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From Junta to Popular Protest: Zimbabwe at the Crossroads

Popular Protest, Social Movements and Class Struggle (Issue 11)  

By David Seddon

In the last issue, I looked at Togo, where popular protests broke out in August 2017 against President Faure Gnassingbé, whose father Etienne Eyadéma Gnassingbé, was (until his death in 2005) the longest serving president in Africa.  In this issue, I return to consider the situation in one country we have already discussed on several occasions, but where the President has at last come to the end of his long 37 year period in office – Zimbabwe.

The Crisis in Zimbabwe

In previous issues we have examined the dynamics of political struggle in Zimbabwe and in issue 8 we noted that popular protest increased significantly during 2016 at the same time as the economy continued to deteriorate.

The Economic Crisis

Thirty-seven years ago, Robert Mugabe inherited a well-diversified economy with potential to become one of sub-Saharan Africa’s best performers. Today, Zimbabwe is the region’s crisis point, with real per capita incomes down 15 per cent since 1980. The queues to withdraw precious dollars from ATMs just hours after the army’s intervention on 15 November 2017 were just the latest illustration of a need for hard currency, reflecting grinding economic difficulties that go back years.

Although in the early days after independence the Mugabe government was theoretically committed to Marxism-Leninism, it never paid more than lip service to the concept. It did, however, set up a plethora of state-owned enterprises.

By the early 1990s, in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its empire, the regime was shoe-horned by the IMF, the World Bank and western donors into a poorly designed and ineptly managed structural adjustment programme. Its designers believed that market and financial liberalization, plus civil service and public enterprise reform, would drive economic growth, with manufacturing as the lead sector. Many of the public sector reforms were stillborn, however, and de-industrialization accelerated. Industrial output today is less than 10 per cent of GDP, against a peak in the early 1990s of 25 per cent.

Far from stimulating the economy as the donors and multilateral institutions promised, market reforms deepened the economic crisis, forcing Mugabe into ever more desperate measures. These included unbudgeted payouts to ‘war veterans’, compounded by Zimbabwe’s military foray into the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998 to support the Kabila dynasty. Together, they helped precipitate the slide into currency collapse and hyperinflation of the early 2000s.

The ‘war veterans’, encouraged by the regime which used them as a political vigilante force to implement some of its policies and to terrorize any opposition, were the vanguard of the chaotic land redistribution policy launched in 2000, ahead of elections in which many analysts insist Morgan Tsvangirai’s reformist Movement for Democratic Change won the vote but lost the count.

To shore-up its rural support base the Mugabe government adopted a populist approach, playing to ZANU-PF’s historical strengths as a radical nationalist movement. It launched  a programme of compulsory land acquisition and occupations of largely white-owned farms. Yet land reform accelerated economic decline exponentially with much of the redistributed land going to party cronies, while poorer farmers were deprived of the seeds, fertilizers and machinery necessary to make the land productive. As a consequence farm production collapsed and by 2008 output volumes were two-thirds below their peak levels in 2000. Real GDP plunged 45 per cent in the decade to 2009.

In 2009, Zimbabwe was forced to abandon its currency — which had gone up in an inferno of hyperinflation — and to adopt the dollar as its principal means of exchange. The enforced dollarization stabilized the economy and led to an initial 40 per cent rebound in incomes, though these have since flat-lined.

With no local currency, money supply became entirely dependent on inflows of dollars, in effect depriving the authorities of control over monetary policy. In a desperate measure to introduce liquidity, the government introduced ‘bond notes’ in 2016. These were theoretically backed by hard currency but quickly deteriorated in value.

In the meanwhile, the underlying economic situation continued to deteriorate. In October 2016, the World Bank issued a report on Zimbabwe in which it stated that the economy was estimated to have grown by only 0.4 per cent in 2016, with agriculture having shrunk by 4.2 per cent, in part due to drought. There was concern that external payment arrears might lead to a further contraction in imports and a decline in GDP. In spite of export subsidies of $175m, the trade deficit now exceeds 10 per cent of GDP.

Non-farm employment at about 850,000 is unchanged from the late 1980s, but the number of industrial jobs has fallen over the decades from more than 200,000 to 90,000. Today, the public sector, excluding the military — mostly teachers, health workers and civil servants — accounts for more than 40 per cent of formal employment. Wages are low and often unpaid for months. 

Money supply surged 36 per cent in 2016-2017 and the ‘bond notes’ plunged 80 per cent on the parallel market, threatening yet higher inflation. Already, at annualized rates, inflation is currently running at more than 14 per cent and the budget deficit is 12 per cent of GDP. The financial crisis continued to have a significant impact on incomes, while the drought of 2016 disproportionately affected the rural poor: the number of extremely poor people is expected to have increased from 3.16 million in 2015 to 3.28 million in 2016.  Moreover, the number of food insecure people was considered likely to increase to over 4.4 million people by end 2016/early 2017.  

The Political Crisis

In Issue 8, we examined the role of the Tajamuka and ThisFlag campaigns as examples of popular movements of civil society that have protested repeatedly against the government, its handling of the economy and its repression of opposition, both on the street and online.

ThisFlag has functioned as an avenue by which ordinary Zimbabweans can demonstrate their grievances against the government, with the group’s leader, Pastor Evan Mawarire, calling for Zimbabweans to engage in passive strikes and stay-aways to make their voices heard (ACLED Conflict Trends, September 2016). In contrast, the Tajamuka campaign was focused on forcing Mugabe to step down before the 2018 elections and became engaged in active protests and riots in Harare and Bulawayo. Protesting alongside these social movements was the National Vendors Union of Zimbabwe (NAVUZ) which also demanded an end to Mugabe’s administration and many other civil society organizations and associations.

In the face of these civil society developments, the conventional opposition parties had become increasingly concerned about losing relevance as the vehicle for anti-Mugabe sentiment. They therefore formed an alliance and also engaged in widespread protest against the government. This alliance included notable former regime insiders and opposition politicians as well as Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic ChangeTsvangirai (MDC-T), former Vice-President Joice Mujuru’s Zimbabwe People First (PF) party, Tendai Biti’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and Elton Mangoma’s Renewal Democrats of Zimbabwe (RDZ).

There was also evidence of increasing tension and factionalism within the ruling ZANU-PF as Robert Mugabe appeared to favour his wife Grace as his successor, and she gave all the signs of being prepared to step into his shoes. Grace Mugabe — 41 years younger than her husband — was once dismissed as a lightweight shopping addict. But she had become increasingly active in public life in recent years. Her ambitions were backed by the so-called G40, a group of young supporters that had earned a reputation for aggression, but also including some ZANU PF ministers.

Born in South Africa, Grace was one of Mugabe’s secretaries when their affair began in 1987, and they had two children in secret before the president’s wife died in 1992. The couple married at a lavish ceremony in 1996 attended by Nelson Mandela, before having a third child. Grace was awarded a doctorate by the University of Zimbabwe, where her husband is chancellor, reportedly just three months after enrolling, and in 2014 became the head of the ZANU-PF party’s women’s wing.

She showed her political mettle in 2014 with her campaign against then-vice president Joice Mujuru, who was a contender to succeed her husband. Grace launched sustained verbal attacks against Mujuru, accusing her of plotting to topple the president. Soon afterwards, Mujuru was ousted and later expelled from the ruling ZANU-PF party. Her confrontational approach and distant public image brought her little popular affection in Zimbabwe, but her supporters sought to popularize nicknames for her, like “Dr Amai (Doctor Mother)” and “Queen of Queens”.

Over the last year or so, she had become a real contender for the presidency. This increased the tension at the top of ZANU-PF to the point where, eventually, in November 2017, a crisis point was evidently reached.

Crisis Point

In September 2017, a study by Research Advocacy Unit (RAU), titled ‘Zimbabwe since the elections in July 2013: The view from 2017’, noted a pattern of violence and intimidation under President Robert Mugabe. But when the crisis that many had predicted over the previous year or so eventually came, it was not in the form of a popular uprising against the endemic repression, violence and intimidation, or a concerted assault on the political dominance of ZANU PF by the ‘democratic forces’ and the political opposition, but as a direct result of infighting within the ZANU PF leadership over the succession to the presidency.

On 10 October 2017, the Daily News published a major – and remarkably prescient – article under the heading: ‘ZANU-PF Infighting Risks Unrest, Instability’. It went on to report that ‘a respected think-tank’ had warned that ‘in-fighting at the top of Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF Party is spreading to elements of the bureaucracy and security establishment, and the harsh words being exchanged and the absence of democratic politics risk provoking a backlash that could bring great political instability and incidents of sporadic unrest’.

With the two Vice Presidents at each other’s throats and First Lady Grace Mugabe now targeting Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa, in a succession free-for-all. the conflict at the top of ZANU PF was now also spreading to the military and the security apparatus, posing ‘a significant stability threat’.

There was increasing concern among many of the ZANU-PF leadership and also, it became apparent in November 2017, the army, that Grace Mugabe would be appointed as vice president at the ZANU-PF party congress in December. Arguably, it was the sacking of Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa by Robert Mugabe – which appeared to support her ambitions – that prompted the military intervention on Tuesday 14 and Wednesday 15 November 2017.

With the advantage of hindsight, Shadrack Gutto, director of the Centre for African Renaissance Studies at the University of South Africa, told AFP on 21 November that ‘the crisis has been triggered by Grace because she wanted to grab power and to have Mugabe remove a lot of people. She over-reached herself. She has done a lot to accelerate the removal of her husband from power. The military decided that enough is enough.”

It is significant that not only was Grace Mugabe effectively sidelined by the army intervention but her supporters in the G40 were explicitly targeted by the military officers who announced on state TV in the early hours of Wednesday that they would bring the ‘criminals’ supporting the Mugabes to justice. 

The Coup that was not a Coup  

At night on 14 November 2017, the military seized the radio and television operations of the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) and by the next morning the world woke up to the news that the top officers of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) had intervened to place President Robert Mugabe in custody. An army spokesman, Major General Sibusiso Busi Moyo, read a statement in the middle of the night which claimed that the intervention was not a military takeover of government but was designed to respond effectively to ‘a degenerating political, social and economic situation in our country which, if not addressed, may result in violent conflict’.

General Moyo explained that President Mugabe was being detained for his own protection and the military were ‘only targeting criminals around him who are committing crimes that are causing social and economic suffering in the country’. By the end of the day, Robert Mugabe was said to be under house arrest and his wife Grace Mugabe was said to have fled the country, perhaps to Namibia; also some former ministers had been arrested, and the former Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, whom Mugabe had sacked at Grace’s instigation only a few days before, was nominated by the remaining ZANU-PF leadership to be acting or interim president.

Civil society organizations  asked the military to ensure restoration of the constitutional order and an inclusive process to resolve ‘Zimbabwe’s political and socio-economic problems’. These organizations that signed the press release numbered 115 in all and ranged widely across the spectrum of civil society, including women’s groups, church organizations, youth groups, community associations, human rights groups, and trade and professional associations.

They called for ‘the peaceful and constitutional resolution of the situation’ and an ‘immediate return of Constitutional order and democracy in Zimbabwe’. They expressed the view that ‘the solution to Zimbabwe’s socio economic and political problems should be a product of an inclusive all stakeholder process’, thereby staking an important claim to involvement in any kind of ‘settlement’. They called for President Mugabe to step down and ‘pave the way for an inclusive, all stakeholder process to determine the future of Zimbabwe’. They ‘implored’ the Zimbabwe Defence Forces to uphold, defend and respect the Constitution, and ‘demanded’ that they issue a clear and quickly implementable roadmap to restoring constitutional order in Zimbabwe.   They also called on the Parliament of Zimbabwe ‘to uphold and fulfil their constitutional obligations by: i) Creating conditions for the swift realignment of key laws to the constitution including the Electoral Act paving way for the conduct of credible free and fair election in 2018; ii) Repealing legislation that they considered diluted progressive provisions of the constitutions, such as the Cyber-Security Act; iii) Immediately discarding Constitutional Amendment Bill No.1 of 2017 to safeguard the independence of the judiciary; iv) Restoring citizens freedoms of assembly and speech by amending restrictive laws such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA); v) Liberalizing the media space; and vi) Ensuring civil servants’ neutrality in the political processes in line with the Constitution.

Clearly these civil society organizations were concerned that the army’s intervention and control of the political situation would be prolonged and effectively constitute a military coup; they were also concerned that any regime that follows the departure of Robert Mugabe as President might prove to be little different – apart from a change of President and shift in the balance of political forces among the top echelons of the ZANU-PF.

The war veterans, who have in the past often been the most loyal supporters of President Mugabe, also made it clear that they believe he should now go, and called for him to be impeached. Some, like War Veterans Association Chair, Christopher Mutsvangwa, even called on South African President Zuma as Chair of the regional body SADC to speed up the process: ‘we want to see the back of Mugabe’, he said.

The party elite of ZANU-PF met at once to discuss the situation and it rapidly became clear that those present (some of Mugabe’s supporters were not able to participate because they had been arrested) were unanimous in wanting the President to step down. He was officially removed from his position as Party leader, at a special session of the ruling party’s central committee, to be replaced by his former trusted lieutenant former Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa, whom he had sacked only the previous week.

Mass Protests

Over the weekend of 18-19 November, there were mass demonstrations as tens of thousands of people came onto the streets of Harare and other major towns across Zimbabwe to celebrate what appeared to be the end of Mugabe’s 37 year long period in office, ripping down images of Mr Mugabe and brandishing signs calling for his wife, Grace, to be expelled from the ruling party. CNN News reported on Monday 20 November that ‘hundreds of thousands’ had come onto the streets, giving a popular endorsement of the action by the military, but also noted that ‘armored vehicles manned by soldiers were still stationed on some street corners’.  

