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Keeping eyes on Sudan – keeping eyes on austerity

In the editorial for the current issue of ROAPE, Elisa Greco writes on the surge in the price of food and role of speculation on food markets, and how this is impacting the lives of the poor across Africa and the world. These trends in global political economy have had a direct and dramatic impact on the course of events in Sudan since 2019. Greco unpicks the consequences of global shocks on Sudanese politics, the recent war and resistance.

By Elisa Greco

Cheap borrowing is over and austerity is back. The 2023 International Monetary Fund (IMF) regional report on Africa argues that the continent is at a turning point: a phase of a constant increase in African borrowing on global capital markets, lasting from 2007 to 2022, has come to an end. This saw an increase in the stock of African Eurobonds, which in December 2021 were estimated at US$140 billion (Smith 2021), but rampant global inflation and the increase of borrowing costs put an end to this phase. The issuing of new Eurobonds in Africa declined from US$14 billion in the second quarter of 2021 to US$6 billion in the first quarter of 2022, while the US dollar effective exchange rate reached a 20-year high (IMF 2023). This has once more reinforced the US dollar – under the rising challenge posed by the internationalisation of the Chinese yuan and its recent digitisation (Deng 2023) – as world money, sitting firmly at the top of the global money hierarchy. African countries, like many others in the global South, are once more entrenched low down in the hierarchy of the global monetary system.

This dynamic brings to light the ‘remarkable historical continuity of capitalist finance as a key vector of imperialism’ (Alami 2019, 2), while African governments are pushed towards the re-enactment of austerity policies. Since spring 2022, African governments have stopped issuing Eurobonds (IMF 2023) and now, more than halfway into 2023, eyes are on which African government is going to default next, following on the default of Zambia in 2020 and Ghana in 2022. A new phase of austerity politics highlights the persisting burden of imperialism, while African states grapple with all the features of centuries of historical layering of uneven and combined development (Ashman 2009).

Our editorial in issue 174 argued that the global economic slowdown has led to the return of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) to the continent, because of the increased rates of indebtedness of most African countries promoted by low interest rates in the first decade of the 2000s. As referenced in that editorial, ROAPEdocumented the emergence of this dynamic the first time round, in the 1980s, and the role of international financial institutions in enforcing SAPs’ austerity policies, alongside the politics of negotiations, resistance or compliance that these generated at the national level in different countries.

As argued by Alami (2018), there is a set of features that can be identified in most emerging or industrialising economies that goes beyond the simple subordination of weaker currencies to stronger currencies on global monetary markets. These features are to be found in most African countries: a persistently strong scrutiny by international investors over national policy processes, high volatility of exchange rates and high interest rates, fragile financial reputations that are easily shaken and rapidly changing, coupled with equally rapid capital flight during moments of financial crisis, and a general dependence on the monetary policies of advanced capitalist countries. All these features lead to a ‘severity of the terrorism of money’ (Alami 2018, 28) that characterises poor, non-industrialised countries.

Capital’s hold on material reality has a strong – though not unshakeable – hold over people’s imagination and perception of reality. One of the mechanisms through which this hold is consolidated is that of ideology. Capital’s ideology revolves around representing capitalist reality as the ultimately natural reality: an order instituted by nature itself, and therefore intrinsically legitimate, solid, and deeply rooted within the human and nonhuman spheres: that is, in their ‘nature’. This conception has been so mainstreamed that many crises are explained away through an analysis of the specificities of a given historical conjuncture, resting on the idea that social and natural systems are normally functioning in a state of equilibrium, which can be disrupted by external shocks, then to evolve towards a new equilibrium.

This conception has become so engrained today that it is hard to encounter deeper explanations of the current global food crisis that go beyond the analysis of the multiple types of shock that have caused this spike of inflation and speculation on global food markets, leading to sustained high food prices. Thus, the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the global food market has been reduced to, and compared with, any other form of external ‘shock’ (Hall 2023), with the food crisis caused by the Russia–Ukraine war deemed comparable to a ‘bad rain year’ (Moseley 2022) leading to the polemic by Hall (2023) against that characterisation.

It is concerning to acknowledge that this focus on shocks and resilience recurs also in critical analyses of the global food system (Clapp 2023). A pervasively implicit assumption of mainstream accounts of the current food crisis and its impact on national economies and on their people is that the Russia–Ukraine war has been causing short- and long-term loss of market access for Ukrainian exports. This immediate loss of crops has caused the surge in food prices in the last year, acting as a physical ‘shock’ to a presumed equilibrium in international food markets (Breisinger et al. 2022). Explanations of supply–demand issues caused by the war as the main cause of the crisis have become pervasive, with an erasure of the role of financial speculation that is too systematic to go unnoticed. For example, in April 2022, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) staff and research fellows rapidly produced an economic estimation of the impact of the Russia–Ukraine war on Sudan’s domestic wheat price (Breisinger et al. 2022). This and similar reports do not even mention financial speculation as an element that caused the price hikes in international food markets in 2022.

The role of international speculation on food markets in the wake of the Russia–Ukraine war has been underplayed. That supply disruption caused the price hikes is far from being an uncontested fact and it is rather an implicit assumption, hiding that the decrease in wheat and maize supply caused by the war has only indirectly caused the current crisis. Many have argued that the determining factor in the increase of the price of food has been the surge of speculation on food markets – that is, of financial speculators actively betting on prices going up as a consequence of the material supply/demand issues caused by the war. While this kind of speculative boom in prices is short-lived, it is long enough for the speculators to make money and induce higher volatility of prices.

Two weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the agricultural economist Aaron Smith argued that the total volume of Ukrainian exports of maize and wheat were not a cause for concern in terms of global food supplies, and that food price hikes had largely been caused by financial speculation and the role of futures markets (Smith 2022). While he later went on to reconsider his calculations and recognised that the former argument was incorrect, the latter argument still holds true. Financial speculators betting on supply problems on the food commodity futures markets have largely fuelled the price hikes and increased price volatility in the last year (Pettifor 2022; Russell 2022). Financial speculators are not the only winners in the current global food crisis. A pre-/post-pandemic overview shows that the nine largest companies producing synthetic fertilisers have seen their profits increase from US$14 billion before the pandemic to US$28 billion in 2021 and US$49 billion in 2022, at the expense of many governments in the global South who are faced with exorbitant bills for the purchase of fertilisers distributed to peasants and farmers through state subsidies (GRAIN 2023).

While agribusiness companies have hugely profited from current food price hikes, food and oil inflation have contributed to increasing the pressure on the working poor. This pressure has been compounded by the return to austerity politics and policies, caused by the current reversal of borrowing trends. In countries where domestic inflation was already an issue before the current crisis, this has led to a cost-of-living crisis for the majority.

These general trends have contributed significantly to the current crisis in Sudan. Since 2018, booming domestic inflation has caused an increase in the price of bread (Breisinger et al. 2022). This, amid a general increase of the cost of living, played a role in the revolutionary moment of 2018/19 that led to the deposing of Omar al-Bashir. The cut in international donors’ funding in October 2021 – as a sanction against the military coup – compounded the onward trend of domestic inflation and contributed to the spike in the price of bread, as the government stopped subsidising wheat in January 2022 (Breisinger et al. 2022). The IFPRI blog post estimated that in Khartoum, between July 2021 and February 2022, the wholesale price of wheat increased by 112% in absolute terms, or about 60% in real terms. Throughout the last year, the Sudanese people – not only the working poor but also the middle classes – have been crushed under economic and political pressures: rampant inflation worsened living conditions have led to lower purchasing power, while an unstable military alliance gradually revealed its fragility and its inability to deliver on the promise of a transition to civilian rule.

The war in Sudan

In the weekend of 15 April 2023, open warfare started in Sudan. With striking rapidity, global media relegated the crisis to the back burner: a second-class war, far from the geopolitical centre of the West, the definition of which is being shaken and redefined by the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war. The relegation of the war in Sudan to the subordinate category of ‘just one more African war’ re-proposes the neo-colonial trope of Africa as a place of ‘tribal conflict’ and permanent war. This has not gone unnoticed by a diverse range of activists in the diaspora, such as the social media site Keepeyesonsudan.net, ensuring the visibility of the ongoing conflict – as echoed in the title of this editorial, ‘Keeping eyes on Sudan’.

The most immediate cause of the conflict is to be found in the fragile alliance between the two leaders of the transition phase: General Abdel Fattah al Burhan, the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces, and his deputy Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo – better known as Hemedti, leader of the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF), who became internationally infamous as previous leader of the paramilitary Janjaweed group that was responsible for war crimes and atrocities in the Darfur war. These two groups created an alliance, while contending for control over the military–security complex that has itself long controlled the Sudanese economy. The tensions emerged over how to share resources and power and how to handle the transition to a civilian government.

The two military leaders took power in October 2021 through a coup d’état that deposed the civilian government led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. Since 2019, Hamdok’s government had ruled over the country, following the deposing of al-Bashir after several months of popular protest and uprisings, national strikes and demonstrations. The Sudanese people organised themselves in spontaneous resistance committees to call for the end of military rule, for demilitarisation of the economy and society in Sudan and for the establishment of a government of civilians. During the uprising, these resistance committees emerged as social formations practising self-help, direct democracy and self-organisation and coalescing around a categorical refusal to compromise with the military forces. They called for demilitarisation of the economy and society, accountability for war crimes and a political transition that included trials of war criminals.

The resistance committees promoted a much more radical change than that envisaged by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), a broad political alliance of pro-democracy activists, who also included professional politicians, that coordinated the protests leading to the demise of al-Bashir. As Campbell and Serekberhan noted (2023), the hesitancy of the FFC in ‘declaring their complete opposition to militarism’ led the resistance committees to push the agenda well beyond a call for elections. The resistance committees challenged the military in an overt, uncompromising way, triggering the evolution of the uprisings into a fully-fledged ‘revolutionary situation’. As Hamdok’s government started seriously threatening to dismantle the hold of the military over the national economy and the consequent entrenchment of violence and corruption, the military staged the coup of October 2021.

Sudan has all the features of an extractive economy, with a colonially inherited and marked reliance on exports of agricultural commodities and livestock, besides an important mining sector (Al Nour 2022). The 30-year rule of al-Bashir consolidated this extractive structure, ensuring their effectiveness through a security complex built around the Islamist movement and delivered through the development of a capillary rural militia (Thomas and El Gizouli 2021). As elsewhere, land grabbing has accelerated after the 2007/08 financial crisis, as national and foreign investors – especially from China and the Gulf – expropriated the land from rural populations, causing an increase of landless people. In 2011, with the secession of South Sudan, Sudan lost the oil enclave territories. In order to recoup the lost oil income, the government encouraged the expansion of gold mining, which has become an important source of rural employment, as artisanal small-scale mining is prevalent. Today Sudan is Africa’s third-biggest gold-producing country, with most gold coming from small-scale mining.

Extractivism in Sudan has been marked by a militarisation of the economy (Thomas and El Gizouli 2021). Military and security leaders are involved in the hundreds of state companies that control a large part of the economy across most sectors (Suliman 2022), ranging from gold mining to large-scale agriculture, banking, telecommunications, transportation and real estate (Campbell and Serekberhan 2023), with striking similarities to the process of militarisation of the economy in Egypt and connections among the military and security systems of the neighbouring countries, as observed in another ROAPE editorial in issue 162. Gold mining and trading has played a big role in funding Hemedti’s RSF, with support from Russia, China, Israel and Saudi Arabia, alongside the European Community’s Khartoum Process – a Fortress Europe funding programme that relied on the RSF to deploy paramilitary forces against illegal migration towards Europe (Campbell and Serekberhan 2023).

As I write, the ongoing conflict has caused a serious humanitarian crisis, marked by considerable loss of life, widespread destruction of houses and infrastructure and an escalation of shortages of food, medicine and electricity. On May 22, after five weeks of conflict, a first ceasefire was negotiated in Jeddah (with arbitration by the US and Saudi Arabia) to allow for humanitarian relief to the population; this was repeatedly breached by both parties. To date, the conflict has led to massive displacement: about 1.4 million people have left Khartoum. Of these, two-thirds of internally displaced people took refuge in the countryside and about a third in neighbouring countries. These numbers stand in staggering contrast to the ridiculously low volume of Sudanese refugees evacuated to (or trying to reach) European countries: seen in this context, the management of Ukrainian refugees can only strike us as a further example of how racialised double standards go beyond migration policies and extend to humanitarian emergencies too.

Elisa Greco is an editor on the Review of African Political Economy. To read Elisa’s full editorial for Volume 50, Issue 175 (2023) click here and to access the articles in the issue, click here.

Featured Photograph: Protestors setting up barricades and burning tires during the Sudanese revolution against President Bashir (15 May 2019).

References

Alami, I. 2018. “On the Terrorism of Money and National Policy-making in Emerging Capitalist Economies.” Geoforum 96: 21–31.

Alami, I. 2019. “Global Finance Capital and Third World Debt.” In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Imperialism and Anti-imperialism, edited by I. Ness and Z. Cope.

Al Nour, S. 2022. “Extractivism Economy and Subaltern Struggles in Rural Sudan.” Final Report, CEDEJ Khartoum, CDCS project ‘Sudan in Revolutions’. Khartoum: CEDEJ – Centre d’études et de documentation économiques, juridiques et sociales au Soudan.

Ashman, S. 2009. “Capitalism, Uneven and Combined Development and the Transhistoric.” Review of International Affairs 22 (1): 29-46.

Breisinger, C., O. Kirui, P. Dorosh, J. Glauber and D. Laborde. 2022. “The Russia-Ukraine Conflict is Likely to Compound Sudan’s Existing Food Security Problems.” IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute), IFPRI blog series post, April 6.

Bush, R., and E. Greco. 2019. “Egypt under Military Rule.” Review of African Political Economy 46 (162): 529–534.

Campbell, H. and M. Serekberhan. 2023. “Sudan’s Counter-revolution.” Africa is A Country, May 9.

Clapp, J. 2023. “Concentration and Crises: Exploring the Deep Roots of Vulnerability in the Global Industrial Food System.” Journal of Peasant Studies 50 (1): 1–25.

Deng, W. R. 2023. “Negotiating Currency Internationalization: An Infrastructural Analysis of the Digital RMB.” Finance and SocietyEarlyView: 1–19.

GRAIN and IATP (Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy). 2023. “A Corporate Cartel Fertilises Food Inflation.” May 23. Barcelona and and Minnesota: GRAIN and IATP.

Hall, D. 2023. “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and Critical Agrarian Studies.” Journal of Peasant Studies 50 (1): 26–46.

IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2023. Regional Economic Outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa: The Big Funding Squeeze. April. Washington, DC: IMF.

Pettifor, A. 2022. “Grain Inflation: Starve the Poor, Feed the Rich.” System Change blogpost entry, July 22.

Russell, R. 2022. “Wall Street Is Mostly to Blame for Rising Commodity Prices.” Jacobin, August 12.

Smith, A. 2022. “Was I Wrong about the Global Food Crisis and Inflation?” Blogpost entry, Aaron Smith’s blog, May 18.

Smith, G. 2021. “Africa’s Hard-won Market Access.” IMF Finance and Development Features, December.

Suliman, S. 2022. “Minimal Hegemony in Sudan: Exploring the Rise and Fall of the National Islamic Front.” Review of African Political Economy 49 (172): 264–286.

Thomas, E., and M. El Gizouli. 2021. “Creatures of the Deposed: Connecting Sudan’s Rural and Urban Struggles.” African Arguments, November 11.

