Analysing the recent anti-French coups across West Africa, Salvador Ousmane argues that opposition to French imperialism is not a panacea for the region’s poverty and crises. Ousmane also argues that calls for a new currency are overstated, and instead urges collective action against the military juntas and old ruling elites across the region by the working poor in their trade unions.
By Salvador Ousmane
The key problems for the working poor in most countries across West Africa are the same, poverty, inequality, and corruption. However, the military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have managed to divert attention from these key challenges by whipping up anti-French feeling over the presence of French troops and the continued use of the CFA franc. As a result, they have gained a measure of popular support.
There is no military solution to insurgency
Across the Sahel, the all-pervasive poverty, made worse by climate change, was the underlying reason behind the armed insecurity led by Islamic militants. It was the failure of previous governments to quell such violence that led to the military coups in recent years.
French troops also failed to contain the Islamic militants. This failure and isolated incidents where French forces shot dead local people led to widespread opposition to the French military and their eventual exit from these countries. Yet this enforced exit demonstrates that their national governments had far more control over the French forces than many people imagined.
However, military solutions were never likely to be successful. The underlying causes of poverty, inequality and corruption must be addressed before insecurity can be significantly under-minded.
Anti-French campaigns bring juntas popular support
The military juntas have benefited from, and encouraged, the wave of anti-French feelings and this also helped the opposition to win the presidential elections in Senegal in March. Anti-French nationalism has provided a certain focus for the bitterness of the mass of workers, peasants, and the middle classes over their economic plight. But it also restricts the political demands of these groups to those demands that do not ruffle the feathers of the ruling classes across the region.
Expelling the French military from these countries does nothing to reduce poverty, inequality, or corruption. In addition, there is an ideological conservatism which accompanies these anti-Western feelings. So, there are moves against women’s rights, and against protections for LGBT people etc. Opposition to French imperialists in West Africa is certainly not necessarily progressive.
CFA franc now controlled in West Africa
The second issue which has emerged is the CFA franc, the currency that remains a hang-over from the colonial era in the French speaking countries of West Africa. The military juntas have also gained a level of popular support from promises to move away from the CFA and this was one of the main planks in the success of the opposition in the Senegalese elections earlier this year. The currency clearly remains a symbol of the former colonial power.
However, at least for West African countries, almost all former aspects of the CFA were removed in May 2022 when the remaining foreign reserves, previously held by the French Central Bank, were repatriated to the common central bank, the BCEAO, in Dakar. In addition, French representation was reduced to only one member on the 27-person Monetary Policy Committee. There is now no representation at all from France on the main board of the BCEAO Central Bank.
Does this finally signify the decolonisation of the currency?
Rich benefit from CFA franc
However, there are benefits, especially for the rich elite, from the common currency and its parity with the euro. It means the imported goods for the rich are cheaper, it is easier for them to transfer their looted funds out of the country and their savings do not dwindle due to the low rate of inflation.
The workers of Senegal, at least, also benefit from this low inflation as the minimum wage, for example in Nigeria – where I am writing this blogpost – has not increased over the last five years, but over the same period inflation in Senegal has been the same as Nigeria over the last six months. Economic stability is a major factor in the quality of life of the working poor in the region.
The anti-French coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have shown that they can successfully demand that French soldiers leave their country (and more recently in Niger which also saw the forced removal of US troops). These new governments are also in a position to break from the link to the Euro, if the governments decide, but given the advantages indicated above they may not actually decide to go ahead with these changes.
West Africa has gone beyond flag independence
In 1960, when countries of West Africa gained independence from France, this may have just been flag independence, but nearly 65 years later things have changed. Even in terms of trade, France no longer dominates. In the two main economies of the region, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal, the largest trading partners are now China and India rather than France.
French multinational firms still form 10 of the 20 largest firms in Senegal, so they clearly remain highly significant, but they no longer totally dominate the economy. For example, the 13 largest French controlled firms only provide 3.3% of formal employment in Senegal. So less than one worker in 20 in the formal sector in Senegal works for a French controlled company. This is a major change from 1960.
Benefits of Françafriquefor local rulers
Our understanding needs to be nuanced, as the relationship between France and its former colonies in West Africa can also be extremely beneficial for the leaders of these countries, if they are prepared to support France in international arenas.
So, for example, the then French President, François Hollande admitted that the French made arrangements for former president Blaise Compaoré to leave Burkina Faso for the Ivory Coast when he was overthrown in 2014 by a popular uprising. In 2019, the French foreign minister admitted that French warplanes had struck a rebel convey in Chad to prevent a coup d’état against the former President Idriss Deby. France then supported the current dictator when he took power after the death of his father two years later. In Côte d’Ivoire, the president Alassane Ouattara has received firm support from France after being elected in contested elections for an unconstitutional third term in December 2020. A former French president attended the swearing-in ceremony.
But swapping French and US troops for mercenaries from Russia will not reduce insecurity across the Sahel. The root causes of poverty, inequality and corruption must be addressed by robust trade union action, and the mobilisation of working people. Across the region, changing the currency or supporting an apparently anti-imperialist coup will not ensure the poor majority can buy enough food to eat.
Salvador Ousmane is a Nigerian socialist who has spent years involved in activism, socialist organising and the development of radical organisations and ideas for an anti-capitalist future in Africa.
Featured Photograph: Banner at a demonstration against the coup d’état, held on 26 March in Bamako, Mali in 2012. The sign reads, ‘Military to the front lines, power to the people’.
ROAPE interviews Mark Duffield about his life and work. For decades Mark has worked on the political philosophy of the permanent emergency, the current global crisis in capitalism, the war economy, and the political and economic situation in the Horn of Africa. From his early days growing up in the West Midlands, to his research in Sudan, and later examiningthe militant struggles of Indian workers in the UK, Duffield has spent a lifetime examining at the central dynamics underpinning our interconnected world of genocide and imperialism.
For ROAPE readers unfamiliar with your work, perhaps you could begin by saying a few words of introduction?
First of all, thanks for this kind invitation. As a start, I would say that I have never fully identified with the academy or, for that matter, felt accepted within it. Perhaps with the exception of working as Oxfam’s Sudan Country Representative in the 1980s, which was a team effort, I have been something an outsider looking in. My more familiar books, Global Governance and the New Wars(2001) and Development, Security and Unending War(2007) came out of consultancy work rather than academic grants. For a long time, it has seemed that the world has been closing in. Fear of capture, that is the only way I can explain it, drove an urge to always stay one step ahead. I might have been an anthropologist, a race and labour migration specialist, a development practioner, an expert on war economies, or even, God forbid, an International Relations pundit. The result, in disciplinary terms, has been a certain ambiguity. However, with an overriding interest in how different peoples, places and times interconnect historically and interact globally, this was perhaps foretold.
Can you describe your politicisation, and the events in your life that started your political and intellectual journey?
Important here was the early feeling that I was being told who I was and not liking it. I was born in 1949 in Tipton, a small industrial town near Dudley in the Black Country. My father was a foundry worker and my mother worked in the local post-office. Hemmed in by railways and canals, until I was 14, we lived in a cramped Victorian terraced house with no bathroom or indoor toilet. Even people in council houses looked down on us. An early memory was the pungent foundry smell of burnt oil, sand and iron filings that clung to my father’s work clothes. At a young age, it was somehow clear this was not for me.
Because of what would now be called dyslexia, I was late learning to read. Nonetheless, failing the 11+ was devastating. Instead of a grammar school, I went to Park Lane, a boy’s secondary modern, which my father and grandfather had also attended. In 1960, its Teddy-boy ethos generated a fearsome reputation. The expectation that we were factory-fodder was summed up in an apocryphal story told by the metalwork master. A professor stands by his stationary car, bonnet open, staring blankly at the engine. A passing secondary modern boy spots the problem and quickly has the thankful professor on his way. Meant as encouragement, it had entirely the opposite effect on me.
In terms of escape, a couple of things stand out. Some supportive teachers organised a weekend walking trip to Wales for a group of us. This led to discovering the Sunday Times and, in the colour magazine and supplements, the sudden opening of a new and hitherto unknown world.
In 1964, I transferred to Dudley Technical College to complete my secondary education. In the last couple of years, we were fortunate to gain a young left-wing general studies tutor. Studying science subjects, his lectures on the Vietnam War, nuclear disarmament and racial discrimination were truly revelatory. If the Sunday Times described appearances, his lectures suggested that hidden connections lay beneath. Not really understanding what it was, but encouraged nonetheless, I became a sociology undergraduate in 1968. Sheffield University was chosen because my mother vaguely knew a woman whose son had gone there.
It was a time of widespread unrest in Britain’s universities. Besides helping occupy the London School of Economics, I was immediately caught up in sit-ins, Vietnam War, and anti-racism protests. My political fate, however, was sealed at the hands of the irreverent and charismatic radical, Frank Girling.
Frank was a veteran of the Spanish International Brigade. As a young Oxford anthropologist studying the Acholi, Frank had been declared persona non grata by the Ugandan colonial government for spending too much time on the wrong side of the fence. Frank’s Comparative Studies course was anarchic and had little formal structure. Besides Marx and Engels, we read the latest radical publications in political philosophy, anthropology, and psychoanalysis as soon as they became available. It was a brutal time of critical practice. The public denunciation of the conveyor-belt ‘Fordist University’, its bourgeois social sciences and the petite bourgeois lectures that promoted them.
The main thing this bruising school taught was that the world was an interconnected whole and struggles in one country helped or hindered those in others.
Could you say something about your ethnographic fieldwork among Sudan’s Hausa-speaking communities?
The main thing is that, back then, getting a research grant and Sudan government approval was comparatively easy. Moreover, rather than today’s security obsessed self-isolating subject. the venturesome goddess Fortuna still ruled. I spent the academic year of 1972-73 learning to speak Hausa at SOAS before arriving in Khartoum on 23 December 1974.
Originally from Nigeria, and settled since the colonial period, there are many such Hausa communities in northern Sudan where they are collectively known as Fellata by the Arabs. Denoting a non-Sudanese of servile status, Fellata is a derogatory generic term for African migrants from Nigeria and Chad.
The mid-1970s marked the zenith of the anti-colonial world-making project before the reassertion of a now US-led imperial order. In Sudan, the period marked the high point its independence, its liberal hour, so to speak. With the agrarian economy focused on the internal market, the central and eastern areas of North Sudan enjoyed a certain rural prosperity.
It was also a time just before the generalisation of the landline telephone. My parents did not yet have one, nor my girlfriend or her family. The letter was the main means of national and international communication. For Britain, especially outside Khartoum, a five to six week send and receive cycle was involved. This impelled a reliance on one’s hosts and allowed for a level of immersion now impossible in our hyper-connected world.
Within three weeks of arriving in Khartoum, I was living in the small Blue Nile town of Maiurno as the guest of Sultan Abu Bakr Mohammed Tahir. A descendant of the last rulers of Nigeria’s Sokoto Caliphate, Abu Bakr was the nominal representative of the Blue Nile Fellata. I would stay there for the next fourteen months, eating with the compound’s unmarried men.
Given prior language tuition, within a couple of months I was fluent in Hausa. With Maiurno as a base, I began a number of lengthy visits to other areas of Hausa settlement. Besides major towns, this included small villages on the Blue Nile south of Ed Demazin, then southern Kordofan, eastern Sudan and Gezira. In the spirit of participant observation, I travelled by lorry and made extensive use of the halwa or guest-hut system operated by local village sheikhs. Usually arriving unannounced, I frequently shared a halwa with migrant workers, itinerant traders, or faith-healers.
Focusing on the development of rural capitalism and dissolution of peasant agriculture in Maiurno, only a fraction of the material I collected was used in my PhD thesis and eventual book, Maiurno: Capitalism and Rural Life in Sudan(1981). In terms of this wider picture, the profitability of Sudan’s commercial agriculture has long been dependent upon the forcible reproduction of cheap labour that, importantly, also has no rights or entitlements. During the colonial period the Fellata took over the structural position formally occupied by slaves. This structural position has subsequently been periodically reproduced anew in relation to other groups who have been dispossessed due to their race, religion, or nationality. Rather than the independent state abolishing this dependence, its factions and institutions have grown out of it. Even to the extent, as today, of fracturing this entity.
Before we come back to present-day Sudan, could you say something on how you see the changing role of the anthropologist?
In the 1970s, radicals imagined that living and working close to the ground, in solidarity with one’s hosts, was a blow against anthropology as a discipline and a contribution to world revolution. These things, of course, did not happen. Today, however, the conditions for the immersive fieldwork of my generation have disappeared. At the same time, the peoples of Sudan have been subject to a deepening cycle of war, dispossession, and violent extraction. The anthropologists who were producing the holistic accounts once possible, have all seen the communities they lived among, and on who they relied, radically altered, even devastated, and scattered by war.
Besides photographs and audiotapes, my own observations were recorded in the form of a daily diary spanning twenty-two notebooks. Unread for decades, I recently began the slow task of transcribing and editing this detailed diary. With forgotten names, places and debts coming back to life, the content remains relevant and historically invaluable. I have just finished transcribing a section when I spent a month, fifty years ago, among the Hausa settlers and indigenous Funj groups living on the banks of the southern Blue Nile. Emerging tensions, issues over nationality and the hardening of cultural boundaries between these groups were well in evidence. In 2022, several violent clashes erupted between these same peoples, leaving around 600 dead and over 200,000 displaced. The same antagonisms recorded in 1974, had not only deepened, but they had also matured into political institutions and armed divisions. That youthful hopes didn’t materialise not only begs the question why? It carries the responsibility to bear witness to the resulting tragedy.
After fieldwork and working at the University of Khartoum, you changed focus and completed research on Indian foundry workers in Britain. This highlighted the racism within the labour movement. Can you say something about this?
In 1979, I joined the Research Unit on Ethnic Relations (RUER) at Aston University, Birmingham. RUER was a new ESRC-funded research Institute. It turned into a five-year fully funded research position on a topic of my choosing. This kind of open-ended opportunity has long since disappeared within universities. Aware of the concentration of Asian workers in the Black Country foundries, and their reputation for militancy, I chose to study their struggles. In particular, Indian workers in the large Smethwick foundry complex of Birmid Qualcast.
The lasting importance of this work was its critique of the mechanistic application of unequal exchange theory, then popular on the left. Specifically, its extension to immigration from Britain’s former colonies. Migrants were understood as a physical, indeed, immutable embodiment of ‘cheap’ labour. Like a living discount note, once arrived, capitalism could use it to work against the future. Thus, its many advocates argued that immigrants would keep old plant going, fill the jobs whites did not want and politically divide the working class. Cheap labour, however, is not born, so to speak. It has to be produced by violence, and then kept cheap by ongoing repression and racism.
