Africa From SAPs to PRSP: Plus Ca Change Plus C’est la Meme Chose

Tunde Zack-Williams & Giles Mohan

We write this editorial as news is breaking that the people of Latin America are standing up to Big Brother to the North at the 34-country Summit of the Americas. The BBC pointed to the discomfiture of George Bush with what The Economist (5 November 2005) described as ‘a rally against ‘imperialism’, by which is meant him personally, the Iraq war and the Free Trade Area of the Americas which he espouses’ (p13). Contributors to the meeting included Hugo Chavez, the Venezuelan leader, who called for the death of NAFTA, the Argentinean football maestro Diego Maradona who criticised Bush’s war record, while the Argentinean leader Néstor Kirchner accused the ‘Washington consensus’ for his country’s woes.

Africa, like Latin America, has undergone decades of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) with the result that poverty has now been instituted as a familiar feature of the African economic landscape. The global resistance to the pauperisation of the African populace stemming from neo-liberal policies led to the ‘demise’ of Structural Adjustment Programmes and the emergence of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The essence of PRSPs is to give African Governments a say in the choice of policies and a move away from what has been described as the one-size-fits-all approach of SAPs. PRSPs are supposed to facilitate the engagement of civil society (often a neo-liberal rubric for NGOs, the neo-liberal surrogate to etatism) in the developmental process, thus subverting the logic of coercion, embedded in SAP. It is increasingly doubtful if PRSPs carry the democratic mantle their proponents claim, since the neo-liberal rejection of any notion of a developmental state has left a political and economic vacuum, which can be filled only by Northern dominated NGOs, donors and the International Financial Institutions (IFI). It is for this reason we argue PRSPs for Africa are a case of Plus Ca Change Plus C’est la Meme Chose.

Indeed, this represents the underlining theme of the contributions in this issue. Duncan Holtom’s analysis of Tanzania/World Bank relations during the height of the SAP era shows how donor conditionality was acceded to. Many analyses of the move towards adjustment by individual countries tend to see it as an inevitable response to debt and balance of payments problems where states are literally ‘hemmed in’. While not refuting this analysis, Holtom reveals the subtle and not so subtle ways in which the Tanzanian Government sought to resist this imposition, in part through discursive strategies regarding what constituted ‘legitimate’ development.

Holtom distances his study from what he sees as ‘well-worn’ debates around the impacts of neo-liberal policies. While we agree, we also believe that such impact analyses tend to focus on only certain kinds of impacts and often treat African
society and politics as reactions to external influences rather than having agency of
their own. It is here that Musambayi Katumanga’s article on Nairobi is so powerful
for he analyses the complex ways in which urban banditry has resulted from the
roll-back of the state and an individualising logic among the poor. He shows how
urban spaces were divided and fought over as people struggled for survival in an
increasingly anomic environment. In some senses Kate Manzo’s paper on modern
slavery analyses similar processes of how adjustment produces contradictory
effects. She shows how slavery has been intrinsic to imperialist capitalism, but that
under neo-liberalism we are seeing both depoproletarianisation and a new type of
feudalism, which condemns sections of the rural poor to a form of slavery.

What a study like Holtom’s also shows is that binary and static understandings of
the mechanisms of imperialism are inadequate. Rather we need to unpick the
complex interplay between ‘global’ discourses, national strategies and popular
struggles. It is this which Susan Willett does in her contribution, ‘New Barbarians at
the Gate’. She argues that the conflation of development with the ‘new security’
agenda draws attention to the increased inequalities and strong sense of injustice
which now surrounds neo-liberal policies of privatisation, liberalisation and free
trade. She further questions the assertion that underdevelopment and poverty are
threats which have led to the securitisation of development in Africa. Thus she
argues: ‘The concept of the “liberal peace” conflates the neo-liberal economic and
political projects of the Washington based institutions, with peace’, and Africa has
become the laboratory *par excellence* of these liberal peace projects. Without justifying
conflicts, she points out that until quite recently the values of the liberal peace were
not shared in Europe, as differences were still settled through war. Development on
its own will not make Africa more secure since the continent’s development crisis is
the product of imperialist imposed economic policies, with little relevance to the
needs of the vast majority of the people of Africa.

John Young picks up on the question of conflict and peace-building in his timely
analysis of the Sudanese peace process and the implications of John Garang’s death
upon it. He argues that the peace accord was in trouble prior to Garang’s death
because in trying to accommodate Northern and Southern demands it actually
cemented the differences that fomented the conflict. However, Garang was an adept
and thoughtful politician who had a more complete vision for Sudan even as he
practised a rather dictatorial leadership style. The leadership vacuum and the
continuing failure of the international community to address the conflict holistically
signal uncertain times ahead for Sudanese politics.

The summer of 2005 witnessed a major focus on the problems of Africa as the Report
of the Africa Commission was published and Prime Minister Blair sought to utilise
his position within the G8 and the EU to mainstream the continent’s problems. In
June the Finance Ministers of the G8 nations announced the cancellation of the debts
of the poorest nations owed to the IFI. As Willet has observed, the relief package
contains the usual onerous conditions associated with SAPs, to the point that Sierra
Leone, the poorest nation according to the UN Human Development Index was not
qualified for debt relief due to failure to comply with conditionality of the country’s
PRSP, though this did not prevent the question of that nation’s water supply being
privatised (ROAPE 104/05).

What is clear is that the help that is being touted around is not based on *noblesse
oblige*, but on the reconstitution of neo-colonial relations. It is important to note, and
as Willett reminds us, these countries are lobbied by powerful commercial interests
(the multinationals) to ensure that the aid business benefits national interests. What imperialism seeks is a new genre: the ‘model neo-colony’ that will open its markets to its manufactured goods, provide a safe haven for its investment and unrestrained avenue for profit repatriation. Poverty reduction is at best an ancillary objective within the neo-liberal project. What is sought is the mandate of the old Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, whereby British colonies can borrow capital for colonial development, in mining and other activities that were complementary to the activities of British industry.

Ankie Hoogvelt’s contribution in this issue is instructive in this respect. She foresees a new form of global stratification based on core-periphery relations with the function of the state designed to serve ‘global rather than domestic capital accumulation priorities’. Paradoxically, whilst undermining the determining relationship of the nation-state, yet, globalisation seeks to uphold the legal sovereignty of the nation-state to police its borders, ensuring its people are penned in, as well as to ensure that copyrights and patents from multinationals are safeguarded and royalties collected. Hoogvelt’s contribution also points to a number of weaknesses in the report of the African Commission. First, it is a mutational genre of the old modernisation paradigm that sought to blame Africa for its own problems, with little or no analysis on: Africa’s adverse relations with the rest of the world; capital flight and debts incurred in shady dealings with corrupt Western business people; the rapacious use of Africa’s resources and the havoc triggered by SAPs. Second, she points out that the aid is given primarily for social infrastructure and little thought is given to national development or a comprehensive agenda for economic development. She calls for a new relationship between Africa and the imperialist centre, whereby the traditional mode of accumulation via production of primary produce will be abandoned and in its place a trajectory of industrial production based on technological change.

In keeping with the editorial’s theme of continuity and change, George Caffentzis discusses the impact of the so-called ‘war on terror’ upon academic freedom. He argues that the neo-liberal model of knowledge involved commodification so that people and ideas could travel and be traded. However, post-9/11 this neo-liberal model has been superseded by a stealthy series of restrictions; on movements of people, on capital transfers, and on freedom of speech. He argues we now live in a climate of ‘torture’ where the authorities believe an ultimate and dangerous truth is out there, to be forced out and quashed. Caffentzis calls for all intellectuals to urgently resist this new regime, something we at ROAPE wholeheartedly endorse.
A City Under Siege: Banditry & Modes of Accumulation in Nairobi, 1991-2004

Musambayi Katumanga

This is a study of the impact of political and economic liberalisation on modes of socio-economic engagement and accumulation in Kenya’s capital city, Nairobi, subsequent to the introduction of multiparty ‘democracy’ in 1992. On the one hand economic liberalisation led to a diminished state-provisioning capacity and unwillingness to protect public interests. On the other hand, political conditionalities opened up political space but also spawned anomic tendencies within the regime and among social groups and individuals, with struggles in defence of economic position against each other at one level, and against the state and local councils at another. This account focuses on the political economy underlying the resultant urban banditry in Nairobi. It seeks to demonstrate how a besieged regime facilitates the criminalisation of urban existence in a bid to ensure its survival.

The argument here is that beleaguered regimes survive through a twin strategy. They privatise public violence and appropriate private violence. The net effect is the perversion of social order and the emergence of bandit economies. Regime longevity may derive not only from lack of an alternative leadership and organising ideology, but also from the threat to perceived benefits accruing from such informal economies. The ruling elite responds to the possibility of losing power by using neo-patrimonial structures to selectively allocate public spaces to their cronies, thereby subverting social order and undermining democratisation, security and social harmony; this in turn spawns urban banditry. Urban banditry here denotes the unregulated deployment of instruments of coercion by ruling elite and various elements within the citizenry in bids to facilitate acquisition of economic benefits and political leverage.

Withering State & the Logic of Urban Banditry

The nature, role and survival of the state as an entity remain at the core of political debate. Realists, system theorists and political economists as well as Marxists have at one point or another predicted its demise. While liberal reformers expected globalising capitalism to diminish the state’s national and international roles, Marxists foretold not only the disutility of its violence once exploitation was ended, but also its disappearance.

A state’s legitimacy rests on its fulfilling certain responsibilities such as security, the management of economic reproduction, the balancing of input and output roles and
the construction of a national identity. Conversely, it is the increasing inability to deliver on these functions that diminishes the essence of stateness (Navari, 1991). Indeed in the global South, contemporary predictions of the state’s demise are anchored in what is perceived as its increasing irrelevance given its diminishing capacity to rule and control the society. States are rooted in a trinity of variables: the idea of State; the institutional framework and the material base. Notwithstanding its abstraction, the idea of State is core to its legitimacy. Underlying its legitimacy are questions such as; what does the State intend or exist to do and what constitutes its political identity? For states grappling with deep-seated identity crises, the transformation of diverse ethnicities into a State-Nation is incumbent upon the evolution of a dominant ideology around which politics can be organised. Facilitating and reinforcing the idea of State is the capacity of leadership to build institutions and evolve programmes critical to socio-economic reproduction.

Institutions are core to this process. They include the executive, administrative and participative infrastructures. A weak idea of State engenders recourse to coercion and patronage by ruling elites in a bid to maintain order which eventually leads to state demise. This is a long durée process characterised by a decline in the state’s institutional capacity to provision the society or to uphold the security of its citizens, paralysis in decision-making realms and social polarisation. If unchecked, the withering process engenders state collapse (Zartman, 1995). State withering is not the monopoly of a predatory leadership. It can also emerge in a context where a regime in a bid to co-opt certain social formations allows them to access and privatise certain common public goods. While state capacity in a wide range of formal activities diminishes, its affinity for illegalities and repressive violence increases. Underlying this is the instrumentalisation of violence and patronage in the manipulation of social forces to the advantage of power wielders. As Navari notes (1991:151), the state is in a position to choose which restraints it imposes and ‘the demand for new rules in a situation of social change increases both a state’s substantive legislative rights and its political salience’.

In essence, it is the ruling elite’s ability to act, manoeuvre and manipulate social formations against each other that enhances its freedom of choice in deciding who to back or displease. This fact is best understood when a conceptual distinction between the state and regime is attempted. A state is an organised aggregate of relatively permanent institutions of governance (Duval and Freeman, 1981:106), an instrument that serves the interests of certain social categories. Those who control its reins tend to make choices that highlight their interests and preferences. Its behaviour, and more so, that of the actors occupying its institutions, differentiates it from a regime. The latter refers to rules, principles, norms and modes of interaction between social groups and state organs, bringing into focus not only political relations between power wielders and social groups but also how these are continually re-composed or decomposed.

The neo-liberal agenda of economic liberalisation and privatisation is promoted both by internally marginalised aspirant entrepreneurs and international capitalist forces with the aim of facilitating State integration into the global capitalist system. Ideologically rationalised as a means to good governance, it seeks to widen the internal economic space for international capital investment and market penetration by undercutting the bargaining power of post-colonial economic nationalism. It insists that the state abandon protectionism and instead privatise public goods such as parastatals (often meaning their sale to foreign investors) and remove tariff barriers while opening up trade. The state is also called upon to remove ‘market
distortions’ such as subsidies (to health and education sectors), price controls and restrictions on the movement of commodities. Once its bureaucratic baggage has been reduced, the state is reduced to a ‘watchman’ role of securing property rights, providing effective legal, judicial and regulatory systems, improving Civil Service efficiency and protecting the environment (World Bank, 1996:110-122).

Since the late 1980s structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) have been presented as an economically rational means to roll back pre-bendal politics while implanting democratisation. What is striking is the assumption that such a shrunken State can then play midwife to the birth of a productive African entrepreneurial class, capable of profiting from the play of ‘anonymous’ market forces. Yet it is the control of sources of accumulation that allows the state to shape social forces and relations of production, class formation and struggle. The fact that international capitalist forces are not homogeneous enables the regime to play off one external faction against the other while creating an internal space within which readjustments for regime consolidation and survival are undertaken. The nascent nature of the domestic private sector ensures that instead of distancing itself from the regime, it seeks to ensure its reproduction by appending itself to the regime; in the process it ends up giving the latter the opportunity to manipulate it. Bandit economies emerge out of illegal privatisation of public goods and the distribution of these to those deemed to be regime-friendly.

If rivalry within the international capitalist system tends to engender anarchy at the international level, at the domestic level, it spawns violence. Exploitation of vulnerabilities and self-interest at individual and group levels and the convergence of these material factors with ruling elite interests spawn multiple identities and particularistic tendencies. The pursuit of these tendencies constitutes the foundation upon which tyranny is constructed and sustained. As Etienne La Boetie noted in 1548, every structure of tyranny is founded on the voluntary submission of hundreds or thousands of men and women. When a few opt to serve a tyrant in a bid to realise their immediate gains, this creates a structure of patronage from which perks filter to lower-level quislings who in turn expect gains for ‘little’ services. The second, third, and fourth level of obedience is enabled to flourish only because the first exists. In the end, people are made to believe that they are compelled to obey. It does not require troops on horse-back, or companies afoot; it is not even arms that defend the tyrant, for force would not be available in the first place unless many were willing to obey and to voluntarily wield military power. The power of tyrants depends on voluntary servitude sustained by multiple ladders of tyranny – what De Jouvenal (1948) calls the State’s ‘grammar of power’. Conversely tyranny and corruption can also come to an end consequent on the withdrawal of consent.

Mobilisation and contestations over economic spaces, and the resultant voluntary servitude, have the effect of engendering instrumentalised violence that tends to narrow associational space as variegated social groups turn against each other at the behest of the State. This process entails the rolling back of the logic of Stateness, especially the state’s need to dominate the means of violence in society. Instead, various lumpen social formations are allowed to arm themselves. When the need to contain oppositional forces arises the regime appropriates and deploys this private violence. These regime marionettes are in turn rewarded through illegal access to common public goods. This mode of engagement not only conceals state complicity but also allows it to retain effective control of associational space away from the prying eyes of external forces.
In Kenya’s case the foregoing behaviour can be best conceptualised as triple deviance; that is, the deviance of the state (manifested through its descent into and encouragement of illegalities); group deviance (illegalities committed by groups) and individual deviance (inclination to illegality by individuals). This collective social maladjustment sustains both state banditism and predatory violence. It equally engenders widespread violation of norms, a process that erodes trust while threatening the foundation of social life. Social life requires a degree of predictability based on people doing what is expected of them. Extensive non-conformity engenders social disorder, chaos, tensions and conflicts. It is equally expensive to the individual and society at large. Underlying this is the fact that it diverts resources such as security resources that could otherwise have been used elsewhere.

The foregoing forms the basis of my argument that externally driven pressure for economic liberalisation engendered the construction of a logic of voluntary servitude that entrenched regime longevity and more particularly, the de(re)composition of socio-economic and political spaces in Nairobi. This thesis is based on a study I undertook in Nairobi on modes of accumulation in the context of supposed political and economic liberalisation and the impact these had on politics of change in Kenya.

Regime Survival & the Drift into Collective Social Deviance

The decade of 1990 created near-revolutionary conditions that spawned atomisation and subjectivism in Kenya. IFI-imposed SAPs engendered hikes in food prices, a decline in real wages and redundancies. Reduced public expenditure in education spawned high dropout rates (three million by 2001) and many of these dropouts made the great trek from the rural into the urban frontier. There they constituted a pool of disaffected youth, open to recruitment by opposition parties seeking to maximise on the opening associational space and external support to acquire political power. Together, they evolved a culture of political revolt that emerged in the early 1990s.

Instead of spawning good governance, externally imposed political conditionalities laid the foundations for insecurities that would plague the state for more than a decade. Conversely, the consequences of economic liberalism were more ambiguous. It was not the nascent private sector but rather the regime that had the last word on who accessed expanding opportunities under privatisation (what I describe as SAP sites of accumulation) – this fact enhanced regime power. The regime responded to the situation accordingly, by minimising the adverse effects of conditionalities as it maximised on the favourable ones of liberalisation.

The regime undertook minimum constitutional amendments. In July 1992, it passed a Bill which compelled prospective winning candidates to the presidency to garner at least 25 per cent of the votes cast in five of the eight electoral provinces in addition to garnering the highest number of votes cast (Katumanga, 1998:31). At the informal level, it resorted to the appropriation of private violence (violence organised by criminal social formations) and the privatisation of public violence (which sometimes involved informalising security agents by having them operate without formal uniforms before deploying them undercover alongside vigilante groups to wreak violence on those deemed as enemies of the regime). The politically instigated ethnic violence that engulfed parts of the Rift Valley, Western and Nyanza provinces in 1992 (Ngunyi, 1996:203-4; Africa Watch, 1993) and in Likoni in 1997 should be seen in this perspective. The net effect was the containment of social formations
opposed to the regime. Those displaced by this violence were unable to exercise their rights (see KHRC, 1997). Demonstrations or public rallies organised by civil society associations were quickly dispersed, seemingly by agents of private violence.

Those who became agents of the regime were rewarded according to their class status. Those from the higher middle class were established bandit companies through which funds were ferreted from the Central Bank. A prime example was the Goldenberg scandal in which more than KSh100 billion (US$769.2 million) was siphoned out of the Central Bank on false pretences. KSh4.5 billion (approximately US$57.7 million) of this cash was allegedly given to the then ruling political party, KANU, to facilitate the buying of political support in the 1992 election. By 2003, politicians and senior civil servants had set up their own modes of extraction from companies seeking to do business in Kenya. It is alleged that a contract worth KSh100 million would cost companies KSh7.5 million in bribes. In printing and publishing, companies were forced to part with an average of 11.5 per cent of the total contract sum; in textiles, garments and furniture 8.9 per cent; and in the metal sector 8.8 per cent (Kimuyu, 2004). Such modes of extraction culminate in the estimated KSh300 billion (US$3.75 billion) stashed outside the country by former power wielders (Daily Nation, 17 December 2003).

In an attempt to detach unemployed urban youth from their 1992 alliances with the opposition, rewards were found, ranging from cash payments to the securing of access to spaces of socio-economic reproduction. The existential ‘illegality’ of urban lumpen elements, their precarious existence in informal habitations and livelihoods, could be manipulated to motivate them into compliance. If necessary, their economic reproduction sites or informal habitations could be destroyed or appropriated for politically compliant individuals who would then be free to dispose of the assets. Following violent eviction of previous tenants, the politically well-connected used their influence to have parastatals such as the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) or National Hospital Insurance Fund compelled to buy them in the name of acquiring assets. NSSF is said to have allocated KSh30 billion (US$384.6 million) over five years for acquisition of such plots. The new owners would subsequently resell, usually to rich Asian businessmen (The Standard, 2 November 2004). Conversely, in a bid to blunt opposition to the state, allocations of public land were granted to religious organisations, politicians, civil servants and foreign embassies. Kenya Airports Authority for instance, lost as much as 972.36 hectares of land distributed to private developers, who later set up illegal structures on flight paths posing a danger to aviation. The fact that the ruling elite used the state to undertake this process, enhanced its powers. It became the major source of potential accumulation.

Patronage might also mean access to sites of accumulation such as drug growing and trafficking. A classic example are the Canabis Sativa plantations allowed in the Mount Kenya forest whose produce was sold in Nairobi and illegally exported (Katumanga, 2001:269). By 2004 Kenya had become a major transit point for drug traffickers as manifested by the discovery of a cocaine haul worth six billion shillings at the Mombasa port in December 2004 (The Standard, 1 January 2005). Others were given licences to import contraband goods from South East Asia. By 2004, these were costing the state KSh40 billion annually (Financial Post, 15 November 2004). The diminishing capacity of law and order institutions (detailed below) had the effect of spawning other urban forms of predation such as motor vehicle theft and hijackings. The rise in crime has often been understood in terms of the ‘deviant sub-culture’ thesis, which attributes poverty and delinquency to
individual failure (Lewis, 1978), whereas the 1990s deviance in Kenya was state-
couraged for politico-economic ends.

What seemed constant was the drift into bad governance characterised by lack of
accountability, trust and authority. In 1997 the ruling elite of KANU had recaptured
power with less than 30 per cent of the vote cast. It did not believe it was accountable
to anybody. Instead of enhancing legitimate state penetration into society, an
element critical to the evolution of social order, conflict management and resolution,
the state was located at the centre of these conflicts. This crisis was exemplified in
Nairobi.

Of Self Help, Violence & Differentiated Bandit Economies

Decades after independence, Nairobi remains a differentiated city. Unlike the simple
citizen-subject racial dichotomy of the colonial period, in the 1990s the city was
spatially divided not only in class terms but around both race and ethnic identities,
especially among the urban poor who sometimes seemed to have merely relocated
their villages into the city. New entrants from rural areas continued to flood into the
city, their numbers augmented by refugees from collapsed states in the region (some
estates like Eastleigh and Komarock were literally taken over by Somali, Ethiopian
and Rwandese refugees). All sought survival in any way they deemed fit, in a city
without any pretence to planned amenities and where corruption and outright
incompetence abounded. By 2003, new slums such as Soweto, Mukuru kwa Njenga
and Maili Kayaba had emerged. Together they housed two thirds of Nairobi’s three
million population. Those earning less than KSh15,000 found themselves in
Dandora, Githurai, Zimmerman, Umoja II, Kayole, Mathare North, Ngong’ and
other neighbourhoods.

City residents responded to poor governance, the lack of services and regime-led
predation on public utility spaces in diverse ways. These ranged from self-help to
more direct forms of engagement. Middle class groups often organised themselves
into supportive networks that extracted additional ‘taxes’ from their members to pay
for services such as security, garbage collection, street lights and road repairs which
the local government no longer provided. In Karen-Langata, a ‘settler’ suburb
(dominated by affluent whites), residents formed the Karen-Ngata Association in a
bid to shield themselves (through legal means) from what they perceived as taxation
without services or representation. These differentiated petty bourgeois responses
were informed by perceptions of costs and benefits likely to accrue from any action
undertaken and capacity to sustain the said action within the prevailing political
context.

The urban lumpen element living in Nairobi’s slums opted for limited direct
resistance against forced dislocation of their abodes through mass demolitions.
Poorly organised, ambushed in the night and overwhelmed by the naked violence of
the state, their resistance tended to fizzle out as soon as it had begun. Unrestricted
violence led to many deaths as was the case during the Muoroto demolitions of
informal settlements near the city centre in the early 1990s. For most urban lumpen
elements, direct resistance was a function of the fact that they had no fall-back
position and everything to lose (c.f. Anderson, 2002).

In the end, this class differentiation of response fragmented oppositional social
forces while reinforcing the regime. Resistance failed to evolve into solidarity,
greater political participation or effective pressure for good governance. An agenda
for far-reaching reforms would have necessitated organisational initiatives led by a radicalised leadership, an ideology and methods of engagement against the state such as seeking to gain control of the mainstream structures of governance. Instead, economic liberalisation, regime deviance, and an ever-expanding urban population with its contradictory responses of co-option, withdrawal, defiance and resistance, converged in transforming urban engagements and modes of socio-economic reproduction into congruence with the regime’s logic. The net effect was the decomposition and re-composition of social space. Four cases of engagement between the state and social forces are now addressed to evidence the assertion that a ruling elite forced to liberalise will tend to prioritise its survival to the detriment of the state as an entity capable of provisioning society and enhancing its legitimacy.

Conflicts, Co-operation & Pavement Spaces for Economic Production

The defiance that characterised the 1990s combined with state deviance to erode the institutional capacity of a corrupt city council to enforce its own by-laws. Hordes of hawkers took advantage of this to conquer and occupy city alleyways, before subsequently descending on pavements running parallel to main streets such as Tom Mboya and Ronald Ngala Streets and Moi Avenue. By 2002 there were around 10,000 hawkers on the streets of Nairobi. This behaviour set in motion violent modes of production-based contestations. The first contestations pitted licensed (mainly Asian) traders against hawkers. The second pitted the hawkers against the city councillors seeking to eject them from the city. The third pitted hawkers against regime-friendly beneficiaries of illegal land allocations.

Yet situationally-defined alliances were also forged among these groups, rooted in their mutually reinforcing needs. For instance hawkers who sold second-hand clothes and electronic goods were provisioned by some Asian businessmen and regime-friendly actors engaged in illegal importations of the same. Trade in counterfeit goods cost the state around KSh40 billion annually in the 1990s (see the Financial Post, 15 November 2004). Women hawking vegetables on the other hand paid bribes to city askaris (local government police) in exchange for ‘permission’ to sell their fresh vegetables and fruits to city dwellers heading home from work.

Understanding their voting potential, the President occasionally seek to intervene on behalf of these petty traders, promising to allocate spaces for them, only to reallocate the same to his political cronies when it suited him. In so doing, he was able to play off one group against another and in the process gain short-term advantage over his opponents. The moment hawkers identified once again with the opposition, the regime would initiate ‘crack-downs’ resulting in violence and loss of property, precipitating those with already meagre livelihoods into poverty.

By 2002, hawkers had invaded Harambee Avenue (which houses the seat of Government). They eventually occupied Parliament Road, the famous Kenyatta Avenue and Koinange Street. Weakening state capacity to maintain order created what Durkheim (1964) calls anomie. Its net effect was a disorganised society and the existence of a situation where individuals lost any sense of shared values and norms. With the emerging discrepancy between culturally prescribed goals and legitimate (socially approved) means of obtaining them, more people drifted into deviance.

Hawker presence in the streets, for instance, constrained human circulation and spawned petty crime while negatively affecting retail trade (more so as hawkers sold
similar items). Once in a while the City Council would engage them in disruptive and violent running battles. Whilst ruining the livelihoods of some, it reminded others of the value of social order. There was increasing pressure from businessmen in the Central Business District (CBD) and members of the public for a permanent solution to the hawker problem. Oppositional forces to the KANU government were able to capitalise on this discontent by promising to remove hawkers in the CBD, contain crime and offer a permanent space for established businesses and hawkers respectively, as well as free movement for members of the public. These promises became part of the platform of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), constituted after the bifurcation of KANU which in 2002 successfully ejected KANU from power.

By the time the Council was retaking its streets in 2003, the crime-infested Central Business District had been abandoned by Asian business in preference for more secure new and burgeoning shopping malls. A new crop of young merchants emerged from among the thousands of unemployed Kenyan college and school leavers. These new entrants rode in on the appeal of cheap South East Asian products and successfully took over hundreds of spaces in the abandoned CBD areas. The post-KANU administration has so far failed to create job opportunities for high school or graduate youth; hence they continue to invade the commercial realm, creating precarious petty ‘table shops’. This is a generational phenomenon, cutting across ethnicity.

‘Militia’ Politics & the Struggle for Residential Spaces

Edged on by the sheer need to survive, thousands of marginalised youths in Nairobi drifted into gangs, militant formations under labels such as Talibans, Baghdad boys, Jeshi la Mzee (the elder’s battalion), Jeshi la Embakasi (the Embakasi battalion) and Mungiki, a millenarian group that derived its name from the word munging (meaning masses in Kikuyu). These groups could be hired by politicians for around KSh250 (US$4) to unleash violence on their opponents. Jeshi la Mzee was used to beat up civil society activists such as the Reverend Timothy Njoya, whilst Jeshi la Embakasi was deployed in land disputes in Nairobi with the most notable incident being an invasion of the 818-acre piece of land that sits between Umoja II, Kayole and Komarock Estates in Nairobi. Some provided vigilante security in working class estates. What was notable about the operations of these groups was their mobilisation around ethnic identities within which class difference was obscured. Politicians sought to borrow their violence by playing down their own class interests and instead appealing to ethnic solidarity.

Underlying these formations in some cases are the ownership of land and houses in low class settlements. In a settlement like Kibera, with a population of more than 700,000 for instance, houses are mainly owned by Nubians and Kikuyu, yet the majority of the tenants are Luo, Luhyia and Kamba. Conflicts emerged following attempts by the regime to construct a new power base to cement a national alliance between KANU and the Raila Odinga-led National Development Party (NDP). In a Harambee meeting (public exhortation and fundraising), held in Kibera on 31 of October 2001 and presided over by the then President, Daniel arap Moi, the District Commissioner was instructed to have local rents reduced by 50 per cent – a move designed to appeal to the ethnic solidarity of those most likely to support the new alliance (Daily Nation, 1 November 2001). The decision met stiff resistance from the private landlords who were then set upon by the Talibans – a predominantly Luo militia. Armed with whips, stones, rungus (knobkerries) and machetes, the Talibans invaded Kibera (Daily Nation, 6 March 2002). By the time the violence was contained,
many had lost their lives, women had been raped and property destroyed (The People, 27 November 2001). Poverty, unemployment and lack of political consciousness have engendered a situation where the political entrepreneurs can instrumentalise ethnicity to mobilise political constituencies.

Kariobangi (another sprawling informal settlement) was ‘ruled’ by Mungiki. Ideologically it appeals to the broadly marginalised of Kenyan society, even to ‘the public’ (Githongo: East African, 15 November 2000). Mungiki advocates a return to cultural values, the right to land and opposition to neo-colonial control of Kenya’s economy. Its spread in the 1990s can be attributed to the uprooting of the Kikuyu masses from the Rift Valley, parts of Ole Nguruoinge, Elburgon, Subukia, Laikipia and Nyahururu following widespread clashes over land. It began its career in opposition to the regime, while assuring its members’ livelihood through provision of security in estates inhabited by lowly-paid workers such as Kariobangi North, Kahawa West and Dandora (Daily Nation, 3 April 2001).

