ROAPE’s Peter Dwyer interviews Hakim Adi about African history, Black history, teaching and the campaign to stop the University of Chichester from slashing his ground-breaking Masters by Research (MRes) in African history and the African diaspora.
As well as closing his groundbreaking African history course, the University of Chichester has also outrageously decided to make Hakim Adi redundant, leaving his students without supervision.
In a recent short video ROAPE’s Hakim Adi made this statement:
Support the fundraising for the student legal campaign here.
Contributing to the ongoing discussion of the conflict over Laascaanood in Somaliland, Markus Hoehne critically engages with Jamal Abdi’s earlier arguments about the matter. Hoehne argues that what is at stake in the conflict over Laascaanood is the question of Somaliland’s secession versus the unity of Somalia. This conflict has been smoldering for a long time. The fact that it escalated now, in early 2023, violently, can, according to Hoehne, be related to first, more external engagement in Somaliland (as Jethro Norman, also in this discussion, has stated), which gives the government in Hargeysa a relatively powerful position, and second, to an authoritarian style of rule under the current President Muuse Biixi of Somaliland, who tries to use the de facto state power of Somaliland to militarily subdue the rebellion in Laascaanood. The UK seems to play an increasingly neo-colonial role in this conflict, with British politicians and diplomats siding with the government in Hargeysa while a British oil company is investigating oil prospects in central Somaliland.
By Markus Virgil Hoehne
On 11 July, Jamal Abdi published a text on the ROAPE blog entitled “Debating Somaliland – lack of recognition and conflict”. In it, the author touches on the conflict over Laascaanood in the Sool region and current developments in Somaliland that are related to this conflict. Before I engage with Jamal Abdi’s arguments, the background to the political situation must be briefly explained.
Background
Somaliland’s claim to Laascaanood and the Sool region is contested. Puntland, an autonomous region in northeastern Somalia, also considers the town and region as part of its state territory. The bone of contention is that Somaliland, in northwestern Somalia, seceded unilaterally from Somalia in 1991 and sees itself as independent state. It is not recognized as such but exists as a de facto state. Puntland, on the other hand, established in 1998, remains part of Somalia and supports the establishment of a federal Somali republic. Thus, the question of Somali unity versus Somaliland’s secession is at stake in the conflict between both regional political entities.
The people residing in the Sool region predominantly belong to the Dhulbahante clan, which is part of the Harti clan collective, itself constituting the main constituency of Puntland. Simultaneously, in colonial times, the Dhulbahante were part of the British Protectorate of Somaliland, which existed in the northwest of the Somali peninsula between roughly 1888 and 1960. On 26 June 1960 Somaliland became independent. On 1 July it united with the Italian-administered Somali territories (to which southern Somalia and today’s Puntland belonged) to form the Somali Republic.
Thirty years later, in 1991, Somaliland seceded from Somalia, then collapsing in the wake of the Somali civil war. However, the declaration of independence was not supported by all groups in the region. While most members of the Isaaq clan-family, who are the demographic majority and reside in the center of Somaliland, are for Somaliland’s independence, most Dhulbahante in the east are in favor of Somali unity. The Isaaq had suffered tremendously at the hands of the previous military dictatorship in Somalia (1969-1991), but the Dhulbahante, as a rule, had supported it.
Until 2007, Laascaanood, the urban center of the Dhulbahante, was not controlled by Somaliland. Then Somaliland forces captured the town. Between 2009 and 2015, Dhulbahante put up armed resistance to Somaliland’s occupation. Yet, from 2015 until 2022, locals in Laascaanood cooperated with the Somaliland administration for the sake of development. Simultaneously, most Dhulbahante residing outside Laascaanood, throughout the regions of Sool and Sanaag and around the town of Buuhoodle, remained distanced from Somaliland.
At the end of December 2022, an uprising began in Laascaanood. Somaliland police, including Rapid Reaction Units (RRU), a UK-trained special force, opened fire at demonstrators, killing and injuring dozens until early January 2023. When the local people started to take up arms, the Somaliland forces withdrew. Elders in Laascaanood called for a clan meeting and an all-Dhulbahante council, complemented by representatives from the much smaller Fiqishiini clan, who are closely allied to the Dhulbahante in Sool region, to begin discussing their political future. On 6 February, when the council planned to publish its decision, the Somaliland army positioned to the north of Laascaanood started shelling the town.
This marks the beginning of an ongoing war between armed Dhulbahante, Fiqishiini, and some minorities standing with them, who from end of February onward have also been receiving support from other Harti clan militias, including armed units from neighboring Puntland, and the Somaliland army. The latter is predominantly staffed by members of the Isaaq clan-family and some other clans from western Somaliland.
In the course of the war, civilian infrastructure, such as the General Hospital of Laascaanood, has been damaged by the indiscriminate shelling of the Somaliland army. As of July 2023, hundreds of civilians have been injured or killed, including staff of the Red Crescent and local hospitals. Many more fighters on both sides have been falling victim to the war so far.
The debate in ROAPE
Jamal Abdi begins his analysis by stating that:
According to the government, Somaliland’s security forces are facing a mixture of misguided local residents, elements of Al-Shabab terrorists and militias from the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. Not surprisingly, the competing narrative is that Laascaanood is being defended by local residents who have taken up arms against a state whose legitimacy they now reject.
Al-Shabab are militant Islamists, mainly active in southern Somalia, who are fighting against the government in Mogadishu and its international allies and terrorizing parts of the local population. Jamal Abdi does not state decisively whether he thinks Al-Shabab is or is not involved in the conflict over Laascaanood.
In my view, however, as an analyst one has not only the responsibility to outline different points of view (as Jamal Abdi did, to some degree), but also, if possible, to qualify existing points of view. There have been repeated attempts by the Somaliland government and its supporters to link the uprising in Laascaanood and surroundings to Al-Shabab influence. Even the “research institute” Sahan joined in and wrote in Issue 555, 19 June, 2023 of its briefings (only available to subscribers) that “[t]he total number of AS [Al-Shabab] fighters in the Sool region is now plausibly estimated at 1,000”, without providing any evidence for this and without any other reliable source confirming this sensational “news”.
These allegations are highly problematic, since they aim at totally delegitimizing the uprising of the inhabitants of Laascaanood both nationally and internationally. They also seek to mobilize international support “against terrorists”, which usually translates into extreme violence against local populations, as examples from southern Somalia or Afghanistan indicate. Thus, this claim of Al-Shabab’s involvement in Laascaanood has potentially dramatic consequences. To restate this claim, even just as an option, without analyzing it, is irresponsible. This is especially the case since, over the past six months, neither the government in Hargeysa nor anyone else has been able to present any tangible evidence whatsoever to substantiate these allegations.
While Jamal Abdi does not say that he, as an author, supports these allegations, the fact that he repeats them without qualification lends the Somaliland government’s war propaganda some credibility. This impression is substantiated by Jamal Abdi using the word “misguided” (in the same sentence) for residents of Laascaanood who have been rising up against the very real violence they have experienced at the hands of Somaliland security forces in December 2022 and January 2023, and ever since. Also, his use of the word “now” in formulating the opposite point of view – namely that locals are taking up “arms up against a state whose legitimacy they now reject” (my emphasis) – is noteworthy. This “now” suggests that the (Somaliland) state previously enjoyed legitimacy among the Dhulbahante. Yet, as anyone familiar with the political history of the region would know, most Dhulbahante never accepted Somaliland as a state, nor did the Warsangeli, their Harti brothers who live in the east of the Sanaag region that was also part of the former British Protectorate but today is fully integrated into Puntland.
Elders in Buuhoodle, a Dhulbahante-inhabited town in the Togdheer region (which Dhulbahante refer to as Cayn), told me during field research in 2004 that they would never accept Somaliland’s independence. The same went for people in Xudun, Taleex, Badhan and Ceelbuuh (all towns and villages in Sool and Sanaag), with whom I spoke at around the same time (between late 2003 and late 2004). I found that Laascaanood was full of “Dervishes” between 2002 and 2004 – “Dervish” being a reference to the anti-colonial uprising against the British and other colonizers in the Horn of Africa between 1899 and 1920, under the leadership of Mohamed Abdille Hassan, whose followers were called “Darawiish” in Somali.
I frequently re-visited these places over the years and found that this attitude had not changed substantially, even after Somaliland had managed to capture Laascaanood at the end of 2007. Some in Laascaanood started to cooperate with Somaliland’s administration for the sake of development, and indeed, some improvements were realized: the first local university, Nugaal University, was supported, some tarmac roads and local government buildings were built, and the General Hospital was renovated. But politically, hardly anyone seriously supported Somaliland’s independence.
Jamal Abdi argues that Somaliland had indeed gained acceptance and legitimacy in Laascaanood in recent years. Supporters of this argument would refer to the participation of locals in the most recent municipal and parliamentary elections in 2021. Indeed, this voting did take place, and in Laascaanood Waddani, the leading opposition party in Somaliland, achieved a clear victory. To understand how substantial this participation of Dhulbahante in Somaliland politics was until recently, it is important to look in detail at the numbers of votes cast. All over Sool region, 63,080 votes were cast. According to a video-report from the local electoral committee in Laascaanood 31,407 persons cast their votes. In Caynabo, an Isaaq-dominated town in western Sool, it was reported that 24,414 votes were cast. The remainder, some 5,000 votes, were cast in Taleex and Xudun (also in Dhulbahante territory).
The important question now is: How big was the eligible voting population in Laascaanood (18 years and above)? This is difficult to establish in the absence of any reliable census data anywhere in the Somali territories. The UN mentioned that around 185,000 persons fled Laascaanood when Somaliland started shelling the town in February; however, several thousand remained behind and took up arms or assisted their people in the fighting. Thus, I would estimate that Lasscaanood is inhabited by around 200,000 people. One could assume that, of these, some 120,000 would be 18 years and above, and thus eligible to vote. If this is correct, one can say that ca. 25% of those eligible in Laascaanood cast their vote in 2021. In my view, a voter turnout of 25% can hardly be interpreted as giving Somaliland legitimacy there.
Therefore, if taking part in the democratic process through elections confers legitimacy on the state, it seems that the election results from Laascaanood in 2021 show that still, after 32 years of the government in Hargeysa claiming the Dhulbahante territories, Somaliland did not achieve much legitimacy there. This, in my reading, has been confirmed by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in its report on Somaliland’s elections in 2021. This report, which celebrates these elections (and the ICG has a record of reporting rather favorably on Somaliland in general) mentions on pp. 6 and 7 that:
The Warsangeli sub-clan appeared particularly indifferent to the vote. Few votes were cast in eastern Sanaag, where the Warsangeli reside, resulting in the loss of four parliamentary seats previously held by Warsangeli representatives. The low turnout could be interpreted as the sub-clan’s rejection of government efforts to include them in Somaliland’s politics. […] The news was in some respects less discouraging in the eastern parts of the equally contested Sool region, from where the Dhulbahante hail. Turnout among the Dhulbahante was higher than among the Warsangeli, but their overall representation still dropped from seven to six seats, a setback for Somaliland’s attempts to fully incorporate Sool under its political umbrella.
Clearly, Somaliland as a state had always enjoyed only very (very) limited legitimacy in the Dhulbahante-and Warsangeli-inhabited areas, and whatever legitimacy they had, seems completely lost now, after the attacks of the Somaliland army on Laascaanood.
In his analysis for ROAPE, Jamal Abdi mentions the series of assassinations that have caused massive insecurity in the city over many years. Focusing on the most recent assassination on 26 December 2022, which triggered the demonstrations in Laascaanood mentioned above and turned into the ongoing armed uprising, Jamal Abdi states:
While the perpetrators are still at large, it appears sound to suggest that Somaliland was most likely not behind the assassination of Cabdi. The logic underpinning this assertion is straightforward: both Cabdi and many of those who have been assassinated before him in Laascaanood were pro-Somaliland. Therefore, it appears unlikely that Somaliland has systematically targeted those who were promoting the legitimacy of the state in a region where the imagining of Somaliland is limited.
Here he refers rather indirectly to the widespread suspicion of many locals who believe that the Somaliland administration was behind this and many previous assassinations in Laascaanood. Inhabitants of Laascaanood would argue that those who were assassinated in 2020-2022 were engaging with Somaliland politically, but were also highly critical of President Muuse Biixi (2017-) and his government. This made them a target, especially since many of them supported the opposition and thus were undermining Muuse Biixi’s chances of winning the next elections (which had been scheduled for November 2022 but were postponed by the government).
Moreover, some locals also argue that Isaaq elites who are dominating politics in Somaliland want revenge against the Dhulbahante, who until 1991 supported the Somali military dictatorship. When I was in Laascaanood for a short field trip in May 2023, virtually everybody mentioned that the reason for the uprising from December 2022 onward was the assassinations, which had not been properly investigated by the Somaliland administration in Laascaanood. People would add that under President Biixi the local administration, including the police, had remained conspicuously inactive regarding the assassinations in Lasanod.
Some had observed that, shortly before assassinations, Somaliland police was seen at their respective locations. Additionally, they stressed that, after the assassinations, no decisive action was taken to apprehend culprits. Some arrests were made, but rather randomly, and following a pattern that instigated sub-clan conflicts among inhabitants of Laascaanood without ever providing convincing proof regarding those arrested. While I personally think that other factors may also play a role in explaining the current uprising, and I have outlined them in my earlier and a analysis of the matter, this point has to be taken seriously.
International actors in Somaliland
Jamal Abdi’s main argument in his analysis for ROAPE opposes the reasoning of Jethro Norman, who argued earlier, also on the ROAPE blog, that through increasing engagement with Somaliland, international actors have fostered conflict in the center of Somaliland and also on the peripheries, such as Laascaanood. In the center, elite competition over resources has led to clashes in holding presidential elections. Demonstrations demanding elections were dispersed violently by the incumbent administration. Eventually, the elections were postponed, against the will of the opposition.