On Sunday evening, 19 November, Robert Mugabe addressed the nation on television. He was expected, and had clearly been asked by his military ‘minders’ – who were present with him in the TV studio – to present his resignation. To almost everyone’s surprise, however, and to the evident consternation of the army officers present but off- camera behind him, instead of resigning, he embarked on a long and rambling speech, recognizing ‘that many developments have occurred in the party, given the failings of the past, and anger they might have triggered in some quarters’, but pledging to remain in office to undertake reforms. He even intimated that he planned to preside over ZANU-PF’s extra-ordinary congress scheduled for December 12-17. Moments after Mugabe’s address, war veterans’ leader Chris Mutsvangwa said he would lead public protests in the streets of Harare to call for his resignation or dismissal. Two senior government sources told Reuters late on Sunday night that Mugabe had agreed to resign but they did not know details of his departure. Whether this was the case or not, external pressures began to build. Representatives from South Africa had already travelled to Zimbabwe and on Monday 20 November, Zambian President Edgar Lungu sent former president Kenneth Kaunda (also 93 years old, like Mugabe) to Harare to try to convince Robert Mugabe to step down in a ‘dignified exit’.

Internal pressure also began to rise as the ZANU-PF deadline of noon on Monday 20 November for Mugabe’s resignation passed. All ZANU-PF MPs were called together to Party headquarters to discuss the proposal for Mugabe’s impeachment. In the meanwhile, Mugabe, apparently unrepentant and reluctant to step aside as requested, apparently met with his Cabinet, suggesting that he might not be prepared to concede his position as President of the Republic of Zimbabwe even under extreme pressure. There was even speculation that he envisaged himself remaining in post at least until the December Party Congress. 

On Tuesday afternoon, however, as Parliament met to initiate impeachment proceedings, a short letter was sent which was read out by the Speaker. It confirmed that Robert Mugabe had, at last, resigned as President of Zimbabwe. 

Short Term Reaction, Longer Term Future

The reaction from the public was immediate and almost universally joyful. There were celebrations from the crowds in the streets, and it seemed clear that, whatever their status or political persuasion, the people of Zimbabwe were pleased to see ‘the old man’ go, and looked forward to a new era of change. Precisely what change there will be remains less clear.

The military that intervened in ‘a coup that was not a coup’, in mid-November 2017, presented itself throughout as merely facilitating a change of leadership, but the army has been less forthcoming as to its own anticipated future role. In a press release the Zimbabwe Defense Forces emphasized that it had the support of the business community and said it wanted to create ‘a peaceful, united investor-friendly and prosperous Zimbabwe’. It is not at all clear yet how far the army is prepared to pass the reins of government back to ZANU-PF, even if headed by a new leader.

Emmerson Mnangagwa, the sacked vice-president of ZANU-PF, who is Mr Mugabe’s most likely successor, and is now the interim President and acting leader of ZANU-PF, is clearly ambitious, and unlikely to cede power easily. He has worked behind the scenes over the last few months to support the aborted Lima process, through which the government had hoped to clear up longstanding debt arrears, opening the way to new multilateral funds and, potentially, more foreign investment – but to many was seen as a further and devastating structural adjustment programme.

It is most likely that he will at least be the ‘face’ of the new government; but whether he will be able to maintain his position and continue to lead what has been in many ways a one-party state through the dominance of the ZANU-PF, remains to be seen. The December Congress of the Party will be decisive in either consolidating his position or undermining it.

The role of the veterans’ association, which moved decisively against Robert Mugabe over the last two weeks, also remains to be seen.

The political opposition clearly hopes that it will be possible for Zimbabwe to return to genuine multi-party politics and that the period before the forthcoming elections will give an opportunity for open and democratic debate, and for the rights of assembly and the expression of different political views to be upheld.

Finally, the many elements of civil society hope for an opportunity to express their demands for a new direction for Zimbabwe’s political, social and economic trajectory in an atmosphere of openness and optimism.

No doubt, the country will be inundated with offers of ‘rescue packages’, from a variety of international donors and companies. Given the devastating impact  since 1980 of these external loans and debts on Zimbabwe’s development, such interventions should be resisted in favour of a more self-reliant strategy for sustainable development. This, however, is unlikely to  happen. Tendai Biti, for example, the former socialist lawyer and leading MDC politician, who was finance minister from 2009 to 2013, has suggested that the economy could quickly recover if it could attract foreign investment and reinsert itself into the international economy: ‘look at the way we bounced back in the government of national unity’, he said, referring to the recovery from hyperinflation after 2009. ‘We can build a $100bn economy in under 15 years and have a growth rate of 7 per cent per annum’.

Others, however, have already expressed a preference for  a more self-reliant road to economic recovery and will be wary of once again subjecting Zimbabwe to foreign development agencies, banks and vested interests. The University of Zimbabwe academic and lawyer, Munyaradzi Gwisai, has put forward another vision for the country, ‘we need a new radical anti-capitalist mass alternative to take on this rejuvenated junta. The new leadership has shed radical economic nationalism for naked IMF-backed neoliberalism under an authoritarian state.’

For the moment, however, the ordinary people of Zimbabwe, who have experienced decades of repression and hardship, are rejoicing and are optimistic; very soon, however – indeed even as this is being written – there will be a renewed struggle for the future of Zimbabwe.

David Seddon (criticalfaculty1@hotmail.co.uk) is a researcher and political activist who has written extensively on social movements, class struggles and political transitions across the developing world.

Making Connections: Radical Transformation in Africa

Accra, November 13-14 November 2017

At last week’s ROAPE and TWN (Third World Network Africa) workshop in Accra, sixty activists and activist-researchers came together to discuss radical political economy and structural transformation in Africa. Over two days wide-ranging discussions and debates explored a variety of radical perspectives, on activism, resistance and research across the continent. 

The workshop was the first of three in Africa. The second is in Dar es Salaam in April and the final meeting will be in Johannesburg in September 2018. The workshops link analysis and activism in contemporary Africa from the perspective of radical political economy.

Among the questions that were raised in Ghana were the lessons that can be drawn from revolutionary historical transitions, including the Russian revolution, and the demise of colonialism in Africa. What has been the impact of limited industrialisation and the scramble for African resources on both urban and rural patterns of class formation and the potential for organising resistance? In what ways do economic crisis, land alienation and dispossession, unemployment and migration generate local resistance and what forms have resistance to the increased financialisation of globalisation taken? And what alternatives to (neoliberal) capitalist social and economic transformation are being debated in Africa?

Discussing financialisation, accummulation and livelihoods: Sam Ashman, Gyekye Tanoh, Akua Britwum and Peter Lawrence  

We discussed how ROAPE was set up in 1974 in the era of late independence movements. ROAPE was founded to promote support and solidarity as well as radical intellectual clout, to the militant movements and governments that emerged after the collapse of the Portuguese empire in 1974. In Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau the Review sought to support what were regarded as socialist projects in countries that had already become independent.

The workshop examined the nature of the ‘world economy’ and what it might mean for projects of structural transformation. How are alternative projects for equitable and just development curtailed by this world economy? Is the concept of ‘auto-centric’ development, similar to Samir Amin’s sovereign national project, possible or desirable?

Reference was made to the work, life and activism of African revolutionaries and politicians. Frantz Fanon, Patrice Lumumba and Amílcar Cabral. Each of these activists, in distinct ways, spoke of the limits of sovereignty, and how national liberation became a ‘curse’ or a ‘prison’. Each of them, focused on the role of the petty-bourgeoise leadership of the liberation struggle, frequently paralysing radical movements  within national liberation.

Participants also spoke in detail about the major contours of the continents’ contemporary political economy, charting financialisation, industrialisation policy, patterns of accumulation, against continuing primitive accumulation and dispossession. Speakers spoke about Chinese investment and involvement in artisanal mining in Ghana, land enclosures and agriculture in Uganda and Tanzania, and Tunisia’s post-revolution land crisis and reforms.

For all of these questions, we returned to the role of the Review and our activism. Can the Review broaden its work to bring solidarity and information about struggles today on the continent? What role does the journal have in keeping a revolutionary tradition alive? And what does that (heterodox) tradition look like in the contemporary period?

We spent a considerable amount of time in Accra looking at the possibilities of a new politics emerging from sites of contestation in Africa and looking both at the potential for revolutionary activity in Africa and for international solidarity in the 21st century, following the current crises in capitalism.

Progressive Transformation Agendas from Below: Munyaradzi Gwisai, Habib Ayeb, Bettina Engels and Ndongo Sylla

Over the coming weeks, roape.net will be posting blogs, short interviews and comments on the workshop. We hope these posts will do two things. Firstly, continue the discussions started in Accra, and secondly, draw in other voices.

Given the recent, tumultuous events in Zimbabwe, we begin by posting short interviews filmed in Accra by ROAPE’s Peter Dwyer with Tafadzwa Choto and ROAPE’s Laura Mann interviewing Munyaradzi Gwisai. Both interviews provide invaluable insight into the dynamics of protest, the political crisis and the attempts of ruling ZANU-PF clique to hold on to power even without Robert Mugabe.

Tafadzwa Choto talks about the economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe, the impact on ordinary people, and some of the factors that are likely to worsen or mitigate the situation in forthcoming years. Choto is a well-known labour activist, researcher and currently director of the Zimbabwe Labour Centre.

Munyaradzi Gwisai discusses the political turmoil in Zimbabwe, and the possibilities of a radical alternative emerging in the coming years. Gwisai is a former Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) parliamentarian, is a law lecturer at the University of Zimbabwe and coordinator of the International Socialist Organisation of Zimbabwe.

 

 

 

Protest, Racism and Gender in South Africa

ROAPE speaks to Nombuso Mathibela about student protests, institutional racism and gender in South Africa. Mathibela was involved in the student movement in South Africa in 2015-16 and is Fellow at the Tshisimani Centre for Activist Education working on expanding political education to assist social movements in their struggles.

Can you tell roape.net a little about yourself, where you grew up, your involvement in the student struggles in South Africa in recent years?

I grew up in Durban, a coastal city in eastern South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province, I lived there for about 13 years and then moved to Johannesburg a landlocked city in the province of Gauteng. When the time came for me to go to university, the first choice was to get out of Johannesburg and I than decided to move to Cape Town in the Western Cape.

Having lived in three historically and culturally different cities that equally have a distinct history of struggle – I began to understand the manifestations of colonial and apartheid rule to play out quite differently. So, in Durban the tensions between the Indian communities (most came to South Africa as indentured labour and some as merchants) and Zulu communities were quite rife at a historical and interpersonal level – old wounds of internal division as a result of colonial wars and apartheid, built up a lot of stereotypes and prejudices within these communities. But at the same time, I saw a lot of solidarity, cultural co-creation amongst these groups of people specifically within the working-class communities. This solidarity took form through trading in the food markets as one example– in fact you could find many working class Indian people speaking isiZulu or dialects – in many ways also defying the spatial separation between Zulu people in the ‘townships’ ‘informal living spaces’ and Indian people who were located in ‘Indian townships’ areas such Phoenix and Chatsworth.  I grew up eating mostly Indian foods and Zulu traditional meals and most of the people I grew up with came from these communities – the tensions were there but some sort of understanding too.

Living in Durban shaped my understanding of race, the dynamics that exist within middle and working-class communities, and I also got to witness the legacy of apartheid, specifically how it highlighted, exaggerated tribal and ethnic difference to the demise of oppressed people. This, then contextualised my experience of Cape Town, a city that reeks of dispossession and hectic spatial inequality of racial and class lines. In some ways the relationship between ‘black’ and ‘coloured’ people reminded me of my experiences in Durban and helped me adjust to the political climate that I found in the city. My early years of university were quite politically different, the traditional structural formation of party-aligned student organisations dominated quite clearly i.e. SASCO, PASMA and DASO, which are student organisations that are aligned and affiliated to the ruling party the ANC and its opposition parties. Student protests in South Africa were already taking place way before the MustFall movement(s) in 2015, through party aligned organisation and other student formations were also rallying under Black consciousness and Black feminism. But my critical involvement at a collective organised level, came into being in 2015 when students formed the RhodeMustFall movement.

Can you discuss how you became involved in the protests in South Africa, what were the major issues and how did these develop?

My experiences in Cape Town were largely shaped by my outsider status as someone who came to study at one of the whitest universities on the continent. It took a while to actually understand Cape Town outside of the university and part of this I am indebted to the student movement, the people I met in this space and the political formations that were made on the basis of collective recognition that there is something wrong with the University of Cape Town (UCT), with the city and quite frankly South Africa as a whole.

This collective recognition, from my understanding was the key catalyst in the formation of what then became the MustFall Movement(s). People were no longer suffering in silos or agitating against power at an interpersonal level but there was a recognition that the crisis in legal education for instance is a broader crisis of pedagogy and an institutional culture that exists across South Africa,. It doesn’t only concern the realities of knowledge production of the historically dispossessed and oppressed.

So, I suppose I was one of those students who felt they did not belong in the university and the struggles of other black students were quite personal. My involvement in the student movement sort of came from that place – a place of needing to deal with historical injustice, current manifestations of anti-blackness – be it the curriculum, the financial exclusion of black students, the exploitation of outsourced workers and the patriarchal nature of the university.

Like many black student activists at UCT during the time of #RhodesMustFall (RMF), I was involved in supporting the struggles of the movement right through to the formation of the #feesmustfall and #endoutsourcing movements. Most of my involvement subsequently moved towards a law faculty based movement that students had formed called DecoloniseUCTLaw, which came out of the need to branch out; RMF couldn’t deal with all the demands and some could be achieved at a faculty level. Hence, we saw the formation of other faculty-based movements although not all explicitly RMF aligned.

The initial outburst of the ‘fallist’ movement was unfortunately understood as primarily an obsession to remove the statue of a European settler and coloniser Cecil John Rhodes, situated at UCT overlooking the city. But as many people have clarified, the demands were much broader, and the statue was simply a symbolic catalyst for us to talk about historical justice, the eurocentricity of curriculum, the racist and alienating institutional culture, the mentally destructive space of UCT, the financial exclusion of black students and exploitation of workers with undignified wages.

With the uprising of students around South African universities the demands began to take a national front were the main demands basically centered around free education and the end to outsourcing. These were two issues that all campus could rally behind and in fact many people saw the reformation of the student-worker coalition as an important step towards contesting the current democratic dispensation – moving the issues outside of our individual campuses and putting forward these two issues as a national crisis.

