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The Basic Issue: LABOUR not Land

The first step in assessing what the future holds for a Zimbabwe now independent, in working out what is to be done, is to be clear about the basic character of the system it is sought to change. White rule is ended but what of the system over which the whites ruled? How much of it remains? How easy will it be to change? What are the possible alternatives to it? This Special Issue on Zimbabwe does not aim to give definitive answers to these questions — although they are at least raised.

What makes prediction especially obscure is a lack of clarity about the nature of the settler system. In part, this is due to a lack of information: no one knows how much white farm land was abandoned or how many displaced people there are; no trade statistics have been issued since UDI, and during sanctions large businesses were coy about the facts of ownership; it is also a matter of pure guesswork how much land in the former African 'reserves' is by now individually owned. But even when the facts are in, there would remain serious limitations and differences in conceptualization. For instance, among our contributors, Yates' discussion of future development strategy is prefaced by an observation that 'the settler minority were the protegé and local representatives of British colonialism . . .' This assertion may not substantially affect his analysis of future prospects but clearly it is a different starting point from the one that Carolyn Baylies develops in her brief Debate about the relationship between metropolitan and settler capitals.

If that issue about the nature of, and interactions between, capitals is one that defines the basic character of the Rhodesian social formation, it ought in turn to be related to a second basic issue: the nature of the relationship between capital(s) and labour. It has become a commonplace to say that the basic issue in Rhodesia has always been one of land: it has been the root of conflicts between black and white throughout the colonial period, and is the core problem whose solution will shape the path of future development. Our contention, however, is that the key to understanding lies in people not things, in the whole complex of relations of production rather than just property relations. In short labour, and the conditions of its reproduction.

As a reflection of this emphasis, our first article views the colonial system from the perspective of the control and organization of labour. In it Luke
Malaba documents how the maintenance of the labour supply to settler mines, farms and industries was always a central concern of the colonial state, and how that state sought systematically to generate and maintain a supply at ultra-cheap wages and to that end to control African labour at every turn. Moreover, he shows how the seizure of African land and the institutionalized division of land by race, and the confinement of Africans to increasingly overcrowded reserves, were crucial, but as mechanisms of ensuring the availability of African labour on particular terms. Put bluntly, the main effect, whether intended or not, of the Europeans taking half of all land for themselves, was not so much to acquire it for their own use (they only ever cultivated 3%) but to deny that land and the possibility of peasant commercial production to Africans, thus ensuring a labour force. The essential outcome of the network of land and labour control measures which Malaba surveys was not to lead to the complete proletarianization of all Africans, but to halt that process short of complete dispossession of the peasantry. While apartheid style regulations limited the flow, especially of families, into the towns, some land was left in reserves to tie as many people as possible to some small plot.

The significance for this system, or certainly for dominant settler interests, of measures to halt the drift towards landlessness among African peasants is exemplified by the fact that when Smith’s Rhodesia Front party took power in the early 1960s they reversed the Native Land Husbandry Act of the previous ‘liberal’ administrations of Garfield Todd and Edgar Whitehead, under which individual titles were being given to land in the ‘reserves’, which in turn meant the loss of rights of access by others. Once again land was to be ‘communal’ which meant under the control of government-appointed chiefs and, in theory, everyone was eligible to be allocated a plot. Such switches in policy help to reveal what settler rather than metropolitan interests saw as crucial components of the system that they were seeking to defend, but are worth recalling when we look to the future for two additional reasons. First, it is instructive to explore how some of the prescriptions for ‘reform’ now being touted by western aid experts, which Munslow reviews in Debates, seem to be simply resurrecting the policies of the 1950s: individual title to land and ‘improvements’ in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) with the surplus population being absorbed, some on holdings carved out from a proportion of the white land, the rest (some day) in paid employment.

In place of a class which is both semi-proletarianized workers and impoverished peasantry, they aim to stabilise a reduced and commodity-producing peasantry on the one hand and a landless reserve army of labour on the other. In one article,* which brings out explicitly the extent to which these formulae for resolving the ‘land issue’ are in fact manipulative prescriptions for social engineering, the former Salisbury university geographer, Kay, even puts numbers to this exercise of restructuring the classes. Kay is doubly revealing. His attempt to think in terms of numbers also shows that ‘reformist’ strategies can in no way solve the problems of poverty in Zimbabwe. As was discovered even in the 1950s, a capitalist path of development for the peasantry in the TTLs will generate such a flood of landless that they cannot possibly be gainfully absorbed elsewhere while ever land redistribution is only partial, as it will be while ever full compensation
has to be paid, as it would have to be to meet the overall conditions of capitalist development.

A second insight follows from viewing current development proposals in the light of earlier 'reformist' measures. In seeking to formulate an alternative to the present system of a semi-proletarianized labour force generated from a sub-subsistence peasantry, and one which is not a reversion to the more 'normal' capitalist social formation of Todd or Kay, the handling of the 'land question' in the TTLs is just as vital as, and must be dovetailed with, the plans for redistribution of the vast former European lands. The need to insure against any premature expulsion of people from TTLs before they can be absorbed in jobs or on redistributed land, and somehow to preserve in any alternative farming system in the TTLs the principle of common access to the means of production, would seem to be greater in a context, which Yates spells out, that for the moment precludes massive resettlement on the scale ultimately required.

The Formulation of Strategy and the Need for Analysis

We started from an assertion that the specification of strategies for the future development of Zimbabwe that could constitute an alternative to the existing system must come to an accurate assessment of the nature of that system it is sought to transcend. The foregoing analysis suggests one specific conclusion about such calculations: the need to see the essentials of the settler colonial system as one that revolved around attempts to institutionalize the reproduction of ultra-cheap semi-proletarianized labour. In fact the debates that have gone on about future development strategy whether in the writings of radical academic would-be helpers (see Munslow's *Debate*) or in official documents like the Chidzero report, have tended not to see things in these terms. The most common point of departure for discussion of 'radical' alternatives is in terms of the old distinction between 'colonialism and imperialism', or about economic dependence as opposed to political independence. The problem is seen simply in terms of whether and how Zimbabwe can avoid 'neocolonialism' and continued dependence. Such formulations don't in practice recognise any difference between a former settler state like Rhodesia and other ex-colonies in Africa. Other approaches do recognise a distinction — but limit it to a discussion of the extent to which there are contradictions between settler and metropolitan capital, as a basis for discussing how they might each be affected by independence and what their new strategies may be. Baylies' contribution to *Debates* explores these themes. But for a complete analysis of the dynamic of the settler system and the prospects for transitions from it such interactions between capitals, between settlers and metropoles have to be set in a context which brings out the other, crucial dimension: the particular forms of exploitation of labour power that such capitals employ, which in turn involves an exploration of the mode of reproduction of that labour power.

One of our other *Debates* pieces does bring out that dimension in trying to conceptualize a 'settler mode of production'. Like many others in this issue, Biermann and Kössler's contribution was presented at the conference which the *Review* jointly organized with the Department of Politics at Leeds University. In the discussion there, their thesis was challenged on the
grounds of its inapplicability to sectors of the settler economy other than agriculture — although they themselves admit that in industry and commerce can be found the more 'normal' form of fully proletarianized labour power associated with capitalism. Some theoreticians will no doubt want to take them to task for the unorthodox way they use one of the most fashionable concepts in current analyses — though they make no exaggerated claims that the 'settler mode of production' represents some totally new and different social construct. Perhaps most questionable of the conclusions that they come to about the 'laws of motion' of the settler mode is its tendency to 'stagnation'. Apart from the difficulty of squaring this with the facts of Rhodesian economic history, it is not clear whether this 'stagnation' implies low rates of growth of output or a tendency to hold back the 'forces of production'. If the latter, it is open to the criticism, well developed by Anne Philips (in No.8 of the *Review*), as to the validity of a notion of 'forces of production' whose advance (or retardation) can be measured independently and then be used as a yardstick of the efficacy of various modes of production. However, the basis on which they argue the stagnation tendency — that the settler mode does not rise above the crudest forms of exploitation, the extraction of absolute surplus value — is potentially useful as it points us centrally to the significance of the forms of labour power and of its reproduction. Certainly, it is instructive in any discussion of future strategy for social transformation in Zimbabwe to be reminded that the conditions of labour are in some measure akin to slavery, in its 'unmediated regimentation', that the exploitation of this labour power goes beyond the extraction of the product of surplus labour only and includes some of the labour time that would in other circumstances be necessary for the workers' reproduction; and that the system puts the whole reproduction of the surplus population at risk. The starting point for any discussion of transformation of Zimbabwe society must be to work out real alternatives to the inherited patterns of reproducing ultra-cheap labour. The further elaboration of this task will depend in part on theoretical work that develops a more appropriate and insightful perspective on the inherited system. It is hoped that the brief discussions we have included here will stimulate a further assault on this necessary theoretical task.

More attention must be given, however, to thinking about possible futures. Hopefully, the kind of perspective we have generated here and elsewhere in this Special Issue, will help in the task of confronting the 'reformist' packages that the western (and western-trained) experts are even now foisting upon Zimbabwe, by exposing, on practical grounds, the inevitable landlessness and impoverishment that they will generate, and more generally that they represent merely a more 'normal', 'rational' capitalist formula. But the 'radical' alternatives surveyed by Munslow in *Debates* must also be subjected to the same questioning: on the practical grounds that the prescriptions for co-operatives or communes in the TTLs and on former white-owned land might translate into over-large, bureaucratically conceived and run 'settlements' of the Zambia type or similar to Tanzania's villagization if the social contexts into which they are introduced are ignored and if they occur without the requisite political mobilization. How, too, are these plans for co-operative production to be geared to actual products that contribute to coherent plans for industrial development and to
overall strategies for redefining the political economy in relation to the regional and global context?

More fundamentally, there is a need to be clear about the nature of any transformation that is now possible in Zimbabwe. Is it in fact possible to raise the prospects of a 'transition to socialism'? Some of the 'menshevik'-oriented analysts who have pointed to the emergence of a national bourgeoisie in Kenya and other African countries and the development there of the productive forces, might welcome policies which promote the Africanization of the resident bourgeoisie and a proletariat completely 'freed' from the land (even at the cost of landlessness). But those who question the necessity of a further protraction of the capitalist stage may not at all accept Yates' formulation that Zimbabwe has had a 'national democratic revolution' and has now entered a (more or less protracted) 'people's democracy' one of several stages which, potentially, can lead to a transition to socialism. Again more elaboration and debate are required but clearly Zimbabwe could not be said to have yet met the preconditions for entering an actual transformation to socialism. Whether it can, what more precisely are those preconditions, and what are the struggles that will have to be engaged in to achieve them — these are all questions requiring urgent consideration, but which some of our other contributions at least touch on.

The Politics of Post-Independence Struggles

One problem with the literature on 'radical' development strategy is that up to now such prescriptions have remained utopian. To a degree that was inevitable given the necessary speculative character of anything written before Independence. But over and above that, much of that literature, useful as it was in drawing attention to the post-Independence future, was also utopian in the sense that proposals were not rooted in any discussion of the political prerequisites for more thorough-going transformation of Zimbabwe society. We are now clearer about the immediate political context in which any struggles for transformation are occurring. In particular, it must be stressed how far the two wings of the former Patriotic Front were pressured into accords at Lancaster House that were extremely unfavourable for any radical transformation. The pressure to concede sweeping concessions came from the front-line governments and was due, as contributions to Numbers 14 and 15/16 of this Review spelt out, as much as to the systematic bombardment and resulting economic blackmail of Mozambique and Zambia, as to those countries' tendency to settle for a guaranteed negotiated solution with some neo-colonial elements rather than the possibility of the anti-imperialist resolution which might occur if the Zimbabwe struggle continued. The dangerous terms of the ceasefire agreement and of the arrangements for the transition were not in the end decisive in ensuring the coming-to-power of an avowedly neo-colonial government but the constitution conceded at Lancaster House, whose provisions inhibiting land redistribution are so clearly brought out in the article by Yates, is still operative. In addition, a host of other pressures from western governments and aid agencies, from South Africa and from white settlers whose mass exodus has to be avoided to provide food, make it difficult to abrogate the constitution with respect to property rights or to the bureaucracy in the short run.
The circumstances of the transfer of power define the immediate political context and do so in a way that seriously inhibits any immediate radical transformation. Our article on the elections tries consciously to seek for those countervailing political forces that are available to support any attempt at fundamental change in the inherited structures. A positive legacy is the potential for non-bureaucratic change that lies in the grass roots organizational structures forged in many areas during the liberation struggle, and which, as we write early in 1981, seem to have not withered away and to be playing a useful role in reconstruction. The limitations of such potential popular pressures are revealed once we remember that they are associated with ZANU-PF and that the expression of class demands by either workers or peasants organization are likely to be distorted by the inter-party competition that continues in Zimbabwe and is, it would seem, based on the culturally-based identification with certain leaders. In a different way, Mbulelo Mzamane's presentation of the poetry of a young guerilla, an interesting and overdue departure for the Review into the politics of culture, offers evidence of social forces that are likely to swing to the side of changes like land reform and the end to the system of reproduction of cheap labour, in particular the determined mood of the people and the guerillas.

The importance of this popular will and of grass roots political organization is the more essential given the ideological ambiguity which exists at the level of political leadership, even within ZANU-PF, and which is frankly exposed at the end of Yates' article. Given, too, the persistence of the settler state’s bureaucratic structures and to the diplomatic, strategic and constitutional constraints on state policy, the expression of any class demands on behalf of the still semi-proletarianized peasantry are likely to occur in part within the state and in part in opposition to the state. Evidence of such struggle can be found in the land occupations and continued strikes and in the opposition to them. That such struggles are, seemingly, continuing is also the best indicator that the future path of development in Zimbabwe is not yet unequivocally determined. But that trajectory depends not only on the political will and organization of the masses but also on the objective forces generated by the political economy — which highlights once again our point of departure: the need to think through the nature of that Rhodesia which the concrete struggles of Zimbabwe are grappling to transform.

*Lionel Cliffe and Barry Munslow


We apologise for the omission of the author's name, Richard Moorsom from the Briefing in No.17 on 'Namibia in the Frontline: The Political Economy of Decolonisation'.

Supply, Control and Organization of African Labour in Rhodesia

Luke Malaba

Luke Malaba's overview of the history of African labour control and organization from the 1930s to the 1970s highlights some of the institutional mechanisms of labour exploitation which were at the root of the whole settler colonial system and which must soon come under review by the new government. He offers a critique of the dualist work on African migrant labour but also points to some of the limits of recent 'radical' writings (see Bibliographic Note at end) which, whilst recognizing the structural integration of the African 'reserves' with the settler capitalist economy, fail to break away from an overly economistic conceptualization. It is the political framework which has defined and maintained the form of migration, Malaba argues. Moreover, workers organizations themselves have divorced the political from the economic aspects of the struggle against capital. The author concludes that the consciousness of workers does not automatically result from their dialectical position in relation to the capital-owning class but needs to be aroused and directed towards the struggle for complete emancipation. The relative divorce between workers organizations and the national movements he poses as a key problem for the future.

The Labour Recruitment Process: The Historical Background

The various methods which have been used in Rhodesia to obtain cheap African labour for the capitalist branches of the economy have their foundations in the 1890s when white settlers entered the territory. In anticipation of high returns from mining, large sums of money had been invested in buying the necessary land and in constructing the railway line from Mafeking to Salisbury. Shareholders of the British South Africa Company did not receive dividends, however, and the financial burdens of administering the affairs of the colony were mounting. By 1900 the Company directors had turned to land as a means of solving their financial difficulties.

The early period of the transition should not be conceptualized in peaceable evolutionary terms because the penetration of foreign capital into this region was marked by military confrontations between the settlers, representing foreign capital and the indigenous populations defending their traditional social formations. In order to create the political, ideological and legal conditions for the existence of capitalist modes of productions and
especially to create the settler-colonial forms of contract-labour, military conquest and subjugation of the local population had to take place one way or another. During the 1920s owners of both landed property and capital were interested in the process of alienating Africans from land and hence their means of subsistence. The company encouraged European settlement for farming, mining and commercial purposes. By 1911 the white population had risen to 23,000. One of the aims of land alienation was to force Africans into wage labour in farms, mines and homesteads but adequate supplies of labour were not forthcoming. A number of views have been expressed to explain the 'shortage of labour'. From the standpoint of the settler-farmers who were directly interested in African labour supply, the 'shortage' was due to African indolence and their wants being met by resort to non-wage occupations. One had to increase the range of wants, therefore, in order to force them to work for wages.

As Charles van Onselen has shown, many of those involved and some of the academics who have analysed this process, created their own mental image of an African to whom they attributed certain characteristics of behaviour in the ideal labour-market in order to explain the 'shortage'. He has called this creation 'Sambo'. However, in an attempt to avoid the weaknesses of the 'Sambo' approach some writers have sought the answer not in the individual African 'psyche' but in the structures of traditional African societies. The argument has been that the nature of the traditional societies over-stressed communal activities and not individual initiative; so when wage opportunities arose traditional kinship ties were too strong for individual incentive to accumulate private property. There is no doubt that such dualist theories served to justify forced African labour. Such views stem from a false premise which conceptualizes the interactions of settlers and indigenous social formations in terms of the movement of capital into these societies as if the latter were completely devoid of any form of commodity production at the time. The fact is that although commodity production was not a generalized mode of production in these social formations at the time of settlement, a section of the population, especially the wealthy, had already been trading with the Portuguese and the hunters from British South Africa. It is this local trading capital which the settler-colonialists used as foundation for the transformation of the traditional social formations and the development of agrarian and mining capital. It was partly a desire to restrict or destroy competition from this capital source that settlers created 'reserves' where Africans could not own land and to a certain extent could not produce for the market.

While Arrighi has shown the significance of the creation of 'reserves' during this period of 'primitive accumulation' of capital, he has viewed them as interdependent with the 'modern economic sector'. They were not 'interdependent' but in fact formed the core of the development of the capitalist mode of production. The sectors did not 'co-exist'; rather the whole capitalist social formation has been developing through and out of the reserves and the 'traditional' social formations. The latter is no longer the same as its pre-settler-capitalist forms, as the populist theory would have us believe. In order to provide the basis for a strong agrarian capitalism in the fertile areas of the high veld and the middle veld, Africans were removed to areas on the fringes of the middle veld and to the low veld.
By the 1920s an area of 21 million acres had been alienated into 96 separatist 'reserves' which varied greatly in acreage and population. Shangani with an area of 92,259 square miles had a population of 10,250; Nava had an area of 1,462 sq. miles but a population of 33,650 while the smallest, Jenya, was 4 sq. miles with a population of 150.

This early stage in the process of creating a social class owning means of production and another without possessions except its labour took place at different rates in different regions of Southern Rhodesia. In some areas a 'labour-tenancy' system developed, characterized by social relations which entailed Africans cultivating small strips of farm land around their huts on condition that they worked on the settler's farm for a specified number of days a week. These relations of production form the basis of what Duncan Clarke has described as 'semi-feudalism' in the agricultural sector. Governed by the Master and Servant Act of 1901, the relationship was basically one of slavery. The provisions of the Act made African labour the property of the master. Like the slave, the only time the African was in control of himself or his labour power was when he engaged in the production of his own reproduction.

Absentee landlords used Africans who occupied their farm land as sources of income. Africans were allowed to continue living on and cultivating the land as long as they paid the landlord 'rent'. This meant that they had to engage in 'simple commodity production' for the purposes of raising the money to pay the landlord. The landlord often 'handled' the crop and thus reduced the subsistence income of the Africans. 'Kaffir-farming', as it was called, was opposed by aspirant resident settler-capitalist farmers because it continued to tie Africans to the soil; it maintained Africans in market produce competition with white farmers when they were wanted as wage-labourers. In order to make some of the African labour available for hire by the settlers the company government, under agrarian and mining capital pressure, banned the system of 'Kaffir-farming'. As a result of the pressure, absentee landlords were forced to lease their lands to agrarian capital. As landlords participated in the distribution of the surplus-value produced by African labour-power, landed property was a fetter to the expansion of capital. There was temporarily a conflict with the commercial interest which had developed out of the purchase of African produce sold to the mines.

To further force labour from the land, the state imposed poll, dog and head taxes to be paid in cash and Africans had either to intensify simple commodity production or seek wage employment. As part of forcing them to take up the latter, the state provided subsidised loans to white settler producers, set different prices for African market produce, removed African peasants from lands near the railways and roads so that transportation costs and profit ratios were discouraging. They closed markets to African produce in some areas in order to encourage the formation of settler-controlled commercial capital. The consequent structural change can be shown by the fact that in 1900, 70% of African earnings came from the sale of produce. By 1932 that figure had collapsed to only 20%.

The foregoing is not an economic explanation of any labour 'shortage' but of why land alienation and a limitation on African commercial cultivation was necessary for settler capitalism to develop. What van Onselen
demonstrates is the administrative means of coercing labour. He has argued that the role of such institutions as the Rhodesian Native Labour Bureaux and their impact on the development of the Southern Rhodesian labour market is of great importance. The Bureaux were formed to recruit, transport and distribute African contract labour to the mines and farms at the lowest possible wage rates. They used the colonial administrative officials such as Native Commissioners and Chiefs. They also recruited and transported foreign labour from the neighbouring British and Portuguese colonies and acted in liaison with the South African Witwatersrand Native Labour Association at a regional labour market level. It is not enough to say that people who went to South Africa were attracted by higher wages alone, because this economistic interpretation plays down the coercive effects of the operation of WNLA and the Bureaux in directing people towards specific areas.

The Land Apportionment Act of 1931 puts into effect the policy of territorial segregation of races by dividing land into the ‘native reserves’ where land was ‘communally’ owned; the African Purchase Areas where individual tenure was allowed to create the conditions for the development of an African middle class; the European sector comprising most of the fertile land; the forest area and the unassigned land. Although the effect of the Act was to consolidate and rationalize a structure of land alienation that had been developing since 1890, its fundamental significance lies in the formalization of the principle of ‘separate development’ whose main objective was to creation conditions whereby a small minority would constitute the social class that owned the means of production while a large majority would own nothing but their labour, to be hired by the former. The ruling class achieved this by use of its legal power to create and protect private property in land while denying the majority such ownership.

Within the framework of this approach contradictions in the creation and transformation of the reserves do not make them separate entities or simply ‘inter-dependent’ with the so-called ‘modern money-economy sector’. They should be seen as one of the ‘concrete categories’ of a complex totality in the process of formation. The presence of ‘reserves’ may express capitalism at its ‘embryonic stage’ based upon ‘semi-feudal’ and ‘traditional’ modes of production. It was the aggregate effects of the actions at different stages in the historical development of settler-capitalism, of officials, of recruiting organizations, deteriorating subsistence conditions in the ‘reserves’, various laws such as tax legislation, the prohibitive regulations like the Kaffir-Beer Ordinance (making it an offence to brew and/or sell traditional African beer except by those who employ ‘natives to perform manual labour and supply it gratis to them in the form of rations’), the destocking policies and direct coercion that together explain the steady increase in labour supply in the 1930s from 157,200 in 1932 to 255,800 in 1938.

At the same time, the average level of wages in mining (the highest paying sector at this time) fell from 31 shillings a month to 21 shillings over this period and did not recover until 1950. Duncan Clarke has argued that ‘the cash wage in 1948 was quite possibly below the level for 1922 . . .’ Mining and farming capital were not prepared to continue employing African labour at pre-1930 wage rates. The drop did not reflect a decrease in the de-
mand for African labour, rather the aim was to reduce the costs of production and maintain levels of profits by employing as many Africans as could be recruited at an unadjustable subsistence wage. The temporary slump in the supply may well have been caused by the reluctance of the indigenous population to work under appalling conditions for wages below the subsistence income that they still managed to get from the cultivation of land in reserves.

Census returns show that the proportion of non-indigenous African males in employment increased at a faster rate than the numbers of indigenous able-bodied males in wage employment. The mining and agrarian bourgeoisie operated through its recruiting agents to obtain labour at the lowest possible cost. Increased numbers of foreign Africans in wage-employment may be viewed as reflecting the effects of contractual coercion whereby workers were recruited without being told about the conditions of work in Southern Rhodesia, transported over long distances by defined routes, fed with poor quality food en route with the result that some died of scurvy, pneumonia, dysentery and diarrhoea. The system was supposed to provide employers with adequate supplies of labour at minimum costs in terms of recruitment and remuneration. An agreement even regulated competition amongst the regional capitalists for labour.

Post-War Trends in African Employment

The Second World War created external stimuli for the accelerated transformation of agrarian and mining capital based upon the semi-feudal forms of production. The state, representing and being a medium for the regulation of conflicting capitalists' interest, took responsibility for providing the necessary infrastructures which competing capitalists could not provide individually. The establishment of the Southern Rhodesia Iron and Steel Commission foundries and mills, the Electricity Supply Commission power stations, the Cotton Industry Board mills and the building of roads provided various sectors of capital individually and collectively with the base for producer goods.

Although there was a general increase in the numbers of Africans in wage employment in all sectors and a proportionately higher rate of increase for the indigenous population in wage employment, the increase of indigenous male wage workers in mining and agriculture was still lower than that of foreign wage workers from Portuguese East Africa, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Bechuanaland.

At national level the increase in wage employment expressed the total effects of political instruments including the provisions of the Land Apportionment Act 1931 the consequent population movement and the increased tax burden. An act of 1942 required all Africans above the age of 16 to have registration certificates and obliged employers to enter particulars of the nature of employment and wage rates on the certificates. Another law required Africans to obtain passes for permission to visit urban areas, ‘pass’ to seek work and ‘pass’ to go out of the country. The increase in wage employment was also due to competitive wages being paid in some areas (witnessed by the state’s intervention to regulate the effects of such a wage war through banning ‘poaching’ and provisions of the Native Registration Act 1931).
Another cause was the inevitable result of changes in the division of labour in the reserves whereby the able-bodied adult males were leaving these areas to look for work in urban areas. The conditions of alienation were becoming generalized in the sense that work was becoming more and more identified with getting wages as a means of subsistence. At regional level the increase in employment was an expression of the work of recruiting organizations who worked in co-operation with other governments.

By passing the Compulsory Native Labour Act 1943, whose aim was to compel all able-bodied male Africans in the territories to offer their labour on farms, mines, factories and settler homesteads, the imperial government helped to co-ordinate and maintain the high level of labour supplies to key industries. It also maintained low wages, especially for the agrarian and mining bourgeoisie. These two sectors earned the foreign currency needed by the manufacturing sector. The accumulation of capital and the high rates of growth and expansion of the various branches of the economy was both based upon and also created demands for 'cheap labour'.

The post-war situation until 1958 is characterized, amongst other things, by a continual increase of the numbers of indigenous African wage-labour and a relative decrease in non-indigenous contract wage-labour. However, agriculture and mining continued to claim 'shortage of labour' particularly in areas like cotton, tobacco and gold mining to the extent that mechanization was considered. Duncan Clarke argues that the 'shortage' was due to 'hoarding' practices of some employers, who kept large numbers of Africans unemployed in the compounds. The extent of the 'ideology of labour shortage' during the 1946-1960 period has been examined in his study of the formation and subsequent operations of the Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission. This Commission expressed a collusion of interests. It represented agricultural, mining, commercial and 'liberal capitalism'. Its formation represents an effort by the various capitalist sectors, through the medium of the state, to regulate the effects of wage-competition from the Second World War by verifying the terms of employment and wage rates through a single recruiting organization. The duties of the RNLSC included recruitment of foreign contract labour from bordering countries and its transportation through recognized routes, distribution of the contractees to the members of the organization according to the demand. It had the responsibility of settling wages for the contract workers, administering the provisions of the contract especially those relating to deferment of a portion of the wages and taxes paid by the worker while he is Southern Rhodesia.

The years 1946-1952 were not successful for the commission because it could not meet the 'shortage'. Also, the Commission charged employers low 'capitation fees' and this led it to financial problems in 1946-50. Its problems were compounded by the reluctance of supplier states to permit large-scale recruitment. Refusal to give permission to recruit from southern Nyasaland led the RNLSC to turn to northern Tanganyika Province and Portuguese East Africans from Tete. The long distances involved meant that recruitment costs were expensive, and the Commission increased its capitation fee. Even so the demand for its contract labour increased because employers were still obtaining labour for a value lower than the costs of its recruitment and at a cost lower than that of local labour.
The crude physical criterion of wages scales was humiliating and dehumanising, ranging from category A, being over 5 feet 5 inches and weighing not less than 130 pounds were considered 'suitable' for underground work or other heavy work and received 65/- per ticket (30 working days) through to Category 'D', the 'undernourished persons or those in younger age groups', weighing not less than 100 pounds or 5 feet tall, who were 'suitable' for light work and received 50/-.

From 1952 to 1963 there was an increase in foreign contract labour and a decrease in the indigenous labour supplies in primary industries. The capitalists did everything to maintain the high profit levels. They adopted labour displacing methods by buying tractors. The University of Rhodesia started research in the 1960s into scientific methods of human management and mechanization of cotton picking; the number of boss-boys on the farms and mines was increased.

Employment of female labour for household work and as casual farm workers increased, sometimes at rates even below the minimum wage. Female labour was not only used as a mechanism of depressing the male labour force's wages but was a ready source of unskilled labour to substitute for the foreign contract labour whose use was being regulated by the state in the process of indigenization of labour supplies. In 1951 there were 29,519 indigenous females in wage employment. The use of indigenous African female labour in the households had the effect of releasing white female labour, some of which was skilled labour or could be trained to acquire the required skill. Capital could therefore meet the national skilled labour policy, which required employers to recruit expensive European labour from the metropolitan areas. Use of white female skilled labour solved the problem of scarcity of skilled labour in certain sections of capital without forcing individual capital to resort to training Africans for the jobs and thereby violating state labour policy. In addition to a low cost female labour force the number of juveniles in wage employment increased: in 1951 there were 65,676 juveniles in wage employment. The use of low cost female and juvenile labour has been one of the mechanisms by which Southern Rhodesian capitalists have maintained a reserve of labour and a low wage structure. By 1953 the supplier governments had relaxed their restrictions over the recruiting of labour by the Rhodesian Native Labour Supply Commission. During the peak period 1953-58 the Commission recruited a total of 86,791 contract workers for Southern Rhodesian farms and mines. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-1963) was accompanied by arrangements for monpolising the Federal labour force. Under the Foreign Migratory Labour Act (1958) certain areas within the Federation could be declared 'closed labour areas' as far as non-federal citizens were concerned. The government also set up an inter-territorial consultative committee of labour to:

explore and report on the possibilities of the uniformity of labour legislation within the Federation . . . (and) study and from time to time report on the developments in regard to the stabilization of labour at the place of employment.

As political independence for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the end of the Federation drew near, the Southern Rhodesia settler-colonial bourgeoisie adopted a 'new economic policy' aimed at the internationaliza-
tion of the institutions of labour supply, for fear that independent Malawi and Zambia would stop the recruitment of their nationals for contract labour in Southern Rhodesia. Yet there was also growing unemployment. The Second World War and to a certain extent the development of the Federation had tied production in the economy to the needs of international markets, and competition in manufactured goods in world markets especially from the technologically-advanced capitalist centres forced firms in Southern Rhodesia to adopt mechanization, one of whose effects was labour displacement.

The number of workers waiting to be hired at labour exchanges in the big cities and at factory gates increased. In fact the number of Africans working or seeking work in towns had increased so much during the boom that the government had to adopt a policy of ‘stabilization’, by passing legislation giving municipal authorities power to build locations for African family accommodation in European areas. Although the policies were aimed at meeting industrial capitalists' interests by providing them with a permanent labour force and the creation of an African middle class in line with the so-called ‘partnership’ ideology, it was a response to the effects of the process of full proletarianization of African peasants.

Pressure of poverty in the reserves pushed a lot of Africans out to where they could only sell their labour-power at wages lower than subsistence levels. It is during this period (1956-75) that the development of the capitalist mode of production in agriculture and mining became complete and generalized. The process was accelerated by the rigorous implementation of the provision of the Land Tenure Act (1967) which divided the land equally between 270,000 European and 6½ million Africans. Force removals of more Africans from the European areas created a reserve of labour. The Act also accelerated the final destruction of the remnants of ‘semi-feudal’ forms of production upon which agrarian capitalism had grown. This meant that a large portion of ‘tillage land’ which had been a base for tenant-families on European farms had to disappear. Since Africans could only remain in European areas as contract workers, once the terms of service expired and the employer could not renew the contract, the worker had to join the reserves of labour in the rural areas or in towns.

The process of complete proletarianization of tenant-labour through the destruction of semi-feudal structures had little to do with the levels of wages. It meant that the worker had no other means of subsistence and would have to accept wages or rations however little these might be. Duncan Clarke has referred to this process as the ‘stabilization’ or ‘full proletarianization’ of a section of the labour force, particularly the able-bodied adult males. These measures proletarianized all able-bodied members of the families in farm compounds because they could only continue living there on the basis of a written contract with the employer that they were working for him. In other words, some female members of families were engaged to work very hard for the farmer during certain seasons of the year.

The Rhodesian Front refused to recognize the full extent of the problems of unemployment. Some government officials produced conservative estimates of the numbers of Africans unemployed by adopting restrictive definitions of a ‘work-seeker’. Capitalists have taken advantage in recent
years of the existence of the reserved army of unemployed to maintain low wages and poor conditions of work. They have employed more female and juvenile labour at rates below the living costs of these workers. According to Duncan Clarke's 1975 estimate the situation was that there were: 60,193 juveniles, 129,370 women and 755,437 men then in wage employment. His estimated number of adult male unemployed would have been 130,773. Suggested solutions to the problem of unemployment have ranged from the creation of jobs through investment of capital in the 'reserves', to increased productivity. Some employers have adopted labour displacing techniques to increase the reserve army, while at national level the government has since the early 1930s adopted a policy of displacing foreign contract labour and exporting labour to South Africa through WNLA. What is clear is that the presence of the unemployed still played an important role in settler-colonial capitalism at Independence. The reserves of labour mean that workers continue to be employed on terms favourable to all branches of capital.

The Nature and Conditions of the Labour Force

The single biggest weakness of the vast 1970s 'radical' literature on the nature, conditions and problems of the African working class, is that its view in terms of 'structures', 'patterns' and 'systems' goes only half way to an adequate analysis of the internal contradictions of settler colonialism. The inevitable conclusion of such an approach is a set of reformist propositions which leave the fundamentals intact. Such approaches may be less idealistic than the historiography of the creators of 'Sambo' but they do not go beyond an interpretation of bourgeoisie society in its own terms and therefore the status quo.

Harris, for instance, recognizes that in Rhodesia workers have been divided into categories of 'skilled', 'semi-skilled' and 'unskilled' but he does not necessarily do this to differentiate values of labour-power in Marx's terms the 'socially necessary quantity of labour for the production and reproduction of the workers'. Such an approach would have recognized that, although the living cost of various categories may be the same, the logic of the economic system demands that the skilled be given more for the time spent in acquiring their skills. The further analysis of skill differentials is imperative in order to understand the extent to which they may be used for purposes of maintaining and justifying the appropriateness of surplus-value and the wide gaps in distribution of wealth.

In Rhodesia the relevant 'skill' is that acquired through formal training at apprenticeship institutions such as Bulawayo Technical College. Regulation and control of numbers and kinds of people who have access to these institutions guarantees high wages for them, while closure or refusal of right of access (such as the Rhodesia Front's closure of the Luvene Technical College for blacks) maintains low wages for the 'unskilled'. The majority of Africans in fact constitute such 'unskilled' labour and are employed to do 'manual' work. While they constitute the majority, especially in farming, their wage bill has been the lowest. In 1972 there were 338,000 Africans in agricultural employment, 120,000 in domestic service, and 112,000 in manufacturing. The average annual earnings for agriculture were R$135,
domestic service R$286, mining R$358 and manufacturing R$527. An average white (though most are classified as doing ‘skilled’ work) earned eleven times the average black in 1972. The average difference in 1963 was $2,214 but had risen to $3,300 in 1973.

‘Skill’ is, however, an aptitude developed from and during labour activity: a result of the combination of ‘practice’ and ‘theory’ within defined social conditions. In Rhodesia, the formal classification corresponds with the practice of ‘job-reservation’. In some industries, however, employers have recognized labour-practice as skill-creating and have employed long-service Africans to do jobs formally reserved for ‘semi-skilled’ and ‘skilled’ white workers. Africans have been employed in some factories to do tasks such as machine operating, welding, rivetting, drilling, painting, and in construction they have been employed in brick laying, plastering, painting and glazing. As a result of increased mechanization, the desire to maintain high levels of productivity and the adoption of the ‘scientific management’, many firms have employed Africans as machine operators, tractor and lorry drivers.

Such moves have been followed in most cases by a shift of the formal level of the colour-bar to the extent that white workers have become supervisors or constitute what Arrighi and Saul have called the ‘labour-aristocracy’. To the extent that the labour-aristocracy is an ‘unproductive’ group it can be argued that in practical terms it is the actively involved workers (i.e. increasingly Africans) who become the skilled. But Africans who do semi-skilled work are not paid the wages previously given to the former incumbent. The classification into skills is clearly linked to the capitalists’ desire to maximize surplus-value at costs lower than the value of the means socially necessary for the production and reproduction of African labour-power.

Another characteristic of the African work force is that it is ‘migratory’. A majority of African workers spend one part of their working life in towns, farms and mines, another in the ‘reserves’. This aspect of the working class has been widely written about and some have even attempted to deny its existence. Eric Gargett writes about the conditions of the African urban population on the assumption that the days of the ‘peasant-worker’ have gone. Other have linked the migratory phenomenon with the ‘target-worker’ theory: that Africans only come to seek work for a period to get a stake.

Other writers have attempted to understand migration in Rhodesia in terms of the structural basis of the economy has been too economistic. They have not moved too far from the theory of the co-existence of two separate but inter-dependent sectors — one sector providing ‘social security’, the other a sum of money to be invested or used in the former as a kind of unemployment benefit or old age pension. In other words, it is the insecurity of the ‘modern-economic sector’ with its poor, small single-sex accommodation, the overcrowded and filthy compounds that forces the worker to have a dual existence. In fact the assumption that the rural areas still provide ‘social security’ does not correspond to the present social reality of African workers in Rhodesia.

Some writers use migratory characteristic to explain non-unionization or
the lack of working class consciousness amongst Africans. In addition to denying the existence of a working class in the country, they persist in viewing Africans as 'tribesmen-workers' thereby denying the fact that man is an expression of the immediate social conditions he finds himself in, and his actions at one place cannot always be influenced by what happens at another place where he is not.

There is no doubt that most of these theories are undialectic and view the phenomenon ahistorically. Migratory labour has a historical origin and forms part of a totality in process of change. The important thing about this characterization of the worker in a settler-colonial environment is that it is used to justify the high rates of profit that stem from capital not bearing the burden of providing adequate means for the reproduction of labour force under healthy conditions. However, the appearance of reserves as providers of social security is illusory. The source of this misconception may lie in the tendency to see the migratory pattern as a 'system' thus ignoring the concrete and conflicting interests of the men involved.

It is the decisions of men in power and their use of the political framework that have defined and maintained the form of migration. The ruling class has used its political power to force workers to go periodically to the reserves. Thus Eric Gargett has shown that the rate of building of African houses in urban areas has been slowed since the 1950s when the main aim was the creation of an African middle class. He has also shown that a large number of Africans youth were urban born. Despite this they were legally belong to the reserves and under the Vagrancy Act are liable to removal if they are not employed in town. However, the growth of the urban working class has continued even under adverse political conditions. Those who use the forced migratory nature of the African workers to say that there is no working class should perhaps bear in mind that the characteristic of a proletariat is not necessarily permanence or the level of wages but the fact that one belongs to a social class that has no possession of means of production, has no other means of subsistence except the hiring of itself to a social class that owns the means of production.

The conditions of alienation both in the process of production and generally in workers' lives have been observed and interpreted by some of the outstanding writers on labour in Rhodesian society. Most valuable contributions have been made in the Mambo Press series, by Duncan Clarke's work on African agricultural workers, Harris on the black industrial workers and Eric Gargett on the social conditions of life in urban areas. What runs through these writings is the theme that the conditions of the African working class are below standard and should be changed. They all seem to conclude that change should come from above through some form of legislation. The value of these works lies in the fact that they have been written with the purpose of identifying the social reality of the African labour market so as to provide data to counter the employers myths and ideology about the conditions of workers in Rhodesia.