Jamal Abdi defends the postponement as legal, since it was accepted by the Upper House of the parliament, called Guurti in Somali. He adds that in the past all presidential elections in Somaliland were postponed, suggesting that this has nothing to do with increasing external support and internal competition over resources. However, he is ignoring the fact that the Upper House in Hargeysa has lost its legitimacy among the vast majority of Somalilanders.
The Guurti members have never been elected, contrary to the provisions of the Somaliland constitution. Over the years, they have become dependent on the executive paying their generous fees and tolerating the inheritance of Guurti seats by close relatives of deceased members without any real credentials. Together with the military, political and economic elite, the Guurti members constitute a new social and elite class in Somaliland which is not accountable to the ordinary people any more. Jamal Abdi also does not mention that, in the past, similar contestations have taken place. He argues that a threefold increase in Somaliland’s national budget to about $130 million in the period between 2009 and 2012 did not lead to internal competition. Yet, this position is undermined by a deeper historical analysis.
Between 2008 and 2010, the previous Somaliland government under President Dahir Rayale Kahin clung to power, just like the current Somaliland administration. Elections had been scheduled for 2008. Demonstrations happened in 2009 and the police violently dissolved them. Members of the incumbent administration shamelessly corrupted the resources of the state and were harshly attacked by the KULMIYE party, which then was the leading opposition party (and today is the ruling party in Somaliland). Only after enormous pressure did elections finally happen in 2010, two years too late.
Simultaneously, the Dhulbahante in the Sool region and around Buuhoodle established an armed resistance movement, claiming to feel marginalized by the Somaliland government, which was preventing development and aid coming to their regions. They also wished to rid themselves from what they perceived as Somaliland’s occupation (from 2007 onward). One can argue that what is happening today, since late 2022, regarding conflicts in the center of Somaliland and the war in the Dhulbahante areas is the previous conflict writ large. Thus, there seems to be a connection between the increased resources now available to the Somaliland government, the inequality of their distribution and conflict.
Jamal Abdi still tries to hold on to his original argument by stating that, throughout its existence since 1991, Somaliland has not received any foreign aid. Yet, he omits to say that over the years Somaliland has been getting its fair share of the money given by international donors to Somalia as a whole. Moreover, he remains silent about the massive foreign private and state investments that have taken place in central Somaliland in recent years, starting most visibly with DP-World and Ethiopia investing hundreds of millions over the years in the Berbera port and the Berbera corridor linked to it, which connects Berbera and Wajaale. Finally, he omits from his analysis the prospects of discovering oil around Berbera and other places in central Somaliland, which would be exploited, if viable, by the British company Genel Energy.
If oil exploitation materializes, it will fundamentally change the rules of the game in Somaliland and, with the utmost certainty, mostly benefit the Isaaq elites, who are already in charge. This will most likely lead to even more conflict in Somaliland in both the center and the periphery. In this regard, one can speak of an unholy neo-colonial alliance between the UK as the former colonial power and Somaliland, which it supports short of recognition. Thus, the UK has trained police special forces that the government in Hargeysa has used to repress civilian opposition, while a British oil company is likely to start exploiting oil in central Somaliland soon.
Jamal Abdi concludes his analysis by arguing that a lack of international support is to blame for the conflict over Laascaanood. His logic is that a recognized Somaliland that would have access to international aid and resources for development could have satisfied the demands of all those claimed to be citizens by the government in Hargeysa. This argument pretends that the current war between the Harti and Fiqishiini clans on the one hand, and the Somaliland army on the other, was just over the issues of resources and development. However, this ignores the fact that the root cause of the war over Laascaanood is the conflicting political visions on the one hand the Dhulbahante, Warsangeli and Fiqishiini, as well as some local minority groups that have joined them, a majority of whom wish to be part of Somalia (hence their leaning toward Puntland), and on the other hand the Isaaq and other clans who support or at least tolerate Somaliland as independent state.
The war over Laascaanood shows that the relative strength of the Somaliland government, which in recent years has managed to acquire considerable resources via foreign direct investments and recently forged diplomatic ties to Taiwan, contains a certain risk. Currently, President Muuse Biixi, who showed authoritarian tendencies early into his presidency, is abusing the de-facto state power at his disposal by letting his army attack Laascaanood and, very likely, carrying out considerable human rights and humanitarian law violations. To give more support to such a ruler and even contemplate recognition for Somaliland, as Jamal Abdi suggested, would contribute to more insecurity in the Horn of Africa.
Negotiating a future
Instead, negotiations between the rebels in the regions of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn, Puntland as neighboring power that supports them, Somaliland, and the Somali government in Mogadishu should be facilitated by credible external mediators to clarify the relations of all the actors involved without resorting to more violence. There should not be many preconditions for these negotiations other than that the Somaliland army vacates Dhulbahante territories, which has already been recommended in a press statement by the UN Security Council in June 2023. What is more, neither Dhulbahante or the other clans opposing Somaliland’s independence can be forced back into Somaliland, nor can the rest of Somaliland (except the predominantly Harti-inhabited regions) be forced to join Somalia. A constructive solution has to be found, and this will take time.
Markus Virgil Hoehne is a Lecturer in Social Anthropology at the University of Leipzig. Hoehne has been researching Somali issues since 2001 mainly in Somaliland and Puntland. He is fluent in colloquial Somali and the author of numerous scholarly publications on conflict dynamics in Somalia and Somaliland.
Featured Photographs: Images taken by the author during a trip to Lasanod in May 2023.
In a further contribution to the ROAPE debate on Ethiopia, Yidneckachew Ayele Zikargie writes that in order to discuss the political future of the country there must not be gatekeepers who determine what is a legitimate discussion while making wild accusations. Ethiopia must embrace a multitude of voices not self-appointed experts who label and condemn those who do not agree with them.
By Yidneckachew Ayele Zikargie
In response to Fana Gebresenbet and Yonas Tariku’s article discussing the Pretoria Agreement, a group of authors, including Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Alex de Waal, Martin Plaut, Jan Nyssen, Mohamed Hassen, and Gebrekirstos Gebreselassie, presented a counterargument. Subsequently, Fana Gebresenbet and Yonas Tariku responded to the criticism in their piece titled ‘Neither a Response nor a Debate: Five Ways to Misread Our Article on Ethiopia.’ Intrigued by these engaging dialogues and being personally affected by the crisis and as an observer of the social, economic and political developments in Ethiopia, I feel compelled to express my uneasiness with the approach taken by Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Alex de Waal, and others. This reflection aims to contribute to the ongoing debate by seeking engaging perspectives and fostering a constructive dialogue on the Pretoria Agreement and the political future of Ethiopia.
Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Alex de Waal and others criticize Fana Gebresenbet and Yonas Tariku’s article as a reproduction of false narratives promoted by the Federal Government of Ethiopia (FGE). The response challenges the claims made in the article, including the portrayal of foreign commentators as supporters of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the dismissal of claims of genocide as TPLF propaganda. The authors highlight the ongoing suffering in Tigray and criticize the lack of nuanced political understanding and empathy in the original article. They also note a broader campaign to deny and misrepresent the atrocities committed in Ethiopia. Besides, they push their arguments by using social media, their networks and activists to maintain a hegemony of their narratives that went beyond academic dialogue and end up with character assassinations and defamatory targetting of the writers.
Yet in the article, Fana Gebresenbet and Yonas Tariku interrogate the significance of the Pretoria Agreement – asking if it is a mere instrument for the cessation of hostilities or does it herald a new era in Ethiopia? The article underlines that the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) on November 2, 2022, marks a significant turning point in Ethiopian politics. It notes the significance of the agreement, which was facilitated by the African Union.
The agreement prevents further escalation of the conflict and the potential loss of lives and destruction. It ensures the return of constitutional order in Tigray, reduces the war to a battle between the FDRE/ENDF and the TPLF, and paves the way for federal forces to regain control without excessive force. Yet the agreement signifies the end of the TPLF’s dominance and the diminishing role of ethnonationalism in Ethiopian politics, setting the stage for a new era of political discourse and power consolidation under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Gebresenbet and Tariku argued that, although the CoHA is not a complete solution to all sources of instability, it symbolizes a significant step toward a more stable political environment.
In their counterargument against the criticisms raised by Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Alex de Waal and others and personal attacks on social media, Gebresenbet and Tariku returned with a thoughtful and ethically bounded response. They demonstrate a strong commitment to academic pursuit and engage constructively by highlighting the misinterpretations and misquotations in the rejoinder. They clarify that they did not argue that claims of genocide are a TPLF propaganda ploy, but rather pointed out the partisan role played by foreign experts. They also assert that the TPLF’s attack on the Northern Command was a triggering factor, not the sole cause of the war. Their emphasis on differentiating between regime and state, as well as their call for a cohesive and just state-society relationship, reflects a nuanced understanding of the complexities in Ethiopian politics. Furthermore, they advocate for open and critical debate, encouraging engagement with their arguments for the sake of peace and stability in Ethiopia. Overall, Gebresenbet and Tariku s responses contribute positively to the ongoing discourse on the agreement, and the political possibilities for Ethiopia.
However, I observe that the ongoing debate highlights an intriguing aspect of the political landscape in Ethiopia, focusing on the production of narratives and the ethical concerns surrounding the pursuit of political hegemony. On one side, some emphasize open discussion and engagement with diverse narratives, promoting a constructive approach by positioning themselves as ‘students of conflict and security studies.’ Conversely, the opposing side adopts a posture of sole authority, seeking to dominate the narrative sphere. They present themselves as a credible source of genocide reports, citing self-documented evidence and criticizing Gebresenbet and Tariku for overlooking Alex de Waal’s selective records of genocide. However, Alex de Waal’s documentation has faced criticism for its selectivity, as it allegedly disregards extensive human atrocities committed against multiple communities in northern Ethiopia, including the Afar, Amhara, and Tigray people. This power game among an intellectual international elite appears to revolve around the manipulation of narratives into a story of triumph and victimhood.
One of the most concerning aspects of the ongoing debate is the alarming efforts made by certain individuals to silence alternative perspectives and assert a monopoly over knowledge and narratives. It is deeply troubling to witness the tactics employed, such as attacking individuals based on their academic views and pressuring a journal to remove an article that challenges their preferred perspectives. Such actions are not only outrageous but also completely unacceptable for an intellectual community that values freedom of expression and intellectual diversity.
With the ongoing debate and prevailing circumstances in Ethiopia in particular and the Global South in general, it becomes increasingly important to prioritize the exploration of diverse perspectives and foster an environment that encourages an engaging exchange of ideas. By promoting a constructive dialogue that welcomes different viewpoints, we can pave the way for a more inclusive and stable society. Embracing a multitude of voices and recognizing the value of varied opinions is essential for meaningful progress and the cultivation of a well-rounded understanding of the complex issues in Ethiopia and across the continent.
Yidneckachew Ayele Zikargie (PhD) is an Assistant Professor at Hawassa University College of Law and Governance, with a specialization in the sociology of human rights, modernist development approach, pastoral land, livelihood, and frontier dynamics in Ethiopia. His research interests include rights, power, modernism, land development, pastoral frontiers dynamics, ethnography, sugarcane plantations, and a human rights-based approach to development.
Featured Photograph: A wounded boy sits on a bed in the Ayder Referral Hospital on 4 June, 2021, in Mekelle, Ethiopia (Yan Boechat).
Renowned Kenyan writer Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o reads excerpts from his recent work in both Gikuyu and English during a presentation in the Coolidge Auditorium, May 9, 2019. Photo by Shawn Miller/Library of Congress.
ROAPE celebrates the life and work of Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, who turned 85 inJanuary this year. Ngũgĩ is a renowned Kenyan writer and scholar, admired for his contributions to African literature and his advocacy of African languages and cultures. Born in Kamiriithu, Kenya, he grew up in a traditional Gikuyu community in the lead-up to Kenyan independence. While at Makerere University in Uganda, Ngũgĩbegan writing and became involved in the burgeoning African literary movement. In 1977, he published his famous novel Petals of Blood, which attacked the elite that ruled Kenya after independence. Later that year, he was briefly imprisoned by the Kenyan government for his radical writing and community organising. As part of his commitment to decolonising African literature, Ngũgĩ switched from English to Gikuyu in his own literarypractice, and became a lifelong proponent of African writers embracing their indigenous languages.
To mark the occasion, we share an extract onNgũgĩ’s early novel A Grain of Wheat (1967), adapted from Sarah Jilani’s forthcoming book Subjectivity and Decolonisation in the Post-Independence Novel and Film (Edinburgh University Press).Jilani explores a selection of Anglophone and Francophone post-independence texts (1950s–1980s) from Africa and South Asia to consider what ‘decolonising the mind’ could mean, and entail. Guided by the psycho-political thought of Frantz Fanon, the book demonstrates how a selection of literary and cinematic narratives from this period help us understand the transformation of subjectivities themselves as a part of the broader, unfinished project that is decolonisation.
By Sarah Jilani
In a 1975 essay, Chinua Achebe writes: ‘the nationalist movement in British West Africa after the Second World War brought about a mental revolution which began to reconcile us to ourselves’ (145). Achebe here singles out the revolutionary impact nationalist movements could have at the ‘mental’ level, possibly going a great way in bringing about what he calls ‘a reconciliation with oneself’. As Achebe’s words suggest, the power of mid-century nationalist movements at a psycho-political level were considerable. Frantz Fanon describes such mobilisations as conducive to remaking people’s ways of relating to themselves and to their own circumstances, ‘creat[ing] a real dialectic between [the] body and the world’ (Fanon 1952, 83). Yet we also know that the diverse kinds of anti-colonial nationalisms across the Global South had uneven effects. Their darker outcomes in post-independence contexts, like territorial secessions and ethnic conflict, left lasting legacies. The lived experiences and effects of anti-colonial nationalisms are therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, grappled with time and time again in the literary production of the post-independence decades in Africa, from novels to plays, films to poetry.