The micropolitics of work in the Central African Copperbelt

In this latest contribution to the Capitalism in Africa debate series, Benjamin Rubbers presents the main ideas of the recently published book Inside Mining Capitalism: The Micropolitics of Work on the Congolese and Zambian Copperbelts. Resulting from a collective research project, the book invites us to look at the mining projects that have been developed in the Central African Copperbelt in the period from 2000 to 2018 through the lens of work. Comparing the labour management practices put in place by new investors, it shows that they point to the emergence of a neoliberal labour regime that breaks in many ways from the paternalism of state-owned enterprises in the 20th century. The book chapters examine how these labour practices have been mediated, negotiated, or resisted by mineworkers, unionists, and human resources managers. This exploration into the micropolitics of work allows not only to highlight variations among mining projects, but also to understand the social dynamics they contribute to generate in new ways.

The mining sector in the Central African Copperbelt has undergone profound changes since the 1990s. In the second half of the 20th century, it was dominated by large state-owned enterprises – the Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines) in Congo and the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) in Zambia – that had put in place a paternalistic labour regime. They managed housing estates and social infrastructure allowing them to take charge of, and control, the lives of their workers and their families. In the 1990s and 2000s, following the decline of these enterprises, the World Bank pushed the two governments to dismantle them and to take measures to attract foreign investors. When copper prices soared after 2004, these neoliberal reforms met with direct success. The Central African Copperbelt witnessed an influx of foreign companies of all kinds: American majors, Chinese state-owned enterprises, Canadian, South African and Australian juniors, as well as businessmen from Belgium, India or Israel. Since then, some thirty mining projects of different sizes have entered the production phase. Today, they produce three million tons of copper annually, around three times more than Gécamines and ZCCM in the 1980s. Congo and Zambia are once again leading countries in world copper production. The Congolese copperbelt is also the world’s main producer of cobalt, a side-product of copper extraction that has gained new strategic import in the context of the energy transition (it is used in lithium batteries manufacturing).

The aim of our research was to identify the extent to which the labour management practices of new mining investors break with those of Gécamines and ZZCM in the past. Our hypothesis was that new mining projects should not be exclusively understood as the result of external forces, but as the outcome of a formation process involving various categories of actors both inside and outside corporations. This is especially the case since new mining projects have become very capital-intensive: Foreign companies invest colossal funds in a fixed place, which will be amortized only after several years or even decades. To make their investment secure and profitable, they therefore have no choice other than to cope with the pressures exerted by political leaders, the laws enforced by state officials, and the demands made by trade unions and the workers – a set of rules, norms and expectations that are, in the cases of Congo and Zambia, profoundly marked by the paternalistic model inherited from Gécamines and ZCCM. From this perspective, the recent boom in mining investments in Central Africa must be viewed not simply as a form of ‘dispossession’ by a new form of imperialism, but as a more complex ‘grafting’ process, through which mining capitalism becomes entangled in the historical trajectories of the two copperbelts in new ways.

The poster reads ‘Through the mine, progress’. 2021 © Benjamin Rubbers.

Understanding mining investments from this perspective implies taking a fresh look at the relationship between capital and labour in this sector. This relationship has been a classic area of research in the 20th century. The main focus of this body of research was the ability of mineworkers to create a world of their own in the mines, and the development of a militant working-class consciousness. For various reasons, however, this interest in class politics has faded into the background in the literature on new mining investments in the 21st century. Researchers’ attention has shifted to the relationships between foreign corporations and local populations, and the community politics they involve.

Although the book puts work centre stage again, it does not come back to an analysis in terms of class culture. Drawing inspiration from the anthropology of capitalism, its aim is to show the insights that can be gained from taking work as a lens to study the transformations of the mining industry in the 21st century. To do so, it foregrounds an approach from below, centred on the “micropolitics of work”. This approach seeks to understand how various actors (workers, trade unionists, customary chiefs) shape the development of mining projects, and how, in doing so, they participate in the transformation of various power configurations (the union field, gender dynamics, class inequalities). In this perspective, mining companies are not viewed as external monolithic institutions that enter into relationships with local communities. Mining projects are studied as being themselves co-produced by various actors both inside and outside mining companies. From the very first steps foreign investors take in the country, they are caught in various power configurations that influence how their extractive projects are developed.

To study the micropolitics of work in the mining, a team of six researchers including myself carried out ethnographic fieldwork in Congo and Zambia from 2016 to 2019: Francesca Pugliese and James Musonda undertook research with mine employees, Kristien Geenen and Thomas McNamara with trade unionists, and Emma Lochery and myself with human resource (HR) managers, labour officials, and political authorities at different levels. Since our research dealt with people in relation to each other, this teamwork method provided the opportunity to study the micropolitics of work in the mining sector extensively in each country, and to make consistent comparisons between different case studies in Congo and Zambia.

Written collectively, the book is the result of this teamwork method. Its aim is not to present all the findings of our research (most have appeared in journal articles) but to answer a set of questions that allow for comparisons between the two copperbelts. These questions are about safety politics, gender equality programme, union elections, strike dynamics, and the role of HR managers. Rather than writing separate individual chapters, as is usually the case in edited volumes, we co-authored chapters discussing similarities and differences between two cases – one in Congo, the other in Zambia – in a consistent way.

The book begins with a historical chapter highlighting the common trends in the labour management practices that new mining investors have put in place in the Central African Copperbelt since the early 2000s: they hire fewer workers, and grant them with fewer benefits in kin, they do not hesitate to carry out mass layoffs in response to copper price reductions or tax increases; and a growing number of their activities are outsourced. These trends point to the Gécamines and ZCCM in the 20th century. This analysis, and the neoliberalisation narrative underlying it, should not however lead us to neglect the diversity of mining projects characteristic of the recent boom. The comparison of new mining projects in both countries suggests that their labour practices show important variations depending on the type of capital involved (state vs. private), the type of mine being developed (underground vs. open pit), and the area where they are established (rural vs. urban).

It is also important to point out that the new labour regime is not simply imposed by foreign investors. Its rise is the result of a variegated process of improvisation and adaptation involving local actors. The subsequent chapters of the book bring to light the agency of mineworkers, trade unionists, and human resource managers in the making of mining companies’ labour practices. They play a significant role in recruitment practices, the negotiation of wages and benefits, the improvement of working conditions, compliance of companies with labour laws, and the organisation of mass layoffs. However, the case studies we carried out show that the margin for negotiation of local actors not only changes over time, with the development of mining projects, but also varies from one domain to another, and from one mining project to another.

Workers queue up at the entrance to a copper mine in DR Congo. 2021 © Benjamin Rubbers.

Such variations are well illustrated in the two chapters by Francesca Pugliese and James Musonda. In the chapter on safety, they show that new rules and procedures have been imposed by foreign investors in this domain without leaving much room for workers to change them formally. But the way in which workers put them into practice differs between the two mines under study, one being an opencast mine and the other an underground mine. In the underground mine in Zambia, contract workers have to circumvent safety rules and procedures informally if they want to meet their production targets and get a bonus at the end of the month, while in the opencast mine in Congo, where the production bonus is less significant or non-existent, workers have no interest – except for their personal convenience – in deviating from safety rules and procedures. In the chapter on gender, on the other hand, Pugliese and Musonda’s analysis suggests that gender equality initiatives by the parent company headquarters have had only a marginal effect locally. The main reason is that the people responsible for recruiting and promoting workers, who are generally Congolese or Zambian men, are still reluctant to hire women in the core departments of the mine – that is, mining, processing and maintenance. If the recent boom has represented a missed opportunity to introduce more gender equality in the mining sector, this is to a large extent due to the power games involved in the recruitment and promotion practices, the changes that have taken place in the contribution of women in household revenues, and the gender stereotypes prevailing in the two copperbelts.

If mining companies’ labour practices have had only limited impact on gender relations, the conclusion of the book shows that they have had far-reaching consequences in other areas of social life. In both Congo and Zambia, the mining boom was accompanied by the creation of new unions which began to compete with more established unions to represent the workers in companies, and this competition has led all the unions to develop new strategies to win elections and increase their budgets. Outside of the union power field, various actors in the political arena have seized on the issue of employment in the mining sector (job and contract opportunities, access to managerial positions, wages and working conditions, mass layoffs, etc.) to extend their support base and impose themselves as essential interlocutors between local people and foreign investors.

This growing political competition must itself be understood in the light of the inequalities that the establishment of new mining companies has helped engender and exacerbate in the two copperbelts. Contrary to what studies focusing on the dispossession of local communities by foreign corporations suggest, the recent boom of mining investments in the Central African Copperbelt has not resulted in a simple division between winners and losers. As in several other mining contexts in the Global South, the recruiting practices of foreign investors have resulted in what Gabrielle Hecht has called an ‘ethnotechnical hierarchy’, with expatriate executives and specialised technicians at the top, skilled employees from the country’s major cities in the middle, and the local unskilled workers at the bottom. At the same time, the development of subcontracting in the mining industry has led to the emergence of a class of small and midsized entrepreneurs and the formation of a large secondary labour market associated with precarious jobs and low wages. Finally, the consumption practices of these various categories of workers and entrepreneurs has had a significant effect on various sectors (construction, transport, food, schools, bars, etc.) with their own labour dynamics.

In a more general way, our research suggests that labour (access to jobs, income levels, career opportunities) remains at the heart of people’s concern. From a political perspective, this observation calls for the regulation of labour to be put back at the centre of mining governance concerns. If we want to get out of the neoliberal labour regime, it is necessary to move the debate beyond issues of state revenues and community development, to refocus it on labour and conditions of employment.

The book results from the WORKinMINING project at the University of Liège, Belgium. The project received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement n°646802).

Benjamin Rubbers is Professor at the Université de Liège and Lecturer at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium. Since 1999, he has carried out ethnographic research on social change in the Congolese copperbelt with a focus on work, capitalism, and public reforms. His publications on the region include three monographs and thirty journal articles and book chapters.

Breaking the silence on colonial crimes

In July this year the Dutch King apologised for the country’s historical role in slavery. Large numbers of young people were present to hear King Willem Alexander apologise for the crimes of his family and kingdom. Yet, there are many questions that remain unanswered in ongoing public debates. For ROAPE, Sayra van den Berg, Emmanuel Akwasi Adu-Ampong and David Mwambari argue that the past of slavery and (neo-)colonialism is not over.

By Sayra van den Berg, Emmanuel Akwasi Adu-Ampong and David Mwambari

On 1 July 2023, the Dutch King apologised for the Netherlands’ historical role in slavery. On location at the Slavery Monument in Oosterpark in the east of Amsterdam scores of diverse young people were present to hear King Willem Alexander apologise for the crimes of his family and kingdom.  Yet, there are many questions that remain unanswered in ongoing public debate. This apology was praised by some as historic and an act of courage, some consider it unnecessary, while others consider it too little too late. In his speech, the Dutch King reflects on the polarity of public opinion surrounding the need for his apology, recognising that for some apologies are a necessary acknowledgement of historical harm and humiliation that has for too long been silenced, while others consider apologies to be excessive (‘overdreven’) as they are far removed in time from their original crimes. The divided nature of public opinion on apologies reinforces exactly why we need them in contemporary society.

In this blogpost we argue that this apology is an important challenge to other monarchies, European political and business elites whose families have benefited from the business of slavery, colonialism and neocolonialism for centuries. Importantly, Europe’s diversified young minds are asking questions that demand the breaking of the active silencing of the past and its continued impact on the present.

The slavery and colonial past of European societies have for a long time been made absent through obfuscation. This active silencing of the past breeds the continued colonial mindset of European political elites as evidenced in their speeches, behaviors and policies. Such colonial mindsets filter down through society inflecting everyday social relations while breeding racism and discrimination at all levels. Crimes committed by western European elites remain the most well-known yet unpunished and disregarded crimes in humanity’s history. The Holocaust and resulting trial is held as a standard of European righting wrong. This is a false understanding underlined by a narrative that Europeans are enlightened and human rights champions that self-regulate when it comes to crimes. Nonetheless we are yet to have institutions such as the Nuremberg trials or International Criminal Court dedicated to investigating and addressing crimes committed under slavery and colonialism. Crimes that UNESCO has in many instances declared as crimes against humanity. Instead we have blood-drenched diplomacy and amnesia propagated by European and American intellectuals, political and business elites that have created an official narrative that insists on white innocence, sealing evidence or diplomacy with the representatives of formerly colonial countries political elites.

The European blindspot regarding its own colonial crimes thus endures – a de facto amnesty that obscures the crimes of colonisation and allows their contemporary legacies to continue. Such amnesia and silencing in diplomacy does not give credibility to European politicians when demanding other countries end wars or invasion. Instead it provides an official model of how to silence criminal pasts of countries and allow human rights crimes to thrive in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy which goes against the very principals European societies prides themselves to protect.

The past of slavery and (neo)colonialism is not over. It still persists and structures the present and the future of everyday social relations in European societies. This much has been shown in studies of cases like the Holocaust, World War I and World War II or crimes in other genocides around the world. The loud silence of the European Union over these slavery and colonial era crimes and lack of apologies cannot be tolerated anymore.

As we recently witnessed the French riots unfold due to police brutality against minorities, we need to remember the continued looting of African resources through shady business deals, inequitable financial arrangements that stem from (neo)colonial rule and the financing of violence in the name of border controls amongst many other racist and discriminatory policies faced by people of African descent on the continent and in the diaspora.

The COVID-19 global health crisis made even more evident ongoing racist attitudes of European countries in their relation with non-European countries. For instance In 2021, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, Suriname – a former colony in the Kingdom of the Netherlands –  sought assistance from the Netherlands in the form of vaccine distribution. While the Netherlands did  – after some weeks – respond and send thousands of COVID-19 vaccines, they opted to send primarily Astrazeneca vaccines, despite having made the decision in the Netherlands to halt administering these vaccines to people under the age of 60 within the Netherlands (due to reports of a small risk factor in younger people). So while the Netherlands came to the ‘aid’ of its former colony in this way, it only saw fit to provide them with an option that was considered ‘below standard’ in the Netherlands itself.

Today, in much of European society, there is what can be called the embodied absence of the past. In a study recently published in the Annals of Tourism Research, this embodied absence of the past is considered as:

the awareness of the physical presence yet narrative absence of the shared history, heritage and role of African-descent people in European societies. This collective amnesia…is challenged and activated through tourism encounters of slavery and colonial traces which trigger an evocation and reconstruction of personal and collective memories.

It is out of such encounters that the stories of slavery, colonialism and the long-standing presence of Africans on European soil are starting to crack through the surface of the public consciousness, thanks in part to the energy of young people.

Many young people in Europe are beginning to realise that part of their countries’ contemporary wealth flows directly from slavery and colonial pillage. The ease of travel they enjoy means they’re coming face to face with the underdevelopment in many countries that has been intentionally generated by European powers. They have encountered an informed, innovative and ambitious youth from the Global South that want to speak against oppression in their own countries and colonial structures that maintain corrupt dealings that are ailing their societies. A youth that can no longer be silenced, distanced or intimidated to continue the political and epistemic decolonialisation project that their ancestors fought and died for. These Global South youth are part of the Diaspora in Europe leading the demands for positive change and fighting racism in all forms.

It is time to break the silence, unseal the archives and demand investigations. There is a need to fully understand how European countries and their political elites have continued to benefit from slavery and (neo)colonial oppression in addition to ongoing blood wars around the world. The young people of Europe in their great diversity are calling for better historical information that reflect the stories of their parents and the generations that came before them. Apologies need to go hand-in-hand with knowledge and historical awareness. This must precede any attempts at repair and reparations.

It is in this context that the public apology and the initiatives to return stolen artifacts by the Dutch King and heritage institutions holds significance. This is an important first step and one that all European powers including Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Portugal, France, Spain and others should follow. A formal apology is a necessary stage in the path toward decolonising the infrastructures of power and inequalities that continue to disadvantage and discriminate along racial fault lines throughout Europe and the colonial Global North.

