchy and how the Ghanaian and Tanzanian development plans failed to recognise that gendered stratification is ‘inimical to national development’ (p. 133). She does make clear that there were positive lessons for development planning that resulted from the Ghanaian and Tanzanian experiences. The strength of the development plans was ‘their sturdy ideological focus that led them to prioritise domestic needs’ the state was a ‘principal economic actor’ and agriculture was central to development planning’ (p. 130). Nkrumah and Nyerere’s imperatives of African socialism provided an important, although not long lasting, ‘ideological grounding in the imperative of African socialism’ (p. 131).

This collection of outstanding essays is constantly grappling with how was it possible to promote development plans in a post-colonial Africa dominated by imperialism? The limitations of beginning from scratch or dealing with the hand that colonial exploitation had dealt is noted in the Egypt case, in Tanzania and Senegal, and Ghana in the context where political leadership became a substitute for limited means of production to liberate states from imperialism.

In Tunisia, Chafik Ben Rouine reminds us how before neo-liberalism the country’s central bank helped mobilise resources to facilitate post-independent agrarian reforms and industrial strategy. He highlights the historical experience of a central bank succeeding in mobilising, controlling and channelling credit to the needs of the national economy. Ben Rouine notes how the 1960s was a period where the state tried to develop a vision of decolonisation and self-centred development with a ten year plan which ultimately floundered on ‘trust in external financial support, an overly centralised bureaucracy’ that didn’t understand the specificity of Tunisian agriculture with a ‘vision of development too focused on the West’ (p. 156). Tunisia’s limited, but important attempt at great autonomy from the world capitalist system floundered after structural adjustment in 1986 and neo-liberalism’s tenet of central bank independence – or rather securing the interests of capital.

The volume is tied together by Sarah Salem’s excellent contribution on radical regionalism, feminism, sovereignty and the Pan-African Project.  She argues that sovereignty in the immediate post-independence period was seen as a regional, pan-African and internationalist project of decolonisation. As we have noted, however, and as the volume instructs, the capacity of newly independent African states to generate a sovereign identity and practice was, and continues,to be, shaped by their subordinate position in the world economy.

Salem highlights the role that African feminists had in shaping policy that challenged colonial structures of global capital including policy of industrialisation and nationalisation to promote independent development. She highlights the important role that ‘regionalism’ played in doing this, which is a term she deploys to ‘refer to a state policy of continentalism across Africa’. Regionalism for Salam refers to ‘the Third Worldist belief in various decolonised regions coming together to confront capitalism’ and is part of emerging Pan-Africanism (pp. 160-161). Salem creates an analysis that pushes the debate about Pan-Africanism to explore ‘radical regionalism’ and feminist contributions to generate agency and sovereignty that ‘incorporates gender into debates around African independence’ (p. 162). Here she addresses concerns about methodology – how to access what it was that women and women’s organisations said, approaching archival material to ‘look for clues between the lines’ (p. 163). Salem explicitly addresses and problematises formal sovereignty or legal decolonisation noting as other contributors do that sovereignty actually requires economic and political independence.

The lessons revisited in this collection apply to understanding the constraints and opportunities for meaningful African sovereignty in the 21st century. It is salutary and somewhat depressing to reflect on the ways in which attempts at autonomous post-colonial development were constantly knocked back by the forces of imperialism. Yet they also provide the tools for understanding and confronting contemporary imperialism, of the need to interrogate the foolish mantra’s of the IFIs and the triad of the US, EU and Japan. The contemporary crisis of global capitalism offers opportunity to challenge imperial hegemony and to do so with radical political and social mobilisation by farmers and workers in Africa.

Lessons to Africa from Africa.  Reclaiming Early Post Independence Progressive Policies’.  Guest Editors – Teteh Hormeku-Ajei and Adebayo Olukoshi, Africa Development (vol 47 no. 1, 2022).  

Ray Bush is Professor Emeritus of African Studies at the School of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) at the University of Leeds. He is also a leading member of the Review of African Political Economy’s Editorial Working Group.

Featured Photographs: Akosombo Dam on the Volta river in Ghana spilling water through floodgates (20 November 2010).

“Whoever wins we must continue to fight” – Nigeria’s coming election

ROAPE speaks to Nigerian socialist and activist, Alex Batubo, about the elections this month, and the political and economic situation in the country. Batubo focuses on the struggle of labour, and the possibilities of a radical alternative emerging from the challenges (and opportunities) of the present.

***

ROAPE: Can you please describe the situation in Nigeria at the moment, the major political and economy fault-lines and divisions? Also, if possible, describe last year’s strikes, and the situation for the labour movement.  

Alex Batubo: As in many countries across the world, the common people in Nigeria have suffered from the ravages of neoliberalism over the last two decades and more. The economy has certainly grown since the end of military rule in 1999. In real terms the GDP is now at least three times bigger than it was two decades ago. In addition, the economy has been transformed. The government now depends for less than half of its income on the export of crude oil. The manufacturing sector of the economy is currently around 13% and is larger than the oil and gas sector.

Despite this huge economic growth and transformation, most people are now poorer than they were two decades ago. A recent survey by the National Bureau of Statistics found that 63% of the population or around 130 million people are now ‘multi-dimensionally’ poor. Half the population do not have access to safe drinking water or electricity. Most power stations are powered by gas and yet suffer from intermittent gas supplies when gas flaring is common across the Niger Delta (this is the largest contribution to climate change across sub-Saharan Africa).