To start with in 2015, the protest wave at South African universities raised questions of student fee increments, but rapidly seemed to develop into a more generalised movement that targeted the nature of the 1994 settlement. Reflecting on your direct involvement in these struggles how would you chart the rapid growth of the movement in 2015 and afterwards?

The movement(s) move towards critiquing the 1994 settlement began long before the RhodesMustFall movement or the subsequent FeesMustFall movement(s), many of the student groups and political blocs that came to form these movements were already calling the 1994 settlement into question. In fact, these groups infused this critique into the 2015 movements and the response was quite organic because their articulations aligned with the sentiments that students held with regards to the current state of South Africa. The radical call for free education from some groups instead of ‘no fee increment’ was in fact a response to the 1994 settlement – because some of us saw this demand as a way of restructuring the nature education and its institutions as a whole. That said, I think the rapid growth was largely due to the formation of the student worker coalition. The involvement of workers totally changed the dynamics of protest intervention and strikes, before then students were protesting alone; because of the precarious nature of workers’ jobs most of the time the strategy revolved around students having to shut down campus and dining halls on their own – through that intervention workers would then be ‘released’. We all know that these universities cannot function without workers so the FeesMustFall movement became much stronger through this coalition.

Students and workers realized that their temporary power was in their combined numbers and their ability to stop the functioning of the university – so there were many attempts to build this coalition though it was harder in some campuses because of stifling trade union involvement, the levels of securitization from the side of the university and the state became unbearable.  Unfortunately, at a collective national level there was no consolidated national programme. Therefore, in most cases insourcing of workers was partially won in some campuses, and in some of those campuses this victory came with a lot of punishment – through the retrenchment of many workers to ‘compensate’ for the so-called ‘end to outsourcing.’ At the moment we still have workers who have been dismissed at the University of Stellenbosh, University of Western Cape, Cape Peninsula University of Technology and other universities across the country are having difficulties with insourcing.

As the movement grew, and drew in wider layers of students, lecturers and workers, other issues were raised. These included questions of continued ‘colonial’ control of the university curriculum, the continued public symbols of the previous racist state and the failure of real and lasting transformation for the majority of black South Africans. What today are the major issues confronting the movement and students?

When RhodesMustFall formed, the movement took on a flat structure and it was known as a ‘leaderless’ movement, which is complicated in itself because ultimately there were people who formed some sort of leadership structure invisible or not. So, when the FeesMustFall movements formed they sort of took on this structure but in some campuses there was a more defined leadership structure – some political party affiliated and in many ways this became one of the major issues confronting the movement. There’s no consolidated national student movement but simply pockets of students organising under FeesMustFall. The movement has no membership, students move in and out of it, there is no organisational structure and because of the political and personal differences it has become increasingly difficult to hold national or even regional meetings to chart a way forward or a programme of how students are going to build a mass movement for free education, get the buy-in of parents, civil organisations, workers etc. The power dynamics internally have become one of the stifling blocs for the student movement. This is merely one aspect that has really troubled quite a few of us because it has made it quite difficult to assist students – so a lot of people are sort of picking areas were they think they can assist in corners but there is not a consolidated voice that I am aware of even though there are many people working in the background in many campuses.

How have issues of sexism within wider society and inside the movement played out during this period of activism?

Patriarchy and deep manifestations of sexism broke down FeesMustFall’s momentum, in as much as movements like RhodesMustFall initially took up intersectionality as an organising theory, the persistence of specific hyper masculinities made it quite difficult for bodies existing outside of those masculinities to find expression. Many black womxn found it really difficult to organise within these movements but perhaps the groups that found it most difficult were the queer community and non-binary bodies. Many people felt that the space was extremely patriarchal and that it centered the voices and expressions of male figures. The division of labour within the movement was quite contested, who does what – when it came to speaking out in plenary session (meeting), who are the dominant voices, when students are in the middle of action who are the people on the ground leading the programme of action, who writes statements and sits in meetings with management, and who can publicly speak about the movement – all of this was contested. And remains contested. That said, the worst aspects that made it very difficult to organise is the insidious culture of sexual violence within the student movement, this was a problem throughout the country; students at a university currently known as Rhodes (UCKAR), black women and non-binary people came out in full force launching a protest campaign called the #Rureferencelist, which literally revealed the rot of our university space and movements. All of this is happening in country that has one of the most debilitating statistics of gender-based violence, so what is happening in our movements and the university is merely a reflection of very real national crisis.

Thinking back on the #RhodesMustFall era, a slogan that went around ‘Dear history/ this revolution has women, gays, queers & trans people – remember that’ – I think students were invoking the theory of intersectionality, that as black bodies we also exist in different spaces and hold other identities that are the cause of experiencing violence. There were attempts at the time to center these voices and for quite some time there was a power shift and quite a solid base of black queer women and trans people exercising power within the movement – however short lived. What intersectionality did was allow ‘functional discomfort’ within the movement and make room for people to contest the direction of the movement – its strategies and tactics and the nature of demands that were being put forward above others. I don’t think #RhodesMustFall or subsequently FeesMustFall succeeded in dealing with patriarchy and its manifestations nor is this surprising because these movements are a manifestation and a reflection of society as it is, but some hard lessons came out of this experience for many people about organising.

What, would you say – and in your experience – are the main challenges for the development of a progressive, non-sexist politics in South Africa?

I think the answer is both simple and complicated but for me – a politics that seeks to destroy gender as an oppressive organising principle is the aspiration under different circumstances. It’s quite true that many men are among the stifling factor in the quest to build a non-sexist politics because the current politics is premised on the domination of specific gendered bodies at the level of politics. The levels at which black women and non-binary people experience violence has necesitated a politics that centers gender and queer theory and practice simply because the culture of marginalisation is so rife. South Africa’s history of struggle is loaded with similar issues of patriarchy, sexism and sexual violence – the collective sidelining of black women and non-binary people is not a new phenomenon nor is it particular to South African history.

That is part of the challenge, that patriarchy and manifestations of sexist behavior have been able to mutate at different levels of struggle – the scary part is that many people want to particularise these challenges to current movements and not look outside – that in itself is a challenge. This is a big question and I think people need to come together and think about these challenges , because of the nature of capitalism and colonialism it is that working class and black people in particular are impacted by different forms of oppression in a more accute way. These groups must be at the forefront of determining what way we move forward – in a sense that is a prerequisite and its something that cannot be solved by one person, it will have to be solved by a movement.

Nombuso Mathibela is a Fellow at Tshisimani Centre for Activist Education, and was involved in the student movement in South Africa, her current work is around expanding political education for the purposes of assisting social movements in their struggles.  

All photographs in the interview have been provided by Nombuso Mathibela.

Neoliberalism, Political Economy and Africa

ROAPE talks to Matteo Rizzo about his new book Taken for a Ride, based on his research in Dar es Salaam. The book is a detailed study of public transport in Dar es Salaam and provides a profound examination of the transformation of society, state and politics in Tanzania since the 1970. As Dar es Salaam grew, Matteo writes, so did the demand for public transport and public transport provision experienced chronic difficulties. Taken for a Ride is a major contribution demonstrating the continued analytical relevance of radical political economy, challenging the claim that class analysis is necessarily dogmatic and reductionist.

Can you introduce yourself and tell us about how you came to do research in Tanzania in the 1990s?

I am from Palermo, Sicily, Italy. I am a political economist. I trained in political sciences at “L’Orientale”, in Naples, and development studies and economic and social history at SOAS, University of London, where I currently work as a senior lecturer in the department of development studies. My interest in Tanzania stems from having studied Swahili for four years as part of my first degree in political sciences with focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. Orienting my research towards Tanzania then became a kind of induced choice, as the interest in the country and fluency in Swahili allowed me to undertake research in a way that I was unable to do in other countries.

Could you explain the genesis of your new book, Taken for a Ride? What was your own journey to this research and how did the idea of it evolve?

The research project has a relatively long gestation. It began back in 1996 when, immediately upon arriving in Dar es Salaam, on my first visit to Tanzania as a Political Sciences of Africa student, I developed an interest in the city’s public transport system, and in particular its daladala, as the minibuses which provide public transport are known in Swahili. Seemingly ubiquitous, colourful and painted with aphorisms, these buses caught my attention, as the sound of the workers calling the stops to attract passengers on board is the soundscape to the city. This early interest was soon accompanied by the reflection that these private buses dominated the transport system of what was once one of the most famous socialist experiments in Africa. I therefore decided to focus my undergraduate dissertation (and subsequently my MSc dissertation at SOAS) on the city’s public transport system, its history and political economy.

My doctoral work, still at SOAS, but on a different topic and discipline (on late colonial and postcolonial development history) took me to Dar es Salaam again, as I carried out archival work in 2001-2002 in the city. Days in the archive would often terminate with visits to a group of daladala workers on whom my research had focussed in 1998. Studying labour relations in bus public transport, as key to understand how public transport works in Dar es Salaam, and for whom, was my main research interest at this stage. When I re-joined academia in 2008, following a 3-year career break, I continued to research public transport in Dar es Salaam through short research trips in 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2014.

In the most recent fieldwork spells, my research aimed to make sense of two important changes in public transport which had emerged since 2002. First, its bus workers had organised and in partnership with the Tanzanian Transport Union had begun, slowly but surely, to struggle for labour rights. Understanding how workers organised, their strategy and achievements to make demands on employers and the state, became one of my research objectives. Second, the World Bank-sponsored Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) began its very slow implementation. I studied the reasons for this delay, which had to do with the various ways in which a range of Tanzanian actors that stood to be displaced by BRT orchestrated their resistance. All in all, what held together my evolving research focus on public transport in Dar es Salaam over the years was its interest in understanding its different and changing facets of power and .

Can you describe how the political-economy of Dar es Salaam public transport has evolved since independence? Is neoliberalism a useful prism through which to view its liberalisation?

The trajectory of public transport in Dar es Salaam mirrors that of most African cities. It was provided by the state under monopoly regime since 1970. As Dar es Salaam grew and so did the demand for public transport, public transport provision experienced chronic difficulties. The state, which was hit hard by the oil crisis of 1974, was unable to increase its supply of public transport. In 1983, reflecting broader changes in the direction of policy-making in Tanzania and in Africa, the provision of public transport was opened-up to private operators. The state retained substantial control over pubic transport until the early 1990s. Since then the state relinquished its control over entrance into the service and over fare levels.

I would argue that neoliberalism is indeed a useful concept to understand, from the early 1980s to the present, Tanzania’s wider political economy, including its changing policies in the public transport system. Neoliberalism is to be understood as a political project, associated with a set of economic policies, and promoted through agents. Whilst wide-ranging in focus, neoliberal policies are rooted in the idea that the promotion of an individual’s economic freedom and private capital is the best way to organise economies and societies. To be sure, neoliberalism is a slippery concept and as such it needs handling with care. But those scholars who argue that we are better off abandoning its use if we are to understand urban realities in Africa (for one important example see Robinson and Parnell, 2011) miss the point, as there is much to be lost in rejecting the concept when making sense of how the public transport system in Dar es Salaam functions, or does not function, and the way in which it has changed over the years. One can empirically see how the promotion of neoliberalism, in complex and different ways over time, has proved to be the main force behind these changes. In the early 1980s, the state was ‘rolled-back’ from the provision of public transport. In the early 2000s, an injection of over 150 million dollars laid the ground for Bus Rapid Transit (BRT), a public-private partnership in public transport. Under the plans, the public sector funds the BRT with tax payers’ money, while the private sector operates the system.

While Dar es Salaam’s experience of a shift in the provision of public transport from public to private mirrors that of every main African city, the actual shape neoliberalism took in Dar es Salaam’s public transport and its politics was unique. The researcher’s job is to ground neoliberalism in particular contexts, and this requires attention to the domestic politics and path dependency of its promotion, and to the challenges and resistance that this triggered. This entails, first and foremost, identifying the range of different actors who had stakes in the sector, and on what sorts of power, if any, they drew in their attempts to influence developments in it.

You mention Mike Davis’ Planet of Slums, in which he describes the demise of the post-colonial state development project from the 1970s.

Perhaps let me start with the strength and importance of Davis’ book, which lies in what was arguably its intended goal, the systematic debunking of mainstream fantasies of slum improvements and of the potential for poverty eradication and economic mobility within the informal economy. His focus on how structural forces influence the nature of the urban poor’s experience of the city in developing countries is important, if chilling. Behind the apocalyptic tone of his Planet of Slums, that so many readers find excessive and disturbing, lies the fact that urbanization in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—unlike urbanization in the nineteenth century in the now-developed world—has often not been accompanied and driven by economic growth and industrialization. Davis crucially reminds us that, because of this, many poor countries host ‘cities without jobs’, as the number of job seekers in them has grown rapidly, while the capacity of the formal economy to absorb labour has decreased, rather than expanded.

As a consequence of this imbalance, the majority of people are pushed towards work in the informal economy, the last-resort employer of this ‘surplus humanity’. These are insights that go a long way in explaining how public transport works and for whom, in Dar es Salaam. As Taken for a Ride discusses at length, the speeding, overloading of vehicles and the general disregard of road safety by transport workers are to be understood as the reaction of workers to their “squeeze” by bus owners. They expect a very high sum of money from workers at the end of each day, a sum that workers can accumulate only by working very long days (16 hours on average). And to understand why workers have limited bargaining power when confronting employers, we need to understand that the lack of structural transformation and industrialization in Tanzania resulted in a highly dysfunctional labour market, with a pronounced shortage of jobs for unskilled workers. Once more, as Davis so effectively put it, ‘cities without jobs’.

Critics identify two main weaknesses in Davis’ work. One is what they see as its excessive focus on structures and its lack of attention to the historical agency that the poor might exert in cities either to change the grim conditions in which they live and work, or even to survive them. There are indeed examples of left-leaning writing which is overly deterministic in its attention to structures. However, what I find problematic about this reading of Davis’s work on slums as hopelessly pessimistic, is that Davis planned to write, with Forrest Hylton, a sequel book on ‘the history and future of slum-based resistance to global capitalism’ (Davis 2006: 201, 207), on the basis of ‘concrete, comparative case studies’, exploring ‘the bewildering variety of responses to structural neglect and deprivation’ and ‘the myriad acts of resistance’. This sequel book was never written, but the very fact that it was planned raises questions about dismissing Davis’s work as conceptually blind to issues of agency by the poor.