In the mid-1990s, Mungiki’s leaders claimed to have an enrolled membership of between 3.5 to 4 million people, with branches across the country. With each member paying KSh3 per month, it claimed to raise as much as KSh4.5 million per month (US$58,000) in subscriptions. In March 2002, Mungiki murdered 23 people and injured 31 others in the sprawling slums in Kariobangi North when 500 of them took revenge on the Taliban for the murder of two of their members (BBC, 4 March 2002).

To the extent that Mungiki was perceived to be aligned to the opposition, it was often confronted by state security. But by late 2002, the regime’s relation with Mungiki was transformed from one of confrontation to overt tolerance. This change was apparently informed by Mungiki’s decision to back the regime’s new presidential candidate, Uhuru Kenyatta. Subsequently they were allowed to take over certain transport routes (a fact that allowed them to raise cash which they used to pay their adherents), hold public processions and threaten opposition opponents with impunity.

The Transport Spaces
Transport spaces stand out as one of the most contested realms in Kenya. Contestations revolve around the matatu – cheap private minibuses and taxicabs competitively plying for business. An informal transport system, the matatu industry was estimated in 1993 to employ 80,000 people directly countrywide, and an equivalent number indirectly. Its activities were said to earn the economy an estimated KSh60 billion, with KSh1.9 billion reaped in taxes (Economic Survey, 1993).

Liberalisation of the Kenyan economy in the 1990s animated not only growth in this industry but also struggles for its soul. Two factors underlay its growth: a relaxation on the import of second-hand cars (mainly Urvan Nissans and Toyotas) which were immediately converted into matatus; and the importation of vehicle chassis which enabled faster assembly of minibuses (christened manyangas). The availability of these vehicles expanded accumulation for owners, their drivers, traffic police, and thousands of urban youth hardened by opposition politics who worked on these vehicles as touts. Profits in the industry were predicated on extortion. Vehicle owners expected to receive up to KSh7,000 a day from the drivers working their manyangas whilst drivers and touts took home an average of KSh1,500 and 1,000 per
day respectively (*Daily Nation*, 17 July 1996). There was also protection money, extorted by poorly-remunerated and highly demoralised police officers from both the owners and the touts lest they were arrested for frivolous reasons. This led to the arbitrary raising of commuter costs. The involvement of some police officers as owners as well as extortionists seemed to encourage the bandit logic among touts, providing a visa for violence and disregard for the law.

There was cut-throat competition, even wars fought over routes and terminal points among these new petty capitalists. Nairobi has a total of 100 *matatu* routes. Cartels emerged to monopolise routes and launch a booming business by setting high entry barriers for their use. Vehicle owners paid an average of KSh20,000-50,000 (depending on potential return) to have their vehicles ply certain routes, as well as an average KSh300 per day to various route-manning cartels. They also paid parking fees of KSh250 to the city council, and there was KSh20 to be paid by the owner every time the vehicle left a given estate with passengers (*The Standard*, 21 November 2003, p.13).

Enlivening the *matatu* subculture was the blaring hip hop music played with impunity in these vehicles, transforming them into moving discos in total disregard of the tastes of their clients. Clad in baggy trousers and American baseball caps, the *khat*-chewing *matatu* touts were easily identified by their foul language, disregard for passenger safety and rudeness towards their clients. They would arbitrarily raise the fares or stop the vehicles in the middle of roads in total contempt of traffic rules and regulations.

By the mid-1990s, vigilante groups like *Mungiki* and *Kamjeshi* entered into this fray. Given the high returns in the *matatu* industry, its profits could be converted with ease to financing the tools of violence. The control of *matatu* routes became a battleground as *Mungiki* and *Kamjeshi* began fighting for physical occupation of the routes and termini: "between July and September 2001 about 15 people were hacked to death consequent to engagements between *Mungiki* and *Kamjeshi* gangs over control of Dandora route" (*Daily Nation*, 20 February 2002).

By November 2001, *Mungiki* had taken over the Kayole, Babadogo and Kikuyu routes while the Transport Licensing Board sat on the fence and failed to support the Matatu Welfare Association’s (MWA) demand that they keep out. MWA is the successor of the Matatu Vehicle Owners Association (MVOA) which had been banned by the Moi regime in 1980. The Government in most cases remained a bystander as these pro-opposition groups fought for supremacy, the police seemingly unable to contain their activities (*The Standard*, 5 November 2001). To the extent that the violence involved opposition-linked groups, the regime was disinclined to intercede. Yet it would selectively rush to intervene whenever the conflict threatened the interests of regime-friendly interests.

Later the inability of the Government to demonstrate its monopoly over violence for the common good saw *Mungiki* successfully take over fifteen out of one hundred routes in Nairobi. This coincided with their new modes of collaboration with the regime in late 2002. It was not until 2004 that a serious attempt was made by the new NARC government to bring order in the transport sector. This entailed the imposition of new rules that limited the numbers of passengers that could be ferried by vehicles and the compulsory fitting of seat belts. They also attempted to remove the self-imposed stage managers. After a brief resistance by various gangs, the rules were operationalised. *Mungiki* went underground, only to re-emerge in January and
February of 2003 with the killing of several people in Nakuru and security officers in Nairobi’s Dandora area.

**Lumpen Banditry**

The 1990s saw increased forms of banditry with roots among urban lumpen elements. Their audacious behaviour was shadowed by the diminishing institutional capacity of the police force. Constraints on government recurrent expenditure imposed by the IMF and the World Bank had the net effect of freezing not only salaries of security forces but also their complements. By 1996, there were 30,000 police officers compared to a population of about 30 million, translating into one police office for every 1,000 Kenyans. By 2002 it had grown to 1:1400. Worse still, the security forces suffered from lack of infrastructure and institutional capacity, poor leadership and corruption in recruitment, promotion and operational matters. Poor pay combined with favouritism to engender demoralisation and lethargy in the force. This was reflected in the absence of adequate supervision with respect to gun handling, to the extent that some began hiring out their guns to others for robbery and other criminal activities.

In the late 1990s the state created the National Intelligence Service. The core of this service was recruited from the best cells of the police force. Little effort was made to retrain and improve the welfare of those who remained. Young graduate recruits to the police force ended up frustrated due to poor pay and lack of promotion opportunities. As the frontiers for primitive accumulation increased, the security forces jumped on the bandwagon. Many doubled up by extorting bribes and collaborating with bandits. Special units created to combat crime became a source of the same. Some police officers went to the extent of leaking operational plans (*The People Daily*, 13 October 2004). Before long, security frameworks become fragile, lacking effectiveness and legitimacy. State institutions were engaged in what Crawford Young calls ‘self-cannibalisation’. Citizens experienced state rule as simple predation instead of protection (Young, 1997:2).

By 2004, the very survival of urban economic activities had come under serious threat from lumpen banditry, exacerbated by the collapsing formal economy and the influx of small arms. One of the more recent developments is the hijacking of vehicles and robbery of their passengers, including *matatus*. Drivers have been shot, conductors and passengers robbed of their money, cell phones and other personal effects. In some extreme cases passengers and drivers have been robbed, assaulted and stripped naked. Women have also been subjected to rape ordeals. In a survey on incidents of *matatu* hijacking carried out in Nairobi and its suburbs between 7 and 19 June 2004, 46 or 25.5 per cent confirmed having experienced hijacking incidents during the year. Routes with high rates of hijacking tend to have certain characteristics. These include density of population (and by inference daily rates of collection) and the availability of accessible escape routes for thugs. These routes are also characterised by poorly lit pick-up points from which thugs can access the vehicles.

A total of KSh576,350 (US$7389) and 398 mobile phones valued at KSh1,173,000 (US$15,038) were expropriated at gunpoint in these hijackings. The total value of assets stolen in the course of the 46 reported incidents of *matatu*-jacking amounted to KSh2,168,350 (US$27,799.4). If this survey were projected to the total number of *matatus* in Nairobi, this would translate to approximately 2,550 *matatus* hijacked.
annually. The value of this economy thus translates to approximately KSh120 million for the six months period and approximately 240 million (equivalent to US$3 million) per year. The actual cost of the bandit economy is a function of the estimated cost of lost assets plus value gained by bandits after resale.

Those operating in this highway bandit economy are basically young unemployed lumpen elements for which it reaps returns far greater than employment. Their victims are equally Kenyans of lesser means who rely on public transport. On average, poor Kenyans live on less than a dollar per day. It is the poor who end up paying more for services/goods due to the increased costs of living engendered by thuggery. For instance, on Routes 32/42 (Dandora), and 19/61 (Kayole, Komarock), matatus tend to hike their fares by 25 per cent from 8 p.m. as a premium for the risk to owners and franchisees of hijacking. The effects of the bandit economy continue to marginalise the already disadvantaged poor. Given this state of affairs, and the dangers of matatu transport, many are forced to trek long distances to work.

Given the magnitude of losses, it is worth speculating how this money could better have been spent. The actual value of this capital could have facilitated the tarmac of 10 kilometres of road, or upgraded 32 kilometres of murram road. Such a road could facilitate peasant access to markets. In a bid to respond to highway banditry, matatu proprietors have had to purchase security screening handsets. Those without them often drive their vehicles to police stations for body searches. Most matatus now avoid picking up passengers en route at night. The net effect of all this is loss in earnings as well as anxiety and insecurity when travelling that continue to impact negatively on the formal economy. In a bid to combat this mode of banditry, the new police commissioner, General Hussein Ali, has set up a new police unit to deal with banditry in matatus. There has also been an increase in the number of roadblocks and motor vehicle inspections aimed at flushing out gun-carrying bandits.\(^8\)

**Bourgeois Banditry**

Nairobi has also been experiencing high levels of predation on personal vehicles. While urban lumpen youth are again at the core of this urban banditry, they are here basically puppets of organised syndicates. The godfathers seem to be individuals involved in ‘respectable’ businesses that act as fronts to camouflage their real activities. Those involved are alleged to include renowned industrialists and businessmen.\(^9\)

Like the matatu banditry this mode is also characterised by high levels of impunity that have seen motorists who hesitate to hand over their vehicles killed. In the early 1980s it was only parked vehicles that were stolen; currently one is as likely to lose one’s vehicle while driving it. An interesting phenomenon of the current thefts is the apparent organised and powerful networks that lie behind them and that make the one-man ‘jobs’ of the 1980s pale into insignificance. While the latter were basically focused on the city centre, the current predatory activities are web-organised to serve regional bandit markets. During the four year period from 2000 to 2004 the scale and value of this trade has increased dramatically.

Of the total of 2,300 vehicles stolen in 2000, only 693 cars were recovered representing an average recovery rate of 30 per cent. At an estimated value of KSh500,000 each (US$6,250), 1,607 vehicles unrecovered had a staggering total value of KSh803,500,000 (US$10,043,000).
By 2004, the situation had worsened. For instance, in the first five months of 2004, a total of 1,127 vehicles had already been recorded stolen; another 857 cars had been reported hijacked. The law enforcement agencies had so far recovered 513 vehicles, representing a recovery rate of 45.5 per cent. Net stolen vehicles for the period under review were 614 units. At an estimated value of KSh500,000 each (US$6,250), 614 un-recovered vehicles are worth a total of KSh307,000,000 (US$3,837,500).

Between 2000 and 2003, the total value of the vehicles stolen was over KSh3 billion (US$38.6 million). Aside from vehicle theft, examination of figures given by a local daily (The Standard, 1 October 2004) notes that there was a total of 2,349 cases of reported carjacking up to October 2004. The cars were snatched from motorists in a total of 1,061 cases while in 797 cases motorists and/or passengers were robbed. In 491 incidents, there were attempts to steal a parked car; 45 per cent (1,091) of the vehicles were recovered in that period. Ninety per cent of the vehicles recovered had been used by criminals as getaway cars. Musa Yego of the special crimes prevention unit notes that 70 per cent of incidents occur in upper class estates in Nairobi. The level of sophistication of the process is discernible by the tactics deployed. Reconnaissance is undertaken on the victims and on ambush spots. The most popular points are black spots: busy roundabouts, T-junctions, pothole points, feeder roads and gates.

It takes an average of one day to plan and steal a vehicle, another day to either dismantle it prior to selling the spare parts or arranging to have new but fake papers, new number plates and the respray needed to drive the car across the border. Stolen cars are driven across the border using what are referred to as ‘panya routes’ (unofficial ‘rat’ routes). This is how the vehicle of Kenya’s Chief of General Staff was ‘siphoned’ out of the country into a local garage at Singa in Tanzania after his wife and escort had been carjacked (12 October 2004).

Out of the 10,993 vehicles stolen in the four and a half years in review, 8,129 units were taken at gun point representing 74 per cent of the vehicles stolen. The implication here is that a motorist is at three times the risk of being robbed of the vehicle than when the same is parked. An owner-occupied vehicle is likely to be in good shape and with fuel. In any case, one can also threaten the victim for the cash needed for petrol. More importantly, parked vehicles are likely to be under surveillance.

### Insecurity & the Economic Base

Between 1999 and 2002, a total of 140 foreign investors pulled out of Kenya, citing corruption, poor infrastructure, bureaucratic bottlenecks and the increased crime rate (East African, 10-16/ 2002, Habitat–ITGD.EA 2001). Direct foreign investment dropped from KSh26 billion to KSh22 billion between 1996 and 1998. It has been estimated that the bandit economy averaged KSh1.5 billion (US$19.2 million) and KSh6.2 billion (US$79.5 million) annually for vehicle theft and hijacking and predation on forests respectively between 1990 and 1998, whilst government corruption averaged KSh127.4 billion between 1990 and 1999 (Ngunyi, 1999). The Kenyan regime literally sustained a bandit economy that ran parallel to the weak formal economy. There were some key beneficiaries of crime rates such as the owners of security firms. The top 20 security companies earned KSh20 billion (US$250m) in 1999. A conservative estimate of a 10 per cent increase would put their earnings at KSh32 billion (US$400m) today. More of these firms continue to mushroom, whilst
security guards are among the most poorly paid and hardly earn enough to send their children to school.

Coupled with an increasing sense of insecurity at the personal level, Kenya’s economic recovery and by inference people’s standards of living, will continue to be undermined. Local industrialists and multinational corporations represented in the Eastern African Association point to crime as their second main concern after poor telecommunication infrastructure. Of the 100 companies sampled, insecurity scored 87.8 per cent compared to communication at 90 per cent. The UN Habitat & Intermediate Technology Development Group-East Africa (Habitat & ITDG-EA, 2001) survey carried out in March-June 2001 indicated that 40 per cent of Nairobians had been victims of robberies, and 22 per cent had been victims of theft at least once in 2000; 18 per cent claimed to have been physically assaulted. Most respondents intimated that they had been victims in broad daylight (East African, 16 October 2002; Habitat–ITGD.EA 2001).

It is notable that increases in crime have the net effect of creating a siege mentality that has seen Kenyans leave their places of work very early, in the process generating heavy traffic jams which in turn erode productive time. Most are afraid of accessing cash machines for fear of being attacked, a factor that has led to plans by the Kenya Bankers’ Association to install closed circuit surveillance cameras along Nairobi’s main streets.

Shopping complexes in Nairobi like the Village Market and Sarit Centre have invested heavily in security (Kariuki, 2005:4). Village Market spends an average of KSh500,000 (US$6,250) per month on 24-hour patrols and security gadgets. Alongside this are insurance premiums which have also increased by between 5 to 10 per cent annually. Sarit Centre incurs a security bill of KSh800,000 (US$10,000) per month. The cost of hiring regular police patrols has also gone up from KSh200 (US$2.5) to KSh1,000 (US$12.5) per day. More critical is the increasing despondency amongst business elements that the state cannot guarantee their rights to property, a factor that constrains commitment to hard work and encourages the drift towards informal economies as the cheap way out of a marginalising formal economy. Informalisation is boosted every time they purchase cheap goods which are probably stolen. Conversely the criminals operate with an increasing sense of impunity.

Nairobi remains a city under constant de(re)composition. It continues to be characterised by vicious struggles over spaces for socio-economic reproduction. The exclusivist logic of the formal political economy ensures that thousands in the slums (especially hawkers and self-employed artisans, unemployed youth and women) remain marginalised. There is an informality that characterises socio-economic reproduction in the city which follows from the weakening capacity of a state under siege from global forces for liberalisation and privatisation. The net consequence is a drift towards urban banditry. It is this informal economy that may explain the survival of Kenya despite aid embargoes from IFIs and the poor physical and communication infrastructure and diminished institutional capacity to guarantee law and order.

To extricate the city from the morass in which it finds itself, there is the need to re-establish a governance realm within the state as a whole. This calls for a developmental state to grapple with questions of access to means of production and enhanced state penetration in the society and provision of education services to stem
the supply side of candidates for crime. The increasing rate of crime will not be contained without a concerted attempt to resolve the crisis of more than four million young Kenyans ejected out of the formal system by the IMF/World Bank-driven logic of a minimalist state. A national youth service under the military that can help build infrastructure, housing units, and schools and in the process enhance skills at one level or opportunities to return to school at another is one way out. The foregoing is an argument for state-building animated by internal dynamics and needs, rather than externally driven neo-liberal projects that call for a watchman State. Externally imposed liberalisation and privatisation do not midwife a democratic, secure or harmonious society; they initiate the distribution of spoils as desperate means to retain power.

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Endnotes

1. In 1992 and 1997, the opposition lost the election due to a combination of tactics applied by President Moi and the ruling party, KANU. In 1992 extreme levels of political violence in the Rift Valley were accompanied by the bribery of voters using funds siphoned out of the Central bank through the Goldenberg scandal (see below); whilst in 1997 fragmentation of the opposition in addition to violence in Mombasa delivered victory again to Moi. It was not until 2002 that an opposition united under Mwai Kibaki and the National Rainbow Coalition, NARC, took power.

2. This is an ongoing project, with recent fieldwork carried out as part of a DFID study of violence and poverty (University of Bradford).


4. These included the Catholic Church, the Anglicans, the African Inland church, Presbyterians, the East Africa Seventh Day Adventists, the Full Gospel, Pentecostal Independent Church of Africa, Pentecostal Assemblies, Holy Trinity (Daily Nation, ‘Churches and MPs named in Land deals’, 8 October 2004:1/4).


6. Interviews with Senior Security and Administrative Officers engaged in urban anti-bandit operations.

7. The data in this section is extracted from a survey undertaken on a cross-section of routes in Nairobi, courtesy of the Bradford Study on Impacts of Violent Crime and Conflict on Poverty. Nine routes were surveyed and a total of 817 vehicles sampled.

8. The underlying data in this section was compiled from Interpol returns of Motor Vehicle thefts and robberies. This was further reconciled with returns from the Commission of Insurance in Nairobi.

9. Amongst the major arrests were Fai Amario, a wine manufacturer and politician from Naivasha, and members of the Akasha family with huge businesses in Mombasa.
Bibliographic Note


BBC World Service, Broadcast, 4 March 2002.


Modern Slavery, Global Capitalism & Deproletarianisation in West Africa

Kate Manzo

This paper explores the concept of ‘new’ or modern slavery in the wake of media reports of widespread child slavery on cocoa plantations in Côte d’Ivoire (the RCI). The first part defines slavery as unpaid forced labour, identifies the defining feature of modern slavery as the shift in the master-slave relation from legal ownership to illegal control, and then draws on a range of secondary sources to show that child slavery does exist in the Côte d’Ivoire even if numbers are contested. The many thousands of child slaves apparently trafficked from Mali make this a West African (and not simply Ivorian) phenomenon. The aspects of global capitalist development used in part two to explain the Ivorian situation, namely deproletarianisation and the costs of adjustment are also wider processes not unique to one country. The focus on the RCI as a case study is therefore intended as a stimulus to further questions and broader research into the relationship between capitalism and modern slavery in Africa.

Young men and boys are trafficked between countries in West Africa and used as forced labour on plantations producing goods for export such as cotton and cocoa … It is not clear how widespread slavery on cocoa plantations in the Côte d’Ivoire is (Anti-Slavery International, undated:2).

A common question is why these practices should be called slavery rather than just another form of superexploitation (Bales, 2002:2).

Inspired initially (as the above quotes suggest) by child slavery investigations and the work of academic and anti-slavery activist Kevin Bales, this paper addresses two related questions. First, what exactly is modern or ‘new’ slavery (Bales, 1999) and how does it differ from both the superexploitation of proletarian labour and the ‘old’ slavery exemplified in earlier centuries by the Atlantic slave trade and the system in the American South? And second, does modern slavery currently exist in Côte d’Ivoire and if so, why?

Answers are found in part in the writings of theorists of modern slavery (including Bales), in the publications of a range of anti-slavery and human rights organisations (such as Anti-Slavery International) and in media reports of child slavery in the RCI; they are also found in theories of global capitalist development. The basic premise of the paper is that modern slavery is not just a social-psychological condition (Bales, 2002). It is also a political-economic relation of power. This means that child slavery in the RCI is best understood in wider context – in relation to the effects of global capitalist development on the West African region and with reference to Marxist understandings and concepts.

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With that in mind the paper proceeds as follows. In part one, slavery per se is defined as unpaid forced labour. The constituent elements of modern slavery are identified as control without ownership: violence (or the threat of violence); coercion (loss of freedom and choice); and exploitation (of labour power through unpaid work). The basic argument here is that the absence of payment for work differentiates the slave from other categories of worker (either the ‘free’ proletarian or the forced wage labourer), while the absence of legal ownership in the master-slave relation is the principal feature distinguishing the new slavery from the old.

The existence of child slavery in conditions of commodity production on Ivorian cocoa farms is then demonstrated in those terms. Support for the argument is found in a range of secondary sources that draw heavily on the testimonies of young people – many of whom wear evidence of violence in the scars on their backs. Sufficient for current purposes, this empirical material will admittedly not settle ongoing questions about how many children (or what percentage of workers) are actually enslaved in the RCI. But then neither will the simple addition of new findings (however interesting in their own right). That is because the very features of contemporary slavery that flow from its illegality (such as fraudulent labour contracts, secrecy and denial) turn any form of data into political arithmetic. Numbers, in other words, are bound to be disputed as long as slavery remains illegal and its meaning contested.

In part two, child slavery is analysed with reference to the other side of the power relationship, namely the wider relations that enmesh the owner of the means of production (the master) as well as the dispossessed labourer (the slave). It is in asking why modern slavery exists (as opposed to what modern slavery is) that the paper departs fully from conventional Balesian wisdom. The second part begins by questioning whether modern slavery can be explained in all cases by reference to the same two factors, namely population growth and modernisation (Bales, 1999:12). The Marxian concept of deproletarianisation is then presented instead and applied to analysis of the costs of structural adjustment to a specific category of West African producer, namely smallholders dependent for their livelihood on an unstable commodity and fluctuating world prices of cocoa.

Within a global context of human rights law and the illegality of slavery, questions about practices that violate children’s rights are inevitably legal and moral. But as the conclusion reiterates, the questions raised here are also broadly about the relationship between capitalism and slavery and the continued relevance of Marxian and neo-Marxian approaches to international political economy. These questions focus attention not only on the exploitation of child labour but also on the workings of the world economy and its consequences for Africa as a whole.

**Slavery as Unpaid Forced Labour**

**Slavery vs. Other Forms of Superexploitation**

Wage labour, unlike bona fide forms of servitude, is uncoerced, even if the working class en masse is forced by dint of circumstance to sign the labour contract (Laycock, 1999:126).

Throughout history, slavery has meant a loss of free will and choice backed up by violence, sometimes exercised by the slaveholder, sometimes by elements of the state … These workers are unable to walk away (Bales, 2002:2).
The exploitation of labour is hardly a novel phenomenon, even in nominally developed societies. Labour exploitation is arguably inherent in all three of what Frederich Engels called the ‘great forms of servitude’, namely slavery, serfdom and wage labour (quoted in Laycock, 1999:125). Contemporary Marxists thus consider modern capitalism to be no less an institution and relation of exploitation than either medieval feudalism (with its institution of serfdom) or the more antiquated social orders that involved the system of slavery (Laycock, 1999:125).

The very normality of labour exploitation under capitalism may explain why the more extreme and therefore newsworthy examples are often equated with slavery. That term has appeared in British newspapers, for example, to describe the unpaid domestic service of trafficked (mostly female) West African children (Hinsliff, 2003:13; see also Gillan, 2003). A category of undocumented adults, furthermore, has been classified as ‘migrant slave labourers’ by virtue of the ‘slave wages’ (as little as £1 a day) that are being paid to them by ‘gangmasters’. These victims of so-called modern-day slavery are apparently beaten or incarcerated if they try to escape and exposed to high levels of ‘violence, exploitation and lack of concern for health and safety’ (Thompson, 2004:4).

Such media coverage begs the question of whether there is scholarly gain (as well as political hay) to be made from classifying as slavery the practices, conditions and power relations described in those reports. The position taken here is that the answer depends on whether payment for work is considered a defining element of proletarian labour. In Marxian theory, slavery is equated with a particular form of labour exploitation, namely unpaid work. Though the difference between capitalism and slavery in this regard may sometimes be an illusion (the old Soviet joke, for example, that factory workers pretended to work while factory owners pretended to pay them), under slavery ‘all the slave’s labour “appears” to be unpaid’ whereas under capitalism ‘all the proletarian’s labour ‘appears’ to be paid’ (Laycock, 1999:123). In these terms then, the notion of slave wages is an oxymoron and the adult migrant labourers paid a pittance for their labour in Britain are not equivalent to the trafficked children who are paid nothing at all.

If the issue is defined more broadly as forced labour – of which slavery is but one ‘face’ according to the International Labour Organisation (see ILO, 2001:48) – then parallels between slavery and other forms of superexploitation are more readily apparent. Theorists of slavery all tend to include forced labour or ‘coercive labour regimes’ as a central element (Blackburn, 1988:273; see also Bales, 1999; Patterson, 1982). Quoting Marx, Patterson (1982:2) suggests that slavery operates on the basis of direct forced labour whereas with wage labour the force is indirect. Be that as it may, the issue with slavery is clearly forced labour and not simply forced removal. Although force may well occur at the point of departure (as in traditional images of chained Africans dragged kicking and screaming across continents), explicit linkages to labour suggest that force (or the threat of force) is ‘the basis of the master-slave relationship’ (Patterson, 1982:3) and not simply a method of capture and removal.

As a central element of slavery, force (or coercion) entails a double loss of freedom and choice. First is the proletarian’s loss of ‘the freedom of wage labour in the relationship between labour and capital’ (Brass, 1999:151). In Marxian theory, this form of freedom is defined by ‘the ability of workers to enter and withdraw from particular labour markets and labour processes’ (Brass, 1999:151, emphasis in the original; see also Bales and Robbins, 2001:30). Any worker (migrant or otherwise)
who cannot vote with the feet and walk away is therefore closer to a slave in this respect than to a true proletarian.

The second, related form of loss under slavery is that of freedom of movement. In the language of rights, slavery violates the human right to freedom of movement by coercing labourers to remain where they are. In this sense, slavery is the antithesis of trafficking across national and international borders. Movement stops not only because a destination has been reached but also because movement is restricted by the slaveholder.

Coercion to work and remain may operate in slavery through forms of control that stop short of physical violence. But violence (or the threat of violence) and the imperative to escape tend to be two sides of the same coin. Horrific abuses and cruelties are typically present in master-slave relations as a back-up if nothing else – to either assert or maintain control when disaffection sets in (De Ste. Croix, 1988; see also Bales, 1999). In the words of Patterson (1982:4), ‘there is no known slaveholding society where the whip was not considered an indispensable instrument.’

In sum, various strands of academic theory point to a definition of slavery as unpaid forced labour. Media reporting in Britain along with investigations by the ILO (2001) suggest that force remains a powerful element of control and mechanism for the reproduction of capital. But regularly paid workers (however meagre their pay) are not technically slaves.

‘New’ Slavery vs. ‘Old’ Slavery

The new slavery appropriates the economic value of individuals while keeping them under complete coercive control – but without asserting ownership or accepting responsibility for their survival (Bales, 1999:25).

Violence toward children is a common theme in the writings of anti-slavery organisations. In a short piece on ‘traditional’ slavery in West Africa, for example, the Anti-Slavery Society (2003a:1) claims that existing ‘hierodulic’ slaves (some as young as five) are ‘beaten with canes or with specially-made wire whips’. A companion overview of the ‘modern’ West African slave trade similarly emphasises the use of the whip, calling it ‘part of the essential equipment of the professional slaver’ (Anti-Slavery Society, 2003b:1).

Such cross-cutting references to violence in general and whips in particular only beg the question of how various forms of the new slavery – such as chattel slavery, debt bondage and contract slavery (Bales, 1999:19-20) – differ from the earlier forms exemplified by the bondage of the Atlantic slave trade and the plantation slavery of the American South.

As once standard methods of procuring slave labour – such as violent capture and chained removal – become less apparent, it can be tempting to view evocative signifiers like chains and handcuffs as definitive features of an outmoded system. For Bales (1999:5), however, the key distinction is a legal one. Modern slavery is defined, not by changing methods of procurement but by an absence of legal ownership in the master-slave relationship.

The key to that definition (and therefore its value) is the author’s contextual analysis. The changing character of slavery is rooted (paradoxically) in its formal abolition. From the Slavery Convention of 1926 to the Rome Final Act of 1998, freedom from
enslavement in the twentieth century has been codified as a human rights principle in many international conventions (see Bales and Robbins, 2001). Betwixt and between are international commitments to the elimination of forced and compulsory labour (such as the Forced Labour Convention of 1930 and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention of 1957) to which the RCI, among other states, is a signatory (UNDP, 2004:245).

The upshot of international legal change is that slavery is everywhere illegal even as it persists in various forms. In a context where ownership cannot be openly asserted, debt bondage and contract slavery are now more common forms than chattel (or hereditary) servitude. Fraudulent labour contracts ‘have two main uses for the slaveholder – entrapment and concealment’ (Bales, 1999:26). Their increasing issue to chattel and bonded slaves shows how secrecy and denial can hide behind modern labour practices (Bales, 1999:20).

In terms of global economics, absence of ownership is arguably efficient. As responsibility for the survival of individuals and a sense of permanence in the master-slave relationship are eliminated, so the slave becomes but another ‘consumable item’ in the world economy, to be disposed of when no longer useful (Bales, 1999:25).

The problem with the concept of global efficiency is that it doesn’t really answer the question for part two, namely why contemporary slaveholders are willing to run the risks that they do. Illegality is doubly costly. Financially, the slaveholder loses money and cannot claim compensation if the slave escapes or is liberated by officials (see Raghavan, 2001:3). Legally, slaveholders are at risk of criminal prosecution if caught. A handful of them are already serving time in Ivorian prisons while others are on the run from police (Raghavan and Chatterjee, 2001:2).

