Number 9

May-August

May-August 1978

Editorial Working Group
Chris Allen
Manfred Bienefeld
Lionel Cliffe
Ruth First
Erica Flegg
Mejid Hussein
Duncan Innes
Mustafa Khogali
Peter Lawrence
Katherine Levine
Jitendra Mohan
Gavin Williams

Overseas Editors
Cairo: Shahida El Baz
Copenhagen: Roger Leys
Dar es Salaam: Mahmood Mamdani
Trinidad: Robin Cohen
Stockholm: Bhagavan, Bjorn Beckman
Toronto: Jonathan Barker, John Saul
Washington: Meredith Turshen

Contributing Editors
Basil Davidson
Sam Geza
Thomas Hodgkin
Charles Kallu-Kalumya
Colin Leys
Robert van Lierop
Archie Mafeje
Claude Meillassoux
Ken Post

Subscriptions (3 issues)
UK
Individuals £3.00
Institutions £4.50

Africa (except South Africa)
Individuals £2.00/$4.00
Institutions £4.00/$8.00

Elsewhere
Individuals £4.50/$9.00
Institutions £7.50/$15.00

Airmail extra £2.25/$4.50

Single copies
Individuals £1.20/$3.50
Institutions £2.40/$7.00
Airmail-add £0.75/$1.50

Subscription to:
Review of African Political Economy
c/o Onyx Press
27 Clerkenwell Close
London EC1R 0AT

Contents

Editorial 1

Zambia: Class Formation and Detente 4
Kren Eriksen 27

The Post-Colonial State and the Forces and Relations of Production
Isobel Winter

Imperialism and the National Struggle in Namibia 44
Duncan Innes

Debate 60

Briefings:
Armed Struggle in Zimbabwe
UK Settlement Proposals
Namibia: A New Stage?
Workers’ Struggle in South Africa
US southern Africa policy
Angola coup

Reviews 105

Current Africana: A Bibliography 113
Most of the contributions in this issue relate to southern Africa and thus follow on some of the themes of number seven of the Review which was on South Africa. They thus help to map out how South Africa is at the hub of what is to some degree a regional political economy. The three main articles deal with three of South Africa's neighbours and in each case the specific ties of investment, trade, labour supply each has with the Republic are spelled out as well as the different complex of social and political forces at work within them. Beyond this common ground, Innes concentrates on the patterns of South African domination that Namibia has experienced and the build up of the struggle against them, which he argues is becoming increasingly based on the peasants and workers — although where one class begins and the other ends given Namibia’s forms of contract labour could be explored further. The more recent unfolding of this struggle is documented in one of the Briefings. Winter’s focus is on the state in Swaziland. She attempts to analyse its essential character from first principles, as it were, by specifying the complex of relationships of production which underlay the whole society as it has developed. Eriksen has a more exclusively contemporary theme: the vacillating but increasing tendency for state power holders in Zambia to accommodate to imperialism and even to the South African regime as a more unambiguously bourgeois class emerges.

An expanded Briefings section provides information on various theatres of the struggle against the racist dominated system which pervades the region. This has reached its most critical stage in Zimbabwe. In all the reporting of various talks the extent of the guerrilla operation on the ground is often overlooked, and its nature and that of the Rhodesia counter-insurgency not appreciated. The first Briefing thus tries to summarise what documentation there is of the armed struggle. Unfortunately, however, it is necessary to assess the potential of the nationalist forces not only in terms of their contribution to the guerrilla war. Thus recent reports point to a large build-up of nationalist forces in the last two years, but many go on to suggest that the force being trained in Zambia is being 'trained as a regular force, though it is also said to contain guer-
rilla units . . . which (moreover) has barely been deployed as yet’ (Financial Times, London, 4 February 1978). Under these circumstances, those supporting the liberation struggle must be tempted to speculate as to what ultimate use this regular army will be put: an eventual invasion of a Rhodesia on its last legs (presumably without much prior politicisation) or against the government of internal settlement? as the army of a future Zimbabwe? as a mere bargaining counter? or as a key actor poised in the wings as occurred at the end of the Algerian War of Independence?

The other Briefing on Zimbabwe provides an evaluation of the British proposals for a settlement. Apart from what it reveals about what Britain and the US hope they might get out of the situation, these proposals are useful as a yard-stick to assess the ‘Internal Settlement’ which seems imminent as we go to press. In fact in the constitutional provision for certain reserved seats for whites and for a bill of rights to protect minorities — and property, and in attempts to guarantee pensions, compensations etc. (without the backing of a Development Fund) the Internal Settlement is similar to the UK proposals. What differs is the parties to the agreement rather than the content; and the consequence of this is not only that it leaves out some politicians but that the guerrilla war, which the UK proposals were attempting to buy off, will continue. There may be some diplomatic flurries which will seek to widen the scope of the Internal Settlement so that it can be represented as meeting the British requirements, and already there are overtures from the new ‘Gang of Four’ that will rule Rhodesia to seek the lifting of sanctions (and presumably military supplies). But the continuation of the guerrilla struggle is the guarantee of some form of independence that can change the conditions of low-paid workers and land-hungry peasants and, in the process, generate democratic changes in the liberation movement of Zimbabwe.

We also carry a compilation, from an impressive range of official sources, of the events surrounding the attempted coup in Angola in May last year. The version of events is, of course, basically that of the MPLA majority, though it does indicate that a coup against Neto’s government was a real danger. What this account of the fighting and main personalities leaves unanswered is the extent and character of any social base that this faction might have been able to latch on to — or if indeed there was absolutely none (despite their involvement in ideological training, military units and among the organs of People’s Power) or even if it was — as with UNITA and FNLA — regional or ethnic, why so? The need for further social analysis becomes all the more crucial given what the document reveals about MPLA’s response to the coup — and the obvious danger it carried of allowing ‘destabilisation’: to allow popular institutions only under firm party control. Notwithstanding that Angola, like others before, is stressing the centralist aspects of a ‘marxist-leninist’ party under the threat of imperialist aggression, a reaction to the factionalism that limits people’s power is a formidable price to pay.

Lionel Cliffe
Gavin Williams
PRICE OF THE REVIEW
For three years we have managed to avoid any major increase in our rates and have now lost our battle with inflation. The new prices for subscriptions and single copies, detailed on the front inside cover, are still reasonable by today's standards. A sizeable subscription list is the best guarantee that a low price be maintained so please help by taking out or renewing your subscription and by getting your friends to do the same.

PRINTING SCHEDULE
Our normal printing schedule of three issues a year has fallen behind schedule although for consistency we have kept the same dating formula. So although there have been delays, a subscription will guarantee that you receive three copies. Now, however, we will be catching up and hope thereafter to keep on a more even keel but meanwhile we hope readers will bear with us. Up until now, all of the work done on the Review has been on a voluntary collective basis and will remain so with the added advantage of having a comrade working solely on administration. We appreciate the support and solidarity our readers have given us and if you have any comments about the Review or about what you'd like to see published, please write to us at our new address (details on inside cover).

Also available from the Review of African Political Economy:

Class & Revolution in Ethiopia by Nega Ayele and John Markakis £2.50/$5.00
South African Labour Bulletin — Special Double Issue on Workers in Namibia with articles and documents of workers' own views. Available in June. £3.00/$6.00

Back issues of the Review
No.1 — Development in Africa; No.2 — Multinational Corporations;
No.3 — Classes in Africa; No.4 — Class Struggle and Liberation £2.00/$4.00
No.5 — The State; No.6 — Merchant Capital & Neo-colonialism;
No.7 — Special issue on South Africa; No.8 — Capitalism in Africa; No.9 — Southern Africa £1.20/$3.50

Please note that issues 2,3 and 4 are not available for the time being; however we are taking orders for them but please do not send payment until they are reprinted and you are billed. No.1 has now been reprinted.

The Editors of the Review would like to take this opportunity to thank Merlin Press for their support. Martin Eve and the Press provided an invaluable backing for our early efforts to get started. They underwrote our first steps not only financially but with their own considerable status as a left-wing publisher. They continued to provide an address and some despatching services as well as a great deal of advice over the years. Now they are in the process of moving to a new address, and we are going our own way with our own office.
Zambia: Class Formation and Detente

Karen Eriksen

Zambia's stance on the liberation of southern Africa has seemed to vacillate in the last few years. In fact there have always been contradictory elements in her policy — shooting of refugees and liberation movements, imposing sanctions on the one hand, but a readiness to parley with the white regimes, a commitment to 'peaceful' change, on the other. These contradictions have deepened and Zambia has become more prone to compromise and to deliver movements up to the negotiating table as a result of the country's perilous economic crisis and, of more permanent importance, the emergence of a more powerful local bourgeoisie.

Zambian government leaders have often stressed the sacrifices made by their country in the struggle to liberate southern Africa. And certainly the Zambian contribution to this struggle has been an important one. The country has accepted refugees fleeing the neighbouring war zones, has permitted the use of its territory to liberation movements and has endured border attacks and incursions on the part of the Portuguese, South African and Rhodesian regimes. The population has endured shortages and rationing resulting from sanctions imposed on Rhodesia, which have frequently affected Zambia more seriously than they have their target. Given the nature of the Zambian economy inherited from colonialism, with its dependence on the British, South African and Rhodesian capital which initially subjugated the country and its heavy reliance on southern-based infrastructural facilities, such sacrifices and such a dedication to liberation have been remarkable. Compliance with sanctions has required diverting resources from scheduled development projects to the creation of alternative external trade routes and energy sources, at a cost difficult to measure.

Against this record, however, it began to appear in the seventies that the Zambian government had lost some of its earlier resolve, that it had begun to meddle in the internal affairs of some liberation groups with the effect of retarding their struggle, and that it had become willing to co-operate with South Africa in orchestrating solutions to existing conflicts. In March 1976, however, its resolve appeared to harden again.
when the country’s President, Dr Kaunda, proclaimed the need for renewed armed struggle as the only way to liberate Zimbabwe. Zambia appeared to have abruptly ended its hopes of a South African influenced solution and to have adopted a hard line position consistent with that of its neighbours, Tanzania and Mozambique.

Here we wish to argue that this apparent vacillation obscures certain consistent elements in Zambia’s foreign policy, namely an unequivocal advocacy of social justice and political equality in southern Africa, but a preference for peaceful and negotiated settlements to the conflict there, a persistent appeal to Western powers to assist in promoting such settlements, and an insistence on unity within nationalist struggles established through intervention, if necessary. These were the fundamental characteristics of foreign policy during the sixties when, with Tanzania, Zambia was one of the few OAU members contributing to the liberation struggle. They remained of central importance during the period of ‘co-operation’ or ‘collaboration’; and they remain so today despite the apparent reassertion of the hard line position.

Yet while some basic consistency exists, important aspects of change in foreign policy positions may also be noted. To some extent these were changes only of degree. Co-operation with South Africa to settle certain crises, for example, became more open and the level of Zambia’s intervention into the affairs of liberation movements more pronounced. To some extent the changes simply involved the removal of ambiguity in their stance. In particular, it became increasingly clear Zambia’s call for unity often implied backing for a favoured leader. Likewise Zambia’s support for particular nationalist contenders or for particular settlement proposals or formulae became more firmly conditioned by the country’s specific economic interests than was previously the case. But even where changes in policy reflected no more than the crystallization of existing tendencies, such clarity is of significance in what it tells us about Zambia’s position in a changing environment and, most particularly, its response to the growing radicalization of the ideology and tactics of the liberation struggle. Thus it is not so contradictory if, at the precise moment of the collapse of Portuguese imperialism and the victory of a genuinely popular revolution, Kaunda could welcome Vorster’s proposals for change as “the voice of reason”.

We wish to indicate the elements of change and of consistency in the country’s foreign policy with regard to the liberation struggle, and then to explore the underlying crystallization of certain tendencies which constitute important shifts in that policy. Two of the more important underlying forces are 1) the extent of the economic crisis experienced, especially in 1975 and early 1976, and 2) the process of internal class formation since independence. This latter, although less immediate in its effect on state policy, is fundamental to the direction in which Zambia is moving. It has involved, on the one hand, growing discontent among the proletariat, the unemployed and the peasantry over shortages, rising costs in basic commodities, and relative decline in employment, and, on the other hand, the growth of an indigenous property owning group closely tied to a state which is in turn increasingly prone to articulate its interests.
Principles of Early Policy

Zambia's early policy on southern Africa centred on opposition to apartheid, colonialism and white domination. Perhaps the most precise statement of that position is to be found in the so-called Lusaka Manifiesto of 1969, which was formulated by the fifth summit conference of East and Central African States. This document stresses a basic belief in human equality and rejects, in consequence, any system of minority rule. At its core is an expressed preference for peaceful, negotiated settlements where social injustice and the denial of political rights existed:

We do not advocate violence; we advocate an end to the violence against human dignity which is now being perpetuated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change.

Given that peaceful change was blocked, the document recorded the necessity of armed struggle, albeit as a last resort. Accordingly, Zambia provided material and moral support to the liberation struggle and continued to observe sanctions on Rhodesia. Economic sacrifice was accepted as a moral obligation in accordance with the Christian and humanitarian concerns of the government. Zambian leaders, in fact, assumed that the expectations of other nations left them little room to choose their own role. As Mainza Chona, then Vice President, stated in 1973:

As most of us said publicly, Zambia's role vis-à-vis the liberation of southern Africa is similar to the role of member nations of the United Nations. Zambia, Mr Speaker, would have been universally and justifiably condemned if she did not give the kind of treatment and support we are at present giving to the freedom fighters. We would have been condemned by the United Nations, by the OAU and other respected organizations like the World Council of Churches.

But Zambia did not stop at an assumption of a role prescribed for it by the UN, the OAU, or its 'Christian-humanitarian' conscience. Its leaders were concerned to effect a settlement, particularly with regard to Rhodesia, with which it had strong economic links. To this end they actively canvassed for external assistance. The direction of such appeals is noteworthy — on the one hand, South African co-operation was sought, and on the other hand, appeals were made to the west.

After receiving feelers from Pretoria, Kaunda undertook a correspondence with Vorster in 1968. The President affirmed that the situation in Rhodesia threatened Zambia's security, and suggested a manner in which this might be resolved:

We have never advocated in Zambia that majority rule and independence will come tomorrow, but rather we had thought that there would be a transitional government which would immediately make a thorough preparation for majority rule and independence.

Emphasizing Zambia's desire for peaceful change, he expressed his belief that Vorster held the key to a peaceful solution in southern Africa. Indeed, he seemed to infer that if Zambia and South Africa worked in concert courageously and with foresight, the difficulties in
southern Africa might be resolved. Though declining to actually meet with Vorster, suggesting that the time was not then opportune, Kaunda was clearly prepared to collaborate with South Africa to bring about a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. The exchange of letters reflects the basic position of the Zambian government: still insistent on change in Rhodesia, but prepared to explore ways to avoid armed conflict in the area.

The Zambian exercise in sounding out Vorster to obtain a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia appears to have terminated by the early seventies — perhaps because the South African Prime Minister attempted to embarrass Kaunda by making their correspondence public. Kaunda was sharply criticized by Zambian students in 1971 for his role in the exchange. But contacts between the two were renewed in 1974, when a series of exchanges between Lusaka, Pretoria and Salisbury, apparently initiated by the Zambians, resulted in the release of nationalist leaders by Smith and in abortive negotiations in 1974 and 1975. The general agreement which had led to these events (referred to as a Rhodesia master plan by the South African press) reportedly envisioned a relatively lengthy transition to majority rule, indicating Zambia's continued belief that Zimbabwe's independence would not come 'tomorrow'.

While Zambia has, therefore, made covert contact with South Africa, it has been much more public and persistent in its appeals to Britain and the United States to intervene in southern Africa. In 1970, for example, Kaunda declared that the United States was the only world power capable of bringing a peaceful solution to the region and called on the US to use its 'special influence' in this direction. These pleas were repeated more forcefully in 1976, first with regard to Angola and later with respect to Zimbabwe. Early in 1976, Mark Chona, Kaunda's Special Assistant, who has on occasion also served as an emissary to Vorster, travelled to Washington to brief State Department officials on Zambia's position and on the Angolan situation. He took the opportunity to urge the US to exert pressure with respect to Russian and Cuban involvement in Angola in such a way that if it were not itself involved directly in promoting peaceful change in southern Africa, eastern powers were likely to be called in and, in the process of assisting liberation movements, also spread their socialist ideologies. A few months later, the Zambian government enthusiastically welcomed the American Secretary of State, Kissinger, to the country, and Kaunda, declaring himself "emotionally charged" by Kissinger's words, affirmed that the US programme had Zambia's full support.

From time to time, the Zambian leadership has denied that it is pro-Western and has reasserted a position of neutrality. But, in spite of such professed neutrality, Zambia has maintained a persistent appeal to the West to intervene for peaceful change in the region. Kaunda has repeatedly first predicted an imminent bloodbath in the region and then welcomed the latest Western peace initiatives. It was just a bloodbath speech delivered in March 1976 which signalled for some western press his return to a hardline position. However, it would seem more accurate to interpret such statements as renewed appeals to the West couched in apocalyptic, rather than optimistic terms. His essential aim at such times appears to be to cultivate a sense of responsibility and
mutual interest in those whose aid he seeks. Thus it is instructive that in the March 1976 speech, Kaunda noted that a British military presence might be required if the impending bloodbath were to be avoided. By contrast, Tanzania's Nyerere was quoted at about the same time as stating that the best thing Britain could do for Zimbabwe would be to stay out. Zambia's periodic militancy is therefore not a substitute but an accompaniment to its desire for a peaceful solution, for a compromise which would be economically beneficial to Zambia. Militant statements constitute more a plea or threat to the West, than a statement of actual preference.

Dealings with Liberation Movements

Zambia's preference for non-violent solutions and for intervention by Western powers, has, as its corollary, a particular pattern of dealing with liberation movements based in its territory. The government has tended to play an increasingly active role in sponsoring certain factions where divisions have occurred and, more recently, has shown a preference for those groups with 'moderate' positions or programmes and/or with a sensitivity to Zambia's economic interests.

One should not belittle the problems faced by Zambia in accommodating liberation movements in its territory. These movements have not always been well organized and disciplined or possessed of coherent aims and ideology. Many have been deeply divided internally. To the extent that such internal divisions within these organizations have threatened the security of the country and endangered the government, the responsibility and obligation of the host regime to act cannot be denied. However, there is a consistent pattern which is congruent with the basic premises of Zambian foreign policy power in affecting the strength and activities of liberation movements has increased in recent years.

An obvious and important element in Zambia's dealings with the liberation movements has been an emphasis on unity — unity of members under a clearly defined leadership and unity of all groups fighting a common enemy. While unity may be essential to the defeat of an oppressing power, insistence on it has often been accompanied by Zambian intervention to uphold a particular leadership with ideological stance compatible with its own, and to thwart dissension from the membership or from militants at the front.

Early in 1971, an editorial in the *Times of Zambia* referred to a division within the South African ANC based in Zambia, in which 30 members of the fighting wing complained of insufficient food, clothing and shelter. Holding that these complaints were 'ludicrous', the editorial called on the protesters to make their peace with the leadership. Somewhat contradictorily, the piece simultaneously rejected Zambia's right to interfere in the internal affairs of a movement and indicated which side the government should (and indeed, did) take:

When such differences occur it is not the business of any Zambian either to take sides or to exploit that situation. The side that Zambians must take must surely be that which ensures unity, respect for authority and a promise of hope for the future. In other words the freedom fighters themselves must respect the people they have put at the top. They must respect authority.
The editorial made the same point with regard to internal difficulties then being experienced by ZAPU:

Our stand was, is and will be, that if the head of the organization tells us what his plans are, it is not for us to go and ask his minions if they agree with his plans.

It was presumably in accordance with this general view that, in August 1971, up to 129 ZAPU guerrillas were deported across the border into Rhodesia. The reasons for this are not clear. A variety of explanations have been offered by various sources, ranging from an official government identification of these people as spies planted by Smith (which prompts the question: why send them back for debriefing?), to claims that their real 'crime' was to have been identified with the Zambian opposition party, UPP, to claim that they included the most radical and militant ZAPU cadres. Whatever the truth, the government clearly acted in a manner which ruthlessly supported the existing leadership within ZAPU.

A further instance of Zambian intervention in the affairs of Zimbabwean liberation movements came near the end of 1974 and in early 1975. As a consequence of diplomatic forays between Zambia, South Africa and Rhodesia, Smith released a number of ZANU and ZAPU leaders and agreed to participate in constitutional talks provided that the various nationalist groups merged into a single umbrella organization and a ceasefire was implemented. In 1974, an enlarged ANC headed by Muzorewa became that organization. Guaranteeing an immediate ceasefire was, however, more difficult. ZANU's military predominance made its co-operation essential, but it had acquired a younger, more militant leadership during the course of the struggle which showed little willingness to lay down arms or to be a party to any negotiations prior to Smith's conceding immediate majority rule. It was in fact largely the resolution of such elements with Chitepo as Chairman of the ZANU Supreme Council their spokesmen, that led to the breakdown of pre-talk negotiations in early 1975.

It is not clear what divisions opened up in ZANU as a result of pressures for talks, nor of their precise connection with the assassination of Chitepo at his Lusaka residence in February 1975. However, shortly after the accord grouping all movements under the banner of the ANC, a conflict within ZANU in which cadres at the front expressed disapproval of the attitudes and performance of the Military High Command surfaced. The dispute was complex, involving a degree of personal opportunism and the manipulation of 'tribal' and 'sub-tribal' loyalties. It has also been alleged that legitimate grievances at the front were manipulated by conservative elements financed by multinationals such as Lonhro and Anglo American. Whatever the case, the Zambian government used this moment to demobilize ZANU as a military organization. Some 53 members of ZANU, including most of the leadership, were officially detained on the allegation that they were either directly involved in, or crucial witnesses to, the assassination of Chitepo. Most remained in Zambian prisons without charge until late 1976, and the three who were eventually charged were acquitted. At a critical moment in the liberation struggle, too, ZANU camps in Zambia were converted into prisons.
Another instance of Zambian intervention into the affairs of a liberation movement involved SWAPO. Again the nature of divisions in the movement were complex and confused, but it is at least clear that as well as an opportunistic clique lower ranks had by 1976 become disgruntled and were calling for a re-organization of the leadership. In response to calls for elections within SWAPO, Zambia put both lots of dissidents into ‘protective custody’ and also deported two other individuals. Zambian officials claimed that ‘protective custody’ did not entail detention and had been voluntarily entered into. However, they also argued that no legal machinery existed for the ‘volunteers’ to release themselves. A situation had been reached wherein Zambia’s legal-coercive powers could be and were utilized to settle a division internal to a given moment, to crush dissent, but were unavailable to protect the individual freedom of members involved in dissent.

An interesting contrast to the Government’s dealings with SWAPO’s internal dissent can be seen in the case of the conflict which emerged two years earlier within the MPLA. For in this case, rather than supporting the existing leadership and counselling respect for authority, the government sponsored a series of meetings through which attempts were made by the dissidents to take over leadership. Zambia did not use state power to detain, deport or otherwise force the issue on this occasion, but the fact that it allowed the dissidents (led by Daniel Chipenda) so much room for manoeuvre, at one time giving him protection, and was influential in holding the meeting in Lusaka (rather than within Angola as preferred by the MPLA leader Aghostino Neto), suggests a general preference for Neto’s primary rival, Chipenda, who had previously headed the MPLA office in Lusaka. In the event, the meetings proved inconclusive and Neto retained the leadership. But it is of interest that the emphasis on unity did not on this occasion take the form of support for the leadership against a dissident.

The call for unity was, however, resurrected when independence finally loomed for Angola. So stubbornly did Zambia insist on unity between MPLA, FNLA and UNITA that, even after most of Africa, and indeed the rest of the world, had recognized the MPLA government, this recognition was withheld by Zambia. Indeed, it must be doubted that it was unity that the Zambian government desired rather than the continued inclusion in the picture of a particular movement – UNITA. For while demanding unity, the government clearly bestowed most of its favour on UNITA. Savimbi, the movement’s head, was permitted a great deal of access to Zambian television and radio before the outbreak of civil war. Mercenaries coming to assist UNITA found their way to the front through Zambia; Lonrho jets used Zambian airport facilities to supply UNITA at the front, and supplies in boxes addressed to Zambia’s UNIP were flown into Angola. Monetary assistance from the United States was funnelled through Zambia to UNITA (as even Mark Chona admitted). Zambian officials vehemently denied assisting or even preferring UNITA, claiming that they opposed on principle a military rather than political solution in Angola and rejected all foreign intervention. However, their antagonism towards Soviet and Cuban intervention on behalf of MPLA far exceeded their indignation over South African intervention support for UNITA and FNLA. Kaunda insisted that South African intervention was the effect, not the cause, of Soviet
involvement. And, though the government vehemently denied any special link with Savimbi (or having agreed to South Africa being called in as was reported in the South African press), Zambia continued for a time to permit UNITA to operate in its territory and to enjoy facilities there, even after having granted official recognition to the MPLA government.

At the same time that national unity was proclaimed the primary consideration in Angola, it appeared to be a lesser concern with regard to Zimbabwe. While exerting great force against ZANU's reluctance to merge into the ANC umbrella, the government seemed less concerned when Joshua Nkomo broke away in late 1975 from the ANC and unilaterally began negotiations with Smith. Indeed, Zambia unambiguously provided support for the Nkomo faction, in the form of a team of typists and stenographers, and, more importantly, through three official representatives at the talks — including P. Kasanda, an assistant to Mark Chona. It was reported that during the talks, Nkomo gave up the universal adult suffrage formula and agreed to a qualified franchise which would have provided a small black electoral majority but restricted electoral politics to the privileged element of the black population. In early 1976, the Smith-Nkomo talks broke down, in part because Kaunda became publicly reconciled to their futility and began to call for the need for armed struggle. But while support for the talks ended, support for Nkomo did not. The latter continued to visit Lusaka for frequent consultations and retained his position among Zimbabweans largely, some of his rivals suggested, as a consequence of Zambian sponsorship. Even when Zambia relaxed its grip on ZANU, permitting its forces to leave for Mozambique, and appeared to fall into step with the position of Nyerere and Machel, it was far from clear that support for Nkomo had ended. His wing of the Patriotic Front continues to operate from Zambia while the former ZANU wing is primarily based in Mozambique. When a new front was opened on Zambia's southern border, ostensibly under a new unified command of all Zimbabwean forces, it appeared to be nothing more than a revived ZAPU base, an expression of continued division within the nationalist struggle, allowed to persist under Zambian protection. The recent meeting between Smith and Kaunda in September 1977, and the apparent non-engagement of Zambian-based guerrillas, brought into the open such divisions and suspicion of Zambian sponsorship of Nkomo and of their future role. In the Zimbabwean case, then, it is necessary to ask the question whether Zambia's concern for unity has been a strategy less for unity than to promote and keep in the running less radical elements of Zimbabwean nationalism.

**Political Opposition to the Liberation Movements**

The crystallization of Zambian foreign policy in 1975 and the early months of 1976, involving the demobilization of ZANU forces, the hostility towards the MPLA in Angola, and the support for Nkomo, was paralleled by indications of increasing unwillingness on the part of certain sections of the Zambian population to continue to make sacrifices in the cause of southern African liberation. Expressions of impatience and opposition to the liberation movements within Zambia were not new. In the early days of Rhodesia's UDI, Kaunda himself had expressed exasperation with nationalist leaders who confined their
activities to the consumption of 'chicken-in-a-basket' at one of Lusaka’s more fashionable hotels. Nevertheless, their struggle had received strong support from the President. In early 1973, however, a number of Members of Parliament complained (not for the first or last time) about divisions within the liberation movements and suggested that many of their leaders were inactive and insincere, living in luxury while waiting for independence to be handed to them on a silver plate. “Let the freedom fighters now in Zambia take part in the fight for their countries by going back to those countries”, was the characteristic call. Expressing this antagonism, Fines Bulawayo, currently a member of UNIP’s Central Committee, proclaimed that:

As a party we are not prepared to listen to many parties springing up here who instead of joining forces to fight the enemies start fighting among themselves.

By 1975, this hostility had increased considerably; on occasion party officials gave expression to it by orchestrating ‘spontaneous’ demonstrations against all Zimbabwean exiles in the country. In late 1975, the Zambia Defence Forces warned liberation movements not to misinterpret Zambia’s intentions nor abuse its hospitality — an extremely significant event given the infrequency of public statements by military leaders.

Among MPs, the decreasing willingness to sacrifice for the freedom of neighbouring territories was expressed in late 1975 with the demand that the border with Rhodesia be reopened. This call for a reversal of policy appears to have had widespread support from members, being communicated to Kaunda during a special caucus meeting of MPs. Kaunda refused the request, arguing that this was not the proper time for such action, but did concede that the Cabinet and Central Committee were studying the situation closely. However, the objections to foreign policy continued. In early 1976, for example, MPs complained that the Government and Party devoted too much time to international matters instead of concentrating on stabilizing and reviving the failing economy. A number of MPs also repeated the demand for official opening of the Rhodesian border. One suggested that the masses should not continue to suffer at the expense of ideological and political differences:

The same people we feed here are the same ones who go out denouncing us. Some of the countries we are sanctioning are better off than us. Let us improve the economic situation.

Another MP claimed that:

There was no sense in buying goods like farming tractors made in South Africa through Malawi. Why can’t we buy them direct from South Africa? We are just enriching Malawi.

To cheers from members of the National Assembly, he continued:

I have been sent by my employers and masters, the masses, to ask the Government to re-open the border because there is too much suffering.

Members of the Central Committee rebuked MPs for their criticism and the President publicly attacked them, noting that the border would not
be re-opened while Rhodesia's white minority regime continued in power. But it is of interest that this did not deter one backbencher, Arthur Wina, Zambia's first Minister of Finance, from reasserting the demand that the border should be opened, claiming that if this were not done, the Zambian economy might well collapse. He argued that Zambia's transport problems would not be solved by creating new routes to replace those presently closed for reasons "totally unrelated to the interests of the country".

The reason for Wina's new stance is not difficult to find. During his period out of Parliament (1968-73), Wina has amassed substantial business interests, as had many of the other MPs who voiced similar grievances in Parliament. Their message to the President was that he should conduct foreign policy in terms not of abstract morality, but of economic rationality. The cost of sacrifice had affected adversely not only national, but also their own business interests. They therefore had an objective interest in condemning the continued closure of the border and the Rhodesian trade route, particularly in the light of the serious economic crisis in which Zambia found itself in 1975.

Economic Crisis and Mass Discontent

The concern of political leaders and members of the new indigenous bourgeoisie over the condition of the economy was well founded. The signs of economic decline, or lack of anticipate dynamism, had been apparent throughout the seventies, but by 1975 had reached crisis proportion. Increased costs of imports, vastly intensified by increased transport costs, and shortages resulting from bottlenecks on existing trade routes and from the tie up of commodities at Angolan ports, meant a decline in local business fortunes. In consequence of the closure of the Rhodesian border in early 1973, Zambia's trade had been largely diverted through the Angolan port of Lobito by the following year. Whereas in 1972, 55% of exports and 66% of imports had passed through Rhodesia to and from the Mozambique port of Beira, by 1974 Lobito handled 55% of exports and 45% of imports. The Angolan civil war stranded an enormous amount of cargo destined for Zambia, and copper intended for sale abroad, in Lobito. In August 1975, when Zambia finally abandoned the use of Lobito, more than 140,000 tonnes of cargo, plus 20,000 tonnes of copper, 18,000 tonnes of zinc and 2,000 tonnes of lead lay at the port.

Given the costs absorbed through rerouting exercises (estimated to have been K350 million between 1973 and 1976 alone) and had given rising costs of industrial inputs and manufactured goods on the international market, Zambia's ability to satisfy local demand for imports was severely affected. The seriousness of the situation only becomes clear when it is appreciated how highly dependent Zambia is on imports in every sector of the economy. In 1972, for example, the value of food imports was about 30% of the combined value of locally marketed agricultural produce and the output of the food, beverages and tobacco manufacturing sector of the economy. In other sectors, the ratio of imported to locally produced commodities was considerably higher, reaching over 600% for machinery and transport equipment. Between 1972 and 1975, the value of imports increased by 49%. Not all of this was due to increased costs. The price of oil, for instance, increased...
drastically, but so too did the volume of oil, which doubled during this period. And while the volume of imported finished goods declined marginally from 1973, the volume of imported inputs for manufacturing increased.

The crisis was further aggravated by the collapse of the international price for copper, the country’s main (and virtually only) export commodity. An indication of the seriousness of the economic situation was a trade deficit of K42m in 1975 and an overall balance of payments deficit of K180m as against a surplus of K18.6m the previous year. At the same time, foreign exchange reserves fell to K31m in August 1975, having stood at K270m in 1970. The balance of payments on current account slipped to a record deficit estimated at K316m in 1975. The problems of a lack of intermediate and consumer goods was therefore accompanied by and interrelated with a severe financial crisis.

Rising costs and pervasive shortages, the most visible indications of a crisis, became a point of contention not only among Zambia’s businessmen, large and small, foreign and national, but also among the mass of its urban and rural populations. While 1975 saw a decline in per capita income of 29.5%, it was estimated that consumer prices had increased 10.4% between January and August 1975 for high income groups and 13.3% for low income groups. In early 1976, price rises became particularly steep. In January it was announced that, given expectations of, at best, minimal revenues for the state from the copper industry (and even the possible need of subsidizing the mines in order to avoid layoffs of workers), subsidies on many basic commodities would have to be eliminated or greatly reduced. The cost of living, and the cost in time devoted to queueing for goods in shops, increased considerably. Periodic and often extended shortages arose of such goods as candles, dry cells, matches, soap, detergents, bread, butter, margarine and cooking oil.

But, in addition to rising prices and scarcity, a relative loss of jobs also affected lower income groups. From 1970 to 1974, the rate of increase in the numbers in wage employment remained roughly the same as the rate of increase in GDP; but overall job creation fell far short of the level planned and of that required by the pressure of urban migration. Even before the economic problems of the mid-seventies became apparent, it had been estimated that by 1976, some 443,000 people (of a total population of some 5 million) would have been unemployed, even were the planned job opportunities to come into existence. In fact, the planned rate was never remotely approached, and the crisis resulted in layoffs as existing jobs were lost. By early 1976, the Minister of Labour and Social Services announced 9,000 redundancies resulting from the ‘unfavourable economic situation’. The total for the year as a whole was probably far higher.

It is hardly surprising that discontent, therefore, was pervasive throughout the population. Workers in particular felt they were bearing the brunt of the crisis. Industrial legislation prevented working class action in many employment categories, strikes have been declared illegal in many sectors of the economy. Even so, some industrial unrest did occur. Workers struck for higher wages in a number of firms, claiming
that their costs of living were rising and in some instances that employers had cut their working hours. In a number of industrial disputes during this time, police were called in and, on occasion, the press were barred from premises. Most symbolic of general discontent, and particularly significant in that it occurred at a Party meeting addressed by UNIP's Secretary General, and presumably attended by the political faithful, was an incident in early 1976 in which the audience responded to the cry 'One Zambia' not with the expected 'One Nation' but with the cry of *Njala Yeka* (only hunger).

Though incidents such as this point to the prevalence of mass discontent, it is difficult to evaluate how far the masses saw their problems as deriving from support of the liberation struggle. There is evidence that some politicians — particularly on the Copperbelt — attempted both to draw on popular discontent and to divert anger away from the Party and Government and towards outsiders through organizing demonstrations against 'ungrateful' Zimbabweans accused of holding jobs at the expense of Zambians. However, the immediate focus of mass discontent was on visible manifestations of crisis — lack of jobs, rising prices and shortages. The couching of demands for policy change in populist terms by MPs was probably an indication not so much of the perception of the masses of links between foreign policy and economic crisis, as the manipulation of mass discontent to promote changes ultimately in accord with the long run interests of the emergent bourgeoisie. This was possible precisely because all classes experienced (albeit with differing intensity) a common problem in the rising prices and shortages of goods whose quickest relief could be attained through purchasing from the cheapest sources and reopening transport routes through Rhodesia. The rhetoric that the Zambian government should concern itself with the needs of its own citizens before addressing itself to the support of its neighbours would hardly be unpopular among workers and peasants. Mass discontent and bourgeois interests were, thus, not in any immediate conflict on this issue.

When trade surpluses derived from copper were high, the country could afford to be generous in assisting the liberation struggle and could even endure a measure of sacrifice. With the erosion of surpluses, the ability to absorb such costs as those required for rerouting diminished, as did the capacity to pay off disgruntled elements through aid to business, increased wages, regional development projects and the like. Thus Zambia's foreign policy became — under pressure of general economic forces and specific class interests — more consistent with economic needs. Support for UNITA was consistent with the fact that UNITA held the area of the Benguela railway line and controlled the port of Lobito and moreover had given assurances to Zambia that high priority would be placed on renewing transport channels were UNITA to achieve control of the Angolan government. MPs called for a similar consistency to be applied to Zimbabwe — namely, through the reopening of trade routes. They were reprimanded by Kaunda for their trouble, and branded 'reactionaries' by one Central Committee member, but also received an assurance that the Party and Government would look into the matter. They did not affect an opening of the border, but the Government did lend support to the talks between Nkomo and Smith.
It is instructive to note the contrast of the government's response to criticism from MPs, which came from its right, with its reaction to criticism from the left by University students early in 1976. A student demonstration of solidarity with the MPLA in January 1976 was at first virtually ignored by the local press. Two weeks later, however it became the excuse for an escalating confrontation which led the government to close the University and detain, without charge, a number of staff and students. The government's extreme reaction to the demonstration and subsequent student strike, belied its shrill insistence that principle rather than economic interests dictated its position on Angola; in effect, to point to contradictions between principle and practice was deemed subversive. Comments suggesting that different principles be invoked and that Angola practice be applied to Zimbabwe were regarded with antipathy by a government made vulnerable by economic crisis, but those MPs who made them were hardly labelled as subversives, nor were they detained. On the other hand, the coincidence of student leftism with popular anger over an increase in maize meal prices and the occurrence of the njala yeka slogan caused the government to lash out strongly, with Kuanda reinvoking emergency powers, immediately before initiating the University detentions.

In the weeks following the student demonstration, presidential speeches insisted that internal subversion was rampant and warned the populace to be on its guard. Remarks were made about the plundering tiger and its deadly cub' with reference to the USSR and Cuba, and about the students being an orchestra led by an 'invisible conductor'. The blame for student unrest was laid against 'misled Marxist lecturers' by one Central Committee member. A government newspaper swiftly produced a major feature article which included the University demonstration as an example of typical KGB activity and reported Chinese congratulations on action against Soviet 'provocations'. The lie of Marxist subversion on the campus was thus created and embellished with little query. The notion of enemies without the borders of the nation which had constituted one of the major themes of the President's speeches regarding foreign policy over the previous ten years, now seemed to have merged with that of enemies within. But, interestingly, it appeared momentarily convenient for the identity of the primary 'enemy' to shift from the racist southern Africa regimes and their agents to the Soviet Union and 'marxists' in general.

The most plausible interpretation of such accusations and fabrications is that by fomenting an internal crisis, the Zambian government could not only seek to deflect popular discontent over the condition of the economy by finding foreigners responsible for its problems, but could also signal the West that its credentials as their friend in the area were stronger than previously. This signal was certainly received. The University crisis therefore was part of a significant shift to the right. The economic crisis, the uncertainties of the Angolan war, popular alienation, all served to shift domestic policy towards the articulated interests of an emergent propertied class within Zambia. At the same time, they served to promote an even deeper dependence on the part of the Zambian state on western political and financial assistance. Kaunda's declared intention of abolishing capitalism articulated in 1975 after a visit to Jamaica and Cuba, had been summarily abandoned.
Increased Dependence on Western Capital

Under acute stress, the government turned more openly toward the west, not only for aid in the solution to southern African problems, but also to undergird its domestic economy. Faced with a government deficit of K237m. for 1975, the Zambian government had, of necessity, greatly to increase its financial dependence, one of the few dimensions of overall external dependence which had never been significant before. Whereas in the period 1966 to 1970, foreign loans amounted to only K125m. external financing for the year 1975 alone was K100.8m. And within the first eight months of 1976, the local press reported K300m. in additional foreign assistance. By far the most important single item of the 1976 borrowing was the Special Drawing Rights facility granted by the IMF, amounting to K93m. for that year. The World Bank made a further K59m. available for development projects. In 1975, it was reported that Zambia had secretly received loan facilities from South Africa, including, specifically, South African payment of Zambia’s 1976 oil bill. Zambia strongly denied that it had received any South African funds or had made any agreement with the South Africans to its own economic advantage. But though perhaps not directly from South Africa, Zambia did obtain financial assistance in paying for its petroleum in 1976, the value of oil needs for the first six months of the year being covered by loan facilities from the Bank of America. In fact, the US had become one of the Zambian government’s major creditors over the past several years. In 1975, it was second only to China, which had made the massive loan to build the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad. Further, the US (along with Britain) had, over the last several years, been perhaps the most important source of loan capital to Zambia’s mining companies, a K28m loan being made in 1976; such a contribution is not altogether surprising, however, given the extensive US corporate investment in Zambian copper.