The power of apologies lies in the act of acknowledgement that they embody – as a public act of recognition that the reality of colonialism was criminal in nature and that its impacts endure. This creates the necessary conditions for responsibility that paves the way for further institutional measures of repair, redress and reconciliation. Without this process such acknowledgement becomes a hollow act. In addition to the apology, the Dutch King has already commissioned a 3-year investigation into the details of his family’s involvement in and profit from slavery.

European people deserve a chance to read historical books that accurately represent varied perspectives on the crimes their monarchs committed around the world, the pain inflicted on those who survived and the looting that followed. It is time that Europeans learn about these historical crimes through formal channels in the classroom.  To break the silence on slavery and the colonial past in Europe and decolonise the minds of the old and the young, we need to consider three main things:

First, decolonise knowledge sources within educational systems. There are many examples and research that has pointed to how we can embark on the de-centering of the European version of the history of slavery and colonialism. Such research should be made visible and placed at the centre of the curriculum. European teachers and classrooms should be decolonised and changes should not be  simply window-dressing if the human rights of the former colonised are to be respected and apologies meaningful. Teachers must be retrained en-mass in a decolonial curriculum that is both past, present and forward looking.

Second, expand and support educational access for minority groups facing chronic structural barriers. There is a need for increased funding to allow continued promotion and creating spaces that allow minority groups with diverse perspectives and ideas to be involved in spaces of power. Some European societies have already implemented some of these programs to allow access to women and sexual minorities. Expanding such programs to cover Afro-descent groups in particular can inspire those that promote ethnic minorities to be visible and be heard.

Finally, the media should be leading the charge to allow public opinion and debate on how the colonial past of European countries structure today’s conversations and debates. We need more programs that are led by both whites and non-whites on the crimes committed in the name of Europeans and continued debates on how to change these narratives and construct a better future.

Public apologies are an important step forward, but they remain just that – one step in what must be a larger commitment to tangibly dismantling the colonial structures and legacies that continue to dictate opportunities and challenges at all levels of life and society. This recent Dutch apology breaks new ground, which, if met with further institutional action could mark a crucial step forward in decolonising mind and space. While King Willem Alexander calls upon us to ‘open our hearts’ to those who would dismiss the need for apologies and respect differences in opinions, we argue that each position evidences precisely why public apologies from European elites are important and necessary.

Those in support of the apology overwhelmingly accept that the mission of acknowledgement, accountability and decolonisation is a collective endeavor, and one which requires breaking the silence of colonial crimes to achieve. Those who refute its relevance highlight the infuriating impact of generations of active silencing: a palpable sense of obliviousness to the lasting impacts in contemporary society. The continuation of the persistent structures of inequalities remain perhaps the most formidable obstacle we must contend with to effectively dismantle (neo)colonialism. Therefore, in the absence of action, this apology risks a decisive step backwards as the face of (neo)coloniality dons a mask of empty words.

Sayra van den Berg is a Dutch-Surinamese national and a research associate at the University of York working on decolonial spaces of transitional justice in contemporary civil wars across sub-Saharan Africa.

Emmanuel Akwasi Adu-Ampong is a Ghanaian-Dutch national and assistant professor in Cultural Geography at Wageningen University & Research. He currently works on the Dutch National Research Council funded Veni project on ‘slavery, heritage and tourism in Ghana-Suriname-Netherlands triangle’.

David Mwambari is an associate professor at KU Leuven University, Afro-diaspora Belgian and leads the European Research Council funded on Traveling Memories, Silences and Secrets of Migrants.

Featured Photograph: 50th Anniversary Parade with Luc Winants, King Willem-Alexander and Salvatore Farina (31 May 2017).

Underground politics in Senegal: a posthumous interview with Eugénie Rokhaya Aw

Eugénie Rokhaya Aw, imprisoned under the regime of Léopold Sédar Senghor, was an active Senegalese left-wing activist who fought clandestinely for the country’s democratisation in the 1970s. More than a year after her passing in July 2022, her testimony sheds light on the struggles of several generations who fought imperialism beyond official African independences.

By Florian Bobin and Maky Madiba Sylla

“For a very long time, we didn’t speak; we kept quiet, perhaps out of modesty, not to disturb others, because, despite everything, we had a suffering that we continued to carry with us. Everything is still alive, buried, but memory resurfaces by speaking and hearing others speak.” On the opening day of a conference on the 1960s-1970s African revolutionary lefts held in Dakar in 2019, Eugénie Rokhaya Aw recounted her memories of underground politics imposed by Senegal’s party-state under President Léopold Sédar Senghor. A year later, she agreed to welcome us to her home in Dakar for a filmed interview as part of our documentary in-the-making Revolutionary Senegal.

Born in Paris in 1952 to a mother from Martinique and a father from Senegal, Eugénie Rokhaya Aw took part in the development of the student movement at the University of Dakar in the early 1970s, in the wake of May 1968. Senegalese students returning from France, such as Landing Savané and Omar Blondin Diop, contributed to the growth of Maoist ideas. In 1974, the anti-imperialist front And Jëf (“To Act Together” in Wolof) launched the newspaper Xare Bi (“The Struggle” in Wolof). At the same time, as a young journalist, Aw sought to document the living conditions of women workers whom she taught to read and write.

During the 1980s, Eugénie Rokhaya Aw intensified her pan-Africanist and internationalist commitment, attending the 1980 World Conference on Women held in Copenhagen; covering several armed conflicts on the African continent; meeting President Thomas Sankara for an interview about women in the Burkinabè revolution; and getting involved in the fight against apartheid in South Africa. Following her thesis in Quebec on the voices of Rwandan women after the Tutsi genocide, she returned to Senegal in the early 2000s to teach at the University of Dakar’s School of Journalism, before becoming its director from 2005 to 2011.

Eugénie Rokhaya Aw sadly passed away on 3 July 2022.

 

Eugénie Rokhaya Aw at a meeting of the Council for the Observation of Ethical and Professional Conduct in the Media, 2022 © Moussa Sow

Florian Bobin and Maky Madiba Sylla: You enrolled at the University of Dakar in Fall 1971, on a campus still strongly marked by the May 68 student mobilisation. How did your activism take shape?

Eugénie Rokhaya Aw: At university, I started to study medicine, but that didn’t work out, so I switched to philosophy. It was a big break. That’s where everything Marxist-Leninist, of all stripes, came together. And that’s how I got hooked on this idea of reversing perspective, that it was possible to change the state, radically transform society. I disagreed with discipline. I disagreed with authority. And I made it known. It caused a lot of trouble in the classrooms I was in. My difference – being African, Western and Caribbean – means I can do things others won’t. For example, there’s a strike at the university and the police shut everything down. But we have to take leaflets in: I’m the one who brings them in. And we have to inform the students that we’re on strike. I’m the one who’s going to get the message across because I look like the good little Westerner walking around. I was given texts to read. And gradually, I was integrated into cells. Then into groups. That’s how I joined the movement.

The movement?

We were part of the Maoist movement and knew all about the Little Red Book. Because Mao Tse-tung’s thought was precisely about the peasantry, showing the link between the rural and urban worlds [1].  At the same time, we had local thinking: the whole movement that went out into the countryside, met and lived with peasants; literacy of workers in factories; cultural work through theatre, song, and poetry; uncovering of our forgotten heroes like Lamine Senghor; the popular movement, especially in sport; the efforts with youths who had been expelled from school, whom we tried to present independently at the baccalaureate.

At the time, only the ruling party – the Senegalese Progressive Union (Union Progressiste Sénégalaise), which was known as the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste) after 1976 – was allowed to exist, so opposition parties had to go underground. How did you organise yourselves?

There were different levels within And Jëf, and you could move from one to another. This meant that you had a particular cell made up of a correspondent, and you had no connection with other cells. There was an extremely high degree of compartmentalisation between the groups. Then, when you got to a higher level, you discovered the links that can exist between cells. Clandestinity meant that you worked and had an everyday life during the day; and at night you had another life. We didn’t sleep much. It meant being careful about what you said. It also meant living in relative isolation. And even if you had a family, everything was geared towards the movement. We didn’t have weekends. When I had my salary, a third of it went to the movement, to give a minimum income to those we called “professional revolutionaries” who were established in the countryside and fully dedicated to the cause but no longer had an income [2]. So, we devoted our whole lives to the cause.

A number of activists used their positions as civil servants within the body responsible for controlling the peanut trade to sound out peasants’ plight and thus expand the movement…

I took advantage of being a journalist for the national daily to choose the subjects I wanted to cover. One day, I suggested to my editor-in-chief that I do a story on women workers in the fish processing factories in the port of Dakar. I was hired and the bosses were very proud to have ‘someone like me’ working with the women. We used the ‘mass line’, which meant that when we went somewhere, we lived people’s lives.

I saw the women’s conditions: subhuman conditions where you had to ask permission to go to the toilet, and you weren’t allowed to go more than a certain number of times. There were gullies with water, and the fish’s blood was dripping down – your feet were soaked… all the time: most pregnant women didn’t carry their pregnancies to term. The worst thing was that these women had worked in these factories, sometimes for several years, but were rehired every day as day labourers. They had no rights. So, I did all the work I had to do and wrote my article.

How did the factory’s management react?

Thanks to the person who supervised me because the article was so shocking that the bosses came to the paper and said: “She has to make a denial”. I replied: “I refuse, never will I deny [the article]”. The person who edited my article then called me: “Eugénie, look at what you’ve written and at what I’ve corrected. No one can say you’re talking about this factory, but everyone knows it’s this factory you’re talking about”. After that, [we were] allowed to go back and see these women, who walked to work without any means of transport. What I find extraordinary about these women is that at no time do I remember any of them saying to me: “You’re telling us tales”.

Meanwhile, you pursued your activism underground…

We knew everything, everything, everything about what was happening with torture in Vietnam—every single detail. We recited “Dimbokro Poulo Condor” [chorus of David Diop’s poem “The Agony of Chains”]. We had booklets with all kinds of experiences. We experienced repression by proxy. We put ourselves in the shoes of Vietnamese fighters who had resisted terrible, inhuman things, and we became those Vietnamese resistance fighters. But it’s something else when you’re personally confronted with such violence.

It wasn’t long before repression hit the movement. In 1975 the police intercepted your underground newspaper Xare Bi. What happened?

One night they came to my house. I like to say ‘they’ because, for me, they’re indeterminate people. They took my husband away. The chief asked me for a glass of water; I gave him one and broke it in front of him. They left. The following day they came back for me, took me to an annex of the Interior Ministry, took me upstairs and threatened me. They showed me my husband, whom I didn’t recognise: his head had doubled in size, and his fingernails were covered in blood. The threat was: “Speak or else…”. And yet I had to resist. I could see his suffering but couldn’t show that I was affected because I knew they were waiting for that. I told them: “You can do whatever you want to me, but I’m warning you: I’m pregnant. If anything happens to me, you’ll be responsible”. Finally, I was taken to the central police station, to the top floor, where they tortured the comrades. Many of the officers there had fought in the wars in Indochina and Algeria.

[In prison] one day I wasn’t feeling well and asked to go to the hospital for some tests. I was taken there, but I still wasn’t feeling well when I returned. I was given an anti-haemorrhagic injection… I can still feel the sting. And in the evening, plop! I lost everything. I had to lie down on the mattress to avoid getting all bloody… I could vaguely hear screams, but I was bleeding to death. You don’t fully understand the logic of the state, which can be murderous. When I miscarried, I felt I was on my way out. Thanks to my comrades who were in prison and the ordinary prisoners who rebelled in the room where I was, I was taken out, bleeding. It seems that when Senghor heard what had happened to me, he said: “Just make sure she doesn’t die”. That’s when I realised they had killed Omar Blondin Diop.

How did you recover from prison?

The moment I told myself that we’re really in a macho world was after prison when we had no income: the men coming out of prison received 10,000 CFA francs, and I received 5,000. So, I was half a militant! And then, at the same time, it was like in traditional parties, you had the ‘women’s movement’. Today I would have said: “No, women need to be integrated into the movement in general; we don’t need a women’s movement unless there are particular issues that we as women need to address”. Of course, there were also forms of [sexual] predation: [the attitude was] if we could have you, we’d have you… But we’re not independent of the social relations that our society produces.

Something else I noticed, more in the popular movement: our friends very often came from the same ethnic or class background as us. And I’ll never forget that the person who made the tea was from an inferior cast. That struck me. I don’t know if any of my comrades saw him that way. They saw him as a comrade like themselves who liked to make tea, which was probably true. But there was something there: this reproduction of society, of social rules, which was a bit disturbing in a movement that claimed to be revolutionary.

In our research, few women are willing to talk about their experiences in underground politics. How do you explain this?

There’s a lot of reserve. There was a lot of suffering. It’s also difficult for men – there are a lot of things in our society that make people reluctant to talk – but a man is more likely to speak than a woman. We’re supposed to be in the private domestic sphere. Women are stigmatised more than men. You’re told: “No, no, no, it’s not your job to do things like that, to go into a cell and come back at midnight, 1 am, 2 am, or sometimes not all night. There’s a problem. You must have a husband and children”. There’s this whole social structure that makes it very complicated to speak.

When I see these women today, the way they dress, they are immobile. There’s too much suffering that we don’t want to talk about, that we’re afraid to talk about, that we haven’t dealt with. Militancy tore families apart. And yet, traditionally, we’re supposed to be the link. Sometimes the children block the writing of this story because they have suffered from the involvement themselves. And as soon as we try to talk about it, there’s an immediate outcry.

Alongside your activism, you began a career in journalism in 1970. How did you combine the two?

I was the only woman journalist when I started writing for the national daily Dakar-Matin, renamed Le Soleil. But it was also amazing to arrive at the state newspaper and to have such a high level of supervision. I worked on issues that interested me: the status of women. And subverted them. When we talk about women’s issues, we’ll give you topics like the housewife’s shopping basket, nutrition, the wives of presidents visiting Senegal…

Subversion is about making all these issues political. For example, I’d take revolutionary countries, learn about the struggles of women in the FLN [National Liberation Front, Algeria], the ANC [African National Congress, South Africa], SWAPO [South West Africa People’s Organisation, Namibia], ZANU [Zimbabwe African National Union, Zimbabwe], and then put their stories in the newspaper. Nutrition? I wrote about how we could recover and improve our traditional dishes. I wasn’t fired from Le Soleil because of the articles I wrote but because of my political problems.

Eugénie Rokhaya Aw (bottom left) with participants at the Second World Conference on Women in Copenhagen, July 1980 © Eugénie Rokhaya Aw

After your dismissal from Le Soleil in 1976, you quickly bounced back to Afrique Nouvelle, a West African Catholic newspaper. What topics did you cover then?

At one point, I specialized in African conflicts. I went underground to Eritrea, to the Second Congress of Workers and Women. I also worked with Eritrean communities from the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front in Nairobi, even though we weren’t in the same political tradition. Mind you, it was a total failure in Eritrea. I’ve been everywhere on the field: Congo-Brazzaville, Zaire [now the Democratic Republic of Congo], Rwanda. I also interviewed Thomas Sankara for two hours on the question of women. Sankara was a special breed. He understood everything, and he was into action. It all happened at his place. He got me a little stool, set up the recorder and looked to see if I was all right. It was a true reflection that we’ve not seen to this day. Everywhere I went, I tried to concretely see the extraordinary suffering of our population, all for the sake of political manipulation. In fact, I did my doctoral thesis on the genocide in Rwanda and women’s voices …

I was also very involved in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. I was fortunate to work with the All Africa Conference of Churches, whose president was Desmond Tutu. So obviously, these were people directly involved in the struggle. I had the opportunity to work with community radio stations and negotiate with African states. During the embargo, we brought young Black South Africans into our countries to work with them on their underground anti-apartheid projects, like in Benin in 1992. We could see their fear. Because they didn’t have visas, their passports were taken away. A Black South African without a passport risked being arrested at any moment. We also had the opportunity to meet extraordinary people like Coretta King, [Black American civil rights activist and Martin Luther King’s wife], and Maynard Jackson, Atlanta’s first Black mayor.

