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The Legacy of the Past on Ethiopia’s Modern Political Life

The legacy of the past weighs heavily on Ethiopia’s modern political life and is frequently manifested in crises that topple regimes and threaten the state’s survival. ROAPE’s John Markakis seeks to fathom the reasons for the repeated failure to resolve them. In this blogpost he highlights the root causes that need to be confronted if meaningful reform is to be achieved.

By John Markakis

Ethiopian historiography has long featured a claim to exceptionalism based on the country’s many distinctive features: a state whose roots go back to antiquity, a literate culture, the only place in Africa where Christianity survived as a native faith and a surplus producing agricultural economy that sustained a sophisticated class stratified society. Not least is the unique confrontation with European imperialism in the nineteenth century, following which the legendary Christian state on the northern plateau, also known abroad as Abyssinia, went on to build its own empire in the Horn of Africa, doubling its size and population in the process.

The self-proclaimed Ethiopian Empire was founded the same time Western imperialism occupied Africa, and with the same goal: access to and exploitation of material resources. In Ethiopia’s case the coveted resource was fertile land needed to relieve population pressure on the exhausted soils of the northern plateau. Accordingly, most of the productive land in the conquered territories was expropriated and given to land hungry northerners who flocked there. Land without labour to work it is useless, and this was forcibly extracted from the natives, turning them into serfs trapped in a quasi-feudal system of landholding. This proved a fateful development. While Abyssinian society was largely culturally homogeneous, the Ethiopian empire was highly heterogeneous, and the massive expropriation of land forged a nexus of class and ethnic contradictions, whose explosive repercussions have marred the country’s political life ever since.

Ethiopian historiography glosses over what is plausibly its most distinctive feature, the fact that the Ethiopian Empire did not dissolve in the past century when all its contemporaries in Africa did, to allow the subjugated population of the annexed regions to determine their own political future. Instead, much earlier, Ethiopia’s Abyssinian rulers had launched a nation-building project intended to create a homogeneous society out of its multi-cultural population. The chosen template for the envisaged nation was none other than the Abyssinian culture, and the goal was the assimilation of the non-Abyssinian population.

This policy greatly reinforced the destabilizing potential of the class/ethnicity nexus, that was immediately manifested in militant resistance on the part of those threatened with cultural deracination. To overcome it required a highly centralized authoritarian system of rule based on force provided by a bloated military and security apparatus, the largest at the time in sub-Saharan Africa. Employed primarily to suppress internal political opposition, the soldiers inevitably became highly politicized and inclined to intervene in public affairs.

The legacy of the past weighs heavily on Ethiopia’s modern political life, and is periodically manifested in crises that topple regimes and threaten the state’s survival.  All of them sprung from the same unresolved issues, all led to frantic attempts to find solutions to age-old problems, and all failed miserably. The latest episode has been unfolding with agonizing slowness since 2018 and its resolution is nowhere yet in sight. I have personally witnessed three such episodes in my professional association with Ethiopia spanning five decades. As a historian, I’ve sought to fathom the issues that caused such crises and the reasons for the repeated failure to resolve them. Below I highlight four root causes that need to be confronted if meaningful reform is to be achieved: the ownership and control of land, ethnic conflict, the structure of the state, and the design of its political system.

Ownership and control of land

Land is Ethiopia’s most valuable resource, as well as the fundamental, perennial cause of conflict throughout its modern history. Control of land is of vital concern to those who live off agriculture; at present about three quarter of the population. Control of land is also of vital concern to the state, partly as a source of revenue, but mainly as the means of exercising control over the rural masses. Every Ethiopian regime in the past used a different approach to maintain such control; from the quasi-feudal arrangement of the imperial regime that collapsed in 1975, and the nationalization-cum-collectivization of the military junta known as the Dergue (1975-1991), to the ‘developmental state’ of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the rebel movement that seized power in 1991 and commenced to implode in 2018.

Every regime in the past also had a different policy for economic development based on agriculture. Before its collapse, the imperial regime was moving towards a free market system; the Dergue nationalized all land, abolished landholding and promoted collectivization; while keeping land under state control, the EPRDF initially tried to modernize small scale production then, having failed, switched to large scale commercial agriculture based on imported capital and technology. These schemes, along with the funds to implement them, came as packages from abroad with scarcely any indigenous input. The ‘once size fits all’ package model ignored Ethiopia’s highly varied physical environment. Crucially, they were imposed without prior consultation with the peasantry, whose life was repeatedly turned upside down with quixotic schemes such as collectivization, villagisation, population resettlement, agriculturally-led-industrialization, and land leasing for plantation farming.

Unsurprisingly, all failed miserably. Failure was variously attributed to financial, environmental, or technical problems, as well as the alleged ignorance and resistance to change of the Ethiopian peasant. Indeed, peasant passive resistance, a weapon honed over centuries of oppression and exploitation, was widely manifested in non-cooperation, delay, subversion, and sabotage that helped undermine and thwart these schemes.

Given the technology of the time and the administrative limitations of the imperial state, the scorched lowlands surrounding the plateau were considered uncultivable and were spared the expropriation visited on the southern plateau. That omission is being corrected now with a vengeance. Imported technology and capital are turning the neglected lowlands into a promised land for the country’s development. Vast tracts of land are declared vacant and offered for exploitation to foreign and domestic capital. Huge state investment in hydroelectric projects provides irrigation. The hapless people who live there are displaced without compensation, and crammed into ‘villages’ without any means of earning a livelihood. The ultimate cruelty is the promise of work in the plantations, when the much claimed advantage of large commercial agriculture is its dependence on capital intensive technology.

Is the long-suffering Ethiopian peasantry ever to have a share in the decision making that controls their livelihood? Will the current political ferment produce a solution? Not likely. The faction that has risen to power from the wreckage of the EPRD gained early popularity with a commitment to far reaching reform in all spheres of public life. Its charismatic leader, Abiy Ahmed, a former army officer, became the focus of great expectations stimulated by bold initiatives at home, and was celebrated abroad with the Nobel Peace Prize for making peace with Eritrea. With a family lineage that crosses ethnic and religious lines, he is a member of the Evangelical community and has surrounded himself with advisers of the same background. Unsurprisingly, the regime has abandoned the ‘state led development’ model of the EPRDF – which claimed record rates of growth and equally spectacular growth in corruption and social inequality – putting its faith in capitalism and the free market. Without the benefit of public consultation, let alone assent, it has started auctioning state assets; even the highly profitable Ethiopian Airlines is on the block. Land privatization appears inevitable. Is the goal, one wonders, to throw the peasantry to the mercy of the free market, and turn food producers into food consumers and urban proletarians; a source of dirt cheap labour?

Ethnic conflict

Land is purely a class issue: control over the means of production. Confronted as such, it could transform the political equation by uniting the rural masses to protect their common interests. This has not happened in Ethiopia, because the land issue is invariably perceived though the ethnic filter an issue that divides and neutralizes the peasants. Nationality in itself is not a problem. As the Nigerian scholar, Claude Ake, put it, asking an African why he belongs to an ethnic group is like asking him why he has five fingers. What is more natural? Ethnicity is the template upon which African society is organized – its economy, society, polity and culture – and has been for ages. It provides a framework for identity and solidarity, as well as economic, social and political organization. Neither colonialism nor independence has provided an alternative. Instead, as Basil Davidson (1992) presciently wrote, the attempt to supplant ethnicity with the nation-state state proved ‘a curse and a burden for the black man.’

The ‘nation state’ became the idol of the westernized, African urban elite, a minuscule minority that inherited state power with independence. The quest of ‘nation-state building’, an imported Western concept and the Holy Grail of modernization, was launched with an unrelenting campaign to cleanse black Africa from the blight of ‘tribalism’. There were mundane reasons, other than modernity, for turning ‘tribalism’ into a social evil and a political crime. It was to undermine surviving traditional authority structures and neutralize political opposition from customary leaders. Africa’s kings, sultans, paramount chiefs, lawmakers, religious leaders, diviners and medicine men were the targets of a campaign that proved initially successful. Thus, ethnicity became a problem. Nevertheless, this hardly affected the currency of ‘tribalism’ since it became the political capital of the ruling elite themselves and remains the most potent force in political life throughout the subcontinent.

The state

The politicization of ethnicity in Ethiopia was planted by the imperial regime and was greatly reinforced subsequently by the persisting attempt to impose a national identity on the many ethnic communities – over eighty in number – that live within the country’s borders. The attempt failed, but not before it contributed to the collapse of the imperial and military regimes. By the end of this tumultuous period, every self-respecting ethnic group in Ethiopia had its own ‘national liberation front’, and the state was on the verge of collapse. State structural reform was imperative.

Itself a coalition of ‘national liberation fronts’, the EPRDF moved boldly to resolve the problem by accepting diversity, rehabilitating ethnicity, abandoning the quest for a homogeneous national identity, and restructuring the state in order to unravel the class/ethnicity knot. It chose federalism as the model. This was nothing new. Federalism has a long history in the Horn, where it has been the staple political demand of subordinate groups in every state of the region. It appeared first in the 1950s in the form of the ill-fated Eritrea-Ethiopia link, and subsequently in Kenya, Sudan and Somalia.

Has federalism served the purpose? In fact, it failed everywhere, and was followed by the longest wars in Africa (fought in the Horn, and the breakaway of Eritrea from Ethiopia, South Sudan from Sudan and Somaliland from Somalia. Federalism failed because it was used as a political ploy; nowhere did it provide a share of state power to those who demanded it. The EPRDF delegated administrative responsibility to the regional states, without even the illusion of decision making power. The center’s exclusive control of power remained intact; a lopsided relationship that made a mockery of the very essence of federalism. EPRDF’s brand of federalism was a perfect example of what J.C. Scott (1998) called ‘seeing like a state’; the pursuit of modernity through uniformity, standardization, regimentation, monitoring and policing of the population. Since presumably federalism is designed to accommodate diversity, the ‘one size fits all’ model of how the state ‘sees things’, turns the concept into an oxymoron. EPRDF’s manipulation of federalism satisfied no one.

Worse yet, it fuelled ethnic clashes in various parts of the country, which are now a graver threat to the state’s survival than ever before, raising the issue of state structure reform to the top of the political agenda, now the subject of an ongoing passionate debate in Ethiopia; with diametrically opposed views firmly held. The focus is on the balance of power between the centre and the regions, with the spokesmen of the subordinate ethnic groups demanding a drastic reversal in favour of the regions, while the spokesmen of the formerly dominant, largely Abyssinian, regions demand the opposite, allegedly in order to secure the survival of the state.

The need for federalism to reflect diversity, the very reason for its existence, is not on the agenda. Yet it is imperative to ask why Ethiopia’s immensely rich and colourful patrimony should be sacrificed on the altar of modernism. Why should every part of the federation have an identical profile to cleanse it of ‘tribalism’? Why should customary rules, familiar and preferable to the people, not be used along with national law? Why can traditional authority systems – Gaada in Oromia, the Sultanate of Aussa in Afar, the Anyawa kings in Gambela, the Somali clan chiefs, and many other institutions – that command popular respect not be integrated meaningfully in local government.

The political system

Because it incorporates all the rest, and will determine how they will be addressed, the design of the political system is the mother of all issues. Political system reform is part of regime change, however, the present crisis has not produced definitive change yet. This offers a rare opportunity to reflect and debate and hopefully agree on how to shake off the legacy of the past and move forward to cross the uncharted ‘political frontier’ (Markakis, 2011).

Every crisis in the past produced a leader – Menelik, Haile Selassie, Mengistu, Meles – a messiah upon who hopes for liberating reform were focused. Each of them in turn forged a rigidly authoritarian personalized regime based on force, betraying all hopes. The current crisis has produced an aspiring messiah also in the person of Abiy Ahmed. Does that imply Ethiopia is ungovernable otherwise? Of course not, people say. Elections have been scheduled for August 2020 to introduce democracy.

Even though they have a woeful history in Africa, elections still inspire a pathetic faith. They were introduced in Ethiopia in the 1950s by the imperial regime, and have been staged more or less regularly under its successors with various brand names – imperial democracy, peoples’ democracy, popular democracy. The popular brand currently is liberal democracy which has its own history in Africa, where it functions as a façade for all types of misrule: keeping political scientists in business classifying types of ‘hybrid democracy’.

Liberal democracy is the opium of the westernized elite, the urban minority that rules Africa. ‘The debate on democracy among African scholars is threatening to become an unabashed celebration of liberalism’ noted the Tanzanian scholar, Issa Shivji (1991) ‘This is where the first pitfall of the debate on democracy lies. So long as it remains imprisoned within the four walls of liberalism, I dare say, The Debate has not begun – it may be a Diversion but not a Debate.’ Reduced to its institutional minimum of periodic elections, liberal democracy is not a representative system. It is a reliable tool of minority rule that excludes the rural masses, entertaining them periodically with theatrical performances called elections. Elections in Africa are not taken seriously by anyone, even democracy’s fervent promoters from the West. Witness the praise heaped on the ‘democratically elected government’ of Ethiopia by Barak Obama following the 2015 elections, which the regime ‘won’ by 100 percent of the vote.