It is evident, then, that the West and especially the US has been responsive to Zambia’s needs and anxious to prop up the economy. Kaunda’s threat of a more militant stance in Zimbabwe in March 1976 did little to either stem the flow of funds or dampen Western enthusiasm for him. And, if Zambia did not borrow South Africa capital, it at least continued to obtain commodities from that country, which remains one of the cheapest sources of many goods. In late 1975, there were South Africa press reports that Zambia had become an important African market for South African commodities. And severe shortages in 1976 of soap, detergent, and cooking oil were finally broken by an airlift of goods not only from Kenya, as reported locally, but also from South Africa.

In terms of trade relations and monetary flows, the mid-seventies witnessed Zambia’s increasing integration into the international capitalist economy. At the same time, as regards foreign policy, Zambia has come increasingly to adopt positions consistent with those of the West. We have suggested that this crystallization of former tendencies in Zambian foreign policy, never previously unambiguous, was fastened and sharpened by immediate short term considerations of economic welfare as a result of the crisis which became manifest by 1975. Indeed, it was only after some indication of an economic upswing (which proved illusory) and the acquisition of loan facilities, that Kuanda withdrew support
for the Nkomo-Smith talks and allowed ZANU cadres to move to Mozambique.

It could be argued that, in the light of Zambia's historically defined orientation towards the West and envelopment within the southern African regional economy, its foreign policy would automatically have meshed with that of the western powers. Such a simplistic argument, however, overlooks the very real attempts made by the government to weaken such constraints and to stake out an independent position for the country. Furthermore, in addition to the forces linking it to the West and to South Africa, there were also pressures from its other neighbours, notably Mozambique and Tanzania — on whom Zambia has become increasingly dependent for alternative trade routes — to maintain its economic sacrifice and support the militant struggle. This countervailing pressure has perhaps contributed to the new militant rhetoric which coexists with the deep desire for a western solution to the struggle. But to the extent that the latter predominates over the former, it reflects not only the strength of external economic pressures but also the rise of an indigenous owning group within Zambia which has close ties with the state and, as we noted, has demanded an 'economy first' policy.

The Character of the New Bourgeoisie

Changes or extensions of the logic of existing tendencies in foreign policy have been largely a manifestation of important changes in class formation within Zambia, and in the class nature of the state. Whereas the nationalist party which ushered in political independent was fundamentally populist in character, there has occurred a subsequent tendency for it to become more responsive to local owning elements, whose own appearance and increasing strength have in turn been sponsored, to a large extent, by state policy. It is to a fuller consideration of the growth, character and influence of this element that we now turn.

In common with the experience of many African colonies, the development of indigenous capital was blocked beyond certain points and channelled in particular directions to avoid competition with foreign and settler capital. Thus at independence, while a substantial, organized proletariat existed, the petty bourgeoisie of African traders, self-employed artisans, and cash crop and labour-employing farmers was both tiny and overwhelmingly dominated by foreign capital, concentrated in the mining industry, and by settler capital, in manufacturing commercial agriculture and commerce. Indigenous 'owners' had been represented in the nationalist parties and in some cases occupied leadership positions within them. But, though it is possible to argue that their interests were reflected in the objectives of the anti-colonial struggle, they did not, as a class, dominate it; in fact, they were far less important in the nationalist party leadership than trade unionists, teachers, clerks and other workers. The nationalist struggle, with its necessary emphasis on political rights for all was oriented to uniting all class groups within the African population toward the goal of wresting political control from settlers and transferring it to the African people as a whole. The character of the movement at this stage, in consequence of the particular forms of colonial oppression, was necessarily populist in tone and makeup.
Given its base and objectives, the regime which inherited the state at independence was, at least initially, oriented toward improving the level of general social welfare and effecting what its leadership termed the participation of the African population in the system as a whole. One logical extension of this greater participation was the promotion of African interests in the inherited economy. Apart from allowing wage increases and seeking to promote Zambians in employment, government policy towards this end took two main forms. The first — consistent with a general acceptance of capitalist production relations involved the creation of incentives and the establishment of protective regulations to promote the growth of indigenous private capital. Thus loan facilities were established for small entrepreneurs or potential entrepreneurs and retail, wholesale, and road service licences were restricted to Zambian citizens. Brickmaking and stonecrushing were reserved for Zambians and the Public Works Department and mining companies were directed to award construction contracts of less than K100,000 exclusively to Zambians. Secondly, while policy was formulated to enable the movement of citizens into sectors of the economy involving the smallest and least technically complex units of production or distribution, the state itself began to move into the economy in medium and large scale enterprise and in sectors involving relatively complex technology. A number of foreign owned companies were taken over partially or wholly and several new enterprises were initiated either independently or through joint ventures with multinational corporations. Thus at the same time that state policy promoted the growth of an indigenous owning group, the state’s direct involvement in the economy increased and a relatively important state capitalist sector emerged.

By the early seventies, then, as a result of political change and specific political policy, the structure of participation and control in the economy had altered significantly. Some of the settler community had left the country, particularly those in commerce and, to a slightly lesser extent, in agriculture. The companies of settlers in industry and commerce who left were taken over in part by settlers who remained and acquired citizenship, in part by multinational corporations, particularly Lonrho, in part by the state, and in a few cases, by individual African Zambians. The farms of departing settlers were absorbed, in a few cases, by remaining settlers, but more often by the state or by individual Africans. Foreign capital retained a dominant position within the economy, despite the partial nationalisation of the mines; and, by virtue of technological expertise, its representatives retained strategic control over many of the joint operations into which the state had entered. Nevertheless, state participation was considerable and the most significant element of the new pattern of ownership. Parastatal firms exercised monopolies or near-monopolies in the production of a number of commodities (e.g. explosives, fertilizers, beer, tyres, cotton fabric). Overall, by 1972, parastatal companies contributed 52% of the value of manufactures, held 51% of the assets of the mining industry, and were well represented in commerce. To a certain degree, the decrease in the share of foreign capital in the economy has been matched by an increase in state capital, and the relative decline in settler capital has been, to a lesser extent, matched by an increase in indigenous private capital.

Changes in class structure paralleled these changes in the pattern of
ownership and control. Prior to independence, the African population basically was comprised of a large peasantry, a proletariat (some 15 to 20 per cent of the adult population) and a small petty bourgeoisie with intermediate groups between each of these (e.g. migrant labourers, part-time traders and marketeers, peasants producing predominantly for the market but employing no labour on a regular basis, etc.). The same ranking by size of these three main groups persisted in the early seventies, but the relative proportion of the petty bourgeoisie had increased considerably. To take one example: whereas prior to independence, about a third of all liquor licences and less than one tenth of all trading licences, went to Africans, by 1973 more than 90% of all trade and liquor licenses were issued to Africans. While the vast majority were petty bourgeois in the real sense, that is, using their own and family labour rather than employing regular wage labour, others had progressed beyond this by the seventies: as small capitalists employing wage labour but essentially still participating in the labour process, but in some cases as an African bourgeoisie, who were exclusively owners rather than 'worker-managers' in their own businesses. And within the state sector, an important group of parastatal managers had emerged, controlling large enterprises operating according to capitalist criteria of rationality, but located within the state apparatus.

A certain degree of conflict obtains between Zambian private and public enterprise, and between parastatal managers and Zambian businessmen. For the momentum of growth in the state sector, based on capitalist principles of profitability, has entailed increasing concentration in those sectors where the parastatals exist and consequent pressure on the profits of small scale private enterprise. This has brought bitter complaints from private entrepreneurs, especially traders; a case in point is the strenuous objection by rural traders to the spread of branches of the state supermarket chains. However, while there are sectors in which state enterprise can impose ruinous competition on the smallest, most inefficient and infant entrepreneurs, there are many sectors in which parastatals do not dominate and growth of Zambian private enterprise is possible and encouraged. Construction, transport, and such manufacturing sectors as clothing, furniture, paper and plastics, are cases in point. Furthermore, competition does not always lead to the ascendancy of state corporations. The inefficiency of some state firms — most notably in public transport — has left gaps which many Zambians have been eager to fill. Hence, while state involvement is substantial, it has not, taken as a whole, stifled the growth of an indigenous propertied class.

Thus the process of class formation has involved the emergence and growth of both a group of parastatal managers and of private entrepreneurs. And in spite of friction between these groups on some matters, there is considerable similarity of orientation on many other issues including many aspects of foreign policy. Particularly is this true of the top levels of parastatal management and the indigenous bourgeoisie, both having close dealings with foreign capital. This similarity of orientation is further enhanced by an objective overlap between the two groups. Parastatal personnel as individuals are highly mobile and in general aspire to join the private sector as property owners in their own right. Indeed many have acquired business interests during their tenure
as parastatal personnel. In this respect the parastatal sector may be viewed as a recruiting ground for the indigenous owning class. Similarly members of that owning class have emerged from the upper levels of the civil service and the party. Indeed in an important sense, the emergent owning group in Zambia is one highly dependent on the state and the party — for access to loan facilities, for the gaining of management experience, for the benefit of high salaries which have allowed savings of the initial capital for starting a business venture, for contracts with sources of foreign capital, for access to knowledge concerning the workings of the economy and the loopholes in legislation and regulations. Background in party, government or parastatal position does not constitute the only route to private ownership, but it is conspicuously characteristic of many, particularly the bourgeoisie proper as opposed to small traders, artisans and cash crop farmers. Thus, governmental position and political power have been used for private accumulation, to create the beginnings of a national bourgeoisie, though one with continuing dependence on the state apparatus, by virtue of its very small size and the continuing dominance within the economy of foreign capital.

There is considerable differentiation within the group of indigenous private owners. Most operate small commercial enterprises, and typically have moved into that position from employment in the middle levels of the parastatals or the civil service or from skilled occupations in the private sector. In contrast those who have become exclusively owners rather than worker-owners or managers, the bourgeoisie proper, tend either to have moved from the upper ranks of party, civil service or parastatals or to have accumulated capital from earnings gained as lawyers, accountants or doctors. Zambians who acquired farms of departing settlers had previous experience in farming and utilized capital accumulated in the form of cattle as an important part of their initial capital. But many — particularly those acquiring small holdings in the Lusaka area — have also been drawn from the upper ranks of party, government and parastatals. Of the emergent group of indigenous owners taken as a whole — whether in agriculture, industry or commerce, whether classifiable as petty bourgeoisie or bourgeois proper — a high proportion have past and/or present involvement in UNIP, Zambia's single party. In addition, a number have benefited as recipients of loans from state bodies. The two factors are not unconnected. For example, an official of the State's Industrial Finance Corporation, which gives out small loans to Zambian entrepreneurs, admitted that many loans had gone to those who had been active in the independence struggle but had not had the advantages of education or previous business experience or indeed the capital which might allow them to make a go of business enterprise. He evaluated the success of his agency precisely in terms of its political importance. In this regard, Kaunda's statement during the period of a multi-party system, prior to 1973, that "it pays to belong to UNIP" is an apt one.

The significance of party ties for individual accumulation has been acknowledged quite openly. One MP who subsequently served as a Central Committee member noted in Parliament in 1973, for example:

Without the United National Independence Party the various properties which we now think we want to protect, to hoard, could not have been there at all. Without
the Party the bank manager could not see you to negotiate an overdraft for anything.

Indicative of the importance of party and government position is the fact that of all those who have been cabinet members since independence, approximately half have farms or business interests. Another 10% have small holdings (i.e. less than 100 acres). Less than 20% had business interests prior to their acquisition of those posts.

Those individuals at the uppermost levels of the Zambian propertied group tend to have relative ease of access not only to state loan facilities but also to private commercial banks. In fact a number have been appointed to the board of directors of the private commercial banks (in the wake of an unsuccessful attempt at their nationalization), indicating the recognition on the part of foreign finance capital of the critical position of these individuals within the economy as well as within the policy. Those Zambians properly included in the bourgeoisie are in fact precisely distinguished by their strong associations with foreign capital. But while this implies an essential dependence on foreign capital, it does not necessarily signify that these individuals are merely the puppets or the unknowing pawns of foreign interests. Even while on balance the dominant position and the greatest benefit resides with foreign capital, there has existed a certain mutual interdependence between the embryonic indigenous bourgeoisie and foreign capital; certainly the latter need the co-operation and goodwill of local individuals who will speak for its interests. For their part, the Zambians who have collected directorships of foreign firms have often come to see with clarity their inability — along with that of the social formation as a whole — to survive long without the continued influx of foreign capital and expertise (though they themselves might wish to replace this foreign element in the long run). Accordingly, some have become champions of the interests of foreign capital and of the need to establish incentives for foreign investment and to provide the requisites of increased local profitability.

As well as party and government having materially benefited many of those who have now acquired private property, there has also been a tendency in recent years for increased political involvement among the growing propertied classes in Zambia. As many as 40% of those elected as MPs in the 1973 elections, for example, had business interests at the time of nomination, a far higher proportion than that characteristic of former parliaments. Though most of these ‘propertied’ parliamentarians were involved in small scale retail trade, approximately one-third were associated with construction or transport business, multiple or very large retail enterprises, commercial farms or manufacturing firms. A similar pattern of increased involvement occurred within local government. Of those elected to the Lusaka City Council in late 1975, half had business interests. Such substantial participation of property owners in national and local assemblies reflects in part the importance of party ties in assisting the initiation or growth of much of the nation’s indigenous enterprise. At the same time, however, it indicates a tendency for businessmen without particularly strong party ties or position to seek out greater political involvement.

The disproportionate representation of property owners within legis-
ulative bodies is underscored by comparison with non-owners. Only one trade unionist was among the 125 elected to the 1973 Parliament and only one worker below the level of supervisory staff. And only three peasant or small scale cash crop farmers were among those elected. The lower classes in Zambia, in fact, have very little direct role in decision-making. A decentralized structure of ‘development committees’ was introduced in the late sixties as a means of bringing participation to the lowest levels. The attempt, however, has been less than successful. Given that the development committees below the provincial level — and even there to a large extent — have been granted very little role in determining policy or projects as opposed to implementing directives and have had virtually no control over the allocation of available funds, the masses have understandably shown little enthusiasm for joining or activating them. There is considerable discontent at the lower levels of the class structure and frequently considerable agitation at the branch level of labour organizations; since independence, however, the state has been able — through partial co-optation of national labour leaders and through more repressive means — to restrain such groups and muffle discontent.

The threat of opposition and protest from workers, the urban unemployed and peasants continues to influence policy formation in an indirect manner. But the class group which has had the more direct effect, because of its vocal and persistent articulation of its interests and because of its location within representative bodies and its access to the media, has been that of property owners, particularly the most substantial among them who constitute the visible seed of an indigenous bourgeoisie.

Members of this group raised little opposition to the series of economic reforms involving the partial and complete nationalizations of foreign firms, since these same reforms included measures conducive to the increase in numbers of their own class. However, they were quick to raise opposition to measures subsequently proposed which threatened to inhibit the growth of that class. Thus, for example, the implementation date of a Leadership Code which was intended to separate the business and ‘political’ communities, removing the temptation of government or party or parastatal officials to enrich themselves at public expense, was repeatedly postponed, and when finally enacted, the code had been much watered down. Some leaders did in fact divest themselves of property, but more typical was the tactic of either placing the business in question in the name of a relative or simply doing nothing to comply with the Code.

Opposition was also voiced against proposals to institute workers’ participation in industry. In August 1975, a group comprising leading members of the Zambian bourgeoisie along with leadership of European-dominated industrial and farming associations issued a statement asserting that the Zambian workers were “not yet ready” to be allowed a voice in the decision making of business enterprises. The significance of the outspoken complaint was not lost on the local press; an editorial of the *Times of Zambia* noted that for the first time the country appears to have a class of Zambians and residents speaking articulately against the revolutionary measures of the Party. They are Zambia’s businessmen.
Criticism of government and party measures, whether revolutionary or not, persisted. Another instance occurred in mid 1976 when the government outlined educational reforms which included the closing of private schools and the prohibition of Zambian parents sending their children to schools abroad. Members of the business community began to meet regularly with parastatal and bureaucratic heads to discuss the proposed reforms and to articulate their opposition to them. They invoked the need to maintain a system of liberal education and 'international standards' as a thinly disguised rationale for retaining the privilege that their wealth allows them of ensuring that their children receive a 'quality' education in the institution of their choosing.

Criticisms of government policy have occurred as well within the National Assembly. One important critic has been Arthur Wina, who attacked the government's current rural reconstruction programme, arguing that economic assistance should be directed predominantly toward private enterprise and that agricultural productivity would be best increased through provision of incentives to private commercial farmers. A similar plea for protection of and encouragement to private investment has been made by Whitson Banda, a former Lusaka mayor, current MP for an Eastern Province constituency and a man with interests in the construction business, who warned that the government's shift toward socialism was scaring away potential foreign investors and, if not relaxed, the country's economy would collapse.

Bourgeois discontent, therefore, has begun to be directed at the very basis of property relations in the country. Members of Parliament as well as senior civil servants have called for shares in state companies to be sold to the public, or for parastatals to be handed over to private enterprises. Leading members of the bourgeoisie, notably some in banking, have agitated privately and publicly for an "end to socialism", for the encouragement of foreign capital and for aid to local private capital. The effectiveness of this set of pressures can be seen in some key events of 1977. The Planning Ministry has been demoted to a department in the amorphous Office of the Prime Minister, presumably to die there of neglect. Another department placed under this office, that promoting industrial democracy, has been plagued since its initiation with inactivity owing largely to lack of resources. More significantly, in the Budget Speech, the Finance Minister, John Mwanakatwe, a lawyer and member of a number of private companies in his own right, announced that restrictions on the external remittance of profits would be relaxed. Later in the year legislation was passed providing incentives to new foreign and local investment and safeguards against future takeovers of foreign-owned property. During an interview in London in October, Mwanakatwe confirmed the import of the Act: there would be no further nationalizations in Zambia. Apparently even this was not enough. In late 1977, a parliamentary select committee called for even greater incentives to attract foreign investors, implying thereby the inadequacy of the recent legislation. At the same time, the committee urged a 'reappraisal of free social services,' a phased removal of all subsidies on mass consumption commodities, and efforts at rural 'redeployment' of government staff made redundant by its proposed cuts in public expenditure. The country has been committed firmly to a straightforward capitalist course, therefore. And even the welfare
measures which both reflected the original mass base of the party and were designed to contain mass unrest are now under siege.

This direction in domestic affairs was paralleled by, and linked to, the foreign policy departures we have already examined. Those who supported government policy in Angola and advocated the reopening of the Rhodesian border, at the same time as they called for new encouragement of capital, were not merely articulating a course of action consistent with the interests of the emergent bourgeoisie; they were, in fact, predominantly members of that bourgeoisie or of the petty bourgeoisie (the two groups sharing a common interest in seeking to reduce shortages and gain access to cheaper imports). If the economic crisis can be identified as the immediate spur to the foreign policy shifts described, the interests of the indigenous bourgeoisie (as well as those of their allies on the issue, the petty bourgeoisie, state management personnel and top levels of the bureaucracy) dictate that this shift will not be an ephemeral one, capable of change once immediate crises have been overcome. Rather, the emergence of this powerful voice of property within the power structure ensures that the removal of earlier ambiguities in policy, and the crystallization of some earlier tendencies, will be a permanent one.

It is important to note that there was also a close correspondence between indigenous property owners and multinational corporations in their pursuit of foreign policy objections. This is particularly notable in the case of Lonrho which has substantial interests in southern Africa generally, including vast landed interests in Rhodesia, and close links between its directors and members of the Zambian government. As noted earlier, Lonrho provided material support to UNITA during the Angolan civil war, using Anglo American Corporation facilities at Lusaka airport to ferry supplies into Angola. Both Lonrho and Zambia were represented at the Nkomo-Smith talks in 1975-76. Both continued to favour Nkomo thereafter, with Lonrho allegedly meeting certain expenses incurred by the Nkomo faction at talks in Geneva in late 1976. The September 1977 meeting between Smith and Kaunda, which revived divisions within the Patriotic Front and suspicions of the Zambian President's promotion of Nkomo at the expense of other nationalist contenders, was arranged by Lonrho's boss, Tiny Rowland. The apparent coincidence of company interest and national interest is not necessarily evidence of any connivance between the two, nor of Lonrho's manipulation of the Zambian government. But in the present conjuncture there exist objective interests which both share — as in Lonrho's, reportedly, furnishing evidence for Zambia's case against the international oil companies. It would be simplistic and foolish to reduce changes of direction in Zambia simply to Lonrho influence. What is more likely is that a combination of forces, particularly the immediate condition of the national economy, and the growing power of a national bourgeoisie who, like Lonrho managers, have an obvious interest in promoting capitalist 'rationality,' combine to promote a rightist course which suits a corporation with vast interests on both sides of the conflict.

Conclusion
We have then a picture of fundamental changes occurring in Zambian
social relations and social structure which promote important shifts in the direction of internal and external politics on the part of the government. The combination of the emergence of a new propertied class, supported by others with similar aspirations, interests and values within the state apparatus, and the crisis of a neo-colonial economy, have coincided to produce two dimensions of policy which, while apparently unrelated are, in fact, the manifestations of the same dynamic. On the domestic front, this conjuncture has served to stem what challenge there previously was to international capital in a manner which accords with the interests of an economically weak but politically strong indigenous bourgeoisie as well as of multinational capital. In the arena of foreign policy, it has been matched by a decision to mend fences with capitalist powers and a crystallization of earlier tendencies to favour solutions of the liberation struggle which are compatible with the intensions of those powers. The effect of such a shift has been an increase in internal repression against dissent from the left, and interventions in the affairs of liberation movements which have had the effect of retarding the struggle, and of hampering the efforts of the more militant and radical.

Of the two forces, economic crisis and the power of imperialism, on the one hand, and the rise of an indigenous bourgeoisie on the other, neither has been, by itself, a sufficient factor in promoting such changes. It is the unique combination of the two which has differentiated the Zambian response from that, say, of Mozambique and Tanzania. But of the two, the less immediate (the emergence of this national bourgeoisie) is the more fundamental. Mozambique and Tanzania, lacking a class of similar size and strength, have, after all, suffered similar economic crises. In Zambia, however, the crisis has permitted the new class and its allies to articulate grievances and demands in a form which elicit sympathy from the masses who seek immediate redress for their sufferings. Not for the first time in history, the crisis of capitalism has promoted proletarian acquiescence for the aggressive pursuit of bourgeois interests. More importantly, the existence of this new class indicates that the change in direction will not be a temporary one. In alliance with international capital, the indigenous bourgeoisie is likely to increase its demands on, and influence over, the state. In the immediate future this portends entrenchment within, rather than disengagement from, the southern-African regional economy and the web of western imperialism.

Bibliographic Note
Sources drawn on in the preparation of this paper include the following:
Republic of Zambia, Dear Mr Vorster . . . Details of Exchanges between President Kaunda of Zambia and Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa, Zambia Information Services, 1971.
as well as official documents.

Quotes are taken from Republic of Zambia, Parliamentary Debates, or from local newspapers: Sunday Times of Zambia, Times of Zambia, Zambia Daily Mail.
The Post-Colonial State and the Forces and Relations of Production: Swaziland

Isobel Winter

In the case of Swaziland it is shown that the articulation of the capitalist mode of production in southern Africa with the non-capitalist mode, the Swazi mode, provides a starting point from which to understand the take-over of state power at independence and of the role played by the post-colonial state.

The Dominant Mode of Production

The dominance of the capitalist mode of production in Southern Africa, after an initial period of transition, can be traced back to the beginning of large-scale extraction of minerals, first diamonds and then also gold. In order to undertake such extraction, money-capital, obtained largely from the imperialist countries, was used to purchase plant and equipment and to employ a labour-force. The ascendancy of capitalist relations as the predominant form of production relations had profound consequences for the (African) non-capitalist modes of production in southern Africa, characterized by the allocation of land by the chiefs, and the extraction of surplus product mainly in the form of tribute labour. Labour-power was required in large quantities and, in the case of gold, at rates sufficiently low to avoid disruptive changes in the price of gold thereby allowing gold to fulfil the functions of the money-commodity in the international system of circulation.

In the latter third of the nineteenth century when large-scale mining operations began, the African non-capitalist modes of production were largely self-sufficient in that they were able by and large to produce the products required for the reproduction of their populations. It was this self-sufficiency that necessitated, if labour-power were to be procured on the scale and at the rates required, the resort to extra-economic coercive measures. The net result of these measures was to undermine the self-sufficiency of the African non-capitalist mode and hence to guarantee an adequate supply of labour-power for capitalist production.

However, the proletarianisation of the population of the African non-capitalist modes was only partial in the sense that although Africans (particularly men in the earlier period) sold their labour in the capitalist
mode, they retained access to land in the non-capitalist mode, periodically went back to live on this land and usually kept their families there. It was because partial proletarianisation, and the migrant labour system that went with it, was functional to capital accumulation that it was perpetuated. Most importantly, family production within the non-capitalist mode (NCM) served to supplement the wage paid in the capitalist mode (CMP). This enabled capitalist producers to pay a wage that was below that required to reproduce the worker's family. With wages below what they would otherwise (in the absence of the NCM), have to be profits, and hence the rate of capital accumulation were accordingly higher. Secondly, the NCM provided a way of reproducing the reserve army of labour, not immediately required in capitalist production, at minimal cost to the state. This was possible since wide access to land was guaranteed by the land tenure system. This reserve army fulfilled the usual function of keeping down the wages of, and of disciplining, the semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Thirdly the NCM offered a way of providing, again at minimal cost to the state, for those who were permanently marginalised, that is, permanently excluded from the production process in the capitalist mode as capital intensity increased. It also provided a means of taking care of others not required for production — the young, aged, sick etc. Finally the NCM fulfilled a political function by providing a way of controlling the population through their ‘traditional’ rulers. These factors explain the ‘articulation’ of the dominant CMP and the NCM and the over-riding tendency to conserve rather than dissolve those aspects of the latter which were functional to capital accumulation.

The Swazi ‘Traditional’ Rulers and the Non-Capitalist Mode
For the reasons just mentioned there was a dominant tendency to conserve the NCM. This entailed a simultaneous conservation of the position of the Swazi ‘traditional’ rulers within Swazi society, that is the King and his advisory body, the liqoqo or inner council of the Swazi National Council, made up of the chiefs and their advisory councils. These rulers maintained their positions in part through their power over the allocation of land and, as has been shown, the land tenure system was one of the ‘traditional’ institutions that was functional to capital accumulation.

The Swazi rulers were also of use to the owners of capital as a result of the control that they exercised over the Swazi population. An example of this is provided by the following quotations from the 1904 Transvaal Labour Commission, investigating the supply of labour mainly for the Witwatersrand gold mines. A labour recruiter in Swaziland said: 'I do not think I should be able to get [the Swazi] to come out unless they are influenced by the Queen and the chiefs.' In reply to the question 'Is it correct that the Queen of Swaziland is in the pay of the Native Labour Association?' he went on:

Well, she is in one way. I explained to the Queen that it was necessary to teach the Swazis that it was to their interest to come up here to work for the white men... and I asked the Queen to teach these people this, and I said that the Labour Association would allow her £30 a month for teaching her people this. I did not put it to her that she was actually a recruiter, but pointed out that she had to teach her people to come up here [to Johannesburg] and that it would be to her interest to do so.
However, even though the overall tendency was for the conservation of those features of the NCM (the Swazi mode) functional to capital accumulation, there were also countervailing features making for the dissolution of this mode. The spread of commodity production (marketed agricultural production) created the condition of the emergence of new elements within the rural social structure with an interest in challenging the hegemony of the 'traditional' rulers. In some cases commodity production created one of the pre-conditions for the emergence of capitalist relations of production, namely, the accumulation of sufficient money-capital in the hands of some for them to employ wage-labour. The second pre-condition for the emergence of capitalist relations, the availability of a wage-labour force (i.e. 'free' labour), existed as a result of the process of proletarianization referred to. There was thus a tendency for capitalist relations to emerge within the NCM itself undermining the latter and therefore the position of the Swazi rulers. A further force tending to undermine the position of the Swazi rulers stemmed from the extraction of labour from the NCM. As the Swazi became proletarianized and spent increasing amounts of time working for white farmers, miners and other employers so less time was available for the performing of tribute labour for the chiefs and aristocracy. Increasingly too, many Swazi began to object to providing unpaid tribute labour. In other words the 'traditional' process of 'primitive' surplus labour extraction tended to be undermined. However, even though less time in the form of surplus labour might have been available to the chiefs and aristocracy, even after allowing for population increases, this did not necessarily mean an absolute reduction in the agricultural products (use values) they received. This is because the productivity of the NCM was increasing with an improvement in the forces of production as hoes and ploughs came to be used. This meant that even if the chiefs could only extract a smaller amount of labour time, the absolute amount of use-values produced in this time might be greater.

Nevertheless, despite these tendencies, the countervailing tendency for the conservation of this mode and of its ruling class was far stronger. The explanation for this lies in the extraction of labour-power from the NCM for capitalist production. An important feature of the NCM in southern Africa was the limited extent of commodity production and therefore only weak tendencies were present for the undermining of the 'traditional' rulers as a result of commodity production. The reason for this is that if Africans were to be forced to sell their labour-power they would have to be denied the option of producing/selling agricultural output. Besides, the production of commodities by African peasants would threaten the interests of (white) large-scale agricultural capitalists. Thus the ruling classes in southern Africa ensured by political and economic means that commodity production would in general be unviable for African peasants. The result was that the general pattern in most parts of southern Africa was for production in the NCM to be used for subsistence purposes to supplement wages paid in the CMP. Although in the earlier stages of capitalist development in Southern Africa peasant commodity production had been significant it tended increasingly to become less so.

The reduction in the flow of 'Primitive' surplus labour to the chiefs and
The aristocracy did not tend to undermine the latter's power in that this flow was reduced rather than completely halted. Therefore even though labour-time increasingly went to white employers, the Swazi rulers, aided by productivity increases in the NCM, were able to maintain their relative position within Swazi society. A further important factor explaining the maintenance of their position was that the control that they exercised over the population in the NCM, in part through the land tenure system, was, as we have seen, functional to capital accumulation. For these reasons the Swazi rulers emerged in the early 1960s as the single most powerful indigenous group and thus as the 'natural' heirs to state power at independence in 1968.

The Swazi rulers and the Swazi 'Middle Class'
The reasons for the strength of the Swazi rulers have been discussed. It remains to examine the position of the other indigenous (i.e. non-settler) groups. In order to distinguish them from the peasantry and workers, who are discussed later, these groups will be referred to collectively as the Swazi 'middle class'.

The 'classical' petty bourgeoisie such as traders and small-scale producers employing non-family labour, was extremely weak before independence. The principal reason for this was that the settler bourgeoisie monopolised most areas of production and distribution not under the domination of foreign capital. It was, for example, extremely difficult for Swazis to obtain trading licences and heavy fines were imposed for illegal trading. Furthermore, the activities of petty producers supplying wage-goods was severely limited by the overwhelming predominance of large-scale export production which enabled the use of company compounds and villages and the provision by the company of most wage-goods. In addition there were the other problems related to finance, technology and knowledge that tended to discourage the emergence of a strong petty bourgeoisie particularly during the colonial period when this group lacked access to state power.

A kulak class had not emerged by independence. Although several settlement schemes which provided land under non-traditional forms of land tenure had at various times been established they were either unsuccessful or affected a very small number of people. On Swazi Nation Land (about 45% of the total land area at independence) the traditional land tenure system prevailed and this, together with other aspects of the rural social structure, tended to discourage the emergence of a kulak class. It was the labour of Swazis that was required and not commodities that they had produced. The production of agricultural commodities was, by and large, taken care of by the foreign and settler bourgeoisies.

The colonial state apparatus provided positions for Swazis only at the middle and lower levels and the same was true in the settler- and foreign-dominated private sector.

The Swazi rulers, in addition to the positions that they held in the 'traditional' political institutions of the NCM, were also often members of the 'middle class'. In this connection the background of Swaziland's cabinet members from independence in 1968 until 1974 serves as an
illustration. Between these years there were nine cabinet members. Of the nine at least five were ‘classically’ petty bourgeois before independence: one was a businessman and trader, two were significant commercial farmers on land held under traditional land tenure, one practised as a doctor and one as a licenced speculator and dealer in livestock. The close ties between cabinet members and the hierarchy of control in the Swazi mode are reflected both by the positions of the cabinet members prior to independence as well as by the positions of their fathers. Of the nine cabinet members, six occupied important positions in the Swazi National Council (SNC) during the pre-independence period and seven of them had fathers who had held important positions in the SNC. One, the Prime Minister, Makhosini Dlamini, is a chief in his own right.

However, although the ‘traditional’ Swazi rulers who gained control of the state apparatus at independence were part of the Swazi ‘middle class’, their control of state power gave them opportunities denied to the rest of the ‘middle class’. Most important of these was the opportunity to strengthen their economic base. The same privileges were extended to the others who were incorporated by the ‘traditional’ rulers into the ‘upper levels’ of the state apparatus after independence. These included Dr Allen Nxumalo and Mr S.S. Nxumalo. Thus members of the ‘upper levels’ and those close to them secured positions in trading, medium-sized agricultural production and small-scale manufacturing. In this sense therefore they were able to consolidate their ‘classical’ petty bourgeois basis which had been extremely weak up until independence. Less important, but not insignificant, was their access to the ‘fruits of the office’ including high salaries and the other ‘fringe benefits’ provided by positions in the state apparatus. It was this monopoly of privilege that laid the basis for conflict within the Swazi middle class, as the excluded groups began to organize in order to obtain their ‘share of the cake’. This will be discussed further below in connection with the pre-independence struggle for control of the post-colonial state.

A further significant factor relates to the clan background of the Swazi rulers and the others controlling the upper levels of the state apparatus. While the ‘Swazi Nation’ consisted of some seventy clans and was reasonably homogeneous it was the conquering Dlamini clan that dominated the others. During the formation of the Swazi Nation by a process of conquest other clans were incorporated into the ruling aristocracy. The relative position of the ruling aristocracy and ruling clans was maintained during the colonial period with the result that what we have hitherto termed the Swazi ‘traditional’ rulers were drawn from these clans. It is for this reason that the conflict within the Swazi middle class is often (quite legitimately) seen in terms of a clan conflict. The crucial point, however, is that the basis of the conflict must be traced to the way in which the NCM was dominated by the CMP rather than seen simply in terms of the domination of some clans by others.

The Pre-Independence Political Struggle
When it became clear that Swaziland would eventually be granted independence the question arose as to which indigenous group would take over state power. Since colonialism prevented the emergence of an economically viable bourgeoisie and since the peasants and workers did not constitute a coherent challenging force it was clear that some
element of the Swazi ‘middle class’ would inherit state power. The question as to which element remained.

Although King Sobhuza and the Swazi National Council originally were strongly opposed to the formation of political parties and preferred traditional methods in the selection of representatives, they were eventually persuaded, partly on the advice of Mr van Wyk de Vries, a South African lawyer and member of the notorious Afrikaner Nationalist Broederbond, to form their own party. This was after it had become clear that the British government insisted on the emergence of parties and that the King and SNC had massive support in the country, particularly amongst the 85% of the population living on Swazi Nation Land. In this way the Imbokodvo National Movement (INM) was formed.

From the point of view of most sections of the foreign and settler bourgeoisies the ‘conservatism’ and ‘traditionalism’ of the King, far from being inimical to the interests of the bourgeoisie, was seen as being strongly supportive of their interests particularly because of the opportunities for control over the Swazi population that such attributes afforded. The conservatism of the peasantry and their docility, which was remarkable given that some 55% of Swaziland was under the control of white settlers and other foreigners, was seen as partially the result of the control of the Swazi rulers. Although the Swazi rulers were strongly opposed by large sections of the working class as clearly emerged during the important 1963 strikes, other sections were willing to accept their authority and during the strikes and in his attitude to workers in general the King had shown himself prepared to deal with recalcitrant workers in the interests of domestic and foreign investment. These factors won widespread support for the INM on the part of the foreign and settler bourgeoisies.

The Swaziland Democratic Party (SDP) was led by educated members of the Swazi ‘middle class’ who, while having close hereditary ties with the Swazi rulers, had been excluded from the power structures, particularly the SNC, in the Swazi mode. Its principal leaders were Allen Nxumalo and Sishayi Nxumalo (who were not directly related). Allen Nxumalo was a medical doctor and son of the famous Benjamin Nxumalo who had been Secretary to the Swazi Nation, an SNC post, and advisor to the King. However, Allen Nxumalo himself had not held important positions in the SNC. Sishayi Nxumalo was a licensed speculator and dealer in livestock. He was the son of chief Ndwanandwe who was an important man on the SNC and who was related to one of the Queen Mothers, who plays a very significant role in Swazi society. He too did not play an important role on the SNC. Both Allen and Sishayi were susceptible to the overtures of several liberal settlers and with their support pursued a generally pro-capitalist (and anti-communist) line while simultaneously advocating the neutralization of the powers of the ‘traditional’ rulers.

The leadership of the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) and later the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) which broke away from the SPP constituted elements of the Swazi ‘middle class’ which had been excluded entirely from the ‘traditional’ structures of control in the Swazi mode. Although some of their leaders had hereditary links
with the Swazi 'traditional' rulers this was not true of the majority of the leadership. The SPP and NNLC pursued an ill-defined socialist line with a Pan-Africanist rhetoric and with appeals to the masses of peasants and workers while at the same time not neglecting the Swazi 'middle class'. The appeals to the workers had some success and the 1963 strikes over pay and working conditions where the NNLC provided leadership were proof of their potential power.

Of these parties the SPP and NNLC constituted a direct threat to settler and foreign interests and were opposed by these interests as well as by the British government. However, there was divided opinion during the earlier stages of the struggle for control of the post-colonial state with regard to the INM and SDP. While the settlers tended to support the former for the reasons already given, the British government tended to support the latter, on the grounds that it represented the 'educated modernising elites' rather than the archaic traditional structures and hence would better serve longer term capitalist interests. However, as the struggle progressed, it became clear that the INM had the overwhelming support of the people on Swazi Nation Land and once this emerged the SDP dissolved, declared itself in support of the INM's objectives and its Swazi leaders were incorporated into the INM's hierarchy. The SPP, largely because of internal personality squabbles, faded in significance while the NNLC continued to have substantial support in the urban areas and on the plantations. Its support increased and in the 1972 election it won, for the first time, one of the eight constituencies and thus the right to send three of its members to Parliament. By the time the last pre-independence election was held in 1967 it was already clear that the INM would, with an overwhelming majority of the vote, take over control of the post-colonial state.