Amongst the myths these writers have aimed at disputing are the following: that at various times in the transformation of settler-colonial capitalism there has been a 'labour shortage' because Africans did not want to work; that there has nevr been unemployment in Rhodesia; that employers have
paid Africans low wages because they were unable to pay higher wages; that if they did increase wages there would be no surplus for re-investment, jobs would not be created and white workers would resist such an increase. The ‘radical’ literature has shown that these claims are unfounded. Duncan Clarke has shown the extent to which the ideology of labour shortage is aimed at perpetuating the low wage structures, and how claims of no unemployment are designed to create an image of social reality suitable to the ruling class whose interest is to maintain a reserve army of unemployed as an essential part of a settler-capitalist system based upon low costs and expropriation of high rates of profit.

Harris has also shown that as far as many industrial firms were concerned African wage bills constituted an insignificant portion of production costs, that spare parts for machinery claim a greater portion of the costs, that on the basis of gross operating profits for the period 1965-72 profits have been increasing more rapidly than wages. In manufacturing, gross operating profits were R$62.5m (1965), R$106.0m (1970) and R$150.6m (1972), while the corresponding total African wages were R$28.8m (1965), R$47.6m (1970), and R$59.3m (1972). In agriculture in the period 1968-72, African wages constituted 19.44% of gross output and in mining the percentage was 16.05. Duncan Clarke has also attacked the assertion by employers that farm ‘labourers’ wages would increase if productivity increased, on the grounds that besides the question that the workers would have taken on trust that wages would indeed rise after a production increase, output had in fact been increasing all the time.

To the extent that these studies are the results of hard, careful research and are a collection of data to help forward the case for improvement in the conditions of workers, they are of great importance and value. Their weakness lies in their restricted purposes because they lead to a reformist conclusion. There is an implicit assumption that the ruling class will pass legislative measures required to rectify the situation. While it is important to reveal the structures of social formations, it is equally important not to be over-concerned with the interpretation of these effects and forget the fact that it is men who create and maintain these ‘structures’. It is also important to look at sources of contradictions which produce these manifestations and the conflict of interests of men who create them, in order to find out whether a particular suggestion really solves the problem. However this short review of the literature should not divert us too far from the subject of forms of control of workers and conditions at work places.

**Mechanisms of Control of the Labour Force**

Methods of control of workers at the micro-level are influenced by the labour policies of the Rhodesian government. They also differ from one employer to another. They have ranged from the use of rations as the greater proportion of the workers’ earnings, so as to perpetuate the paternalist dependency relationship between employers and employees, to the use of scientific forms of management especially in large production units. In small firms and in households it is the employer who is directly responsible for giving orders to the worker and for almost all the important decisions. Delegation of authority over the worker may seem to occur especially where
the system of ‘boss-boys’ in farms and mines, or the supervisor or foremen in factories is used. The ‘boss-boys’, ‘foremen’, are instruments through which the employer gets workers to do things. It is the presence of these intermediate people in large firms that makes control less personal. It is based upon a hierarchical structure of authority to the extent that the workers do not deal directly with the employer. They will blame the ‘boss-boys’ or ‘foremen’ for the harsh policies and cruelty vented on them. The labour committee of the Rhodesia National Farmers Union advised their members to adopt this distant form of discipline so that they may retain their paternalist integrity.

However the position and actions of ‘boss-boys’ and ‘foremen’ have always been controversial. On the one hand he is an employee, on the other a person with some authority over others. In many cases they have proved more ruthless than the employer because they have to prove themselves worthy of the higher wage they get. In order to maintain their job security or to get promotion or favours they become ruthless. In large firms the bureaucratic system has been enhanced by the development of a set of rules defining the behaviour of workers which de-personalises the relationship and therefore makes the ‘boss-boys’ less blamable for what they do behind these rules. The system of rules is intended to give their actions some form of legitimacy.

All these forms of control take place within a national labour policy. For domestic, agricultural and mining workers social relations at work are defined by the provisions of the Master and Servant Act 1901. This Act defines the roles of ‘master’ and ‘servant’, their unequal status, and the way they relate to each other. In addition to the inequality of bargaining power, the Act gives the employer wide powers to determine the terms of the contract of employment. The appearance of freedom of parties in contracts under the Master and Servant Act relates to the extent to which the potential employee makes a decision to look for work in order to survive. Even within this area of pre-negotiation his freedom is limited since other forces such as poverty and tax requirements act as coercion.

However, once he has decided to take a job with a particular employer slave’s position is formalized by the Act and he loses all freedom to control his life. Although the Act leaves wage levels to be negotiated by the parties, the contractual status of the worker is then backed by the penal provisions of the Act throughout the length of the contracting period. The Act puts a floor below which the employer’s expectations of returns from the labour-power of the servant cannot fall by setting the minimum working day and maximum working days per contract. The Act also makes the place of execution of contract immaterial as long as the master orders the servant to perform the work at a place other than his residence. It does not say anything about specification of the jobs so that it is no breach of contract if the employer orders the servant to perform work which the latter reasonably believes he did not contract for.

In recent years poor conditions coupled with the rigorous implementation of the Land Tenure Act of 1967 making a large number of Africans in European areas landless and therefore easily purchasable have placed the
workers until their full control of employers. In farms the development of what is called the 'poly-valency' system whereby an employee enters into more than one contract as a way of raising subsistence income, has placed workers under employer’s paternalism. The temporary character of the contracts increases insecurity. The increasing employment of casual contract workers from the villages through the recruiting agents increases insecurity for the permanent compound farm workers.

Living Conditions of Workers

A large proportion of the African labour force on farms and in mines live in compounds. Compounds are characterized by a cluster of pole and dakha huts situated away from the farmer’s homestead. The damp, dirty condition of life in the compounds give rise to diseases such as tuberculosis and pneumonia. TB has increased due to the malnutrition caused by poor and unbalanced food given as rations. Sanitation is bad. Many of the compounds use the open pit latrine system. The poor drainage system also gives rise to disease and is an ideal breeding place for mosquitoes, flies and insects. A survey carried out in 1972 by a special committee of Rhodesia National Farmers Union, as part of the ‘impression management’ designed to improve the ‘image of agriculture’ amongst African employees showed amongst other things that workers preferred modern brick houses. Overcrowding and the depressing conditions in the compounds have destroyed family unity, destroyed privacy and have led to crime and prostitution. Van Onselen has indicated the way employers used prostitution as a way of stabilizing the male labour force and as social control despite the fact that in 1945, for instance, syphilis was the cause of 2,318 cases of sickness in the mines.

Those who live in urban areas are relatively better off than those in the compounds on farms and mines. Most of the male labour force in urban areas live in single-sex hostels where six people may share a dormitory and a kitchen and toilet. There is no privacy or security of tenure. These hostels were built to meet the needs of employers not the interests of workers. They are owned by employers but administered by the municipalities. Since they are tied to the job the loss of the latter automatically makes the worker homeless. Municipalities have not built many houses for married workers. Available accommodation in 1975 in Bulawayo had 11,700 registered lodgers living with 24,000 black families in the African townships. In Salisbury, houses available were being given to employees who had been in continuous employment for thirteen years. The number of squatter areas has been rising in the cities. Unemployment has increased leading to the growth of an ‘informal’ sector characterized by hawking, shebeens, basket weaving and the sale of met in beer-halls. Insecurity of life in urban areas has given rise to crime and violence, heavy drinking and prostitution. These are all manifestations of the injustices of settler colonialism.

Taking all these factors into account and given the increasing cases of malnutrition in the reserves, the capitalists adopted strategies of relying upon a quick succession of unhealthy and short-lived generations to keep the labour market well supplied.
Workers’ Organizations

African workers’ resistance to terms and conditions under which their labour power was obtained has its roots in the early days of settler-colonialism. The common form of resistance in the early period was ‘desertion’. The main causes of such withdrawal were the dehumanizing treatment of workers by employers, poor working conditions characterized by long hours, hard and dangerous underground operations in mines, unhealthy living conditions, low wages or poor quality food rations.

The large number of convictions of Africans at magistrates’ courts for desertion, arson and refusal to pay taxes show the extent of individual forms of resistance; and they have continued to characterize labour relations in Rhodesia because of the low level of organized collective workers’ response. This was inevitable in the 1920s because the working people were small in number and were, by the very nature of production structures, scattered. Although the use of contract-wage labour presupposed the legal recognition and existence of capitalist relations of production, forms of labour-relations such as the labour-tenancy system militated against strong workers’ organizations because they retained family relations at points of production. In addition, the fact that people who were hired to work on farms and mines were strongly attached to the soil reduced the chances of working class consciousness.

Since recorded organized forms of workers’ protests against individual mining and farming capital in the early 1920s are not available some writers have concluded that:

at the beginning of the 1920s . . . there were few evidences of any effective articulation of the hopes, fears and grievances of the workers.

The fact that there were no recognizable formal structures of workers’ organizations does not in itself mean absence of any form of articulation of workers’ grievances. Spontaneous workers’ protests at individual points of production may have occurred. Other writers have measured workers’ organization by the presence of a trade union. However, a union is only one form of organizing workers. Trade unionism has its historical origin in societies whose work force was characterized by categories of crafts. The suitability of such forms of unionism for a working group of people predominantly unskilled and in the Rhodesian context has not been questioned.

This is the problem with African workers’ organizations in Rhodesia. African workers adopted the ‘trade’ union structure as the vehicle for the protection of their interests and for voicing their demands. The more general suitability of trade unions which serve the interests of skilled white workers. Can such an organization represent the genuine economic interests of the African workers without being used by management or ruling class as instruments for the oppression of workers. It does not follow that those workers who have a say in the body-politic will necessarily represent the interests of the other section of workers who are marginal to the body-politic, by reason of the fact that they all belong to the class without private property. Class determination is not enough to understand the problems of African workers in a setting of settler-colonialism and the suitability of the organization supposed to represent their interests.
One of the primary tasks of workers' organizations is to fight for the economic interests of workers. The workers' economic struggle can be waged against individual capital on a day to day basis at the point of production through a variety of methods. It is when they struggle as a class to achieve fundamentals such as a reduction in working hours, the setting of minimum wage levels, pension funds, unemployment benefits, safety at work regulations that their struggle is political as well as economic. It is in the context of African workers having no minimum wage regulations, no pension and unemployment benefits, no safety at work regulations when white workers have these things that the suitability of the inherited workers' organizations in Rhodesia has to be questioned.

The Shamva mine strike of 1928, one of the earliest if we are to trace the history of industrial actions, took place against a background of conditions of repression characterized by the Master and Servant Act contract. Amongst other things, workers at Shamva resented dangerous working conditions underground where they suffered uncompensated accidents. They protested against low wages, poor quality food rations, unhealthy and overcrowded compounds, and wages which were lower than the value of the means of their reproduction. From what some of the workers said, for example that:

the white man came to the mine a poor man. His duties were apparently to watch the native do the work and was able to purchase cattle . . . that the native had to perform all the dangerous work in which some of them had been killed, whereas the white man suffered no injury.

One may deduce how they viewed the relationship between economics and politics. The grievances they put forward formed part of the immediate economic demands against the individual mining capital. But the strike itself may be viewed as a more general response to the contradictions inherent within the settler-colonial social formation. The political dimension of the conflict was reinforced by the response of the ruling class through its state machinery. The employer reacted with the use of 'collective power' by sending a special Police Unit trained for the purposes of repressing workers' actions. He also responded by brushing aside promises to consider the workers' grievances after they had returned to work, threatening dismissals, punishing agitators and also by the familiar argument that workers were doing themselves more harm than good by keeping production at a standstill since they could not get wages.

Under the Master and Servant Act the workers had no right to organize and join organizations for the purposes of either negotiating with or using the power of their numbers — through withdrawal of their labour-power — to force individual capitals to improve their working conditions. Industrial relations under the provisions of the Master and Servants Act were in force for all African workers until 1959. They were reinforced and supplemented by the terms of the Compulsory Native Labour Act 1943.

During the 1940s and 1950s a series of strikes took place in various branches of the economy such as the railways, the municipalities, the mines, culminating in a general strike in 1949. The strikes show the extent to which the African working class had developed, and that they based their actions upon principles that were a threat to the whole settler-colonial policy. The response of the Rhodesian government on behalf of united capital
demonstrates the importance of conflict as the dynamics of change in labour relations and society in general. It also demonstrates the vulnerability of the ill-organized, divided and unpoliticised workers in the settler-colonial social formation. In 1959 the government responded to the workers’ action by providing a mechanism for incorporating some African workers into the dispute machinery, so far dominated by white skilled workers. The aim was to divide African workers, to redirect their actions and thoughts towards the use of institutions designed to effectively control them.

This was achieved through the manipulation of the ideological and legal sphere of industrial relations through amending the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934. That Act itself represented the limited but important victory of white workers’ struggle at a political level in the 1920s. As part of the recognition of their electoral power of white workers, capital gave this section of the working people the right under the constitution of responsible government (1923) to organize themselves into trade unions for purposes of negotiating with employers’ organizations.

Although the capitalist class pretended to represent the general interests of all Europeans by giving white workers the official right to own property through the Responsible Government Constitution, and the position of white workers did improve in terms of obtaining higher wages than Africans, still their objective position did not change. The Industrial Conciliation Act also created a certain wage structure by setting a statutory minimum to be paid to workers in defined categories — thus setting a floor below which white wages could not fall. By providing them with machinery for obtaining trade union recognition by employers the Act gave this section of workers a power base in industrial relations within the settler-colonial capitalism. It also provided them with dispute settlement procedures and the right to participate in collective bargaining. The provisions of the Act did not cover African workers because the legal definition of ‘employee’ explicitly excluded them. In 1959 the government made limited amendments to the provisions of the Act to incorporate Africans who worked in sectors of the economy other than agriculture, mining and households — thus excluding about 85% of the workforce. Workers in these other sectors were in principle given the right to form and join approved, ‘responsible’, registered trade unions under the Industrial Conciliation Act. Their representatives had to come to agreement with representatives of employer associations for the particular industries to form an Industrial Council to negotiate matters affecting all workers in the industry. Those who were not represented by trade unions could have their ‘rights’ decided by government-appointed Industrial Boards.

A number of reasons for the exclusion of farm, mine and household workers have been adduced by the employers: that there were inherent difficulties in prescribing comprehensive conditions of service for farm workers; that there would need to be a large inspectorate to enforce regulated conditions; that there is a large seasonal fluctuation in the labour force on farms; and that an industrial council will be expensive to operate. The excuses are obviously weak and justify the maintenance of poor working and living conditions and low wages.
To speak about ‘rights’ in a job is to presuppose the availability of a set of laws which define and protect them. It is by virtue of being human that man has a fundamental right not only to work but to do so within conditions of satisfaction. In a social formation where one class of people have the absolute right to decide who has access to the use of the means of labour and when such use can be terminated, the right to work for as long as one is able becomes a matter of class struggle. The significance of workers’ organizations should be understood in reference to the rights workers may have in their jobs — the right to strike, the right to be compensated when made redundant, and the right not to be excluded from the permanent use of the means of labour by arbitrary decision of any other person. In a capitalist system the limited rights workers have in relation to their jobs cannot be won through legal means. What law can do is either recognize or formalize the results of a struggle by workers themselves to establish their rights against individual or collective capital. The degree to which workers’ organizations manage to wrestle with important sections of management prerogatives is important.

The Rhodesian law was not passed so as to recognize a strong organization and the power of workers’ unions as independent representatives of the interests of their members. Nor was it passed as a response to an already built up strength of the workers, nor to regulate their negotiations with employers or to give validity to the agreements on procedural machinery for settling trade disputes with the option to take industrial action in the eventuality of exhaustion of the agreed procedures without a solution acceptable to both parties. While the Industrial Conciliation Act’s amendment was a response to the effects of strikes in the 1940s and 1950s, particularly the General Strike of 1949 which had united workers from all the sections of industry, it co-opted a section of African workers into an already existing structure of union recognition and dispute settlement dominated by independent, strong, legally-recognized, white ‘trade’ unions. In fact the effect of the amendment was to remove or thwart the potential power base amongst African workers which had been developing in the 1940s, and to divide the workforce.

Law was used to define and circumscribe the powers of African ‘trade’ unions to the extent that many of them exist only on paper or do not represent the interests of workers. By continued participation in the use of settler-colonial capitalist forms of collective bargaining as institutions of dispute settlement, the leaders put the workers under some kind of moral obligation to observe the agreements and therefore satisfy the expectations of employers. The reaction of African workers to the terms of the agreements is difficult to assess because of the repressive penal provisions built into the system of industrial relations. In fact some of the workers’ organizations such as the Rhodesian African Railway Workers Union, developed out of previously existing ‘associations’ and in this case did so under an explicit management demand that it should be less militant, ‘responsible’, and its recognition came as a tactical response of the management to the powers of the sister union in Northern Rhodesia. By recognizing the moderate Southern Rhodesian wing of the two organizations management thought it could destroy the power of the other.
The paper unionism was achieved through the establishment of dispute settlement machinery and institutions which appeared fair on paper when in practice had not been. According to the Industrial Conciliation Act a trade union can be registered as the representative of workers in negotiations with employer representatives for the particular industry through an Industrial Council set up at the request of both parties. They can then reach agreements on matters such as wage rates and working conditions for all members in the industry regardless of union membership status. The proposed arrangements have to be based on the consensus of all parties to the Industrial Council though; failure to reach consensus means the retention of the status quo and as long as there is disagreement the old arrangements or agreements apply and workers' action is illegal. This meant that institutionalized, strong, legally-backed skilled (usually white) workers can always frustrate any proposals by African workers' representatives who attempt to put forward demands for increased wages to the extent where they threaten the position of white skilled workers. Any substantial wage demand unsupported by employers, any arrangement for job fragmentation which challenges the fundamental principles of the job colour-bar and its accompanying privileges will be opposed by white workers.

Cheater has shown how conditions of Africans in industries where they are represented by black-dominated unions differ from the conditions of those in industries whose agreements are negotiated by white-dominated unions. With reference to the position of African low income workers in two companies in a case study of the structure of labour recruitment, promotion and representation within firms, he concluded that:

these low-income employees (in one firm) were generally in a weak bargaining position relative to management, not only for the same reasons (as in the other) of lack of control over skills and a labour surplus in the external market, but also because they had no direct representation of their interest in the bargaining process. Because their interests were represented by white-controlled unions catering mainly for the interests of skilled workers, these low-income black workers could be used as bargaining counters in the process of negotiating the claims of white, skilled employees.

The co-option of the low-income workers into the already existing machinery of trade dispute settlement dominated by strong, politically backed unions of skilled workers meant that the negotiations benefited the unskilled workers very little but were used as pretext for increasing the gap of wealth distribution between the low-income categories and the labour aristocrats.

The other means of paralyzing the effectiveness of African workers' organizations was to take away the right to strike where their labour is involved with 'essentials', or where negotiations are in progress and all procedural channels have not been exhausted. This latter provision includes reference of the dispute for arbitration by a third party who is usually someone with legal or judicial experience. The decision of the arbitrator is binding on both parties to the dispute. Or the status quo may be maintained by a declaration of the president of an industrial court to the effect that the threat of industrial action is against the public good. Once the declaration has been made the dispute settlement is taken out of the industrial relation context and placed in the political sphere thus exhibiting the class content of the conflict and especially the partiality of the state.
The system has in-built ways of thwarting any genuine development of workers' organizations. The leaders of workers' organizations cannot call official strikes without risk of prosecution and thereby losing office as union leaders. Office holding thereby becomes the objective and similarly the mere formal existence of the institution an end in itself. The wide industrial applicability of the agreements weakens unions in that workers get benefits even if they are not members. To this extent union membership is not seen to confer any exclusive rights of the job such as high wages, better working conditions, job security and unemployment benefits. On the other hand the fact that the strength of the union depends on sacrifices from the members in terms of payment of dues, for the low-income workers such as obligation may be hard to justify. Those who are not covered by a union have their matters decided upon by an Industrial Board whose members are selected by the Minister of Labour. The further provision that the Minister may veto an agreement reached by the interested parties if he thinks it violates national labour policies, limits the freedom of the workers' representatives to negotiate terms favourable to their members.

Conclusions

The overall picture is of the use of state controlled capital-labour relations: a number of trade unions existing on paper, a leadership used as instruments of controlling workers at shop floor for the purposes of achieving high productivity not as organizing centres for the development of workers' economic and political power. Frequently the existing trade unions have depended upon the use of formal legal machinery such as the arbitration systems to settle wage disputes in their favour and not upon the resort to the weapon of withdrawal of labour as the best instrument for guaranteeing their power and the permanence of the benefits acquired for their membership, as would occur if workers' organizations were independent organizing centres dependent upon the majority support of their members.

African trade unions in Rhodesia seem to have developed upon a promise to the state that they would confine their activities to the attainment of the economic benefits for their members. They defined their tasks in terms of attaining and defending immediate benefits in their day to day economic struggle against individual capital, not to view their task in a more broader social economic and political context.

There was a failure to realize the dialectical position of the labour-aristocracy in Rhodesia vis-a-vis the unskilled African workers on the one hand, and on the other the use by this privileged section of the working class of the political power it had to influence the economic sphere for their own benefit. At the same time leaders of the African workers' organizations divorced the economic from the political aspects of the workers' struggle against capital. The struggle to improve immediate economic conditions of workers should have been seen not as an end in itself or the sole task of the 'trade' unions but as one aspect of a wider class struggle waged simultaneously at all levels. These organizations should not have defended their selfish interests but should also have waged a war against individual and collective capital for the improvement of the positions of the lowest-paid agricultural, mining and domestic workers. They should have waged a
political-economic struggle for the abolition of the dehumanizing Master and Servant Act controlling the workers in these sectors. They should have increasingly fought for the establishment of independent workers’ organizations based upon the majority support of their membership as guarantee for their survival. The strikes in the 1940s and in subsequent years was not seen as one of the means of a wider class struggle, to increase wages but also to take political power for the workers.

In Rhodesia the linkage of political struggle with the workers’ movement was more of an opportunist venture as far as the leadership was concerned. Some of the trade union leaders denounced the political implications of their economic struggle. The state even threatened them with imprisonment should they engage in political activities as unionists. This meant that they existed at the pleasure of the ruling class because they advocated economic reformism. The political leadership that emerged in the 1950s paraded under the banner of African ‘nationalism’ and ‘constitutionalism’ when in fact they constituted an aspiring small African bourgeoisie set on replacing some of the interests of the settler-colonialist ruling class with a nationalist class. This class was not representing the interests of the rank and file proletariat but could have been used in the transitional period, as it was under the ‘internal settlement’ in 1979, to maintain a fictitious political independence without much change in the capitalist relations of production.

It is obvious that while trade unionism or any form of workers’ organization are important as organizing centres, or what Karl Marx calls the ‘schools of socialism’, it is essential that their activities should go beyond the limited immediate economic struggle to support all the political movements that have as their objectives the interests of the oppressed classes. In other words what is required is a political party to work in liaison with workers’ organizations but independent from them. It is the duty of such a political party to prepare itself for the acquisition of the power resulting from the workers’ complete emancipation of themselves and other sectors of society. The nature of the actual relationship between the revolutionary political parties in Rhodesia today, ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) and ZANU (Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union) with organizations which represent the genuine interests of the workers in Rhodesia needs further examination. It is important to establish such links as the consciousness of workers does not just result from their dialectical position in relation to the class that owns the means of production but needs to be persistently aroused and directed towards the struggle of complete emancipation.

Bibliographic Note

The other classical contribution is Charles van Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1933, (Pluto Press, London, 1976); his more general arguments against the inventors of ‘Sambo’ are contained in ‘Black Workers in Central African Industry:


![Land Apportionment in Zimbabwe 1970](image-url)
The People’s Mood:  
The Voice of a Guerilla Poet

Mbulelo Mzamane

The article on Chimedza’s work by is a new departure for us — into the field of poetry. Its significance is as a powerful expression of the hopes and aspirations of the young guerillas who fought and won the war against the settlers. Through the poetry of one of them, Chimedza, ably interpreted by the author, we see the brutality of colonialism and the resistance it engendered through the eyes of one militant youth. The poems are divided into three categories: the economy, the oppressive conditions and the war effort. Above all though, the poems articulate the expectations of the people, which the future government of Zimbabwe will rapidly have to meet. This is the key message which Mzamane draws from his study. The article finishes by speculating on the future literary trends in Zimbabwe and examines the role of writers as critics of African governments.

Objectives
What I really intend to discuss in this paper are the aspirations and the expectations of the ordinary people of Zimbabwe who have survived the war of liberation. I also point out some likely results should the new government fail to meet these expectations; to warn even, where they seem dangerously close to failure in delivering the goods. I do not for a moment underestimate the enormity of the task ahead in Zimbabwe, nor do I wish to give the impression that I imagine there are simplistic remedies to its problems. However, I believe that there are certain basic facts, known facts, from which the right start should be made. For this purpose I have chosen to make the nationalist poetry of Polycarp Chimedza my starting point. It is the language I understand best, not being trained in the social sciences. Moreover, Chimedza’s poetry summarizes some of these facts for us in a language which I believe the people of Zimbabwe, a people with a long history of struggle, will most readily comprehend.

Let me point out my other limitations. Far be it for me to pose as any kind of specialist on the literature of Zimbabwe. My basic tools are Chimedza’s poetry and what I personally know of conditions in that country. But I believe that Zimbabwean literature, like everything else in Zimbabwe, is about to enter a boom period. My notes are designed, at least in part, to assess the trends which contemporary literature in Zimbabwe are likely to
follow — and there are already some indications. Second, I believe that politicians everywhere can and should use literature as a kind of political barometer to gauge popular feeling and the impact of their policies upon the nation. It can be shown that any regime which becomes unpopular with its creative writers usually earns such unpopularity. This may happen when a government pursues disastrous policies which are likely to cause untold suffering to the majority of its people and thus do irreparable damage to itself as a government. I need only point out that the spate of coups that continues to sweep across Africa because of the elitist policies of most governments was predicted as long ago as 1956 by the black South African novelist, Peter Abrahams, in his novel *A Wreath for Udomo*. I may not be a great admirer of that doyen of white liberals in South Africa, Alan Paton, but in South Africa itself many whites will live to regret the day they failed to heed Msimangu’s warning, the black priest in *Cry, the Beloved Country*, when he says:

I have one great fear in my heart, that one day when they are turned to loving, they will find we are turned to hating.

Similarly some people in Kenya will be very sorry they ignored Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s warning against corruption in high places and other evils of the capitalist state, the day a raving lunatic, like Munira in *Petals of Blood*, frustrated by blatant exploitation from self-seeking leaders, sets fire to their psychedelic brothels. All of which is to say, politicians should learn to listen to the voices of their countries’ committed writers.

**Polycarp Chimedza and his Significance**

I met Polycarp Chimedza by chance in 1977. He looked to be a lad of 18 or so. But his poems, a few of which are dated, go back to August 1975. It is fair to surmise that the rest belong to the same period. Like many of his compatriots at the time, he had just skipped Zimbabwe to take up a scholarship abroad — I never got to know where. At the time, he was waiting for his British passport to be issued through the British High Commission in Botswana. One day he came up to me, introduced himself and left me with twenty pages of poetry, written in his own hand-writing. After I had read them he was going to come back so that we could discuss them. But he never did. I believe when his passport eventually came through he was whisked out of Botswana before we could meet. He never wrote for his script, probably thinking his poems of no great significance or distinction. I have since had cause to think otherwise. I was thus left clinging to his script, as I still am. This is the first time I have had its contents released and when he hears of what I have done, without his permission, I hope he will understand.

Chimedza’s work is highly significant in so far as it gives the reader a graphic picture of conditions under U.D.I., as seen through the eyes of a student, one of a group who have been of great importance to the success of the guerilla struggle in that country. Chimedza is unusually articulate for his age and certainly a very accomplished poet. But despite his exceptional talents he undoubtedly speaks with the voice of the youth upon whom Zimbabwe’s future must depend. His poems articulate the aspirations and expectations of the people of Zimbabwe, which any future government in the country will neglect at its own peril. This paper will try and show how reconstruction in Zimbabwe requires the government, as a matter of ex-
treme urgency, to address itself to some of the problems raised by Chimedza in his poems. For convenience of treatment I shall divide his poetry into three largely overlapping categories of poems dealing with:

The Economy
The Oppressive Conditions
The War Effort

I shall only refer to his shorter poems, which are generally more successful than his single experiment with the epic form 'Mental Tones', in seven, uneven movements, about the people’s broken lives in strife-torn Zimbabwe, part of which is reproduced at the end of this article.

The Economy
Chimedza’s collection of shorter poems opens with one entitled ‘I sat by a stream one day’, which sets the general tone for the rest. This poem is a subtle reminder about whose interests in Zimbabwe shall prevail in the end. The last two of this three-stanza poem read:

I sat by the stream one day and wondered
why it flowed that way and not the other way;
why it marched continually and never halted.

I sat by a stream one day and wondered
if hope and desire were like a stream —
continually marching to fulfillment’s lake
smoothing pebbles, scooping silt
with brown frothing foam against embedded rock.

The flowing stream in the poem represents the people’s unyielding will to indomitably and inexorable forge ahead, smoothing rocks and gliding over all manner of obstacles on their path to self-determination. It doesn’t matter whether these obstructive forces are represented by the Smith government or Muzorewa’s or, indeed, Comrade Mugabe’s himself. Like the irreversible flow of the stream in the poem the people’s hopes and desires shall prevail. Chimedza reminds the reader that what people have fought for, what they are interested in, is a government that will deliver the goods. As in the poem under discussion, at his best Chimedza manages to convey profound thoughts and complex emotions through simple, unaffected language. His imagery is highly evocative and suggestive.

If it is accepted that the people want their grievances settled with a minimum of delay, the next question that arises is: what areas of their lives have been affected most? Chimedza’s next poem in the collection provides the answer. Here Chimedza moves into the sphere of industrial relations, perhaps the single most urgent problem facing the current leadership in Zimbabwe. This short poem which is entitled ‘The Factory Hands’ is reproduced in full:

Hopes are pedalled along the rioting tarmac
Sustaining sparks of a horizontal existence
The factory hands grapple with the wild throbbing pistons
For a few hard-sweated cents
the bespectacled spectre sits in air conditioned languor
And proclaims, 'Production must be increased'.
The grief-wrung minds are shuttled
Between the agony of the factory
And the misery at home.

The opening of this poem again alludes to the people's 'hopes'. Chimedza's pre-occupation with the subject suggests that he considers it to be of paramount importance. The people's expectations must be met. The master's insensitivity is brought out in the poem by referring to him largely in inanimate terms which enable the reader to equate him to his machines, a device which John Steinbeck uses very effectively in *The Grapes of Wrath*. It is important for the new government to avoid displaying the same indifference to the fate of others. Words like 'sparks' and 'rioting' ominously intimate at the inflammable economic situation which we recently saw break into workers' strikes in Zimbabwe. A further collocation of terms like 'Grapple . . . sweat . . . grief . . . agony . . . misery' suggests back-breaking drudgery. Labour exploitation and underpayment are the immediate subject of the poem.

Other questions with which we must be concerned arise out of the poem. Are these economic problems which the poet discusses being realistically tackled, from the people's point of view, by Comrade Mugabe's government? I'm afraid that some of the measures that have been adopted so far would seem to make a mockery of the people. The question may be highly debatable, but there can be no harm in sounding a note of caution. The Minister of Labour has already (*Guardian*, 29 May 1980) laid down certain minimum salary scales: £20 for the rural worker, as against £47 for urban workers (excluding domestic servants). If the urban labourer, who is known to have been the most vociferous in the recent round of labour unrests, is not being pacified at the expense of his rural counterpart, what can be the justification for such wide salary differentials? One may further ask whether it is in fact absolutely necessary to assure the white farmer in Zimbabwe — the 'bespectacled spectre' of the poem in his 'air-conditioned languor' (a very graphic way of proclaiming that they do no work, whether it be in farm or factory)? Is it necessary or desirable that the government should ensure that the white overlord remains on the land at all costs, even at the expense of the indigenous labour? It would be interesting to know how else the new government would have handled the disputes if the farm-workers had gone on strike first. Just how inadequate these minimum wage figures are, especially for the rural workers, can be seen from the fact that as long ago as 1975 even a country as poor as Lesotho had already pegged the minimum wage level for all workers in the country at R40 (about £22); while in 1979 in South Africa the minimum living level, as established by the University of South Africa, was given as R102.47 (£57.25). Any ordinary African who has lived in these various regions in southern Africa will rapidly recognize the economic hardships upon the rural Africans which are bound to be perpetrated by the new minimum wage figures announced by Zimbabwe's new Minister of Labour. Nor do I buy the argument, which I consider largely mythical, that the peasant can, in fact, grow his own food and thereby offset his cash expenditure. Where does he get the time and energy to do this effectively when he is fully employed in the services of the white farmer? Or does Zimbabwe wish to perpetuate the system of squatters? Why ask the rural worker to pay a double penalty for living in the
countryside, by working for the master, like the urban labourer, and then working further to feed himself? Nowhere does the Minister of Labour say that the white farmer is obliged to feed his employees. On the contrary, the rural dweller's need for cash can be greater where he has to pay more for commodities which have been transported over long distances from the towns and cities. It is for this reason that some countries pay an inducement allowance to keep workers in the remote districts where cash commodities are hard to come by and generally more expensive. Lesotho has the so-called 'Mokhotlong allowance' for workers in the nearly inaccessible regions of the Maluti mountains. All this points to an added danger. The government may very well be running the risk of depopulating the countryside by making urban salaries much more attractive than wages in the rural areas. All in all, these new salary figures would seem to come dangerously close to pandering to the white farmers, in which case some people would argue that this is taking reconciliation too far.

In Zimbabwe a very thin line divides the efforts of Comrade Mugabe's government to ensure a smooth transition, discourage wide-scale emigration of white expertise and encourage foreign investment, on the one hand; and on the other, the probable perpetuation of such economic relations as existed under the white, exploitative minority regime, with an increasing number of the emerging black petit bourgeoisie stepping into the shoes of their erstwhile masters. What the reader learns, therefore, from a poem like 'The Factory Hands' is that people have fought for healthier labour relations, a quick end to economic exploitation and for equitable redistribution of wealth. A government that frustrates the people's march to 'fulfilment's lake' in the economic sphere will have failed to meet the people's expectations and betrayed their trust.

Another of Chimedza's poems on the economic theme is 'Raid on the Market'. This is a protest poem against police brutality and harassment directed against the unlicensed petty market trader:

The sirens slice the afternoon air,
And jackboots strike the dull tarmac.
Conversations are stilled in birth
Transactions cease and laughter stalls . . .

The symbolism of 'sirens and jackboots' is reminiscent of another Rhodesian-born poet Dennis Brutus, who, however, grew up in South Africa. Chimedza ends his poem by showing how the police, oblivious of the anguish and the suffering they are causing, make footballs out of the market women's oranges and tomatoes, which they trade for handcuffs:

Citrons football, football along the ochre dust,
Yellow fingers strike the air and splatter,
Tomatoes gape — surprised by the sudden fall,
And silver bracelets liberally are handed out.

Chimedza, with a single, swift stroke of the pen, manages in the last line to dig deeply into the history of black and white confrontation, through suggestion and innuendo, when whites are said to have won the land from blacks in exchange for such useless trinkets as bracelets. Chimedza's light-hearted treatment underscores another very important point about the way
the police trifle with people's lives. In this state of affairs a new economic order becomes necessary to accommodate the petty trader, struggling to make ends meet against state and multinational monopolies, and generally redress all the other wrongs down history's corridors which the blacks have suffered.

Oppressive Conditions
Chimedza's protest extends to the general oppressive situation found in Zimbabwe. The poems in this category form the bulk of his writing. ‘The Miserere’ is a protest against institutionalized violence, also in the tradition of Dennis Brutus:

The miserere
is teeth ground under the impact of gunbutts
and human flesh dangling putrid from canine jaws . . .

‘Gunbutts . . . bullets . . . bayonets’ indicate the strong-arm tactics of the authorities. The abhorrent nature of the system is conveyed through the revolting imagery of putrefaction — the symbol of putrefaction recurs in Chimedza's poetry because, to put it mildly, for him and those like him the whole situation in Rhodesia stinks. The distasteful image of 'human flesh' dangling 'putrid from canine jaws' also brings out the anguish of the people's downtrodden humanity. Protest gains its effect through shock. Finally the poet laments the senseless violence against a largely innocent and uncomprehending people — 'homes leaping flames of distressed incomprehension', from whichever camp. He regrets the genocidal war in Zimbabwe. The poet effectively evokes the senseless carnage of war in the tradition of Wilfred Owen's poetry or, more recently in Africa, in the war poetry of the Nigerian civil war. This dimension of Chimedza's poetry will be treated more fully in the next section.

‘The Force of the Midnight Knock’ is a narrative poem about the unnerving night raids carried out by the police with blinding searchlights:

The force of the midnight knock
kicked me out of my drunken sleep
and switched on the mechanism of my glands

I rubbed cobwebs from my eyes
stiffened my sinews in apprehension
and told myself
"Thieves never knock . . ."

The allusion to thieves is a shocking reminder that the police are worse than common criminals because they steal from a man what is infinitely more precious than his material possessions: his freedom, peace and dignity. The same concept of human degradation by the police, with all the symbols of power found in Chimedza's poetry, crops up repeatedly in Dennis Brutus' poetry, as in 'Somehow We Survive', which reads in part:

Investigating searchlights rake
our naked unprotected contours;
over our heads the monolithic decalogue
of fascist prohibition glowers
and teether's for a catastrophic fall;
boots club on the peeling door.
But somehow we survive
severance, deprivation, loss.

Always the objective is to terrorize and humiliate. Ironically in Chimedza’s poem it is the police, who have assumed the form of ‘ghosts in kappies’ to the poet, and who bark out loud, ‘You are the terrorist!’ Thus after a thorough beating up the hounded victim emerges with multiple injuries, completely broken of body and spirit:
broken lip
broken nose
swollen unseeing eyes
fractured skull
fractured ribs
multiple bruises
broken skin
internal bleeding
congested kidney
broken teeth — and broken hope.

The victim is shunted off to a prison hospital and guarded by ‘two khaki clad statues’ (another image of insensitivity), as if such a human wreck could ever rouse himself to escape. Yet unlike Brutus whose victimized African suffers passively in ‘Somehow We Survive’, Chimedza’s Africans remain a threat to the very end, as evidenced by the armed guard.

Chimedza fully realizes that it is at such moments, when the dice are heavily loaded against them, that the urge to do something desperate, to throw off their fetters, seizes the people. What else have they to lose besides their shackles? This notion comes out in a rather ingeniously contrived poem entitled ‘Sonsweepastheirmothersgrieve’ in which the poet depicts the oppressed as ‘screaming’ for an ‘opportunitytobettertheirlot’ and ‘todiefreeing-themselves’ from ‘theexcessofninedecadesofgroupdespotism’ and ‘social-darwinistchains’. Chimedza’s technique expresses the oppressive situation, the desperation, the pent-up rage, the whole inflammable situation. The spirit of defiance increases in direct proportion to the degree of regimentation and oppression imposed on blacks by white rule.

Even more appropriately, the poet uses the same technique of suggestion by compressing words together in another poem entitled ‘Imprisonment’ to evoke the prison atmosphere. This poem describes a prisoner’s existence in a small, cold, clammy, lonely, stinking and claustrophobic cell. The prison cell is transformed in the poet’s imagination to a microcosm of Rhodesian society, as in the prison poems of Dennis Brutus or in the prose of Alex La Guma. This method, of course, recalls to mind Solzhenitsyn’s evocative technique in Cancer Ward. ‘A Sign of the Times’ carries over the prison analogy. The irony of the Rhodesian situation is again brought out by showing how those who strive for justice are themselves unjustly treated and imprisoned. In the poem the firing squad turns into the ‘fearing’ squad, a witticism which suggests the reversal of roles. Human rights are trifled with by a regime that believes that might is right. ‘A sign of the times’, Chimedza writes, ‘is when human rights are rifles poised’. Morality is thus
obscured because what is wrong becomes right in the eyes of the authorities and the righteous are condemned on trumped-up charges.

From moral issues Chimedza then turns to bread-and-butter issues. The problems of youth are uppermost in his mind. In fact, not surprisingly as he is one of them, Chimedza is at his most eloquent when he is dealing with the problems of youth. In ‘A Sign of the Times’ starvation is manifested in the children’s ‘fight to first the best stocked bins’. His deep concern for the plight of these children is further shown in the same poem by his lamentation for the lack of proper living, recreational and educational facilities — problems which have directly affected him to the extent that he has had to flee his country. The homeless, who ‘pillow’ putrefied cats and dogs in ‘sodden drainpipes or under bridges’ (abomalala-pipe, in Ndebele) or those who have to fight rats and snakes ‘for territory’ — all these spark off the poet’s empathy and compassion. The image of rats and snakes can also be applied metaphorically to the whole establishment against which the real fight for territory is being waged by Chimedza’s people. Like William Blake, Chimedza blames the whole establishment for ‘the legalization of hunger and the proliferation of tramps’, for all the ‘twig-legged gutter-urchins’. Here is a summary statement of the causes of the war for the youth of Zimbabwe.