Is this farce to be repeated in 2020 as planned? Predicted to involve over 100 political factions, nearly all of them ethnically based, can it rationally be expected to accomplish anything other than to inflate tribalism, the political capital traded by the ethnic entrepreneurs now queuing up to register for the elections. Cannot the long suffering Ethiopians not look inward to devise systems and institutions that have roots in their country’s soil, to serve its entire people, in the cities and the villages, the highlands and the lowlands, recognizing and respecting their cultural differences?

This task cannot be left to the ruling elite. Their training has deprived this class of the ability to think independently, outside the box imposed by the modernity dogma, and to relate empathetically with the rural masses, the overwhelming majority of the population they seek to ‘modernize.’ What has been called the ‘decolonization of the mind’ is imperative for the production of solutions based on Ethiopia’s reality – history, culture, custom, traditional systems of authority, rulemaking and conflict resolution. This is not to reject universal values that are the inheritance of all humankind. It is to ‘naturalize’ them by adapting and integrating them into the native patrimony. An ‘African solution’ the Ugandan scholar Mahmoud Mamdani explains is a ‘contextual’ solution: ‘Context is not opposite to universal value or standards. Context is an understanding that any concrete situation is an outcome of multiple processes; historical, political, economic, social, moral and so on’.

John Markakis is Emeritus Professor of History at the University of Crete, he has published numerous books and articles on Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa and the whole continent. John is a member of ROAPE’s International Advisory Board.

This blogpost is based on John Markakis’ keynote address delivered to the Oromo Studies Association Conference, 30 July 2019, Addis Ababa.

Featured Photograph: View of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital (12 January, 2015)

References

Davidson, Basil (1992) The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State New York: Times Books

Shivji, Issa (1991) ‘The Democracy Debate in Africa’ Review of African Political Economy Vol. 18/ Issue 50

Markakis, John (2011) Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers James Currey

Scott, J.C. (1990). Seeing Like a State Yale University Press

Dimitri Tsafendas – Exposing a Great Lie in South African History

In the South African House of Assembly, on 6 September 1966, Dimitri Tsafendas knifed to death Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd. Shortly after, Tsafendas was declared to be a schizophrenic who had no political motive for assassinating Verwoerd. Declared unfit to stand trial, Tsafendas went down in the history books as a deranged murderer. Harris Dousemetzis exposes one of the great lies in South African history and shows that Tsafendas was an extraordinary man, with deeply held communist and anti-racist politics.

By Harris Dousemetzis

It was the 6 September 1966, when Hendrik Verwoerd, South Africa’s Prime Minister, known as the ‘architect of apartheid’, was stabbed to death by Dimitri Tsafendas, a parliamentary messenger, inside the House of Assembly in Cape Town. Tsafendas had originally intended to assassinate Verwoerd with a gun and then shoot his way to freedom; but, unable to procure a firearm and with his term of employment at the Parliament almost at an end, he decided to stab him instead.[1] Even though this left him with no escape plan, he still felt that, since he had the opportunity, it was his duty to carry out the killing. As he put it:

Every day, you see a man you know committing a very serious crime for which millions of people suffer. You cannot take him to court or report him to the police, because he is the law in the country. Would you remain silent and let him continue with his crime, or would you do something to stop him? [2]

To Tsafendas, Verwoerd was the ‘brains behind apartheid’, without whom the system might well fall apart. He was a ‘tyrant’, ‘a dictator who oppressed his people’ and ‘Hitler’s best student’ as he had imposed some of the Nazi Nuremberg Laws on Blacks in South African. This was how Tsafendas routinely described Verwoerd. Yet even before they had questioned Tsafendas, the South African authorities announced that the assassination had been the work of a madman with no political motive.[3]

During his first two days in detention, Tsafendas was intensively questioned by the notorious General Hendrik van den Bergh,[4] the chief of the investigation,[5] who later stated that ‘no person in South African history has ever been interrogated as much as Demitrios Tsafendas.’[6] Van den Bergh’s friend and Minister of Police at the time John Vorster, who became Prime Minister of South Africa after Verwoerd’s death, said of him that ‘if a man does not break after 48 hours of van den Bergh’s questioning, then you know that he does not know a thing.’[7]

Under questioning, Tsafendas made coherent statements explaining that he had committed his act in the hope that after Verwoerd’s ‘disappearance’ ‘a change of policy would take place’.[8] He added that, ‘I wanted to see a government representing all the South African people. I do not think the Nationalist Government is representative of the people and I wanted to see a different government … I did not care about the consequences, for what would happen to me afterwards. I didn’t care much and didn’t give it a second thought that I would be caught. I was so disgusted with the racial policy that I went through with my plans to kill the prime minister.’[9]

According to South African anti-apartheid lawyer George Bizos, Tsafendas’s statement meets ‘the definition of a political act’, showing that he was ‘a politically minded person and activist who opposed apartheid and colonialism. He clearly killed Verwoerd with the hope that apartheid would collapse without him.’[10] John Dugard agrees, the statement ‘confirms the view that Tsafendas was not insane. It reads like a very normal story of a politically informed person, angry with apartheid and Dr Verwoerd, determined to make a change, with nothing to lose personally. Really an incredible statement which was carefully concealed.’[11] Denis Goldberg, Rivonia trialist and anti-apartheid activist, believes that Tsafendas’s statement ‘clearly shows that he was politically motivated and not insane … the man is determined to kill the Prime Minister because of the racism … [Tsafendas] has a clear political opinion about racism.’[12]

Tsafendas also related to his interrogators his long history of political activism, from his membership of the South African Communist Party (SACP) between 1936 to 1942 to his time in London in the early 1960s, when he had attended meetings of the Committee of African Organizations and had held ‘the posters up’ at ‘anti-colonial’, ’anti-apartheid’ and ‘anti-racial’ meetings. In short, he was anti-racist, ‘anti-colonial, against slavery and in favour of all colonies which were controlled by Belgium, France and Portugal to be afforded self-government’.[13]

Tsafendas was subjected to the torture which, according to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, ‘was the dominant form of violation by the apartheid police during the 1960s.’[14] This included all the standard techniques of the apartheid police. He was placed in a cell without a bed, forcing him to lie on the concrete floor, often naked and in handcuffs. He received daily electric shots, was beaten and kicked still more frequently, and had his head placed in a plastic bag while water was poured over him to simulate suffocation. After the first week, things became steadily worse, as a new almost-daily ritual was introduced in which he would be blindfolded and his hands tied up, and would then be taken to another room while the policemen shouted: ‘Now, you bastard, now your time has come.’ They would place him on a chair with his neck in a noose, ask him for his last wish, and remove the chair, leaving him hanging for a few seconds. The policemen would then allow him to fall, explaining that it was not his time yet, but even so he would not get out of there alive.[15]

The Police Investigation

When the police began a detailed investigation into Tsafendas’s personal history, they found – no doubt to their great consternation – that his statements had been entirely accurate. In fact, he was such a dedicated activist that the South African authorities had four files on him.[16] Not only had he formerly been in the South African Communist Party (SACP); he had been banned from entering South Africa due to his Communist and anti-colonialist beliefs and activities in Mozambique in the 1930s, and those activities had also caused him to be thrown out of Mozambique and exiled for twelve years.[17] In 1936 in Mozambique, he had been fired from his job ‘owing to his Communist leanings’ and had been under suspicion for ‘disseminating Communistic propaganda’.[18] He had been arrested in Mozambique on several occasions for communist and anti-Portuguese activities; for example on 16 November 1964 on the charge of ‘making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses’, after which he had spent three months in custody.[19] The Mozambican press had reported that Tsafendas was ‘violently anti-Portuguese.’[20] In South Africa from 1939 to 1942, he had ‘engaged actively in Communistic propa­ganda’.[21] Elsewhere, he had fought on the Communist side in the Greek Civil War of 1947–49, and in London he been a close associate and assistant of the ANC’s local representative, Tennyson Makiwane.[22]

Witness testimony from several sources further confirmed the picture of a violently anti-apartheid figure with deep political commitments. Edward Furness, a South African who had met Tsafendas in London, stated that he ‘was willing to do anything that would get the South African regime out of power’, including ‘civil disobedience’ ‘to create a resistance to the regime of South Africa’.[23]  According to Kenneth Ross, his landlord in Durban in 1965, Tsafendas ‘was very fond of discussing politics and gave me the opinion that he was well versed in politics. Tsafendas objected to the Communists being banished to Robin Island [sic] because of their political opinions and actions. In general, Tsafendas opposed to every decision taken by the South African Government and freely voiced his opinion to me. He was blatantly opposed to the National Party policy, the policy of the present Government, and was definitely pro-Russian.’[24] Finally, at least six witnesses said that three days before the assassination, Tsafendas had argued that it would be ‘justifiable’ to kill Verwoerd, since he was ‘a dictator and a tyrant who was oppressing his people.’[25] Just over a year before the killing, two men had informed on him to the police, describing him as a political agitator; a ‘Communist and a dangerous person;’ in fact, ‘the biggest communist in the Republic of South Africa.’[26] Colonel van Wyk of the South African Police was sent to Mozambique and Rhodesia to look into Tsafendas’s past; in his report, he described him as ‘intensely anti-white.’[27] The Commission of Enquiry into Verwoerd’s death also uncovered the fact that while living in London, Tsafendas had attempted to ‘recruit people to take part in an up­rising in South Africa.’[28]

One of van den Bergh’s first acts after the assassination had been to contact PIDE, the Portuguese security police, to ask them for their intelligence on Tsafendas. This prompted PIDE’s Chief Inspector in Lisbon to send a top-secret telegram to the force’s Sub-Director in Mozambique, ordering that any ‘information indicating Tsafendas as a partisan for the independence of your country should not be transmitted to the South African authorities, despite the relations that exist between your delegation and the South African Police’.[29] Instead, they should send a report included with the telegram, in which some of Tsafendas’s political acts were minimised or even left out. PIDE falsely claimed to have no file on him; in fact, their file (No. 10,415) dated back to 1938, when Tsafendas was just 20, and stretched to around 130 pages. Its first entry was made when he was ‘suspected of distributing communist propaganda’ in Mozambique.[30] Although PIDE held back some of their information, they did confirm that Tsafendas was ‘in favour of the independence of Mocambique.’[31] They could not avoid acknowledging this as his beliefs and activities were well known to his friends and acquaintances, and the Mozambican media had reported his 1964 arrest.

With all this information, together with Tsafendas’s own statements, the South African authorities – and especially van den Bergh and Vorster – must have been worried. Therefore van den Burgh set out to conceal everything the police had discovered, except for the small amount of intelligence that either was already publicly known or supported the picture that the government was trying to paint: an apolitical madman who had stabbed Verwoerd out of pure insanity. This cover-up continued throughout Tsafendas’s summary trial and the Commission of Enquiry that followed it. As Advocate George Bizos states:

The police at the time would have never allowed it to become known that Tsafendas was a politically minded person who had killed Verwoerd for political reasons; if this had happened, Tsafendas would have instantly become a hero of the anti-apartheid movement. Then, a trial of a politically minded person like Tsafendas, just like the Rivonia, would have put apartheid in the dock … it would have also been hugely embarrassing for the police to admit that a dedicated Communist with such a long history of political activism had managed to penetrate what was alleged to be a top security system … Communism was at the time the monster in South Africa, the Number One enemy, and the killing of Verwoerd by a Communist would have been a major blow to the prestige of the regime, but also a big victory for Communism. Verwoerd at the time was adored and accepted by most Whites in this country and the thought that someone had killed him because he disagreed with his policies would have shattered such an image.[32]

John Dugard stated:

The apartheid regime had two reasons for portraying Tsafendas to be insane. First, the regime wished to suggest that no one in his right mind could kill such a wonderful leader as Hendrik Verwoerd. Secondly, there was the security aspect. The security apparatus, led by the Minister of Justice and Police, John Vorster, wished to avoid accountability for allowing a political revolutionary to be employed in a position close to the Prime Minister. So it was that the media and the legal proceedings were manipulated to present Tsafendas as a mentally deranged person dictated to by a tapeworm.[33]

Tsafendas’s Life up to 1966

Tsafendas’s parents were Michalis Tsafantakis, a Greek marine engineer, and Amelia Williams,[34] his Mozambican servant from the Shangaan tribe.[35] Michalis’s family was of Cretan origin and was known for producing rebel fighters against the Ottoman occupying forces. Michalis was named after a particularly famous rebel – his uncle, Captain Michalis Tsafantakis – and he himself had become a committed anarchist while studying in Italy.[36]  His son was born on 14 January 1918 in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) in Mozambique, and was named Dimitris after his grandfather, Captain Dimitris Tsafantakis, another renowned anti-Ottoman fighter.