Nevertheless the support for and success of the INM is not best understood in terms of the 'cunning' of King Sobhuza and the SNC or the 'plans' of the settler and foreign bourgeoisies. At the same time it cannot be seen as the rise to power of a group occupying an important economic position in the country's structure of production. The explanation must rather be based on an analysis of the economic and political domination of the Swazi mode by the CMP. The articulation of these modes as we have seen was such as to conserve, albeit in a transformed way, the 'traditional' Swazi social structure and the hierarchy which controlled it. In this way the CMP was able to reduce its contribution to the costs of the reproduction of labour-power and at the same time achieve the political objective of control. This was functional to the accumulation of capital in the CMP. In the post-independence period when direct control of the Swaziland state was relinquished it was necessary for the dominant class to ensure that the state would continue to assist capital accumulation. This explains the support given to the INM. Thus the take-over of power by the INM was due both to 'economic' as well as 'political' factors: economic in the sense that its dominant position in the Swazi mode was determined by the domination of this mode by the CMP; political in the sense that its accession to state power was determined by the political interests of the dominant class rather than by its importance in the dominant relations of production.
The Dominant Class

The two elements of the dominant class are the foreign and settler bourgeoisies. The foreign bourgeoisie consists mainly of a close interpenetration of South African and British capital and straddles the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy. It dominates, to mention the more important corporations and their areas of domination, the production of sugar (Commonwealth Development Corporation — CDC; Lonrho); timber (Anglo American, Courtaulds together with CDC); woodpulp (Courtaulds together with CDC); minerals (Anglo American — iron ore, coal; Turner and Newall — asbestos); pineapples (Libby’s); meat products (Imperial Cold Storage together with Anglo American); tourism (Rennies Group, Southern Sun); finance (Barclays Bank, Standard Bank) and retail trade (O.K. Bazaars). The most important feature of the foreign bourgeoisie, involved mainly in primary industry and processing for the export market, is the non-antagonistic nature of its constituent elements. This harmony of interest is further enhanced by the interpenetration of capital that has taken place, a process that has been ably encouraged by the CDC.

The foreign bourgeoisie has encouraged, often without strong state pressure, participation in its activities by the ‘Swazi Nation’. In general this participation has taken the form of some equity holding by the King ‘on behalf of the Swazi Nation’. Participation by the Swazi Nation however has been noticeably limited and in no case does the Nation own a majority of the shares in a major foreign corporation.

While the most lucrative areas are controlled by the foreign bourgeoisie, the settler bourgeoisie has dominated those areas that have been left by large-scale foreign capital but which have not been amenable to penetration by the indigenous Swazi petty bourgeoisie. Thus the settler bourgeoisie, consisting mainly of white Swazis who settled in the country before independence in 1968, dominate the smaller estates producing sugar, citrus, cattle, and medium-sized farms producing, amongst other things, cotton, tobacco, maize and vegetables. They also control much of the commercial activities in the major urban centres, own a significant proportion of the property in these centres and also have important interests in tourism and medium-scale manufacturing.

The relationship between the foreign and settler bourgeoisies is characterised by an overall harmony of interest. The settler bourgeoisie lacks the resources, technology and expertise to challenge the hegemony of the foreign bourgeoisie in the most lucrative parts of the economy while the foreign bourgeoisie has deemed it unprofitable to enter those branches dominated by the settler bourgeoisie. For their part the settler bourgeoisie appreciates the advantages bestowed by the presence of large-scale foreign capital, mainly in the form of new market opportunities. The result has been close co-operation between the foreign and settler bourgeoisies institutionalised in organisations such as the Swaziland Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Federation of Swaziland Employers. However, unlike the foreign bourgeoisie, the settler bourgeoisie has played a direct political role and has participated in party politics, mainly in the INM. In the post-independence parliament several settlers were given positions and, in the case of the Ministers of Finance, Leo Lovell and later R.P. Stephens, in the cabinet. In this
way, through its alliance with the settler bourgeoisie, the foreign bourgeoisie has been able to give political clout to its economic interests. Even more important, however, has been its relationship with the Swazi rulers and with the Swazi 'middle class' in general. This relationship is taken up again later.

The Dominated Classes: The Workers
Given the low level of wages prevailing in capitalist production much time is spent by semi-skilled and unskilled workers in retaining social ties on Swazi Nation Land and in producing agricultural output. These ties with Swazi Nation Land also involve an integration into and acceptance of the 'traditional' hierarchy and in this the role of the chief is crucial. For it is the chief, himself responsible to the King, who is in charge of the distribution of land and it is necessary to pay allegiance to him in order to receive land. On the one hand, therefore, the working class is not a permanent proletariat depending solely on wage-labour and on the other hand it is forced to accept the traditional hierarchy of control and the land tenure system which is an integral part of this control. Nonetheless Swazi workers do have a tradition of class action. The famous 1963 strike which forced the British government to send troops from Kenya to Swaziland is the outstanding case in point. Significantly, however, working class action has been confined to the place of employment and substantial protest on Swazi Nation Land has not occurred.

A major contradiction in the social formation lies in the determination of wages. On the one hand the interests of the Swazi 'middle class' in general and the Swazi rulers in particular are closely linked to the expansion of settler and foreign capital. This expansion, by creating a larger domestic market and by providing the state with greater amounts of revenue, create the conditions whereby the Swazi 'middle class' and the Swazi rulers are able to accumulate. The lower the wages, other things equal (and this applies particularly to 'foot-loose' manufacturing industry in southern Africa) the greater the inflow of foreign investment. Thus the Swazi 'middle class' and the Swazi rulers tend to favour low wages. The state, through the National Industrial Development Corporation of Swaziland has used the drawing card of cheap labour in its campaign to attract investment as this quotation from one of its pamphlets shows: ' Strikes, absenteeism, and other work stoppages that plague industry in many countries are virtually non-existent in Swaziland. An ample labour force is available. Minimum salaries and wages apply only to the Hotel Industry and a few others. There is little unionized labour... Wages are modest by South African and European standards.'

However, the exploitation of labour carries with it its own contradictions and these take the form of worker opposition reflected in industrial action, party and other political activity etc. The one constituency which the opposition NNLC, campaigning largely on a worker ticket, won in the 1972 election was the Maphumalanga constituency which contained a large number of sugar plantation and estate workers. It is therefore necessary for the Swazi rulers, through their control of the state apparatus, to ensure that the worst excesses are avoided. But it is here that the contradiction becomes apparent: higher wages will reduce the rate of inflow of foreign investment and thus the rate of accumula-
tion of the Swazi 'middle class' and the Swazi rulers; but lower wages lead to a threat to the stability of the social formation. We shall see later how one of the state's main functions has been to attempt to resolve this contradiction.

The Dominated Classes: The Peasants

Although the overall tendency was for the conservation of the Swazi mode rather than its dissolution, the articulation of the Swazi mode was contradictory in that the spread of commodity production tended to dissolve the Swazi mode. The maintenance of the traditional land tenure system and the power of the chiefs did not prevent the penetration of commodity production nor the spread of capitalist relations of production, and where conditions were favourable the production of commodities and the employment of wage-labour appeared and expanded. However these processes were not rapid and the overall picture is one of stagnation on Swazi Nation Land rather than rapidly increasing production. It is necessary to understand why this was so.

The colonial administration was committed neither to the transformation of relations of production in the Swazi mode (the abolition of the land tenure system and the power of the chiefs) nor to the extension of commodity production within the framework of the 'traditional' institutions prevailing in this mode. There are several reasons for this. First, as has been discussed, the preservation of the Swazi mode and its 'traditional' relations of production served the interests of capital accumulation. Secondly, the labour-power of Swazi workers in this mode was required and the extension of commodity production would reduce dependence on the sale of their labour. Thirdly, since the extraction of labour from the Swazi mode necessitated the absence of economically active people from this mode production tended to stagnate as the amount of labour time was reduced. As Hilda Kuper (1947;56) has put it: '[The British] Government in theory regards the Swazi as peasants, but has not seriously attempted to make them self-supporting. In the first place, this would require more money than the overseas treasury has shown itself prepared to allot, and in the second place such a policy is contrary to the direction of economic development in South Africa. The Union economy is based on the availability of an adequate reserve of cheap Native labour, drawn not only from its own areas but from the adjoining territories. The Swazi, therefore, are expected to depend on the European trader for essential goods and on the European labour market for money to buy them.' The result has been stagnating production on Swazi Nation Land and increasing dependence on wages as the main source of family income. At the same time such rural development policy as existed assured the continued existence of the 'traditional' institutions in the Swazi mode and therefore tended to reinforce these institutions.

The relative absence of commodity production and the strength of the 'traditional' structures in the Swazi mode have tended to encourage conservative political attitudes and it is not surprising that the King and Swazi National Council have derived strong support from most of the population living on Swazi Nation Land.

Class Struggle and The State

Having discussed the relations of production in the CMP and NCM,
the structure of social classes, and some of the major contradictions in Swaziland, we can now proceed to examine the role of the post-colonial state. Attention will be confined to three important aspects of the state's role; the reproduction of capitalist relations in Swaziland; the maintenance of the unity of the social formation; the creation of the conditions for accumulation by the Swazi 'middle class'.

**The Reproduction of Capitalist Relations**

The prime role of the post-colonial state in Swaziland is to reproduce capitalist relations of production. Concretely this has taken the form of the creation by the state of the conditions for the extended reproduction of capital. An example of this is the attitude of the state towards foreign investors and the conditions provided for foreign investment.

The Swaziland state has openly declared its support for foreign investment and has vowed to protect the rights of foreign investors. Soberly the Second Development Plan (p.49) points out that 'To supplement domestic savings, Government will continue its policy of encouraging the inflow of foreign private capital for productive purposes. Substantial financial incentives are offered to suitable investors. Company tax rates are moderate and appreciable tax allowances are available.' This policy is not surprising in the light of the dependence on foreign capital which is extreme even by African standards. What is more surprising is the openness with which the state bends over backwards in its support of foreign capital — surely an indication of the degree of success that those who control the state apparatus have had in legitimizing their position. The INM in its 1972 election manifesto states that

The Movement lays emphasis on production and not on redistribution of wealth. For this reason the Movement does not support nationalisation. The Imbokodvo, on the contrary, supports the fair distribution of income. The ownership of firms by private individuals will be protected provided the operation of such firms is in the general interest of Swaziland.

King Sobhuza has been no less outspoken. The *Times of Swaziland* of 27 August 1973 reported as follows:

Speaking about investment in this country, the King said it is an accepted fact of life that two hands wash each other. Investors, he told the crowd, should get a good share of the profits from their money they have entrusted this Kingdom, and the Swazi should get an equal share for his labours. Overlooking this cardinal principle would result into (sic) a chaotic situation. Referring to the Prime Minister's speech at a recent Commonwealth leader's Conference in Canada, His Majesty said that: 'we expect to see a climate where mutual benefit will be the order of the day', but rumours of industrial unrest will scare any investor. He added that it is government's duty to see to it that this did not prevail.

It is clear from the last quotation that the 'reproduction of capitalist relations' involves also the creation of a 'reliable' work-force. At the same time, as is also clear, it involves the reproduction of the hegemony of the dominant class and, furthermore, the reproduction of Swaziland's 'place' in the structure of production in southern Africa — as exporter of raw materials and commodities, importer of South African manufactures and exporter of labour to South Africa.

**The Unity of the Social Formation**

A major goal of any state is to maintain the 'unity' of the social formation, that is to contain, within its own institutions, the contradictions
inherent in that social formation. Some of the important contradictions in Swaziland have been dealt with above. Here we shall deal with the contradiction existing between the foreign and settler bourgeoisies and Swazi rulers and 'middle class' on the one hand, and the proletariat on the other.

The nature of this contradiction has been discussed in the section on workers where it was shown that the level of wages forms the crux of the issue. In short, the lower the wages the greater the inflow of foreign investment and hence the greater the accumulation of the Swazi 'middle class' and Swazi rulers. But the lower the wages, the greater the industrial unrest. The state has attempted to alleviate the consequences of this contradiction by strongly discouraging the activities of existing trade unions and the formation of new unions. Again the King has been open regarding his attitude to trade unions. The following is an extract from a report of one of his speeches made in 1972:

He condemned the methods and philosophy of the trade unions and said they were causes of industrial unrest through strikes . . . thus bringing the national industrial growth to a standstill. He said those who suffered most from leaders who organised industrial strikes were the poor man in the street.

The alternative set of institutions proposed for industrial relations serves not only as an example of the state's attempt to come to terms with the contradiction over the level of wages but also as an indication of the advantages derived by the Swazi rulers from similar institutions in the Swazi mode. The strategy is three-pronged. On the one hand attempts are made to set up works councils democratically elected by the workers within each production unit. A model constitution issued by the Labour Department states that the works council shall consist of four management representatives nominated by management and four workers' representatives elected by the employees. The Chairman of the works council is appointed by management. The most important object of the works council as set out in the model constitution is to 'Provide a recognised means of consultation between the management and the employees on all matters of common interest not covered by any wage negotiating body.' No provision is made for co-operation between workers on an industry or inter-industry basis.

The second prong of the strategy makes provision for the appointment of a Ndabazabantu (King's representative) for the larger production units by the King and the Swazi National Council. Some of the duties of the Ndabazabantu, who co-operates with the works council and is paid by the company, are spelt out in an official paper issued by the SNC. They include the following:

He will encourage the workers and build a sound sense of responsibility, respect and discipline — inspire the workers with a feeling of regarding the Industry in terms of a partnership — teach the workers to realize that any realization of profits will result in better wages and better social conditions in their villages . . . He will advise Management on all matters pertaining to Swazi law and custom and usages and cultivate a spirit of co-operation and belonging which is conducive to economic progress by affording the workers equal opportunity in order to narrow the gap between the haves and have-nots. To fight against and wipe out any idea that there is what is termed 'cheap labour' in the Territory . . .

The King of Swaziland will speak to the workers and the management on all matters affecting the workers through the Ndabazabantu — so will the SNC and
likewise the management to the workers. All requests for holding meetings of workers will go to the Ndabazabantu in the first instance.

It is clear from this paper that the Swazi rulers, given their firm base in the Swazi mode and their proven ability to legitimize their continued domination of this mode, are attempting to adapt the institutions of control in this mode to the industrial milieu. Nevertheless the Swazi rulers are perceptive enough to realize that such institutions of control are not sufficient without real safeguards against the worse excesses of exploitation — save in those circumstances where exceptionally low wages are demanded by the economic realities of the situation. Hence the third prong of the strategy has been to establish a national board entrusted with the establishment of minimum wages for selected sectors of the economy. Care has been taken to ensure that the government and workers' representatives on this board are sympathetic to worker interests and the result has often been that statutory minimum wages have been higher than what employers would have liked.

In short, the state has attempted to contain the contradiction over the level of wages by creating institutions which will have the effect of defusing pressures for higher wages (in particular by attempting to prevent the emergence of trade unions and by installing alternative institutions that will provide less power for workers) while at the same time avoiding excessive exploitation through the national wage board. The success of this strategy will depend on the ability of this board to keep wages at a satisfactory level, on the ability of the respective works councils to resolve conflict at factory level and on the skill of the individual Ndabazabantu. However, the attempt to contain this contradiction is unlikely to be successful. First, since the accumulation of the Swazi 'middle class' depends, in part, on the level of wages, there is likely to be a tendency for wages to be kept down. Secondly workers have resisted and are likely to continue resisting the attempts to deny them trade union rights. In this connection the conclusion of an official report after the 1963 strikes which deals with the discouragement of trade unions by the SNC is relevant: 'It seems to me inevitable that Trade Unionism will grow in Swaziland whether or not the Swazi National Council maintains its present attitude [against them]' (Whitson, 1964, p.9).

The Accumulation of the Swazi 'Middle Class'
As has been explained, the Swazi 'middle class' was extremely weak at the time of independence and the 'traditional rulers who took over power, although they retained power within the Swazi mode, did not possess a significant economic basis. One of the role's of the state in the post-independence period has been to facilitate the accumulation of the Swazi 'middle class' in general and the Swazi rulers in particular in a way that will not seriously interfere with the interests of the dominant class. This role has been carried out in a number of ways. Here we shall examine one aspect only, namely policy relating to the accumulation of land.

At the time of independence roughly 54% of Swaziland consisted of Title Deed Lands while about 46% constituted Swazi Nation Land under the traditional land tenure system. This system impeded the accumu-
lation of land since it guaranteed land to each adult Swazi male. We have also seen how the land tenure system enabled not only the reproduction of labour-power for the capitalist mode but also the maintenance of the power of the 'traditional' rulers. A modification of the land tenure system would run the risk of impairing both these functions. It has also been shown that the Swazi 'middle class' and the 'traditional' rulers were unable to make significant economic advances in view of the domination of the foreign and settler bourgeoisies and the colonial state. Their activities were, by and large, limited to commodity production on Swazi Nation Land and trading.

Although Swazis could purchase Title Deed Land (about 45% of Swaziland) in practice this proved to be difficult. The main reason was that South African land speculators were increasingly purchasing land in Swaziland and the effect was to push the price of land above what the Swazi 'middle class' and the Swazi rulers could afford. As a result the Swazi rulers introduced the Land Speculation Control Bill which aimed at getting more land into the hands of the Swazi 'middle class'. This Bill proposed that the sale of land to non-Swazi citizens be prevented unless permission was obtained from a Land Control Board which would be established. This Board would be required to authorize such transfers of land to non-citizens as were deemed to be in the interests of 'the development of the country'. The Bill was passed in 1971 and brought into force in December 1972.

However mild it was, the importance of the Bill was quickly acknowledged since for the first time the state had provided itself with powers which could, although in practice it did not, threaten the interests of the foreign and settler bourgeoisies. It is this that explains the intensity of the response to the Bill. The Minister of Finance, Leo Lovell, an ex-South African MP, was forced out of the Cabinet when he opposed the Bill. The South African Financial Mail was quick to sound the alarm and voice threats on behalf of the foreign bourgeoisie. In a cover article written on 13 July 1973 the newspaper warned that 'Faced with one of the highest population growth rates in Africa, Swaziland badly needs economic development. Without it, this apparently peaceful country could fall into disorder. Yet the Swazi government seems almost wilfully intent on driving away the foreign investment that is vital for economic growth. Its first measure to shake White confidence was the Land Speculation Control Act.'

However the Swazi rulers were adamant and at the same time vigorously defended their 'right' to a share of the economic cake. Their dependence on and support for foreign investment was openly acknowledged and 'land speculation' rather than 'legitimate investment' was singled out as the target for attack. 'Nothing in this Bill will affect legitimate investment ... All of us in Swaziland want foreign investors who will contribute to the development of the country. Section II of the Bill contains a firm assurance to all foreign investors that their land requirements shall be respected.' In fact, the Prime Minister in the same House of Assembly debate in 1971 pointed out that, far from threatening foreign investment, 'The Bill removes growing dissatisfaction that could in the future develop into a dangerous anti-foreign attitude among the indigenous people.' What were the causes of this 'growing dissatisfac-
tion? In the debate on the Bill in the House of Assembly the Minister for Agriculture pointed out that

In the past few years, Swaziland has been besieged by land-hungry speculators from outside our borders. Attracted by our beautiful landscape and political stability, the land speculator has found a paradise here. He has brought large farms, chopped them into little plots and resold them to more outsiders who are also interested in speculation. Buying and selling land in Swaziland has become big business, making profits for the select few but causing a galloping inflation of land price that is totally disproportionate to the overall economy of this country. Swazis who are interested in buying plots of title deed land are finding that all the desirable land is priced far beyond their means.

The Prime Minister echoed these sentiments:

At the present moment we are faced with a spectre of rising prices throughout the country. For certain people in Swaziland and elsewhere this is a very profitable development. But it does not benefit the people of Swaziland in certain parts of the country, even Swazis who are fairly well-off cannot afford to buy a plot of title deed land upon which to build their rooms or homes... If this process is allowed to continue increasing dissatisfaction of the Swazi, people may call for drastic action...

This passage is also of interest in that it clearly reveals the ‘double-think’ required in purporting to represent ‘the people of Swaziland’ whilst clearly representing the interests of only part of this population, the ‘fairly well-off Swazi’ — those wealthy enough to purchase property, the Swazi ‘middle class’. By helping to overcome the dissatisfaction of the Swazi ‘middle class’ the bill serves the interests of the foreign bourgeoisie. It was for this reason that the Minister of Agriculture pointed out that ‘As investors have discovered in other countries that have similar legislation, so investors in Swaziland will also realize that this Bill is in their own interest as well as the interest of the Swazi people’ [i.e. read: the Swazi ‘middle class’]. (Quotations from Debate of the House of Assembly. Third Meeting of the Fourth Session, 1971, pp.123-9.)

Although the foreign and settler bourgeoisie felt it necessary to protest against the extension of state bureaucratic power by arguing that it would lead to an ‘undermining of confidence’ they were clearly aware that their best interests were, as the Swazi rulers had pointed out, well served by the land legislation. As Dr V.S. Leibbrandt, a white Senator, pointed out in supporting the Land Speculation Control Act: ‘the demand for land and labour reform have formed the backbone of revolution through all history and our government is wise to tackle these problems timeously... A healthy economy will only be achieved when sufficient Swazis are investors here. The small businessman and farmer are the large investor’s insurance policy and ally.’ (Times of Swaziland, 27 July 1973.) In similar vein John Marvin wrote in Optima (June, 1973, p.97) the quarterly review published by the Anglo American Corporation, that ‘even those who dislike the new measure [i.e. the Land Speculation Control Act] almost all agree that in one way or another it is desirable to get more land into Swazi ownership.’

While the Land Speculation Control Act furthered the interests of the Swazi ‘middle class’ in general, that section of the indigenous popu-
lation — excluding the settlers — which could afford to purchase Title Deed Land, it did not undermine the position of the Swazi rulers. Since their incomes were far higher — occupying the upper levels of the state apparatus they were paid higher salaries — and since they monopolised decision-making power in the state apparatus, they were able to derive greater benefit from the Act.

Other examples of state support for the accumulation of the Swazi ‘middle class’ include the attempt to involve Swazis in small-scale production through the Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO) and attempts made by the Ministry of Commerce and Cooperatives to increase Swazi ownership of trading concerns. Some foreign firms have made portions of their shareholdings available for Swazi citizens but in general this has been limited. The overall picture, therefore, is one of expanding economic activity for the Swazi ‘middle class’ and Swazi rulers but an expansion that is complementary to rather than conflicting with the interests of the foreign and settler bourgeoisies.

Conclusion

More general questions are raised by the role of the state in assisting the accumulation of the Swazi ‘middle class’ and the Swazi rulers, the oligarchy controlling the state apparatus. Are the Swazi rulers to be regarded as a ‘class’ or even as a ‘class-in-formation’? To what extent is the post-colonial state in Swaziland and those who control the state apparatus ‘autonomous’ from the determinations of other classes more directly rooted in the production process?

The answer to the first question depends on our theoretical conceptualization of a ‘class’. In the Swaziland case the state is not, by and large, involved in the extraction of surplus value through directly productive activities. Its revenues come in the form of taxation, in part from the surplus extracted by the foreign and settler bourgeoisies in the private sector, from foreign aid and the customs union pool. In this sense, therefore, those who control the state apparatus are in a qualitatively different position vis-a-vis the means of production than those, including the Swazi (‘classical’) petty bourgeoisie, in the ‘private sector’. However, it is true that their control of the state apparatus has enabled the Swazi rulers to begin to accumulate an ‘economic base’ in the ‘private sector’. In most cases this has taken the form of the purchase of residential property and the receipt of rent therefrom but in other cases medium-sized agricultural land-holding have been purchased and farmed capitalistically. Whether this qualifies the Swazi rulers (Shivji’s bureaucratic bourgeoisie) for the appellation ‘class’ or ‘class-in-formation’ becomes a matter for definition and should not obscure the more important questions: 1) How do we explain the accession to power of the Swazi rulers? and 2) How do we explain their use of political power in the accumulation of an economic base?

The first question we have answered in terms of the articulation of modes of production in this part of southern Africa. The second question raises again the latter question in the first paragraph of this section: to what extent is the state ‘autonomous’ from the determinations of other classes more directly rooted in the production process? In answer
to these questions the argument of this paper in the case of Swaziland has been that the state, insofar as it has influenced the process of class formation among the indigenous Swazi, has acted in a way entirely consistent with the interests of the dominant class. In this sense, therefore, the state has preserved and extended the position of the dominant class rather than serving as a springboard for the undermining of this position. During the colonial period the state apparatus was used to deny practically all opportunities of accumulation to the Swazi rulers and the Swazi ‘middle class’ in the interests of the foreign and settler bourgeoises. It was an anomaly after independence that although control of the state had been handed over to the Swazi rulers their economic position was extremely weak and it was clear that unless this was rectified pressures would mount for the expropriation of the bourgeoises. Hence the state’s role, responding to the interests of the dominant class, in enabling the accumulation of the Swazi rulers and the Swazi ‘middle class’. At the same time the ‘unity’ of the social formation was strengthened and the reproduction of capitalist relations of production guaranteed.

References and bibliographic notes
Kuper, H 1947 *The uniform of colour* Johannesburg.

NGUGI WA THIONGO

Kenya and East Africa’s foremost writer was detained earlier this year by the Kenya Government. The specific grounds have not been spelled out. There has been a suggestion that he had ‘banned’ literature. But if that were so he could — such are the laws in ‘democratic’, ‘stable’ Kenya — be charged with a criminal offence. Much more likely is that he committed the unpardonable sin of addressing his scorching social commentary to the ordinary people of Kenya: unlike his justly famous novels, his last play was in the local Kikuyu language and was to be put on in a peri-urban slum near Nairobi.

Protests about his detention and about this further evidence of the slide into systematic, if not yet widespread repression in Kenya should be sent to *State House, Nairobi* or to Embassies. Contributions to a Ngugi wa Thiongo Defence Committee can be sent to: 28-29 Southampton St., London WC2.
Imperialism and the National Struggle in Namibia

Duncan Innes

The struggle for national liberation in Namibia has developed historically into a confrontation between the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) on the one hand and the apartheid regime in South Africa on the other. Yet over the last few years we have witnessed the rise of other political groupings inside Namibia, the staging of the so-called "Turnhalle" Constitutional Conference and the open involvement of the major Western powers in the struggle. This article attempts to explore the broader issue of South African imperialist involvement in Namibia and to examine the response of the Namibian people to that involvement. In so doing it will attempt to throw some light on the current stage of the struggle and to assess some of the more important recent political developments in relation to that broader struggle.

We find ourselves here in a foreign country, convicted under laws made by people whom we have always considered as foreigners. We find ourselves tried by a Judge who is not our countryman and who has not shared our background... It is the deep feeling of all of us that we should not be tried here in Pretoria. You, my Lord, decided that you had the right to try us, because your Parliament gave you that right. That ruling has not and could not have changed our feelings. We are Namibians and not South Africans. We do not now, and you will not in the future, recognise your right to govern us; to make laws for us in which we had no say; to treat our country as if it were your property and as if you were our masters. We have always regarded South Africa as an intruder in our country. This is how we have always felt and this is how we feel now, and it is on this basis that we have faced this trial. (Statement by Herman Toivo ja Toivo, a founder member of SWAPO, after being convicted under the Terrorism Act in Pretoria, 26 January 1968).

The tasks before SWAPO at present and in the immediate future are: The liberation and winning of independence for the people of Namibia, by all possible means, and the establishment of a democratic people's Government; and

The realization of genuine and total independence of Namibia in the spheres of politics, economy, defence, social and cultural affairs. (From the Political Programme of SWAPO of Namibia; adopted by the meeting of the Central Committee, 28 July-1 August 1976.

From this exposition it thus appears that in substance we are in agreement with the most important aspects of the points of view which are put in the UN. As far as the OAU are concerned, in principle, and bearing in mind what I have already...
said, we have no quarrel with their points of view concerning self-determination, independence and the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Territory. Where we do differ and differ very clearly is in regard to the role claimed for the UN and SWAPO... If someone wants to hold talks with me on South West Africa on the basis that SWAPO is South West Africa, then I say: 'Forget it'!

(B.J. Vorster, Prime Minister of South Africa, 1975).

Historical Background: Underdevelopment and Stagnation

The earliest period of capitalist development in Europe – the era of mercantile capitalism – was characterized by the international expansion of capitalist relations, especially through the extension of capitalist trade. It was during this period – in 1652 – that southern Africa was first colonized by the Dutch. The European settlers, traders and missionaries who arrived at that time began to penetrate the interior of the sub-continent and, in this way, capitalist relations came to be extended to various parts of the region. To the north-west of the sub-continent, beyond the area delimited as the Cape Colony (in what is now Namibia) the traders found the existence of trade routes as well as certain products of the indigenous communities, such as ivory, iron, ostrich feathers and cattle, for which there were markets in the capitalist centres of Europe and in the settlements of the Cape Colony.

The transformation from mercantile to industrial capitalism in Europe brought with it the emergence of Britain as the foremost capitalist state. In the early years of the nineteenth century the British took over the Cape Colony from the Dutch. The development of industrial capitalism in Europe intensified the demands for raw materials and consequently trading relations with southern Africa as a whole, including parts of Namibia, were extended. The extraction of increasing supplies of iron, cattle and even slaves from northern Namibia in return for consumer goods and arms served gradually to undermine the material bases of the local economies, as means of production and subsistence as well as human labour (in the form of slaves) were drained away. By the end of the nineteenth century the intrusion of capitalist relations had underdeveloped the local economies to such an extent that they were no longer able to support their populations. At the same time, as the intrusion of capitalist relations was bringing about these profound economic transformations in Namibia, important political changes were also being introduced. In 1876 the British colonial Government at the Cape had sent a Commissioner “to get a hold on the county between the Orange River and the Portuguese settlements on the west coast (i.e. more or less the present area of Namibia – DI) in such a way as might lead to annexation, if the inhabitants described it and our own interest made such a course desirable”. As it happened British imperialism, bogged down in inter-imperialist rivalry over Egypt and Turkey and, locally, involved in wars with the indigenous communities in neighbouring South Africa, felt that such a course was, for the moment, undesirable. However, this hesitation gave Germany the opportunity to intervene in Namibia. A wealthy German trader began annexing parts of Namibia for the German state and in 1890, the British government, which sought the support of Germany in her struggle for control over Egypt, conceded the German annexation of Namibia.

The incorporation of Namibia under the aegis of the German imperialist
state facilitated the expansion of capitalist relations in the colony. In particular, settler farmers and land and mineral speculators from Germany, supported by the colonial state, began to expropriate land from the local communities. In an effort to defend themselves against the theft of their land, first the Herero and then most of the Nama groups rose in armed revolt against the colonial state in 1904. It was not until 1907, after the savage defeat of the Herero and Nama, that the colonial regime was able to exert control over the southern part of Namibia. The defeat of these communities in the south and the confiscation of their land was a major step in the struggle waged by German capital to secure the material conditions for the gradual expansion of capitalism in Namibia. First agriculture and then, after 1906, mineral production (copper and diamonds) expanded. Between 1900 and 1910 the value of Namibia's exports rose by almost 1000% — from 8,000 Marks to 79,000 Marks. By 1915 there were over 1,300 European farms in Namibia.

By crushing the armed resistance of the people in the south the colonial state had secured an area in which capitalist relations of production could expand. This was the area which came to be known as the Police Zone. Yet the overall labour requirements of capital could not be met in full by the remnants of the local communities within the Police Zone, since their numbers had been sharply and drastically reduced in the extermination campaigns during the war of 1904-7. Although the economies of the communities in the north, particularly the Ovambo and Okavango, had been considerably weakened by the form of capitalist exchange relations in the region, these communities nonetheless remained sufficiently powerful for the colonial state to abandon the idea of extending their wars of conquest northwards. (These communities had in fact already proved their military prowess by inflicting serious defeats on the Portuguese). However, the continuing underdevelopment of the northern Namibian economies, particularly through the cattle and slave trades, ensured a growing drift of migrant labourers to the areas of capitalist production in the south. This process was intensified through the collaboration of most chiefs, who selected migrants from among the tribe to labour for capital and then taxed the goods they returned with. The total number of migrants coming south each year increased from less than 1,500 in 1907 to an average over 10,000 per annum for the period 1910-14.

The outbreak of World War I in 1914 presaged the start of a new era in Namibia's colonial history. Germany's defeat in the War resulted in the transfer of Namibia to the British "sphere of influence". In 1915, at the behest of the British Government, the South African army had invaded and occupied Namibia. According to the terms of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 South Africa was designated to administer Namibia on behalf of Britain and as such was responsible for the territory to the League of Nations. Since British imperialist interests dominated South Africa, Namibia now became subjected to the requirements of British imperialism. Most important in this regard was the British acquisition, through the Anglo American Corporation, of the diamond mines in Namibia. World diamond production, centred in South Africa, had been controlled by British capital at the turn of the century. However, with the commencement of large-scale capitalist production of diamonds in
Namibia in 1908, Germany had come to threaten Britain’s dominant position in diamonds (between 1908 and 1915 over 55 million carats of diamonds were produced in Namibia and exported to Germany). The result of the trade war in diamonds between British and German interests had been a dramatic slump in prices.

After gaining control over the Namibian diamond mines in 1920, Anglo American halted production of these labour-intensive mines so as to increase the demand, and consequently the price, for British-controlled diamonds. Even though Anglo American re-started production later in the 20's the value of diamonds mined in Namibia in 1929 remained below the 1920 level. Thus British capital’s monopoly control over Namibia’s diamond resources resulted from the very beginning in these being developed only sporadically in order to further the interests of British capitalism. However, this was only one of the many fundamental changes to be introduced in Namibia following the transition to South African colonial domination. Politically, the new colonial administration immediately enacted legislation to further entrench and intensify the process of colonization (begun by the German colonial regime) so as to open Namibia up for further capitalist exploitation. In 1922 the new Native Administration Proclamation had legalized the de facto racial segregation that had been introduced to Namibia under German colonial rule. By this Proclamation Africans were confined to limited geographical areas within the Police Zone, the so-called Reserves, which effectively reduced their existing land holdings quite considerably and denied them access to new land on which they could rebuild their economies. All land outside of the Reserves (within the Police Zone) was to be the domain of European capitalism, while the Reserves themselves and the vast area to the north of the Police Zone, especially Ovamboland, Kavangoland and Caprivi, were to become the labour reservoirs for the expansion of that capitalism The actual flow of labour between the northern areas and the areas of capitalist production in the Police Zone was controlled by the South West African Native Labour Association (SWANLA), a joint State-employers recruiting organization, established in 1925. It was on this basis that the contract labour system was developed in Namibia to govern the supply of labour to the centres of capitalist production. Under this system, Namibians from outside the Police Zone were prevented from entering into negotiations with their employers over their wages and conditions of work, and capital therefore extended its control over the grounding labour force.

Furthermore, in 1926, with the passage of the South West Africa Constitution Act, a measure of political power was passed to European settlers who could now vote for a local Legislative Assembly. However, control over African affairs, the police and defence remained the direct responsibility of the South African state. Africans, on the other hand, were denied all political rights: in 1928, in fact, the new Native Administration Proclamation gave the South African state the authority to appoint and dismiss African chiefs and headmen as tribal leaders in the reserves and thereby gave the state the right to exercise formal control over virtually all aspects of African life. In this way the state sought to secure the transformation and subordination of existing structures of African society to the domination of capital. Those chiefs who resisted the collaborationist role demanded of them by capital were now subject to removal by the state.

47
Thus by the 1930s the political conditions for the exploitation of the people and resources of Namibia, and therefore for the expansion of capitalism, had been established. While ultimate political authority rested with the state in South Africa, a measure of local control was vested, in varying degrees, in both the European settlers and in the officially-sanctioned chiefs. Though existing under different political and economic conditions, these groups both played a part in extending capital’s political control over the oppressed African peasantry, thereby assisting in the process of expanding the migrant labour force for capital. Despite these harsh new conditions the oppressed peasantry continued to struggle against the process of proletarianization. There were armed rebellions against the state, such as the Bondelswarts Rebellion of 1922, but the brutality with which these were suppressed forced the peasantry increasingly to resort to other forms of struggle. While rising numbers of peasants were joining the growing army of migrant workers in an attempt to earn sufficient cash to maintain their access to rural production, many of these migrant labourers sought to avoid becoming contract labourers, preferring instead to enter the area of capitalist production in the Police Zone illegally in order to negotiate their wages and conditions of employment themselves rather than subject themselves to the harsh terms laid down by the contract labour system. Although this individualistic form of resistance by the declining peasantry did enable some to gain better terms of employment than they would have done as contract labourers, it did not challenge the basis of capitalist production in Namibia. Consequently, although the fully capitalist sector of the economy grew only slowly, the African rural areas continued to decline.

The state provided considerable economic support for the development of capitalist production in the Police Zone. South African and British farmers were encouraged to settle in Namibia with offers of cash advances and rent-free farm leases while funds were pumped into European education and into providing infrastructure for the capitalist industries. So far-reaching was this financial support that in 1936 the South West Africa Commission commented:

So many of the European inhabitants are indebted to the Government as settlers or debtors to the Land Bank, that a financially independent electorate can hardly be said to exist.

Throughout the thirties the process of undermining the peasantry continued unabated through the imposition of further taxes by the state and by other means. After imposing a grazing tax on the Hereros and being told by their leaders that they had no money to pay the tax, the Administrator for South West Africa replied that:

To get money to pay the grazing fees your young people must, of course, go out to work amongst the Europeans.

However, the policy (imposed by British capital) to restrict the production of diamonds and the debilitating effect of both the depression and a harsh drought on agriculture led to Namibia’s Gross Domestic Product being in 1933 less than one-third the size it had been in 1920 after South Africa took over responsibility for the country (from R13m in
1920 to R3.8m in 1933). Anglo American again halted all diamond production in Namibia during the depression, though production on some of its more capital-intensive mines in other parts of the world was allowed to continue. Even after the depression the company, which in fact by this time controlled world diamond production, continued its policy of restricting production on its labour-intensive Namibian mines so as to force up the world price for diamonds. Although capitalist agriculture, based on stock farming, expanded somewhat prior to World War II, it fell again during the war, as did both diamond and copper production. By 1942 Namibia’s GDP at R12m was still no larger than it had been in 1920. (Between 1921 and 1927 the GDP averaged R9.2m per annum; between 1928 and 1934 R8.1m; and between 1935 and 1941 R11.8m). Over this period (1920 to 1942) secondary industry’s contribution to the GDP moved fractionally from R0.4m to R0.6m.

The economic stagnation experience in Namibia during the first twenty years of South Africa's occupation was, however, not without its benefits for the colonial power. On the one hand, the restriction on the production of Namibian diamonds resulted, as we saw, in an increase in the price gained for diamonds exported from South Africa, the world's largest producer at that time. Secondly, the South African State benefited from taxation of the mining industry and other areas of productive activity in Namibia, in addition to benefiting through interest paid by the Colonial Administration on the many loans provided to the colony. By 1934, a year in which the value of Namibia’s GDP stood at R5.4m, the colony had accumulated loans valued at over R4.7m on which interest of 4½ per cent was to be paid.

Yet by the end of World War II Namibia was on the brink of an important transition. Firstly, the transformation of the power relation between the capitalist powers on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, accomplished during the War, meant that the United Nations Organization emerged in the post-war period as more than just a “capitalist talking club” as the League of Nations had been. Secondly, the development of capitalism inside South Africa had produced a capitalist state more able to engage in expansionary activity beyond its borders. And thirdly, the slow but continued underdevelopment of the African rural areas inside Namibia had, despite the resistance of the peasantry, produced a large migrant labour force whose links with rural production grew ever more tenuous. The emergence of these three forces were to constitute the primary determinants of Namibia’s development in the post-war period.

The Development of the Struggle for National Liberation
Immediately after the War the UN introduced a scheme whereby all those territories previously held under League of Nations mandate would be placed under trusteeship. This scheme, which was applicable to Namibia, was unpalatable to South African capital, firstly, because it involved a far greater degree of UN supervision that had previously been exercised by the League and, secondly and more importantly, because the trusteeship scheme involved the clear intention that there should be a “progressive development” of the trust territories “towards self-government or independence”. The danger for South African capital was that if it accepted the increased involvement of other capitalist
powers in Namibia and if it accepted the move towards Namibian independence, its own position in Namibia would be threatened. Being on the periphery of world capitalism, South African capital could not hope to compete with the major capitalist powers, particularly in a period of the international expansion of capital, for the "right" to exploit the natural resources and people of Namibia under conditions of decreasing privileges for itself. At the same time the expansion of capitalism inside South Africa had reached the stage by the end of the War where there was more finance available to invest in Namibia and also more commodities in search of foreign markets. South African political domination over Namibia would ensure a captive outlet for both capital and commodities, thereby promoting the advance of capitalism in South Africa. Consequently, both the United Party Government of General Smuts in South Africa and, after the victory of the National Party in 1948, the new Government of Dr Malan rejected the trusteeship system, continuing instead to administer the country under the defunct League mandate. This decision represented the first step in the state's new strategy for South African capitalist exploitation of Namibia and it paved the way for a further process of capitalist expansion in Namibia, this time based, as we shall see, on a significant restructuring both of the forms of political domination and of the forms of economic exploitation. However, these fundamental changes in the material conditions of Namibian society were to create the conditions out of which the forces of national resistance would emerge.