Abject poverty for the majority continues with unbelievable wealth accruing to the rich minority. Whilst the majority of the population are poorer, the rich are now rich beyond their wildest dreams. Dozens of executive jets arrive for society weddings. Purchases of properties by the Nigerian elite has a significant impact on the cost of housing in London, for example. Aliko Dangote, the richest of the elite is now richer than anyone in Africa and almost anyone in Britain.

The rich elite have stolen all of the oil wealth, so most people are as poor as anywhere across Africa and the quality of public education and health is one of the lowest. Certainly, government spending on health and education is significantly below the average for governments across sub-Saharan Africa.

This poverty, inequality and corruption is the reason for rise of rampant insecurity. Crime, kidnapping and cattle rustling have exploded since the restrictions arising from the COVID-19 pandemic decimated the informal sector. The trade unions have been active but have not provided a successful alternative. So, a minority of the desperate poor have turned to individual violence.

Yet since 2000, we have seen a wave of strikes including several general strikes. Unfortunately, in most cases, these strikes have been tightly controlled by the trade union leadership and have not actively involved individual trade union members. They have been ‘stay at homes’ rather than the militant active strikes that are needed to terrify the government and the ruling class.

So, for example, last year, the university lecturers were on strike for eight months, closing all the public universities. The workers at all the government research institutes were also on strike for more than a year. In each case they were striking over the failure of the government to implement previous agreements. Both of these strikes ended in defeat because the trade union federation, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) failed to provide the necessary solidarity.

The frustrating thing is that we know what is necessary for the movements to win. The NLC organised impressive rallies in solidarity with the striking university lecturers last year, in all 36 state capitals at the end of July. At the rally in Abuja, the general secretary of the NLC even announced a realistic strategy to win. He said that if the government did not act within two weeks a three-day general strike would be called. If the government then failed to act in the following two weeks, he warned, an indefinite general strike would be organised. Unfortunately, the NLC took no steps to implement this strategy, so finally the lecturers returned to work defeated and never received their monthly salaries for the period of the strike.

In May 2021, the NLC organised a three-day general strike in one of the states. This was an active strike involving all the workers in the state. The electricity was cut off, the schools and banks, for example, were all closed. In addition, daily demonstrations took place in the streets of Kaduna led by the president of the NLC.

But then, after three days, the NLC called off the strike immediately it was invited to talks by the government. Over the next year the governor who had been forced onto the ropes by the strike action, regained his confidence and once again sacked thousands of teachers including the national president of the Nigerian Union of Teachers (NUT). No action was taken by the NUT nor the NLC over these attacks.

The trade union leaders have similarly failed to provide adequate political leadership. Though the trade unions established the Labour Party, they then failed to adequately ensure a consistent leadership in the party. This resulted in a split and a series of court cases. A former vice-presidential candidate of one of the two main political parties then joined the Labour Party and became its presidential candidate within four days. He was Peter Obi.

However, the NLC is still not providing consistent support for the Labour Party candidate and in return Obi is not openly supporting the NLC’s Charter of Workers Demands. An NLC leader is standing as a state governor under the ruling political party. Similarly, the NLC leadership in Lagos, the business capital, has come out in support for the ruling party. Total disarray.

As a result, Bola Tinubu of the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) is likely to win the presidential elections taking place in late February. Tinubu was the governor of Lagos State for eight years from 1999. He might have been less corrupt than many other governors but led attacks on the workers and their trade union leaders.

We hope that the new leadership of the NLC, to be elected at their four-yearly congress later in February, will reflect on these issues. However, we know that it will require pressure from the member trade unions and the rank-and-file of these unions to ensure that we have the active strikes and the solidarity that is necessary to win our demands.

And whoever wins the presidential elections we will need a militant trade union movement to start to reduce poverty, inequality, and corruption. No president will just give us a decent minimum wage with regular increments. We will have to force them to fund public education, health, electricity, and water for all.

Ahead of the elections, can we chat about some of the party-political developments? The PDP (People’s Democratic Party) was the ruling party from 1999 until 2015, after which the APC came to power with Muhammadu Buhari as president, with much fanfare and promises to stamp out corruption, to deal with insecurity, and tackle poverty and poor service provision etc. Can you talk us through Buhari’s tenure? 

In 2015, Buhari and the APC provided an optimistic manifesto. He promised to reduce corruption and use the money to adequately fund public education and health. As a result, he claimed he would eliminate insecurity, which at that time was largely limited to the North East. Many people hoped that Buhari would win the elections and implement his promises.

These hopes were completely dashed. Poverty, inequality, and corruption have all increased significantly in the last eight years. The resulting despair and the economic desperation of the majority of the population is the reason for the major rise in insecurity.

The value of the minimum wage has reduced to less than US$50 a month, one of the lowest in Africa. It has only been increased once since Buhari came to power, despite inflation at around 15 – 20% each year. This increase has not even been implemented in some states.

The proportion of the federal budget dedicated to education and health are now lower than when Buhari became the president. In 2015, more than 12% of the budget was to be spent on education, by 2021 this had fallen to less than 6% and it has not significantly increased since then.