Chimedza’s awareness and his ability to translate this consciousness into vivid poetry, in clear and succinct terms, make the allegation that large numbers of school children used to be forcefully apprehended and compelled to join the ranks of the guerillas somewhat ludicrous. During these years one of my students, a crippled Zimbabwean girl who could easily have obtained a first class pass if she had stayed on at the University, simply went missing from class and the next I heard of her she was teaching other children at a camp in Mozambique. I know there was never any pressure on Irene Mahamba, only a fierce commitment I knew only too well. Such a claim by the Rhodesian forces is similar to the equally unpalatable charge by the South African government after the outbreak of the student demonstrations in June 1976, that the children of Soweto rebelled against the government because of instigation from externally based liberation movements, about which up to that time many of the students involved had never even heard. As though any Soweto child of sixteen would be ignorant of the humiliation and indignity of posing naked, bottoms-up, before a multitude of others, for the dubious privilege of carrying a pass (called isithupa in Rhodesia) and other such atrocities, too numerous to mention here, which have been perpetrated with impunity by the white minority regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia. The parallels with the South African situation are too glaring and irresistible to ignore.

Chimedza addresses himself to the problems of youth, as they arise out of his own experiences. He doesn’t need an agitator to teach him how black children lived in Rhodesia. He raises issues affecting youth which the new government of Zimbabwe must face as a matter of extreme urgency. These problems embrace all the operations involved in the demobilization of young guerillas, not just the bandits who still roam the villages with weapons, instilling fear into people’s hearts but also those who agreed to lay down their arms and report to the assembly points. The latter group, in par-
ticular, one would imagine, is very much aware of its rightful deserts in the country. These young men and women are most certainly still fired with the revolutionary zeal which was so effectively instilled in them through the political education they received in the camps, to a dangerously restless pitch.

In ‘The Greatest Day in a Man’s Life’ Chimedza again delves back into his experiences as a student. With wry humour he describes the visitation, probably imaginary, of Ian Smith to this school. Africans who have lived through a white school inspector’s visit will be able to recreate the scene for themselves. Extravagant and elaborate plans are made to receive the great man (this form of address is used throughout the poem with mocking irony). A great deal of fastidiousness is shown over everyone’s appearance at the school. ‘Armed bodyguards, and soldiery in trucks, armed constabulary on motorbikes’ turn out to escort the great man. Archaisms like ‘soldiery’ and ‘constabulary’ are effectively, if unwittingly, used to describe what must be an anachronistic experience to the rest of Africa. All this pomp and ceremony for a mere visit to a school, probably a primary school at that! Obviously a show of strength, which unfortunately fails to elicit the desired response of docility. But all around the great man, like obsequious sambos, the teachers and their pupils sing ‘Rock of ages’, with great gusto, in his honour. The great man is thereby elevated by the hymn to the status of a god. He, in turn obliges the school with a song, an abusive one in Afrikaans, which goes: ‘Bobotjaan klim die berg’ (Monkey climb the mountain). The satirical poem is a dramatization, in light-hearted vein, of the utter contempt in which Ian Smith and many Rhodesian whites held the black man.

In the poems discussed Chimedza shows how Rhodesian blacks became the victims of the worst acts of brigandage their oppressors could conceive, against which no amount of reasoning or appeal to human decency could prevail. Only outright war could bring an end to this unfortunate state of affairs.

The War Effort
Poems like ‘The Miserere’ and ‘A Sign of the Times’, which have already been discussed, refer to the state of war in Rhodesia. A few other poems also deal with the war of liberation in Zimbabwe, its progress and its setbacks as well as its other side-effects.

In ‘The March of Wicked Season’s Step’ Chimedza sees blacks as people who have been emasculated and incarcerated alive for nine decades. The people need to regain their freedom and manhood very desperately. The poem endorses the armed struggle as the most realistic way way of bringing to an end the excesses of white rule which has become sadistic to the extreme and impervious to all reason. The oppressive regime is described as:

the heedless hounds of boundless power
cold instruments of cold thoughts
spelt from mouths perched on tapering white knuckles
piling death upon death and lie upon lie
mutilating conscience with nine decades of deception . . .

The description brings out clearly the white regime’s complete lack of com-
passion. In these inhuman and degrading conditions the 'incarcerated manhood' of the black population 'squirms' to be let free. The people can only realize their objectives by resorting to armed struggle.

'Swirling in the Pot of Unmixable Broth' shows Chimedza's contempt for the politician's uncanny ability to mix oil and water, for all political marriages of convenience (such as Mozorewa's and Smith's, perhaps). He depicts such political alignments as opportunistic and survivalist only: we must needs be married to names to survive.

The ineffectiveness of these alliances against the people is likened to attempts by witches to produce an elixir for long life. The description of the process is reminiscent of the witches in Macbeth:

Swirling in the pot of unmixable broth
— hardstone, oil, water, various roots, leaves — all churned, boiled, ingredients of the magic prescription . . . the elixir of politicality
boil, bake, mix, churn and churn . . .

The lesson of Macbeth is that witchcraft against a whole nation can never succeed. The rest of the poem, which is not very clear, is probably meant to advocate steadfastness to principle in place of vacillation and opportunism displayed by some politicians and organizations during the years of struggle in Zimbabwe. In present-day terms, perhaps, it can be read as a warning against any regime which sacrifices its ideals on the altar of political expediency.

With the intensification of the guerilla struggle treason seems to have escalated. In 'Treason' Chimedza observes that:

Treason's season's pinnacle is reached
Its fruits break the cellulose grip
and fall —
break open on the ground,
spilling pips from a rotten core.

The poem is a warning against treason's rotten fruits, whose poisoned harvest fed traitors like Morrison Nyati, the African leader of the Rhodesian troops who destroyed a nationalist camp in Mozambique in 1976.

The war in Zimbabwe continues, albeit on a different plain, so that one need not overstress the need for the new government to heed the voices of its committed poets like Polycarp Chimedza. It would be foolish to imagine that Zimbabwe's enemies have suddenly vanished or been utterly transmuted. We in Africa have lived with animals of all descriptions and one thing we know for sure is that a leopard does not change its spots — on the contrary, as the Ndebele would say, ingwe idla ngamabala (a tiger prides itself on its spots).

Literary Trends
I am now in a position to speculate briefly about future literary trends in Zimbabwe. Like elsewhere in Africa, there exists in Zimbabwe today an old tradition of largely unrecorded oral literature, as old as the Mhondoro cult. Many legends, for instance, exist about Chaminuka, the Shona seer, who
prophesied before Lobengula, the Ndebele conqueror-king, about the arrival of men without knees, — *vasina mabvi*, they were called in Shona — men who were reputedly more powerful than the Ndebele or any black nation. Chaminuka's wisdom and fearlessness in the face of death are still celebrated by both the Shona and the Ndebele. Lawrence Vambe writes that Chaminuka has also provided 'an inexhaustible emotional theme for their political poetry, platform stunts and poster slogans'. But this rich oral tradition had largely gone unrecorded, — though some attempts have been made in the indigenous languages, notably by people like M. Shamuyarira whose collection of Shona traditional poetry appeared in 1959. One can rightly anticipate a spate of activity in this area by Zimbabwe's historians (following in the steps of Lawrence Vambe and younger academics like Ngwabi Bhebe and Aleck Mashingaidze) and the country's creative writers.

A considerable body of written literature, largely missionary inspired, also exists in Shona and Ndebele. So far this literature has been designed for school readership and to that extent was seen as being under the auspices of the Rhodesian government which controlled African education, as they did everything else. But with independence the growth of literature in the indigenous languages is also a distinct possibility, even if only to replace out-dated school textbooks which tended to pander to white supremacy. The position in Zimbabwe is now different from the situation in South Africa, where literature in the indigenous languages continues to be mixed up with the government's Bantustan policy.

For reasons we need not go into here, the literature of English expression in Zimbabwe is likely to outstrip the development of writing in the indigenous languages. To date, Stanlake Samkange, who is also a historian of renown, has been the leading literary figure in Zimbabwe since the appearance of *On Trial For My Country*, which is based on an imaginary confrontation between King Lobengula and Cecil Rhodes. Samkange's latest novel, *Year of the Uprising* is also set in the turbulent Rhodesian atmosphere of 1896/7, when the people of Zimbabwe tried to make a last ditch stand against the imperial forces and failed. Lawrence Vambe, one of Zimbabwe's earliest black journalists, ranks with Samkange as Zimbabwe's pioneer novelists in English. Vambe's *An Ill-Fated People* is a curious mixture of family chronicle, national history, contemporary politics and African customs. Samkange's *Origins of Rhodesia* and Vambe's *Ill-Fated People* represent the first serious efforts by Africans to piece together their history from oral sources in order to strip it of all the usual distortions and insulting insinuations. The deployment of history for literary purposes in the works of such writers had another revolutionary purpose. Their historical writings were also designed to forge an accessible myth in order to sustain their people in their heroic struggle for emancipation. Thus the theme of resistance to white settlement is prominent in the novels of these writers.

A new generation of writers, among whom the most celebrated is probably D. Marechera, author of the prize-winning *House of Hunger*, is less preoccupied with early historical themes. They have been more involved with the contemporary state of affairs, namely the war situation in Zimbabwe. An unpublished short story, 'To Be Free', by Evuray Daka Zhakata, who has been resident in Lesotho, deals with the feeling of duplicity which
assails a black member of the Rhodesian armed forces until he decides to join the ranks of the guerillas. Several other scripts of prose and verse, written by Zimbabwe's young and aspiring writers, which passed through my hands while I was responsible for the Writers' Workshop at the University College of Botswana and its publication *Marang*, also deal with the war situation.

If literary trends in the rest of Africa are anything to go by, there are at least two themes in Zimbabwean literature which are likely to persist for some time. First, the historical, dealing with black society until its conquest by whites in the 1890s and a recreation of the strenuous years under Rhodesia's oppressive, white regime. Secondly, the guerilla struggle itself. But by and by these themes will come to be of historical interest only and then dropped (the guerilla theme, perhaps, last) in the light of more pressing problem themes arising out of the independence situation. But the guerilla struggle is likely to occupy the creative imagination for a long time to come until the people of Zimbabwe have freed themselves from the physical and psychological ravages of war. The situation in Kenya illustrates this point. Literature in Kenya, — whose history of white conquest, occupation and resistance greatly resembles that of Zimbabwe — under its leading exponents like Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Leonard Kibera, followed very much the same course.

African literature tends to keep track of events on the continent. We can expect therefore, a few writers in Zimbabwe to celebrate the attainment of independence — though again this may take the form of recreating the conduct of war and the successes of the guerilla struggle, as in Ngugi's *A Grain of Wheat*. A few visionaries, not kill-joys by any means, may then stretch their imaginations to the future, in the manner of Peter Abrahams' *A Wreath for Udomo*, without necessarily being as pessimistic. A great many will appoint themselves watchdogs of the country's progress, its record on human rights and so on. Yet more will rise still to assess the state of affairs at a given time in history. The stage has been clearly set for a literary renaissance.

**Conclusion**

In most countries today the true needs of the people are very often more honestly and faithfully reflected in the works of that country's committed writers, themselves ordinary citizens (with perhaps slightly more guts, sensitivity and talent than others) than in the official government proclamations and pronouncements. As a result, it would be to the advantage of any government, trying to formulate sound policy in the interests of the majority of its people or to gauge their popular appeal, to study its creative writers very carefully. I want to go as far as to suggest that even from the point of view of foreign governments, attempting to frame their policies towards countries in the grip of revolution, a study of the creative writers in these countries could help them immensely, to decide on which side to throw their capitalist weight. Such an acquaintance with a country's committed authors could enable certain governments to avoid such wishy-washy thinking, for instance, as characterized Western foreign policy (or Soviet) towards Zimbabwe, right up to Comrade Mugabe's win at the polls. The knack, which has been repeatedly shown by some Western governments, to support the
wrong side in a revolution, can be curbed, at least in part, by paying some attention to what creative writers in the situation have to say. Unlike the politicians, they are not given to calling a spade ‘the workman’s best friend’ for the aggrandizement of capitalist speculators.

Many countries throughout the world have traditionally responded to criticism expressed by writers, which could so easily be turned to advantage by the governments concerned, by imprisoning or banishing these writers. That has been the fate of writers like Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Sembene Ousmane and Alex La Guma in Africa. However, Zimbabwe has the lessons of the whole continent to draw from — in fact, it can be argued that never before has an African country upon the attainment of its independence been better prepared than Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe has its own poets, too, like Chimedza who are likely to be churned out in ever increasing numbers, to listen to. Heinemann, Longmans and other British publishers are waiting in the wings to made immediate capital gain. Why can’t the government and people of Zimbabwe make sure they benefit too?

The committed writer in the modern world has a sacred and largely thankless duty to perform. For all his forthrightness, dedication and honesty Ngugi wa Thiong’o has found himself stripped of his University job, not to mention the excursions he has already made to prison. Yet the task must continue until the battle is won. This will be achieved sooner if politicians take into account the relationship which should exist between the committed artist and the liberation movements or the revolutionary government, a relationship which is nearly summarized in a statement quoted by the revolutionary South African poet, Keorapetse Kgositsile, from Barry Feinberg:

The revolutionary poet concretises the dreams of people for a better life; the liberation movement fights to make those dreams a reality.

PAMBERINE CHIMURENGA!

Bibliographic Note
MENTAL TONES:
For all the people of Zimbabwe (Excerpts)

V
We want war,
War in our country,
We want war,
War in our country
We want war
War in our country
Its hour has come
What Chaminuka said has happened
— War
What Grandmother said has happened
— War
Its hour, it has come
We are the owners of the land
We desire freedom
We tell you
We are the owners of the land
We desire freedom
Kaunda, Mugabe, Nkomo
We cry for freedom
Its hour has come
Songs of sorrow
Songs from pride-piled hearts, wrestling dishonour,
dehumanization and debasement, duelling wrong
wreaking vengeance — valiant and victory-sure.

VI
The novice, war-naive, war-nerve weak
wakens to war's meaning
meaning of truth and truth's meaning —
ruthless roots of conflict
inflict pain, nip-bud-thaw of soft thought
striving to live mercy-thrift, nursing vengeance,
vowing to maw, maul and mangle prefabricated structures
of social violence . . .
Man after man, the whole night long
Arm after arm, the whole march long
Fording rivers, braving all, all brave
Passing crocs, hippos, flies, foul marsh grave
Over river, over hill and veld —
The merging of man and nature
Striving for beliefs long held
Wielding weary arm and gaunt stature
Ready to die . . .
Amputate lie's limb; cleanse, cleanse,
And build on hope and truth from hence.
O Great Ones
O Spirit unseen who see all
Those from the hills
The eternal rainmakers
The-one-who-cannot-give-well —
Shoko
The lion
Museyamwe
The heart . . .
Those at the tree with no name
Whose mbiras play unseen by human eyes
Those at Matopo
Throne Supreme of the Supernatural
Those at Chinoyi
Caves of mystery waters;
Chaminuka
Father of all men
Sprit supreme, Sovereign eternal
Save us from our folly,
— Save us from ourselves.

Polycarp S. Chimedza

State and Society in Nigeria
Gavin Williams

Williams 'raises fundamental questions about the development of capitalism which go beyond the specific Nigerian experience' (Beckman, Review 10).

State and Society in Nigeria brings together critical, Marxist analyses of Nigerian society written between 1972 and 1979. In a brief postface, Williams examines the debate about the limits to capitalist development in Nigeria and the 1979 elections.

Contents: Preface and postface; Nigeria: a political economy; Politics in Nigeria; Political consciousness among the Ibadan poor; Ideologies and strategies for rural development: a critique; Agriculture in Nigeria 1979.

£3.25

Nationalist Politics in Zimbabwe: The 1980 Elections and Beyond

Lionel Cliffe, Joshua Mpofu and Barry Munslow

This study of the February 1980 Zimbabwe elections which preceded Independence is not so much concerned with the administrative conduct of the elections, nor the charges of manipulation. Rather it seeks to explore the results, the campaigning and the whole background leading up to the elections for what these events tell us about the character of Zimbabwe's African politics, so long submerged. What does the decisive rejection of the Smith-Muzorewa Internal Settlement tell us about what the African masses expect of Independence? What of the structures of the two nationalist parties: are they carry-overs from the liberation struggle or of pre-UDI politicking? How far do these experiences 'explain' the victory of the two parties of the former Patriotic Front? And how are we to explain the regional split in support for the two parties? What are the consequences for the period of reconstruction ahead of the legacy of the particular forms of popular involvement in the liberation struggle, and of the continuing split between the nationalist parties?

The results of the 1980 elections in Zimbabwe which produced a transition to Independence under a government of the two wings of the Patriotic Front surprised almost everyone — not least those who took seriously the gloomy forebodings published in this Review. There was a feeling that the divisions which had led the two wings of the Patriotic Front to fight the elections as two separate parties plus the pressures from Rhodesian security and from British officials who were running the elections would produce another puppet regime or a stalemate, prescriptions for a neo-colonial state or for turmoil. In the event the two parties of the Patriotic Front won 77 out of the 80 African seats in the new Parliament. The former Zimbabwe African National Union, now the ZANU-PF Party of Robert Mugabe, won 57 seats and the former Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) under Joshua Nkomo, now renamed the Patriotic Front Party (PFP) won 20. The United African National Council (UANC) of Bishop Muzorewa had won 51 out of 72 seats reserved for Africans in elections the previous year under the 'Internal Settlement' constitution elections from which ZANU and ZAPU, still fighting their liberation war, were excluded. A year later UANC gained only three seats, despite massive financial and organisational backing from the whites, from South Africa and from international business and over-
whelming pressure to support the Bishop’s party exerted by the Rhodesian security apparatus.

This electoral victory was undoubtedly a success that all supporters of the struggles of the peoples of southern Africa must welcome. But particularly as it was a surprise, there is a need to fathom the voting to try and explain the victory — to see how far it implies the need for a reassessment of Zimbabwe politics. This need is the greater for it has been impossible for over sixteen years to say anything with much accuracy about the popular dimension of Zimbabwe politics. ZAPU had been banned for three times as long as it existed as an open and legal political party; ZANU was made illegal almost as soon as it split off from ZAPU. Both parties have existed in exile and underground since then. Their respective guerillas have been active in recent years in various parts of the country — in fact both parties claimed that they had a presence in almost all parts of the country, and that over 80% of the country was ‘liberated’ or ‘semi-liberated’. Meanwhile in 1971 during the Pearce Commission inquiry into African opinion on the constitutional proposals, providing for independence under an indefinitely extended white minority rule, that was agreed by Smith and the British Government, a new, legal, political ‘umbrella’ organisation the African National Council came into existence. Originally an internal front, backed by the two nationalist parties, to mobilise people to reject the proposals, its fortunes have since fluctuated, Bishop Muzorewa moving from being its figurehead to commanding the United ANC as an internal vehicle for his own political advancement, eventually doing a deal with the white Rhodesian Front government of Ian Smith.

Clearly the elections have clarified the various claims for popular support made by these main parties — ZANU-PF, PFP and UNAC — and the other, rump organisations of the nationalist leaders like Sithole and Chikerema. So first, an exploration of the elections should tell us just why it was that the Bishop’s UANC got such little support — was it always so, or was it a product of his disastrous months as Prime Minister? Second, we must ask why and how did the nationalist parties of the former Patriotic Front win such a sweeping victory in the teeth of the Rhodesian resistance — for to answer these questions will hopefully reveal both something of the character of the two parties but also of the mood of the African people, for so long the unknown quantity in Zimbabwe politics. On the measure of the parties and the people much will depend; there is no other source from which could come those pressures for a future that goes beyond the limited, neo-colonial reforms that western governments, the aid agencies, transnational investors, the South African govenment and the remaining white civil servants and settlers will all be busy promoting. But a third issue, is to explore not why the Patriotic Front parties won, but why, as rivals as well as former allies, did the popular support they got divide the way it did? ZANU-PF got almost three times as many votes and seats as PFP, but each party had overwhelming support in Mashonaland and Matabeleland respectively — and thus neither is able to lay claim to being a truly nationally-based party. The explanations of this regional voting pattern are complex but whatever its causes this pattern, one that neither party sought or relishes, is part of the legacy an independent Zimbabwe will have to contend with, and its implications thus warrant exploration. But before we proceed
to the explanations and the implications, let us take a closer look at the actual voting figures in the eight electoral districts, each corresponding to the existing provinces:

Table I: Results of the 1980 Zimbabwe Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Districts</th>
<th>Total Votes</th>
<th>ZANU-PF</th>
<th>PFP</th>
<th>UNAC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Vote</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>% of Vote</td>
<td>Seats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>321,120</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>336,561</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>179,712</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>641,181</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>290,144</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>355,995</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland North</td>
<td>402,339</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland South</td>
<td>175,223</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>2,702,275</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Each electoral district had a number of seats filled by proportional representation: each party put forward a 'list' and won that proportion of seats, providing it got over 10% of total votes, equivalent to its ratio of the votes.

The Rejection of the Internal Settlement Parties

One clue to the political awareness of the Zimbabwe people lies in attempting to explain why the UNAC lost so badly in 1980 given the support registered a year before. In the April 1979 poll, Bishop Muzorewa's party made a clean sweep in Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland West and Mashonaland East. It took a majority of the seats in Manicaland, the Midlands, Victoria and Matabeleland North, and was in a minority only in Matabeleland South where it lost to the United National Federal Party of Chief Ndiweni, who cashed in as a surrogate for Nkomo. And a year later in one of the least cost effective electoral battles ever fought in Africa, several million pounds sown, reaped a mere three seats.

In the first place one must ask how much real support for Muzorewa the 1979 vote demonstrated. First, the choice offered the voter was no choice at all. There were no parties contesting the legitimacy of the Internal Settlement itself, or the birth of a country called significantly 'Zimbabwe-Rhodesia' in which the Europeans retained 28 seats in Parliament and much of the real power elsewhere. Many people had no choice but to cast a vote, as the Rhodesian authorities saw a large turn-out as the key to international acceptance. And yet Lord Chitnis, on behalf of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group opined that it was achieved at the expense of a 'cowed and indoctrinated electorate'. Thus threatened, many people thought, we were told, that it did not matter greatly whether they gave a vote to Muzorewa and Sithole, for the real change was still to come. But in fact, not so many people actually did vote. The Rhodesian claim of a turnout of 64% of the estimated black electorate was always a meaningless figure when there was no prior registration of voters, but just how meaningless was revealed in 1980 when the vote in some electoral districts would have been over 100% by that fictitious yardstick. Indeed the total number of votes cast in 1980 (in only three days of polling) was 2.70 million as compared with the 1.87 million who voted in five days of polling in 1979.
Among those that did vote for UANC were many, urban residents especially, who had been misled by government propaganda, over the radio particularly into believing that the Patriotic Front leaders would participate in the government and the war would end. These were embittered when they later realized that this piece of propaganda had no basis in fact.

Once elected, the Internal Settlement government in fact went on to operate virtually all the laws of the previous government. Proposing a renewal of the declaration of a state of emergency, the Minister of Law and Order (5 July 1979) made an 'appeal to tribesmen to assist the security forces' in bringing the terrorists to justice. The appeal, needless to say, was made in vain. The war continued unabated and the repressive laws remained in force. Even the Bishop's boasts of re-opening schools and clinics remained idle. At the same time although the racist legislation had been repealed and some Africans could drink in the best hotels, and a few bought European farms, the basic structures of the settler economy and society was untouched and the lot of the mass of the people changed not at all.

But one might speculate, given the strong religious affiliations of many of the electorate, the Bishop still might have potential appeal as a national leader. But the projected image of a peace-loving man of God was tarnished not only by the Bishop's continuation of the war both internally and externally — with constant raids into Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana — but also by the killing of 183 auxiliaries belonging to Sithole's ZANU. That two colleagues, both men of the cloth, should bicker in such a bloody manner and that the victor should report glowingly in parliament 'there has been a marked increase in both morale and efficiency since the removal of the dissident elements', was understandably too much for the collective stomach of supporters the Bishop was thought to have among Christian women voters.

But the activities of the auxiliaries were not just turned against each other. They added one more structure of repression to the lot of the peasants. Recruited mainly from unemployed youth, often far away in towns, they only related to the people of the TTLs in a bullying, commandist way. The activities of the Internal Settlement government had done much to discredit the implicated parties even prior to the 1980 elections, but the actions of the auxiliaries during the campaign and the action of the security forces in general finished the job. The war did not end, but instead escalated after the Muzorewa government took power.

This is not the place to set out once again the extent of the government pressure especially against ZANU-PF. Briefings in the last Review gave some details and even the Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group presents a 'pattern of intimidation which in some areas was contrary to the official view'. In fact the whole bias of the existing power structure towards the UANC and against the ZANU-PF and PFP acted as a form of negative reinforcement for these two parties. The African electorate had gained insufficient political experience not to be totally cowed by the whole operation. What was crucial, however, was that they really believed that the ballot was secret. Without this the weight of security force intimidation and economic pressures exerted by employers would have worked.
Popular Support for the National Liberation Movements

Even given the electoral liabilities, the UANC, its leadership and its white backers must have thought they were in with a chance. After all with twenty seats reserved for whites in a 100 seat Parliament, the Bishop and the minority parties had only to deliver another thirty to prevent a real shift in power from the whites, indeed even a split decision where the UANC was the largest of three more or less equally backed parties might be enough. Clearly many UANC supporters, especially among the whites, remained victims of their own propaganda that this would be the outcome, until the results were announced. But they also had another option in the event of a roughly equal three way split. Nkomo, who both Ian Smith, since their negotiations in 1976, and the British Government regarded as a pro-Western, pragmatic and professional politician with much more political cunning than Muzorewa, might well be persuaded to head a ‘moderate’ coalition and come to play the role of another Kenyatta.

These were probably also the calculations of the British, at least until just prior to the election. Certainly, we gathered from some British members of the Monitoring Force and observers that they were beginning to advise Government House of the extent of ZANU-PF’s support — even if they did put it down to successful ‘intimidation’ by guerrillas who had not gone to the Assembly Points. It seems clear too that Soames was, by election day, not totally unprepared for the outcome: he seems to have ‘mended his fences’ with Mugabe in a meeting the day before the elections; and General Walls was despatched to Mozambique for discussions while the voting was still going on, with Mugabe following immediately after — suggesting that the delicate process whereby the transfer of power was carried out was not unanticipated.

If the white authority structure had been sensitive enough to pick up African opinion, the extent of their grievances would have been realized, as would the widespread realization that the internal settlement parties were not capable of redressing them. The national liberation parties did articulate these grievances — and in such a way that they offered an appeal to most classes among the African population. To the peasants of the TTLs a promise was made that land would be made available to all those who wished to use it. For the much smaller numbers of African Purchase Area farmers and other ‘master’ farmers, a future ZANU-PF government promised to provide reasonable loans. A ‘reasonable’ minimum wage was promised to agricultural labourers on the settler farms, and an examination of the structure of salaries was promised to mine workers and those in industry — small wonder then the rash of strikes immediately followed the elections. As one Provincial Chairman of ZANU-PF in Mashonaland West put it ‘To local businessmen and traders we promised equal opportunities with the white man’. This was not a strikingly dissimilar policy to those presented by the other parties, but ZANU and the PFP promised to end the war, as the others did also, but only they could end the war. However, it was not a case of simply ending the war at any price: the two concerns, for change and peace, were meshed together. As a teacher from a ‘keep’ in Sipolilo TTL in the north astutely observed, ‘People know, know how they are going to vote. They want the war to end if this war has achieved what the people want. They (the guerrillas) have fought for the land and they have brought
back the land to us. Go into the TTLs and ask even the oldest man if he will tell you'. Voters in many of these areas also believed that the parties of the Patriotic Front would be more likely to fulfill their promises.

**Party Organisation**

That the nationalist parties voiced the grievances and reflected some of the aspirations of the workers and peasants as well as other classes, was important, but this alone would have been insufficient to guarantee them victory. Given the weight of repression and manipulation ranged against the two parties, it was their ability to organise which proved decisive. The people had to be ‘educated’ and there was scant time or freedom allowed to do this during the election campaign. But also the vote had to be ‘got out’ on the day; the pressure from the regime to vote for Muzorewa or abstain had to be withstood; the counter propaganda had in turn to be countered. That these were successful betokens an organisational presence whose effectiveness one wouldn’t expect from structures quickly thrown together during the campaign or inherited from the long ago days of legal existence. The grass roots organisational frameworks that were so crucial were in fact a product of the period of the liberation struggle, so we now turn to look at the structures established by the Patriotic Front and ZANU-PF and to register the contrast between the two.

**ZANU and ZANLA:** ZANU had had only some brief months of existence before it was banned in 1963. Consequently there was only a scattering of ZANU cells throughout some parts of the country in the 1960s. However, the guerilla presence, slowly spreading from the northeast of the country after 1972 really established the party organisationally, and we would argue, ensured its electoral victory. There were a number of levels of organisation; first the guerillas themselves. The ZANLA forces were organised on the basis of provincial commands, but based on the Mozambican provinces from which they launched their operations. These were three in number. Tete to the northeast of Zimbabwe, Manica in the east and Gaza in the south. The guerilla presence spread from 1972 from Tete and from 1976 in the other two areas of operation and did so essentially as a result of the new tactics that ZANLA used: the classic guerilla tactics of 'people's war', establishing first a basis of support among local people so as to effectively hide among them. In the process, we discovered, the guerillas set up other levels of organisation among the people themselves. The level of organisation achieved and the extent of the incorporation of the rural population that began to be revealed during the elections was surprising even to observers sympathetic to their cause. It was both a measure of the support that ZANU had received and a reason for that support.

The creation of such structures was not unique. Similar examples could be found in other national liberation struggles. But to appreciate some of its different forms this pattern of organisation has to be seen as one set in a particular context not of totally liberated regions but a patchwork of semi-liberated pockets in a majority of the TTLs. In the neighbouring ex-Portuguese colonies, the war developed in the main in areas without a significant settler presence and whole vast regions became fully 'liberated areas' — but only at one end of the country. This was not the case in Zim-
babwe. The Land Appointment Act and subsequent legislation had led to a massive occupation of land by settler farmers and at the same time created many scattered discrete pockets of African reserves, the TTLs. Whole regions capable of generating and maintaining their own infrastructure and of isolating areas from any contact with a colonial regime, which to all intents and purposes was some hundreds of miles away, were a feature of Mozambique's history of struggle. Where such efforts had been attempted, the fields were usually destroyed. This had also occurred in the area south of the Zambezi River in Tete Province of Mozambique, where the Portuguese had effectively handed over the counter insurgency role to the Rhodesian army. The Rhodesian army was extremely effective in destroying such economic bases. Ingenuity and a somewhat different approach was required on the part of ZANU, faced as it was with this fragmented pattern of African reserves, interspaced with white areas through which passed the major arteries of communication.

One set of levels of organisation was made up of various tiers of people's councils. At the grass roots level, there was the village unit — usually covering an area equivalent to the *kraal* under the existing administrative system. On average, between eight or ten of these units would make up a base committee which was the old ward or *zsadu*. Above these were the district committees, covering usually one TTL, and a provincial committee. The committees at each level of the hierarchy would hold meetings at fairly regular intervals, although these meetings tended to decrease in frequency the higher up the hierarchy that one went, until at the provincial level, meetings were held perhaps twice a year. The reasons for this are readily apparent, the logistics and security risks involved in arranging a necessarily clandestine gathering of members from all parts of a province were not inconsiderable. In some areas, such as the liberated zones of certain TTLs, there was no police presence whatsoever and meetings could be held openly, whilst in other area far greater caution was required.

Within the committees, there would be a chairman, treasurer and secretary and people with responsibility for such tasks as agriculture, health, women's organisation, youth, political mobilisation and transport. Each would have a deputy. The functions of the committees at the various levels differed considerably. Grass roots village committees dealt with day-to-day problems of feeding and clothing the guerillas and basic services to the community. But issues concerning the outlay of large sums of money, for example, would be passed on to a higher committee. A certain division in areas of responsibility was worked out between the village committees and the *kraal* head (who was the lowest level functionary within the Administration's local government structure). Some 'traditional' aspects of organising village life continued to be carried out by the *kraal* head where he supported the aims of the struggle, but the committees dealt with everything concerning the war. The committees also settled disputes and provided a judicial system.

The other activities undertaken probably varied depending on how effectively the Rhodesian state apparatuses had been excluded. In cases where this was complete the committee structure was on the way to becoming an alternative administration. While there was no widespread restructuring of production, the committees did provide the impetus for some self-help. In
the field of health, for example, instruction in hygiene was given, the
necessity of building latrines and pits to store the rubbish was stressed and
in the last few months of the war, local clinics were set up in some areas.
From one TTL in the south, a dozen boys with four years' secondary educa-
tion were sent to a friendly mission clinic to receive medical training. And
even where the area was not 'semi-liberated', a missionary in the area noted
'the improved appearance of the villages' last year: 'clean-swept yards, newly
thatched and plastered huts, freshly ploughed fields, etc. It is said that
this is due to the establishment of committees of eight leaders . . . in each
village. Each member is responsible for a certain 'department' (hygiene,
education, etc.). Co-operation is greatly encouraged, e.g. payment of
school fees for poorer members of the community'. (Southern Africa, New
York, February 1980).

When the guerillas first arrived in Victoria Province in 1976, it was they
who chose the people to sit on the committees. But this was not terribly ef-
efective because the local people did not necessarily feel that these commit-
tees members had their trust. A decision was handed down rather than
emerging from the local community. It sometimes happened that ne'er-do-
wells were chosen, elements who put themselves forward for opportunistic
reasons. But this was to change, and with experience, it was the people
gathered in pungwes (public meetings) who were to choose their own
representatives. Teachers, nurses, peasant farmers, traders and those who
generally commanded respect within the community were often elected to
be the committee representatives.

On the admittedly scanty evidence at present available, it is difficult to do
justice to the new structures that were built up. It is perhaps possible,
however, to attempt to characterize them in this way. Outside of the im-
mediate border area with Mozambique, where the peasants had either been
forced into strategic hamlets (in the north east) or were in some other way
under the permanent and close scrutiny of armed guards, a form of 'dual
power' took shape. Behind the ostensibly quiescent normal peasant daily
existence of the TTLs, there grew up activities and structures of a system of
dual power challenging the settler state. This was metaphorically — and fre-
quently also literally — a difference of night and day. When darkness fell
and the curfew laws came into operation, entitling anyone leaving their
homes to be shot by the security forces, villagers would sneak off to the
agreed rendezvous for a meeting with local guerilla units. These meetings
were virtually a nightly occurrence in many places. In these meetings
politicism occurred and problems not treated by the committee struc-
tures were heard and dealt with. Some TTLs became virtually no-go areas to
most normal administration but could never become totally proof against
occasional incursions in strength, perhaps by air, by the Rhodesian security.

This duality of existence — a life lived both within and apart from colonial
control — was exemplified in Victoria Province in the scheduled
schizophrenia of a certain district committee official, who worked for one
week in his job as a catechist and worked the next week full-time in his
political function. Not all employers, needless to say, were so obliging as the
catechist's on this particular mission station. But peasant farmers and small
traders could organise their lives in similar fashion. Great caution was re-
required, however. The penalties for those caught were harsh in the extreme. The security forces took to arresting all the people of alleged 'influence' within a particularly TTL. One headmaster spoke of a particular 'sweep' made by the security forces and the subsequent arrests made in his TTL in November 1978. Three schoolteachers, a housemaster and local businessmen were arrested and tortured for four days. The District Commissioner personally tortured one African businessman. In an interview, this businessman expressed the widespread grievances experienced by the small African traders. It was very difficult for people to start a business he complained, as there were no loans given to Africans, and when capital was raised, the difficulties were far from being over. Along with the arrests of traders, their shops were also closed. At the time of the interview, after the election results had already been announced, over half of those arrested during this particular incident were still in detention.

One crucial significance in this peculiar situation of dual power that emerged in the TTLs was the role of the mujibas who formed a quite distinct level of organisation between the guerrillas and the people's committees. They certainly bore some resemblance to the people's militias developed by the PAIGC, MPLA and Frelimo, in the Lusophone territories. As one MPLA commander in Angola put it, the role of the militias was 'to be vigilant, looking after the place, seeing who is coming in and going out . . . Everyone who goes from one place to another must have his pass. Without this they will not be allowed to travel. They will be arrested, taken back to the place they came from, and then judged'. The mujibas like the militias had a policing function. They were the watchdogs of the ZANU controlled TTLs, supervising the entry and exit of people. This was doubly important given the lack of a clear cut spatial distinction of the liberated areas — there were no clear geographical limits between settler and guerilla territory. Naturally this idea should not be carried to extremes. Many TTLs, were effectively liberated areas. Security forces could not go into these areas except in large and heavily armed numbers. But a village could not be bombed and the crops destroyed just because it existed. Only in the north and eastern provinces where peasants had been driven into the strategic hamlets, called 'keeps', could people living outside of these be legitimately considered 'terrorist sympathisers'. Hence it was doubly important to create a political distinction, a distinction of personnel between liberated areas and the rest. Mujibas knew the people living in the area and could automatically detect strangers who might then be observed, questioned or even killed if suspicions were raised. There were intelligence as well as counter-intelligence agents, gathering information about the movements of security forces and discovering the presence of informers amongst the local population. Certain respected mujibas might carry a weapon, such as a grenade, and if an area was under attack they would fight alongside of the guerilla unit.

But in addition to their security functions, the mujibas had many other important functions which highlight even more the special dual-power situation in Zimbabwe. Given the general absence of a distinctly separate economic system within the liberated areas, there was for instance a symbiosis with the colonial economy in this context; the mujibas were amongst other things, the link between the guerillas and the colonial economy. They collected contributions from the people for their guerillas. These contribu-
tions took the form of money, food, medicines, drink and clothing. The exact division of labour in supplying the guerrillas, between mujibas and the network of grass roots committees is as yet unclear and much local variation must have occurred. Given that the reputation of the guerrillas was at stake, a strict watch had to be kept on the mujibas. On occasions people claiming to be mujibas collected items for themselves, or real mujibas kept some of what they collected. This problem was solved in two ways. Usually a written request with perhaps three signatures of commanders might be required to prove the authenticity of a request. Secondly, those caught pretending to be mujibas or abusing their position were ferociously punished. One or two examples of this locally were usually sufficient to limit the malpractice.

Paralleling the mujibas were the chimbwidos, women and girls who fulfilled many of the same roles, as well as fulfilling the tasks of washing and cooking for the guerrillas. One basic task they both carried out was that of politicisation. They would help co-ordinate and organise the political meetings and in other ways spread the word. They acted in a close auxiliary role to the guerilla units, providing them with the key point of entry to go deep into the local community. The chimbwidos also were able to undertake some of the most dangerous jobs as messengers, or of transporting supplies, incurring much less suspicion that the mujibas.

The several levels of organisation — the guerrillas, the mujibas and the people’s committees — could not have been set up and maintained without a considerable input of political education. As regards the ZANLA guerrillas themselves this is how one of our colleagues, Barnabas Masanzu, describes their training:

Informal interviews with comrades in Assembly Points in Mashonaland reveal a pattern of training which starts with an orientation phase of politicisation. The focus of this political education is on “Why take up arms to liberate Zimbabwe?” Both external and internal factors to justify the necessity. The second stage of training related to organisation and the ranks of the army. In fact, the organs of ZANLA ranged from the smallest unit, a Section (15 soldiers) up through Platoon (30-45), Company (100-200), Detachment, Battalion, Sector and Province. Each unit had a similar complement of officers: a Commander, Political Commissar, plus Security, Logistics, Medical and Agricultural Officers. The final stage of the training concerned action, the use of the various weapons of war, tactics, etc. . . . The same phases, with some modification were adopted in the political education of the peasants. For the masses to appreciate the reasons for waging of the war, and how to execute it, a similar programme or orientation, organisation and action was instituted . . . The Political Commissar articulated the grievances affecting the people and appealed for armed struggle.

In fact the chief vehicle for political education were pungwes, meetings held in the countryside, very often at night, occurring in some areas, we were informed, two or three times a week and sometimes going on much of the night, and consisting not only of political instruction but the teaching of slogans and a wide repertoire of chimurenga songs (the word for ‘revolution’ with its connotation of the wars of resistance of the 1890s). Other cultural symbols making the link with the earlier struggles were used. In particular the spirit mediums, mudzimu, played an important role. Masanzu reports guerrillas as saying that ‘whenever they go to a new area they registered their presence with the mediums and sought spiritual guidance’. In fact the choice of the party’s election symbol, the cock (jongwe), was seemingly made by the mudzimu. Traditional ‘prayers’ for victory would feature in the pungwe sessions and in general the traditional forms of worship were encouraged. And there are some indications, according to Masan-
zu, that the role of the spirit mediums might be institutionalized in the new post-Independence structures.