The necessary and ongoing role of violence and militarism within capitalism is ignored. What became Black Radicalism and the Politics of Deindustrialisation(1988), details how Asian workers did none of the things accorded them. In fact, they fought back and achieved the opposite.
While the history of the ‘68 revolt is usually told in relation to the intelligentsia, prior to the May clashes in Paris, British industrialists already thought control of their factories was being lost to non-union worker militancy. Asian workers were a vanguard in this unrest. The left’s mechanistic view of cheap labour articulated with the chauvinism and racism organic to the British labour movement. Since decolonisation, there has been a single, increasingly repressive logic underpinning the reformulation of race and nation in Britain. That is, the pitching of public and welfare services as a finite quantity. From the beginning, immigration has been seen as a zero-sum game. The more immigrants, the less wealth in common for the deserving classes. Consequently, the constant refrain has been the control of numbers and restriction of social reproduction. Britain’s Labour Party and trade unions, have always been a key player within this violent logic.
During the 1950s, trade union presence was concentrated in the old Black Country craft foundries. Helped by strong union opposition, Asians concentrated in the new mechanised foundries then opening to support the motor assembly industry taking-off around Birmingham and Coventry. Through wild-cat strikes, that is, outside of trade union control, Indian workers leveraged what had become a regional just-in-time supply chain to increase, rather than lower, wages. Such was the threat, through private lobbying by large West Midland foundry groups, the Labour government inserted a Racial Balance Clause into the 1968 Race Relations Act. In the interests of ‘racial harmony’, this made it lawful for employers to disperse militant concentrations of Asian workers that monopolised specific foundry shops.
More politically significant than wages, was the struggle against racism. In particular, the racialised definition of ‘skill’ wielded in common by employers and the trade unions. In the mechanised foundry, the machine-operator stood atop the skill hierarchy. In reality, a repetitive and easily learnt task. Since the 1950s, the unions had argued that Asians were culturally unsuitable for machine work. In 1968, the Indian Workers Association (IWA) organised a series of Smethwick strikes against this racial exclusion. Instead of recruiting outside white workers every time a machine operator position became vacant, the IWA proposed that first refusal should be given to those who had been in the shop the longest.
The combined employer, trade union and government response to this attempt by Asian workers to control the labour process would prove historically significant. While conceding machine work was routine, management highlighted the need for racial balance and, as a health and safety issue, proficiency in English.
Unrest in the foundries saw the start of government funded industrial language training programmes aimed at Asian workers. Rather than exploitation, industrial unrest was redefined as a communication failure and cultural misunderstanding. As a way of winning back control, by the end of the 1960s, Birmid Qualcast was operating Britain’s first ‘equal opportunity’ programme. That is, using training programmes and official statutes to side-line militants while opening higher paid positions to the more politically compliant. During the 1970s, language training, morphed into the racist ‘anti-racism’ of Racism Awareness Training (RAT) which, with its emphasis on cultural relativism and identity, weakened class solidarity.
By the time that deindustrialisation gathered strength, the Indian shopfloor movement had collapsed. The legacy, however, was a suite of managerial tools that would grow in importance.
You eventually returned to Sudan as Oxfam’s Country Representative in 1985. What sort of changes were underway at this time?
Borrowing from Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, from comparatively few, the sudden surge in the number of NGOs operating in northern Sudan as a result of the mid-1980s drought was aptly called the ‘fantastic invasion’. At the same time, Sudan quickly became Oxfam’s largest overseas aid programme. If capital confronts labour on a global scale, the ‘fantastic invasion’ was part of a profound change in the nature of this confrontation. Deindustrialisation and emergence of the western mass consumer society was coterminous with the transformation of East Asia into the new workshop of the world and, importantly, the crystallisation of a new Middle East/Africa imperial axis. One open to hitherto more directly violent neocolonial methods of dispossession and extraction.
US imperialism has always had an indirect or proxy structure. Preferring coups, regime change, colour revolutions and, not least, either enjoying total military dominance or getting others to fight its wars. This has always given US imperialism a certain plausible deniability. Western humanitarianism is an integral element of this smoke and mirrors act.
While beginning earlier, the ‘fantastic invasion’ completed the process of Sudan’s imperial recapture. The accumulation of debt enforced IMF austerity and reorientation of agriculture towards exports, all fed into the rural inability to cope with the mid-1980s drought. The manner of Sudan’s capture was a rerun of how the old League of Nations justified its tutelage over otherwise independent Abyssinia. That is, as necessitated by the failure of black sovereignty. Western humanitarianism has drawn its legitimacy from this imputed failure ever since.
The 1980s, was also a time of radical change in the organisational structure of western NGOs. While initially employed as Field Director, within a year, my title had changed to that of Country Representative. There is a difference between ‘directing’ and ‘representing’. It was a period when NGOs were centralising authority. Helped by improvements in communication technology, centralisation saw the downgrading of area expertise, language proficiency and country programme independence.
Complementary changes were also underway in how disasters were understood. Seeking out the social and economic causes of a particular event were set aside. While predicting disasters became more important than knowing their cause. During the 1980s, famine was transformed into a series of behavioural signals and alerts. For example, population movement, changes in market prices or labour migration. The remote sensing of crop production through US satellite technology also became established. The trend from causes to prediction would accelerate with the spread of computers. The result is an enduring paradox of western humanitarianism. Although NGOs have been in places like Sudan for half a century, other than endlessly recalculating the needs arising from the failure of black sovereignty, they have no real knowledge of what is going on there. I explore this paradox if my book Post-Humanitarianism: Governing Precarity in the Digital World(2019).
During the 1990s, you did consultancy work on humanitarian intervention. How would you sum up the historical significance of this period?
This work was mainly for the UN, European aid ministries and NGOs on so-called conflict-related emergencies. Apart from revisiting Sudan several times, it also took in the former Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and Afghanistan. While always critical of the singularity of the surge in UN interventionism during the 1990s, with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine the historic significance of this period is now clear. NATO’s eastward expansion in Europe and the increase UN/NGO humanitarian interventionism in the Middle East and Africa are two sides of the same coin. The resurgence of western militarism with the onset of the second Cold War.
With regard to the aid industry, there are two key institutional departures. For the first time, the UN accepted to work in unresolved civil wars. During the first Cold War, a ceasefire was usually required for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission. Second, was the UN’s pronouncement that the time of absolute sovereignty was over. Captured in the term ‘humanitarian war’, sovereign inequality is intrinsic to western humanitarianism. Together, these departures marked the end of any semblance of aid neutrality. By the time of the US-led War on Terror, NGOs had evolved into agents of counterinsurgency. As Colin Powell aptly remarked, they had become invaluable ‘force-multipliers.’
Western humanitarianism justifies itself by claiming to ‘save lives’. Not only is there sparse evidence for this, but it also turns the purpose of the aid industry on its head. Once famine becomes a problem of prediction instead of an historically determined event, rather like European immigration, it becomes a question of numbers. In particular, the formal designation of the limit of human wastage beyond which famine becomes official and international appeals authorised.
Since the 1970s, however, there has been a steady increase in the level of malnutrition deemed acceptable before an emergency is declared. Rather than saving lives, through the setting of emergency thresholds, the aid industry is more a means of regulating death. Instead of finding causes and changing situations, humanitarians strive to keep death within limits acceptable to the status quo. That life expectancy in parts of Africa is half, or less, that in Europe, is indicative of the level of human wastage both acceptable and necessary to maintain western consumer societies.
Together with Nicholas Stockton, you recently published an article in ROAPE on the impact of livestock exports from the Horn of Africa to the Gulf states. How is this relevant to your concerns?
The piece on the rise of militarised sheep ranching in Somalia and Sudan emerged from our dissatisfaction with mainstream commentary on the region’s deepening crisis. This was before the tragic outbreak of civil war in April 2023. Nick uncovered several UN and World Bank datasets concerning the export of livestock from the Horn of Africa since the 1970s. From the figures, several trends are unmistakable. The export of livestock, especially sheep, has risen steadily such that, prior to Covid, Sudan and Somalia were exporting more livestock than the likes of Australia and the US. Quite a feat for two otherwise impoverished countries. Moreover, all of this animal protein was going to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. By 2020, supplying 90% of the region’s livestock imports. In the last two or three decades, the Horn has been reduced to a violent food frontier for the rapidly urbanising Gulf states.
This trade is absent from mainstream commentary because of the liberal tendency to see war as a side-effect of other factors, like ignorance or climate change. In other words, war is always an externality. Violence, however, is as an economic relation in its own right. The effect of the IMF’s imposition of austerity, or structural adjustment, was to transform the previous relation of reciprocity between ‘farmers’ and ‘herders’ into a relation of permanent war.
The data shows a correlation between periods of increased internal conflict and spikes in sheep export numbers. The violent dispossession of Somali farmers during the 1990s is one such spike. Another follows a decade later with the outbreak of war in Darfur. The aid industry transforms this formative violence into a series of unconnected ‘humanitarian emergencies.’ On rare occasions when the livestock trade is mentioned, it is in the positive sense of ‘development’ in action.
Regulating death conceals that land is being cleared of people to free cheap and disposable labour for the region and Europe, and to facilitate the emergence of a predatory form of militarised livestock production. Deepening the crisis within the agro-pastoral economy, this destructive and expansive mode of meat production is part of Sudan’s recent collapse into civil war. The key beneficiaries of the Horn’s violent food frontier, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are currently vying over the division of the carcass of this economy. The same states, as it happens, that are key players in US attempts to normalise regional relations with Israel.
For the aid industry, Sudan’s tragedy is another example of the failure of black sovereignty. This time, rejuvenated as a zero-sum ‘political marketplace’. At the same time, the mystifying claim of ‘saving lives’ finds no greater expression. It is widely accepted that a genocidal intent, with the support of western powers, is being unleashed on Gaza. For Sudan, however, this awkward truth is ignored. Exploiting plausible deniability to the full, the aid industry is now urging the same imperial alliance to forcefully intervene in the interests of peace. Such a peace, however, will come at the heavy price of a regional carve-up of this stricken but once proud country.
A final question, how do you see the political mood at the moment and the changing dynamics of imperialism?
Since the 2008 financial crisis, and especially the Covid pandemic, western capitalism has entered a deepening crisis. This has a number of unique and disturbing characteristics. While still retaining great power, the west’s half-millennium dominance over the global South can no longer be taken for granted. Certainly, the soft power it once enjoyed has been eroded. The hoarding of vaccines during the pandemic, the double standards with regard to Ukrainian refugees compared to Afghanistan, the Middle East and Africa and, not least, the western backing for the genocide unfolding in Gaza have all contributed to this erosion. One can add the rise of China and the questionable effect of sanctions on Russia. For the first time, to the concern of US imperialism, the vast Eurasia landmass shows clear signs of a halting process of unification.
Such factors are fuelling the resurgence of western militarism that emerged with the ending of the first Cold War. This militarism, however, is not like earlier versions. Both previous world wars, especially WWII, saw an increase in compensatory welfare spending. In Britain, war gave birth to the welfare state. Today, it is militarism with neoliberal characteristics. Preparation for external aggression is combined, through austerity, with attacks on the social reproduction of home populations.
A call to arms is taking place against the backdrop of the deliberate destruction of the public commons. Rearmament under conditions of deindustrialisation is also novel. Earlier phases occurred when western powers still had an industrial base. Other than small batches of high-tech weaponry, the infrastructure, skill sets and ethos necessary to sustain peer-to-peer industrial war have been wantonly destroyed by finance capital. And, unless the west defaults to nuclear weapons, if the proxy war in Ukraine escalates, it will be peer-to-peer industrial war. Militarism, moreover, is intensifying climate change. War depends upon the space-time advantages conferred by fossil-fuels. That pumping oil is now actually increasing rather than decreasing is no accident.
In juggling such contradictions, the political classes no longer govern in the public interest and politicians are widely derided. That capital is now fighting on both internal and external fronts has seen the return of unprecedented censorship, media manipulation and the suppression of the right of peaceful protest. The situation currently existing in the universities is unique in living memory. Such vital topics as Ukraine and Gaza are not openly debated for fear of sanctions. There is a new McCarthyism afoot.
From its inception, neoliberalism was anti-democratic. Until the 1990s, however, this was hidden within regional, trade and patent agreements. Today, it is visible. Rather than disappearing as many hoped with the 2008 financial crisis, neoliberalism has adopted outwardly authoritarian characteristics as capital intensifies its production of waste. To call for negotiation rather than war, to defend democracy against oligarchy and, in an increasingly multipolar world, to see utility in an independent foreign policy have all become threats to ‘western values.’ We are, indeed, at a crossroads.
Mark Duffield works on the political philosophy of permanent emergency, including, the datafication of the current global crisis, the expansion of remote management systems and the growing antagonism between ‘connectivity’ and ‘circulation’.
Kalundi Serumaga offers a radical take on the two-day conference at Makerere University in Kampala in January 2024, reflecting on 40 years of neoliberalism in Uganda. He observed that while Uganda’s intellectuals speak up against poverty and social instability, they fall short of envisioning a way out of the neoliberal impasse. Serumaga defines neoliberalism, elucidates its origins in Uganda’s tumultuous political and economic history, and emphasises the necessity of critiquing it.
By Kalundi Serumaga
Neoliberalism, as a set of economic policies, is in full bloom in Uganda. The moment of the arrival in power of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime, which at the end of January 2024 celebrated its 38th year in power, was the occasion for this to happen. Its impact on the livelihood and social fabric of the country has been marked and attracted many creative responses and coping mechanisms. There were some findings at a mid-January Makerere University conference I attended, where some of these realities were explored.
Papers were presented by researchers who had done a wide variety of work on observing and sometimes analysing what life has become for Ugandans, some four decades after the process of privatising and liberalising everything, had first been introduced here. An important early takeaway was the reminder that the genesis of this new economic direction did not start in Uganda under the current National Resistance Movement government but earlier, during the time of the 1980-1985 Uganda Peoples Congress party under the presidency of Milton Obote. More on that later. Milton Obote was the person who came to power at Uganda’s independence in 1962. He served as executive Prime Minister until 1966, when he emerged victorious in his tussle with the country’s then-president and took complete power after a bloody coup d’état.