Buhari promised change and he has certainly delivered that, unfortunately in the wrong direction. Most people are now poorer than they were eight years ago whilst the corrupt ruling class are laughing all the way to their banks in London.

Tinubu, the most likely next president, paid tens of thousands of US dollars to each delegate at the APC primaries to become their candidate. This money came from his continued draining of money from Lagos State, where his consultancy company still collects massive revenue, in his media empire.

There is limited hope that the next government will be any better and the opposition from the NLC still needs to be organised. The new president of the NLC will be elected unopposed at their congress later in February – he’s Joe Ajaero. He comes with a good reputation, but this is hardly deserved. He is from the electricity workers’ trade union – the General Secretary of the National Union of Electricity Employees (NUEE) – who have suffered privatisation since 2013 with very limited fight back. In addition, Ajaero led a five-year split from the NLC when he failed to be elected president in 2015.

Interestingly, and some would say, positively these elections are being contested by Peter Obi of the Labour Party. Many young Nigerians seem very excited about the candidacy of Obi. Can you talk us through the emergence of Obi, the history of the Labour Party and his programme for change in the Nigerian elections?  

We live by hope, many, especially the youth, have now placed their hope in Obi of the Labour Party. This is the optimism of the will, promoted by Gramsci. The pessimism of the intellect is that Obi is unlikely to be successful. He is a business tycoon who was the governor of Adamawa State for eight years. This background and his open support for neoliberalism does not really justify the faith that millions are placing in him.

what is more, Obi has not created a strong or broad enough coalition to win victory in the polls, let alone to become the next president. Until recently he was a leading member of the PDP that ruled Nigeria from 1999 to 2015. His alliance with the trade union movement has not been consummated, neither is it based on his actions when he was a state governor. However, the Labour Party leadership retreated, late last year, voting firmly and clearly to support the NLC’s Charter of Workers Demands. But no mention of this document is made in Obi’s manifesto. Similarly, this manifesto does not mention the Nigerian Labour Congress nor the need to implement a decent minimum wage.

Perhaps as a result, the NLC leadership are not providing consistent support for Obi as the Labour Party presidential candidate. The NLC support for the Labour Party has always been lukewarm and the NLC president is rumoured to have been a card-carrying member of the ruling party, the APC.

Despite this, Obi, as the candidate for the Labour Party has created a level of enthusiasm especially amongst the youth not seen for some time. This resulted in a series of mass rallies in many cities. These were largely attended through conviction rather than people being paid to attend, as is the tradition for the two major political parties. Plus, several opinion polls have indicated that Obi leads in terms of public support.

Whether this support is enough to bring victory is yet to be seen. Tinubu of the APC appears determined to use his stolen wealth and political support to win. His party holds both the Federal Government and most of the state governments and this power will probably determine the outcome, no matter who people actually vote for.

If, as you say, Obi does not fundamentally offer an alternative for Nigerians hungry for real change, can you tell us what needs to be done, and the state of the radical left across Nigeria, and regionally?  

The organised left is small and is split over the elections. The moderates are calling for support for Tinubu of the ruling party. They claim his is less committed to privatisation than the PDP candidate. Other parts of the left are calling for support for Omoyele Sowore who also stood in 2019 under the African Action Congress. He would need to receive 50 times as many votes to win this time.

Somehow, we need to be able to unite the left to argue and push for the NLC to lead an active and sustained campaign against poverty, inequality, and corruption, whoever turns out to be the next president.

In the medium term, we need to patiently re-build the radical left and attempt to create a viable electoral platform.

In the last two years or so Socialist Labour has begun to build a left current based on the need for the working class to lead active opposition to neoliberalism. We now have several hundred members on our supporters WhatsApp group. This is still small in a country with well over 200 million people, but it is significantly larger than the more established left groups.

International experience has shown that building a progressive or left electoral alternative faces considerable challenges. There are all too few successes from which we can learn. But it seems to me that we need to start from the grassroots and build some electoral success at the local level, rather than first demonstrating our weaknesses at the national level. We also need to build alliances with other progressive organisations, other radical groups and progressive civil society organisations.

The recent alliance between the African Action Congress (AAC of Sowore) and one wing of the northern based Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) provides some medium-term hope. This could be built as a militant alternative to the Labour Party. But it would be even better if all three (and more) of these parties came together in an electoral alliance.  There was talk of an alliance between the Labour Party and the New Nigeria People’s Party (NNPP) of the former Governor of Kano State, but this did not come to fruition.

However, there is a history of party hoping. Several governors in past were elected as Labour Party candidates or supporters only to leave after being elected. All the Labour Party candidates in Jigawa State recently left to join the ruling APC.

I believe strongly that the future, as the Polish socialist Rosa Luxemburg said, is socialism or barbarism. We have had more than our fair share of barbarism across Africa. The immediate economic prospects in Nigeria look poor, with a declining price of oil, government revenue is likely to fall, and all three leading candidates have promised to end the subsidy of the price of petrol by June. In these circumstances we need a robust, active, and sustained campaign by the labour movement. We all need to unite to try and deliver this.

Alex Batubo is a member of Socialist Labour and a trade unionist. He is now based in Abuja but comes from the Niger Delta.

Featured Photograph: Protesters at the end-SARS protest in Lagos, Nigeria (13 October 2020).