Illegality is also costly in a political sense. Negative publicity is no guarantee of abolition, in part because the ‘new abolitionists’ themselves are relatively weak and divided (Bales, 1999:258-60). But as the following section now shows, no country (like the RCI) that has signed international agreements and outlawed slavery wants to be seen to be a place in which the practice persists.

**Child Slavery in Conditions of Commodity Production**

*These [slaves] are people held against their will, coerced to work with the threat of violence, and paid nothing at all* (Morris, 2000:3).

A British television documentary aired in 2000 claimed that ninety per cent of Ivorian farms employ slave labour (see Channel 4, 2000). That claim was rejected as ‘nonsense’ and ‘wildly inaccurate’ by Kouadio Adjoumani, the RCI’s ambassador to the UK (quoted in BBC News, 2000:1). A fellow Ivorian – Agriculture Minister Alfonse Douaty – adopted a similar stance in a four-part American investigation for Knight Ridder Newspapers. While admitting to the pervasive presence of indentured child labour, Douaty dismissed suggestions of widespread child slavery (calling it a marginal ‘clandestine phenomenon’) on the grounds that the term itself ‘conjures up images of chains and whips’ (Raghavan and Chatterjee, 2001:4).

The introductory quote from Anti-Slavery International admits to a degree of uncertainty over the magnitude of enslavement on Ivorian cocoa farms. According to the Child Labour Coalition (CLC) as well, ‘no extensive research findings are
available on how many children are enslaved’ (CLC, undated:1). Cocoa and coffee farms in the RCI number in excess of 600,000, so limited findings are partly a consequence of economic geography. The most extensive study to date (of child labour in the entire West African cocoa sector) employs only a random sample of 1,500 Ivorian farm households rather than a comprehensive survey of all farms (see IITA, 2002).

The important point here is that the very illegality of slavery – the feature that defines its modern version – ensures that numbers will always be contested however comprehensive the investigations. Slavery can be redefined as something else, such as indentured servitude. It can also be ‘hidden, well hidden’ (Douaty, quoted in Raghavan and Chatterjee, 2001:3) behind fraudulent labour contracts or false claims to kinship relations between adults and child labourers. But this means that even if figures are wildly inaccurate, they are as likely to be under-estimated as over-estimated. Conventional wisdom, in other words, is probably highly conservative.

It is in references to trafficked children from Mali that something akin to conventional wisdom exists. Following a UNICEF study, a US State Department report on human rights in Ivory Coast noted that ‘approximately 15,000 Malian children were trafficked and sold into indentured servitude on Ivorian plantations in 1999’ (US State Department, 2000:33). Plans by the Malian government to assist ‘what they estimate to be 15,000 Malian children working without payment on Ivorian cocoa farms’ have been reported in the British media (BBC News, 2000:2). A later, academic reference to the trafficking of children from Mali to the RCI by Chanthavong (2002:3) again places at 15,000 ‘the number of children forced to work as slaves on these farms.’

Whether the plight of such children should be termed slavery or indentured labour is a matter of interpretation. It depends on how slavery is conceived and not simply on numerical evidence of abuse. The remainder of this section therefore aims to show that if chains (as a signifier of forced removal) are taken out of the equation then there are plenty of sources of evidence of unpaid forced labour on Ivorian farms.

One such source is the final part of the aforementioned Knight Ridder report (entitled ‘A Taste of Slavery’). Sub-titled ‘Two Boys, Two Years, No Pay’, part four chronicles the experiences of Malian youngsters named Brahimale and Siaka Traure. At the ages of 12 and 14 respectively, they were enticed away to the RCI with promises of paid skilled apprenticeships. After two days of travel and payment to a ‘slave trader’ of $28, they were put to work on an Ivorian farm producing cocoa and coffee, cotton, yams, corn and rice. Two years on, the adequately fed boys (who were once given a small sum to celebrate Muslim holidays) were found sharing a windowless mud hut and dreaming of escape. They were held in check by a combination of violence (the beating of Siaka with a big stick after a failed attempt to flee), threats of violence (i.e. of further beatings) and the promise of eventual payment (Raghavan, 2001).

The value of a report featuring only two cases is that it captures succinctly the constituent elements of modern slavery identified earlier. It also presents in microcosm the findings of other reports by academics and human rights activists, who have found further examples of migrant children in the RCI being overworked, unpaid, prevented from leaving and beaten after attempts to escape (Chanthavong, 2002; ISHR, 2002:5; see also Blunt, 2000:2).
Illegality brings other actors into the master-slave relationship. Secrecy and denial in the face of human rights investigations are one manifestation of this, as emphasised previously. The other side of the coin, however, is liberation and repatriation of slaves by government officials (Blunt, 2000:2; Raghavan and Chatterjee, 2001: 3). Law enforcement is important to state actors wishing to send a strong political message that slavery won’t be tolerated. Its added value is in providing an additional source of evidence that modern slavery exists.

The oral testimonies of emancipated child slaves further illustrate the variety of means by which West African children have been kept in conditions of slavery. Lost in a foreign country, they cannot find their way home (Frenkiel, 2001). They haven’t been paid and have no means to travel; they require the permission of adults – either parents or otherwise (IITA, 2002:13). They have been enticed into signing the fraudulent labour contracts mentioned earlier (Savoor, 2001:1). They have been locked up at night to prevent their escape (Chanthavong, 2002:4; Savoor, 2001). They have been warned of physically punishment if they try to escape (Raghavan, 2001; Savoor, 2001). And last but not least, they have been subjected to violence. Returned escapees have been beaten in front of other children to teach them a lesson (Blunt, 2000:3; Chanthavong, 2002:4; Savoor, 2001:1-2). They have also been beaten with ‘chains, whips and switches’ and, ‘when they tried to leave, they were beaten and sometimes killed’ (Shelby Biggs, 2002:2).

So modern slavery, in a nutshell, exists in West Africa. It is to the second question – of why it exists there, in the RCI in particular – that the paper now turns.

Global Capitalism & Modern Slavery

Even in areas where the demand for labour is either met or exceeded by the existing supply...employers may still be faced with rising labour costs...because overproduction and the tendency of the rate of profit to fall in the course of capitalist competition generally requires individual producers to cut the price of labour-power (Brass, 1999:158).

It wasn’t until the bottom dropped out of the cocoa market that the promises of jobs turned into the reality of slavery (Shelby Biggs, 2002:4).

The work of Bales (1999) is the starting point for this investigation into the causes of modern slavery in the sense that he locates it firmly within the context of the global economy. The uneven effects of modernisation and globalisation – produced in part by the shift from subsistence agriculture to cash-crop production and export-led growth – are linked to the rise of the new slavery (Bales, 1999:13). Furthermore, Bales (1999:25) argues that ‘the new slavery mimics the world economy by shifting away from ownership and fixed asset management, concentrating instead on control and use of resources or processes.’

The theoretical departure from Bales in what follows is driven by three considerations. Firstly, Bales’ global theory is broad but not deep. Only two pages of Disposable People are devoted to both categories of explanation (or variables), namely population growth and modernisation (see Bales, 1999:12-13). What Bales offers is arguably more of a general framework than a detailed mode of explanation applicable without amendment to all situations.

Second, there are problems with both of those variables. The ‘population growth’ factor attributes slavery to an over-supply of children. Where ‘countries are flooded
with children’ then, according to Bales (1999:12), the ‘supply of potential slaves’ increases and the price of slaves is driven down. In what follows, this emphasis on labour supply is replaced (in regard to the RCI) with an emphasis on labour cost.

As for the ‘modernisation’ factor, the main problem is the lack of historical perspective in an analysis beginning only after World War Two. In the RCI as elsewhere, the relationship between cash-crop production and forced labour is certainly robust but it began under colonialism (Amin, 1973:50) and not in the era of formal independence. Here again, it is more useful to consider variation in the costs (and conditions) of capitalist production rather than rely on broad explanatory categories like modernisation.

Thirdly, the relationship between modern slavery and the world economy is more complex than Bales suggests if the issue is framed more broadly (in Marxian terms) as the relationship between global capitalism and modern slavery.

**Semi-feudalism vs. Deproletarianisation**

According to Marxian theorist Tom Brass, forced or ‘unfree’ labour is regarded as inconsistent with the development of capitalism by neoclassical economists and also by Marxian exponents of the ‘semi-feudal’ thesis. The common ground on which the two camps meet is the view of forced labour as both anachronistic and inefficient; a ‘pre-/non-capitalist relation that constitutes an obstacle to accumulation’ (Brass, 1999:163).

The semi-feudal thesis has already been discredited within Marxism by various exponents of an alternative ‘deproletarianisation’ thesis. One line of attack is a global ‘development of underdevelopment’ approach, which views free labour in the core of the world economy and unfree labour in the periphery as contradictory elements of an international division of labour and opposite sides of the same capitalist development coin (see for example Amin, 1973).

A complimentary approach emphasises (like Marx) the varied, uneven and contradictory character of capitalism as it expands on a world scale. At whatever level of analysis, capitalism entails ‘typically uneven waves of commodification, decommodification and recommodification’ in regard to land, labour and goods (Jessop, 1997:562). The effects of capitalist expansion (via means such as market liberalisation or structural adjustment more generally) are thus necessarily uneven given the logic of capital. The dark side of progress – like the impoverishment and ‘over-work’ of rural African producers or the economic and political crises of the West African region – is therefore a consequence of capitalist development itself and not exogenous to it (Gruffydd Jones, 2003; Robson, 2005).

Yet another relevant Marxian approach is one that views forced labour as ‘a crucial aspect of class conflict in particular agrarian situations’ (Brass, 1999:153). It is Brass who suggests that population growth is irrelevant to the rise of modern slavery when he cites labour costs rather than labour availability as the key contributory factor. He argues that capitalist producers may incline toward forced labour when it ‘enables them to segment the labour market, and also to cheapen and/or discipline their workers’ (Brass, 1999:164).

Turning now to West Africa, the semi-feudal thesis is itself anachronistic if it cannot recognise the capitalist forces – what Robson (2005:77) calls ‘peripheral capitalism’ –
at work in the region. Cocoa production is a telling example, with producers subject to global capitalism via an international division of labour and the forces of commodity production and exchange. Approximately two-thirds of the cocoa destined for the world market is produced on West African farms measuring six hectares or less (IITA, 2002: 4, 17). In the RCI, an estimated eleven million smallholders have helped cocoa to supplant coffee as a major export commodity thanks to the government price incentives that encouraged cultivation in the era of independence (Chanthavong, 2002:5, 14; Crook, 1990). The upshot is that many small farmers have become dependent for their livelihood on cocoa, and it is this smallholder production that accounts for ‘most of the large increase in production and export from the Ivory Coast in the 1990s’ (Tiffen, 2002:393).

Smallholders must be counted among those to suffer from the varied and uneven effects of the structural adjustment programmes implemented after the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reached a stand-by agreement with the Ivorian government in 1989. Structural adjustment was designed to restore economic growth (and indirectly assist farmers) after a period of decline occasioned by a world drop in coffee and cocoa prices in the early 1980s. Fiscal constraints at a time of declining global terms of trade were followed (in the mid- 1990s) by economic liberalisation, i.e. ‘labour market deregulation, price decontrol, trade reform, reductions in civil service employment, and faster privatisation’ (Naiman and Watkins, 1999:10).

The social impact of economic liberalisation (its subjection of government-controlled economies to market forces) has been ‘severe’ in the sense that the ‘incidence and intensity of poverty’ doubled between 1988 and 1995 (Naiman and Watkins, 1999:10). As well as impoverishment, however, liberalisation has produced what Tiffen (2002:385) calls a ‘social development paradox’, whereby smallholders in remote areas suffer while bigger farmers and those near the cities prosper (see also Cheru, 1992). Small farmers suffer by no longer receiving much support through state agricultural policies, ‘even though 70 per cent of the world’s poorest people live in rural areas’ (Tiffen, 2002:383). These farmers suffer when commodity markets are weak and there is ‘simply no market for all the extra supply or production being urged on these already skewed economies’ (Tiffen, 2002:388; see also IITA, 2002). And last but not least, small farmers suffer when the price of their commodity plummets.

**Cocoa Prices, Uneven Development & Unequal Exchange**

Rural livelihoods depend on both the quantity and the price of their produce. Under pressure from both the IMF and World Bank, the RCI ‘freed up its cocoa market in 1999, abandoning fixed prices in favour of those set by the market’ (Cowell, 2002:2). In this newly-liberalised market, ‘farm-gate price is now determined by market forces, government taxes, and marketing margins, with the latter varying spatially as a function of distance-to-port and quality of road infrastructure’ (IITA, 2002:17).

When looked at globally, cocoa prices are an indication of the combined and uneven effects of capitalist expansion, for at a time when the retail prices of tropical commodities such as coffee, cotton and cocoa are high, farm-gate prices ‘are now falling well below the cost of production for even the most efficient farmer’ (Tiffen, 2002:391). The power of retailers (or distributors) may be growing, along with that of dominant brand-owners like Cadbury and Mars (Tiffen, 2002). And yet the retailer (like the producer) is but one component of the international division of labour.
A host of profit-making intermediaries stand between the retailer and the producer of commodities. These intermediaries include (but are not limited to) a group referred to by the International Cocoa Organisation (ICA) as ‘hard-bargaining commodity buyers,’ i.e. merchants and middlemen who ‘have systematically shortchanged the growers, buying their beans cheaply and selling at big profits in the rising market’ (Cowell, 2002). In this situation, even a European cocoa industry executive finds it ‘somewhat ironic that while European and American agriculture is protected, we should argue to developing countries that they should be fully exposed to the vagaries of the market’ (quoted in Cowell, 2002:3).

Cocoa prices, furthermore, are an illustration of the long-term, structural inequalities or unequal exchange within the world economy that liberalisation has arguably exacerbated (Barratt Brown and Tiffen, 1990; Emmanuel, 1972; Hoogvelt, 1997:171). Without acknowledging the impact of their own policies on declining commodity prices and terms of trade, even the IMF and World Bank admit the rather obvious economic point that ‘expansions of production may induce price falls in the cases of bananas, cocoa, coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco’ (Sapsford and Singer, 1998:1655).

More significant is the Fund and the Bank’s recent acceptance of the 1950 ‘Prebisch-Singer declining trend hypothesis’. This is the idea of a declining trend in real commodity prices because of a long-term tendency for terms of trade to deteriorate (Sapsford and Singer, 1998). In this situation, if all commodity producers are asked to diversify and switch to other exports (as they have been), ‘there arises the possibility of the occurrence of what might be seen as a second-order adding up problem in the sense that the alternative lines of activity… may themselves be subject to falling prices!’ (Sapsford and Singer, 1998:1655, emphasis in the original).

It is precisely in order to cut labour costs and reduce expenditures that impoverished farmers have turned to two main methods of deproletarianisation. On the one hand, farmers have increased their reliance on unpaid family labour. According to the IITA (2002:17), ‘the open interviews with community leaders indicated that the greater employment of family labor was a common response to the recent drop in cocoa prices and the crisis in cocoa incomes.’ On the other hand, farmers have increased their reliance on slaves ‘in order to lower costs in an increasingly competitive global market’ (American Anti-slavery Group, undated:1).

When Ivorian officials blame child labour on ‘immigrant farmers from Mali’ as well as on ‘world cocoa prices that have fallen almost 24 percent since 1996’ (Raghavan and Chatterjee, 2001:3), their explanations are clearly double-edged. But emphasis on the negative consequences of low cocoa prices for farmers is a reasonable response to concerns about child slavery. Any salary paid to a farm worker is dependent on the price the farmer receives for the cocoa (Bass, 2004:158). Cocoa farmers (like the producers of other primary commodities) ‘have been squeezed by the “double-whammy” of a falling trend in real price coupled with an increase in its volatility’ (Sapsford and Singer, 1998:1657). When prices of cocoa drop, farmers must therefore ‘look for ways to cut costs by using cheap labor, driving them to even resort to use slave labor’ (Chanthavong, 2002:5).

Anecdotal evidence suggests that when prices rise – as they have done since the record low recorded in 2000 – the use of slave labour declines (Anti-Slavery Society, 2003c:2; Bass, 2004:158; Krishnan, 2001:1). Higher cocoa prices would therefore seem to be a viable solution to the problem of child slavery. But unfortunately, they are not – at least not in the long-term – for reasons both political and economic.
The Political Economy of Rising Prices

The first factor to consider is the reasons why prices have risen. Price increases are not simply due to what John Newman, the Chairman of the UK-based Biscuit, Cake, Chocolate and Confectionary Alliance, has called ‘the economic fundamentals of supply and demand’ (quoted in Dadson, 2001:1). Recent increases in world cocoa prices are due to a combination of rising demand (driven by growing markets for cocoa in Asia and Europe) and declining output thanks to civil war in the RCI and bad weather and pest problems throughout West Africa (BBC News, 2001; Peltola, 2003:1). So even as prices have risen ‘the fighting has killed hundreds in cocoa-growing regions, destroyed crops and kept farmers from harvesting what remains – and sharing in the higher prices’ (Cowell, 2002:1).

The second factor relates to the ‘trend and cycle’ character of global commodity markets. As Sapsford and Singer (1998:1654) caution, ‘commodity booms are temporary and invariably followed by bust.’ When bust follows boom, commodity prices are often even lower than before, so the World Bank ‘sensibly and rightly admonishes countries to behave prudently during commodity booms, not to make rash expenditure commitments’ (Sapsford and Singer, 1998:1654). Commitment to worker pay might be considered ‘rash’ in this context.

Finally, a third factor to consider is international responses to (as opposed to reasons for) price increases. Such responses can be contradictory and conflicting. On the one hand, there is the World Bank, which is ‘most emphatic in recommending trade liberalisation’ when prices boom but fails to entertain the prospect that controls might be reintroduced when prices invariably fall (Sapsford and Singer, 1998:1656). Indeed (as already seen), liberalisation was recommended in the first place as an antidote to the economic decline occasioned by depressed commodity prices.

On the other hand, there are conflicts of interest between producers seeking permanently higher prices for their output and importers (or consumers) wanting to keep costs under control. Conflicts of this sort surfaced, for example, during a meeting in Geneva held in 2001. Although the conference did agree to monitor market forces as a way to control imbalances between supply and demand, it failed to resolve a number of outstanding issues between global producers and users of cocoa (BBC News, 2001:3).

Strategic manipulation of market forces by various actors suggests that ‘the low level of return on labour and investment by farmers is being extracted because of how the market is controlled, not just as a result of supply and demand’ (Tiffen, 2002:391). It also suggests that the world market is no more ‘free’ than the children who produce for it in West Africa. Power is being exercised, and not just by slaveholding farmers.

Conclusion

This paper set out to address the causes (rather than the consequences) of modern slavery. While drawing to some extent on the classic study of the phenomenon by Bales (1999), the paper departed from Bales in two related respects. First, the scope of this investigation was limited to the situation of one category of slave (children) in one part of the world (West Africa) and in one particular situation (cocoa production on Ivorian farms). Second, child slavery was explained in terms of deproletarianisation rather than population growth and modernisation.
Academic theory (as well as a variety of more topical writings) was drawn upon to illustrate and support the approach and arguments of the paper. Much of the theory suggested in part two as an alternative to Bales can be classified as Marxian or neo-Marxian political economy. The key themes were: commodity production and trade (Ivorian cocoa being the traded commodity in question); labour costs within a hierarchical international division of labour; unequal exchange or terms of trade (signified by the declining and volatile price of primary commodities like cocoa); capitalist expansion (via commodification and, more recently, economic liberalisation); and last but not least, the varied and uneven effects of the world-wide expansion of capitalism. Other than deproletarianisation, then, the over-arching theme of part two was global capitalism.

Marxian and neo-Marxian thought remains varied and eclectic, and no single theoretical framework or theorist was presented here as having the final word on the subject of the modern enslavement of children. Whether or not the international political economy approach adopted here makes sense is ultimately for the reader to decide. The broadly Marxian framework is arguably defensible, however, on two grounds.

First, Marxian thought – particularly in its more global applications – makes sense not only of the condition of slaves but also of the behaviour of slaveholders. Slavery is a relation of power; it needs to be explained in ways that capture all aspects of the relationship and not simply the treatment or condition of one element.

Second, the resort to Marxian thought begs further questions about the continued ‘relevance and power of marxism’ as a theoretical approach to understanding ‘essentially capitalist societies’ (Jessop, 1997:566, emphasis in the original). Those who view West African agriculture as semi-feudal may well question the utility of such an approach. What the paper has tried to show, however, is that West African agriculture is indeed embedded within an essentially capitalist world economy (be it thanks to colonialism, modernisation, structural adjustment or something else).

Overall, the paper has tried to demonstrate the importance of asking varied questions about slavery. Rights are being violated and laws are being broken. Imperatives to ask questions about (and find solutions to) these problems are inevitably legal and moral. But the ways in which markets are currently controlled and power is currently exercised raise much bigger questions about the workings of the world economy and its consequences for Africa as a whole.

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Bibliographic Note


John Garang’s Legacy to the Peace Process, the SPLM/A & the South

John Young

The death of Dr. John Garang, First Vice President of Sudan, President of Southern Sudan, and Chairman of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in a helicopter crash on 30 July, and the riots that followed, produced doubts about the viability of the 9 January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the prospects of peace processes underway elsewhere in the country. On the surface, this is not surprising because Garang had been the leader of the SPLM/A since its founding in 1983 and for many in Sudan and abroad he virtually personified the struggle of the south. Garang was also the unchallenged focal point during the various peace processes, in particular during the final phase of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) negotiations which were largely reduced to then First Vice President Ali Osman Taha and himself. And more than anyone else on either side of the table, Garang was the biggest beneficiary of the peace process which granted him a virtual hegemonic position in the south and the holding of a strong vice presidency nationally.

Beyond the south Garang was held in high esteem by many northern Sudanese who believed in his rhetoric of ‘New Sudan’, and – at least until recently – saw support of him and the SPLM/A as the best means to remove the highly unpopular ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and bring about a democratic transformation in the country. The Western powers, led by the US, saw Garang as the linchpin of the north-south peace process, indeed helped make him so, and looked to him to resolve the conflicts in western and eastern Sudan, as well as serving as a critical element in the ‘war on terror’. He also had close relations with many regional leaders, all of whom hoped he would be instrumental in ending Sudanese support for Islamist terrorism and groups like the Lord’s Resistance Army.

However, despite the lavish praise that greeted the signing of the CPA, and the critical role ascribed to Garang in achieving that agreement, the peace process was facing a crisis before Garang’s untimely death because the agreement was not – as its defenders claimed – comprehensive (Young, 2005). At the core of the agreement was the Machakos Protocol, which involved a trade-off of self-determination for the south (a popular demand of all southerners) for the acceptance of Sharia in the north, a demand designed to give a measure of legitimacy to the NCP. And even this demand, which implied the commitment of the NCP to an Islamic vision of governance, was disingenuous since the leading elements of the ruling party had long since been displaced by security operatives for whom Islam was only a slogan.
The impact of the agreement was not to invigorate a broader peace process, but instead to galvanise opposition across the south and north by those who feared that the entire national pie was being divided in their absence and at their expense. The backers of the agreement routinely labelled these critics ‘spoilers’ and either attempted to isolate them or looked to Garang to bring them on board a peace train, albeit a train that had already left the station. Although Garang and the SPLM/A proclaimed a ‘New Sudan’ which provided democracy and equity for all, the CPA was not a national agreement, nor was it a model that could be implemented elsewhere in the country, and even less was it a roadmap for democratic transformation. With most of the government and state resources divided between the parties to the CPA, there was little to give the large majority of Sudanese outside the process.

Aftermath of Garang’s Death

It might have been assumed that the commitment of the SPLM/A to a ‘New Sudan’ embracing all Sudanese, together with 2½ years of almost continuous negotiations with the NCP to reach a peace agreement, would have created a measure of trust between Sudan’s disparate peoples. But within hours of the announcement of Garang’s death, shemasha (street people) in Khartoum and a number of towns in the south were attacking and looting northern establishments. The rioters drew support from many disadvantaged communities, but significantly the largest numbers were from Darfur and the Nuba Mountains, and these groups were also most likely to have carried out the fire bombings. As a result, the rioters included more Moslems than Christians in their ranks. The cleavage was thus racial with the rioters coming from various African tribes, the targets were businesses owned by so-called Arab northerners and the security services, and apart from the local police, the rioters were confronted by security personnel from the north, most from the Shaggia tribe of Vice President Ali Osman. Although there was little order and even less leadership in the riots, it appears that some Darfurians were inspired by the propaganda of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army. Generally, however, the riots took the form of the African marginalised from the streets and IDP camps looting the property of northern merchants and attacking northerners, after which the revenge attacks of the northerners began.

Although the ‘New Sudan’ rhetoric of Garang opposed racialism and tribalism, the approach of the rioters was not in fact completely different from the SPLM/A’s popular appeal which was widely understood to be a struggle against the jallaba, which is a pejorative term originally applied to Arab merchants operating in the south, but is now largely applied to all northerners (Young, 2003). In Juba, and to some extent Malakal, the small population of ‘Arab’ merchants, most of whom had lived in the south for two decades and had married locally, were ruthlessly attacked and many subsequently left, thus precipitating a food and market crisis. And in Khartoum, northern street fighters retaliated after the first day of attacks and for a brief period it appeared that the city would erupt into a race war. That did not happen, but the contrast between the language of the CPA, which stressed pluralism and national unity, and the reality expressed by those on the streets could not have been greater.

Other currents came to the surface in the immediate aftermath of Garang’s death. Islamists who had long opposed any agreement with the south that did not involve southern assimilation into the Islamist-Arabist mode used mosques to preach
sermons of hate and struggle and appealed to parishioners to ‘take care of the infidels’. They held that Christian and pagan Africans were at the gates and should be fought. The hand of Turabi was widely held to be behind these efforts, but there are other Islamist currents at work in the north, and some are in the government itself. The Forum for Justice and Peace, a group fearful that the peace process will threaten Sharia in the north and supports northern self-determination, used the opportunity of the riots to appeal for the establishment of self-defence brigades. This group is led by Al-Tayeeb Mustafa, an uncle of President Beshir. The Ansar-Sunna, a Wahabbi group, also used the opportunity to press its extremist views.

Divisions among southerners came to the surface during the riots in Khartoum. While many were saddened by Garang’s death, there were some among the Dinka community from which Garang derives his origins who held that the Nuers were not demonstrating either enough grief or were not taking a sufficiently active role in the riots. It was also widely and falsely reported that Paulino Matieb, leader of the Nuer dominated South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF), had been assassinated and this rumour may have been spread to bring them in greater numbers into the anti-northerner rampage. Thankfully the Nuers for the most part did not rise to the bait because traditionally they strike more fear into northern Sudanese than other southerners. As well as a contingent of SPLM/A soldiers, armed men from the SSDF patrolled the streets to protect southerners from retaliation by irate northerners and SSDF leaders later reported that they came close to open conflict with the security services. Garang had long accused the SSDF of being stooges of the government and rejected any power sharing arrangement with them. Later the Military Intelligence refused to permit an SSDF contingent to attend Garang’s funeral in Juba, apparently out of fear that it might end up in a violent conflict with the SPLM/A.

Initially the security services watched, but did little, as rioters brazenly attacked northern establishments. This led to speculation that elements of the security services wanted the riots to develop as a means to deepen the divisions between northerners and southerners and weaken the growing influence of the SPLM/A in the north. Later when it became apparent that Darfurians and not southerners were the dominant elements in the melee the security services clamped down. Nonetheless, there were widespread reports that they or their friends conducted assassinations of enemies during the evening hours when Khartoum was under a curfew. After the riots, the security services claimed that their lack of preparedness was due to their weakness, particularly at the neighbourhood level, and argued for more resources.

The riots spoke to the deep socio-economic and cultural divide in the country, and in particular in Khartoum. As a result, the capital has become a tinder box, with a largely Arab NIF linked elite at the apex, a decimated northern middle class, an impoverished working class, and a large population of marginalised and displaced from the south, west, Nuba Mountains, and the east. In recent years the marginalised and poverty-stricken have steadily increased, largely because of the multiple wars under way in the country, growing polarisation as a result of oil wealth, and the NCP’s neo-liberal economic policies. And while the traditional northern opposition leadership has long called for an intifadah against the government, it did not support the riots, and nor did the poor from the centre and the riverine core, thus again emphasising the racial dimensions of the riots.
Although the riots must be understood as a revolt of the marginalised, many of whom came from the north, they had the effect of driving the wedge further into the divide between northerners and southerners, between Arabs and Africans. Thus moderate northerners sometimes concluded that it was neither possible nor desirable to have southerners and northerners under one roof, while others from the north expressed the view that the abed (slaves, a pejorative term applied to southerners) should either behave themselves or return to the south. As a result, Garang’s death and the ensuing riots have had the effect of increasing tensions between all of Sudan’s disparate peoples, further undermining Garang’s notion of ‘New Sudan’, and bringing the separation of the south one step closer.

**Garang & the Development of the SPLM/A**

As was made clear in the Machakos Protocol of 20 July 2002, the peace process is built upon a compromise between southern demands for self-determination and the NCP’s demand for Sharia in the north. But Garang did not initially press the demand for self-determination. Mainstream history dates the second civil war from the 1983 revolt by southern soldiers in the garrison town of Bor and the establishment of the SPLA under Garang a few months later. But the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which ended the first civil war, was a subject of controversy from the beginning by those angered at the decision of Anyanya’s leader, Joseph Lagu, to forego the struggle for independence and accept autonomy for the south. These opponents re-grouped and calling themselves Anyanya II began military operations in 1978 in eastern Upper Nile along the Ethiopian border under the banner of southern separation, or in contemporary parlance, national self-determination.

The circumstances surrounding the formation of the SPLA and Garang’s assumption of leadership of it remains murky, but there is little doubt that the Ethiopian Derg and its leader Haile Mengistu Mariam played a critical role (see for example, Adwok, 2000 and Akol, 2001). By 1983 the Derg was threatened by a number of Eritrean and Ethiopian guerrilla groups, all of whom espoused self-determination. Many of these groups received small amounts of logistical support from Khartoum, and Mengistu saw the revolt on his western border as an opportune means to counter the threat posed by Sudan. But he could not support Anyanya II with its separatist ideology which mirrored that of some of his opponents in Ethiopia.