One example is the 1967 novel A Grain of Wheat by Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o. An early work that is often overlooked for Ngũgĩ’s later novels such as the polemical Devil on the Cross (1980) or the magisterial Wizard of the Crow (2006), A Grain of Wheat was published as part of the Heinemann African Writers Series when the author was still writing in English as James Ngũgĩ. This novel acknowledges complex and politically urgent questions around the psycho-political possibilities and limits of anti-colonial nationalisms. Following the struggles of two protagonists, Gikonyo and Mugo, A Grain of Wheat works from Fanon’s ‘dialectic between [the] body and the world’ (1952, 83) to explore how people change their relationships to themselves, each other, and to the political energies that marked the Kenyan independence struggle. However, as Gikonyo and Mugo work through the psychic scars of violent anti-colonial resistance and find re-integration into community, women’s subjectivities remain something outside, or other than, the Fanonian ‘self–world’ dialectic that Ngũgĩ’s novel affirms. This makes visible important fault lines in the relationship between the experience of anti-colonial nationalist struggle – even with its powers of ‘mental revolution’ – and its actual outcomes.
The charged relationship between anti-colonial nationalism and gender in A Grain of Wheat is latent. It requires, as scholar Brendon Nicholls proposes, reading against the grain of Ngũgĩ’s main narrative preoccupations in the novel, working both ‘strategically within, and against, the dominant symbolisms of A Grain of Wheat in order to discover the spaces that these texts make available to a female sexual and revolutionary subject’ (Nicholls 2010, 115). Featuring flashbacks and diversions into 150 years of Kenyan history, Wheat focuses on the protracted liberation struggle of the Kenya Land and Freedom Army (‘Mau Mau’) from 1952–1960 against British colonial rule. The main narrative takes place over four days in 1963, leading up to Uhuru celebrations that will honour the fallen fighters of the anti-colonial struggle. But several of Wheat’s characters are still grappling with the psychic afterlives of resistance, including guilt, shame, and anger. Various histories (including both Gĩkũyũ and Christian myths) are woven throughout the novel into the daily rhythms of village life, as these characters try to reconcile personal traumas with a collective narrative of victory.
Ngũgĩ’s vision of the Kenyan anti-colonial nationalist struggle and beyond is itself a complex and at times contradictory one. On the one hand, Ngũgĩ himself identifies that ‘the [African] writer in this period was still limited by his inadequate grasp of the full dimension of what was really happening in the sixties: the international and national realignment of class forces and class alliances’ (1986, 11). Yet others have pointed out that this period of his writing was engaged in a multi-dimensional manner with questions of political and social transformation after independence. The novel articulates the principle of community unity, but also foregrounds the lasting effects of violent anti-colonial struggle on individual psyches. It argues decolonisation is only possible if cycles of betrayal are disrupted, yet gives us characters who struggle to move past having betrayed or been betrayed. And it ‘critically investigate[s] the links between nativist politics and hegemonic masculinities’ (Hammond 2011, 115), but cannot entirely sever its dialectical vision from certain patriarchal supports. While all of these are related, it is within the latter tension that we see Ngũgĩ grapple with the possibilities and limits of Fanon’s psycho-political dialectics of liberation.
British troops in Kenya during the Mau Mau rebellion, Socialist Worker
Many have already read gender as a blind spot in Ngũgĩ’s revolutionary vision, but for reasons as different from one another as Elleke Boehmer’s (2005), who critiques Ngũgĩ’s accentuation of class at the expense of gender, to Peter Mwikisa’s, who proposes that ‘Ngũgĩ is ultimately grappling with issues of his Christian faith’ (2010, 249) rather than advancing revolutionary gender ideals. I am more interested in how this blind spot is consequential to the novel’s politics of decolonisation. More consequential than trying to determine the author’s personal inclinations with regards to women is why the novel excludes them from the kind of dialectical becoming that facilitates Wheat‘s politics.
Wheat positions Gĩkũyũ women as both the moral facilitators of post-independence reconciliation, as well as symbols via which Gĩkũyũ male subjectivities may be re-constituted after the trauma of violent struggle. In this way, the novel is able to reimagine Gĩkũyũ masculinity in ways that serve social healing and nation-building, as critics Kenneth Harrow (1985) and Andrew Hammond (2011) have explored – but at the expense of granting that its female characters could undergo similar psycho-political transformation. Presented as driven either by exclusively political-heroic motivations (Wambui, Mary Nyanjiru) or exclusively sexual-romantic ones (Njeri, Mumbi), Wheat’s women seem to exist outside of the ‘real dialectic between [the] body and the world’ (Fanon 1952, 83) that the story grants its male characters, who move from states of solitary distress to communal wellbeing. This difficulty in imagining that women are also shaped by their lived experiences over time undercuts the psycho-political power Wheat seeks to invest in nation-building.
Collective histories
To trace this, we can first consider how the novel conceives of subjectivity as an accumulation of collective history and lived experience. Both recent (Emergency-era) history and distant history (Gĩkũyũ and biblical mythologies) are consistently woven into daily life in the fictional village where the novel is set. Via flashbacks to the 1950’s, the novel iterates how a sense of the collective past served as a means of resilience during the resistance: ‘Karanja and others collected [in Gikonyo’s workshop] in the evenings, hurled curses and defiance in the air, and reviewed with pride the personal histories of the latest men to join Kihika’ (Ngũgĩ 1967, 101). These stories allow Wheat’s male characters to reassure one another of their loyalty to the struggle. They recall Fanon’s words on how, in a colonial context, ‘disalienation will come from refusing to consider their reality as definitive’ (1952, 201) for the colonised. Here, men living daily with the fear of being captured remember the past and present of Gĩkũyũ resistance, imagining future victory. Fanon’s theorisations as to where the ‘raw material’ (1952, 113) for processes of disalienation may be found here takes the form of the relational and psychic power of shared histories.
These characters’ collective emotional investment in the trial of the Kapenguria Six also functions in this way. Learning of the sham trial’s outcome galvanises the political detainees into action, including the novel’s troubled protagonist Gikonyo: ‘They refused to look into one another’s eyes in order not to read what the other was thinking… Then one night, suddenly, they believed the news, all of the detainees to a man. They did not say their belief to one another, it was only that they gathered together in their compounds and sang’ (104). The inmates sing the Gĩkũyũ creation myth. A connection between the mythological past and political present, performed through song and the memory it sustains, helps them ‘look into one another’s eyes’ (104). The individual shame they had felt in desiring life over martyrdom now turns into unity and resolve.
Christian mythology also grounds the novel’s understanding of subjectivity as, among other things, a location of shared histories. Brendon Nicholls points to Ngũgĩ’s ‘residual sympathy towards Christianity and individualism,’ which for him ‘problematises Ngũgĩ’s Marxian sympathies, because the fictional representatives of collective resistance emerge only as savage killers (Gen. R) or rapists (Koinandu) or self-styled Messianic heroes (Kihika)’ (2010, 87). Nicholls does not elaborate on why the two (Christianity and individualism) are implied to be analogous, when Ngũgĩ’s choice of biblical myths are distinctly informed by ones that help illustrate an anti-individualistic conception of subjectivity. For instance, in a scene describing the Uhuru celebrations, biblical parallels are written into the community’s recitation of resistance history: ‘They sang of Jomo (he came, like a fiery spear among us), his stay in England (Moses sojourned in the land of Pharaoh) and his return (he came riding on a cloud of fire and smoke) to save his children’ (214). Despite occasionally bordering on messianic declarations, the militant character of Kihika also frequently adopts biblical myth to emphasise the motivations behind nationalist struggle. He exclaims: ‘Can’t you see that Cain was wrong? I am my brother’s keeper. Take your whiteman, anywhere, in the settled area. He owns hundreds and hundreds of acres of land. What about the black men who sweat dry on the farms to grow coffee, tea, sisal, wheat and yet only get ten shillings a month?’ (96)
With such links gestured towards between subjectivity and relational histories, Wheat, however, then withholds the same kind of dialectical becoming from women. Where the former should result in the narrative presenting us women’s subjectivities of a similar historicity, they instead appear static. This re-routes what could have been a radical politics of decolonisation in the novel: one that may have brought full circle the novel’s psycho-political investment in anti-colonial nationalism.
Undated photo of Mau Mau Field Marshal Muthoni wa Kirima who lay down arms at Kenyan independence in 1963, The Elephant
The symbol of Woman
Wheat configures women’s bodies as sites of male reconciliation, even when it invests in women as society’s depositories of a latent reconciliatory potential. As Elleke Boehmer points out, ‘it is by singling out female voices, by fixing women beneath the evaluative epithets “vibrant” and “beautiful”, that Ngũgĩ gives way to that tendency to objectify women which qualifies his attempt to grant them a leading role in the revolutionary struggle for Kenyan liberation’ (2005, 42). One way this occurs is through the novel’s reliance on positioning ‘Woman’ as symbol, with the function of making or breaking male bonds. That Mumbi, for example, ‘arous[es] other characters to a better knowledge of themselves’ (Sharma 1984, 207) and ‘is the catalyst that prompts [Mugo] to public confession’ (Nnolim 1984, 219) renders her a disembodied trope that can take on various meanings.
These include becoming a stand-in for psycho-social healing in conversations that facilitate the relationship between Gatu and Gikonyo, and between Mugo and Gikonyo. During detention, Gikonyo experiences a ‘terrible bond being established between [Gatu and himself]. He struggled against this but in the end gave up, so that it was he who first opened his heart to Gatu’ (107). His confession centres around Mumbi, or rather, around all the imaginative weight Gikonyo has assigned her. By recounting their marital bliss, Gikonyo is able to confess (via the sign that is Mumbi/Woman) his guilt about the fact that returning to domestic life, rather than the abstract notion of Kenya’s freedom, is what sustains him throughout imprisonment. When Gatu answers Gikonyo’s confession with a disclosure of his own about a missed opportunity at marriage – where, again, Woman functions as a symbol of ‘all our losses for the cause’ – Gikonyo thinks, ‘weak, weak like any of us’ (108). The having of ‘Woman’ and the loss of her becomes a stand-in for what these men have sacrificed by joining the resistance: patrilineal futurity, psychic unburdening, and sexual comfort.
Sam Radithalo (2001) proposes that, in Wheat, Ngũgĩ invites us to see women’s facilitatorship of male bonding as a vital role that benefits all of society. In his anthropological studies, Richard Werbner (2002) similarly argues that it is often the very undergoing of subjection which constitutes a ‘persuasively influential and dignified female subject in postcolonial intersubjective relations’ (8). The asymmetries of this, however, are stark. Throughout the novel, it is the reclusive Mugo who is assumed by others to be the facilitator of reconciliation, on the basis of an incorrect rumour about his heroism. This is later resolved in Mugo’s narrative; during the Independence celebrations, he confesses he betrayed Kihika’s whereabouts to the colonial authorities, and subsequently feels ‘a load of many years lifted’ (232). Ending his self-imposed isolation, he is free to earn re-integration into community, and to re-constitute his subjectivity. The actual women themselves, like Mumbi, remain symbolic guides, confidants and healers of men.
In addition to the promise of communal re-integration for men, it is not insignificant that Mumbi-as-symbol also becomes the site of a struggle between Gikonyo and the novel’s antagonist, Karanja. The representation of land in Wheat speaks to a historical crux of the Kenyan anti-colonial struggle: the demand for the redistribution of the fertile central uplands in Kenya (still sometimes called ‘The White Highlands’). The British colonial government’s Swynnerton Plan, a colonial agricultural policy aimed at expanding cash-crop productions, was implemented in Kenya in 1954. It concentrated land ownership with the strategy of establishing a new middle class of loyalists in response to the ‘Mau Mau’ uprising. The result was that ‘a new Gĩkũyũ society was born – propertied and propertyless – and left to face an uncertain future in face of the politics of independence’ (Ogot and Ochieng 1995, 25). Mumbi’s body is laden with land symbolisms that speak to these tensions. Unless her body is utilised by the man with the ‘right’ to do so (her husband, the peasant revolutionary Gikonyo), the implication is that it could, vassal-like, be claimed by the ‘wrong’ kind of man (the middle-class loyalist, Karanja). Eventually, Gikonyo’s successful claim upon Mumbi’s body symbolically maps onto (for Ngũgĩ) the righteous claim of the Gĩkũyũ peasant to the land. To that end, the novel’s final moments feature Gikonyo’s political-sexual fantasy: ‘He had never seen himself as father to Mumbi’s children. Now it crossed his mind: what would his child by Mumbi look like?’ (241). The questionable legitimacy of this land claim – especially given the majority advantages of the Gĩkũyũ after independence – diverts the reader from the class irresolutions of Kenyan independence.
Some scholars argue we misinterpret Ngũgĩ’s ‘marked sensitivity to women as nationalists’ (Radithalo 2001, 9) if we miss the autonomy in the female characters’ sexual choices, like Mumbi’s choosing Gikonyo over Karanja. But it would be inconsistent to reach for this limited lens to read Wheat – a novel that, as discussed above, otherwise sustains a dialectical relationship between history and subjectivity. In fact, considering reproductive sexuality in the novel reveals a flip side to the seemingly empowering final reconciliation between Mumbi and Gikonyo. While ‘[Mumbi] was now really aware of her independence. Gikonyo was surprised by the new firmness in her voice’ (242). This hint at her transformation in consciousness is overshadowed by the image that closes the novel: ‘I will carve a woman big — big with child’ Gikonyo thinks to himself (243). This prophetic pronouncement on the nation-about-to-be-born counterpoises the woman with the ‘new firmness in her voice’, and what the latter could mean for the future of decolonisation.