Lives invisible to power – an interview with Victoria Brittain

ROAPE’s Leo Zeilig interviews the radical journalist, campaigner, and writer Victoria Brittain. Brittain has spent a lifetime exposing the lies and destructions of Western imperialism and celebrating the resistance and hope of those who fight back. For decades, Brittain worked and lived in Africa, and struggled to get the voices of the oppressed heard, and their lives seen.

 *

Leo Zeilig: We are delighted to be able to interview you on roape.net. Speaking personally, your journalism and writing on Africa was a revelation to me in the late 1980s and 1990s, as I became aware of the world – providing extraordinary and radical coverage of the plunder and resistance on the continent, amid the narrative of coups, war, famine on Africa presented by most media outlets.

Can you tell us a little about yourself, and how you started writing, and your own politicisation? How did you become the radical writer and campaigner you are today?

Victoria Brittain: Thank you, Leo, for your interesting questions and for pushing me to take time to think about the past and to explain things I didn’t expect to.

Actually, it is all about luck, and the kindness of strangers. I was helped too by being an outsider, as a woman reporter then was, plus the timing of working in a period of journalism on a small canvas, unimaginable in todays’ transformed media world with the huge commercial pressures, plus the mass output in social media, blogs, podcasts etc.

My first job was in a weekly magazine, The Investor’s Chronicle – not a very likely place for someone no good at maths and with no interest in The City, but it happened because it was the only paper that replied to my many random letters to editors asking for a job. I think the editor gave me the job out of pity when he saw me for an interview – I was on crutches after a bad riding accident. In Tehran my horse slipped and fell with my foot still in the stirrup and I could barely walk for a couple of years. It was by chance and in desperation to find an independent life that I tried journalism – I had never read newspapers and had no knowledge of politics or the wider world.

Can you take us through your political background, and explain some of the formative moments in your work, writing and activism? I am thinking of the time you spent in Vietnam, reporting – along with others – on American imperialism, and resistance to it.

In fact, I had no political background. I was the under-educated product of a poor boarding school and a silent home life. It was my good luck to arrive in Washington DC in 1968 and to find myself in an unimaginable new world of high drama as anti-Vietnam war demonstrations and violent police reactions played out on the streets of the capital and in cities and campuses across America. I shyly joined the crowds in Washington.

Gradually I learned new names of academics, poets, priests, and others who I heard speak out against the war: Professors Noam Chomsky and Richard Falk, Dr Spock (already my guru as a new mother with a baby), the Berrigan brothers Daniel and Philip, Jesuit priests and poets.  I found the New York Review of Books with its elegant, scathing articles on the war, and I F Stone’s wonderful weekly newsletter with its extraordinary exposures of wickedness in US domestic politics. I was surprised by the emotion which hit me at the assassination of Martin Luther King, just a year after his blistering speech in Riverside Church condemning the immorality of the Vietnam war. Exposure to the issues of the Vietnam war and the US civil rights movements had opened doors of curiosity that my rural conservative background had kept sealed.

By chance the well-known New Statesman correspondent, Andrew Kopkind, who I didn’t actually know, asked me to cover his weekly column for a few weeks or months for reasons even then unclear to me. Had I perhaps met one of his friends in a demonstration? In early 1969 for the New Statesman, I found myself sitting on a bench in the street outside the White House with Ron Ridenhour, the young helicopter door gunner who had tried unsuccessfully to get US authorities and major media to report and investigate the US soldiers’ massacre of an entire Vietnamese village of women, children and old men at My Lai, or Pinkville as the US soldiers called it. He finally got Seymour Hersh, then of Pacific News Service to publish the first incendiary story, which Hersh followed with much more research in articles and books for many years.

Listening to Ridenhour it seemed that hours went by, and I was overwhelmed by the unimaginable horror of the scenes he described. I was out of my depth and staggered at the scale of the official coverup as he explained it all to me and I put it in my notebook for the Statesman. I was frankly clueless (I certainly didn’t know the word imperialism). But I really wanted to go to Vietnam and see this extraordinary world of America in Asia. I read and re-read Graham Greene’s The Quiet American, and I still didn’t understand it, but I was hooked.

A little later, back in London, the ITN News editor decided on the then radical idea of hiring a woman reporter, in fact two, and, oddly, he came to my house and asked me to do it. I didn’t like the camera and I was too shy to be any good, but I needed a job. One day he sent me on a three-week stint in Vietnam – my old dream. I went, entirely guided on the ground into soft short stories by my experienced and kind cameraman – he was Canadian and markedly different in his attitude from the patronising and hostile reactions I got from some of the British contingent. I wanted to stay in Saigon.

Another outsider, Louis Heron, foreign editor of The Times whom I knew slightly from Washington days gave me a chance when I approached him hearing his staff man was leaving. Louis took me to lunch, offered me a small monthly retainer and told me, “Remember, no story is worth dying for.”

I left London, with my small son and one-way tickets to Saigon. Two things made my Vietnam a different experience from other Western journalists, who were nearly all men. Living with my son meant I was with Vietnamese and French mothers and children at school and at the swimming pool – another world away from the male journalists’ social life.