I noticed three things during the conference. The first was how there is still a strong spirit among Ugandan and non-Ugandan intellectuals to defend and rescue human dignity. This was especially marked among the younger presenters. It was most encouraging. The consensus was that economic growth notwithstanding, the policies have generated poverty and social instability. The second was how, notwithstanding, we seemed as a group to have been conditioned to lower our expectations. It was as if the current global neoliberal economic regime is now taken as a fixed “norm”, and little to nothing can be envisioned of a life outside of its parameters.
The third was, therefore, an open-ended conclusion. Was the purpose of the research to illuminate or to guide? Should such a convening, therefore, have a pre-determined target, or should it form one on the basis of all the findings? We did not decide whether neoliberalism should be accepted as it has been so far, reformed, or strongly opposed. I was left wondering about the extent to which the provenance of the key participants might have influenced this.
First of all, this was Makerere University. The premiere of the colonially-established universities in Eastern Africa, and still the prime absorber of the best and brightest minds of the Ugandan and other countries’ mission school education system which, historically, then formed part of the professional-managerial class. This presents two situations. On the one hand, it tends towards being a bastion of conformist thinking for any given epoch; on the other, there can be found a built-in resistance to contrary ideas and alternative realities that they have not thought up themselves since the average student has hitherto been deemed the sharpest throughout the earlier days of their education.
Secondly, having said that there was also a new orthodoxy coming in. The arrival of the new regime came with many new (and donor-funded) ideas, which laid the foundations for new social and public policy in parallel to the new economic order. And so also began a new phase of conformism. This could take the form of whole new entities like the School of Women and Gender Studies, being established in 1991. Elsewhere, more emphasis began to be placed on hitherto marginal subjects like Commercial Law, and political science became very concerned with new developmental concepts
Even the nature of studying was to change as a lot of education became liberalised, with even Makerere taking in essentially private students. These are some of the issues described by Prof. Mahmoud Mamdani in Scholars in the Marketplace. I mention him in particular because, along with scholars from the Schools of Law, Gender and Politics, Ugandan conference participants also came from the Makerere Institute for Social Research (MISR), which had been stewarded by Mamdani for 12 years until 2022 and refashioned to reflect his own thinking on education.
The significance of this will be addressed later. Suffice it to say for now that as with this new epistemological regime and the new rigours of the marketplace to which they may later enter, a certain kind of paralysis seemed to have been present in terms of the aforementioned possibility of conclusions. To the standard African nationalism of old, neoliberalism’s proposals were pure heresy. Whatever their disagreements among themselves, post-independence African nationalists basically settled on one model for economic growth: a state-managed economy dominated by large parastatals, institutions which were virtually the sacred cows of the development agenda.
The economic arguments
Neoliberalism is a push-back against thinking that through the work of 1930s economists such as Maynard Keynes, was emerging as a dominant policy in capitalist countries as a way of containing revolts among ordinary people. Social Democracy called for an element of public spending to prevent poverty becoming a crisis.
In principle, capitalists always disliked such measures, but mainstream capitalism had come to accept that some level of social-welfarism was going to be necessary for the sake of social cohesion and stability, as these were the basis of sustained industrial activity. The United States had the New Deal in the early 1930s, which re-set American public policy for decades. The United Kingdom had a whole cluster of laws and policies that, since the 1940s, transformed housing, education, mass transit, and health into public goods.
What was called the Chicago School of Economics also emerged in the 1950s among academics (also called “monetarists”) like Milton Friedman, who began theorising ways to defeat Social Democratic measures and return to a preference for the “free market” merchant capitalism days. The difference is that what the world has today is no longer a free market (nor can it be one) in which entrepreneurs enter and leave according to their skills and fortunes and where local and global trade is defended against monopolism. That was the 1860s era when Western navies protected trade routes, and parties like the Liberal Party – whose name was not coincidental – emerged in global powers like Great Britain. It was the era of merchant capitalism. Neo-liberalism today is a pretence to that, using its arguments to disguise the dominance of a few big banks and corporations. The economy remains dominated by groups of ever-merging corporations and their financiers. In case of problems, they still fall back on public funds to rescue them. In short, the capitalists actually simply privatise state benefits to themselves but deny welfare to the masses. This is the real meaning of the “neo” affix. It goes against the very essence of the original capitalist ideology of “pure” capitalism based on survival of the fittest.
Theory is only theory until it gets power behind it. The first step was when neoliberals acquired influence in Western academia, the media and sections of mainstream political parties by setting up think tanks and the like. Their line of attack was through politically exploiting the growing crisis of Social Democracy. This was relatively easy, as Western Social Democracy (be it British “Labourism” or the legacy of the American New Deal) was always a halfway house mediating between capital and labour. Over time, it became too expensive for capitalism to sustain itself, especially with the gradual loss of its colonies. So the choices faced were to abolish capitalism and become a fully socialist state or abolish Social Democracy and, well, have neoliberalism.
The second step taken by the neoliberalists was when the traditional conservative parties, headed by those factions and advocating the second option, then acquired state power. But the first experiment was not in an imperial power: it was in Chile with the 1973 coup against the socialist government of Salvador Allende organised by British and American intelligence agencies led by the budding war criminal Henry Kissinger. The military government that came in proceeded on a brisk policy of privatising state-owned corporations, opening the economy to “investors” (“liberalisation”). Those opposed or in the way, civil society, critical media, trades unions and leftists in general were simply crushed in the process.
The second and the third were the British governments of Margaret Thatcher (1979) and the American government of Ronald Reagan (1980); I emphasise the individual because, as said, these policies represented a new strand of thinking even within their own already pro-capitalist parties and led to a lot of internal debate and feuding. In short, they represented an extreme faction within their own parties, which had managed to capture the formal leadership of the party. Neoliberalism, therefore, started with coups, some of which became violent as part of the process. Both Thatcher and Reagan were initially elected by a minority of voters.
Once political power is achieved, then the work of the wholesale dismantling of whatever public goods and protections the neoliberal capitalists feel are a “hindrance to enterprise” begins. This changed Western politics in those countries, bringing the corruption the West had long foisted on the South into the open at home. For example, the Thatcher government organised the sell-off of public housing by rigging the results of a referendum held to decide on the matter.
Now firmly entrenched in state power, Western neoliberalism further formalised itself by taking over global trade bodies. This ideology became the “Washington Consensus” by about 1989: a package of ten conditions that had to be met in order to qualify for supposedly “international” aid. It is not clear to me whether the “consensus” referred to was between the international institutions and Washington as the US capital, or an agreement among the powerful in Washington alone. Here was certainly no “consensus” on the receiving side, and it has been dictators signing up to these terms.
Our backstory
Independence, for all its flaws, was an achievement for African politics. In Uganda, much as the original anti-colonial leadership was sidelined and the mass element stood down, its demands still had to be addressed. This became the framework of all post-independence politics. It was, in essence, a Social Democratic system for African conditions.
This brings us to Uganda today; we have the first and probably the most committed neoliberal regime in Africa, something that made President Museveni the absolute darling of the West. Regarding the aforementioned violence, history shows ours to have been the product of not one but two coups. The first was the December 1980 election crisis that saw Obote’s henchman declare him the winner. A lot of ink (and blood) was since expended in the business of analysing all the political events that followed. Relatively less time and energy has been devoted to examining the economic direction of Milton Obote’s (1980-1985) UPC government.
Just as imperialism at home sought to find a way to erode the Social Democratic policies, it also always wanted to do so to the gains created ultimately by the real and original anti-colonial 1920-1949 movement (as opposed to the Obote-led reformists who followed in the later colonial period) which gave us trades unions, the right to elect lower reps, agricultural co-operative unions, affordable credit, currency autonomy, and trade protection. As said, this is because all these things formed barriers to greater exploitation. All post-independence governments upheld these to some extent, especially since they could game the West under Cold War conditions by flirting with the Soviet Union so as to make the West tread a bit more gently. In addition, Obote had a faction of his party that was still somewhat wedded to the Social Democratic system it had overseen – and autocratised- in the 1960s. This is possibly why, in the midst of these reforms, then President Obote saw it necessary to also serve for a while as his own finance minister.
The NRM in power faced far fewer handicaps, not least because the Cold War was basically over by then, so the triumphant West could be a lot bolder with the diktats coming via the World Bank/International Monetary Fund. This is why I describe the NRM version as being “in full-bloom”: because out of the ten standard requirements, the Milton Obote regime, in the midst of all its self-created problems, was only able to deliver on four. The NRM, for its part, has delivered possibly eleven out of the ten.
Condition
Obote 1981-1985
Museveni 1986-
1
Reduce national budget deficits
Attempts made but resisted by party diehards who demanded public servant increases and a raise in the minimum wage.
Public expenditure was reduced until cronyism and attendant irresponsible borrowing set in.
2
Redirect spending from politically popular areas toward neglected fields with high economic returns
Public expenditure remained a policy focus, for political reasons.
More emphasis on creating infrastructure for mining and agribusiness enterprises and industrial parks.Hospitals and higher education made to “cost share” with the public.
3
Reform the tax system
Not really implemented in a way that made any difference.
A complete and thorough overhaul of tax policies and collection, including militarism anti-smuggling operations, put in place. They mainly target African businesses.There are also regular tax holidays for “investors”.
Cronies regularly avoid taxes.
4
Liberalise the financial sector with the goal of market-determined interest rates
Not much.
Central Bank made independent of government, under a hugely revised Bank of Uganda Act.IMF, World Bank and Bank of England representatives placed on governing board.Ugandan and African-owned banks harassed out of the market.
5
Adopt a competitive single exchange rate
Currency was floated and therefore devalued up to possibly 41 times, but divided into two categories: one regulated, and the other not.
No really possible in a highly regulated economic environment dominated by state-owned enterprises.
Process of registering foreign businesses and simplifying land sales were put in place
7
Abolish barriers to foreign direct investment
Not much investor interest, due to the civil war, and other statist policies.
Three key policies:-a fully floated and convertible currency.-Removal of all restrictions on export of profits.
-Commitment to prevent and otherwise compensate for any acts of nationalisation,
Were put in place
8
Privatise state-owned enterprises
Out of the question.
Carried out with extreme vigour and comprehensiveness.
9
Abolish policies that restrict competition
State regulation of the economic sphere remained largely in place.
Done.Legally and informally.
10
Provide secure, affordable property rights
Expropriated Properties Act in 1983, was first attempt to restore investor confidence, by cancelling Amin-era confiscation of Asian-held properties.
The 1983 Act was widely built upon, and newer “investors” were also given greater legal protection.Conversely, ordinary peoples land often seized for investors.
When I say “eleven”, I mean in terms of the Museveni regime’s bonus point of enabling the installation of West-friendly regimes in nearly all of Uganda’s neighbours. An illustration of how complete the NRM capitulation is can be found in the fact that an IMF delegation from Washington arrived at Uganda’s international airport on the very same day the new Bank of Uganda Act was passed in parliament and proceeded straight to the Bank of Uganda headquarters for a meeting with the Bank governor. They were then allocated offices, which their successors occupy to this day.
Uganda’s Chile moment
The debate in Uganda today about the merits and demerits of the Amin era continues to unfold, sometimes taking unexpected turns. However, one clear effect was for the entire rest of the political class, coming from their very differing perspectives, to have all become fed up with him to the point of ending up in one coalition against him.
This Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) coalition sought to actively build on the legacy of the independence struggles in an orderly manner. It was formed in 1978 as a political solution to Tanzania’s determination to avoid finding itself controlling a politically divided country once the process of militarily removing Amin’s government was achieved following the 1978 invasion of northern Tanzania by Amin’s army. It was only a collection of Marxist individuals who had the capacity to create such a coalition since much of the rest of the exile political groupings were caught up in feuds and militarist competitions against one another. For this reason, the imperialists – particularly Britain – actively sought to undermine the post-Amin government it formed from day one.
The coalition government was militarily overthrown in May 1980, to the relief of the imperialists and to the glee of even the various so-called “left” factions that had always been critical of it, who sided with one or other of the two armed factions that had jointly carried out the coup. Nobody should have really been surprised that the NRM quickly and wholeheartedly adopted neoliberalism once it came to power in its own right: Yoweri Museveni was number two in the military junta that overthrew the UNLF.
The 1980 December elections were the chance for imperialism to further implement its anti-Social Democratic intentions. It made a deal to help one party steal the elections and then help it hold onto power by providing it with extensive diplomatic support on the international scene. And the fact that they were using a now desperate “socialist” entity in the form of Milton Obote and his Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) party to do so was just an extra blessing. It helped win the propaganda arguments, just as President Yoweri Museveni today will always fall back on his pan-Africanist and guerilla credentials to explain away policy contradictions. Such “leftist” coverts to an open imperialist program are particularly valuable in political terms: their about-face leaves the progressive body-politic confused and demoralised for a long while; their origins in, and familiarity with, the left circles allow for much more effective surveillance, co-option and even suppression of the Left, and their control of the state leaves left hardliners isolated.
In return, Uganda, under the UPC, adopted a four-year “Economic Recovery Plan” based on “advice” from Western economic institutions. In essence, this plan obliged the state to borrow “rehabilitation” money to fix the infrastructure and make the parastatals into loan-bound partnerships with foreign investors. So the overthrow of the UNLF coalition was our Chile movement, but the Ugandan capacity for resistance (however badly focused) made it become a five-year civil war.
The war eventually brought down the Obote-UPC government as well as the short-lived military junta that had overthrown it. But the west was able to regroup by promising power to one of the armed rebel groups on condition that it also embraced neoliberalism. Enter Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army. Therefore, it is better to say that Obote and Museveni were only enemies on the battlefield of the war. When it came to dismantling the basics of Ugandan Social Democracy, they were, in fact, on the same page.
The rest, is basically obvious, and history: poverty is a natural consequence of all capitalisms, and especially this one. Literature, from Victorian-era Britain, the Marcos-era in the Philippines – whose countrywomen formed the first mass wave of migrant labour in the Middle East – to Frantz Fanon all tell us the same story. I, therefore, had a problem with the near-empiricist nature of some of the presentations. Especially when they were being done by the non-Ugandans, I suggested perhaps in the future that they could use their positions to conduct similar studies on the poverty being created in their home countries and come to the present since neoliberalism is a global phenomenon.
This suggestion, as well as the writings of Dani Nabudere can put all of this in at once a Ugandan and global context, did not go over particularly well. But it was of interest to me to note once again that this most incisive and prolific analyst to come out of Uganda, but who wrote and analysed on a global level, was nowhere to be found in the lips and the notes of any of the presenters (except me). Nabudere tended to work “from the general to the specific” and from the philosophical to the practical. He was able to apply this to the eight or nine works that located the Ugandan economy within the global imperium, how this impacted Ugandan politics, and what could be done. On that last point, he was active against various Ugandan regimes and endured detention, exile, and war between 1966 and 1993.