Back to Senegal, what stands out in your years of struggle?

We tried to contribute as much as we could, but there were also many things we thought we’d solved. In my time, I felt much freer, even under repression. We were politically repressed, but at the same time, afterwards, we had a relatively free voice. Today I’m scrutinised for everything: the clothes I wear, if I drink a glass of wine, if I take certain positions. Us women used to have a relatively free voice, an ability to move in public spaces. Now we’re losing that more and more.

There was a time when we were so in tune with the Chinese theses of the “Three Worlds Theory” that I asked myself: “Can we think for ourselves?”[3]. I know it caused quite a stir. But for me, it was perhaps this turning point that we couldn’t systematise. The movement was full of elements, initiatives and innovations that could have been systematised. Maybe we weren’t able to capitalise on it. We let ourselves be absorbed by repression and political changeover [4].

The 2000 political changeover was highly damaging to the movement. It’s a matter we should have discussed. Perhaps it was a mistake to dissolve all the movement’s structures; we should have kept some of them. The problem is that when you stay in the opposition for too long and have political ambitions, you quickly become a politician like all the others. The exercise of political power is a perilous task… But now, some of us have to exercise it. So, what do we do?

The main lecture hall of the University of Dakar’s School of Journalism, renamed after Eugénie Rokhaya Aw Ndiaye in November 2022 © Florian Bobin 

Read Eugénie Rokhaya Aw’s interview in French here: in full (Revue d’histoire contemporaine de l’Afrique) and a shortened version (Afrique XXI)

Florian Bobin is a Dakar-based researcher in history who studies liberation struggles and state violence in 1960s-1970s Senegal, author of a forthcoming biography of revolutionary philosopher Omar Blondin Diop. Maky Madiba Sylla is a Senegalese artist and filmmaker, co-director of the documentary El Maestro Laba Sosseh (Linkering Productions, 2021).

Featured Photograph: Eugénie Rokhaya Aw during our interview in Dakar, November 2020 © Linkering Productions

Notes

[1] Maoism found a favourable echo in Senegal in the second half of the 1960s with the short-lived Senegalese Communist Part (PCS), founded in 1965 by former militants of the disbanded African Independence Party (PAI). But it was not until the 1970s that the movement began to take shape underground, around And Jëf.

[2] And Jëf activists (an average of thirty at a time) who were responsible for expanding the movement by setting up new cells among peasants, workers and trade unionists: formally unpaid, they benefited from the contributions of salaried comrades for their daily living.

[3] A theory developed by the Chinese leader Mao Zedong in 1974, which presented a tripartite division of the world: the first world was that of the superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union); the second world was that of the intermediate powers (Europe, Canada, Japan); and the third world included all the other countries of Asia (including China), Africa and Latin America, as the main force opposing the hegemonism of the first world, supported by the second. This theory was challenged by the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha, who was not aligned with either the Soviet Union or China, and for whom the opposition between “revolutionary” and “reactionary” countries remained the fundamental demarcation. This led to a “pro-Albanian current”, to which some Senegalese Maoist activists belonged, causing a split within And Jëf.

[4] After forty years of rule by the Socialist Party (PS), formerly the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS), the 2000 presidential elections marked the first political changeover in Senegal. Abdoulaye Wade, leader of the liberal Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), defeated the incumbent president, Abdou Diouf (successor of Senghor in 1981) and came to power thanks to a broad opposition coalition that included the historical leaders of the underground left from the 1970s: Landing Savané for And Jëf; Abdoulaye Bathily for the Democratic League (LD); Amath Dansokho for the Independent Labour Party (PIT).

Breaking the silence on NGOs in Africa – a review

In Breaking the Silence of NGOs in Africa, members of the Kenya Organic Intellectuals Network explore the role that NGO discourse and participation has had on contemporary struggles for radical change. Zachary Patterson writes that this timely book offers insights into how NGOs play a critical role in stifling the development and independence of radical African movements. Activists must proceed cautiously to avoid the risk of falling into a trap of Western rights discourse and liberal movement dynamics.

By Zachary J. Patterson

Africa has experienced a resurgent wave of popular protests in 2023, with themes of government accountability, economic inequality, and democratic involvement influencing the upsurge in widespread demonstrations. Up and down the continent, communities are organizing against high costs of living and unemployment, fraudulent elections and government corruption, and authoritarianism and police violence – gaining momentum and international attention through direct collective action.

Thousands of Tunisians march through the streets against president Kais Saied’s seizure of power and the expanding crackdown on opposition voices amid rising inflation. Protests against the detention of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko continue in Senegal, as young voters voicing concerns about political corruption, deteriorating democracy, and low economic opportunity clash with security forces. Trade union leaders in South Africa mobilize workers across the nation to demand interest rate cuts, electricity reforms, and job growth, while the government approves salary increases for public office holders and social unrest widens due to economic uncertainties and heavy-handed police tactics. Anti-government protests, fuelled by opposition leader Raila Odinga, against the imposition of tax increases, soaring costs of living, and recent electoral flaws in Kenya are met with teargas and live ammunition from a militarized police force, leaving approximately 75 people dead as of the end of July.

Neoliberal capitalism as the vast process of deregulation, liberalization, and privatization that has infected the continent since the 1980s – restructuring political, socio-economic, cultural, and ecological dimensions and preventing colonial emancipation and national autonomy – is in crisis. Africans are seizing this historical moment and rising up against neo-colonial governments sympathetic to and driven by neoliberal ideology. As seen in recent months, citizens mobilizing for change face violent police repression backed by ruling elites’ intent on maintaining power. In addition to their concerns for safe assembly, organizers considering international support and collaboration with NGOs – pursuing benefits of visibility, legitimacy, and security – are advised by the Kenya Organic Intellectuals Network in their book Breaking the Silence on NGOs in Africa to proceed vigilantly so to avoid the risk of falling trap to Western rights discourse, reform rhetoric, and liberal movement dynamics.

Since their rise to prominence as agents of service delivery during the 1990s, NGOs have grown exponentially in size and influence, forging coalitions with grassroots activists to offer solutions to rising inequality, dictatorial authoritarianism, and other obstructive consequences of neoliberalism. Yet, often what NGOs say they want to address and fight against does not improve or change, and their efforts and limited successes become estranged from the aspirations and struggles of grassroots communities. In Breaking the Silence of NGOs in Africa, members of the Kenya Organic Intellectuals Network explore the role that NGO discourse and participation has had on contemporary struggles for radical change. Considering and reflecting on Issa Shivji’s (2007) Silences in NGO Discourse: The Role and Future of NGOs in Africa, the authors present their experiences in organizing – stories of frustrations and contradictions – and the impacts that NGOs have had in the popular movements across the continent. The authors provide a historical chronology of resistance in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and the rest of Africa, relating those to the subjective factors in existence at each period. Through this, a relationship is drawn between social movements and NGOs in our current era. Their timely and essential book offers insights into how NGOs play a critical role in stifling the development and independence of radical African movements, providing a cautionary contribution worthy of consideration by all involved in the struggle for liberation from neo-colonial domination and the oppressive conditions experienced by neoliberalism.

Resistance, justice, and liberation

The Kenya Organic Intellectuals Network is comprised of active organizers in the struggle to cultivate progressive movements in Kenya and revitalize a larger revolutionary, Pan-Africanist Movement with a socialist orientation. Engaged in revolutionary politics, members of this diverse Network are challenging the dynamics and impacts of neoliberalism through their affiliations with a variety of initiatives, including the Revolutionary Socialist League, Kongamano la Mapinduzi, the Communist Party of Kenya, the Ukombozi Library, and social justice centres in Mathare and other informal settlements of Nairobi. The Organic Intellectuals Network formed in 2021 with the purpose of generating active writers and thinkers inside the social justice movement by historicizing African resistance and progressive politics through collective reading, shared dialogue, and reflective writing. The goal of the initiative is to amplify the voices of grassroots activists who are articulating the effects of capitalism in their communities in Nairobi, through both their words and practices. Through their publications, public forums, and related community activities, comrades reveal for themselves and the masses a repressed national and continental history of radical and progressive alternatives to the dominance of neoliberal knowledge – the mindsets and approaches that have greatly affected the political ideas and actions of much of Africa by masking the crises created by capitalism. Together, they explore theoretical concepts alongside the current historical moment and apply understandings to lived experiences, informing a radical ideology – critical of ruling class hegemony – and radical politics for revolutionary change.

The Network utilizes the concept of “organic intellectual” as developed by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. For Gramsci, an organic intellectual has a direct connection to the economic structure of their society and their own class. By unifying various ideological elements from the discourses of marginalized voices to form and articulate a common, organic ideology – rooted in the history of shared class struggle – they create a hegemonic principle which can be used to challenge the dominant cultural and ideological aspects – the superstructure – of state power and the ruling class. The concept of “organic ideology” is central in understanding Gramsci’s “philosophy of praxis” – the application of Marxism as a reflective and inter-defining relationship between theory and practice. Combined, ideology and praxis can be used to understand hegemony as the consummate material of politics – how social power can be practiced to confront or preserve class relations. The maintenance of the prevailing hegemony and historically imbalanced relations under global capitalism requires both coercive force and the domination of ideas for mass consent, making alternatives unthinkable and unviable and neutralizing counter ways of being.

As Brian Mathenge explains, “it is in fact the thought of Antonio Gramsci, closely integrated with the contributions of Walter Rodney, that inspired the formulation and adoption of the political and organizational establishment of the Organic Intellectuals Network” and their use of theory in critical analysis of the current hegemonic system and reflective practice in revolutionary organizing. Applying this understanding, the initiative uses “tools of historical and dialectical materialism to analyse society and produce knowledge that is rooted in the struggle of the common people” to achieve its mission to challenge neoliberal hegemony – abolishing the ideological censorship of the ruling class – and inspire revolutionary thought and action.

The expansion of the New Policy Agenda – discursively emphasizing poverty alleviation, good governance, and democratic citizenship, and promoted by Western donor states and financial institutions following the end of the Cold War – made way for the increased presence and role of NGOs in service delivery and advocacy campaigns for institution-building and human rights in Kenya. As the key actor of the “third sector,” NGOs were explained, introduced, and justified within the conceptual framework of civil society – a contested terrain of bourgeois relationships and individual associations, in which dominant ideologies permeate, state power is upheld, and hegemony appears fixed. As Shivji (2007) explains, “NGOs were born in the womb of neoliberalism and knowingly or otherwise are participating in the imperial project” titled globalization, renewing and strengthening Western dominance in Africa. Just as the colonial enterprise used the church and missionaries as civilizing agents – legitimizing the role of Western colonialists and damning freedom fighters – NGOs have been used in the project of globalization as ideological foot soldiers that speak the language of secular and non-political human rights that influences an acceptance of neoliberal ideology, ascendance of a capitalist, comprador class, and submission of the masses to imperial dominance.

Echoing the contributions of Glen Wright (2012), Maurice Amutabi (2006), and James Petras (1999), this book maintains that NGOs dominate much of the defining and stewarding of development throughout Africa today – mirroring the interests of their Western financiers – which has led to the unwavering predominance of neoliberalism.

According to Lewis Maghanga, however, unlike the colonial missionary history, it would be wrong to present the relationship between Western NGOs and donor agencies as some sort of conscious conspiracy. Rather, as Maghanga explains,

the co-option of NGOs in the neoliberal cause reflects a coincidence in ideologies rather than a purposeful plan … [where] proponents of neoliberalism saw in charitable development the possibility of enforcing the unjust social order they desired by consensual rather than coercive means – an excellent merger of interests and opportunity for masking the intention and nature of the capitalist system.

Informed by their reflections on Shivji’s text, members of the Network agree that the imperial project is not only historical but the lived present, where NGOs function as service providers to marginalized and oppressed communities – existing, bound and limited by data collection necessary for donor funding impact reports – diagnosing and addressing non-political issues, rather than the ideology and political arrangement upholding the grand totality of the violence experienced under global capitalism.

NGOs, symptoms, and movements

A notable and significant contribution made by the Organic Intellectuals Network is their concern and warning of the threat of NGO-ization of social justice causes and movements for radical political change in Kenya. Throughout their contributions, the activist-authors describe how they have experienced the contradictions inherent to the NGO discourse and the economic, political, and ideological role played by these organizations in camouflaging the neoliberal offensive as campaigns for human rights and political reforms. ‘Movement-building support’ has become another buzzword in the NGO discourse and a deceptive tactic executed throughout the non-profit industrial complex. Disguised as ‘non-political advocates’ in support of citizen concerns, NGOs jostle over which movements to ‘support’ and allocate resources towards, directly linking Western finances and interests with movement efforts, thereby shaping the nature of struggle and limiting the otherwise radical orientation of a movement’s trajectory.

The Intellectuals go on to diagnose several key symptoms felt by the NGO-ization of Kenyan movements. Telling the story of Bunge La Mwananchi (The Peoples Parliament) in the early 1990s, Kinuthia Ndungu explains how the movement became a shadow of its original self as NGOs capitalized on poor members’ material conditions and turned them into ‘guns for hire’ by mobilizing them to join activities and demonstrations – whatever the cause – in exchange for monetary reimbursements. This is but one way how NGOs create a culture of dependency within a movement, making it challenging for grassroots leaders to organize activities without adequate finances and payments to those supporting a cause. Reliance on NGO resource support – in the form of staff time, printed materials, computers, etc. – can influence movement dependence, which can experience severe strain when donor funds shift to other alliances or causes. Additionally, movements that accept NGO resource and advocacy support often become softer in their critique of NGO positionality, dismissing the historical relationship between imperialism and NGOs.

As the NGO infiltrates a social movement as a partner in a common cause, the movement is impacted by the symptoms of dehumanization and depoliticization. Dividing community members into clusters for data collection and statistical analysis, and documenting stories of lived experiences of subjection to systemic, structural violence manifested as extreme poverty, extra-judicial murders, and gender-based violence, NGOs dehumanize struggles and depoliticize conditions while securing millions of dollars from funding reports and applications. Organically existing as an informal revolutionary structure, NGOs distort and disrupt the situation by converting activists into report writers for the impact reporting needed to get more funding.

Under neoliberalism, strategic plans, projects, and NGO advocacy programs aimed at donor-funded outputs and outcomes have done nothing but depoliticize the issues faced by the masses – “displacing national liberation ideologies and social emancipation, turning confrontation into negotiation”. Other comrades in the edited collection highlight the impacts that NGOs have on grassroots causes through the symptom of professionalization of activism. Through supporting movements in advocacy and awareness campaigns aimed at government officials, the media, and other actors in civil society, NGOs are often framed as a mouthpiece of a cause, establishing a fabricated outward-facing hierarchy and undermining internal voices and functions. In this way, NGOs appear as expert custodians of modest, reform-driven advocacy, leading grassroot movements to solutions outside of themselves. The accounts and reflections provided in this book show how NGOs can Astro-turf radical African movements of resistance and liberation by becoming representatives – pseudo leaders – championing misguided solutions to illusory grassroot concerns and demands.