In sum, then, there was a complex network of structures on which ZANU-PF could rely in the countryside: the people's committees, the mujiba networks, and the guerillas. The latter did retain some presence during the election, for if they had all been confined to the cease-fire Assembly Points the crucial politicising link with the peasantry would have been absent. In addition, however, ZANU-PF also set up very quickly some of the organs of a more orthodox, election-oriented political party during the few weeks of the campaign. They opened offices, set up district and provincial committees, appointed election agents for the eight polling districts and then had to find large numbers of polling agents to observe the voting at each polling station. Much of this formal infrastructure was set up at levels above that of the individual TTL and of course it had to take in the towns and the white farming areas — plus a national headquarters and staff. There was no shortage of personnel to fill these roles, even at such short notice and even when thousands of newly appointed officials were picked off and detained. The kinds of people on whom the main level of organising at district and provincial level fell were very different from the guerillas or those involved in the people's committees in the TTLs: for the most part it was small businessmen and professionals in the towns plus an important sprinkling of students and other exiles who returned for the elections. At the national level there is another hierarchy — of leaders, of party workers who themselves came on the scene rather abruptly early in 1980 and from yet another direction: most of the top personnel who organised the election and who now constitute the leadership of the government either came back from exile in Mozambique or, some, from recent prison release within the country, or from more distant exile in academic or other professional circles in the west.

There is no straightforward, simple answer as to what constitutes the party. In assessing the legacy that derives from the war and the election there is a multiplicity of levels that on the eve of independence had not yet had chance to by fully welded together: a leadership consisting of 'generations' with quite different experiences (direction of the armed struggle, exile, internal imprisonment or politicking), the guerillas themselves who since the election have effectively been removed from any political role by being cooped up in the assembly points, the new (electoral) structure of formal branches, the mobilised youth (the mujibas), and the people's committees. Which of these will play the decisive roles in the future of the party remains to be seen.

**ZAPU and ZIPRA:** The forerunners of what became, in the elections, the Patriotic Front Party held sway in some parts of the north-west and west of the country during the latter years of the guerilla struggle but the form of their organisational presence and the kind of legacy it bequeathes to an Independent Zimbabwe was different in many respects, and these differences are worth charting.

There are reasonable grounds to suggest that the seven year guerilla campaign was viewed by ZAPU leaders from a different angle, as an election campaign, as well as furthering the guerilla alliance. One curious thing that persisted up to the elections within PFP leadership circles was the assump-
tion that the structures of the old ZAPU were still operational and that, therefore, PFP was still the dominant political party in the country. This assumption was based on the following historical factors: ZAPU had entrenched itself within the masses when it operated legally in the early 1960s; when it operated on the surface, ZAPU set up numerous operative branches and sub-branches throughout the country; its charismatic leader, Joshua Nkomo, had proved to be the most popular national leader in the country. When the party was banned all the lower echelon organs went underground and continued to mobilise the people to resist the ban through various acts of disobedience, including violence.

Given these pre-armed struggle conditions, the leadership held that the social environment within which ZAPU grew was conducive to its continued existence. This belief was based also on the underground structures' ability to resist not only the government bureaucracy but also the rise of ZANU throughout the 1960s.

So when the armed struggle was launched after UDI, it was hoped that the guerillas would rely on the existing underground structures of ZAPU inside Zimbabwe. This precluded the necessity to mobilise and politicise the masses on the part of the guerillas. They were deployed into a theatre of operation with instructions to 'wage war against the white settler regime' but little was said about politicising and mobilising the masses to participate in the war. The guerillas were, however, instructed to make contact and work with the 'underground officials of the party'. The operative role of the said officials was: to organise and supply food, medicines and clothing for the guerillas; to provide a courier-system upon which the guerillas would rely for information and co-ordinating contacts; and to assist guerillas in the recruitment of personnel for military training abroad. This pattern characterized ZIPRA guerilla operations during the period 1965-70. There was no politically substantiated programme spelling out the objectives of armed struggle and, therefore, the politicisation and preparation of the masses for a long drawn out liberation war was precluded. The absence of such political mobilisation of the masses led to the total failure of the 'strategy' of that period. The failure led to a crisis within ZAPU, with the guerillas demanding the drawing up of a comprehensive programme defining the objectives of the struggle in a 'new outlook' The leadership had to admit that the purpose of training a guerilla army had been not for 'waging guerilla warfare for the purpose of carrying out acts of sabotage which were considered relevant to bring forth fear and despondency to the settlers in Rhodesia to accede to the popular revolutionary demands of the people of Zimbabwe'. (The Reply to the Observations on Our Struggle, p.4, 17 March 1970, by James Chikerema, ZAPU Vice President till 1971).

The 1970-71 crisis in ZAPU led to a reappraisal of the whole war situation. A formula was produced by J.Z. Moyo which laid the foundation for ZAPU's operational strategy throughout the 1970s, this still laid more emphasis on the military than on the political aspects of the operational programme. This is clear from its title '1970 Programme of Recruitment, Training and Deployment' — though it was not implemented until after 1972. To add a political flavour a document entitled 'Ideological Concept' was drawn up, but whereas the military programme was specific on such
matters as numbers per province per period of time, the ‘ideological’ document omitted any operational strategy. It ambiguously sketched the party’s economic objectives in an independent Zimbabwe. Its preamble philosophised on the ‘evils’ of capitalism and racism without spelling out whether the masses necessarily need to be involved in the process of destroying those evils.

The military programme was carefully implemented with cadres being deployed only on the basis of planned operations. The reconnaissance units were strengthened and they managed to create covert operative contacts upon whom the guerrilla units could rely once inside the country. The guerrillas were deployed in small units with instructions to avoid engagements with the Rhodesian Security Forces until they were well-established in the country. To be ‘well established’ meant among other things, to have been able to identify the existing ZAPU underground officials who would help with the supplies necessary for the war effort.

In the main the Moyo strategy was overtaken by the 1972 and 1976 offensives by ZANLA forces in the northeast and southeast of Zimbabwe. By the time ZAPU recovered from its crisis of 1970-71, ZANLA forces had successfully entrenched themselves in the entire eastern half of the country. This compelled ZAPU to deploy most of its ZIPRA forces in Matabeleland, northern Mashonaland West, and northern Midlands.

In accordance with the instructions of the High Command, the ZIPRA forces concentrated their activities on the following: revitalising the existing ‘underground’ ZAPU structures by encouraging the district council officials of the party to establish links with existing branches or to set up some where they did not exist; undertaking military operations on enemy installations and subverting civil authority that represented the state; recruiting of personnel for military training abroad; and checking the westward and north-westward advance of the ZANLA forces.

ZIPRA did not establish numerous operational structures characterized by co-ordinating committees and sub-committees on the scale that was undertaken by ZANLA forces in their base areas. The political aspect of their mission included ‘reviving’ the ‘existing’ structures and no reference was made to the political reorientation of the masses. The revitalised structures were simply to be organs for supplying medicines, uniforms, food and raw recruits. The courier system was established by the guerrillas themselves from specially selected persons, especially youths. The role of the couriers was different from that of the mujibas in ZANLA areas in that the former’s tasks included gathering of information about the enemy’s activities in the ZIPRA operational areas. They did not possess any political power like the mujibas. They were merely messengers or intelligence operatives for ZIPRA. Without systematising their political activities, ZIPRA cadres held political meetings with peasants in a somewhat crude fashion. People were called to meetings mostly to be given precautionary measures for maintaining security. Political meetings were called ‘once in many months’. ZIPRA mainly contacted the people through the party’s District or branch officials, but also they would drop in on individual households for whatever support they needed. A detachment of about 100 men could be split up into mini-sections of three persons for the purpose of ‘visiting the masses in their
homes' as the Commander at St Paul’s Assembly Place, Matabeleland North put it.

None of the peasants we talked to mentioned the replacement of the chief’s authority with elected people’s committees. Many people assumed that the replacement would be done after independence. The authority vacuum in the rural areas caused peasants to look to the guerillas for political and cultural guidance. Some of the breaches of customary law were heard and judged by the guerillas. Some of the judgments pleased the peasantry, others did not. Punishment was very severe for the guilty parties.

However, after the collapse of government-sponsored civil authority, it is not yet clear who took over what functions of administration in most ZIPRA semi-liberated areas. ZAPU structures do not seem to have been directly involved in civil administration until the cease fire. The local party committees did not immediately assume specific functions of a civil nature other than those related to the liberation war effort, although local ZIPRA detachment commanders issued verbal decrees from time to time on certain civil matters.

Curiously though the ZIPRA guerillas constantly told the peasants that political power belonged to them (i.e. the peasants) and no authority could function without their approval and consent. To sustain high morale and enthusiastic support for ZAPU in the local population, the ZIPRA guerillas relied not on frequent ‘base meetings’ and slogans but on their military operations. Through their effective attacks on enemy installations and camps they generated a high degree of political affinity with the local peasants. In the ZIPRA operational areas, many people talk about the guerillas as if they possess mystical power to demolish the enemy forces with ease. Having heard the bangs and seen ‘security force trucks burning and soldiers dying and bleeding’, the peasants regarded the guerillas as possessors of extraordinary power that had never been known before. Since the performers of this ‘mystical power’ were sent to ‘perform it’ by Joshua Nkomo, his name also became associated with some inexplicable legend ‘possessing extraordinary powers to conquer and liberate Zimbabwe’. This view is till widely held in the Matabeleland provinces. In these provinces most people are not in the least keen to listen to anybody other than a representative of Joshua Nkomo. For as far as they are concerned, no one else ‘banged’ the oppressor-forces out of their areas except Nkomo (through ZIPRA).

So through the bangs of bazookas and the rattling of gunfire, ZIPRA reviv-ed and revitalised not only the ZAPU — Patriotic Front Party but also the determination of the peasants to support the struggle. For the bangs were an absolute demonstration of power in physical terms which proved decisive for gaining and sustaining mass support in the operational areas. For ZIPRA, there was no other way because they did not have a propaganda machinery nor a robust political commissariat to systematise political teaching in the population. Nevertheless, their operational areas became as impenetrable as those under ZANLA control, and they remained so up to the time of elections in February 1980.

However, the cease-fire agreement signed at Lancaster House on 21 December 1979, unveiled many surprises for the Patriotic Front Party of
Joshua Nkomo. As the guerillas checked in at the Assembly Points it became evident that ZANLA forces constituted about two thirds of the total number of the assembled guerillas. PF leaders modified their original claims but still maintained that they would emerge with more seats than any other party. They assumed that the allegations of intimidation of voters by the ZANLA forces were true; that the UANC was unpopular; that other parties were regionally based marginal and unknown to the people; and that, therefore, the people would vote for them as the party that preached peace, national unity and reconciliation.

To all intents and purposes the above stance constituted the main theme of PFP’s campaign speeches at mass rallies and other election meetings. Mass rallies were the major means of displaying PFP popular support and the main platform through which the leaders delivered PFP’s election message and promises. To underline the importance of rallies, PFP organised and held not less than twelve rallies in Matabeleland North alone, three of these addressed by Nkomo himself. In Matabeleland South there were also mass rallies, including the most important of all in PFP’s campaign when Nkomo spoke to perhaps 250,000 people at Njelele mountain at Kezi, the ‘Sinai’ of Zimbabwe where Mwari (god) once lived and spoke to his children.

Campaign teams were formed for each of the Provinces and in turn for each administrative district and on down to a branch and cell level. They arranged public meetings, distributed publicity and in the Matabeleland Provinces at least, carried on detailed instructions of how to vote and what the PFP symbol was. The key members of these teams were old guard cadres from the 1960s, many of them having been in prison or exile much of the time since 1964. Part of their role was to keep ‘their’ areas free of intruders from other parties. Not surprisingly, though these stalwarts did their best, they were out of touch and their impact was limited outside Matabeleland.

The Contest Between ZANU and ZAPU
Under their new guises of ZANU-PF and PFP, the two wings of the former Patriotic Front were not only locked into an electoral contest with UANC and with the Rhodesian authorities they had been fighting for so long but by their decision to stand as separate parties (taken at the end of the Lancaster House Conference at the initiative of some ZANU leaders) they were competing against each other. The results (see Table I above) indicate, however, that the competition was limited in the sense that each got overwhelming support in some electoral districts and virtually no support at all in others. Moreover as Table II below shows the areas of overwhelming support for ZANU were in Mashonaland and other Shona-speaking regions, and for PFP were in Matabeleland. It is this pattern that we shall seek now to investigate.

In fact, we may broadly divide the various provinces into three categories: those overwhelmingly supporting ZANU-PF, those that were overwhelmingly PFP, and those which were divided. In the first category we have Victoria, Mashonaland Central and Manicaland in which all seats went to ZANU-PF. Then in the provinces of Matabeleland North and South fifteen of the sixteen seats went to the PFP. Of the remaining three provinces, one Mashonaland East (including Salisbury) was only marginally split, 14 seats
Table II: Percentage Composition of African Population by Language, 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Shona Speaking %</th>
<th>ZANU-PF’s % of Vote</th>
<th>Ndebele Speaking %</th>
<th>PFP’s % of Vote</th>
<th>Other Tongues %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland Central</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East (incl. Salisbury)</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland North</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland South</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Population figures are taken from 1969 Census. Whereas overall numbers in each Province may have changed greatly the proportions speaking the different languages may not have changed much.)

to ZANU-PF — 80% of the poll and 2 to the UANC. Somewhat more dispersed was Mashonaland West (6 seats to ZANU-PF with 71% of the poll and one each to the PFP and UANC). The only province that was more genuinely split was the Midlands where both parties that had fought the war divided the spoils, with ZANU-PF taking 8 seats and the PFP 4 seats. These divided electoral districts, especially the latter two, might repay some closer scrutiny.

Two factors probably contributed to these less than unanimous outcomes. While both Mashonaland West and Midlands contained some TTLs which had considerable guerilla presence, they also both contained areas where the guerillas had only marginally penetrated or had entered very recently. This was particularly so in the extensive white reserves — the rich farmlands centred around Sinoia, in Mashonaland West, and the mining areas scattered over much of Midlands Province. Even in these white owned and controlled areas, where the African population consisted of labourers, often living in compounds, many of them Mozambicans and Malawians, guerilla influence was not unknown. But essentially the two parties of the Patriotic Front were moving into these areas during the elections if not from scratch, then without the grass roots structures discussed earlier. Thus Nathan Shamayurira, one of the candidates in Mashonaland West, told us that ‘ZANU-PF has only just moved into the Sinoia area and have very little infrastructure’. In some areas then, the main party/parties have come into existence only recently, and existed much more as formal party machines geared to the election, than para-guerilla bodies. Thus the absence of strong grass roots structures, and a limited guerilla presence, among a high percentage of ‘captive’ voters in the white towns, farms and mines perhaps explains the more mixed voting and the relative success of UANC. The same factors would also operate in the Salisbury area of Mashonaland East.

A second factor in these two electoral districts is that they also included some areas where ZANLA had been operating and others where ZIPRA had established itself. And indeed along the ‘borders’ there had recently been contestation for control. Thus in Gokwe District in the Midlands, among some pockets of Shona speakers, ZIPRA control had been undermined by Muzorewa government auxiliaries in 1979 and then during the campaign by ZANU-PF, operating purely as an election organisation. Con-
verseley, Shamayurira claimed that in Uringwe TTL in Mashonaland West the ZIPRA presence was sufficiently strong that when ZANU-PF came to open its offices this year, they were soon burned down. There are then, some regions of the country which were not and are still not unequivocally involved with one party and where genuine contestation on the ground occurred, and may well continue to do so.

What remains to explain, however, is the basic split between ZANU's sweep of the eastern provinces and PFP's strong base of support in the two Matabeleland provinces. Two explanations have been offered. The first puts the vote down to 'tribalism'. The second is put forward in Zimbabwe in the commonly heard slogan 'the vote followed the gun', meaning that people in an area voted overwhelmingly for whichever wing of the Patriotic Front had liberated or had presence in their area.

Before exploring the validity of these and other explanations it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the all too instinctive evocation of 'tribe' as a factor. The overall figures do clearly show a general tendency for Shona speakers to vote ZANU-PF and Ndebele speakers for PFP. But it is not clear how an assertion that the 'voting was tribal' is an explanation of the observed voting pattern rather than just a way of summarising that pattern. 'Tribalism' does offer an explanation if by the term is meant a certain 'primordial loyalty' which exists in the mind of Zimbabwe Africans which is what causes them to vote in the observed way. Apart from the problem of how we test for the existence of such inherent attitudes, there are other difficulties with this as an explanation. First, it cannot be reduced to the simplistic notion that Shona and Ndebele voters left to their own devices just vote for one of their own: the ZANU-PF candidates in Matabeleland (like Canaan Banana, now the President and Enos Nkala, now Finance Minister) and the PFP candidates in Mashonaland (like Chinamano the party's Vice-President) were 'locals'; and for that matter Nkomo, the symbol of PFP, comes from the Kalanga, a small minority group, anyway. The 'tribal' explanation can only only mean that voters voted 'their' party — which presupposes that one party was identified with one language group. This may well have been the case in Zimbabwe, but if so what has to be investigated is the prior process whereby that identification came about and not some inherent 'tribal' attitude of the masses. Of course that could point us back to our other common explanation: that the identification simply came about as a result of different areas of guerilla operation. But any explanation of how this process of identification came about has to be a complex one given the fact that both parties eschewed an explicitly 'tribal' appeal and sought a national following. While the guerilla experience was a factor, as we shall argue, the process may well have other roots in other political experiences. Attributing the voting pattern to 'tribal' attitudes on the part of the people overlooks the possibility, always likely in Africa and, we shall argue, very much the case in Zimbabwe, that the appeal to tribal loyalty was something initiated from the leaders not the masses. A final answer to the simplistic assumption of an instinctive tribalist orientation by voters is given by the fate of some of the minor parties that contested the election on the basis between Karanga, Manyika, Zezuru and Ndau that reportedly had figure in earlier divisions within ZANU. The National Front of Zimbabwe (NFZ) for instance, did make explicit appeals to Karanga
separatism in its publicity in the predominantly Karanga, Victoria Province. The Zimbabwe Democratic Party (ZDP) similarly made a bid to Zezuru voters but both received infinitesimal support, even in their local areas. So we are still left with more a question than an explanation: why and how did the identification of each of the two major parties with one of the major language groups come about?

To explore this we must briefly look at the history of interaction between the two movements. When ZANU was formed in 1963 by a breakaway ZAPU group, most of the internal nationalist structures present inside the country remained with ZAPU. We have already seen that the leadership of ZAPU appears to have cherished the illusion that they continued to command this support, such support took a further jolt from one result of the crisis inside the ZAPU leadership in 1970/71. This could not have happened at a worse time for the movement, which remained incapable of launching an effective military presence for several years. The timing was unfortunate for them, because in 1970 the Mozambican liberation movement, FRELIMO, crossed the Zambezi River in the Mozambique province of Tete, thereby considerably extending the length of Rhodesia's border vulnerable to guerilla entry. FRELIMO was at the time formally in a diplomatic alliance with ZAPU, together with the ANC of South Africa, the MPLA of Angola, SWAPO of Namibia and the PAIGC of Portuguese Guinea. ZAPU, therefore, would have been the natural choice for collaboration with FRELIMO. The Mozambican movement was expanding into liberated areas and had the capacity to grant 'safe' passage to the Zimbabwe nationalists into the northeast, and later the east and south east of their country. ZAPU's leadership crisis was so severe that the movement was unable to avail itself of the opportunity FRELIMO presented and ZANU stepped into the breach. Young people coming out of Zimbabwe increasingly joined ZANU and the movement's influence spread rapidly. But their ability to take advantage of this opportunity of moving into the north east of the country from 1972 and the further extension of those opportunities, once the whole of Mozambique became independent and available as a rear base, meant also that ZANLA's areas of operation were for many year predominantly in the Shona-speaking provinces. The politicisation of the people that had become a crucial dimension of their strategy was taking place in the Shona language. Hence the party-language group identification was being reinforced.

Earlier developments at the level of leadership and organisation had meant that already an even higher proportion of Shona speakers than might be expected were recruited to ZANU leadership and cadre positions. The initial breakaway had not been exclusively on tribal lines by any means. It would be accurate to say that perhaps proportionately more the new ZANU leaders were Shona, through ZANU at that stage remained very mixed. But the pattern at the leadership level changed during the period of exile. The 1970 split within ZAPU was one where the rival factions did make tribal appeals. Many Shona-speaking guerillas quit ZAPU and joined ZANU in frustration, and the Chikerema leadership group, broke away but later combined with some ZANU dissidents to form FROLIZI; however, that was regarded as little more than grouping of Zezuru politicians. Subsequent splits within ZANU were not along the Shona-Ndebele divide, but that divi-
sion was still very roughly coincidental with ZANU-ZAPU in the mid-1970s and attempts to bring the two groups together in ZIPA in 1976 and in the Patriotic Front have ultimately proved unsuccessful.

This brief survey suggests that the parties were not exclusively based on one language group in terms of leaders or members at the original divide, and that the tendency towards identification with one 'tribe’ has come about through stages during the years of exile and banning, importantly as a result of factional infighting among leaders, but also through the actual pattern of fighting on the ground. What needs still to be explored is whether and how such identification transferred itself to the people. One way to further clarify how significant a factor has been the symbolic identification of members of one language group with a particular party as opposed to the actual links between people and a guerilla army during the course of the war, is to look at those exceptional pockets where the guerillas present in the area were not from the party normally associated with the local language group. As the British Electoral Commission has refused to reveal the detailed breakdown of voting by district or polling station within the eight provinces, the evidence is only suggestive, but we nevertheless undertook a close look at Matabeleland South province, nearly a third of which was infiltrated by ZANLA forces. How then did PFP re-establish itself in spite of an effective presence of the ZANLA forces over some year? The ZANLA guerillas established their politico-military structures in the entire Filabusi District, most of rural Essexvale, just under half of Beitbridge, a ‘good portion’ of rural Gwanda, a ‘sizeable’ slice of Kezi and a ‘pocket’ of rural Plumtree, according to reports we received from the Provincial Commissioner’s office. The typical ZANLA base area committees, mujibas and chibwidos were established to involve the masses in the struggle. Officials estimate that the proportion of people affected in the Province was roughly as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of District</th>
<th>Estimated Voters</th>
<th>Estimated Proportion of Voters under ZANLA control</th>
<th>Potential Pro-ZANU-PF Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kezi</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plumtree</td>
<td>20,100</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beitbridge</td>
<td>40,300</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>16,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gwanda</td>
<td>48,600</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>7,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filabusi</td>
<td>39,400</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>35,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essexvale</td>
<td>22,200</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>12,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>191,000</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>73,900 (equivalent to 2.32 seats out of 6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The accuracy of these figures cannot be guaranteed but they at least help to pose the problem, and may prompt further inquiry. If people had simply 'voted the gun' ZANU-PF should have received at least two seats, whereas they received none. The irony was that in Matabeleland North, where there seems to have been little ZANLA presence, they won one seat — most likely from voters in Bulawayo city.

The evidence suggests that after gaining initial support, one ZANLA slogan
'Pasi na Nkomo' (down with Nkomo) generated intense resentment amongst the local peasants. Peasants attended base meetings, sang ZANU-PF songs and shouted ZANU-PF slogans as directed. But to shout *Pasi na Nkomo* some people felt was too much. As one man described it:

When the ZANLA guerillas arrived here, we welcomed them. We pledged our support to the cause they were fighting for. They demanded *sadza* (maize porridge); we gave them. They called us to their meetings; we attended. But we were shocked to be told to say, *Pasi na Nkomo*; denounce a man who has fought and suffered together with Mugabe for the freedom of our country? Is he not the founder of African nationalism in Zimbabwe? Worse still: when we tried to resist saying the slogan, we became subjected to the most humiliating treatment ever. I cannot trust you to tell you all the details. Just take it from me that people here paid very heavily for refusing to denounce Nkomo. Maybe we will forget it now that the leaders are talking about reconciliation.

This statement is identical to others made by people who once lived under ZANLA control in Matabeleland South Province. The ZANLA commanders in the area might not have noticed that the local people deeply revered Nkomo like a 'spiritual' leader. So what would have been a wholehearted welcome turned into hatred for ZANLA. They earned themselves a nickname called *O-pasi* (the 'down' ones). Furthermore, the local people's resentment gradually transformed itself into a solid form of silent resistance that projected itself through the formation of unnoticeable pro-PFP counter-structures. A peasant from Filabusi District gave a graphic description of the germination of these counter-structures:

We gradually formed ourselves into small groups consisting of only those who had the same attitude against ZANLA slogans and treatment. When the election campaign was launched, we quickly made covert contacts with PFP officials in Bulawayo and Gwanda. We were issued with bundles of model ballot papers. *O-pasi* too brought theirs and taught us how to vote for *Jongwe* (cock) — the ZANU-PF election symbol. We accepted both lots. The Njelele National Rally pumped new life in us. *Mdala* (old man) Nkomo made us feel fresh and confident. After that rally the pro-PFP structures grew rapidly to cover all former ZANLA base areas. To be safe we had to be double-faced. Of course ZAPU blundered by not sending its guerillas to cover our area during armed struggle. In any case if ZANLA had treated us well, we would have had no reason to dislike them.

So the politicisation process of ZANLA produced opposites here; a 'double-face' one to be presented to ZANLA cadres when the conditions demanded it; the other, well concealed from ZANLA, to be presented to PFP. The ZANU-PF structures collapsed or just ceased to function and when ZANU-PF election agents were posted to the area from the Headquarters in Salisbury, they found no committees at all. Local people were not so afraid to shun the civilian wing of ZANU-PF. So there was no response and the intended public meetings did not take place.

On the basis of what the local people said, the underlying causes of the collapse of the ZANU-PF structures in Matabeleland South Province could be summed up as: (a) an immutable loyalty of the local people to Joshua Nkomo as a national leader — exhibited by their refusal to say *Pasi na Nkomo*; (b) a backlash against ZANU-PF alleged ill-treatment when local people refused to denounce Nkomo; (c) a revival and activation of PFP support reinforced by the Njelele National Rally addressed by Nkomo himself.

However, an important question still remains: the *Pasi na Nkomo* slogan was one of the major ZANLA slogans at meetings throughout the country. Why was it resented so bitterly in Matabeleland South and not in other provinces?
Part of the answer might be revealed in this statement by a local teacher:

I would have voted for ZANU-PF if O-pasi had treated me and my family properly. But they did not treat us in a good way. They tried to compel us to speak Shona. They were ruthless on those who asked why. All the slogans and songs were in Shona and they were not be translated into Sindebele. Every thing tended to ‘change’ us to Shona. Yes, O-pasi told us that Nkomo had been shown to be unreliable by negotiating with Smith in 1976. They allege that he had a secret meeting with Smith in Lusaka without informing his comrade, Robert Mugabe. They said at the Lusaka meeting Nkomo wanted to give up the struggle if Smith promised him a high position in government. For doing this he was no longer fit to be a leader. That might be so, but then why did Mugabe and Nkomo remain co-leaders of the Patriotic Front Alliance if ZANU was unhappy with his way of doing this? At the top the leaders are working together but at the bottom we are told to denounce one of them. Why?

There was thus an attempt, not without considerable basis in fact, to justify the denunciation of Nkomo, which was in turn rejected by listeners on rational grounds. But especially revealing are: first, the statements of the importance of language and culture: the insensitivity of ZANLA cadres’ insistence on the use of Shona and the reaction by local people to reassert their own cultural identity; and second, the statement ‘going back to my original party’ — an expression that was common in the areas controlled by ZANLA — and which suggests that for ordinary people there had been an identification of the parties with language groups for some years. The fact that elsewhere in the two Provinces, ZIPRA forces who controlled areas proclaimed Nkomo as the symbol of their struggle makes it easy to understand voting in those areas, but it also provided an important alternative symbol for voters to latch onto in ZANLA-controlled areas and in the city and white farms where no guerillas had penetrated.

Another set of circumstances also probably affected people’s symbolic identification of the parties in the Province and especially in Bulawayo. The conflicts at leadership level and the symbols of personality and language that they used to appeal to the masses, and the guerilla contact we have referred to, but these were not the only dimensions of political activity. It is now clear that there developed a major tribal fissure between the Ndebeles and Shonas in 1976 in Bulawayo. Football matches conceived and begat tribalism through the tribally inclined teams: the Matabele Highlanders, supported mainly by the Ndebeles; the Mashonaland Football Club (now known as the Zimbabwe Saints) supported mainly by the Shonas. Both of these teams are Bulawayo based. The Ndebele slogan on behalf of the Highlanders is Sitshilamoya-Bozo (punitive twisting of opponent’s soul). The Shona slogan for the team was Chiwororo (punitive fixing of the opponent).

The Sitshilamoya and Chiwororo movements crystallised into concrete politically-motivated tribal battalions. Each claimed to be the legitimate representative of the entire tribal grouping from which its football team derived its name. The two movements attracted large numbers of youth mainly according to their tribal origins. Thus the Sitshilamoya group claimed Joshua Nkomo as its leader while the Chiwororo became pro-Muzorewa. But Nkomo rebuked and denounced both groups and, in a bid to defuse tension between the two, he renamed the Mashonaland Football Club, ‘Zimbabwe Saints’. He declared Sitshilamoya-Bozo illegal as it bedevilled the cause of national unity. The two groups lessened their public provocation against each other. In private, however, in the streets, pubs, schools, and in
places of work the groups retained their hostile stances to each other. This trend produced more far-reaching deadly effects than the leadership of the nationalist movements had realised. Young men and women went out of the country with these tribalist tendencies in their world outlook. Those who stayed behind were no exception.

So when Nkomo was negotiating with Smith in 1976 the Chiwororo movement highlighted it as the most notorious attempt at sell out since Lobengula (see James Chikerema’s Press Statement 1977). Also the April 1979 election was regarded by the Ndebeles as a Chiwororo sell-out. The tribal self-preservation element expressed itself clearly in the vote for Kaisa Ndiweni’s party (the United National Federal Party — UNFP) in the 1979 election. Here the Ndebeles either boycotted the elections or turned out to vote for Kaisa, not because he had attractive election promises, but because he presented himself as Nkomo’s regent as well as a legitimate custodian of Ndebeleism in the face of a Chiwororo predominance. So when Nkomo returned to Zimbabwe Kaisa stayed in the electoral ring. But the Chiwororo versus Sitshilamoya pattern was to be repeated under different conditions and different forms. The major parties in the contest were those that had led guerilla forces, but as neither presented any alternative ideological principles during the campaign, the Chiwororo versus Sitshilamoya-Bozo patterns re-emerged.

Conclusions
The brief survey of patterns in the Matabeleland South areas that had had a ZANLA presence and of the way symbolic identification affects many areas of life in and around Bulawayo suggests that ordinary voters in that part of the country did tend to identify each party with one or other language-group. In most other areas of course the two factors, the ethnic identification of party and the history of guerilla presence, whatever their relative weight, would have reinforced each other. What is also certain is that the actual voting pattern is likely to confirm the identification of party with language/region: at the level of people’s perceptions — there will be a tendency for voters to see this as ‘our’ party; at the leadership level — Shona politicians in PFP (like Chinamano) and Ndebele in ZANU-PF will not have local bases; and at the organisational level — both parties will first and foremost organise to hang on to the support they have.

Such likely trends point to one unfortunate legacy of the nationalist struggle and of the election. If the two parties remain separate and PFP is able to hang on to its strong minority support (backed by its guerillas), then the pattern of party politics likely to emerge will be the all too familiar one in Africa of tribal-factionalism as a platform for in fighting among the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. The form of organised politics will be critically divisive, thus giving openings to South African and other enemies of Zimbabwean liberation, elitist — the preserver of privileged classes, and paternalistic with only blind, ‘tribal’ loyalty being demanded of workers and peasants not participation. Unfortunately some indications suggest that these are indeed the trends in the post-Independence period. The PFP immediately set about recruiting a formal, card-carrying party membership especially in areas where it got electoral support. Although its leaders are in government its stance is often that of an ‘opposition’ and many party
statements already refer to organising for the next election. The ZIPRA guerillas have also been encouraged to maintained a separate identity. And Nkomo, as ever all things to all men, seems intent on aggregating all discontents from whatever social class, even to the point of supporting criticisms that Mugabe’s government is not doing enough for the masses over issues such as land, while at the same time he and others in his party seem no less intent on amassing personal wealth than other politicians and would-be bourgeois. On the other hand, some ZANU-PF ministers are doing little to win over the Ndebele minority or halt the drift into ethnic politics by their inflammatory statements calling for the imposition of one party rule.

Given such actions it is little wonder that one of the ZIPRA guerillas was quoted (New African, December 1980) in these terms as tension mounted in one suburb of Bulawayo, which eventually lead to open fighting between ZANLA and ZIPRA guerillas:

Hatred is being brought about by our own leaders; it is going to bring hatred between the people of Zimbabwe. People are being kept apart by the leaders.

As we have briefly indicated, such charges could have been levelled against leaders at several other critical moments in the history of the nationalist movement — indeed, one small ray of hope lies in the fact that such charges have actually been made before by those engaged in the struggle. And in fact the one basic point that has to be made about the issue of ‘tribalism’ is that there is no reason to believe it is endemic to Zimbabwe society. There are cultural differences in this as in any other society and there is a practical problem of language policy, but beyond that awareness of ‘tribe’ will only be kept alive by leaders with no other basis of appeal to the exploited classes. The problem of ‘tribe’ could be solved in the process of the two organisations coming together — although for the moment this seems unlikely.

The issue of the two parties is inextricably linked to another vital dimension of post-independence politics — participation. We have concentrated in fact in charting another legacy of the nationalist struggle that was revealed in the elections: the links between party and people, and the popular organs that exist at local level. The potential of such mass mobilisation is great — as mechanisms for the tasks of reconstruction and development, as alternatives to the bureaucratic structures such as those of the headmen, chiefs and district commissioners, as defenders of a realm which will remain threatened by South African sub-imperialism for some years to come. Moreover, to the extent that organised politics takes a plural, electoral-competitive and inevitably elitist and ‘tribal’ factional form the possibilities inherent in the popular structures bequeathed from the war are unlikely to be realised. And yet, unless they do, there will be little in the way of active, organised and systematic political weight to throw against the forces for neo-colonialism that are represented in the settler state structure which still remains, in the settler and foreign capitalist interests, in the aid agencies clustering to give advice, in the necessary tactical compromise with South Africa, and in the existing and would-be African bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie now faced with the prospect of taking over rich pickings in an elaborate and sophisticated economy. Fortunately, there are some signs that
the popular struggle is still being joined. The wave of 'unofficial' strikes that followed independence has continued to the end of 1980 and seems to be in support of demands for a greater say and for basic changes of structures as well as better wages. In the rural areas, 'illegal' occupations of land are occurring, workers and squatters are refusing to move off abandoned white farms. In these and many other ways the workers and peasants are taking action themselves and also thereby imposing awkward but edifying choices for the politicians as to whether they back the people or the functionaries and norms of the white state apparatuses.
The Prospects for Socialist Transition in Zimbabwe

‘Peter Yates’

This article argues there is no alternative in the short run to the compromise tactics that ZANU(PF) has had to adopt in the few months that it has been in power; but it also seeks to discover whether they will, in the future, become its long run strategy. The movement’s guiding principles at this stage of Zimbabwe’s struggle have been summed up by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe as ‘Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Resettlement’. At the same time, in its election manifesto, ZANU(PF) set its goals for Zimbabwe’s future as ‘to reconstruct Zimbabwe’s economy and evolve a socialist pattern in which the country’s resources are fully tapped for the common benefit of all the people of Zimbabwe’ (emphasis added).

The Inherited Situation

Having achieved political independence by the transfer of state power from a racist settler minority, the protegé and local representative of British colonialism, to a democratically elected majority government, ZANU(PF) rightly argues that the stage of national democratic revolution in Zimbabwe has been successfully achieved. ZANU(PF) has now embarked upon the socialist revolutionary phase. But then when we look at the existing socio-economic system we find that the means of production are privately owned to an extent where over 90% of production and trade in agriculture, manufacturing, construction, distribution, finance, mining, insurance and real estate is carried out by foreign individuals or multinational corporations (MNCs) operating through their South African headquarters. Zimbabweans own and control a meagre 10% of the productive capacity of the economy. About 66% of Zimbabwe’s labour force is engaged in traditional or small commodity production. It is in the overcrowded, unproductive and underdeveloped rural areas that the bulk of Zimbabwe’s population lives — nearly 5 million people — a subsistence life characterized by large-scale illiteracy, fatalism, despair, ignorance, disease, hunger and poverty. In 1976, 680,000 peasant families and 6,682 white settler farmers occupied 45 million acres each, as stipulated by successive colonial land laws.

Of course, the situation in the peasant areas was worsened by the institutionalized and planned destruction of peasant agricultural capacity by the
The racist Smith government and its Muzorewa puppet regime as a means of denying guerillas food, through the notorious military manoeuvre called 'Operation Turkey'. So called 'protected villages' were established. Many peasants fled from war zones to towns, cities and neighbouring countries to seek refuge. Estimates put the exodus from the rural areas between one and two million people out of the country's population of just over 7 million. Thus, the impact of the colonial and racist, enemy military operations was widespread and disruptive to the peasant economy and its social fabric. Clearly then, there is need on the part of the new ZANU(PF)-dominated government of national unity to correct the white-settler peasant imbalance in the rural and agrarian sectors. For the vast majority of Zimbabweans, the armed liberation struggle was fought over one crucial issue — land. Thus, for the labouring masses, the question of land remains paramount. There is a compelling argument for structural changes as well as a short-term crisis of serious proportions which the national coalition government cannot delay tackling.

While wages and salaries accounted for about 60% of gross domestic income in 1979 (which the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe regards as 'high in terms of African levels of development') the distribution of this income, is, however, highly skewed in terms of class, group, race and sex differentials. In the public sector itself, the ratio between the highest and lowest paid workers is 1:75. Ten per cent of the wage and salary earners account for more than half the wage bill throughout the economy. The lower paid workers hardly receive enough wages to support themselves and their families. Under colonialism, widespread race and sex discrimination prevailed in employment, payment and promotion of workers. Wage differentials between unskilled (Africans) and skilled (whites) ranged from 21 to 1 in agriculture, 7 to 1 in manufacturing with an average of about 11 to 1 in all branches of the economy. African women received about half of what their male counterparts got. Women in general, but African women in particular, were excluded from a wide range of higher paid employment opportunities, despite the fact that with the armed liberation struggle an increasing number of them were directly supporting their families. Only 4% of workers in manufacturing industry are women and in this branch wages average nearly four times more than in agriculture where 65% of women wage earners are employed.

The Immediate Tactics: Towards People's Democracy

How then does the government of national unity in general, and ZANU(PF) in particular, hope to bring about a socialist revolution in Zimbabwe? Obviously it cannot be achieved overnight in a country which is economically dependent on international monopoly capital for investment, trade, aid, markets, capital, technology, research and development and which is

*Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Quarterly Economic & Statistical Review, Vol.1 No.1, September 1980, (Salisbury), page 7. In a following paragraph the Report admits the existence of the large income differential between racial and social groups. It states, '... in 1979 an average wage of just over ZS400 per annum, in the predominantly black and unskilled agricultural sector, contrasts with that of ZS5300 in the largely white and skilled financial, insurance and real estate sector'.

dominated, controlled and manipulated by international bourgeois forces opposed to the new social order. How fast can radical changes be achieved given an independence constitution with rigidly entrenched clauses designed to prevent those changes, in a society which is very fragmented, disunited, divided along ethnic lines and organized into more than ten political organizations with antagonistic aims? In any case are such changes feasible given the present socio-political climate both internally and externally?