The first formal change in the colonial relation occurred when the South African Government replaced the system of restricted local government in Namibia with Direct Rule from South Africa. At the same time it launched an offensive against the organizations and resistance of the oppressed and exploited people in Namibia. For, in order to expand the relations of capitalist production, it was necessary for capital to intensify the forms of labour control and coercion in Namibia. The contract labour system was more effectively and ruthlessly administered; efforts were intensified to prevent migrants from entering the Police Zone illegally; the only major African trade union in Namibia, the Food and Canning Workers Union, was destroyed by the state in 1952, while large strikes were forcibly suppressed. In 1959,65 black Namibian demonstrators were gunned down by police in Windhoek (eleven died).

The intensification of political oppression in Namibia was accompanied by a sudden upsurge in economic activity. The GDP rose from R12m in 1942 to R42m in 1949, to R121m in 1958, reaching R147m in 1962. However, despite the sudden leap in the size of the GDP, growth in this period was in fact uneven, being confined almost solely to those sectors for which there were foreign markets, either in the capitalist centres or in South Africa. Mineral output rose from R.7m in 1942 to R63m in 1956 and R115m in 1965. This increase was achieved through revolutions in the labour-processes in both diamond and copper mining: under the single control of the Anglo American Corporation, labour-intensive methods of diamond production were replaced by the more capital-intensive open-cast method, while a consortium of international monopolies (US, British and South African)
took over the copper mines and began to transform and extend the method of production. In addition, copper and lead smelters were brought into operation in the early sixties, thereby enabling the mining companies to export the ore in a more easily marketable processed form (for which a considerably higher price could be obtained). Agricultural production also expanded (in the European-controlled area), but this was confined to one sector of agriculture — livestock — which accounted in 1965 for 99% of the total gross value of agricultural commodities produced for the capitalist market. Within this sector production was confined to two export commodities: cattle, which went primarily to South Africa; and Karakul pelts, exported primarily to Europe and the US. Namibia’s present fishing industry was first founded by South African interests in 1948 and was also geared to export markets. By the sixties the fishing industry was the second largest export industry in Namibia (surpassed only by mining), providing almost a quarter of all exports. One type of fish, pilchards, accounted for almost 90% of all Namibia’s earnings from fishing. Fish and meat processing were the major planks in Namibia’s tiny “manufacturing” sector, contributing two-thirds of the value of the sector’s output.

Thus the post-war period saw capital transform or restructure itself in Namibia: through a restructuring of the forms of political oppression and labour control, capital intensified and secured the subordination of the mass of the population and created the conditions for the enhanced exploitation of labour-power; through restructuring the form of the economic relation between South Africa and Namibia from one in which the latter’s economy largely stagnated to one in which capitalist production in certain sectors expanded based on new methods of production, capital reaped the benefits of the enhanced exploitation of labour-power. (Over the whole period between 1920 and 1971 the minimum wage rates for contract workers increased in real terms by only about 50%). The development of these few sectors of the economy to the exclusion of all else resulted in a form of economic growth in Namibia which intensified that country’s dependence on the colonial power. First, there was the dependency created through South Africa’s investments, since South African capital financed almost all the expansion of this period (the only exception being copper mining which included US and British capital). Second, by concentrating agricultural production on exports alone South African capital secured for itself a large market in Namibia for its own agricultural commodities, while at the same time securing cheap beef for itself (beef is imported to South Africa from Namibia on a quota basis and prices are often as much as 15% lower than on overseas markets). Third, the low level of development of Namibia’s manufacturing industry meant that South African manufacturers supplied virtually all of Namibia’s requirements, such as consumer goods, means of production in mining, agriculture and fishing, means of transport, etc.

At the same time as creating this dependency situation, South African capital also created a highly unstable economic structure in Namibia. For dependent as it is on five export commodities — diamonds, copper, cattle, karakul pelts and pilchards — the Namibian economy is highly sensitive to the vagaries of the world capitalist market. This situation
is worsened by the fact that at least two of these commodities, diamonds and karakul pelts, are luxury commodities which are among the first to suffer in a recession. Any major capitalist crisis which seriously affected these commodities would result in almost the whole of Namibia's labour force being made redundant.

Although this form of economic growth suited the interests of South African capital, opposition to the form of political oppression and colonialism which made it possible was mounting in two quarters: primarily, among the swelling ranks of migrant workers whose exploitation was responsible for the growth and, secondly, among the African states who in the late fifties began to demand an end to colonialism. The extension of capitalist relations in Namibia had by the late fifties proceeded to such an extent that most African males had been forced into migrant labour for much of their working lives, not simply to acquire agricultural tools and equipment, but more especially to acquire food and other necessities of life. (For instance, Ovamboland where the majority or Nambians live became a net food importer). Wage labour had thus become necessary for the reproduction of the African household. As the reserves became increasingly unable to provide subsistence for African families, African migrants began to seek to increase their incomes by initiating changes at the centres of capitalist production.

In the late 'fifties organizational work among contract workers intensified and in 1959, the second year of a severe drought in Ovamboland, the first mass organization of Namibians was formed among the contract workers in the compounds of the towns and mines. This organization, the Ovamboland People's Organization, directed its efforts explicitly to an attack on the contract labour system and in so doing attacked the very nerve-centre of imperialist domination and exploitation in Namibia. The response from the migrant workers was immediate: in just over a year the OPO had developed a mass following (after the first three months of recruiting in Walvis Bay, for instance, almost the whole contract labour force had joined up). Consequently, it reconstituted itself as a national political organization (SWAPO) dedicated to bringing about an end to colonialism in Namibia. In the words of SWAPO's Political Programme:

The fundamental question which confronted the Namibian people during the latter half of the 1950s was the establishment of a political organization or a party which was capable of providing leadership and an organizational framework through which spontaneous and scattered anti-colonial activities which characterized that period could be given an organizational expression. Prior to the formation of SWAPO, there were unco-ordinated, anti-colonial activities which were expressed in the form of localised strikes against colonial rule and individual petitionings to the United Nations concerning the South African racist oppression in Namibia. It was thus realized then that the establishment of a political organization was the most appropriate and effective way by which the politically conscious elements of our society could come into a direct and constant contact with the broad masses of our people to give articulate expression to the problems, aspirations and hopes of these masses. Thus SWAPO was formed on 19 April, 1960, as a concrete response to that fundamental need.

Thus by constituting itself as a national anti-colonial organization SWAPO was able to give political expression and unity to the various oppressed classes in Namibia: to unite the oppressed petty-bourgeoisie,
comprising small traders and intellectuals, with the oppressed peasantry and a growing working class. Simultaneously, by concentrating its attack on the issue of contract labour SWAPO showed itself to be firmly rooted among the migrant workers — that is, it showed itself to be primarily the organized expression of an alliance between the peasantry and the proletariat which sought to attack the specific form of capitalist domination in Namibia. It was the formation of this alliance more than any other which accounted for the mass support which SWAPO received throughout the country. And it was the emergence of SWAPO, as an organization which gave political expression to that alliance, which forced the colonial power suddenly onto the defensive — a form of defence, which, as the following SWAPO statement suggests, combined elements of fierce repression against SWAPO with moves towards social reforms:

The task of rooting the movement firm in the society entailed also the concentration of the principal issues around which the masses had to be mobilized. This meant that SWAPO had to place the particularized problems, such as those of arbitrary residential relocation and contract labour into the broader context of Namibia's national independence. This was the real beginning of the development of Namibian national consciousness. But since this trend of development represented a direct antithesis to South African colonialism in Namibia, it brought about new waves of repression against SWAPO. For instance, by December 1963 the South Africans banned all public meetings in Namibia. A score of SWAPO cadres came under severe harassements in the form of dismissals from jobs, schools, and expulsions from urban areas to the countryside. Concomitant with this stream of harassements, the South African Government set up a commission (known as the Odendaal Commission) early in 1964 to draw up a plan for the balkanization of Namibia into a chain of bantustans (my emphasis).

Thus the state's response to the threat to colonial domination which was posed by SWAPO — by the organized form of the major oppressed classes in Namibia — was, on the one hand, to seek to smash the organization through repression and, on the other hand, by splitting Namibia up into Bantustans, to destroy the material base for a movement for the national liberation of Namibia. By institutionalizing divisions among the various communities of peasants and among migrant workers along tribal lines — between the Ovambo, Kavango, Herero, Nama, etc. — the State sought to turn the various communities against each other, while simultaneously isolating the “detrabalized” proletariat (who have no Bantustan) from the “separated” peasantries. However, for such a strategy to work certain reforms were necessary, particularly among the various “tribal” groups. It was these reforms which the Odendaal Commission, set up in 1962, sought to recommend as a necessary part of the second period of major capital restructuring to be attempted in Namibia in the post-war period.

According to the Commission itself, the reforms were to be based upon “a broad programme of capital expenditure” in Namibia which “must largely be founded on the development which has taken place”. In other words, there must be no fundamental change in the form of economic development — in the structure of production — since a more broadly based form of economic growth could threaten the existing relation of dependency on South Africa. Furthermore, “this development can best be achieved if the various population groups . . . are not unsettled unnecessarily by disrupting their existing strong traditional family and homeland ties”. That is, economic growth must take place within the form of the social and political structures imposed by the
colonial regime. Or more explicitly: “Economic activities must therefore be brought to the home areas as far as possible”. In this way the state sought to allow a minority of the peasantry in each Bantustan to transform itself into a middle peasantry or even kulak class which, together with a small trading and professional petty bourgeoisie whose future would be dependent on the reproduction of existing political relations, could serve as a bulwark against the forces of national liberation. This reactionary peasantry and petty-bourgeoisie would be serviced by facilities provided by the South African state, such as the Bantu Investment Corporation, whose function was to provide loans to Africans in the Bantustans “in accordance with policy in the Republic of South Africa”. While the South African state undertook to provide the finances for the necessary infrastructure, thereby deepening Namibia’s financial dependence on South Africa, other foreign capitals would be encouraged to invest in Namibia.

The state in fact pumped over R150m into the Namibian economy between 1964 and 1969, while foreign investment, particularly in mining, expanded considerably at this time (especially with the development of lead, zinc, vanadium, tin and uranium mining). The result of these measures was, economically, a dramatic rise in the value of the GDP from R147m in 1962 to R616m in 1973 (between 1960 and 1972 the economy expanded at an annual average rate of 11.9% at current prices), and, politically, the passage of the Development of Native Nations Act in 1968 and the South West Africa Affairs Act in 1969, which provided for the formal incorporation into South Africa of a Namibia subdivided into Bantustans constituted on a tribal basis.

Thus by the end of the sixties the process of restructuring the relations of capital in Namibia in response to the mass resistance expressed through SWAPO had produced an intensification of the forms of Namibia’s economic dependence on international capitalism (especially on South African capital) and, at the political level, the formal dismembering of Namibia into a number of political appendages of the South African state. In response to these changes SWAPO, the only national mass organization in Namibia, had earlier launched the armed struggle (the first combat between SWAPO guerrillas and the South African military occurred in 1966). However, as the capitalist strategy unfolded further, SWAPO sought during the seventies, to intensify the national form of its struggle (to emphasise the dangers of tribalism, regionalism, etc.) and at the same time to stress the class character of the struggle.

The Present Struggle against Imperialism and Colonialism

1971 heralded two major set-backs for South Africa’s colonial strategy in Namibia. Following intense pressure from progressive African and Asian and Communist states in the UN, the World Court declared South Africa’s “continued presence” in Namibia to be “illegal”. This outright rejection by the world body of Namibia’s formal incorporation into South Africa through the 1969 Act forced South Africa onto the defensive internationally.

A few months later the contract workers inside Namibia struck their most powerful blow yet against the regime, refusing to work any longer
as wage-labourers until the contract labour system was disbanded. Agitation and resistance had in fact characterized wage labour in Namibia throughout the post-war period: one newspaper, for instance, reported 43 “collective actions” by workers in the towns, mines, ports and railways between 1950 and 1970, and undoubtedly there were many more. In 1968 over 1,000 workers had struck for almost a month to get night shifts accepted as overtime and flash strikes, go-slows, overtime bans and walk-outs over victimization were some of the forms of struggle utilized in individual work places. But the significance of the 1971 strike was its co-ordination and organization on a national scale and, following on from this, its mass support: over 21,000 workers took part in 23 centres throughout the country out of an estimated total of 53,000 black industrial workers (or 87,000 including domestic servants and farm workers). The strike forced the state to employ extreme measures: strikers were repatriated to the Reserves, strike-breakers were flown in from South Africa; emergency regulations were proclaimed in Ovamboland; and a huge military build-up began. Yet in the face of these activities resistance intensified: back in the rural areas strikers began to organize among the peasantry and to articulate and combine specific peasant grievances with their own; government vehicles and installations together with collaborationist elements in African society were subjected to violent attacks (employees of the State-owned Bantu Investment Corporation in Ovamboland were so fearful for their safety that their offices were moved to Windhoek); and the military campaign of SWAPO, swelled by large numbers of new recruits, intensified. Although eventually a combination of economic distress in the rural areas, brutal state repression and reforms to the existing contract labour system broke the resistance of the strikers, the strategy of the colonial power to incorporate Namibia into South Africa lay in ruins. (African wages were also raised by 66% on average after the strike). The alliance of the oppressed classes had been cemented through the strike and the strength of their organization, SWAPO, proved. South African capital had no choice but to begin a retreat from its strategy of incorporation. In 1972 the Vorster Government “confirmed that its policy was one of self-determination and independence” for Namibia and requested that the UN “in consultation with the South African government and other interested parties . . . should assist in achieving this aim”.

This new strategy of the colonial regime, however, represented little more than an attempt to reap the fruits of the policies initiated by the Odendaal Commission under a different political form — and, consequently, to undermine the unity within SWAPO as well as to undermine the position of SWAPO and its supporters at the UN. For by declaring itself now to be in favour of “self-determination and independence” in Namibia, the colonial state paved the way for the collaborationist African petty-bourgeoisie in Namibia and for potential opportunist elements within SWAPO to try and present themselves as the leaders of the people and to “negotiate independence” with them.

The form of the struggle in Namibia had now reached a new phase and this meant that an ideology based solely on African nationalism was inadequate as a form of response unless it expressed itself in class terms — unless it articulated the interests of certain classes in Namibia against
others. For the emergence of an expanded and more powerful collabor-
ationist, African petty-bourgeoisie in Namibia created the possibility for that bourgeoisie to take up the call for national independence. The issue then became a struggle over the kind of independence that would be achieved — that is, the struggle became not simply an anti-colonial struggle, but more fundamentally a struggle against imperialism. SWAPO's response to the new form of the imperialist strategy was to take up the struggle against the expanded collaborationist African petty bourgeoisie inside Namibia by defining the national liberation struggle as being essentially based upon an alliance of certain specified classes whose ultimate goal was a socialist society. From that moment on, the struggle for national liberation in Namibia involved not only a struggle against the racist South African state, but also a struggle against 'the enemy hidden under the same colour' — i.e. against all those who opposed this goal. At its conference in 1976 SWAPO resolved:

a. To persistently mobilise and organize the broad masses of the Namibian people so that they can actively participate in the national liberation struggle.
b. To mould and heighten, in the thick of the national liberation struggle, the bond of national and political consciousness amongst the Namibian people.
c. To combat all manifestations and tendencies of tribalism, regionalism, ethnic orientation and racial discrimination.
d. To unite all Namibian people, particularly the working class, the peasantry and progressive intellectuals into a vanguard party capable of safeguarding national independence and of building a classless, non-exploitative society based on the ideals and principles of scientific socialism.

The South African Government's preliminary manoeuvring around its new strategy had culminated in 1975 in the establishment of the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference in Namibia. Invitations to the conference were confined to representatives of the Bantustans and white legislative assemblies: “All eleven population groups are represented at the Turnhalle by their recognised leaders and representatives”, claimed a South African propaganda sheet, “and must therefore be seen as representing the majority of all the peoples of South West Africa”. Despite the efforts made by representatives of the major capitalist powers to involve SWAPO in the negotiations, SWAPO maintained its internal unity and boycotted the Conference. As a result the South African government intensified its representation of SWAPO militants. SWAPO's action exposed the Conference clearly for what it was: pseudo-negotiations between the colonialist state and its collaborationist allies among the white and black petty-bourgeoisie. The anti-government murmurings of some of the white delegates, like Dirk Mudge, and even the anti-colonial orations of Chief Clemens Kapuuo and others among the black petty-bourgeoisie, appeared in stark contrast to the more openly anti-imperialist position articulated by SWAPO. For instance, while Kapuuo in his “constitutional plan” presented at the Conference found it “desirable and necessary . . . to provide a machinery through which the ethnic groups, as such, might have a voice in the welfare of its people”, the SWAPO Programme demanded that “reconstruction in a free, democratic and united Namibia will have, as its motive force, the establishment of a classless society”. The SWAPO Programme then went on to argue that: “The Government of a truly liberated Namibia will therefore, be called upon to take the following measures:

1. Wage the struggle towards the abolition of all forms of exploitation of man by man and the destructive spirit of individualism and
aggrandisement of wealth and power by individuals, groups or classes.

2. Ensure that all the major means of production and exchange of the country are under ownership of the people.’’

The articulation of these specifically anti-imperialist working class demands in the Political Programme drawn up by SWAPO in 1976 showed the extent to which the organization had progressed since the massive workers strike of 1971. It also showed clearly the hopelessness of the South African strategy of negotiating with a petty-bourgeoisie which was totally isolated from the masses.

It was the representatives of the major imperialist powers, specifically the five Western Members of the UN’s Security Council, who, following the collapse of colonialism in the Portuguese colonies, understood this and it was they who formed the so-called Western Contact Group to encourage the South African Government to drop the whole charade of the Turnhalle. The major point of difference between these powers and the South African regime arose over the issue of SWAPO — of how best to undermine the alliance between the two most powerful oppressed classes in Namibia. Following the victories of the forces for national liberation in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau, these powers, representing the most advanced capitalist interests, understood that SWAPO could not be ignored — that any neo-colonialist solution in Namibia could only be achieved if SWAPO, as the representative of the masses, could be bought off or divided. Consequently, the strategy which they favoured was to negotiate independence on terms acceptable to SWAPO while at the same time using their economic power to encourage the emergence of those elements within the ranks of SWAPO’s supporters who would assist international capital politically in undermining the struggle of the workers and poor peasantry. Although South African capital had long resisted this strategy, fearing that its own weakness in relation to other capitalist powers and its long history of struggle against SWAPO would lead to its own position in Namibia being rapidly undermined, the failure of the Turnhalle talks and the failure of its military assault on Angola left it little option but to support this strategy, salvaging for itself whatever remnants it could en route.

But in order to negotiate effectively with SWAPO — that is, in order to weaken the internal unity of SWAPO — the Western Contact Group has insisted that the South African Government should show itself willing to make concessions to the Namibian people. In so doing they hope to lay the groundwork for negotiations which will secure a restructuring of class relations in Namibia that will not fundamentally affect the domination of capital. To this end the South African Government has so far repealed the Immorality Act in Namibia, modified the system of Influx Control and repealed the emergency regulations which have been operative in Ovamboland since 1971. These are but the first in a number of concessions the state will be forced to make if it is to negotiate with SWAPO. However, none of these concessions fundamentally affects the relations of capitalist exploitation in Namibia. The state seeks through these concessions to break the alliance of oppressed classes in Namibia by making concessions to the petty-bourgeoisie and upper echelons of the peasantry in particular, which,
while increasing their potential to accumulate wealth, leaves undisturbed the basic relations of capitalist exploitation.

At the same time sections of those "tribal" representatives at the Turnhalle Conference, like Dirk Mudge and Clemens Kapuu, have united to form a new political party, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. Although this party is clearly set up in opposition to SWAPO (witness Kapuu's increasingly anti-SWAPO rhetoric), one of its prime aims is to distance itself from other collaborationist elements inside Namibia so as to be able to forge an alliance in the future with capitalist elements within SWAPO should the opportunity arise. Hence, while the state seeks through its concessions to create divisions within SWAPO, DTA emerges as a possible alternative political home for potential dissidents from SWAPO.

It is not possible in an article to dictate the precise form of the outcome of the struggle in Namibia; that will depend on the response, strategies and tactics of the various participants. But what we can say is that the struggle against colonialism is nearing its end. SWAPO as the party of the oppressed masses in Namibia is close to securing an important victory — the downfall of colonial rule in Namibia. But as SWAPO itself has come to argue so forcefully during this decade the struggle for national liberation is not just a struggle against colonialism, it is a struggle against imperialism — against the forces of international capitalism. This struggle will not necessarily be won when the last South Africa soldier leaves Namibia soil.

SWAPO will inherit a Namibia whose people and resources have been exploited for well over a hundred years; they will inherit an economy which is totally subordinated to the world capitalist system; they will inherit a society divided along class lines and a form of state which reproduces those divisions. In the words of Samora Machel, the enemy are only weakened, not dead. There will be continued attempts by the forces of international capitalism to provide reforms, to offer vast amounts of aid, to restructure the capital relation in Namibia yet again, this time allowing more wealth and autonomy to pass to the local African petty-bourgeoisie, building up a stratum of wealthy peasants and African businessmen, deepening the class divisions in the society. Such measures will inevitably strike at the unity of SWAPO as the vanguard party — to encourage the development of contradictions and capitalistic tendencies within its ranks. SWAPO will need to retain that unity if it is to retain its vanguard role in the struggle. It will need to give consistent expression to the interests of the growing working class and depressed peasantry from which it draws its essential unity, remembering always that "unity implies drawing an ever firmer dividing line between us and the enemy, regardless of the form he may take". It is only on this basis, by relying on the strength of the class alliance which has supported it through the dark years of colonial oppression, that SWAPO will be able to carry through the struggle for national liberation in Namibia and embark on the road to socialism.

Bibliographic Note
This article is drawn in part from a larger work by the author entitled: "Changing Relations of Imperialist Exploitation and Domination in Namibia", which is to
be published later as part of a collection of articles on Namibia edited by K. and M. Kiljunen. I have benefited from a number of studies which attempt to apply a Marxist perspective in analyzing Namibia. In particular, Richard Moorsom, ‘Underdevelopment and Class Formation: the origin of migrant labour in Namibia, 1850-1915’, also his ‘Proletarianization and the Formation of Worker Consciousness: Background to the contract workers strike in Namibia, 1971-1972’, Roger Murray, ‘The Namibian Economy: as analysis of the role of foreign investment and the policies of the South African Administration’; Jo Morris, ‘The Black Workers in Namibia’, (both Murray’s and Morris’s articles are published in Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia, The Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia); and Ruth First, South West Africa (Penguin).

BILL WARREN

As this number was going to press, we learnt of the death of Bill Warren, one of our founding contributing editors. Bill’s courage and strength of will, exemplified by his struggle against a long and debilitating illness, was matched by an equally courageous and determined struggle to advance Marxist ideas and political practice. He will be best remembered by his seminal article in New Left Review 81, a critique of the dependency theory of ‘neo-Marxism’ hotly contested at the time, but which put back into the arena of debate the classical Marxist view of the process of capitalist development in the backward countries. It is a tribute to Bill’s iconoclastic approach to received theory that the debate on capitalist development and underdevelopment has been taken several stages further largely as a result of his pioneering critique of dependency theory, and that dependency theorists themselves have begun to modify their positions in the light of his work and that of Kay (see RAPE 6).

Bill’s formal association with RAPE lasted until the second number. This was because he regarded the Review as leaning too heavily towards dependency theory. However RAPE 8 provided a body of theoretical and empirical work largely addressed to the issues raised by Bill in NLR 81. But for his untimely death, the publication of our number on ‘African Capitalism’, might have persuaded him to resume his formal association with the Review.

Active politically until his death, Bill had a healthy suspicion of fixed and dogmatic positions which in his view failed to recognise reality. He found himself out of step with many on the British left, but it was a mark of his ability to recognise social and economic realities that many more on the Left began to address themselves more seriously to some of the questions he, together with others, had raised, while at the same time he continued to develop new ideas. Ever a stimulating and resourceful thinker, he will be missed by us all. We have been heartened to learn that the book on Imperialism, which Bill had been writing up to his death, will be completed by comrades, and we look forward to its appearance.

Finally, those who may wish to make a very concrete appreciation of Bill Warren can make a contribution to The Bill Warren Fund for Renal Research, c/o Rose Warren, 4 Cedar Avenue, East Barnet, Herts, England.
Debate


Vassilis Droucopoulos and John S. Henley

Terisa Turner raises some important issues in her article in RAPE 5: the role of foreign firms operating production units inside Nigeria; the political mechanism; the relationship between the ruling elite, the middlemen and the technocratic cadres and its implications for the instability of the Nigerian state.

1. Foreign Capital and Manufacturing. There is no doubt that, despite the oil boom, the contribution of the manufacturing sector to the GDP is particularly low in Nigeria. In 1970-1 its share (crafts included) at constant 1974-5 prices was 5.0%, 4.7% in 1974-5 and according to the Third National Development Plan 1975-80 (1:22,49) projected to 6.9% in 1979-80. Moreover, most of the total paid-up capital of manufacturing establishments was some years ago foreign-owned. But Turner exemplifies ‘the Triangular relationship’ by citing a ‘foreign businessman (who) comes to Nigeria to sell his firm’s products’ (p.64). There is no mention of foreign firms with productive facilities in Nigeria and consequently no discussion of the role of middlemen and compradors in this case. Is it assumed by the author that directly productive capital and capital in extracting and/or commercial activities have the same implications regarding, for example, socialization of labour within capitalist relations of production (Cf. Cohen and Sandbrook, 1975)? It is a pity that Turner did not address herself to these questions.

2. The State. A major weakness of her account of the ‘instability’ of the Nigerian state is its lack of historical perspective. As a result interesting but hardly key events involving the machinations of the Nigerian National Oil Corporation are blown up out of all proportion to their significance in the political economy of Nigeria. The 1975 coup scarcely proves Nigeria was less stable than say the USA when Nixon was deposed for corruption.

The state apparatuses do provide the arena in which the struggle for political power occurs. But do the key protagonists seek advantage for themselves alone? What of their regional and ethnic affiliations? If there are no checks and balances at the top, it seems likely that members of
the elite, even if they are generals who can ostensibly demand the obe-
dience of their subordinates, will endeavour to secure their positions
through clientelism reinforced by kinship considerations. Where institu-
tions founded on rational-legal principles are weak, ties of personal
loyalty would seem to provide a more reliable insurance policy than
simple monetary exchange between middlemen and the elite. As Furnivall observed of colonial society, the worship of Mammon, the
sole common deity of the heterogeneous elements of a culturally plural
society does not create consensus. The obvious way to retain control
without consensus is through factionalism.

The basis of the Federal Army administration initially rested on the
power of the gun but with the passage of time it has discovered the
advantages of the petro-dollar channeled along networks of dependents.
Consensus and stability has developed within factions at least in terms
of preserving the chief patron’s position at any cost. While stability is
generated within factions each is potentially at war with its rivals over
the control of the state apparatuses. Of course: ‘... politics is a form
of business through which actors seek influence in the state, not in
order to make and apply general rules, but in order to secure advan-
tages’ (p.67). Transnational corporations do their best to play off one
faction against another where it improves their own competitive advan-
tage; so, they can certainly be held responsible for adapting a given
business environment to their own ends. But Turner argues the contrary:
‘... international firms cannot be held responsible for adapting to a
given business environment’ (p.67).

To compare Nigeria with Iran or Algeria merely serves to emphasize
the author’s failure to define what is meant by ‘instability’ in the
Nigerian context and to explain its origins and development. To under-
stand the present situation we need a much clearer measure of shifts
in the power structure over time. Does it really matter to the inhabit-
ants of Kano who rules in Lagos? Is there really a ‘national bourgeoisie’ or
merely a comprador class? What do businessmen and civil servants do
with the ‘dash’ once it has been acquired? How do people decide who
they can trust? In other words, unless we are presented with historical
data on the formation of the Nigerian state, the changes that have
occurred, and the forces that have brought about shifts in the compo-
sition of the ruling elite, it is impossible to judge its ‘instability’. Cul-
turally pluralistic states that are unstable tend to disintegrate when the
ruling elite cannot command support and has to resort to terrorising
the population as in Uganda and Ethiopia. Nigeria compares very
favourably with Iran in terms of level of political violence. The stability
of Nigeria cannot be judged just by the road from Lagos airport or the
congestion in the harbour!

3. Instability. The main pivot around which the explanation of the ‘in-
stability’ of the Nigerian state revolves is the conflict between the ‘rela-
tively uncorrupt’ technocrats who undertook to promote indigenous
private capitalism and the well entrenched dominant compradors and
middlemen pursuing personal gains through the servicing of foreign
interests.

We argue that this reasoning is marred by inconsistencies, and that
this 'conflict' can by no means be considered the main cause of the instability of the Nigerian state if indeed it is unstable in any significant sense.

First let us look at the following statements: 'Technocrats are those technically skilled professionals who were hired to put into effect the military's new policy of state intervention to foster capitalist economic development' (p.69, our emphasis), and 'Technocrats were appointed not only to carry out certain technical functions, but to implement policies which would satisfy public aspirations for increased economic development and national control of the economy' (p.78). The author therefore maintains that 'public aspirations for . . . national control of the economy' and 'capitalist economic development' are compatible. Since when can a former colony in the age of imperialism strive, we repeat, 'for increased economic development and national control of the economy' by adopting (state or private) capitalist policies for development that rely so heavily on the importation of foreign technology, management contracts, etc?

Moreover, the author claims that 'Technocrats are relatively uncorrupt . . . because . . . their function is to . . . reduce dependence on foreign resources' (p.69) and 'They establish relations with foreign firms but attempt to gain for the Nigerian state the best possible terms' (p.78). Since when can somebody reduce dependence on foreign resources by establishing (to establish: to found, to lay the base of, to begin the construction of) relations with foreign firms? And what about Nigerian investments in foreign countries (e.g. Guinea and Benin, reported in The Times, 17 May 1977) undoubtedly organized, executed and run by technocrats? Do these also aim to reduce Nigerian dependence on foreign resources? The problem with Turner's analysis is that she fails to distinguish changes in forms of dependence from the fact of dependence.

Finally, it is argued that since triangular and bilateral relationships cannot be eliminated ' . . . the state remains an arena for unruly capital accumulation' (p.78). As if capital accumulation under national capitalism run by a national bourgeoisie and technocrats can ever become 'ruly'. As if the anarchy of private capital accumulation and of market forces could be tamed by a sleight of the skilled technocratic hand!

Even the author suggests that the 'conflict' between technocrats, and compradors and middlemen, is 'non-antagonistic' (p.78). But how is it possible for a non-antagonistic contradiction to become the fundamental reason for instability? Turner fails to distinguish two kinds of competition identified by Marx and Engels. 'Subjective competition is between workers and workers on one hand, and capitalists and capitalists on the other. Objective or fundamental competition between workers and property owners' (Meszaros, p.144, our emphasis).

We can agree when Turner writes: ' . . . technocrats have little capacity to change Nigeria's political economy' (p.78) but this is not because they are weak, frustrated, made to feel irrelevant and superfluous, and pushed around by the compradors and Co. We would rather argue that their own class interests and ideology can in no way change Nigeria's
political economy even if they were strong, felt fulfilled, complacent and self-satisfied, and at the real controls of the commanding heights of the economy. They would in all cases remain a stratum in the pay of and in the service of the ruling class. The ‘economy’ might be marginally changed but not the ‘political economy’.

We finally agree with the author when she says: ‘Only classes which are opposed to the triangular system can (transform the system)’ (p.79), since the technocrats even when opposed to this system, can in no way be considered as forming a distinct class. Turner should have focused her attention on those classes in the first place in order to ‘penetrate beneath the surface appearances of things and lay bare for analysis the hidden essence’ (Sweezy, p.1); this would have enabled her to come to grips with the true reasons of the ‘shaky’ condition of the Nigerian state. After all, ‘the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles’.

Bibliographic Notes
Briefings:

AN OUTLINE OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN ZIMBABWE

Kees Maxey

The 1977 British/American proposals for a settlement in Rhodesia are a last ditch attempt by the South African government, and the Western powers, to reach an accommodation which will stop the future Zimbabwe from falling into the hands of revolutionaries fighting for a radical transformation of its society. The success of the armed liberation struggle is the impetus behind the Proposals and the recent efforts for an ‘internal solution’. But the war has gone largely unreported in the Western press. This has partly been due to the difficulties put in the way of reporting by the regime: the movement and copy of journalists (who are carefully vetted) are rigidly controlled, they are not allowed to visit the rural areas, and they are swamped by a vast mass of pre-digested material. The regime’s propaganda war is essential to the morale of the whites, the recruitment of foreign mercenaries, and to its negotiating position vis-à-vis the West.

Even so white Rhodesian sources can be used to reveal much. In their eyes the present military threat to white rule began in late 1972 with the offensive in the north-east by the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). The success of this offensive was one of the major factors behind the so-called ‘detente’ at the end of 1974. An important aim of detente was to stop the fighting — and in this, white southern Africa, abetted by the Zambian government, was eminently successful for a time. In 1975, the level of fighting dropped dramatically as ZANLA guerrillas inside Rhodesia (and in the camps in Mozambique) were starved of military supplies, and one and a half thousand guerrillas were marooned in Zambia. However detente did not bring liberation to the African population. Instead, 1975 was marked by an exodus of young African men and women to Mozambique to become guerrillas. By the end of 1975, many of the supply problems had been solved. The ZANLA guerrillas in Zambia had been released, ZANU’s internal problems resolved, and Mozambique itself was under its own radical government committed to the liberation of Zimbabwe.

The third phase of the liberation struggle began at the beginning of 64
1976, and rapidly spread down the eastern border of Rhodesia, and across the northern part of the country, so the road and railway connections with South Africa came, and remain, under attack. The regime have responded by setting up a series of operational areas. The 'Hurricane' area in the northeast was set up in 1972. The 'Thrasher' area, along the eastern border, and the 'Repulse' area in the south were set up in mid-1976. There followed the 'Tangent' area in December 1976 along the western and northwestern borders in response to attacks by the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZPRA), associated with the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU). According to Rhodesian sources, there were about 700 ZANLA guerrillas in Rhodesia in March 1976, which rose to 1,700 in September, and then to 2,500 in March 1977: 100 of the latter were ZPRA guerrillas (*Rhodesia Herald*, 7 April 1977). In September 1977, they had risen to 3,600 inside the country (*Radio South Africa*, Johannesburg, 16 September 1977). Although anti-insurgent forces regularly overestimate the number of guerrillas they are fighting, the figures do reflect an increase in the level of fighting, and the gradual loss of control by the regime over many parts of the country. In the September report, the regime's spokesman also estimated that ZANLA had a further 5,000 'deployable' men in Mozambique and ZPRA about 3,000 men in Zambia.

The regime has responded to the increase in guerrilla activity by a wide range of new regulations. These virtually give the executive carte blanche to do what it likes in all spheres — military, political and judicial. Thus its agents, including mercenary security guards on some of the large European farms, are indemnified in advance against what would otherwise be criminal acts, including murder. It has set up 'Special Courts', which come very near to being instant 'kangaroo courts'. Virtually anything critical an opponent of the regime says is indictable. It has enlarged its armed forces. This has been necessary because of the removal of the South African paramilitary police as well as the increase in fighting. There has been a mobilization of almost all European men under the age of 50. A third battalion of the Rhodesian African Rifles is being formed. Finally, a vigorous recruitment campaign abroad has been conducted. Apart from South Africans and Portuguese, most recruits come from UK, USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Germany and Belgium. In proportion with its growing army, defence expenditure has increased.

In 1973-74 it was Rh.$38.8 million (11.1% of the total budget). The estimate for 1976-77 was Rh.$98.4 million (16.5% of the total budget). Expenditures directly related to war (such as Internal Affairs, and Police) have also increased.1

The main strategy of the regime is to break the contact between the guerrillas and the ordinary people. They have set up 'protected villages' in which all of the local people from an affected area are herded. These villages serve two purposes — they allow the security forces direct physical control over the people, thus making it more difficult for the guerrillas to make contact with the people. They also act as military strong points in an area rather in the way castles were used in medieval times. The 'keeps' of these villages are well protected from attack with earth banks and associated firing bunkers. However they are surrounded by the Africans they are supposed to protect, instead of a moat. Guer-
rilla attacks on the keeps are taken to show the callousness of the guerrillas, although there have been few reports of Africans being killed in such attacks. ‘Consolidated villages’ (without keeps or fences) have also been set up as a cheaper method of controlling the African population. 500,000 Africans have been herded together in this way. Despite these precautions, one Guard Commander admitted that it was necessary to have night patrols inside the protected villages ‘because even with the strict identification controls, terrorists have managed to get inside the fence’ (RH, 14 February 1977).

Strong armed tactics are used to show ‘who is boss’, and to make clear the fatal results of supporting the guerrillas. The people in the rural areas have been subjected to a massive propaganda effort — leaflets, radio programmes (with free FM radios — which will only receive local broadcasts), and visits by the various arms of the regime. One such leaflet dropped by plane in the Makoni Tribal Trust Land (in the east) in June 1977 said that all ‘Tigers, Terrorist informers, Terrorist agents, Sympathisers and feeders of terrorists (and) Recruiters for terrorist training’ would be ‘counted as terrorists and (would) be killed by the Security Forces’. According to the regime’s official communiques, there have been at least 832 African civilians falling into these categories killed by the security forces between January 1976 and September 1977. The Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace has provided very carefully authenticated evidence of a number of other unreported massacres by the regime. The Selous Scouts (a mostly African unit) have a special role in this sort of ‘terrorist propaganda’ action. According to interviews with Rhodesian Army deserters by the World Council of Churches, the Scouts go into a village pretending to be guerrillas, and get food and information. They are followed shortly after by the regular Army, who interrogate the villagers. When they leave, the Scouts return, accuse the villagers of giving information to the Army, and half destroy the village. As a result, it becomes difficult for the villagers to know who they are talking to (One World, No.28, July/August 1977).

The regime has attacked the neighbouring African states. There have been almost daily attacks on Mozambique, and less frequent attacks on Botswana and Zambia. Until the coup in Portugal, the Rhodesian Army operated quite freely in Mozambique, and, until recently, it has been from this border that the only real threat to Rhodesia has come (from ZANLA). The major attacks on Mozambique (Nyazonia in 1976 and Mapai in 1977) may have been an attempt to make Mozambique call for Cuban help (thus bringing Western help to Rhodesia), or it may have aimed to destabilise the Frelimo government. Certainly, the anti-Frelimo Radio Voz de Africa Livre is transmitted from Rhodesia. The economic and internal political effects of these aggressive attacks on all three countries has been considerable and is part of the cost of liberating Zimbabwe.

Finally, it has been the policy of the regime to keep a ‘presence’ in whatever form it can, in all parts of the country. For example, in opening an office for a new regional authority centre at Mudzi, the Minister said: ‘The second reason for the new site is to protect local people from the terrorist threat which has reared its ugly head in this district’ (Radio Salisbury, 4 August 1977). European farms have been continually
under attack — to kill European occupants, to scare off the African farm labourers, and to cause the maximum damage to crops and equipment. The regime has expressed great concern about the increasing number of unoccupied European farms.