Silences, histories, and ideologies

Issa Shivji’s examination and interpretation of NGOs from the 2000s – ahistorical in their character and introspection, and adverse towards social and theoretical understandings of development, poverty, and marginalization – is confirmed by the personal narratives of the Kenya Organic Intellectuals Network in the 2020s. Shijvi presented NGOs as self-perceived non-governmental, non-political, non-ideological, non-profit associations of well-intentioned individuals dedicated to making the world a better place for the poor and downcast. NGOs are well-funded and structured for efficiency, vocal and listened to, and provide data, analysis, recommendations, and plans; however, they operate without a clear understanding of their role in neoliberal reforms and the imperial project, neglecting the current historical moment and dismissing political ideology necessary to unify the struggle for liberation. The role of NGOs in Africa is complex and difficult to analyse and summarize. It requires a clear understanding of history and politics, fact and theory, and self-reflection and criticism. Interpreting their role and impacts is helpful, but misreading them – analytically and politically – could be costly for realizing radical political change. Thoughtful intellectual and personal reflection is required to collectively comprehend the matter and manner of NGOs. This book offers just that.

Throughout the book, 16 contributors apply analysis that highlights the ideological, economic, and political role of NGOs in expanding and consolidating neoliberal hegemony throughout Africa. The struggle for ideology – related again to Gramsci and his conception of the “war of position” – in movements and throughout the contested terrain of Kenyan civil society is a well-developed theme throughout the text. Central to their common ideology, the Network emphasizes political education and the need for cadres to share a theoretical foundation that enables movements to understand the historic function of NGOs and the interconnected nature of the neoliberal system acting in the interest of global imperialism. Shivji’s 2007 book challenges the Organic Intellectuals Network to learn from current struggles “and creatively appropriate intellectual insights on the role of NGOs in their political and historical context,” informing an organic ideology and offering these organic intellectuals a clear direction as a vanguard for the revolutionary movement.

Comprehending NGOs in Africa and capitalism is a tricky-yet-vital intellectual exercise and political activity, necessary to inform the current conjuncture. This book advances the needed ideological clarity by making sense of NGOs in the context of neoliberalism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism. This book is a valuable contribution – a radical political project – and should be applauded. It authentically contextualizes – through personal narrative and reflection – other scholarly and peer-reviewed contributions on the role of NGOs in development, human rights, social movements, and neoliberal hegemony. Understanding the nature, role, and impact of NGOs in Africa and on grassroots movements and protests is important-yet-neglected by scholars, as well as activists. Rarely within the academic spaces of social movement theory, development studies, or international relations is the NGO and social movement relationship critically studied, empirically examined, or a topic of publication. Moreso, the study of the impacts of NGOs on African movements and popular protests is an underexplored frontier for inquiry and understanding by community organizers and academics. These author-activists deliver an accessible, unique, and useful collection that should be considered by leftist activists and intellectuals alike to inform ideological reflection, collective conversation, and revolutionary intervention. This timely, insightful, and important book is not to be missed.

Kenya Organic Intellectuals Network, Breaking the Silence on NGOs in Africa. Nicholas Mwangi and Lewis Maghanga (eds.). Daraja Press.

Based in the States, Zachary J. Patterson is an independent researcher, activist, and roape.net contributor, he writes on Kenya, NGOs, socialist politics and movements on the continent.

 Featured Photogragh: BASICS International, an American NGO in Ghana (9 May, 2018).

References

Amutabi, Maurice N. 2006. The NGO Factor in Africa: The Case of Arrested Development in Kenya. London and New York: Routledge.

Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith (eds.). New  York: International Publishers.

Mathenge, Brian. 2020. “Introduction to the Reflections of Maina wa Kinyatti’s Kenya: Prison Notebooks.” Groundings: The Journal of The Walter Rodney Foundation, 5 (2), SPECIAL ISSUE: 25 Years of Kenya: A Prison Notebook: 7-9.

Petras, James. 1999. “NGOs: In the Service of Imperialism.” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 29 (4): 429-440.

Ramos, Jr., Valeriano. 1982. “The Concepts of Ideology, Hegemony, and Organic Intellectuals in Gramsci’s Marxism.” Theoretical Review, 30: 8-34.

Shivji, Issa G. 2007. Silences in NGO Discourse: The Role and Future of NGOs in Africa. Nairobi and Oxford: Fahamu.

Wright, G. 2012. “NGOs and Western Hegemony: Causes for Concern and Ideas for Change.” Development in Practice, 22 (1): 123-134.

‘Stealing back’ – Uganda’s Nasser Road, political posters, forgery and resistance

There is a huge demand for forged documents in Uganda from academic documents, bank statements, birth certificates, to identification cards. In the capital Kampala these documents are commonly made on Nasser Road. Kristof Titeca and Yusuf Serunkuma write how in the context where the state, and private institutions are considered widely corrupt the delivery of various services and documents is regarded as indispensable. The power of political posters designed on the road is explored by the authors.

By Kristof Titeca and Yusuf Serunkuma

Around 2014, the story goes, a man walked to Mulago Hospital – Uganda’s biggest hospital – looking for a death certificate to declare himself dead so that he could escape loan repayment.  The hospital snitched on him and called the police. “But hadn’t this man heard of Nasser Road?” one commenter asked.

Strange as it sounds—someone seeking their own death certificate to fleece a bank—it is insightful at two levels: first, there’s a huge demand for forged (alternative) documents in the country. These range from academic documents, bank statements, birth certificates, to identification cards and several others. Second, while illegal as defined by the state, practices of forgery and counterfeit are considered as practices of survival: ‘Kweyiya’, loosely translated as ‘sketching an existence’.

There’s one major address in Kampala where these documents are commonly made: Nasser Road. It’s the heart of the country’s printing industry, filled with shopping arcades, each of which are jam-packed with graphic designer studios, printing places, and numerous shops. Whichever document is required for any official purpose, a passable fake can be made by this street—if not unmistakable from the original, it would be aesthetically better than the official one if you worked with the right designer.  A common joke being that, for a reasonable fee, Jesus Christ’s birth certificate can be printed there.

The issue of ‘Nasser Road degrees’ has been regularly debated in the Ugandan press—with moralistic lenses—with frequent allegations of politicians using these degrees to clear the bar for permission to run for election. In 2018, Uganda’s speaker of parliament ordered a crackdown on the road, for what she considered the ‘serious impact on the country.’

In a recently published edited volume, and together with photographers Badru Katumba and Zahara Abdul, we write about Nasser Road, and one of its most visible products: political posters.

The street and its posters must be firmly understood in Uganda’s political and economic context, and particularly the limited social mobility for its citizens.  For example, 2017 statistics show that 9 out of 10 Ugandans who have completed any form of education cannot find a job. Somewhere in the region of 700,000 people join the job market every year regardless of their qualifications, but only 90,000 of these are lucky enough to find something to do—in a space where political connections are considered crucial. All of this happens in a general context in which the state, and private institutions (banks and other corporations) are considered widely corrupt, ineffective and slow in the delivery of various services and documents.

In these general circumstances, with few opportunities for the unconnected, it’s perhaps not surprising that fraud and forgery begin to be regarded as legitimate options – as an opportunity to ‘steal back’. Getting a job with fake documents is considered an act of survival, and for some, an act of resistance and bravery – beating a system which is considered structurally unfair. As the Kampala police spokesperson explicitly argued in an interview in 2018: “This is a crime that has great support from the society. ‘Abantu mubaleke bafune emirimu,” (loosely translated as ‘leave people to get jobs’) people say in support.”

In other words, in a situation of difficult economic circumstances, resorting to fraud can be considered a legitimate act of resistance, a “weapon of the weak”. The fraud perpetrated in and through Nasser Road is thus seen as a form of redistribution, a legitimate right exercised by the Wananchi – the ordinary citizens. In the words of an analyst, “forgery is a public service provided by Nasser Road to address a systemic imbalance in opportunities in Uganda”.

As Yusuf Serunkuma has written, “Indeed, as a centre of power, Nasser Road has many times redefined people’s identities, created new futures, contested, and outwitted official power for the advantage of the ordinary person.” One analyst would describe Nasser Road noting that “it’s not the American dream, but the Ugandan dream: Nasser Road is often the only way to get a job, or get rich, in these circumstances: through fraud”.

A journalist described this in strikingly similar terms noting that, “in Uganda, you have two ways to get rich: you either work with the authorities, meaning you’re related to a politician, an army commander, or someone in the ministry – you name it. Or you use fraud. In fact, both are closely related!” This perception also explains some of the nicknames given to Nasser Road, such as “the road of those with sharp minds” (Oluguudo lw’abagezi), or “Uganda’s Silicon Valley”.

One of the most visible products of the street are its political posters, commenting both on national and international politics. Strikingly, they display images of international figures that many regard as villains, such as Osama Bin Laden or Saddam Hussein. The aesthetics include a mixture of images copied from the internet and flashy colours, showing Hollywood action figures such as RoboCop or Rambo, but with their faces replaced by those of national and international political actors. In these images, it is arguable that ordinary people aspire to have the powers of these movie stars and would use these powers, if they had them, to fight against the often extortionist, extractivist, unfair but apparently officially sanctioned institutions because they form a part of the state. What becomes clear is that people who produce and also buy these posters have a critique of officially sanctioned power and are thus willing to associate with any alternative centres of power that seek to challenge these officially sanctioned institutions.

The above context also helps to understand the posters’ politics and aesthetics: the main characters are presented as being locked in a contest with the powers that be—often the officially sanctioned national or global institutions. In doing so, they rely on the theatrical, the supernatural and the impossible to combat these injustices. The designers of Nasser Road translate the concerns, wishes, and hopes of the wider population into the poster design.

In other words, in a situation which many perceive to be oppressive, action heroes in battle outfits are presented as being ready to take on these oppressive structures of power. Thus, it can be argued that RoboCop symbolizes the impossible task of bringing justice to an unjust system. In the words of one designer: “They think their heroes, RoboCop, are getting ready to battle their tormentors. To them, buying the poster is a way of identifying with the efforts of their heroes to change the status quo, for the benefit of the underprivileged in society.”

This is the case for both fighting at the international level – fighting imperial structures – and the national level. Whereas the Museveni government has always been characterised by political repression, this has intensified over the years. For a long time the Museveni government was widely regarded as an example of a ‘hybrid regime’, characterised by both democratic and authoritarian elements; yet over the years, this has evolved into outright authoritarianism.

In this context, many argue that the posters are a source of hope, allowing them to dream of a better future, and visualising how success is possible even in difficult circumstances: “It shows how Bobi Wine was small, a boy from the ghetto, and now he can go to the state house. When you see the poster, you can start dreaming: you’re down, and you go up! People get ideas from this, they’re inspired.”

The posters are not only a metaphor but also a practice, a form of activism. They are considered a relatively safe way of expressing political support, which one commentator called “a totem of their political and social struggle (…) in times when political rallies are banned in Uganda, these posters have efficiently formed the glue that holds political movements together.” By hanging it in their houses, the poster becomes visible and invisible at the same time, expressing support within their social networks, but hiding – as much as possible – from the reach of the state.

This particularly is the case for posters displaying opposition leaders, for which designers and distributors of posters therefore feel specifically monitored. And indeed, at particularly contentious political moments, Nasser Road and its posters have been raided – confiscating opposition posters, arresting the designers and distributors and seizing printing machines.

Nasser Road is emblematic of many spaces in the world: a place of innovation and contestation against repressive regimes, at both national and global levels. It uses print, and fraud, as a way to contest closed and repressive regimes—a ‘weapon of the weak’ in dire circumstances; whose morality and legitimacy is very different from its legality. The posters are a particular product of this space, and a rare form of political expression which can operate at both national and more global scales: they are not only able to contest the national regime but also international structures. Similar to humor or radical art, it’s a rare platform of contestation in repressive circumstances.

Nasser Road – political posters in Uganda is edited by Kristof Titeca.

Kristof Titeca teaches at the Institute of Development Policy at Antwerp University. His work lies at the intersection of political science, development – and area – studies and relies heavily on field research.

Yusuf Serunkuma is a columnist in Uganda’s newspapers, scholar, and a playwright. In 2014, Fountain Publishers published his first play, The Snake Farmers which was received with critical acclaim in Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda. He teaches decolonial studies/new colonialism and writes regularly for ROAPE

Featured Photographs: photographs and posters in the text are reproduced from Kristof Titeca’s Nasser Road

Defending African history – campaign to support Hakim Adi & African history teaching

ROAPE’s Peter Dwyer interviews Hakim Adi about African history, Black history, teaching and the campaign to stop the University of Chichester from slashing his ground-breaking Masters by Research (MRes) in African history and the African diaspora.

As well as closing his groundbreaking African history course, the University of Chichester has also outrageously decided to make Hakim Adi redundant, leaving his students without supervision.

In a recent short video ROAPE’s Hakim Adi made this statement:

Support the fundraising for the student legal campaign here.

Towards a proper understanding of the conflict in Somaliland

Contributing to the ongoing discussion of the conflict over Laascaanood in Somaliland, Markus Hoehne critically engages with Jamal Abdi’s earlier arguments about the matter. Hoehne argues that what is at stake in the conflict over Laascaanood is the question of Somaliland’s secession versus the unity of Somalia. This conflict has been smoldering for a long time. The fact that it escalated now, in early 2023, violently, can, according to Hoehne, be related to first, more external engagement in Somaliland (as Jethro Norman, also in this discussion, has stated), which gives the government in Hargeysa a relatively powerful position, and second, to an authoritarian style of rule under the current President Muuse Biixi of Somaliland, who tries to use the de facto state power of Somaliland to militarily subdue the rebellion in Laascaanood. The UK seems to play an increasingly neo-colonial role in this conflict, with British politicians and diplomats siding with the government in Hargeysa while a British oil company is investigating oil prospects in central Somaliland.

By Markus Virgil Hoehne

On 11 July, Jamal Abdi published a text on the ROAPE blog entitled “Debating Somaliland – lack of recognition and conflict”. In it, the author touches on the conflict over Laascaanood in the Sool region and current developments in Somaliland that are related to this conflict. Before I engage with Jamal Abdi’s arguments, the background to the political situation must be briefly explained.

Background

Somaliland’s claim to Laascaanood and the Sool region is contested. Puntland, an autonomous region in northeastern Somalia, also considers the town and region as part of its state territory. The bone of contention is that Somaliland, in northwestern Somalia, seceded unilaterally from Somalia in 1991 and sees itself as independent state. It is not recognized as such but exists as a de facto state. Puntland, on the other hand, established in 1998, remains part of Somalia and supports the establishment of a federal Somali republic. Thus, the question of Somali unity versus Somaliland’s secession is at stake in the conflict between both regional political entities.

The people residing in the Sool region predominantly belong to the Dhulbahante clan, which is part of the Harti clan collective, itself constituting the main constituency of Puntland. Simultaneously, in colonial times, the Dhulbahante were part of the British Protectorate of Somaliland, which existed in the northwest of the Somali peninsula between roughly 1888 and 1960. On 26 June 1960 Somaliland became independent. On 1 July it united with the Italian-administered Somali territories (to which southern Somalia and today’s Puntland belonged) to form the Somali Republic.

Thirty years later, in 1991, Somaliland seceded from Somalia, then collapsing in the wake of the Somali civil war. However, the declaration of independence was not supported by all groups in the region. While most members of the Isaaq clan-family, who are the demographic majority and reside in the center of Somaliland, are for Somaliland’s independence, most Dhulbahante in the east are in favor of Somali unity. The Isaaq had suffered tremendously at the hands of the previous military dictatorship in Somalia (1969-1991), but the Dhulbahante, as a rule, had supported it.

Until 2007, Laascaanood, the urban center of the Dhulbahante, was not controlled by Somaliland. Then Somaliland forces captured the town. Between 2009 and 2015, Dhulbahante put up armed resistance to Somaliland’s occupation. Yet, from 2015 until 2022, locals in Laascaanood cooperated with the Somaliland administration for the sake of development. Simultaneously, most Dhulbahante residing outside Laascaanood, throughout the regions of Sool and Sanaag and around the town of Buuhoodle, remained distanced from Somaliland.