The ultra-leftists both inside and outside the country as well as some ZAPU elements have accused ZANU(PF), unjustly, of having ‘sold our to imperialism’ and of having turned counter-revolutionary, on the evidence of its initial concessions. What these critics fail to understand is the nature and character of ZANU(PF) as a political organisation. The critics regard ZANU(PF) as a proletarian or workers’ party guided by and following a Marxist-Leninist political line in the traditions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communist Party. Concretely, ZANU(PF) is a united front of various ideological and political trends ranging from feudal, capitalist, social democrats/liberals, to Marxism-Leninist. Its membership incorporates all social classes found in Zimbabwean society today — traditionalists, petty-bourgeois, the big capitalists, workers, peasants, revolutionaries and other sub groups. Its leadership consists of the representatives of the petty-bourgeoisie: intellectuals, social democrats, traditionalists, and a few Marxists-Leninists. The political line and programme of ZANU(PF) inevitably reflects the class interests of its leadership and general membership. This is to say that in practice, the movement’s conflicting class interests and ideas have to be reconciled by its leadership in a way which, (a) causes the movement’s practice to be contradictory to its theory and stated objectives; (b) results in a lack of clarity and precision in the articulation of the movement’s general policies and programmes. It is thus unrealistic to expect a mass political organization like ZANU(PF) to behave like a revolutionary proletarian party whether in or out of power. The mass organization character of ZANU(PF) puts limitations and, in certain cases, even brakes on its ability to theorise and to formulate appropriate strategies and tactics in its continuing struggle to achieve economic control and reconstruct the economy along socialist lines.

Another error which the critics of ZANU(PF) make is their failure to analyse and comprehend the objective situation in Zimbabwe today. Of all the political movements in Zimbabwe, ZANU(PF) stands out as the most progressive and patriotic organization fighting for the true interests of the labouring masses. The rest of the other organizations have in one way or other already — at various stages — discredited themselves by collaborating with, or being vehicles for, the class enemies of the people of Zimbabwe. Even some of the ZANU(PF) ‘detainees’ in Mozambique (the former ZIPA Commanders and the Gumbo-Hamadziripi groups), who were thought to be ‘radicals’ and ‘communists’, have aligned with the British colonialists, South African racists, and the Muzorewa/Sithole puppets against ZANU(PF) and the toiling masses at the time of the independence elections. These former ‘communists’ have actually turned traitors and are now fighting on the side of the class enemies of the people of Zimbabwe. An objective analysis of Zimbabwean society and social classes shows that it is wishful thinking and suicidal to establish an independent workers’ party im-
mediately. This is why all patriots and revolutionaries have to rally behind ZANU(PF) and assist it in shaping clear policies, programmes, tactics and strategies in the continuing struggles.

Notwithstanding the shortcomings of ZANU(PF), outlined above, the movement has shown that it has the dynamism, potential and ability to overcome the problems confronting it both as a political organization and as a government. There is no question of ZANU(PF) achieving radical changes or the socialist revolution in the short run. After the armed liberation struggle and having achieved freedom and independence, ZAPU(PF) has to go through a number of stages before arriving at the socialist revolution. The first phase is that of People's Democracy where the movement's strategy is political as opposed to the military one in the previous phase. Tactically, ZANU(PF) has to show that its concepts of reconciliation and national unity work. As the Zimbabwean Minister of Labour and Social Services, Comrade Kumbirai Kangai put it, reconciliation refers to the establishment of a new political order based on democracy and majority rule.

It is on the foundation of the principle (of reconciliation) that we are finding it possible to transform groupist objectives and inclinations into collectivist, popular and socialist objectives and aspirations... Our people as a whole are quickly transforming by accepting the principles of (national) unity and reconciliation (Herald, 20 December 1980).

Obviously, ZANU(PF)'s concept of reconciliation does not mean the retention of the status quo — the continued settler privileges and exploitation and oppression of the majority that many remnants of colonial-settlerism would like to see. In short, conceptually, reconciliation entails forgetting and forgiving the past between the two antagonistic sides during the armed liberation struggle; avoiding reprisals against the losers by the victors in settling old scores; starting afresh in shaping new legal and social relationships in the process of realignment of political and social forces. It is only under these conditions that Comrade Kangai speaks about the possibility of transforming ‘groupist objectives and aspirations’ in a new political order based on democracy, national unity and majority rule.

Thus, in forging national unity and reconciliation, ZANU(PF) has successfully tried to avoid premature and direct confrontation with the well-organized internal and external enemies and to prevent military intervention from the racist Pretoria regime. Tactically, ZANU(PF) is winning over to the side of the masses such groups as the former Rhodesian African Rifles, the majority of the ex-colonial black policemen and prison warders. The teachers, African businessmen, labour unions, workers in large cities and towns, many of whom used to be Muzorewa, the Rev Ndabaningi Sithole and Nkomo supporters are shifting their political allegiance to ZANU(PF), some genuinely but others opportunistically, of course. Simultaneously, the movement is neutralizing the white hierarchy of the former Rhodesian Army (a case in point is the appointment of General Peter Walls as co-ordinator of the Joint High Command of the ZANLA, ZIPRA and Rhodesian Armies in forming a new integrated National Army of Zimbabwe and his subsequent dismissal from his post and banishment from the country), the all white Rhodesian Light Infantry and the Special Air Services, the white special branch and other state security agencies, while isolating the rabid racists of the RF and the Muzorewa/Sithole stooges and puppets. By adopting such tactics, ZANU(PF) has given itself breathing space to sort
out other urgent problems, consolidate its hold on the state machinery and firmly establish itself amongst the masses by winning control and influence in the trade unions, education, cultural and social groups and the mass media. Up to date, such tactics have kept the wolf at bay, i.e. so far there has been no internal revolt or civil war waged by ZANU(PF)'s opponents, nor the anticipated adventurous military intervention by Pretoria on the side of the remnants of colonial settlerism and its black puppets.

In the current phase of People's Democracy, perhaps covering three to five years, ZANU(PF) has put great emphasis on the need to create national unity. In a speech at Ahmadu Bello University in Kaduna, Nigeria (18 December 1980), Prime Minister Robert Mugabe stated that as a result of the bitter experiences of the armed liberation struggle Zimbabweans had learnt the importance of the weapon of national and international unity. Without unity in the movement and between it and the labouring masses, independence could not have been won. In turn, independence has formed the bond of unity for all the people of Zimbabwe who are prepared to accept the phenomenon of political change. With an organised and united people, no problem is unsurmountable. National unity is, therefore, a devastating weapon in the hands of the toiling masses in bringing about the necessary changes and defeating their enemies, and resisting their manoeuvres.

In the economic sphere, the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the war-damaged economy and the adverse effects of sanctions have been given top priority by ZANU(PF). Since coming to power in April 1980, ZANU(PF) has been repairing, rebuilding and reopening socio-economic infrastructure damaged during the armed liberation war in the rural areas, e.g. schools, clinics, dip tanks, roads, bridges, and administrative centres. It has tried to normalize internal trade by assisting rural businessmen re-open shops and grinding mills which were either closed or damaged during the war, and supplying the rural trade network with basic and essential consumer commodities. Externally, the ZANU(PF)-dominated coalition government has taken steps to normalize international trade and attract foreign investment to create more employment opportunities for the 40% of the labour force which is out of work. Economic and diplomatic relations have been re-established with the international community after the period of international isolation under UDI. The question arises, is ZANU(PF) prepared to disengage the country's economic and trade relations of subservience, dependence and unequal exchange from international monopoly capitalism and its South African satellite? If this disengagement is to come, how quickly can we expect it and towards which countries and social systems will it be re-directed? Why does Zimbabwe not reciprocate by importing some goods not locally available in the country from the People's Republic of China after the latter brought $30 millions worth of tobacco here? We shall return to these problems further on.

Meanwhile, it is our contention that ZANU(PF) has been tactically correct in not interfering with private property, or expropriating businesses, estates and other economic enterprises. Neither can we blame ZANU(PF) for not attempting to change or overthrow the Lancaster House independence constitution nor for observing the letter and spirit of that agreement. Various
spokesmen of ZANU(PF) made it clear at the time of the independence negotiations that the movement had been compelled to sign a disagreeable and racist constitution and that ZANU(PF) would change that constitution at the first available opportunity. That position remains unaltered even today. Again, one notices that ZANU(PF) has not attempted to interfere with the inherited colonial judicial system and its courts. The affair of Tekere and his seven aides is a case in point.* Added to this, the fact that ZANU(PF) has so far not forced a one party state on the country and has permitted all political organizations to function means that the movement has built for itself good will, confidence and support from many of the 'doubting Thomases' who always thought ZANU(PF) was a rabid and dogmatic Marxist-Leninist party.

On the international plane, ZANU(PF)'s tactical objective has been to prove to the international (and national) bourgeoisie that it is not subordinate to the Soviet Union or China, but that it is free to choose its own friends and make its own independent decisions on any matter. This has lulled the bourgeoisie, both inside and outside the country, into a sense of ideological and economic security. Diplomatic and economic relations were quickly re-established with the western capitalist countries rather than with the socialist states when ZANU(PF) came into power. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the advantages or disadvantages of this move. The important thing is to note that the bourgeoisie is being neutralized by ZANU(PF) to prevent any possible counter measures they might have taken during the first few months of independence to destabilize the new government economically and politically.

South Africa is Zimbabwe's most hostile neighbour. Being the strongest economic and military power in Africa south of the Sahara, the relations between the two countries take on a sinister and dangerous aspect now that only Namibia and South Africa itself remain bulwarks of white rule in southern Africa. ZANU(PF)'s attitude towards the racist Pretoria regime has so far been to 'live and let live', but breaking diplomatic ties with that country whilst retaining the economic relations — transport, communications, import-export trade and tourism — with South Africa.

Internationally, Zimbabwe condemns the apartheid and Bantustan systems practised by South Africa and supports the struggles of the people of Namibia and South Africa diplomatically, financially and morally through the OAU and other international forums. Because of the unstable political situation in Zimbabwe and the absence of a unified, national regular army at present, ZANU(PF) has not thought it wise as yet to provide rear bases for the military operations of the South African ANC and PAC liberation movements. ZANU(PF) recognises that for its government to participate openly, directly and positively in the South African struggle, its military capability has to match that of South Africa. Moreover, the Zimbabwean masses have to be prepared politically for a protracted and bitter struggle,

*Edgar Tekere (Secretary General of ZANU(PF) and Minister of Manpower Planning & Development) and seven aides were arrested in August 1980 and charged with the alleged murder of a white farmer and attempted murder of some National Army soldiers. They were tried and acquitted of both charges in December 1980 on the grounds that they were genuinely suppressing terrorism in their operation on the dead white manager's farm near the capital.
more intense, ruthless and brutal than the War of Chimurenga which toppled the settler colonialists in Zimbabwe itself. This is the view of the more far-sighted ZANU(PF) leadership which feels, correctly, that the independence of Zimbabwe is incomplete without the total liberation of South Africa and Namibia. Since UDI, South African capital has increasingly dominated the Zimbabwean political economy in trade, brewing, petroleum products, insurance, agriculture, manufacturing, mining, tourism and technology. So far, ZANU(PF) has not done anything to upset the South Africa racists by way of expropriation of South African-owned enterprises, diverting trade routes away from South Africa to Mozambique ports, or invoking economic and trade sanctions. South African firms and subsidiaries are being allowed to operate in Zimbabwe freely without any government interference. The South African investors and parent companies of Zimbabwean subsidiaries have not complained. For them ZANU(PF) is a political organization of logic and pragmatism that does not threatened their economic interests in any way and should therefore be (grudgingly) encouraged and supported.

But can these attitudes of compromise and conciliation be interpreted as a permanent feature of ZANU's long term economic and political strategy? Should ZANU(PF) have immediately nationalised South African and other foreign enterprises, severed all trade, communication and transport connections with South Africa, and provided rear bases for the ANC and PAC movements on assumption of power? Only sham Marxists and those with left wing ‘infantile disorders’ could answer these questions in the affirmative — because of their failure to analyse the domestic and international situations concretely and objectively, because they divorce theory from practice, engage in utopian thinking and sectarianism while failing to sum up correctly the experiences of ZANU(PF) and of other revolutionary movements in various countries before it.

The above are the tactics and compromises of a political organization that has seriously analyzed its own strengths and weaknesses via-à-vis those of its opponents in a frank and concrete manner. It must be clear to the ZANU(PF) leadership that at this stage its hold on state power is shaky and weak until it has successfully integrated the ZANLA, ZIPRA and the colonial Rhodesian Armies into one united national regular army under a single military command. It is an open secret that so far the police, judiciary, prison services and the public service are under the complete control of personnel from the old social order and that ZANU(PF) has little or no control and influence over these arms of state machinery. Until such time (and this can only be in the long term) as ZANU(PF) can appoint its own cadres into these positions in government (as opposed to mere Africanization as an end in itself), we can expect little significant changes at all. Looking at the economy as a whole, the ZANU(PF) top leadership seems to appreciate the fact that the transformation process from the colonial system of imperialism to a socialist and egalitarian Zimbabwe can only come about as a result of the organization having created, trained and moulded its own large reserve pool of cadres to manage and control cooperatives, collectivized enterprises and the socialist economy. Again here one is talking about long term time perspectives rather than the short run.
Given the manner in which the country achieved its independence, the structure of the economy and its historical perspectives, plus the alignment of forces inside and outside the country which are opposed to ZANU(PF), the initial concessions which the movement made were unavoidable. The internal reactionary forces are still quite powerful and organized; externally, South Africa is ready at the slightest excuse to intervene to overthrow the new ZANU(PF) government. ZANU(PF)’s tactics so far have been correct insofar as they have been aimed at achieving national unity, winning over to its side and that of the masses, the greatest number of former opponents, neutralising the remnants of settlerdom and isolating the most dangerous elements of the people’s struggle.

It is precisely for these reasons that the continuing Zimbabwe revolution has to pass through the current phase of ‘People’s Democracy’ as preparatory ground, laying the foundations and creating conditions leading to a socialist revolution in future. In the People’s Democracy phase, ZANU(PF)’s tactics encompass the introduction as well as the spreading of the democratic process in existing and newly created institutions in all sectors of society and the economy. The tactics also involve the abolition of racial discrimination and the checking of exploitation and oppression of the large masses of our people. These themes are outlined in the general economic policy set out in ZANU(PF)’s election manifesto:

The people’s national liberation struggle has had, as its main objective, the creation of People’s Power... Zimbabwe’s economic resources cannot but belong to the people of Zimbabwe as a whole. Accordingly, their ownership must vest with the people themselves, while their exploitation must serve the people’s common interests.

As ZANU(PF)’s ideological belief is socialism, the manifesto goes on to assert that:

... the achievement of political power by the people will remain hollow in terms of their material development unless it can translate itself in quantitative and qualitative benefits deriving from their economy... ZANU(PF) thus believes in the development of a Socialist Economy. (But) in working towards the socialist transformation of Zimbabwean society, ZANU(PF) Government... recognise(s) (the) historical, social and other existing practical realities of Zimbabwe. One of these existing practical realities is the capitalist system which cannot be transformed overnight (our emphasis). Hence, while a socialist transformation process will be brought about in many areas of the existing economic sectors, it is recognised that private enterprise will have to continue until circumstances are ripe for a socialist change.

In other words, ZANU(PF) clearly realises that the achievement of psychological, social and economic independence can only come about in a step-by-step progression, each new phase being higher than the previous one, rather than being realizable at the stroke of a pen. This involves the waging of struggles against all elements opposed to meaningful change. In the phase of People’s Democracy we can identify a number of important measures being taken by the coalition government under ZANU(PF) in the spheres of industrial relations, local government, education, health and the resettlement of displaced people on the land. We shall look at each briefly in turn.

Social Reforms

In the field of industrial and labour relations, the ZANU(PF) and the government are creating workers’ committees in all firms and institutions,
establishing a new, unified national trade union movement, the ZCTU,* to:
(a) end the colonial divisions and competition among workers and labour
unions which weakened their bargaining positions with employers and led
to much industrial strife; (b) extend, and in some cases, introduce
democratic methods in the election of office-bearers and thus have a trade
union leadership that is responsible to and relates to the grass roots; (c)
facilitate increasing worker participation, with worker responsibility in the
enterprises or industries where they are employed in terms of formulation
and implementation of plans at local levels; (d) provide an educational
forum on industrial, economic and national issues aimed at increasing
labour productivity; (e) improve the bargaining position of workers vis-à-
vis the employers on a national level by demanding standardized wage rates
and working conditions, ensuring equal employment opportunities, pay,
and promotion regardless of sex, ethnicity, class, religion etc., and protec-
ting workers’ interests against arbitrary or discriminatory management; (f)
raise the political and social consciousness of the workers and labour unions
so that they broaden the perspective of their struggles from waging
economic struggles only to acquiring a socialist consciousness.

In the long run, this last aim, if implemented, can be the key to the transfor-
mation of a disintegrated, quarrelsome, undisciplined and unconscious
trade union movement which would mean more than the Minimum Wages
Act of 1980, and the amendment of the colonial Industrial Conciliation
Act, that have occurred, put together. It is imperative for ZANU(PF) to win
the majority support of the workers and the labour movement in the current
phase if at all it is one day going to transform itself into a Worker’s Party
with the working class playing the leadership role in the struggle. In any
case, many of the urban and industrial workers and some unions like
Phineas Sithole’s 60,000 strong textile union were puppet Muzorewa and
Ndabaningi Sithole supporters prior to independence.

Already, town and district administration elections at local government
level have been conducted throughout the country. The trend of results has
been similar to the general elections of February 1980, i.e. ZANU(PF) can-
didates winning overwhelmingly in areas under its political control and
ZAPU doing the same in the west of the country. Candidates of other reac-
tionary groups as the UANC, NFZ, ZANU (Sithole), ZDP, etc., nearly all
failed to gain even a single seat. Elections are still to be conducted in the
politically unstable cities of Salisbury, Chitungwize and Bulawayo. Again,
the aim is to democratize local government by extending the vote to the in-
digenous people and giving them a measure of self-government in the
towns, cities and rural areas. In the towns and cities, ZANU(PF) and its
government have introduced legislation to control rents paid by tenants to
landlords in a bid to reduce the suffering of lower paid workers who used to
pay exorbitant rents for overcrowded and poor tenements.

District Administrative Councils have been vested with local administrative

*The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was set up in September 1980 as an um-
brella organization with the approval of the Ministry of Labour & Social Services, linking the
various trade unions — one for each industry. But at the time of going to press, there were
vicious power struggles in many industries, with established unions refusing to be affiliated to
the ZCTU, and break-away unions supporting the umbrella organization.
and economic development powers at the expense of the colonial District Commissioners and Chiefs. The DCs have lost their former judicial, executive and other powers. Ultimately, they will be phased out, but in the meantime their role is an advisory one to the District Administrative Councils which can ignore, overrule or veto the recommendations of the DCs. The powers of the chiefs which were granted to them by colonial settlerism have also been drastically reduced. They can no longer allocate land or plots in their areas, try minor civil and criminal offences under customary or traditional law and tax their subjects in case or kind. ZANU(PF) has stated that it is not going to appoint any new chiefs to fill vacant chieftaincies, neither is it going to uphold the claims of unpopular chiefs who sided with the colonial white settler regimes in the past. It is doubtful, in fact, if in the long run a ZANU(PF) government would be prepared to continue paying the generous salaries, and fringe benefits granted to chiefs and their entourages during the pre-independence era. The ZANU(PF)’s policy on the institution of chieftaincy, the role and functions of chiefs has been aptly stated by the Minister concerned, Eddison Zvobgo: ‘from now on, government will recognize only those chiefs with popular support amongst their people; the unpopular ones will have to go; furthermore, the central task of the chiefs is a spiritual one linking the dead with the living generations, which is a customary Zimbabwean tradition’. It would appear that the political role of chiefs will be gradually phased out so that they remain figure heads with nominal powers only. However, what is not very clear is whether or not the institution of chief will be abolished in the long run when all matters relating to local administration and development are in the hands of popularly elected District Administrative Councils.

In the sphere of health and medical care, ZANU(PF) is implementing measures to correct the vast racial as well as urban/rural disparities in the allocation of medical resources inherited from the colonial past. All rural health centres and clinics damaged or closed during the armed struggle have been repaired and reopened. Free medical treatment for the low income groups earning less than Z$150 per month is now available. The system of ‘closed’ (European) and ‘open’ (African) hospitals that segregated patients along racial lines has been scrapped with patients from overcrowded African hospitals being transferred to underutilized ‘closed’ hospitals. The new National Health Scheme envisages the abolition of private medical practice in the long run. Its philosophical and ideological basis is to emphasize preventive as opposed to curative aspects of medicine. The new emphasis is thus on primary health care in which 60% of resources are allocated to the rural dwellers who constitute the vast majority of the population of Zimbabwe, and the urban areas get 40%. The Primary Health Care programme encompasses an expanded scheme of immunization, research and development, provision of disease-free water supplies and basic sanitary measures, health education, nutrition as well as education on child spacing. Obviously a sick society cannot raise productivity, nor can its people develop intellectually. Health for the majority of the people can be drastically improved to reduce the high infant mortality rate and raise the life expectancy rate significantly.

In the field of education, so very vital for its ideological impact on the minds of the young and the skills that it provides, ZANU(PF) is introducing
some far-reaching reforms. By the beginning of the 1981 academic year in January, all rural primary and secondary schools closed during the war will have been reopened. The table below summarizes the enrolment figures for schools and University for the years 1979-1981.

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<th>Education Enrolments, 1979-81</th>
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The significance of these figures is that primary school enrolment increased by 54.5% less than one year after Independence and that in 1981 enrolment will more than double the pre-independence figures. There has been a 23% increase in secondary school intake between 1979 and August 1980 and projected enrolment for 1981 will again more than double the figures for 1979. Prior to independence, the student population at the local university was just under 1,000 and yet with the incoming ZANU(PF) government it increased by more than 100%. The 1,300 ‘A-level’ candidates are virtually assured of entry into the local University in 1981 if they do well in their examinations.

There is now free primary education for all children. The next step is to make education compulsory and free from primary to secondary level. The Form I (secondary) intake for 1981 is being quadrupled with the putting into operation of the ‘double session’ system. There were 3,161 primary schools in the country in 1980 with 2,905 in the rural areas and 256 in urban areas. At the same time there were 197 secondary/high schools, 126 of which were privately owned and run and 71 government secondary schools. Of the latter, 28 were ‘Group A’ or European secondary schools, 35 were ‘Group B’, or African secondary schools, and 8 were designated Community secondary schools — something akin to British public schools. For 1981, the government has directed that 60% of all new schools should be in rural areas and 40% in urban areas.

The greatest drawback in implementing the new government education policies is the shortage of teachers, particularly trained teachers, to cope with the increased enrolment of students at all levels. The existing teacher training colleges’ annual output of trained teachers is a meagre 1,073 — 690 primary and 383 secondary teachers. Of the 28,423 primary school teachers in 1979, 8,031 were untrained, 15,290 were semi-trained and only 5,102 were fully trained. At the secondary school level there were 112 untrained, 309 semi-qualified and 3,314 fully trained teachers totalling 3,731 secondary school teachers in 1979.

To overcome the teacher shortage at primary school level, the Ministry of Education and Culture has established, commencing in 1981, the Zimbabwe

*If every child of school-going age attended school in 1981, approximately 2,068,000 would be enrolled in primary.

**The University of Zimbabwe has a tutorial capacity for 9,000 students but because of lack of accommodation on the campus, it has always adopted a restrictive entry policy. The student/staff ratio is low while the exchequer grants are high: for instance in the 1980/81 fiscal year, the University was allocated Z$13 million.
Integrated National Teacher Education Course (ZINTEC) which provides on-the-job practical training with theory taught at a teacher training college alternatively over a period of four years. A new breed of teachers equipped with the weapons of education for liberation, as opposed to ones trained under the colonial education for oppression system will be in a better position to implement the new educational policies of ZANU(PF). A new system of education combined with production is being experimented upon in a number of ZANU(PF)-run schools. If successful the system will be adopted nationally by all schools. The ZINTEC project will produce 2,700 trained teachers a year when it is fully operational. After the first eight years, ZINTEC will have produced 9,900 fully qualified teachers, which is more than the number of trained teachers — primary and secondary — for the whole colonial era. At the same time, the 15,290 semi-qualified primary teachers will have to be upgraded in stages so that they too can be fully trained. As for the secondary school level, the existing teacher training colleges are expanding their facilities to accept some trainee teachers. Only one more secondary teacher training college is being opened in 1981.

We have gone on at some length to describe ZANU(PF)'s tactics in government in this phase of People's Democracy in such spheres as health, education, industrial and labour relations in an attempt to show how the movement is trying to tackle some of the inherited problems of deprivation and oppression while at the same time trying to lay the basis of the new struggle for social, economic and mental decolonization. The heterogeneity of the membership of ZANU(PF) and their diverse class interests and the historical experiences of the movement in the past have guaranteed the dynamism of the organization to date. We therefore, cannot visualize how current ZANU(PF) tactics can eventually evolve into its long run strategies unless something dramatic happens to its organization. We shall return to this theme later on.

The Land Issue and the Prospects for Agrarian Reform

We now turn our attention to the problem of land. Earlier we commented upon the general situation in the rural areas and mentioned some of the problems faced by the millions of peasant producers there. It is worth here quoting at length the views of an irate and frustrated peasant on the land problem in the correspondence columns of the Herald (14 November 1980):

... If reconciliation is to mean anything to the (peasant), land must be simply grabbed from the European farmer and redistributed to the (peasants) crowding in the tribal trust lands. Any student of the land question in this country will tell you that talk of compensation to white farmers is simply ridiculous if it means that our government should pay for such land to the dispossessed farmers. The total area of land allocated to one white family alone in 1892 was about 108,000 acres. Nothing was paid for those lands. Why then should the new ZANU(PF) Government be expected to pay a cent for these lands? In Kenya at independence, the British Government offered loans to Africans so that they could buy back European land from which they had been driven during colonial rule. The results were disastrous and humiliating to the African population. We cannot respect that disaster here. If the international community cannot help the European farmers, our Government has no obligation to do so whatsoever. You do not buy land from which you have been forcibly evicted. That is our guiding principle (emphasis added). Signed Rusununguko Shungudzomwoyo, Umtali, Zimbabwe.

In its election manifesto, ZANU(PF) identified the land and agrarian problem as one of its priority targets in government. It promised speedy collec-
tivization of the peasant agrarian economy, the establishment of collective villages, creation of state farms and the retention of only the efficient, privately-owned plantations and estates. The Manifesto outlined a land reform which would enable the ZANU(PF) Government to acquire as much unused, abandoned, under-utilized land and land owned by absentee landlords as possible for resettling the millions of war-displaced people and creating collectivized agricultural units. In the words of the Manifesto itself:

It is not only anti-people but criminal for any government to ignore the acute land hunger in the country, especially when it is realized that 83% of our population live in the rural areas and depend on agriculture for their livelihood.

But then, once in power, ZANU(PF) was forced to postpone the collectivization of agriculture and to concentrate primarily on the resettlement problem. At the same time, ZANU(PF) has postponed announcing its land and agrarian reforms because of several dilemmas confronting the new government over these issues. This has also necessitated the re-arrangement of government priorities in the whole social reconstruction programme, with the emphasis on such social services as health and education as well as the resettlement of displaced people.

In the first place, the agrarian capitalist sector, or commercial farming as it is called in Zimbabwe, is the biggest employer of labour, employing about 38% of the indigenous labour force. This branch of the economy produces over 90% of all marketed agricultural commodities — tobacco, sugar, beef, milk, fruit, wheat, maize, vegetables etc. It is therefore an important foreign exchange earner and contributes to the self-sufficiency of the country in food production and raw materials used in agro-allied industries. Commercial agriculture produced 12.5% of the GDP in 1972. Having learnt from the experiences of the collectivization programme of the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and early 1930s and the Chinese communes, ZANU(PF) cannot, in the short run, make decisions that add to the rising unemployment situation in the country, or that lead to shortages of foodstuffs necessitating the importation of that food at great foreign exchange cost. The powerful bargaining position of the agrarian bourgeoisie becomes one of the most crucial factors in determining the land and agrarian reforms in future. ZANU(PF) has therefore guaranteed the future of all efficient white commercial farmers on the land.

Only 4% of the white settler farmers and multinational corporations in agriculture paid any taxes in 1976, contributing in fact about 50% of taxable income in agriculture, while the remainder (96%) paid no taxes at all. This suggests a high rate of inefficiency in plantation and estate agriculture. Since the 1920s this inefficiency has been subsidized by a wide range of government subsidies and other support programmes. Coupled with the inefficiency in plantation and estate agriculture are the twin evils of unused and underutilized land which some estimates put at 60% of the total land area allocated to agrarian capitalism. Inefficiency in white agriculture is not penalized. Nor are there any taxes levied on unused or underutilized land. As already pointed out, it is from this category of land that ZANU(PF) hoped to acquire areas for resettlement and its collectivization programmes.

Even this land is not within the reach of government because of the Declaration of Rights in a section of the independence constitution. 'Freedom from
Deprivation of Property' is an entrenched clause requiring all 100 members of the Zimbabwean legislature to agree before it can be altered or removed. According to this section in the Lancaster House agreement the new government can only acquire land by compulsion if it is for the 'public benefit' or 'in the case of underutilized land, settlement of land for agricultural purposes'. The section goes on to say that acquisition can only be lawful on condition that 'prompt payment of adequate compensation' is made by government and remitted abroad 'within a reasonable time'. The interpretation of the legal provisions is left to the judges of the High Court, the majority of them products of UDI and sympathisers of the old settler colonial order, if not the Rhodesian Front. It is up to these judges to define what is meant by 'underutilized land', 'adequate compensation', 'prompt payment' and so on. What all this has meant in practice has been that government has been compelled to renounce expropriation of the white settler farms. Instead, government is having to buy white-owned land at exorbitant prices in order to acquire land on which to resettle the 1 to 2 million refugees.

The pace of the resettlement programme has been painfully slow with only about 200,000 people having been resettled by the end of 1980. The major reason has been lack of funds to buy out the white farmers. The agrarian bourgeoisie and their contacts in the public service have been demanding that the ZANU(PF) government should issue them with state bonds equivalent to the selling price of their farms redeemable at some future agreed date. But they also demand that the British government should be a signatory to such an agreement which would then guarantee the remittability of the funds abroad. It is not clear what government thinking on such a suggestion is, but were it to agree to the proposal, it would be tantamount to it printing and issuing large sums of paper money to circulate within the economy (i.e. generating demand without adequate supply to meet that demand) and exacerbating the already high rate of inflation in the country. At present, there is hardly a noticeable market for plantations and estates in the private sector. The sole buyer of land remains the government.

If government is committed to the Lancaster House Agreement, as it obviously is, why not let market forces determine the price of land? And since there is a glut on the land market, land prices should fall and continue to decline if the glut persists. If the principle of purchasing white land continues to be accepted by the ZANU(PF) government then it is virtually in the position of a monopolistic buyer who can determine the prices and conditions of its purchases. The offer by white farmers to accept government bonds guaranteed by the British government should therefore be rejected out of hand.

In drafting the 'freedom from deprivation of property' section of the constitution, the British colonialists no doubt wanted to control the pattern of expropriation by the new Zimbabwe government even more effectively than they did in the Kenya independence constitution in 1963. Even our peasant correspondent to the Herald can read through this British manoeuvre very easily. He objects to the use of externally borrowed funds to compensate white farmers for land that was forcibly taken away from the Zimbabwean peasantry during the colonial era. He is absolutely correct.

In the meantime, government is faced with another sticky problem — what
to do with the thousands of people who have not only moved in as squatters and occupied the white estates, but some former African Purchase Area farms as well. This is a national problem but one which is more pressing in commercial farming areas adjacent to the rural reserves. With the problem of squatting are other associated problems of theft of livestock, fencing, equipment and tools and the destruction of facilities on the occupied farms. In a Herald report (9 November 1980) on the Chemagora Purchase Area, near Gokwe in the west-centre of the country, specializing in cattle ranching and affected by the problems of squatting, Nigel Adlam quotes the President of the African Farmers’ Union, Gary Magadzire, who owns a ranch there, as saying, ‘The Government must act. The (peasants) must be forced (by the government through the law enforcement agencies) to recognize that they have no rights in this area to graze, cultivate or settle’. In the same report, Adlam added that nearly 400 peasant families, about 2,000 people, had occupied the neighbouring Mufungubusi Forestry Commission Land, i.e. crown land. The occupiers had cleared trees and commenced cultivating crops, thereby wiping out young saplings and effectively deforesting the 82,000 hectares of forestry land. In other cases, the owners of occupied estates and farms were in danger of eviction by the squatters from their properties.

The squatters are landless peasants or those with insufficient or poor land and displaced people. They are impatient with government’s slow resettlement programme and have decided to act on their own to alleviate their pathetic state even though ZANU(PF) functionaries and government representatives have asked them to exercise more patience while alternative land is sought to settle them. In some cases, the police have been used to forcibly evict the occupiers. However, both ZANU(PF) and government have requested owners of occupied farms to let the squatters stay on until government made alternative arrangements for them. In practice, the request by ZANU(PF) not to evict squatters has no legal force and any owner of an occupied farm can actually use the police to get rid of the squatters. This has happened on numerous occasions.

While the resettlement programme consumes much of the government resources and time, it has one disturbing feature which could adversely influence future agrarian reforms. According to the ZANU(PF) election manifesto, resettlement is supposed to be carried out on a collective basis but such collectivization is to be by persuasion rather than by compulsion. We estimate that up to date the greater part of the resettlement programme has been on an individual freehold allocation to peasant families with very little co-operative settlement. Government spokesmen have argued that when asked to specify the agricultural systems they preferred, the peasants overwhelmingly chose individual peasant holdings in the majority of cases. The peasants reportedly ‘reject’ co-operative and collective farming on the grounds that these systems are strange and incomprehensible to them. The civil servants have enthusiastically backed (influenced?) the peasants in their choice without explaining and teaching them in practice how co-operatives function and the advantages to be derived from large-scale production and economies of scale.

Without the guidance of cadres (political as well as technical) who unders-
tand what co-operative farming is all about and who are patient in teaching the peasantry, the peasants themselves will always opt for the agricultural systems which they have practised in the past and with which they are familiar. But once the peasantry has been shown in practice that alternative systems work to their advantage, they will usually co-operate and show great enthusiasm in implementing radical agrarian changes. In the war zones and semi-liberated areas which existed during the armed liberation struggle a beginning had already been made toward co-operative farming, but now it seems all this is going to be reversed.

ZANU(PF)'s thorniest problem for now and the future will be the land and agrarian problem. It is difficult to see how ZANU(PF) can introduce a far-reaching land reform and socialize agriculture in the short run given the complex situation we have described earlier. If present trends in the rural sector continue, the transformation process will be simply an 'economistic' drive — i.e. government fulfilling the peasant's demand for more land, more education, better health, higher agricultural prices, more technical services and other support measures. But if the transformation process is to remain on the right tracks, ZANU(PF) has to realize that collectivization or the socialist transformation of agriculture can not be achieved in the short run. In the Soviet Union, the Bolshevik's October Revolution triumphed in 1917 but agriculture was collectivized only in the late 1920s. In the People's Republic of China the CCP took the reigns of power in 1948 but socialization of agriculture was not achieved until 1956-7. In the Democratic Republic of Korea socialization of agriculture took some years to achieve. In successful cases, the transformation process has been a step by step progression starting from mutual aid teams, to co-operatives and then collectives and communes.

Towards Socialist Revolution

Assuming that the phase of People's Democracy triumphs, the next stage of the Zimbabwe revolution, ultimately leading to the socialist revolution, will involve state intervention in the production, distribution and exchange processes currently dominated and controlled by private interests. The assumption is that this second phase of 'Economic Intervention' will be embarked upon once the ZANU(PF) government has firm control of the state machinery and apparatus: i.e. there is a unitary national army, a greater measure of material unity than is the case at present, the creation of a nucleus of ZANU(PF) political, technical, scientific and intellectual cadres to man key posts in the public service and other vital sectors of the political economy; the principles and processes of democracy are firmly established in mass organizations such as trade unions, the Women and Youth Leagues, Peasants Associations etc; and, organizationally, ZANU(PF) has firmly embedded itself in the whole society. The enemies of the revolution would still be there but their tactics would be underground and engaged particularly in economic and ideological struggles.

In the phase of Economic Intervention by the state, ZANU(PF)'s major preoccupation would be to lay the basis for economic independence and disengagement from the South African, racist and imperialist orbit. In the existing political economy of Zimbabwe, there is a substantial state sector
consisting of electricity generation, an industrial development corporation, post and telecommunications, Air Zimbabwe, the National Railways of Zimbabwe and various agricultural marketing boards (for cotton, grain, dairying). Together, these parastatals account for one third of the country's total economic activity. The state also controls 49% of the shares in the country's iron and steel industry, as well as exercising state controls over foreign exchange, prices and incomes, imports and production of Virginia flue-cured tobacco.

It goes without saying that a ZANU(PF) government can not continue to tolerate the economy's distorted external dependence on South Africa and the MNCs, a situation which was aggravated by UDI. There are at least five compelling reasons why a ZANU(PF) government should intervene to transform the country's political economy. First, the Zimbabwean economy has been heavily dependent on an import substitution strategy, increasingly gearing itself to the production of luxury requirements of the high income white settler community and its military needs. This feature of the economy was particularly pronounced during the UDI days and the stage of armed liberation struggle when military production of security, transport, communications equipment, etc., was increased. Second, the manufacturing industries have grown more capital intensive rather than labour intensive despite the fact that the unemployment rate is about 40%. Manufacturing industry contributes 25% of GDP but it only employs 14% of the country's labour force. It has been providing fewer new jobs for the increasing number of workers joining the labour market each year. Third, the manufacturing branch of industry has become increasingly dependent on imported spare parts, raw materials and equipment. The primary source of all these goods during UDI was South Africa, thus increasing dependence on the south. Fourth, there has been a growing dependency of Zimbabwean industry on foreign capital. This has come about despite the mandatory sanctions imposed by the UN at the time of UDI. MNCs operating through their South African subsidiaries, which acted as intermediaries, have played an increasingly significant role in providing capital, machinery, equipment and raw materials for the expanding Zimbabwean manufacturing sector. This is how growing concentration and external dependence have been fastened on the Zimbabwean political economy. Finally, the location of industry has exacerbated the lopsided development of the national economy. The bulk of manufacturing industry is to be found in:

Salisbury accounting for 47% of all manufacturing employment,
Bulawayo accounting for 22% of all manufacturing employment,
Que-Que accounting for 10% of all manufacturing employment,
Gwelo, Gatooma, Umtali & Fort Victoria accounting for 12% of all manufacturing employment.
Southern smaller towns accounting for 8% of all manufacturing employment.

TILCOR (Tribal Trust Land Development Corporation) set up by the settler colonial authorities to stimulate and establish industries in the rural areas could not change the existing pattern. The MNC subsidiaries aiming at maximizing short term profit continued to locate industries near existing markets, infrastructure and sources of raw materials.

ZANU(PF)'s economic policy wants to see the evolution of a system of production, distribution and exchange that services the basic needs of the broad
masses of the people. What is difficult to foretell at present are the kinds of state actions ZANU(PF) is likely to adopt in the phase of Economic Intervention. These could possibly involve the regulation of private sector investment through an investment code, nationalization of the foreign banks, compulsory state participation with private capital in key and basic industries such as coal mining, oil and petroleum products, chemicals and fertilizers, chrome, asbestos and fabrication of metal products, as well as the establishment of state farms in agriculture. One expects greater state controls than at present of imports, foreign exchange, prices and incomes as well as state intervention in the routing of imports and exports. The problem so far has been that ZANU(PF) has not had a comprehensive economic policy, nor has the movement outlined its overall economic development policy. But what is clear is that ZANU(PF) will have to formulate a long term industrial and agricultural strategy to be implemented in the phase of Economic Intervention. Its aims should be to restructure the political economy in such a way as to achieve balanced and integrated development, to reduce dependence on South Africa and imperialism while seeking new trade routes and trading partners, providing productive employment opportunities and raising the standards of living of the broad masses.

**Political Conditions for Transition**

We could summarize the conditions of the success of the People's Democracy and Economic Intervention phases as dependent on a number of conditions:

*a. A United People's Army.* The speed and direction taken by ZANU(PF) to gain complete control of the state apparatus and machinery. In the first place, we have already discussed the need to create one national standing army, under a single unified military command. The importance of the standing army as the chief component of state power cannot be overemphasized in both the short and long run. Without it, there cannot be a ZANU(PF) government. If it is fragile the government will also be weak and unable to implement its policies and programmes. It would be very easy for the organized opponents of ZANU(PF) to topple the new government. If all former ZANLA and ZIPRA guerillas are integrated with acceptable elements of the colonial Rhodesian army, the size of the new national army would be somewhere in the region of 50,000-60,000. Such a huge army would be a real burden to a small country if it remained a non-productive, consumption-oriented and apolitical army like its colonial predecessor. For these reasons, it will be imperative that an army of that size changes its organizational structure and ideological outlook to become a regular People's Army which not only engages in the defence of the country, but is involved in the production and construction processes as well as being highly conscious through the study of politics. These were the three tasks of the ZANLA army during the armed liberation struggle. A highly organized, conscious and disciplined army can only be a great asset to the country insofar as it is able to reduce government expenditure and costs on the military through being self-sufficient in food production, and even manufacturing small agricultural implements as well as its own munitions to save vital foreign exchange. Another important advantage of a regular People's Army is that in a situation like that of Zimbabwe today, it can show
the way to the broad rural masses as to how to go about organizing and managing co-operative/collective production, having acquired the knowledge during the War of Chimurenga. In other words, a regular People’s Army has to take over where the ZANLA guerillas left off in the radicalization of the peasantry and raising the masses’ political consciousness.