Nabudere’s silencing begins with the downfall of the UNLF coalition, of which he was a major architect and member. Mamdani was the intellectual among the “Left” groupings, which sided with the various militarist factions. Having engaged extensively in debates with Nabudere while both were in exile at the University of Dar es Salaam, he was sure to be extremely familiar with Nabudere’s writings and perspectives. The fact that he and his then cohorts could not recognise an anti-imperialist initiative when they saw one says a lot about their analytical abilities. The fact that the issues are not brought for discussion at MISR even today raises questions of intellectual honesty.
I would argue that part of MISR paralysis, in particular, stems from the lack of exposure to a whole alternative and extensive counter-reading of Ugandan political science as Nabudere’s writings effectively do not feature on Makerere curriculum in any of the disciplines (Law, Philosophy, Economics, or Politics) he wrote in, and certainly not at MISR as reincarnated by a Nabudere contemporary. The story of the genesis of our neoliberal crisis and the full scope of our engagements with and analysis of it must not be hidden or forgotten. Nor should he be. Otherwise, what is the point of an academic conference or academics in general?
Kalundi Serumaga is an activist and political commentator based in Kampala. He has had a long career working as a filmmaker, director, journalist, dramatist, and historian, and has faced broadcasting bans. Serumaga is a follower of the late African activist and philosopher Dani Nabudere
Featured Image: Museveni speaking at African Land Force Summit created by the United States Army to bring together African leaders (wiki commons)
ROAPE’s Rama Salla Dieng writes Senegal is facing a wave of protests following the appointment of the new government. Feminist organisations have been shocked at the pathetic number of women ministers in the new government. Dieng writes about the history of marginalisation of women in public office in Senegal since independence, and what the new government must do.
By RamaSalla Dieng
Senegalese President Bassirou Diomaye Faye and his Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko are facing a wave of protests following their 5 April decree appointing the new government: 25 ministers and five secretaries of state . The protests came from women and feminist organisations of diverse ideological and political persuasions. These groups expressed their disappointment at the feeble number of women ministers in the government (only four). This disappointment is all the greater given that the newly elected President proposed in his political platform to promote “the empowerment and promotion of women for an inclusive and prosperous society“. Women’s rights defenders and feminist organisations rightly point out that women have made a significant contribution to the fight for political change in the country.
Women’s disillusionment at their being marginalised in politics is nothing new in Senegal. In March 1964, four years after Senegal obtained its political independence, the editorial team of AWA, La Revue de la Femme Noire, made a convincing statement illustrating women’s desires for more political inclusion:
We no longer want to be mere electoral votes, the ones who tip the balance. We want to know what is going on in the National Assembly, in the municipalities, inside the “party” whose colours we defend in national institutions. We are aware of our strength, and we know that without us, Senegal will not have its true dimension.
Sixty years after this unequivocal call for women’s equal access in decision-making, contemporary Senegalese women appear to face the same glass ceiling. One of the first acts posed by the newly elected leaders was to transform the ministry formerly dedicated for Women, Children and Entrepreneurship into the Ministry for the Family and Solidarities with the decree co-signed by the Head of State and the Head of Government. This new ministry is henceforth responsible for matters relating to “the family” as well as women’s rights, social protection, and the fight against all forms of discrimination. The renaming of the ministry is justified by the government’s concern for pragmatism and rationalisation.
The differences between the content of the current decree and the previous decrees on the remit of the Ministry for Women, Children and Female Entrepreneurship are minimal. However, it is legitimate to question the message that the new government seeks to convey by removing the reference to “women” and “child” from the ministry’s title.
Erasure and deliberate oblivion
The demands of women and feminists of the post-independence generation and the 2012 and 2024 political governments pose a more structural problem which becomes apparent when we examine history over time. In the same 1964 article in AWA referred to above that profiled Caroline Faye Diop, she expressed the same desire for social equity:
We want to participate in the development of our nation, have our full share of responsibilities. At important moments in our history, we have been at your side, and often leading at the front!
This appeal from Faye who was Senegal’s first female member of parliament brings to light a sinister fact: worse than the invisibility of women. Indeed, it must be acknowledged that after having been an integral part of the struggle for independence alongside their male comrades within political parties and even more involved in community organisations, these women were often overshadowed by patriarchy. For example, while the right to vote was granted to the French citizens residing in the four communes (Saint Louis, Gorée, Dakar and Rufisque) as early as April 1944, Senegalese women had to fight to access this right. This was only achieved on 6 June 1945.
This logic of erasure continued after independence in 1960, despite the fact that women often carried out all the work of mobilising and raising awareness among the rural and urban masses, or paid the price of imprisonment and violence, as did the placard-bearers who demanded independence from the French president Charles de Gaulle. Political women and women in general are often deliberately relegated to the background, to the “margins of the margins”, once the hard work is done, as shown in the film Les Mamans de l’indépendance.
Selective forgetfulness
We need to look back at history to see that this logic of selective oblivion and deliberate erasure is not new. Indeed, historian Babacar Fall, who drew up portraits of two Senegalese political activists from the early days who are little known to younger generations – Arame Diène and Thioumbé Samb – deplored the fact that the political and electoral weight of women was not reflected by their access to major decision-making positions.
This relegation of women to secondary roles and their erasure is compounded by a logic of social differentiation that deepens inequalities not only between women and men, but also between different categories of women alongside class, caste, race, marital status and generation. This has resulted in women being forgotten by official history, including Diène and Samb, who Fall sought to rehabilitate. This erasure is also noted by the activists of Yewwu Yewwi pour la Libération de la Femme (‘Educating oneself to liberate self and others’ in Wolof). In their June 1984 appeal to the women of Senegal, they noted that “while the meagre privileges of educated women increased with independence, the gap separating them from the underprivileged widened even further, to the extent that the latter confined themselves to social actions/activities”.
While making this observation, Yewwu Yewwi called for the constant mobilisation of women against an erosion of the gains of the liberation struggles and the fruits of certain achievements such as the reform of the family code to which they actively contributed. Moreover, the family code remains eminently discriminatory despite the fact that women have gained access to certain professions and improved salaries that were not shared equally among all women. They recommended an intersectional analysis that would reveal the internal dynamics of patriarchy and the relations of subordination that justify and legitimise the subjugation of “the overwhelming majority of women, made up of poor peasant women, housewives in working-class neighbourhoods and working-class women”.
As for the editorial team of AWA, it reiterated in February 1973, their aspiration to be recognised and included in decision-making as political leaders in an article profiling four female members of the National Assembly: Caroline Faye Diop, Haoua Dia Thiam, Léna Diagne Gueye and Marianne Sambou Sohai, denouncing the relegation of women to the political background. This was how they expressed their protest:
Committed activists, passionate feminists or housewives traditionally ignorant of “public” affairs, none of us women in this country are indifferent to these political affairs that can – and must – improve certain aspects of the status of women.
How can the situation be rectified?
The President of Senegal, Bassirou Diomaye Faye, must instruct his new government to take the protests of women’s organisations and movements seriously – and act swiftly by taking appropriate measures. Here are three priorities for the President and his government:
honour his electoral promises to Senegalese women as outlined in his Project for a sovereign, just and prosperous Senegal. These promises included: the protection of women’s rights, equitable access to land, an audit of the Strategy for Gender Equity and Equality (SNEEG), and the extension of parental authority to women. Also included was the search for paternity for women and girls in the event of unwanted pregnancy, the training and retention of girls in school, the strengthening of maternal and child health, support for women entrepreneurs, the fight against gender-based violence, and the reform of nurseries (which are not the exclusive preserve of women). In order to implement some of these promises, the family code needs to be reformed to ensure greater equity within the family and in the public sphere.
Preserve the achievements of the May 2010 gender parity in elective or partially elective institutions for which generations of women (and men) have fought. The recommendations of this law should also be extended to political functions (such as government and administrative management positions).
Ensure the inclusion and representation of young people and women in all actions taken by the President of the Republic and in all official government communications as a guarantee of respect for the principle of equality of all citizens as established by the Senegalese Constitution.
Rama Salla Dieng is a Senegalese writer, academic and activist. She is currently a Lecturer in African and International Development at the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh. Rama is also a feminist activist who has collaborated with several feminist organisations on agrarian change, gender and development, and social reproduction. Rama has written this text in a personal capacity.
Featured Photograph: Two issues of AWA, La Revue de la Femme Noire, a women’s magazine founded in 1964.
Immaculata Abba and Sa’eed Husaini introduce a project that aims at digitising important and imperilled archival holdings of Nigeria’s radical and pro-democracy activists to increase accessibility to these materials as well as to preserve them for posterity. Abba and Husaini invite researchers working in the social sciences and humanities to submit proposals for research papers that use archival research in the collections to produce new narratives of Nigeria’s rich and important history of the radical left.
By Immaculata Abba and Sa’eed Husaini
Archives of the Nigerian Left is a project run by the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD) and funded by the French Institute for Research in Africa (IFRA), using the Solidarity Fund for Innovative Projects (FSPI) awarded by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This project, which is a component of IFRA’s ‘Nigerian Heritage Digitisation Programme’, aims at digitising important and imperilled archival holdings of Nigeria’s radical and pro-democracy activists to increase accessibility to these materials as well as to preserve them for posterity.
CDD is an independent, not-for-profit, research, training and advocacy organisation established to mobilise global opinion and resources for democratic development and provide an independent space to reflect critically on the challenges posed to the democratisation and development processes in West Africa.
With few exceptions, the study of left radicalism in Africa has focused on countries where Soviet-aligned movements or prominent African socialist leaders took power. Less is understood about contexts like Nigeria where ideological counter-movements remained in opposition. This project aims at reducing the generational divide in historical memory of radical pro-democracy struggles in late 20th-century Nigeria where elite narratives are dominant but popular and ideological counter-movements are largely forgotten.
Since 2022, we have been working with archivists and families of activists, intellectuals and organisers active in the Left in the twentieth century. We situate the project in the company of the likes of Revolutionary Papers and are working to make the archives available and accessible online for researchers and the general public to learn about and study them. We believe that digitisation projects can be useful for resuscitating suppressed or minority heritages, despite the hierarchies of knowledge, resources, and power which such projects might also reinforce.
Our collection currently includes four archives, albeit in different stages of digitisation: Yusufu Bala Usman’s archive, Baba Omojola’s archive, the archive of Ola and Kehinde Oni, and the Socialist Library and Archives (SOLAR).
Yusufu Bala Usman worked in the Department of History, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, from 1970 until his death in September 2005. Among his many contributions to the study of African history and sensitising Nigerians to liberation struggles against neocolonial and imperialist oppression across the Global South, Yusufu Bala Usman was the Director of Research of the People’s Redemption Party. He is the author of many books including For the Liberation of Nigeria (New Beacon Books, London, 1979), Nigeria Against the I.M.F.: The Home Market Strategy (Vanguard, Kaduna, 1986), The Manipulation of Religion in Nigeria 1977-1987 (Vanguard, Kaduna, 1987). The self-proclaimed aim of the Yusufu Bala Usman Institute which currently holds his archive is to “critically examine and disseminate his ideas which, years after they were espoused, have proved prescient in their analysis of the society’s problems and provide possible solutions to the issues of today […]”.
Baba Omojola, a Nigerian socialist activist and intellectual who died in 2013, was a foremost opponent of military rule and gained prominence organizing across various radical collectives to build a united front in support of the transition to democracy as well as rallying support for African liberation movements and anti-apartheid struggles. In addition to serving as a political adviser to notable radical leaders such as Aminu Kano and Micheal Imoudu, he later became a key advocate for a new constitution for Nigeria aiming to empower Nigeria’s various ethnic groups.
Ola Oni was a political economist who taught at the University of Ibadan for 24 years. His life of activism began when he was a secondary school student at King’s College and included key roles in the Socialist Party of Workers, Farmers and Youth, the Nigeria Labour Party, and in the formation of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) in the 1970s and 1980s. He is the co-author (with Bade Onimode) ofEconomic Development of Nigeria: The Socialist Alternative.
Kehinde Ola-Oni is a socialist feminist activist and the life president of the Action Women of Nigeria. For four years, she was the coordinator of Women in Nigeria. The Marxist activist couple’s archive contains documents on the left political movement in Nigeria, particularly histories of the Trade Union and Women Union from the 1960s to the 1990s in South-West Nigeria (Ibadan).
SOLAR’s archive is a product of the combined archives and libraries Edwin and Bene Madunagu have collected since 1973. Parts of it constituted the free socialist public library that opened in 1995 in Calabar at a time when government-funded public libraries were collapsing in Nigeria. With a mission to be an important resource centre in Africa on revolutionary and progressive literature, SOLAR holds books, journals, essays, audiovisuals, and ephemera on the lives, struggles and quarrels of individuals and generations of Nigerian revolutionaries and activists from the colonial period to the present period.
Writing about his hopes when SOLAR was launched, Biodun Jeyifo, wrote that he hoped SOLAR would bridge ‘the chasm between generations for whom anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism are fundamental points of departure and the much younger generational cohorts for whom the effective ideological and strategic context for their struggles for justice and equality […] is subsumed under a “patriotic”, nation-state polity in which the be-all and end-all of revolutionary or democratic subjectivity are captured by “governance”, “state capture” […].’
Similarly, we hope that the Archives of Nigerian Left project as a whole offers a wellspring of inspiration for younger Nigerians and Africans to think about and learn from our shared struggles under global capitalism.
Our work at The Archives of Nigerian Left project also includes developing a website to serve as a central hub for these archives as well as organising workshops and conducting research to publicise knowledge about the archives and Nigeria’s heritage of left radicalism. We have previously funded journalists to engage with the project and now we would like to cultivate academic research around the archives.
As such, we invite researchers working in the social sciences and humanities to submit proposals for a peer-reviewed research paper that uses archival research in our collections to produce new narratives. We are especially interested in political theory, historical, historiographical, and sociological work that explores radical movements during military regimes between 1967 and 1999. Cross-cutting areas of emphasis may include Northern Nigeria, women’s contributions, guerrilla movements, discourse in popular media, and the intellectual thought of individuals and collectives.
Two selected scholars will receive €500 Euros (paid out in the Naira equivalent) to conduct their research and develop their proposals into peer-reviewed journal articles. Emerging scholars (including current graduate students at MA- or PhD-level), recent PhD graduates, early career academics and independent researchers are especially encouraged to apply.