Then, in the greatest stroke of luck, Mark Frankland, the distinguished, long-time Observer correspondent, passed on to me his exceptional translator and fixer, Mr Loc, to show me a Vietnam far from Western military and diplomatic briefings. Mark told me later that Mr Loc was hard to please, he would not work for a French or American journalist, he spoke French but no English, and he really only wanted to work with quiet, discreet, knowledgeable Mark Frankland. Mark promised Mr Loc I had the first two qualities and he, Loc, could work on the last.

Behind Mr Loc, riding pillion on his motorcycle, Vietnam’s people, not just the war, opened up for me. I sat and listened to Vietnamese villagers and farmers, schoolteachers, monks, ousted politicians, displaced widows with their families, lost and wounded children and their carers. I had found what I wanted to hear and write about – oppressed people, the majority, whose lives were invisible to those in power. Later, the struggle to get those voices themselves heard unmediated was central to my work.

Everywhere I saw great natural beauty and America’s unthinking destruction of place and people. I heard despair and what I would later learn to think of, in Southern Africa, as Dennis Brutus’s Stubborn Hope.[1]

You were a direct witness, and fellow traveller, to some of Africa’s liberation movements, not least the struggles in Angola against Portuguese colonialism (but also, of course, South Africa). Can you tell us about this period, and your experiences? What did reporting and writing over these years teach you about the role of British and American imperialism on the continent, and the experience of national liberation – not least the ways this liberation was terribly constrained?

I came to Africa in the late 1970s and spent two years in Algiers in the time of President Houari Boumédiène when Algeria was a central player in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation of African Unity. After what I had seen of American horror in Vietnam, I was ready to embrace the steep learning curve of Cold War politics in Africa, where America and its allies – notably neighbouring Morocco, busy with a military takeover of Western Sahara from Spain – were always in the wrong. The Polisario delegation in Algiers liked to perch in the Reuters’ office where I often was too, to watch the news ticker-tape for news of the World Court ruling on Morocco’s claim to their territory. We became friends, and when their declaration of independence of the Saharoui Arab Democratic Republic (RASD in its French acronym) was announced in Addis Ababa at an OAU summit, it was my birthday and their delegation insisted on a touching joint celebration. Visiting the desert refugee camp in Tindouf in southern Algeria, ignored beyond the Global South, later was an experience that combined the Saharoui inspiration at miraculous creativity in making a dignified life for those in the camp, with shock at the overwhelming injustice they faced. The thought came to be familiar to me among the Southern Africa liberation movements: MPLA, FRELIMO, ANC, and SWAPO.

When we left Algiers one Algerian minister, hearing we were moving to Nairobi said, with a sly smile, “perhaps you will enjoy life more in the perfect neo-colonial setting.” He was right – five years in Kenya was privileged living, and between the beauty of the place and exceptional new friends cemented my love of the continent. The work, in the nearby countries of Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and even the Seychelles, covered coups, wars, famine and dramatic U turns in geo-political alliances of the Cold War which were huge changing stories with so much to try to understand.

I was lucky again after Nairobi with a part time dream job in London at the Guardian in the 1980s editing an experimental page called Third World Review (TWR) where almost all the writers were from the Global South. I have written elsewhere (Radical Moments at the Guardian) about that unique experience which educated me on other continents beyond Africa and Asia, by people who lived, or were exiled from, them. As in Saigon, my, by then two, children gave me a different pattern of work from most journalists. I was at home in the evenings and many of these people came to talk to me there, long talks, not formal interviews. Some, like Mohamed Babu the Zanzibari Marxist, insisted on doing the cooking, others, like Abdul Minty, then leading the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Cooperation with South Africa from exile in Norway, brought me a cooking pot.

It was a historical moment when revolutionary movements flared in countries of the Global South such as Nicaragua, Grenada, Ghana, and Burkina Faso and found resonance beyond the South in TWR. Ambitious US covert interventions, notably in Ghana in the Rawlings era, were revealed, and, obviously, denied. The experienced Cuban ambassador in Ghana, Niel Guerra, once warned me that there is a price for disturbing imperialism, but it is worth paying. He arranged an invitation to Cuba, among other things to see the various schools in the Island of Youth for children from the liberation movements, and newly progressive countries such as Ghana and Ethiopia.

At the same time, I was educated about a Britain beyond the small bubble of my past experience when the ANC in London and the Anti-Apartheid Movement sent me, reluctantly, to speak about Angola’s grim realities to small audiences in British cities I wouldn’t have known where to place on a map. There I met and listened to trade unionists and activists, often, and still sometimes today, people told me they were keen readers of TWR. And on cold nights of demonstrations outside the South African embassy in London I listened to a cross section of people I had never seen before and discovered how solidarity was built.

For the first time, because of who and what came to me through TWR’s open door, and what I knew from Angola visits, I felt at home in London as a city of radical exiles and their politics.

It was a decade when in the Global South neo-liberal dominance, austerity and repression fired revolt against dictatorship, oppression, and economic crisis. Political prisoners, academics, opposition politicians, journalists, guerrilla fighters and writers like Ngugi wa Thiong’o and Mohammed Babu from countries I knew became my friends. The modest Committee for Kenyan Political Prisoners produced small pamphlets and leaflets in late night work sessions in the Finsbury Park home of Caribbean activist, poet and publisher John La Rose’s New Beacon Books.