If ZANU(PF) tries to create a regular People’s Army, there will be strong opposition from the military hierarchy of the former settler-colonial army and the British military instructors who are currently helping in the creation of the new national army. These military ‘experts’ believe in what they call a politically neutral and professional army. In the current integration process, they are rapidly promoting elements whom they consider not to be politically motivated to high army ranks — particularly those from ZIPRA — in order to pre-empt any possible transformation from a conventional western-oriented army to a regular people’s army in future. Obviously, it is a myth and politically naive and dishonest to talk of a ‘neutral army’. The interests of the top military brass (the ex-Rhodesian commanders and British instructors) are unmistakenly bound up with those of the departing colonialists, white racists and imperialists. During the liberation struggle, the ZANLA guerillas were undoubtedly the nucleus and motive force behind the radicalisation of ZANU(PF) itself and the rural masses in the areas where they operated. The work they began, the line and direction of the struggle they mapped out must be carried through to the end.

b. Control of Other State Structures. The other components of the state apparatus like the police, the judiciary and prison services have also to undergo change and become people-oriented in line with ZANU(PF)’s general policy.

c. Politicise the Bureaucracy. The civil service cannot pretend to remain politically neutral indefinitely despite its exaggerated claims of professionalism, expertise, competence, experience, stability and continuity. ZANU(PF) has to accelerate the recruitment of the right kind of people to established posts in the civil service if the government’s progressive ideas and policies are to be correctly interpreted and implemented. Many ministers appreciate the need to Africanize quickly as they have learnt the bitter lesson as to what it is like to be at the top of a Ministry while remaining powerless to get their directives implemented by a largely unco-operative white civil service, who in some extreme cases deliberately and consciously go against stated policy, veto the ministers or deny them information in order to embarrass them publicly. It ought to be clear to ZANU(PF) by now that as a government bent on the socialist transformation of society, it cannot rely on public servants of an opposing political and ideological persuasion or expect them to bring about the required changes. They will do everything in their power to distort, foil, frustrate and prevent the necessary changes in order to prove to the masses that the government’s ideas and policies on socialism do not work. During the phase of People’s Democracy ZANU(PF) has to embark on a programme of training its own cadres in the fields of politics, organisation, management, science and technology, and this programme has to be stepped up in the phase of Economic Integration to meet the manpower needs of transforming society.

d. Constitutional Change. We have posed the problems of land and
agrarian reforms as well as those relating to the economy as a whole — disengagement, dependence and economic reform. Here the key lies in changing the Lancaster House Constitution which as we saw earlier has been designed precisely to increase economic dependence, to control land reform to suit the interests of plantation and estate owners, and to prevent the wholesale nationalisation of banks, manufacturing industry and the mines. If ZANU(PF) sticks to this constitution, it will take at least seven years before the amendment of critical entrenched clauses. But can a ZANU(PF) government manage to maintain a balance between maintaining white confidence and satisfying the expectations of the masses for the next seven to ten years? A balancing act for such a long time is impossible and dangerous for ZANU(PF).

e. Party Development.
Over and above everything else, one cannot expect qualitative changes and development in the transformation process from one stage to the next unless ZANU(PF) itself is simultaneously changing and developing qualitatively. At every stage ZANU(PF) has to be clear about its objectives and how it is going to achieve those objectives. It has to get clearer and clearer in its ideological, political and organisational line, be clear about its friends and foes at every stage of the struggle, about which classes and groups to unite with and those to be struggled against, and it has to learn to analyse any situation concretely and be able to sum up experiences correctly from such analyses. ZANU(PF)’s capacity to resolve contradictions amongst the people correctly has to grow. The same goes for its ability to unite the labouring masses and patriotic forces of the nation against the machinations and manoeuvres of domestic and external enemies of the revolution.

Conclusion
From the foregoing, it becomes an urgent task of ZANU(PF) to hold a congress that will formulate and articulate the movements’ social, economic, political, ideological, organizational, and foreign policies for the People’s Democracy and the Economic Integration phases of the struggle. Such a congress would also have to consider the question of a ‘Leadership Code’ to prevent the amassing of wealth, property and money by corrupt party and government officials who are in politics for what they can get out of it rather than to serve the interests of the labouring masses. The leadership code should cover leaders in local government as well, and should prevent those it covers from having more than one source of income, ensuring they publicly declare their assets and liabilities, disqualifying corrupt and counter revolutionary elements from positions of authority and leadership in the movement, government, local government and the civil service. Such a congress would also have to clarify the relationship between ZANU(PF) and government, and specify the role of the state. This is an area which is still confused and confusing to the masses of people. Lastly, the congress would provide an opportunity to up-date the constitution of ZANU(PF), draw up appropriate strategy and tactics for the next phase of struggle, restructure the organization and elect a properly-based leadership until the next congress.

However, while we recognize the need to hold an emergency congress of ZANU(PF), we cannot overlook the fact that the outcome of such a con-
gress is likely to be the emergence of a preponderance of traditionalist, conservative, petty bourgeoisie elements, at the expense of the movements more progressive wing, the liberals, social democrats and Marxist-Leninists. In practice, such a turn of events would mean the movement losing the dynamism and revolutionary character of the armed liberation era. From that point onwards Zimbabwe would become a Bantustan or at best a client state of racist South Africa like Malawi. The progressive wing of the movement is not as cohesive and well organized as the right wing, at the moment.

In summary, ZANU(PF)'s current tactics could evolve into its long run strategies if the right-wing of the movement continues to consolidate its position in the leadership at the expense of the more progressive elements. For the right wing of ZANU(PF) (a group whose interests coincide with those of the remnants of the racist settlers, the international bourgeoisie and domestic petty bourgeoisie and capitalists) the initial concessions which the coalition government and ZANU(PF) conceded for tactical reasons, must from now on be turned into a permanent trend of compromise with capitalism in Zimbabwe, from which it would be impossible for both ZANU(PF) and the coalition government to retreat. Obviously a silent class struggle is being waged within the ZANU(PF) leadership, as it is also being fought in the larger society. Some elements are working quietly to create conditions for the realization of a socialist revolution in the long run, while others (especially populists) make pseudo-revolutionary noises promising the masses this and the other thing but without the slightest clue as to the nature of the transformation process, the various stages to go through, the appropriate strategy and tactics and the general perspectives of the utopia they shout about. The lessons and effects of the radicalization of the masses, the ZANLA forces and some of the political leaders during the war will not easily be forgotten, however. This is what gives us confidence that ZANU(PF) will in the long run, transform both itself and society along socialist lines.

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ZIMBABWE AFTER INDEPENDENCE

Following the electoral success of ZANU(PF) in February 1980, the initial problems facing the new government were to establish peace and state security, to begin to meet some of the economic expectations of the mass of the population who had supported the armed struggle, and to attempt to end the bitter divisions after seven years of war.

Although General Walls' indiscretions on British television lead to him becoming persona non grata in Zimbabwe, he was an instrumental figure in preventing any positive action to perpetrate the much vaunted white coup. His departure has created a vacancy that Mugabe does not seem too keen to fill — despite the government's overt policy of Africanisation at the earliest opportunity. Another white commander, British or otherwise, would be impolitic in a newly independent state trying to shake off its colonial yoke. A ZIPRA leader would be unacceptable to the ruling party, and the current ZANLA commander has scarcely distinguished himself since Tongogara's death. Another possibility is the appointment of a military figure from an African state. However, the current void appears to be working and it may be better to leave it thus.

The integration of the three armies has been a slow and very difficult process, with some 32,000 guerillas and the 'acceptable' elements of the Rhodesian forces providing a much larger army than the country requires. By the end of 1980, nine new integrated battalions have been deployed on Operation Seed — concerned with land clearing and irrigation schemes — others have opted to return to civilian life, but most still remain, heavily armed, in the assembly points. Not all have exhibited the remarkable levels of patience required and have wandered out with their weapons causing problems for the police and local ZANU(PF) officials. For instance, 30 'dissident' guerillas were rounded up in the Gutu area from the Foxtrot assembly point, with an assortment of weapons, and road-blocks were mounted around Fort Victoria to foil attempts to bring the weapons into the town. (The Herald, 23 August 1980).

Other guerillas have not assembled at all, and these dissidents have been causing trouble, notably in the Nkai and Gokwe districts. Clinics and schools that had briefly opened were forced to close down again after
threats by ZIPRA dissidents. Although both ZANLA and ZIPRA have been used to round up their own dissidents, the allegedly larger hands of ZIPRA dissidents who have 'refused' to accept the results of the election have caused great friction between the ZANU(PF) and PF parties. Mugabe even suggested in Parliament (26 June, 1980) that the dissidents were 'organised bands of ZIPRA followers', and despite absolving the PF leadership from responsibility, he suggested that these dissidents were acting on instructions from their local leadership. This brought a vehement denial from Nkomo, who described the remarks as 'outrageous ... tragic ... unfortunate and a slap in the face' for the PF. The personal attacks on Nkomo by ZANU(PF) ministers Nkala and Tekere can be seen in part as a reflection of the ZANU(PF) Central Committee's fear of the 'old man's' ambition. There is no evidence to associate the PF leadership with dissident activity and, indeed, there seems little that the Minister of Home Affairs could hope to gain by it.

In the rural areas the role of the formerly all-powerful District Commissioner has been called into question. His authority has been increasingly challenged by ZANU(PF) officials, who had established their own administrative authority during the war in the 'semi-liberated zones'. One example of the changing roles was that the Anglican Bishop of Mashonaland told us he had to get permission from the local party officials before being allowed to tour the churches and missions of Maranke TTL (south of Um- tali). The numerous reports of 'kangaroo courts' indicate than two systems of authority are confronting one another, with party officials punishing offenders and then being punished themselves in the courts for meting out this illegal punishment. The government appears to be supporting the traditional authority rather than the party structure, as the Provincial Magistrate at Harare Court claimed:

There have been statements made by Government Ministers that these courts of the people, the so-called kangaroo courts will not be tolerated, and that only the properly constituted and lawful courts of this country are empowered to deal with these matters. (The Herald, 5 July 1980).

The failure to defeat the settler enemy on the battlefield has led to ZANU(PF) so far forsaking the structures it established amongst the masses during the war, and allowing itself to be dominated by the previous administrative structure. However, if the party officials continue to administer their own form of justice, then this power crisis in rural administration may be so easily resolved. In Matabeleland control of the rural areas is supposedly in the hands of the DCs, but in reality the administration is seen either as white continuity or the attempted domination of ZANU(PF). In this region of fervent support for Nkomo, neither the authority of the whites nor of the government is unquestionably recognized. One PF official said that the DC had been forced to call in local PF officials to deal with certain problems after the government's representatives had been disregarded in Matabeleland North.

Many promises were made by all the parties in their election manifestos, and now ZANU(PF) face the problems of trying to enact them in spite of bureaucratic obstinacy and limited financial resources. The immediate aspirations of the people were demonstrated in the waves of strikes that followed the election. There were suggestions that these strikes were
politically motivated: ‘. . . there have been elements capitalizing on the situation and exploiting it for reasons best known to themselves’, said Minister of Labour, Kangai, and a ZANU(PF) MP in May accused the PF of sending ‘agitators to the mines and industries trying to stir it up’ and of preaching a ‘gospel of disunity’. The strikes may have been more efficiently organized in areas where the PF dominated the trade union network, but there appears to be little evidence that they were organized to demonstrate opposition to the new government, rather that this was an expression of the workers’ desire for improved wages and conditions now that black majority rule had been achieved. Both political parties had fuelled these expectations during the long years of bitter struggle and, although political power may have been won, the control of the economy remains firmly in the hands of the settlers and international capital, and the government feels able to offer only slight material improvements and further promises. The continuing appeasement of white farmers and international business interests will serve only to encourage the Zimbabwean masses to question the sincerity of the promises made during the war.

The most positive actions to relieve the economic burden on the poorest sections of Zimbabwean society have been the reduction of sales tax from 15% to 10% and the introduction of the minimum wage. The latter has not been without its problems. Before the election, there was widespread talk of a minimum wage of about $100 a month. At the beginning of June 1980 the minimum wage came into force at the level of $30 for agricultural and domestic workers, mine workers $47 (both taking into account provisions, accommodation, etc.) and $70 for industrial workers, with a promise of a further rise at the beginning of 1981. The reaction was mixed: one correspondent to The Herald (9 June 1980) stated that the ‘majority of our people will earn . . . a pay packet they would never have dreamt of receiving for the rest of their lives.” Another sent in his budget for a month for his family of five in St. Mary’s township, Salisbury. His account did not include clothing, school fees, Chibuku (a cheap African beer made from maize and shaken before consumption) or cigarettes. It still amounted to $136.38. Undoubtedly, for most domestic and agricultural workers, the minimum wage represents a significant increase; however, in the Mtoko and Mt. Darwin areas, workers, dissatisfied with their material conditions, demonstrated against ZANU(PF). Considerable numbers of domestic and agricultural workers, often the very old who were kept on more or less as retainers, have been dismissed. Industrial workers, on the other hand, have not gained so much — some were already paid in excess of $70. An employee of Lever Bros. claimed that his wage was reduced from $85 to the minimum, and he was told to take it or leave it. Nurses at Harare hospital benefitted from the increase, but then found that most of their extra cash was clawed back in tax; single women felt particularly badly treated. Other people we spoke to were threatening not to vote for ZANU(PF) again on the strength of this disillusionment alone.

Nkala’s first budget was, perhaps rather cynically, entitled a ‘people’s budget’, although the ‘people’ gained little apart from a further reduction in sales tax on selected items and a total of $200 million pledged to reconstruction work. Defence expenditure, with the funding of a vast army, remains high at $233 million. The reaction of other sectors indicate where
the emphasis of the budget lay: the Sunday Mail described it as 'conservative and wise', the Rhodesia Front praised it and the head of a French business delegation said it could bring a 'foreign investment boom in Zimbabwe'. Are the hopes of the masses, who brought ZANU(PF) to power, again going to be sacrificed to the interests of international capital?

The new government has faced great difficulties in getting the white hierarchy in the civil service to act on its policy directives; indeed, the Minister of Manpower accused them of deliberate sabotage. Many directives have met with intransigence; for example, questionnaires designed to ascertain the qualifications, experience and so forth of government employees have not been filled in. Until the freeze on civil service promotions was announced, whites were being promoted along the old racial lines without even informing the minister. Of the four permanent secretaries appointed in June, only two were black. One minister, more determined than most to Africanise, has managed to fill his senior civil service positions with Africans, following the resignation of his senior white officials due to the drafting of a Zimbabwean from Zambia as an understudy and potential successor to the permanent secretary. However, the cost has been considerable — the files for the past decade have been 'lost', therefore making the administration of his department much more difficult.

The minister apparently most frustrated by civil service intransigence, Edgar Tekere, has presented Mugabe with further problems. The former's alleged involvement in the murder of Adams on 4 August 1980 tarnished the image of the new government with all except its most radical supporters. The mere fact of Tekere being tried at all was originally indicative to the whites that the 'rule of law' is being maintained, but to many of the party activists Tekere appears to be something of a populist hero in his forthright opposition to continued white dominance. There have been frequent rumours of a split in the party's Central Committee, with Tekere leading a 'radical' wing, and these were given added credence in mid-July when leaflets were found circulating in the townships criticising Mugabe and demanding the quickening of the revolutionary pace. They were at first dismissed as the work of political opponents (the UANC were accused), but subsequent events have suggested that they originated from within ZANU(PF) itself. After Tekere's arrest rumours abounded — one of the most widespread was that a new 'super-ZANU' would be formed on Heroes Day (August 11-12). Although Tekere does appear to have a populist appeal, with considerable contact with those in the assembly points, he has not advocated a coherent strategy for the effective transfer of power from the settler elite and international capital to the masses of Zimbabwe. Neither does he seem to want to offer himself as an alternative to Mugabe. However, if the rank and file continue to see the professed objectives of the liberation struggle being thwarted or postponed, they may perhaps begin to turn towards someone who appears to identify with the people rather more than the somewhat austere figure of the current Prime Minister. Mugabe, himself, is not unaware of this and has recently made greater efforts to get out and broaden his personal support amongst the people and, perhaps more significantly, the guerrillas.

One of the most serious problems remains the relationship between ZANU(PF) and PF. The latter felt very bitter about the election results,
believing that they had ‘played the game’ by ordering their men into the assembly points whilst ZANLA remained outside ‘intimidating’ the people, and moving into former ZIPRA areas to gain more support — particularly in Mashonaland West. ZANU(PF) now appear less concerned with Nkomo’s alleged desire to be ‘number one’, but they are still worried about the number of well-trained troops he has at his disposal that have not been integrated into the new national army. The personal attacks by Nkala and Tekere served only to alarm, both internally and externally, with regard to the stability of the coalition. Despite one or two desertions from the PF, a one-party state does not seem at all likely, with the PF already convinced of their ability to win the next election. The PF has become increasingly angered by the emphasis in the media that the liberation struggle was waged by ZANU(PF) alone. They feel that their role in the struggle has been underrepresented in the composition of the government. Complaints are frequently heard that the vital decisions are not taken in Cabinet but in ZANU(PF) Central Committee meetings. They are growing increasingly critical of ZANU(PF)’s failure to meet their election promises and the failure to live up to its socialist programme, and are beginning to articulate this opposition together with alternative strategies in their weekly paper, Zimbabwe People’s Voice. If ZANU(PF) is going to succeed in its rather piecemeal and pragmatic approach towards implementing its policies of reform and reconstruction, then it must make greater efforts to portray itself as a national party and to ensure that the people of Matabeleland do not feel that they are being neglected when new appointments are made and resources reallocated.

Caston Nyawo
Tony Rich

SOUTHERN AFRICA’S STRATEGIES OF DISENGAGING FROM SOUTH AFRICA

A famous economist once remarked that India drew up the best development plans, however, they never seemed to go beyond the drawing board. The independent southern African states seem well set along the same path over their disengagement from South Africa. Conferences, meetings, seminars, working parties, and commissions follow thick and fast. Resolutions are passed and plans drawn up. But every time trade figures are released, they show their increased trade with, if not dependence on, South Africa.

The latest conference on this thorny subject was held in Lusaka in April 1980, and was attended by representatives from Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Of these nine countries, only Angola and Tanzania do not trade with South Africa, and only Angola, Tanzania and Zambia do not have workers in the South African mines. Angola and Tanzania are not, however, completely unconnected with South Africa. Both countries are important diamond producers and whoever sells diamonds in the Western market must, at some state, do business either directly with De Beers Con-
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solidated Mines, the giant diamond monopoly whose headquarters are in Kimberley, South Africa, or with De Beers’ international arm, the Central Selling Organization which buys and sells rough diamonds.

The difficulty of the task must not be underestimated. Relative to its neighbours South Africa is immensely rich. The group of nine, on the other hand, all have obvious economic problems. To fully appreciate South Africa’s economic strength, it is useful to locate South Africa in the context of African economic activity.

The Problem
South Africa has a little over 6% of the population of the African continent but it consumes more than 50% of the energy consumed in Africa. In 1975, it was ranked sixteenth in the world in consumption of energy. Another telling statistic is that at the end of 1975, there were almost 250,000 tractors in operation in South Africa. This represented about 66% of all tractors in use on the African continent. As a result, South Africa has about 4.5 million hectares under maize, and in the 1979/80 season it produced just over 10 million tons of maize. This gives South Africa an exportable surplus of nearly 3.5m tons of maize, the staple food throughout southern Africa.

Practically all independent southern African states are net importers of grain. If they don’t import from South Africa, they import from countries outside Africa. In many instances they import from South Africa but the consignment papers are suitably ‘doctored’. Thus recently Kenya announced it had bought $11 million worth of maize ‘from Mozambique’ — itself an importer. Even Zimbabwe which had always been self-sufficient in food, had to import maize from South Africa last year. Besides the disruption of the war and the current drought, white farmers have reduced the area under maize from 300,000 ha. in 1972 to 190,000 ha. last year. The farmers, apparently are demanding a higher price, in the absence of which they are switching to more lucrative crops such as sugar. Zaire and Zambia of course have been buying food from South Africa for some time.

On the industrial front the situation facing the southern African countries is just as critical. From the end of 1973 when the price of oil started going up, and from 1974 when the recession and inflation hit the West, southern Africa countries have been experiencing grave difficulties. The increased import bill for oil meant less foreign exchange for industrial and transport equipment and spares. Plant started rapidly to deteriorate for lack of maintenance, thus, further increasing the need to import, at the very time when western countries were passing the oil price increase on to consumers. As lorries and locomotives went out of commission for lack of spare parts, it became harder to collect cash crops from country districts for the export markets. Roads went into disrepair until, for a country as vast as Zaire, it is estimated that its usable roads have shrunk from 180,000 kilometres at independence to 20,000 km today. Interestingly, the East African Community of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda fell apart when in 1976, the Crown Agents called in the debt owed them by the East African Railways Administration for spare parts. The individual countries would not pay up — probably could not pay up — and thus started to impound rolling stock on their own side of the borders. To move the 200,000 tons of maize and the other
manufactured goods Zambia is buying from South Africa, it has had to borrow 12 locomotives from South African Railways, not to mention the thousands of railway wagons that go to and fro across the Zambezi.

To cope with this desperate situation, southern African countries started to incur large debts with the IMF, the World Bank, and other agencies in an effort to try to pay for their imports. The 'richer, copper mining countries fared worse still. While the copper price dropped from $1.50 per pound in 1974 to 0.50c, they still had to pay the expatriate miners and mine management in foreign currencies. Thus in 1976, about half the foreign exchange earned by the Zambian mining industry stayed abroad as expatriate salaries and wages.

Without doubt the most humiliating aspect of the relationship between independent Africa and South Africa is that of migrant labour. South Africa has an insatiable appetite for cheap labour. As far back as 1876, the Commissioner for Crown Lands, comparing the emigration position in South Africa and in other British colonies wrote:

In the Cape the Government is called to survey mankind from China to Peru in the hope of creating and maintaining a class of cheap labourers who will thankfully accept the position of helots and not be troubled with the inconvenient ambition of bettering their condition.

It couldn't have been better put if Karl Marx himself had said it. All the member of the group of nine have, at one time or another, exported labour to South Africa. Tanzania stopped the practice in 1961, Zambia in 1966, and Angola in 1975. The remaining six still send large numbers of their people to work in South Africa. Official figures are not very meaningful since there is considerable illegal migration. In 1976 it was estimated that between 40,000 and 100,000 Zimbabweans were working in South Africa illegally. No doubt there are many other workers in the same position from other countries. The figure in the 1970 Population Census, for what it is worth, was 490,000 immigrants. It is only the mining industry that keeps accurate figures. In December 1977, the mine labour force included 99,964 from Lesotho, 24,810 from Botswana, 11,756 from Swaziland, 38,244 from Mozambique, and 29,115 from Malawi and Rhodesia.

After more than a century of labour migration, South Africa has become an old hand in juggling which country will supply how many workers, and when. There are more or less arbitrary quotas that South Africa uses to play one country off against another and in general unsettle its neighbours with threats of unemployment. Sometimes the threats are carried out — as in the case of Mozambique. Soon after independence in 1975, there were 101,800 Mozambican miners working in South Africa. By the end of 1977, only 38,244 were left. Since with some of the countries the remittances of the miners are a significant component of their foreign exchange sources, such threats produce the desired effect. Not surprisingly therefore, it has been primarily in the area of reducing their dependence on South African jobs that independent countries are most active.

The Solution
As early as 1958, the All-African Peoples Conference called on African states to withhold labour from the South African mines. Resolutions establishing the Organization of African Unity incorporated cessation of
labour export to South Africa. The problem has always been where alternative employment for the migrants would come from. After the mid-1960s Africa’s main political preoccupation was with the wars against the the Portuguese and the Smith regime. It was therefore only after Mozambique’s independence in 1975 and after South Africa had tried to destabilize the new FRELIMO Government with migrant unemployment that the search for a solution resumed.

Two conferences held in Lusaka in April, 1978 marked the first significant step. Both conferences were organized by the UN Economic Commission for Africa. The first, from April 1 to 3 was of the Trade Ministers of eastern and southern African states called with the objective of discussing the possibilities of expanding intra-regional trade so as to stimulate production within the region and therefore increase employment opportunities. The migrant labour conference of April 4 to 8 echoed the Trade Ministers by calling on the ‘international community’ to assist the affected countries with employment generating investment. It also passed a resolution creating the Southern African Labour Committee to be made up of governments of affected countries and trade unions. The objective of the Committee was to fight for improvement in the welfare of migrants, for in the meantime they still had to work on the South African mines.

The next conference was the Arusha Co-ordinating Conference held in July 1979 to initiate coordinated regional development. Its main outcome was the creation of the Southern African Regional Transportation and Communications Commission to be based in Maputo, whose brief was coordinate the use of existing systems, the planning of additional regional facilities and, ‘to set in motion a steady reduction of links with the Republic (of South Africa)’. The follow up to the migrant labour conference was a meeting of labour exporting countries in Gaborone in February 1980. Mysteriously, the Southern African Labour Committee had become a Commission from which the trade unions were now excluded. The weaknesses of the disengagement strategies are becoming all too painfully obvious. Southern African governments want to disengage from South Africa without their having actually to put in an effort and mobilize their people. Firstly, the governments seem to think there are millions waiting somewhere in the ‘international community’ ready to be sunk into any project whatever its viability. It is estimated that for the Transportation Commission to get off the ground, it will need US $2 billion, 99% of which will have to come from outside. Given that these countries are already heavily in debt, and in many cases have to top up their budgets with foreign aid, how then are they going to repay another $2 billion? Secondly, if the southern African governments are not ready to work with their own people through trade unions in what after all is a national effort to overcome dependence and a real threat to their national sovereignties, how are foreigners, especially hard-faced financiers, to believe that they really are faced with a problem that is serious enough to warrant diverting large funds to southern Africa, and with no immediate profit in sight, if ever? In any case any sympathetic potential donor or foreign investor would probably conclude that troubled times lie ahead between southern African governments and their workers if there appears to be so little willingness to work together.
Appraisal

Southern Africa has a number of features which make it unattractive to foreign investors, in comparison with South Africa, and thus foreign capital cannot be relied to back efforts to lessen dependence on South Africa.

1. The region is politically unstable. It is true that Portuguese colonialism has been defeated but there still remain unresolved the existence of UNITA in southern Angola. UNITA has immobilized the Benguela Railway which used to serve Zambia and Zaire. This has increased the overland distances that freight has to travel to these countries, resulting in increased costs and bottlenecks. To the UNITA issue must be added the Namibia question whose resolution is uncertain, to say the least.

2. The Rhodesia problem has been solved, amicably as it would appear. But whether the whites will stay, in what numbers and at what price, remains to be seen. This is important because the whites are the main skilled component in the labour force. If, for example, what happened in Zambia is repeated in Zimbabwe, that is, large number of whites retain their British or South African citizenship but work in Zimbabwe, then they can demand part payment in foreign currency. This would affect Zimbabwe’s ability to import capital goods which, according to all accounts, desperately need replacing. Just as important as the question of whites is what reforms does the new government have to implement to satisfy the black population.

3. It is probably still more profitable to invest in South Africa which, though it has its own share of problems, clearly is more able to cope. It is reasonable to say no other government in Africa could have withstood a disturbance of the breadth and duration of the Soweto events. Furthermore, South Africa has an extensive and functioning infrastructure, cheap labour, and an abundance of minerals which are the mainstay of the natural resources of the region. These factors tend to attract capital to South Africa rather than to its neighbours.

4. Independent Africa, probably with the exception only of Egypt, does not have modern industrial and managerial skills. This is at the bottom of the poor performance of southern Africa’s agriculture, industry, and transportation systems. When he returned from a visit to Zimbabwe recently, the British Trade Minister described its industrial equipment as ‘clapped out’, and that as a result of sanctions and the war Zimbabwean industry had been ‘flying on a wing and a prayer’. The point however is that it kept ‘flying’ by white skills. The economic life of a public utility bus in the US is twelve years and in periods of financial stringency is frequently extended up to twenty years or more. The life of a lorry in Africa is reckoned in months.

Whatever the solution to the problem of dependence, it include measures for developing manpower resources. For one thing, it is the one area where they stand a reasonable chance of obtaining assistance, and with fewer strings attached. It is to the credit of the Zimbabwean liberation movements that they started addressing themselves to this question some years before independence. Skills and industry of course go together; one cannot have industry or attract investment where there are no skills. To develop skills and retain them in the country, governments need the support of their people, of trade unions etc. Far too often governments of underdeveloped countries are inclined to think that trade unions, student unions, etc., are a
luxury of developed Western countries. It is not quite that simple. How, for example, does an apprenticeship system function without unions

Whatever steps are taken it must in conclusion be stressed that South Africa is in earnest about making the other countries of the region dependent on it. A recent indication of this was offered by Deon Fourie of the University of South Africa's Strategic Studies Department in emphasizing the political and strategic value of the country's food surpluses: 'Food surpluses can be used as a political lever or a means to buy the goodwill of countries unable to feed their own populations'. This view was repeated by the chairman of an official commission when explaining why South Africa must continue producing maize surpluses notwithstanding that they are a financial burden to the country. This is only one of South Africa's answers to the collapse of Portuguese colonialism and of the Smith regime.

Postscript
November 1980 saw another Conference of southern African countries, in Maputo. Generally speaking much of what happened there confirms my basic thesis. Briefly, most of the monies pledged at that conference were by the African Development Bank which is internationally funded. The monies from ADB would have been going into the southern African region in any case. More important, given the erratic economic performance of the Group of Nine, it seems that South Africa mainly stands to gain from the extension of the transport network in the region. Such an extension would relieve some of the bottle-necks that have become apparent as a result of the greatly increased movement of goods from southern Africa into the rest of Africa. According to the Washington Post (1 January 1981), South Africa sold $1.3 billion worth of goods and services to 40 African countries in 1980 and bought in return $343 millions worth. In 1969 South African exports to the rest of Africa had been only $300 millions.

Moeletsi Mbeki

ANGOLA — 1980

South African incursions
Since the South African invasion in 1975 was repelled by Angolan and internatilist Cuban soldiers, Angola has suffered repeated aggressive acts from its racist southern neighbour. In May 1978, the infamous massacre at Kassinga was the South African's equivalent of My Lai. In 1979 there were innumerable reconaissance flights over Angolan territory and many bombings of defenceless villages.

On 7 June, 1980 South Africa launched an invasion of Angola which was comparable in personnel and military weight with that of 1975. Already in May, helicopter-transported troops had hit a number of villages in the southernmost provinces of Cunene and Kuando Kubango. The June invasion began in Cunene with the entry of some 2,000 South African troops, backed up by some 40 Mirage jets, two Hercules paratroop transports, 20 Puma helicopters and 40 AML-90 armoured cars. On 7 June itself, the Angolan anti-aircraft defences shot down 3 Mirages during an attack on a Namibian refuge camp near Lubango. In the weeks which followed the
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South Africans advanced on many civilian targets including the village of Evale, an attack in which Savimbi's UNITA forces participated. On 24 June, the invasion was intensified with a fresh infantry battalion and an armoured battalion being thrown into the fray. The Angolan counter-offensive began shortly thereafter, with the retaking of Mongua from the South Africans on the 28th. As July began, the FAPLA (Forcas Armadas Populares de Libertacao de Angola) forces moved decisively against the South African emplacements, and by the 4th the last enemy troops had crossed back into Namibia. Since then, there have been sporadic small-scale incursions and constant reconnaissance flights. Perhaps the most significant action was the mid-August bombing of the petroleum installations at Lobito, claimed by UNITA, but almost certainly carried out with South African aid. Raids were intensified towards the end of October, as a means of pressure on the UN as they went to South Africa to 'negotiate'.

The primary objective of the South African invasion was the destruction of the SWAPO (South West African People's Organization) military bases in southern Angola. In spite of the triumphalist statements of the apartheid regime, SWAPO was in no way destroyed, although it did receive a serious blow. A subsidiary aim, which became evident when the invasion was extended, was the re-introduction of UNITA into Angola. This could later be claimed as the basis for including this pro-South African force in talks over the future of Namibia. Ironically, at this very same time, the remnants of a UNITA network were being tried in the capital, Luanda, where the Popular Revolutionary Tribunal delivered 16 death sentences on 29 July. A second group of UNITA bombers were tried in Huambo in August, and no amount of blustering in the south under South African protection could change their overall pattern of decline. So, the first set of South African objective centred around their proposed 'settlement' of the Namibian question. The United Nations' proposal of demilitarized zone between Angola and Namibia, (accepted by Luanda and SWAPO) followed by free UN supervised elections in Namibia is now the only alternative as effectively the South Africans do not have a viable option in Namibia which could exclude SWAPO and be recognized.

As the MPLA Political Bureau rightly pointed out, a further aim of South Africa was to 'provoke the de-stabilization of the political and social and economic situation in the People's Republic of Angola, in the vain attempt to prevent the consolidation and advance of our democratic and Popular Revolution, and the subsequent setting up of a socialist regime in a region of the world particularly important in the context of the global strategy of imperialism' (Declaration of the Political Bureau of the MPLA Workers Party on the South African aggression against Angola; Jornal de Angola, 1 August 1980). Effectively, during the actual period of the invasion, a commission of the US Congress authorized President Carter to aid the UNITA puppet forces in Angola. Also during September, the Jornal de Angola revealed new CIA plans for sabotage of strategic installations in the country. Leaving aside the overall evolution of the situation, which depends essentially on how the Namibian question is resolved, South African aggression has had a considerable effect on the Angolan economy. Cunene is one of the main cattle-raising zones, and it is calculated that nearly $53 million have been lost since 1978 as a direct result of South African actions. This is
just a small indication of the overall effects of dislocation; more important perhaps is the fact that 500,000 people (one tenth of the population have had to abandon the southern war zone).

If the South African intentions were at least partially achieved, the Angolans also won a great victory. Whereas in 1975 Cuban aid was probably decisive, in 1980 it was the newly organized FAPLA which ejected the invaders, with the internationalist forces only being held in reserve should the South Africans have penetrated too deeply inside the country. Just as noteworthy was the unifying effect the invasion had on the Angolan people, with innumerable demonstrations up and down the country, showing a will to resist the aggression of apartheid.

Poder Popular
The commitment to 'Popular Power' has been a long standing one for the Angolan revolution. In November 1980, the Assembleia do Povo (People's Assembly) met for the first time, thus concretising the last wishes of the late President Neto. The first article of the new Electoral Law declares that 'the Assemblies of Popular Power are the highest organs of State Power at each political-administrative decision-making level of the Nation'. (Jornal de Angola, 25 September 1980). The 206 deputies to the People's Assembly will be chosen from amongst 'the most politically active and experienced citizens, those dedicated to the cause of the workers-peasants alliance . . .' (Article 9). The 'appointment' (indicacao) of candidates is the responsibility of the MPLA and the mass organizations, JMPLA (youth), OMA (women) and UNTA (unions), according to Article 10. During the course of October, elections took place for the Provincial Assemblies throughout the country, from Cabinda in the north to Cunene in the south. These elections were proceeded by an intensive phase of political education around the aims and objectives of Popular Power. The role of the Provincial Assemblies according to Manuel Alfredo is 'to lead the socio-economic, political and cultural development of the provinces in accordance with the principles of democratic centralism'. (Journal de Angola, 13 October, 1980). Lucio Lara, of the MPLA's Political Bureau clarified this statement at the same meeting when he said that the assemblies will 'propose solutions, will struggle alongside the Government to resolve the urgent problems (of the people)'.

During this first phase of implementation of Popular Power it was possible to note a wide diversity of processes — from the stage-managed token elections, to genuine discussions and popular participation. Likewise, the conception of these assemblies' role varies from the formal undertaking of their political primacy to a more realistic assessment of their basically advisory role. In fact, to understand the present elections one must go back to the factory commissions and neighbourhood committees of 1975. Analyzing these at the First Party Congress (1977) the late President Neto noted that, 'the organs of Popular Power are not treated as integral elements of State Power but separated and even opposed to the organs of the state apparatus, and above all the central state organs' (Central Committee Report, p.30). There seems little chance that the same 'mistake' will be repeated this time.

It is significant perhaps that the Popular Power 'Information Committee'
felt obliged to issue the following statement in the run up to the People's Assembly: 'the presentation and examination of candidates by the working masses, which includes the possibility of rejection of the candidates, constitutes an essential element of democratic elections . . . the candidates for delegates to the Electoral Conferences are elected in Assemblies and are not appointed (indicados) as certain reactionary elements attempt to put around, with the intention of questioning the democratic character of the elections'. (Jornal de Angola, August 31, 1980). It is not a question of directing abstract criticisms at a very difficult process, but one must realistically recognize that 'Peoples' Power' means 'participation', a certain 'control' over the state apparatus but not workers' power in the Marxist sense.

First Extraordinary Party Congress

Hard on the heels of the Asembleia do Povo in November, there was a closed MPLA Congress in December, primarily centred around economic issues. The 20,000 or so members of the MPLA which became the Workers Party in 1977, had for some months been discussing the balance-sheet of socio-economic development. The tasks of this extraordinary party congress were to assess to what extent the goals set in 1977 have been achieved and to map out the course of social and economic development till 1985.

The economic situation of Angola is critical. A recent resolution of the Central Committee concludes that 'the worrying economic-financial situation of the country is due fundamentally to the decline in production and in productivity, apart from other causes of a structural, organizational and conjunctural nature, as well as the effects of the general crisis of capitalism and the permanent aggression of South Africa, which our country is victim of'. (Novembro, June 1980, p.8). At the same time attention is drawn to the inefficiency of certain sectors of the state apparatus, and a general lack of fulfillment of Party decisions and orientations.

Reading the press in Angola one comes across a whole litany of economic bottlenecks, sheer inefficiency, wholesale corruption and a general apathy towards such serious problems as the rampant black market (which now surpasses the official market). The queues for consumer goods are as long as ever, although since 1975 the situation has improved in terms of the availability of foodstuffs at least. The party journal Novembro for June 1980 notes that infant mortality has actually increased in recent years to 1 in 10, the majority as victims of malnutrition.

The documents prepared for the Congress have openly discussed all these problems. One decision already taken is to reorganize and presumably streamline the state apparatus. Furthermore, following the path of Mozambique last year, the government 'will study the forms of support to be given to private and individual initiatives in the economic field, namely in the agro-livestock, industrial and service sectors'. (Novembro, June 1980, p.11). There is a certain air of unreality in some of the official speeches which constantly refer to the 'sabotage' of the revolution by sections of the petty bourgeoisie, while still claiming to have the support of the 'revolutionary' petty bourgeoisie.

Ultimately, however, there is a certain realistic recognition of the dangers faced, with one recent article calling attention to 'the danger of falling into
a state bureaucracy in the best of cases, or in the worst of cases a capitalist type of class society, with an "intermezzo" of "African socialism"."

(Novembro, June 1980, p.11).

The economic guidelines which are likely to emerge from the Congress should bring no great surprises. The orientation of ‘agriculture the base and industry the decisive factor’ in socio-economic development will remain. The attitude towards foreign capital will still be the same wary acceptance, and in this sense Mozambique’s more enthusiastic welcome will not be followed, nor as regards the encouragement of a private capitalist sector. The forthcoming national census and the general improvement of statistics, should allow for the elaboration of a more precise economic plan for the period up to 1985.

When all is said and done however, the problems facing the Angolan revolution are directly political, and cannot be resolved by administrative measures alone. At the First Party Congress, President Neto pointed to 1980 as a key point. Today President Dos Santos has accepted that 1980 is a watershed, but it is difficult to see precisely what direction the process will take. A lot will hang on the evolution of the ‘Namibian question’ with serious repercussions in Angola itself. The Party Congress may gear up the revolutionary nationalist movement for a more decisive course of action. Fundamentally, the future of the revolutionary process hinges around the increased political role of the masses, which means the Assembleia do Povo. If this remains a mere showcase for popular ‘participation’, or just a check on an inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy it will not be able to fulfill this role. In this case the social road of ‘African socialism’ towards neo-colonialism will inevitably be the result. As it says on a wall in Luanda — ‘The revolution is like a bicycle, when it stops it falls’.