At the end of December 2022, an uprising began in Laascaanood. Somaliland police, including Rapid Reaction Units (RRU), a UK-trained special force, opened fire at demonstrators, killing and injuring dozens until early January 2023. When the local people started to take up arms, the Somaliland forces withdrew. Elders in Laascaanood called for a clan meeting and an all-Dhulbahante council, complemented by representatives from the much smaller Fiqishiini clan, who are closely allied to the Dhulbahante in Sool region, to begin discussing their political future. On 6 February, when the council planned to publish its decision, the Somaliland army positioned to the north of Laascaanood started shelling the town.

This marks the beginning of an ongoing war between armed Dhulbahante, Fiqishiini, and some minorities standing with them, who from end of February onward have also been receiving support from other Harti clan militias, including armed units from neighboring Puntland, and the Somaliland army. The latter is predominantly staffed by members of the Isaaq clan-family and some other clans from western Somaliland.

In the course of the war, civilian infrastructure, such as the General Hospital of Laascaanood, has been damaged by the indiscriminate shelling of the Somaliland army. As of July 2023, hundreds of civilians have been injured or killed, including staff of the Red Crescent and local hospitals. Many more fighters on both sides have been falling victim to the war so far.

The debate in ROAPE

Jamal Abdi begins his analysis by stating that:

According to the government, Somaliland’s security forces are facing a mixture of misguided local residents, elements of Al-Shabab terrorists and militias from the semi-autonomous region of Puntland.  Not surprisingly, the competing narrative is that Laascaanood is being defended by local residents who have taken up arms against a state whose legitimacy they now reject.

Al-Shabab are militant Islamists, mainly active in southern Somalia, who are fighting against the government in Mogadishu and its international allies and terrorizing parts of the local population. Jamal Abdi does not state decisively whether he thinks Al-Shabab is or is not involved in the conflict over Laascaanood.

In my view, however, as an analyst one has not only the responsibility to outline different points of view (as Jamal Abdi did, to some degree), but also, if possible, to qualify existing points of view. There have been repeated attempts by the Somaliland government and its supporters to link the uprising in Laascaanood and surroundings to Al-Shabab influence. Even the “research institute” Sahan joined in and wrote in Issue 555, 19 June, 2023 of its briefings (only available to subscribers) that “[t]he total number of AS [Al-Shabab] fighters in the Sool region is now plausibly estimated at 1,000”, without providing any evidence for this and without any other reliable source confirming this sensational “news”.

These allegations are highly problematic, since they aim at totally delegitimizing the uprising of the inhabitants of Laascaanood both nationally and internationally. They also seek to mobilize international support “against terrorists”, which usually translates into extreme violence against local populations, as examples from southern Somalia or Afghanistan indicate. Thus, this claim of Al-Shabab’s involvement in Laascaanood has potentially dramatic consequences. To restate this claim, even just as an option, without analyzing it, is irresponsible. This is especially the case since, over the past six months, neither the government in Hargeysa nor anyone else has been able to present any tangible evidence whatsoever to substantiate these allegations.

While Jamal Abdi does not say that he, as an author, supports these allegations, the fact that he repeats them without qualification lends  the Somaliland government’s war propaganda some credibility. This impression is substantiated by Jamal Abdi using the word “misguided” (in the same sentence) for residents of Laascaanood who have been rising up against the very real violence they have experienced at the hands of Somaliland security forces in December 2022 and January 2023, and ever since. Also, his use of the word “now” in formulating the opposite point of view – namely that locals are taking up “arms up against a state whose legitimacy they now reject” (my emphasis) – is noteworthy. This “now” suggests that the (Somaliland) state previously enjoyed legitimacy among the Dhulbahante. Yet, as anyone familiar with the political history of the region would know, most Dhulbahante never accepted Somaliland as a state, nor did the Warsangeli, their Harti brothers who live in the east of the Sanaag region that was also part of the former British Protectorate but today is fully integrated into Puntland.

Elders in Buuhoodle, a Dhulbahante-inhabited town in the Togdheer region (which Dhulbahante refer to as Cayn), told me during field research in 2004 that they would never accept Somaliland’s independence. The same went for people in Xudun, Taleex, Badhan and Ceelbuuh (all towns and villages in Sool and Sanaag), with whom I spoke at around the same time (between late 2003 and late 2004). I found that Laascaanood was full of “Dervishes” between 2002 and 2004 – “Dervish” being a reference to the anti-colonial uprising against the British and other colonizers in the Horn of Africa between 1899 and 1920, under the leadership of Mohamed Abdille Hassan, whose followers were called “Darawiish” in Somali.

I frequently re-visited these places over the years and found that this attitude had not changed substantially, even after Somaliland had managed to capture Laascaanood at the end of 2007. Some in Laascaanood started to cooperate with Somaliland’s administration for the sake of development, and indeed, some improvements were realized: the first local university, Nugaal University, was supported, some tarmac roads and local government buildings were built, and the General Hospital was renovated. But politically, hardly anyone seriously supported Somaliland’s independence.

Jamal Abdi argues that Somaliland had indeed gained acceptance and legitimacy in Laascaanood in recent years. Supporters of this argument would refer to the participation of locals in the most recent municipal and parliamentary elections in 2021. Indeed, this voting did take place, and in Laascaanood Waddani, the leading opposition party in Somaliland, achieved a clear victory. To understand how substantial this participation of Dhulbahante in Somaliland politics was until recently, it is important to look in detail at the numbers of votes cast. All over Sool region, 63,080 votes were cast. According to a video-report from the local electoral committee in Laascaanood 31,407 persons cast their votes. In Caynabo, an Isaaq-dominated town in western Sool, it was reported that 24,414 votes were cast. The remainder, some 5,000 votes, were cast in Taleex and Xudun (also in Dhulbahante territory).

The important question now is: How big was the eligible voting population in Laascaanood (18 years and above)? This is difficult to establish in the absence of any reliable census data anywhere in the Somali territories. The UN mentioned that around 185,000 persons fled Laascaanood when Somaliland started shelling the town in February; however, several thousand remained behind and took up arms or assisted their people in the fighting. Thus, I would estimate that Lasscaanood is inhabited by around 200,000 people. One could assume that, of these, some 120,000 would be 18 years and above, and thus eligible to vote. If this is correct, one can say that ca. 25% of those eligible in Laascaanood cast their vote in 2021. In my view, a voter turnout of 25% can hardly be interpreted as giving Somaliland legitimacy there.

Therefore, if taking part in the democratic process through elections confers legitimacy on the state, it seems that the election results from Laascaanood in 2021 show that still, after 32 years of the government in Hargeysa claiming the Dhulbahante territories, Somaliland did not achieve much legitimacy there. This, in my reading, has been confirmed by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in its report on Somaliland’s elections in 2021. This report, which celebrates these elections (and the ICG has a record of reporting rather favorably on Somaliland in general) mentions on pp. 6 and 7 that:

The Warsangeli sub-clan appeared particularly indifferent to the vote. Few votes were cast in eastern Sanaag, where the Warsangeli reside, resulting in the loss of four parliamentary seats previously held by Warsangeli representatives. The low turnout could be interpreted as the sub-clan’s rejection of government efforts to include them in Somaliland’s politics. […] The news was in some respects less discouraging in the eastern parts of the equally contested Sool region, from where the Dhulbahante hail. Turnout among the Dhulbahante was higher than among the Warsangeli, but their overall representation still dropped from seven to six seats, a setback for Somaliland’s attempts to fully incorporate Sool under its political umbrella.

Clearly, Somaliland as a state had always enjoyed only very (very) limited legitimacy in the Dhulbahante-and Warsangeli-inhabited areas, and whatever legitimacy they had, seems completely lost now, after the attacks of the Somaliland army on Laascaanood.

In his analysis for ROAPE, Jamal Abdi mentions the series of assassinations that have caused massive insecurity in the city over many years. Focusing on the most recent assassination on 26 December 2022, which triggered the demonstrations in Laascaanood mentioned above and turned into the ongoing armed uprising, Jamal Abdi states:

While the perpetrators are still at large, it appears sound to suggest that Somaliland was most likely not behind the assassination of Cabdi. The logic underpinning this assertion is straightforward: both Cabdi and many of those who have been assassinated before him in Laascaanood were pro-Somaliland. Therefore, it appears unlikely that Somaliland has systematically targeted those who were promoting the legitimacy of the state in a region where the imagining of Somaliland is limited.

Here he refers rather indirectly to the widespread suspicion of many locals who believe that the Somaliland administration was behind this and many previous assassinations in Laascaanood. Inhabitants of Laascaanood would argue that those who were assassinated in 2020-2022 were engaging with Somaliland politically, but were also highly critical of President Muuse Biixi (2017-) and his government. This made them a target, especially since many of them supported the opposition and thus were undermining Muuse Biixi’s chances of winning the next elections (which had been scheduled for November 2022 but were postponed by the government).

Moreover, some locals also argue that Isaaq elites who are dominating politics in Somaliland want revenge against the Dhulbahante, who until 1991 supported the Somali military dictatorship. When I was in Laascaanood for a short field trip in May 2023, virtually everybody mentioned that the reason for the uprising from December 2022 onward was the assassinations, which had not been properly investigated by the Somaliland administration in Laascaanood. People would add that under President Biixi the local administration, including the police, had remained conspicuously inactive regarding the assassinations in Lasanod.

Some had observed that, shortly before assassinations, Somaliland police was seen at their respective locations. Additionally, they stressed that, after the assassinations, no decisive action was taken to apprehend culprits. Some arrests were made, but rather randomly, and following a pattern that instigated sub-clan conflicts among inhabitants of Laascaanood without ever providing convincing proof regarding those arrested. While I personally think that other factors may also play a role in explaining the current uprising, and I have outlined them in my earlier and a  analysis of the matter, this point has to be taken seriously.

International actors in Somaliland

Jamal Abdi’s main argument in his analysis for ROAPE opposes the reasoning of Jethro Norman, who argued earlier, also on the ROAPE blog, that through increasing engagement with Somaliland, international actors have fostered conflict in the center of Somaliland and also on the peripheries, such as Laascaanood. In the center, elite competition over resources has led to clashes in holding presidential elections. Demonstrations demanding elections were dispersed violently by the incumbent administration. Eventually, the elections were postponed, against the will of the opposition.

Jamal Abdi defends the postponement as legal, since it was accepted by the Upper House of the parliament, called Guurti in Somali. He adds that in the past all presidential elections in Somaliland were postponed, suggesting that this has nothing to do with increasing external support and internal competition over resources. However, he is ignoring the fact that the Upper House in Hargeysa has lost its legitimacy among the vast majority of Somalilanders.

The Guurti members have never been elected, contrary to the provisions of the Somaliland constitution. Over the years, they have become dependent on the executive paying their generous fees and tolerating the inheritance of Guurti seats by close relatives of deceased members without any real credentials. Together with the military, political and economic elite, the Guurti members constitute a new social and elite class in Somaliland which is not accountable to the ordinary people any more. Jamal Abdi also does not mention that, in the past, similar contestations have taken place. He argues that a threefold increase in Somaliland’s national budget to about $130 million in the period between 2009 and 2012 did not lead to internal competition. Yet, this position is undermined by a deeper historical analysis.

Between 2008 and 2010, the previous Somaliland government under President Dahir Rayale Kahin clung to power, just like the current Somaliland administration. Elections had been scheduled for 2008. Demonstrations happened in 2009 and the police violently dissolved them. Members of the incumbent administration shamelessly corrupted the resources of the state and were harshly attacked by the KULMIYE party, which then was the leading opposition party (and today is the ruling party in Somaliland). Only after enormous pressure did elections finally happen in 2010, two years too late.

Simultaneously, the Dhulbahante in the Sool region and around Buuhoodle established an armed resistance movement, claiming to feel marginalized by the Somaliland government, which was preventing development and aid coming to their regions. They also wished to rid themselves from what they perceived as Somaliland’s occupation (from 2007 onward). One can argue that what is happening today, since late 2022, regarding conflicts in the center of Somaliland and the war in the Dhulbahante areas is the previous conflict writ large. Thus, there seems to be a connection between the increased resources now available to the Somaliland government, the inequality of their distribution and conflict.

Jamal Abdi still tries to hold on to his original argument by stating that, throughout its existence since 1991, Somaliland has not received any foreign aid. Yet, he omits to say that over the years Somaliland has been getting its fair share of the money given by international donors to Somalia as a whole. Moreover, he remains silent about the massive foreign private and state investments that have taken place in central Somaliland in recent years, starting most visibly with DP-World and Ethiopia investing hundreds of millions over the years in the Berbera port and the Berbera corridor linked to it, which connects Berbera and Wajaale. Finally, he omits from his analysis the prospects of discovering oil around Berbera and other places in central Somaliland, which would be exploited, if viable, by the British company Genel Energy.

If oil exploitation materializes, it will fundamentally change the rules of the game in Somaliland and, with the utmost certainty, mostly benefit the Isaaq elites, who are already in charge. This will most likely lead to even more conflict in Somaliland in both the center and the periphery. In this regard, one can speak of an unholy neo-colonial alliance between the UK as the former colonial power and Somaliland, which it supports short of recognition. Thus, the UK has trained police special forces that the government in Hargeysa has used to repress civilian opposition, while a British oil company is likely to start exploiting oil in central Somaliland soon.

The UK’s Foreign Office censors information on its assessment of the situation in Laascaanood and especially who shot protesters in the town in late December 2022 and early January 2023. On top of that, a British diplomat, Catriona Laing, has just been named as the UN’s Special Representative to Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia. In her first address to the UN Security Council at the end of June, she dramatically downplays the number of injured and dead the war over Laascaanood has produced so far. Shortly afterwards, Sir Gavin Williamson, a conservative backbencher in the UK parliament, successfully presented a motion for Somaliland’s recognition, albeit it is unlikely that any bill based on this motion will go through.

Jamal Abdi concludes his analysis by arguing that a lack of international support is to blame for the conflict over Laascaanood. His logic is that a recognized Somaliland that would have access to international aid and resources for development could have satisfied the demands of all those claimed to be citizens by the government in Hargeysa. This argument pretends that the current war between the Harti and Fiqishiini clans on the one hand, and the Somaliland army on the other, was just over the issues of resources and development. However, this ignores the fact that the root cause of the war over Laascaanood is the conflicting political visions on the one hand the Dhulbahante, Warsangeli and Fiqishiini, as well as some local minority groups that have joined them, a majority of whom wish to be part of Somalia (hence their leaning toward Puntland), and on the other hand the Isaaq and other clans who support or at least tolerate Somaliland as independent state.

The war over Laascaanood shows that the relative strength of the Somaliland government, which in recent years has managed to acquire considerable resources via foreign direct investments and recently forged diplomatic ties to Taiwan, contains a certain risk. Currently, President Muuse Biixi, who showed authoritarian tendencies early into his presidency, is abusing the de-facto state power at his disposal by letting his army attack Laascaanood and, very likely, carrying out considerable human rights and humanitarian law violations. To give more support to such a ruler and even contemplate recognition for Somaliland, as Jamal Abdi suggested, would contribute to more insecurity in the Horn of Africa.

Negotiating a future

Instead, negotiations between the rebels in the regions of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn, Puntland as neighboring power that supports them, Somaliland, and the Somali government in Mogadishu should be facilitated by credible external mediators to clarify the relations of all the actors involved without resorting to more violence. There should not be many preconditions for these negotiations other than that the Somaliland army vacates Dhulbahante territories, which has already been recommended in a press statement by the UN Security Council in June 2023. What is more, neither Dhulbahante or the other clans opposing Somaliland’s independence can be forced back into Somaliland, nor can the rest of Somaliland (except the predominantly Harti-inhabited regions) be forced to join Somalia. A constructive solution has to be found, and this will take time.