A more valid criticism is its tendency to over-aggregation, whereas a more descriptive ‘exploding’ of the slums was, perhaps, necessary. For example, lumping the entire population of Soweto, home as it is to about two million residents in Johannesburg, under the category of slum resident, conceals its remarkable heterogeneity, which includes relatively wealthy areas.

You challenge some of the literature on the African city as ‘unhinged from the material and the economic’. Can you also talk about this challenge you make to the ‘romantic and unsubstantiated celebration’ of the poor?

This book is entitled Taken for a Ride because its analysis aims to debunk two misleading narratives that have become dominant in writing on African cities and on their informal economies. The first, which can be dubbed as ‘postcolonial’ is associated with the influential work of, among many others, Pieterse, Robinson, and Simone. Its celebration of the functionality of African cities, and of the agency of the African urban poor, including their initiatives in the informal economy, pays inadequate attention to the magnitude and nature of the structural forces at play in African cities and in the informal economy. It also fails to articulate whether and how the alternative order and social fabric woven by urban poor initiatives, to which their works refer, help to address the structural problems of African cities or the structural disadvantage faced by the poor.

A second narrative is that informed by mainstream economics, of which De Soto’s market fundamentalism is the best example. Its celebratory reading of informal economic activities as poor people’s empowerment is equally unconvincing, as it presents a rosy conceptualization of the nature of markets and how they work. A close examination of the reality of working in the informal economy in public transport in Dar es Salaam, and of the operations of private operators in unregulated markets, will suggest that the superior efficiency of the private individual in ‘free markets’, which has informed policymaking since the early 1980s, is no more than an ideological article of faith. It will also show that readers on urban Africa and their informal economies are not the only category who have been taken for a ride; passengers’ experience of Dar es Salaam public transport following economic deregulation was very different from what the advocates of reforms had promised, as speeding and overloading became the trademark characteristics of the inefficient private operators which supplied public transport to the city.

What the postcolonial and mainstream economics approaches share is a lack of attention to the political and economic structures in which we need to locate the study of the agency of the poor and the barriers that stand against their efforts to improve their circumstances.

Your book is a sustained challenge to a sloppy understanding of Tanzania and the continent in much of the scholarly analysis – shorn of a rigourous critical political economy and class analysis. How would you assess the dominance of these approaches in African studies in general and in your research and writing on informalisation and the city in particular?

Obviously Roape is atypical, and inspiringly so, in its tradition of class analysis and critical political economy. But outside Roape, class analysis and critical political economy have become unfashionable since the late 1980s. A glance at the programmes of the large African studies conferences, like ECAS, ASAUS or ASAUK, and of the keynote speakers and the themes around which panels are populated, signals the strong influence of postcolonial approaches in African studies today. Mainstream economics still holds a lot of influence in development studies and economics. But there is increasingly more and more attention to labour and class, and I hope that Taken for a Ride can be a small contribution to show the analytical and political relevance of radical political economy and to challenge the claim that class analysis is necessarily dogmatic and reductionist.

It is not just at the level of ideas, you mention that some of these ideas influenced policy makers, i.e. de Soto’s work praising neoliberalism. Can you talk briefly about this?

De Soto sees growth of the informal economy as the consequence of a choice by entrepreneurs, rooted in their spontaneous and collective response to over-regulation by predatory state apparatuses. De Soto puts forward a simple idea, and a very seductive one for policymakers, that the informal sector exists in separation from the formal sector, and it is the refuge of the urban poor who are excluded from the formal economy. De Soto pays no attention to internal differentiation within the informal economy and to whether such differentiation impacts on how informality works for different kinds of people. This is part of his explicit downplaying of the explanatory power of class. Its usefulness, he suggests, has been made redundant by the (alleged) reality that self-employment and working for a family business are the dominant employment relations in the informal economy. As de Soto put it, ‘Marx would probably be shocked to find out how in developing countries much of the teeming mass does not consist of oppressed legal proletarians but of oppressed extralegal small entrepreneurs’ (de Soto 2001: 229).

The influence of these ideas on policymakers can be seen in the many programmes promoting the formalization of property rights and small businesses, which have been rolled out across developing countries, Africa included. Their record in unlocking the productive potential of the poor has been far from positive. While microcredit has different roots, it is an intervention that dovetails effectively with the narrative of the informal poor as small-scale entrepreneurs, and on that premise it has attempted to foster their financial inclusion, with very mixed results. Above all, this approach, and the interventions that emanate from it, suffers from ‘jobs dementia’, as Amsden (2010: 60) memorably termed it: the belief that by supplying credit or training to self-employed entrepreneurs, demand for such businesses will, somehow, materialize. Urban poverty-reduction efforts must rest on a grounded study of urban capitalism and the place of the poor in it, rather than on idealised and misleading notions of entrepreneurship.

In place of the twin faults of the literature – vague ‘romanticism’ on informalisation and ‘market fundamentalism’ – you pose a non-teleogical and non-deterministic Marxism. Can you explain how you see this approach as superior, and how its helped to clarify your research in the book?

As I said, the urban poor must be located within an economic, social and political context. Making sense of the formidable structural forces the informal poor are up against is crucial to understanding their agency in the process of development, in a less romantic and more grounded fashion. In this case-study of urban public transport in Dar es Salaam and its development over time, first and foremost, I use class as a relational concept. Ownership of capital (such as land and other assets, most notably buses in this case), as opposed to the sale of labour power to those with such capital, determines people’s class position in the structure of a given society, and their economic stakes. The social relations between capital and labour, and the dynamics of class formation over time, are the key drivers (but not the only ones) of processes of socio-economic change. Their study must begin with questions such as ‘who owns what’ and ‘who does what with it’ as these are key to understanding the nature and actors of capitalist development. Only by posing such questions can one see that the private operators of bus public transport in Dar es Salaam are differentiated between those who own the vehicles and those who work on them. Posing these questions also reveals that the employment relationship linking these two classes is central to the way in which the service of public transport is provided, with all its tensions. The consequences of unregulated employment relations affect not only workers but also Dar es Salaam’s public; speeding, overloading buses, and refusing transport to school pupils are to be understood as practices through which workers respond to exploitation by bus owners.

Second, while class matters, its manifestation is messy and in many ways elusive, as one can observe different categories of transport workers, with different roles and interests, in the labour process. The book draws on Bernstein’s conceptualization of this phenomenon in terms of ‘classes of labour’ to make sense of this. The common ground of these workers, is that the sale of labour power is their main source of income.

Third, the identity, political consciousness, and capacity to act collectively by ‘classes of labour’ cannot be ‘read off’ from their socio-economic position in society in a teleological or functionalist fashion. This means that the study of labour identity(ies) and the extent to which it is experienced and expressed—or not—in class terms is an important line of enquiry in itself and one that requires attention to the way in which workers’ activists and transport unionists constructed a shared meaning of exploitation to then act upon it. None of this approach is teleological or deterministic, as critics of Marxian political economy too hastily suggest.

A meeting of a dalaladala workers’ association in Dar es Salaam (Matteo Rizzo, 1998)

I wonder whether you can say something about the nature / character of Tanzania’s ‘socialist’ past and the ways this has influenced/impacted on the liberalisation of Tanzanian society? How also has it impacted the development of resistance to these reforms?

Post-socialism is indeed an insightful analytical lens to understand neoliberalism, its politics in Tanzania, and the ambivalent positions of the Tanzanian government towards economic reform, including the direction of public transport in Dar es Salaam. The Tanzanian government has been seen as a model implementer of economic liberalization in many ways, but far from straightforward in its commitment to it, as values and discourses from the socialist period both called for and informed its attempts to intervene in the economy. Research on Eastern and Central European countries, and on China, has thrown important light on the hybrid and contradictory thrust of policy-making in countries embracing economic liberalization following the demise of socialism. Among Africanists, Pitcher and Askew incisively argue for more historical depth in much research on neoliberalism on the continent and in particular for an understanding of ‘whether, or how, a socialist past might shape a postsocialist present’ (Pitcher and Askew 2006: 3).

In paying attention to Tanzania’s socialist past and what is left of it, one must begin by noting that its ruling party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) first and then Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has been in power since independence. Since then, TANU/CCM transitioned from being the spearhead of ujamaa, as Tanzanian socialism was named from 1967 to the mid-1980s, to being the implementer of one of the most comprehensive experiences of economic liberalization in sub-Saharan Africa, and one for which Tanzania became one of the donors’ darlings. Throughout the process, the uses of the socialist past have been open-ended, as different actors have exploited in different ways concepts that were central to the building of a socialist nation under ujamaa, such as egalitarianism, social justice, and state ownership. These have been reappropriated and/or reworked, both to resist economic and political liberalization and to justify it. As Taken for a Ride shows, in the case of public transport, socialist ideals have been mobilized to bring back notions of social justice and public ownership in the liberalized economy and to justify attempts, with limited capacity and success, to bring back some degree of regulation in the liberalized sector.

You write in detail in the book about the development of the transport workers organisations and how workers organise themselves in the sector. What factors mitigated against an effective collective response to their situation?

As one transport worker wrote on the back of his bus, “Kazi mbaya; ukiwa nayo” [Bad job, if you have one]. The relatively unskilled nature of work in public transport, and the oversupply of unskilled workers in Tanzania today, is the first aspect to bear in mind when understanding the barriers to workers’ organization. The mismatch between demand for work in the sector and existing employment opportunities significantly undermined the bargaining power of daladala workers when facing employers, as the oversupply of workers forces workers to accept very long working days, and uncertain and meagre returns. Then there is the related issue of the fragmentation amongst different ‘classes of labour’ performing different tasks, and with different interests, as overworked workers call on underemployed workers, to whom they sub-contract part of the working day. Finally, the spatial unit in which transport work is performed matters as the atomised nature of work in buses, as opposed to a factory, was a barrier to the emergence of workers’ effective collective response to their plight.  

These were significant constraints to the organization of workers. But none of the barriers above should be crudely seen as destiny, the course of which cannot be changed. As I learned from later rounds of fieldworks, a group of workers successfully established a workers’ organization in the late 1990s, and over time, in partnership with the Tanzanian transport trade unions, achieved limited but substantive gains through their demands on employers and the state. How workers’ organised and what were their goals, therefore became part of my study.

‘Kazi mbaya; ukiwa nayo’ (Bad job, if you have one) on the back of a taxi in Dar es Salaam (Matteo Rizzo, 2002).

What conclusions would you draw from your research on labour possibilities and what the ‘unorganised’ can achieve in an informal economy in the Global South? 

I think we can draw out three related conclusions.  The first one is about time-frames in research. Struggling for labour rights in this segment of the informal economy entailed a slow effort at constructing a common ground between informal workers and their Union counterpart. The complex nature of this process partly explains the very slow pace at which change took place. So, we need to allow adequate time-frames when studying the political organization of informal workers.

The second conclusion is methodological, as the book shows the value of class-based political economy as an analytical approach. Far too often, studies on economic informality skirt around the questions of who owns what, and with what outcomes, in the informal economy. By contrast, this study demonstrates that understanding the way in which the workers are linked to (capitalist) employers, locating workers within their economic contexts, and mapping the sources of both their precariousness and power, is essential in making sense of whether, why and how workers mobilize politically. Asking these questions in no way condemns the analysis to functionalism and reductionism, which are certainly features of some work in the radical political economy tradition, but which can be avoided. Taken for a Ride does not simply read off workers’ political interests from their economic position in society, nor has it identified the economic position of workers as the only predictor of what was politically possible for them. Indeed, the very barriers that prevented the organization of these workers up to 1995 were then overcome through the initiative of some workers and the events that unfolded subsequently.

The third and final lesson to be learned from this study is that its findings challenge widely-held beliefs: that collective action by organized (or organizing) labour belongs to the past; that the problem poor people face is not one of adverse incorporation and exploitation by capitalism through informal and highly precarious work; and that social protection is a more realistic and strategic policy target in tackling workers’ precariousness. The workers who are the protagonists of Taken for a Ride share the lack of a clear employment relationship to their employers—the main characteristic that, it is argued, prevents workers’ mobilization for a ‘rights at work’ agenda in the informal economy. While this was indeed the main source of workers’ precariousness at work, it was also the very stimulus and goal of their mobilization. When challenging, with some success, the unclear nature of employment relations in the sector, workers drew on the significant structural power they commanded as providers of the cheapest form of available public transport. While the circumstances and context in which these workers’ mobilization took place are necessarily specific, the broader lesson is that we need to disaggregate the realms of the possible for different groups of workers in different economic sectors and countries. Above all, rather than celebrating prematurely the death of organising and organised labour, my work is a call to put ongoing labour struggles at the centre of our reflection on the possibilities for action by precarious workers.

Matteo Rizzo is a Senior Lecturer in Development Studies at SOAS, University of London. Matteo has degrees in Political Sciences from “L’Orientale” (Naples, Italy) and Development Studies and History from SOAS (MSc and PhD), where he also completed an ESRC postdoctoral fellowship. Matteo has taught at the LSE, at the African Studies Centre in Oxford and in Cambridge, where he was a Smuts Research Fellow in African Studies at the Centre of African Studies. Matteo is a member of the Editorial Working Group of the Review of African Political Economy and works on public transport for the International Transport Workers Federation.

Taken for a ride: Grounding neoliberalism, precarious labour and public transport in an African metropolis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Series on Critical Frontiers of Theory, Research, and Policy in International Development Studies (for readers of roape.net on the publishers page please enter the code ASFLYQ6 for a 30% discount on the cover price). 

 

References

Amsden, A.H. 2010. ‘Say’s Law, Poverty Persistence, and Employment Neglect’. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 11 (1): pp. 57–66.