The ‘new man‘ and nationalist struggle
While the symbol of ‘Woman’ in this way functions in the service of male bonding and nation-building, Wheat’s secondary cast of female characters complicate this. Applying Nicholls’ (2010) idea of an ‘interested reading’ that must to an extent ‘work strategically against’ the novel’s dominant symbolisms, we can explore this paradox as an irresolution: one that is potentially fruitful for understanding the complex triangulation between gender, subjectivity and history in this post-independence novel. In Wheat, a chain of events implicate all characters in the nation’s making, regardless of their personal desires for non-involvement. Wangari, Gikonyo’s mother, becomes an important character in this regard. Whereas Mumbi’s mother admonishes her daughter for excessive pride when Mumbi returns to her childhood home after Gikonyo slaps her, Wangari challenges her son. ‘Wangari stood up and shook her front right finger at him. ‘You. You. If today you were a baby crawling on your knees I would pinch your thighs so hard you would learn,’ (172) she says to a raging Gikonyo. Wangari here sees through her son’s anger and knows it to be a misplaced attempt at dealing with his ‘thingification’ under detention. This word with psycho-political inflections was coined by Aimé Césaire (1950, 43) and echoed later by Fanon: ‘the “thing” which has been colonised’ (1961, 37). In not ‘knowing himself’, his mother seems to imply, Gikonyo is losing sight of the pending task of his own ‘dis-subjection’ (Cherki 2000, 262) – of refusing to ‘thingify’ others because he himself was ‘thingified’ by colonial violence. Wangari repeatedly reminds Gikonyo that decolonisation involves reconstituting his subjectivity: ‘Let us see what profit it will bring you, to go on poisoning your mind […] Read your own heart, and know yourself’ (172). In doing so, she raises a question the novel does not pursue: did what the anti-colonial fighters go through during the Emergency indeed have psycho-politically transformative results?
Bethwell A. Ogot (2003) describes how Mau Mau was not an exclusively Gĩkũyũ anti-colonial movement, pointing out that several Gĩkũyũ leaders who occupied positions of power after independence did not accept its radical redistributive demands. As such, a generalisation cannot be made about one ‘kind’ of Mau Mau strategy, recruit, or experience. Evan Mwangi (2009) also notes that, while ethnicity and class have been discussed by historians of the Mau Mau movement, ‘gender and sexuality as analytic categories in Kenyan historiography of decolonisation as presented in art have not been systematically explored’ (90). In light of these ambiguities around what Mau Mau was and how it continues to be narrated, Wangari’s question is a discomfiting but important one to ask – especially for a novel that maintains that to live in, and for, community is the condition of collective transformation out of the legacies of colonialism. Wangari’s warning to Gikonyo implies those who fought in anti-colonial nationalist struggle cannot straightforwardly assume to have ‘decolonised their minds’ (Ngũgĩ 1986). An ontological re-alignment with others and commitment to (self-)transformation is necessary, too, of the moral victors of the struggle.
So while the novel condemns collaborators like Karanja for not having sacrificed much, it also gestures to a problem that concerns peasant freedom fighters like Gikonyo and Mugo. Looking to undo the emasculating experience of detention via enacting gendered violence brings Gikonyo no peace. Interestingly, in this way, Ngũgĩ both strategically minimises the question of Mau Mau men’s political consciousness, and writes a peripheral woman who flags up the path of inquiry left untrodden. Individuals who are ‘involved in the active work of destroying an inhibitive social structure and building a new one begin to see themselves,’ Ngũgĩ writes in Homecoming (1972, 10). Wangari’s call to Gikonyo to ‘know himself’ (172) suggests that, Gikonyo is not yet thinking in terms of Fanon’s ‘real leap’ of ‘introducing invention’ (1952, 204) at either the intimate or social level.
Mukami kimathi, freedom fighter and wife of late Mau Mau leader Dedan Kimathi, passed away in May 2023 at the age of 96
Sexual politics and/in resistance
Decolonisation in Wheat is a sacrificial project that involves the complex coming-to-terms with one’s own betrayals and fears, as part of the process. All can then emerge with a new consciousness, directing collective labours towards nation-building. But just as the novel struggles to incorporate Mumbi into this dialectical view, the same transpires with the character of Njeri, a woman who contends for Kihika’s affections. In contrast to Mumbi’s function as facilitator of male-to-male relations, the novel’s treatment of a militant woman, Njeri, genders the politics of nationalist motivation. She is one of few in a story deeply occupied with the notion of loyalty — to oneself, to one’s community, and to anti-colonial struggle — who emerges perhaps faultless. Njeri taunts Kihika’s lover Wambuku for expecting Kihika to remain out of the action. Instead, ‘letting loose her long-suppressed anger… [Njeri pledges,] “I will come to you, my handsome warrior,” trembling with the knowledge that she had made an irrevocable promise to Kihika’ (101). Honouring her sexual and political promise, she joins Kihika in the forest and dies as Mau Mau. Where does this leave the subjectivity of a character like Njeri, whose actions we are told stem from ‘long-suppressed anger’ towards the trappings of her gender on the one hand, and from her desire for Kihika, on the other?
Njeri’s loyalty and passion (which men like Gikonyo wrestle with trying to sustain, then grapple with the shame of failing to) seem the ‘wrong’ kind for nation-building. Indeed, Njeri’s actions are written through the assumption of their stemming from a rage that emasculates. Despite her reputation as a fighter preceding her attraction to Kihika, the novel suggests her political militancy arose solely out of jealousy: ‘[Njeri] felt superior and stronger and she could not help her contempt for Wambuku’ (100). Whereas the narrative affirms that Mau Mau men’s lived experiences – both of land dispossession and torture at the hands of colonial forces – motivates their resistance, it struggles with the implications of a political consciousness borne of lived experience in women. The combination of rage (at her social powerlessness) and desire (for both Kihika the man and the political ideal) that motivate Njeri’s actions are deemed inappropriate at a time when Gĩkũyũ masculinity is fragile.
Recent scholarship has established that Mau Mau women’s detention and punishment were similar to that of their male counterparts. The British detained approximately 8000 women under the Emergency (Bruce-Lockhart 2014). Why, then, would Njeri’s anger and loyalty mark her an outlier? Sociologist Srila Roy’s discussion of gender as central to the moral economy of radical political violence helps illuminate this: ‘Given that women have been historically and conceptually excluded from the public realm, and marked as “other” even upon inclusion, political participation entails varying degrees of “ontological complicity”, including acquiescing in the power hierarchies within which they are located’ (2014, 183-4). This raises the question of what is at stake in ‘attaining “composure” through normative (political) identities’ (Roy 2014, 183), which is precisely what Njeri defies when she arrives at political commitment through sexual rebellion.
As we have seen that, in Wheat, ‘female identities and anatomies became symbolically bound to motherhood and to the nation — at the expense of female political agency and female sexual agency’ (Nicholls 101), Njeri’s choice is significant. Like Wangari, she presents an unfulfilled opportunity for the novel to pursue the full complexity of gender vis-a-vis radical nationalist politics. In what ways — other than requiring the ‘ontological complicity’ of women — could the relationship between gender and nationalism inform the transformation of subjectivities? How would such transformations effect the trajectory of decolonisation? Wheat hurries over its markedly ‘other’ woman, whose actions bring to mind how, for Fanon, ‘the beginnings of decolonisation’ are to be sought ‘within life itself’ (Clare 2013, 63), where we desire and act upon desires.
In some of the above ways, A Grain of Wheat centres the re-socialisation of Gĩkũyũ men to the project of decolonisation. Despite its political vision, the novel struggles to imagine women’s subjectivities in a dialectical relationship with their material conditions. The latter transform over the course of the narrative only insofar as doing so makes a revolutionary masculinity possible after the trials of anti-colonial struggle. When women’s actions are deemed in ‘excess’ to this task (as are Njeri’s and Wangari’s), the narrative intriguingly acknowledges, but does not pursue, this challenge. As such, although Ngũgĩ builds a dialectic that conceives of subjectivity and its transformation as an historical and embodied, the reduction to symbols of a complex set of female characters’ subjectivities weakens the dialectical becoming that is at the heart of this post-independence novel. While there is no doubt that Wheat remains a milestone in Anglophone African writing, its grappling with gender invites deeper reading into the possibilities and limits of understanding anti-colonial nationalism as a source of ‘mental revolution’ (Achebe 1975, 145) during the independence period. Ngũgĩ’s text crucially brings into view how any vision of liberation must overcome a tendency to treat the re-constitution of subjectivities – of ‘decolonising the mind’, in Ngũgĩ’s own words (1986) – as a process that men undergo, and women merely facilitate.
Sarah Jilani is a lecturer in Anglophone world literatures at City, University of London. Her research interests include subjectivity, decolonisation and political consciousness in African and South Asian novels and films. She has published widely and broadcast radio programmes on a range of related topics.
Featured photograph: Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o giving a talk in 2019 (Wiki Commons)
ROAPE contributor, Yusuf Serunkuma, reviews a new book on the loneliness of the left. Left Alone is a highly original collection of urgent stories, reflections and short essays from around the world on the lived experiences of left loneliness from a variety of genres and left political currents. Serunkuma praises a volume that capture struggles in the trenches of authoritarianism, and on the streets of the capitalist world.
By Yusuf Serunkuma
In all struggles—before mass consciousness and awakening—strugglers, fighters, resistors or peasant/organic intellectuals have tended to start and sustain the struggles either alone or with very few comrades in arms. A few comrades. Because these moments tend to be long and winding, they come with corrosive spells of loneliness—and are often exhausting. The toll could be either mental or material or both. With the exception of openly violent exploitation (such as 1880s colonialism or earlier slave trade), where among the victims, the openness of violence itself mobilised resistance, most anti-exploitation struggles—especially against deftly disguised, fetishized and structured modes of exploitation—have fought to mobilise mass consciousness. A few inquisitive folks are able to make sense of the hidden hand of authoritarianism and extraction, which renders them enemies of the machine. On the other hand, living from amongst the oppressors—say in capitals in Europe and the United States—among the profiteers of colonialism, capitalism, slavery, apartheid, wars entrepreneurs, is even more lonesome, and outright dangerous. This is especially because the exploiters—as Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman told us in 1988—tend to control the ways in which their exploitative practices are received in the public domain. This is the painful fate of Julian Assange or former UK labour party leader, Jeremy Corbyn.
The same is true with present-day authoritarianisms across the world. Because of the violence cultivated within the public through a fear industry that includes killings, abductions, torture and arrests, entire publics are rendered helpless and afraid. In turn only a few bold individuals—almost considered reckless—are willing to stand up and fight. In the course of this, they are left alone because of the risks posed by their acts of resistance (which could be both outright activism on the streets or the intellectual radical positions they hold).
Daraja Press’ recent publication, Left Alone: On Solitude and Loneliness amid Collective Struggle covers commendable ground on this discussion of the subject of loneliness and solitude in struggles supposedly meant to be engaged in collectively. The book is a massive collection of fairly short pieces, but heartfelt, mostly personalised contributions by writers and activists from across the world: Kenya, Argentina, Italy, the UK, the United States, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Germany and several others. The contributors are from different backgrounds ranging from poets, theatre, academia (with topics such as Marxist political thought, communism, racial discrimination), and general activism. They capture struggles in the academia and public intellectualism, in the trenches of authoritarianism, on the streets of the capitalist world or all of them together at once. The book playfully but powerfully incorporates several genres of literary expression, ranging from poetry, painting to prose writing. There are strong academically written essays (such as Derefe Chevannes’s “The Problem of Pathology” or Richard Gilman-Opalsky’s “The Practicality of Utopianism”). There are poems by Lena Grace Anyuolo, Patrick Anderson, and Lena Stoehrfaktor, which although sombre and more reflective, serve to lighten up the readings. There are creative fictions (such as Leo Zeilig’s 2084), and biographical writing (such as alejandra ciriza’s “A Red Rooster Does Not Give Up”). There is an interview of Turkish/Kurdish scholar and activist, İsmail Beşikçi, which offers an even more radical reading of the subject of loneliness—as empowering!
The refrain from a poem by Lena Stoehrfaktor, summarises the ambitions of this book. She writes: “Before our outer shells can no longer hold us/ We must reach out to each other, so isolation won’t enfold us/ If we can bridge the gaps between us, it won’t be so crushing/ When the songs of exploitation tell us we’re good for nothing” (146). Indeed, written in the spirit of solidarity, the different contributors come to the subject of loneliness from different (mostly Left) vantage points, but all appealing for connections and solidarities: while some see it as a form of tiredness, fatigue, overwhelming conditions of labouring, trauma, marginalisation, disenfranchisement, dehumanisation (such as being pathologized), violent (unintellectual) defeat, or fear, others see it as the feeling that comes from holding a different radical view than assumed co-strugglers. But all these unite at that point of a quest for union and empathy.
Richard Gilman-Opalsky powerful essay wrestles with the intellectual loneliness, seeing this as that feeling “one may have whether alone or in the crowd…of being dejected, deprived of companionship, without sympathy or human solidarity (22). And later sees loneliness, of feeling “uprooted, disconnected from purpose, dejected, cut off from human solidarity,” and normally “a totalitarian government presents itself as the rallying cry against this condition” (23) as people find the imperative to create solidarities, organise and uproot this very government.
It had to be Gilman-Opalsky—a professed communist, and author of The Communism of Love—who blasts folks “generally regarded as smart and sensible – who think that the only thing wrong with the capitalist reality is that some presidents and prime ministers could be better,” (33) instead of seeking to dismantle the entire system. This view is echoed by James Martel, when fellow liberal Lefties soon realise that your views insist on dismantling the entire system, at which point they seek to keep away (94).
In a deeply personal, emotional and introspective piece, alejandra ciriza recollects the memories of struggle and exile after the 1976 coup in her home country of Argentina which brought in the murderous government of the Cono Sur. ciriza writes that the military junta that headed the coup in 1976 was so brutal that political persecution by the state included, “systematic use of terror, in broad daylight, forced disappearance, murder, confinement, and censorship, but [also] the methodical inculcation of fear” (45). Reflecting on this condition, as one of those who had been active in resisting the junta, ciriza recalls the pains of exile, the pain of brutal defeat, and hopelessness about the future: “It was a harsh isolation. The absences transformed into permanent anguish, the endless searches in the newspapers looking for a name … among the fallen” (52).