Markus Virgil Hoehne is a Lecturer in Social Anthropology at the University of Leipzig. Hoehne has been researching Somali issues since 2001 mainly in Somaliland and Puntland. He is fluent in colloquial Somali and the author of numerous scholarly publications on conflict dynamics in Somalia and Somaliland.

Featured Photographs: Images taken by the author during a trip to Lasanod in May 2023. 

Perspectives and constructive dialogue on Ethiopia’s political future

In a further contribution to the ROAPE debate on Ethiopia, Yidneckachew Ayele Zikargie writes that in order to discuss the political future of the country there must not be gatekeepers who determine what is a legitimate discussion while making wild accusations. Ethiopia must embrace a multitude of voices not self-appointed experts who label and condemn those who do not agree with them.

By Yidneckachew Ayele Zikargie

In response to Fana Gebresenbet and Yonas Tariku’s article discussing the Pretoria Agreement, a group of authors, including Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Alex de Waal, Martin Plaut, Jan Nyssen, Mohamed Hassen, and Gebrekirstos Gebreselassie, presented a counterargument. Subsequently, Fana Gebresenbet and Yonas Tariku responded to the criticism in their piece titled ‘Neither a Response nor a Debate: Five Ways to Misread Our Article on Ethiopia.’ Intrigued by these engaging dialogues and being personally affected by the crisis and as an observer of the social, economic and political developments in Ethiopia, I feel compelled to express my uneasiness with the approach taken by Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Alex de Waal, and others. This reflection aims to contribute to the ongoing debate by seeking engaging perspectives and fostering a constructive dialogue on the Pretoria Agreement and the political future of Ethiopia.

Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Alex de Waal and others criticize Fana Gebresenbet and Yonas Tariku’s article as a reproduction of false narratives promoted by the Federal Government of Ethiopia (FGE). The response challenges the claims made in the article, including the portrayal of foreign commentators as supporters of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the dismissal of claims of genocide as TPLF propaganda. The authors highlight the ongoing suffering in Tigray and criticize the lack of nuanced political understanding and empathy in the original article. They also note a broader campaign to deny and misrepresent the atrocities committed in Ethiopia. Besides, they push their arguments by using social media, their networks and activists to maintain a hegemony of their narratives that went beyond academic dialogue and end up with character assassinations and defamatory targetting of the writers.

Yet in the article, Fana Gebresenbet and Yonas Tariku interrogate the significance of the Pretoria Agreement – asking if it is a mere instrument for the cessation of hostilities or does it herald a new era in Ethiopia? The article underlines that the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) on November 2, 2022, marks a significant turning point in Ethiopian politics. It notes the significance of the agreement, which was facilitated by the African Union.

The agreement prevents further escalation of the conflict and the potential loss of lives and destruction. It ensures the return of constitutional order in Tigray, reduces the war to a battle between the FDRE/ENDF and the TPLF, and paves the way for federal forces to regain control without excessive force. Yet the agreement signifies the end of the TPLF’s dominance and the diminishing role of ethnonationalism in Ethiopian politics, setting the stage for a new era of political discourse and power consolidation under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Gebresenbet and Tariku argued that, although the CoHA is not a complete solution to all sources of instability, it symbolizes a significant step toward a more stable political environment.

In their counterargument against the criticisms raised by Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Alex de Waal and others and personal attacks on social media, Gebresenbet and Tariku returned with a thoughtful and ethically bounded response. They demonstrate a strong commitment to academic pursuit and engage constructively by highlighting the misinterpretations and misquotations in the rejoinder. They clarify that they did not argue that claims of genocide are a TPLF propaganda ploy, but rather pointed out the partisan role played by foreign experts. They also assert that the TPLF’s attack on the Northern Command was a triggering factor, not the sole cause of the war. Their emphasis on differentiating between regime and state, as well as their call for a cohesive and just state-society relationship, reflects a nuanced understanding of the complexities in Ethiopian politics. Furthermore, they advocate for open and critical debate, encouraging engagement with their arguments for the sake of peace and stability in Ethiopia. Overall, Gebresenbet and Tariku s responses contribute positively to the ongoing discourse on the agreement, and the political possibilities for Ethiopia.

However, I observe that the ongoing debate highlights an intriguing aspect of the political landscape in Ethiopia, focusing on the production of narratives and the ethical concerns surrounding the pursuit of political hegemony. On one side, some emphasize open discussion and engagement with diverse narratives, promoting a constructive approach by positioning themselves as ‘students of conflict and security studies.’ Conversely, the opposing side adopts a posture of sole authority, seeking to dominate the narrative sphere. They present themselves as a credible source of genocide reports, citing self-documented evidence and criticizing Gebresenbet and Tariku for overlooking Alex de Waal’s selective records of genocide. However, Alex de Waal’s documentation has faced criticism for its selectivity, as it allegedly disregards extensive human atrocities committed against multiple communities in northern Ethiopia, including the Afar, Amhara, and Tigray people. This power game among an intellectual international elite appears to revolve around the manipulation of narratives into a story of triumph and victimhood.

One of the most concerning aspects of the ongoing debate is the alarming efforts made by certain individuals to silence alternative perspectives and assert a monopoly over knowledge and narratives. It is deeply troubling to witness the tactics employed, such as attacking individuals based on their academic views and pressuring a journal to remove an article that challenges their preferred perspectives. Such actions are not only outrageous but also completely unacceptable for an intellectual community that values freedom of expression and intellectual diversity.

With the ongoing debate and prevailing circumstances in Ethiopia in particular and the Global South in general, it becomes increasingly important to prioritize the exploration of diverse perspectives and foster an environment that encourages an engaging exchange of ideas. By promoting a constructive dialogue that welcomes different viewpoints, we can pave the way for a more inclusive and stable society. Embracing a multitude of voices and recognizing the value of varied opinions is essential for meaningful progress and the cultivation of a well-rounded understanding of the complex issues in Ethiopia and across the continent.

Yidneckachew Ayele Zikargie (PhD) is an Assistant Professor at Hawassa University College of Law and Governance, with a specialization in the sociology of human rights, modernist development approach, pastoral land, livelihood, and frontier dynamics in Ethiopia. His research interests include rights, power, modernism, land development, pastoral frontiers dynamics, ethnography, sugarcane plantations, and a human rights-based approach to development.

Featured Photograph: A wounded boy sits on a bed in the Ayder Referral Hospital on 4 June, 2021, in Mekelle, Ethiopia (Yan Boechat).

Gender, Subjectivity and Ngũgĩ’s Post-Independence Vision

Renowned Kenyan writer Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o reads excerpts from his recent work in both Gikuyu and English during a presentation in the Coolidge Auditorium, May 9, 2019. Photo by Shawn Miller/Library of Congress.

ROAPE celebrates the life and work of Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, who turned 85 in January this year. Ngũgĩ is a renowned Kenyan writer and scholar, admired for his contributions to African literature and his advocacy of African languages and cultures. Born in Kamiriithu, Kenya, he grew up in a traditional Gikuyu community in the lead-up to Kenyan independence. While at Makerere University in Uganda, Ngũgĩ began writing and became involved in the burgeoning African literary movement. In 1977, he published his famous novel Petals of Blood, which attacked the elite that ruled Kenya after independence. Later that year, he was briefly imprisoned by the Kenyan government for his radical writing and community organising. As part of his commitment to decolonising African literature, Ngũgĩ switched from English to Gikuyu in his own literary practice, and became a lifelong proponent of African writers embracing their indigenous languages.  

To mark the occasion, we share an extract on Ngũgĩ’s early novel A Grain of Wheat (1967), adapted from Sarah Jilani’s forthcoming book Subjectivity and Decolonisation in the Post-Independence Novel and Film (Edinburgh University Press). Jilani explores a selection of Anglophone and Francophone post-independence texts (1950s–1980s) from Africa and South Asia to consider what ‘decolonising the mind’ could mean, and entail. Guided by the psycho-political thought of Frantz Fanon, the book demonstrates how a selection of literary and cinematic narratives from this period help us understand the transformation of subjectivities themselves as a part of the broader, unfinished project that is decolonisation.

 By Sarah Jilani

In a 1975 essay, Chinua Achebe writes: ‘the nationalist movement in British West Africa after the Second World War brought about a mental revolution which began to reconcile us to ourselves’ (145). Achebe here singles out the revolutionary impact nationalist movements could have at the ‘mental’ level, possibly going a great way in bringing about what he calls ‘a reconciliation with oneself’. As Achebe’s words suggest, the power of mid-century nationalist movements at a psycho-political level were considerable. Frantz Fanon describes such mobilisations as conducive to remaking people’s ways of relating to themselves and to their own circumstances, ‘creat[ing] a real dialectic between [the] body and the world’ (Fanon 1952, 83). Yet we also know that the diverse kinds of anti-colonial nationalisms across the Global South had uneven effects. Their darker outcomes in post-independence contexts, like territorial secessions and ethnic conflict, left lasting legacies. The lived experiences and effects of anti-colonial nationalisms are therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, grappled with time and time again in the literary production of the post-independence decades in Africa, from novels to plays, films to poetry.

One example is the 1967 novel A Grain of Wheat by Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o. An early work that is often overlooked for Ngũgĩ’s later novels such as the polemical Devil on the Cross (1980) or the magisterial Wizard of the Crow (2006), A Grain of Wheat was published as part of the Heinemann African Writers Series when the author was still writing in English as James Ngũgĩ. This novel acknowledges complex and politically urgent questions around the psycho-political possibilities and limits of anti-colonial nationalisms. Following the struggles of two protagonists, Gikonyo and Mugo, A Grain of Wheat works from Fanon’s ‘dialectic between [the] body and the world’ (1952, 83) to explore how people change their relationships to themselves, each other, and to the political energies that marked the Kenyan independence struggle. However, as Gikonyo and Mugo work through the psychic scars of violent anti-colonial resistance and find re-integration into community, women’s subjectivities remain something outside, or other than, the Fanonian ‘self–world’ dialectic that Ngũgĩ’s novel affirms. This makes visible important fault lines in the relationship between the experience of anti-colonial nationalist struggle – even with its powers of ‘mental revolution’ – and its actual outcomes.

The charged relationship between anti-colonial nationalism and gender in A Grain of Wheat is latent. It requires, as scholar Brendon Nicholls proposes, reading against the grain of Ngũgĩ’s main narrative preoccupations in the novel, working both ‘strategically within, and against, the dominant symbolisms of A Grain of Wheat in order to discover the spaces that these texts make available to a female sexual and revolutionary subject’ (Nicholls 2010, 115). Featuring flashbacks and diversions into 150 years of Kenyan history, Wheat focuses on the protracted liberation struggle of the Kenya Land and Freedom Army (‘Mau Mau’) from 1952–1960 against British colonial rule. The main narrative takes place over four days in 1963, leading up to Uhuru celebrations that will honour the fallen fighters of the anti-colonial struggle. But several of Wheat’s characters are still grappling with the psychic afterlives of resistance, including guilt, shame, and anger. Various histories (including both Gĩkũyũ and Christian myths) are woven throughout the novel into the daily rhythms of village life, as these characters try to reconcile personal traumas with a collective narrative of victory.

Ngũgĩ’s vision of the Kenyan anti-colonial nationalist struggle and beyond is itself a complex and at times contradictory one. On the one hand, Ngũgĩ himself identifies that ‘the [African] writer in this period was still limited by his inadequate grasp of the full dimension of what was really happening in the sixties: the international and national realignment of class forces and class alliances’ (1986, 11). Yet others have pointed out that this period of his writing was engaged in a multi-dimensional manner with questions of political and social transformation after independence. The novel articulates the principle of community unity, but also foregrounds the lasting effects of violent anti-colonial struggle on individual psyches. It argues decolonisation is only possible if cycles of betrayal are disrupted, yet gives us characters who struggle to move past having betrayed or been betrayed. And it ‘critically investigate[s] the links between nativist politics and hegemonic masculinities’ (Hammond 2011, 115), but cannot entirely sever its dialectical vision from certain patriarchal supports. While all of these are related, it is within the latter tension that we see Ngũgĩ grapple with the possibilities and limits of Fanon’s psycho-political dialectics of liberation.

British troops in Kenya during the Mau Mau rebellion, Socialist Worker

Many have already read gender as a blind spot in Ngũgĩ’s revolutionary vision, but for reasons as different from one another as Elleke Boehmer’s (2005), who critiques Ngũgĩ’s accentuation of class at the expense of gender, to Peter Mwikisa’s, who proposes that ‘Ngũgĩ is ultimately grappling with issues of his Christian faith’ (2010, 249) rather than advancing revolutionary gender ideals. I am more interested in how this blind spot is consequential to the novel’s politics of decolonisation. More consequential than trying to determine the author’s personal inclinations with regards to women is why the novel excludes them from the kind of dialectical becoming that facilitates Wheat‘s politics.

Wheat positions Gĩkũyũ women as both the moral facilitators of post-independence reconciliation, as well as symbols via which Gĩkũyũ male subjectivities may be re-constituted after the trauma of violent struggle. In this way, the novel is able to reimagine Gĩkũyũ masculinity in ways that serve social healing and nation-building, as critics Kenneth Harrow (1985) and Andrew Hammond (2011) have explored – but at the expense of granting that its female characters could undergo similar psycho-political transformation. Presented as driven either by exclusively political-heroic motivations (Wambui, Mary Nyanjiru) or exclusively sexual-romantic ones (Njeri, Mumbi), Wheat’s women seem to exist outside of the ‘real dialectic between [the] body and the world’ (Fanon 1952, 83) that the story grants its male characters, who move from states of solitary distress to communal wellbeing. This difficulty in imagining that women are also shaped by their lived experiences over time undercuts the psycho-political power Wheat seeks to invest in nation-building.

Collective histories

To trace this, we can first consider how the novel conceives of subjectivity as an accumulation of collective history and lived experience. Both recent (Emergency-era) history and distant history (Gĩkũyũ and biblical mythologies) are consistently woven into daily life in the fictional village where the novel is set. Via flashbacks to the 1950’s, the novel iterates how a sense of the collective past served as a means of resilience during the resistance: ‘Karanja and others collected [in Gikonyo’s workshop] in the evenings, hurled curses and defiance in the air, and reviewed with pride the personal histories of the latest men to join Kihika’ (Ngũgĩ 1967, 101). These stories allow Wheat’s male characters to reassure one another of their loyalty to the struggle. They recall Fanon’s words on how, in a colonial context, ‘disalienation will come from refusing to consider their reality as definitive’ (1952, 201) for the colonised. Here, men living daily with the fear of being captured remember the past and present of Gĩkũyũ resistance, imagining future victory. Fanon’s theorisations as to where the ‘raw material’ (1952, 113) for processes of disalienation may be found here takes the form of the relational and psychic power of shared histories.

These characters’ collective emotional investment in the trial of the Kapenguria Six also functions in this way. Learning of the sham trial’s outcome galvanises the political detainees into action, including the novel’s troubled protagonist Gikonyo: ‘They refused to look into one another’s eyes in order not to read what the other was thinking… Then one night, suddenly, they believed the news, all of the detainees to a man. They did not say their belief to one another, it was only that they gathered together in their compounds and sang’ (104). The inmates sing the Gĩkũyũ creation myth. A connection between the mythological past and political present, performed through song and the memory it sustains, helps them ‘look into one another’s eyes’ (104). The individual shame they had felt in desiring life over martyrdom now turns into unity and resolve.