Bernstein, H. 2007. ‘Capital and Labour from Centre to Margins’. Prepared for the Living on the Margins Conference, 26–28 March, Stellenbosch, South Africa.

Davis, M. 2006. Planet of Slums. London and New York: Verso.

Pieterse, E. 2008. City Futures: Confronting the Crisis of Urban Development. London and New York: Zed Books.

Pitcher, A. M. and Askew, K. M. 2006. ‘African Socialism and Postsocialism’, Special Issue of Africa 76 (1): 1–14.

Robinson, J. 2006. Ordinary Cities: Between Modernity and Development. Questioning Cities Series. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.

Robinson, J. and Parnell, S. 2011. ‘Travelling Theory: Embracing Post-Neoliberalism through Southern Cities’, in G. Bridge and S. Watson (eds), The New Blackwell Companion to the City. Oxford: Blackwell, 521–31.

Simone, A. 2004b. For the City Yet to Come: Changing African Lives in Four Cities. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

de Soto, H. 1989. The Other Path. New York: Harper and Row.

 

 

 

Revolution 2.0: Thomas Sankara and the Social Media Generation

By Heike Becker

Burkina Faso is a fascinating example of how a long history of socio-political mobilization, the resurgence of interest in a murdered former revolutionary leader, and the digital connections of the social media age have recently coalesced in a successful revolution. 

Long-time strongman Blaise Compaoré was overthrown in late October 2014, when hundreds of thousands, predominantly young Burkinabé participated in mass protests in the capital Ouagadougou and the country’s other centres. Almost a year later, in another upsurge of popular mobilization they came out on to the streets again; with massive acts of civil disobedience the popular resistance of September 2015 magnificently defended the new democracy against an attempted military coup.

The young Burkinabé activists at the forefront of the protests have dubbed the events ‘Revolution 2.0’. They did so for two good reasons: on the one hand, they referred to the digital connection of the protestors, journalists and opposition politicians who live-tweeted their way through the chain of events. But the tag also captured the mobilization as a second coming, finding its inspiration through a massive resurgence of interest in Thomas Sankara. Burkina Faso’s former president from 1983 until his murder in October 1987, never entirely ceased to be an inspiration for radical aims and hopes. Frequently he has been called the ‘African Che Guevara’. Yet Sankara’s image, his words, his legacy really became alive again with the massive mobilization of Burkina Faso’s youth from 2013 onwards.

Burkina Faso is one of the poorest African countries; its urbanization rate is still low at 31% (2017), and only 2.15 million Burkinabé (out of a total population of 18.9 million) are active web users today. More than three quarters of those who access the Internet do so through their smart phones, only 20 per cent have access to computer devices. In 2013-2015 these numbers were even much lower; nonetheless the hashtags #Burkina and #Lwili served to provide significant connections.

Popular movements such as Le Balai Citoyen (the ‘Citizen’s Broom’), founded by musician-activists Serge Bambara (known as the rapper ‘Smockey’) and Sams’K Le Jah, who plays reggae, mobilized through concerts, mass meetings and social media. During the frenzied days of street battles, at the Parliament building, on the Place de la Revolution, and elsewhere in 2014, those with smartphones, even though only a minority among the hundreds of thousands of protestors, tweeted events and information, which became a significant part of a remarkably flexible strategy of moving street blockades. Facebook, the most popular social media in the country, was used extensively for organising. While the Compaoré regime shut down sms services (but not the internet), cellphones – even if not internet-enabled – played an important role as transmitters of another, older media form: radio. Independent radio stations played popular rap and reggae songs celebrating Sankara’s life and ideas, and during the insurrection itself broadcast strategic instructions and information.

Burkina Faso in 2014 was no ‘Facebook revolution’. However, social media played an important role in connecting activists from the popular movements, opposition politicians, trade union leaders, and journalists. They shared what was happening on the streets. Twitter images were particularly significant also in joining ‘Revolution 2.0’ with the Burkinabé diaspora in neighbouring West African countries, elsewhere on the continent, and in countries of the ‘Global North’. They also reached influential international media. The President’s attempt to change the country’s Constitution and create a ‘presidency for life’ was increasingly isolated locally and internationally. Digital social media can be credited, in part, for the fact that the 2014 uprising succeeded to bring down the unpopular regime. Opposition leaders and human rights groups had been denouncing the Compaoré regime for years, however earlier waves of fierce protests in the late 1990s, and again in 2011 had stood no chance; they were crushed brutally.

With reference to the uprisings in North Africa that had brought down long-term strongmen there and in other parts of the Arab world, observers have described the Burkinabé insurrection as an ‘African spring’. Indeed, #AfricanSpring was another virulent hashtag although less actively used than #Lwili, named for the traditional fabrics worn in Burkina Faso. The local woven garments had also been intensely promoted by Thomas Sankara during his presidency in the 1980s as part of the project to promote economic self-reliance.

Sankara spoke out strongly, and to the face of powerful Western leaders against repayment of African debts. Under him, Burkina Faso embarked on child immunisation campaigns, and a large-scale campaign to fight desertification. Quite unusual for his time, Sankara promoted women in high positions and banned female circumcision; he is remembered for a powerful speech in which he pronounced that the revolution could not triumph without the emancipation of women. The young leader, attractive in his signature red beret, personally incorruptible, and a keen soccer player and guitarist, took on vested interests internationally and locally, which – as some have pointed out – led to a dangerous situation and eventually his murder and the coup led by his former associate Blaise Compaoré.

Today, Sankara’s message and example are finding enthusiastic admiration among young Africans in Burkina Faso, and beyond. From Burkina Faso, Senegal and The Gambia in the West, to South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe in the southern parts of the continent a social media generation has taken to the streets with their posts and tweets and cellphone videos, with their blogs and rap music. They are deeply angry at the postcolonial condition and austerity, at unreformed global racism and corrupt, authoritarian postcolonial elites; they share a great desire for democracy and social justice. In the 21st century young Africans with their smartphones are, arguably, at the forefront of an alternative globalisation from the south.

Heike Becker writes about the intersection of culture and postcolonial politics with a focus on memory politics, popular culture and social movements, some of her work can be found here. Heike is a regular contributor to www.roape.net.

Photographs: Featured photograph is a portrait of Sankara painted on the wall of François Compaoré’s mansion, the economic adviser to the deposed president. The mansion was raided and occupied during the revolution in 2014, it is still held by revolutionary youth (Leo Zeilig, March 2016). The first image in the text is a souvenir DVD of the revolution sold on the streets of the capital Ouagadougou (Heike Becker, December 2014). The second image is a burnt car outside the Assemblée nationale in Ouagadougou, the parliament building was burnt to the ground at the end of October 2014 (Heike Becker, December 2014).

Kenya’s Incredible Election

By Nic Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch and Justin Willis

What makes a credible election? As Kenya lurches deeper into political crisis over presidential polls scheduled for October 26, this is a pressing question. The last few weeks have been a political roller-coaster, with repeated, unexpected, shifts and turns; even those close to leading political figures have found it hard to keep up with events – and with the tactics and demands of the main protagonists. When a majority judgment by the Supreme Court annulled the first attempt at a poll on 8 August and ordered fresh elections, the incumbent president, Uhuru Kenyatta, turned his anger not on the electoral commission – whose ‘irregularities and illegalities’ led to the judgment – but on the court itself, whose members he denounced as ‘know-alls’. Now Kenyatta himself has taken a case to the Supreme Court, seeking to force Raila Odinga, his principal opponent, to take part in the coming election – because Odinga has said he will boycott the poll, even though he himself brought the case which led to the first election being annulled.

Why is Kenyatta now so keen on the fresh election, and why is Odinga reluctant? Kenyatta had been declared the winner of the 8 August poll, in which his Jubilee party also won a majority of multiple lower-level elections. He has not shown much enthusiasm for the electoral commission’s subsequent efforts to introduce changes that will make the fresh presidential poll more credible; and one electoral commissioner recently resigned in dramatic circumstances, alleging that necessary reforms are being stymied by political interference. Instead Kenyatta has been campaigning hard, and insists he is confident of victory. He would, he claims, romp home in an election without Odinga – there are other, minor candidates in the race, but they will attract very few votes. Kenyatta wants the legitimacy, international and local, that would come from an election in which he defeats Odinga – though it seems he will push ahead with the election anyway if Odinga refuses to stand.

Flouting established parliamentary practice, Kenyatta’s party has rushed through changes in election law that would make it harder for the court to overturn another result; but the president has held off from assenting to these, seeking to use this as leverage to force Odinga to participate. Odinga, meanwhile, has declared that the changes in procedure are not enough, that he was the real winner in August – and that he would be cheated of victory again in a new poll. He insists that he is not reluctant to face the electorate – but will only do so after comprehensive reforms. In turn, Odinga called for the elections to be postponed – a position that has also been supported by a number of local and international civil society organisations. At the same time, he has called for periodic demonstrations against the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) and scheduled polls, and last week told his supporters to wait for his direction on the eve of the scheduled polls as to the plan for collective action.

Behind the calculations – and the posturing – of the two men lies a keen awareness of the realities of Kenya’s electoral politics. Kenya’s politics are ethnic – but not just ethnic. Kenyatta’s support is strongest in central Kenya – and in the Rift Valley, the home area of his deputy, William Ruto. Odinga commands overwhelming support in Nyanza, in the west. But many Kenyans live outside these core strongholds; and even in the strongholds, voters are not simply supporting their candidate out of blind ethnic loyalty. This is also a politics of clientelism; people vote for candidates who will reward, and safeguard the interests of themselves and their community. Clientelism is not everything; the debate over Kenya’s new constitution – which was approved by a clear majority in a 2010 referendum – showed a popular enthusiasm for accountable, devolved government – and Odinga has clearly positioned himself as an advocate for more devolution. But voting on policy grounds against an incumbent, and a perceived likely winner, is a risk for the individual voter, and their community – incumbency is a powerful force in these circumstances.

NASA’s Mashujaa Day (Hero’s Day) rally in Kisumu, 20 October. Raila Odinga arriving (Gabrielle Lynch, 20 October, 2017).

The line between government and state is far from clear, and the president and ruling party have much greater campaign resources. Those resources fund giant rallies and campaign paraphernalia, and also allow the small-scale, ubiquitous gift-giving through which candidates demonstrate their generosity to win the support of voters. In the run-up to the August elections, Kenyatta and Jubilee made determined and effective use of this advantage. Since those polls, they have continued to do so; and Kenyatta’s advantage has been multiplied, as all the lower-level candidates who won seats have strong motivations to campaign for him. If they fail to show enthusiasm, or even worse, if he were to lose, they would lose the patronage that they need to deliver to their local constituents. Many local politicians and former Odinga allies from swing areas – outside the strongholds of the two rivals – have also defected to Kenyatta’s side. That is not simply the result of self-interest (though that often plays a part); it is also because many believe their constituents want them to be on the side of the incumbent government, because that is the most likely route to reward. Kenyatta wants an election because he is the incumbent, and this politics works for him; whether the electoral commission can deliver a problem-free process is a secondary issue for him. For him, a credible election is one with a high turnout and a clear result.

Odinga hailed the Supreme Court decision as a victory. He also argued that it proved the truth of his claim that he had been the real winner. In fact, it fell short of that; the full judgment offered no opinion on how many votes had been cast for each candidate. The election was annulled because the electoral commission failed to follow its own processes, and the law, in the process of tallying and transmitting of results: for the court, a credible election is defined by process. If this was a victory, it was one which handed Odinga a problem; his resources – and those of his supporters at lower levels – had been exhausted by the first campaign. Up against an intransigent government and a chaotic electoral commission, his rhetoric has naturally focused on demands for dramatic changes in the electoral commission, but is underpinned by the fact that the realities of political clientelism place him at a significant disadvantage. For Odinga, a credible election would not only require certain electoral reforms, but also the elimination – or at last, the significant reduction – of the advantages of incumbency: something that Kenyatta will not allow. Whatever the electoral commission do to improve their performance, it seems impossible that this will happen before the election on 26 October – and so Odinga has denounced any poll on that day as not credible.

Meanwhile, others look on. International observers, and diplomats, were wrong-footed by the events after August 8. The relatively smooth polling process distracted attention from the developing fiasco around tallying and transmission. While, in the absence of conclusive evidence that Kenyatta benefitted from the flaws in procedure, few anticipated the decision of the Supreme Court, which went against the legal precedent set during Odinga’s unsuccessful electoral petition in 2013 – when the Supreme Court ruled that, while there were significant procedural problems, the petitioners had not shown that they were systematically in favour of a particular candidate and had changed the overall outcome.

Kenyatta and Odinga have each accused ‘western powers’ of favouring the other. But it seems rather that the governments that have long considered themselves to be allies of Kenya – in relationships that have been close, but also sometimes tense and problematic – are desperate for an election that will reduce the sense of political crisis in Kenya: that is what credible elections would mean for them. But it is by no means clear that polls held on October 26 would meet that criterion. Unable to agree on what a credible election would look like, Kenya is perilously close to holding a presidential poll that satisfies no one.

Nic Cheeseman is Professor of Democracy and International Development at Birmingham University. Gabrielle Lynch is Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Warwick and Chair of ROAPE. Justin Willis is Professor of Modern African History at the University of Durham. 

Featured Photograph: NASA’s Mashujaa Day (Hero’s Day) rally in Kisumu, 20 October. Raila Odinga speaking to crowds (Gabrielle Lynch, 20 October, 2017).

The Earth Shook and Crumbled

Review of The Fall (produced by Baxter Theatre Centre, South Africa).

Royal Court, London. 

By Colin Fancy

Radical Theatre from South Africa has a longstanding and hugely respected reputation. Plays like Woza Albert!, Sizwe Banzi is Dead and The Island were some of the most influential plays in the late 20th century.

Plays from Apartheid-era South Africa told stories of struggle that those of us living in the West could empathise with and solidarize with. They entertained and educated us about that struggle.

The Fall, produced by Cape Town’s Baxter Theatre Centre, is of that illustrious and inspirational traditional. Yet it’s also very different.