Instead, Mengistu looked to the creation of the SPLA to pursue a national agenda that called for a united Sudan and adopted a Marxist ideology of the type favoured by the Ethiopians, that is, statist, centralised, and beholden to Addis Ababa and its Eastern Bloc supporters. With Ethiopian support the newly formed and Garang-led SPLA was able to largely defeat the separatist Anyanya II rebels and thus assume a dominant position in the southern rebellion. The natural proclivity of southerners to support self-determination was rejected and the vaguely leftist notion of ‘New Sudan’ became the guiding political objective. Attractive though this was among northern intellectuals and foreign supporters, ‘New Sudan’ never had any resonance among southerners and Garang was unable to use the SPLA as a vehicle to mobilise support for it. Garang’s acceptance of Mengistu’s crude Marxism also had no basis or support in a south Sudan characterised by an overwhelmingly rural economy of small landholders and fiercely independent pastoralists. However, there is no doubt that he learned much from the ruthless
Mengistu and his Eastern Bloc allies when it came to matters of security and control, as Garang’s many political victims can readily testify. And Garang was nothing if not loyal to his benefactors in Addis Ababa. Even with the rebels of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) virtually at the doors of Addis Ababa in 1991, Garang’s forces fought a rearguard action to preserve the Derg (Young, 1999).

This would have seemed an ideal time to re-assess the SPLA’s political stance and Garang’s mode of leadership, but that was not to be. Nor did Garang give ground when in 1991 some of his senior officers, notably Drs. Riek Macher and Lam Akol, and the Anyanya veteran, Gordon Kong, called for a clear commitment to self-determination and accountable leadership. The result was a conflagration as the power struggle frequently took on the form of a war between Dinka, and particularly Garang’s Bor Dinka, and the Nuer of Riek and Gordon. But ultimately these battles were not determined by political positions (since most southerners supported the views of the dissidents), but on the basis of logistical assistance where Garang was more successful. But ironically Garang had no sooner defeated his opponents than the notion of self-determination began creeping into the ideology of the SPLA. Without the need to satisfy Mengistu, and with the increasing regional popularity of self-determination after the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) capture of power in Eritrea and the organisation of the Ethiopian state on the basis of the concept, it became very difficult to challenge. Thus from the mid-1990s two notions – self-determination which southerners equated solely as independence – and ‘New Sudan’, which was understood to be a call for a united Sudan, went hand in hand. But never comfortably. Indeed, few in the SPLM/A leadership ever supported a united Sudan and most have been forthright in their espousal of independence. ‘New Sudan’ was officially accepted because it was favoured by Garang and everyone knew what the consequences would be to openly challenge the leader on this issue.

The SPLM/A’s Marxism met a quicker death. Communism was in terminal decline by the early 1990s and not a viable ideology from which to appeal to international supporters, particularly the growing number of foreign Christian organisations and the US Government. So without virtually any debate, Marxism was jettisoned. However, the top-down dictatorial control of John Garang did not change. With the passing of time Garang did not so readily resort to having his opponents physically eliminated, but he proved remarkably effective in having them politically isolated and maintaining a hegemonic position in the SPLM/A.

And in doing so Garang kept the banner of southern resistance flying, even after the 1991 loss of Ethiopian support and the subsequent divisions in the movement’s leadership. His rule has been tough and high-handed, but many argue necessary in the difficult political environment of south Sudan. However, the costs of his leadership have been high. The SPLM/A has never developed an ideology that was coherent and acceptable to its followers because it always had to be subject to the dictates and needs of Garang. By calling for a united Sudan and at the same time giving support to southern self-determination, Garang has been able to be all things to all people. In the Arab world and for northerners his rhetoric has been strongly in favour of a united and democratic Sudan, while in the south he presented himself as a true son of the soil. Of course this duplicity ran thin over time and Sudanese and foreigners alike increasingly began asking what John Garang really stood for.
Garang’s Party

More damaging to the SPLM/A has been the failure to develop viable civil, political and military institutions. If, as some students of insurrections have argued, revolutionary groups must build institutions in opposition to the established ones (see Migdal, 1974), they would have to think again when looking at the SPLM/A because Garang has consistently fought to minimise institutionalisation in the movement. A major problem Garang faced was bringing independent minded commanders under control, but instead of constraining them through strong institutions he made them personally beholden to him. Thus he maintained complete control over weapons and supplies, divided military and political control at the local level, placed his supporters in key positions, and went over the top of his army high command to deal directly with selected commanders, all of which had the effect of seriously weakening the military capacity of the organisation. Senior security officials in both Ethiopia and Eritrea have told the author in almost identical terms how their efforts to train and create a professional fighting force of SPLA units that could operate independently were repeatedly undermined by Garang. The result is an army dependent upon personal control – and as has been made clear in the months following the 9 January 2005 peace agreement – only too quick to resort to settling of scores and pursuing tribalist concerns when its senior members were not in the field with them. These problems in the SPLA are well known and figured prominently in what almost amounted to a coup against Garang during three days of meetings in Rumbek in late November 2004 between the chairman and his commanders. So compelling were the criticisms that Garang was forced to accept the appointment of a committee under his deputy, Salva Kiir, to re-organise the army. Little has been heard of this committee, but Salva was promoted, and then removed from his position and retired from the army, no doubt for his leading role in challenging Garang’s authority.

Civil administration under the SPLM is notoriously weak, the more so when it is appreciated that the movement has been in the field for twenty-two years and some areas have been under continuous SPLM/A control for more than a decade. While liberation movements that took power in neighbouring Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda utilised their experience in public administration acquired during the war years when they assumed state authority, the SPLM/A has little experience and no model from which to operate. Indeed, during the movement’s Marxist phase local structures were dismantled because of their ‘feudal’ character and replaced by commissars and the like. Only years later when it was appreciated how destructive this was, were attempts made to resurrect the tribal institutions, but by then it was largely too late. Instead, to the extent that local services are delivered, they are mostly provided by international NGOs.

Misplaced resources, underdevelopment, and the demands of military struggle all figure in explaining this sad state of affairs, but the over-riding reason was Garang’s fear that establishing strong systems of governance could lay the basis for a challenge to his authority. In recent months USAID and the International Republican Institute has been working overtime to try and implant some technical skills, but the real problem has been a lack of political commitment to public administration and the SPLM/A’s poorly developed sense of civic ethics. Like the problems in the military, concern with the poor state of local government was considered at the Rumbek meeting of the commanders with Garang. As a result, a committee was duly appointed to come up with proposals, but at the time of his
death there was no word on the fate of the committee’s report and this is hardly surprising given the chairman’s past performance at stifling such reforms.

As noted, Garang has controlled the political direction of the SPLM/A from its inception and again this was best accomplished by putting the breaks on institutionalisation. While liberation movements need structures, Garang strove to ensure that they were weak and that the organs the established bodies met infrequently. Critical in this light was his opposition to the holding of national conferences and with his control over resources he was very effective. However, in the wake of the crisis of the early 1990s Garang was forced to give way and hold a conference in Chukudum in 1994 and its clear emphasis was on establishing effective and accountable local governance structures. These decisions had the potential of radically changing the character of the SPLM/A and its leadership, and no doubt for that reason only a few of them were ever implemented and Garang has ensured that no other national conferences were held. The National Leadership Council has only been marginally more effective than the national conference in controlling Garang and again his preferred approach was to ensure that it not be called.

**Rumbek Challenge to Garang’s Rule**

Despite increasing dissent with his autocratic leadership during the years of armed struggle, Garang could silence his critics by removing them or arguing that unity must prevail, and for the most part it did. This accomplishment should not be underestimated given the fractious character of southern Sudan culture, but with the advancement of the peace process there were growing concerns among the SPLM/A leadership at Garang’s overwhelming domination, reluctance to consult, failure to operate through party institutions, and utilisation of the peace process to further strengthen his personal authority in both the south and the north. The explosion came when rumours circulated in late 2004 that Garang’s long-standing deputy and Chief of Staff, Salva Kiir, was to be relieved of his command and arrested. This galvanised the opposition to Garang, particularly from the commanders of Bahr El Ghazal who were closest to Salva. The result was a three day meeting in Rumbek from 29 November to 1 December where Garang faced off with his critics. The minutes of the meeting, which were leaked to the Khartoum media and others within hours of their completion, were a shock. Even Garang’s closest colleagues strongly criticised him, and the theme of those criticisms is largely summarised above, namely, his autocratic style of leadership, failure to consult, ethnic favouritism, and the corruption of some of those nearest him. Salva probably best summarised the views of many when he accused Garang of carrying the SPLM/A in his briefcase.

For those three days the fate of Garang, the SPLM/A, and implicitly the peace process, hung in the balance. But the critics, and particularly Salva and Riek Macher, succumbed to Garang’s argument that open dissension among the leadership at this time would lead to the destruction of the dreams of southern Sudanese for peace and self-determination. In response, however, Garang accepted the formation of three committees under Riek Macher, Salva Kiir, and James Wanni to put forward a package of reforms in the spheres of administration, military and governance. And underlying all of these reform efforts was the clearly appreciated need to develop institutions of accountability, and hence to restrict Garang’s capacity for arbitrary decision-making.
But having taken the SPLM/A to the cliff’s edge the leading critics appeared reluctant to permit another crisis to unfold when Garang subsequently resorted to favouritism in the selection of disproportionate numbers of Bor Dinkas to attend senior administration courses in South Africa, or his high-handedness in choosing state advisors. At every step when his critics could have used the commitments Garang made at Rumbek to challenge and potentially displace him, they drew back. And all the while Garang was dispensing with his critics, mostly through re-assigning them to new and less threatening positions. Salva was replaced as chief of staff with Garang’s son-in-law, Oyai Deng Ajak, and then promoted, retired from the army and made vice-president of southern Sudan. This meant that the two highest positions in the south were held by Dinkas, a difficult sell in the tribally conscious region. Presumably to reduce criticism of his high-handedness Garang went on to abolish the SPLM/A’s National Leadership Council.

It would appear that the critics were either so traumatised by the civil war within the ranks of the SPLM/A in the early 1990s, or feared that their actions could impede or even end the prospects of an agreement with the north, that they repeatedly drew back from challenging Garang. And when the peace agreement was signed it was contended that the SPLM/A’s dirty linen could only be dealt with after it had entered the government. There always seemed reasons to put off the confrontation and Garang proved very effective at playing to these reasons. Many of Garang’s critics, both in the SPLM/A and outside, took the view that with virtual unanimous southern support for the CPA and only slightly smaller numbers crediting Garang for that agreement, any challenge to his leadership would not be understood or accepted by southerners. But these critics also seemed confident that with time Garang’s autocratic approach to leadership and the peace process would make him more vulnerable to challenge. And so things stood at the time of Garang’s death.

**Garang & the Southern Opposition**

While the SPLM/A alone negotiated the fate of southern Sudan with the NCP, it by no means represented all southern Sudanese and it might have been expected that efforts would be made by Garang to unite his divided community. And indeed, two conferences were held: a south-south dialogue in Karen, Kenya and a meeting of the SPLM/A and the SSDF in Nairobi. These conferences made clear that southerners supported the CPA, and in particular the commitment to self-determination. But if anything the meetings served to emphasise the divisions within the south and the focus of the dissidents was the autocratic leadership of John Garang and thus they largely echoed the critics at the Rumbek meeting. The southern opposition to Garang outside the SPLM/A came from three sources: southerners in the NCP government, independent organisations and individuals, and the SSDF. By far the biggest threat to both the SPLM/A and to the stability of south Sudan, however, was posed by the SSDF.

Although the SSDF has long been used as a tool of the government’s Military Intelligence, it is capable of independent action, its commanders are unpredictable, and the largely Nuer membership can be mobilised to challenge the SPLM/A that is held to be dominated by Dinkas (Young, 2003). But Garang was not anxious to negotiate with the SSDF or acknowledge that the large majority of SSDF members were formerly from the movement, and that they controlled considerable sections of southern Sudan, particularly in Upper Nile. Indeed, he denied the extent of SSDF
control and claimed that the organisation was a militia operating solely at the behest of the government and hence did not warrant a voice at the negotiating table. And with the friends of the SPLM/A (notably the US) only too willing to accept this, and in any case being concerned about unduly complicating the negotiations by bringing in other groups, the SSDF was ignored (Young, 2005). This may have been effective in the short term, but in the end the SSDF had to be dealt with.

Knowing the strong desire of southerners, and particularly those in Upper Nile who have suffered the most from SPLA-SSDF confrontations, for reconciliation between the two armed groups, Garang was forced to give ground. But only after the SPLM/A’s hegemonic position in southern Sudan was confirmed by the CPA and Garang’s position of leadership were virtually beyond challenge. Then Garang went to his long-standing friends in the Moi Foundation and asked them to sponsor a south-south reconciliation conference. With the view that this was the best means to overcome insecurity in southern Sudan, donors lined up to put money behind a process they were led to believe would neutralise the SSDF. In the event, because of Moi Foundation errors in sending out invitations and because the Military Intelligence did not want to lose their valued allies, the SSDF was not able to attend the conference in the Kenyan town of Karen on 18-22 April 2005. But efforts to stop the SSDF from meeting with the SPLM/A proved counter-productive and another conference was quickly organised with the explicit objective of dealing with the SPLA-SSDF problem; Khartoum was forced to provide assurances that it would not interfere.

That conference was held in the first week of July in Nairobi, again under the auspices of the Moi Foundation. Although SSDF leader, Major-General Paulino Matieb, made clear his support for the CPA and his willingness to integrate his forces into a duly constituted army under a Government of South Sudan (GoSS), Garang insisted that during the interim period it must be absorbed into the SPLA. He also did not accept the demand that SSDF troops be part of the Joint Integrated Units that are to be established under the CPA, and rejected any SSDF representation in the GoSS or say in the appointment of southern state governors. The SSDF leadership calculated that Garang would reject any proposal other than a full and un-negotiated integration of its forces into an SPLA under his personal control (SSDF interviews, June, 2005). But the SSDF also assumed that many in the SPLM/A would be sympathetic (even if passively because of fears of raising Garang’s ire) to its proposals. Not surprisingly the conference broke down. Probably Garang calculated that because the CPA stated that only two armed groups – those of the SPLM/A and the government – would be permitted in southern Sudan, and that the government would be obliged to stop providing logistical support to the SSDF on the first anniversary of the 9 January 2005 agreement, time was on his side. If the SSDF was still on the ground at the beginning of 2006 then he could call upon his allies to force the Government of Sudan to have their units dismantled. From a narrow legal perspective Garang was probably correct, but if he had been successful it would have produced a legacy of bitterness, if not the outbreak of a civil war among southerners. With Garang’s death and his replacement by Salva, the dynamics of the SPLM/A’s relations with other southern groups, and that of the SSDF in particular, has markedly improved.

Improving the situation is the fact that in the most successful effort at south-south reconciliation during two decades of conflict Salva dragged a very reluctant Garang and the SPLM/A into the Wunlit Agreement of March 1999 that ended
tribal fighting between Dinkas and Nuers that had gone on for eight years. Salva’s efforts to reform the SPLA and place it under the accountable leadership of the soon to be established Government of South Sudan also increases the prospects of SPLM/A-SSDF reconciliation. The widespread perception that unlike Garang, Salva favours the independence of south Sudan, further serves to reduce misunderstanding. During Salva’s visit to Khartoum for his inauguration on 11 August he held a number of informal meetings with the SSDF leadership during which he made clear that he had a different approach to reconciliation than that of Garang and that he looked forward to an early conference to achieve this objective (SSDF interviews, August, 2005). Indeed, Salva and a team that included Drs. Riek Machar and Lam Akol went far in a very few days to overcome the animosity and suspicion between the SPLM/A and the SSDF that had developed over many years. No doubt many hurdles still lie in the way of achieving reconciliation between these armed groups, but there is no denying that the prospects have greatly improved under Salva’s leadership.

An indication of the direction of the SPLM/A leadership under Salva Kiir can be seen in his appointments to the GNU (Government of National Unity) announced on 20 September 2005. And most noteworthy was the failure of the SPLM/A to get the much prized Energy and Mines portfolio, which most southerners thought was their due. Of the senior ministries of Defence, Interior, Energy, Finance, and Foreign Affairs, the SPLM/A only picked up Foreign Affairs. And of the twelve advisors to the president, the SPLM/A took only one. Although Garang allies like Deng Alor (Cabinet Affairs), Malik Agar (Investment), and Dr. Mansour Khalid (Presidential Advisor) gained appointments, major critics of Garang like Dr. Lam Akol (Foreign Affairs), John Luc (State Minister for Energy, although he subsequently refused the position), Telar Deng (State Minister of the Presidency), and Dr. Peter Niyot (Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research) mark a slight shift away from the old guard, without however marginalising them. What is most striking about the new government is the marginal position of the SPLM/A in it. Although reckoned to be a close friend of Salva, Bona Malwal owes his appointment as presidential advisor to President Beshir, an appointment which has caused widespread consternation. Whether Salva can continue to maintain harmony between the Garang loyalists and the Garang critics remains to be seen. Among the other politically significant southerners who were appointed to the government are Galwak Deng and Alison Magaya from the NCP who kept their positions of Ministers of Animal Resources and Labour respectively, while Dr. Riek Gai assumed the position of Presidential Advisor as well as serving as a deputy leader of the ruling party. Joseph Malwal, leader of the NCP-aligned United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF) shifts from Civil Aviation to Tourism and rounding out the major southerners appointed to the government is Joseph Okelo, leader of the SPLM/A-aligned Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP), who becomes Minister of Parliamentary Affairs.

**Conclusion**

Garang was a strong man in a movement that could only have survived under the leadership of a strong man. And to his lasting credit he kept the SPLM/A alive in the face of enormous challenges from within, from Khartoum, and internationally. He was an intellectual and had a vision. He was adept at winning the support of regional and extra-regional actors. By making alliances with parties in the north and courting Arabs in the region he weakened the claims of successive Khartoum...
governments that the movement he led was dedicated to southern independence and represented a threat to the unity of the Arab and Islamic world. Probably because of his lack of ideological convictions he had little trouble presenting the SPLM/A in a favourable light to the socialist world, and then even more effectively selling it to the West and the increasingly powerful Christian organisations. After losing the support of Ethiopia and the East Bloc he worked tirelessly to win the support of the US, and with its commitment to the peace process as an ally of the SPLM/A he achieved one of his biggest victories. Although the SPLM/A leadership includes many talented men (and unfortunately no women), there are almost certainly none who could match Garang in these areas.

But Garang’s achievements came at a very high cost to his party, to southern Sudanese, and to the peace process. He was a dictator who fought to his dying day to maintain a hegemonic position in the SPLM/A. Challengers were routinely killed and jailed in the early years, and banished and marginalised in the later period. Garang talked the language of democracy, but ruled like Savimbi. He created an artificial unity based on a forced acceptance of his rule, but as the Rumbek meeting of late 2004 demonstrated, his authority was increasingly being challenged. The weaknesses of the SPLM/A in civil administration, the political sphere, and in the military, are largely due to his failings and his refusal to continence reform and the establishment of accountable institutions. The nepotism in his appointments and the favouritism of the Bor Dinka fostered resentment and tribalism. His espousal of a united Sudan may have weakened opposition to the SPLM/A in the north and beyond, but left the movement and his followers without a clear sense of direction. His opportunist courting of the US and American fundamentalist Christian groups met short-term needs, but would (and probably still will) make the south and through him all of Sudan increasingly subject to the demands of US interests, and in particular the ‘war on terror’.

It can be argued that the SPLM/A needed a man of Garang’s strong character during its difficult formative period, but even if that contention is accepted that era has ended, and for some time he has been both a liability to his movement and a threat to the viability of the peace process. Salva Kiir has few of Garang’s attributes – he is not an intellectual, not urbane, has little understanding of the niceties of diplomacy, appears to have a limited interest in the rest of the country and hence cannot be expected to magically resolve the conflicts in Darfur and the east as the West expected from Garang. But more importantly, Salva does not have Garang’s many failings – most significantly his record is not that of a dictator, but a leader who searches for compromises and reconciliation. Salva supported the Wunlit process, and he pressed for the reform and accountability of the army in the face of Garang’s opposition, and he opposed Garang’s efforts to alone hold all the major positions of power. Salva is also not perceived as sharing the same tribalist orientation as Garang, and indeed almost his first act of leadership was to confirm Riek Macher, a Nuer, as his deputy, thus with one stroke markedly reducing growing Dinka-Nuer tensions. Moreover, within days of his arrival in Khartoum Salva’s humility, genuineness, and transparency (all in marked contrast to Garang) were proving remarkably successful in winning over many southerners alienated by Garang. His simplicity, absence of formality and pretension, all of which set him apart from Garang, are held to demonstrate his lack of sophistication and inability to deal effectively with the devious and scheming leaders of the NCP and the other northern parties. Indeed, Salva does represent a break from the intellectuals who have dominated much of Sudan’s political life (in the north and
the south) since independence, but it should not be forgotten that this class has brought ruin to the country.

Although in his first public address in Khartoum Salva voiced his support for the CPA and a united Sudan, his words and record over two decades speak for themselves, and his views are far closer to those of the majority of south Sudanese than Garang’s ever were. The clique that surrounded Garang may find that its influence is reduced, but this may be less disruptive than expected because they do not have significant constituencies. In any case, Salva appears far more concerned about bringing unity to the SPLM/A and south Sudan than with settling old scores. Nonetheless, he is constrained by the extent to which Garang had defined the course of the peace process and by his still loyal followers in the movement. However, with the emergence of a leadership closer to the south Sudanese and the commanders in the field, there is a real prospect of the SPLM/A becoming a more responsible organisation, developing an accountable leadership, and moving to overcome the divisions between the disparate communities of the south. This approach is more likely to protect the interests of southerners than the scheming of Garang, which was so admired by his supporters.

The road forward will not be easy. The security cabal that controls the NCP does not support the peace agreement and its very existence would be threatened by a democratic transformation. Based on his record Salva will not be expected to have any great concern for introducing democracy in the north, or in challenging the security cabal. If the cabal can accept a separate southern Sudan then a deal can be cut (more likely without any formal agreement) and south Sudan can go its own way and the north its way. But this is by no means clear and Salva’s lack of knowledge or interest in the north could prove to be a liability. However, based on his appointments to the GNU it appears that he will lean heavily on Bona Malwal (a close friend from his home area of Gorgriel in northern Bahr El Ghazal), Dr. Lam Akol, and more surprisingly because of his former close ties with Garang, Dr. Mansour Khalid, for direction, particularly when dealing with the north. The failure of the SPLM/A to gain the Energy portfolio weakened Salva and deepened the scepticism of the southerners about the direction of the peace process. At the same time, the death of Garang served to undermine the hold of the NCP on its southern allies in the government and in the SSDF. While the security services will continue to employ their time-tested schemes to win support and divide the SSDF, the time when they could mobilise on the basis of hatred of Garang has ended.

Another implication of Garang’s passing and the rise to power of Salva is that the northern opponents of the NCP must realise that they now stand on their own in the struggle for justice and democracy. Since 1983, and particularly since the advent of the NCP coup in 1989, many in the northern opposition have looked to the SPLM/A as a critical ally in their struggle, or to put it more negatively, they looked to the SPLM/A to carry them to power. But Garang was well on his way to disabusing them of that illusion, and Salva is unlikely to give them reason for hope from his quarter. Indeed, in an interview four years ago, Salva spoke of his resentment of members of the northern opposition who expected to come to power on the backs of southerners (Salva, 5 March 2001). Salva inherits Garang’s political partnership with the NCP, ostensibly a critical element in implementing the peace agreement, but just as significantly as a mechanism to entrench the power of the parties to the CPA. And not surprisingly this caused anxiety among opposition parties which saw the partnership as a means to exclude them from the peace
process and obstruct Sudan’s democratic transformation. However, much as the SPLM/A leadership would like this arrangement to work, it is by no means clear that the NCP is in fact willing to genuinely share power. While Salva does not appear to have Garang’s interest in the north or his personal political ambitions, which probably included running for president in the national elections in four years, the new leader may continue the political alliance with the NCP if he concludes that it represents the best means to achieve his objectives for southern Sudan. Nor should it be forgotten that Salva was leading the SPLM/A negotiating team in the lead up to the Machakos Protocol, which permitted the NCP to pursue an Islamist agenda in the north.

And in that light, the struggle for democratic change in Sudan does not look positive. The international community continues to give strong backing to the CPA and that means supporting the parties that signed that agreement, namely the SPLM/A and the NCP. The CPA commitment to hold a national election within four years is viewed with concern by many in the international community and among southerners because if free and fair they could bring to power a party or coalition in the north which might press to open up the peace agreement. Added to this difficulty is the strength of the relations between the CIA and the Sudanese security services. This was graphically emphasised by the Agency’s feting in the US of Salah Gosh, the head of the National Security Agency, and a man widely believed to be at the top of the International Criminal Court list of those suspected of crimes against humanity for his actions in Darfur (LA Times, 29 April 2005). Meanwhile, the war in Darfur is largely in a stalemate, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) is politically divided, unable to hold its repeatedly announced convention, and its leadership which was endorsed by Garang, is weakened with his demise. In the east, the Eastern Front of the Beja Congress and Free Lions has been unable to capitalise on the attention given it in the wake of the army’s killing of civilians in Port Sudan in late January, and indeed it looks militarily vulnerable with the evacuation of the SPLM/A forces from the area.

The only new factor in the political equation is that the intefadah is again becoming a political prospect to consider. The long proposed intefadah favoured by the elites of the northern opposition has died, but in the wake of the riots following Garang’s death, an intefadah of the marginalised has become a possibility. The marginalised from the north, leaderless, directionless, hungry for loot, angry and frustrated, have entered the political stage and since there is little that the existing peace processes can offer them, they are unlikely to be easily satisfied. The cultured but failed elites that have dominated Sudanese political life since independence may find that they must share the political stage with the unsophisticated marginalised masses. The security services appear to have concluded that the riots of August will be repeated. And that begs the question: in the event of an intefadah of the marginalised, on which side of the divide would the SPLM/A make its stand? Even before the riots one very senior SPLM/A official expressed his fear to the author that the movement would stand with the government in opposition to the masses. It would be the height of ironies if Garang’s notion of a ‘New Sudan’ was taken forward by the marginalised and the SPLM/A as part of the government opposed it.

The engagement of the international community in Sudan’s peace process also looks increasingly exposed in the wake of Garang’s death. That approach had largely involved clinging to the CPA as the one peace process that could be realised, making peace processes in the west and east subject to the constraints of the CPA,
and looking to Garang to pull the proverbial rabbit out of the hat and successfully resolve these conflicts. But the division of spoils between the NCP and the SPLM/ A made agreements in the west and east virtually impossible without opening up the CPA. Moreover, the CPA gave legitimacy to the NCP, which has never given any indication of relaxing its hardnosed approach to these conflicts. Indeed, according to the UN, the NCP government has not stopped supporting the Jingaweed and has done little to create security in Darfur that would permit the return of two million displaced and refugees. Negotiations are talked about, but not underway, to resolve the eastern conflict. Since the international community frequently employs ‘big men’ in top-down peace processes, its leaders must be wringing their hands in despair at the death of Garang and at the same time trying to get Salva to step into the former chairman’s shoes. But these efforts are unlikely to be successful. Just as the hope of the northern opposition that the Garang led SPLM/A would be their salvation was rapidly fading even before his death, their faith in the US, UN, and international community to usher in democracy and bring peace to the country is also in free fall.

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Reconsidering the Power of the IFIs: Tanzania & the World Bank, 1978-1985

Duncan Holtom

In 1985, Julius K. Nyerere, one of the South’s most articulate and influential critics of Northern policies resigned as president of Tanzania. Soon after, his successor – Ali Hassan Mwinyi – would reach agreement with the IMF and World Bank. Tanzania, for many, the experiment in African socialism and the high-profile heretic of the 1980s had fallen and recanted, implementing a structural adjustment programme. Tanzania was in many ways exceptional. A former World Bank favourite, it became one of the few cases in sub-Saharan Africa where the IMF and World Bank (the IFIs, International Financial Institutions) brought their full coercive power to bear in a protracted struggle. In understanding this apparent contradiction, this paper discusses the role played by economic discourses in shaping the positions taken by two key actors in the policy process: the Government of Tanzania and the World Bank.

The capitulation of the Tanzanian government in 1985 to the demands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (hereafter the Fund and the Bank), stands as a landmark in relations between the Bank, Fund and sub-Saharan African (SSA) states. After six years of bitter struggle, Nyerere’s Tanzania, leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, and standard bearer of African socialism, had given into the demands of international capitalism (McHenry, 1994). Thereafter, in the era of adjustment, there would be few SSA states willing to resist the apparently overwhelming coercive power wielded by the Bank and Fund over impoverished aid-dependent states (see e.g. Hayter and Watson, 1985; Onimode, 1988).

This paper does not seek to retread the well-worn ground debating the costs and benefits of structural adjustment (see e.g. Stewart, 1995; Cornia et al. 1987; Demery and Addison, 1987). Nor does it seek to explore the ‘interests’ the policies of the Bank and Fund served (see e.g. Woods, 2000; Escobar, 1995; Payer, 1991, 1983). Instead, the paper focuses upon why the Tanzanian government resisted neo-liberal policies promoted by the Bank and Fund for six years before acceding to them in 1985.

The majority of the literature examining policy change in the period 1978-85 treats the adoption of Bank/Fund-sponsored neo-liberal policies in the 1985 budget as an example of an alien set of ideas (neo-liberalism) imposed upon an unwilling government left with no choice but to capitulate (see e.g. Green, 1995; Svendsen, 1995). The literature on this period also highlights the relative autonomy of the state vis-à-vis other classes (see e.g. Kiondo, 1989; Coulson, 1982; Shivji, 1976) and the struggle within the state between pro- and anti-reform factions (see e.g. McHenry, 1994; Lofchie, 1994; Campbell and Stein, 1992). Taken together, this body of literature highlights the ‘coercive power’ of donors, most notably the Bank and Fund over the government, identifying them as the key players who ‘made’ policy within...
Tanzania. This paper complements this account. It accepts that as an aid-dependent country, the ability of the Bank and Fund to mobilise and withhold aid was a decisive factor: by 1985 the government was essentially bankrupt and had little or no choice but to accede. Nevertheless, this does not explain why Nyerere, in near suicidal fashion, drove the country right to the very brink of collapse, before turning back.

The paper contends that in order to more fully understand policy-making in Tanzania, we need to pay more attention to the institutional realms within which policy was made. In understanding how two key institutions – the Bank and the Government of Tanzania – moved from broad agreement and support in the 1970s, through bitter recrimination to uneasy agreement in the 1980s, the paper will focus upon the evolution of discourses within each institution. The paper will argue that the discourses within each institution came to circumscribe the realm of ‘rational’ policy, and therefore their ability to compromise. By drawing upon the work of Peter Hall (1993), the paper will examine how discursive change within the Government that could have allowed agreement to be reached in 1979, was blocked. The paper will argue that it would take another six years before another political window of opportunity would open the door to the discursive change that enabled agreement to be reached.