Dates to remember:
Deadline for proposal submission: 10 May, 2024
Successful applicants will be contacted by: 15 May, 2024
Deadline for final paper submission: 12 July, 2024
What to submit:
– A research proposal (1000 – 1500 words) that presents your research aim and questions, a literature review that shows how your research project contributes to the state of knowledge in your field, methodology (including your conceptual framework and what archives and what sections or material will you be looking at) and preliminary schedule.
– CV (one to two pages)
– 100-word bio (to be included in the body of your email)
Immaculata Abba is a freelance photographer, writer and scholar based in Abuja and Enugu, Nigeria. Sa’eed Husaini is research fellow at the Center for Democracy and Development in Abuja, Nigeria, and a regional editor for Africa Is a Country.
Featured Photograph: Protesters at the end SARS protest in Lagos, Nigeria (13 October 2020).
In this blog summary of a ROAPE journal article, Ben Radley argues that the Democratic Republic of the Congo provides an illustrative case of green imperialism, as large capital and hegemonic powers seek to control and generate profit from Congolese territory and resources under the discursive banner of ‘greening’ the global economy. The result, Radley contends, is the reproduction a model of mining-led national development that historically has delivered little by way of material improvements for most Congolese, undermining the prospects of future prosperity in the country.
Green New Deals in the global North, such as those unveiled by the US and the EU in 2019, hope to reinvigorate stagnating capitalist economies by catalysing massive growth in the manufacturing and export of renewable energy and other green technologies, creating millions of high-skilled and well-remunerated jobs in the process. Max Ajl has labelled these low-carbon capitalist visions as belonging to an historical form of capitalism that has only survived through its ability to “hunt and feed on the periphery”. In other words, as an imperialist project dependent upon the transfer of value from South to North, producing uneven development and seeking to maintain Southern subordination within the global capitalist economy.
Green imperialism in the Congo
There are few other places, perhaps, where green imperialist dynamics are more visible than the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Home to a range of critical low-carbon metals and minerals, including lithium, copper, and cobalt (with the country currently responsible for around two-thirds of global cobalt supply), the Congo also hosts an estimated $1 billion off-grid solar market and is home to 13 percent of global hydropower potential.
In the opening decades of the 21st century, hegemonic powers – most notably the US and the EU, with the support of the IMF, the World Bank, and Northern donors – successfully dismantled Congolese sovereign ownership and control over its natural resource wealth (not only low-carbon metals, but also water and sunlight) through the post-war liberalisation of the country’s mining and energy sectors. This, in turn, has established open access to the Congolese economy for the profitable extraction of low-cost, low-carbon metals and the entry of profit-seeking renewable energy finance and technology. Both processes serve to advance the imperialist economic agendas detailed in the wide array of Green New Deals coming out of the global North in recent years.
While China was less directly involved in the Congo’s post-war liberalisation (or at the least, if it was more directly involved, this has been less well documented to date), it has nonetheless been a major beneficiary of the process. In 2021, four of the six transnational mining corporations holding majority ownership of the Congo’s major cobalt projects, together accounting for 90 percent of total cobalt production in the country that year, were Chinese (Table 1).
The US appears to have fallen asleep at the wheel here – with US mining corporate Freeport-McMoRan for example holding majority ownership of Tenke Fungurume up until 2016 – and is today heavily preoccupied with and concerned by China’s dominant position in the control of Congolese cobalt production. In July 2023, a press release accompanying a new bill towards the creation of a US national strategy to secure supply chains involving critical minerals from the Congo noted:
Currently, China operates 15 of the 19 cobalt producing mines in the DRC, which has created dominance for the Chinese Communist Party over global critical mineral supply chains which directly harms US strategic interests. As a result of this supply chain reality … it is imperative that the United States increases its engagement in the country [emphasis added].
The US is not alone in this concern, with most other countries and regional economic blocs in the global North busily implementing recently published critical minerals strategies designed to secure their access to Congolese and other metals and minerals deemed crucial for national security and intended transitions to low-carbon capitalism. Just last week, Toronto-based Electra Battery Materials signed an agreement with Eurasian Resources Group to buy 3,000 tons of Congolese cobalt hydroxide annually to feed a new refinery in Canada.
In contrast to China’s current hold on cobalt production, Northern firms and finance dominate the renewable energy space (Table 2), or what Lucy Baker has coined the continent’s “new frontiers of electricity capital”. Supplemented in many instances by development finance institutions, such as the UK government’s British International Investment, and taking place within a neo-colonial civilising mission to ‘light a dark continent’, there should be no mistaking the reality that first and foremost these are investments seeking profitable returns.
In solar, alongside generating profit through energy provision, new avenues have been opened through the deployment of a mobile phone ‘pay-as-you-go’ (PAYGO) system. PAYGO enables the purchase of solar home systems through a range of flexible, digital payment methods and allows solar firms to push other products such as televisions and fridges onto consumers (as practiced currently by the British firm Bboxx in the Congo, among others). Through this development, solar energy has been transformed into an asset stream for finance capital, becoming part of the financial technology industry that has served in the realm of mobile money on the continent to greatly enrich fin-tech firms and shareholders.
Mining-led national development?
Over the last several years, Congolese state officials have undertaken efforts to resist imperial encroachment and reassert a greater degree of sovereign ownership and control over the country’s resource wealth. This included, during the Kabila administration, the adoption of a new Mining Code in 2018. The new code raised tax and royalty rates and increased state ownership in licensed mining firms from five percent to 10 percent, changes that were all bitterly resisted right up until the final hour by the foreign mining corporates.
The following year, in November 2019, and now under the Presidency of Felix Tshisekedi, the Congolese government established the state-owned Entreprise Générale du Cobalt (EGC), which represented in part an attempt to wrest control over the processing and export of artisanal and small-scale cobalt production – which accounts for around five to 15 percent of total cobalt production in the Congo – from a range of foreign-owned refineries. Most recently, beginning in 2021, the Tshisekedi administration has been developing plans to move up the estimated $8.8 trillion electric vehicle battery value chain from mineral exploitation to transformation and eventually to the domestic manufacture and export of batteries.
Yet in all of this, there has been no clear indication of shifting the country’s national development strategy away from the belief, most clearly expressed in the Congo’s 2017-2021 strategic plan for the mining sector, that mining industrialisation is “capable of realising the government’s vision to make the Congo an emerging country by 2030 and a global power by 2060”. The Tshisekedi administration appears as committed to this vision as the Kabila administration that preceded it. From this, it appears the increased demand for the Congo’s cobalt, copper and lithium to help facilitate low-carbon capitalist transitions elsewhere is making the country materially more reliant on these same exports, further constraining the space for a shift in national development strategy.
There is little evidence, however, from post-independence attempts at mining-led industrialisation to create much cause for optimism as to its emancipatory potential as a national development strategy in the Congo, and even less from the last two decades of pursuing this strategy in the context of a 21st century foreign corporate-owned mining landscape. Mining industrialisation since the turn of the century, while delivering high rates of GDP growth, has failed to translate into greater household income, poverty reduction, the emergence of domestic industry, or significantly improved wages and conditions for most workers.
The political response to green imperialism in the Congo, then, appears to be reproducing a model of mining-led national development that historically has delivered little by way of material improvements for most Congolese, undermining the prospects of future prosperity in the country. Albeit this time around with the possibility of expanded access for some to renewable forms of energy as a foreign-owned privatised commodity, and all the limitations and contradictions this new model of energy delivery entails.
You can read the full version of this article, Green Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Quest for National Development in the Congo, here. The article is part of ROAPE’s recent special issue on the climate emergency in Africa, which can be found here.
Ben Radley (@RadleyBen) is a political economist and Lecturer in International Development at the University of Bath. He researches mining, energy, and labour in the context of green transitions, with a regional focus on Africa. He’s a member of the Editorial Working Group for ROAPE, and an affiliated member of the Centre of Mining Research at the Catholic University of Bukavu, DR Congo.
Featured image: US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo meets Congo President Felix Tshisekedi in Washington DC, 3 April 2019. Wikimedia Commons.
Ending the war in Sudan will require real Sudanese dialogue and carving out a new political course. Nada Wanni argues that any Sudanese dialogue will be intensely contested particularly at this time of war. Wanni warns against a controlled, manufactured process, run by a political and economic elite which will only reproduce the conflict and political crisis in different forms. This will bring neither peace nor stability to Sudan or the region.
By Nada Wanni
On 15 April it will be a year since the war in Sudan started. Today the country on the brink of famine. Yet in 2019 the country’s mass uprising was at its peak. Omar al-Bashir had been overthrown and the new political project, conceptualized by Sudan’s revolutionary forces who had flooded the streets for months, were demanding a complete break from the ways of doing politics by the dominant political class, calling for freedom, radical political change, equal citizenship, peace, social justice and fighting against deeply entrenched socio-economic inequality. In many ways, the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) with its conflict over political power, economic resources and control was a war against this project.
There have been calls and efforts by some Sudanese, African and Western actors for a Sudanese civilian dialogue to envision a political pathway for the post-war phase. The proclaimed aim of these calls is to make sure that any upcoming negotiations to end the conflict are not solely left to the belligerents in the conflict and that Sudanese civilians are the ones developing the political roadmap for the ‘day after’.
However, it is important to remember that the concept of a ‘Sudanese-Sudanese Dialogue’ has often been initiated and instrumentalized in different phases of Sudan’s history by both military actors and civilian elites for self-serving political purposes. We need to be wary that current initiatives do not do the same.
For the past months, some Western actors have been technically and logistically supporting certain Sudanese platforms as the main civilian fronts leading these political processes.
One of the main platforms being supported is the Coordination for Civilian Democratic Forces (Taqaddum), a coalition of the main political parties, some armed movements, professional groups, civil society individuals and organizations, and a few resistance committees which was formed in October of last year. The core political group within the platform are the Forces of Freedom and Change-Central Committee (FFC-CC).
In the US Senate Committee for Foreign Relations, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mary “Molly” Phee, described the members of the group in the following way:
…Sudanese civilians have been meeting in Addis Ababa. And they are working towards forming an inclusive and representative pro-democracy civilian front. It’s an important group of Sudanese. We are actively encouraging those dialogues and we hope that this is the start of a serious process to form the next government of Sudan and to counter … the security forces.
Since then, the platform has been holding workshops on post-conflict issues such as post-war constitutional arrangements, local governance, justice and transitional justice and security and military reform. The coalition is also planning to organize a workshop on the ‘Negotiations Position’ of the platform regarding the war.
The culmination of these workshops is what the platform calls a ‘Foundational Conference’ and what some Western actors refer to as a ‘National Convention’ planned for May this year. One of the strategic goals of this conference, according to sources, is to ‘expand political participation’ of other ‘pro-democracy forces’ on the ‘issues related to ending the current armed conflict’ as well as the ‘civilian democratic future of the country.’ Another key purpose of the conference is to approve the coalition’s political vision at a macro-level in order for that to provide a ‘foundation for negotiations with the warring parties.’ The convention also aims to get participants to agree on a ‘design process’ in order ‘to negotiate an end to the conflict.’
So far, sources say the planned process appears to have around 600 invitees, with reserved places for youth and women. However, numbers and specific percentages, on their own, are a misleading measure when we are talking about genuine political and grassroots participation particularly in the current complex war context.
‘Inclusivity’ and ‘expansion of political participation’
It is important to note here that experience from national dialogues in other parts of the world emphasizes that the ‘Selection Process’ of dialogue participants is an essential factor, since it shapes ‘the legitimacy, dynamics and outcomes of the dialogue’.
However, some Sudanese political elites have mastered the technique of using Western constructs and terms like ‘inclusivity’ and ‘expansion of political participation’ in their documents and current political discourse on war and peace while avoiding explaining what these notions exactly denote, or how they will be meaningfully enacted into a real political dialogue that genuinely embodies the intense plurality of different Sudanese perspectives and voices.
Recently Western actors supporting the platform and the upcoming National Convention have also been using the term ‘digital inclusion’ to refer to efforts to bring in more Sudanese to this convention. It is not clear how the Sudanese actually living in conflict zones will be able to benefit from this ‘inclusion.’ More importantly, the coalition has already begun to work on the selection of its invitees in this planned and internationally supported Foundational Conference.
As has happened historically with national dialogue processes during al-Bashir’s period and the transition, extensive ‘lists’ of broad sectors such as: ‘civil society’, ‘professionals’, ‘experts’, ‘women’, ‘youth’, ‘religious leaders,’ ‘native administration,’ ‘refugees’, ‘workers,’ ‘farmers’, ‘herders’ and other categories are routinely put together. Real ‘inclusivity’ and participation remains a remote element to these conventions.
We should remember that notions of ‘civil society’ and ‘civil society organizations’ have been extensively used by both military actors and the political elite in all of Sudan’s recent political dialogue before and after the war to lend legitimacy and the appearance of having ‘expanded political participation’. This is frequently a political message that some civilian politicians are keen to send both internally to the Sudanese people, and externally to the Western community. However, some of the civilian politicians on these platforms continue to practice subtle, controlled forms of diversification and plurality in these political processes.
Paradoxically, at the same time, there is an ongoing debate among these platforms about the ‘political parties-civil society’ composition and the balance within these bodies. Some politicians believe that the presence of civil society within such platforms is at the expense of the traditional role of political parties. This is currently being debated with percentages being used for participation.
It is essential to note here that there are voices and groups within platforms like Taqaddum, particularly from youth groups, resistance committees and some civil society organisations, who have been pushing against the control of these bodies by political elites, and for genuine, uncontrolled political dialogue. It remains to be seen if they will succeed.
At the same time, other civilian entities comprising political parties and civil society organizations who are not happy with the current political direction of Taqaddum or who have been excluded from its processes will likely organize themselves into new alliances. Regional countries with a stake in the war could support such new ‘parallel’ coalitions for political influence and leverage.
It is imperative that the Sudanese do not allow the political ambitions of certain individuals to jeopardise real political dialogue and negotiations by reducing the Sudanese people’s credible political leadership to attendance lists, percentages, and a managed plurality. They need to define for themselves what credible political participation looks like.
National dialogues in other regions of the world have shown the ‘role of elites’ is the most pivotal factor impacting the process before and during negotiations, as well as in the implementation phase.
At the same time, efforts by regional and western bodies continue to play a decisive role.