The first priority of the liberation army, on the other hand, has been to politicise and gain the confidence of the local people. Thus, before any major military activity is undertaken, a few guerrillas go into an area, and get to know the people. Only when the ground is prepared in this way, will larger numbers of guerrillas enter an area and attack the means of European control. These include European farms, Council offices and halls, beer halls, bridges, roads, and stores. Schools have not, on the whole, been physically attacked, but many have been forced to close down. By the end of July 1977, 300 primary and nine secondary schools had been closed. Over 20% of the country's African Councils were on the brink of bankruptcy due to non-payment of dues in May 1977 (RH, 24 May 1977). Communications (both road and rail) are regularly mined and ambushed, as are tourist centres. For example, 53 buses (worth about Rh.$1.5 million) were destroyed in 1976 (RH, 11 February 1977). The tourist trade has been badly hit. Taking the same comparative period (January-July), in 1975 there were 130,163; in 1976, 89,107; and in 1977, 54,647. Europeans working and travelling in the 'operational' areas are at risk, and a number have been killed. African agents of the regime are a particular target — a number of Chiefs and kraal heads have been killed, as have members of the army, police and district assistants on leave. Anyone who is thought to be an informer is also killed, though usually after some sort of a trial. Speaking in September 1976, a spokesman for ZANLA said:

We can say that at this stage we have managed to establish semi-liberated zones, in the sense that although the political and administrative infra-structure is not yet fully organized, the enemy has no control whatever in these areas. The masses are fully mobilized and organized and are fully behind the armed struggle that is being waged by the freedom fighters. We also feel that establishing liberated areas at this stage would be presenting the enemy with many targets vulnerable to airstrike (Radio Maputo, 29 September 1976) . . . .

The existence of these areas has been obliquely confirmed by the regime.

In order to gain an overall picture, the figures for the last two years of those killed, as reported by the regime, are tabulated below:

Number Killed in the Liberation War (according to Rhodesian communiques)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Security Forces</th>
<th>African Civilians</th>
<th>Europeans by Guerrillas</th>
<th>Others killed by Guerillas</th>
<th>Guerillas killed per Security Force member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In action</td>
<td>Accidents</td>
<td>Guerillas</td>
<td>Helpers</td>
<td>Recruits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st qr.</td>
<td>17 3 114</td>
<td>11 12 9 14</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd qr.</td>
<td>37 7 266</td>
<td>31 42 22 45</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd qr.</td>
<td>37 10 291</td>
<td>57 15 39 62</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th qr.</td>
<td>63 14 545</td>
<td>52 6 96 41 156</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st qr.</td>
<td>64 20 413</td>
<td>52 44 71 35 127</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd qr.</td>
<td>60 13 258</td>
<td>30 49 41 29 30 11</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd qr.</td>
<td>57 399 60 57 13</td>
<td>8 59 18 30 11</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The ratio of guerrillas killed for each member of the security forces has been consistently well under the 10 to 1 ratio normally accepted as necessary for success by the anti-insurgent forces. The number of security forces wounded is not normally reported in these communiques.

These figures present a version of events favourable to the regime. There is documentary evidence that some casualties are not reported at all, and that those killed by mines are reported as 'vehicle accidents'. The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace report shows that security force casualties (as well as the number of civilian Africans killed by the security forces) are underplayed. Finally, the liberation movements report that they have killed far more members of the security forces (including the police). ZAPU report that over 1078 members on active service were killed by ZPRA from January to September 1977. Between January and May 1977, ZANLA claims to have killed 851 members (ZIPA Combat Diaries, January-September 1977). These may be over estimates (European deaths on this scale could not be hidden), but the casualties admitted by the regime are certainly underestimated.

The final question which must be considered is who is fighting the war. Both ZAPU (paralleled by the ANC — Zimbabwe inside Rhodesia), and ZANU (with the Peoples Movement inside Rhodesia) have armies — ZPRA and ZANLA respectively. The other factions — the United ANC (Muzorewa) and the ANC (Sithole) do not have military wings. After the Lusaka talks in 1974, ZANLA and the small number of ZPRA guerrillas formed the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). An initial attempt at full integration failed. However the subsequent diplomatic agreement of ZAPU and ZANU to form the Patriotic Front has helped keep full integration a possibility. ZANLA clearly has both more guerrillas active in the field and more in training. However the strength of ZPRA is increasing rapidly. There are many pressures to keep the two groups apart — historical tensions between the members themselves, divisions between the supporters of the two parties in Africa, in the West, and among the Communist powers who actually supply the military hardware, plus of course real political differences. However both Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo seem determined to keep the Front together, and discussions about integration of the two armies continue.

The determination of the Smith regime to resist the inevitable must not be underestimated, and the war could go on for some time yet. But, to quote ZANU's Zimbabwe News (May-June 1977): 'The Smith regime is doomed no matter what concrete wall it may try to build against the strong revolutionary tide. The revolutionary process has its own inner logic and force that one cannot stop.'

References
Proposals for Whose Benefit?

An insidious aspect of the constant round of negotiations is the way in which the British role (and now the American role, also) is presented as neutral. The British Government soberly characterises itself as the arbitrator between the undesirable extremes of white racism and violent black nationalism. An admirable exercise in public relations! British authority kindly and patiently intervenes to separate white and black extremists, to stop them from killing each other and from destroying Zimbabwe's promising economic future. After installing the "neutral caretaker administration" (page 4 of the British Government White Paper) the US and the UK propose to hand over $1.5 billion to the majority rule government to develop the country. How big of them! And what a big prize for those willing to say 'yes' to an offer, it is hoped, they can't refuse. However, in the harsh realpolitik of today's international affairs, only the naive could expect to get something for nothing. What's in it for Britain and the US?

Between two-thirds and three-quarters of the Rhodesian economy (in terms of investment, output and profit) is dominated by British, South African and US capital.* White Rhodesian capital controls the remainder. Multinational corporations control almost totally the mining, manufacturing and finance sectors and have a large share of the agricultural sector. This is what is at stake behind the proposals — namely, whether these interests are to entrench themselves or whether the country's wealth is to be appropriated by Zimbabweans. The UK/US proposals are clearly designed to secure the integration of independent Zimbabwe into the international capitalist system, which will be ensured by taking over the existing state structure, which includes the Civil Service and Judiciary, the existing laws and police force, and sections of the armed forces (see below). This will be supported by a new Constitution redolent with bourgeois values. For example, protection of existing rights to private property is entrenched in the proposed Bill of Rights:

Protection from deprivation of property: this will confer protection from expropriation of property except on specified grounds of public interest and even then only on condition that there is prompt payment of adequate compensation (the amount of which, if not agreed, can be determined by an independent tribunal) and that the compensation may be remitted abroad within a reasonable period . . . (para. 5[v], page 11).

Any nationalisation measures the new Government will take mean automatic compensation, either abroad or locally, for whites' land (at guaranteed inflated values), businesses and other property.

The Constitution will protect the pensions of all public officers (including past officers) by: a provision which will ensure that the pensions of officers who are compulsorily retired to facilitate the reconstruction of the public service can be freely remitted abroad (para 7[f], ii, page 14).

Since one third of all white employees are state employees, this provision will guarantee compensation abroad for a very large proportion of the white population. Here is another example of the ideological assumptions embedded in the proposals:

The ability of an independent Government of Zimbabwe to raise the living standards of the poor majority depends not only on the development of the traditional sector but also on effective administration and a high level of output in the modern sector, which accounts for the greater part of Rhodesia's export earnings, internal revenues, domestic production of consumer goods, and wage employment of African Zimbabweans (p.22, para. 3).

Despite the fact that the so-called ‘traditional sector’ referred to here includes 80% of the Zimbabwean people, this quote is the only reference in the whole 8,000 word document to their economic development. All other specific provisions under the ZDF refer to the so-called ‘modern sector’. The underlying ideology in this approach is what has been called the ‘trickle down’ theory whereby it is assumed that capitalist economic growth percolates down to promote growth in the ‘backward’ rural sector of the economy. However the Latin American, African and Asian experience shows conclusively that this approach leads only to the further impoverishment, and ultimately to the destruction, of the ‘traditional sector’ because growth in capitalist agriculture proceeds directly at its expense.

In short, the proposals embody the lessons of Kenya’s decolonisation.* The basic instrument of counter-revolutionary social engineering is a ‘land deal’ which does much more than allow whites to take out their money if they want to leave. It props up values of all properties for those interests remaining and sanctifies property and the principle that ‘no take over without full compensation’. At the same time the landless and poor peasants are isolated once rich peasants and some of the middle are bought off with a partial land distribution and loans.

The Zimbabwe Development Fund
The ZDF has a multi-purpose role. By guaranteeing compensation and pensions it not only seeks to buy out those whites who want to leave, but more importantly it also encourages those whites who are essential to the continued functioning of the present infrastructure to stay. By underwriting training schemes and by encouraging some black ownership of private property, the ZDF hopes to generate and co-opt a black petty bourgeoisie by allowing them access to such property and to administrative and clerical jobs. Finally, by initiating and encouraging investment, the ZDF aims to entrench the role of foreign capital in the economy as a whole, while maintaining external control over the use of funds:

The operation of the Fund would help to ensure that the obligations of the Zimbabwe Government under the settlement will not inhibit economic develop-

*For an exploration of the Kenya model see M. Bratton, ‘Structural Transformation in Zimbabwe: Comparative Notes from the Neo-Colonisation of Kenya’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 15 April, 1977 — though from our view it over-emphasizes the differences in economic structure and obscures somewhat the similarity of the British approach to two, admittedly differing, situations — Eds.
ment in Zimbabwe for lack of foreign exchange and would thereby also help to reassure those who might fear that the new Government might be unable to carry out these obligations (para 13, page 7).

African Zimbabweans should have expanded access to better jobs in mining, industry, commerce and the public service. More balanced patterns of ownership for farms, houses and business will emerge (para 2, page 22).

The fund could . . . also co-ordinate bilateral development assistance, especially in the training of Africans in technical and administrative skills (para 6, page 23).

The ZDF thus aims to make Zimbabwe safe for capitalism. The 'donor' countries are given a decisive say over future development; their long term interests are guaranteed. And if that is not enough, the World Bank is handed a key role from the outset to orchestrate the political economy:

The Fund could assist both the transitional administration and the independent Government of Zimbabwe to plan development projects and programmes consistent with the political changes which will have taken place without disruption of the economy (para 6, page 23).

Its (the ZDF's) efforts should encourage commercial capital flows, especially in extractive, processing, and manufacturing industries, supported as appropriate by national export credit and investment insurance agencies (para 5, page 23).

The fund will also facilitate action by agencies of donor countries to make appropriate non-concessional loans and guarantees to encourage commercial trade and private investment flows to Zimbabwe (para 10, page 24).

Not only are the funds conditional on facilitating private capital flows to, and subsequently out of Zimbabwe, they are only to be made available 'in accordance with the criteria of the Development Assistance Committee' (page 24) of the World Bank. One of these criteria is that, wherever possible, such monies are made available only in conjunction with funds raised on the private capital market. The long-term effect of this is that the so-called 'independent' Zimbabwean Government can be held to ransom through its international debt burden. Another criterion is that World Bank funds are not available 'for the creation or extension of state-owned enterprises except in extremely rare cases when . . . private capital is not available and if it is satisfied, after thorough examination, that the Government’s participation will be compatible with efficient operation and will not have an unduly deterrent effect upon the expansion of private initiative and enterprise’ (Policies and Operations of the World Bank, page 37).

The establishment and continued operation of the Fund are predicated upon the acceptance and implementation of the terms of the settlement as a whole (para 13, page 7).

The Fund’s objectives, and the fact that experience shows that economic development projects take a long time to mature, will make it necessary to envisage a fairly long period of disbursement of the Fund’s resources (para 7, page 23).

In other words, the authoritarian powers set up under the Transitional and Independence Constitutions (see details below), which the Zimbabwean people have played no part in formulating, must be accepted if these funds are to be made available and, furthermore, will only be made available over a considerable period of time to ensure that the restrictive conditions are complied with. This is ensured by the funds themselves
being externally controlled by the World Bank. If, however, the imperialist powers feel that the liberation movement cannot be 'neutralized' during the transitional period, or they feel that the Independent Government tends to take a line unacceptable to international capital, or the overall profitability of the exercise is not realised, they can withdraw their contributions to the Fund on any of several pretexts.

Finally, the Fund offers with one hand to take away with the other:

... The Government of Zimbabwe would inherit the assets and debts of the Government of Southern Rhodesia ... (para 8, page 5).

... The Fund should be prepared to provide balance of payments support during the period of economic transition, especially to enable the gradual return to normal external relations after the lifting of sanctions (para 5, page 23).

In other words, it is a means of providing the foreign exchange whereby the illegal regime's long-outstanding debts can be repaid and the stored up profits of foreign companies can be repatriated.

The Transitional Constitution
The ZDF provisions give no controlling power to the Zimbabwean people whatsoever and, as the Guardian of 28 September 1977 says: 'by the time the really difficult problems are tackled the plan hopefully will have developed enough momentum to ride out the inevitable storms.' In other words, the Transitional Constitution is a farce which simply allows the existing order to be reinforced by a dictatorial commissioner using existing laws, existing judicature, existing civil service and existing police forces. Just in case this is not adequate a UN force will be provided for him to complete the job.

Papa Carver
The Resident Commissioner will himself be the legislature (para 3, page 16).

The Resident Commissioner will be able, if he considers it desirable, to set up one or more Advisory Councils or Committees to assist him in the performance of any specific function or of his functions generally. But he will be free to act without having consulted any such body or to act otherwise than in accordance with its advice if he does consult it (para 6, page 17).

Smith's Laws Stay
... there will be a general validation of all laws which were purported to have been made during the period since 11 November 1965 (para 18[a], page 20).

... The Resident Commissioner will exercise all powers that are currently vested by any law in a Minister ... (para 4, page 17).

As a precautionary measure, a number of the emergency powers now operating in Southern Rhodesia will need to be available to the Resident Commissioner immediately upon the commencement of the Transitional Constitution, which will therefore deem a proclamation of emergency to be in force as from that date and until the Resident Commissioner himself otherwise provides (para 9[b], page 18).

In limited cases, therefore, the Transitional Administration (and subsequently the Government of Zimbabwe) ... will be permitted to continue these existing laws and practices, notwithstanding the Bill of Rights ... (para 9[a], page 18).

Police State Remains
The Transitional Constitution will provide that the judges of the High Court and
the subordinate courts will be the persons who are serving in those respective capacities immediately before it comes into operation. . . . a judge of the High Court, once appointed (and this includes such a judge who has been continued in office at the commencement of the Transitional Constitution), may not be removed until he reaches retiring age . . . (para 11, pp.18 and 19).

The Transitional Constitution will provide that all persons holding or acting in public offices immediately before the coming into operation of the Constitution will continue to hold or act in the like offices . . . (para 15, page 19).

The primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order during the transition period will lie with the police forces (para 11[d], page 6).

Security – for Whom?
Which armed forces (other than the UN force) will be 'lawfully operating' in the transitional period? Only those that the Resident Commissioner chooses to confer that dignity upon. The vague wording of the provisions can only lead to the conclusion that he will take control of all those forces in the existing Rhodesian army who are prepared to swear allegiance to the Crown. Presumably there will be an attempt to incorporate elements from the guerrilla forces into the new Zimbabwe National Army (to stand alongside their former enemies!). Those who refuse to accept the Resident Commissioner's authority, and the repressive apparatus that he will enforce, will be deemed to be operating unlawfully. They will no doubt be disarmed and disbanded, so that those who fought for liberation will be excluded from the army of independent Zimbabwe.

The Resident Commissioner will be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces which may be lawfully operating in Southern Rhodesia during the transition period . . . (para 5, page 17).

The Resident Commissioner will be empowered to require any member of any such force to swear an oath of allegiance to the Crown and an oath to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of Southern Rhodesia (para 5, page 17).

On the agreed day on which power is transferred to the transitional administration, a cease-fire will come into effect within Rhodesia . . . (para 11, page 7).

The Independence Constitution
The Independence Constitution is a farce. It is an attempt to foist a bourgeois democratic state system on the Zimbabwean people. It is not only a system totally inappropriate to conditions in Zimbabwe, but is a deliberate attempt to reverse the process of popular participation that has begun to be developed in the course of the liberation struggle. For this reason alone it should be thrown out. We confine ourselves to mentioning a few of the more outrageous provisions.

1. The Specially elected Members
The specially elected members are to be elected by the ordinary members of the National Assembly. Their number will be one-fifth of the number of the latter. The purpose of this provision is to give 'adequate representation to minority communities' — i.e. to the whites, who constitute only one-twenty-fifth of the total population. Their disproportionate representation in the Assembly should be carefully noted in the light of the one third blocking mechanism for constitutional amendments. This provision may not in any case be changed for the life of two parliaments, or eight years, whichever is the longer.
Not so different from Smith’s ‘Internal Solution’ is it?

2. The Bill of Rights
The Bill of Rights would permit the Government of Zimbabwe to introduce measures of land reform (sic) while guaranteeing the right to private property (para 7, page 5).

This will obtain for at least four years, after which it could only be changed by amendment of the constitution. Other provisions of the bill of rights, however, may be suspended but two years after independence . . . ! The bill of rights protects the ‘fundamental freedom’ of groups (i.e. whites) to ‘establish and maintain schools at their own expense’.

3. The Public Service
The five ‘non-political’ members of the Public Service Commission will have the right to hire and fire civil servants. The pay of these civil servants may not be cut. Their pensions must be allowed to be freely remitted abroad.

4. Elections
Lastly, elections to the first National Assembly will take place under certain restricted conditions during the transition period. They are allegedly intended to be ‘fair and impartial’ . . . However:
   a. Carver will appoint the electoral and boundary commission which will register voters and delimit constituencies. Coupled with the provision for the specially elected members and the one third blocking vote for constitutional amendments, this creates some sinister possibilities.
   b. Only people over 21 will be able to vote (para 4[e], page 9), thus excluding the numerous and more radical younger generation (approx. 250,000 people).
   c. There is no guarantee that all Smith’s detainees will have been released by the end of the 6-month transition period. Will Carver find the time to ‘review’ the many hundreds of cases? (para 18[c], page 21).

Self-determination for Zimbabwe!

These notes are based on the Zimbabwe Information Group’s Bulletin No.4, October 1977. That issue and regular subscriptions (5 copies – £1.00, UK individuals; £1.50 UK, institutions; elsewhere individuals $6.00, institutions $8.00) can be had from ZIG, 1 Cambridge Terrace, London NW1 4JL.

NAMIBIA: THE LATEST ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE

Jo Morris

Reading the South African press one might be forgiven for believing that Pretoria had experienced the blinding light of conversion over Namibia. Even the press now refer to the illegal colony as SWA/Namibia and claims that ‘the National Party Government is now creating in
Not so different from Smith’s ‘Internal Solution’ is it?

2. The Bill of Rights
The Bill of Rights would permit the Government of Zimbabwe to introduce measures of land reform (sic) while guaranteeing the right to private property (para 7, page 5).

This will obtain for at least four years, after which it could only be changed by amendment of the constitution. Other provisions of the bill of rights, however, may be suspended but two years after independence . . . ! The bill of rights protects the ‘fundamental freedom’ of groups (i.e. whites) to ‘establish and maintain schools at their own expense’.

3. The Public Service
The five ‘non-political’ members of the Public Service Commission will have the right to hire and fire civil servants. The pay of these civil servants may not be cut. Their pensions must be allowed to be freely remitted abroad.

4. Elections
Lastly, elections to the first National Assembly will take place under certain restricted conditions during the transition period. They are allegedly intended to be ‘fair and impartial’ . . . However:

a. Carver will appoint the electoral and boundary commission which will register voters and delimit constituencies. Coupled with the provision for the specially elected members and the one third blocking vote for constitutional amendments, this creates some sinister possibilities.

b. Only people over 21 will be able to vote (para 4[e], page 9), thus excluding the numerous and more radical younger generation (approx. 250,000 people).

c. There is no guarantee that all Smith’s detainees will have been released by the end of the 6-month transition period. Will Carver find the time to ‘review’ the many hundreds of cases? (para 18[c], page 21).

Self-determination for Zimbabwe!

These notes are based on the Zimbabwe Information Group’s Bulletin No.4, October 1977. That issue and regular subscriptions (5 copies – £1.00, UK individuals; £1.50 UK, institutions; elsewhere individuals $6.00, institutions $8.00) can be had from ZIG, 1 Cambridge Terrace, London NW1 4JL.

NAMIBIA: THE LATEST ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE

Jo Morris

Reading the South African press one might be forgiven for believing that Pretoria had experienced the blinding light of conversion over Namibia. Even the press now refer to the illegal colony as SWA/Namibia and claims that ‘the National Party Government is now creating in
SWA/Namibia the diametric opposite of everything it has fought and schemed for 29 years to create in South Africa: a totally non-racial democracy (Johannesburg Star, 22 October 1977). Whites in this bastion of reaction itself have welcomed the loosening of apartheid laws because they believe it will stave off international criticism. The optimism is reflected by a property boom in Windhoek, with a number of German speakers reported to be leaving the Western Cape to return to ‘South West’.

Explaining this optimism and financial upsurge the editor of the English language Windhoek Advertiser touches on the basic contradiction in the situation: whites in Namibia believe that South Africa is in a stronger and more cohesive position than it has been since the ill-conceived Turnhalle conference was launched. He explains that with South Africa spending hundreds of millions annually to secure the northern frontier with Angola, many whites are adopting the notion that Pretoria has no intention of surrendering military control over Namibia. ‘They sense that Pretoria does not really mind what kind of civilian and political administration looks after the internal affairs of SWA so long as it can be sure the country does not become a military corridor along which South Africa’s enemies can advance to the Orange River.’ While the perception of South Africa’s neo-colonial intention is correct, the white analysis ignores the strength of SWAPO inside and outside the country and the unworkability of any ‘settlement’ which has not involved direct negotiations between Pretoria & SWAPO.

It was the lack of credibility of the tribally-based Turnhalle conference, convened two years ago to allow the ‘peoples’ of Namibia to determine their future, which forced Vorster to shift to a more fully developed neo-colonial strategy. In the face of pressure from the Western ‘contact group’ (Britain, France, West Germany, USA and Canada) last summer, he conceded the principle of one man one vote. The Turnhalle, based on the concept of a federal ethnic state, was formally dropped though subsequent events suggest that Pretoria has had a hand in the recent split in the SWA Nationalist Party which has resulted in the formation of the multiracial Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA). The new party is led by former Nationalist MP Dirk Mudge and Clemens Kapuuo, Chief of the Herero tribe and known for his anti-SWAPO activities. The DTA is pledged to fight SWAPO in the elections and its manifesto reflects the recommendations of the Turnhalle’s Constitutional Committee, chaired by Mudge.

The Western initiative, made in an attempt to avoid further embarrassing confrontation at the UN, has served Vorster well. While publicly accepting elections with some kind of UN supervision, Vorster has never conceded the key point of the Namibia dispute: that South Africa is illegally occupying Namibia. SWAPO has agreed to participate in elections, but only when all of the occupying army has been withdrawn:

South Africa still has an army of 50,000 men in Namibia. These have to be removed entirely before preparations for a democratic election may begin. It is also clear from recent events in South Africa itself, notably the clamp-down on the more outspoken opponents of the regime, that the South African Government is determined to maintain its apartheid system of government unchanged. We can therefore only approach negotiations with apprehension and care, knowing that the South African Government has only one goal, namely the retention of as much influence as possible in Namibia.
Though Pretoria may feel that it is in a stronger position than ever before to pull off some kind of internal settlement, it is clear that it can only be on borrowed time if it does not involve direct negotiations with SWAPO. Nevertheless Pretoria is pressing ahead with its plans for elections with an urgency that suggests a calculation that as little time as possible should be given the opposition to organize effectively. The newly appointed Administrator-General of Namibia, South African Justice Steyn, has allowed only two months for the compilation of a completely new electoral register. Meanwhile the DTA, now it has the advantage of having no direct relationship with the ruling Nationalist Party, has announced that it will be seeking funds from the 200 foreign and South African companies in Namibia.

South Africa’s confidence that the election will go its way is borne out by the consolidation of the ‘Bantustanisation’ of Namibia. During 1976 the South African administration began the process of creating three more bantustans (Bushmanland, Namaland and Basterland), held elections in Eastern Caprivi and further consolidated the separation of Ovamboland and Kavangoland. In July this year, while Vorster was talking to the Western ‘contact group’, the Damara Legislative and Executive Council was established and will soon be followed by the Rehoboth Legislative Council. On 31 August, South Africa, in its most provocative act during the course of the talks, announced the integration of Walvis Bay (Namibia’s only viable port) into the Republic. The South African Navy arrived a few days later.

But Pretoria’s plans for Namibia are most clearly seen in its military training programme. While drafting an increasing number of national servicemen to the north of Namibia the SADF has begun a training programme for eleven tribal armies. Military chiefs recently finalised plans for the establishment of an ethnically composed defence force, which is intended to become the nucleus of a future national Namibian army. Training is to be by the South African Defence Force which is also to supply arms and equipment. Even a formal withdrawal of SADF would leave Pretoria with a strong military influence over defence and security.

The training of African recruits will be extended to include all Namibia’s eleven ‘ethnic groups’. Initially they will be trained separately but will ultimately form part of an integrated army command. Already a border auxiliary force of several hundred has been primed in Ovamboland and Kavangoland (the northern border area), while Bushmen are used extensively as trackers in so-called ‘hot pursuit operations’. New recruits are to be trained in counter-insurgency methods for use in the border area against SWAPO guerrillas and will remain part of SADF until the scheduled independence date of December 1978.

South Africa foresees a long low-intensity war on Namibia’s northern border. UNITA groups are being trained and assisted in Southern Angola, the obvious intention being to put a brake on SWAPO’s raids into northern Namibia. South Africa has an estimated 50,000 troops in the border zone, which now has a 5km wide no-go area, running right along the border. Tanks, armoured cars, helicopters, sophisticated communications systems, air weapons and an early warning satellite
are all part of South Africa’s military complex. Paratroopers and a mechanised brigade are reported to be stationed at Grootfontein, a motorised infantry brigade of 5,000 men at Okahanja, a police unit at Oshikati and reserves at Omisalnuta.

SWAPO’s military wing – PLAN – have launched regular raids and attacks into Ovamboland and the Caprivi Strip, as well as penetrating on occasions into Central Namibia (south of Windhoek). During the period 1 April to 11 May 1977 SWAPO claimed that PLAN forces killed 135 South African soldiers and wounded many more, destroyed 14 enemy vehicles, shot down three armed helicopters and captured a large quantity of arms. In November the SWAPO Secretary for Foreign Affairs claimed at a press conference that 82 enemy soldiers had been killed during actions the previous month. These figures, along with South Africa’s claim to have killed a large number of PLAN militants on the biggest attack ever by PLAN from across the border, gives substance to the recent decision of the SWAPO Central Committee to escalate the armed struggle.

Within Namibia there are few illusions about the nature of the struggle. While Vorster negotiates with the western contact group, refusing to a total withdrawal of South African troops before the elections, the South African administration in Namibia is taking a tough anti-SWAPO line. While it is dismantling some of the more offensive manifestations of apartheid, it is going to extreme lengths to discredit SWAPO. At a show trial in Windhoek, Victor Nkandi, member of the executive committee of SWAPO, was charged with the murder of tribal chief Elifas in August 1975. This was the crime for which Aaron Muchiniba and Hendrik Shikongo got the death sentence in 1976, later commuted because of gross irregularities by the defence lawyers and in response to the international outcry at Nkandi’s trial. The second trial used evidence dug up after the previous trial — a desperate attempt to pin the assassination on to SWAPO. If found guilty he faces an almost certain death sentence.

Besides widespread and intense harassment of civilians in northern Namibia by the South African army, many SWAPO executive members have recently been arrested. Daniel Tjongarero, deputy chairman of SWAPO, was held in detention by the Security Police who induced a state of disorientation and forced him to sign a letter of resignation from SWAPO. He later repudiated this statement, describing the threats made on the lives of the SWAPO leadership.

Reports from inside Namibia suggest that SWAPO is politically stronger than ever, in a buoyant and determined mood to face the final stage of their struggle. SWAPO’s strength has always lain in the mass consciousness of the Namibian people. While South Africa can remove successive layers of the leadership, it has never been able to stem the growing support which SWAPO has. Since the end of June an estimated 500 Ovambo youths have crossed into Angola for training in SWAPO camps. The mobilisation of Namibian women to an unprecedented level of politicisation (many women are with PLAN at the front) is one of the major strengths of SWAPO. A statement by a leading SWAPO woman activist gives a measure of the strength of the resistance inside the country.
The South African soldiers who are based in the northern part of Namibia are raping old women. When I say they rape old women, I mean even as old as 70. Even schoolgirls are taken by force. We totally reject the regime which is carrying out these things in the northern part of our country. However we don’t want our freedom fighters who operate in that part of Namibia to stop their activities, because things are getting worse and many people are killed by the South African soldiers. We believe that the gun is the only thing that will bring liberation to Southern Africa.

LIBERATION AND WORKING CLASS STRUGGLES IN SOUTH AFRICA

David Hemson

The general resistance of black people in South Africa to the apartheid regime is developing into a challenge both to the racist state and to employers. Both have been confronted through the attacks on the foundations of the state machinery of labour control in the townships and through the mass political strikes which have lead to mass demonstrations and a disruption of production. The black working class has drawn upon a long experience of proletarian struggle in South Africa in the form of the political strikes and boycotts of collaborative institutions. In July and September 1976 there were up to half a million black workers on strike, and the 1977 Soweto ‘anniversary’ political strike was more successful than was presented by the media in South Africa. The deepening resistance by black workers to the intense exploitation of their labour power is being met by tightened controls over working class organization and mobility, and the struggle has been marked by class action which is both anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist. Given the opposition of employer associations and the state to any form of political action involving the working class, the resistance to apartheid has clarified the connection between employers and the state in repression and has strengthened anti-capitalist ideology among black workers.

The resistance which swept South Africa after Soweto has accelerated the crisis both in political authority and in the capital relation as a whole. The discipline of capital on the mines and in the factories was already being challenged by the black working class. Mass strike action in Natal in 1973 lead to a resurgence of working class organization and an increase in the confidence of black workers. The demands of workers were met with wage increases as well as demonstrations of strength by the police and mass dismissals, and were followed by attempts to develop plant organization in opposition to trade unions. When strike action spread to the mines, demands for increased wages and resistance to the compound system were resisted by employers and the state with a heavy toll in the lives of black workers. In the period 1972 to June 1976 it has been estimated that 178 black miners were killed and 1,043 injured in the suppression of strikes and uprisings on the mines. Despite the attempt to isolate workers from the struggle against the apartheid state in the townships, the resistance in the schools, mines, factories, and plantations has developed into a combined assault on the system of exploitation in South Africa.
The South African soldiers who are based in the northern part of Namibia are raping old women. When I say they rape old women, I mean even as old as 70. Even schoolgirls are taken by force. We totally reject the regime which is carrying out these things in the northern part of our country. However we don't want our freedom fighters who operate in that part of Namibia to stop their activities, because things are getting worse and many people are killed by the South African soldiers. We believe that the gun is the only thing that will bring liberation to Southern Africa.

LIBERATION AND WORKING CLASS STRUGGLES
IN SOUTH AFRICA

David Hemson

The general resistance of black people in South Africa to the apartheid regime is developing into a challenge both to the racist state and to employers. Both have been confronted through the attacks on the foundations of the state machinery of labour control in the townships and through the mass political strikes which have lead to mass demonstrations and a disruption of production. The black working class has drawn upon a long experience of proletarian struggle in South Africa in the form of the political strikes and boycotts of collaborative institutions. In July and September 1976 there were up to half a million black workers on strike, and the 1977 Soweto ‘anniversary’ political strike was more successful than was presented by the media in South Africa. The deepening resistance by black workers to the intense exploitation of their labour power is being met by tightened controls over working class organization and mobility, and the struggle has been marked by class action which is both anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist. Given the opposition of employer associations and the state to any form of political action involving the working class, the resistance to apartheid has clarified the connection between employers and the state in repression and has strengthened anti-capitalist ideology among black workers.

The resistance which swept South Africa after Soweto has accelerated the crisis both in political authority and in the capital relation as a whole. The discipline of capital on the mines and in the factories was already being challenged by the black working class. Mass strike action in Natal in 1973 lead to a resurgence of working class organization and an increase in the confidence of black workers. The demands of workers were met with wage increases as well as demonstrations of strength by the police and mass dismissals, and were followed by attempts to develop plant organization in opposition to trade unions. When strike action spread to the mines, demands for increased wages and resistance to the compound system were resisted by employers and the state with a heavy toll in the lives of black workers. In the period 1972 to June 1976 it has been estimated that 178 black miners were killed and 1,043 injured in the suppression of strikes and uprisings on the mines. Despite the attempt to isolate workers from the struggle against the apartheid state in the townships, the resistance in the schools, mines, factories, and plantations has developed into a combined assault on the system of exploitation in South Africa.
The squatters’ movement has exposed to all workers the denial of the right to housing and family life in the cities. The independence of Bantustans has shown how the rural black petty bourgeoisie is undermining even the limited rights black workers have to be in urban areas. The struggle against Bantu education and the state apparatus in the townships has been complemented by the workers struggle against the state system of liaison committees and employers who are all involved in implementing apartheid labour legislation such as the pass laws. The protracted struggles for recognition of independent trade unions fought in multinational companies have also widened the resistance to apartheid to include management which uses mass dismissals and the Security Police to break or deadlock the struggle for mass organization.

The political resistance to the apartheid state by black workers has been deepened by the nature of the crisis of capital accumulation in South Africa. The expansion of the economy has been hampered by world recession, by its own contradictions, and by the growing resistance of the black working class which is weakening the confidence of capital. Capital accumulation in the past decade has been marked by a massive increase in unemployment (2 million black workers are estimated to be unemployed) and by rising inflation. Severe difficulties in the balance of payments indicate a far deeper problem: that of low productivity in manufacturing. In recent months total manufacturing production has started to decline. Capital can only resolve the current crisis through an increase in exploitation; through the removal of subsidies on staple foods, increased rents in townships, rising military expenditure, and declining real wages. It is in this context that the struggle of the black working class expresses the resistance of the people as a whole.

As the crisis has deepened, so the use of force against the black working class has increased. Squatters’ homes have been bulldozed down and the pass laws tightened; organization on the factory floor has been met with victimization, interrogations, arrests, and prosecutions. Workers who challenged anti-strike legislation during the mass strikes in 1973 were able to avoid prosecutions for strike action because of the way in which the police were disorganized trying to marshall a display of force both in the townships and outside the factories. Despite a relative decline in industrial strike action since 1973 there has been an increase in political strikes, and the demands of the workers are now more definitely centred around the issues of organization and working class rights rather than the wage demands of the earlier period. Strike action at a number of foreign-owned or financed companies (Heinemann Electric, Natal Cotton and Woollen Mills, and Pilkingtons) illustrate the new level of resistance in the factories. In Heinemann Electric the workers rejected all alternatives to recognition of the Metal and Allied Workers Union. The police charged the workers with batons, and those who were selectively re-employed were forced to sign a statement identifying the leaders of the strike. The union leaders involved were prosecuted and then banned. At Natal Cotton and Woollen Mills, workers struck against the appointment of a personnel manager who was closely connected with the Security Police. The police prosecuted trade union leaders who were finally banned in November 1976. The strike at Pilkingtons indicated a new level of organization among workers, both strikers and non-strikers. Despite the arrests of pickets and emergency
legislation which prohibited mass meetings, the strike lasted for ten weeks sustained by collections from shop stewards in other industries.

The employers and the state have reacted forcefully to the greater determination of the black working class. Factory discipline is being maintained by a restructuring of labour relations to permit 'communication' with management through collaborative liaison committees and through the pressure of the queue outside the factory gates. This has had the effect of making strike action more deliberate and protracted. As a challenge to management prerogatives and the policies of the state, strike action has become a consciously political act.

The rising consciousness of the black working class is made evident by an attack on the state system of representation within the factories and the growing strength of an underground workers movement (particularly involving militants of the South African Congress of Trade Unions — SACTU), but it has lead to an increase in the repression of working class action. Prosecution for striking by black workers follows dismissal by employers and is a technique for hounding working class militants out of the factories altogether. Mass trials of striking workers are taking place and bail is being opposed for 'security reasons'; despite these pressures workers are refusing to appoint spokesmen on their behalf knowing clearly these workers would be further victimized. The crisis in South Africa has been marked by increasingly severe sentences for striking black workers and more determined counter-action by employers. During a recent court case in the Transvaal 30 workers were fined R100 or three months for staying away from work on a public holiday with a further 6 month jail sentence suspended for three years (Rand Daily Mail, 14 June 1977). Strikers in the mining industry have been sentenced to up to three years imprisonment. Striking workers have been confronted by armed police at work as well as in the townships. Bus drivers who struck in Durban last year demanding the removal of a wage differential between white and black drivers were forced back to work by the police. The workers reported: 'We were told to go into a big workshop — about 500 of us — and when we got in we found ourselves surrounded by policemen with guns. There were guns, rifles, Land-Rovers, and the policemen even wore steel helmets. We were told we could choose to go to work or go to gaol for five years. There was no negotiation (Natal Mercury, 3 September 1976).

The state and employers have given particular attention to the suppression of certain advanced groups of workers who have persistently defied controls over their organization. Following repeated strikes for recognition of the Metal and Allied Workers Union at British Leyland, the factory putting forward these demands was shut down as threatened by the company. Similar action in the form of mass redundancies was taken against unionized workers employed by the International Textile Manufacturing Association in Pietermaritzburg. Other militant groups of workers, for example, Durban abattoir workers who have consistently struck against starvation wages, unfair dismissals, and for pension rights have been dismissed en masse as a lesson in discipline for workers in the area (RDM 3 September 1976). The increasing role of independent black trade unions in defending workers prosecuted for striking indicates the importance of organized defensive action against repression of working class organization.
As the crisis in South Africa deepens, the state has become increasingly involved in stepping up both repression and bourgeois reforms. At this stage the state has become involved in a major restructuring of the employer/employee relationship through the appointment of two Commissions of Enquiry into labour legislation. Increasingly 'liberal' statements are being made on the question of black trade unions i) because of the rising demands of the workers and ii) because of the international working class demands for elementary working class rights in South Africa. The argument is now not so much whether to have black trade unionism as the nature of trade unionism among black workers. This debate is taking place on the open arena of class struggle. The state is attempting to reinforce reformist notions by eliminating militant trade unionists, by holding out the carrot of trade union recognition at some future date, and by smashing open black resistance. While trade union recognition is being discussed, the state is mounting an attack on black organizations and eliminating class-conscious leadership through ban- nings or death in detention. Following a long trial in Pietermaritzburg of SACTU militants five were sentenced to life imprisonment because, in the words of the judge, 'they have shown themselves to be dedicated revolutionaries, and there appears to be little or no reformation (sic) in their cases' (Workers Unity, SACTU, 5 September 1977). Three SACTU militants were recently tortured to death in South African prisons: Lawrence Ndzanga who organized railway workers, Joseph Mduli who organized workers in Natal, and Elijah Loza, who organized dock and municipal workers in the Cape. Both the state and employers have become increasingly fearful of the political demands of the black working class expressed by SACTU in adopting the Freedom Charter which demands that monopoly industry, banks, and the mines be nationalized.

The recent attack on all forms of black organization within the country is closely linked to the crisis of capital. Nowhere has this been clearer than in the struggle against collaborative institutions in Soweto. The apartheid state has attempted to reinforce sections of the black petty bourgeoisie in order to carry out measures which attack the security of the black working class in order to increase the overall exploitation of black workers. This attack on the working class has sharpened the issues of struggle; the announcement of rent increases was met with the response: 'Down with capitalism', and a determined opposition to the collaborative black petty bourgeoisie which agreed to these increases. The state has now responded decisively by banning all open black resistance and immediately re-introducing the rent increases which were thwarted by working class action in April! The measures which are being adopted by capital to maintain the overall rate of profit in South Africa are compelling the state to intervene with increasingly exploitative and oppressive measures, speeding the development of political resistance by the black working class.

Despite the increase in repression and mass unemployment, capital is correctly wary of the potential of working class action. Despite an agreement not to increase the wages of black mine workers in gold and coal mining this year, strike action by 3,600 workers at the Cornelia Colliery near Vereeniging demanding wage increases caused widespread fears among management that unrest could spread to other coal and gold mines (RDM, 2 June 1977). The workers were told that wage
increases would be announced ‘in due course’, and finally wage increases for all black miners have been made. In this way working class resistance to the wage freeze (actually declining living standards of the working class as a whole) has forced concessions to forestall mass economic and political strikes. In this sense increased repression is an acknowledgement of the growing strength of working class action.