The Fall is about a struggle in South African which, though only in 2015-16, has already had an impact in the West –  witness the campaign to tear down the racist Confederate statues in USA. But even more than that influence, The Fall is about struggles that we are fighting simultaneously alongside our activist sisters and brothers in South Africa.

The Fall tells the tale of the student activists, or cadres as they refer to each other throughout, who came together to bring down the statue of Cecil Rhodes which stood until 2015 at the University of Cape Town campus. That’s the part of the story which is well known – less so is the agitation and debate that was necessary to reach that bold act of de-colonisation.

The play has been created and performed by the class of 2015 graduate actors, some of whom had been involved or affected by the campaign. The actors perform in a classic Empty Space stage but they fill it with foot-stomping, handclapping, singing, and passionate personal testimony and scenes still hot from the struggle less than two years ago.

The show starts with them clapping, stamping, dancing and singing as they re-enact the storming of the university building. Woven into this theatrical fabric the students begin narrating, “We were pushing each other, sweating and singing, not knowing what would happen next. Fuck, man, it was historic! Finally black students at UCT felt confident to speak about the traumas we face on this campus.”

“I’ve never seen so many people with such fire.”

“It was bloody hot inside the foyer and it didn’t help that management switched off the fucking aircon system.” 

Anyone who’s been involved in student occupations and struggles will recognise the pace, intensity and passion of the political debate amongst the rapidly radicalised agitators. As the students verbally chip away at the existence of the statue and all that it represents, they grow in experience, in knowledge and in stature to become a new generation of history makers.

Bringing down the statue of Rhodes is expressed by the activists as the next step in “the fall of every colonial icon in this country, one by one.” The icon represents the colonial system that the students have to live and learn in, though they are the first generation born after the fall of apartheid. Interestingly apartheid is barely mentioned in the play. They may be living after apartheid but from the way racism and other forms of oppression weigh heavily in their lives far too much of the divisions of the old continue into the present day.

The statue of Rhodes is at the centre of the play, but it is only comes into focus mid-point into the story. After their iconoclastic act the cadres are both empowered by their achievement and conscious that much more is wrong with their lives, their life opportunities, South African society and indeed the world. This is where the similarities and parallels with struggles elsewhere really come to the fore.

The students’ acknowledgement that there are multiple oppressions appears to stop the movement in its track and threatens to fragment it. As once character says, “You see, now that Rhodes had fallen, all the problems that the movement had been pushing aside began to come back into focus…The issue of gender had been simmering throughout the occupation and now that the statue was gone, so tensions began to boil over.”

Also the issues of sexuality, non-binary rights, class exploitation and others come to the forefront.

Non-binary student, Cahya, says, “Every time we have these discussions about gender you cishet men and women make it all about you, and the rest of us are sitting here – suffocating… Our mission statement clearly states that we are an intersectional movement!”

As Marx said, it is necessary for people to throw off the muck of ages as part of the revolutionary process of changing the world.

The play shows these issues were neither ignored for the sake of ‘unity’ or allowed to divide the movement but instead, they are debated and fought over, sometimes fiercely. It is a great lesson for everyone who wishes ‘the left should stop arguing amongst themselves’ or thinks, ‘why do people bring these divisions to the movement?’ The debates portrayed are about overcoming divisions in society that will adversely affect the movement if they are not addressed.

The staff on campus have supported the students in their struggle and the students recognise the workers are suffering – especially since their work has been outsourced (as elsewhere in the neo-liberalist world). The workers conditions have deteriorated and exploitation has increased. Crucially the students make common cause with the workers as captured in the play’s dedication, “We dedicate this to all the students and workers who marched for free, decolonial education.”

The final words go to Qhawekazi, as she finishes the play, with a commitment to continuing the struggle: “We used to be people. We used to dream about a future where we didn’t need to protest anymore… my soul is tired, but the reasons I came the first time won’t let me leave. They won’t let me live a normal life.”

Colin Fancy is a London-based activist, writer and teacher. He is one of the editors of the RS21 website.

Rwanda’s Green Revolution

By An Ansoms, Giuseppe Cioffo, Neil Dawson, Sam Desiere, Chris Huggins, Margot Leegwater, Jude Murison, Aymar Nyenyezi, Johanna Treidl, Julie Vandamme

A ‘green’ revolution in Africa

The Rwandan government – supported by major international donors – has high ambitions to modernise and professionalise the agrarian and land sector to turn Rwanda from subsistence farming into a ‘modern’ and ‘developed’ country. Its reform fits into a broader call to implement a Green Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It is believed that formalisation of land tenure, investment in modern inputs, and commercialization will drive increased production of selected marketable crops, which will be profitable for smallholders if they are integrated into commercial commodity chains. This, in turn, is expected to lead to increased national food security, exports and growth at the national scale (see Knickel et al. 2009).

Key policy dimension of agrarian and land policies

However, several studies in SSA have shown that there are considerable negative impacts of the Green Revolution policy for significant sections of the rural population, especially poorer socio-economic groups, and more vulnerable farmers. This blogpost focuses upon three key policy dimensions in Rwanda’s agrarian and land sector modernisation: land registration, the Crop Intensification Policy (CIP) and cooperatives. It combines the findings of nine researchers who have done in-depth, qualitative research on the impact of Rwanda’s rural modernisation policies. By combining their findings, these studies cover a broad variety of settings and regions, reaching a fairly broad geographical scale, as the map suggests.

 

This map indicates the locations of research

The authors did not cover entire districts but locations in districts highlighted in this map.

The use of statistics in Rwanda

In and outside Rwanda, statistics validate the government’s claim of increased agricultural productivity and poverty reduction as they are viewed as a major instrument in policy design, implementation and evaluation (see Ansoms et al. 2017). However, we argue that they do not adequately capture the impact and success of Rwandan agricultural and poverty-reduction policies. ‘The problem is not a lack of data availability – the GoR undertook significant and laudable efforts to make their datasets publicly available – but rather that different data sources contradict each other and there is no way of telling which dataset is more reliable’ (Desiere et al. 2016, 10).

Poverty increase: 2010/11 – 2013/14

On the basis of thorough analyses of statistical data, we claim:

Yields probably increased over the period of the implementation of the agricultural reforms, but less than what the most optimistic but least reliable data source (FAO statistics) suggests (see Desiere et al. 2016).

Poverty decreased significantly over the 2005/6 – 2010/11 period but with seasonal effects playing a partial role (see Ansoms et al. 2017; McKay and Verpoorten 2016).

Inflation over the 2010/11 – 2013/14 period was probably much higher (around 30%) than the assumed 16.7% (see Desiere, 2017).

Under this assumption, poverty did not decrease significantly over the 2010/11 – 2013/14 period, but remained constant (see Desiere, 2017).

A nuanced view upon rural development

The modernisation and professionalization of the agricultural sector are often presented as key drivers of developmental progress. The government has taken a highly interventionist stance in the agricultural sector (as in the economy more generally). It has pushed farmers into obligatory formal land registration to enhance investment in the agricultural sector and reduce land conflicts. In combining our data, we focus on three key policy dimensions:

Land registration:  Despite land registration, land conflicts are still widespread and often concern parcels that have already been officially registered. Because people often do not report the transactions of officially registered land, particularly not in the case of small land plots, new land conflicts are likely to arise. In addition, farmers are worried about the ways in which a land register allows authorities to ‘govern’ land rights, as an updated register is a very efficient tool for authorities to push farmers into centrally-organised modern farming systems or to exclude those who resist from access to land.

Crop Intensification Programme (CIP): The Crop Intensification Programme started in 2007 and entails 1) land use consolidation; (2) sale of fertilisers and improved seeds; (3) provision of proximity extension services; and (4) improvement of post-harvesting handling and storage. It aims to transform Rwanda’s family-farming into a professionalised sector, and is oriented towards the sale of target crops rather than home consumption. However, on the basis of our evidence, we argue that the CIP is a model that is too simple and rigid as it operates in a complex and variable human, climatic and agro-ecological context. It has often proved to be counter-productive in terms of food and tenure security for the poorest households and other vulnerable groups.

Cooperatives: It is through cooperatives that CIP crops are brought to the market and they are key structures in the organisation of the new agrarian model. Not only do they allow for a more coordinated agrarian approach with its emphasis on scale-effects in collective, more efficient, production schemes, they are also instruments in a top-down state-controlled governance model. At the level of implementation, several gaps facilitate the structural exclusion of poorer socio-economic groups, and more vulnerable farmers. This will continue as long as the heterogeneous socio-economic background of farmers is not taken into account. Top-down approaches tend to lead to a financial burden, to production schemes, and to opaque management structures which undermine the cooperatives’ claim for inclusiveness.

Exclusion of poor and vulnerable groups

Our data suggest that for many small-scale farmers the aforementioned policies lead to increased land-tenure and food insecurity, tensions and the exclusion of vulnerable groups. Furthermore, there is limited space for policy transgression and advocacy by CSOs because of the rigid top-down character of Rwanda’s governance system.

Moving beyond the Rwandan case

This blogpost also tries to add a layer of complexity to the assessment of the Rwandan agricultural modernization effort and provides three important insights (that extend beyond the Rwandan case):

Large-scale statistics overlook in-depth realities:  Empirical evidence derived from both statistical analysis and micro-level qualitative research problematizes the overreliance upon state-generated national-level statistical analysis. Not only does this information source risk being misleading in case of shaky methodologies, but it is inherently designed to overlook and simplify the complex details of social reality (see Dawson 2015).

Generation of statistics has a normative dimension:  National-level statistics are instrumentalized by governance structures to make reality legible. The creation of statistical information is not only a descriptive activity, but a highly normative one: it narrates reality, and in doing so, it shapes it in conformance with the vision held by the central observer.

Top-down approach is blind to unexpected patterns:  This ‘panoptical view’ (Scott 1998) is, because of its central and typifying nature, blind to dynamics that do not fit into expected patterns of behaviour, economic activity or interests. This risks creating vicious cycles in which the evaluation and re-formulation of state policy does not benefit from grassroots feedback and from the social responses to their requirements. The transgression of strict policy implementation guidelines and rules are signifiers of such distance between centrally-planned policies and real local life, but the top-down approach of Rwanda policy-making makes it so that they are rarely acknowledged beyond the local context.

As an overall conclusion, the authors plead for a more nuanced, in-depth and multi-faceted research approach in order to understand the distance between centrally-planned policies and the realities of rural livelihoods.

Prof. An Ansoms (Université catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium) has over 15 years of experience on natural resource conflicts and challenges for rural development in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.

Giuseppe Cioffo, MA (Université catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium) is involved in research on agricultural modernization in Rwanda and is a Program and Policy Officer at the European network for Central Africa (EurAc).

Dr Neil Dawson (University of East Anglia, UK) is a specialist in poverty, wellbeing and environmental justice research among rural populations in developing countries and is a member of The Global Environmental Justice Group that studies linkages between social justice and environmental change.

Dr Sam Desiere (Ghent University, Belgium) is an expert in statistics and has focused on data quality of household surveys in developing countries, including Rwanda and Burundi

Prof. Chris Huggins (University of Ottawa, Canada) is a researcher, lecturer, and trainer with more than 15 years of experience on land and natural resources rights in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly the political economy of land and agricultural reform.

Dr Margot Leegwater (Université catholique de Louvan-la-Neuve, Belgium) has done research on land-related policies and how these affect social relations in Rwanda.

Dr Jude Murison (University of Antwerp, Belgium) has conducted extensive field research in developing countries, especially in Rwanda and Uganda, focusing on human rights, health, international business, judicial politics, rural development, agricultural production, and migration.

Dr Aymar Nyenyezi Bisoka (Université catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium) has expertise on land grabbing by local elites and issues of power and resistance in relation to access to natural resources in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.

Johanna Treidl, MA (University of Cologne, Germany) is conducting research into the social and cultural dimensions of wetlands in Rwanda, with a focus on gender and food security.

Dr Julie Vandamme (Université catholique de Louvan-la-Neuve, Belgium) has studied agricultural innovation in Rwanda, in particular with regard to banana cultivation.

Featured Photograph: Farmers working in agriculture in Rwanda, January 2007

Notes

Dawson, N. 2015. “Bringing context to poverty in rural Rwanda: added value and challenges ofmixed methods approaches.” In Mixed Methods Research in Poverty and Vulnerability, edited by K. Roelen, and L. Camfield. Basingstoke/ New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Desiere, S., L. Staelens, and M. D’Haese 2016. “When the Data Source Writes the Conclusion: Evaluating Agricultural Policies.” The Journal of Development Studies 52 (9): 1372–87.

Huggins, C. 2014. “‘Control Grabbing’ and small-scale agricultural intensification: emerging patterns of state-facilitated ‘agricultural investment’ in Rwanda.” Journal of Peasant Studies 41 (3): 365-384.

Huggins, C. 2014b. Restrictions on Land Use Rights in Rwanda: Understanding the ‘Bundle of Land Rights’ in Context. Focus on Land in Africa (FOLA) Brief.

McKay, A., and M. Verpoorten. 2016. “Growth, Poverty Reduction and Inequality. In Growth and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa, edited by C. Arndt, A. McKay and F. Tarp, Chapter 6. doi:10. 1093/acprof:oso/9780198744795.001.0001.

Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development (RISD). 2013. Securing Land Rights Project: A Working Paper on Land Tenure Regularization in Rwanda. Kigali: RISD.

Scott, J. 1998. Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Have and London: Yale University Press.

ROAPE Editorial: Neoliberalism, Labour Power and Democracy

Every quarter the Review of African Political Economy’s quarterly journal is published by Taylor and Francis, roape.net posts an extract from the editorial. In the context of a widespread revolt against neo-liberalism, including Jeremy Corbyn’s re-energised Labour Party, Hannah Cross writes about the ‘neoliberal invasion of Africa’ and an issue that addresses the ‘attacks on gender relations and rights, workers and standards of living.’ This extract of the editorial is taken from Vol. 44, Issue 153 of ROAPE, available here.

By Hannah Cross

Labour will take robust action to end the self-regulation of [UK] Department for International Development private contractors, establishing and enforcing new rules to ensure aid is used to reduce poverty for the many, not to increase profits for the few.