Tsafendas was born into a strongly political milieu: his father had held onto his anarchist beliefs and retained links with European anarchist movements. Intending his son to become ‘a conscious citizen’ and ‘a useful member of the society’, he frequently discussed politics and history with him. Tsafendas was soon attracted to anarchist ideas, and especially to the ‘propaganda of the deed’ (meaning violent actions such as bombings and assassinations). He was influenced by Luigi Galleani,[37] who argued that violence was a legitimate tool against tyranny and oppression.[38]

While still a teenager, Tsafendas was sacked from his job at the Chai et Kiosk for ‘voicing Communist ideas.’ Soon afterwards he travelled to South Africa with the sole intention of joining the SACP.[39] In 1938, a change to Portuguese government rules, intended to protect the domestic textile industry against competition from the colonies, caused economic troubles in Mozambique. Tsafendas was active in the campaign against the new rules, making speeches and handing out copies of the Communist Manifesto among cotton growers and his colleagues at the Imperial Airways factory.[40] This caused PIDE agents to place him on their watch list: they opened a file titled Secret Criminal Record nº 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis.[41] By this time, Tsafendas had already become known as ‘The Red’ to other members of the Greek community; he had taken to wearing a red rose or carnation on his lapel, and would sometimes write Communist or anti-colonial graffiti.[42] According to a 1961 PIDE report, while ‘residing in that Province [Mozambique], he was twice a suspect of Communist activities, but evidence of such activities was never found.’[43]

Tsafendas’s family had moved away from South Africa in 1938. The following year, after a visa application failed due to his status as a ‘half-caste’ with ‘Communist leanings,’ ‘suspected of dissemination of Communistic propaganda’,[44] he illegally entered the country. While there, he was placed under surveillance for being ‘engaged actively in Communistic propaganda.’[45] The tipoff to the police came from the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs, who stated that ‘the above information is passed to you in order that the activities of Tsafendas may be watched, and I will be glad if you will advise me in due course should anything to his detriment become known.’[46]

After leaving South Africa in 1942, Tsafendas moved to the USA, where he spent much of World War II serving in Liberty Ships [mass produced cargo ships built in the United States to replace ships lost during the war].[47] In October 1947, he was deported to Greece, which  was in the middle of a bloody Civil War, and he joined the Communists who were battling against the Royalists. However, by the spring of 1949, with the Communists obviously heading for defeat and large-scale reprisals already under way, it was time for him to move on.

On 8 November 1949, Tsafendas was detained at Barca d’Alva on the Portuguese border and held there for three months by officials who suspected him of being a Greek Communist fleeing the post-Civil War persecutions; they did not trust his Greek Red Cross passport, nor his protestations that he was Portuguese.[48] The Mozambican police confirmed his nationality, but also confirmed that he was indeed a Communist.[49] After being moved from Barca d’Alva, he spent a further six months in Lisbon’s Aljuba Prison, an infamous interrogation centre for political prisoners.[50]

Tsafendas was released in late 1951 and immediately attempted to return to the country of his birth. However, he was denied entry as he was still on the authorities’ list of known Communists and anti-colonialists due to his pre-war activities, and was accordingly detained for a fortnight in Lourenço Marques before being deported to Lisbon.[51] The Mozambican police informed their colleagues in Portugal that he was a ‘Communist’ suspected of ‘unclear activities’ in the 1930s; he was therefore arrested on his return to Lisbon, to be questioned on these ‘unclear activities’, his involvement in the Greek Civil War and his present political beliefs. He was sent to another of PIDE’s detention facilities, Cascais (Caxias) Fort, where he was subjected to torture that included beatings and electric shocks.[52]

Upon his release, he remained under PIDE surveillance, including ID checks and house searches.[53] For the next decade, he kept applying for permission to return to Mozambique, but was always refused. He therefore began searching for a safer country to reside in. In 1954–55, he travelled to Denmark, Sweden and West Germany, returning to the latter country in 1958–59. He also made two trips to England, in 1959 and 1962, partly due to a wish to participate in the anti-apartheid movement. He attended lectures and speeches and took part in demonstrations, once carrying a placard which depicted Dr Verwoerd as a member of the Ku Klux Klan. He also joined fellow activists in street fights with members of the fascist, pro-apartheid Union Movement run by Oswald Moseley.[54] However, he was to leave London disillusioned after failing to convince other campaigners of the need for armed resistance against apartheid.[55]

Back in Portugal, Tsafendas broke his links with other radicals and took to publicly condemning Communism and expressing support for the Salazar regime, all in an effort to convince the authorities that he ‘a reformed man’ who no longer believed in independence for Mozambique, so that they would give him amnesty. His efforts bore fruit to the extent that he was given an amnesty, returning to Mozambique in October 1963.[56]

However, by this time, his family were living in South Africa and he was banned from entering this country too. Nevertheless, his family was able to convince a passport control official at the consulate in Lourenço Marques to issue him a temporary visa, and he entered the country on 4 November 1963.[57] He tried to convince his old comrades to join him in violent action against apartheid, but had no more success than he had had in London. Around six months later, he was back in Mozambique, where there was now an armed independence struggle taking place, with the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) fighting against the Portuguese colonialists. Being overweight and a slow mover Tsafendas knew he would be a liability in a guerrilla war.[58] He knew though that there were other ways for him to contribute. He moved to the Beira area and gained employment with the Hume Pipe Company, which laid and operated a petrol pipeline between Mozambique and Rhodesia. His aim was to learn about the company’s operations, with the eventual intention of blowing up the pipeline.[59] He also took on the role of a travelling agitator, roaming the region with a suitcase full of political tracts in an attempt to persuade the inhabitants to support Communism and join FRELIMO’s anti-colonialist struggle.[60]

PIDE learned of what Tsafendas was doing and caught up with him on 16 November 1964 as he was stirring up revolution in the small town of Maforga, five miles from Gondola. He was arrested for possessing ‘subversive’ literature and ‘making subversive propaganda against the Portuguese government and spreading subversive propaganda among the native masses’, and brought to Beira’s police substation to be questioned. Tsafendas’s story was that he was a Christian preacher, not an anti-colonial campaigner; this merely resulted in his being further accused of posing as a missionary and speaking ‘under the guise of religion in favour of Mozambique’s independence.’[61] Tsafendas denied this, but conceded that he did believe in independence, explaining that he thought Mozambique should be ‘governed by the natives of that Province, whether they are black or white’, rather than by Portugal.[62] In the opinion of the officer in charge of the cells, Inspector Horacio Ferreira, Tsafendas was ‘intensely anti-white’ and believed that ‘the Portuguese Government has never done anything for its non-whites.’ He also thought him a ‘normal’ and ‘very intelligent person.’[63]

The charges were serious, so Tsafendas was sent to the Sub-Delegation of PIDE in Beira. Having being held for two months for posing as a missionary, Tsafendas started claiming to be the ultimate missionary: St Peter, apostle of Christ.[64] Concluding that he was insane, PIDE initially transferred him to the Government Hospital in Beira, before deciding to release him on 19 January 1965, on the grounds that he was unfit to stand trial ‘at a juridical or penal level’.[65] Once he learned of this, Tsafendas miraculously recovered his sanity, dropped his St Peter act and was discharged from the hospital.[66]

Knowing that he would now be a marked man, he shelved his plan to destroy the pipeline, instead decided to go back to South Africa to fight apartheid. Arriving in Durban in March 1965, he contacted local anti-apartheid activists such as Rowley Arenstein, hoping to interest them in a plot to kidnap Verwoerd and hold him hostage in exchange for prisoners on Robben Island. Once again, however, his comrades refused to join him in any violent action. Resolving therefore to do it alone, he began to explore the idea of shooting Verwoerd from a distance. In July 1966, he started to watch the Parliament building in Cape Town; sometime later, he was able to get a job as a Parliamentary messenger, finally giving him access to his prey.

After the Assassination

In a brief summary trial, in which the words ‘Communist’ and ‘Communism’ were never even mentioned, Tsafendas was dismissed as a non-political schizophrenic; a madman supposedly acting on the orders of a tapeworm that lived inside him. His own statements and those of other witnesses were hushed up. Afterwards there was a Commission of Enquiry, which also discovered what sort of a person Tsafendas really was. However, its final report followed the same pattern as the police; the facts about Tsafendas’s political activities that were already public knowledge were played down, while the rest remained concealed. Tsafendas was depicted unsympathetically as a mentally ill loser, unworthy of any sympathy, and not as a politically committed person.

Tsafendas never received the medical treatment for schizophrenia that, if one believed the verdicts of the Court and the Commission, he so desperately needed. Instead, he spent the next twenty-eight years in prison, subjected to constant and extreme torture. For twenty-three of those he was held in a specially built cell at Pretoria Central, next door to the death chamber, where he could overhear the executions.[67] He himself was convinced that this was not simple mental torture, but a warning of his fate if he should ever recover his ‘sanity’.[68] He was often confined entirely to his solitary cell, barred from any contact with other prisoners; he was also denied access to any reading material.[69]

By the time democracy came to South Africa in 1994, Tsafendas was the country’s longest-serving prisoner. He spent his final years in the Sterkfontein Hospital, a secure psychiatric facility, having been transferred there by the new ANC government as his health had declined to the point where he could no longer live independently; he died there on 7 October 1999.[70] While Verwoerd’s remains are still in the Heroes’ Acre, Tsafendas lies in an unmarked grave. However, on December 2019, the SACP’s Special Congress reinstated Tsafendas’s membership posthumously and plans are under way to build a tombstone on his grave.; furthermore, the SACP held a memorial service on October 2019, on the 20th anniversary of Tsafendas’s death.

Harris Dousemetzis teaches at the School of Geography, Politics and Sociology at Newcastle University. He holds a PhD in politics from Durham University and is the author of The Man who Killed Apartheid: The Life of Dimitri Tsafendas and of the Report to the Minister of Justice in the Matter of Dr Verwoerd’s Assassination.

Notes

[1] Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 19 September 1966. K150, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Circumstances of the Death of the Late Dr the Honourable Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd, (hereafter cited as K150), Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. National Archives of South Africa, Pretoria (hereafter cited as NASA).

[2] Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

[3] Rand Daily Mail, ‘Devoid of Political Meaning’, 7 September 1966.

[4] In the early 1960s, van den Bergh went to France and Algeria to receive special torture training from French forces (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Volume Two, (1998), p. 195.)

[5] John D’Oliveira, Vorster – The Man, (Johannesburg: Ernest Stanton, 1977), p. 180.

[6] Winter, ‘Tsafendas was Ineffective Red—Van den Bergh’, The Citizen, 26 October 1976.

[7] John D’Oliveira, Vorster – The Man, (Johannesburg: Ernest Stanton, 1977), p. 180.

[8] Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, NASA.

[9] Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, NASA.

[10] Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 18 November 2017.

[11] John Dugard in a personal interview, 7 February 2016.

[12] Denis Goldberg in a personal interview, 12 April 2016.

[13] Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

[14] Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Volume Three, (1998), p. 530.

[15] David Beresford in a personal interview, 11 April 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013.

[16] Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Circumstances of the Death of the Late Dr the Honourable Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd (hereafter cited as Report of the COE into Dr Verwoerd’s Death), December 1966. R.P. 16/1967, Chapter XI, Paragraphs 4 and 5.

[17] Secret Telegram from S.A. Embassy, Lisbon, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cape Town, 07 September 1966. K150, Vol. 7, File: 09/04 Suspect Persons Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA; Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol 4, Sub file: 1/8. NASA; Pretoria News, ‘Dimitrio A Red, They Alleged’, 7 September 1966: 1; The Herald (Melbourne), ‘The Killer: Five Passports and A Record of Subversion’, 8 September 1966: 1; The Rhodesia Herald, ‘Assassin Said To Have Been Deported From P.E.A. for Communist Connections’, 8 September 1966: 1.

[18] Confidential Report of the Police Body of the Province of Mozambique regarding Demetrio Tsafendas. No: 726/694/PI, 3 May 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. Arquivo National da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon (hereafter cited as ANTT); Report of the COE into Dr Verwoerd’s Death, Chapter II A, Paragraph 16.

[19] PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

[20] The Cape Argus, ‘180-Day Prison for Tsafendas?’, 7 September 1966: 1.

[21] Report of the COE into Dr Verwoerd’s Death, Chapter II A, Paragraph 26.

[22] Edward Charles Furness statement to the police, 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

[23] Edward Furness statement to the police 12 October 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas. NASA.