Ronaldo Munck

THE CONSTELLATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES:
A NEW STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE BY SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa’s latest offensive in foreign policy is its attempts to establish a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS). In opposition to South Africa’s manoeuvres in the region the front line states — Botswana, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania — have organized a number of counter moves, in particular a strategy for increasing economic cooperation among African states so as to liberate them from economic dependence on South Africa.

The CONSAS Aims

The CONSAS proposal was initiated by the South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha at a meeting not just of politicians but also businessmen from key sectors of the economy plus top government officials, on 22 November 1979. Botha’s address called for businessmen to become actively involved in ‘strengthening economic relations’ between South Africa and the states of southern Africa. The ‘business leaders’ responded positively to the Botha call. Harry Oppenheimer, head of the giant Anglo-American Corporation, described the scheme as possessing ‘charm and imagination’.
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South Africa's strategic planners (Star Johannesburg, 20 November 1979) have divided the 11 countries of the southern African region into different groups according to their calculation as to how difficult it will be to draw them into the CONSAS alliance. The first group includes Swaziland and Malawi. These countries are seen as already 'following a policy of cooperation with South Africa' and drawing them into CONSAS is not seen as posing any particular difficulty. The second group includes Zimbabwe and Namibia. Their position was seen as depending very much, on the type of government which takes over after independence. The next obvious members of CONSAS are Botswana and Lesotho. These countries have strong economic ties with South Africa but are seen as needing some 'persuasion' to get them to enter into an open alliance. Next on the list of potential members are Zaire and Zambia. Zaire although physically distant is seen to be a potential member because of its 'pro-Western' stance and it is felt that once Zaire and others have joined, pressures on Zambia to affiliate will be too great for it to resist. Finally at the bottom of the list are Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania. These countries are not really seen as being potential members of CONSAS under their present governments. However, making some intervention in these countries in order to try and bring about a change in government is definitely not being ruled out by South Africa's strategic planners.

The proposed establishment of a Constellation of States is clearly an aspect of what Prime Minister P.W. Botha has called South Africa's 'total strategy'. This envisages intense activity in four fields: the economic, the military, the political and the psychological ideological — with the objective of ensuring the long term survival of the exploitative and oppressive system of apartheid in South Africa. The formation of a Constellation of States is seen as a means of creating a favourable ‘external environment’ for South Africa. Ultimately what is being aimed for is the formation of an ‘anti-Marxist’ alliance grouped around South Africa and involving up to eleven countries ‘stretching to the equator’.

The CONSAS strategy does not in fact, differ fundamentally in aims from the policies South Africa has been pursuing in independent Africa for some years. Ever since the beginning of decolonization in the 1960s and more particularly since the defeat of Portuguese colonialism in 1974, South Africa has sought to forge alliances with or at least neutralize states in Africa. Thus in the 1960s Dr Verwoerd put forward the idea of an Economic Community of Southern Africa in which the two white-dominated states of South Africa and Rhodesia would be the nuclei around which a number of economically dependent ‘black-ruled’ states would be grouped. Vorster's 'outward looking policy' of the late 60s and the 'detente' policy of the early 70s were likewise aimed precisely at incorporating African states into an economic and political alliance with South Africa.

The New Means

What distinguishes the CONSAS strategy from earlier policies is the means which it seems will be employed. The evident failure of earlier approaches, manifest in South Africa’s increasing isolation and the advancing mass popular struggles, have made a new approach imperative for South Africa’s
ruling class. The Patriotic Front’s victory in the Zimbabwe elections have made a more effective South African foreign strategy even more urgent. The earlier approaches of the Verwoerd and Vorster periods tended to be based on crude, directly political pressures. The Muldergate revelations have now made clear how attempts were made to build up inter-state relations through secret diplomatic contacts including the use of bribery of key decision makers in particular African countries. This, in the post-Muldergate era seems to have been recognized as a too fragile, too unreliable basis for building alliances.

The CONSAS strategy will be based on a much more subtle approach. Instead of concentrating on influencing particular decision makers the CONSAS approach will concentrate on trying to influence the objective conditions within which decisions are made. More particularly the strategy will attempt to build up a series of economic relations, sufficiently favourable to at least the rulers of target African states to persuade them that they have common interests with South Africa. Economic aid projects initiated by South Africa will be set up without demanding prior political commitment from the recipient state. They will be regarded as an investment in the future; as a means of entrapping these states economically so as to influence their future political behaviour. Thus the Constellation will not involve, in the first instance at least, the establishment of a formal organization. It will recognize that at present there are a number of political and ideological barriers to African states collaborating openly with South Africa formally. Accordingly the major effort in the immediate future will be on building up economic ties while keeping organizational form flexible so as to accommodate as wide a spectrum of target states as possible.

The concept of a constellation of states does not primarily denote a formal organization, but rather a grouping of states with common interests and developing mutual relationships . . .

Another noteworthy feature of the CONSAS strategy is the more subtle way in which the ideological basis of the proposed alliance is being defined. South Africa’s strategic planners recognize that it will probably not be possible to gain much direct support for that country’s apartheid policies, but they are calculating that at least some of the leaderships of the target African states can be won over to a common acceptance of the proposition that ‘a Marxist order will not provide the solutions to Africa’s formidable problems’. The concrete projects undertaken to promote the Constellation will thus be intended, as P.W. Botha puts it, to ‘demonstrate in a practical way the superior advantages of the system in which we believe (i.e. capitalism)’. In this way South Africa hopes to gain wider acceptance for its own ideological definition of the liberation struggle as an ‘intrusion of foreign elements . . . who do not come to help and heal but to enslave and destroy’. It hopes that from this will follow a decreasing commitment on the part of certain African states to the liberation struggle.

The new strategy will, it seems, involve a much greater mobilization of resources than previous South African offensives. An increasing number of ‘development projects’ are likely to be undertaken by South African state and private capitalist concerns. They will be used to demonstrate the virtues of a ‘free market system’. In his Carlton Conference speech, Botha spoke of the establishment of a special Inter-Departmental committee to co-ordinate
projects; of the possibility of the establishment of a South African Development Bank ‘in the near future’, and government involvement in a series of infrastructural projects. He also called on business organizations to match these efforts with their own projects, especially now that South Africa seems to be recovering from recession.

**Continued Underdevelopment**

There is no doubt that South Africa can generate the capital to finance a range of economic projects in the less industrialized countries of the region. However, there can equally be no doubt that the type of projects to be financed will not alter the fundamental patterns of underdevelopment in the region. The existing patterns of trade and investment in the region are geared to the reproduction of a highly unequal division of labour, advantageous to South Africa but highly disadvantageous to neighbouring countries. In the present regional division of labour in southern Africa neighbouring countries are drawn into economic relations with South Africa as sellers of raw materials, suppliers of migrant labour and purchasers of finished products produced in South Africa. This division of labour was created through a long historical process and has been reinforced since the independence of neighbouring countries by South Africa’s trade and investment activity. It serves to fuel the accumulation process in South Africa, while at the same time limiting and arresting the possibilities of development within neighbouring countries by depriving these countries of the resources, labour power and markets necessary to build up their own productive capacities. Accelerated investment from South Africa, particularly investment undertaken with the express purpose of strengthening ties with South Africa, can only intensify the problems of underdevelopment created by the present division of labour. It will therefore necessarily run counter to the real needs of development in the region which require the progressive lessening of economic ties with South Africa.

**A 'Total' Strategy**

The CONSAS strategy is far more than it seems.

1. It will use the economic inducements of development aid to bind African economies to South Africa.
2. It will use economic projects for political ends, namely the strengthening of the apartheid state.
3. It will seek to break African unity and to divide African states from one another.
4. The CONSAS strategy is only part of a total strategy. The other sides of this strategy involve military and counter-insurgency methods. (The internal dimensions within South Africa will be reviewed in our next issue).

The various counter proposals for an alternative structure for regional economic co-operation by the independent African states (most recently in the Second Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference in November — editors) represent important first steps in a strategy to break economic links with South Africa.

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THE SETTLER MODE OF PRODUCTION: THE RHODESIAN CASE

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Within the broad Marxist discussion on imperialism and colonialism, problems specific to particular regions have been accorded only marginal attention. To a large extent, this explains the non-existence of theories of capitalist relations of the settler-colonial type. This gap in the theoretical analysis of colonialism is even more surprising when we note the central importance accorded to the problem in debate during the age of ‘classical’ imperialism. The Philosophical Radicals like Simmel considered the settler colonies as being the very embodiment of colonialism and their main reference was to the successive colonies in New England. A similar position was taken by Hobson in his study *Imperialism*, which so greatly influenced Marxist theory. This anti-imperialist English liberal attributed any economic advantage for the colonizing metropolis solely to the establishment of settler colonies, as against imperialism itself which was necessitated by intra-capitalist contradictions such as under-consumption and over-saving.

Except for a chapter on colonialism in the first volume of *Capital*, orthodox Marxist theory did not deal with this subject. Without doubt this was the result of the political context under which Lenin, Luxemburg and Bukharin undertook their work. Their main interest, quite legitimately, lay in proving the inevitability of war under the conditions of world-wide capitalist expansion during World War I. Furthermore they wished to show the actual possibility of making a revolutionary transformation in imperialist dominated societies. Given their global approach, specific forms of colonial domination were of no particular importance to them. The long-term influence of the classics was partly responsible for the failure of recent discussions to take up this issue. This paper is an attempt to reopen the discussion on the ‘settler colony’ as a specific form of capitalism and through this, to gain some insight into the workings of capitalist structures under certain conditions.

On the Notion of ‘Settler Mode of Production’

Our reference to the category ‘settler mode of production’ does not envisage
a system of social relations to be ranged alongside the 'capitalist', 'feudal' and other basic modes. Rather, the Rhodesian example comprises a combination of different modes, in this broad sense, which are in turn dominated by a specifically formed set of capitalist relations of production and exchange. This terminology departs from current usage in Marxist discussion which, perhaps due to an unconscious bondage to Stalinized Marxism, uses very rigid terminology compared to Marx himself. Our interest is in the basic structures on which production and life processes in white settler colonies are based. Here, Rhodesia is a typical example of what Marx defined as 'the ways and means by which people gain their livelihoods'. Analysis of these basic structures enables us to infer their dynamic; in the Rhodesian case, to draw conclusions as to the constraints and possibilities that were open both to the settler government and to the imperialist powers.

The employment of the term 'mode of production' is certainly not fortuitous. As used here it is meant to signify a very definite logical status of the basic underlying structures from which emanate long-term tendencies. These tendencies fashion the entire course of events over long periods of time. They will not, therefore, disappear with the formal ending of settler rule but will represent a powerful adversary to the new government for the foreseeable future. At the same time, to say that settler society by virtue of its fundamental structures cannot change to accommodate equal rights or other elements of a more 'normal' capitalist system would be nonsense as a statement on the level of actual politics and not, as it is here, as a statement of long-term tendencies. We consider that it is possible to show by an analysis of the Rhodesian example a basic common structure which constitutes a specific form of the imperialist articulation of capitalist and pre-capitalist relations of production.

The Genesis of the Settler Colonial Mode of Production

The economic activities of the settlers centred largely on agriculture which was initially carried out on a subsistence level. After the violent elimination of competition from African peasants they turned towards supplying the internal market. A final stage was reached by producing cash crops exclusively for the world market. This type of economy is centred around the continuously reproduced exploitation of African labour power kept available at the cheapest possible price, and, as a consequence, it involves a low input of overhead capital. This becomes possible by the articulation of what is formally 'capitalist production' with a precapitalist society which furnishes labour power to the settler economy at only the cost of current reproduction, but which itself takes on the long-term cost of reproduction of the next generation of labourers. Since this process of long-term reproduction takes place outside the sphere of capitalist production and since the workers enter this sphere only at the time of their optimal working ability, the savings to the capitalist sector are enormous, both at the level of individual farm and that of the settler agrarian bourgeoisie as an entire class. Settler agriculture is based on surplus value production in its 'absolute' form, i.e. prolonging working hours, cutting down on the means of reproduction etc. This leads to a very high rate of surplus value, which can only be realized, however, on the world market.
To guarantee the continuation of these conditions, a huge amount of repressive power is required — in addition to the repression employed in the establishment of this mode of production, which required the expulsion of Africans from their lands and their restriction into 'reservations'. Since the settlers had to depend on a suitable supply of labour power, they were forced to establish 'reserves' as a reservoir of labour power. Settler structures have a blocking effect on the development of the traditional African subsistence economy. Since the latter represented a competitor on the internal market, the settler agrarian bourgeoisie had to enforce political changes, such as the definitive regulation of the land question immediately after the granting of autonomy status to the colony in 1923. The African subsistence economy in the reserves was henceforth reduced to replenishing the reservoir of labour power. Since labour was in abundant supply and no other means of reproduction were available to the Africans, any form of constant and outright coercion, such as slavery, was superfluous. The southern economy of the USA in the 19th century had to depend on a continuous supply of slave labour from Africa, and also had to cope with an open frontier, which, under 'normal' conditions would have prevented any capitalist production from forming. The Rhodesian settlers solved this problem by establishing the reserves. Africans are by no means free wage labourers: they are not free to go where they choose to sell their labour power but it is simply unnecessary to bind them individually to an individual master. In the same process the settler bourgeoisie eliminated the existing free land and thereby created one of the necessary conditions of capitalist agriculture. The land area as a whole had to be monopolised to prevent the development of a class of 'self-employed' subsistence farmers who might, by marketing their surplus produce, endanger the price structure on which the market oriented settler farmers had to depend. The actual area under cultivation by the settlers is consequently only 3% of the cultivable land in their possession.

To paralyze the resistance potential of the exploited Africans and at the same time safeguard the profitable configuration of capitalist and pre-capitalist sectors, the agrarian bourgeoisie vigorously reinforced the migrant labour system. This had emerged from the failure of mining capital, the first form of capitalist development in the country, to proletarianize the African peasants completely, leaving them at the level of marginal subsistence agriculture. (A similar experience pertained in those areas of west Africa, dominated by the concession companies; they were at first obliged to break up the simple commodity producing cycle by military force and had to rely constantly on the military structuring of production relations.) As a result the pauperized Africans, their traditional basis of reproduction destroyed, had no choice but to accept temporary wage labour, which afforded an additional opportunity of raising the rate of exploitation. Thus Africans found themselves within a vicious cycle: the severe exploitation in capitalist agriculture aggravated pauperization and so reproduced the necessity to seek temporary employment. The amount of fixed capital needed for this kind of agricultural production is thus minimal; the entire fund 'normally' required for further accumulation is therefore available for consumption (by the settler capitalist), which of course creates a tendency for stationary reproduction of the entire economy. The over-abundance of means of consumption is shown for ex-
ample in the many African domestic servants and the excessive consumption of luxury goods.

Class Structure and Class Formation

The settler economy is totally lacking in any kind of competitive mechanism characteristic of classical capitalism. This is due to the total integration of settler activities with the settler state from the very beginning of colonization. It was finally cemented through political measures, racial discrimination reinforcing capitalist exploitation under the conditions we have described. The stationary system finds its economic expression in the state-organized marketing of all cash crops. The existing mode of production is endangered by any opening up of these structures towards the world market, as well as by any liberalization of the labour market internally. In this sense, the settler bourgeoisie may be termed anti-imperialist, since it rigidly opposes any strategy designed to change the status quo. Production on a stationary level implies a high degree of physical wastage of human labour power. This means in the long run, mounting resistance on the part of the exploited Africans. Although clearly pauperized, the Africans in Rhodesia are semi-proletarians rather than a ‘lumpen-proletariat’, a vital consideration in any discussion about liberation strategy. Given increasing resistance by the Africans, the settler state is forced to exert ever stronger repression, to such a degree that its reaction to outside pressure must necessarily take on an increasingly militant posture as well. The existing system of extensive exploitation of the African subsistence economy in the reserves produces what may be called a ‘wastage effect’ which is clearly dysfunctional to the permanent search of international capital for new markets. This has become a distinctive feature of colonial-metropolitan relations since the close of World War II. The migrant labour system was in the long run not only stationary but produced distortive and dissolving effects on the traditional mode of production which was constantly depleted of surplus labour. This in turn led to increased pauperization and ineffectiveness on the part of the traditional structures, contrasting with an increasingly intensive accumulation within the capitalist agricultural sector.

The non-agricultural activities of the settler bourgeoisie, such as industry and distribution, are not necessarily characteristic of the settler bourgeoisie nor of the settler colonial mode of production. The agrarian bourgeoisie stood under no necessity to follow the cycle of accumulation and reinvestment, and it was only after UDI that some urgent diversifications took place, without altering the long-existing structure profoundly, however. Industrial capital, on the other hand, had been exposed to capitalist market mechanisms and investment requirements. The settler colonial mode of production consequently is marked by primitive capitalist structures, not dictated by the imperatives of capitalist accumulation. Reproduction on a constant level is indicated as well by the absence of a layer of ‘poor whites’ which was generated in South Africa by capitalist penetration.

A further typical feature of settler colonialism in Rhodesia is the existence of a white proletariat. These are descendants of qualified workers who were recruited for the colony when immigration was restricted to qualified labour. Thus the settler proletariat originated not from contradictions
within the existing production relations as did the European proletariat. Therefore it is not a declassed stratum. This proletariat, although it is proletarian by virtue of its position in the production process, in its social conscience identifies itself completely with the settler bourgeoisie. This is in keeping with the fact that its relatively privileged position is afforded solely by the increased exploitation of African labour power. The main interest of this corrupted working class lay in the continuation of its privileged status. This corporate policy of the qualified European workers, which was designed to monopolize its own position, evolved along lines similar to the guild organization of medieval Europe. As industrialization went on, it ran into contradictions with the interests of industrial capital, which wanted at a certain stage of development of industry to break the white workers exclusive bargaining position and also to form an African industrial proletariat. The agrarian bourgeoisie and settler proletariat thus form the main supporting pillars of settler capitalism. They tend to conserve the existing form of exploitation and work by this very means for the gradual pauperization, dissolution and final destruction of the indigenous social structures.

The settler economy is dependent, both for its development and for its continued existence, on its connection with the world market, where, in the form of the exportation of raw materials, the extra profits made in the capitalist sector have to be realized. There exists, then, a necessary linkage between the exploitation of Africans as migrant labourers in their subsistence economy on the one hand and in the imperialist centres, where world market prices are decided, on the other. This close linkage must not be lost sight of, especially in analyzing the contradictions between the imperialist centres and the settler bourgeoisie. In each particular case, we always have to take into account the use value of the goods produced by settler capital for the world market as well as the economic linkages between settler capital and metropolitan capital. At the same time, one should still note the specific and relatively disparate interests of the settler bourgeoisie — and especially its agrarian faction — which was pinpointed by the Rhodesian secession in 1965.

A Special Type of Capitalist Relations
From the Rhodesian example we can draw the following conclusions about the settler colonial mode of production:

1. The settler colonial mode of production is fundamentally different from the capitalist mode proper, since it excluded competition and generated stagnation from its inception. Production on a relatively stable level affords a maximum share of money capital available for private consumption, since pressure for reinvestment is excluded. The small size of this reinvestment fund inhibits the formation of local consumer goods industries to meet this demand.

2. Contrary to the capitalist model, wage labour is not freely available, but is called up in case of need. This makes necessary a partial integration of the indigenous peoples under the conditions of capitalist production. However, this happens in such a fashion that they are compelled to respond to the calls of capital in an ad hoc manner. This state of things is reached in a 'natural' way, by increasing pauperization in the reserves as well as by use
of extra-economic force. Since the settler capitalist is interested exclusively in the surplus-value-producing aspect of the labour power, the strategy of optimum extraction of surplus labour leaves the reproduction of labour power as well as of the whole working population entirely up to the worker himself, except for furnishing the only necessary prerequisite, the reserves. In this respect, settler capitalism resembles the crudest forms of industrial capitalism at a time when an abundant supply of labour power, in the form of expropriated peasants, presented a comparable opportunity of extorting surplus value from a working population whose reproduction had not yet become a matter to worry about. This is the basic working of the process of extraction of surplus labour from the reserves, which today appears as a 'natural' one, irrespective of the debate among historians as to whether it emerged as a result of conscious planning or of the unconscious working out of the relationship between the indigenous structures and the settler economy.

3. The settler mode of production, contrary to the capitalist one, is of a hybrid character: it is capitalist-oriented by its surplus value production, but it is based on traditional productive structures. The settler economy is not purely capitalist in its fundamental relations of production. However, it is essentially capitalist in that it produces exclusively for the world market, which in turn is subject to the exigencies of capitalist accumulation. Therefore, we are faced, in Marx's terminology, with a formal subsumption under capital but not with a real subsumption carried through to its final conclusion. The settlers are thereby forced, according to the laws of capitalist commodity production, to realize 'surplus value' produced partly under extra-capitalist conditions.

4. The settler mode of production is a variation of colonial capitalism: a developed capitalist world market forms a necessary precondition for its development. It is not a preliminary stage of the capitalist mode proper, though it shares some of the same savage forms of exploitation. The origin of capitalism proper results from the internal contradiction of the feudal mode of production and also from the external modes of production. The settler mode of production is, on the contrary, implanted on existing traditional structures without being the result of contradictions within these social structures; rather it is the result of intra-capitalist contradictions. The process of expulsion from the old agricultural areas, though it resembles primitive accumulation, is different as it is not completed until the full expropriation of the Africans occurs; but at the same time, they do not become totally 'free' individuals. The traditional mode of production is cemented in but on a mere subsistence level, in a state of pauperization. If social transformations destroyed these traditional social structures, the settler mode of production, rather than being transformed, would disappear without a trace. An expression of this threat is the fascist means employed by the Rhodesian settlers to safeguard their status quo against any form of emancipation, be it by the liberation of Africans, by the industrial fraction interested in the free use of labour power, or by policies of international capital. Repression and the enforcement of conformity have thus been directed, not with the same intensity but with an identical goal, against serious attempts at liberalization within the European settler society; although without doubt, the primary aim of the repressive machinery has been the African population and their liberation movement.
The exploitation of the reserves by attracting workers into the capitalist sector is not, to be sure, a feature limited to settler capitalism. The specificity lies in the fact that settler capitalism is of necessity dependent on this form of exploitation. 'Normal' capitalism also makes use of gratuitous reproduction potentials in order to lower the individual or societal price of labour power, and it does so wherever possible.

5. Constant repression is directed against the indigenous population without, however, it being allowed to destroy their social structures — this would imply the end of settler colonialism itself. At the same time, the need of the settlers to preserve these traditional structures implies the continuation of the fundamental antagonisms between conquerors and conquered. Direct brutal force is thus a constant and necessary element of settler rule. Only as the Africans have been forced into wage labour by their growing economic distress, has this system of brute force changed somewhat.

6. Temporary, migrant wage labour can be compared to slave labour only within certain limits. Both have in common a high degree of unmediated regimentation of labour power. However in migrant labour, the owner of the commodity of wage labour, within the confines of the labour market at least, appears as a free vendor, even though he stays bound to his original production relations in the reserves. The slave, on the contrary, is the unlimited property of the owner, who takes over the full responsibility for reproduction. The capitalist relationship thus stays outside the master-slave relationship. Capital is realised as such on the external market, the subsumption of slave labour under capitalist conditions is only a formal one mediated by the dependence of the master on the capitalist market. In the case of migrant labour, the settler capitalist pursues a strategy of maximum extortion of surplus value, without having to respect the conditions of reproduction which stay the preserve of the traditional sector. The process of underdeveloping indigenous society is thus intensified. Thus a common trait of the system of migrant labour and slave holding is that under the condition of an existing capitalist world market, they are both economically defined exclusively by that. From purely economic considerations, migrant labour seems more efficient in terms of absolute surplus value formation and the minimization of the social costs of reproduction. The main parallel traits then are: the extraction of parts of the necessary production, 'labour rent', along with the surplus product, due to exploitation without consideration for the reproduction of the working population; the application of extra-economic compulsion; and the personal bondage of the producer. However, settler capitalism differs from slave-holding in the important respect that here the class of migrant workers as a whole is, in true capitalist fashion, dependent on the class of settler capitalists as a whole. Although the migrant workers are not personally free, their illiberty is not in terms of a personal relation of bondage to an individual master.

7. The definition of class in settler society is based on racial demarcation. The relations of property and exploitation are delimited by ethnic discrimination. This represents the main contradiction in Rhodesian settler society. The dominance of this structure and the necessity to ensure the prolonged existence of the status quo by the ruling class forces all members of the ethnic minority, without exception, to accept this structure unconditionally, regardless of any class specific contradictions. This results in
strong racial chauvinism and a denial of 'class' opposition, which is facilitated by the position of the settler proletariat as a privileged labour aristocracy.

8. Within settler society, class opposition between wage labour and capital is superseded by the structures of racial differentiation. This results in the settler proletariat sharing in the extremely large social surplus product, itself an outgrowth of the rigid form of exploitation of Africans. Certainly of equal importance is the failure of capitalist relations of production to actually penetrate the old structures. This persistent failure stems of course from the conserving structures of the settler mode of production itself. There has never been, and could never be, anything resembling a bourgeois revolution in the sense of a process which would lead to the total annihilation of all traditional bonds of dominance and/or kinship, i.e. the total proletarianization of the direct producers. This is why the existing Rhodesian industrial proletariat had to be created by means of immigration and therefore its aspirations to defend its specific interests took on, from the beginning, a corporate character.

Settler Colonialism and Imperialism

Various instances of open contradictions between settler colonies and capitalist centres have occurred apart from the Rhodesian secession — Algeria, Katanga, Mozambique, and now Namibia. What was at stake, in all these cases, was the form of the retreat by the colonial power. Also posed is the question of the form which the integration of the settler colonies into the world market has taken historically — which in turn makes possible a more precise assessment of the metropole's claim of helplessness in the face of Rhodesian secession or the persistent illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa.

From the viewpoint of the world market, settler colonialism must be understood as a contradictory element in the global capitalist process of value formation. This is also clear from the counter-measures on the part of imperialism against secession, the sanctions and their workings. If we appraise settler colonialism as a social formation which does, within certain limits, exhibit independent forms of development, then we have to modify the rigid schema of imperialism as a system of centralized accumulation and peripheral surplus drainage by making allowance for a 'third factor that intervenes between imperialist capitalism and the peoples of the exploited countries, i.e. the colonialists themselves' (Emmanuel). Economically, this implies the emergence of a bourgeoisie of agrarian and industrial origin. From its position, it is obliged to attempt to defend itself against both international capital and the exploited indigenous peoples. The struggle for the market was of necessity the dominating element in all economic processes. The total impossibility of the settler bourgeoisie consenting to the metropolitan strategy of decolonization led, of necessity, to the struggle to establish an independent white country in Africa. This was the only way the settlers could preserve the productive relations from which they derived their privileges. A major shortcoming in Emmanuel's argument, however, is his neglect of the continuing dependence even of a settler state which has become independent politically. Here Emmanuel clearly argues along the lines of his Unequal Exchange, transposing the contradiction between cen-
tre and periphery on an international scale and thus missing out the importance of existing structures of capitalist production and exploitation within the periphery itself.

With these considerations in mind, we can appraise the strategies of sanctions and response to UDI. Actually UDI did totally frustrate the decolonization strategies of international capital. Decolonization had been the central instrument to attain the projected aim of removing anachronistic production relations, which not only blocked the expansion of industrial capital, but at the same time were bound to generate an extraordinarily strong potential for resistance, which might be directed against any form of capitalism. Therefore, decolonization was vital both for achieving economic access to the country's labour power, thus instituting neo-imperialist conditions, and to ensure the submission of this labour power to capitalist conditions politically.

The Relationships between Settler Colonialism and Metropoles

The economic differences between settlers and the capitalist centres involve a struggle over shares of social revenues, mutual contradictory strategies of surplus value formation and of its realization, and generally a competition for third markets and also for access to the settler market proper. This last aspect was of especial importance for the UN sanctions policy against Rhodesia. Generally the struggle for shares of the social revenue is over the terms on which the surplus value that is produced in the realm of settler capitalism is split between the settler and metropolitan bourgeoisies. The settler bourgeoisie, therefore, may be viewed genetically as a split-off 'secessionist-section' of the bourgeoisie of the metropolis. The conditions of production of this section have differentiated it from the metropolitan bourgeoisie to such an extent that antagonisms have broken out and we can rightly speak of two distinct classes operating under quite divergent social and economic conditions. Decolonization strategy then appears as the attempt on the part of the metropolitan bourgeoisie to contest part of the surplus value appropriated by the settler bourgeoisie by means of stepped-up capitalist penetration, by destroying the indigenous structure and thereby cutting the ground from under the feet of the settler mode of production. This would explain the open antagonisms that erupted from the 1960s and possibly even harsher clashes to come.

When we turn to the political transposition of these conflicts, it is clear that the principal conflict over strategies of accumulation that took place in Rhodesia certainly leads to a far more rigid political response than one would expect from the 'normal' competition for markets. Politically, we have to recognize a special position of the settlers, who are not to be seen as only the agents of imperialism. Although historically, from the age of classical imperialism up to about 1960, there existed an objective identity of interests between the metropolitan and the settler bourgeoisie, this has largely evaporated, with the only exception being Israel, though even there we can also discern tendencies of a shift in global class alignments. The divergences between the settlers and the metropolitan bourgeoisie are not, however, those between principally opposed social systems. In this sense, settler colonialism is a modification within the general framework of
capitalist societies. Therefore settler counter-imperialism cannot, in any sense, be considered of an emancipatory nature, but rather as a defence for atavistic forms of exploitation which by this token take on a politically anachronistic stature as well. The metropolitan strategy, on the other hand, exhibits a much greater potential of adaptation and is forced to generate additional adaptive mechanisms as new spheres of contradiction emerge. The conclusion of Emmanuel, therefore, that the principal struggle which was fought by the metropolitan bourgeoisie was directed against their own settlers, is not only wrong scientifically, but takes on, in the face of objective repression and also of the breadth and the success of the anti-imperialist struggles in the periphery of world capitalism, an outrightly counter-revolutionary tint.

Postscript (August 1980)

After overcoming the obstinate resistance of the settlers, the people of Zimbabwe have at last succeeded in winning the prerequisites for the reconstruction of their country towards a self-determined path of development. The road leading to the accession to power of the Patriotic Front government has demonstrated the extent to which the settlers were prepared to go in defending their supremacy, but also has borne out the thesis that, despite a fundamental proximity of interests, there have been wide divergences in the class interests of the settlers on the one hand and the metropolitan bourgeoisie on the other. In the present situation, while it can fairly safely be said that settler dominance has definitely been overthrown, the prospect of a neo-colonial development as envisaged by the bourgeoisie of the developed capitalist countries can by no means be ruled out. In effect, the remaining settlers who find themselves still in control of large parts of the state apparatus and of the economy, may well turn out to be the mainstay of such an attempt to preserve the most basic relationship of exploitation that the country has been subjected to over the last ninety years. Their interests, after the abolition of their over-privileged position even within the context of a capitalist system, must necessarily turn towards the installation of 'normal' capitalist relations — in the given situation, neo-colonial ones.

At the level of class relations the heritage of settler colonialism thus consists in the continued presence in Zimbabwe of the old ruling class, which is still delimited ethnically and will continue, for a considerable time, to exert a powerful influence through its control of decisive apparatuses and know-how. The Zimbabwean government is thereby presented with the choice of radically extinguishing the power of this class and at the same time risking massive economic and social disruption, by a rapid restructuring of all social relations, which well might take on a catastrophic form and encourage intervention from South Africa, or of trying to bring about the necessary changes in a relatively slow manner which may avoid disruption, but on the other hand gives an opportunity to the remaining settlers to further their own interests in a neo-colonial development. For this, the settlers are well equipped by their technical and administrative experience and by their potential for outright sabotage, should more positive actions fail.

The Zimbabwean example presents important lessons for the southern African region as a whole, which can usefully be seen through the theoretical framework outlined here. The installation of an illegal govern-
ment in Namibia and the concomitant pursuit of the old Bantustan plans in that country clearly shows that the basic structures of settler colonialism will be defended wherever and for as long as possible. Only after the definite failure of such attempts, as had become clear in Zimbabwe by mid-1979, will the settlers be prepared to accept outside (Western) mediation and to adopt a softer attitude, in an attempt to save at least the preconditions of a capitalist society. At that point the contradictions between metropolitan imperialism and what here has been termed the ‘counter-imperialism’ of the settlers becomes clear, at the conference table, and are ultimately resolved in the overriding unity of imperialist interests in the continuance and consolidation of economic and social dominance.

Bibliographic Note
This is a shortened version of a paper, originally published in German, which was presented at the Leeds conference and has been subsequently amended. The original, under the title 'Siedlerkoloniale Produktionsweise: Das Beispiel Rhodesien', Studien zu Imperialismus, Abhängigkeit, Befreiung, No.3, 1978, contained a more comparative discussion of Rhodesia in relation to other settler colonies. The analysis of the settler creation of a labour force owes much to G. Arrighi, 'Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia', in G. Arrighi & J.S. Saul, Essays in the Political Economy of Africa, (Monthly Review, New York, 1973), and at a more theoretical level to C. Meillassoux, Maidens, Meal and Money, (Macmillan, London 1981). The only comparative treatment of antagonisms between imperialism and settler colonialism that is written from a perspective that is not sympathetic to the settlers is A. Emmanuel, 'White Settler Colonialism and the Myth of Investment Imperialism', New Left Review, 73, 1972.

IMPERIALISM AND SETTLER CAPITAL: FRIENDS OR FOES?
Carolyn Baylies

An examination of the existing configuration of class forces in Zimbabwe is necessary to assess the chances of various developmental strategies. What distinguishes Zimbabwe among African countries is the size of its settler community and the degree of diversification and entrenchment of settler capital. Moreover, this community enjoyed substantial scope for political participation. While the metropolitan power retained its formal capacity to influence and set broad limits for policy, government was essentially in the hands of settlers from the early twenties. The transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe thus involves issues and problems of a different order from elsewhere. It cannot, for instance be assumed that the typical dimensions and forms of neo-colonialism will necessarily apply.

Light would be shed on a wide range of post-Independence issues by a prior assessment of the various ‘settler’ interests in relation to those labelled ‘imperialist’. To gain greater control over development of the agricultural sector, should the government expropriate settler farms or the vast foreign estates? Is it more rational to rely on foreign as opposed to settler capital to reinvest profits locally — and in a manner consistent with the need to create additional job opportunities? Can settler capital be relied on to upgrade its existing labour force or allow for increased worker participation any more
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(or less) than foreign capital? And are such calculations of the chances of capital co-operating with the Zimbabwean government in fact best evaluated in terms of such distinctions between 'foreign' and 'settler' capital? Or would they be more appropriately analyzed in terms of a sectoral breakdown of capital? Is, for example, manufacturing capital, whether foreign or settler, more likely to accede to increased African wages and a general upgrading of the work force than capital invested in agriculture?

Rather than directly answering these questions or offering a comprehensive analysis of class forces, our purpose here is relatively modest and preliminary in nature: simply to raise and hopefully clarify some of the issues involved.

Background — Arrighi's Depiction of the Rhodesian Political Economy

Clearly not all aspects of Arrighi's method nor the details of his interpretation need be uncritically accepted; but his analysis represents a crucial contribution to the dynamics of Rhodesian development under colonialism and of the interrelation of class and state.

His approach is, first, to identify classes within an evolving economic structure, then to specify their economic interests, then to determine the implied antagonisms or possible alliances among various class groups, and finally to evaluate their level of political consciousness. Arrighi then examines state policy, indicating how it expressed the relative political influence of particular local classes within limits set by the overall dependence of the economy on foreign capital.

According to Arrighi, the white agrarian bourgeoisie stood at the centre of gravity of Rhodesia's class structure in the 1930s. This was a group 'national' in orientation, in the sense that its economic interests lay in expansion of the domestic market and hence were compatible with reinvestment of locally generated surplus value and more specifically with industrialization. But at the same time it was oriented toward preservation of its market position against possible competition from within the African population. The political expression of its combined interests involved the division of the economy into largely non-competing racial groups, the continuously decreasing productivity of the African peasantry, but government intervention to foster industrialization. As Arrighi points out, this policy package was internally inconsistent since the decline of peasant productivity would tend to depress local demand for manufactures. It was also unstable in that it promoted antagonistic class forces, particularly the growth of the African proletariat.

Given these contradictory forces, what development occurred is attributed to somewhat fortuitous external factors — the second world war, which stimulated the export sector and local manufacturing, the post-war dollar shortage and increasing demand for raw materials, and the tendency to divert foreign funds from South Africa to Rhodesia. Creation of the Federation, a consequence of the aspirations of settler and foreign mining capital, was similarly a factor in stimulating local development. Sustained external markets thus allowed changes in the sectoral structure and,
gradually, the replacement of the white agrarian bourgeoisie by manufacturing capital at the centre of gravity of the class structure.

Arrighi posits a ‘certain coincidence of class interests’ by the fifties between African skilled and white collar workers, the emergent African petty bourgeoisie and manufacturing capital. Against these he sees a coincidence of interests between the white petty bourgeoisie, agrarian bourgeoisie and white wage workers, all of whom were threatened by potential African competition. International capital, though not dependent on local development, is still regarded as closer to manufacturing capital than to other white groups. Indeed there was a considerable overlap between foreign and manufacturing capital.

The political implications of these economic changes included a tendency toward reformist policy, exemplified by the ideology of ‘radical partnership’, the operation of a ‘colour blind’ law of supply and demand, involving recognition of African trade unions and the promotion of an African petty bourgeoisie, and commercial production among African peasants by the individualization of land tenure. This apparent drift toward a neo-colonial solution was, however, sharply curtailed by the acquisition of political power by a coalition of those white groups most directly threatened by African competition and whose reaction to reform was starkly racialist. UDI, as the policy of this coalition, represents a dramatic use of state power to entrench elements which clearly occupied a subsidiary rather than an economically dominant position. Policy was directed both toward severe repression of the indigenous population and toward stemming the influence of international capital on the political level. This solution, apparently a ‘nationalist’ one in an economic sense, involved an attempt to ‘go it alone’ on the part of settler elements who believed that only through directing state power exclusively towards their interests would there be a chance of their survival.

Nature of Distinctions between ‘Foreign’ and ‘Settler’, ‘National’ and ‘International’

UDI implied the refusal of a settler community to accept a normal neo-colonial solution, under which political participation is accordance with race would be abrogated and relative privilege allowed to wither away in favour of gaining peace sufficient to carry on metropolitan capital's business as usual. Thus UDI can be represented as the use of political power to formalize an objective antagonism between settler interests and the interests of imperialism. Though Arrighi does not do so, it is easy for the political antagonism as represented by UDI to be simplistically taken to stand in for a broader conflict at the economic level, and thereby to see settler production as representing a distinct form of capital (and even as a distinct class).* At this point it may thus be useful to turn to the issue of distinguishing ‘settler’ as opposed to ‘foreign capital’ and attempt to determine whether there is a necessary conflict between them.

As will be seen, making such a distinction is in practice a slippery business.

*Bozzoli (Review No.11) offers a useful assessment of the application of this argument to the South African case and with reference to 'national' capital.
The two tend to merge into one another and may be characterized by less divergence of interests overall than exists among capitals invested in different sectors, whatever their national identity.

Settler capital at its most narrow refers to resident capital lacking any transnational ties of ownership. Accordingly it may be regarded as more ‘committed’ to the local economy in the perverse sense that it is less able to export surplus and is more vulnerable to restrictive policies or to the consequences of partial or total expropriation than is the case for multinational capital. Resident capital is also distinguished by the fact that its owners can take part in electoral politics. This was clearly of crucial significance for settlers prior to the establishment of Zimbabwe, since they had considerable representative weight. Constitutional provisions permit a continuing influence of this sort, though no longer of the same order.

But if multinational capital is barred from electoral participation, it cannot be regarded as lacking thereby in direct political influence. For this is clearly effected through lobbying activities and interest group representation, as well as through bribery and other ‘persuasive’ means, and given all the greater force by virtue of a capacity to call on the political and military back-up of the metropolis to which it is attached. Moreover, the ‘passive’ but crucial influence of foreign capital imposes itself as an element of the underlying structural context — the position of the national economy in the world market, the level of development of local forces of production, the pattern of ownership in limiting the range of policy alternatives. The extent to which state appropriated surplus derives from foreign-owned productive units (which for various reasons cannot be immediately nationalized) is a measure of the state’s dependence and of a necessity for it to be attentive to the interests of foreign capital. Arrighi illustrates how political power hardly entails ‘freedom of choice’ in discussing Rhodesia during the thirties:

Responsible government merely meant a greater share of power for the white classes and by no means their undisputed rule. Economic dependence on foreign capital forced the settlers’ government to adopt middle-of-the-road policies, compromising between the interests of the national bourgeoisie and white workers on the one hand, and of international capitalism on the other.