… The current global tax system is deeply unjust. Africa’s economies alone lose more than £46 billion annually through corruption and tax evasion – more than 10 times what they receive in aid. Labour will act decisively on tax havens, introducing strict standards of transparency for crown dependencies and overseas territories, including a public register of owners, directors, major shareholders and beneficial owners for all companies and trusts. (Labour Party 2017, 122)

Not only promising to maintain aid commitments and international agreements, the above development policies and others in the UK’s Labour Party manifesto reflect its core aims to dismantle the rigged economic system, expand public ownership and strengthen workers’ rights. They expose the international development for the few that has persisted in the shadow of Thatcher’s reign, through Tony Blair’s pro-privatisation ‘New Labour’ regime, and which is now being pushed to extremes. More than a departure from neoliberalism, the stakes are even higher in the prospect of a disjuncture from British imperialism (Cross 2016). Meanwhile, the Conservative government projects the fantasy of returning to its heights in a post-Brexit world. The International Development Secretary Priti Patel aims to use aid money to secure post-Brexit free trade deals that would drive down prices, remove tariffs, and cut regulation whilst increasing the private share of development aid (Global Justice Now 2016). Her party aims to ‘create millions of jobs in countries across the developing world’, a punishing prospect when the collaborating International Trade Secretary Liam Fox has repeatedly undermined workers’ rights and claims they are unsustainable for business (Stone 2016).

Prime Minister Theresa May called the UK’s snap election on 8 June 2017 on the calculation that she would destroy the opposition to her party’s austerity programme and grandiose ‘Empire 2.0’ Brexit vision, backed by a plutocratic national media that promotes xenophobic nationalism and apathy. Yet the mass mobilisation of the Labour campaign offered unprecedented hope of an alternative when it significantly weakened her government and left her clinging to power. It prevailed both over a media almost unanimously presenting leader Jeremy Corbyn as ‘unelectable’ at best, a supporter of terrorism at worst, and over the stubborn adherents of neoliberalism in his party.

A major theme in this collection of articles, neoliberalism is a political project orchestrated by the capitalist class in the 1970s. It originates in the aim to suppress the power of labour by opening up global competitiveness between workers, empowering finance capital, and crushing jobs with privatisation, deregulation and technological change. Think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation followed up with the ideological front, eventually infiltrating universities (David Harvey in Jacobin 2016). The neoliberal construct of ‘governance’ is hostile to politics, ‘meshing [the] political and business lexicons through which neoliberal reason is disseminated’ and reducing people to ‘self-investing and responsibilised human capital [in] the project of a growing economy’ (Brown 2015, 70). As a consequence, for Brown, Marx’s depiction of capitalism as ‘vampire-like, exploitative, alienating, inegalitarian, duplicitous, profit-driven, compulsively expanding, fetishistic, desacralising of every precious value, relation and endeavour’ is inadequate to the damage neoliberal rationality has wrought to democracy as well as the economy (Brown 2015, 111).

Yet the transnational capitalist class can no longer unite in this runaway project. The International Monetary Fund and international organisations attempt to moderate the neoliberal programme of austerity in the increasingly rogue US and UK governments, while liberal international institutions that buffered the neoliberal invasion in Africa and elsewhere can no longer reconcile themselves with the attacks on gender relations and rights, workers and standards of living (Giugliano 2015; Bretton Woods Project 2017). Regionalism is also breaking down its unity as the USA’s geopolitical power declines along with the other ‘triad’ countries in Western Europe and Japan. The power of financial oligarchies in their political systems is fragile in the periphery because it does not accommodate political regimes of popular legitimacy (Amin 2016) Insights from Odinga and Dobler in the current issue (Vol. 44, Issue 153) of the Review show respectively how the USA is weakened by dependency on uncertain allies, and how, on the other hand, globalised liberalism in its erosion of regulatory power has opened up countries to the reproduction of comprador class dynamics by non-Western powers.

As Brown (2015) has explained so eloquently how neoliberalism is ‘undoing the demos’, now the demos is undoing neoliberalism in the countries that pioneered it. Its ideology has been fundamentally challenged by popular socialist campaigns that gained the majority of youth votes in US, French and UK elections (Blake 2016 Anderson 2017; Seymour 2017). Its hegemony is fatally eroded at the core. As a result, it can no longer be stabilised without recourse to increasingly authoritarian tactics, which disrupts the complicity of its bureaucratic upholders. Bereft ‘centrists’ might find comfort in Emmanuel Macron’s victory over the far right in France, but there lacks a more positive argument of support for the tactical election of a former investment banker who promotes 1990s-style ‘modernisation’ and entrepreneurship to be found in the dismantling of welfare and collective bargaining rights for workers (Halimi 2017, 2). This ‘third-way’ politics championed by Tony Blair and Bill Clinton has left much to grieve for – a world of cheap labour competitiveness and war, with more than 65 million forcibly displaced people and persistent deaths at sea, those caused by the disasters of deregulation and privatisation, not to mention the environmental consequences of unfettered growth. The violent ideologies of Islamic extremism and fascism have found support in communities that have been betrayed, impoverished, disempowered and patronised by self-styled liberal ‘experts’, while capitalist interests benefit from and sponsor these cultural interpretations of social and economic division. This regression was inevitable, not something that can be controlled with better management, and the remaining promoters of neoliberalism appear increasingly outdated and driven by narrow self-interest rather than rationality.

David Harvey, however, warns that ‘most anti-neoliberalism fails to deal with the macro-problems of endless compound growth – ecological, political and economic problems. So I would rather be talking about anti-capitalism’ (Jacobin 2016). As distasteful as neoliberalism has become socially and culturally, the shock rise of Jeremy Corbyn’s popularity in the UK, to become its most popular leader soon after the election, has emerged in an equally shocking, but absolutely necessary, class framing of political struggle. ‘For the many not the few’ was a sufficiently simple message to rapidly shift political consciousness beyond the committed left, rendering the elite capture of social movements, such as that found in the ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign of 2005, unimaginable. The election campaign defied the pluralism and compromise often expounded in radical forms of democracy, instead promoting the substantive class narrative that destroys neoliberal logic, with impetus from newly empowered working class politicians and minority groups. The irony of its radicalism is that it is a moderate vision of democratic socialism to counter the neoliberal revolution that shifted the capitalist world order to new extremes and totality. It does not depart entirely from capitalism but does open up the space to conceive of a different world beyond capitalism – one that no longer accepts the hierarchical ordering of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries or assumes Western elites’ superiority of knowledge and interpretation, and instead remakes it according to material realities and the knowledge found in local resistance and global struggle, where the intellectual action is. As veteran activist Angela Davis (2017) argues: ‘we always use as our standard, those who are at the centre of the structures we want to dismantle.’ In dismantling these fraudulent structures, it is time to pursue a different standard by reimagining citizenship, work and democracy from a renewed socialist perspective …

 


 

Contributions in the current Issue 153 of The Review show neoliberal carnage and forms of resistance in Africa. The logic of the former is one of ‘shared sacrifice’ by whole communities, the demand that people suffer slashed jobs, pay, benefits and services, ‘with no immediate returns to those who sacrifice or are sacrificed … [for the] restoration of economic and state fiscal “health”’ (Brown 2015, 216). In this model of development, Lauren Maclean’s article examines the expansion of non-state providers of social welfare, showing how they produce new inequalities of access, complex barriers to accountability towards citizens, and the long-term erosion of state capacity. Labour migrancy is another outcome of this ‘shared sacrifice’. Based on a collaboration with ROAPE founding editor Lionel Cliffe (whose take on the political events of the past year would have been a delight to discuss), the next article comparatively examines the political economy of migration and labour mobility in West and Southern Africa. It includes analysis of Samir Amin’s regionalisation of Africa and the mechanisms of cheap labour, suggesting agenda and methods for approaching contemporary patterns.

The next two articles explore trade unionism in Africa, particularly in South Africa. Nick Bernards analyses the interaction between the International Labour Organisation and trade unions, assessing the ‘tripartite fantasy’ of formal institutions through which government mediates between workers and employers. Within the global rise of neoliberalism, their capacity to advance workers’ interests is restricted and deviations from the depoliticised and non-radical ideal are seen as a ‘moral failing’. David Dickinson’s article than examines casual workers’ organisation in the South African Post Office in a form of ‘insurgent unionism’ that is understood in the context of structural violence within a vastly unequal society.

The final two articles focus on the role of outside powers – the USA and China – in African politics. Sobukwe Odinga examines US-Ethiopian intelligence cooperation, revealing how Ethiopia has leveraged the liaison for its regional objectives and enabled the Meles administration to evade criticisms or sanctions for its increasingly autocratic politics. Gregor Dobler examines how China’s new role in Africa influences local lives, social and political relations, finding that this cooperation widens the rifts between the elites and the people. He highlights the importance of the political and technical regulation capacity of the state for determining international actors’ role in its political economy.

For the full editorial click here. Roape.net readers can access Briefings and Debates in the journal by registering and logging on here.

Hannah Cross is author of Migrants, Borders and Global Capitalism: West African labour mobility and EU borders, Routledge 2013. She is a lecturer in International Relations at the University of Westminster, and an editor of ROAPE.

References

Anderson, P. 2017. “The Centre Can Hold: The French Spring.” New Left Review 105, May–June

Amin, S. 2016. “The Election of Donald Trump.” Monthly Review, November 30

Blake, A. 2016. “More Young People Voted for Bernie Sanders Than Trump or Clinton Combined – By a Lot.” Washington Post, June 20

Bretton Woods Project. 2017. “IMF and World Bank Labour Policies Criticised by UN Expert.” April 6. Accessed June 27, 2017.

Brown, W. 2015. Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. New York: Zed Books. 

Cross, H. 2016. “Corbynism and Africa: Breaking from Imperialism?” Review of African Political Economy online blog, November. Accessed June 27, 2017.

Davis, A. 2017. “Angela Davis in Conversation.” Women of the World Festival, Southbank Centre, March 11. Accessed June 28, 2017.

Giugliano, F. 2015. “IMF Paper Warns Low-risk Governments against Needless Austerity.” Financial Times, June 2

Global Justice Now. 2016. “Dreaming of Empire? UK Foreign Policy Post-Brexit.” November. London: Global Justice Now. Accessed June 26, 2017.

Halimi, S. 2017. “Unprecedented Politics: Decades of Practice at Tactical Voting May Keep the Far Right Out, but at the Price of a Business as usual Neoliberal for President.” Le Monde Diplomatique, April, translated by George Miller

Jacobin. 2016. “Neoliberalism Is a Political Project: An Interview with David Harvey.” July 23, Brooklyn, NY

Labour Party (UK). 2017. For the Many, Not the Few. The Labour Party Manifesto 2017. London: The Labour Party

Seymour, R. 2017. “Where We Go from Here.” Novara Media, June 11.

Stone, J. 2016. “The New International Development Secretary Wanted to Scrap What is Now Her Department.” Independent, July 14.

Popular Protest & Class Struggle in Africa – Part 10

By David Seddon

Last issue, David Seddon reviewed the recent political history of Niger, where President Mahamadou Issoufou had – as an exception to most African presidents – recently announced that he would not amend the constitution to allow him to seek a third term after his second and final mandate ends in 2021. In this issue, he considers the case of Togo, where popular protests broke out in August 2017 against President Faure Gnassingbé, whose father Etienne Eyadéma Gnassingbé, was (until his death in 2005) the longest serving president in Africa.    

Togo achieved independence from France in on 27 April 1960. In the first presidential elections in 1961, Sylvanus Olympio gained 100 per cent of the votes as the opposition boycotted the elections. On 9 April 1961 the Constitution of the Togolese Republic was adopted, according to which the supreme legislative body was the National Assembly of Togo. Olympio tried to reduce Togo’s dependence on France by establishing closer relations with the United States, Great Britain and Germany.

In December 1961, several leading figures in the opposition were accused of plotting an anti-government coup. They were arrested and detained, and opposition parties were dissolved by decree. In January 1963, Olympio was assassinated by a group of soldiers under the direction of Sergeant Etienne Eyadéma Gnassingbé, and a state of emergency was declared. The military handed over power to an interim government led by Nicolas Grunitzky. In May 1963, Grunitzky was elected President of the Republic. The new leadership reversed Olympio’s foreign policy and pursued closer relations with France. Internally, his tried to reduce the differences and tensions between north and south, to promulgate a new constitution (1963) and introduce a multiparty system.

Exactly four years later, on 13 January 1967, Eyadéma Gnassingbé overthrew Grunitzky in a bloodless coup and assumed the presidency. He created the Rally of the Togolese People party, banned the activities of all other political parties and formally introduced a one-party system in November 1969. He was re-elected in 1979 and 1986. In 1983, a privatization programme was launched and in 1991 – as in so many other African countries at the time – other political parties were allowed to operate again, but with considerable informal restrictions. Efforts at ‘economic reform’, undertaken with support from the World Bank and the IMF, led to private and public sector strikes, and popular protest throughout 1992 and 1993. The devaluation of the currency by 50 per cent in January 1994, designed to provide an important impetus to renewed structural adjustment, generated considerable political turmoil and economic development remained limited.

The Economy

This was, in part, because prices of Togo’s major exports – phosphates and agricultural commodities (coffee, cocoa, cotton and groundnuts) – remained relatively low over the next decade (depressed cocoa prices led to a 1 per cent drop in GDP in 1998), and in part because of the lack of electricity, as Togo produces only about a third of its needs and imports the remainder from Ghana and Nigeria, which constrained the development of the industrial sector, including cement production.

Togo has the fourth largest phosphate deposits in the world, producing around 2 million tons per year (and generating 34 per cent of GDP in 2012). Since the mid-90s, however, there has been a decline in the mining industry and reduction in export earnings due to falling phosphate prices on world markets and increasing foreign competition. While export earnings are high relative to most other countries in Africa (owing to the exploitation of its phosphate deposits and its relatively developed agricultural export sector), the standard of living of most Togolese is not.