“So, this is what largely defeat is all about,” she writes, capturing the pain of loneliness when friends and comrades have been exiled or murdered. “The isolation, the rupture of the threads of collective fabric, of the connections with others, so indispensable for us to think and struggle, of loss of emancipatory horizons, which can be envisioned when the masses become conscious of their powers” (53). These different reflections on loneliness provide a spectrum of reflections covering different modes of struggle.
There is a beautiful word play with the title of this book, “Left Alone.” On the one hand, it could mean Left liberal politics—as often understood against Right wing conservative politics. On the other, simply being left alone, as used in the English language to mean, being abandoned, ignored, dejected, and alone. While both are readable as reflected in the book, the entire volume is conceived mostly as Left-identifying. This is a weakness of the book, especially for African/postcolonial/subaltern readers: it reflects a Eurocentric bias especially that most struggles across the world while being equally lonesome, fighters/activists and strugglers never identify as members of the Left. It is not our grammar. In fact, for Francophone West Africa, for example, the French Left continues to be part of the system that reproduces the CFA colonisation. And for many victims of bombing in the Middle East, Palestine or South East Asia and Latin America, it does not matter whether the leaderships in the United States or Europe are Left identifying. The pain is the same. Probably Left-identifying Barack Obama dropped more bombs on Pakistan than Right identifying George Bush—and this pattern remains unchanged.
Perhaps this overt inclination toward Left-identifying politics is a product of the lack of conceptual clarity on how struggle ought to be understood in its broader sense. It is in Leo Zeilig’s story—on the power of ground-level solidarities, traumas of no-end-in-sight, and pain of suicide—that you find a broader, more comprehensive sense of what struggles could mean, and what is normally being struggled against:
[Among] the 1300 individuals who own over half of the world’s wealth, who own the companies that dump grain into the sea to keep prices artificially high, and the politicians who order bombs to be strewn across our towns and cities, or the forest to be burnt to clear land, not for the landless, mind you, but for a few bastards who have stolen it. Perhaps you want something closer to hand, take the money wasted on military equipment which could be spent on schools and hospitals… (197).
Zeilig makes connections with the rest of the subaltern world, the postcolonial worlds suffering under the weight of bombs and capitalist extraction, while at the same time identifying with the challenges of being and living inside the western world which includes the neglect of schools and hospitals for the continued investment in endless war.
But these criticism of mine notwithstanding, it is a delightful, poignant read for whoever is involved in any struggle against capitalist exploitation and authoritarianism—especially when they find themselves alone and dejected. The message is clear: You aren’t alone.
Yusuf Serunkuma is a columnist in Uganda’s newspapers, scholar, and a playwright. In 2014, Fountain Publishers published his first play, The Snake Farmers which was received with critical acclaim in Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda. He is also a scholar and researches topics in political economy, and teaches decolonial studies/new colonialism, and writes regularly for ROAPE.
Featured Photograph: Kimberly Chiimbais one of the artists featured in Left Alone; Kimberly is a young black British-Zimbabwean portrait painter based in London, UK. Best known for her bright, natural and hyperrealistic paintings of contemporary Black subjects.
Isaac Samuel is an independent researcher whose work focuses on African history and economics. His prolific output on pre-colonial African history can be found on his blog AfricanHistoryExtra, which as a collective body of extraordinary scholarship puts the lie to the still widely held belief that – in the words of esteemed University of Oxford historian Hugh Trevor-Rope in the 1960s – there is no African history, “only the history of Europeans in Africa. The rest is darkness”. Here, in a blistering account, Samuel shows how German philosopher Georg Hegel – one of the most influential figures of 19th century philosophy – wilfully misinterpreted first-hand accounts of the Asante kingdom from the 18th century. The result, both in the work of Hegel and those who followed him, was the construction of an absurdly fictional account of African society, steeped in popular beliefs of his time about the continent’s supposed backwardness, that deliberately subsumed the richness and complexity of Asante history in order to legitimate imperial expansion and colonial rule.
By Isaac Samuel
In the year 1744, a series of battles in northern Ghana marked the ascendance of a new regional power, whose legacy in the Atlantic world would greatly influence western conceptions of African history. For several months, the cavalry armies of the kingdoms of Gonja and Dagomba – heirs to the legacy of the old empires of Ghana and Mali – faced off against the formidable infantry of the Asante kingdom, an upstart state to their south which had been founded less than a century prior. Asante’s northern campaign, which was personally led by its king Opoku Ware, ended with a resounding victory in Gonja but a near defeat in Dagomba where his besieged army was only saved by the musket fire which frightened Dagomba’s cavalry.
The Gonja scholar Sidi Umar wrote of these events that “At the end of this year 1744 the infidels entered the country of Gonja, and the Gonja knew them as Imbo [i.e. Ashanti], they also invaded Dagomba and the people of Dagomba took to flight … the cursed unbeliever, Opoku, entered the town of GhGh (in Dagomba) and plundered it”.[1] When Opoku Ware died in 1750, Sidi Umar left no kind words for the Asante ruler, writing “May Allah curse him and put his soul into hell. It was he who harmed the people of Gonja, oppressing and robbing them of their property at his will”.[2]
In the decades following its northern campaigns, Asante formally incorporated Gonja as a tributary province. An imamate was created at Asante’s capital Kumasi that was populated by scholars from Gonja, among whom was Sidi Umar’s great-grandson Karamo Togma, the author of a chronicle on Asante’s history in 1807.[3]
A Scribe of Bondoukou, ca. 1897, National Archives UK. Bondoukou in north-eastern Cote d’Ivoire was one of Asante’s northern vassals.
No longer seen as an oppressor but as a protector, Gonja scholars lauded the Asante government. Karamo’s chronicle of Asante was unfortunately lost in the Anglo-Asante war of 1874, but it had been extensively used by the British envoy Joseph Dupuis who visited Kumasi in 1820. In the sixth chapter of Dupuis’ Journal of a Residence in Ashantee where he outline’s Asante’s history based on information he copied from the “moslem records”, Dupuis shows Asante to be a well-organized “empire” with an elaborate administrative system and “codes of laws”, led by a king who was elected by the “principal officers of state” and respected by his subjects.[4]
Dupuis’ nuanced but positive view of Asante is corroborated by an 1822 letter to King Osei Kwame from Karamo’s uncle named Malik, (who was also the Imam of Gonja) which read “Oh sultan of Alshati and king of this world, may Allah give you long life and good health until old age, may Allah bless your son and help him conquer the people of the land”.[5] Dupuis observed that with the exception of some bad practices, King Osei’s subjects from Gonja thought “he was a good man, and wholly underserving the name of tyrant”.[6] However, this observation was at odds with the contemporary European perception of Asante, popularized by the German philosopher Georg Hegel.
Nearly two decades after Karamo’s chronicle on Asante’s history, Hegel included the Asante kingdom in his lectures on world history and religion, delivered in Berlin in 1827.[7] While Hegel is celebrated in the West as one of the founders of modern European philosophy, he had a lacklustre reputation as a historian due to his pre-occupation with constructing philosophies of history around the concept of race.[8]
For information on Asante’s society and history, Hegel relied on the writings of Thomas Bowdich, who was Dubois’ predecessor in the role of British envoy to Asante.[9] In 1819, Bowdich published his meticulously detailed account of the Asante kingdom in his book Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee. Bowditch’s account on Asante described an African government and society so sophisticated and familiar to his Western audience that some of his peers, including Dubuis, considered it embellished.[10]
Bowdich had also seen the chronicle of Asante’s history but since he couldn’t read Arabic, he relied on oral accounts from Asante’s courtiers who, understandably, recounted an even more positive account of their kingdom’s history than what Karamo had written.[11] However, anyone who has read Bowdich’s colourful description of Asante’s society (that has proved to be an invaluable resource for specialists on Asante history) would be surprised at how much Hegel distorted it.
A house in Kumasi, ca. 1819, Thomas Bowditch, British Library.A street in Kumasi, ca. 1819, Thomas Bowditch, British Library.
Nearly one third of Bowditch’s book contained chapters on the Asante’s geography, history, constitution, laws, architecture, economy, trade, language. However, Hegel appeared to deliberately ignore this detail to focus instead on a few specific passages. Even here, the passages that attracted Hegel’s attention were misconstrued.[12]
In a section on the supposed despotism of African kings, Hegel’s evidence from Asante was that “the king inherits all the property left by his deceased subjects”, yet Bowdich had recorded that “the king is heir to the gold of every subject”.[13] In a section on the supposed fanaticism of Africans, Hegel claims that in the Asante’s pre-war preparations, the bones of the king’s mother are washed with human blood, yet Bowditch’s account mentions that bones were “bathed in rum and water”, wiped with silks, covered in gold in a brief ceremony and later re-interred.[14] In a section about the supposed sensuousness of Africans, Hegel claims that Asante festivals including the consumption of a person by the public, yet Bowditch records that it was “only whispered” that “small pieces” of the enemy’s heart were mixed in the meals of the few war chiefs but not the public.[15]
Hegel then uses the above claim of cannibalism to argue that “slavery has awakened more humanity” among Africans taken away on European ships because those left back in Africa are in a worse condition.[16] Whereas Bowditch mentions that any slave who enters Asante territory from a kingdom not tributary to it “is received as a free subject” and that in Asante, the “good treatment of slaves” is provided for by the liberty of transferring themselves to any freeman that they coerce into doing so by “invoking his death” if he refuses to take them in.[17]
The abovementioned misinterpretations of Asante society are not just anecdotes but make up the entirety of Hegel’s writing on Asante and provide the basis on which Hegel rejected the idea of instinct and respect as a universal human characteristic. Even where Bowdich had attempted to explicate the rationality of Asante’s laws, Hegel’s retelling greatly reinterpreted or simply ignored the evidence that contradicted his preconceptions.[18]
Hegel’s Africans supposedly exist at the lowest level of consciousness – immediate sensuousness – which is why he claims that Africa lies outside history. According to Hegel, it’s only by encountering the West and enduring slavery that Africa enters into the dialectical process of consciousness and thus world history. Hegel therefore surmises that it is both necessary and just that Africa be subjected to slavery and colonization.[19]
Hegel selected and deployed details from Bowditch’s account to fit with his theoretical apriorism of Africa as a place without history. This is representative of Hegel’s academic practice, in that he looked into books written about African societies and found what he was looking for, even when this meant wilful misinterpretation to construct an absurdly fictional account of African society that is steeped in popular beliefs of his time about the continent’s supposed backwardness. Hegel’s ludicrous theorizing barred him from ever admitting Africa and its people to ‘history’ as he construed it. For a continent which supposedly has no “historical interest of its own”, Hegel devoted a great deal of attention to it, primarily because Hegel’s glorification of Europe was predicated on his denigration of Africa.[20]
In his later books such as Philosophy of Right, Hegel advocated for colonial expansion as a solution to elevate the so-called barbarian nations onto the stage of history, stating that “the rights of mere herdsmen, hunters, and tillers of the soil are inferior, and their independence is merely formal”.[21]
The ideas of Hegel and his peers such as Immanuel Kant were part of the dominant discourses of colonialism which purported a racial and cultural superiority of the West over non-Western societies such as Asante. They provided a rationale for colonial expansion cloaked in the language of extending civilization and bringing Africa into history.[22]
Beginning in 1807 and continuing for nearly a century, the armies of Asante would engage in a protracted war against British colonial expansion from the coast. Ironically, Hegel interpreted Asante’s resistance against British expansionism as evidence for Africans’ “lack of respect for life”.[23] The Anglo-Asante wars were an extremely expensive undertaking that was paid for by the British government largely instigated by extremely negative reports about Asante current in the British public from the writings of Hegel and his peers.[24] Added to this were the biased reports from the British governors of Cape Coast castle on the coast of modern Ghana who even tried to block the embassy of Dupuis which advocated for peace with Asante.[25]
The 1874 Battle of Amoaful between the British and the Asante kingdom, British Library.
The armies of Asante defeated the British in several battles until an internal conflict over strategy led to the Asante’s defeat in 1874 when the British found Kumasi abandoned and the King Kofi Kakari sent a negotiating party while in retreat. The 1874 invasion had been widely covered by British war correspondents with British newspapers such as The Times publishing 415 articles about Asante in just one year.[26] This furthered the extreme contempt felt by British society towards Asante even more than the fictitious image of the kingdom invented by Hegel had done. So, when the Asante initiated a series of diplomatic exchanges with the British which saw many of their envoys travelling to London, they found the cards heavily stacked against them.
A combination of negative press about the Asante kingdom and great power competition between Britain and France culminated in the preparation for a British expedition against Asante in 1895, even as the kingdom’s envoys were in London trying to avert the looming threat. Despite the envoys’ success in obtaining a more favourable treaty to retain their sovereignty through a concessionaire arrangement, and despite their nascent efforts in public relations to document the “civilizing” improvements in Asante’s laws, the British colonial secretary, headed by the expansionist Joseph Chamberlain, authorized the invasion.[27]
Fully trusting in the efforts of his envoys, the reigning Asante King Prempeh I made no effort to resist the expedition, whose leaders’ racism against Africans was extreme even by the standards of the day.[28] Prempeh was promptly exiled to Seychelles, but the kingdom was only formally occupied by the British after a final anti-colonial war in 1900.