The paper is divided into four sections. The first outlines the theoretical framework used, the second outlines the existing literature on the crisis. The third section discusses how an understanding of discursive change can enrich and complement this literature, and concludes with a brief summary.

Policy Paradigms, Experts & Discursive Change
Peter Hall’s (1993) work on the transformation of economic policies within the British government in the 1970s and 1980s uses the concepts of ‘social learning’ (developed by Theda Skocpol, and Paul Sacks) and ‘policy paradigms’ (developed by Thomas Kuhn) to help explain how and why the three different ‘orders’ of policy (‘instruments’, ‘setting[s]’ and ‘the overarching goals that guide policy’) he identifies change (Ibid. pp. 278-279). Hall’s work suggests that because ‘policy paradigms’ come ‘to circumscribe the realm of the politically feasible, practical and sensible’, until the paradigm changes, only first and second order changes are possible. Hall argues that because third order change is a radical break with past policy, it has far reaching consequences and is more likely to be overtly politicised. Therefore, third order change depends not only on the outcome of conflict between experts pushing for and against third order change, but also upon their ability to mobilise wider support by having their view accepted as ‘authoritative’ (Ibid.).

Hall’s analysis of economic policy change in the UK in the period 1970-1989, indicates that the radical change in policy after 1979 was catalysed by a ‘policy network’. Hall contends that this network’s ability to change policy depended upon political change: it was Margaret Thatcher’s political success that enabled them to implement the (paradigmatic) change they pushed for. Hall concludes that the prevailing discourses that make up the dominant paradigm legitimates some policies, privileging them, while delegitimating others. Thus, actors within the policy process, be they organised interests, politicians or policy experts do not simply ‘exert power’, ‘they acquire power in part by trying to influence the major discourses of their day’ (Ibid. p. 290).
Hall’s work complements and can itself be enriched by much of the literature on policy-making processes. For example, Hall (1993) identifies the role played by ‘policy networks’, but his treatment of them remains rather underdeveloped. As this paper will show, of the different types of ‘policy network’ (see e.g. Stone, 1996), Haas’ (1993) work on ‘epistemic communities’ is the most relevant to Tanzania. Hass (1992) defines an ‘epistemic community’ as the characteristics of a network that has:

>a shared set of causal principles (analytical and normative) and beliefs, a consensual knowledge base, and a common policy enterprise (common interests) that distinguishes epistemic communities from other groups (Haas, 1992:18).

Like Hall, Haas’ work emphasises the importance of policy ‘experts’ in complex fields like economic policy-making, and their dependence upon political support to advance their cause (Ibid.). What Hass’ work offers over and above that of Hall’s, is a more developed discussion of how these networks of experts can come together to actively promote paradigmatic – or discursive – change.

Policy Change Within the South

The work of both Hall and Haas explores policy changes within a liberal democratic society with a well-developed bureaucracy. In contrast, under Nyerere, Tanzania became a one-party state and its bureaucracy remained weak (Bigsten, 1999). Power was centralised, and the bureaucracy did not emerge as a powerful independent actor. Instead, the air-conditioned Weberian bureaucracy would become ‘corrupted’ by the politics of the ‘veranda’ (Terray, 1986). The bureaucracy – a prime source of political patronage – would become subsumed within, and controlled by, the broader ruling class. Dubbed the ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’, it would come to dominate both political and economic life in post-colonial Tanzania, suppressing the emergent private bourgeoisie (Hyden, 1994; Kiondo, 1989; Coulson, 1982; Shivji, 1976).

The bureaucracy in Tanzania may therefore have been less institutionalised and political conflict less open than in the UK, nevertheless, this paper will demonstrate that Hall’s, and by extension Haas’ work, is still applicable. This paper’s case rests upon the central proposition that economic policy in Tanzania was ‘rational’. That is to say, economic policy was not arbitrary, but informed by discourses (Hyden and Karlstrom, 1992). The absence of multiparty politics and a well-developed bureaucracy did not render Tanzania’s politicians any less idealistic or self-interested than their British counterparts. Political actors supported economic policies that they expected would both develop Tanzania (McHenry, 1994) and secure their political position (Kiondo, 1989). Crucially, their expectations of the outcomes of policy were shaped by discourses (Cf. Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1990), and therefore the major shift in economic policy in the mid-1980s was dependent upon the discursive change examined by this paper. This discursive change led politicians to reassess the policies that best served both their own interests and those of their country.

The Dominant Narrative of the Tanzanian Crisis & its Resolution

As the following section outlines, there is broad consensus in the literature that the seeds for Tanzania’s economic crisis in the late 1970s were sown by the policies of
the government. By the end of the decade, internal policy failures were compounded by external shocks, leaving Tanzania in desperate need for aid and therefore, donor support.

The Roots of the Economic Crisis, 1970-79
In the post-colonial era Nyerere's bold vision of 'self-reliance' somewhat ironically attracted aid from donors keen to help a recipient who was 'helping themselves'. This was readily accepted as Tanzania sought to transform both its economy and society (Samoff, 1992). Within the Bank, the appointment of Robert McNamara as president in 1968 brought a significant change in Bank thinking. Placing 'poverty' at the forefront of the Bank's activities, in 1973 McNamara launched the Bank's first major poverty-focused programme of lending: 'Integrated Rural Development'. This was followed by a degree of North-South consensus around the 'Basic Needs' agenda (Kapur et al. 1997).

With the Bank keen to burnish its 'apolitical' independent credentials during the cold war, Tanzania's moderate socialism, far from ruling out aid, proved a positive boon (Lancaster, 1997; Rugumamu, 1997). Decisively, McNamara's vision of promoting growth and equity was matched by Nyerere's vision. The confluence of interests between the Bank and Tanzania was cemented by the personal bond between their leaders (Svendsen, 1995). As a World Bank Country Program Note in 1973 put it:

From a donor’s point of view Tanzania comes close to being a model developing country in the sense that the Government is seriously committed to development in a climate of political and social stability … Development policies and priorities are generally well though out and well conceived … We are inclined to give Tanzania an excellent performance rating (Duncan, 1997:394).

The Bank would double its lending to Tanzania between 1973 and 1977 (Bagachwa et al. 1997). Aid would prove a mixed blessing. It supported the expansion of social services (most notably health and education), but also what would turn into a series of costly aid-fuelled failures most notably villagisation and the (over)expansion of industry under the Basic Industrial Strategy (BIS). Further failures were compounded by the neglect of agriculture (see e.g. Lofchie, 1994; Yeager, 1989; Hyden, 1980),

In the mid-1970s, the initial shocks caused by the first OPEC oil crisis (1973-74) were eased with Fund credits and were later offset by the coffee and cotton price booms (1975). However, the financial windfall brought by the booms served to disguise the extent of the underlying structural problems, most notably the stagnation of the agricultural sector (Lofchie, 1994; Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993). In 1977, the East African Community broke up disrupting trade and by 1978 the coffee boom had ended. In the wake of a brief but costly war with Uganda, and the onset of the second OPEC oil crisis (1979), foreign exchange reserves that had peaked at US$281.8 million in 1977 (equivalent to 4.5 months of imports) following the coffee and cotton booms slumped. By 1980 they stood at just $20.3 million (equivalent to 0.25 months of imports) (World Bank, 1995) and Tanzania was facing a worldwide recession, rising interest rates and the onset of the debt crisis (Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993).

In response to the mounting economic crisis, Tanzania like much of SSA, sought donor aid to ease the economic problems. A number of bilateral donors, most notably
the Scandinavians, were sympathetic. However, as the 1970s drew to a close, the political and economic climate in the North was changing. Many Northern governments proved less disposed to their ‘obligation’ to the South; its problems increasingly blamed upon internal policy failures. The Bank and Fund were enrolled as the North’s prime instruments for promoting, and where needed, imposing reforms (Kapur et al. 1997). By 1979, both the Bank and Fund had become increasingly critical of Tanzania’s agricultural policies, domestic pricing, BIS and the exchange rate. Their criticism and advice flew in the face of Nyerere’s vision and policies, and their previously healthy relations with the government began to deteriorate (Green, 1995; Svendsen, 1995; Barkan, 1994).

The Breakdown in Relations between the Fund & Government, 1979-80

As the economic crisis deepened, Tanzania turned to the Fund for financial assistance to complement bilateral aid as it had in the mid-1970s. An interim programme was agreed in 1979 requiring devaluation and credit controls. Attempts to reach agreement on a more comprehensive programme faltered though, breaking down in the autumn 1979 in the face of Fund conditionalities, including a 15 per cent devaluation (Stein, 1992). Nyerere, strong both domestically and with many bilateral donors held fast, blocking reforms (Bigsten and Danielson, 1999; Biermann, 1988).

There have been a number of reasons put forward for the breakdown in negotiations and consequent rejection of the Fund proposals. The literature discussing the period has tended to emphasise two largely complementary issues that motivated the government’s rejection: the approach of the Fund and the content of its policies. The Fund presented its package on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis, bypassing protocol to go straight to Nyerere with a ‘final offer’. As Reginald Herbold Green, then a key government advisor put it:

*it was not so much what was in the IMF package [in 1979] that brought about the sharp breakdown of negotiations as the manner in which it was presented and the tactics used in the negotiations (Green, 1983:357-358 cited in Kiondo, 1989:151).*

The Fund’s clumsy approach was aggravated by the threat its proposals posed to the government’s and in particular Nyerere’s political and economic agenda. Internationally, the Fund’s proposals were part of the wider rejection of Nyerere’s calls for a ‘New International Economic Order’ in favour of a ‘foreign aid regime’ (see e.g. Rugumamu, 1997). Domestically, the Fund’s proposed policies threatened to reverse the policies of *ujamama* – Nyerere’s grand vision, the base of the party’s patronage and hence legitimacy, and the economic base of the emerging bureaucratic bourgeoisie (see e.g. Shivji, 1994; Kiondo, 1989). Nyerere’s position with the Party and his resistance was strengthened by the fact that unlike much of SSA, the economic crisis in Tanzania had not yet translated into a political crisis. Indeed, Nyerere continued to garner strong support among both the Party and country (Bigsten et al. 1999; Kiondo, 1992).

The literature may emphasise differing motivations for the government’s rejection of the Fund’s proposals, but is in agreement that the atmosphere within government became increasingly poisonous in late 1979. Those supportive of reforms were denigrated for ‘allying themselves with the IMF’ (Kiondo, 1989). The Fund’s mission was ordered to leave the country and the pro-reform Minister for Finance, Edwin Mtei, was replaced by Amir Jamal, in a move designed to suppress pro-reform
elements within the CCM Party (Bigsten et al. 1999; Yeager, 1989). The hardening of anti-reform sentiment within government was followed by attempts by Nyerere to rally Southern solidarity, with a conference on ‘The International Monetary System and the New International Economic Order’ in Arusha (Kiondo, 1989). Despite Nyerere’s stubborn public stance, the continuing economic crisis forced Tanzania back to the negotiating table. Nyerere’s position as a leading voice in the Non-Aligned Movement may have entrenched his inability to compromise with the Fund. Nevertheless, Nyerere’s high profile position and the conference helped ‘internationalise’ the debate, and appears to have contributed to the relatively ‘soft’ terms Tanzania was subsequently offered, leading to a three-year standby agreement with the Fund (Loxley, 1989). Despite the softer terms, Tanzania was unable to comply and the programme was soon abandoned (Green, 1983 cited in Stein, 1992).

The Entrenchment of the Crisis, 1980-84
In the wake of the breakdown of the Fund agreement, Tanzania turned to the Bank in light of its support during the 1970s. As noted, the Bank had already by this stage become increasingly critical of the policies it had previously supported. Although the Bank was more conciliatory than the Fund, in the prevailing international political and economic climate, the Bank was reluctant to release aid without a commitment to reforms on the part of the government. In what would prove a decisive move, it sided with the Fund, effectively becoming its ‘junior partner’. The Fund would focus upon ‘stabilisation’ while the Bank focused upon ‘structural adjustment’ (Kapur et al. 1997). The previously bilateral relations between donors and government were increasingly ‘multilateralised’ as the Fund, with the support of the Bank, took a leading role in co-ordinating aid. A number of bilateral donors (e.g. the UK, USA and the Federal Republic of Germany) made their aid conditional on agreement with the Fund (Kiondo, 1989). In effect, donors delegated responsibility for negotiating adjustment policies to the Bank and the Fund, considerably amplifying their coercive power. Nyerere castigated the shift as ‘de facto recolonisation by fairly crude financial blackmail’ (Green, 1995:102). As Nyerere put it:

And when we reject IMF conditions we hear the threatening whisper: ‘Without accepting our conditions, you will not get our money and you will not get no other money’ (Nyerere, 1980:8 cited in Kiondo, 1989).

Despite the increasing aid co-ordination, Tanzania was able to rely upon the continued support from the Scandinavian bloc of donors providing Nyerere with the financial breathing space needed to resist the Fund and Bank (Bigsten et al. 1999).

The government’s initial attempts to respond to the economic crisis – the ‘National Economics Survival Plans’ (NESP I, 1981 and NESP II, 1982) – contained some new measures and were effectively de facto applications to the Fund, but they remained ‘more exhortations than policy change documents’ (Bigsten et al. 2001:317). Crucially, they did not challenge any of the fundamentals; problems were to be dealt with by adjusting state intervention. Structural reforms such as liberalisation and deregulation that would have transformed the Tanzanian economy were ruled out (Bigsten et al. 1999; Kiondo, 1989). This position only reinforced the view held by the Bank and Fund that Tanzania did not understand the depth of the crisis and the changes required (Svendsen, 1995).
In the increasingly poisonous atmosphere, the Fund submitted a memorandum for a possible programme in 1982 (Stein, 1992). Attempts to agree on a programme stalled over the Fund’s demands for a 50 to 60 per cent devaluation, significant cuts in the budget deficit, removal or reduction of consumer and producer subsidies, positive real interest rates, higher agricultural prices and import liberalisation. The proposed devaluation emerged as the major point of contention. It appears that Nyerere did not fully understand the economic implications of devaluation (Helleiner, 2000). With his Minister for Planning, Kighoma Malima, supported by key expatriate economists such Ajit Singh, forcefully arguing that devaluation would be inflationary (Singh, 1986), Nyerere blocked a major devaluation, and hence blocked agreement with the Fund. Meanwhile, as in much of SSA, as the economic crisis deepened, public support for the government’s position softened, with many turning to the ‘exit’ option (Bigsten et al. 1999). Although this forestalled direct confrontation with the government, it sapped the government’s strength by further exacerbating its revenue problems (Bigsten et al. 1999).

With the country in a ‘desperate situation’, former Bank President Robert McNamara, supported by a number of bilaterals, helped put together the ‘Tanzania Advisory Group’ (TAG). The TAG was funded by the World Bank but composed of both expatriate and Tanzanian economists hired by the Government of Tanzania. It was intended to help broker rapprochement between the Bank, Fund and government, and lay the groundwork for a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (Bigsten et al. 1999; Svendsen, 1995). Many of the TAG’s authors were sympathetic to the Nyerere’s vision, and the first draft was in many ways a ‘Socialist Structural Adjustment Programme’ (Loxley, 1989), yet the TAG would ultimately fail. Decisively, the (unpublished) report, which in many respects was quite different from the recommendations of the Bank and Fund, proposed a modest devaluation but this was once again rejected by the government (Loxley, 1982 cited in Kiondo, 1989).

The government used the TAG’s report as a basis for its own structural adjustment programme (1982): increased prices for producer goods, cut-backs on government expenditure and curtailed monetary expansion. Nevertheless, under the influence of Kighoma Malima, a noted anti-reformer, the government diluted many of the TAG’s proposals. As a consequence, the SAP did not adequately address issues like the liberalisation of agriculture – areas that remained key concerns of the Fund and Bank. Despite further conciliatory gestures on the part of the Government, most notably a series of small exchange rate devaluations, the government’s proposals were rejected as inadequate, a decision apparently motivated by the desire ‘to teach Tanzania a lesson’ (Loxley, 1989:11; see also Campbell and Stein, 1992; Kiondo, 1992, 1989).

As the 1980s dragged on, the economic and political situation worsened (Lofchie, 1994; Yeager, 1989). The limit of the SAP’s reforms were further undermined by the failure to secure external finance to support them, and already weak per capita GDP growth of 1.1 per cent (1965-1980) slipped to -2.4 per cent (1981-1985) (Barkan, 1994:22). It is tantalising to speculate what might have happened had the Bank not sided with the Fund and supported a SAP that had attracted significant foreign aid. In the event though, the Bank stood with the Fund. By 1983, although the Fund remained the ultimate ‘gatekeeper’, the Bank had expanded its traditional role helping co-ordinate donors, to one where it actively mobilised other donors to grant – or in cases like Tanzania – withhold aid (Kapur et al. 1997). By 1984, the
Scandinavian donors who had been sympathetic to Tanzania’s resistance, made it clear that additional aid would be conditioned on Fund approval, leaving the government bereft of aid and facing a united donor front (Bigsten et al. 2001; Kiondo, 1992). In 1985 Nyerere resigned. His inexperienced successor – Ali Hassan Mwinyi – was left facing a deepening economic and political crisis. With the Tanzanian government facing bankruptcy and with no prospect of aid without reform, Mwinyi was forced to capitulate in the face of the coercive power wielded by the Bank and Fund (see e.g. Bigsten et al. 1999; Svendsen, 1995; Stein, 1992).

**Re-Interpreting the Crisis: Coercive & Discursive Power**

In the context of relations between the Bank, Fund and African states in the early 1980s, the acrimonious debates in Tanzania and the posturing of both sides were not of themselves unusual. Indeed, there were number of other countries (including Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Sudan) threatening to reject Bank/Fund sponsored reforms in the early 1980s (Lancaster, 1997). What marks out countries like Tanzania, and to a degree, Ghana, is the length of the dispute. In most of SSA, the Bank and to a lesser degree the Fund, were in sufficient internal need of a deal (given pressures to disburse) to compromise. Meanwhile, African elites slowly adjusted to adjustment, using the aid to sustain their regimes, and the Bank and Fund as convenient new scapegoats. In countries like Kenya, compromise was fairly swiftly secured (even if not always honoured) (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Mosley et al. 1995; Ndulu and Mwega, 1994). In contrast, Tanzania and Ghana dug their heels in. The Bank and Fund brought their full coercive power to bear against a recalcitrant government by issuing an effective ultimatum: no aid without reforms. Having exhausted all other options, their governments apparently reluctantly acceded to reforms to sustain themselves. The following section will discuss the discursive roots of these conflicts by examining the evolution of economic discourses and their relationship to economic policy in Tanzania.

**The Limits of Coercive Power**

Tanzania and Ghana can be used to support the literature arguing that conditionality (coercive power) doesn’t work (see e.g. Dollar and Burnside, 2001). Because the Bank and Fund took a hard line which they had not taken elsewhere, they stand as an exception to the general principle (Mosley et al. 1995). Nevertheless, this coercive model of ‘policy transfer’ leaves a number of questions unanswered. In particular, we might ask, why did their Governments resist so fiercely? Conversely, why did both Ghana and Tanzania, standard bearers of African socialism, execute such a dramatic volte-face to become celebrated Bank ‘success stories’, while their more ‘capitalist’ brethren like Kenya acquiesced more rapidly, but implemented reforms with far less vigour (see e.g. Devarajan et al. 2001)? In the case of Ghana, it has been persuasively argued that the economic crisis created political space. This space enabled an indigenous pro-reform movement aided and abetted by the Bank, to champion a pro-reform agenda that transformed economic discourses and hence policy (see e.g. Devarajan et al. 2001; Mohan, 1994). As this paper will demonstrate, Tanzania followed a broadly similar path.

The Bank’s and Fund’s hard line toward Tanzania appears to have been motivated by two key factors: first, the need to ‘make an example of Tanzania’ given both its very public anti-neo-liberal stance and a sense of pique at the way the Fund was ejected in 1980 (Loxley, 1982, cited in Kiondo, 1989); and second, their
incomprehension that the Tanzanian government couldn’t ‘understand’ the problems they faced (Svendsen, 1995). On the government’s side, Nyerere and the party, unlike many of his contemporaries, was not facing a political and economic crisis, nor were they bereft of ideas. Bolstered by a discourse that ruled out the reforms promoted by the Bank and Fund, the self-confident regime was able to resist. The remainder of this paper focuses upon one of the key reasons underpinning the incomprehension and intransigence of both sides: the opposed and non-communicating discursive positions the two sides occupied.

Discursive Change in Tanzania, 1963-80

After independence in 1963, the economic modernisation discourse practised by the British Colonial Service and promoted by advisors from among others the Bank, continued within government. ‘Modernisation’ would be the hallmark of Tanzania’s first development plan (1964-69) (Yeager, 1989; Coulson 1982). Notwithstanding a policy of ‘Africanisation’ of the public sector, the private sector remained important, and the economy remained fairly open although industrial development was promoted by an import substitution policy. The policies brought macroeconomic stability, low inflation and growth, but progress was made from a low base and Nyerere became increasingly concerned about increasing inequality (Bigsten, 1999).

Throughout the 1960s, the foundations of Nyerere’s political thinking which were laid out in ‘Ujamma: The Basis of African Socialism’ (1962) were consolidated. By 1967 he published perhaps his most famous work, ‘The Arusha Declaration’ (1967). Nyerere’s idealisation and vision of a more egalitarian communal traditional African society (ujamma) as the solution to Tanzania’s problems remained constant (see e.g. Nyerere, 1962, 1968). However, by 1967 his earlier belief that ‘the basic difference between a socialist society and a capitalist society does not lie in their methods of producing wealth, but in the way in which that wealth is distributed’ (Nyerere, 1962:1) had hardened into the belief ‘that in order to ensure economic justice the state must have effective control over the principal means of production’ (Nyerere, 1968:231-232).

Nyerere had come to believe that market determined prices were simply an indication of profit making and hence a capitalist outlook and barrier to the realisation of ujamma (Erixon, 2003; Hyden and Karlstrom, 1996).

Nyerere’s ‘Arusha Declaration of 1967’ heralded a radical change of direction for the government. The hitherto fairly cautious approach of economic modernisation was cast aside in favour of the grand vision of political and economic transformation in order to realise ujamma. State control was increased in an attempt to hasten industrialisation and reduce external dependence. By the 1970s the government controlled the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy, and state pricing had largely replaced the market system. Foreign exchange controls were introduced, the ambitious villagisation programme was launched, national marketing boards were established and the BIS launched (Yeager, 1989; Coulson, 1982). By the third Five Year Plan (1976-81), ‘autarky and comprehensive state control over the domestic economy’ had become the government’s policy (Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993:1396).

Nyerere’s political power, derived in part from his charisma, helped secure and was itself secured by this discursive vision for the transformation of Tanzania (see e.g. Jackson and Rosenberg, 1982). Its diffusion through the Party and bureaucracy was
speeded by political indoctrination. By the end of the 1970s, Nyerere’s ‘strong antimarket philosophy’ had colonised both the Party and government (Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993).

**Discursive Change within the Bank, 1970-80**

The Bank under President Robert McNamara supported a broadly mixed economy in line with the post-war Keynesian settlement (Ruggie, 1995). Although broadly sceptical of large-scale government intervention, in practice, when faced with the enthusiasm for national economic planning, the Bank acquiesced and in some cases even advocated comprehensive state-led planning and industrialisation. McNamara’s championing of the ambitious Integrated Rural Development lending of the 1970s, saw the Bank’s and Tanzania’s discourse converge (Kapur et al. 1997).

Discursive convergence would break down at the end of the 1970s as the limitations of McNamara’s ambitious rural development programme became increasingly clear and the ‘Basic Needs’ agenda stalled. In 1979 the second OPEC oil crisis hit. The economic shock would soon gather political momentum with the ascension of monetarists in both the White House and Downing Street (Reagan and Thatcher). The consequent ‘sea change’ in political and economic discourses among the Bank’s masters would effectively kill off McNamara’s ‘Basic Needs’ agenda (Kapur et al. 1997). The Bank’s conversion to the new political and discursive order epitomised in the ‘Berg Report’ (World Bank, 1981), pilloried the interventionist rural development pioneered by McNamara, and heralded the neo-liberal onslaught. It advocated rolling back of the state and ‘structural adjustment’ at the expense of the interventionist rural development previously promoted by the Bank and implemented by Tanzania (Lancaster, 1997). As the World Bank’s Official History put it:

> *if there was one country that epitomized the Bank’s disillusionment with the past, the break from it, and a preview of the future, it was Tanzania* (Kapur et al. 1997:712).

**Discursive Divergence & Convergence, 1979-80**

By 1979, both the Bank and Fund and the government were operating within competing discursive frames of references. Each discourse offered mutually incompatible constructions of the problems facing Tanzania (endogenous vs. exogenous causes) and ‘appropriate’ policies to rectify the problems (stabilisation and adjustment vs. more aid, trade reform and state intervention). Nonetheless, there is a strong case for arguing that in 1979 the depth of the discursive divide need not have condemned both sides to the bitter dispute that followed. In 1979, the University of Dar es Salaam as a whole was weak and the intellectual capacity within key government ministries remained limited (Bigsten, 1999). However, a nucleus of pro-reformers remained while a generation of Tanzanian economists had departed to complete their Ph.D.’s in North America. The ideas they returned with had ‘transformed’ internal policy discourses within the faculty of economics to one sympathetic to the Bank and Fund’s neo-liberalism; the change was marked. Previously considered to the left of Nyerere, by the late 1970s, key members of the faculty were urging reforms and rapprochement with the Fund (Lipumba, 1988 cited in Campbell and Stein, 1992).

Within the government and the Party there had always been people who were less ‘ideological’ than Nyerere. In part, this reflected those cases where the Arusha
discourse had not been internalised (e.g. because it conflicted with other discourses) and in part because support from some quarters was motivated by the rewards that support brought, rather than belief per se (McHenry, 1994; Kiondo, 1989). Whatever their motivation, in 1979 the government was not as yet united against the reforms proposed by the Bank and Fund. In this context, it was by no means certain that the negotiations were doomed to fail. The government’s decision to approach the Fund appeared to portend the ‘beginning of technocratic rule’. At the very least, it opened up political space for debate and discussion (Biermann, 1988). Agreement was reached in 1979. If it had not broken down, it might well have sustained the political space needed for a discursive transformation of the bureaucracy away from the ‘Arusha discourse’ toward a position closer to the Bank’s and Fund’s ‘neo-liberalism’. In the event, the agreement broke down, precipitating a bitter split, closing the window of opportunity and forestalling the emergent technocracy’s rise (Bigsten and Danielson, 1999).

With Nyerere publicly castigating the Fund and later the Bank, the political space for the development of economic alternatives was closed. The dominant Arusha discourse delegitimated the radical third order called for by the Bank and Fund as well as pro-reformers within government. The government’s initial attempts to respond to the economic crisis, the NESP I (1981) and NESP II (1982), inevitably only contained ‘first’ and ‘second order change’ (cf. Hall, 1993). The government firmly believed that the problems facing the economy were primarily exogenous, and that the Bank’s and Fund’s proposals, which entailed cutbacks in state control and social spending, would not help resuscitate the economy (Bigsten et al. 1999; Kiondo, 1989); problems were to be dealt with by adjusting state intervention (the ‘instrument’ and its ‘settings’). As noted, this position only reinforced the view held by the Bank and Fund that Tanzania did not understand the depth of the crisis and the changes required. In a sense they did not. Operating within a different discourse to the Bank and Fund, they ‘saw’ quite different problems and identified quite different solutions. For Nyerere, the Bank’s and Fund’s policies were at best ‘irrational’, and at worst, part of a neo-imperialist plot to oppress the South.

Throughout the early 1980s the discursive positions of both sides became entrenched, curtailling their ability to compromise. Within the government, Nyerere’s political dominance was exacerbated by the weak intellectual capacity within key ministries where a more pragmatic (more pro-Bank/Fund) position might otherwise have been strengthened. In crude terms, the capacity to develop independent analyses and policy options outside the parameters of the Arusha discourse was simply absent (Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993). The problems were compounded by Nyerere’s own weaknesses: his political astuteness did not extend to the economic sphere (Helleiner, 2000), contributing to his ‘excessive reliance’ on a small number of expatriate advisers, including Reginald Herbold Green and Ajit Singh, who were firmly against any devaluation. With Nyerere’s support, they were able to resist those within the Party and government calling for devaluation (Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993). This issue, upon which the Government, Bank and Fund were all unyielding, helped block ‘meaningful debate’ or negotiation, and the discursive change that could have broken the deadlock (Bigsten et al. 2001; Gordon, 1994; Kiondo, 1989).

In contrast to the government’s position, the Bank’s and Fund’s monolithic neoliberal discourse confidently constructed the problems as primarily endogenous, indicating the need for structural adjustment and stabilisation (Campbell and Stein,
1992). In the prevailing political climate of the 1980s, this cause was aggressively championed by neo-liberal economists eager to bring down statist development policies, and reluctant to give an inch, lest this be interpreted as a sign of weakness or uncertainty (Kanbur, 1999). The resulting confrontation with the Tanzanian government was predictably heated and the discursive conflict became ‘almost theological’, with little scope for compromises that would not undermine the integrity of either discourse or the political capital each side had invested in it (Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993; Loxley, 1982 cited in Kiondo, 1989). Without any change in their respective discursive positions, each side became imprisoned by them and unable to compromise. The only way the deadlock between the government and the Bank/Fund could be broken was by policy makers adopting ‘irrational’ polices that ran counter to their discourse (e.g. in the face of coercion), or through a further discursive transformation that would change what would count as ‘rational’ policy.

Reform from Within, 1982-85

The network of pro-reformers may have failed in 1979 as the political window swiftly closed, but by 1982 a number of them were working on the Bank-sponsored Tanzania Advisory Group (TAG). This helped consolidate links between them and gave its members an early taste of policy work (interview; Bigsten et al. 1999; Svendsen, 1995). Within both government and the Party, those of a more ‘pragmatic’ outlook (to use McHenry’s, 1994 phrase) helped establish an informal network, or ‘epistemic community’ (cf. Haas, 1992). United by the neo-liberal discourse and an advocacy of economic reform, the network brought together economists from the University’s economics department and Economics Research Bureau (ERB) together with private consultants and staff from key ministries such as agriculture, transport, industry and trade (Bigsten et al. 2001; Svendsen, 1995; Lofchie, 1994).