[24] Kenneth Heugh Ross statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

[25] Cleanthes Alachiotis in a personal interview, 29 September 2010; Nikolaos Billis in a personal interview, 12 June 2011; Nikolas Kambouris in a personal interview, 17 January 2014; Georgios Kantas in a personal interview, 11 January 2012; Grigoris Pouftis in a personal interview, 28 November 2009; Michalis Vasilakis in a personal interview, 17 March 2016.

[26] Johannes Jacobus Botha statement to the police, 15 September 1966. K150, Vol. 12, File: Verklarings Demitrio Tsafendas, NASA.

[27] Col. van Wyk’s report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, Sub file: 1/5. NASA.

[28] Report of the COE into Dr Verwoerd’s Death, Chapter II B, Paragraph 32.

[29] Top Secret letter of the head Inspector of PIDE in Lisbon to the Subdirector of PIDE in Mozambique regarding Demitrio Tsafendas, 8 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

[30] Secret Criminal Record nº 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

[31] Vertaling. Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. K150. Vol: 6, File: 3. NASA; PIDE report: Information: Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafandakis. 7 September 1966. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

[32] Advocate George Bizos in a personal interview, 18 November 2017.

[33] Professor John Dugard in a personal interview, 8 September 2016.

[34] Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

[35] Antony Maw statement to the police, 7 September 1966. K150, Vol. 4, Sub File: 1/8. NASA; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

[36] Mary Eintracht in a personal interview, 9 October 2014; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Michael Vlachopoulos in a personal interview, 14 April 2016.

[37] I Galleanisti, Galleani’s followers in the USA, had committed a number of bombings and attempted assassinations during the previous two decades.

[38] Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015.

[39] Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

[40] Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Helen Grispos in a personal interview, 22 January 2013; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

[41] Secret Criminal Record nº 10.415 of Demitrios Tsafantakis. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

[42] Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Ira Kyriakakis in a personal interview, 27 March 2015.

[43] Letter of the Director of PIDE to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 November 1961. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

[44] Report of the COE into Dr Verwoerd’s Death, Chapter II A, Paragraph 16.

[45] Report of the COE into Dr Verwoerd’s Death, Chapter II A, Paragraph 26.

[46] Report of the Commissioner for Immigration and Asiatic Affairs regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, 14 October 1941. K150, Vol. 3, File: W.D. 10/10/4102. Subject: Enquiry regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis. NASA.

[47] Grafton State Hospital report regarding Demetrios Tsafandakis, n.d. Demitrio Tsafendas Mediese Leer A125. NASA.

[48] PIDE Confidential Report about Demitrio Tsafendas or Demetrio Tsafantakis, 13 November 1962. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

[49] PIDE Confidential Report about Demitrio Tsafendas, 7 June 1955. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

[50] The Cape Argus, ‘Brainwashed in Jail Held Man Told Argus.’ 7 September 1966: 3.

[51] PIDE Record of questions. 25 November 1964. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

[52] The Cape Argus, ‘Brainwashed in Jail Held Man Told Argus.’ 7 September 1966: 3; Father Nikola Banovic in a personal interview, 21 August 2014; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

[53] John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016.

[54] Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 29 March 2015.

[55] Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

[56] Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

[57] Report of the COE into Dr Verwoerd’s Death, Chapter II C, Paragraph 1; Eleni Vlachopoulos in Live and Let Live; Antony Michaletos in a personal interview, 2 May 2016; John Michaletos in a personal interview, 16 April 2016; Katerina Pnefma in a personal interview, 30 March 2015; Demetrio Tsafendas statement to Major Rossouw. 11 September 1966. K150, Vol. 1, File: Verklaring van Demetrio Tsafendas. NASA.

[58] Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015; Costas Poriazis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

[59] Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Bishop Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 19 July 2015.

[60] Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

[61] PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

[62] PIDE Confidential Report regarding Demetrio Tsafendas: no: 2707/64/SR, 25 November 1964. SR. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

[63] South African Police report regarding the activities of Dimitrio Tsafendas in Mozambique and Rhodesia. 20 September 1966. K150, Vol 3, File 1/5. FILE Suid Afrikaanse Polisie. NASA.

[64] Andreas Babiolakis in a personal interview, 19 March 2016; Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Nick Papadakis in a personal interview, 30 January 2015.

[65] Alberto Henriques de Matos Rodrigues conclusion to the Subdirector, 23 January 1965. PIDE/DGS, SC, CI (2) 6818, NT 7461, PNA. ANTT.

[66] Costas Poriazis in a personal interview, 5 April 2016.

[67] John de St Jorre, ‘I Was Glad That Cancer Got Me Out of Vorster’s Jail’, The Observer, 1 December 1968: 7.

[68] Father Minas Constandinou in a personal interview, 6 February 2013; Father Ioannis Tsaftaridis in a personal interview, 6 April 2015.

[69] David Beresford in a personal interview, 11 April 2014; Alexander Moumbaris in a personal interview, 13 December 2015.

[70] Henk van Woerden, A Mouthful of Glass, (London: Granta Books, 2000), p. 152-156.

Kenya, the United States, and the Project of Endless War in Somalia

SOMALIA, Garsale: In a handout photograph dated 22 September and released by the African Union-United Nations Information Support Team 23 September, a Ugandan soldier of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) looks on as members of the Al Qaeda-affiliated militant group Al Shabaab stand in line after more than 200 fighters gave themselves up to AMISOM forces of the in Garsale, approximately 10km from the town of Jowhar, 80km north of the capital Mogadishu. The militants disengaged following in-fighting between militants in the region in which 8 Al Shabaab were killed, including 2 senior commanders. The former fighters were peacefully taken into AMISOM's protection handing in over 80 weapons in the process, in a further indication that the once-feared militant group is now divided and being defeated across Somalia. Deputy Force Commander of AMISOM Operations, Brigadier Michael Ondoga said a number of militants have contacted the AU force indicating their wish to cease fighting and that they their safety is assured if they give themselves up peacefully to AMISOM forces. AU-UN IST PHOTO / ABUKAR ALBADRI.

With American-supplied aerial reconnaissance, satellite surveillance, and troop presence, Somalia has now been under military occupation for thirteen years. Samar Al-Bulushi analyses the involvement of regional bodies and states in the project of endless war in Somalia.

By Samar Al-Bulushi

On 5 January, the Somali militant group Al-Shabaab launched an attack on a military base in northeastern Kenya that houses Kenyan and American troops, and that serves as a launch pad for US drone strikes in Somalia and Yemen. Three Americans were killed when the Shabaab fighters fired a rocket-propelled grenade on a plane piloted by contractors from L3 Technologies, an American company hired by the Pentagon to carry out surveillance missions in Somalia; due to Kenyan government secrecy about the loss of its own troops in the war with Al-Shabaab, it remains unclear how many Kenyans lives were lost.

This is unprecedented: Al-Shabaab has never launched a large-scale assault on a military installation within Kenyan territory. While the group has targeted military sites within Somalia, most of its targets in Kenya have been on civilian spaces, with the 2013 attack on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall as the most notable. As analysts familiar with the region have observed, Al-Shabaab’s actions are a likely response to the United States’ rapidly expanding undeclared war in Somalia, where American drone strikes have killed between 900-1,000 Somalis in the past three years alone, and where the American troop presence now exceeds 500.

The Pentagon responded with a new round of drone strikes in Somalia (at least three in the month of January), and with the prompt deployment of additional troops to Kenya’s Manda Bay military base—a clear reminder that the US military establishment has not lost its appetite for endless war. While the New York Times reported in December that the US was likely to ‘draw down’ its military presence in Africa, the Times focused only on the military’s interests in West Africa. In doing so, they overlooked the strategic significance of the Horn, a site of growing competition between the US, China, and Russia, with Turkey and the Gulf states playing increasingly influential roles. While instability in Somalia served as a pretext for many of these states’ initial involvement in the region, the rapidly expanding archipelago of foreign military bases suggests that most of these actors have long-term, if not permanent, visions for securing their respective political and economic interests.

In my presentation to the Political Economy, Knowledge, Solidarity, Liberation: From Asia to Africa workshop in Tunis, I reflected on the significance of these developments and drew on my research in Kenya to analyze the imbrication of Global South states and regional bodies in the project of endless war in Somalia. Somalia has now been under military occupation for thirteen years. With American-supplied aerial reconnaissance and satellite surveillance, Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia in December 2006.  At the time of the invasion, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had presided over six months of relative stability in Somalia. Contrary to mainstream media coverage that claimed Al-Qaeda ties, the ICU was an indigenous response to CIA-backed warlords, whose drug and weapons-trafficking had subjected Somalis to years of violence and uncertainty.[1]  Its popularity grew not because of a unified Islamist ideology, but because of a shared desire to counteract the warlords. With the ICU driven into exile by the invasion, more militant factions emerged. As such, the invasion and subsequent occupation planted the seeds for the growth of what is now known as Al-Shabaab.[2]

The United Nations not only failed to publicly condemn Ethiopia’s invasion, but authorized an African Union-led ‘peacekeeping’ mission known as AMISOM. It is important to underscore here the ways in which liberal governing discourses of ‘peacekeeping,’ and the ‘rule of law’ function to mask and depoliticize the realities of imperialism and war.  While AMISOM’s initial rules of engagement permitted the use of force only when necessary, it gradually assumed an offensive role, engaging in counterinsurgency and counter-terror operations. What began as a small deployment of 1,650 peacekeepers progressively transformed into a number that exceeded 22,000 as the architects of the intervention soon battled a problem of their own making.

AMISOM’s donors (including the US, EU, and other actors) have been able to offset the expense and public scrutiny of maintaining their own troops in Somalia by relying on private contractors and African forces. The employment of multiple, interlinked security regimes has enabled the US in particular to replace images of its own, less credible, military adventurism with seemingly benign actors that are focused on ‘state-building.’ Entities like Bancroft Global, Adam Smith International, Dyncorp, Pacific Architects and Engineers, Engility, and the Serendi Group have tactically positioned themselves for contracts focused on logistics, capacity building, and security sector reform.[3] Like the private contractors, troop contributing states (Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Burundi) have financial incentives to maintain instability in order to justify the continued need for foreign intervention:[4] AMISOM troops are paid significantly higher salaries than they receive back home, and their governments obtain generous military aid packages in the name of fighting Al-Shabaab.[5]

Kenya is an important example of a ‘partner’ state that has now become imbricated in the project of endless war.[6] As a close ally of the US. in the so-called War on Terror, Kenya has been one of the largest recipients of US security assistance in sub-Saharan Africa. It temporarily closed its borders to civilians fleeing the violence that ensued with Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia, and worked with US officials to arrest and interrogate over one hundred and fifty people who managed to cross over into Kenya, in some cases facilitating their rendition to detention sites in Mogadishu and Addis Ababa. Support from the US has been instrumental in emboldening the Kenyan military to engage in its own ‘war on terror’ at home and abroad. Within the country, the security apparatus has become notorious for the disappearances and extra-judicial killings of Kenyan Muslims who are deemed to be suspicious in the eyes of the state. In Somalia, Kenyan troops have been engaged in direct combat with Al-Shabaab since Kenya invaded the country in October 2011, without parliamentary approval.

AMISOM’s readiness to incorporate Kenyan troops into its so-called peacekeeping mission was a strategic victory for Kenya, as it provided a veneer of legitimacy for maintaining a military presence in Somalia. To this end, the Kenyan state has actively worked to cultivate an image of itself as a regional leader in multilateral peace and stabilization efforts.  Yet the 5 January attack on a military base that serves as host for US drone and surveillance operations is a crucial reminder of the Kenyan state’s simultaneous entanglement in an American-led project of intervention and endless war in Somalia.  Recognition of this reality is crucial for the broader effort to resist it.

Samar Al-Bulushi teaches at UCI Irvine, Department of Anthropology.  Her research is broadly concerned with militarism, policing, and the ‘War on Terror’ in East Africa. 

Featured Photograph: Ugandan soldier of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with members of the Al Shabaab group (22 September 2012).

Notes

[1] Without explicitly naming the United States, the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia confirmed that a ‘clandestine third-country’ was responsible for violating the terms of the UN arms embargo at the time (Scahill 2013).

[2] For more see Jeremy Scahill (2013) and Mary Harper (2012).

[3] Abukar Arman uses the term predatory capitalism to describe the hidden economic deals that accompany the so-called stabilization effort in Somalia, as ‘capacity building’ contracts often serve as a cover for the negotiation of oil, gas, and other agreements, and for the illicit transfer of arms and other goods.

[4] Some troop contributing states have been accused of selling their arms on the black market, and of collaborating with Al-Shabaab in the illicit trade in sugar and charcoal.

[5] Paying the monthly allowances for AMISOM troops has become the EU’s single largest development project in Africa.