A host of South African household names, some resident exiles, others passing through, were my world to listen to: Adelaide Tambo worked in a care home in Hampstead; Frene Ginwala (later First Speaker of Parliament) was assistant to Oliver Tambo; the unknown heroine of early underground action Eleanor Kasrils confided her terror as Conservative politicians publicly demanded the expulsion of her and her sons because of her husband, Ronnie Kasrils’ leading role in the ANC’s armed struggle against the apartheid regime. I met him in Angola and decades later we became, as we still are, close colleagues and collaborators on many projects, including Palestine.

Palestinians, Lebanese, Iraqis, and other Arabs came to TWR as the first Intifada and then the first Gulf War upended their world. Unsurprisingly, and following the Cuban ambassador’s warning in Accra, TWR came under constant attack from the Israeli, South African, Kenyan, American and other diplomats in London and their many friends in the media, including inside the Guardian. The editor Peter Preston finally decided the page was “dated” and had to go.

Luckily, I had by then a link with AfriqueAsie the radical magazine in Paris, close to liberation movements. They published all my articles, initially under the more suitable name Alexia Ahmed, and gave me an intellectual and political home from home and the dear friends and colleagues who have been central to my life ever since.

Given that some of your work was in Lusophone Africa, can you talk about the colonial legacies in that part of the continent, and how these legacies were a handicap for post-independence politics, and continue to be? Many of us, including in ROAPE, had high hopes for liberation in Portuguese ex-colonies – the continent’s great second wave of ‘radical independence’ – and have been bitterly disappointed with the experience. Can you also speak of these disappointments, and how we can explain them?

Portuguese-speaking Africa, and Angola in particular, was the most intense part of my work in the 1980s. But for me it was not the appalling dehumanising colonial legacies of Portuguese settler economies, racism and fascism that were central, but rather the ruthless US-led war to control independent Angola’s future, and with it apartheid South Africa’s future. The US military project of the Reagan years in Africa, supported by Margaret Thatcher, was to use its client state Zaire, mercenaries from Western countries and South Africa’s army to install Jonas Savimbi as a client leader in oil rich Luanda in 1975 as the Portuguese left. The goal was to safeguard Western economic interests in South Africa in particular, keeping apartheid alive, and Namibia maintained under South African occupation. A blind eye was turned to South Africa’s military campaign of targeted assassinations, economic destruction, and destabilization of the FLS (Frontline States) and the death of the high hopes of independent states across the continent. Without Cuba’s historic intervention and its people’s enormous sacrifices and courage beside the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola, Washington would have succeeded.

Western journalists were not often welcomed in Luanda, but in an act of kindness and trust, the radical historian of Africa Basil Davidson, who did not then know me personally, but knew some of my work, wrote letters to three Angolan leaders introducing me as someone who should write about the US/South Africa devastation being unleashed to cripple Angola’s independence.

Lucio Lara was one of the founding members of the MPLA (Augusta Conchiglia, Soyo, 1976).

Those letters gave me extraordinary access to remote places and, in time, to friendships with remarkable people. I was able over the years to visit towns and cities besieged by UNITA, the rival movement supported by South Africa and the CIA. They were scenes of battered hospitals full of legless peasant victims of landmines, with infrastructure bridges, dams, roads, schools, blocks of homes built by the Cubans all reduced to rubble, and hundreds of thousands of hungry despairing people on the move. Think of more recent images of Faluja, Raqqa, Aleppo, Grozny and giant refugee camps in Pakistan, Jordan, Lebanon.

In remote Angola I saw handfuls of Cuban and sometimes Vietnamese school teachers, doctors, nurses alongside the MPLA keeping humanity alive as the West tried to crush it. I met Angolan doctors and scientists later assassinated as UNITA targeted the local intellectual leadership. In Luanda I listened to MPLA leaders and Cuban generals talk of the shape of the social, economic, military, and diplomatic challenges aimed at the progressive advances of the post-independence years were targeted.

After months of fighting around Cuito Cuanavale in south-east Angola from October 1987 a 40,000 Cuban and Angolan and SWAPO [South West Africa People’s Organisation] force, with Soviet supplies, confronted and defeated the South Africans in March 1988. Cuban engineers and Angola’s new generation of army officers laid down two airstrips towards the border with Namibia, giving Cuban pilots air superiority. The epic battle around Cuito Cuanavale and in the neighbouring province of Cunene was won against the most powerful army on the continent. It changed African history.

This is the context that was followed by the political disappointment you talk about – decades of struggle for life against years of utter destruction, death and loss imposed by apartheid South Africa and the West. Angola and Mozambique opened their countries to the resistance of the ANC, SWAPO, and ZANU and ZIPRA from what was then Rhodesia; Mozambique implemented Commonwealth sanctions on Rhodesia to the total detriment of the economy. Heroism and principle came with an incalculably high price.

Your work, books, and journalism highlight the role of imperialism. Can you talk about imperialism today, and how it manifests itself in Africa and elsewhere in the Global South? Are we correct to identify other imperialist players, including China, alongside the United States?

I don’t think of my work as ‘highlighting’ the role of imperialism. That sounds too purposeful and theoretical. I would say rather that I was for a long time living and reporting from inside countries being systematically wrecked by US imperialism’s drive to maintain world control.