After the fall of Asante, amateur colonial historians begun reconstructing the history of the kingdom that was now subsumed under the Gold Coast colony. In 1915, Dr Walton Claridge, a medical officer with no formal training in history, published A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti, a 1,287-page volume of the Gold Coast history. Claridge was a loyal imperialist whose account of Asante’s history was written to legitimize the presence of the colonial government. He wrote that the extension of British power “was the natural unavoidable outcome of the long contact of their continued presence in the country and of the long contact of a stronger and more virile race with a less enlightened people”.[29]
The racialized concept of the British as a “virile race” and a leading force in world history was popularized by Joseph Chamberlain,[30] the aforementioned colonial secretary responsible for the most aggressive colonial wars. Claridge’s account of Asante history focuses almost exclusively on its interactions with the British and the latter’s eventual victory over Asante.[31] By inscribing Chamberlain’s racialized notions of British superiority into the history of Asante, and solely focusing on British interactions with Asante, Claridge was championing a Hegelian conception of African history.
Later writers such as William Balmer’s 1925 book A History of the Akan Peoples of the Gold Coast and W.E.F Ward’s 1935 book A Short History of the Gold Coast made little improvements to Claridge’s work, even as Ward’s account of Gold Coast history went through many editions and became a standard text in local schools.[32] As late as 1967, Ward was paying homage to Claridge as a source of inspiration, writing that “everyone who writes on Gold Coast history should begin, after the fashion of the country, by pouring a libation and sacrificing a sheep in honour of D. Claridge”.[33] The colony had since gained its independence and been renamed the Republic of Ghana, and professional historians such as Ivor Wilks were beginning to challenge the previous writing on Asante society and history by Western scholars and colonial writers who had been pre-occupied with rationalizing imperial expansion and its subsequent establishment of colonial rule.[34]
Using the vast corpus of internal and external accounts of Asante’s society, Ivor Wilks published his celebrated account on Asante history, Asante in the Nineteenth Century. Wilks relied on several primary sources including; oral traditions which had been documented by the deposed king Prempeh in 1907; the 19th century chronicles by Muslim writers such as Karamo and his peers; as well as the detailed accounts of European visitors such as Bowditch, Dupuis and the missionaries who succeeded them.[35] Wilks’ work was improved upon by other specialists of Asante history such as Tom McCaskie[36] and Emmanuel Akyeampong[37], which combined with the rise of postcolonial historiography was influential to contemporary African writers.
Among the most prominent post-colonial African writers is the Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe. In a 1994 interview with the Paris Review where he explains the source of his interest in storytelling, Achebe recounts the stories he read as a student at school about European encounters with remote people and strange lands. He adds that “Then I grew older and began to read about adventures in which I didn’t know that I was supposed to be on the side of those savages who were encountered by the good white man. That was the way I was introduced to the danger of not having your own stories. There is that great proverb—that until the lions have their own historians, the history of the hunt will always glorify the hunter. Once I realized that, I had to be a writer. I had to be that historian. It’s not one man’s job. It’s not one person’s job. But it is something we have to do, so that the story of the hunt will also reflect the agony, the travail—the bravery, even, of the lions”.[38]
Achebe’s often cited proverb metaphorically describes how dominant groups such as colonialists inscribe power through historical narratives, and his solution was to tell the story which reflected the lion’s bravery rather than the hunter. Achebe’s call to shift modern African historiography away from its Eurocentric foundations was emblematic of the prevailing movement of decolonization in post-colonial studies, which sought to move beyond the colonial library by interrogating the internal sources of African history including those written by literate Africans like Karamo.[39]
However, the documented history of Asante shows that the kind of history which glorified the British was not a result of the Asante not having their own stories, but that their stories had been deliberately subsumed in order to legitimate imperial interests. Furthermore, the writers of Asante’s own stories such as Karamo and Bowditch recorded a fairly accurate account of Asante’s history, despite falling into Achebe’s metaphorical camps of the ‘lion’ and the ‘hunter’ in relation to Asante.
Hegel and the colonial writers who succeeded him weren’t lacking accurate information about African societies, but deliberately ignored the stories of the African ‘lion’ to glorify the European ‘hunter’. The so-called ‘facts’ and ‘truths’ that Hegelian and colonial discourses often claim to embody are instead simply a projection of how the colonizers envisioned and sought to legitimate their rule. They were misconceptions deliberately invented by particular understandings of the world as well as by particular configurations of power. We therefore ought to read them extremely critically to reassess their world view as well as their claims to authenticity.
Stories of African history don’t just reflect the agony and bravery of the lions, but they reveal the boasts of the wily hunter to be nothing more than a farce.
Isaac Samuel is an independent researcher whose work focuses on African history and economics. He currently runs a blog called AfricanHistoryExtra which focuses on the pre-colonial history of Africa.
Featured Photograph: A portrait of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) (Jakob Schlesinger).
[1]Akwamu 1640-1750: A Study of the Rise and Fall of a West African Empire, Ivor Wilks, p. 123.
[2]The History of Islam in Africa by Nehemia Levtzion, Randall L. Pouwels, p. 104.
[3]Asante in the Nineteenth Century, Ivor Wilks, p. 346.
[4]Consul Dupuis and Wangara, Ivor Wilks, pp. 58-63; Journal of a Residence in Ashantee, Joseph Dupuis, p. 229.
[7]Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Georg Hegel (University of California Press, 1996), p. 5.
[8]Hegel and the Third World, Teshale Tibebu; Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History, Susan Buck-Morss; Hegel, Critique de l’Afrique, Pierre Franklin Tavares.
[9]Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, p. 188.
[21]Philosophy of Right, Georg Hegel (Cosimo Inc, 2008), p. 202.
[22]Hegel and the Third World, pp. 119-123 & p. 144; Hegel and Colonialism, Alison Stone.
[23]Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, p. 185.
[24] While Hegel was popular in late 19th century Britain, he was only one among many Western thinkers who contributed to the dominant discourses of colonialism, see e.g., Hegel in England: Victorian Thought Reconsidered, Tibor Frank and Hegel in Britain: A Brief History of British Commentary and Attitudes, James Bradley.
[25]The Fall of the Asante Empire, Robert B. Edgerton, pp. 73-74.
[26]Wolseley and Ashanti: The Asante War Journal and Correspondence of Major General Sir Garnet Wolseley 1873-1874, Ian Frederick William Beckett.
[27]Asante in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 640-650.
[28] Clarke Musgrave’s 1896 book To Kumassi with Scott uses the n-word at least 35 times to refer to the Asante and their king, which doesn’t appear at all in accounts written by Bowditch and Dupuis in the early 19th century.
[29]A History of the Cold Coast and Ashanti: Second Edition, W. W. Claridge, p. 536.
[30]Racism After Race Relations, Robert Miles, p. 68.
[31]A History of the Cold Coast and Ashanti: Second Edition, pp. 180-182.
[32]The History of Ghana, Roger Gocking, pp. 299-300.
David Tonghou Ngong writes about the importance of understanding Leopold Senghor’s poetry when thinking about his perspective on political power. Senghor’s 1951 poem “Chaka” captures his own situation as a person torn between his duties as poet and politician. Ngong argues that from this perspective, we should see Senghor as a complex figure who was neither saint nor sinner.
By David Tonghou Ngong
A portrait of Senghor marking the 60th anniversary of Senegal’s independence in 2020 was critiqued for implicitly praising Senghor’s leadership as first president of Senegal, as one “whose pen mattered more than his sword.”[1] The brief film was taken to task for showing only Senghor’s sunny side, for showing him as poet-president who led the people “as a teacher, with method and organizational spirit,” but failing to show his shadow side, such as how Senghor was beholden to France and the brutality that characterized his regime (1960-1980).
The critique portrayed Senghor as one who was never comfortable with independence, preferring instead to remain under French tutelage. It catalogued the brutalities of Senghor’s regime, among which was his enforcement of a single-party political system, the jailing of opponents, the putting down of student revolt, and orchestrating the death of activists. For the critic, Senghor was not as radical as he should have been.
My goal in this piece is neither to defend the short film nor Senghor. Rather, it is to argue that to understand Senghor, we need to begin with his theory of political power. When we look at his theory of political power, we would realize that his leadership style, both as an anticolonialist and as president mirrored his view of political power. From this perspective, we would see that Senghor saw himself as a complex figure who needed neither to be portrayed as saint or sinner. Speaking of his leadership, Senghor noted that human beings are neither saints nor heroes.[2] This is not to say that we should not condemn him where such condemnation is deserved nor praise him where such praise is needful; rather, understanding his theory of power would prevent us from simplistically presenting him as one thing – and only one thing. In Senghor’s view, I argue, political power is inextricably linked to violence.
I make this argument by noting that the place to look for Senghor’s theory of political power is not in his philosophical corpus or even his acts as president but rather in one of his poems that have received little attention over the years. The poem in question is “Chaka” (also spelled Shaka), which was written in 1951, when he was still involved in anticolonial struggle. I argue that this poem was his way of coming to terms with his conception of political power that served both his anticolonial work and his work as president of Senegal. The vision of power enunciated in the poem captures his life as politician and poet. Writing to the American scholar of African literature Donald Burness in 1971, twenty years after the poem was written and over ten years after he became president of Senegal, Senghor confessed to the importance of this poem in his thinking about power when he said that “Chaka” captures his own situation as a person who is a poet and a politician, a person torn between his duties as poet and politician.[3] The poem is found in Senghor’s poetry collection, Ethiopiques (1956).
While “Chaka” was inspired by the legendary Zulu strongman and empire-builder, King Shaka (1787-1828), Senghor’s portrait of Shaka is actually inspired by a work of fiction, the novel Chaka, originally written in the Sotho language by Thomas Mofolo and published in 1925. Senghor’s depiction of Shaka however departed from Mofolo’s portrait of the man because Senghor’s Shaka was influenced by Negritude. In fact, Senghor’s Shaka is a reaction to Mofolo who is believed to have slandered African cultures and the king in his own portrayal. In Mopholo’s Chaka, as the translator of the novel Daniel Kunene has noted, Mofolo invented traditions that did not exist among the Zulus and characters that did not exist in the life of the actual Shaka.[4] For example, early in the novel, Mofolo says that there is a tradition among the Zulus that a woman found to be pregnant out of wedlock is to be killed.[5] Mofolo creates a Diviner called Isanusi who would lead Chaka to sign a pact with him in his violent quest for power, and a woman, Noliwa, with whom Chaka would fall in love, and whom Shaka eventually murders in his quest for power. Mofolo’s Chaka, it is suggested, portrayed Chaka as a violent person who sought power for its own sake and destroyed everything that stood in his way to achieving that power.
Mofolo was a Christian and is therefore believed to have been influenced by missionaries to slander both African culture and a revered African leader. Many scholars in the Negritude movement sought to challenge Mofolo’s view of Shaka, including Senghor. Senghor’s portrayal of Shaka was therefore intended to redeem his character. Senghor’s portrayal of Shaka however was scandalous at the time it was written because the world was just coming out of wars believed to have been orchestrated by people with violent characters such as Shaka’s.[6]
“Chaka” is a dramatic poem made up of two songs (Chant I & II) that interrogate and at the same time praise Shaka’s actions, developing theories of political power in the process. The central question in the poem is why Shaka wanted power? Did he want power for its own sake or did he want it to achieve some higher purpose? In Senghor’s hand, Shaka becomes a figure who wanted power not just for its own sake, as Mofolo portrayed him, but rather to serve a higher purpose – to rescue his people from oppression and create a more humane world, a new world.
Thus, Senghor presents Shaka as a kind of Christ figure who dies for love of his people, a martyr who dies for a worthy cause. In fact, the poem is dedicated to “the Bantu martyrs of South Africa,” suggesting that the poem should be read from the perspective of the martyrs among whom Shaka is included. In other words, Shaka’s death should be understood as the death of a martyr. While Mofolo presented Chaka as a tyrant who would not let anything, not even his love for a woman, stand in his way to achieving absolute power, Senghor presents him as one whose quest for power is motivated by love, the love for his people, the love for Black people – as one whose quest for power is motivated by his Negritude.
Yet if Shaka is motivated by love, the love of Black people, by his Negritude, as the poem suggests, why did he kill his lover, Noliwa, whom Senghor calls Nolivé, and a host of other people? Shaka’s response is that he killed her because of love, the love of his people. He kills her not just because he wants power but rather because he wants power “as a means” (“un moyen”) to serve his people, to rescue his people from oppression, the oppression of Europe.
It is at this point that we see Senghor at his most realistic when it comes to how to obtain power and keep it. For Shaka to obtain absolute power, as the Diviner, Issanoussi, tells him, he must give up something important. As the Diviner states, “Power doesn’t come without sacrifice/ And absolute power requires the blood of the most cherished.” (“Le pouvoir ne s’obtient sans sacrifice, le pouvoir absolu exige le sang de l’être le plus cher.”) Here, we see that Shaka does not flinch from sacrificing the love of his life to obtain power. If sacrificing her is what he needs to do to obtain power, “Then she must die,” he concludes. “Il faut mourir enfin, tout accepter….”
Thus, in “Chaka,” Senghor is suggesting that the one who seeks political power should be motivated by love, the love of people, their people. The African who seeks power should be motivated by love for Africans. This is indeed a rare claim to make about why an African leader should seek power. But we also see that this love for the people is fraught as it could also be used as a pretext – the pretext for murderous acts! What kind of love is this that does not hesitate to massacre in order to obtain the power to rescue one’s people? Should love seek power through the murder of the very ones purported to be rescued? Given that Senghor indicates that the poem is his way of coming to terms with political power, did his claim that the politician should be motivated by love shape his own political life? If so, how? If not, why not?
Reading “Chaka”, we see that Senghor’s theory of political power is a problematic one that could sponsor the brutalities that happened under his regime. While he sees love for one’s people as an ultimate reason to seek political power, it also seems that this love may sometimes be used as a pretext, as a reason to do whatever it takes to sieze power, even to the point of killing one’s intimate partner and people.
Senghor’s “Chaka” should therefore lead us to interrogate the kind of leaders we idolize. Do the people we idolize stand for lifegiving politics? Does the remaking of Shaka in the image of Negritude lead Senghor to pass over in silence a murderous view of power that was in turn replicated in his political life as first president of Senegal?