[6] For a nuanced discussion of Ethiopia’s role, see Sobukwe Odinga (2017) “We Recommend Compliance: Bargaining and Leverage in Ethiopia-US Intelligence Cooperation,” Review of African Political Economy 44:153, 432-448.

Nigerian Trade Union Leader Murdered

The murder of the trade unionist and socialist, Alex Ogbu, is the latest victim of the Nigerian government’s shoot to kill policy.

On Tuesday 21 January, the Nigeria Police shot and killed a trade union leader, Alex Ogbu, at the busy transport hub of Berger roundabout in Abuja, in the Nigerian capital.

Alex Ogbu was the National Administrative Secretary of the Nigeria Automobile Technicians Association (NATA). He was also a socialist and a member of Socialist Workers and Youth League (SWL). His untimely death was part of peaceful protests by the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) being met with lethal force by the police.

The Shi’ites of the IMN have been bravely demonstrating for the release of their leader, Ibrahim Zakzaky and his wife for over four years.  Their leaders have been illegally detained since the massacre of at least 350 IMN members in December 2015 in Zaria in the north of Nigeria.  The High Court ordered their release in December 2016, but this decision and subsequent protests have been ignored by the government.

On Monday, 29 October 2018 the security forces massacred at least 39 people on the road from the popular residential area of Nyanya to central Abuja.  A peaceful, unarmed demonstration was gunned down. The army had killed at least another six IMN protesters the previous Saturday.

In the aftermath of this massacre Osai Ojigho, Director of Amnesty International Nigeria said, ‘It seems the Nigerian military are deliberately using tactics designed to kill when dealing with IMN gatherings. Many of these shootings clearly amount to extrajudicial executions.’ This view has been confirmed by subsequent killings, mainly by the police, against both the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, and the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) movement who are calling for an independent state of Biafra in the South East of Nigeria. In addition, several journalists are being illegally held by the regime and others, like Sowore of Sahara Reports, are accused of serious crimes (read Baba Aye on roape.net for background on developments in the country).

In July last year, 11 peaceful IMN protesters were gunned down by the police outside the National Assembly. After this event the IMN were banned. Later, in September, at least a dozen members of IMN were killed on traditional parades in northern cities. Again, on 27 November last year, another peaceful march by IMN was held to protest the police shooting dead a school student by the popular Wuse Market in central Abuja.

The killing of comrade Ogbu is not merely an unfortunate, tragic accident. It emerges from the clear strategy of shoot to kill against the opponents of the Buhari regime.  Especially since the fall of the price of oil, which provides the main income of the government, poverty has increased in Nigeria which is now the poverty capital of the world.  Unemployment amongst the young, inflation leading to declining real wages for workers and the failure of the government to properly fund social services including education and health has led to desperate measures by many people.

This has included the ten-year-old uprising by Boko Haram in the North East of Nigeria, murderous disputes between farmers and cattle herders in the middle belt, kidnapping, increased burglaries and communal disputes. Some people are turning to ethnic solutions, including IPOB, and disputes between northerners and southerners.  Others are turning to religion, Islam in the north and mainly Christianity in the south.

In this situation, socialists and trade unionists are trying to build a clear alternative by calling for:

  • Acceptance of culpability by the police for the killing of Alex Ogbu
  • Compensation be paid to his wife and 2-year old daughter
  • The constitution of a judicial panel of inquiry into the circumstances surrounding police killings (this must include trade unions and other popular organisations)
  • The ending the use of live bullets by the police around public protests
  • The release of Zakzaky, his wife and all other political prisoners from illegal detention.

 

Displacing Indigenous Knowledge: the Tunisian Student Movement

The Tunisian student movement played an important part in the country’s liberation struggles and has continued to play a vital role in the decades that followed political independence. However, Moutaa Amin Elwaer argues that the student movement often defends an elitist conception of society, which silences indigenous knowledge accumulated over the centuries, with a perspective not radically different from the national consensus.

By Moutaa Amin Elwaer

In my presentation to the Political Economy, Knowledge, Solidarity, Liberation: From Asia to Africa workshop in Tunis, I assessed some central elements of the contradiction between anti-imperialist and anti-colonial practices and conceptions within the Tunisian student movement. To begin within, I presented an overview of the history of the Tunisian student movement.

The first student mobilisations in Tunisia began in the early twentieth century, and specifically in 1910, when students of the Zaytuna mosque-university protested in defence of their pedagogical and material rights. Tunisian student activism witnessed numerous organisational improvements up to  and including 1952 [1], when some students took the initiative to establish the General Union of Tunisia’s Students (GUTS), [2] the organisation that would be at the centre of student struggles for decades (see Corinna Mullin’s blogpost).

Despite the presence of Communist and independent students since its establishment, and the membership of nationalist students since the mid-1950s, GUTS suffered in the first years of its existence from the domination of students of the Constitutional Liberal Party (commonly known as the Destour party). In addition to the students’ union, the Destour dominated all national organisations and controlled the last stages of the struggle against French colonialism and the process of establishing the nascent state after the declaration of independence on 20 March 1956. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, GUTS witnessed the emergence of a trade union opposition demanding the independence of the union from the Destour party and the authorities.

In parallel, Tunisian student political organisations were created in France, before gradually moving to establish themselves in Tunisia. Opposition between students defending the union’s affiliation with the ruling party and supporters of the organisation’s independence (with clear leftist tendencies) continued until the beginning of the 1970s. At the 18th congress of GUTS supporters, a majority of students backed the organisation’s independence, which led the authorities to outlaw it, a status that remained unchanged until 1988. In 1985 the students of the Islamic tendency and those close to them founded a second union called the Tunisian General Union of Students (TGUS). Both unions were officially recognized in 1988, a year after the coup led by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali against Habib Bourguiba promising Tunisian democracy.[3]

Political repression intensified in 1991, targeting mainly Islamists who turned into a serious political competitor with the ruling party and, also, the left. Independent student organisations paid a heavy price during that wave of repression. TGUS was dissolved and all of its leadership were put on trial. Authorities were also preparing to dissolve the General Union of Tunisia’s Students, but instead placed severe constraints on its ability to organise. Trials and administrative sanctions of its activists were frequent and continued until January 2011.

Student movements can be considered an ideal unit of analysis for the study of the dominant intellectual frameworks in their respective countries. In the Global South, student movements played an important role in the national and liberation struggles and have continued to play an important role throughout social and political protest movements in the decades that followed political independence. It is a role that the Tunisian student movement has played since the beginning of the twentieth century and has maintained during all the major milestones that Tunisia has known. For this blogpost, I will limit myself to the left-wing part of this movement.[4]

One of the most important features of this movement is the difficulty of determining its position vis-à-vis the colonial intellectual heritage, the subject of my presentation at the workshop in Tunis. On the one hand, it has been an unequivocal anti-imperialist and anti-colonial movement. The movement has been vocal at the main milestones of the anti-imperialist struggle (supporting independence movements in southern countries, Lumumba’s assassination, the Vietnam War, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Palestinian uprisings, opposing American aggression and occupation of Iraq etc) are sufficient to attest to this reality. Additionally, the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial stance has been expressed unambiguously since the General Union of Tunisian Students’ Charter of 1957, and this clarity continues today without confusion or interruption. Moreover, the movement has spared no effort in denouncing French cultural hegemony and upholding the flag of the Arabic language, whether it is in education or in their own political and union communication.

On the other hand, this movement has adopted an ideologically essentialist and a politically hostile standpoint regarding local cultures and frameworks. For example, it consistently denigrates Islam as a culture and a religion and Islamists as political actors, reproducing the frameworks of the mainstream French left analysis. In addition, an evolutionary vision of history dominates the leftist student movement. It is a view that the movement inherited from the leftist and pan-Arabist trends that constitute it. According to this perspective, capitalist civilisations are at a more advanced historical stage than those of Global South, in states like Tunisia. To reach this ‘advanced’ position, the majority of the movement adheres to a production-oriented, developmentalist model, which they consider the only way to assure the country’s future abundance as a condition of sovereignty and prosperity.

The tensions between what I have identified as an anti-colonial political position versus a capitalist-modern epistemic stance can be linked to the hegemonic knowledge production shared by the student movement (leftist or otherwise) with the rest of the Tunisian cultural and political elite. According to the dominant view, the university maintains a monopoly on the legitimate production of knowledge and excludes from this process all extra-university spaces. This social division excludes the knowledge accumulated by the various local communities, and whose production is not subject to academic standards. For example, it ignores knowledge accumulated over the centuries by Tunisian peasantry and its substitution with imported techniques with the production of technicians uprooted from their social environment. This is despite a growing body of research that demonstrates the harm of these forms of knowledge on Tunisian food sovereignty.

This representation is based on an authoritarian Jacobinism and an evolutionary understanding of the state’s relationship with society. It also hides the common understanding, of what is and what should be the relationship of the ‘elite’ and society, shared by all components of the political scene since ‘independence’ and inherited from the colonial state. In this conception, the state exercises a kind of colonial policy towards the rest of society by voluntarily shaping it. State power is embodied in this conception by a minority (a political elite) that has proclaimed itself as the thinking mind instead of all society. One can easily recognize what may be considered a ‘coloniality of knowledge’ in this relationship. However, perhaps the greatest issue posed by this perception is how it functions to obscure a class-based analysis of the state. The post-colonial state claims, through its public institutions, the first of which are educational institutions, to preserve the social gains of independence against the imperialist neoliberal attack. In actuality, education functions like other institutions to reproduce inequality between class social structures as well as the disparity between regions.

The student movement was not in isolation from this dominant perception inherited from colonialism by defending the necessity of breaking all ‘traditional’ frameworks and replacing them with abstract and parachuted-in university knowledge. Destabilising ‘traditional’ structures turned into a goal in itself, with the aim being to replace indigenous forms of knowing with frameworks that mimic those promoted by the imperial centre. This was especially problematic considering that new models were imposed without linking knowledge production to Tunisians’ actual conditions and needs, as well as with a lack of recognition that the means of producing knowledge are multiple, and the university is only one of them.

This authoritarian and class conception cannot be understood without linking it to the ideals that political elites have sought in Tunisia since independence. The ultimate goal of the post-independence state has been to ‘catch up’ with the ranks of developed countries by increasing productivity and supporting the ability to control all the resources surrounding us, subjecting them to our desire. This aim has been instrumentalized to justify class and geographic divisions in the country. Scientism and anthropocentrism dominate as ideologies with the assumption that humans are able to control all aspects of their lives, and that it is desirable to place all assets at their service. Both left and right have defended different variants of the colonial-capitalist development model, with the left arguing that the accumulation of wealth is necessary to ultimately redress social inequalities and guarantee popular welfare.

Since technology disconnected from social and political struggles became an end in itself, it became legitimate for a social group – an intellectual elite – to claim a monopoly on this ‘technological’ production. Of course, this monopoly did not take place arbitrarily. It was subject to the social division of labour in the capitalist society, which increases the estrangement between intellectual and manual work. Tunisia’s elite at independence and its successors had strongly increased this separation by speaking contemptuously about  manual labor while praising intellectual work. This is evident in the country’s successive educational reforms and in the unbalanced relationship between so-called general and professional (and manual) teaching.

In line with these developments, the left student movement ended up defending an elitist conception of the university, in a position that is not radically different from the national consensus that was produced in the country since its founding after independence. The university, according to this model, is a knowledge production institution entrusted with the role of leading the ‘masses’ to rid it of ‘underdevelopment’ and ‘dependency’. Also, the prevailing perception always gives an epistemological superiority to academic over non-academic knowledge, which legitimises a patriarchal and authoritarian relationship between these types of knowledge.

One of the consequences is that the student ‘elites’ have the right to underline the priorities that other students should devote themselves to achieve. The unity of the student movement is based on this perception of the ‘vanguard’, which has the ability to represent the fundamental interests of the rest of the students thanks to its mastery of the  tools of ‘scientific analysis.’ Popularity in this case is the ability to attract the ‘substantial interest’ of the student masses through analysis of abstract scientific knowledge accessible to anyone who masters these tools, independently of their usefulness to the class struggle.

As a corollary of the above, neoliberal and neo-colonial concepts like ‘awareness building’ occupy an important place among Tunisian student movement repertory of collective actions. Political positioning and ideological background have very little influence on the importance accorded to this type of action. I have repeatedly heard students freshly arrived at university talking without embarrassment about ‘the need to educate and raise awareness of citizens.’ What is at issue is not some knowledge that the student believes that she has accumulated and must now disseminate, but rather is it is the outcome of collective mental structures that reproduce the capitalist-colonial epistemology that views the university as the only legitimate producer of knowledge. By saying so, those students are involved in the unequal ‘vertical’ relationship that links the university to society.