The bulk of the population (65 per cent) remains rural and relies heavily on subsistence farming of crops like cassava, maize, millet and rice and on livestock production. Agriculture generated 28 per cent of GDP in 2012 and employed about half of the working population in 2010. Togo is one of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) with an average per capita GDP of $491 (average for all LDCs is $1,436) and an economic vulnerability index of 33.6 (average for all LDCs is 41.4).      

Recent Political Developments

Eyadema Gnassingbé died suddenly of a heart attack on 5 February 2005. At the time of his death, he was the longest-serving leader in modern African history, after having been president for 38 years.

Under the Togolese Constitution, the President of the Parliament, Fambaré Ouattara Natchaba, should have become President of the country, pending a new presidential election to be called within sixty days. Natchaba was out of the country, returning on an Air France plane from Paris. The Togolese army (known as the Forces Armées Togolaises (FAT) or Togolese Armed Forces) closed the borders, forcing the plane to land in nearby Benin. With an artificially created power vacuum, the Togolese Parliament voted to remove the constitutional clause that would have required an election within sixty days, and declared that Eyadema’s son, Faure Gnassingbé, would inherit the presidency and hold office for the rest of his father’s term. Faure was sworn in on 7 February 2005, despite international criticism of the succession.

The African Union described the takeover as a military coup d’état. There was also disapproval from the United Nations. Within Togo, opposition to the takeover took the form of uprisings in many cities and towns, mainly in the southern part of the country. In the town of Aného, a general civilian uprising followed by a large-scale massacre by government troops went largely unreported. It was estimated by some sources as many as 500 people died in the government crackdown against opposition protests. In response, Faure Gnassingbé agreed to hold elections and on 25 February, he resigned as president, but soon afterward accepted the nomination to run for the office. On 24 April 2005, he was elected President of Togo, receiving over 60 per cent of the vote according to official results.

His main rival in the race had been Emmanuel Bob-Akitani from the Union des Forces du Changement (UFC) or Union of Forces for Change. Parliament designated Deputy President, Bonfoh Abbass, as interim president until the inauguration. On 3 May 2005, Faure Gnassingbé was sworn in as the new president. The European Union suspended aid to Togo in support of the opposition claims, unlike the African Union and the United States which declared the vote ‘reasonably fair’. The Nigerian president and Chair of the African Union (AU), Olusẹgun Ọbasanjọ, sought to negotiate between the incumbent government and the opposition to establish a coalition government, but Gnassinbgé rejected the AU Commission appointment of former Zambian president, Kenneth Kaunda, as special AU envoy to Togo. In June 2005, however, he nominated opposition leader Edem Kodjo as the prime minister.

In October 2007, after several postponements, elections were eventually held under proportional representation. This allowed the less populated north to have as many MPs as the more populated south. The president-backed party Rally of the Togolese People (RPT) won an outright majority, with the UFC coming second and the other parties managing very limited representation. Again, vote rigging accusations were leveled at the RPT. Despite the presence of an EU observer mission, there were canceled ballots and illegal voting took place, mainly in RPT strongholds. The election was, however, declared fair by the international community and praised as ‘a model’, with little intimidation or violence, for the first time since a multiparty system was reinstated. On 3 December 2007, Komlan Mally of the RPT was appointed to prime minister succeeding Agboyibor. However, on 5 September 2008, after only 10 months in office, Mally resigned.

Faure Gnassingbé won re-election in the March 2010 presidential election, taking 61% of the vote against Jean-Pierre Fabre from the UFC, who had been backed by an opposition coalition called FRAC (Republican Front for Change). Though the March 2010 election was largely peaceful, electoral observers noted ‘procedural errors’ and technical problems, and the opposition did not recognize the results claiming that irregularities had affected the outcome.

Periodic protests followed the election. On 11 April 2010, for example, it was reported by All Africa that 4,000 opposition activists had taken to the streets of the capital, Lomé, to protest the re-election of Faure Gnassingbé in the March polls. The demonstrations, organised by the main opposition coalition Republican Front for Change (FRAC) and which had become weekly events, ended peacefully, and in May, long-time opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio announced that he would enter into a power-sharing deal with the government, a coalition arrangement which provides the UFC with eight ministerial posts.

In June 2012, government electoral reforms prompted protesters supporting the coalition of opposition parties to take to the streets once again for several days. The protesters sought a return to the 1992 constitution that would re-establish presidential term limits and reverse changes made to voting rules. Dozens were arrested. A prominent opposition leader and former prime minister, Agbeyome Kodjo, who led some of the protests, was also briefly detained. On 14 July, security forces raided the home of one of the movement’s leaders, Jean Pierre Fabre, leader of the National Alliance for Change party (ANC). The officers fired teargas and injured some of the occupants. Four of the officers involved in the raid were formally reprimanded, according to the Ministry of Security, but Fabre’s ANC called on its supporters to protest: ‘the population needs to mobilise to defeat this regime, which does not respect the constitution and human rights’, Fabre told AFP. Following this, several thousands of anti-government demonstrators rallied in Togo’s capital to protest what they said was a crackdown on the opposition movement. The demonstration ended more or less peacefully.

July 2012 also saw the surprise resignation of the prime minister, Gilbert Houngbo, and the rest of the government. Reuters reported that the president’s office had claimed that they resigned voluntarily ‘to broaden the leadership ahead of the next parliamentary elections’, which were to be held in October. According to an official statement issued by the president’s office, it was considered ‘important that all representative movements in Togo’s society are involved in public office in this new period in preparation for the parliamentary elections’. The statement, published by government daily newspaper Togo-Presse, added that the president would now hold talks with all those interested in joining the government. Days later, the commerce minister, Kwesi Ahoomey-Zunu, was named to lead the new government.

Legislative polls were planned for October, but no date had been given yet, and opposition groups said more time was needed install measures to guarantee a clean vote. Opposition-led protests and strikes demanding electoral reform effectively delayed the process, and, after being rescheduled for 24 March 2013, the parliamentary elections were postponed again, first to 21 July 2013 and then to 25 July 2013. Some members of the opposition sought a postponement in order to see electoral reforms take effect prior to the elections, while others sought the repeal of the changes as improperly introduced. Amongst the latter was the controversial alleged gerrymandering of constituency borders to favour the ruling Union for the Republic (UNIR), led by President Faure Gnassingbé, and the 10-seat increase in the number of members of the National Assembly from 81 to 91.

Although the government banned street demonstrations in commercial areas during the elections – which were eventually held on 25 July 2013 – citing an inability to maintain security and public order, protest organizers from opposition and civil society groups pledged to carry out protests and denounced what they termed an attempt to stifle criticism. In the event, the ruling Union for the Republic (UNIR) won 62 of the 91 seats in the new enlarged National Assembly in what was considered to be a landslide. The opposition Union of Forces for Change (UFC) suffered heavy losses (down to 3 seats from 27), and a new grouping, the Save Togo Collective, secured 19 seats to become the main opposition party in the National Assembly.

Protests termed ‘Let’s Save Togo’ were planned for 21–23 August. On the first day, several thousand protesters commenced a march in Lomé‘s Be neighbourhood and then headed to the commercial district of Deckon, where 100 police officers were deployed. There was then a dispute as to whether the protest march would end in Deckon for a rally or proceed further; eventually, the protesters were dispersed using tear gas 10 minutes after the march commenced.

When the National Assembly began its new term at the beginning of September, Dama Dramani, a UNIR deputy, was elected as President of the National Assembly. Opposition MPs boycotted the vote as UNIR was unwilling to give them the posts of first and second vice-president in the Bureau of the National Assembly; consequently UNIR deputies were elected to all of the 11 posts in the Bureau – another landslide victory for the ruling party.

On 25 April 2015, over 2 million Togolese took part in the third presidential election since the death of Eyadema Gnassingbé in 2005. The election was held in the face of considerable public opposition to a third term for the president. There had been more demonstrations demanding a return to the 1992 Constitution, which limited the presidential term of office to two only, and just before the elections, teachers and health care workers went on strike, demanding better pay and working conditions. Some of these were violently repressed, creating an ugly mood in the country. Some observers even considered it possible that Togo would go the same way as Burkina Faso, where the long-ruling Blair Compaoré had been forced to resign from office after protestors called for his departure in late 2014 (discussed in previous issues, nos. 2, 3 and 4 of this project).

Initially scheduled for 15 April 2015, the election was postponed by ten days at the recommendation of John Dramani Mahama, President of Ghana and acting chair of the ECOWAS organization, given the tense situation. Provisional results by the National Independent Election Commission declared Gnassingbé the winner with about 59 per cent of the vote, whilst Fabre, the leader of the ANC and main opposition contender, received 35 per cent. Fabre called the results ‘a crime against national sovereignty’, saying he considered himself the new president. The UN, the African Union, ECOWAS and the National Consultation of Civil Society (a Togolese NGO funded by the European Union) pronounced the elections to have been free and transparent. On 3 May, the Constitutional Court validated the official results and proclaimed Gnassingbé president for the next five years. Fabre refused to file appeals to the Court, arguing that the institution was subservient to the ruling party. Gnassingbé was sworn in for his third term on 4 May 2015, thereby extending his tenure until at least 2020. Official reports put the turnout at 61 per cent of registered voters, which gave Gnassingbé a solid if not overwhelming victory. 

Recent Popular Protest

Things remained generally quiet until recently, in August 2017, when anti-government protests broke out in response to renewed calls for the introduction of presidential term limits. Faure Gnassingbé has now been head of state for over a decade, since 2005 when he took over from his father Gnassingbé Eyadema, who seized power in a coup in 1967, seven years after independence. The Gnassingbé dynasty has been in power for 50 years.  

Parliament voted recently in favour of a proposed change to the constitution to introduce a two-term limit ahead of the next presidential election in 2020. But the opposition boycotted the vote, claiming that the proposal was in fact a ruse by the government to make itself look reform-minded and at the same time allow President Gnassingbé to stay in power until 2030. A similar constitutional reform draft bill was rejected two years ago. Some opposition politicians want the president to step down immediately, and none of them want him to be able to stand in 2020. They say he is already in his third term, since he took over from his father in 2005 and was re-elected in 2010 and 2015, and want to revert to the 1992 Constitution which states that ‘under no circumstances may anyone serve more than two terms’. The opposition is now supported by the majority of the bishops, as well as by large numbers of protestors.

Demonstrations have so far been largely peaceful – although there have been clashes with the police and a certain amount of street violence – but the scale has been unprecedented, with organisers claiming that as many as 800,000 people – out of a total population of about 7 million – took to the streets on 19 August 2017, all across the country and not just (as usual) in Lomé.

This is what makes the current wave of protests different from before. For many years, the south of the country was seen as anti-government; but the Gnassingbé family drew all the support it needed from the north, where they come from. This time, however, some of the biggest demonstrations have taken place in cities like Sokodé in the centre-north (where two people were killed according to official sources and seven according to the opposition), and in Dapaong and Mango in the north. Also, a new opposition figurehead, Tikpi Atchadam, leader of the National Panafrican Party (PNP), hails from the north.

The government responded to the popular unrest by cutting off all mobile 3G data to try and prevent people from using social media to mobilise. It also called for its own supporters to demonstrate. In addition, it accused Atchadam of links to Islamist radicals, but has not produced any evidence to support its allegations. This seems not to have been effective.

On 7 September, Al Jazeera reported that ‘hundreds of thousands of opposition supporters have reportedly taken to the streets in several cities across Togo to call for constitutional reform, despite an apparent government concession to their demands. Aime Adi, head of Amnesty International in the West African country, told AFP news agency ‘at least 100,000’ were demonstrating in the capital, Lomé, with similar demonstrations taking place in some 10 other cities. For his part, opposition party leader Jean-Pierre Fabre had called the demonstrations ‘unprecedented’ and estimated (perhaps somewhat overenthusiastically) that ‘more than one million people’ were on the streets of Lomé. Al Jazeera noted that ‘the figures could not be independently verified by Al Jazeera’. 

On 12 September 2017, it was reported that the National Assembly had suspended its session for the summer break with opposition members objecting to the lack of any discussion on constitutional reforms, despite promises that this would be addressed. Opposition MPs want a discussion on re-instating the country’s 1992 Constitution – as has been demanded on several previous occasions, to no good effect. This would mean presidential terms limited to two, and two rounds of voting to enable the opposition to re-unite in the second round behind one candidate. Meanwhile, the popular protests continued, with reports of a number of people killed and more injured.

On 20 September, Africa News reported that internet connection had been intermittent in Togo hours ahead of another planned demonstration over the following days for the reinstatement of the 1992 constitution. Bandwidth was reduced and WhatsApp was totally blocked across the country, creating difficulties in accessing the internet, according to Togolese journalist Emmanuel Agbenonwossi. In the meanwhile, protestors clashed with security forces in several towns, including the north. Reuters reported that a 9-year-old boy was shot in the head and killed in Mango, according to Francois Patuel, of Amnesty International, citing local sources including family members. This was confirmed by Security Minister, Damehame Yark, but he blamed the opposition and the protestors. There were also demonstrations in the northern city of Bafilo between protesters and Gnassingbé loyalists, injuring several, according to opposition leader Jean-Pierre Fabre at the end of a peaceful march in Lomé.

The news, as of late September, was that President Gnassingbé had chaired a cabinet meeting which saw ministers approve plans for a bill about restrictions on terms in office and changes to the voting system. ‘This bill to modify the Constitution concerns specifically the limitations of mandates and voting procedures’, said the government statement, referring to article 59 of the Constitution. What is not clear, in particular, is whether the bill would be retrospective in effect, which would mean Gnassingbé could not stand in 2020, or would apply for the future, giving him the possibility of at least one more and possibly even two further terms of office.

David Seddon (criticalfaculty1@hotmail.co.uk) is a researcher and political activist who has written extensively on social movements, class struggles and political transitions across the developing world.

Featured Photograph: Demonstration in Lomé on 29 November, 2013.

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For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
We use cookies to collect and analyse information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customise content. By clicking into any content on this site, you agree to allow cookies to be placed. To find out more see our