In his paper “Representation of Violence in Two African Epic Heroes,” Konate Siendou of Université de Cocody-Abidjan takes Africans to task for idolizing leaders whose view of power is rooted in violence.[7] This, he suggests, is found in how the stories of leaders such as Shaka and Sundiata have been narrated. These narratives often present the violence of these figures as essential to their rise to power so that they might save their people. Should we accept such violence as central to political power? If so, can we blame politicians for relying on it in their rise to, and execution of, power?
Modern African politics has been characterized by leaders who identify with the violence of animals such as the leopard or the lion, such as Mobutu of former Zaire (leopard) and Paul Biya of Cameroon (“l’homme lion”). Senghor’s “Chaka” helps us interrogate the relations between power and violence. How is it possible for violence to bring about a new world (“monde nouveau”), as Senghor intimates in the poem? Has African leaders’ use of violence not only brought death and destruction to the people?
Perhaps it is this aporia of the relation between power and violence that led Senghor to finally give up the quest for political power in “Chaka.” Thus, in the poem, the politician gives way to the poet. “Let the politician die,” we read, “and let the Poet live!” (“Bien mort le politique, et vive le Poète”). The poet here is one who wants to provide a salutary vision for life, a vision of fraternity and peace. But seeking these things seems to be intimately linked to violence. Could this be why Senghor gave up power, why he resigned the presidency? Did he give up power because he was disillusioned with the life of a politician and preferred the pensive life of a poet? Could he then be described as poète de l’action (poet of action) as the title of one of his books suggests?
Whatever the case, in “Chaka”, we see the struggles of the poet-politician. The poem provides us with a window into Senghor’s vision of power and how this pans out in his political career and it should be central to any study of Senghor’s praxis of political power.
Featured Photograph: Independence Day in Senegal, President Léopold Sédar Senghor (centre) is walking to N’Gor beach with a crowd of spectators in the background (4 April 1962).
Notes
[1] See Florian Bobin, “The Senghor Myth,” Africa Is A Country, June 9, 2020. Florian Bobin previously published the piece as “Poetic Injustice: The Senghor Myth and Senegal’s Independence,” Review of African Political Economy, May 5, 2020, and “Le Mythe Senghor à l’épreuve du souvenir de l’indépendence,” Seneplus April 6, 2020.
[2] Léopold Sédar Senghor, La poésie de l’action: conversation avec Mohamed Aziza (Stock, 1980), Loc 2064, Kindle edition. Senghor writes: “Les homme ne sont, hélas! ni des saints ni des héros.”
[3] Donald Burness, Shaka: King of the Zulus in African Literature (Washington, D.C.: Three Continents Press, 1976), 30, 40 n 8. In a letter to Donald Burness, Senghor writes that “c’est ma situation que j’ai exprimée sur la figure de Chaka, qui deviant, pour moi, le poète homme politique dechiré entre les devoirs de sa fonction de poète et ceux de sa fonction politique.”
[4] Daniel F. Kunene, “Introduction,” in Chaka, xiv-xix.
[5] Thomas Mofolo, Chaka, a new translation by Daniel F. Kunene (Oxford: Heinemann, 1981), 5.
[7] Konate Siendou, “Violence in Two African Epic Heroes: A Comparative Study of Chaka and Sundiata,” Revue Scientifique the Lettres, Arts, et Sciences Humaines (2020).
In an analysis of the Wagner group in Africa, Graham Harrison argues that Western coverage on the group’s activities on the continent characterises it as an extension of the Kremlin’s violent and venal cronyism and a disrupter of African-Western partnerships dedicated to the building of liberal sovereignties through aid, peacebuilding, and policy advice. Yet, Harrison explains the commentary from Western circles share a deep and significant misreading of African politics.
By Graham Harrison
Wagner and its affiliates’ presence in Africa follows a faultline. Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Sudan, and Mali each possess a present or recent history of loss of sovereign territorial control to insurgencies, recent coups or unstable regime changes, and failed or troubled interventions from Western organisations. Wagner and associated projects also led by Yevgeny Prigozhin have trained African militaries and militias in counter-insurgency, served as private security for heads of state, directly carried out counter-insurgency, secured (and exploited) mineral resources, and provided spurious but legitimating observation of elections. In essence, Wagner has acted to privatise state security, fight ‘dirty’ wars outside of established liberal codes of combat, and produce propaganda for insecure incumbent regimes. Until the march towards Moscow, Wagner had worked in Africa with background support from the Russian government.
Western reportage on Wagner in Africa characterises it as an aberration, a globalisation of the Kremlin’s violent and venal cronyism. It is also characterised as a spoiler: a purposeful disrupter of African-Western partnerships dedicated to the building of liberal sovereignties through aid, peacebuilding, and policy advice. One can readily agree with the former characterisation. But the latter is based in a kind of ideational sleight-of-hand, one that has proven remarkably durable in official Western circles when the question what to do about Africa? comes into focus.
Liberalism and Western elites’ misreading of Africa
Commentary from Western governments, diplomatic cadres, and a good number of consultants share a deep and significant misreading of African politics. This is that African governments have not yet properly learned the best and/or right modes of rule. This misreading was initialised during decolonisation, a period in which decolonising powers discussed independence within a singular framing: are African elites ready for statehood? The corollary of this question was that postcolonial African politics was defined by its inabilities. Up to the present-day, various tropes concerning corruption, state failure, peacebuilding, development aid, policy-based lending, election monitoring, technical assistance, and good governance refresh this very Western anxiety.
This framing is unified by a liberal counterposition. If African politics is too corrupt, violent, inefficient etc., then the solutions should be sought within the codes of liberal governance: liberalised markets, strong enforcement of property rights, an open national economy, civil society, accountability and transparency, pluralistic and deliberative political processes often based in partnerships, and multi-party democracy.
Again and again, facets of this doctrine anchor Western commentators’ representation of African politics as undeveloped in some fashion or other. And this allocates African politics to a specific relation with Western agencies: paternal tutelage.
Real politics is about how you make the right kind of compromises and the right arrangements so that you arrive at a better system for your country, and I think… [Somalis]… are discovering that they can’t have everything that they want and that’s just a basic rule.
This was the European Union’s Special Representative to the Horn of Africa, commenting on the inauguration of Somali Parliament in 2012. Think about that. A foreign diplomat characterising a newly-constituted parliament in which members are supposedly just now discovering that politics is about choice of action under conditions of constraint. The infantilising implication that you can’t have everything you want, and that you have just now learned this.
Political excess: Africa’s political overdevelopment
Basil Davidson’s brief history of decolonisation and the sovereign state in Africa, The Black Man’s Burden, characterises the winning of independence as ‘a transfer of crisis’ and, as a general leitmotif, this seems apt. The struggle for statehood was deeply intertwined with colonial failure: the brief, violent, and extractive experience of colonialism meant that newly-sovereign ruling elites did not ‘attain state power’. Rather, independence meant gaining control of projects of state construction, projects that had been previously executed in highly traumatic fashion. For new ruling elites, decolonisation involved immediately facing major-order and even existential challenges concerning the exercise of authoritative rule over peoples.
African elites have struggled to manage what might be described not so much as an undeveloped politics but rather an excess of politics: a succession of strategic, social, and material difficulties that would overwhelm any cabal of EU policymakers, consultancies, or UN institutions. None of this is to excuse the sometimes abysmal failures and predations of many post-colonial elites. It is simply to say that the challenges of governing states that were a product of a highly traumatic colonisation, thrown into world-systems heavily overdetermined by the Cold War, and (from the early 1970s) defined by generalised economic instability set post-colonial governance in a condition of complex and urgent political strife. The core political resources of manoeuvrability, resilience, innovation, ideological bombast, patronage, accommodation, repression, conciliation, deception and hypocrisy, institution-building, and the seeking of legitimacy were ever-present and ever-pressing.
The more detailed one’s investigation into specific cases, the more apparent this political excess seems. The EU’s talking suit was profoundly wrong about Somalia for example. Somalia has faced complex and existential challenges from the late 1980s onwards: the balancing and changing of Cold War patrons, the creation of a national development strategy in a society over which the state had almost no institutional presence in some places, invasion by Ethiopia, the rise of a secessionist movement in the north, the emergence of clan-based autonomous political formations, the rise of a massive informal economy in which piracy, finance, and international trade in bananas and khat produced new conduits of power and wealth. Two massive military interventions, the second of which dissolved into a US-led war. The formation of an exile government; the constant negotiation with donors concerning Somalia’s post-conflict future. A successful secession, leading to the creation of a genuinely original form of national assembly that has largely maintained civic peace even in the absence of juridical recognition of its sovereignty. All this in sixty years.
What is most interesting for our purposes is why Western politicians and diplomats get African politics wrong. The key reason is that they all deploy the same simplified liberal paradigm as a way to make African politics legible. Discourse on Africa is strewn with fatuous advice about free and fair elections, decentralisation to bring government closer to the people, the benefits of economic liberalism as a hotbed for entrepreneurialism. And so on. This Liberalism 101 ostensiblyserves to render African politics as undeveloped but substantially what it reveals is the continued naiveté of Western observers who have repeatedly failed to generate even the minimal cognitive sophistication to recognise that African politics is, if anything overdeveloped: defined by an excess of politics.
We have the answers… what’s the question?
In a response to recent interest in Wagner’s presence in some African countries, the United Sates Institute of Peace (USIP) worries that America is losing its influence in Africa. It argues that the West needs to win back Africans from the illiberal influence of Russia. It needs to make its case, a case that is not as judgemental or tainted by colonialism as it used to be. In summary, its liberal case to win back Africa is:
Intensify diplomacy and dialogue with Sahel states […]
Work not just with governments, but with whole societies… Support and seek guidance from opposition, civic, religious and communal groups, women and youth leaders — and critically, the business sectors — on specific steps in each country to better meet populations’ needs through democratically elected governments.
Demonstrate to Sahel nations the opportunities to build their economies through the rule of law that invites domestic and foreign investment.
Dialogue, partnerships with civil society organisations, the market economy. This ‘re-evaluation’ (USIP’s phrase) of the Western case for Africa could have been written in the mid 1990s and it could have come from all kinds of UN, Bretton Woods, OECD, EU, bilateral government aid departments, or consultancies. It is in this sense an encapsulation of the rudimentary and unchanging nature of the Western liberal optic in relation to African politics. Yet, its iteration in this specific circumstance is perhaps revealing.
Tempting though the figurative might be, Wagner’s presence in some African countries is not virus-like. That implies that it is a morbid symptom, a dysfunction. Something that can be flushed out in order to return politics to order. Wagner is, rather, part of a repertoire of techniques of governance in the context of continuous and radical instability: of lived-in crisis. The fragmentation of territorial sovereignty, the use of the state as a resource-in-itself, the ‘extraversion’ of elite enrichment into tax havens and property held by family groups, the use of militaries as a mode of plunder, the contracting out of core government services to international actors through opaque resource deals, the ambiguous relationships between governments and criminal organisations… all of these things are what Africa’s post-colonial politics looks like in an age of crisis. The activities of Wagner in Africa are extreme but not exceptional.
The politics of lived-in crisis
Lived-in crisis has spread through many African states from the 1980s. Jane Guyer encapsulates the nature of lived-in crisis as follows: ‘existential precarity, moment-to-moment, and the long processes of a structure in crisis’ A day-to-day precarity locked into a secular precarity. Crisis and instability does not undermine normal politics; politics is crisis and instability.
It is instructive that international attention on Wagner in Africa emerges in the wake of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s march on Moscow. Perhaps Russia and many parts of Africa share something. In Adam Curtis’s documentary Hypernormalisation (2016), a representation is made that Russia’s shadow elite straddles many venues in which power is produced: business, government, military, intelligence, and media. And, the documentary suggests, these elites are not interested in any kind of ‘new normal’; it is a constant state of instability that allows them to flourish or perish. They are equipped to survive in the midst of permanent chaos. The exception is, for them, the norm. Multiple citizenship, multiple cliques of associates, hidden money and property. Ready to grab opportunities not as investments but as short-term enrichment.
This condition profoundly affects the nature of governance. Elites also have their shadow cliques, militias, secret international links. Often, an incumbent elite cannot know their future once they have left government. Elite politics in much of Africa requires a kind of super-charged Machiavellianism, a nimble fox, a smart thief, a flexitarian horizon watching. A political skill-set way more advanced than the stolid mechanics of many Western governments during the 1990s for example.
In 2000, Botswana’s President, Festus Mogae, said ‘We’re very proud of how dull our elections are. It proves that our democracy is working.’ Botswana’s politics is relatively boring and this is sign that the immense political work many other states have to undertake are largely absent. In many of its regional siblings—Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, and South Africa—politics is defined by major-order questions of political survival, the absence of successful nation-building, severe deficits in legitimacy, extreme volatility, insurgency, and unbalanced and recessionary economies.
In this context, some African countries share something else with Russia. Sam Kriss writes that: ‘Russia is the only country where old-fashioned events still take place, and those of us trapped outside Russia can barely see it.’ But Russia is not alone. This phenomenon is inscribed into many parts of Africa. The deep realities of politics—the project of nation-building, the establishing of uncontested authoritative power, the construction of institutions that secure a basic predictability to social life, the founding of a basic legitimacy claim that the state and its nation can aspire to a good polity—manifest themselves in many parts of Africa as partial and contested phenomena.
This is perhaps why Wagner is present in Russia and parts of Africa. It is a symptom of the fact that many states seek ways to enforce state power, eradicate armed opposition, deploy resources, and establish international networks that evade, shortcut, or refuse the liberal mantras that has proven over decades not up to the task.
Many African governments perform a dynamic and improvised hybridity, combining liberal, nationalist, and vernacular political strategies. Every national strategy and vision cohabits with clientelist manoeuvre, with considerations of territorial security, with venal ambitions to capture resources, with the secretive transnationality of wealth accrual. Private security is part of this hybridity, along with transnational corporations, tax havens, and shadow elite brokers and fixers.