The high regard given to the unemployment of higher education graduates is a manifestation of the university’s superiority in the public imagination.[5] It is considered as the most dangerous type of unemployment in public opinion, as it represents a failure of the social development project through education, on which the independent state built its legitimacy. The unemployment of higher education graduates has been targeted by specific research and public policies since the end of the 1990s. Moreover, this social group created its own organisations that defend its interests by a framing that distinguishes it from the rest of the unemployed. Most political actors, whether they are in power or in the opposition, agree that this unemployment is a priority compared to the unemployment of the other social groups.

This analysis should not obscure the liberatory potential stored within Tunisia’s student movement. For the last four decades it has been at the forefront of the forces resisting the neoliberal ‘reforms’ that international lenders are pushing Tunisia to adopt. In addition, the student movement remains one of the most important forces maintaining a continuous opposition to (neo)colonialism in the Arab region, whether in Palestine or elsewhere. Regarding its conception of education, the movement defends the principle of free quality higher education, oriented toward a progressive national culture. This principle could be summed up in the slogan: ‘Popular university – democratic education – a national culture.’ In addition, student activists and professors always had an important role in defending the existence of social services and a public sector – even in the face of their deteriorating quality – against the neo-liberal assault. This means that the student movement remains one of the most important liberating forces in Tunisian society, but in order to achieve its full potential, it is required to engage in critical self-reflection and uproot a part of its intellectual foundations that reside in the remains of colonialism.

Moutaa Amin Elwaer was a member of the General Union of Tunisian Students (UGET) from 2003-2009 and is currently a PhD student at the University of Montreal.

Featured Photograph: ‘Moutaa, un combattant aux urnes à Tunis’ (2 November 2011)

Notes

[1] The Tunisian student and student movement witnessed several organisational attempts before that date, perhaps the most notable of which was the experiences of the Tunisian Students Association, especially the Voice of the Zitouna Students Association in 1950.

[2] This designation was adopted at the 1956 conference, and the name at the time of the establishment was the “General Union of Tunisian Students”.

[3] At that moment, GTUS has become totally controlled by left-wing (mainly Stalinists and Maoists) students.

[4] It is difficult to present a general reading about the reality of a diverse movement, such as the Tunisian student movement in a limited space, without failing to simplify the areas of difference in it and resorting to generalisations. It should be cautioned that it can become a barrier that obscures the view of the contradictions during a particular historic episode.

[5] This does not mean that the university does not suffer from marginalisation like all public services since Tunisia took a liberal approach from the 1970s. Rather, this means that this marginalisation is more condemned when it comes to university.

The taming of youth activism in Tunisia and the Global South

At the workshop in Tunis, Malek Lakhal presented a scathing critique of ‘capacity building’ and ‘awareness-raising campaigns’ promoted by Northern NGOs that rely on orientalist tropes of lacuna and deficiency to reinforce how Tunisians – and the Global South generally – are perpetually ‘lagging behind’ or ‘catching up’ and in need of western tutelage and knowledge.

By Malek Lakhal

My presentation to the Political Economy, Knowledge, Solidarity, Liberation: From Asia to Africa workshop in Tunis provided an ethnography of the neoliberal ‘capacity building’ workshop, focusing on the way in which a narrowly conceived Global South ‘civil society’ gets further incorporated within Global North dominated funding circuits and forms of knowledge production that are designed to tame youth activism. Capacity building is often paired with the ‘awareness-raising campaign’- two discourses that rely on orientalist tropes of lacuna and deficiency to reinforce how Tunisia and Tunisians are perpetually ‘lagging behind’ or ‘catching up’ and therefore in need of western (in this case ‘civil society’) tutelage and knowledge to reach an illusory state of ‘completeness’. These ‘free’ workshops contribute to the consolidation of the Western monopoly on knowledge production, as they bring a set of ‘best practices’ to be applied in Global South countries. For the purposes of this blogpost, I will only speak about capacity building.

Capacity building postulates local actors as suffering from a lack of skills as well as a lack of capability in relation to civil society organizing. In response to this deficiency, civil society organizations propose to remedy this lack by organizing capacity building workshops where local actors are trained. These workshops usually take place in hotels and are subject to a preliminary selection process: CVs, letters of motivation, etc. are taken into consideration by those deemed more expert at conducting civil society.

I base my analysis on a capacity building workshop in which I participated as a trainee between July and September 2017 to learn how to write a policy brief. The workshop, entitled ‘Policy Lab (We Gov) Empowering Middle East and North African Civil Society Organizations’ Participation in Policy Making’, was organized by the Tunisian association Impact Foundation under the leadership of an Italian NGO called Gruppo di Volontariato Civile (GVC). The workshop was funded by the European Union.

The facilitators were almost all Tunisians working in international organisations or as consultants for Tunisian NGOs. Most of the participants were students or young workers under the age of thirty. They were familiar with this type of workshop and had attended several of them. Some had already met at similar workshops in Tunisia. Participation in these workshops – whether in Tunisia or abroad – is seen as a plus to add to one’s CV, while offering the opportunity to travel and meet ‘leaders’ from all over the world. Several participants had accumulated ‘opportunities’- meaning they had attended multiple ‘workshops’, on themes like ‘entrepreneurship’ or ‘governance’, often providing them with the opportunity for international travel, to Europe as well as to North America or Asia. The young people who were participating were largely from working class or lower-middle class backgrounds, and therefore lacking access to economic and social capital. Most of them are graduates of Tunisian public universities, often in English language and civilization. The only one to have graduated abroad was a holder of a one-year master’s degree at the College of Europe, where he studied on a scholarship. Considering their social situation, which can often be precarious, it seems obvious why these individuals would choose to participate in such an event. There is the allure of social gain by integrating into the world of development and official ‘civil society’. This world offers them the possibility of significant social advancement as well as a chance to be recognised.

The discourse of capacity building claims to opens the way to a diversification of the ‘elites’. However, as Yves Dezalay shows, the stakes of internationalization are inseparable from the reproduction of social and class hierarchies in national spaces. These workshops function to (re)incorporate political and economic elites within western ‘governance’ discourses and practices, which in turn shape the Tunisian political landscape. They are a bet placed on aspiring new elites to rule the way they were taught to rule.

Participants were introduced to a range of neoliberal concepts like decentralization, leadership, and stakeholder mapping, connected by the overarching theme of ‘governance’. From the outset, a distinction was made between politics and policy, a binary in which the latter term alone is imbued with positive content. As the main facilitator of the workshop explained, politicians are steeped in ideology and therefore lacking in objectivity, while policy analysts are concerned with technique, with what he calls a ‘rational ideology, based on expertise, an efficient approach’.

In this workshop, we learned that voting and political alternation are completely inconsequential variables in the choice of public policies. The latter are above political considerations, they are under the reign of rationality and technique. Representative democracy is a mere formality, politicians play on passions and emotions to obtain votes, and leave the serious matters to the stakeholders: State, donors and civil society.

It seems to me that it is no coincidence that the target audience for these workshops is a young audience. These are political training sessions, dressed up in the finery of professionalization and skills acquisition. They teach young people that in order to obtain something from power, there is only the path of advocacy and not, of course, the path of struggle. This is also a first step in the professionalization of activism, which very often rhymes with maintaining the status quo.

Of course, the participants are not fooled; they sometimes criticized the imported character of the best practices they are taught during the workshop. In fact, almost none of them gave a policy brief, expressing disappointment with the training, which did not achieve its objectives. But it seems to me that despite the quirks, the fact remains that underneath, these individuals accumulate training which is above all the learning of a language, a method, and that it is not necessary to believe in it to apply it, to use it, to reinforce its hegemony.

These training sessions and workshops are a tiny drop in the bucket of neo-liberal governmentality. However, they play an essential rallying role in maintaining this regime. By training young people concerned with public affairs in ever more leadership and public policy trainings and workshops, the organizations behind these activities contribute to the strengthening of the political hegemony of neoliberalism by disqualifying other forms of political work. They are also neo-colonial insofar as they reinforce unequal power relations between the Global North and Global South: one as the eternal teacher, the other as eternal pupil.

This dynamic echoes the economic domination exercised by the international organisations in charge of maintaining the neoliberal order (EU, IMF, World Bank), which condition their loans on the implementation of structural adjustment programs and policies requiring the adoption of European standards. Like the colonial civilizing mission, these policies are always claimed in the name of the country’s best interest, in the name of economic ‘progress’. While the violent domination behind the rhetoric may have been exposed for many decades, one must be wary of the continued attraction that these ‘free opportunities’ offer young people aspiring for recognition.

It is crucial to point out the political agenda to which these governance projects are linked. A decolonial critique coupled with the popularisation of other possibilities for action, particularly collective action, are crucial to counter the insidious hegemony of governance and it is impact on taming youth activism.

Malek Lakhal is an independent journalist and researcher based in Tunis. She is also the co-founder of Asameena, a literary online magazine.

Featured Photograph: ‘The Road to Hell is Paved by Corporate Profits and Compromised NGOs’ (Wrong Kind of Green).

Knowledge, higher education and liberation in Tunisia

Continuing the series from the Tunis workshop in January, Corinna Mullin looks at the conditions of the Tunisian university from the period of the anti-colonial struggle to the era of neoliberalism. Drawing parallels with universities and activism elsewhere on the continent, she examines how these conditions have shaped resistance within and beyond the university.

By Corinna Mullin

In my presentation to the Political Economy, Knowledge, Solidarity, Liberation: From Asia to Africa workshop in Tunis, I examined transformations in the material and epistemological conditions of the Tunisian university from the era of anti-colonial struggle to the current moment of neoliberalism, reflecting upon how these conditions have shaped resistance both within and beyond university walls. To highlight the relationship between conjuncture, agency and institutional setting as well as to draw broader regional and more generally Global South comparisons, I employed Mahmood Mamdani’s historical sociological and comparative approach to the African university, as developed most recently in his London Review of Books article ‘The African University’. In this piece, Mamdani counterposes two developmental paths taken by African universities based on the experiences of two different institutions (Makerere University and the University Dar es Salam) as well as two divergent scholars (Ali Mazrui and Walter Rodney).

Makarere university was founded in 1922 when Uganda was still under British colonial rule. Post-independence, the university followed the European colonial university paradigm, adhering to its conservative Humboldtian tradition, with its ‘disciplinary nationalism’ and claim to be pursuing ‘universal’ knowledge. As Mamdani has explained elsewhere, though this trajectory included an initial decolonial effort through ‘deracialization’ of faculty and staff, it did not entail the kind of the institutional transformation required for what Walter Mingolo has theorized as an ‘epistemic delinking’ of the university. Dar es Salam, on the other hand, became the ‘flag bearer of anti-colonial nationalism and the home of the new, African public intellectual,’ with its scholars focused on a complete overhaul of both university curriculum and structure. Unsurprisingly, given the post-independence persistence of neocolonial modes of domination, despite the existence of this alternative model, it was the Makerere example that would come to typify the trajectory followed by a majority of the continent’s universities.

With their roots in the colonial-capitalist model of knowledge production, it is unsurprising that most African universities submitted to the diktats of International Financial Institutions in the neoliberal era, compromising as a result of reduced state spending and increased privatization on their important post-colonial redistributive function, and enabling yet another form of Global South drain.

In the narrative relayed by Mamdani, Ali Mazrui was a scholar ‘fascinated by ideas’ who subscribed to the idealized liberal model of education promoted by Makerere university where he taught. He dismissed as ‘ideological’ the intellectual agenda of those he described as ‘superleft’ academics who had aligned their knowledge production with nationalist political projects, which he believed were the handmaiden of authoritarianism. The Guyanese revolutionary Walter Rodney, on the other hand, taught at Dar es Salam university, was a socialist and called for the university to be fully rooted in the political project of liberation. He defended the need for ideologically oriented knowledge production as required for upending neocolonial relations of power.

In only drawing our attention to the epistemological concerns of Marzui, highlighting what he saw as the western ‘mode of reasoning’ underpinning Marxist theory, Mamdani, whether wittingly or unwittingly, ends up reaffirming Mazrui’s dismissal of the ‘ideological orientations’ of scholars like Rodney as ‘superficial and malleable’. Yet worldviews like Rodney’s were also closely tied to a deeper epistemological project. As Devyn Springer and Jesse Benjamin explain, Rodney’s critique of the university’s colonial conditions ‘crucially includes language, discourse, culture and epistemology – not instead of, but in conjunction with material conditions and political struggles.’[1] In other words, it was not an either or choice – to be effective, Rodney thought projects of epistemic delinking and insurgent pedagogy must be rooted in the actual material conditions, needs and political struggles of the masses.