The pro-reform epistemic community went on to organise a series of seminars, targeting policy makers, politicians and a few business leaders, that would prove ‘very influential’ (interview; Bigsten et al. 1999). This process helped consolidate the still nascent, neo-liberal counter discourse within Tanzania (Green, 1995; Lofchie, 1994). At the time, their attempt to build support for their position set off a vicious struggle at the University of Dar es Salaam (described by those who took part in it as a time of ‘war’, interviews) and parts of the ruling party. The reform movement was heavily criticised. The prevailing mood was summed up in the belief that the reformers were part of ‘a systematic manoeuvre by the imperialist West, dominated by the US, to extend their ideological, political and economic influence over Tanzania’ (Bagachwa, 1992:40).

Given this divide, most analyses of resistance to reform in Tanzania (including the Bank’s) identified two broad competing groups within the Party and bureaucracy: ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ reformers (e.g. Kiondo, 1989); ‘reds versus experts’ (Lofchie, 1994:165); ‘marketeers’ versus ‘planners’ (Campbell and Stein, 1992:16); ‘directive’ versus ‘liberal’ factions (Stein, 1992:60); or ‘ideological socialists’ versus ‘pragmatic socialists’ (McHenry, 1994:217). Despite the differences in terminology, most of the analyses agreed that the ‘anti-reform’ faction included Nyerere, major sections of government, including the National Executive Committee, large parts of the Party (CCM), most government ministries (including Labour, Commerce and Industry), and the employees in parastatals corporations and state industries. This anti-reform grouping clung to the ‘Arusha discourse’ that defined the problems facing Tanzania...
as predominantly exogenous. This discourse indicated that the costs of adjustment were greater than continued resistance, favouring economic autarky (Green, 1995; Lofchie, 1994; Kiondo, 1989). On the pro-reform side, following the Fund’s rejection, Cleopa Msuya, formerly the Prime Minister, was appointed Minister of Finance, in 1982. Supported by his permanent secretary, Rutihinda, and the Bank of Tanzania, he pushed for a rapprochement with the Fund, and for reforms. Further support emerged within the Ministries of Planning and Economic Affairs and Agriculture and from the economists at the university (Bigsten et al. 2001; Lofchie, 1994; Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993).

The cabinet remained dominated by ‘hard line left-wingers opposed to the reforms’ leaving Cleopa Msuya largely isolated. Malima brought in Ajit Singh from Cambridge to write a rebuttal of Msuya’s proposals, while Malima called Msuya a ‘traitor’ in a memo to Nyerere (Bigsten et al. 1999). Malima went so far as to argue the cause of the problems facing the parastatals was the private sector, suggesting the private sector should therefore be eliminated to allow the parastatals to recuperate. Public opposition grew particularly in the coffee growing areas of Arusha, Moshi and West Lake. Generally though, in the wake of the repression or co-option of civil society in the 1970s, there was little organisational base for resistance, and most Tanzanians simply withdrew into subsistence production and the informal sector, rendering state-directed planning increasingly ineffective (Bigsten et al. 2001; Hyden, 1994; Yeager, 1989).

In the early 1980s, a confident political leadership fortified by the certainty offered by the ‘Arusha discourse’ was able to reject serious reforms without discussion. Yet as time passed, it became increasingly clear that maintaining the existing exchange rate was untenable. The debate slowly began to shift ground, with conflict emerging amongst those seeking to salvage what could be left of Tanzanian socialism and those like Edwin Mtei who advocated its dismantlement. Nevertheless, even those like Cleopa Msuya also seeking to salvage Tanzania socialism, recognised the need for reform, and faced tough opposition within the Party. Although major change was not forthcoming, by this stage incremental (first and second order) change was possible – both advancing and retarding reform depending on who could get the President’s ear (Bigsten, 1999).

Alongside the partial reforms and against a worsening economic backdrop, the government continued its exhortations to ‘tighten belts’ with slogans like *hali halisis* (life is hard) and *hali mbaya ya umchumi* (bad economic conditions). These, however, were undermined by the increasingly visible inequality dividing the government from the increasingly impoverished populace. As both the economic and now political situation deteriorated, Prime Minister Sokoine initiated harsh security measures against alleged ‘smugglers’ and ‘profiteers’ believed to be stockpiling goods (Bigsten et al. 1999; Shivji, 1992). These campaigns received widespread public support until it became clear that the drive would not actually extend to those within the ruling class. In the face of mounting popular pressure, the government backed down (Campbell, 1992).

The mounting political crisis would create the space for reforms, but did not of itself dictate them. The ever increasing economic hardship and the shortage of cash to fund the patronage that underpinned Party legitimacy left politicians increasingly desperate for a solution. However, it was the apparently ‘perverse’ results of Sokoine’s measures – they served mainly to increase shortages, a material result in direct contradiction to the ‘Arusha discourse’ – that helped stimulate a more
fundamental rethink within government (Bigsten et al. 1999; Svendsen, 1995). In a situation analogous to Hall’s ‘third order change’, the economic and consequent political crisis created the political space in which new ideas could be put forward by pro-reform technocrats (Mans, 1994). A limited import liberalisation was introduced and in 1984 Sokoine widened the liberalisation starting with transport in a bid to aid distribution. The positive response in both economic and popular terms helped consolidate a process of social learning, further strengthening the neo-liberal discourse and the technocrat’s position (Bigsten et al. 1999; Biermann, 1988).

By 1983/84, with the necessity of devaluation increasingly accepted and the limited economic liberalisation bearing fruit, the neo-liberal discourse gained strength (Green, 1995; Lofchie, 1994). By this stage it was also clear that without a ‘proper’ Fund-sponsored SAP, much needed donor aid would not be forthcoming. Increasingly politicians reassessed where both their country’s and their political interests lay. In crude terms, the reforms appeared to offer the prospect of reviving the economy, releasing much needed aid that would help sustain the political system of patronage, and provide the basis for a new settlement between the ‘bureaucratic’ and ‘private’ bourgeoisie (Rugumamu, 1997; Kiondo, 1989). With political support growing, an inter-ministerial technical group co-ordinated by the Ministry of Finance was formed, bringing together key government members with the emergent ‘epistemic community’. Tanzania initiated ‘discussions’ rather than ‘formal negotiations’ with the Fund, first in Washington and later in Dar es Salaam (Svendsen, 1995; Kipokola, 1993). By this stage both agreed on the need for reform, but there were important disagreements about the timing and extent of reforms, with a perception that the Fund favoured ‘shock treatment’ and painful reforms before funding would be forthcoming. In contrast, the Tanzanians feared that this could stimulate still higher inflation and cause political instability (particularly if subsidies for basic foodstuffs were removed) (Ibid.).

As the state teetered at the edge of financial collapse, Nyerere conceded defeat (Svendsen, 1995; Lofchie, 1994). In a bid to secure essential external financing, the 1984 budget, crafted without external direction, albeit with an eye to acceptability, contained most of the reforms demanded by the Fund and advocated by pro-reformers (Green, 1995; Kiondo, 1989). The budget attempted to reduce public expenditure by 30 to 35 per cent, remove subsidies and introduce user fees for the health sector. In line with the ‘National Agricultural Policy’ (URT, 1983), there was also a substantial devaluation (35 per cent), agricultural prices were increased by 30 per cent, and agricultural expenditure doubled (Ponte, 2002; Stein, 1992). Perhaps crucially an own fund importation scheme was introduced which acted as a further de facto devaluation14 (Biermann and Wago, 1986, cited in Kiondo, 1992).

The Fund was approached in late 1984 to evaluate the programme and, hopefully, secure financial support. Meanwhile, the Bank began to take steps to mobilise aid pending an agreement with the Fund (Kipokola, 1993; Loxley, 1989). By 1984, the Fund was attempting to be more ‘accommodating’ in a bid to regain influence. Consequently, the Fund took a less hard-line neo-liberal stand (softening its discursive stance), opening the space for compromise and its support.

In 1985 Nyerere retired as President, though he continued to hold the powerful position of chair of the Party. Opinion is divided about how decisive his retirement was. The majority view is that it opened the door to further liberalisation and devaluation (see e.g. Bigsten and Danielson, 1999; Hyden and Karlstrom, 1993). The minority position maintained that many of the reforms commenced in 1984 before
Nyerere's resignation, while his commitment to the 'Arusha discourse' had only slowed the pace of change (see e.g. Green, 1995; Morrisey, 1995). In either case, commentators are agreed that the period 1984-86 was the turning point undermining the Arusha discourse and transforming the economy from statism to neoliberalism (Bigsten et al. 2001; Kiondo, 1989). Once Tanzania took this step, and agreement with the Fund was reached, the aid monies mobilised by the Bank flowed once again, saving the state (Mukandala, 1999; Rugumamu, 1997).

Conclusions

The experience of Tanzania and Ghana challenges the dominant view in much of the literature of apparently overwhelming 'coercive power' on the part of the Bank and Fund. The increasing multilateralisation of donor relations behind the Bank and Fund leadership in the 1980s may have increased their coercive power, but there were very few cases in the 1980s where they actually appeared to exercise it. Both Tanzania and Ghana are exceptions but they also indicate clear limits to that power. Where resistance was motivated by a discursive disagreement as it was in both Ghana and Tanzania, the discourse also served to stiffen resistance; agreement depended upon either discursive change or one side adopting 'illogical' policies. This conclusion is in line with the current literature on aid effectiveness which emphasises the importance of genuine 'national ownership' of reforms (see e.g. Dollar and Burnside, 2001, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 1999; Killick, 1998). What this paper offers is a discussion of how that ownership developed in Tanzania.

This paper has demonstrated that Hall’s (1993) work on the link between discursive change and policy change in the UK is applicable to Tanzania. In both, policy decisions were considered ‘rational’, that is to say informed by discourses which came to circumscribe the realm of both the political and economic possibilities. Therefore, while the political processes in the UK and Tanzania may have differed, in each case policy change was championed by an ‘epistemic community’ that pioneered the emergence and diffusion of the neo-liberal discourse which flourished when their ideas were taken up by politicians.

By exploring the process of discursive change in Tanzania, this paper has also explored both the limits of the Bank's coercive power and the potential of what might be thought of as its 'discursive' power (Holtom, 2003). Within Tanzania, donors like the Bank supported discursive transformation. By suspending aid, they exacerbated the financial crisis that helped spark a political crisis; they incentivised change (through the promise of aid for reform); supported pro-reformers; and dominated both economic analyses and training. Ultimately though, much of the discursive change within Tanzania was ‘authorless’ and not only beyond their direct control, but all the more powerful for being so (cf. Ferguson, 1990). Moreover, although economic discourses are important, they are not determinative. Agent’s subjectivities may encompass multiple (discursive) rationalities. For example, economic policy making in Tanzania, has as elsewhere, never been solely an economic affair. Political considerations have mediated the impact of economic discourses upon policy. Nyerere’s and the Party’s resistance to economic reforms was bolstered by political considerations. Therefore, even if they had shared the Bank’s discourse, political considerations might still have trounced economic ‘rationality’, leading to conflict with the Bank and Fund.
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Endnotes

1. The declining terms of trade in the 1970s lead the government to draw its non-conditional (Fund) gold tranche and approach the Fund for additional credit. A low conditional credit tranche and the oil facility were granted. However, the second tranche was made conditional upon constraining domestic credit, which Tanzania found unacceptable (Biermann and Wago, 1987:119 cited in Stein, 1992:63).

2. By November Tanzania had failed to meet targets on the payment arrears and domestic credit (a problem exacerbated by the ‘explosive growth of borrowing by agricultural marketing boards’) (Stein, 1992:64; see also Loxley, 1989:15).

3. Allegedly for its criticism of ‘over-centralised economic decision-making’ (Svendsen 1995:118).

4. There were devaluations of 12 per cent in 1982 and 20 per cent in 1983 (Kiondo, 1992:24-25).

5. Loxley notes that ‘The suggestion that the Fund wished a lesson was given credence by a comment of a Senior Fund official to the author … in 1985 to the effect that in the Tanzania case the Fund was simply being ‘bloody minded’ (Loxley, 1989 cited in Kiondo, 1989:158).

6. Following the introduction of the donor supported SAP it would recover somewhat to 1.4 per cent (1986-1990) (Barkan, 1994:22).

7. Despite Kenya’s status as a donor ‘darling’ in the 1980s, its actual record of implementing Bank and Fund programmes was very poor. By the early 1990s, with the cold war imperatives lost and corruption and political repression mounting, donors finally lost patience with Kenya, imposing stringent conditionality (Barkan, 1994).


9. Interview: Prof. Brain Van Arkadie, Chairman CDP Consultants, Senior Advisor, ESRF.

10. Haas (1992:18) defines an ‘epistemic community’ in terms of a the characteristics of a network that has ‘a shared set of causal and principles (analytical and normative) beliefs [in this case neo-liberalism], a consensual knowledge base [in this case economics], and a common policy enterprise (common interests) [in this case securing reform].’

11. Interview: Peniel M. Lyimo, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Tanzania

12. See e.g. interview with Dr G.D. Mjema, Director Economics Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM); see also interviews with Prof. Issa Shivji, Faculty of Law, UDSM; Prof. Chachage Seithy L. Chachage, Department of Sociology, UDSM.

13. The Bank concluded, that while the government bureaucrats were ‘pragmatic’ (i.e. broadly pro-reform), they were stymied by the party bureaucrats, who had a ‘hard-line ’leftist’ position’ which precluded liberalisation. This party/government ‘dichotomy’ appears overly simplistic. It ignores, for example, the overlap between party and government (Kiondo, 1989:162-163).

14. The effect was to introduce a ‘dual exchange rate’ by the back door, so that in practice commodities sold on the street were sold at the black market exchange rate of TShs 150:US$1 rather than the official exchange rate of TShs 17.50: US$1 (Campbell, 1986:21 cited in Kiondo, 1992:26).
Bibliographic Note


New Barbarians at the Gate: Losing the Liberal Peace in Africa

Susan Willett

Within contemporary liberal peace discourse, poverty and underdevelopment are being constructed as ‘new threats’ that feed conflict and terrorism. This perception has encouraged a growing convergence between the security and development policies of the major donors. However, in Africa, where the need to simultaneously tackle conflict and underdevelopment is most pressing, the global institutions have failed to acknowledge that the neo-liberal policies that they pursue have been instrumental in structuring the domestic political and economic tensions that have contributed to violent conflict. Moreover, the current preoccupation with the war on terror has encouraged the co-option of development resources for security functions resulting in the incremental securitisation of development policies. Regardless of its expanding base and the process of mission creep, the liberal peace complex has failed to secure sustainable peace in Africa. Into the vacuum created by failure, the ‘new barbarian’ agenda that underpins the ‘war on terror’ has surreptitiously moved, expanding its reach and its wake of pillage and destruction.

Conflict in Africa has proved steadfastly resilient to the international community’s attempts to secure a liberal peace. Drawn from Kantian principles, the liberal peace is premised upon the idea that economic interdependence, democracy and the rule of law constitute the sustainable foundations for world peace. Africa presents a particularly complex challenge to the liberal peace, for not only is it the epicentre of conflict and failing states, it is plagued by underdevelopment and poverty which, following the events of 9/11, have been construed as the ‘new threats to global stability’. This representation is clearly expressed in the G8’s Africa Action Plan (AAP) which argues that:

Poverty, underdevelopment and fragile states create fertile conditions for violent conflict and the emergence of new security threats, including international crime and terrorism. There will be no lasting security without development and no effective development without security and stability (G8, 2005a:4).

Development is being construed as the ‘new security’, a central tool in the conflict prevention kitbag. This perception is clearly elaborated in the report by the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, entitled ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’ which states that:

Development is the first line of defence for a collective security system that takes prevention seriously. Combating poverty will not only save millions of lives, but will also strengthen states capacities to combat terrorism, organised crime and proliferation. Development makes everyone more secure (UN 2004).
Underdevelopment and poverty are being linked with terrorism and crime providing a powerful justification for more interventionist theories and practice in conflict prone states in Africa. Three problems arise with these developments:

1) The assertion that development makes everyone more secure flies in the face of mounting evidence in Africa which suggests that the neo-liberal policies of the mainstream development community, including free trade, liberalisation and privatisation, have increased inequalities and the sense of social injustice which in turn has had the effect of intensifying levels of human insecurity that feeds violence (UNCTAD, 2004; Willett, 2004; Stiglitz, 2002; Duffield, 2001; Castells, 1998; Cox & Sinclair, 1996);

2) The presentation of underdevelopment and poverty as ‘threats’ have allowed for a deepening of the securitisation of development. Conflicts in Africa have already provided opportunities for the donor community to establish new forms of agency, legitimacy and intervention which prioritise the security related policies of the liberal peace agenda over those of development (Duffield, 2001). By opening up the development space to pursue security objectives, the liberal peace has found its foundations eroded by the encroachment of the ‘new barbarian’ agenda of US isolationism, manifest in the expanding remit of the ‘War on Terror’. The latter has co-opted elements of humanitarian discourse to legitimise interventions that advance great power politics and corporate interests (Luckham, 2005);

3) Established analyses of the causes of conflict in Africa are shaping incongruous, unrealistic and over optimistic policy responses (Shaw 2003; Dillon and Reid, 2000). The emerging political economy of violence perspective suggests that African conflicts are a function of the power hierarchies of the global system and more to do with resource control and economic survival than with struggles over the control of the state, ethnicity, religion or ideology (Duffield, 2001; Smillie et al. 2000; Reno, 1998; Cox & Sinclair, 1996). War in Africa, in all its complex manifestations, functions as an important means of social reordering and transformation – an axis around which new social, economic and political relations are formed at the local and global level (Duffield, 2001).

Methodologically the paper is concerned with an examination of the dominant discourse on security and conflict in Africa. It attempts to locate the discussion in the context of the key documents and policy descriptions of the leading institutions of global governance. While the paper is not meant to be policy prescriptive, the intention is to expose the structural trends that are shaping Africa’s contemporary security and development crisis. In pursuing these aims the first part of the paper examines the security community’s approaches to Africa, highlighting the historical failures and limitations of the liberal peace project. This is followed by insights into African conflicts provided by political economy perspectives, which provides a meta narrative on the structural causes of violence in an increasingly globalised world. In so doing provides possible explanations for the limitations of the international communities liberal peace project. The next section analyses the way in which the institutions of global governance have looked to development as a possible conflict resolution mechanism. This departure has not only led to a convergence in security and development discourse resulting in the growing securitisation of development, it has also encouraged a rapid expansion of the liberal peace complex. Here specific reference is made to the donors’ security first programmes including security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) strategies and the ways in which these security
programmes increasingly impinge upon development budgets. However, the co-
option of development as an instrument of security, provides no guarantee of
improved security while development policies remain firmly focused on the very
same neo-liberal policies that have been responsible for en-structuring the poverty
and inequality that underwrite social tensions and conflict in African societies. This
final part of the paper analyses the rise of the ‘new barbarian’ agenda in the US
which is beginning to eclipse the liberal peace project in Africa. In particular, it
examines the way in which the securitisation of development has opened up a space
for the ‘new barbarians’ to co-opt development resources to extend their ‘war on
terror’ in Africa.

Security & Development Discourse
The recent convergence in security and development policies has consolidated a
broad consensus about the goals of the liberal peace project. The concept of ‘liberal
peace’ conflates the neo-liberal economic and political projects of the Washington
based institutions, with ‘peace’ – manifest in a predilection towards conflict
resolution and social transformation. The concept of the liberal peace draws its
inspiration from Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace A Philosophical Proposal (1795),
which suggested that international peace could be established upon a foundation of
three elements: republican constitution, cosmopolitan law (embodied in free trade
and economic interdependence), and international law and organisations.

The ending of the Cold War and the subsequent expanded reach of global
institutions brought to the fore the possibility of achieving a Kantian peace. This
encouraged a growing consent among donor nations, multilateral institutions,
military establishments and NGOs, that conflict resolution in the South could be
achieved through a number of interconnected processes involving the economic,
political and social transformation of chaotic or collapsed states. Nowhere is this
more apparent than in Africa, which has become a laboratory for the liberal peace
project.

Despite a general consensus about the overarching aims of the liberal peace project,
two contrasting sets of policy narratives are discernable: a) that of the mainstream
security community which is preoccupied with securitisng development, and b) that
of the development community that is concerned with developmentalising security.

From the Security of the State to Development as Security
During the Cold War the state was afforded a privileged position in security
discourse. Peacekeeping and conflict resolution strategies were circumscribed by
state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the norms of non-intervention. The only
movements challenging state sovereignty during this era were national liberation
struggles. With the end of the bi-polar era, Western liberal democracies led by the US
and including a growing host of NGOs and multilateral agencies, began to
challenge the inviability of state sovereignty as democratic values and human rights
were accorded greater worth in the pursuit of liberal peace. A new model of peace-
keeping and conflict resolution was introduced which legitimised interventions in
the name of humanitarian values. Peace enforcement operations designed to keep
warring factions apart, in order to provide the space and time for negotiated
settlements tied to third party mediation, were implemented. (See Appendix for
details of conflicts in Africa)
Third party mediation assumed the mantel of neutrality when in fact it imposed the values of Western liberal democracy which analysts such as Clapham (1998) have argued brought about disastrous consequences, most notably in Rwanda. According to Clapham, the negotiated peace settlement and subsequent elections in Rwanda, allowed the extremist Hutu party to bide its time, assume power and organise the genocide which occurred in April 1994. The international community’s approach did not recognise the need to tackle the deep-seated grievances between the Hutus and Tutsis including land pressures, the unequal distribution of economic and political power, the effects of an economic crisis and the insensitivities of neo-liberal policies.

The Western assumptions about the viability of negotiated settlements rested upon the naïve supposition that the opposing parties bought into the values of the liberal peace. But as Clapham has pointed out, the values of liberal peace were not even shared in Europe until relatively recently. In fact, until the middle of the last century, differences were settled through war where the victor took all. Wars have largely shaped the political geography of the European landscape, not negotiated settlements and conflict resolution.

In attempting to impose power sharing solutions onto conflict riven states in Africa, UN peace missions have failed to recognise the changes in the balance of power brought about by years of conflict. By freezing conflicts at a certain point and failing to deal with the causes of conflict, particularly those pertaining to horizontal inequalities, peace processes in Africa have inevitably proved unsustainable and became a format for renewed violence.

John Dory (2002), author of a US Institute of Peace report entitled ‘Effects of Violence on Peace Processes’, has noted that of the 38 formal peace accords signed between January 1988 and December 1998, 31 failed to survive more than three years. Elisabeth Wood (2000) suggests that peace processes that address economic redistribution have a better chance of long-term success. Yet in the current discussions on post-conflict settlements, while issues of power redistribution via developed and federated systems receive a high priority, issues of social and economic injustice and inequality are still being ignored. In Sri Lanka for example, where an internationally brokered peace process has been linked to neo-liberal reforms, the subsequent increased cost of living and the further pauperisation of large sections of the population have alienated the electorate and created a number of negative perceptions about the peace process that threaten to derail the peace (Rajasingman-Sennanayake, 2003).

Following the end of the Cold War, the neo-liberal triumphalism of the bilateral and multilateral institutions blindly assumed that free markets would resolve the issues of social and economic injustice that often fuel conflicts in Africa. Yet there is no tangible evidence to date that free markets alone do anything other than exacerbate social inequalities and feed social tensions, in the worlds poorest developing countries (Willett, 2004; Stiglitz, 2002; Sachs, 2001; Nafziger and Arvinen, 2002; Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2000).

Following repeated failures of UN peacekeeping missions, the initial optimism about the role of the UN to extend the liberal peace agenda to Africa has been replaced by widespread scepticism and derision about its capabilities and effectiveness. In effect, the UNs exclusive role in peacekeeping has been superseded by an extension of networks involving state and non-state actors including military-
civilian and public-private organisations which has had the effect of enmeshing international non-government organisation, donors, military establishments, IFIs, private security companies, business partners, NGOs and the UN into what Duffield has termed a strategic complex (Duffield, 2001). The ongoing consensus built around the liberal peace agenda binds these new strategic actors and networks into a consolidated approach to tackling the security/insecurity nexus confronting the African continent. What it has not done is to review the concepts upon which peace is ostensibly to be founded. Rather, an ever expanding strategic complex is to be observed that appears to have gained an unremitting momentum in the name of peace, while the latter remains as illusive as ever.

Following the disastrous failures of Rwanda and Somalia, the leading Western democracies have displayed a marked reluctance to engage in further UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. The humanitarian principles used to justify interventions in Kosovo and elsewhere are now applied with discretion. For instance, widespread humanitarian crisis are being experienced in Darfur where over 200,000 people have been killed and over 2 million displaced, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo where over 3 million people have died, but the UN Security Council has so far failed to respond to calls for adequate peacekeeping operations. Rather, attempts are being made to devolve peacekeeping functions and conflict resolution mechanisms to regional strategic complexes, thought to be better able to develop and implement ‘African solutions to African problems’ (G8, 2005a).

Regional initiatives include the promotion of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, together with the conflict-prevention and peacekeeping mechanisms of the African Union, and the strengthening of the security and peace keeping functions of the Economic Commission for West Africa, Southern African Development Community, and other regional and sub-regional bodies. Moreover, ODA from OECD donor countries is being allocated to support these initiatives (OECD, 2005). The regionalisation of solutions reflects a preoccupation with the expanded reach of liberal governance rather than with tangible and practicable peace processes. Regionalisation of the liberal peace/security complex has not facilitated a real transfer of power to Africa and its people. In effect, it is a system of ‘liberal peace by proxy’, whereby resources from African countries are mobilised to undertake security mandates determined by the powerful vested interests of Western liberal democracies that are themselves increasingly reluctant to militarily engage in African conflicts. For the international community, the added advantage of regionalising peace initiatives is that when things go wrong, the blame can be deflected from the institutions of global governance and projected onto regional bodies and functionaries in Africa.

Political Economy of Violence in Africa

In liberal discourse violent conflict is viewed as an exogenous shock to development caused by the deviant and criminal behaviour of warlords that perpetuate social breakdown and collapse (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000). Motivated by greed and rent-seeking behaviour, conflict entrepreneurs have deepened poverty, eroded social cohesion, reversed the gains of development, perpetuated illicit trade and undermined human security (Collier et al. 2003).

Many of these assumptions about war and conflict have been challenged by political economists (Harris-White, 2004; Willett, 2004; Duffield, 2001; Reno, 1998; Keen, 1998) who argue that the normative systems and structures that are utilised in
liberal discourse to analyse African conflicts are wholly inadequate to the task, as they have no foundation in the African context. For example, in traditional security discourse, the state is viewed as the organising principle around which security is both conceived and delivered. In Africa, by contrast, the state and state borders which were artificially constructed by European colonial powers, have become increasingly meaningless or irrelevant to either the organisation and provision of security, to flows of informal trade and to local identity and loyalties. From Sierra Leone to Somalia and from Darfur to the DRC, the state has been replaced by multiple centres of authority, dominated by local elites or ‘warlords’ who do not have a particular interest in capturing the artificial state, except perhaps as a means to extend their commercial activities (Duffield, 1998). Thus, to describe African conflicts as intrastate or civil wars, as is so commonly done, is misleading, as the very phrase pre-supposes there is a ‘state’ over which, and inside which, combatants are fighting.

Keen (1998), in challenging the common assumption that war is a contest between two sides trying to triumph over one another, argues that war in Africa has become an alternative system of profit, power and protection in which adversaries often cooperate in their common pursuit of profit. Moreover, Kaldor (1999) has noted that the current forms of violence have blurred the distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or organised political groups for political motives), organised crime (violence undertaken by privately organised groups for private gain), and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organised groups against individuals).

To political economists war is not an aberration as liberal discourse would have us believe, but an ‘ever present axis around which opposing societies and complexes continually measure themselves and re-order social economic, scientific and political life’ (Duffield, 2001:13). In fact, just as in Europe’s past, Africa’s new wars function as an important means of social reordering and transformation in which new local, regional and global power relations are being formed. At a structural level, Africa’s ‘new wars’ are a reaction and adaptation to the reordering of the global order that has been occurring since the end of the Cold War.

The reduction in super-power patronage that fuelled many of Africa’s conflicts during the Cold War, encouraged military leaders to identify new ways to fund combat and maintain their power bases (Berdal and Malone, 2000; Keen, 1998). The exploitation of natural resource endowments allowed for the emergence of dynamic war economies that have become highly integrated into the global economy via complex networks of trade and finance. In the DRC, war has been sustained by diamonds and coltan, in Liberia Charles Taylor has exploited rare timbers, in Sierra Leone multiple actors have fought over the control of diamond mines and in Angola, UNITA sustained itself through the diamond trade while the MPLA prosecuted its war through the exploitation of its oil reserves. Realising the value of these commodities required the establishment of trade routes, systems of brokerage, money laundering etc all of which required the collusion of the formal economic institutions of the global economy. As Duffield argues, these processes hardly constitute breakdown and disorder; rather, they represent highly structured and sophisticated processes and networks, revealing complex organisational abilities and functions that fully utilise the ICT facilities of the modern information based global economy.
The links between ‘conflict trade’ and globalisation have given rise to the notion of ‘networked wars’ which conceptually highlights the interconnectedness of African conflicts with the global economic system. In their struggle for control over strategic assets, warlords have often secured support from multinational companies that have a vested interest in maintaining access to profitable natural resources. Multinational companies are also known to hire the services of mercenary groups who secure payment in lucrative mining concessions. In this manner, international capital rewards reinforces the indigenous structures of violence enhancing militarised solutions to resource disputes that often inadvertently undermine international resolution to conflict.

There is thus a rational calculus to conflict trade and Africa’s ‘new wars’ which is uncomfortable for the adherents of the liberal peace, as it challenges not only the normative basis of Western notions of rationality and progress, but also the fundamental perceptions of how the world is understood and ordered. The actors in Africa’s conflict are creating the social and political conditions in which new forms of wealth, redistribution and legitimacy are being realised, in much the same way as piracy created the initial conditions for the accumulation of capital in the UK that went on to underpin investments in the industrial revolution. Duffield goes so far as to argue that what is being witnessed in Africa is a new form of development, that has replaced the failing neo-liberal paradigm promoted by the Washington institutions (Duffield, 1998:11). Into this vacuum new forms of protection, authority, rights and accumulation are emerging which are legitimised by those local and regional communities that gain and flourish from such structures. In Somalia, for example, where there is no central government, most regions have reverted to local forms of governance and justice, either secular clan-based arbitration, or Islamic (Shari’a) law. Somalia’s economy is also highly devolved, but nevertheless agricultural exports and telecommunication systems flourish.