Despite the attempts of Western countries to carry out a policy of ‘constructive engagement’, a form of humane imperialism, to reinforce the black petty bourgeoisie and encourage reformism among the working class, the state and employers are still faced by the enormous problem of building reformism at a time of crisis where the capital relation takes a weak form i.e. requires the constant intervention of the state to reproduce it. The dictatorial controls exercised by the state over the movement of black workers, the attacks on working class organization, and suppression of strike action, all point to the problem of securing compliance by workers with the rule of capital at the point of production and in the society as a whole.

Note
Many case studies of strike action in South Africa can be found in the South African Labour Bulletin, Durban, which attempts to describe working class action from the trade union viewpoint. See particularly SALB, June-July 1977, 3(7).

U.S. IMPERIALISM AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Barry Cohen

The Carter Perspective

Jimmy Carter and Andrew Young both tend to perceive the problems of southern Africa as analogous to the struggle for black civil rights in the American south. Obviously, they still have a great deal to learn.

Carter’s publicised views are still somewhat limited, but an interview with the Financial Mail of Johannesburg (at the end of 1976) succinctly captures this perspective:

I think our businessmen can be a constructive force achieving racial justice with South Africa. I think the weight of our investments there, the value the South Africans place on access to American capital and technology can be used as a positive force in settling regional problems.

Like the arrival of an enlightened capitalism in the American South, Carter expects that increased corporate penetration will expand opportunities for blacks, raise their material standard of living, and whittle down the structure of apartheid. Nevertheless, faithful to his trilateralist* assumptions, he stated:

America alone cannot have much influence throughout the entire southern African region. We must work in concert with other relevant powers, such as Britain which has real influence in Rhodesia, and in those nations such as Zaire and South Africa where we have some clout of our own.

*Carter was a member of the influential Trilateral Commission for some years, which in turn furnished most of his foreign policy advisers and positions.
increases would be announced 'in due course', and finally wage increases for all black miners have been made. In this way working class resistance to the wage freeze (actually declining living standards of the working class as a whole) has forced concessions to forestall mass economic and political strikes. In this sense increased repression is an acknowledgement of the growing strength of working class action.

Despite the attempts of Western countries to carry out a policy of 'constructive engagement', a form of humane imperialism, to reinforce the black petty bourgeoisie and encourage reformism among the working class, the state and employers are still faced by the enormous problem of building reformism at a time of crisis where the capital relation takes a weak form i.e. requires the constant intervention of the state to reproduce it. The dictatorial controls exercised by the state over the movement of black workers, the attacks on working class organization, and suppression of strike action, all point to the problem of securing compliance by workers with the rule of capital at the point of production and in the society as a whole.

Note
Many case studies of strike action in South Africa can be found in the *South African Labour Bulletin*, Durban, which attempts to describe working class action from the trade union viewpoint. See particularly SALB, June-July 1977, 3(7).

U.S. IMPERIALISM AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Barry Cohen

The Carter Perspective

Jimmy Carter and Andrew Young both tend to perceive the problems of southern Africa as analogous to the struggle for black civil rights in the American south. Obviously, they still have a great deal to learn.

Carter's publicised views are still somewhat limited, but an interview with the *Financial Mail* of Johannesburg (at the end of 1976) succinctly captures this perspective:

I think our businessmen can be a constructive force achieving racial justice with South Africa. I think the weight of our investments there, the value the South Africans place on access to American capital and technology can be used as a positive force in settling regional problems.

Like the arrival of an enlightened capitalism in the American South, Carter expects that increased corporate penetration will expand opportunities for blacks, raise their material standard of living, and whittle down the structure of apartheid. Nevertheless, faithful to his trilateralist* assumptions, he stated:

America alone cannot have much influence throughout the entire southern African region. We must work in concert with other relevant powers, such as Britain which has real influence in Rhodesia, and in those nations such as Zaire and South Africa where we have some clout of our own.

*Carter was a member of the influential Trilateral Commission for some years, which in turn furnished most of his foreign policy advisers and positions.
Angola

When Young made his famous statement about Cubans being an ‘element of stability and order’ in Angola, the effect was astounding. Many observers failed to appreciate Young’s sophistication on this matter. In Congressional Hearings in 1976, he stated that the Cubans were invited by the legitimate government of Angola as a necessary response to the South African invasion. Since every African nation valued its non-alignment, Young was sure that Angola would not allow itself to fall under Soviet domination. The Cuban presence was a result of US policy mistakes. At a State Department press conference in February 1977, Young revealed that he was asked by MPLA representatives shortly before Angolan independence to arrange appointments with key members of Congress. They told him: ‘Don’t force us into the Marxist camp. We want to be non-aligned.’

Young is convinced that, regardless of the self-designation of any African regime, they all need and desire good economic relations with the US. In Angola’s case, Gulf Oil has actually surpassed its pre-war output of oil. Gulf’s installations in Cabinda are being guarded, ironically enough, by Cuban troops, against attacks from the Front for the Liberation of the Cabindan Enclave (FLEC). Young’s strategy has rapidly evolved to deal with the growth of Third World economic nationalism. Even where nationalisation occurs, the multinationals manage to achieve handsome profits through management fees, royalties from the sale of technological know-how, and the global marketing of resources. When once asked whether there might be a future Marxist government in Rhodesia, Young replied: ‘I don’t know what a Marxist government means anymore. If Angola is a Marxist government and its main trading partner is the United States then that doesn’t worry me.’

Rhodesia

Pursuing a persistent theme in US-southern Africa policy, the Carter administration continues to oppose armed struggle as a solution to Rhodesian settler colonialism. At the same time, it has been more emphatic on bringing white rule to an end in the near future...

In its most important gesture for African support, the US Congress repealed the Byrd Amendment on 15 March 1977. The Carter administration had lobbied very strongly to ensure this legislation. Vance told the Senate subcommittee on Africa on 10 February 1977 that American industry was not dependent on Rhodesian chrome; the cause of human rights demanded repeal of the amendment. Vance added that ‘the key to peace lies in ... Smith’s hands, and repeal of the Byrd amendment would do far more to persuade him to use it.’ The repeal was, of course, largely symbolic since Rhodesian minerals would simply be re-routed through other countries. Nevertheless, it pointed out to Smith that the US was growing impatient with his stubbornness.

To reassure the white minority of its future after majority rule, the Carter administration obtained Congressional support for the multilateral Zimbabwe Development Fund (see item in Briefings) – first proposed as part of the Kissinger plan. As a State Department official
explained, the Fund is designed ‘to encourage whites to retain their jobs. The blacks are not skilled . . . if they were left on their own it would all fall apart.’

Such American assurances to the white minority make it easier to persuade South Africa to apply pressures, for supplies of ammunition and oil from South Africa continue to sustain the Rhodesian war effort.* Although Vorster withdrew South African equipment in August 1976 — prior to the Kissinger shuttle — in order to coax Smith into a compromise, reports in Britain and the US have revealed that South African aircraft, helicopters and artillery were arriving in Rhodesia in April 1977.

US business is counting on a moderate black nationalist evolution to power. In October 1976, State Department officials met American corporate executives and bankers (many of whom hold interests in Rhodesia) to prepare a programme for investments during the transition to Zimbabwe. The plan was to coordinate private American capital with the government aid programme being worked out. E.F. Andrews of Alleghany Ludlum, the leader of the discussions and an advocate of the Byrd Amendment, said: ‘The question is what can the private sector do with an eye to keeping Rhodesia . . . in the Western sphere as opposed to the Soviet and Cuban sphere?’

Completed at the same time was a classified inter-agency study on Rhodesia by the State Department, the CIA, the Pentagon and various other government departments. Frank Wisner, the director of the State Department’s office of Southern African Affairs, recently stated that a Western military role has not yet been ruled out. Visits to Rhodesia by General William Yarborough, former commander of the US Army’s psychological warfare unit and later head of US Army Intelligence, lend some substance to Wisner’s statement. Although direct military involvement by US military forces is extremely unlikely, the presence of hundreds of American mercenaries in the Rhodesian army is a kind of covert intervention.

In requesting Congress for an allocation of $135 million for Security Support Assistance for Southern Africa, the Carter administration aims to influence the moderate tendencies in the front-line states. Ultimately, their political positions will be influenced by the degree of radicalisation they fear from the Zimbabwe struggle.

Namibia

During the Kissinger era, the US policy on Namibia was designed to use South Africa to protect both its own and imperialist interests there. This included backing for the Turnhalle conference (see Briefings on Namibia).

Clemens Kapuuo, Chief of the Herero tribe, has been increasingly promoted as the future leader of Namibia. A confidential UN memo leaked

*Contrary to UN sanctions, the multinational oil firms — Mobil, Caltex, Shell, BP and Total — are responsible for oil supplies to Rhodesia. An interruption in supply would bring the Rhodesian military to a standstill.
in late 1976 detailed BOSS/CIA plans to promote Kapuuo as a credible leader to the West. The New York law firm of Burns and Jacoby is representing Kapuuo at Turnhalle. Psychographic Communications of New York, a marketing consultancy agency, is involved in a campaign to 'sell' Kapuuo in the US, on a recent visit he met Secretary of State Vance. A former UN adviser in Africa reported to the Dublin Sunday Press on 19 September 1976 that Kissinger presented Vorster at their Zurich meeting with a proposal to create a Namibian army after the departure of South African troops. It would be equipped and trained by US military personnel and financed by the US for at least a decade. To prepare the groundwork for this type of intervention, the US Agency for International Development undertook two important projects in 1976 dealing with the development of programmes for backing South Africa in Namibia. The content of both studies indicated that counter-insurgency considerations were predominant.

Secretary of State Vance signalled a change in tactics when he told Congress on 10 February 1977 that the US considered a conference between South Africa and SWAPO to be of a very high priority. Any solution in Namibia had to develop under UN auspices with the participation of SWAPO. Young has held a number of meetings with SWAPO leaders. After a meeting with Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, Young declared: 'I was trying to convince him that his diplomatic strength was better than his military strength'. It is conceivable that, if SWAPO steps up its armed struggle, the US may attempt to exploit the contradictions existing between the internal and external wings of the organization.

It is clear that international capital acknowledges the fact that SWAPO would probably win genuinely free elections. If so, it would prefer a SWAPO government via the ballot box rather than the gun. SWAPO's programme calls for a 51 per cent share in mining ventures. On the subject of foreign investments, Nujoma has admitted that 'we need them and they are beneficial for the country'. The Director of the Namibia Association of Mining Companies told the Washington Post that 'American companies are lining up to get in here once we get independence'.

South Africa
As always, the American grand strategy for the southern African region is ultimately dependent on South Africa's cooperation. As we have seen, increased pressure on Ian Smith or progress towards a UN-recognized independence for Namibia are intimately related to the view the South African government holds regarding its future security. As Young frankly admitted in Congressional Hearings, 'anything that South Africa does in Rhodesia or in Namibia would have to be done because they feel it is in their own interest and not because of any agreements that are made with this administration'. The great task of the Carter administration is to prod the South African regime to increasingly view its best interests through the eyes of Western imperialism. What is required is not an abandonment of America's junior partner in Africa; after all, the economic and strategic investment is too great. Instead, the US must work, in southern Africa, towards giving the Nixon Doctrine 'a human face'.
In his *Financial Mail* interview, Carter stated that he believed American influence in South Africa was ‘very great’. His policy has been predicated on a ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach towards South Africa. The close cooperation and liaison which Kissinger evolved with South Africa was initially continued. However, following the widespread crack-down on South African organizations, newspapers, and black leadership in October 1977, the US expressed open displeasure by recalling its ambassador from Pretoria. In a TV interview with the BBC, Young stated that he did not see the possibility of a violent overthrow of the apartheid system in South Africa. Nevertheless, he added

... at some point, we are going to have to realise ... that we are not going to be able to do business with black Africa on one set of principles and then deny that set of principles totally in doing business with white Africa, and that all of us are going to have to make a choice. What I am saying to my country is that the intelligent thing to do is to put pressure on South Africa right now, before we get to the point where we have to make those kinds of hard either/or choices.

The US stance at the Vienna meeting between Vorster and Vice President Mondale signalled Carter’s desire to translate its moralistic rhetoric into some harder bargaining. Mondale stated, before the meeting, that it was vital for South Africa to end apartheid. However, as a reflection of the contradictions within the policy-making machinery between conservative Africa Bureau officials like Assistant Secretary of State William Schaufele and ‘liberals’ like Young, it was decided to press for small-scale gradual adjustments. Because Carter’s policy is more activist than Nixon’s, it was necessary to be more specific about the range of penalties it might apply against South African intransigence. These included a withdrawal of US military attachés from South Africa, cutting links between the two countries’ intelligence agencies, limiting Export-Import Bank guarantees on loans to South Africa, stiffer visa requirements for South Africans, and suspending tax credits for US corporations operating in South Africa. Regarding the employment of the most significant economic weapon — sanctions — Carter and Young have frequently expressed their opposition to this tactic. On 6 October, Young did acknowledge that a mandatory UN arms embargo or support for a Swedish proposal to limit new foreign investments in South Africa would have his support ‘when it is the only thing we can do’. However, these sanctions were viewed as final extreme measures. The primary task of the US at this stage, according to Young, was to channel pressures into ‘attainable and specific goals’.

**US Business**

The instability of South Africa has seriously affected the investment views of the American multinationals. By the time of the Soweto rebellion, the rate of return on US direct investment had fallen from a high point of 18.4% in 1973 to 8.7% in 1975. Since Soweto, the flow of new American investment has almost completely dried up.

A survey conducted by the Graduate School of Business in Cape Town on the attitudes of US corporations in South Africa discovered that 15% of those interviewed were contemplating a withdrawal from South Africa. Interestingly, major US financial institutions advanced an unprecedented total of $700 million in loans during 1976. By the end of that year, total lending to South Africa by American finance capital had
surpassed $2 billion — almost doubling the amount in one year. *The Economist* (London) explained this development by reporting: 'The banks are too sophisticated to pull the rug out from underneath South Africa. Their line is that its mineral resources make the country a good bet in the long term whatever the political changes.'

By 1977, 12 leading US corporations and banks which were coming under increasing pressure from American churches and liberal organizations issued a manifesto in March pledging to end discriminatory racial practices in their South African operations. Although this mild declaration side-stepped the larger issues of apartheid laws, black trade unions, etc., it did have the support of the Carter administration. Given the expanding economic involvement in black Africa where the volume of American trade far exceeds US-South African trade, US corporations were anxiously trying to ensure their commercial prospects for the future.

**The Future: Atlanta or Azania?**

In its strategy to liberalize the South African economy, the US will be applying considerable attention to the social and political forces which it could encourage on the reformist road of internal change. Given a lack of momentum to alter even the most superficial aspects of apartheid, Vorster could eventually represent a tremendous obstacle to American plans. Among the white population, the Progressive-Reform party, backed by industrial capitalist interests like the Anglo-American Corporation, has called for reforms similar to the Carter-Young proposals. In the black political spectrum, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi who refuses outright cooperation with the South African government but shuns the tactics of the more militant black organizations, may prove to be the great black hope of international capital. In essence, the politics of a Buthelezi strives towards the creation of a black petty bourgeoisie with a stake in the capitalist structure of the country. Buthelezi has manoeuvred to form an alliance with the Progressive-Reform Party. White bourgeois interests could possibly push the dominant National Party to create the conditions for the minor growth of black capitalism. As Gordon Waddell, a director of Anglo-American recently stated: 'They (the government) deliberately make it impossible for a black or brown in South Africa to enjoy any of the benefits of private enterprise.'

On a visit to the US in March 1977, Buthelezi, who had already met Kissinger in Africa in 1976, conferred with Carter, Young and top US officials. This was the first official meeting between a US President and a black South African leader.

The American civil rights analogy constantly postulated by Carter and Young bears no realistic relationship to the situation of South African blacks. The struggle in the United States revolved around 'civil rights' using the machinery of a bourgeois-democratic state to achieve legal adjustments to discriminatory practices. In South Africa, fascistic racism allows no such prospect for the oppressed majority. It is not through the deliberations of a Supreme Court but, through revolutionary socialism, that liberation for blacks and whites in South Africa will be achieved.
A socialist revolution in the most industrially advanced state in Africa would create enormous repercussions for neo-colonialism throughout the entire continent. Within the United States, itself, the effect of a large-scale conflict in South Africa would have serious consequences for the domestic racial situation. In the final analysis, the management of all the contradictions in American foreign policy will be directly related to the development of the class struggle in southern Africa. What is patently clear at this stage is that the future thrust of Western intervention will increasingly stem from the United States.

A fuller, earlier discussion along these lines can be found in Barry Cohen's pamphlet, *The Black and White Minstrel Show: Carter, Young and Africa* published by Spokesman Books, Nottingham in September 1977.

**ANGOLA: THE RISE AND FALL OF NITO ALVES**

Paul Fauvet (Mozambique, Angola, Guinea Information Centre)

With the arrest of Nito Alves on 7 July 1977 at Piri (his birthplace in northern Angola), a chapter of Angolan history centred around the 'nitista' insurrection of 27 May came to an end. There remain the clearing-up operations and the trials of the nitista leaders by the special military tribunal set up for that purpose. But an attempt can now be made to sum up the history of the factionalism within the MPLA in which he was the central figure.

The First Region

Born in 1945, Nito Alves studied at an evangelical mission near Piri, and then from 1960 in Luanda. Unlike Agostinho Neto and some others of the top MPLA leadership he was not university-educated. Nor, however, was he of the same social background as the teeming masses of the *museques*—Luanda's sprawling slum townships—though he was later to proclaim himself their spokesman. His education continued to a fairly high level, and when he took up clandestine anti-colonial activity in 1965 he was in his sixth year of studies at a Luanda *liceu*.

When a number of his comrades were arrested and incarcerated in the Sao Nicolau prison camp in southern Angola in 1966, Nito Alves left Luanda and joined the guerrilla fighters of MPLA's First Politico-Military Region in the Dembos forests. This pocket of guerrilla activity north of Luanda had been in existence since 1961 when the failed rising against the Luanda prisons sparked off the armed struggle. It was cut off from the rest of MPLA's activities. In June 1966 MPLA reinforcements, the Cienfuegos Column, totalling 72 men, managed to reach the First Region, after a hazardous twenty-day trek from the Zaire frontier. In January 1967, a further MPLA detachment, the Camy Column, set out to join the fighters in the Dembos, but was ambushed on the way by Portuguese troops and by men of Holden Roberto's FNLA. Out of its original complement of 158, only 19 of the Camy Column managed to fight their way through. After this there was no further contact between the First Region and the rest of the Movement until 1974.

Nito Alves rose to prominence in the Dembos. In 1967 he was put in joint command of the local CIR (Centre for Revolutionary Instruction),
A socialist revolution in the most industrially advanced state in Africa would create enormous repercussions for neo-colonialism throughout the entire continent. Within the United States, itself, the effect of a large-scale conflict in South Africa would have serious consequences for the domestic racial situation. In the final analysis, the management of all the contradictions in American foreign policy will be directly related to the development of the class struggle in southern Africa. What is patently clear at this stage is that the future thrust of Western intervention will increasingly stem from the United States.

A fuller, earlier discussion along these lines can be found in Barry Cohen's pamphlet, *The Black and White Minstrel Show: Carter, Young and Africa* published by Spokesman Books, Nottingham in September 1977.

**ANGOLA: THE RISE AND FALL OF NITO ALVES**

Paul Fauvet (Mozambique, Angola, Guinea Information Centre)

With the arrest of Nito Alves on 7 July 1977 at Piri (his birthplace in northern Angola), a chapter of Angolan history centred around the 'nitista' insurrection of 27 May came to an end. There remain the clearing-up operations and the trials of the nitista leaders by the special military tribunal set up for that purpose. But an attempt can now be made to sum up the history of the factionalism within the MPLA in which he was the central figure.

**The First Region**

Born in 1945, Nito Alves studied at an evangelical mission near Piri, and then from 1960 in Luanda. Unlike Agostinho Neto and some others of the top MPLA leadership he was not university-educated. Nor, however, was he of the same social background as the teeming masses of the *museques* — Luanda's sprawling slum townships — though he was later to proclaim himself their spokesman. His education continued to a fairly high level, and when he took up clandestine anti-colonial activity in 1965 he was in his sixth year of studies at a Luanda *liceu*.

When a number of his comrades were arrested and incarcerated in the Sao Nicolau prison camp in southern Angola in 1966, Nito Alves left Luanda and joined the guerrilla fighters of MPLA's First Politico-Military Region in the Dembos forests. This pocket of guerrilla activity north of Luanda had been in existence since 1961 when the failed rising against the Luanda prisons sparked off the armed struggle. It was cut off from the rest of MPLA's activities. In June 1966 MPLA reinforcements, the Cienfuegos Column, totalling 72 men, managed to reach the First Region, after a hazardous twenty-day trek from the Zaire frontier. In January 1967, a further MPLA detachment, the Camy Column, set out to join the fighters in the Dembos, but was ambushed on the way by Portuguese troops and by men of Holden Roberto's FNLA. Out of its original complement of 158, only 19 of the Camy Column managed to fight their way through. After this there was no further contact between the First Region and the rest of the Movement until 1974.

Nito Alves rose to prominence in the Dembos. In 1967 he was put in joint command of the local CIR (Centre for Revolutionary Instruction),
and in 1971 he became a member of the Region leadership, under the overall command of Jacob João Caetano (who went under the nom-de-guerre Monstro Imortal).

Under difficult and isolated conditions, what President Neto has criticised as a ‘certain regionalism’ crept into the thinking of the Dembos fighters. A mythology was erected, and was enshrined in Nito Alves’ book *A Dialectica e a Guerrilha* (Luanda, 1976) according to which the First Region was ‘the unbreakable front of the resistance, the national holocaust’. It was claimed that this was the main battleground against colonialism, and that it made greater sacrifices than MPLA’s other fronts, particularly than the Third Region (the Eastern provinces of Moxico and Cuando Cubango). In fact the reality was less glowing. Colonialist offensives in 1969 defeated the MPLA guerrillas on the southern sector of the First Region front. All contact with clandestine activity in Luanda was broken. A series of betrayals severely damaged the First Region’s offensive capacity. The member of MPLA’s Directing Committee in the Region were captured. Through its links with the Mobutu regime in Zaire, FNLA continued to sabotage MPLA’s activity. Passage from Cabinda (MPLA’s Second Region) into the First Region, for instance, was a dangerous business: a strip of Zairois territory had to be crossed, and the Zairois army had orders to intercept any MPLA fighters.

When Monstro Imortal was sent to Cabinda to seek aid for the Dembos, Nito Alves was named joint commander of the Region. Monstro Imortal was never able to return, and Nito Alves came to run the supreme politico-military body in the Region. This was where the April 25 insurrection in Portugal and the downfall of the Caetano dictatorship found him.

From the Fall of Fascism to Independence

In the new political situation, Nito Alves returned to Luanda with the mission of resuming contact with the clandestine networks in the city. Here he met up with José Van Dunem. Van Dunem had been imprisoned in the Sao Nicolau camp, had built up clandestine structures within the prison and had won the personal loyalty of many of the 6,000 Angolans held there. These were released shortly after April 25th, and they were to provide the faction set up by Alves and Van Dumen with many of its leading figures. Van Dumen then married a white Angolan of Portuguese origin, Cita Vales, who had formerly lived with Nito Alves. In Portugal she had been an important leader of the UEC (Union of Communist Students). Here began the unhappy connection between Nito Alves’ faction and certain elements of the Portuguese left, including members of the Communist Party, who presumably saw in Alves a ‘genuine’ revolutionary leader. However the position of the PCP as a Party was always one of support for the MPLA majority under Agostinho Neto.

MPLA was beset with serious internal problems in 1974. Daniel Chipenda’s ‘Eastern Revolt’ had virtually seceded from MPLA in 1973, had organized attempts against Agostinho Neto’s life, and had badly disrupted military activities in the Third Region. A second faction, the ‘Active Revolt’, led by Gentil Viana — whose members had been rather
inactive in the anti-colonial struggle — had appeared in Brazzaville where it denounced Neto’s alleged ‘presidentialism’. MPLA thus entered the post-Caetano period with its hands tied through factionalism. Rather than attempt a political solution to this problem, an organizational solution was forced on MPLA at a ‘Congress’ held in Lusaka in 1974. African states, well-meaning or otherwise, tried to marry the two factions back into MPLA, by according them effective quality with the MPLA majority.

At this Congress Nito Alves, as a delegate from the First Region, met Agostinho Neto for the first time. He exhibited his reading of Marxist classics with great ostentation, and carved out an image for himself as an intransigent Marxist-Leninist, cast very much in a Maoist mould. He launched violent attacks against Chipenda; and doubtless Neto and the MPLA leadership were grateful for the support they received from Alves, Van Dunem and the other First Region representatives. But at this Congress divergences also began to appear between the future nitistas and the Movement’s majority, notably on the question of race. Alves made no secret that for him the Revolution was for black people only.

MPLA rejected the Lusaka ‘Congress’ and organized its own Inter-Regional Conference of Militants, free from outside pressures, inside Angola in the liberated zones in the East. Here Nito Alves declared himself a ‘champion of struggle against the bourgeoisie’. Although he demonstrated an indefatigable ability to quote Marxist texts, Alves’ definition of the Angolan bourgeoisie collapsed into racism. The bourgeoisie was to be identified with whites and mulattos. He went on to propose that Angolan citizenship should be withheld from all whites born in Angola except those who had actively participated in the liberation struggle. As for mesticos, they too would not have citizenship as a right. They would have to apply for it. This flew in the face of all that MPLA had said and practised over the years about the definition of the enemy: that the Angolan blacks were not fighting the Angolan whites, that the Angolan people were not fighting the Portuguese people, but that the oppressed masses of both Angola and Portugal were fighting against a colonial-fascist system, supported by imperialism. MPLA thus rejected Alves’ positions, but was not prepared to excommunicate him because of them.

In the political ferment of Luanda in 1974, Alves and Van Dunem worked hard to control MPLA’s structures. A new First Region CIR, named Certezza (Certainty), was set up, headed by Alves, which was used to turn out cadres that he could rely on. Fifteen of these trainees were taken by Alves to form the core of the National Secretariat of the DOM (Department of Mass Organisations). But Nito Alves was valuable to the Movement in 1974, not merely because of his anti-Chipenda stance, but also because of the work of organization that he embarked on in Luanda. ‘Popular Power’ were words that became associated with Alves. Now the concept was nothing new to MPLA. Mass democratic grass roots bodies had been set up during the armed struggle in the villages of the East, for instance. But in 1974 the phenomenon took on very different form as the masses of the Luanda musseques began to organize themselves, firstly against the vicious terrorism of bands of
white racists, and later against the parallel terrorism of the FNLA. It would be useless to pretend that this organization was something marvellously pure, enjoying a 100% correct revolutionary leadership. Far from it. Much of it was spontaneous reaction to aggression. And since colonialism had ensured that Luanda’s bairros would have a very large lumpen and criminal population, these elements inevitably played a major role. For instance, a charismatic bandit called Sabata organized what was virtually a private army which defended the Rangel bairro against white terrorist attack in July 1974. Sabata and his followers were later to be integrated into FAPLA, and played a distinguished role in the struggle against FNLA and UNITA in Luanda. Unfortunately, Sabata had a taste for violence and riots. When these were no longer being created by FNLA, Sabata started his own disturbances, which eventually led to his imprisonment.

Nito Alves inserted himself into the ferment of the Luanda bairros and dedicated himself to the development of the capital’s embryo organs of popular power. His talent as a spellbinding demagogue came in useful here. In this feverish activity it was not easy to discern ideological differences within MPLA. For the masses in 1975 Nito Alves and Agostinho Neto represented the same thing. In July 1975 came the greatest triumph of Popular Power in Luanda with the week-long conflict which finally expelled FNLA from the city. It was largely on the basis of these successes in Luanda that Nito Alves became Minister of the Interior in the first government of the People’s Republic of Angola, formed after the proclamation of independence on 11 November 1975.

Nito Alves as Interior Minister
In government Alves continued to pose as the ‘traditional’ head of Luanda’s old clandestine network and as leader of the First Region, as distinct from MPLA militants from the Eastern Front and those who had operated outside the country. He considered that MPLA’s policy of national unity equalled class collaboration, and proudly declared himself a partisan of unflinching class struggle. Since Nito Alves was quite unable to locate classes within the Angolan social structure, this was simple demagogy. It was, however, attractive demagogy and it ensured him support among the newly-politicised elements in the bairros, support among student circles, and support among some of the Portuguese left in Angola. Reaction to colonial racism had implanted sentiments of black racism in the bairros, and Nito Alves exploited this to the full, much to the concern of the MPLA majority.

Alves had a high opinion of his own abilities. A volume of his poetry, published in Lisbon, contained boastful and arrogant proclamations of his own worth. Among his friends he was frequently heard to say that ‘history has reserved for me the heavy task of leading the working class to power’. In a brochure of military texts of Lenin, selected by Alves, he made reference to ‘the immortal Lenin, whose work I intend to continue’.

Nito Alves was far from the only ultra-leftist active in Luanda. Indeed in late 1975 and early 1976 his ultra-leftism was overshadowed by that of others – the so-called Henda Committees and Amilcar Cabral Committees (CACs), and then the grouping that many figures from these
committees joined, the OCA (Angolan Communist Organization). The OCA was basically an Angolan extension of Portuguese Maoism. It was therefore fanatically hostile to the Cuban and Soviet assistance to MPLA in the struggle against the South African and Zairois invasions of the country. It wrote: ‘As from November 1975 the war ceased to belong to the Angolan people and belonged to the Cubans and Soviets. The previous war against imperialist aggression was transformed into a bloody conflict between two superpowers fighting for the division of Angola and for influence in southern Africa’ (OCA: Teses e Resolucoes da 1 Conferencia, Lisbon, 1976).

Tirades against ‘social imperialism’ and the ‘Cuban army of occupation’ did not win much appreciation in MPLA as the People’s Republic of Angola struggled for its survival. The OCA was suppressed — and key to its suppression was Nito Alves himself as Interior Minister. The OCA waxed hysterical against Alves, referring to ‘a strong social-fascist current (within MPLA) headed by Nito Alves’. Yet in fact some of their positions — notably their constant denunciation of the MPLA as ‘bourgeois’ — bear close comparison with those of Alves.

Nito Alves’ hostility to the OCA demonstrates that Alves himself was intent on eliminating potential rivals, and that he did not look to Peking for guidance. For by this time Nito Alves’ politics had undergone one or two somersaults. From enthusiasm, in 1974, for the works of the Albanian leader, Enver Hoxha, which were being assiduously distributed in Angola by small bands of Portuguese Maoists, he moved on to write a garbled ‘class analysis’ of Angola which was a straightforward plagiarism of Mao Tse-tung’s early writings on Chinese class structure. But Chinese policy towards Angola soon made it rather uncomfortable to uphold Maoist positions within MPLA, and Alves changed his allegiances. He and Van Dunem, verbally at any rate, became partisans of the Soviet Union, particularly from the time of the 25th Congress of the CPSU, which Alves and Van Dunem attended as fraternal delegates from MPLA. The effect of this ostensible loyalty to the Soviet Union was to spread considerable confusion. The Government of Angola seemed to be on excellent terms with the Soviet Union, was grateful for the aid it had received from that quarter, yet here was an oppositional faction within MPLA criticising the Government for being ‘anti-Soviet’. Stories proliferated in the Western press (particularly the Portuguese) according to which Nito Alves was Moscow’s man in Luanda. If this was an attempt to create a breach between MPLA and the socialist countries, then it failed. There is certainly no evidence of Soviet complicity in Nito Alves’ plotting. Indeed the Soviet Union continued to supply President Agostinho Neto’s government with military hardware, and only a few days after Nito Alves’ failed bid for power a consignment of Soviet tanks (types T54, T55 and T77) and sophisticated missile equipment was unloaded at Luanda.

The Fractional Network
As Minister of the Interior, Nito Alves was able to place many of his own followers within the new Angolan administration. In particular, the appointment of Provincial and District Commissars was made by the President on the proposal of the Interior Minister. Although Agostinho Neto refused to nominate some of the men proposed by Nito
Alves, this procedure ensured that some nitistas occupied very high positions indeed. Pedro Fortunato, Provincial Commissar for Luanda, was perhaps the most important of these. Others included the Provincial Commissars for Benguela and Malange, the provinces on which Luanda was traditionally dependent for much of its food supply.

Alves’ ministry was also in charge of the structures of Popular Power, notably the Luanda CPBs (Popular Bairro Committees). Alves put the Law of Popular Power that he had presented into immediate effect. There is little wrong with this legislation on paper. But Alves rushed ahead with its implantation in order to consolidate his personal power base in Luanda. Elections to the Luanda CPBs were held in May 1976. They were badly prepared. The turnout was low (10% or so in some CPBs), and so a number of CPBs dropped into the hands of nitistas. It was now not the people who ran the organs of Popular Power, but Nito Alves’ men from the ‘Certeza’ CIR, and Van Dunem’s contacts from the old Sau Nicolau prison.

The MPLA majority tried to recover the nitista leadership in the CPBs for the revolution, but without success. Agostinho Neto himself convened the CPBs several times, and tried in vain to convince them that the positions they defended were incorrect — in particular their obstruction and downright sabotage of the setting up of People’s Shops in the bairros. Concrete problems of the Luanda bairros were not tackled by the nitista CPBs, who took no initiatives on the questions of housing, water or electricity supplies, health and hygiene.

In the FAPLA, Van Dunem, enjoying a misplaced trust from the Chief Political Commissar, Jika (later killed in battle), infiltrated the Commissariat and started installing his own network. Nitistas were put in control of the People’s Defence Organization (the ODP, a form of militia), and the Military Police. In every region Van Dunem installed a group of political commissars chosen from his own Luanda friends. At the head of the Sangue do Provo CIR, where some of the first commanders of the post-independence period were trained, Van Dunem put one of his men, Amadeu Neves — who had already been expelled from one CIR because of his dubious attitudes. The Kimpuanza CIR, where experts in strategic weapons were trained, was perhaps subject to the most blatant manipulation of all. Here Van Dunem installed no less than seven members of his own family.

Since Van Dunem had no military experience, he could not be the nitistas’ choice for head of the National Political Commissariat of FAPLA after Jika’s death. Instead the job went, on the proposal of Alves, to one of the former First Region commanders, Bakalov. Bakalov had been associated with the Henda Committees, but after some hesitation broke with them and aligned himself with the nitistas. With Bakalov’s appointment, the nitiastas exercised overall control of all FAPLA’s military schools. Another of Alves’ old comrades from the First Region, Monstro Imortal was FAPLA’s Deputy Chief-of-Staff.

In the rest of the State apparatus, the nitistas’ most important stronghold was in the Ministry of Internal Trade. The Minister here, David Aires Machado, was the only member of the Government whom Nito
Alves considered a genuine revolutionary. Corruption was rampant in the Ministry. EMPA (Public Supplies Enterprise) had to be dissolved because of the gross corruption within it, with the failure of goods to arrive at their destination, mysterious destruction of documents by fire etc. The nitistas denounced this corruption — but only after they had encouraged and fomented it in the first place. The idea was to have it both ways: to use food shortages for their own political ends, and to pose as champions in the struggle against corruption.

After the dissolution of EMPA, the problem of food supplies to Luanda did not improve. Matters in this sector would have been difficult, even with the best of management, given the devastation caused by the 1975-76 war, the breakdown of the transport system, the abandonment of farms etc. Food shortages, particularly in Luanda, provided fertile ground for nitista agitation. And nitista-controlled bodies added to the chaos with deliberate economic sabotage. Consumer cooperatives and CPBs were complicit in stockpiling foodstuffs while the shelves in Luanda shops remained empty. After the failed coup, warehouses full of food were discovered. The nitistas had planned to clinch popular support for their power bid by distributing this food to the masses. But as some of it had been hoarded for months, it had rotted and become quite inedible.

Inside MPLA the most important nitista infiltration was in the Department of Mass Organization (DOM). An extra-legal secretariat under Cita Vales' control was openly tolerated and was the agency for establishing nitista cells in all the mass organizations — the youth movement (JMPLA), the Organization of Angolan Women (OMA), the trade unions etc. In the field of information the nitistas controlled the newspaper *Diario de Luanda*, which devoted enormous amounts of space to Nito Alves' speeches, and also a radio programme, *Kudibanguela*. This latter was suppressed in early 1976 because of its overt anti-white racism, and *Diario de Luanda* was afterwards closed down.

The October Central Committee Meeting

Nito Alves' behaviour as Interior Minister seriously worried the majority of the MPLA leadership. The matter came to a head at the MPLA Central Committee Plenary meeting of 23-29 October 1976. Alves was accused of factionalism. He denied the charge, and a Commission of Inquiry was set up to look into the matter. The nitistas suffered a series of defeats at this week-long meeting. Cita Vales was removed from her functions in the DOM. The right to MPLA membership was limited to Angolan citizens — thus automatically eliminating a number of Portuguese nitistas including the editor of *Diario de Luanda*, Virgilio Frutuoso. An attack was launched on the behaviour of the FAPLA National Political Commissariat — i.e. against Bakalof and Van Dunem, though the final resolution did not name them — and it was resolved that the General Staff should exercise greater control over the Commissariat. All organs of information were put under the control of the MPLA Department of Information and Propaganda, and the Ministry of Information was abolished. *Diario de Luanda* was suppressed. On Popular Power, no direct criticism was made of the May elections, but it was decided that future elections would only be held
where MPLA structures are sufficiently strong, organizationally stable and mature, from the political and ideological point of view. This is because the process of installing Popular Power, wherever Socialism is built, is a function of the revolutionary vanguard and not merely of the State... The principle should be adopted that before the preparation of any timetable for the installation of organs of Popular Power, a study must be made of the level reached by the structures of MPLA and of the mass organizations in the areas affected, as well as of the level of development of economic production in the locality.

A crushing blow was dealt to Nito Alves when his own Ministry was abolished. The relevant part of the resolution simply read:

Until now the principal function performed by the Ministry of Internal Administration has been that of liaising with the Provincial Commissars. This should revert to the Council of Ministers, as the collective governing body. Their direct and day-to-day support falls to the Prime Minister and to the President of the Republic, as President of the Revolutionary Council. Therefore at this stage the Ministry of Internal Administration should disappear.

Alves, Van Dunem, Bakalof and Monstro Imortal all remained on the Central Committee. But Alves, a co-opted member of the Political Bureau, suffered further demotion when his membership of that body was not confirmed by the Central Committee. From this time on, Alves and a handful of his chief supporters began actively to plot a coup d'etat — despite what Nito Alves himself had written a few months previously: namely that 'the coup d'état, the putsch, is totally alien to socialism' (*A Dialectica e a Guerrilha*, page 93).

**Preparing for Power**

The nitista network in Luanda went into action. Clandestine meetings were held and tasks distributed. The nitistas Betinho and M'Bala were entrusted with work in the *bairros*. One Luis Kitumba was in charge of factional work in the JMPLA, and Pedro Fortunato was to contact other Provincial Commissars in the nitistas confidence — those in the Provinces of Huila, Kwanza-Norte, Malange, Kwanza-Sul and Benguela.

The coup was carefully planned. A mass demonstration was to be used as a cover for a seizure of power. The masses would be manipulated onto the streets in order to legitimise the nitista putsch — hence the need to worsen the grievances felt by the masses, particularly in the sphere of food supplies, which could then be blamed on the Government. Monstro Imortal was charged with heading a delegation that would also include Bakalof, another leading FAPLA factionalist, Commander Sianouk, and representatives from nitista CPBs to President Neto who would then be presented with the nitista demands. Should he reject them, then Monstro Imortal would arrest him. The nitistas seemed not to have made up their minds as to whether they should kill Neto or merely exile him. But a number of top MPLA and Government figures were marked for definite physical liquidation: Lucio Lara, MPLA Secretary-General; Iko Carreira, Minister of Defence; Ludy, Director of National Security; and Central Committee members Onambwe, N'zaji and Xietu. A new government was to be formed with Nito Alves as President, Jose Van Dunem as Prime Minister and Machado remaining as Trade Minister. Bakalov would become Chief of Staff, Monstro Imortal Minister of Defence, and Sianouk Director of Security (all those, one may note, had been members of the 'Cienfuegos Column'
of 1966). As for the MPLA Central Committee, this would be abolished. A ‘Politico-Military Revolutionary Committee’ would take its place.