The path followed by the Tunisian university in large part reflects the trajectory of Makerere university, from its post-independence western oriented development in which socialist, anti-imperialist and indigenous ways of knowing were often marginalized or completely excluded, to the current neoliberal restructuring under the guidance of International Financial Institutions and other imperialist actors, impacting everything from faculty hiring, wages and tuition, to the shaping of curriculums, course offerings and structure,[2] as well as location and spatial design of new campuses. Although no historical trajectory is ever locked in place given the contingency of social phenomenon, the Tunisian university was bound by a certain path dependency that emerged as a result of the outcome of intra-nationalist struggle in the anti-colonial era. Tracing the trajectory of the Tunisian university shows us how higher education institutional developments are connected to and reflect the dynamics and outcomes of broader political struggles underpinning the national question. Building on this point, I argue that the possibility that the Tunisian university would adhere to the early institutional path of Dar es Salam and the radical epistemological project conceptualized by Rodney was in large part foreclosed by the victory, with the support of the imperialist powers, of the pro-west, capitalist oriented Habib Bourguiba over his erstwhile rival, the Third Worldist, Pan-African, Arab-nationalist oriented Salah Ben Youssef.

In the Tunisian context, the equivalent of the Makerere/Dar es Salam binary can be found in the contrast often made between two pre-independence institutions: Collège Sadiqi and Al Zaytuna mosque-university. The former, founded by Khair al Din al Tunsi in 1875, provided ‘bicultural’ education with the ‘traditional subjects taught in Arabic, and a curriculum shaped by French pedagogy emphasizing European languages, math and science. Many of its early graduates worked in the colonial administration, and several alumni went on to participate in the nationalist movement, including Tunisia’s first post-independence president Habib Bourguiba. Sadiqi provided the early personnel as well as pedagogical influence for the establishment of the post-independence University of Tunis.

On the other hand, there was the Al-Zaytuna mosque-university, which, even during the period of ‘reform’, managed to partially eschew disciplinary nationalism in favor of a combination of theological and secular studies. One of the oldest teaching establishments in the region (founded in 737 CE), Al Zaytuna’s famous alumni include the historian-sociologist Ibn Khaldun and trade unionist and writer Tahar Haddad. Although it had a mixed history of relations with the colonial authorities, by 1954, at the height of the anti-colonial struggle, Al Zaytuna’s faculty and student bodies committed themselves to a path of epistemic delinking. The university’s Sawt al-Talib al-Zaytuni (The Voice of the Zaytuna Student), demonstrated this commitment with its unapologetic advocacy on behalf of an ‘Arab-Islamic inspired educational system.’[3] Their epistemic concerns were also firmly rooted in an explicitly anti-colonial political agenda. Students who were active in this organization supported Salah Ben Youssef’s call for a regional strategy towards complete decolonization rather than the bilateral negotiations underway that he believed limited the scope and depth of independence. Reflecting his close ties to the university, Ben Youssef chose Al Zaytuna as the site to deliver his passionate speech denouncing Bourguiba’s acceptance of the 1955  accords with France that granted Tunisia ‘internal independence’ claiming that these amounted to a ‘surrender to colonialism.’[4] The anti-colonial leader rejected Bourguiba’s gradualist approach to independence and accused him of having betrayed the cause of the Arab Maghreb.

The Ben Youseff/Bourguiba – Al Zaytuna/Sadiqi divide not only reflected these deep political differences over the trajectory of Tunisia’s anti-colonial struggle, but also, through their divergent social bases, exposed the class and geographic divisions that underpinned Tunisia’s post-independence uneven development.  Ben Youssef’s supporters tended to come from rural, south/south-west, peasant and urban working-class backgrounds, whereas Bourguiba drew his support in large part from bourgeois landowners of the wealthy Sahel and Cap Bon regions, from the urban middle class as well as from institutionalized labor.

The post-independence marginalization and dismantling of Al Zaytuna university along with its epistemological delinking project found its political expression in the forced exile and eventual assassination of Ben Youssef, along with the repression of his supporters, many of whom went on to join the armed resistance (fellagha). The Tunisian university continued to be a site of revolt at various points in the post-independence period and despite heavy surveillance and repression under both Bourguiba and Ben Ali,with students engaging in a range of leftist, nationalist and other political causes – from resisting the Tunisian government’s alliances with neocolonial/imperialist powers and its adherence to the colonial-capitalist model of development, to rejecting single-party rule and political repression as well as resisting attempts to enclose upon the Tunisian academic commons and calling for a more democratically organized university. However, as a result of the historical legacies and institutional constraints I have discussed, these struggles have often found more sustenance off rather than on university campuses with many activists who cut their teeth in university struggles going on to play important roles in social movements that transcend the university.

Recalling Al Zaytuna’s role in the pursuit of a more complete epistemic and political decolonization – a history that has been suppressed by post-independence governments seeking to maintain their neocolonial backed  discursive and political hegemony- may contribute to the struggle already underway to forge an alternative to the dominant colonial-capitalist model of higher education, one rooted in the actual conditions, struggles, and needs of the Tunisian people. The success of this struggle both depends upon and furthers the goal of South-South solidarity as well as of global liberation.

Corinna Mullin teaches at the New School in New York, before this she spent five years living and working in Tunisia (2012–2017) as a Visiting Assistant Professor of International Political Economy/International Politics at the University of Tunis.

Notes

[1] Benjamin, Jesse and Springer, Devyn. 2019. “A Revolutionary Pan-African Pedagogy for Guerilla Intellectuals,” In (ed) Derek R. Ford, Keywords in Radical Philosophy and Education: Common Concepts for Contemporary Movements. Brill publishers; p. 223

[2] Guessoum, Mouldi. 2016. “Al-Jami‘a al-Tunisiyya wa al-Mujtama‘ fi Zill al-Taqsim al-‘Alami al-Jadid li-l-‘Amal”.

[3] Weideman, Julian. 2016. “Tahar Haddad after Bourguiba and Bin ‘Ali: A Reformist between Secularists and Islamists,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 48 (1), 47-65.

[4] Abun-Nasr, Jamil M..1987. A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period. Cambridge University Press; p. 57.

Knowledge Production and the Construction of Utopias in Africa

Considering the university as the institutional context where the majority of knowledge production continues to take place on the continent, Carlos Cardoso at the Tunis workshop argued that prominent intellectual and scientific production in African states today facilitate the drainage of information and marginalization of other forms of knowledge. Where, he asks, can we look for a new dream, a new critical and creative utopia, to move forward?

By Carlos Cardoso

The history of human development shows us that since the beginning of time, knowledge has played an essential role in the way individuals view the present and build their future. As Boaventura de Sousa Santos  and Paula Meneses have argued, all social experience produces and reproduces knowledge and, in doing so, involves one or more epistemologies. It is through the knowledge they produce that women and men shape their relationships with nature and with other members of society. However, the cognitive subject – the human being – is also part of a collective, social and historical subject, and a particular social context and mode of production, which is, today, predominantly capitalist. Human knowledge produced by the social being is therefore not exempt from the tensions that emerge from this contradiction.

It is in this light that we can understand the function of the colonial sciences and institutions of knowledge production: to enable the various colonial powers of the time to establish and maintain a system of domination and subordination of the colonized peoples. The succession of acts and processes negating indigenous forms of knowledge production amounted to what the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos called colonial ‘epistemicide.’

However, colonial power never achieved its aim of complete domination. This same urge for knowledge enabled colonized peoples not only to analyze their shared conditions of domination and enslavement, but also to appropriate scientific methods of knowledge and put them in the service of their liberation struggles, building new utopias based on historical consciousness.

All knowledge is the product of a collective act that is stored by cognitive and mnemonic processes, transmitted by example, orally as well as through written and other visual mediums. Communities, social groups, non-governmental organizations and individuals in need of solutions to their difficulties are driven by processes of investigation, seeking knowledge by understanding these issues, proposing solutions and often producing answers that become theories and technologies.

In the colonial era the university became the center of knowledge production in the Global South, with its purpose shifting in the post-independence period as universities were repurposed in large part to serve a nationalist rather than colonial agenda. The epistemology that has given science the exclusivity of valuable knowledge has resulted in a vast institutional apparatus beyond the university, including research centres, ‘think tanks’, NGOs, etc.

My presentation for the Political Economy, Knowledge, Solidarity, and Liberation: From Asia to Africa workshop focused on the university, as this is the institutional context where the majority of knowledge production continues to take place in the Portuguese-speaking African states (PALOPs). What follows is a summary of the talk I gave in Tunis.

The university has a set of characteristics that vary from country to country and from region to region within countries. In one group of countries (Angola and Mozambique), knowledge production through the university began earlier, as the institution was established by the colonial power in the 1960s. In others, such as Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, it began after independence. Knowledge production in all of the PALOPs has evolved significantly over the last three decades.

Despite their weak development compared with other African countries, the social sciences in the PALOPs have not remained indifferent to the debate on the epistemologies of the South. Many PALOPS academics have actively engaged in building a paradigm and epistemology centred on the values and aspirations of their peoples, a process that was initiated by the liberation movements. There is a desire to contribute to the building of ‘epistemologies of the South’. The central idea to this epistemology is that we must move away from the perennial condition of being mere consumers of the thoughts and actions of others, and above all, have the courage to take the risk of being authentic producers of knowledge.

In Africa, the social sciences have undergone enormous changes with different impacts at the regional and national levels. As in Asia, these changes have led to the emergence of centres of excellence in social science research and the emergence of new research areas and themes. The work of Valentin Mudimbe, Claude Ake, Mahmood Mamdani, Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Achille Mbembe and many others testify to this resurgence of knowledge production. Advances in information technology around the world, and particularly in the Global South, are shaping the environment and conditions of knowledge production today. Crucially, they facilitate South-South dialogue.

International academic cooperation is, of course, a vital necessity for universities in both North and South. The increasing globalization of economies, the confrontation of common global problems and the need to find global solutions make such cooperation indispensable. However, such cooperation cannot be carried out blindly. We need to ask ourselves about the philosophical and political bases underlying collaborative projects. Far from putting an end to neo-colonial patterns of accumulation, prominent intellectual and scientific production in African states today, for the most part, facilitate the drainage of information and marginalization of ‘traditional’ forms of knowledge. In other words, they contribute to the slow but sure extraction and/or deterioration of all the scientific heritage and other forms of indigenous knowledge that could otherwise be put towards the aim of Global South liberation.

These so-called collaborative knowledge production projects often function like foreign ‘aid’ programs. Far from eliminating global inequalities they work to reinforce dependency of the periphery on the centre. Cooperation in this historical framework has been marked by a donor-recipient syndrome, in which the donor decides what to give and dictates the conditions of use, while the recipient is expected to accept these conditions unreservedly with gratitude.

International cooperation based on colonial ties does not solve African problems, but rather helps to deepen them. Genuine cooperation must aim above all at the development of African societies, through their educational and research institutions, and not at constituting a field for experimentation or propaganda with guinea pigs blinded by the funds available and committing African countries to another cycle of indebtedness. It is time to review the traditional terms of cooperation. Gone are the days when ‘cooperation’ was limited to granting scholarships to African students so that they could complete their university training in European universities, thus contributing to Africa’s ‘brain drain’.

Particular attention should be paid to mechanisms that strengthen the research component and theorization in African universities, for example through investment in the development of postgraduate programs so that African students choose to stay home rather than complete their PhDs abroad. The massification of higher education in Africa provided both opportunities, resulting in a significant increase in the number of institutions administering higher education and expanding access to formerly excluded communities, yet this increase in student numbers, and lack of investment, has impacted the capacity of universities to serve as research and theory building institutions..

Moving from a philosophy of aid to a philosophy of partnership can help to shift the focus away from philanthropic considerations. Clearly defining the responsibilities of partners in terms of material, financial and human resource contributions seems to be the right path. Partnership requires intellectual symmetry. This means that the partners must be convinced that the objectives of the project can only be achieved if both parties are willing to learn from each other’s experience.

As we have seen above, in order to deprive indigenous peoples of their capacity to produce knowledge, the colonizers had to commit another foundational act: to deprive these peoples of the capacity to make history. In his philosophy of history, Hegel theorized the alienation of Africans from world history prior to the establishment of colonialism on the continent, namely through the first great division of the globe, when Africa was left to the devices of a handful of European powers. The myths of ‘discovery’, encompassing territories already inhabited by populations with indigenous forms of social, economic and political organization, and of Europe’s ‘civilizing mission’ in Africa, were rooted in a similar rendering of history. And as if that were not enough, one of colonialism’s greatest crimes was to try to sweep out of the collective memory of Africans anything that might resemble the affirmation of their historical consciousness.