Engaging in African conflicts, strategic actors pursuing the liberal peace find themselves ill-equipped to respond to the so-called crises (Reno, 2001; Dillon and Reid, 2000). Simplistic explanations that reduce wars to breakdown, fail to capture or respond to the complex emerging structures which represent an alternative and antagonistic system to that proposed by the liberal peace. There is a logic to the violence in which practices of accumulation at or beyond the confines of the law reveals a new form of political economy to be emerging. It is a form of accumulation that has been facilitated and indeed encouraged by the globalisation of trade, the deregulation of markets and the growth of demand from the rich countries of the North. Collectively these observations help to explain the durability of violence and conflict in Africa and the general resistance African conflicts have to conflict resolution and international peace brokering strategies which are predicated on outdated assumptions about the nature of conflict and the state in Africa.

**The Securitisation of Development**

The litany of failure on the African continent has not dampened the momentum for securing liberal peace in the region. New solutions and strategies are forever being invented – the latest being the systematic convergence between the security and development policies of major donors and multilateral institutions.

During the Cold War era the development community had been wary of engaging in security issues in Africa. Conflict was viewed as an external shock, an unfortunate
interruption to development, more often than not brought on by the ideological pursuits of superpowers. As such, the development community was powerless to influence such processes. However, with the end of the Cold War and the persistence of conflict in Africa, a consensus began to emerge within the donor community that the causes of war in Africa were attributable to the nature of underdevelopment and its related pathologies of crime and terrorism (CfA, 2005; DFID, 2005; OECD, 1998; Annan, 1998). Subsequently, developmental practice moved from simply funding humanitarian programmes that sought to provide protection and relief to the civilian victims of war, to influencing aid recipient countries’ military expenditure allocations through peace conditionality, to directly transforming security institutions under the rubric of good governance, so as to ensure a secure environment for market-based development. From this it has been a fairly short and logical step to the idea that the development community could and should reconstruct the state in post-conflict situations (Luckham, 2005). The hubris involved in trying to reconstruct entire states and national societies after war and state collapse is not lost on Luckham (2005). Yet in recent years this is precisely what is being attempted by the donor community in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and Rwanda.

The events of 9/11 were highly instrumental in defining poverty and underdevelopment as the ‘new threats’ to security. James Wolfensohn, the then President of the World Bank observed that:

The horrifying events of September 11th have made this a time of reflection on how to make the world a better and safer place. … We must recognise that while there is social injustice on a global scale – both between states and within them, while the fight against poverty is barely begun in too many parts of the world, while the line between progress in development and progress toward peace is not recognised – we may win a battle against terror, but we will not conclude a war that will yield enduring peace.

The recognition that poverty and inequality feed instability and conflict, has led to a plethora of high profile reports being published on the subject including DFID’s ‘Security and Development Strategy’ (DFID, 2005), the Cabinet Office’s ‘Investing in Prevention: an international strategy to manage risks of instability and improve crisis response’ (CO, 2004), the UN’s, ‘A Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’ (UN, 2004), and the Commission for Africa Report (CfA, 2005).

The idea that development will make Africa more secure flies in the face of mounting evidence which suggests that Africa’s development crisis has largely arisen as a result of the imposition of inappropriate economic policies foisted upon African governments by multilateral and bilateral donors over the last two decades. A number of leading analysts, including some notable authors that have worked in senior positions within the international financial institutions (IFIs), have provided strong evidence to the effect that neo-liberal policies have intensified horizontal inequalities (political, social, cultural and economic), weakened indigenous institutional capacities, increased indebtedness, and rendered countries more prone to the external shocks of currency and commodity price fluctuations (Stiglitz, 2002; Sachs, 2001; UNCTAD, 2001; Wade, 2000; Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2000).

The IMF’s short term stabilisation policies designed to reduce inflation, restore currency convertibility, and renew debt servicing, have all involved deep public expenditure cuts as well as the tightening of fiscal, credit and monetary policies.
New Barbarians at the Gate: Losing the Liberal Peace in Africa

These measures have had the effect of eroding public institutions, weakening the states’ capacity to provide social safety nets, health, education, law and order. The costs of these adjustment's have been disproportionately distributed to the poor, while the benefits have accrued to the rich. The widening of income inequalities and the social injustice associated with structural adjustment has been a major cause of tension and conflict in African countries (Adekanye, 1995). When a state fails to provide its citizens with public goods, their societies are likely to experience a series of escalating problems that spill over into neighbouring states and the rest of the world. Failed states have become seedbeds for violence terrorism, crime mass migration, refugees and disease (Sachs, 2001:187).

The acceptability of the high social costs of adjustment might be legitimate if economic growth and development took off as a result of IMF structural adjustment policies, but as UNCTAD has noted:

while structural adjustment programmes have been applied more intensely and frequently in Africa than in any other developing region, barely any Africa country has exited from such programmes with success, establishing conditions for rapid, sustained economic growth. This is true not only for those countries, which are said to have slipped in the implementation and stabilisation and adjustment programmes (the so-called non-adjusters or bad adjusters), but also most of the core- and good-adjusters (UNCTAD, 2001:5).

In almost all cases in Africa, structural adjustment has been deflationary, intensifying levels of social and economic regress and propelling countries into a vicious cycle of decline. The almost evangelical zeal with which officials from the IFIs adhere to neo-liberal economic theory has blinkered their ability to recognise widespread policy failure (Willett, 2004 ).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GNI per capita $2002</th>
<th>Life expectancy 2002-2005</th>
<th>FDI $m 2002</th>
<th>ODA £m $m 2002</th>
<th>External debt as % of GDP</th>
<th>Debt service as % of exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1,312.1</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>900.7</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>900.7</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>230</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>53</td>
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<td>1307</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
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<td>45</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>-85.1</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>102.2</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>405.9</td>
<td>2058</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>83</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>83</td>
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<tr>
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<td>39</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>130</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>681.0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>74.7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>...</td>
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<tr>
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<td>293</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>1233</td>
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<td>7</td>
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</table>

Source: Data selected from the Least Developed Countries, Report UNCTAD 2004.
An examination of the development statistics of selected SSA countries engaged in conflict or recently emerged from conflict (and therefore vulnerable to conflict re-igniting) reveals a startling pattern of low per capita income, low life expectancy, low levels of FDI, and ODI and high levels of indebtedness.

It is tempting to argue that the table above reveals the effects of conflict on development, but for the majority of these countries, economic crises and state collapse preceded the outbreak of violence (Nafzinger and Arviren, 2002). The official recognition that conflict can wipe out years of constructive development has not been accompanied by an acknowledgement of the converse process: that the macro-economic policies pursued by the IFIs and major donors have been responsible for the pauperisation and social polarisation of many African societies.

The recent acceptance of the relationship between poverty and conflict by the global economic institutions has done little to alter the basic framework of the dominant development paradigm. In fact, the Bretton Woods institutions continue to apply their neo-liberal policies to an ever-widening group of countries, including those that have just emerged from conflict. In fact post-war reconstruction has become a major growth sector of the liberal security complex. Roland Paris (1997), having studied peace-building processes in eight different countries, concluded that the neo-liberal policies of the Bretton Woods institutions have often been instrumental in destabilising peace building operations. According to Rajasingam in Sri Lanka, the Bretton Woods post-conflict reconstruction efforts have built information asymmetries, global-local hierarchies of knowledge and power and the making of myths and models of development (Rajasingam-Sennanayake, 2003).

The ‘new threats’ of underdevelopment and poverty have come to be viewed as a development opportunity by both multilateral and bilateral agencies – a way to re-legitimise the neo-liberal development paradigm after the lost decades of the 1980s and 1990s. The World Bank, in particular, has re-orientated itself towards post-war social transformation impinging on roles and functions traditionally executed by the United Nations. While the UN has a relatively open approach to human security and is more inclusive towards local participation and knowledge, the World Bank is a less neutral actor whose policies are driven by the financial and corporate sector interests of the developed world. It disburses funds towards projects that are capital friendly rather than those that focus on social justice. The persistence of the World Bank and IMF in promoting structural adjustment and privatisation programmes in the highly unstable aftermath of a war can have disastrous socio-economic effects on the already weak and vulnerable sectors of society. In effect, a neo-liberal peace orchestrated by the World Bank is even less likely to secure peace and stability than have the past efforts of the UN.

The co-option of neo-liberal development as an instrument of conflict prevention and security, has arisen partly in responses to the desire by major governments to reduce the costs of conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction, which have become exceedingly onerous for major donors in the last ten years (Chalmers and Willett, 2003). In 2001 the OECD argued the need to move beyond the ‘short-term concentration on post-conflict recovery and reconstruction

towards a ‘culture of prevention’ in which trade, finance and investment, foreign affairs, defence and development policies are co-ordinated to create greater ‘structural stability’ in conflict prone countries (OECD:DAC, 2001).
Such sentiments were reiterated in the Commission for Africa Report, ‘Our Common Interests: Action for a Strong Africa’ (CfA 2005). Yet there remains a notable lack of coherence between the development and security policies of the major donors, particularly in the areas of conflict prevention and conflict management (BOND, 2005). Recent reports that highlight conflict prevention strategies suggest that the main mechanisms for enhancing conflict prevention are peacekeeping operations, SSR, DDR and post-conflict reconstruction (DFID, 2005; Cabinet Office, 2005; UN, 2004). Such instruments reflect a preoccupation with short-term conflict management mechanisms rather than with strategies designed to overcome the structural causes of conflict.

**Development for Security?**

The G8 announcements in 2005 on increased debt relief, ODA and poverty alleviation appeared to offer some prospect of relieving the structural causes of conflict in Africa. Nevertheless, on closer inspection it would appear that the partiality with which such policies are implemented, the self-serving strategies which motivate the system of rewards and punishment in aid allocations, and the overriding preoccupation with the ‘war on terror’ by the US and UK, offer little prospect for enhanced conflict prevention in Africa.

**Debt Relief**

In June 2005 the finance ministers from the G7 nations promised to cancel the debts the poorest countries owe to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The debt relief package contains onerous conditions such as enforced liberalisation and privatisation. Political and economic conditionalities allow the powerful nations to leverage economic opportunities for private foreign investors. Rarely do private foreign investments benefit the poor. Monbiot (2005a) points out that in the late 1980s, the IMF and World Bank forced Uganda to impose ‘user fees’ for basic healthcare and primary education, thereby creating new markets for international private capital. School attendance collapsed, as did health services, particularly for the rural poor. In the face of widespread social discontent, Museveni reinstated free primary education in 1997 and free basic healthcare in 2001. Enrolment in primary school leapt from 2.5 million to 6 million, and the number of outpatients almost doubled. The World Bank and the IMF were infuriated describing this move as a ‘bad investment’. But bad for who? Certainly not Uganda’s poor. The G8 governments claim they want to help poor countries to develop and compete successfully. But they have a powerful commercial incentive to ensure that the policies of the multilateral organisations benefit their ‘national interests’ so that conditionalities tend to reinforce the structural inequalities of the global system (Stiglitz, 2002; Wade, 2000).

To qualify for debt relief, developing countries must endeavour to ‘tackle corruption, boost private sector development’ and eliminate ‘impediments to private investment, both domestic and foreign’ (G8 Finance Ministers, 10-11 June 2005). Corruption has undoubtedly crippled poor nations, especially in Africa. Resources that should have been used to enhance standards of living, have been siphoned off into the private Swiss bank accounts of corrupt leaders and officials. Donors have the right to ensure that ODA goes to target groups and projects, but as Monbiot (2005b) points out, in reality corruption has rarely been a barrier to foreign aid and
loans. In the past, the World Bank and IMF, disbursed loans to the Mobutu and Moi regimes without political conditionalities. More recent recipients include Rwanda’s Paul Kagame and Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, both of whom are repeatedly cited by the G8 countries as practitioners of ‘good governance’ yet their armies, as the UN has documented, are largely responsible for the conflict and carnage in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has so far claimed over three million lives (Monbiot, 2005b).

The perception of corruption depends on whether or not an African government or leader serves the ‘interests’ of the powerful nations. Since 9/11, world leaders have turned a blind eye to the gross human rights violations and corruption of certain regimes when they have supported the objectives of the ‘war on terror’. Compliant governments are rewarded with military aid, debt relief and impunity from the political conditionalities and sanctions normally imposed upon corrupt and authoritarian regimes. The only conditionality is that they open their territorial space to counter-insurgency operations.

**Overseas Development Assistance & Poverty Alleviation**

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) represent the main focus of the international community’s attempt to eradicate global poverty. An interim assessment by UNCTAD of the ability of African countries to meet their MDG targets, predicts that the majority will fall far short without a massive increase in ODA from the world’s wealthy nations (UNCTAD, 2004b). On current trends, there is likely to be a funding shortfall in ODA in support of achieving the MDGs in Africa’s poorest countries.

One of the major reasons for the shortfall in aid is that US aid levels remain far below the UN target of 0.7% of GDP. The US Congress remains highly sceptical about the effectiveness of aid, arguing that it ends up in the hands of corrupt governments. Nevertheless, after steady cutbacks in the 1990s, the US has begun to increase development aid, but this is only partly in response to the MDGs. The Millennium Challenge Account, set up by the Bush administration has imposed strict conditionality on the disbursement of funds, insisting that only governments with sound neo-liberal policies, strong leadership and the capacity to absorb resources can qualify. This stringent conditionality means that many countries with populations most in need of poverty alleviation will be excluded from access to US aid.

The nature of current aid allocations suggest that poverty reduction may not be the major aim of certain donors aid policies. The primary instrument of US development policy towards Africa, the African Growth and Opportunity Act on Africa (AGOA), is currently administered by the Africa Corporate Council (ACC). The ACC is the lobby group representing the big US corporations with interests in Africa: Halliburton, Exxon Mobil, Coca-Cola, General Motors, Starbucks, Raytheon, Microsoft, Boeing, Cargill, Citigroup and others. Under the terms of this act, African countries must bring about ‘a market-based economy that protects private property rights’, ‘the elimination of barriers to United States trade and investment’ and a conducive environment for US ‘foreign policy interests’. In return they will be allowed ‘preferential treatment’ for some of their products in US markets.

The UK is adopting a similar approach with its Investment Climate Facility, a $550m fund of public monies which will be driven and controlled by the private sector.
Companies involved in the launch included Anglo American, Barclays, Shell, British American Tobacco, Standard Chartered Bank, De Beers and the Corporate Council on Africa. The fund is designed to create a ‘healthy investment climate’ which will offer companies ‘attractive financial returns compared to competing destinations.’ Africa urgently needs inward investment, but investments by multinationals have done little to enrich African people; on the contrary, all the evidence suggests that it has impoverished them. The history of corporate involvement in Africa is a history of forced labour, evictions, murder, wars, the under-costing of resources, tax evasion and collusion with dictators (Monbiot, 2005a).

Neither the UK’s Investment Climate Facility or the US Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) impose mandatory constraints on corporations. While their power and profits in Africa will be enhanced with the help of foreign aid budgets, they will be bound only by voluntary commitments: of the kinds that have been in place since 1976 and have proved less than effective in encouraging ethical business practice. Considering what Shell has done in Nigeria, what Barclays and Anglo American and De Beers have done in South Africa, and what British American Tobacco has done around the world, reconfiguring these corporations as champions of development will fool few in the developing world. In effect, these corporations have been given the right to pillage and plunder Africa’s resources with impunity.

A further cause for scepticism about the motivation of US aid is that a significant proportion of the recent increases are being allocated to tasks in support of the ‘War on Terror’. For instance, most of the United States’ increase in 2001 was due to a $600 million disbursement to Pakistan for economic support as a frontline state in the war on terror. US ODA was again increased in 2002 by 11.6 per cent in real terms mainly due to additional and emergency funds in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Of the increases in US aid in 2004, $875 million went to Afghanistan and $2.9 billion was allocated to Iraq (OECD, 2005). As one US commentator has observed:

*The administrations 'global war on terrorism' is the main determinant in the distribution of economic aid – not development needs, not humanitarian disasters, not hunger or the increasing numbers of the world population living on a dollar a day or less. In providing a new rationale for US foreign aid, the war on terrorism has provided a new policy coherence that integrates foreign assistance with foreign and military policy. When the officials of the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) justify their aid requests before congressional committees, they stress that aid is part of the country’s national security strategy. The war on terrorism has replaced the war on communism as the underlying rationale for foreign assistance. That makes selling increasing foreign aid budgets much easier on Capitol Hill and has restored a bipartisan consensus in support of USAID programs* (Barry, 2005).

**Tinkering at the Margins: Security First Strategies**

The capture of overseas development assistance (ODA) for security functions is most pronounced in the arena of ‘security first’ policies adopted by DFID and other major donors as a crisis management response that seeks to improve the security of the operational environment for the implementation of development programmes in conflict prone states (DFID, 2000; EU, 1999; OECD, 1998). Security first programmes emerged in response to the donors’ need to quickly establish security in the aftermath of conflict and have evolved to become a major priority of post-conflict
reconstruction and conflict resolution (DFID, 2005). ‘Security first’ programmes first emerged in 1994 when a UN Advisory Mission to Mali concluded that the lack of capacity of the police, gendarmerie, national guard and border guards to control smuggling and banditry was blocking both the implementation of the peace accord and economic and social development. The Mission proposed a ‘Security First’ approach under which aid for development and the re-integration of ex-combatants was integrated with assistance to improve policing and border controls. The initial success of the Mali experiment has stimulated the adoption of other initiatives modelled on the ‘security first’ philosophy.

The thinking and practice of the UK’s Department for International Development on security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) strategies, have been highly influential in shaping an international consensus on ‘security first’ strategies. The decision by DFID to prioritise SSR strategies in the immediate aftermath of a conflict is based on the belief that ‘appropriate, accountable and affordable security bodies in countries at risk of violent conflict are a potentially important adjunct to the prevention or management of such conflict’ (Ball, 2004:6). The broad objectives of SSR strategies are to:

- help governments and transition countries to fulfill their legitimate security functions through reforms that will make the delivery of security more democratically accountable, as well as more effective and efficient way, thereby reducing the potential for internal and external conflict (Ball, 2004:1).

The problem with implementing ‘security first’ programmes has been the assumption of the existence of a legitimate state, around which security can be re-established, when in fact the state in many conflict prone African countries has imploded under the combined effects of prolonged economic, social and political crisis, two decades of IFI orchestrated neo-liberal reforms that sought to minimise the state, and the subsequent loss of political legitimacy (Howe, 2001; Zartman, 1995).

William Reno (1998) argues that systematically weakened African states have lost control of their traditional spheres of influence, that is, the military, resources, territories, public services etc; the effective authority of governance moved elsewhere. Into the vacuum of collapsed and delegitimised states the international donor community is attempting to inculcate a normative security agenda that is derived from Western discourse and practice. This misfit creates a profound dilemma for the efficacious implementation of ‘security first’ programmes. In Sierra Leone, Ero (2001) has observed of the security sector reform programme that:

- rebuilding security forces in post war climates cannot be considered in isolation from a comprehensive programme of transforming, or in some instances, reconfiguring the political and socio-economic foundations governing that given society. Security forces do not operate in a vacuum, they are not a separate entity but are part of the underlying social fabric in any given society (Ero, 2001:95),

Various observers have expressed concerns about the lack of effective economic regeneration programmes designed to absorb ex-combatants into gainful employment in the civil sector. For instance the UN has reported concerns about the numbers of ex-combatants that have joined the army of young men seeking gainful employment (UNOCHA, 2004). Likewise the International Crisis Group (ICG) has noted that a large number of ex-combatants are unhappy with the reintegration programme and are facing bleak employment prospects in the formal economy (ICG,
2003). Disaffected youth with few economic prospects, offer ample opportunities for peace spoilers to incite violence. As Joseph Hanlon (2004) has suggested, the continuing failure to address the exclusion of young men from economic activity is likely to create the conditions for a conflict to re-ignite (Hanlon, 2004). Despite these concerns, the World Bank claims that the $36.5 million DDR programme in Sierra Leone to be ‘the best practice example throughout the world of a successful DDR programme.’

Within the donor community, DDR strategies are presented as the holy grail of current conflict prevention strategies and peace consolidation strategies (DFID, 2005), yet all too often they are poorly conceived and implemented. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for instance, donors rushed in with undue haste to implement a DDR programme once the Sun City Accord was signed in 2002, regardless of the continuing violence in the Eastern part of the country, the precarious nature of the peace process, the fragility of the transitional government and the absence of economic recovery or development that could provide economic opportunities for reintegration. These conditions provide little prospect for success of the DDR programme.

Existing evaluations of such policies tend to highlight successes in quantitative terms. For example, how many guns have been collected and destroyed, the number of soldiers demobilised and the number of combatants returned to civilian life. In qualitative terms the measure of success is taken as the prevention of a return to widespread violence. Evaluative approaches based on such measures ignore the more nuanced challenge of appraising success in terms of securing a sustainable peace and security (understood here in its broadest sense) and tend to be structured within short-term timeframes, more often than not circumscribed by the conclusion of democratic elections.

DDR programmes need to be linked to sustainable economic opportunities that transcend the horizontal economic inequalities that underpin grievance, otherwise violence can rapidly resurface. In Liberia, in the first half of 2005 there were outbreaks of rioting by former combatants, as the United Nations found itself without sufficient resources to continue the education, training and other reintegration benefits for more than 100,000 ex-combatants who were disarmed at the end of the country’s 14-year civil war.

Without long-term guarantees of secure employment opportunities and an adequate income on which to live, the temptation to return to arms remains strong. Many disarmament programmes have failed to secure all the small arms in circulation, because weapons are concealed by ex-combatants as an insurance against future risks, and also as a means of potential economic survival. Where the formal economy fails to provide economic security, small arms provide ex-combatants with the option of securing a livelihood through appropriation, crime and predation, which is often why crime rates soar in the aftermath of conflict. In Mozambique, for example, despite the fact that DDR was hailed as a great success by the official UN evaluation, the international community’s reintegration programmes were under-resourced and short-term in nature, which has produced two long-term security challenges: a) the involvement of ex-combatants in organised crime; and b) political instability due to the ongoing politicisation of reintegration issues (McMullin, 2004). This outcome has had a destabilising effect not only on domestic security but also on regional security, particularly, where organised crime has become trans-border in nature.
Failure to stem the reoccurrence of violence in Africa has not altered the enthusiasm for the pursuit of liberal peace by the institutions of global governance. Rather, new myths and modalities are invented, adding new layers of legitimation and new forms of intervention. For instance, Collier’s work at the World Bank has introduced a new and influential narrative, focusing attention on the relationship between poverty, primary commodity dependence and economic crisis, which creates an enabling environment for the rent seeking behaviour of predatory warlords, criminal elements and terrorists. The incentives for these groups to perpetuate violence and lawlessness are high, mitigating against the success of international attempts to broker peace. Collier’s empirical work has attempted to prove that it is greed rather than grievance that has driven wars in Africa (Collier et al. 2003).

Collier’s analysis has been widely embraced by the donor community because it fits nicely into their tendency towards a ‘one model fits all’. By conflating conflict with corruption and greed it reinforces the neo-liberal ‘good governance’ agenda, thus reinforcing the role of mainstream development agencies in conflict prevention. Yet more institutions and mechanisms have been developed to tackle conflict trade and target the activities of violence entrepreneurs. Yet few of these initiatives produce the outcomes they aspire to. Nevertheless, by identifying the primary role of greed in the perpetuation of violence, attention has been deflected from the role of grievance in conflict, particularly grievances caused directly or indirectly by the neo-liberal policies of the mainstream development community.

Mainstream development and security discourse presents itself as a force for good, a means by which to pursue global security and peace. In reality, it represents a form of intervention geared towards the radical social transformation of the South. As such, it represents an extension of Northern power over the South, another layer on which to segregate and manage ‘the other’ (Ibrahim, 2004). By projecting underdevelopment and poverty in Africa as ‘threat and danger’, space has been opened up in which prejudice and discrimination flourish. The fear that such an agenda builds in the North creates the political space in which greater extremes of external interference into the affairs of African countries are legitimised and unquestioningly condoned. The weakness and ineffectiveness of the liberal peace project to secure a more stable peace has given succour to the ‘new barbarian’ agenda that underpins the US /UK ‘War on Terror’. It is to this sinister development that we now turn our attention.

The Ascendancy of the New Barbarians

Following the rout of US troops in Somalia in 1993, the idea of a UN rule-based collective security system imposing universal constraints in the common interest was eclipsed by the resurgence of unilateralism and exceptionalism of the world’s major military power, reluctant to accept the external constraints and disciplines of the UN system (Willett, 2002). The ascendancy of the ideology of ‘new barbarism’ has powerfully influenced contemporary US security discourse and practice.

The ‘new barbarism’ emphasises the notion and role of primordial, innate and irrational cultural and ethnic identity in conflicts in Africa (Peters, 1994). According to this narrative, in times of turmoil when political and economic systems are weak or collapse, the anarchic and destructive power of traditional antagonisms and resentments are unleashed. From Rwanda to the DRC, conflicts presented as anarchic killing fields fuelled by ancient ethnic hatred, have supported popular demands in America for US disengagement from such conflicts (Kaplan, 2001).
Unable to identify a Clauswitzian logic to the violence, Africa’s civil wars are codified as a breakdown in civilisation, a Hobbesian descent into chaos which is identified as a threat to global stability. In seeking causal explanations, Kaplan’s work focuses on the consequences of Malthusian resource pressures, in which economic collapse, environmental crises, rising birth rates and widespread crime fuse together in an explosive mix of violence, destruction and dislocation (Kaplan, 2001).

Huntington’s Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order (1997) has also been highly influential in this discourse. Cultural or ethnic identities are broadly equated with civilisational identities which Huntington argues are shaping emerging patterns of cohesion and conflict in the post-Cold War era. The clash of civilisations is tribal conflict on a global scale. It is a powerful narrative that both describes, informs and empowers the current ‘war on terror’ – the clash of the Christian and Islamic civilisations. For a US administration versed in Christian fundamentalism, this discourse has had a powerful mobilising impact. Since the events of 9/11, this narrative has gained widespread legitimacy and momentum in the US and frames the discourse of the ‘War on Terror’.

Extracts from speeches by influential leaders in the US and UK illustrate the extent to which new barbarism informs policy choices towards Africa. J. Brian Atwood, former head of the US foreign aid agency, USAID has commented that:

failed states’ (which included a number of African countries suffering from conflict) threaten our nation. They cost us too much. They create diseases that impact on us. They destabilize other nations. They stymie economic growth and they deny us economic opportunity in the largest new marketplace – the developing world (McHugh:2001:54).

Tony Blair extends this narrative to embrace terrorism by stating that:

We know that poverty and instability leads to weak states which can become havens for terrorists and other criminals. Even before 9/11, al-Qaeda had bases in Africa. They still do. Hiding in places where they can go undisturbed by weak governments, whilst they plan their next attack – which could be anywhere in the world, including right here in Africa as we have seen. For these reasons, because it is morally right and because it is in our own interests, it is clear that Africa deserves the attention of the rest of the international community (Blair, 2004).

The new barbarism discourse places emphasis on military solutions to conflicts and crises in Africa. An example of this trend in practice can be seen in the Bush administration’s Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI). The Sahel, a vast region bordering the Sahara Desert and including the some of Africa’s poorest countries – Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania – has been identified by the Bush administration as ‘the new front in the war on terrorism’. In response, it has instigated the ‘Pan-Sahel Initiative’ which is providing training and equipment to light infantry companies in Mali, Mauritania, Chad and Niger. According to the International Crisis Group, the Sahel while being a region influenced by traditional Islam is not a hotbed of terrorist activity, nor is it anti-Western in a militant or aggressive way (ICG, 2005a).

In June 2005 the US expanded the PSI with its launch of the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCI). It was initiated with its Exercise Flintlock 2005 in which US special operation forces trained their counterparts in military tactics which they deem critical in enhancing regional security and stability. The new programme will receive about $100 million a year for five years, and is to add
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal and Nigeria to the original four countries in the PSI. Notable is the inclusion of Nigeria, the continent’s biggest petroleum producer and source of one-fifth of all US oil imports.

The ICG has pointed out that the misconceived and heavy-handed approach adopted by the US in the Islamic states in Africa could tip the scale the wrong way encouraging a fundamentalist backlash in the region. The ICG argues that to be effective in preventing the growth in terrorism in the Sahel region an international security policy needs to address security in the broadest terms, with more development aid rather than military programmes and assistance.

Somalia has also become the focus for renewed US counter-terrorist activities. But as the ICG has observed, ‘US counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia threaten to destabilise the country further and provides a popular platform for the spread of jihadism.’ The ICG goes on to say that ‘Containing and eliminating jihadism in Somalia demands patient sustained support for the twin processes of reconciliation and peace building until a legitimate, functional government is restored’ (ICG, 2005b). At a time when Somalia’s fragile peace process is falling apart, the international community needs to apply sensitive diplomacy and positive incentives for peace and not an increase in the militarisation of the situation.

US strategic interests are also focused on West Africa, the most conflict prone region in Africa. Pierre Abramovici (2004) argues that the United States is turning its diplomatic and military attention to the region, not just for its oil and natural gas supplies, although these represent an important future contribution to US energy supplies, but to its metal and industrial diamond resources. It is quietly establishing military training and equipment links with a number of countries to secure future supply lines. While the US and international donor organisations are quick to condemn the ‘conflict trade’ within the region, the US itself has assumed a legitimate right to use its own monopoly of force and coercion to access the same resources.

The strategic responses of those major powers that have coalesced under the umbrella of the ‘war on terrorism’ is less to do with the transformational agenda of the liberal peace than it is to do with a new and overt imperialism informed by the narrative of new barbarism. The convergence of security and development within the discourse on liberal peace has created a space for the new barbarian discourse to co-opt development resources for the prosecution of the ‘war on terror’. The incremental shift in ODA for security and counter-terrorism activities is a tangible measure of this process. In April 2003, an OECD discussion paper entitled ‘A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention’, suggested using ODA in response to a narrow counter-terror agenda in the post-September 11 era.

Elements within the liberal peace strategic complex are highly critical of these trends arguing that:

Effective and legitimate development and humanitarian assistance are threatened by pressures to allocate aid according to donor-driven counter-terror priorities, the military’s encroachment on humanitarian space, and a tendency to promote short-term crisis management over longer-term conflict prevention (BOND, 2005).

So far these voices are marginal within the liberal peace complex. Moreover, while the liberal peace continues to pursue unrealistic and destructive agendas in Africa the subtle co-option of the liberal peace strategic complex will continue apace, as the new barbarians pursue their far more sinister and cynical agenda of the ‘war on terror’.
Conclusion

The liberal peace discourse contains a fundamental contradiction, while ostensibly concerned with peace it has constructed poverty and underdevelopment as threats, which underpin a new dynamic in North/South security relations. This narrative has played into the hands of the ‘new barbarian’ discourse which underpins the current ‘war on terror’. Development is being divisively used to substantiate the discourse of fear. In so doing, it reinforces the unequal power relations between the North and South, between the haves and have nots, and is being used to justify increasingly interventionist policies by both development institutions and the military.