This month the African Union plans to bring certain Sudanese actors to Addis Ababa for discussions. Similarly, a seminar for Sudanese civil society is planned for 15 April by France, Germany, and the EU in Paris. There are already differences between several of the organizers about the ‘list of participants’ and its ‘inclusivity.’
These efforts by regional and Western governments and interests to get Sudanese civilians to talk and agree on their agenda prior to any negotiations cannot and must not replace Sudanese-led and owned processes.
Another key question is whether to include Islamists in these upcoming processes. Some Western actors have recently been exploring the possibility of engaging certain Islamists in the process. Others have been holding meetings with Islamist figures. The US Special Envoy for Sudan, Tom Perriello, has also asked politicians if they thought Islamists had significant presence within Sudanese society, i.e. if they had social weight.
For some Western governments, the rationale of including Islamist groups is to prevent them becoming spoilers in any upcoming political process. The problem is that most of the Western community do not have a nuanced understanding of the complexity of the Sudanese Islamist movement. Their reductionist analysis of ‘Hardline Islamists’ versus ‘Less hard-line Islamists’ is overly simplistic, and highly problematic.
Western and regional roles
Most of the Western community and African regional partners are only able to engage with the Western format of ‘organized Sudanese’. This is what Sudanese politicians have understood very well. However, it is critical that other international bodies support Sudanese groups already working in the war context by developing unconventional, adaptive, context-specific mechanisms to bring them visibility and incorporate their thinking and positions into any dialogue, and political negotiations. This will be difficult given that most Sudanese inside and outside the country are fighting against violence, economic insecurity and livelihood challenges on a daily basis. But it needs to be done. The current traditional INGO-format (International non-governmental organisations) workshops practiced by these Western actors cannot be the only method to get the Sudanese to talk to one another.
Conversely, any attempt to drown the upcoming dialogue in technicalities using a box-ticking project-management approach will lead to an output of workshops, papers, presentations and recommendations which hold no relevance to most Sudanese and around which no consolidated, credible civilian agenda can crystallise.
At the same time, it’s important to remember that Sudan has a long history of external mediation and facilitation processes with decidedly mixed outcomes. Some mediation mechanisms and facilitators have been criticized in the past for being biased, not transparent or consultative. These include African mediation bodies. During the current conflict, a number of regional and international actors including Sudan’s neighbouring countries, the African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the US and Saudi have come up with different mediation initiatives. Any new mediation process for it to be meaningful must be aware of the mistakes of previous ones.
Recently the US Special Envoy for Sudan has been talking to Sudanese political actors about the importance of including the UAE and Egypt to the US-Saudi Jeddah Platform. This could provide much-needed missing leverage to the process. However, sources say that Saudi Arabia is reluctant about bringing new mediators – particularly the UAE – to the process, which it feels it owns. US pressure would probably succeed in making that happen.
There are plans to hold another Jeddah Forum session this month in which it is hoped that a ceasefire will be agreed upon to allow desperately needed humanitarian aid to get through. However, without stronger, targeted and coordinated international pressure on the warring parties and the countries militarily supporting them, there will be no reason to commit.
Final thoughts
Sudan is facing a famine. Ending the war, a real Sudanese dialogue and carving out a new political course is a matter of life and death. Any Sudanese dialogue and political processes will be intensely contested particularly at this time of war.
However, a controlled, manufactured process, run by a political and economic elite will fail in the long term – even if technically progressing – and will reproduce the conflict and political crisis in different forms. This will bring neither peace nor stability to Sudan or the region.
Sudanese people need to take full control of these processes, and they should not allow the great hope, courage and vision they demonstrated in overthrowing the Bashir authoritarian regime, their deep aspirations and strong will to create new, different forms of direct democracy to be co-opted by national elites and international actors.
Nada Wanni is an independent researcher focusing on conflict analysis, peacebuilding, governance, and democratization processes. She has worked in academia and civil society and as a consultant to the UN, a number of INGOs, international development organizations, and policy and research institutes.
Featured Photograph: The Peace Agreement, Sudan (17 August 2019).
One hundred years since the birth of the Mozambican revolutionary-intellectual Aquino de Bragança on 6 April 1924, his friend and comrade, Colin Darch, writes about this “man of anguish” – constantly battling to understand what it meant to be a Marxist in the twentieth century. Darch writes how Aquino spent his adult life committed to the struggle for the liberation of Mozambique and for the rest of southern Africa. In 1986 he died in the plane disaster alongside President Samora Machel.
By Colin Darch
I first met Aquino sometime in late 1978 or early 1979, when I moved from Dar es Salaam to Maputo to become part of the team that Ruth First – as the recently appointed research director – was enrolling to work in the Centro de Estudos Africanos (CEA) within Eduardo Mondlane University. This was a time of political optimism – the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) had driven the US from Viet Nam and the country had been reunified, the Portuguese had been forced from their colonies in Africa and elsewhere, and the struggle for liberation in Zimbabwe and the rest of southern Africa was intensifying.
I have no clear memory of that first, probably formal encounter, but we shook hands as I was introduced as a new staff member and exchanged the usual pleasantries. Much more vivid in my mind is bumping into him quite soon afterwards in the then somewhat cramped offices of the CEA, and his suggestion that we should go for a drive along the Avenida da Marginal, as far as the Costa do Sol restaurant. We drove the same route a couple of times, along what was in the late 1970s an empty beachfront, while Aquino talked in a mixture of French and English – my command of Portuguese was almost non-existent at that time. This happened at an extremely difficult period in Aquino’s life, as his wife and comrade Mariana was seriously sick, and eventually died after a long illness on 29 May 1979.
Aquino was an extraordinarily generous person with his time, devoid of arrogance, and willing to share his knowledge and his friendship. His influence manifested itself in various ways – early in my time at the CEA, for instance, he told me that if I really wanted to master Portuguese, I should read the great writers, such as Eça de Queiroz or the more difficult Aquilino Ribeiro. I remember spending many evenings slowly but dutifully reading O Crime de Padre Amaro (1875) and Os Maias (1888), with a dictionary at my elbow – and it’s my belief that Aquino’s advice eventually paid off. He would often bring distinguished visitors – the MPLA’s (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola) Lúcio Lara, the Brazilian intellectual Neiva Moreira, the Soviet Africanist Roza Ismagilova, and many others – to the Centre so that we could meet and talk to them. On one memorable evening, there was even a knock at the door of our house on Avenida Mao Tse-tung, and Aquino came in accompanied by Carlos Rocha “Dilolwa” of the MPLA. They sat discussing Angolan politics and drinking whisky for a couple of fascinating hours. Aquino also brought Mário de Andrade, the first president of the MPLA, to the Centre between May and July 1985, to teach a course on the ideologies of national liberation.
The Mozambican revolutionary intellectual Tomaz Aquino Messias de Bragança – Aquino to all who knew him – was born one hundred years ago on 6 April 1924 in what was then the Portuguese colony of Goa. Self-described as a “man of anguish” – constantly battling to understand what it meant to be a Marxist in the twentieth century – Aquino spent his adult life committed to the struggle for the liberation of Mozambique and for the rest of southern Africa and died in the plane disaster at Mbuzini in October 1986, alongside President Samora Machel. As the memorial in the garden of the CEA puts it, he was “murdered for the cause of peace, science, and freedom”. A trusted confidant of Machel’s, he played multiple roles as a teacher, a journalist, an academic, and a diplomatic messenger, undertaking sensitive and highly discreet missions in the service of the Mozambican revolution.
Known in FRELIMO (Liberation Front of Mozambique) for his discretion, he consistently refused all offers of political appointment after Mozambique’s independence, whether as an ambassador or a minister, and never held an official role in the Mozambican liberation movement. He believed that the mobilisation of popular support for the objectives of national liberation required getting inside people’s heads, understanding their ways of thinking, and to do this successfully required study and reflection on history, culture, and society. Consequently, in 1975 he told Samora Machel that he didn’t want a political appointment, but “only… a centre of studies” – the Centro de Estudos Africanos (CEA) which he set-up and led from 1976 until his death, defending its independence when those in power disliked the outcomes of its research. It was in the CEA that I had the opportunity to work with him and to get to know him, as a member of the staff that he memorably described as consisting not of Mozambicans and foreigners but rather of “militants of different nationalities”.
When Aquino was born, Goa was still under Portuguese colonial rule, three small settlements scattered along the lengthy western Indian coastline. Many of his friends and relatives were active in campaigns for greater political autonomy within the Portuguese empire. In 1948, at the age of 24 and like other disillusioned young Goans of his generation, he migrated to Mozambique, but failed to win appointment to the colonial civil service through the competitive examinations. He had mentored some young white settlers who were preparing for the same examinations – but they all passed, while he, an Indian, was placed last.
After this experience, in 1951 Aquino left to study physics in Grenoble and Paris. In France – and later in Morocco and Algeria – he began to move in anti-colonial political circles and to forge lifelong friendships with such figures as Marcelino dos Santos, Mário Pinto de Andrade, Agostinho Neto, Eduardo Mondlane and Amílcar Cabral. After graduating, he moved to Morocco as a teacher, and in April 1961, representing the nationalist Goa People’s Party (GLP) he helped to found the Conference of Nationalist Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP), a coordinating body for the common struggle against Portuguese domination in the colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and elsewhere. The CONCP was initially based in Casablanca, but later moved to Algiers after objecting to revanchist Moroccan claims over Mauritanian territory. Aquino himself remained in Algiers until Mozambican independence in 1975.
Aquino’s interests were not limited to the Portuguese colonies, or even to southern Africa. His published articles show that he followed closely political life in such regions as the Maghreb, Vietnam and Indonesia, and in the 1960s and 1970s, he wrote extensively on a wide range of political topics – on Brazil, in West Africa, in Angola – as well as on events in metropolitan centres such as Portugal, West Germany and the United States. His articles were published in French in Algeria in such progressive magazines and newspapers as the weekly Révolution Africaineand the FLN daily El Moudjahid, and later in France in such radical publications as Afrique-Asie, edited by Simon Malley, and the monthly L’Economiste du Tiers Monde. Interviews with Aquino – especially after 1980 – published in weekly and daily newspapers constitute an important component of his intellectual heritage.
When the 25 April 1974 coup took place in Portugal, Aquino was sent to Lisbon to find out who held real power. As he recounts in his article “Independence without Decolonisation”, his advice to FRELIMO was to wait for the demonstrations on 1 May, and then to negotiate with the captains rather than with the generals – an assessment that turned out to be entirely correct.
After Mozambican independence, when he had become Director of the CEA, Aquino led a collective research project analysing the political economy of Rhodesia, in support of the Zimbabwean liberation movements at the ill-fated Geneva conference of 1976. Later he brought Ruth First to Mozambique for several months to lead another collective project – with a team of teachers from other faculties and departments – to assess the impact of the migrant labour system to South Africa on the peasantry of Inhambane (a province in southern Mozambique). By the end of 1978 a decision was taken to bring Ruth back permanently as research director, and to build on the earlier experience of collective investigation. Aquino and Ruth’s sharply different personalities meant that they did not always see eye to eye, but nonetheless they led the CEA during what may have been its most productive years. They were committed to critical and engaged teaching and research practices, and believed in research that had a transformative impact.
The methods deployed – collective work, the critical reading of published sources, the use of interviews and fieldwork, and the rapid publication and distribution of results – were largely organised by Ruth. But critically, the Centre provided Aquino with a platform – above all through the Oficina de História or History Workshop – that supported him in producing much of his later body of political work.
Important though the CEA was to him, Aquino was more than just the director of an academic research centre. According to Graça Machel, speaking in 2006, his nickname in Frelimo Party circles was ‘the submarine’ because of his ability to carry out delicate diplomatic missions with little fanfare. It’s clear that he influenced policy, and Samora Machel sent him at different moments to Lisbon, London, Paris, Washington, Luanda and Harare. In January 1985 it was through Aquino that the Portuguese-Galician businessman Manuel Bulhosa tried to suggest a way to end the war with RENAMO (the anti-communist guerilla movement opposed to Mozambique’s FRELIMO, funded by racist South Africa); in March 1985, in Lisbon, Aquino held talks about possible Portuguese military support in the struggle against RENAMO. There were other similar occasions, most of which we may never know about.
Aquino believed in the value of the spoken word – he ‘loved to talk, and [intellectual discourse fascinated him’. Conversation was, for him, a means for acquiring and evaluating new ideas and fresh concepts, to be synthesised and deployed later on in innovative ways. His collaborator Yussuf Adam wrote several years later that ‘Aquino had a great capacity to listen’ but nevertheless, while ‘the whole world said that Aquino talked a lot… Aquino spoke when he wanted to’.
This was a key characteristic of Aquino’s personality, a characteristic that made him such an effective interviewer and an inspiring teacher. His occasional public lectures – sometimes advertised as ‘A Night of Conversation’ – delivered at the Casa Velha in Maputo or in the lecture rooms of the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, covered topics such as ‘Race and Class’, ‘The Thought of Eduardo Mondlane’, ‘People’s Power in the Liberated Zones’, ‘Samora Machel’ and ‘Guinea and Amílcar Cabral’. There are plans afoot to publish transcriptions of recordings of some of these lectures – specifically, on the Salazar dictatorship, as well as on the origins and history of FRELIMO.
Aquino was a ‘totally political person’ and despite his admitted intellectual anguish he was a personification of Gramsci’s “optimism of the will”. His friend Immanuel Wallerstein said that Aquino played three different political roles during his life: militant, diplomat and revolutionary. There’s little doubt that these three political dimensions were present in many different moments, always accompanied by a desire for social transformation and the hope that a new world could be built through political action. One of Aquino’s favourite sayings, after all, echoed his close comrade Amílcar Cabral in affirming that “sonhar é préciso” – we need to dream.
One hundred years after Aquino’s birth, then, and nearly forty years after his murder at Mbuzini, while genocide rages unchecked in Gaza and brutal conflicts drag endlessly on in Europe and Africa, let us acknowledge how much we miss the generous commitment of Aquino and his generation, and their vision of a democratic transformation of society.
A Note on Online Sources
Much of Aquino’s journalism from the 1960s onwards has been digitised and is available, in the original French, on the website Mozambique History Net, here. A collection of twelve of his post-1980 articles and interviews, translated into English, was edited by Marco Mondaini and Colin Darch and published as Independence and Revolution in Portuguese-speaking Africa (HSRC Press, 2019) and can be downloaded here. A biographical text organised by his second wife, the late Sílvia Bragança, was published in English in Goa as Battles Waged, Lasting Dreams and can be obtained here. The book is based on a wide range of interviews with Aquino’s comrades and friends. There is also a collection of photographs and document facsimiles on Flickr here.