Thus if capacity to participate directly in the local political process gives resident capital a certain latitude in acting to protect its interests, this does not necessarily allow it to dictate policy, nor even achieve a position of political dominance. It may become extremely influential in directly determining policy, but that determination is still bound by limits established by the structural context.

Such general distinctions between resident and multinational capital on the political level and involving the mobility of capital are important, but they may be less significant than the distinction of ‘interests’ which follow in accord with a set of other factors, including (a) the nature of commodity markets toward which output is directed: external (extra-continental), regional, domestic or some combination of these, (b) the nature of markets from which inputs are obtained and (c) the nature of the capital-labour relation. Arrighi drew a distinction between the agrarian and manufacturing bourgeoisie, indicating the extent to which their interests were in some respect clearly opposed. But additional distinctions could be drawn between tobacco (producing for export) and maize (for domestic consumption)
farmers with respect to the manner in which their product market influences their orientation to the growth of local demand or the expansion of local skills. Similarly distinctions could be drawn within manufacturing between that oriented primarily to export and that to local consumption, between that whose output is of consumption as opposed to production goods or which utilizes skilled as opposed to predominantly unskilled labour. Not all of these divisions and distinctions acquire political expression and to the extent that they do, such expression would probably take the form of interest group pressure. It is open to question and further analysis whether such distinctions among capitals and their varied specific interests are sufficiently fundamental (constituting a distinctive relationship to the reproduction of social capital as Clarke puts it) to allow for the identification of permanent ‘fractions’ or, beyond this to conceptualize, as some tend to do, a struggle among fractions for hegemony within the power bloc. (An example of the debate on the appropriateness of such conceptualizations is offered by the contribution in the Review on the South African state by Davies et al (No.7), Innes and Plaut (No. 11) and Kaplan (No.17).)

It might be tentatively suggested, however, that if the factors yielding variable interests (nature of product and supply markets and specific capital-labour relation) are fully taken into account, such interests will not coalesce in a manner consistent with either sectoral positions or the broad distinction between foreign and settler capital. Foreign capital, for example, is generally oriented toward maintaining minimal local costs and exporting as much locally-produced surplus value as possible. Its characteristic concentration, especially in the early colonial period in the production of raw materials has historically implied an objective dis-interest in local development — at least until such lack of development has threatened to disrupt the reproduction of the social formation and the continued process of accumulation within the export sector. However, where market conditions have been favourable, as they were later in Rhodesia, foreign capital has moved into local manufacturing. And this in turn implies promotion of industrialization and a concern with the expansion of local incomes. Its interests may then be compatible with upgrading the skills of the workforce and with the emergence of indigenous ownership. At the same time, settler capital in some product markets has not necessarily been characterized by an orientation toward local development. In other words, as Arrighi’s analysis indicates, neither settler nor foreign capital is characterized by a uniform set of interests, nor attachment to a certain development policy. Even within the same sector and with regard to the same ‘type’ of capital, variability can be observed. Settler agriculture specializing in the production of tobacco for external markets, for example, may be less concerned with the progressive expansion of local consumer demand than settler agriculture producing maize and cattle. On the other hand, both may share an interest in preventing the stabilization of the work force and its complete separation from the possibilities of peasant production. It is therefore not so much whether capital is ‘foreign’ or ‘settler’, or even its sectoral location, that determines its orientation to local economic expansion as the nature of its markets and the manner in which its specific production dynamics govern its relation to labour. To the extent that output is sold in international markets and that its use of locally produced or available inputs is minimal, its concern with local development is also minimal. On the other hand, to
the extent that output is produced for domestic markets and that inputs, including labour, are locally obtained, interests will be in accord with local development.

There is, however, a general sense in which the orientation of settler capital, and more broadly the settler community, may be construed as 'national' and thereby anti-imperial. For the common interest of members of this community in achieving local appropriation of as much of locally produced surplus as possible — and, moreover, for achieving authority over the manner of its utilization — necessarily implies antagonism to foreign control and ownership. As Innes and Bienefeld (*Review* No.7) have put it, one important aspect of the struggle between capitals involves gaining the right to make use of the international purchasing power which accrues to the economy. But if 'national' in that sense, such as orientation, does not necessarily imply a goal of overall national development. The case of settler political domination in Rhodesia aptly illustrates this. For the policy pursued by the state involved diversion of locally appropriated surplus as far as possible to the end of increasing the level of welfare of the white population and at the expense of that of the indigenous population.

Settler interests were clearly not monolithic. As well as being differentiated and in some degree opposed to accord with class positions internal to the settler community, they also varied within capital in accord with sectoral location and other factors. There are thus clear hazards in attempting simplistically to impute a 'settler interest' as opposed either to 'imperialism' or the interests of the indigenous population. Yet it cannot be denied that their position in a peripheral economy generated an objective opposition to the *external* appropriation of locally-produced surplus which affected all members of the white community and made possible its political mobilization along anti-imperialist lines. At the same time, the blatantly racist dimension to the local distribution of resources created a commonality of interests of the settler community as against the indigenous population. The overthrow of a system based on white privilege and the establishment of a government on the part of a previously repressed indigenous population would necessarily threaten both the level of privilege and the continued security of the settler community — especially for those groups most directly threatened with economic competition from emergent class groups within the African population: the agrarian bourgeoisie, the white labour force (and particularly its less than highly skilled elements) and the white petty bourgeoisie. It is not surprising that from these groups came the original and primary support for the party which gained control of the state in 1962 and ultimately declared UDI. But to the extent that all of the white community participated in and benefitted from a system which entrenched white privilege at the expense of the indigenous population, all shared a sense of insecurity at the possibility of a 'traditional' neo-colonial solution.

Thus if settler capital locations within the economy — such as manufacturers who favoured 'development' of the African population both as a means of expanding domestic consumer demand and providing cheaper skilled labour inputs — may have been willing to accept transition to African rule, and if others, such as tobacco farmers producing primarily for external markets, may have been resistant to a move disruptive of foreign
trade, a large majority could, on the other hand, be persuaded of the need to oppose imperial strategies for decolonization and to unite to protect their common privilege. This is to say that while important differences existed within the settler community, which persist and continue to be of potential political significance, a certain commonality of interests can also be identified. But neither the common nor the divergent elements should be taken to obscure the other. Both must be carefully assessed in an analysis of the relative position and political role of the settler community.

Consequences of UDI for Settlers and Imperialism

If UDI ostensibly represented a political antagonism between settler interests and the interests of imperialism, what was the balance of benefits to settlers as opposed to foreign capital in practice? In some respects the economic effects of UDI and consequent sanctions were similar to what Arrighi describes with respect to the period of the Second World War. The restriction on imports increased the size of the market for locally produced goods and created an artificial form of infant-industry protection. In consequence, as Stoneman indicated (in No. 11 of this Review) the manufacturing sector expanded to account for 24% of GDP, as against a previous figure of 18%. And in spite of export difficulties, sustained world demand for the economy's raw materials led to some degree of growth, particularly in mining. Indeed in some respects the stimulus to local production was greater than in the earlier period, since restrictions on capital export led to a large pool of available capital and relatively easy terms for borrowing.

Some of the gains in the aftermath of UDI accrued to settler capital, as a large number of units, often of small scale, opened to produce local substitutes for prior imports. But in a manner again perhaps similar to the war period, the role of foreign capital as regards new investment and expansion of existing facilities was also extensive. In contrast to the forties, however, though some of the foreign capital was of British parentage, perhaps the greatest part involved an inflow from or on the part of South African capital. According to Stoneman, foreign capital, and especially South African capital, strengthened its hold on beverages, chemicals, mining, non-metallic mineral products and hotels and made further inroads into food manufacturing and retailing. Thus if settler capital shared in the economic gain, foreign capital (except perhaps for that involved primarily in foreign trade) made few losses:

... the general picture of the Rhodesian economy in almost every sector is of one or two multinational firms operating in a monopoly situation ... with a number of small domestically-owned firms picking up what crumbs are to be had.

Settler capital may have rejected a strategy favoured by imperialism in making its bid to secure its survival. But its own strategy was not in the end antagonistic (at least in the sense of displacing) to foreign capital. Indeed the participation of imperialism was essential to even the partial success of UDI which, if not allowing settlers to dictate the terms for their existence, did buy them an extended period of political power.

Returning to and extending Arrighi's analysis, it may be possible to see the substance of state policy in Rhodesia as biased toward the interests of the agrarian bourgeoisie in the thirties, with a shift towards the interests of
manufacturing capital in the post-war period, followed by a reaction on the part of relatively marginal settler elements which in gaining parliamentary control diverted policy not so much toward a sectoral interest as toward the political survival of a racial group — including its marginal elements. In the pre-UDI period analyzed by Arrighi, whatever the group whose immediate interests were reflected in policy decisions, the resulting policy bias was not in contradiction to the requirements of foreign capital. The policy shift from the thirties to the more 'reformist' measures of the fifties, for example, may be seen as complementing the changing requirements of mining: its increasing need for a more stabilized labour force, for local production of inputs, for some degree of local development to offset growing political unrest among the population. Moreover, these trades may be seen as reflecting the expansion of foreign capital from the export sector into manufacture for local markets. Thus identification of a particular policy bias may not necessarily indicate that, for example, white farmers were 'in control' of the state during the thirties, nor manufacturing in control during the fifties. It is probably more accurate to say that throughout the entire period foreign capital remained predominant economically and that its interest were always accorded ultimate political expression. But within limits set by the requirement of reproducing conditions favourable to exploitation by foreign capital, some leeway was permitted; so that pressure on the state effected by various elements of capital through the electoral process or other means could produce the particular policy bias identified by Arrighi. Indeed in some respects such pressure could yield policy at variance with the most favourable terms for foreign capital (and indeed at variance with the long term interests of those elements exerting the pressure themselves). But it would be expected that ultimately the very requisites for reproduction of the social formation would lead to an undermining of such policy, and a ‘falling into line’ with the structure of class forces.

What then of the Rhodesian Front government and its declaration of unilateral independence? This represented not just a manipulation of policy but a statement concerning the nature of the state itself and its relation to imperialism on a political level. It was not a move directly against foreign capital on an economic level and did not represent an attempt by settlers to entrench national capital. It did not signify the rise to a position of political dominance of specifically settler capital. Rather UDI represented the use of political power to attempt to entrench a racial group and its position of relative privilege. And though the repercussions of UDI were clearly disruptive of international economic relations in some degree, the move was still implemented within limits permitting reproduction of the economy and of its peripheral status — that is, within limits compatible with the continued dominance of foreign capital. If not a strategy preferred by imperialism, foreign capital made the most of it.

In a sense, the Rhodesian Front government pushed imperialism — or sufficient units within it — to temporarily accept its terms, in lieu of foregoing immediate profits. Given the dominant position of foreign capital as a bloc within the Rhodesian economy, had its representatives in fact acted in concert, UDI would have enjoyed little success. But economic dominance was not in this circumstance translated into control at the political level. if foreign capital could have exerted control over the state by frustrating
policy, it did not do so in this instance. And perhaps this was in consequence of its less than monolithic nature, derived not only from differing relations of its fractions to the reproduction of social capital and its internal divisions on the basis of national 'home', but also from the fact that its units are fundamentally related to one another on the basis of competition. This essential fact allowed in this case, as in the case of developmental strategies of peripheral economies more generally, the playing off of national capitals against one another as well as, on another level, one firm against another.

Over time, perhaps, the cost of UDI to foreign capital as a whole and to constituent units individually may have served to dampen its support of the Rhodesian Front government. The ultimate failure of UDI, of course, had much less to do with foreign displeasure or intervention as with internal class forces — which were the most important factor in determining the ‘costs’ of the policy in question. For the move was never so much one in opposition to foreign capital as to the indigenous population. And the severe repression that it entailed ultimately called forth a level of militancy much more extensive than that ushering in more ‘normal’ instances of African independence. Class pressures thus impinged on the state, forcing an upheaval and restructuring of the terms of representative politics.

Questions for the Present

What then of the present? How are foreign and settler capital, or capital in various sectors, affected by the establishment of the Zimbabwean state? In what respects and in what areas may the interests of foreign and settler capital be compatible — or at least not in contradiction — with requisites of development as perceived by the present government? These are issues requiring most crucial and extensive analysis. We can touch on them only briefly, raising some questions for discussion. The establishment of Zimbabwe has shifted direct control of the state from the settlers to the African population and in so doing it has necessarily shifted the structure of ‘interests’ represented by those in command of state machinery. These interests are antagonistic to racial privilege, but whether they prove in practice antagonistic to capital remains to be seen.

Settlers are clearly the greatest potential losers in the changed situation, as they always feared would be the case, even if less so than their fears would have had it. As African competition is allowed to emerge, there is little basis for assuming that settlers should retain positions of superiority, except insofar as their previous position allows them an initial advantage. As regards settler capital, the end of formal sanctions also means the removal of protection for relatively inefficient operations. And to the extent that settler units are of relatively small scale and employ less than highly skilled personnel, they may prove non-competitive and thus relatively unprofitable. This should be all the more true if wages are increased. Moreover, such units are more vulnerable since their individual loss will have relatively little effect on overall societal reproduction. It is only if a massive withdrawal of settler capital should occur that the stability of the economy would be threatened.

But the same cannot be said for foreign capital which tends to be involved in units of larger scale. Indeed there is little reason for assuming that
dependence on foreign capital will automatically be any less for Zimbabwe than for colonial Rhodesia. If anything, it is foreign capital which stands to gain by the removal of whatever barriers to external commerce existed. The original implementation of UDI may have led to stimulation of internal demand, but the expansion of this market was limited by the political necessity for the regime to restrict the increase of African incomes. Thus the system under UDI implied a certain stagnation. But with the opening of borders, the market has once again expanded, at least to the dimensions of the former Federation. And the enthusiasm of foreign capital over future possibilities is indication of their clear recognition of this fact.

But having made the basic point that in the context of the continuing legitimacy of capitalist production relations, it is in general foreign rather than settler capital that is likely to reap advantages, what can be said about the stance which the Zimbabwean state can or should take against settler or foreign capital? Should policy even treat the two in such a distinct fashion or rather deal with matters on the basis of sectors and with units on the basis of their scale? Perhaps some tentative points can be made here.

If settler capital is more ‘committed’ to the local economy by virtue of its greater vulnerability, the elimination of its political sway also makes it extremely insecure. As experience elsewhere on the African continent has indicated, it remains only insofar as its alternative options are limited. In the case of Zambia and Kenya, for example, that sub-section of former capital which has been most committed in the sense of having reinvested locally and increasingly diversified its holdings is the Asian community. This suggests a more general point: that settler capital cannot be treated as a uniform whole, but must be regarded in terms of its internal divisions and their variable characteristics. And as previous discussion has indicated, such divisions are not only in accord with its relative ability to depart the country, but also its sectoral location, the nature of the markets in which it interacts and its specific relation to labour. Stoneman’s data indicates that most manufacturing sub-sectors are dominated by multinationals, which by their size, access to external technology and links to external supply and marketing arrangements often have a competitive advantage. However, there are no doubt some areas in which small or medium sized firms owned by settlers have a competitive advantage, due to their experience in the local market and to expertise developed to meet the requirements of the local situation. Their specialization may thereby make them an integral part of the economy and at the same time they would lose some competitive advantage were their owners to transfer their operations to another economic environment. It is such units which may be most valuable in terms of their commitment and contribution to the Zimbabwean economy.

Foreign capital, for its part, is more secure in its position than small scale settler firms, particularly those of dubious efficiency. Its monopoly position in certain areas implies the dependence of the state upon it. At the same time, however, its commitment to the Zimbabwean economy may be fragile and limited to the persistence of highly favourable conditions. Moreover, it spite of its advantages, it can perhaps be more easily replaced than a highly specialized settler firm. And certainly it has many competitors in the world market who would be willing to take its place and could provide the same
access to supply and product markets, technology and management expertise as existing firms. Such replacements might have no greater commitment to the economy, save the desire to extract as much surplus value as possible. But the existence of competitors makes these units possible targets for state takeovers (accompanied by the securing of management contracts from former firms or their competitors if necessary) or joint ventures either with existing firms or their replacements.

But such points as these are both basic and general. Hardly of a comprehensive nature, they are merely offered to underline the point made initially — that whatever strategy proposed, it must be in cognizance of the distinctions within capital, both on the basis of sector and 'national identity', and of the objective and perceived interests associated with specific location within the economy.

Bibliographic Note

THE ONGOING DEBATE ON ZIMBABWE'S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
Barry Munslow

This brief account of some debates concerning Zimbabwe's future development strategies is based on papers presented at a conference held in June 1980, sponsored jointly by the Review and the Department of Politics at the University of Leeds. These short discussion pieces form a second generation of thinking on this issue. They take up, add to, take issue with, but to some extent take as read, the considerable recent outpouring telling the Zimbabweans what to do (summarized at end). Reviewing the papers might be doubly useful: presenting in summary form material not easily accessible elsewhere, as well as mapping out some of the undoubted complexities facing the new government in this field — matters readers might like to take up in future issues. Two fundamental considerations need stressing before evaluating any specific proposals. First, an agrarian, or other sectoral strategy cannot be considered in isolation from the economy as a whole. The intimate relationship between workers and peasants, town and countryside, industry and agriculture has to be conceived of in its totality. Thus, to take one issue dealt with below, peasants will not market their produce if the price is not right, neither will they put a surplus on the market if there is money but no manufactured goods to buy with the cash. Parallel markets then develop as with the candongo system in Angola. Second, the viability
access to supply and product markets, technology and management expertise as existing firms. Such replacements might have no greater commitment to the economy, save the desire to extract as much surplus value as possible. But the existence of competitors makes these units possible targets for state takeovers (accompanied by the securing of management contracts from former firms or their competitors if necessary) or joint ventures either with existing firms or their replacements.

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of any strategy depends on a combination of political will and favourable internal and external conditions. It remains to be seen whether these exist in Zimbabwe.

We might begin with the industrial sector, not least because Zimbabwe’s is one of the largest in Africa. David Wield points out (Industrial Strategy and Zimbabwe — Some Questions) that this sector is overwhelmingly in the hands of either foreign capital or European immigrants and the settler government has generally played an active interventionary role, especially since UDI. Investment in certain sectors has been weak and machinery is old. Many products were produced strictly for the settler market creating wildly uneven sectoral growth. The exodus of increasing numbers of settlers has already caused both market difficulties and low production. One highly important legacy from the recent past, which the government must take into account in forging its new industrial policy is that foreign companies have already had more than ten years of practice in making and repatriating indirect profits under difficult conditions of strong government controls on foreign exchange and international sanctions.

Of course, western ‘experts’ stress how one particular colonial legacy, the low African living standards, improve the possibilities for economic growth. Capital will naturally wish to keep wage rates low and maintain the existing organization of production; but it is in a less secret position now, and is therefore unlikely to reinvest a sizeable amount of its profits internally. Industrial capital will also be pressing to keep high tariffs, lower taxation and ease foreign exchange restrictions. But the government is being pressured by two forces. Labour wants the government to raise wages (directly and indirectly), give greater job security, upgrade black workers and allow greater participation in decision-making. There will be strong nationalist pressures for Zimbabweanisation at management and other levels, which may, depending on how it is implemented, come into conflict with production and productivity targets. There are two alternatives: either the maintenance of skilled and managerial European personnel and forms of production organization, or encouraging Zimbabwean workers to participate in the organization and control of production. The racial division of labour in the colonial period clearly creates difficulties for the latter strategy as African workers were formerly denied scientific, technical and managerial training and responsibility — but these obstacles are not insuperable. Wield makes the important point that the forms of organization that involve a degree of worker control also call for greater self-discipline by the labour force, and that ministerial and other forms of state control cannot by themselves solve the problems of participation and efficiency. They must be solved at the factory level in the last analysis.

Inevitably a policy will be required for enterprises abandoned and sabotaged by their former owners and this will be an important part of a general strategy that will perforce to be defensive. The experience of Mozambique is perhaps salient here, where the necessity for an early control of numerous small scale enterprises lessened the priority which could be given to controlling the largest enterprises. Thus Mozambique had the worst of both worlds, as it did not have sufficient manpower or policies to exercise even the weak control over private management which the colonial government had, and it
was unable to intervene in the large enterprises before the existing organizations were entirely dissipated.

The mining sector at present contributes about 7.7% of Zimbabwe’s gross domestic product — more than in most African countries, but much less than Zambia, say, where it represents over a third of GDP. About 60,000 workers are employed in mining and wage rates are uniformly low. Gold, asbestos, nickel, copper, chromium and coal constitute 95% of the total value of mineral production, almost all of which is exported. Zimbabwe ranks third in the world for the production of chromium and fifth for gold and asbestos. Lithium and nickel deposits are also important in world rankings. Reserves are still vast, estimated to be about 60 times the likely value of production in 1980. There is a clear distinction to be made between the small and large scale mines, with the latter being predominantly foreign owned. At present, according to Colin Stoneman (The Mining Sector in Zimbabwe), there are 500 small mines employing fewer than four skilled (i.e. white) workers. The clear distinction between large and small mines, roughly mirrors the foreign/national division of capital, may point to a dichotomous government policy towards the mining sector in the future. There may be no short-run alternative to the government’s early statement of policy not to take over the mines, at least as regards the large mining operations in the hands of multinationals — but there would not be the problems of technology, equipment, management and access to markets with respect to the small mines. On the other hand, are the multinationals the best class ally (even in the short term) for the future development of Zimbabwe?

Two principal future agrarian strategies for Zimbabwe were laid out prior to independence. One, termed variously the ‘evolutionary, or ‘reformist’ approach, is associated with, among others, the Salisbury-based, liberal ‘think-tank’, the Whitsun Foundation; the other, called the radical or transformatory approach, was put forward notably by Riddell and Weinrich. A short paper by Muvingi et al (Proposed Agrarian Strategies for the Future of Zimbabwe) contrasted the two approaches and questioned whether these two provided the only possible options. The Whitsun Foundation proposes a basic continuation of the existing situation with the maintenance of most of the more productive large commercial farms but some carefully controlled redistribution of some white farms (with of course full compensation) to expand the small-scale family sector, as major reforms would drastically reduce the marketable surplus, it is argued. As for the over-crowded tribal trust land farmers, tilling their infertile land: credit, extension services and marketing channels should be provided — at least to the more ‘progressive’ — and eventually the land should be converted to individual freehold. This set of policies would inevitably promote a class of kulaks (like the existing Master Farmers) and a less destitute middle peasantry but at the expense of creating a permanently landless class, whilst the existing scandalous division of land would be only modified and the fruits of the original settler conquest would continue to be enjoyed by settler farmers and foreign-owned agribusiness.

The second proposed strategy certainly tackles the central problem of land redistribution, proposing an approach based on the social ownership of the
means of production and self-reliance. Under Riddell’s model, over a period of time all European farms would be bought by the State, but the emphasis is on achieving this without reducing production and efficiency. Existing farmers who are commercially efficient, will be persuaded to stay on whilst being given incentives to move towards a system of co-operative farming through worker participation. The transference would thus occur over a period with a gradation of compensation being paid proportional to the level of co-operation of the existing farmer with the scheme. Land pressure on the TTLs would be eased by major resettlement on the underutilised land on the large farms, coupled with the gradual collectivization of the existing small homestead farms into co-operative units.

The Whitsun Foundation clearly reflects the neo-colonial model of 'resettlement' that the British masterminded in Kenya whilst the 'radical' schema at least aims at thoroughgoing land distribution. The danger in this latter proposal is that the state will throw good money after bad if it tries to implement the land transfer in this way. It is perhaps utopian to imagine that many settlers will behave in accordance with the reward system. They will take the money and run with it and whatever else they can make from various illegal dealings, made possible by their friends who remain in the various state apparatuses. Settlers and foreign agribusinesses cannot be expected to nurture and oversee a transference to co-operatives, and their own liquidation, even less to promote the participation and control of workers that they have exploited for year. Furthermore, the funding of any compensation scheme would have to be seriously examined, especially if it were to stay within the bounds set in the Lancaster House constitution, otherwise the country could find itself paying twice — the foreign currency that the settlers would take with them plus repayment of the original loan and high interest rates to foreign governments, as the compensation fund would have to be borrowed abroad.

Rukuni and Palmer-Jones (The Political Economy of Irrigation Development in Zimbabwe) underlined similar dangers. Irrigation schemes, either for African settlement or capitalist enterprise, will be financed by foreign debt, be controlled by foreign enterprises, be managed if not owned by foreign capital, use foreign technology and produce for foreign markets. Moreover, if privately owned, guaranteeing their profitability means perpetuating a cheap labour system. To achieve the high and immediate marketable surpluses they insist on may divert scarce resources from peasant agriculture — where it is desperately needed in the widespread pockets of poverty in the TTLs — into the larger capitalist farms.

Prior to independence, irrigation was much in vogue, as it is now by many consultants. Significant development occurred in the southeastern Lowveld, on large foreign and nationally-owned estates. Irrigation schemes for African smallholders were started in the 1930s but were unable to cover operating costs, never mind capital costs. Very few resources were allocated to these smallholder schemes. In fact, of 145,000 irrigated acres of land they only account for 15,000, whereas multinational estates and large commercial farms account for the rest. It was cheap water in harness with cheap labour (ensured amongst other things by overcrowded and unirrigated TTLs) which guaranteed the profitability of the Lowveld schemes, which
were neatly dressed up in an ideology of ‘making the dessert bloom’. Capital bloomed and the deserts were created elsewhere. An argument used to justify this past allocation of resources was that the smallholder irrigation schemes failed due to a lack of entrepreneurial spirit, and not the unproductive and economically unfavourable conditions under which smallholders operated.

Nearly a quarter of the $826 million budget for the proposed five year development plan issued in 1979 was intended for irrigation purposes. As Rukuni and Palmer-Jones point out, these recent plans allowed the creation of a small class of African capitalist farmers but more generally aided the continuation of a peripheral capitalist development. International competitiveness would have to be maintained, but smallholder irrigation on a large scale is unlikely to be competitive as it is an inefficient means of exploiting peasants. Present alternatives include nationalising the large-scale irrigated estates, but this might still leave extensive dependence on foreign management, equipment supplies and finance, as indeed would smallholders or forming worker co-operatives on the larger irrigation schemes. These latter would need to be heavily subsidised if they were to operate within a competitive capitalist economy. Writing off capital investments and encouraging small-scale irrigation developments by peasants who would produce subsistence initially, and market-surplus later, might provide the only genuine alternative to being caught within the capitalist nexus. But this is an unlikely solution in the present circumstances the authors conclude.

In the first of two papers Vincent Tickner focuses on Immediate Food Supply Problems in Zimbabwe. Although in total there is sufficient food, the real problem emerges in relation to the purchasing power of large segments of the population. A quarter of a million returning refugees, three quarters of a million urban squatters displaced by the war, villagers in the ‘keeps’ who were prevented in the main from continuing agricultural production, and many people living in the TTLs where severe disruptions were caused by the war and food supplies were frequently cut off, all these groups now face severe problems of food shortage. Given the magnitude of the problem no overnight solutions can be expected and reliance on international aid, much of it from or through South Africa must be expected for some time (although, encouragingly, the 1980 year-end crop yielded a national surplus). A further problem facing the government is the level to which it is prepared to subsidise food and fertiliser, as prices have increased significantly in the months following independence. Any policy concerning food production is constrained by the existing current situation, in which almost four fifths of the total marketed output for all crops and livestock comes from ‘commercial’ farms and 99% of these are in European hands. In a second paper, Class Struggles and the Food Supply Sector in Zimbabwe, Tickner attempts to analyse the nature of class formation and class struggles in a succession of economic sub-sectors constituting the various linkages in the chain of the food supply system: moving from agricultural production through agricultural marketing and food processing to wholesale and retail food distribution. He points to two lessons for development strategy: first, the importance of studying such linkages and, second, class struggles in one sector have an impact on those in others.
Robin Palmer’s note on *Agricultural Research: Change and Continuity* draws attention to the immense volume of agricultural and veterinary research work, dating back to the beginning of the century that Zimbabwe has inherited. Although in the main this served the interests of the settler farmers, the positive legacy of this research may be in danger of being dissipated. Much post-independence research might be carried out by foreign expatriates on short term contracts and the essential continuity might then be lost. He concludes that local Zimbabweans must be encouraged to take up this scientific work but notes that in other countries, notably Zambia, volunteers in this area have not always been forthcoming.

Rob Davies’ *Zimbabwe’s External Economic Relations: Some Areas for Discussion* notes some of the international effects on the domestic economy and thus on development policies. He sees the disruption of ties with the international economy following UDI as potentially leaving a positive legacy, as it may mean that the country has a greater scope to restructure and redirect its external relations. We might note in passing, that the absence of substantial foreign aid promised on a number of occasions by British and American governments may have a similar *positive* effect, reducing as it does external dependence and forcing the country to be self-reliant. The short term effect of the removal of connections will be falling import prices and rising export prices as the additional costs for sanctions breaking are removed. Market pressures are therefore likely to cause a shift away from currently non-traded goods into the export sector, whilst imports may rise at the expense of some domestic production. External policy should clearly aim to allow the greatest possible freedom for the pursuit of domestic policies, but it appears clear to many observers that, given the nature of the southern African regional sub-system dominated by South Africa, the parameters for action are somewhat restricted. The absence of good relations with the Soviet Union and many Eastern European countries similarly restricts the manoeuvrability of the government.

Whilst not covering all aspects of development strategy the arguments in these papers should at least provoke further much needed debate. (A full set is available, price £10, from Department of Politics, University, Leeds.)

**Bibliographic Note**


Typical of the many ‘reformist’ blue-prints are the publications of the Whitsun Foundation, Salisbury and its Director I. Hume, see A *Preliminary Essay on Land Reform in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe* and his article in the Anglo-American Corporation’s journal, *Optima*, 27.1.1978, ‘What Model for Zimbabwe’s Economy?’ One document, which obviously informs present government thinking is the ‘Chidzero Report’, prepared when the present Minister for Planning was with the UNDP — *Zimbabwe: Towards a New Order: An Economic & Social Survey*, UNCTAD/MFO/7, (UN, New York, 1980). It is in fact an uneasy amalgam of ‘radical’ and ‘reformist’ prescriptions.
Walter Rodney: A Biography and Bibliography

Horace Campbell

Walter Rodney was born in Georgetown, Guyana on 23 March 1942. His parents were workers who struggled to get him through primary school. He attended Queens College in Georgetown where he won an open scholarship to the University of the West Indies to read history. In secondary school he distinguished himself in extra-curricula activities. He was in the student cadet corps, as well as being a high jumper and a debater. At the University of the West Indies his debating techniques were improved and he was known as one of the sharpest debaters with a very cutting tongue. He was champion debater at the University and represented the University of the West Indies at the Pittsburg Debating Championships in the USA. While at university he was active in student politics and campaigned extensively in 1961 in the Jamaica Referendum on the West Indian Federation. His first writing on slavery and on Guyanese politics appeared between 1961 and 1963. It was at the University of the West Indies, Mona Campus, that he strengthened his skills at indoor-games such as bridge, scrabble and chess.

He got a First Class Honours Degree from the University of the West Indies in history and he proceeded to the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London in 1963. He came to Europe on a cargo boat, as part of the first prize he won in an IQ Test. It was his first visit to Europe. In London he did his Doctoral research on slavery on the Upper Guinea Coast and did painstaking work on the records of Portuguese merchants both in England and in Portugal. He learned Portuguese and Spanish during this period to add to his knowledge of French which he had learned at Queens College.

Before he finished his Doctorate in 1966 he married Patricia Henry from Guyana, who was studying in England.

In 1966 he obtained his Doctorate which was based on a thesis on the impact of slavery on the Upper Guinea Coast. This work was path-breaking in the way in which it analyzed the impact of salvery on the communities and the interrelationship between societies of the region and on the ecology of the region. This thesis was later refurbished and published under the title A History of the Upper Guinea Coast 1545-1800. Historians who study West Africa now see this work as a necessary guide for students of history of the

From London he went to teach in Tanzania for a year, but he soon returned with his wife to work in Jamaica where he lectured in the History Department at the University of the West Indies. He spent much of his free time with the Rastafarians in sessions called ‘Groundings’, enriching the Rastafarian understanding of African history and social change. When he attended the Black Writers’ Conference in Montreal, Canada in October 1968, Hugh Shearer’s Jamaica Labour Party Government banned him from returning to his job at the University. The riots and revolts in Kingston subsequent to his banning showed the deep respect that he had gained in the short 8 months period that he lived in Jamaica. His sessions with the Rastafarians were published in a pamphlet entitled *Grounding With My Brothers*.

After being banned from Jamaica, Walter Rodney returned to Tanzania to teach history at the University of Dar es Salaam. Here he was at the forefront of establishing an intellectual tradition which still today makes Dar es Salaam one of the centres of discussion of African politics and history. Out of the dialogue, discussions and study groups he deepened the Marxist tradition with respect to African politics, class struggle, the race question, African history and the role of the exploited in social change. It was within the context of these discussions that the book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* was written.

In the same period, he wrote the critical articles on Tanzanian Ujamaa, imperialism, on underdevelopment, and the problems of state and class formation in Africa. Many of his articles which were written in Tanzania appeared in *Maji Maji*, the discussion journal of the TANU Youth League at the University. He worked in the Tanzanian archives on the question of forced labour, the policing of the countryside and the colonial economy. This work was later published as a monograph by Cornell University in 1976: *World War II and the Tanzanian Economy*. In Tanzania he developed close political relationships with those who were struggling to change the external control of Africa. He was very close to some of the leaders of liberation movements in Africa and also to political leaders of popular organizations of independent territories. Together with other Pan-Africanists he participated in discussing leading up to the Sixth Pan-African Congress, held in Tanzania, 1974. Before the Congress he wrote a piece: ‘Towards the Sixth Pan-African Congress: Aspects of the International Class Struggle in Africa, the Caribbean and America’.

In 1974 he left Tanzania to return to Guyana to work as Professor of History at the University of Guyana. On his way home to Guyana, he lectured extensively in the United States and there helped to clarify some of the questions of class and race within the context of African and black American struggle. This work on the question of class and race in black America was always important to him and he had lectured extensively in the
US in 1972. He was one of the main speakers at the African Liberation Day Rally, 25 May 1972 in San Francisco. Some of his most important papers in this period were reproduced by the Institute of the Black World in Atlanta, Georgia.

In September 1974, he returned to Guyana to find that the Prime Minister had blocked his appointment with the University. Although the Government refused to allow him to teach, he decided to stay in the country in order to contribute his knowledge, experience and ideas to the Guyanese working people. Shortly after he had returned to Guyana he began to work among the workers, and he was one of those who was instrumental in the foundation of a new political organization called the Working People’s Alliance in 1974. This Alliance was aimed at national unity and people’s power and he directed his energies at trying to end the politicization of race which had violently ruptured Guyanese society. He exposed the falsehoods of Burnham’s ‘Cooperative Socialism’ with such uncompromising vigour that soon even his wife was victimized by the state. She was also not allowed to get work.

Rodney’s intellectual and political work was then focused primarily on the history of the Guyanese working class. He felt that such a history was needed to clarify the misconceptions which had been the basis of some of the racial divisions in the society. In the summer of 1977 he immersed himself in the records of the British Public Records Office to unearth the details of the material divisions which formed the basis of the Indian-African divide in the society. This work is now to be published as *A History of the Guyanese Working Class*. He had also compiled and edited a document called *Guyanese Sugar Plantations in the late 19th Century*. This work was part of his research into the plantation records in Guyana and in the United Kingdom.

Walter Rodney was an executive member of the Working People’s Alliance and a full-time organizer of the party in Georgetown. He was loved by all sections of the working class and even by some of those classes who had been mobilized against him by the pernicious campaign of Burnham. Walter Rodney’s efforts were to enrich the political culture of Guyana for the expression and the strengthening of working class organizations such as the Working People’s Alliance. As a believer in the self-emancipation of the working class he stood for a new kind of openness, honesty and plain-speaking which has inspired a new tradition in Guyanese politics. One of his last major academic appointments outside of Guyana was at the University of Hamburg. There he also made his mark on academic colleagues who had already seen the importance of his work and had translated *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* into German. This book has also been translated into Portuguese and Spanish.

In 1979 he was charged with arson after a fire destroyed the headquarters of the ruling People’s National Congress in Guyana. After being held in prison for a short while, Walter Rodney and his three co-defendants were granted bail after widespread national and international protest at their being arrested.

Though he was on trial, at great personal risk he and the others continued
work in the WPA and intensified efforts to remove the dictatorial regime of Forbes Burnham. Two speeches given at mass rallies in Georgetown during this period by Rodney have been reproduced as pamphlets: *The Struggle Goes On* and *People's Power, No Dictator*. There speeches, along with a short piece in *Transition*, were to be his last major contribution to the discussion of the form of state which should emerge or could emerge in a liberated Guyana.

Rodney had been invited to Zimbabwe at attend the Independence Celebrations, but the Burnham Government prevented him from attending. However, with exemplary bravery he was able to disguise himself and to go to Zimbabwe, after the celebrations. He met the Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, who asked Walter Rodney to stay in Zimbabwe to set up a research institute there. Rodney declined the offer, saying that he was committed to return to Guyana to stand trial and continue the political struggle.

On his way back to Guyana he gave a seminar for his friends and colleagues in Hamburg where he had stayed in 1978 as a visiting professor. Wherever he spent time teaching, those who met and worked with him see his political and personal legacy as a mandate.

That Walter Rodney was an internationalist, a humanist, a Marxist and an independent-minded thinker was clear to all those who met him and came into contact with his work. His struggle, together with the WPA, against oppression, racial discrimination, exploitation and violence will be carried on. His fight for 'bread and justice' was based on a deep respect for and love of the people.

At the end of May 1980, he returned to Georgetown after a short stay in Africa and Europe. It was announced the trial would begin on 3 June. However, it was adjourned until 20 August 1980. On Friday, 13 June 1980, Walter Rodney was killed at the hands of the dictatorial regime by a bomb exploding in the car used by himself and his brother, Donald.

From the WPA Statement of 14 June 1980:

Our talented, inspiring, committed and much-loved brother Walter Rodney died last night, 13 June, at the hands of the People's National Congress rulers. He is the third Working People's Alliance victim and the first of the highest leadership of the party. He is the fifth political murder victim of the PNC State, including Teekah, the Minister of Education, and Father Darke, Catholic priest. One of the most politically intelligent opponents of the regime has been removed. A prophet of the self-emancipation of the working people has been silenced. A partisan of the liberation of all people is no more. The WPA and his comrades-in-arms will carry on his work.

The impact Walter Rodney made on his countrymen and women was expressed clearly in the participation of nearly 35,000 people at his funeral on 23 June. Although the Burnham regime had threatened to dismiss from work anyone tacking part in the Memorial Service, people followed the horse-drawn coffin, singing and shouting their condemnation of this cowardly murder.

Walter Rodney will live wherever and whenever men and women stand up to fight injustice, to declare their love of freedom and goodness.
A Selective Bibliography of Works by Walter Rodney

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On the Neo-Colonial Period — The State — Tanzania


'Notes on Disengagement from Imperialism’, *East African University Social Science Conference*, 1970.


'Notes on Disengagement from Imperialism’, *East African University Social Science Conference*, 1970.


On Socialist Transformations


TRADE UNION HUNGER STRIKE IN MAURITIUS ENDS IN VICTORY

The following message, reminding us of the importance of international solidarity was recently received:

On 19 September 1980 the 13-day long hunger strike of thirteen trade unionists came to an end as the government agreed to the immediate employment in the Development Works Corporation of all workers sacked in the August 1979 strike movement (see Review Nos.8 and 15/16). The victory of the hunger strike was a direct result of the massive popular mobilization that developed around the thirteen determined union leaders. Every day, workers from different sites would demonstrate with banners and posters in the streets. People from poor villages and poor city areas would also form up in processions, chanting and carrying slogans. And perhaps more important were the evening demonstrations. People all over Mauritius began to hold vigils grouped around home-made lighted torches. Often these would become night-time processions to the trade union offices where the hunger strike took place. There was almost unanimous support from all local social organisations. Every trade union and every club, and even many religious organisations expressed their support — by visits, letters, demonstrations, and press communiques. Support from abroad in terms of telegrams, both to the hunger strikers and to the Prime Minister, and of donations to the support committee, helped a great deal.

An appeal, signed by many Africanists, is being circulated to urge an Internal Commission of Inquiry into Walter Rodney's death. Those who would like to contribute funds or be associated with setting up such a commission are asked to contact the Los Angeles Committee for Academics in Peril (LACAP), PO Box 25722, Los Angeles, California 90025, USA.
### 4d. NORTHEAST AFRICA Continued

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