To gain support in the armed forces, nitistas resorted to fraud. A factionalist anti-aircraft commander, First Lieutenant Paulito, was found to have hoarded no less than two million kwanzas in cash boxes at the Luanda air-base. This money was five months salary for his troops. The failure of this money to reach the men’s pay packets was then blamed on the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff. Similar events took place in the Military Police, whose chief, José Manuel Veloso, commanded operations from the nitistas’ own shadow General Staff.

Nito Alves now expanded his views that ‘the Movement is a front in which class struggle exists’, and went on to make the claim that ‘in the present phase the MPLA is dominated by right-wing forces, by social-democracy allied to the Maoists who have come in from the CACs, the Henda Committees, the OCA’. Not a shred of evidence was offered for this fantasy. Alves also compiled a massive document entitled *Thirteen Theses in my Defence*. These were not merely for presentation to the Committee of Inquiry on factionalism: they were also printed and distributed on a mass scale. By taking this action Alves was acting in open defiance of the Central Committee and breaking the most elementary rules of democratic centralism. Bakalof immediately planned to use Alves’ *Thirteen Theses* as ‘political education’ for FAPLA troops.

The atmosphere became increasingly tense as Spring wore on. The nitista presses worked overtime as clandestine leaflets flooded through the *bairros*. These presses were located at the office of the Bankworkers’ Union, where the nitista M’Bala worked as Chief of the Administration. Nitista racism became more blatant and was directed particularly against white Portuguese expatriates working on contracts for the Angolan Government. Nito Alves referred to them as ‘Lisbon’s new colonisers’. Alves even managed to prevent a number of white technicians who had been carefully chosen by the Angolan authorities, from disembarking at Luanda airport. He remarked that ‘I’m well aware that we suffer from various deficiencies, but it’s wiser to retard economic recovery than to accept white Portuguese technicians’. Alves’ identification of whites and *mesticos* as ‘petty bourgeois’ became more strident. A Portuguese engineer in the Public Works Ministry was savagely beaten up, and some Portuguese were even murdered, apparently in attempts to spread panic in what remained of Luanda’s Portuguese community.

Acts of insubordination and near-mutiny mounted in the army, and Bakalov and Van Dunem used their power as leading political commissars to the full. The nitistas were now openly challenging the Government, and threatening to make Luanda itself ungovernable. A response was needed, and the Security Force, the DISA, was sent on raids into the *bairros*, particularly into Sambizanga *bairro*, where factionalist activity was centred. Here they succeeded in discovering and confiscating a number of arms caches.

The nitistas raised an outcry against the raids. In Sambizanga the nitista CPB held a poorly-attended ‘popular assembly’ that denounced DISA, the FAPLA and the Government. The nitistas who controlled the Patrice
Lumumba, Nelito Soares, Operario, Rangel, Neves Bendinha and Prenda CPBs rapidly organized their own ‘popular assemblies’ in solidarity with Sambizanga. MPLA now responded to the nitistas’ cynical manipulation of the CPBs. A series of meetings of MPLA militants denounced the factional and undemocratic activities of the nitistas. President Neto summoned the Sambizanga CPB to meet him to find out if their allegation of DISA brutalities had any truth. Their bluff called, members of the CPB had to produce local inhabitants who had been maltreated. Unfortunately for the nitistas, the people they picked out all fulsomely praised the behaviour of the DISA during the raid.

The May Central Committee Meeting
On the weekend of 20-21 May 1977, the Central Committee met to consider the report of the Commission of Inquiry. The nitistas, after briefly considering staging an insurrection in Malange — an idea that was scrapped when FAPLA broke up factional meetings in the Malange bairros arranged by the Provincial Commissar — planned a rapid coup for that weekend. Under cover of a civilian demonstration, military nitistas would surround and arrest the Central Committee. But this plan never got off the drawing board, since the Central Committee, suddenly and without any explanation, altered its meeting place.

Not surprisingly the Commission of Inquiry found Nito Alves guilty of factionalism. The Central Committee issued a statement noting:

a. the de facto existence of factionalism;

b. that this factionalism, presenting itself under an apparently revolutionary cloak, really seeks to divide the MPLA and consequently to deviate the People from the genuine objectives of the present stage of the struggle: National Reconstruction and the defence of the territorial integrity of the country against imperialism;

c. the diffusion of wrong ideas among our militants and among the people and the fomenting of agitational activity against Central Committee members and State and MPLA bodies such as the DISA and the Political Bureau with the aim of shaking the cohesion of MPLA and the unity of the nation;

d. that this factionalist activity is led by Comrades Alves Bernardo Baptista, Jose Jacinto de Silva Vieira Dias Van Dunem and others.

By any standards, Alves’ behaviour during this Central Committee meeting was remarkable. With an abundance of quotes from Lenin, he attempted to prove that Angola was on the verge of a sharp turn to the right, and that the man mainly responsible for this was the ‘social democratic Maoist’, Lucio Lara. He claimed that corruption, incompetence and nepotism were rife within MPLA, that ministers were engaged in diamond smuggling or debauchery, that the DISA was linked to the CIA and that its commander, Ludy, was in the pockets of the Americans, that the daily Jornal de Angola was playing the same role in Angola as the right-wing Chilean press before the Pinochet coup. No shred of evidence was produced for any of this.

Alves declared to the rest of the Central Committee that if there really is factionalism inside the MPLA, then it is amongst you, the present leadership, that it will have to be looked for. As for me, I am the revolution incarnate. History has reserved for me the right of carrying through the process of this revolution. The conditions I put are the only ones possible, the only ones acceptable: the immediate resignation of the political committee, suspension of
the central committee, and the appointment of a revolutionary politico-military committee to take the leadership of the country into its hands.

Despite this virtual declaration of war, further attempts were made to dissuade Nito Alves from his chosen path. During a lunchtime break President Neto took Nito Alves and Jose Van Dunem aside for a private discussion. He told them that their actions should be condemned, and that they would be held responsible for all that happened arising out of the Central Committee meeting. He asked them to consider the continuing imperialist threat to Angola and the need to hold MPLA together on the basis of national unity. Alves and Van Dunem took no notice. Their plans were too advanced to consider any change now.

The bitter discussions continued into the following day. With still no sign of any self-criticism from Alves and Van Dunem, the Central Committee voted to expel them from its ranks. That afternoon President Neto announced this decision to a Luanda meeting tens of thousands strong. In the next few days motions of support for the expulsions and demanding an end to factionalism poured in from meetings all over the country.

On 26 May, the eve of nitista putsch, the MPLA Political Bureau issued a statement on factionalism:

The components of these factions almost always reveal weak political consciousness, a feeling that they are great and wise theoreticians, repeat in parrot fashion many words difficult for our people to understand, do not contribute to the study and solution of the most pressing concrete problems, and falsify the dynamic of the class struggle for their own benefit, and not the benefit of the classes they claim to defend.

Factionalism, which is an evil that occurs in all revolutionary parties, manifests itself above all in the appearance of small groups of ambitious opportunists, attempting, under various pretexts, to contest the orientation of leading bodies, to falsify the content of MPLA's political line, and to fight for hegemony and control over the entire organization.

Factionalism is expressed through a fundamental contempt for the principles of democratic centralism which, in a revolutionary organization, makes it obligatory, even for dissident minorities, to carry out majority decisions.

Factionalism attempts to undermine the confidence of the masses in their leaders, using slander or exploiting the difficulties that still exist in production, in supplies, in transport, in education, in health. Instead of trying to make a contribution towards improving the different sectors where national reconstruction is taking place, factionalism sabotages positive measures, thus attempting to provoke the discontent of the masses.

Factionalism uses pseudo-revolutionary verbosity to confuse the masses and to hide the factionalists' inability to dedicate themselves to solving the most urgent problems that afflict our people...

Pretending to fight against other factional groups, and hiding under the cloak of a verbose 'Marxism-Leninism', the new factionalists have shielded themselves in a simulated devotion to this or that friendly country, not hesitating even to visit certain embassies where they engaged in slanders against the MPLA and certain of its leaders and militants.

Using and abusing a demagogic phraseology arising from a badly-assimilated reading of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, the new factionalists duped the masses and our militants, classifying this or that militant, this or that leader as 'right-wing', 'ultra-left', 'maoist', 'anti-Soviet', 'national socialist', 'social democrat', thus camouflaging their essentially reactionary, regionalists and racist ideology.
A Coup Cancelled and Relaunched

Plans for a coup were now virtually complete. The nitistas were to go into action on 25 May and seize the prisons, the radio station and the daily paper *Jornal de Angola*. A forged order purporting to come from the FAPLA General Staff had already been circulated to certain units, commanding ‘all units in the Luanda area to be ready to protect the population in the event of a demonstration’.

Nito Alves was in a state of feverish excitement by the middle of the week. He drew up a list of those who were to be eliminated — including Carlos Rocha Dilolwa, Secretary of the National Planning Commission; Manuel Pedro Pacavira, Minister of Transport; and Beto Van Dunem (no relation to Jose) from the JMPLA. A little later the idea of a list seems to have been scrapped and Alves merely proclaimed that ‘all the reactionary ministers have to be imprisoned’. But the nitistas faced problems. Jose Van Dunem was to contact some FAPLA units, and Veloso others, but there were not enough reliable high-ranking nitistas to put one in command of each key unit. Nito Alves thus came to rely on the planned popular demonstration to neutralise the remaining units in Luanda, reasoning that FAPLA would not dare open fire on a large crowd.

But at the last moment the military nitistas, considering that Alves’ plan seriously overestimated their strength, refused to go into action. The coup, scheduled for 4 a.m. on 25 May, failed to happen. In the ensuing quarrels among the nitistas, Nito Alves was reported as saying angrily to these military followers: ‘You talk a lot about the ‘People’ without respect. Now the masses are ready. They’re putting their trust in you. And now you don’t want to advance’. Alves threatened that regardless of what the military factionalists thought, he would call the masses onto the streets, and if they were shot down, the responsibility would lie with those who had got cold feet.

Betinho and other CPB nitistas were prepared to force their military colleagues’ hands, and went ahead with organizing a ‘popular uprising followed by military intervention on the pretext of protecting the people’. They put this revamped plan to Nito Alves on 26 May — Alves had left Luanda in considerable anger, and was now sulking in Caxito, some 50 kilometres north of the city. He agreed to Betinho’s scheme, in which the rising was scheduled for Saturday, 28 May, and they all drove back to the capital.

Meanwhile Van Dunem, stung by Alves’ criticism of the military factionalists, had worked to patch up the weaknesses of the previous plan and restore the prestige of the military nitistas in the eyes of their civilian counterparts. Three sinister ‘Death Commandos’ were formed who were to liquidate specified members of the Central Committee, DISA and the FAPLA General Staff. The date of the coup was finally advanced to 27 May, with the military resuming responsibility. Van Dunem engaged in a whirlwind of secret encounters to ensure that the machinery of the coup would work properly. An operational command was established under Veloso. The planned attack on *Jornal de Angola* disappeared from the scheme because, according to Veloso, ‘it was necessary to give the impression that what was happening was a popular insurrection, and not a coup d’état’.
The entire putsch hinged on the mass demonstration that Betinho and the nitista CPBs were supposed to organize. This, and the ensuing FAPLA ‘protection’ for the demonstrators, would, it was calculated, deliver the Presidential Palace to the nitistas. President Neto would be confronted with an ultimatum and if, as expected, he rejected it, he would be killed. Nito Alves would then assume the title of President and make his first broadcast to the nation. The text of this proposed broadcast, written in Cita Vales’ hand, was discovered later. It began, ‘Angolan people, the Government has just been overthrown’, recited the nitista accusations of ‘hunger, poverty and repression’, proclaimed ‘to the whole country the People’s Armed Insurrection’, and for good measure ended by decreeing a state of siege.

Friday, 27 May
Nito Alves was never to get the opportunity to make that speech. His coup attempt was to last little more than eight hours. It started between 4 and 5 in the morning of 27 May with the attack on the Sao Paulo prison. According to nitista accounts later in the morning, they released ‘combatants from the first war of National Liberation’. In fact, about a dozen nitistas were freed, along with hundreds of common criminals and FNLA and UNITA members. Members of Gentil Viana’s ‘Active Revolt’, and the British and American mercenaries imprisoned at Sao Paolo were also offered their freedom, but had the wisdom to refuse. Elsewhere in the city, nitistas seized some of their leading opponents (though not those they most wanted, such as Ludy, Iko Carreira or Lucio Lara) and imprisoned them near the factional headquarters in Sambizanga.

By 8 a.m. the nitistas had seized the radio station. The old Kudibanguela group, plus a few factionalists still employed on the radio, took over the programmes. They began to broadcast attacks on the Government and appeals for a mass demonstration outside the Presidential Palace. But now things started to go very seriously wrong for the nitistas. Nito Alves’ trump card — his supposed mass support in the bairros — failed to materialise. The masses did not respond to the nitistas’ appeals. Only a few made their way to the palace, while more were shepherded in that direction at gunpoint by nitista troops. M’Bala and Betinho had utterly failed in their task of raising the Luanda bairros. Less than 500 people gathered at the Presidential Palace. As the morning wore on, and the masses continued to stay at home, fresh recriminations between military and civilian nitistas broke out.

On the military side things were also looking bleak for the factionalists, since the vast majority of the troops remained loyal to the Government. One barracks fell to the nitistas — that of the Ninth Armoured Brigade. They also captured a fort on the outskirts of Luanda — but as soon as loyal troops appeared here, the rebel commanders fled and the soldiers laid down their arms, saying they didn’t know what was going on, but had been told by nitista officers that they were ‘defending the revolution’.

Confessions of nitista leaders soon after 27 May show that Alves believed that the Cuban forces in Angola would at least stay neutral in the conflict, if not rally to him. He was therefore shocked to discover that the Cubans had immediately put themselves at President Neto’s disposal.
When questioning Veloso mid-morning on the situation in the centre of Luanda, Alves asked ‘And you even saw the Cuban comrades?’. When Veloso confirmed this, Alves remarked ‘Then I shall have to review my understanding of scientific communism’.

By 11 a.m. FAPLA had dispersed the small crowd outside the palace by shooting into the air above their heads. Remnants of rebel supporters gathered outside the radio station. At 11.55 loyal forces stormed the building and retook the transmitter. The slogan ‘Down with factionalism’ was soon being broadcast. There remained the mutiny of the Ninth Armoured Brigade, but the men of this unit surrendered after another 90 minutes. By 13.30 the entire coup was over.

Initially there was uncertainty over what had happened in the morning — over precisely how serious the events were. In his first speech to the nation after the retaking of the radio, President Neto showed remarkable leniency, even suggesting that after a lengthy period of rehabilitation, Nito Alves and Jose Van Dunem could return to leading positions in the movement. But when this speech was made it was not realized that the nitista putsch had had a savage postscript. Between 13.00 and 13.30 on 27 May the nitistas had taken their revenge. On the orders of Nito Alves and Cita Vales they murdered the seven MPLA leaders whom they had arrested and taken to Sambizanga. The dead men were:

Major Saidy Vieira Dias Mingas — Minister of Finance, and member of the Central Committee and of the Revolutionary Council.
Commandant N’zaji — Eugenio Verissimo da Costa — Member of the Central Committee, of the Revolutionary Council, of the FAPLA General Staff, and Chief of FAPLA Security.
Commandant Dangereux — Paolo da Silva Mungungo — Member of the Central Committee, of the Revolutionary Council, and of the FAPLA General Staff.
Commandant Bula Matadi — Jose Manuel Paiva — Member of the Revolutionary Council and an assistant FAPLA Chief of Staff.
Commandant Eurico Manuel Correia Goncalves — Head of the FAPLA General Staff Personnel Department, and member of the Revolutionary Council.
Helder Ferreira Neto — Member of the DISA Command.
Antonio Garcia Neto — Director for International Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Murdered with these top leaders were a loyal FAPLA soldier, Joao Rodrigues (Recua) and Cristino Santos, an anti-nitista member of the MPLA Action Committee in Sambizanga. A tenth victim, Commandant Gato (Ciel da Conceicao), Director of the Port of Luanda, was left for dead by the nitistas, and thrown along with the corpses into a vehicle which the assassins then set on fire. But Gato was still alive and, though severely burned, he made his way back to the port and was able to tell the authorities of the murders and of the whereabouts of the bodies.

The murders in Sambizanga provoked a national outburst of grief and rage. A period of national mourning was declared, while mass rallies throughout the country demanded the death penalty for the factionalists.

Outside Luanda, the nitista schemes met with total failure. In Malange province, the sector command of FAPLA was well aware of the nitista convictions of the Provincial Commissar and had neutralised him before 27 May. Similarly, in the ports of Benguela and Lobita MPLA and FAPLA vigilance left no room for action on the part of the nitista
Commissar of Benguela Province. The story was the same in Kwanza Norte and Kwanza Sul. In Bie, two military officials planned to occupy the local radio station and the Provincial Commissariat. This scheme was easily scotched by the action of Central Committee member Jamba ya Mina, the Bie Provincial Commissar and local DISA officials. In Huambo and Huila provinces the factional nuclei dared not make a move. In Mexico the nitista network in the province tried to support the Luanda putsch, but was promptly crushed by local FAPLA units. In Uige Nito Alves had, after the failure of his putsch, sent an envoy to ask a certain Tonton to take a force of 50 men to Piri to help the ‘fugitives’. Provincial DISA officials nipped this in the bud. In the remaining provinces (Cabinda, Luanda, Zaire, Cuando-Cubango, Mocamedes and Kunene) nothing at all of note happened.

One can deduce from this that even had the nitistas seized Luanda and overthrown the Government, their victory would not have lasted long. FAPLA units outside the capital, relatively immune to nitista infiltration, would not have tolerated Nito Alves in the Presidency. A civil war in which the nitistas would have been overwhelmed would then have been the likely scenario. Such a conflict, of course, would have lain Angola wide open, once again, to foreign intervention. In the turmoil the plans for renewed invasions across the Zaire and Namibia frontiers could have been taken out of cold storage.

The Aftermath
A purge of factionalists now began. Pedro Fortunato had been removed from his post as Luanda Provincial Commissar the day before the coup. Now others followed him: the Provincial Commissars and Directing Committees from the Provinces of Malange, Benguela, Kwanza-Sul and Zaire were suspended; the National Directing Committee of the JMPLA was dissolved as were a number of trade union committees. David Aires Machado was sacked from the Government. Seven CPBs in Luanda were dissolved as having proved themselves ‘unworthy to be representing Popular Power’: these were in Sambizanga, Bairro Operario, Patrice Lumumba, Rangel, Prenda, Nelito Soares and Neves Bendinha. The note from Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento announcing this stated that ‘Until the reestablishment of conditions of normality that will make it possible to hold Popular Bairro Assemblies, the management of the popular committees referred to above should be guaranteed by the competent MPLA bodies’. Hundreds of arrests were made in Luanda. In Sambizanga FAPLA and the CPPA (Angolan Popular Police Force) detected the nitista general headquarters, where the coup had been masterminded and where the murdered leaders had been held prisoner. Searches revealed further arms caches.

Leading nitistas such as Monstro Imortal, Veloso and Betinho were captured almost immediately. Van Dunem and Cita Vales went into hiding, but were picked up after a fortnight. With astonishing naivety, or perhaps out of simple desperation, Cita Vales tried to send a message to the Soviet embassy pleading for assistance to flee the country. It is doubtful whether the message would have had any impact even if it had been received; as it was, Cita Vales’ messenger was intercepted. Nito Alves himself headed north. After six weeks of wandering he arrived at Piri, tired and hungry — only to be handed over to FAPLA almost
immediately. Of the top nitista leadership, only Bakalov still eluded capture.

The crimes of the nitistas were compared to those of FNLA and UNITA. No direct link between Nito Alves and the defeated puppet movements has been established, but UNITA spokesmen in Europe have seized the opportunity to offer any remaining nitistas a ‘united front’ against MPLA. There is also some evidence, as yet unconfirmed, of pre-coup contacts in Rome between representatives of Nito Alves and of UNITA.

The political repercussions of the coup continued to be felt at the August 1977 MPLA Central Committee Plenary meeting. Here two more Central Committee members, Aristides Van Dunem and Armando Campos (Xi-Cota), were deprived of their positions. They were accused of hiding from the Central Committee knowledge of factional activities that they possessed. Bearing in mind that the two had made what was considered to be a sincere self-criticism, the Central Committee decided merely to suspend them until the MPLA Congress scheduled for later in the year.

Trade in Luanda began to revive after the coup. With the removal of Aires Machado and the Benguela and Malange Provincial Commissars the supply of foodstuffs to Luanda dramatically improved. Shops in the bairros began to receive goods for their empty shelves as the economic sabotage practised by nitista consumer cooperatives came to an abrupt end.

According to Lucio Lara, the Angolan Revolution emerged from this traumatic experience ‘victorious and strengthened’, despite the grievous loss of leading cadres. With its racist and ‘ultra-left’ wing destroyed, MPLA now stood as a united movement and rapidly asserted its full control over the political structures of the country. MPLA’s insistence on its own political authority was uncompromising. At a mass rally after the funeral ceremonies for the murdered leaders, President Neto stressed that ‘All mass organizations must be subordinated at all levels to MPLA organs ... There are no parallel organizations in this country. Here in Angola it is the MPLA that commands’.

President Neto was also concerned in his speech to reject the nitista accusation of ‘anti-sovietism’:

I want to restate here, before the entire population of our country, and especially the population of Luanda, that the comrades from the Soviet Union have expressed, at every difficult moment in our life, their feelings of friendship and solidarity. Not only have they expressed feelings, but in a practical positive manner they have contributed to the training of our army, to the reduction of our economic difficulties, to the training of technicians, so that we could in fact enter on a period of National Reconstruction. Similarly with the Cuban comrades.

Strong messages of support to Neto from both the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and of Portugal should have squashed rumours of Soviet or PCP involvement in the putsch, but the right-wing press in Europe has continued to circulate these.

Perhaps the best note on which to end this summary are the MPLA slogans issued round the funerals of those murdered in Sambizanga:
Glory to those who have fallen in the People's cause!
Let us not mourn their deaths! Let us honour them by fighting for People's Democracy and for Socialism!

NOTES
The main sources for this article are: the daily paper Jornal de Angola (of particular interest are the confessions of captured nitistas printed after the failed coup); the official report of the MPLA Political Bureau on the events, published in Luanda on 12 July, and later translated into English in MPLA's Information Bulletin No.4, July 1977; and two articles by Simon Mallet "Autopsie d'un Putsch" and "Les Multiples Visages d'un Complot" published in the magazine Afrique-Asie on 11 July and 25 July, 1977.

The writer wishes to acknowledge the kind assistance of Basil Davidson who read the first draft of this article and suggested a number of valuable improvements and corrections.

*How long will South Africa survive?* examines the effects of the international financial system on South Africa, and especially the role of gold as a standard medium in international commodity exchange. The effects of the imperialist system of international relations are illustrated by Johnson’s study of the relations between South Africa, as a major gold producer, and the United States as the most powerful state in the world capitalist system. Johnson sees the US as having the will and the power to fix arbitrarily the price of gold. The US can also control the policies of international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (the IBRD). According to Johnson, the United States can use its economic power vis-a-vis South Africa in three ways. It can apply diplomatic pressure on the South African government through its foreign affairs office, as witnessed by the Kissinger shuttle diplomacy. It can control the gold price, either directly or in a more subtle way through the manipulation of the activities of the IMF. It can close sources of credit to the South African government, thus making the South African government obtain short-term or long-term loans at high rates of interest.

Because of South Africa’s dependence on flows of investment capital from the West through US dominated commercial channels, and South Africa’s dependence on returns from gold exports, any control of the gold price will have serious effects on the South African economy. According to Johnson, the deficit in South Africa’s international trading account of 1975-76 results from the deliberate use by the US of its capacity to alter the market price of gold in order to bring pressure on South Africa. He says that, ‘the trouble was that gold prices had nothing to do with economics . . . the figure of $35 had been fixed entirely by whim. The $35 price level rested on political fiat and the South African economy rested entirely on that . . . Behind this political fiat lay, of course, the awesome economic power of the USA’. According to Johnson, the challenge to US hegemony by the French between
1967 and 1973 opened new markets for gold and caused sharp rises in the gold price. However, this challenge did not last long, indicating that alternatives to the arbitrary financial decisions from Washington are limited and temporary. South Africa failed to sustain the boom caused by a competitive gold market.

Johnson does not show the link between the problems of South Africa's balance of payments and the general boom or slump in the world's capitalist economy. To what extent is the problem of the balance of payments in South Africa a reflection of the contradictions in international capitalism? What is the relationship between the level of the gold price and conditions in the ordinary commodity markets? It is questionable whether the level of the gold price is obtained solely by the political whim of the United States or whether it is also prone to the influence of complex market forces. It is also important to look at changes in the capital-labour ratio at the point of production of gold in South Africa in 1974 to see whether these affect the market price. These changes may explain why South Africa experienced a longer period of economic boom than other capitalist countries.

There is little doubt that the US has the power to influence a degree of change in South Africa. However the problems of South Africa's balance of payments may be the effects of the US government's attempts, as leader of the world's capitalist system, to solve its own national inflationary problems, and to help the international capitalist system survive the crisis. The integration of capitalism internationally may mean that what the US does in response to its own internal economic crisis has repercussions in the South African economy which are not aimed at achieving US political objectives. It is doubtful whether the US can use its economic power to fix the price of gold in order to pressure South Africa to change its social, economic and political structure, with reckless disregard for the consequences of such arbitrary action on other industrialized countries.

The questions Johnson asked about the fate of South Africa, and the areas he searched for the answers, led Johnson to exaggerate the significance of external pressures, particularly from the USA. His presumption that the 'gold war' waged in the international market by the United States against South Africa is the key to the future survival or collapse of South Africa exaggerates the importance of economic factors as a source of change. Because of his belief that crises which 'were to have important internal repercussions with a momentum all of their own inside South Africa . . . were all generated outside South Africa', he concerns himself more with developing a framework relating to the financial relations between the centre (US) and the periphery (South Africa). He then superimposes on this framework unrelated contemporary and temporary events, many of which are unrelated to the subject matter and do not fit the narrative.

However, the question How long will South Africa survive?, presumes the existence of a problem. It presumes that there is something wrong with South Africa and that there is a struggle to change it. In order to understand this problem, we need a thorough examination of the forces which make up the society. Thus we must examine the social
relations and institutions of control in South Africa, in order to identify the sources of a struggle for change and the conditions in which such a struggle takes place. At some stage in his narrative, Johnson gives the impression that what he is really concerned with is the fate of whites in South Africa. He seems to identify South Africa with the white establishment, thus suggesting that people's struggle in South Africa is characterised by a racial confrontation. But the struggle in South Africa is not just concerned with racial repressive measures, but is a struggle against capitalism, a struggle whose objective is to change the whole social, political, legal and economic system. The fact that in 1973 the 17% of the population who are white took 68% of all wage and salary payments, the 9% of coloureds received 7.9%, the 3% Asians 2.8% and the 71% who are black received 21.1% does not change the nature of the struggle as basically between labour and capital. Considering the state's measures to protect white workers, it is inevitable that the initiators of large-scale uprisings will be the oppressed and exploited blacks.

According to Johnson, the Soweto uprising and strikes were caused by the United States of America manipulating the gold price, causing balance of payments problems, unemployment of blacks and therefore a fall in living standards. Black students and workers rose to defend the standard of living they had acquired during the boom years. Had there been no slump or fall in the price of gold the problems in Soweto could not have arisen. He says for example that 'what was explosive in 1976 was the fear of unemployment among a younger generation of Africans, cruelly cutting short the heightened expectations generated by a period of prosperity and upward movement'. He is wrong to assume that the real wages of black workers rose and that there was full employment of black workers during the boom period. The forms of oppression characteristic of South African capitalism: the migrant labour system, pass laws, homelands, discriminatory legislation, and other measures to control physically the black workers and people of South Africa, form the basis for the continuity linking Soweto to Sharpeville through struggles by workers in the factories. It is through an analysis of the contradictions inherent in the South African racial capitalist system, as sources of dynamic change, that the answers to Johnson's question about the fate of 'South Africa' can be found.

Johnson sees Soweto as an expression of another blunder in the struggle by black workers. In his view, it is futile for the oppressed classes of South Africa to fight against the racial capitalist system because the ruthless and efficient state police will deal with them effectively. He says that 'the economy may well appear to tremble on the brink of the apocalypse but it is too fundamentally strong not to pull through by the simple expedient of off-loading most of the costs of recession on to the blacks. It is possible (though by no means certain) that we shall witness further revolts by the black unemployed or even the peasantry under such circumstances. These revolts could take almost any form, with urban guerrilla action perhaps marginally the most likely. What is certain (not just possible) is that such revolts, if they take place, will be thoroughly and effectively repressed'.

Apart from the might of the state's internal security measures, Johnson argues that blacks are too divided and disorganized to pose any real
threat to the ‘white establishment’. The leadership is subject to intellectual confusion and is opportunist. Anyway, ‘history, in a word, is again on the side of the verkrampet’s’! Uprisings like Sharpeville and Soweto are consequently effective to the extent that they contribute to the economic factors by affecting the confidence of the foreign investor. He argues that ‘to date the greatest power of the urban Africans has, as we have noted, been felt in the international money markets. Black protestors may not be able to stop the factories or mines for long, if at all, but they can interdict the flow of foreign capital into South Africa on which the economy depends’. While it would be unfair to deny the validity of some of Johnson’s criticisms of the organization of the oppressed classes of South Africa, it is not difficult to see the way he arrives at this criticism and its purpose. Its purpose is not constructive at all. It is rather given in a contemptuous manner to reinforce his belief that South Africa’s fate really lies outside its boundaries.

Because of the questions he asks himself about the fate of South Africa, and the belief that the real power for change lies in the United States, he gives very little credit to revolutionary struggles in other parts of the world. He argues that the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Africa was not brought about by the intensified, long, hard and bloody armed struggles by the oppressed people in these colonies. According to him, when Portugal was faced with the choice of continuing in Africa or joining the EEC, since Britain which had provided her with markets was also joining, it became clear that ‘Portugal would decolonise. If Caetano could not do it, someone else would have to. In the Portuguese context this ‘someone else’ would necessarily have to be found among the military’. He sees the struggles in Zimbabwe and Namibia in the same way. He treats the representatives of liberation movements of Zimbabwe at the Geneva Conference with a very high level of contempt. He reduces the whole scenario at Geneva and the subsequent attempts to find a solution to the Rhodesian problem to part of the stage management by Kissinger to further the interests of American foreign policy and, particularly, to add to Gerald Ford’s votes in the 1976 general elections. He does not however say why the Portuguese had not decolonised for 200 years, why the United States had used the most sophisticated deadly weapons to fight so ruthlessly and for so long in Vietnam, why Britain could not voluntarily decolonize in Rhodesia for 80 years and why successive attempts to arrive at a constitutional settlement have failed. Nor does he satisfactorily explain the failure of South Africa’s ‘detente exercise’ forcing it to fight in Angola and Rhodesia to protect the interests of its national capital, those of Western capital, and to contain the spread of revolution to its borders. The failure of the ‘detente exercise’ is rather blamed on changes by unreliable African leaders under threat of the Arab oil embargo.

Luke Malaba


This is the best study of African labour history I have read. Charles van Onselen’s account of the system of forced labour (Chibaro) to the
Rhodesian mines is a powerful, meticulously documented and almost entirely persuasive work. Such reservations as I have are concerned with some conceptual ambiguities and overall theoretical perspectives which are not fully developed by van Onselen. In particular, given that his account is written within the ambiance of conventional historiography, he doesn't make the transition from the situationally-specific features of his material to a set of propositions generic to the capitalist labour process as a whole.

But such comments must await the exposition of his principal themes and conclusions. Rhodesian gold mines were never as profitable as those in South Africa. Speculative capital which financed their operations at the turn of the century, was an unreliable source of capitalisation, so the mine-owners had to evolve a long-term strategy to increase production and to reduce costs. This meant, in effect, increasing the supply of cheap labour to the mines and reducing the wages of the work force. The Rhodesian Native Labour Bureau was assigned the task of replacing the Native Commissioners and private labour recruiters, while the compound evolved to habituate workers to the conditions of their immiserisation.

It is to the compound system itself, in all its many ramifications, that the bulk of van Onselen's work is devoted. Reducing direct wages (lower in 1922 than in 1900) was the first task of the bosses, but costs had to be cut too in terms of food, accommodation, medical attention and compensation for injury. The high mortality and disease rate, the poor food sold at four times its value, equally reflected a super-exploitation of labour-power. As van Onselen reflects:

"The economics of death suited the Rhodesian mining industry because it relied not on the capacity of a fully developed proletariat to reproduce itself, but on a flow of migrant labour created within a regional economic system" (p.60).

Such a system can work so long as (a) the capitalist is literally prepared to burn out his stock of labour-power for short-term objectives and (b) he can rely on an inexhaustible supply of labour-power as was made clear in the Nazi use of concentration camp workers. But, as van Onselen later points out, the Rhodesian mines were, to some degree, competing for labour in a regional system where the South African mines were offering higher wages. There were, in other words, also good reasons to promote a policy of labour stabilisation, a process which van Onselen describes minutely in his discussion of the social control systems inaugurated in the compounds.

The tensions between the economics of death and labour stabilisation is never fully resolved by van Onselen. Is it, for example, to be explained in terms of the different periods of capital (a formulation he considers briefly), through the fluctuations in labour supply, in terms of a conflict between primitive and progressive fractions of capital, or finally, as something based on the varying profitability of different mines?

When discussing the possibility of labour stabilisation, it is important to realise that progressive capital did not ever contemplate the simple expedient of raising wages. Rather, mine-owners mixed overt forms of
coercion (fines, assaults and an almost military discipline) with more subtle, but no less obnoxious, methods of subordinating the workers. The catalogue of these methods makes grotesque and stunning reading, and this review can do scant justice to the richness of van Onselen's observations. The credit system (with its twisted variations of a company store operation), the provision and production of alcohol, drugs and sex, religion, education, dancing and sports — all these were manipulated by the mine managements to induce patterns of obedience, service and habituation to the debilitating and dangerous conditions of work.

Workers responded by a whole series of everyday forms of resistance ranging from desertion, to theft, to individualised pleas for justice and to time bargaining (called loitering). There was some organisation through mutual aid societies, dance teams, even a well-established branch of the (South-African based) Industrial and Commercial Union, and there were some strikes, although van Onselen spends little time in mapping out the more obvious forms of struggle. Instead, he argues, "Compound police, spies, censorship and the sjambok (whip) do not produce an environment conducive to the development of public ideologies, organisations, meetings, petitions or strikes . . . the pattern of resistance should be looked for in the nooks and crannies of the day-to-day situation" (p.239).

I have no doubt whatever that he is right to widen our focus of labour protest in this way, and his book represents a wholly successful attempt to do this in the context of the Rhodesian mines.

However, and here is where some of my theoretical doubts intrude, I cannot agree with van Onselen's apparent wish to delimit such observations to the cases of labour-coercive economies. First, I'm not sure of the theoretical status of such a notion. Derived presumably from Barrington Moore, or perhaps from some views on patterns of industrialisation in South Africa (Rex, Trapido?), it seeks to set up a special case, where none exists. The early forms of capitalist (including State capitalist) production often reveal a ruthless process of habituation — from the Bolivian tin mines to the Brazil coffee plantations to the railway workers of India. Marx has a passage in Capital where, in discussing agricultural labourers in Britain, he describes a process of batching, recruiting, labelling and selling ostensibly free labour in much the same terms as the operation of the Chibaro system. While not wishing to deny the special features of the Southern African case it would appear important not to lose sight of the generic characteristics of the capitalist labour process. In the absence of this, van Onselen's notion of proletarianisation loses much of its analytical thrust. Second, one of the further spin-offs from accepting a wider frame of reference would be to examine more carefully the transitions and distinctions between slave and free labour. We are already intuitively aware of intermediary types — contract, indentured, forced, and migrant labourers — and van Onselen himself has some useful comments on how Masters' and Servants' Ordinances, Pass Laws and Native Regulations' Ordinances restricted, by political means, the possibilities of worker mobility. But political regulation of the labour process was common to all colonial societies, and is present in one form or another (immigration control, work certificates, etc.) in contemporary societies. In short, while van Onselen has provided a masterful account of the Chibaro system, his cautions and over-specific
theoretical formulations need extension and recasting to evolve a more meaningful comparative sociology of labour.

Robin Cohen


The unionization of black labour to assuage radical black demands and preempt a revolutionary situation in South Africa is not a newly conceived tactic. But with the success of the Durban Strikes and the change in the balance of power in Southern Africa, it is currently becoming the main priority for white reformists. This explains the sudden proliferation of books on black labour and black trade unions.

Included in this literature are two books based on the proceedings of workshops concerned with incorporating black labour into the capitalist economy and thereby as one editor puts it, contributing "to the stability and security of the whole system". Labour Perspectives on South Africa is based on a workshop held jointly by TUCSA (the mainly white reformist multi-racial minority trade union body) and the Centre for Inter Group Studies at the University of Cape Town (formerly the Abe Baily Institute). Anglo-American Corporation and De Beers subsidised its printing, a fact which its editor considers as being "encouraging for the issues underlying the book".

This is a dry and arid book containing very little new analysis. The Editors restrict themselves to considering the future of black labour as a "problem of industrial relations". The wider political and economic implications are ignored as is the role of employers in suppressing and exploiting black labour. The book contains papers by both academics and TUCSA leaders, with the trade union leaders' contribution being, on the whole, more interesting and stimulating. Particularly revealing is Mrs Lucy Mvubelo's (National Union of Clothing Workers) comment that "the future of Africans is so much dependent on white people extending this hand of friendship and partnership". Equally Dr Anna Scheepers (TUCSA Garment Workers' Union) argues that Africans should establish strong well-organized unions which must act "responsibly as industrial organizations . . . If Africans bring political activity into their trade union this will set the clock of trade union evolutionary progress substantially back."

The SAIRR booklet provides a rather more lively and informative introduction to the current debate on black labour within white circles. It covers a much wider range of issues and presents a much wider range of opinions, including that of the majority of employers who still balk at allowing black trade unions to exist.

The main argument in both publications is that white employers and white trade union leaders should be encouraged to educate and to
organize blacks so as to establish a non-political reformist trade unionism. However, there is also a group in South Africa who advocate the unionization of blacks so as to enforce major social and economic changes. The Institute for Industrial Education, recently established in Durban, represents this approach and its monthly *South African Labour Bulletin* includes writings of a more radical thrust.

The I.I.E. prepared *The Durban Strikes 1973*. This is a well-written and stimulating analysis of the strikes. However, whilst the authors do dig deeper than the previously mentioned books, they suffer from similar shortcomings. They also advocate black unionization to "secure social and industrial stability" and to prevent those "social forces at work which have unperceived consequences that threaten the viability of the society". They admit, however, that this *stability* can only be maintained by means of a major redistribution of wealth and power which they hope black unions will help bring about. Thus they argue that the white wage earners and middle classes will have (it appears, almost voluntarily) to sacrifice their ill-gained privileges. But they uphold a pro-capitalist position by arguing that the wealth of white capitalists is essential for economic growth and to provide an increasing number of jobs for the rapidly growing black population.

It is of course easy to see why such a strategy might be attractive to large and powerful multinational corporations such as Anglo-American, even though it is highly unlikely that the majority of the white population will be prepared to countenance such a development.

The book's proposals are thus largely unrealistic and vacuous, although, the fact that three of the participants in this study (including the original leader, Richard Turner) were banned while preparing it, is an indication of the government's continuing sensitivity to this type of strategy.

All three books reflect growing concern with the pre-emption of the emergence of a revolutionary alternative. But what is a source of concern to them, is after all a source of inspiration to the masses.