Featured Photograph: Colin Darch (right) and Aquino de Bragança in Dar es Salaam during a mission to interview Mwalimu Julius Nyerere about early FRELIMO history, October 1985 (Colin Darch personal archive).
Ludo De Witte, author of The Assassination of Lumumba reviews Stuart Reid’s recently published book The Lumumba Plot, which has been heavily promoted in the UK and the United States. De Witte argues that although Stuart Reid, the editor-in-chief of Foreign Affairs, provides some new information on the dynamics of this complex crisis, the real dynamics and internal coherence of the Congolese crisis remain hidden.
By Ludo de Witte
Stuart Reid’s The Lumumba Plot: the secret history of the CIA and a Cold War assassination (2023) should be seen as the first publication to shed new light on the Congo crisis (1960-1961) since a Belgian parliamentary committee published a report on the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the Congo’s first prime minister, more than two decades ago.
Let’s briefly review the main points. In July 1960, shortly after nationalist Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba had expelled racist white officers from the Congolese army, Belgian troops invaded the former colony. The copper-rich province of Katanga, which accounted for 70% of the country’s income, was separated from central power with the help of the Belgians.
Lumumba called for UN intervention to restore order. A force of blue helmets was deployed, but it came under the control of the United States, which quickly adopted Belgium’s objective: to replace Lumumba’s government with a docile one. With the decisive help of the UN, Lumumba was deposed. Chief of Staff Mobutu dismissed parliament and locked up the deposed prime minister. The CIA and Belgian military personnel temporarily suspended their plans to assassinate Lumumba.
At the beginning of 1961, Lumumba’s supporters organised an unexpected and overwhelming military offensive. The soldiers guarding Lumumba demanded his release. Washington and Brussels panicked. The Belgians, who controlled procedures in the capital, Leopoldville, and in Katanga, organised Lumumba’s transfer to Katanga, where he was killed shortly after his arrival.
It was not until 1965, after a series of rebellions had been crushed by a Belgian-American intervention force, that Mobutu succeeded in establishing a stable pro-Western dictatorship.
The overthrow of Lumumba’s government and the coup d’état of General Mobutu are undoubtedly one of the best documented and analysed international crises of the last century, largely thanks to a report of the American Senate (1975), the publication of The Assassination of Lumumba (1999), which triggered the report of the Belgian Parliament (2001), and additional research into the death of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld.
Unsurprisingly, The Lumumba Plot, a 620-page brick, contains no new elements that add anything substantial to what we already know. This should not be a problem, on condition that the book provides new information on the dynamics of this complex crisis marked by military interventions, the deployment of a UN force, a military coup and secessions, with the threat of a Cold War between Washington and Moscow in the background.
However, the book falls short.
A host of anecdotes…
Stuart Reid is an excellent writer and his researchers have unearthed a wealth of anecdotes, conversations between actors and post factum opinions that bring the story of the Congo crisis to life. The reader has the impression of looking over the shoulders of the protagonists. For example, on the meeting where US President Eisenhower made remarks that were interpreted by the CIA as an order to kill Lumumba: Eisenhower,
entered the Cabinet Room of the White House, a high-ceilinged room next to the Oval Office, with a fireplace, a portrait of George Washington and a view of the Rose Garden through arched windows. He sat down in the leather armchair reserved for him, slightly larger than the others, and opened the weekly meeting of the National Security Council. Twenty other men, including the director of the CIA and the secretaries of defence, treasury and commerce, joined him around the massive mahogany table. At one point, Eisenhower said a few words about Lumumba. Whatever the exact wording, …[the] message that day was pretty clear: “will no one rid me of this turbulent prime minister?” Eisenhower’s directive did not seem to weigh heavily on his conscience. Having just become the first American president to order the assassination of a foreign leader, he went to the whites-only Burning Tree Club in Bethesda, Maryland, to play eighteen holes of golf with his son and grandson.
… but where is the role of the United Nations in the crisis?
These details and anecdotes, the many digressions and reflections of the players involved, give the impression of an in-depth and complete analysis. But the dynamics and internal coherence of the Congolese crisis remain hidden.
Is it not strange that Stuart Reid does not cite the Security Council resolution that defines the mandate of the peacekeeping force sent to the Congo after Kinshasa requested UN intervention to end the Belgian invasion of the country? As well as calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo, the mandate unequivocally states that the UN will provide military assistance to the Lumumba government so that its armed forces can “fully discharge their duties”.
This omission masks the UN’s fundamentally biased action in the Congo in favour of opponents of the Lumumba government, such as the Katangese secessionists and coup leader Mobutu. Without the cover of the UN intervention in the Congo, Belgium and the United States would have found it much more difficult to achieve their central objective: to replace the Lumumba government with a docile Western regime.
There are other examples, and omissions, in the book.
Crucial documents from the UN archives on the role of Secretary General Hammarskjöld in the liquidation of Patrice Lumumba are not cited. After Mobutu’s military coup and the closure of the Congolese parliament (with the help of the United States and the UN), Patrice Lumumba left the capital and tried to join his supporters in the north-east of the country. Pursued by Mobutu’s soldiers, Hammarskjöld’s subordinates ordered the UN peacekeepers on the ground not to place the deposed prime minister under protection. A copy of this order was sent to UN headquarters in New York. An officer of the Ghanaian UN peacekeepers, obeying the order, refused to place Lumumba under protection, which directly led to Mobutu’s soldiers capture of the deposed Prime Minister. This decision led to Lumumba’s imprisonment in what was to become his death cell. A fatal decision taken with Hammarskjöld’s approval, and one that Hammarskjöld kept silent about at a meeting of the Security Council, where he declared that the UN had no way of offering Lumumba protection.
Hammarskjöld’s role in the crisis – and that of his four closest advisers in what was known as ‘The Congo Club’ – remains underexposed in Reid’s book, but the skewed sketch of Lumumba’s personality is no less problematic. The Lumumba Plot contains an enormous number of judgements about the Congolese prime minister by US and UN personnel active in the fight against the Congolese government and its nationalist leader. Almost all of these opinions are negative, giving the reader a very one-sided view of the man behind the myth. The book does not revive Lumumba in the flesh, as he really was, but only as he was presented in the war rhetoric of the time. A prime minister whom a Belgian journalist said in retrospect that he had probably been attacked with more fury in the mainstream press than Hitler.
… and Belgium?
Even more worryingly, Stuart Reid almost completely ignores the role of the main protagonists in the Congolese crisis. Belgian ministers, diplomats, secret agents, military officers, and civil servants have either disappeared from the story or are given secondary roles. Of the five Belgian government emissaries who played a central role in the crisis – colonels Marlière and Vandewalle, secret agent Lahaye, major Loos and diplomat Davignon – Vandewalle is mentioned once and Marlière four times, but only in the endnotes; the other three are not mentioned at all!
Compare these four mentions of Belgians with the predominance of CIA agents Devlin, Gottlieb and O’Donnell in the book: they are mentioned 463, 51 and 23 times respectively! This huge blind spot in the book is intentional. Of the 30 people interviewed by Reid and his researchers, 21 are linked to the State Department and the CIA; the others are Africans. No Belgians were interviewed!
Apart from a reference to the order given by the Belgian Minister for African Affairs to his emissaries to “eliminate definitively” Lumumba and a description of the role of low-ranking Belgian officers in Lumumba’s execution, Belgium’s role remains hidden from the reader.
So many questions are not answered, yet they are at the heart of any serious consideration of the murder of Lumumba.
What about the Belgian soldiers who dressed up in Katangese uniforms to build and lead the Katangese army? What about the Belgian-American plan to arm Lumumba’s opponents for a (failed) assassination attempt? Belgian King Baudouin’s approval of an assassination plot against Lumumba? Or the order given by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to his emissaries in Congo to ‘neutralise Lumumba’? And the proposal by the Belgian Minister for African Affairs to send a hitman to assassinate Lumumba? The order given by the same minister to his subordinates in the secessionist state of Katanga, under Belgian control, to accept Lumumba’s transfer to that province, which would he knew would mean his death? What about the Belgian senior officers and senior civil servants in Katanga who were kept informed of Lumumba’s torture and murder by their Belgian subordinates, but who looked the other way, knowing the intentions of the King of Belgium and senior Belgian ministers?
None of these facts, none of these questions, are analysed as being fundamental for an understanding of the drama in progress.
A settling of scores “between Africans”?
Reid indicates in the subtitle of his book that he aims to bring to life the CIA’s secret history of the crisis. But this is not possible without integrating the CIA’s role into the full picture. To fill the gap created by the ousting of the dominant Belgian factor, the author inflates the role of the CIA’s Congo station chief, Larry Devlin. Reid writes that Mobutu’s inner circle told Devlin that Lumumba would be transferred to his sworn enemies in Katanga. Reid correctly writes that in this way “the dirty work [would be] outsourced”, and continues: “Given his influence (…), there was every reason to believe that he could have persuaded them to abandon their plan. Devlin did not. In fact, in the context of his close relationship with Mobutu and his retinue, his failure to protest could only have been interpreted as a green light. This silence sealed Lumumba’s fate”.
The assassination thus became a Congolese affair, carried out under the approving eye of the CIA. This is the dominant story – the great lie – told for decades about the Congo crisis, according to which the assassination was “a settling of scores between Africans”, albeit with Devlin’s blessing. This story is recycled once more in Reid’s book.
The omission of Belgian responsibility for the fall of the Congolese government and the assassination of the prime minister is no coincidence. Reid’s book has the same flaws as the report of the Church Commission (US Senate, 1975) and the report of the Belgian Lumumba Parliamentary Commission (2001). Out of respect for their NATO partner, the Americans leave out Belgium’s role, while Brussels does the same with Washington’s role. And the role of the United Nations leadership, which have provided and provides essential services to the Western interventions since 1945, is largely obscured in these reports.
But how can a murder be properly analysed when four parties are involved (Belgians, Americans, UN leaders and Congolese), but the main party is kept in the dark and the role of another is played down? No examining magistrate would get away with it. Yet that is Stuart Reid’s approach. Perhaps this is because the author is the Executive Editor of Foreign Affairs magazine, published by the Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank operating at the heart of the Washington establishment?
Ludo De Witte is an investigative journalist, and writer of The Assassination of Lumumba (Verso, London) and Meurtre au Burundi (in English, Murder in Burundi) (Investig’Action/IWACU, Brussels), on the liquidation of the Burundese Prime Minister Louis Rwagasore in October 1961.
Featured Photograph: Patrice Lumumba in Brussels (26 January, 1960).
This series on state repression and police brutality in Senegal arrives as the nation transitions to a new presidency. It documents the case of state violence that would be investigated if the Amnesty Bill adopted in the last month of the Macky Sall regime was reconsidered. La Maison des Reporters investigated and documented cases of torture, killings, and unlawful arrests suffered by political opponents and ordinary citizens in major Senegalese cities like Dakar and Ziguinchor, providing clear evidence to the public of the abuses under the Macky Sall regime. ROAPE shares two pieces by journalist Moussa Ngom, which are introduced by Senegalese Scholar-activist Rama Salla Dieng and contextualised by historian-activist Florian Bobin.
Introduction
By Rama Salla Dieng
On the day after the election of a new president in Senegal, I am very emotional yet filled with a sense of duty to write an introduction to this series on State Brutality and Police Repression from La Maison des Reporters of Senegal. As Senegalese citizens celebrate (at last) to see their democracy at work after many years of repression, human rights violations and protests under President Macky Sall, lest we forget about the survivors and the victims of this violence and their families. On 6 March 2024, the outgoing president Macky Sall and his government proposed a fast-track Amnesty bill related to the deadly protests between March 2021 and February 2024, which was discussed and adopted by the Senegalese Parliament the same day. The Amnesty bill covers ‘all acts likely to be classified as criminal or disciplinary offences committed between 1 February 2021 and 25 February 2024, both in Senegal and abroad, relating to demonstrations or having political motivations’.
According to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, the enactment of the amnesty legislation by the Parliament represents a derogation from the state’s responsibility under international legal frameworks to ensure the provision of justice, truth, and reparations to the families of more than 60 individuals deceased in the course of demonstrations. Fifteen families who have instituted legal proceedings before the judiciary are awaiting resolution. For Amnesty International’s Regional Director for West and Central Africa, Samira Daoud: “This draft law would be a denial of justice for victims, as well as their families, who are waiting for justice, truth and reparations. By passing such a law, the Senegalese state would not only fail in its national and international obligations but also promote impunity for blood crimes”.
The Amnesty bill is comparable to the 2005 Ezzan Amnesty law, contested by the opposition and civil society. Article 1 of the Ezzan bill granted a ‘complete amnesty for all crimes committed in Senegal and abroad, relating to the general or local elections or committed with political motivations between 1 January 1983 and 31 December 2004, whether the authors have been judged or not.’ As for the law’s article 2, which was found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court on 12 February 2005, it sought to grant a similar amnesty for all crimes committed in relation to the death of Babacar Sèye. Sèye, a judge and then Vice-President of the Constitutional Court, was assassinated on 15 May 1993, the day after the results of the legislative elections (won by the Senegalese Socialist Party-PS) results were announced.
Despite the case being still unresolved, three men, including Cledor Sene, were condemned in 1994 for murder and arrested. Both human rights organisations and the local civil society have indicated their suspicions of a political killing and pointed to the responsibility of activists in the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) then led by Abdoulaye Wade. Abdou Latif Coulibaly, an investigative journalist and former minister (who resigned during the February events), also suspected that Judge Sèye’s assassination was a contract killing and the liberation of Sene and his co-accused in 2002 by Wade, two years after he became president fuelled the suspicions on his involvement.
Considering this past and the fact that President Senghor introduced the first Amnesty law in Senegal to ‘pardon’ his former prime minister Mamadou Dia in 1976 and the 2005 Ezzan Amnesty bill introduced by Wade, the question must be asked: Is history repeating itself in 2024 with Macky Sall’s proposed Amnesty?
This mission is ever more vital as there has been recent evidence of the involvement of the EU-funded Rapid Action Surveillance and Intervention Group (also known as GAR-SI), violently crushing Senegalese protestors. Such evidence revives questions of accountability and justice on the one hand and sovereignty from former imperial powers on the other, within the struggle of Senegalese citizens rethinking their social contract with the ruling class.