As Lopes professed, for Africans, regaining the right to speak, restoring access to that liberating verb, was a sine qua non condition for fully exiting the colonial condition. Amilcar Cabral likewise considered the liberation struggle as an act of culture, insofar as it is through culture that a people can advocate the recovery of the verb stolen by the colonists. This conceptual approach derives its relevance from the correlation established by Cabral between culture and history:

As the fruit of the history of a people, culture determines history at the same time, through the positive or negative influence it exerts on the evolution of man and his environment, as well as among men or human groups within a society or even between different societies (…). The break, whatever the ideological or idealistic characteristics of its manifestations, is therefore an important element in the history of a people.[1]

Aminata Traoré reminds us of the urgency in recalling and ‘weave again’ the ‘threads of hope’ expressed by those African revolutionaries from the era of anti-colonial struggle who sought to establish ‘a new historical and political consciousness.’

But where can we look for the articulating principle of a new sociability, a new dream, a new critical and creative utopia, to move forward?

We need to develop a hope of liberation that is the fruit of a historical consciousness rooted in and developed from the sense of the cyclical crises we have lived through all these years. Although the existing African university is by no means an inherent part of this liberatory project, a transformed university can be instrumental insofar as it contributes to the process of redeveloping the sense of service to the nation and to the people, and therefore to analyzing and addressing the new challenges and opportunities faced by Africans in the current moment.

Carlos Cardoso is a Senior Programme Officer at the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). Before joining CODESRIA, Cardoso was the Director of the National Institute of Studies and Research (INEP), Guinea-Bissau (1998-2004). He also taught political sociology at the Lusophone University, Lisbon (Portugal).

Notes

[1] Cabral, 2013, Unidade e Luta. A Arma da Teoria, textos coordenados por Mário de Andrade e publicados pela Fundação Amílcar Cabral, Praia, Cabo Verde pp, 319-320.

Slaheddine el-Amami: Towards National and Social Liberation

In the text of his presentation from the Tunis workshop, Max Ajl spoke about Tunisian radical agronomist Slaheddine el-Amami. Ajl celebrates an approach which emphasized the specifically ecological aspects of uneven development and the specifically ecological aspects of resistance to uneven development.

By Max Ajl

Some of you have heard or read me present on the Tunisian radical agronomist Slaheddine el-Amami, who in my view is probably the most important holistic thinker of the specifically technical-ecological aspects of rural, national, and popular development in North Africa during the 1970s and 1980s.[1]

There are many facets of Amami’s work to consider: the technology critic, the agronomic-regional state planner, the scientific experimenter, the intellectual historian. I would like to consider all of them, but to use them as a bridge to connect questions of epistemology and political economy as posed by the framework of this workshop.

One of the central intellectual and political problems in the development of Marxism has been a tendency for practice and theory to sidestep and therefore make invisible a central facet of accumulation on a world scale: the core-periphery, or North-South, or First World-Third World division. At the epistemological level, it relates to how interests determine knowledge and theory. On the one hand, this explains why the core-periphery distinction frequently disappears. On the other, it clarifies what kinds of knowledges and procedures for gathering knowledge are necessary in order to challenge the core-periphery relationship.

Theorizing from the South

This brings us to a question which dominated discussion earlier in the workshop: what does it mean to produce knowledge, and theorize from, or in relation to, or on behalf of, or with, or in solidarity with, the Global South?

Theories which come from the core, including Marxist theories, have often upheld the colonial division of humanity. Theories from the periphery have often challenged it. To theorize from the South, then, is not reducible to a human being theorizing from a southern country, nor a genetic or cultural identity. It is a form of knowledge production, sense-making, and abstraction which challenges international periphery-core flows of value alongside intra-national class epistemological architectures which support uneven accumulation and environmentally unequal exchange.[2]

To theorize from the South is to theorize from a national-class position, and to theorize towards a communist horizon within which southern workers and northern workers are not at odds but unite.[3] But a true unity, which accounts for – in order to erase – the uneven incorporation of nations into the world system.

Slaheddine el-Amami’s Knowledge Production

This brings us to Amami. From the 1970s onwards, he carried out a program of basic research and a critique of Tunisia’s second ‘decade of development’, which interwove questions of whom was considered a trustworthy producer of agronomic knowledge, with how to develop Tunisia in a national-popular-sustainable style. He was, then, well ahead of his time in emphasizing the specifically ecological aspects of uneven development and the specifically ecological aspects of resistance to uneven development. In this way, he raised the question, in the economist Azzam Mahjoub’s phrase, of how to carry out a ‘peripheral convivial research’ program.

Amami’s Local Libraries of Knowledge

Amami saw clearly that a system of technology born of an imperialist epistemology produced a neo-colonial theory of development, which ensured uneven accumulation. Directly inspired by Maoism, Amami carried out several radical breaks from prevailing theories of development.

First, he rejected the universalizing and flattening tendencies of industrial and especially northern theories of development. He connected the kinds of thinking encouraged in the national schooling system and the ways foreign corporations could turn Tunisia into an arena for profit. What he saw was that neo-colonial capitalism’s conversion of Tunisia into a dependent arena of profit rested on the local production of neo-colonial ideology. If this was a bane, it was also a boon, because insofar as neo-colonialism rested on specific local structures of thought, it could accordingly be challenged by an attack on those structures and the institutions which reproduced them.

He analyzed the engineering schools’ contempt for the ‘traditional,’ and the technologies to which the slur referred. In disdaining over a millennium of precolonial polytechnics, such contempt became ‘in reality a colonial ideology favoring the supremacy of imported technology and wanting to disown any specificity to the colonized country.’[4]

Colonialism and neo-colonialism dissolved and disarticulated the national agricultural system. As it became oriented further and further away from feeding the population, the agricultural system could no longer protect the ecology. The bequest from the past, Amami contended, had been slowly shrunk: ‘Just some pockets and enclaves have been preserved from colonial destruction and constitute the true national libraries of Maghrebi agricultural technology.’[5]

Disarticulation and re-articulation also meant an ideological attack on these older forms of knowledge production. The new system, through schooling, ‘dangled the mirage of an urban life getting rid of centuries of prejudice and downgrading in which the rural world bathed. To ‘modernize’ is to erase and surpass all of the traditional systems of managing natural resources…The choice of techniques is almost never inspired by the local patrimony.’[6]

By tradition, specificity, or the local Amami did not mean nativism. He meant that places are different from one another: they have different levels of precipitation and different hours of sunlight and different temperatures and different wind patterns and soil profiles. Traditional systems meant the repertoire of technologies for managing that ecology – maintaining the ability to reproduce it while extracting what was needed for human well-being. Implicitly, Amami saw that specific ecologies had to be the rational basis for long-run sustainable planning.

Amami saw that northern – or imperialist-capitalist – ways of knowing, such as the presumption that ‘of course’ it was wise to shift to excessively mechanized and input-intensive agriculture, had to be countered, with southern, anti-colonial, and national-popular ways of knowing. In this way, they would distinguish and break from capitalist accumulation of value from above with a southern accumulation of ecologically embedded use values from below.

The transformation he envisioned had two elements. One was institutional – a shift in how people learned in the engineering schools. The other was epistemological – rooted in a popular-mass and implicitly ‘peasantist’ and Maoist conception of technological advance and diffusion, based on valuing rather than dismissing peasant knowledge. In the first place, this meant embedding research nationally:

In order to advantageously and effectively use the research infrastructure, every decision and technical choice of the research organisms…must be condoned by the research organisms. The orientations and the technical choices will then be taken on rational bases and as a function of norms and trials elaborated in Tunisia and not artificially transferred.[7]

However, this also, potentially, and more in spirit than in letter, had a class element: social liberation alongside national liberation. In the most general terms, this meant a populist project:

The Arab countries must encourage the promotion of a socio-economic ecology which analyzes the ‘rationality’ of local populations with a view towards injecting technological improvements corresponding to the aspirations and mutations of these populations and not to the sophisticated and very expensive technology giving the illusion of ‘miracle’ solutions.[8]

Here was a way of bridging the methodology of the laboratory with the methodology of the ethnographer, which rested on elaborating an epistemology which did not eliminate from discussion but elevated to the dais the capacity to think of local peasants and pastoralists. He called for an interplay of knowledges in which such practices were understood to have their own rationality and were even considered libraries.

On the other hand, Amami did not reject technology: he called for technological improvements.[9] And he did not reject the knowledge procedures of science, but insisted that local practices, and the norms and dreams of those populations, should serve as guidelines shaping engineering decisions concerning where and when to inject improvements.

Thus, the place of specialists is as boosters, refiners, and complements the creative national-popular productive practice of poor rural people. As Amami elsewhere wrote alongside his collaborator J.P. Gachet, this would entail a

Regional agricultural plan, decentralized and depending primarily on the mobilization of the creative will of peasants capable of ‘moving mountains’ and of defeating difficulties of all genres and of living with droughts in order to limit the havoc [that] could in this manner constitute a real tool of development in the rural world.[10]

Here was an argument resting on the poorest of the poor, especially southern peasants and pastoralists from ‘useless’ Tunisia, adding a muted regional-class element to the program for national development towards auto-centred accumulation. It was also based on an epistemological revolution, breaking sharply with the notion of the peasantry as empty vessels for Western knowledge which had been the calling card of Western neo-colonialism in Tunisia and its native collaborators.

Conclusion

What Amami presented, in sum, was a way of theorizing from the South which identified the North-South divide as not merely marked by value flows from the latter to the former, but a system of ideological and epistemological disciplining which sought to lock the periphery in an iron anti-developmental cage. His southern theory was meant to break the bars of the cage by making its prisoners the agents of their own liberation, an intellectual ‘return to the peasantry’ which is a possible basis not just for the liberatory development plans of yesterday, but also of tomorrow.

Max Ajl has a PhD from Cornell University and researches national liberation and post-colonial development theories in Tunisia. He is a regular contributor to ROAPE and roape.net.

Notes

[1] Samir Amin and many other Egyptian, Tunisian, and other Maghrebi social scientists excelled in other aspects of theorizing accumulation and development. Paul Pascon did exceptional work, like Amami, on Moroccan indigenous hydraulics. Amami himself was writing alongside a vibrant Tunisian conversation concerning appropriate development strategies for the Third World, including figures like Azzam Mahjoub, Abdeljelil Bedoui, Tahar Gallali, and others.

[2] Cf. Jean and John Comaroff, “Theory from the South: A Rejoinder,” Cultural Anthropology Online, 2012.

[3] Enrique Dussel, “Marx’s Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63 and the ‘Concept’ of Dependency,” Latin American Perspectives 17, no. 2 (1990): 62–101.

[4] Slaheddine El-Amami, “Pour Une Recherche Agronomique Au Service d’une Technologie Nationale Intégrée,” in Tunisie: Quelles Technologies ? Quel Développement ? (GREDET, 1982), 15. Polytechnics was a term which the historian of technology Lewis Mumford developed to refer to life-centered technologies which were decentralized and devoted to human flourishing.

[5] Slaheddine El-Amami, “Technologie et Emploi Dans l’Agriculture,” in Tunisie, Quelles Technologies ? Quel Developpement, GREDET (Tunis, 1983), 21.

[6] El-Amami, 23.

[7] El-Amami, “Pour Une Recherche Agronomique Au Service d’une Technologie Nationale Intégrée,” 19.

[8] Slaheddine El-Amami, “Projets de Coopération Régionale En Matière de Recherche Scientifique et Technologiques,” in Les Cahiers Du CRGR, vol. No, 21 (Conférence des Ministères des Etats Arabes Charges de l’Application de la Science et de la Technologie au Développement, UNESCO, Rabat, 1976), 6.

[9] It is noteworthy that in the same paper, he called for development of an Arab metallurgical industry.

[10] J.-P. Gachet and Slaheddine El-Amami, “La Sècheresse En Tunisie, Réalité Permanent Ou Phénomène Accidentel?” (Ministère de l’Agriculture, D.E.R.F.C.: C.R.G.R., February 1978), 13.

Egyptian Researcher Arrested and Detained

Patrick George Zaki was arrested at Cairo airport, tortured and placed in detention.

Early on 7 February, Gender and Human Rights Researcher Patrick George Zaki, was stopped at Cairo airport on his return home from abroad. Patrick, who had been on leave since August 2019 to study for a postgraduate degree in Bologna, Italy, was returning for a brief family visit when he was taken into the custody of Egypt’s National Security Investigations at the airport and disappeared for the following 24 hours.

Patrick was removed briefly from the airport and sent to an NSI facility somewhere in Cairo for further interrogation, before being transferred to NSI offices in his hometown, Mansoura, about 120 kilometers northeast of Cairo. During these 24 hours, according to his lawyers he was beaten, subjected to electric shocks, threatened, and questioned about various issues related to his work and activism…

Read more about the campaign and detention of Patrick Zaki on the website Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 

For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
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For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
We use cookies to collect and analyse information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customise content. By clicking into any content on this site, you agree to allow cookies to be placed. To find out more see our