Christian mythology also grounds the novel’s understanding of subjectivity as, among other things, a location of shared histories. Brendon Nicholls points to Ngũgĩ’s ‘residual sympathy towards Christianity and individualism,’ which for him ‘problematises Ngũgĩ’s Marxian sympathies, because the fictional representatives of collective resistance emerge only as savage killers (Gen. R) or rapists (Koinandu) or self-styled Messianic heroes (Kihika)’ (2010, 87). Nicholls does not elaborate on why the two (Christianity and individualism) are implied to be analogous, when Ngũgĩ’s choice of biblical myths are distinctly informed by ones that help illustrate an anti-individualistic conception of subjectivity. For instance, in a scene describing the Uhuru celebrations, biblical parallels are written into the community’s recitation of resistance history: ‘They sang of Jomo (he came, like a fiery spear among us), his stay in England (Moses sojourned in the land of Pharaoh) and his return (he came riding on a cloud of fire and smoke) to save his children’ (214). Despite occasionally bordering on messianic declarations, the militant character of Kihika also frequently adopts biblical myth to emphasise the motivations behind nationalist struggle. He exclaims: ‘Can’t you see that Cain was wrong? I am my brother’s keeper. Take your whiteman, anywhere, in the settled area. He owns hundreds and hundreds of acres of land. What about the black men who sweat dry on the farms to grow coffee, tea, sisal, wheat and yet only get ten shillings a month?’ (96)

With such links gestured towards between subjectivity and relational histories, Wheat, however, then withholds the same kind of dialectical becoming from women. Where the former should result in the narrative presenting us women’s subjectivities of a similar historicity, they instead appear static. This re-routes what could have been a radical politics of decolonisation in the novel: one that may have brought full circle the novel’s psycho-political investment in anti-colonial nationalism.

Undated photo of Mau Mau Field Marshal Muthoni wa Kirima who lay down arms at Kenyan independence in 1963, The Elephant

The symbol of Woman

Wheat configures women’s bodies as sites of male reconciliation, even when it invests in women as society’s depositories of a latent reconciliatory potential. As Elleke Boehmer points out, ‘it is by singling out female voices, by fixing women beneath the evaluative epithets “vibrant” and “beautiful”, that Ngũgĩ gives way to that tendency to objectify women which qualifies his attempt to grant them a leading role in the revolutionary struggle for Kenyan liberation’ (2005, 42). One way this occurs is through the novel’s reliance on positioning ‘Woman’ as symbol, with the function of making or breaking male bonds. That Mumbi, for example, ‘arous[es] other characters to a better knowledge of themselves’ (Sharma 1984, 207) and ‘is the catalyst that prompts [Mugo] to public confession’ (Nnolim 1984, 219) renders her a disembodied trope that can take on various meanings.

These include becoming a stand-in for psycho-social healing in conversations that facilitate the relationship between Gatu and Gikonyo, and between Mugo and Gikonyo. During detention, Gikonyo experiences a ‘terrible bond being established between [Gatu and himself]. He struggled against this but in the end gave up, so that it was he who first opened his heart to Gatu’ (107). His confession centres around Mumbi, or rather, around all the imaginative weight Gikonyo has assigned her. By recounting their marital bliss, Gikonyo is able to confess (via the sign that is Mumbi/Woman) his guilt about the fact that returning to domestic life, rather than the abstract notion of Kenya’s freedom, is what sustains him throughout imprisonment. When Gatu answers Gikonyo’s confession with a disclosure of his own about a missed opportunity at marriage – where, again, Woman functions as a symbol of ‘all our losses for the cause’ – Gikonyo thinks, ‘weak, weak like any of us’ (108). The having of ‘Woman’ and the loss of her becomes a stand-in for what these men have sacrificed by joining the resistance: patrilineal futurity, psychic unburdening, and sexual comfort.

Sam Radithalo (2001) proposes that, in Wheat, Ngũgĩ invites us to see women’s facilitatorship of male bonding as a vital role that benefits all of society. In his anthropological studies, Richard Werbner (2002) similarly argues that it is often the very undergoing of subjection which constitutes a ‘persuasively influential and dignified female subject in postcolonial intersubjective relations’ (8). The asymmetries of this, however, are stark. Throughout the novel, it is the reclusive Mugo who is assumed by others to be the facilitator of reconciliation, on the basis of an incorrect rumour about his heroism. This is later resolved in Mugo’s narrative; during the Independence celebrations, he confesses he betrayed Kihika’s whereabouts to the colonial authorities, and subsequently feels ‘a load of many years lifted’ (232). Ending his self-imposed isolation, he is free to earn re-integration into community, and to re-constitute his subjectivity. The actual women themselves, like Mumbi, remain symbolic guides, confidants and healers of men.

In addition to the promise of communal re-integration for men, it is not insignificant that Mumbi-as-symbol also becomes the site of a struggle between Gikonyo and the novel’s antagonist, Karanja. The representation of land in Wheat speaks to a historical crux of the Kenyan anti-colonial struggle: the demand for the redistribution of the fertile central uplands in Kenya (still sometimes called ‘The White Highlands’). The British colonial government’s Swynnerton Plan, a colonial agricultural policy aimed at expanding cash-crop productions, was implemented in Kenya in 1954. It concentrated land ownership with the strategy of establishing a new middle class of loyalists in response to the ‘Mau Mau’ uprising. The result was that ‘a new Gĩkũyũ society was born – propertied and propertyless – and left to face an uncertain future in face of the politics of independence’ (Ogot and Ochieng 1995, 25). Mumbi’s body is laden with land symbolisms that speak to these tensions. Unless her body is utilised by the man with the ‘right’ to do so (her husband, the peasant revolutionary Gikonyo), the implication is that it could, vassal-like, be claimed by the ‘wrong’ kind of man (the middle-class loyalist, Karanja). Eventually, Gikonyo’s successful claim upon Mumbi’s body symbolically maps onto (for Ngũgĩ) the righteous claim of the Gĩkũyũ peasant to the land. To that end, the novel’s final moments feature Gikonyo’s political-sexual fantasy: ‘He had never seen himself as father to Mumbi’s children. Now it crossed his mind: what would his child by Mumbi look like?’ (241). The questionable legitimacy of this land claim – especially given the majority advantages of the Gĩkũyũ after independence – diverts the reader from the class irresolutions of Kenyan independence.

Some scholars argue we misinterpret Ngũgĩ’s ‘marked sensitivity to women as nationalists’ (Radithalo 2001, 9) if we miss the autonomy in the female characters’ sexual choices, like Mumbi’s choosing Gikonyo over Karanja. But it would be inconsistent to reach for this limited lens to read Wheat – a novel that, as discussed above, otherwise sustains a dialectical relationship between history and subjectivity. In fact, considering reproductive sexuality in the novel reveals a flip side to the seemingly empowering final reconciliation between Mumbi and Gikonyo. While ‘[Mumbi] was now really aware of her independence. Gikonyo was surprised by the new firmness in her voice’ (242). This hint at her transformation in consciousness is overshadowed by the image that closes the novel: ‘I will carve a woman big — big with child’ Gikonyo thinks to himself (243). This prophetic pronouncement on the nation-about-to-be-born counterpoises the woman with the ‘new firmness in her voice’, and what the latter could mean for the future of decolonisation.

The new man and nationalist struggle

While the symbol of ‘Woman’ in this way functions in the service of male bonding and nation-building, Wheat’s secondary cast of female characters complicate this. Applying Nicholls’ (2010) idea of an ‘interested reading’ that must to an extent ‘work strategically against’ the novel’s dominant symbolisms, we can explore this paradox as an irresolution: one that is potentially fruitful for understanding the complex triangulation between gender, subjectivity and history in this post-independence novel. In Wheat, a chain of events implicate all characters in the nation’s making, regardless of their personal desires for non-involvement. Wangari, Gikonyo’s mother, becomes an important character in this regard. Whereas Mumbi’s mother admonishes her daughter for excessive pride when Mumbi returns to her childhood home after Gikonyo slaps her, Wangari challenges her son. ‘Wangari stood up and shook her front right finger at him. ‘You. You. If today you were a baby crawling on your knees I would pinch your thighs so hard you would learn,’ (172) she says to a raging Gikonyo. Wangari here sees through her son’s anger and knows it to be a misplaced attempt at dealing with his ‘thingification’ under detention. This word with psycho-political inflections was coined by Aimé Césaire (1950, 43) and echoed later by Fanon: ‘the “thing” which has been colonised’ (1961, 37). In not ‘knowing himself’, his mother seems to imply, Gikonyo is losing sight of the pending task of his own ‘dis-subjection’ (Cherki 2000, 262) – of refusing to ‘thingify’ others because he himself was ‘thingified’ by colonial violence. Wangari repeatedly reminds Gikonyo that decolonisation involves reconstituting his subjectivity: ‘Let us see what profit it will bring you, to go on poisoning your mind […] Read your own heart, and know yourself’ (172). In doing so, she raises a question the novel does not pursue: did what the anti-colonial fighters go through during the Emergency indeed have psycho-politically transformative results?

Bethwell A. Ogot (2003) describes how Mau Mau was not an exclusively Gĩkũyũ anti-colonial movement, pointing out that several Gĩkũyũ leaders who occupied positions of power after independence did not accept its radical redistributive demands. As such, a generalisation cannot be made about one ‘kind’ of Mau Mau strategy, recruit, or experience. Evan Mwangi (2009) also notes that, while ethnicity and class have been discussed by historians of the Mau Mau movement, ‘gender and sexuality as analytic categories in Kenyan historiography of decolonisation as presented in art have not been systematically explored’ (90). In light of these ambiguities around what Mau Mau was and how it continues to be narrated, Wangari’s question is a discomfiting but important one to ask – especially for a novel that maintains that to live in, and for, community is the condition of collective transformation out of the legacies of colonialism. Wangari’s warning to Gikonyo implies those who fought in anti-colonial nationalist struggle cannot straightforwardly assume to have ‘decolonised their minds’ (Ngũgĩ 1986). An ontological re-alignment with others and commitment to (self-)transformation is necessary, too, of the moral victors of the struggle.

So while the novel condemns collaborators like Karanja for not having sacrificed much, it also gestures to a problem that concerns peasant freedom fighters like Gikonyo and Mugo. Looking to undo the emasculating experience of detention via enacting gendered violence brings Gikonyo no peace. Interestingly, in this way, Ngũgĩ both strategically minimises the question of Mau Mau men’s political consciousness, and writes a peripheral woman who flags up the path of inquiry left untrodden. Individuals who are ‘involved in the active work of destroying an inhibitive social structure and building a new one begin to see themselves,’ Ngũgĩ writes in Homecoming (1972, 10). Wangari’s call to Gikonyo to ‘know himself’ (172) suggests that, Gikonyo is not yet thinking in terms of Fanon’s ‘real leap’ of ‘introducing invention’ (1952, 204) at either the intimate or social level.

Mukami kimathi, the wife of mau mau leader Dedan Kimathi, passed away in may 2023 at the age of 96
Mukami kimathi, freedom fighter and wife of late Mau Mau leader Dedan Kimathi, passed away in May 2023 at the age of 96

Sexual politics and/in resistance

 Decolonisation in Wheat is a sacrificial project that involves the complex coming-to-terms with one’s own betrayals and fears, as part of the process. All can then emerge with a new consciousness, directing collective labours towards nation-building. But just as the novel struggles to incorporate Mumbi into this dialectical view, the same transpires with the character of Njeri, a woman who contends for Kihika’s affections. In contrast to Mumbi’s function as facilitator of male-to-male relations, the novel’s treatment of a militant woman, Njeri, genders the politics of nationalist motivation. She is one of few in a story deeply occupied with the notion of loyalty — to oneself, to one’s community, and to anti-colonial struggle — who emerges perhaps faultless. Njeri taunts Kihika’s lover Wambuku for expecting Kihika to remain out of the action. Instead, ‘letting loose her long-suppressed anger… [Njeri pledges,] “I will come to you, my handsome warrior,” trembling with the knowledge that she had made an irrevocable promise to Kihika’ (101). Honouring her sexual and political promise, she joins Kihika in the forest and dies as Mau Mau. Where does this leave the subjectivity of a character like Njeri, whose actions we are told stem from ‘long-suppressed anger’ towards the trappings of her gender on the one hand, and from her desire for Kihika, on the other?

Njeri’s loyalty and passion (which men like Gikonyo wrestle with trying to sustain, then grapple with the shame of failing to) seem the ‘wrong’ kind for nation-building. Indeed, Njeri’s actions are written through the assumption of their stemming from a rage that emasculates. Despite her reputation as a fighter preceding her attraction to Kihika, the novel suggests her political militancy arose solely out of jealousy: ‘[Njeri] felt superior and stronger and she could not help her contempt for Wambuku’ (100). Whereas the narrative affirms that Mau Mau men’s lived experiences – both of land dispossession and torture at the hands of colonial forces – motivates their resistance, it struggles with the implications of a political consciousness borne of lived experience in women. The combination of rage (at her social powerlessness) and desire (for both Kihika the man and the political ideal) that motivate Njeri’s actions are deemed inappropriate at a time when Gĩkũyũ masculinity is fragile.

Recent scholarship has established that Mau Mau women’s detention and punishment were similar to that of their male counterparts. The British detained approximately 8000 women under the Emergency (Bruce-Lockhart 2014). Why, then, would Njeri’s anger and loyalty mark her an outlier? Sociologist Srila Roy’s discussion of gender as central to the moral economy of radical political violence helps illuminate this: ‘Given that women have been historically and conceptually excluded from the public realm, and marked as “other” even upon inclusion, political participation entails varying degrees of “ontological complicity”, including acquiescing in the power hierarchies within which they are located’ (2014, 183-4). This raises the question of what is at stake in ‘attaining “composure” through normative (political) identities’ (Roy 2014, 183), which is precisely what Njeri defies when she arrives at political commitment through sexual rebellion.

As we have seen that, in Wheat, ‘female identities and anatomies became symbolically bound to motherhood and to the nation — at the expense of female political agency and female sexual agency’ (Nicholls 101), Njeri’s choice is significant. Like Wangari, she presents an unfulfilled opportunity for the novel to pursue the full complexity of gender vis-a-vis radical nationalist politics. In what ways — other than requiring the ‘ontological complicity’ of women — could the relationship between gender and nationalism inform the transformation of subjectivities? How would such transformations effect the trajectory of decolonisation? Wheat hurries over its markedly ‘other’ woman, whose actions bring to mind how, for Fanon, ‘the beginnings of decolonisation’ are to be sought ‘within life itself’ (Clare 2013, 63), where we desire and act upon desires.

In some of the above ways, A Grain of Wheat centres the re-socialisation of Gĩkũyũ men to the project of decolonisation. Despite its political vision, the novel struggles to imagine women’s subjectivities in a dialectical relationship with their material conditions. The latter transform over the course of the narrative only insofar as doing so makes a revolutionary masculinity possible after the trials of anti-colonial struggle. When women’s actions are deemed in ‘excess’ to this task (as are Njeri’s and Wangari’s), the narrative intriguingly acknowledges, but does not pursue, this challenge. As such, although Ngũgĩ builds a dialectic that conceives of subjectivity and its transformation as an historical and embodied, the reduction to symbols of a complex set of female characters’ subjectivities weakens the dialectical becoming that is at the heart of this post-independence novel. While there is no doubt that Wheat remains a milestone in Anglophone African writing, its grappling with gender invites deeper reading into the possibilities and limits of understanding anti-colonial nationalism as a source of ‘mental revolution’ (Achebe 1975, 145) during the independence period. Ngũgĩ’s text crucially brings into view how any vision of liberation must overcome a tendency to treat the re-constitution of subjectivities – of ‘decolonising the mind’, in Ngũgĩ’s own words (1986) – as a process that men undergo, and women merely facilitate.

Sarah Jilani is a lecturer in Anglophone world literatures at City, University of London. Her research interests include subjectivity, decolonisation and political consciousness in African and South Asian novels and films. She has published widely and broadcast radio programmes on a range of related topics.

Featured photograph: Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o giving a talk in 2019 (Wiki Commons)

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For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
We use cookies to collect and analyse information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customise content. By clicking into any content on this site, you agree to allow cookies to be placed. To find out more see our