Time to learn from Africa
In an age in which liberalism in Western political cultures seems severely weakened by populisms, integralisms, and deglobalisations, one has to wonder how long the West can keep its global Liberalism 101 going. This endless repetition of liberal desiderata—we have the answer now what’s the question?—now faces a disposition in much of Africa in which the political foundations of the national project are eroding, there is no liberal ‘new normal’ in view. Transnational nexus of violence, resource grab, trafficking, and privatising state patrimony leaves a prospective for Africa that liberalism is ill-equipped to make sense of.
Recognising this and seeking more troubling but more relevant political analysis is the first step that those who are interested might take if they are to respond to the thoroughly modern and sophisticated political of Africa. After all, one cannot assume that Africa might hold in its present some auguries of the West’s own future. It is striking how, after seventy years of expectation that the world economy would converge through economic growth in the Global South, it is global crisis that seems to drive convergence in all nations.
Graham Harrison teaches political economy at the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham University and is on the editorial board of ROAPE. His recent book Developmentalism: The Normative and Transformative within Capitalism is published by Oxford University Press.
Featured Photograph: Russian mercenaries on 25 May 2019 in the Central African Republic (Florence Maïguélé for CorbeauNews).
Continuing our discussion of Somaliland, Jamal Abdi argues that the country is an unrecognized state, operating in the shadows of international relations. The country has never been eligible for direct foreign aid. Abdi argues that the recent conflict is caused, in part, by lack of economic development in eastern Somaliland. As a result, the so-called international community bears considerable responsibility for the conflict.
By Jamal Abdi
Having unilaterally declared independence in 1991, Somaliland has functioned as a de-facto sovereign state for the past three decades. What makes Somaliland particularly interesting is that its post-war peace and state building trajectory is characterized by lack of external intervention in the political process. Differently put, groups that fought on opposing sides of a lengthy, bloody, and bitter civil war voluntary negotiated and, in this way, created peace, stability, democracy and forged an inclusive state from scratch with virtually no external assistance.
On 6 February, 2023, an armed conflict broke out in the city of Laascaanood, the administrative capital of Somaliland’s eastern Sool region. According to the government, Somaliland’s security forces are facing a mixture of misguided local residents, elements of Al-Shabab terrorists and militias from the semi-autonomous region of Puntland. Not surprisingly, the competing narrative is that Laascaanood is being defended by local residents who have taken arms up against a state whose legitimacy they now reject.
The precipitating cause of the conflict is that Cabdiftaax Cabdillahi Cabdi, a young and popular member of Somaliland’s main opposition party was gunned down on 26 December 2022. While the perpetrators are still at large, it appears sound to suggest that Somaliland was most likely not behind the assassination of Cabdi. The logic underpinning this assertion is straightforward: both Cabdi and many of those who have been assassinated before him in Laascaanood were pro-Somaliland. Therefore, it appears unlikely that Somaliland has systematically targeted those who were promoting the legitimacy of the state in a region where the imagining of Somaliland is limited.
Foreign aid fostering the conflict?
Commentators have suggested that the international community, through increasing engagement with Somaliland, has fostered the conflict in Laascaanood. We are, according to this line of reasoning, asked to believe that accelerating external engagement is turning the state into a lucrative source of income, causing internal competition for control of the state. As will be seen shortly, this line of reasoning is problematic for a multitude of reasons.
First, postponement of a general election, which was initially scheduled for November 2022, constitutes the sole evidence marshalled in defence of the contention that accelerating external engagement and foreign aid has led to internal competition for control of the state. It should be readily evident to anyone who has studied Somaliland seriously that all presidents since 1993 have had their term in office extended.
Before we can accept that postponement of the latest general election is indicative of internal competition for control of the state, caused by external engagement and foreign aid, one must explain what caused the postponement of previous elections. It is worth noting that the postponement of the latest general election was, as in previous cases, sanctioned by both Somaliland’s upper house of parliament and the supreme court, challenging the idea that it can be construed as an example of increasing authoritarian tendencies.
Second, as an unrecognized state, operating in the shadows of international relations, Somaliland has never been eligible for direct foreign aid. Furthermore, it is paramount to stress that the bulk of the funds that Somaliland receives, on paper, are often allocated to the salary of foreigners who do little more than occasionally deliver workshops on gender equality, good governance and the like.
According to the World Bank, Somaliland’s national budget increased threefold to about $130 million in the period between 2009 to 2012. The question must therefore be raised of why significant increase of the national budget in the past did not raise the stakes, leading to internal competition for control of the state?
A united Somaliland issued a communique to the United Nations in 1993, stressing that the organisation should keep it forces out of Somaliland and that Somaliland did not stand in need of external assistance in terms of reconciliation and peacebuilding. Representatives of all communities in Somaliland also stressed that they did not need the UN to offer food aid protection convoys as Somaliland was not receiving aid. By rejecting UN-led peace and reconciliation, social and political leaders in Somaliland also rejected foreign aid. It is indeed an empirically verifiable fact that Somaliland, at its darkest hour, recovering from a devastating civil war, rejected international assistance, including foreign aid.
Yet we are asked to believe that the influx of external money is currently destabilising Somaliland by turning the state into a lucrative source of income. The suggestion that international engagement, intended to stabilise Somaliland, has had destabilising consequences is an untenable contention, devoid of evidence.
The deep cause of the conflict
The deep cause of the conflict in Laascaanood is best grasped through the intersection of limited state capacity and lack of economic development in eastern Somaliland, eroding the legitimacy of the state. As a result, the so-called international community should recognize that it, indirectly, bears a part of the responsibility for the conflict in Laascaanood.
The treatment of Somaliland by the international community is deeply disappointing and raises doubts about the sincerity of the West in promoting so-called liberal values in the developing world. Somaliland has on its own achieved what the West claims to champion and is allegedly willing to wage wars for, e.g., democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
Yet, the so-called international community appears unwilling to grant Somaliland de jure recognition, thereby denying Somaliland access to global financial institutions. At the same time, Somaliland does not receive sufficient financial aid. In my opinion, the ongoing conflict in Laascaanood could have been avoided if Somaliland had been granted de jure recognition or had access to international funding bodies. A legally recognized Somaliland would be able to enhance the provision of public goods and services, thereby remedying the perceptions of marginalization in eastern Somaliland that have led to the questioning of the legitimacy of the state.
The recent developments in Somaliland should prompt the so-called international community to seriously reconsider its engagement with Somaliland and it is evident that more rather than less engagement is needed. The question of Somaliland’s political future must also be seriously considered. Disregarding the aspirations of most Somalilanders for independent statehood is simply unsustainable. Anyone who is intimately familiar with Somaliland, will know that voluntary reunification with Somalia is considered beyond the realm of plausibility by most Somalilanders.
Jamal Abdi holds a MSc in European and International Relations from Linkoping University. He is currently a PhD Candidate in Politics and International Relations at Keele University. Abdi’s research focuses on peace and state building in Somaliland.
Featured Photograph: An aerial photograph of Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital (8 April 2020).
ROAPE’s Hannah Cross writes that the UK government’s policy to deport asylum seekers to Rwanda has been ruled unlawful by the Court of Appeal. Asylum seekers, the court argued, risked being returned to their home country and could face inhumane treatment and persecution. Paul Kagame’s Rwanda, with the complicity of Western media and international financial institutions, has been presented as a successful developmental state, but in reality it is a place of systematic state brutality.
By Hannah Cross
A major contradiction of free market capitalism is that, for all its ‘imperfections’, it is supposed to end feudalism, creating free circulation in the labour market and bringing political equality to people ruled by an impartial market. Yet as it accelerates, these market relations can only hold with authoritarian state intervention, repression, and more imposition of feudal relations. Hence a government that has no interest in controlling the destructive profiteering of the private sector, while growing numbers of people lose access to the necessities of life, does all it can to elevate aristocratic rule, stimulate divisive nationalism, and intervene heavily in the movement of people.
The force of the UK governments fascist-inspired efforts to remove political freedoms has advanced with the force of economic chaos facing the majority. Recent developments suggest some of its efforts are failing, but it will fight on. The House of Lords, including Conservative peers (from the governing party), brought wrecking amendments to the illegal Migration Bill last week. These would require the government to abide by international human rights conventions, allow unaccompanied children to claim asylum, and stop potential victims of human trafficking from being detained or deported before their cases are heard. Further amendments passed on Monday concerning deportation, detention and processing limits for LGBTQ+ migrants, pregnant women and children, and asylum seekers in general.
Unlawful
The government’s policy to deport asylum seekers to Rwanda has been ruled unlawful by the Court of Appeal. After the High Court had ruled that Rwanda was a ‘safe third country’, this case brought by asylum seekers and Action Aid reversed the decision, finding that asylum seekers risked being returned to their home country and could face inhumane treatment and persecution. The Home Office itself, with the remit of enforcing the policy, has found it unworkable. This week, it reported that the plan would cost £169,000 per person, significantly higher than the cost of housing asylum seekers in the UK.
Lawyers at the Court of Appeal argued that the High Court showed ‘excessive deference’ to the Home Office leadership’s assurances that deportees would be protected. The material provided by the Rwandan authorities was lacking in credibility, with ‘blanket denials and clear contradictions.’ It is barely credible that the successive Home Secretaries leading the Rwanda policy are assured of the safety of the policy.
Last year, the Public and Commercial Services Union, which represents Home Office members, joined asylum seekers, Care4Calais and Detention Action in a case which prevented the deportation of eight asylum seekers and showed that Rwanda was an unsafe country, with the possibility of forced conscription for those sent there after fleeing war-torn countries. Home Secretary Priti Patel was found to have ignored the Foreign Office warning of human rights abuses.
Paul Kagame’s Rwanda, with the complicity of Western media and international financial institutions, has been presented as a successful developmental state, working with donors to achieve high development indicators. From 2015 onwards, researchers in ROAPE challenged this narrative and the claims of a ‘Green Revolution’ in which neoliberal agrarian modernisation had brought widespread benefits to the country’s rural populations. Some of the researchers had to publish anonymously for fear of reprisal by the state in Kigali, while the veracity of their data was followed up by a Financial Times investigation into the country’s poverty statistics. The terrible finding that there had been a true increase in poverty did not only damage the credibility of the state’s top-down developmentalism, but also of the World Bank, which endorsed its data, the IMF, and bilateral donors.
As for the politics of the regime, its bureaucratic state apparatus and spatial planning lends itself to the outsourcing of detention centres, while state violence has included the killing of refugees. An investigation last year found that a 13th Congolese refugee had been shot dead at the hands of state authorities, months after 12 protestors from the Kibiza camp were killed in 2018.
Human and economic cost
Suella Braverman, who praises the opportunities offered for asylum seekers entering Rwanda, is backed by Prime Minister Rishi Sunak as she fights back for her flagship policy. The fightback is built on further unsubstantiated claims and deceptions. The idea that the human and economic cost of the Rwanda plan is justified because it would deter channel crossings might have a twisted logic if France were a safe country for refugees and onward migration were a choice.
However, it is not: if asylum seekers are coming from countries outside Europe and are racially identified, they find themselves destitute and suffer physical violence, humiliation and the destruction of shelter, food, and water supplies by the French authorities.
Brexit opened up the possibility of asylum in the UK because the Dublin convention, which allows governments to return people to the European countries they have passed through, could no longer be enacted; thus, English-speaking refugees and those with potential connections to the country might have some chance here of finding safety, building a tolerable life and supporting their families, no matter how risky and hostile their reception.
This forced condition of migration exposes the emptiness of Braverman’s repeated suggestions that all the world would come to the UK if it could, so harsh penalties are necessary. Her argument shows an arrogance that ignores the ways that people are uprooted from their lives in specific circumstances, are torn from their families and struggle to find safety anywhere. Britain has a role in many of these upheavals, including in Sudan’s counter-revolution. Moreover, it has contributed significantly to Fortress Europe and its militarised borders, as well as to its failure to find a workable asylum policy, and this has created the conditions for irregular migration.
Lies and more lies
Because most migration is not by choice, the closure of legal and safe routes does not deter people or fundamentally reduce numbers. It makes the journey unsafe and kills people. This is borne out by the terror that the Rwanda policy announcement brought to refugees in Calais in early June 2022, yet the channel crossings increased in the summer and have continued in their thousands this year, with Afghans becoming the largest nationality.
Nor are there any grounds to the repeated claims that the Rwanda policy would be ‘the will of the people’: this government and its new programme is not even elected by the people. And one further lie, that the Labour Party – the country’s main opposition party – has been particularly complicit in, is that the fight against ‘illegal immigration’ is a fight against the traffickers and smugglers, when in reality it is migrants and their dependants who suffer the brunt of it, and smugglers are often in a similar situation. Considering the layers of deception on which the policy flounders, it is remarkable that an opposition party led by a barrister has done little more than mock the failure of the policy to reject the people arriving in boats.
If government’s appeal for the Rwanda policy succeeds, the main victory for the Tories will be that they are no longer restrained by international law or a functioning democratic state in its narrowest sense, and this will embolden their suppression of any threats to their survival, domestic and international. The decisions of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords, and Home Office scrutiny, might give the sense of having the ‘good governance’ and democracy that British policymakers claim to offer the Global South.
However, the terrible conditions of indefinite detention that asylum seekers face and the failure to protect children, the ‘unfree’ labour that British production relies on, and the prosecution of dissenters, all coexist with military and economic imperialism in parts of Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere. The Rwanda policy would be a further step to an illiberalism that is already deeply embedded in the state and most evident in its external relations. We can find surprising alliances in its resistance and must retain the internationalist class perspective in the first instance.
Featured Photograph: Activists in London participating in a protest against racism, holding a Care4Calais banner, an organisation which provides essential basics and legal support for asylum seekers in Belgium, France and the UK (19 March 2022).
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