As former investigative journalist Abdou Latif Coulibaly (and minister under Macky Sall) reminds us in his book Sénégal Affaire Me Sèye: Un Meurtre sur Commande: “The task of elucidation is part and parcel of mourning. A task that has not yet been fully evacuated, even though the nation has been wearing the costume for over a decade. This mourning process continues because one element is missing in the unfolding of history and time that will put a definitive end to it. That element is the identity of those who ordered the crime. No amnesty law will be able to add the missing link or links until history delivers the identity of those who plotted in the shadows against the life of Judge Babacar Seye.”
It is in this bloody history that this series on State brutality and Police Repression is rooted. This series comes as a gesture of healing-justice, and solidarity. Against Amnesty and amnesia, we (researchers, journalists and ordinary citizens) stand today in solidarity and sisterhood with the families of the victims and the survivors to situate the responsibilities for these acts of brutality and unlawful repression for which we seek justice and reparations for the victims.
No justice, no peace
Police repression in Senegal: documenting history today
By Florian Bobin
In recent years, the Senegalese people have become accustomed to images of demonstrations broken up by tear gas grenades, live ammunition fired by police forces and harrowing testimonies from former detainees describing the torture they were subjected to. If the security apparatus has been able to grow in this way, we need to look at the environment that has allowed it to do so.
Although Senegal has enjoyed an image as a “democratic exception” since independence, shaped early on by President Senghor and consolidated by the multi-party system introduced in the 1980s and the two government changeovers of 2000 and 2012, political repression remains a common thread running through these years of building an authoritarian state.
Since the early 1960s, the Senegalese authorities have pursued a dual strategy of strengthening the executive through institutional mechanisms and weakening the opposition through coercive practices. Those in power maintained their authority by muzzling obstacles to their policies, psychologically intimidating opponents, interning and conscripting striking students, using live ammunition against demonstrators, and physically torturing detainees. For example, a sulphurous French officer called André Castorel, who epitomised the continuity of the colonial police, oversaw endless torture sessions on dissidents of Senghor’s regime: waterboarding them; electrocuting their sensitive areas (genitals, ears, tongue); tearing their anuses with bottlenecks. Some, like Omar Blondin Diop, had their lives cut short.
Today, these police methods still structure the relationship between the Senegalese state and its opposition. Public demonstrations calling for better living conditions and against growing inequalities, political arbitrariness, and democratic restrictions are often violently dispersed. The tragic events of March 2021 (14 dead) and June 2023 (30 dead) were thus part of a long colonial tradition of “pacifying” dissent in the public space by force.
This repressive culture has been able to survive for so long because impunity is the norm of governance in autocratic states born out of the colonial rule. In such a context, the role of investigative journalism is crucial: it acts as a counterweight by documenting the abuses of a system whose brutality crushes lives. La Maison des Reporters has taken up this salutary challenge with its series of investigations into police violence in contemporary Senegal.
Episode 1: In Ziguinchor, the story of the tortured of 17 June 2022.
By Moussa Ngom
A day of protests was called by the Yewwi Askan Wi coalition, led by Ousmane Sonko. In Ziguinchor, the Hlm Néma district is ablaze, one month before the 2022 legislative elections, against the Constitutional Council’s invalidation of the national list of opposition candidates. This afternoon, Rodrigue Tendeng saw the crowd stampede towards him, but the sales agent, convinced he had nothing to fear, watched on. He suddenly became aware of the danger, however, when the gendarmes’ pick-up deliberately sped towards him. His attempt to escape is cut short.
The gendarme tackled me then I fell from a height into the gutter. He found me in there, then drowned me in the dirty water and called me a bad rebel. He kicked me everywhere he could: head, stomach, chest, all in the dirty water.
Rodrigue was then taken on board. Or almost. When he stumbles at the foot of the vehicle, the fury of the gendarmes descends on him. “The whole team came down and they kicked me up.” Lying under the seat of the pick-up, the 38-year-old was used, in his words, as a “footrest” by the gendarmes, and was subjected to a multitude of degrading insults.
He describes an ordeal lasting over four hours after his transfer from the pick-up to the gendarmerie van. “I was bleeding heavily from the head, but they wouldn’t let me wipe the blood off, and kept hitting the same spot. Sometimes, their superior would come and pretend to enquire about the situation, then played along. As soon as he came down, the torture continued, becoming more and more vile, sometimes with blows from the butts of their weapons – large sticks, I think, prepared for the occasion – and sometimes with gris-gris taken from the inmates.”
Among the improvised instruments of torture was a leather talisman violently torn from the waist of a certain Cheikh Sourat Youssouph Sagna, who spoke at length to us, La Maison Des Reporters:
“Cheikh Sourat is the one who suffered the worst torture among us, I was the third to enter the vehicle and I found him completely covered in blood”, says I. Thiam. “They asked me to offer them something to drink, then as I was bringing it to them, one of them grabbed me by the wrist.”
Gradually, other people, already in a bad shape, joined them as the arrests went on. “The heat was stifling inside, it was full, but they put us on top of each other, beating us endlessly”, recalls Sidy Pascal Dhiédhiou, arrested at the same time as his friend Tamsir. All were repeatedly beaten, even Georges Mendy, a student in Seconde at Lycée Djignabo. One of the gendarmes, wearing a balaclava, made a particular impression on the passengers in the armoured vehicle. “At one point, one of his colleagues said: ‘Kalach, hit less hard’, and that’s when I remembered his name”, said Mendy
Sidy Diédhiou adds: “When I asked him not to hit me in the chest because I had breathing problems, he said he would only hit there from now on [with a stick].”
At around 10pm, the uniformed men’s vehicle finally made its way to the Néma gendarmerie headquarters. On the spot, the companions in misfortune, exhausted by the long hours of violence, thought the violence was over, but were soon disillusioned. To “welcome” them, the company’s gendarmes formed a cynical hedge from the foot of the truck to their cell. “They had formed two lines on either side, and right up to the entrance, we received blows of all kinds”, explain the high-school student and Cheikh Sourat Sagna.
Their ordeal continued in appalling conditions. The detainees were crammed into two cramped cells, where not only the arrestees but also others from Bignona (another nearby city) were crammed together. With no space to lie down properly, Sidy suffocated and almost imagined himself dying: “During the night, I started banging on the door to get the guard to open, because I couldn’t breathe any more, there was so little ventilation.”
One by one, the detainees were removed from their cells. They all recount how they were forced to sign their statement without the possibility of contesting it. One of them was slapped when he complained that he couldn’t read French: “If you didn’t give them the exact answer that they wanted, they hit you with anything they could get their hands on,” recalls Georges Mendy.
Held in police custody over the weekend before being transferred to prison on Tuesday, the gendarmes’ victims went on trial a week later for “taking part in an unarmed gathering” and various other offences. Cheikh Sourat, carried to the courtroom in poor health, attended the hearing but appeared seated due to his state of health.
On June 28, after twelve long days in detention, the prosecutor, “unable to establish accountability for the facts”, requested the acquittal of Rodrigue and 28 of his co-defendants. Cheikh Sourat, on the other hand, received a one-month suspended sentence and a financial penalty that the former hotelier is still unable to digest. “I’m the one who was tortured and fined 50,000 FCFA [US$65], even though my condition after the abuse was obvious […] They destroyed my life and left me with lasting consequences that I still can’t measure,” he says, still bitter, two years later.
Episode 2: “Break his legs!” Pape Abdoulaye Touré and the leaked video that exposes the Senegalese gendarmes.
By Moussa Ngom
A confidential video consulted by La Maison Des Reporters confirms the acts of torture committed by gendarmes on activist Pape Abdoulaye Touré. It’s a chilling video, barely two minutes long. Pape Abdoulaye Touré appears in it, with a bloody nose and a red eye from a kick he received, surrounded in a room packed with uniformed gendarmes. Some of them are armed with truncheons. The photos immortalising his posture, handcuffed from behind, shoulder pressed against a decrepit wall, have been widely shared on the internet. These photos are, however, a pale copy of the violence conveyed by the film.
“Chef Sow, can I speak?” pleads Pape Abdoulaye Touré.
“Break his legs,” someone replies in the audience.
Behind Pape, another gendarme is shown about to pour the contents of a large bottle over him several times as the activist is questioned by his superior. The constable is holding a mixture of sand and water designed to make the blows more violent. But the liquid was used for more than just this purpose during the long torture session.
“They made me lie down, with my back on the ground, before pouring the water in my face, and I almost drowned,” testifies Pape Abdoulaye Touré.
On February 15, 2024, Toure who is a member of the organization “Sénégal, notre Priorité” [Senegal, our priority] was released in a wave of “decrispation” in the political arena (to paraphrase the terms used by President Macky Sall). Neither Toure’s double fractured on his right leg and left hand, nor his multiple bruises, nor the confidential video added to his file, were enough to free the activist, who had spent nine months behind bars.
“This is the last time you’ll ever speak”
On June 1, 2023, as Dakar became the theatre of protests following the sentencing of opposition figure Ousmane Sonko to two years of imprisonment for “corrupting the youth”, Pape Abdoulaye Touré returned late to his second home, where he lived with his friend. Not far from the alley leading to his home, the activist was talking on the phone with his “girlfriend”.
“It was around 11pm… He was telling me he was on his way home. It was calm so I could hear him,” she recalls.
It was only the following day that Aissatou (pseudonym) learned of Pape Abdoulaye’s arrest on social networks.
“I remember asking him if he or his team were involved in the ransacking at UCAD, and he told me no; and that it had been a while since he’d organised such things… Then I asked him: ‘so, where are you at this late hour? You’re still out on the street, aren’t you going home?’ He replied that he was well on his way, walking home, and even told me he’d call me back if he arrived early and I wasn’t asleep”, says Aissatou.
It was at this moment that her companion was intercepted by men in civilian clothes claiming to be politicians and members of the Senegalese government [more on this later].
“That’s the last time you’ll talk!” they threaten, before dragging Toure off to what he fears is another vehicle on which he would be put.
Luckily, the incident took place just a few dozen meters from the Leclerc gendarmes’ barracks at Liberté 6. Pape Abdoulaye Touré managed to call a nearby gendarme for help. It was the latter who led the three protagonists to the gendarmerie. At first, Touré couldn’t recognise this sort of “headquarters” of gendarmes as the latter were still in the process of stripping off their law-and-order equipment. Hell was awaiting Toure who thought he’d found an escape route from the violence of the “thugs”.
As he was carrying his personal telephone and that of the Forces Vives de la Nation (F24) movement, for which he manages communication matters, as well as a wallet containing his certificate of residence, he intended to present these items to the uniformed men as evidence that he lived on the spot to contest the thugs allegations.
On the leaked video, one of them, very audible in the narrow room, accuses Touré of having been caught “calling the crowd”, while the latter begs the gendarmes’ chief to check on his phone the nature of his last call, as well as his publications on social networks.
A few moments earlier, the interrogation turned sour when the famous “Chef Sow” discovered a photo of the opposition leader Ousmane Sonko that Toure uses as his phone’s wallpaper.
“I recognize you […] You’re one of Sonko’s boys”, he told him.
The violence that followed led him to be temporarily unable to work (for 90 days). “In 23 years at the bar, I’ve seen a lot of police violence, but Toure clearly escaped death,” exclaims his lawyer, Moussa Sarr.
“Sometimes I wonder if I’m really Senegalese”
After his release, Pape Abdoulaye Touré appeared fitter than in his old photos. Between the Pavillon Spécial of Le Dantec hospital, a medical prison unit and the Rebeuss prison, Toure, who spoke to La Maison Des Reporters on several occasions, spent his detention between care, despair and hunger strikes, more worried about his studies than the state of his health.
Under provisional release in another case dating from 2019, he was placed under a committal order on June 9, notably for “participation in an insurrectional movement”, three days before his first semester exam. He later missed the second one, despite his optimism and multiple sessions of course revision on his hospital bed. The prosecutor remains categorically opposed to any provisional release for the man who was arrested “at least ten times” between 2021 and 2023. As fate would have it, Pape Abdoulaye Touré did not pass his second year exams in 2020 after being arrested and “savagely assaulted” by police officers during his student days at Cheikh Anta Diop University. After that, he was tried and then released.
This is now a distant memory, because since 2021, the student pursuing his studies in a private education institution has been banned from all public university establishments for a period of five years on suspicion of ransacking a public restaurant.
“An exclusion without proof”, retorts the activist before adding: “I succeeded my A-Level in 2018, until now (2024) I’m running behind my Bachelor degree, can you believe that? All my classmates have validated the second year of their Masters in 2023.”
“That alone is enough to traumatize you” confides his doctor at the psychiatric hospital where he received psychological follow-up two months after the gendarmes’ abuse.
“Sometimes I ask myself this question: Am I really Senegalese?” concludes a disappointed Pape Abdoulaye Touré.
In both episodes attempts to question the spokesman of the national Gendarmerie have so far been unsuccessful. La Maison des Reporters have also addressed a correspondence to General Moussa Fall, High Commander of the National Gendarmerie and will update this article with any replies received.
Are you a witness or a victim of torture in Senegal? Or do you have information to share? Contact La Maison des Reporters on Whatsapp or Signal on +221 76 194 63 40 or by email: redaction@lamaisondesreporters.com
Florian Bobin is an activist-researcher in history at the Cheikh Anta Diop University of Dakar. His research focuses on liberation struggles and state violence in Senegal.
Moussa Ngom is a Senegalese journalist and the Founder of la Maison des Reporters, Senegal’s first publicly-funded, independent media site which takes the side of the people
Feature Photograph: Police repressing protests in Senegal (Wikicommons)
For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
We use cookies to collect and analyse information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customise content. By clicking into any content on this site, you agree to allow cookies to be placed. To find out more see our
For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
We use cookies to collect and analyse information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customise content. By clicking into any content on this site, you agree to allow cookies to be placed. To find out more see our
To provide the best experiences, we use technologies like cookies to store and/or access device information. Consenting to these technologies will allow us to process data such as browsing behavior or unique IDs on this site. Not consenting or withdrawing consent, may adversely affect certain features and functions.
Functional
Always active
The technical storage or access is strictly necessary for the legitimate purpose of enabling the use of a specific service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user, or for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network.
Preferences
The technical storage or access is necessary for the legitimate purpose of storing preferences that are not requested by the subscriber or user.
Statistics
The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for statistical purposes.The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for anonymous statistical purposes. Without a subpoena, voluntary compliance on the part of your Internet Service Provider, or additional records from a third party, information stored or retrieved for this purpose alone cannot usually be used to identify you.
Marketing
The technical storage or access is required to create user profiles to send advertising, or to track the user on a website or across several websites for similar marketing purposes.