In Vietnam and Angola, the military aspect was then the most obvious. But control of financial systems, of science and technology, of communications, of information wars, of the systems of influence and funding which operate through NGOs, think tanks, diplomacy both inside the countries of the Global South and well beyond, all shaped, and continue to shape, the history, which has so disappointed you, and so many others, in the context of Southern Africa’s political outcomes. (It could of course have been very different, as the examples of Cuba and Vietnam’s social welfare systems of education, health and care of the elderly illustrate today.)

I believe these Western systems aim to keep most of the Global South in labour intensive production – and poverty. Let’s remember that resistance across the Global South continues despite defeats – see Latin America and India, for instance. China, with its extraordinary successes in poverty reduction, can rightly be criticised for many things, but for me, it is not “an imperialist player” as you suggest.

Working on the continent, and meeting some of the giants of political struggles and liberation, can you tell us of these experiences and personalities? Who stands out, and what characteristics did you note specifically, in some of these political activists and politicians?  

It was my great privilege to know Julius Nyerere, Lucio Lara, Thomas Sankara, and Ngugi wa Thiong’o as political activist in London, and to meet others, like Oliver Tambo and Namibia’s Toivo ya Toivo, with the same characteristics. What stood out was their integrity, their modesty, their habit of listening to the powerless, and their ceaseless hard work.

I remember watching President Nyerere once in his garden standing for a long time intently listening to the gardener who was sweeping the path. (And on his visits to London in the mid 1980s there was always an invitation to breakfast, and he would ask me for every detail of my visits to Luanda, so crucial for the Frontline States to understand through the language barrier.)

Similarly with Lucio, at his house in Luanda there were always humble people sitting waiting to talk to him. He always had time for everyone. Once, in two days spent travelling with him in Malange in 1984, driving round cooperative farms with local MPLA officials and seeing how South Africa and UNITA were encroaching on this rich agricultural province I noted: “through hours of sitting in farm courtyards Lara barely spoke, but listened as the complaints came thick and fast with no fear of the man in authority. The peasants were angry and asking for more military action against UNITA, against the South Africans….it was a vision of what the party meant to people. Here the MPLA was the centre of people’s lives, their security, their entry into a new world of organised farming, and their faith in the leadership was touching and unmistakeable.”

I knew the private Lucio and his wife Ruth too. Pictures in my mind are of Lucio feeding his pet monkeys in Luanda or walking on the beach with his dog, Lucio on rare visits to London reading Le Monde for hours, walking for miles on Hampstead Heath and wanting to go to the ballet.

And sitting in his house in Ouagadougou with Sankara, at a different stage of life, I witnessed the energy and optimism, his thirst for knowledge, the piles of books he was reading, his torrent of questions, his urgent requests to have his speeches translated into English and given to Nyerere, to the ANC in Robben Island, Lusaka and London.

I knew Sankara because he had met Maurice Bishop of Grenada at the Non-Aligned summit in Delhi in 1983 and despite having no common language the two men had bonded, recognising the parallels in their bold projects of transformation for their tiny countries. Maurice’s assassination in October of that year horrified Sankara, and mutual friends who knew that I had been in Grenada as the coup unrolled, and that I spoke French, invited me to Ouagadougou to explain to Sankara the treachery of a long-time close colleague – which would then be his own fate. In the four febrile years of social revolution until the same scenario ended his life Thomas invited me several times – always with his agenda of work, translations, and discussions, plus presents of hand printed Indigo dresses.

Recently, in the last twenty years, your work has focused on Palestinian liberation and justice. Please tell us something about your current work, activism, and writing.

Nowhere better illustrates the power of imperialism than Palestine’s shameful betrayal over more than a century. It was inevitable that after leaving Africa and coming back to live in London I would be drawn to Palestine’s escalating drama. Palestinian writers and photographers were prominent in TWR, and Palestinian artists and filmmakers were central in my London world of exiles. I first went to Gaza at the invitation of its first and leading psychiatrist Dr Eyad Saraj who wanted me to write a pamphlet on his organisation, the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme (GCMHP), for fundraising in the Gulf. I had interviewed him in London when he had talked in particular about his work with adolescent boys traumatised by witnessing their fathers’ humiliation and impotence in the face of violent arrests, house demolitions, disappearance into Israeli prisons.

It was 23 July 2002 and Hamas military leader Salah Shehadeh had been assassinated the day before by a 1-ton bomb dropped on his home in a crowded neighbourhood of Gaza City. Fifteen people were killed, including eight children and infants, more than 100 wounded, the area devastated. I spent the following days shadowing Eyad’s staff in homes of the traumatised near the massive crater. Several were social workers who were veterans of Israeli prisons, quiet men bringing practical aid with food, water, clothes and above all emotional empathy in the horror they knew so well. Palestinian experience of injustice could never then be an abstraction for me.

After that terrible night 27 Israeli pilots signed a letter refusing to take part in such “illegal and immoral” targeted killings in civilian areas in the West Bank and Gaza. International condemnation went as far as a case brought under international jurisdiction in 2005 in Spain for Israeli war crimes by the New York based Centre for Constitutional Rights. In the end, as with the US soldiers in My Lai village, or the CIA and South Africans who devastated the lives of Angolans and Mozambicans (along with their own majority) over decades, there was largely impunity, forgotten history, indifference.