*M.K.*

---

**Change of Address**

The Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Information Centre

*has moved to*

34 Percy Street, London W1

(Tel: 01-636 7108, telex 23391)
General

1. Hindess, B & Hirst, P
   Mode of production: social formation in pre-capitalist modes of production, *Crit. Anth.* 8 (1977), 49-58

2. Clarke, J

3. O'Laughlin, B; Dhoquois, G

4. Petras, J
   State Capitalism and the Third World, *Dev. & Change*, 8,1 (1977), 1-18

5. Pease, A

6. Nash, J

7. Harrison, M

8. Cook, S
   Toward a revised marxist theory of precapitalist formations and the transition to capitalism, *Ibid.*, 360-89


10. Sklar, R L

11. Scott, J

12. Wall, R

13. Kende, I

14. Cleaver, H
    Malaria, the politics of public health and the international crisis, *Rev. Rad. Pol. Econ.*, 9,1 (1977), 81-103

15. Scott, J C

16. Streeten, P
    Poverty and urban bias (review), *Round Table* 367 (1977), 291-98

17. Mackintosh, M
    Reproduction and patriarchy, *Capital & Class* 2 (1977), 119-27

18. Godfrey, M
    Surplus population and underdevelopment: reserve army or marginal mass?*, MURA*, 10,1 (1977), 63-71

19. Frank, A G
    Dependence is dead, long live dependence and the class struggle, *World Dev.*, 5,4 (1977), 355-70

20. Villamil, J
    Development planning and dependence, *IDS Bull.*, 9,1 (1977), 57-61

21. Bonnafe, P
    La logique de l'ideologie, *Cult. et Devt.*, 9,1 (1977), 98-133

22. Zieman, W & Wanzendorfer, M
    The state in peripheral societies, *Socialist Reg.*, 1977, 143-77

23. Kuitembrouwer, J
    Science and technology: for or against the people. The Hague: ISS Occ. Paper 49, 1975, 30pp

24. Kuitembrouwer, J

25. van der Laar, A

26. Berg, E

27. Kitching, G

28. Turok, B
    Revolution. Milton Keynes: Open Univ., Course D 302, Unit 33

29. Hindess, B

30. House of Lords
    *Select Committee on Commodity Prices: minutes of evidence*. London: House of Lords Papers 1975/6, Vol. 7, 545pp

31. Amin, S

32. Nabudere, D

33. Schmidt, S W
    *Friends, Followers and Factions: a reader in political clientelism*. Berkeley: California UP, 1977, 504pp

AFRICA GENERAL

34. Nkemdirim, B A

35. Baker, J

36. Rood, L L

37. Ollawa, P E

38. Colcough, C

113

African history and the ideological reproduction of exploitative relations of production, *Africa Dev.*, 2, 1 (1977), 43-60


'Tribe': a socio-political analysis, *Ufahamu*, 7,1 (1976), 143-65


Static and dynamic analysis of the intermediate sector: a synthesis, *MURA*, 10, 1 (1977), 73-8


China’s role in Africa, *Annals*, 432 (1977), 96-109


La mise en dépendance de l’Afrique noire, *CEA* 61/2 (1976), 7-58


Underdevelopment in Africa: comments on methodology, *History in Africa* 3 (1976), 157-62

The Lome Convention and the new international economic order, *Common Market Law Review*, 13, 3 (1976), 315-34

Conflict in Africa: Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa, *Strategic Survey* 1976, 44-60


Considerations critiques sur la Convention de Lome, *Cah. du CEDAF* 7/8 (1976), 42pp


Frantz Fanon: social and political thought. Columbus: Ohio State U. 1977, 232pp


3. WEST AFRICA

The manipulation of youth politics in Ghana and the Ivory Coast, *Geneve-Afr.*, 15,2 (1976), 38-63


The international cocoa agreements, *J. World Trade Law*, 11,1 (1977) 37-51

*Cocoa production*. New York: Prager, 1976, 413pp
a. NIGERIA

00 Muller, J C Chefferie, ideologie et mode de production chez les Rukuba, CJAS, 11,1 (1977), 3-22
01 Polhemus, J H Nigeria and Southern Africa: interest, policy and means, Ibid., 43-66
02 Olagunju, O Career perspectives among an administrative elite: the Northern States of Nigeria, Quart. J. Admin., 11,1/2 (1977), 23-42
03 Olouwu, O E The legislative process in a military regime, Ibid., 3-22
04 Fadahunsi, O The politics of local administration in W Nigeria, Ibid., 97-114
05 Yahaya, A Representation in local government: the emirates case, Nig. J. Public Affairs, 6,1 (1976), 25-36
06 Okime, O Reforming Nigeria’s revenue allocation system, Ibid., 79-94
07 Oyemakinde, W The Nigerian general strike of 1945, Ibid., 693-710
08 Aluko, O Nigeria and Britain since Gowon, AA, 76, 304 (1977), 303-20
10 Aluko, O Nigeria and the superpowers, Millenium (London), 5,2 (1976), 127-41
12 Barrett, J The rank and file of the colonial army in Nigeria 1914-18, JMAS, 15,1 (1977), 105-15
13 King, R Capital, credit and savings in Northern Nigerian agriculture, Samaru Agric. Newsletter, 18,1 (1976), 17-21
14 Igbe, O J Un aspect des échanges entre le Dahomey et le Nigeria: le commerce du cacao, Bull. IFAN, 38,3 (1976), 636-69
15 Sinclair, S W Ease of entry into small-scale trading in Lagos, MURA, 10,1 (1977) 79-90
16 Cohen, R Review of Cocoa, Custom and Socio-economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria, by S S Berry (OUP, 1975), IJAHS, 9,4 (1976), 689-92
17 Waterman, P The lot of the Lagos dockworker, Management in Nig., Dec. 1976, 8-19
18 Waterman, P Industrial relations and labour unrest in Nigeria, Business Times (Lagos), 14-28.12.76
19 Anon The character and the features of the present situation in Nigeria, Afr. Red Family, 3,1 (1977), 26-32
20 Nwankwo, G O Probing the Nigerian economy, Banker 612 (Feb. 1977), 63-7
21 Nwosu, S The political economy of Nigerian oil, Chindaba 2 (1976), 58-61
22 Adeniji, K State participation in the Nigerian oil industry, J. World Trade Law, 11,2 (1977), 156-79
63 Forrest, T Notes on the political economy of state intervention in Nigeria, IDS Bull., 9,1 (1977), 42-7
64 Lazar, A Von, & Duersten, A L Oil and development planning: implications for Nigeria, Energy Policy (Guildford), 4,4 (1976), 330-42
66 Ollawa, P E The political and social setting of military government in Nigeria: Problems of political instability, Geneve-Afr., 15,2 (1976), 6-37
67 Ijomah, B I C The role of women in Nigerian society, Conch, 6, 1/2 (1974), 47-59
68 Waterman, P The concept of the semiproletarianised peasantry (and) the Lagos dock strike of 1968. The Hague: seminar on Third World Strikes, 1977
70 Fapohunda, O Employment and unemployment in Lagos. Ibid. 60, 1977, 18pp
71 Ojo, F Economic integration: the Nigerian experience. Ibid. 54 (1975) 22pp
75 Beer, C E F The Politics of Peasant Groups in West Nigeria. Ibadan UP, 1977
76 Imoagen, O Social mobility in emergent society: the new elite in western Nigeria. Canberra: ANU Press, 1976, 368pp
77 Dent, M J Improving Nigeria’s draft constitution. Keele: Dark Horse, 1977
78 Minor items
3b. GHANA

180 Killick, T

181 Peil, M
Demographic change in a Ghanaian suburb, Ibid., 63-78

182 Twumasi, Y
Prelude to the rise of mass nationalism, Ibid., 35-46

183 Kaufert, J M
Situational identity and ethnicity among Ghanaian university students, JMAS, 15, 1 (1977), 126-35

184 Ladouceur, P
Politics in Ghana reconsidered, Ibid., 344-48 (review art.)

185 Cohen, D L
Review of Political Corruption by V T Le Vine (Stanford, 1975), Ibid., 15, 3 (1977), 508-10

186 Kelly, R
Local-level politics in Ghana, Ibid., 505-8 (review art.)

187 Howard, R
Economic imperialism and oligopolisation of trade in the Gold Coast 1886-1939, Ufahamu, 7, 1 (1976), 71-92

188 Howard, R
Differential class participation in the Ghana cocoa boycott of 1937-8, CIAS, 10, 3 (1976), 469-80

189 Date-Bah, E
Commercial driving as an occupational avenue for the less educated in Ghana, MURA, 10, 1 (1977), 39-46

190 Forsyth, D J C & Solomon, R F
Choice of technology and nationality of ownership in manufacturing, Oxford Econ. Papers, 29, 2 (1977), 258-83

191 Terray, E
Asante au 19eme siecle, Annales, 32, 3 (1977), 311-25 (review art.)

192 Chinery-Hesse, M
Women and decision-making, Labour & Society, 1, 2 (1976), 33-6

193 Kraus, J

194 Sandbrook, R
Rural-urban migration in Sierra Leone. Ibid., 13, 1976, 113pp

195 Luckham, R

196 Minor items

Economy: AD 1977, 919; Afr. 67 (1977), 32; WA 76, 1741-2, 1810-1, WA 77, 327, 661-2, 697-9, 738, 931, 1509, 1802 (gen.); S97 (electric); 99, 146-8; New Internat. Nov. 77, 14-5 (oil); WA 77, 1963 (steel); 1033-6 (industry); 747-50 (Budget); 313-5; AD 1977, 821; Afr. 69 (1977), 116-7 (agric); WA 77, 861-3, 903-5, 947-8, 991-2, 1044-5, 1157-8, 1205-6, 1267-71, 1345-7, 1406-7, 1476-7, 1583-4, 1635-6, 1679-80, 1810-1, 2063, 2081-2, 2575-9

Other: Afr. 66 (1977), 32; WA 77, 1854, 1875-87, 2394-5 (educ.); WA 66 (1977), 32; WA 77, 1854, 1875-87, 2394-5 (educ.); WA 66 (1977), 32; WA 77, 854, 1335-6 (Lake Chad)

3c. SIERRA LEONE, GAMBIA, LIBERIA

200 Ketkar, S L
The economics of education in Sierra Leone, JMAS, 15, 2 (1977), 301-9

201 Hoogvelt, A M & Tinker, A M
The Sierra Leone Development Company: a case study in imperialism, Crit. Anth. 8 (1977), 66-9

202 Spencer, D S C

203 Byerlee, D
Rural-urban migration in Sierra Leone. Ibid., 13, 1976, 113pp

204 Liedholm, C & Chute, E
Small-scale industries in Sierra Leone. Ibid. 14, 1976, 129pp

205 Abraham, A
Mende Government and Politics under Colonial Rule. Freetown: Sierra Leone UP, 1977

206 Peil, M
Unemployment in Banjul, MURA, 10, 1 (1977), 25-30

207 Kingsland, J
A Gambian chieftaincy election, JMAS, 15, 4 (1977), 651-6
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Author/Title/Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>Dunsmore, J L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Minor items</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
244 Delancey, M W  Credit unions in Cameroun, *Ibid.*, 316-22


246 Stark, F  Federalism in Cameroun: the shadow and the reality, *CJAS*, 10,3 (1977), 423-32

247 Minor items  
*AD* 1977, 1290; *Afr.* 65 (1977), 36-7; *WA* 77, 1147-50 (Malipol.); *WA* 77, 360-2; *AD* 1977, 423-32

3e. GUINEA-BISSAU, FORMER SPANISH TERRITORIES


256 Minor items  
*Guinea-Bissau: Peoples Power 9* (1977), 19-20 (private trade); 7/8 (1977); 8-10 (health); 5-8; *AD* 1977, 1289 (literacy); *AD* 1977, 245 (agric); *People's Power 9* (1977), 16-8 (justice); *Guardian* (NY) Mar. 77 suppl. (women); *Afr.* 70 (1977), 62-3; *WA* 77, 1088-91, 1401-2 (gen.); *WA* 77, 183; *WA* 78, 12-13 (Cape Verde); *WA* 77, 2502-3, 2555-7 (PAIGC)

*Sahara: AD* 1977, 429, 585, 917, 1060-3, 1144; *Afr.* 66 (1977), 18-9; 69 (1977), 75, 78; 70 (1977), 16-8; *WA* 76, 1937; *WA* 77, 981-3, 1037, 1399-1400, 2234-5, 2450; *Guardian* (NY), 20.10.76; 24.11.76; 16.3.77; 10.5.77; 16.7.77; 13-20.7.77; 24-31.8.77.

*Equatorial Guinea: WA* 76, 1744; *Guardian* (NY), 15.12.76

4. EAST AFRICA


4a. KENYA

270 Avromovic, D  Commodities in Nairobi, *Devt. & Change*, 8,2 (1977)


274 Davis, J T  The development of the small farm sector in Kenya 1954-72, *Canadian Geographer*, 21,1 (1977), 32-58


81. Kitching, G
82. Stichter, S
83. Cowen, M
84. Livingstone, I
85. Martin, D
86. O'Keefe, P et al
87. Wisner, B
88. Pala, A D et al
89. Child, F C
90. Minor items

100. Wayne, S & Howard, L
101. McHenry, D E
102. Chamungwana, W
103. Kashuti-Zirahuka, C G
104. Cadribo, A R
105. Msekwa, P
106. Oman, L M
107. Ishumi, A G
108. Mlekwa, V M
109. Honey, M S
110. Nabudere, D W
111. Ngunangwa, N
112. Sheriff, A H M
113. Ishumi, A G M
114. MMari, G
115. Coulson, A
116. Shaw, T M
117. Carter, R
118. Mpakati, A
119. Chipembere, H B M
120. Nabudere, D W
121. Shah, R M
122. Roemer, M et al
123. Mwapachi, H B
124. Tooker, P P
125. Rigby, P
126. Konter, J H
127. von Freyhold, M
128. Akpan, M B
129. Markie, J


Some problems of income distribution in Kenya. Nairobi Univ., 1977


AD 1977, 152, 387 (for. inv.): 209-24, 827 (econ.); 485-6; Afr. 69 (1977), 45 (pol.); AD 1977, 907-9 (agric.)


Self-reliance as a strategy for cultural transformation, *Ibid.*, 3-17


Imperialism, state, class and race, *Ibid.*, 1-31


Tanzania's fertiliser factory, *JMAS*, 15,1 (1977), 119-25

The Tan-Zam Railway, *JMAS*, 15,2 (1977), 324-7 (rev. art.)


Ujamaa villages: a possible solution to the problems of the rural poor *Land Reform* 1 (1976), 54-76

4b. TANZANIA

Wayne, S & Howard, L


Self-reliance as a strategy for cultural transformation, *Ibid.*, 3-17


Imperialism, state, class and race, *Ibid.*, 1-31


Tanzania's fertiliser factory, *JMAS*, 15,1 (1977), 119-25

The Tan-Zam Railway, *JMAS*, 15,2 (1977), 324-7 (rev. art.)


Ujamaa villages: a possible solution to the problems of the rural poor *Land Reform* 1 (1976), 54-76

119
337 Kjekshus, H (ed)  *The party: essays on TANU*. Dar: TPH, 1976, 73pp
341 Herzog, J  *Traditionelle Institutionen und nationale Befreiungs revolution in Tansania*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1975, 314pp
343 Etten, G M van  *Rural Health Development in Tansania*. Assen: van Gorcum, 1976, 181pp
344 Tanzanian Library Services  *Subject index to the Nationalist 1964-72*. Dar: POB 9283, 1977, 250pp
347 Sabot, R H  *Open unemployment and the employed compound of urban surplus labour*. Dar: Economic Res. Bureau Paper 74.4, 1974, 93pp
348 Williams, D  National planning and the choice of technology: the case of textiles Dar: ERB Paper 7512, 1975, 36pp
350 Rice, R C  *The Tanzanian price control system*. Dar: ERB Paper 76.4, 1976, 47pp
352 Msekwa, P  *Self reliance as a strategy for development*. Dar: ERB 76.6, 1976
356 Kim, K S  *The linkage effects of basic industry in Tansania: some policy issues and suggestions*. Dar: ERB Paper 76.11, 1976, 22pp
359 Hess, O  *The establishment of cattle ranching associations among the Maasai*. Cornell Univ. Center for Int. Stud., Rural Devt Ctee 1976, 57pp
365 Hall, B L  *Adult education and the development of socialism in Tansania*. Nairobi: EALB, 1975, 144pp
367 Minor items  *Afr. 59 (1976), 43-72; 66 (1977), 87-114 (survey); AD 1976, 1195-1212 Afr. 63 (1976), 77-9 (econ.); 57 (1976), 62-3 (agric.); 61 (1976), 46,
UGANDA, BURUNDI, RWANDA

Mujaju, A B
The role of UPC as a party of government in Uganda, CJAS, 10,3 (1976), 443-68

Mafeje, A
Review of Polities and Class Formation in Uganda, by M Mamdani (NY 1976), Ibid., 11,1 (1977), 171-4

Kabwegyere, T B
Land and the growth of social stratification in Uganda, JEA Res. & Devt, 5,1 (1975), 1-18

Alibaruho, G
Pricing policy and the disappearing farmer's income in Uganda's cotton industry, Ibid., 55-68

Odongo, J & Lea, J
Home ownership and rural-urban links, JMAS, 15,1 (1977), 59-73

Scarritt, J
Political cleavages in Zambia and Uganda, Umoja, 2,2 (1975), 1-12

Kiwanuka, S
The Uganda national movement and the trade boycott of 1959/60, Makerere Hist. J., 2,1 (1976), 1-26

Provizer, N W

Gitelson, S A
Major shifts in recent Ugandan foreign policy, AA 76, 304 (1977), 359-80

Vincent, J
Colonial chiefs and the making of class: Teso, Africa, 47,2 (1977), 140-59

Doornbos, M R
Ethnicity, Christianity and the development of social stratification in colonial Ankola, IJAHS, 9,4 (1976), 555-75

Mamdani, M
The Makerere massacre, Maji Maji 27 (1976), 69-73

Vincent, J

Hansen, H B

Rodegom, F
Quinze ans de vie politique au Burundi, Cult. et Devt, 8,4 (1976), 666-725

Chretien, J P
Les fratricides legitimes, Esprit, Dec. 1976, 822-34

Minor items

Burundi: AD 1977, 77, 396 (pol.)

NORTH EAST AFRICA

Farer, T J

Markakis, J & Ayele, N

Col. Mengistu

Hamilton, D
Ethiopia's embattled revolutionaries, Conflict Stud., 82 (1977), 20pp

Lee, W F

Harlpern, J
Problemes de planification et developpement en Ethiopie, Pount (Djibouti), 14 (1976), 5-14

Legum, C
Realities of the Ethiopian revolution, World Today, Aug. 1977, 305-11


Jordanos, G M
Eritrea: background to revolution, MR, 28,4 (1976), 52-61

Morgan, E
A geographical analysis of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, JMAS, 15,4 (1977), 667-74

Ellingson, L

Cervenka, Z

Palen, J J
Urbanisation and migration in Addis Ababa, Internal Migration, ed. A H Richmond & D Kubat (Sage, 1976)

Gyenge, Z
Ethiopia on the road of non-capitalist development. Budapest: Studies in Developing Countries 90, 1976, 48pp

Cohen, J M et al

Stahl, M

Holmberg, J

121
407 Scholler, H & Brietzke, P  
**Ethiopia: Revolution, Law and Politics.** Munich: IFO Studien 92, 1976  
216pp

408 Hughes, A J  

409 Di Georgi, U  
Somalia: learning from the disaster, *Ceres* 45 (1975), 41-5 (drought)

410 Sheik-Abdi, A  

411 Lewis, I M  

412 Matthies, V  
Somalia – ein sowjetischer 'Sattelstaat' im Horn von Afrika?, *Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee* 9 (1976), 437-56

413 Matthies, V  

414 Salad, M K  

5, 5A, 5B: CENTRAL AFRICA, ZAMBIA, MALAWI

420 Palmer, R & Parsons, N (eds)  
**The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa.** London: Heinemann, 1977, 450pp

421 Martin, R  

422 Quick, S A  

423 Markakis, J & Curry, R L  

424 Garvey, B  

425 Schultz, J  
The contributors to the agrarian market production in Zambia, *Die Erde*, 106, 1/2 (1975), 10-20

426 Dresang, D  

427 Harvey, C  

428 Ollawa, P  

429 Canter, R S  

430 Mwendapole, M R  

431 Luhring, J  
*Rural development planning in Zambia*. Tangier: CAFRAD, 1975, 72pp

432 Hall, R  

433 Phillips, E M  
H B M Chipembe 1930-75, Malawi patriot, *Ufahamu*, 7,1 (1976), 5-:

434 Henderson, R D'A  

435 Kadzamira, Z D  

436 Phipps, B  
Evaluating development schemes: problems and implications, *Dev & Change*, 7,3 (1976), 469-84

437 Boeder, R B  
Malawian labour and the Kariba Dam, *JMAS*, 15,2 (1977), 310-15

438 Kandawire, J A R  
Thangata in precolonial and colonial systems of land tenure in South Malawi, *Africa*, 47,2 (1977), 185-91

439 Doyle, C J  

440 Golola, M L  

441 Williams, T D  

442 Mufuka, K N  
*Missions and Politics in Malawi*. Kingston, Ont.: Limestone Press, 1977, 289pp

443 McCracken, J  
*Politics and Christianity in Malawi*. Cambridge UP, 1977, 324pp

444 Minor items  
*Zambia: Afr.* 66 (1977), 64-7; *AD* 1977, 149, 591, 899, 1048, 1300 (econ.): 721, 571, 1049-51; *Afr. 69* (1977), 41-2 (pol.); *JMAS*, 1977, 234-4 ( & Rhodesia); *AD* 1977, 1192-3 ( & Zaire); 489-90 ( & oil firms)

**5c. FRANCOPHONE CENTRAL AFRICA**

450 St Moulin, L de  

451 Lukoji, M  

452 Mungongo, N  

453 Chubaka, B  
Deux chefs de Bushi sous le regime colonial: Kabare et Ngweshe (1912-60), *Etudes d'histoire afr.*, 7 (1975), 89-112
Mouvements recents de population dans la zone de peuplement dense de l'est Kivu, *Ibid.*, 113-24

Histoire de l'agriculture africain dans Katanga 1919-40, *Enquetes et documents d'histoire afr.*, 1 (1975), 55-113


Zaire-Shaba, *Remarques afr.*, 504 (1977), 4-18 and 505 (1977), 5-11

Local administration in Zaire and underdevelopment, *JMAS*, 15,3 (1977), 349-78


Le phenomene de la colonisation et quelques problemes le la mise en valeur du sou-ouest de 1'Angola, *CJAS*, 11,1 (1977), 69-83


Colin, J P


Henderson, R D'A


Mittelmann, J H


Angola: *AD* 1977, 191-2, 921, 1197-9; *Guardian* (NY), 24.11.76; 25.12.76, 9.3.77, 24.9.77, *WA* 77, 651, 1518-21 (ext. intervention); 1077, 1257-9, 1472-3; *AD* 1977, 713; *Guardian* (NY), 1-15.6.77 (butch); 24.11.76; *WA* 77, 1578-9, 1630-1 (gen. strategy); *Guardian* (NY), 26.1.77, 27.4.77 (Cabinda), 20.7.77 (Cabinda)

123
CARRIED OVER FROM CURRENT AFRICANA No. 13

6a. SOUTH AFRICA

445 Magnusson, A  

446 Leys, R  
*S Africa and sub-imperialism.* Uppsala: Nordic seminar on the State in the Third World, 1976

447 Winai Strom, G  
*The internationalisation of capital and state interventionism in South Africa.* Uppsala: Nordic seminar

448 Callinicos, A & Rogers, J  
*Western Coloured Township: problems of an urban slum,* Jo’burg: Brindley, M, Stares, R  

449 Christian Inst. of S Africa  
*South Africa: a ‘police state’?* Jo’burg, 1976, 55pp

6b. NAMIBIA


461 Nujoma, S  
*S Africa’s bantustanisation of Namibia,* *Ibid.,* 7,3 (1975), 9-11

462 SWAPO  
*Political programme,* *Afr. Youth,* 1, 9/10 (1976)


464 Moolman, J  

465 Entralgo, A  
*Tell me your name and I’ll tell you where and how you live in Namibia,* *Tricont.* 100 (1976), 45-52

466 Best, A C B & de Blij, H  
*Namibia: political geography,* *Focus (NY),* 26,3 (1976), 1-7

467 Muller, E  
*Namibia: vers quelle indépendance?*, *Afr. Contemp.* 89 (1977), 4-10

468 Murray, R  
*Namibia’s elusive independence,* *Round Table* 265 (1977), 42-9

469 I. L. O.  

6c. BOTSWANA, LESOTHO, SWAZILAND

470 Wiseman, J A  
*Multipartyism in ... Botswana,* *AA,* 76,302 (1977), 70-9

471 Dale, R  

472 Truschel, L W  
*The preservation of Khama’s state and growth of the Ngwato monarchy,* *Transaf. J. Hist.*, 4, 1/2 (1974), 71-93

473 Fransman, M  

474 Wallman, S  
*The modernisation of dependence ... (in) Lesotho,* *JSAS,* 3,1 (1976) 102-7

475 Winai-Strom, G  
*Socio-economic structure and traditional authorities in Lesotho,* *Africa Devt.,* 1,1 (1976), 28-33

476 Maane, W  
*Lesotho: a development challenge.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1975, 88pp

477 Jones, D  
*Development and Aid in Southern Africa.* London: Croom Helm, 1977, 360pp

6d. RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE

480 Weinrich, A K M  
*Strategic resettlement in Rhodesia.* *JSAS,* 3,2 (1977), 207-29

481 Phimister, I  

482 Clarke, D  
*The debate on unemployment in Rhodesia,* *SA Lab, Bull.,* 3,3 (1976), 49-76

483 Palmer, R  

484 Weinrich, A K M  
*Guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia,* *New Blackfriars* 57 (1976), 499-505

485 Kay, G  
*Population problems and development strategy in Rhodesia,* *Scot. Geog. Mag.,* 92,3 (1976), 48-60

486 Kubiak, T J  
*Rhodesia: white minority rule in a black state,* *Focus (NY),* 27,2 (1976) 108

487 Zipa  
*Statement on the Geneva talks,* *Africa Speaks* (Toronto), 3 (1976), 5pp

488 Zipa  
*Zimbabwe people’s army.* Oakland, Cal.: LSM, 1976, 10pp

489 Pollak, O & K  
*Rhodesia and Zimbabwe: an international bibliography.* Boston: G K Hall 1977
7. NORTH AFRICA

490 Zartman, I W

The elites of the Maghreb, Int. J. Middle East Stud., 6,4 (1975), 495-504

491 Waterbury, J

Corruption, political stability and development in Egypt and Morocco, Govt. & Opposition, 11,4 (1976), 426-45

492 Griffin, K


493 Smith, T

The political and economic ambitions of Algerian land reform 1962-74, Middle East J., 29,3 (1975), 259-78

494 Gendzier, I L

Psychology and colonialism: some observations, Ibid., 30,4 (1976), 501-15 (Algeria)

495 Hagel, J

Workers' self management in Algeria, RAPE 6 (1976), 96-109

496 Waterbury, J

Land, man and rural development, Common Ground, 1,1 (1975), 21-30

497 Le Pape, M

Terroirs français, gourbois algériens: politique de l'habitat et morale, Cah. Int. Social, 60 (1976), 97-128 (new Alg. villages)

498 Mahiou, A & Autin, J L

L'impact de la révolution agraire sur les institutions administratives en Algérie, R. jur. et pol., 30,1 (1976), 3-43

500 Le Pape, M & Pirson, M

Une problematique de passage chez les populations du Hoggar-Tassili: du nomadisme a la sedentarité, Civilisations, 26, 1/2 (1976), 64-80

501 Lazreg, M

The emergence of classes in Algeria. Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1976, 264pp

502 Harbi, M

Aux origines du FLN. Paris, 1975

503 Nellis, J

Workers participation in Algeria’s nationalised industries. Carleton Univ., School of Int. Affs., Occas. Paper 30, 1976, 32pp

504 Sivan, E


505 Leca, J & Vatin, J


506 Melasuo, T

The role of the state in Algerian development strategy. Uppsala: Nordic seminar on the state in the Third World, 1976

507 Horne, A


508 Various


509 Leveaux, R


510 Athorpe, R J


511 Various

Libyan agriculture since oil, Maghreb Rev., 1 (1976), 7-12

512 Mansour, A

Egypt at the crossroads, Pol. Affs. (NY), 54,12 (1975), 30-9

513 Aulus, M C

Sadat’s Egypt, New Left Rev., 98 (1976), 84-96

514 Crabb, J

Politics, history and culture in Nasser’s Egypt, Int. J. Middle East Stud., 6,4 (1975), 386-420

515 Hajjar, F M

State and university in Egypt 1961-7, Rev. Pol., 38,1 (1976), 57-87

516 Abu-Lughod, J

Review of The Political Mobilisation of Peasants (Indiana UP 74), Contemp. Sociol., 5,3 (1976), 292-4

517 Abdel-Falil, A


518 Richards, A

Technical and social change in Egyptian agriculture 1800-1940. Greenwich, Conn.: Jai Press, 1977

519 Collins, C

Sudan: colonialism and class struggle, Merip Reports 46 (1976), 1-20

520 Badal, R K

Crisis in the S Sudan, Afr. Comm., 68 (1976), 69-81

521 Badal, R K

The rise and fall of separatism in S Sudan, AA, 75, 301 (1976), 463-74

522 Mustapha, M el M

Manpower and employment problems in the Sudan, MURA, 9,1 (1976), 61-78

523 Mustapha, M el M

The Sudanese labour market, MURA, 9,2 (1976), 29-53

524 Bechtold, P K

Politics in the Sudan. NY: Praeger, 1976, 384pp

525 Beshai, A A


526 Roden, D


B. Recent Theses

Most of these can be obtained on inter-library loan, by citing the number beneath the author’s name. Abstracts of North American theses are in Dissertation Abstracts International (DAI), part A. Unless otherwise stated, theses are for doctorates or equivalent.

1. GENERAL

530 Hope, J A

The concept of the ‘peasantry’ in Africa and its possible political application, MA, Sheffield, 1974

125
3a.-3c. WEST AFRICA: ANGLOPHONE

560 Meredith, D G The British Government and colonial economic development... (in) D5666/76
                                            British West Africa 1919-39, Exeter, 1976, 545pp
561 Ekoko, A E British defence policy in Western Africa 1878-1914, Aberdeen, 1976,
                                            D17866/76 454pp
562 Monsonis, J A The significance of the concept of pluralism for understanding econo-
                                            mic development. New School, 1976, 231pp; DAI, 37,2 (1976), 1240
563 Awojinrin, J E British direct investment and economic development in Nigeria
                                            1955-72. Keele, 1974/5
564 Beckles, T C Direct foreign investment in Nigeria. M.Sc., Birmingham, 1975
565 Stewart, M H Political process and change in Nigerian Borgu. Oxford, 1976,
                                            D18642/76 491pp
566 Ochlan, P E Economic evaluation of government services for... groundnut
                                            farmers in Kano. Oklahoma State, 1974, 139pp; DAI, 36,11 (1976), 754
                                            (1976), 1210
568 Trager, L Yoruba markets and trade: Ijesha. U Washington, 1976, 310pp; DAI,
                                            37,5 (1976), 3002
569 Schultz, J F Population and agricultural change in... Soba District, Kaduna State,
                                            76-29,863 Columbia, 1976, 381pp; DAI, 37,7 (1977), 4620
570 Akinmoladun, R O Oil in Nigeria: a case study in the political economy of development.
                                            76-30,104 Howard, 1976, 458pp; Ibid., 4581 (uncritical)
571 Boyd, T A Modernisation and market participation ... in the Fanti rural com-
                                            munity, Cambridge, 1975, 312pp
572 Greenhalgh, P An economic history of the Ghanaian diamond industry 1919-73.
                                            76-30,104 Birmingham, 1974
573 Southall, R Cadbury on the Gold Coast 1907-38. Birmingham, 1975
574 Libby, R T The ideology and power of the World Bank. U Washington, 1975,
                                            76-20,721 329pp; DAI, 37,3 (1976), 1780 (chap. on Ghana)
575 Prakas, K The economies of size of food crop farmers in the Mampong-Ejura
                                            76-21,392 District, Washington State, 1976, 200pp; DAI, 37,4 (1976), 2318
576 Winchester, N B Strangers and politics ... (among) the Hausa in Kumaari. Indian 1976,
                                            76-21,522 244pp; Ibid., 2405
577 Bluwey, G K Continuity and change in Ghana's foreign policy 1966-75. Howard
                                            76-30,106 1976, 284pp; DAI, 37,7 (1977), 4599
578 Sinclair, J S Education and changing social structure in Sierra Leone, Edinburgh,
                                            76-30,106 1976
579 Bledsoe, C H Women and marriage in Kpelle society. Stafford, 1976, 148pp; DAI,
                                            76-18,748 37,2 (1976), 1060

3d. FRANCOPHONE WEST AFRICA

                                            M. Sc., Birmingham, 1975
581 Finnegan, G A Population movement, labour migration and social structure in a
                                            Mossi village. Brandeis, 1976, 274pp; DAI, 37,5 (1976), 2995
582 Kjellgren, M Ethnic unity and colonial boundaries: the examples of Togoland,
                                            M. Sc., Birmingham, 1975
583 Gwan, E A Types, processes and policy implications of the various migrations in
                                            W Cameroon. Berkely, 1975, 478pp; DAI, 37,1 (1976), 603

4a. KENYA

590 Wisner, B The geopolitics of hunger: human ecology of the Kenyan drought
                                            1970-1. Clark  Univ., 1975
591 Kiloh, M Labour protest and trade unionism in Kenya 1939-63. Sussex, 1975,
                                            D17766/76 458pp
592 Friesen, R L Import demand and tariffs: Kenya and E Africa. Columbia, 1973,
                                            76-15,556 320pp. DAI, 37,3 (1976), 460
593 Karisa, G M B Monetisation in Kenya 1922-72. Johns Hopkins. 1976, 156pp; Ibid.,
                                            76-16,823 492
594 Breen, R M
76-18,601
The Kenya Land Commission (1932-33) and its effects on land policy.
Michigan State, 1976, 221pp; DAI, 37,2 (1976), 1149

595 Moock, J L
76-17,834
The migration process and differential economic behaviour in S Maragoli, W Kenya, Columbia, 1976, 246pp; Ibid., 1065

596 Barnes, C
76-27,063
An experiment with African coffee growing in Kenya: the Gusii 1933-50
Michigan State, 1976, 281pp; DAI, 37,6 (1976), 2825

597 Gilpin, G W
76-29,595

598 Sharpley, J G
77-1350
Intersector capital flows and economic development: Kenya. North western, 1976, 238pp; Ibid., 4497

4b. TANZANIA
600 Mosha, A C
D16809/76
Regional planning in the Kilimanjaro/Arusha Region, Nottingham, 1975, 2 vols., 901pp

601 Dunne, J C
76-15,676
Socialism and development ... (in) Tanzania. M. Phil., Leeds, 1974/5

602 Sumra, S
An analysis of environmental and social problems affecting agricultural development in Handeni District, MA, Dar es Salaam, 1975

603 Cadribo, A R
Popular participation under Tanzania's decentralised administrative structure (In Lushoto), MA, Dar es Salaam, 1975

604 Makundala, R S
Decentralisation and popular participation, BA, Dar es Salaam, 1976

605 Lobulu, W N
Popular participation in Tanzania: health projects in Kinondoni District. BA, Dar es Salaam, 1976

606 Ngaiza, M K
The role of the District Councils in Tanzania's decentralisation: a case study of Mafia. BA, Dar es Salaq, 1974

607 Madaha, J
Cash crop production in Shinyanga 1920-67. BA, Dar es Salaam, 1975

608 Salaite, J
Colonialism and underdevelopment in Unyanyembe 1900-60. BA, Dar es Salaam, 1975

609 Anacleti, A O
Pastoralism and development: economic changes in pastoral industry in Serengeti 1950-61. BA, Dar es Salaam, 1975

610 Haiitula, W M
Local administration and development performance in Karagwe. BA, Dar es Salaam, 1975

611 Mpungwe, A R A
Ujamaa producer cooperative villages and socialist development. BA, Dar es Salaam, 1975

612 Mwiliza, J F
An economic history of Rungwe District 1890-1962. BA, Dar es Salaam, 1975

613 Ndisi, C
Ujamaa villages as a collective development strategy. G Washington U, 76-14,817

614 Mutukwa, K S
Politics of the Tanzan railway. Columbia, 1976, 256pp; DAI, 37,6 (1976), 3888

4c, 4d. UGANDA, ETHIOPIA
620 Schultheis, M J
76-18,203
Population growth, labour utilisation and regional development in Kigezi. Cornell, 1976, 556pp; DAI, 37,2 (1976), 1227

621 Quam, M D
76-21,516
Pastoral economy and cattle marketing in Karamoja. Indiana, 1976; 211pp; DAI, 37,4 (1976), 2280

622 Jamal, V
76-26,020
Role of coffee and coffee in Uganda's economic development. Stanford, Stanford, 1976, 231pp; DAI, 37,5 (1976), 3037

623 Batala-
Nayenga, F P
Economic history of the lacrustine states of Busoga 1750-1939. Michigan 1976, 393pp; Ibid., 3067

624 Todd, D M
D16880/76
Politics and change in Dimam, SW Ethiopia, Kent, 1975, 268pp

625 Ghebrejohnannes, A
77-1254
Choice of technique in Ethiopian manufacturing industry, North-western, 1976, 340pp; DAI, 37,7 (1977), 4490

5. CENTRAL AFRICA
630 Seymour, T
D17770/76
Squatters, migrants and the urban poor ... (in a squatter settlement in Lusaka). Sussex, 1976, 724pp

631 Scott, I
Party politics in Zambia. Toronto, 1976

632 Adam, Y M
The genesis of authoritarian politics in Malawi. M. Sc., Edinburgh 1976, 157pp

633 Poewe, K O
76-25,676
Religion, kinship and labour in Luapula. New Mexico, 1976, 315pp; DAI, 37,5 (1976), 1998

634 Brenneman, L E
76-24,408
Conflict and change in Zaire: an analysis of domestic factors leading to military rule. American U., 1976, 362pp; DAI, 37,3 (1976), 1763

635 Abdi, S Y

127
636 Christie, R  The political economy of the Kunene River hydro-electric scheme. MA, Cape Town, 1975

6. SOUTHERN AFRICA (see also 635)


641 Young, A D T  British policy towards the Union of S Africa 1919-29. Bristol, 1974/5

642 Coles, R J  South African sub-imperialism. MA, Birmingham, 1975


645 Muzorewa, B C  The development of the money economy and an analysis of the monetary and financial system in Botswana. M. Phil., Leeds, 1976

7. NORTH AFRICA

650 Bennoune, M  Impact of colonisation and migration on an Algerian peasant community. Michigan, 1976, 471pp; DAI, 37,6 (1976), 3733


652 Larson, B K  The impact of national government on local life and politics in a Tunisian village. Columbia, 1976, 227pp; DAI, 36,10 (1976), 8152

653 Castle, M A  Social reproduction and the Egyptian agrarian transformation. NRU, 1976, 426pp; DAI, 37,3 (1976), 1655

654 El-Fathaly, O I  Public political participation in Libyan local government. Florida State, 1975, 347pp; DAI, 37,1 (1976), 561

UTAFITI
JOURNAL OF THE FACULTY OF ARTS
AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM
P.O. Box 35051 — Dar es Salaam
Chief Editor: Prof Y. Tandon
Associate Editors: G. Mmari and G. Kamenju


A.J. Tamu, The Changing Image of the USA in Africa
C.E. Barker, et al., The Structure and Balance of Industrial Production in Tanzania
D.W. Nabudere, Review Article on I.Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania
A. Mishambi, Review Article on W. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa
N.S.N. Dawood, The Militarisation of the Indian Ocean
J.M. Gibbs, Wole Soyinka’s Drama of Essence
Kenya Students, Education and University must serve majority of Kenyans
J. Depelchin, Toward the Production of a materialist epistemology
O. Agyeman, The Super Marxists and Pan-Africanism
D.W. Nabudere, Imperialism, the National Question and the Politics of “Class formation” in Uganda (A critical review of M. Mamdani’s Politics and Class Formation in Uganda)

Annual Subscription
Institutions Outside Third World Countries — $15.00
Individuals Outside Third World Countries — $10.00
Third World Countries — TShs.40 or equivalent