But Palestinians’ resistance has only grown stronger, more visible, internationally supported over these decades. One of my activities on this front was 11 years of running the Palestine Book Awards from their inception. It was a period when more and more books came to us every year, new small publishers emerged, and the winners became overwhelmingly Palestinians – academics, poets, novelists, cooks, artists, photographers and writers of children’s books. Nothing gives me more pleasure and optimism than the strength and creativity of young Palestinians. I am still close to GCMHP and other Palestinian projects and individuals. And I still study Arabic.

Palestine overlapped with my work during the years of the “war on terror”. Post 9/11 in the UK the jailing or putting under house arrest of Muslim men, deportations of some to US prisons, collaboration with US torture and detention in secret prisons across the world, and Guantanamo, I was writing and speaking in protest meetings constantly. It was my privilege to become close to many of the families involved in this tragedy, several of whom were Palestinians. I co-wrote Moazzam Begg’s Guantanamo memoir Enemy Combatant, plays, other books, notably Shadow Lives on wives and daughters of men imprisoned in the US and UK in which the Palestine connection emerged clearly for me. Those women and their now grown children are still in my life, as are political prisoners in many places, including those still in Guantanamo.

But I have never lost sight of Africa, which has a special place in my heart, and I am happy today to be part of the editorial collective of Afrique XXI where we publish exceptional articles, interviews, video, and audio testimonies in French. One day we hope to publish in English too, like our older sister, Orient XXI which appears in French, Arabic, English and Persian.

Obviously, a life of activism, campaigning and investigative journalism never ends, but can you tell ROAPE readers some of the lessons you have learnt from a lifetime of radical engagement? What are some of the immutable(s) you have found, and that a new generation need be aware of, for example?

Given how very much better educated and generally informed today’s generation such as ROAPE’s readers are, this is hard to answer. Let me give you words of others who inspired me decades ago, and whose historic actions still have unending resonance. And of course, actions of resistance, organising, tangible solidarity behind every popular struggle for justice, education, health, and food are obligations that can never end.

Ron Ridenhour, the Vietnam vet who exposed My Lai, wrote this in March 1993 in the Los Angeles Timeslooking back 25 years. “There were several important lessons in this for me, personally. Among the most important and disappointing of them was that some people – most, it seems – will, under some circumstances, do anything someone in authority tells them to. Another is that government institutions, like most humans, have a reflexive reaction to the exposure of internal corruption and wrongdoing: No matter how transparent the effort, their first response is to lie, conceal and cover up. Also, like human beings, once an institution has embraced a particular lie in support of a particular coverup, it will forever proclaim its innocence.”

Other words reverberate from Martin Luther King speaking in New York’s Riverside church in 1967 (just replace Vietnam with Palestine): “We still have a choice today: nonviolent coexistence or violent co-annihilation. We must move past indecision to action. We must find new ways to speak for peace in Vietnam and justice throughout the developing world, a world that borders on our doors. If we do not act, we shall surely be dragged down the long, dark, and shameful corridors of time reserved for those who possess power without compassion, might without morality, and strength without sight.”

Let me end with a last quote, from a conversation with Lucio Lara in Angola in the mid 1990s. He said: “I don’t have illusions about many things anymore. In the Angolan struggle perhaps, we didn’t have philosophers or sociologists, but we had these words of Neto’s, ‘the most important thing is to solve the people’s problems’. Once in the Council of Ministers I heard someone say that we should stop using this phrase. I thought that maybe he was right, because no one spoke out against him. In my opinion this was when the Party began to collapse. That was the time when the leaders felt they all had the right to be rich. That was the beginning of the destruction of our life.” Lucio sent my book, Death of Dignity, from which I quoted him, to Thabo Mbeki when he became South Africa’s president. It was a warning of how political visions can be lost. Lucio died in 2016.

The historical work on the anticolonial archives of the MPLA in exile and in the bush until independence in 1975, is meticulously carried out, in Lucio’s old house, first by his wife Ruth then by the family and close friends (creating the Tchiweka Documentation Centre). After Ruth’s death the work was led by Lucio’s son Paulo, who died last year, and whose life course was set by those days. Paulo at 19 was in the military front line in repulsing the South African invasion in 1975 and he became a general in the long years of post-independence war until the death of Jonas Savimbi. Lucio’s daughter Wanda now runs it.  There is also a treasure trove of filmed interviews by Paulo in the remotest of provinces with the people who lived those years. This website is a jewel, the richest record of a people’s successful years of struggle against all that imperialism could devise to have them fail.

Victoria Brittain is an activist, writer and journalist who has spent years reporting in Africa, and campaigning internationally. 

Featured photograph: Victoria Brittain, Luanda 1986 (Augusta Conchiglia).

Notes

[1] Stubborn Hope: Selected Poems of South Africa and a wider world, by Dennis Brutus, Heinemann 1978. Dennis Brutus was one of Africa’s greatest poets, political organiser, veteran of Robben Island and 30 years of exile in US academia. When he died in South Africa in 2019 Noam Chomsky called him “a great artist and intrepid warrior in the unending struggle for justice and freedom…a permanent model for others to try to follow.”

For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
We use cookies to collect and analyse information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customise content. By clicking into any content on this site, you agree to allow cookies to be placed. To find out more see our
For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
We use cookies to collect and analyse information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customise content. By clicking into any content on this site, you agree to allow cookies to be placed. To find out more see our