Conflict portrayed as an aberration and interruption to development fails to perceive situations whereby conflict and violence have become an effective means through which previously marginalised groups are able to accumulate wealth, power and even legitimacy. Through ‘networked wars’, these groups are able to access to the benefits of globalisation that would otherwise be closed off to them. These forms of conflict are rarely settled by externally mediated ‘peace’ agreements that seek to impose liberal concepts of peace and security into a context shaped by the structural disorder of the current system of global economic and political governance. International or regional attempts at building sustainable peace will only be viable if constructed upon a subtler analysis of war economies and failing states and when the inequities of the global economic and political system are redressed.

In the meantime, the emerging ‘danger discourse’ embraced by donors, NGOs academics the media and private companies who have been subtly co-opted into accepting this agenda, have produced new relations of international complicity and accommodation in the subjugation of the South, and most particularly Africa. The liberal discourse that emphasises ‘freedom, democracy and security’, obscures a reality in which the prosecution of free markets, compliant governments and enhanced state security are the means by which powerful commercial interests can gain greater and more secure access to Africa’s scarce resources and ensure control of Africa’s embryonic markets. Speeches peppered with references to humanitarian principles and the importance of poverty alleviation give the appearance that the G8 have embraced more altruistic policies towards Africa, when in reality the forces of rampant and unchallenged globalisation have been strengthened in their bid for expanded markets and access to natural resources regardless of the socio-economic costs to the poor.

That these policies generate greater global instability does not present an obstacle to the new barbarian agenda as it presents further legitimacy for interventions and produces market opportunities for the military industrial complexes of the leading powers. The hypocrisy of world leaders that have co-opted a language of humanitarian principles, yet violate the same principles in prosecuting their ‘war on terror’ have produced a ‘backlash’ of anti-Westernism which provides a powerful incentive for marginalised and aggrieved groups to use terror as an instrument of asymmetric warfare. This is the new global disorder in which barbarism is writ large.

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Endnotes

1. The British militarily has engaged in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone but on an independent basis and not as Blue Helmets.

2. James Wolfensohn, keynote address at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre in March 2002.

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Editor’s Note


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**War & Poverty**

The G8 proposals will mean around $2bn debt relief a year. US arms manufacturer Lockheed Martin made $17bn profit in 2004 alone.

The world spends around $6bn on education each year but spends more than 100 times that on military equipment & training.

The world’s top 10 arms producers made more in profit last year than was spent in providing basic health & nutrition for the last five years.

To satisfy the world’s sanitation and food requirements would cost around $18bn a year. The world spends that much on the occupation of Iraq every two months.

War keeps more than a billion children in poverty. The majority of wars are fought for control of natural resources such as diamonds, coltan, oil or gas.
APPENDIX: African Conflicts 2004


Cote d’Ivoire: North/South ethnic divide fuelled by government hate campaign; Northern rebel movements or New Forces include MPCI, MPIG & MPJ opposed to President Gbagbo. Rebel violence broke out in September 2002 orchestrated by northern rebels opposed the southern domination of the country. Violence turned against French & ex-pats in November 2004 after French had destroyed Cote d’Ivoire airforce in retaliation for killing 9 French peacekeepers. March 2005: The new peace & ceasefire agreement may hold but there has been a history of ceasefire violations. Will depend upon the success of power sharing & DDR programmes. No precise figure for dead 100,000 IDPs. 31 October 2002 ceasefire signed between PMCI & President Gbago Linas Marcoussis Agreement, 30 July Accra, III Agreement, 7 April Pretoria Agreement. French had 2,000 troops stationed in Cote d’Ivoire & sent an additional 1,000 in 2002. 4 April 2002, UNOCI currently has 7,000 personnel.


Sierra Leone: The Liberian backed Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a war in 1991 to overthrow the government & capture lucrative diamond mines; mercenary groups were also attracted by diamond mine concessions; from the outset, ECOMOG troops were deployed against the RUF. A 1,000 strong British force became involved in May 2000 when the RUF appeared to be about to recapture the capital. They helped reinstate the Kabbah government, War began in 1991 & the violence continued albeit with temporary truces until January 2002. British troops entered the fray in May 2000 & captured the RUF leader Sankoh. March 2005: vulnerable to renewed fighting & state failure. 200,000 people have been killed &
over 1 million have been displaced. November 1996, Abidjan Accord signed by the government & RUF; 23 October 1997, Conakry ceasefire; July 1999, Lome Agreement signed by all parties to the conflict; May 2001, 2nd Ajuba Agreement. ECOWAS sent in ECOMOG composed of 12,000 Nigerian troops from 1991 onwards. They played an active peace enforcement role. Nigerian troops were implicated in the conflict diamond trade & were sent home in 2002. June 1998 UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). Currently it has 17,500 military personnel.

Somalia: Origins of conflict can be traced to the superpowers war of proxy conducted in Somalia & simultaneous breakdown of traditional society. The subsequent emergence of heavily armed clan-based warlords precipitated the collapse of the state & the descent into endemic conflict criminal activity & shadow states. The resulting collapse of central government left a vacuum in which rival warlords have fought out their differences. 1993 UN forces were drawn into war. Following large-scale confrontation with forces from General Aideed’s clan in which 18 rangers were killed, the UN withdrew its forces. Clan warfare continues leaving untold toll of dead & human abuses. March 2005: the country is plagued by numerous localised conflicts between rival militia groups backed by regional powers in which human rights abuses take place. Battles have, at times, threatened to escalate into large-scale bloodshed between allies of the Transitional National Government & their rivals, those associated with the Somali Restoration & Reconciliation Council. Between 1991-92 as many as 500,000 people died from the direct effects of violence & the indirect effects of war induced famine. 1 million refugees & 1.7 million IDPs; currently there are 375,000 IDPs. No known figures for the number of war related dead since 1992. During the 1990s, 14 internationally mediated peace negotiations took place: all failed. 2002 Inter-Governmental AD Peace Agreement. January 2004, General Peace Agreement Finalising the details & implementation remain a serious barrier to a peaceful future. April 1992, United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) - humanitarian mission; December 1992, Operation Restore Hope deployed 24,000 US soldiers & 13,000 other troops under US command to support humanitarian mission: withdrew in May 1993. April 1993, United Nations International Task Force (UNITAF) replaced US troops with a force of 25,000 from 30 different nations; US force of 4,500 remained; withdrawal 1995.

Sudan: 1) Dafur crisis: rebel groups motivated by grievances vs. Janjaweed militias supported by Sudanese government involved in ethnic cleansing & scorched earth policy; 2) North/South civil war based on control over oil resources & ethnic differences between Muslims of North & Christians in South; 3) Lords Resistance Army activities along Ugandan/ Sudan border. LRA HQ based in Sudan. LRA funded & armed by Sudan government. Early 2003 when Darfur rebel groups the SLM & JEM attacked military installations; 1st civil war: 1956-72; 2nd civil war: 1983-02 involving Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) & National Islamic Front government forces of North. LRAs war in Uganda has been in progress since 1987. March 2005: situation grave; ceasefire violations by all sides; human rights abuses, mass rape, indiscriminate killings, looting, massive displacement of ethnic minorities by Janjaweed militias. Peace agreement holding but under threat from effects of Dafur crisis. LRA engaged in economic extortion, looting, terrorism of civilians, abducting children, sex slavery of young girls, enforced child soldiers. 2 million IDPs in Darfur, 130,000 refugees in Chad; 50,000 dead. Since 1983, 2 million dead; 1.3 million IDPs among Acholi people of Northern Uganda. 8 April 2004: CeaseFire Agreement between Sudanese government & SLA & JEM; 5 July 2004,
Plan of Action’ signed by UN & Sudanese government; Inter-Governmental Authority on Development peace process 1994-2001; Machakos Protocol: 20 July 2002 granted south self-determination referendum after 6 yr. interim period; LRA resistant to peace talks. African Union peacekeeping mission consisting of 3,000 peacekeepers deployed since end of 2004. African Union peacekeeping mission: 1,000 soldiers; No peacekeepers; Museveni seeks a military solution to the challenges posed by the LRA.

Togo: Turmoil since the death of President Edayema in February 2005; April 2005: violent outbreaks following flawed election, threatens to descend into civil war. 1,000 fled to neighbouring states.

Uganda: Northern based rebel movement the Lords Resistance Army - drawn from Acholi tribe - predatory force with no clear political mandate. LRA have been active for 18 years. March 2005: LRA engaged in economic extortion, looting, terrorisation of civilians, abducting children, sex slavery of young girls, enforced child soldiers. 1.3 million IDPs. LRA & Museveni sceptical about peace negotiations. Museveni seeks military solution.

Zimbabwe: Conflicts around land issues & race. Zimbabwe’s ongoing crisis dates back to 1965 when Ian Smith declared Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) & white minority rule. A guerrilla war commenced continuing until 1979. Many whites remained owning the most productive land. Proposed land reforms never took place leading to resentment & open hostility towards whites. 2000 following prolonged drought & deepening economic crisis ZANU veterans seized white owned land. Mugabe has utilised youth militias & war veterans to violently suppress opposition. March 2005: Zimbabwe is a failing state; if its economic & political crisis persist it will become a failed state. External powers see the solution in democratic elections but democracy alone will not resolve the underlying tensions about land ownership & the economic crisis. Guerrilla war: 36, 000 lives & 1.5 million IDPs. 1979 Lancaster House Agreement; September 2001 Abuja Agreement (failed). No peacekeeping missions; Members of SADC have been attempting to deal with Mugabe through quiet diplomacy but so far to little effect.

Source: Crisiswatch data 2004 & UN DPKO website 2004; See various reports & articles on conflicts at www.crisisgroup.org
In the historical development of world capitalism there have been, time and again, seemingly dramatic turning points in the relations between rich and poor countries, between the core and the peripheral areas. Such turning points were the abolition of the slave trade, and the associated transition from mercantile pre-colonial to formal colonial relations, and the great independence struggles and the ensuing post-war dispensation of national sovereignty and self-determination within a framework of what came to be known as modern, or informal imperialism. We are once again at a historic juncture where we may discern a transition from modern imperialism to a new, post-modern, imperial formation. But each of these great changes did not fall from the sky, did not come from on high, or by divine inspiration, and were for all the genuine moral passion of their advocates, not radical emancipations in the human condition, but were more modestly a predictable outcome of structural contradictions engendered by the previous arrangements.

I was reminded of the dialectics of capitalist history in June/July 2005 when hearing the deafening roll of the bandwagon of the Make Poverty History campaign (debt cancellation), the Live 8 concerts, the G8 Summit and the Commission for Africa Report. In a forthcoming publication (Hoogvelt, 2005) I have tried to analyse just where these progressive sentiments are coming from and how they are almost certainly unwittingly but nonetheless successfully being co-opted and, even driven by, the structural contradictions between, on one hand, the material forces of globalisation, and on the other, the now obsolete institutional arrangements of ‘modern’ imperialism.

The task which I set myself in that paper was to try and grasp the ‘coherent conjunction’ between on one hand, the dominant characteristics of globalisation at the level of material capabilities and social forces, and on the other, the ascent of postmodern imperialism as an institutional framework governing the relations between the core and periphery of the world capitalist system, including the new moral principles, world views or ideologies, that are emerging to underpin this framework. This is a task that leaves aside grander ethical examinations of questions of ‘right’, of ‘justice’, or ‘progress’.

In other words, just as I am not saying that the abolition of slavery was a bad move, so I am not saying that the current passion for Making Poverty History is to be condemned. What I am saying is that by studying how this new emerging dispensation fits in with the directional tendencies of global social forces, we will be in a better position to judge where the limits are of these progressive sentiments, at which junctures they are being co-opted, and how compromises struck in the interest of one objective might close down avenues toward alternative fu-
tures. When the rock star Bono says that Warren Buffett (second richest man in the world) and Rupert Murdoch are amongst his most helpful supporters, and when Gordon Brown, according to his civil servants, was ‘surprised’ at the ease with which his G8 colleagues swung behind the debt cancellation idea, then its only right for us to pause and reflect what is going on here.

In brief, what I argue in my paper is that the world economy is characterised by an emerging social hierarchy of core-periphery relations rather than – as before – a primarily geographic one. Under conditions of globalisation the functions of the state become reorganised to suit global rather than domestic capital accumulation priorities. As a result, the political and economic integrity of the national territorial state is eroded, and domestic peripheralisation and exclusion become a principal source of instability.

However, domestic instabilities translate into international insecurity, as social exclusion within nations builds up pressures for the territorial expulsion – or fleeing – of excluded groups. The resulting spectre of economic and political refugees in turn threatens the social stability of the rich nations to which they flee. And thus, globalisation, paradoxically, reinforces the need to maintain, at all costs, the de jure interstate system and to uphold the legal sovereignty of states in the periphery with the emasculation of economic state capacity consequent upon imposed privatisation and liberalisation programmes, and the simultaneous hollowing out of political state capacity, consequent upon military-backed strategic interventions.

In search of the answer, I concluded my paper with a few notes on the discourse of the revitalised aid agenda for Africa which encompasses Gordon Brown’s G8 debt relief package, Tony Blair’s Commission for Africa Report, the Make Poverty History campaign and the Live 8 concerts. It may seem churlish to knock what is undoubtedly a deeply felt humanitarian spirit that has commendably moved millions around the world. It would also be wrong to ignore the differences between disparate groups; some more critical and aware than others of the destabilising economic and power relations that undermine the sustainability of any aid effort however well intended. Nevertheless, the coming together of corporate and G8 leaders with the human rights world of NGO’s from Oxfam to ActionAid and World Development Movement (WDM) in an apparent new moral consensus, should make us wary. As George Monbiot writes:

The G8 leaders and the business interests their summit promotes can absorb our demands for aid, debt, even slightly fairer terms of trade, and lose nothing. They can wear our colours, speak our language, claim to support our aims, and discover in our agitation not new constraints but new opportunities for manufacturing consent. Justice, this consensus says, can be achieved without confronting power (Monbiot, 2005).

So what are the terms of this new moral consensus? The Report of the Commission for Africa ‘Our Common Interest’ (2005) is revealing, not for its impassioned sentiment to cure Africa of the ills...
of poverty, curable diseases and especially and foremost HIV/AIDS, but for the detail of commissions and omissions.

The first thing that strikes me about this 450 page Report, is the overwhelming focus on Africa as the cause of its own problems. Corruption on the part of domestic leaders and governments is a relentlessly recurring theme accompanied by repetitive emphasis on the need to improve both governance and transparency. Adverse past or present links with the rest of the world are given either scant attention as structural causes of poverty and underdevelopment (pp.108-109) or dwell on capital flight and debts incurred by past dictators (p.114). And, though there are two minuscule paragraphs on the role of foreign companies in conflict zones (p.40), what is entirely missing is any recognition that the rich world’s lifestyle and rapacious use of Africa’s resources has created, and continues to create, unsustainable economies on the subcontinent in the first place. The loud and clear message is: Africa is at fault, and Africa has to change with our help.

The second important message of this Report is that the change needed and the aid given is to be primarily (even if not exclusively) focused on the social infrastructure. The Report offers an analysis that – besides corruption – attributes causes of poverty to poor health (particularly HIV/AIDS) and education, with the path to economic growth to come primarily from investing in people. Poverty reduction strategies and addressing the HIV/AIDS pandemic are repeatedly signalled as the most important goals of development intervention. That is okay as far as it goes. What is missing though are any thoughts on national developmentalism, on a comprehensive agenda for economic development, including industrialisation and the backward and forward linkages, that so dominated the economic growth perspectives of a bygone age. Indeed, on reading the Report one gets the impression that the economic agenda is relegated to third place (after governance and health) and that it deals only with creating a better investment climate for the private sector, on transport, and on diversification of agriculture for exports. There is some mention of developing local and regional markets and encouraging small enterprises but this is dwarfed by the repeated emphases on reducing trade barriers and market opening. As I have argued in another paper, instead of trying to make Africa pay its way in the world economy with old-economy prescriptions (i.e. an expansion of traditional agricultural products of obsolete comparative advantage), African economies should be assisted to proceed from a dynamic resource concept and start not with what they have, but with they might have along the trajectory of ever-faster technological change (Hoogvelt, 2001). Alas, there is not one single imaginative idea on economic development in the entire report.

A third most significant theme of the Report it seems to me is the emphasis on developing state capacity and public administration at all levels. On first reading this is a refreshing departure from the preceding neo-liberal (the Washington) consensus. The World Bank and the IMF come in for some stick over their dogmatic conditionalities of macro-economic stability and fiscal rectitude which have disabled social programmes and downsised bureaucracies. This Report seems to be doing a U-turn. There is an understanding that the delivery of targeted sectoral aid requires capable administrations at national and local levels and that therefore capacity building programmes should include, besides civil society organisations, also government ministries. Indeed, the Report bends over backwards to place African leadership at the head of the ‘Partnership with the World’, and to commend the progress in good governance already achieved (p.370; pp.322-323). In a further reversal
of recent past practice it suggests that the most efficient way of giving aid is through Direct Budget Support wherever there is a capable state apparatus with transparent and accountable development priorities in place. In fragile states where this is not the case, it might however be necessary to continue to provide support direct to NGO’s and civil society organisations. (p.312)

But there is a sting in the tail. The new conditionality that is proposed to accompany the debt relief agenda and the generous (intention of) a doubling of aid monies, homes in on the process of local disbursement with transparency and accountability of allocations paramount and subject to scrutiny by the international multilateral organisations and international NGO’s. For example, ActionAid and Oxfam together with the multilateral institutions will sit on a steering committee monitoring a special Nigerian anti-poverty fund set up with the proceeds of its debt relief programme.

Put in the context of the lacklustre ‘business-as-usual’ economic prescriptions, the nannying governance agenda, and the primacy of the social protection goals, the new Africa aid agenda, in my view, describes the contours of an emerging ‘social services’ model of sovereign states in the periphery. In this social services model the NGOs human rights agenda serves rather than contradicts the security and privatisation priorities of global capitalism in relation to the periphery. It may be the case, as Michael Barnett (2005:25) writes, that for many humanitarian organisations there is incredible discomfort in knowing that their agenda of transforming failed states coincides with part of the strategy of Bush’s war on terrorism, but the fact is that for a variety of reasons, e.g. the privatisation of donor funding, and competitive contracting under neo-liberalism, core nation states are depending more and more on NGO’s to get things done, and donor funding is increasingly being redirected from multilateral organisations to international NGO’s. Both the US and the EU now disburse 25-30% of their aid budgets through private groups (Smillie, 1997:564). Between 1985 and 1995, private aid agencies expanded their international operations by 150% affecting the lives of 250 million people worldwide (UNDP estimate cited in Charlton and May, 1995:240). As a result, the hallowed space between humanitarianism and politics, has become narrowed and porous, and international NGO’s have become principal agents of imperialism.

The new moral consensus around core-periphery relations that I have sketched out is as yet only an emerging one. It is true that there has been – this summer – a coalescence of disparate forces, core governments, business leaders and NGO’s, with some mass participation thrown into the mix in the Live 8 concerts. But credit has also to be given to the various critical voices, including within the Make Poverty History campaign and the NGO world, of the shortcomings of the Commission for Africa report, and the limitations of the debt relief agenda. The issues of Trade Justice as opposed to Free Trade, of Real Aid as opposed to Phantom aid, and of the burden of responsibility for corruption on the part of multinational corporations, all these remain strong campaigning targets, and rightly so. Some NGO’s (for example WDM) are even beginning to distance themselves from the UK Government’s successful co-optation strategy. But all these do not detract from the fact that the NGO movement’s engagement with the Government led African aid agenda is in serious danger of accepting the globalisation agenda rather than opposing it.

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Bibliographic Note


Academic Freedom & the Crisis of Neoliberalism: Some Cautions

George Caffentzis

The consequences of a decision to adhere to what I understood to be your earlier determination that the Geneva Convention III on the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) does not apply to the Taliban include the following: some of the language of the GPW is undefined (it prohibits, for example, ‘outrages upon personal dignity’ and ‘inhuman treatment’), and it is difficult to predict with confidence what actions might be deemed to constitute violations of the relevant provisions of GPW (memo from Alberto R. Gonzales [US Attorney General], to President George W. Bush on 25 January 2002; Greenberg and Dratel, 2005:120).

This article concerns academic freedom in the context of the war on terror.1 I want to make four points at the start and then I will elaborate on them:

1) There are two concepts of academic freedom current in the field that need to be distinguished: (a) the neoliberal notion of academic freedom which takes knowledge to be a commodity, education as a service to be privatised and academic freedom the ability to market knowledge and education services without governmental regulation; (b) the ‘commoner’ notion of academic freedom which takes knowledge as a common resource for all, education as a public good, and academic freedom as the enlarging of the capacity of all to access and produce knowledge.

2) The USA Patriot Act and other directives and laws meant to support the war on terrorism are ironically undermining the neoliberal knowledge regime it was meant to save.
3) The epistemology of torture and espionage that is being introduced in the war on terrorism is an archaic one that is built on the notion of the ‘secret’ that must be extracted from unwilling bodies or spied upon by unseen eyes. This epistemology has been repudiated by the contemporary conception of knowledge as social production and is not only inhuman, but also futile.

4) The knowledge workers in the African Studies Association (ASA) who are being mortally threatened by the laws and epistemology of the war on terrorism, must find a credentialization process that would publicly differentiate themselves from the mercenary intellectuals that do the imperial masters’ bidding in Africa.

Clash of Academic Freedoms

I approach this topic on the basis of more than a decade of work with the US-based Committee for Academic Freedom in Africa (CAFA). CAFA has devoted much effort in investigating and protesting the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programmes’ (SAPs) impact on African universities (Federici et al. 2000). That experience immediately forces me to ask, ‘What kind of academic freedom are we talking about?’ For CAFA’s work has made me realise that our notion of academic freedom is antagonistic to the World Bank’s neoliberal notion of academic freedom (Caffentzis, 1994). It is important to differentiate between these two understandings since they involve different political antagonists and interests and, hence, the type of struggle we wage. There is a real danger that if we confuse them, we could end up defending a notion of academic freedom that we abhor.

The neoliberal notion of academic freedom arises from viewing knowledge as a commodity (i.e., as so many pieces of intellectual property to be bought, sold or leased) and education as a path to income generation that must be privatised and made profitable in order for it to be maximally effective. Academic freedom in the neoliberal perspective would thus be equivalent to reducing government restrictions on the commodification of knowledge and on the privatisation of education. Thus, the World Bank views many of the provisions of the SAPs (that it has designed and imposed on African societies) relevant to universities and knowledge as increasing academic freedom, i.e., the freedom to make money from ideas in an international market for intellectual property goods.

For example, from its perspective, the SAP provisions that require African governments to subscribe to the copyright and patent policies of the US and to open their markets to intellectual property items (from films, to software, to the molecular structure of pharmaceuticals, to music CDs, to video games, to genetically modified seeds, etc.) appear as ways to guarantee that Africans would be academically free to buy (or sell) any intellectual fare they can afford – unhindered by government restrictions (World Bank, 1998:145). Similarly, the SAP requirement that forces African governments to allow private, for-profit universities to open their doors on their territory is another ‘blow for traditional academic freedom’ in the World Bank’s eyes since it increases the choice of educational institutions available and increases competition (World Bank, 2002). Finally, the SAP proposals reducing the subsidies for university students and requiring that the students ‘share’ the cost of their education is another forward step for academic freedom, since it recognises that the end of education (knowledge), increases personal income and its institutional costs should be paid for by the eventual benefactors.

In the last two decades, students and faculty members all across Africa have responded to the World Bank’s imposition of neoliberal policies as an attack on
their academic freedom with demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts. They have paid for their resistance with hundreds killed, tens of thousands beaten, arrested and tortured by African governments eager to show their commitment to the World Bank’s programmes in order to keep their credit line open to save themselves from bankruptcy. We at CAFA have chronicled anti-SAP student and faculty movements across Africa and have admired their tenacity and ubiquity (Federici, et al. 2000). The notion of academic freedom these militant students and faculty were fighting for at such great cost was clearly antithetical to the neoliberal conception of knowledge, education and academic freedom. The World Bank was, in effect, ‘enclosing’ knowledge, education and academic freedom. In their view, they were fighting back.

But what was their notion of knowledge, education and academic freedom? After reading many documents of the struggle and interviewing many students and faculty members involved, we concluded that these anti-SAP protestors viewed knowledge as a commons, education as a public good and academic freedom as an effort to preserve and expand the commons of knowledge and to increase access to education as a public good (Caffentzis, 1994). They saw neoliberal agencies’ use of money as a barrier to knowledge and education and hence the World Bank was an enemy of their academic freedom. These anti-neoliberal conclusions have been shared by many outside of Africa, of course, who have increasingly seen the effort to sanctify intellectual property rights (with draconian penalties for the violators) in many recently negotiated ‘trade treaties’ (like the WTO, NAFTA, MIA (Multilateral Agreement on Investment) FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas)) as a sort of ‘second enclosure movement’. The free software to the creative commons movements, for example, increasingly recognise knowledge as a common good that must be preserved against the stifling of its production by commodification. Thus the anti-SAP African students and faculty have been part of a growing worldwide ‘commoner’ movement to preserve the commons of knowledge and to keep education a public good.

As a result of these considerations, we should distinguish two kinds of attack on academic freedom qua the commons of knowledge. The first is the neoliberal ‘enclosure’ of the knowledge commons and of education as a public good; the second is the US government (and its allies) ‘war on terrorism’ attack on the neoliberal form of academic freedom, which is increasingly restrictive. The urgency of the latter attack has undoubtedly inspired the Roundtable (ASA, 2004) from which this paper emerges, whereas the former ‘enclosure’ has become a chronic feature of contemporary reality in African universities and is increasingly losing its salience because of its prevalence. These are two quite different struggles, however, with different political antagonists and interests. If we confuse them, we might well discover that we defend a notion of academic freedom that we abhor.

The very fact that the US government is increasingly restricting the movement of ideas, academics and students within and across its borders and hence is becoming antagonistic to the neoliberal notion of academic freedom should make us allies neither of the ‘war on terrorism’ nor of the neoliberal knowledge regime. The enemy of my enemy is definitely not a friend in this conjuncture. Consequently, the academic freedom struggles of the immediate future will be ideologically murky. They will require the defenders of the commons and opponents to the war on terrorism to be measured in their words and strategically decisive in their actions. In the rest of this paper I hope to raise issues which will help clarify this murkiness. I start by examining how the war on terror impinges upon
the previously hegemonic neo-liberal view of academic freedom.

**Unintended Consequences of the ‘War on Terrorism’**

Throughout history imperial politics has been filled with deliberate ironies. They are often encapsulated in cynical aphorisms such as the description of the Roman devastation of Carthage, ‘They made a desert and they called it peace’, or the famous Vietnam-era US military quip, ‘We had to destroy the village to save it.’ But there are many unintended consequences of imperial policy that are unheralded by cynical *bon mots* since they were not even observed until long after they had completed their acidic work. I think, in this regard, of the consequences of recruiting barbarians into the Roman armies so that the very boundaries between Rome and non-Rome disintegrated. I believe that we are in a similar situation today with respect to neoliberalism and the war on terrorism. On the one side, the war on terrorism was first declared by the Clinton Administration in order to ‘save’ the neoliberal order from a general crisis that began in 1997; but on the other, the prosecution of this war has had many unforeseen damaging consequences for neoliberal economics as well as for academic freedom.

A good example of this duplicitous effect is in the USA Patriot Act which was hurriedly passed to carry the war on terrorism forward. Civil libertarians have objected to its provisions concerning guilt by association, ideological exclusion.
sion, unilateral executive detention and secret searches without probable cause (Cole, 2003). Using an extremely vague definition of terrorism, the USA Patriot Act legalises, for example, searches and seizures of people’s homes and offices without their knowledge, the wholesale surveillance of private citizens’ library records and internet communication, and the arrest and detention without hearing or trials of anyone deemed by the President to be a terrorist.

The USA Patriot Act and its cousins might justly be called ‘the laws that ended neoliberal academic freedom’. Neoliberalism promised to the academic community a sense of ‘no borders’ to academic discourse through organising open, ‘global’ universities and scholarly networks where knowledge and information could circulate ubiquitously at the speed of light. The war on terrorism legislation is now restricting and even blocking the information channel. Indeed, the result is becoming the exact opposite of the neoliberal ‘deal’ that promised a small increase in ‘user fees’ and ‘licenses’ for intellectual property in exchange for a huge increase in the flow of information and diffusion of knowledge. The ideology of neo-liberalism is being strangled by the war on terrorism’s effort to save it.

The clearest example of this is in the dramatic collapse of the so-called ‘global universities’ in the US. They were one of the most visible examples of the globalisation of knowledge in the 1990s, since their existence was premised on the increased movement of students from Asia, South America and Africa to US universities. Indeed, the money these foreign students (their families and/or governments) expended to finance their university education in the US was the equivalent of $13 billion dollars of US exports (Dillon, 2004a). These students certainly embodied the free movement of knowledge promised by neoliberalism. Moreover, the scientific and technical intellectuals that came to the utopias of neoliberalism – global universities in the US whose ‘catchment area’ was the planet – often stayed and became the theoretical backbone of the computer and genetic engineering ‘revolutions’ of the 1980s and 1990s (given the refusal of US-born students to enrol in demanding scientific and technological fields). After all, in 1998 foreign citizens earned 44 per cent of the doctorates conferred by US universities in engineering, 30 per cent of the physics and chemistry doctorates, 36 per cent of the computer science doctorates, 22 per cent of the biological science doctorates and 43 per cent of the agricultural sciences doctorates (US Census Bureau 2001:517). As one journalist frankly put it, ‘America does not produce enough doctoral candidates in the sciences and related fields to meet its own needs’ (Freedman, 2004:B10).

But with the increasing scrutiny of student visas, the mass arrest and indefinite detention of foreigners (including students and intellectuals), the increased existential irritations of politically-sanctioned racism and xenophobia, the threat of tuition funds being confiscated because of purported connection with terrorism, and all the other allied anxieties stirred up by the war on terrorism’s legal and political environment, students are no longer flocking to US global universities. For example, after three decades of uninterrupted growth, total enrolment of foreign students in US colleges and universities fell in 2003 by 2.4 per cent. The graduate schools have been especially affected and faced a 28 per cent drop of foreign applications and a 6 per cent drop in foreign student enrolments during 2004 followed by a 5 per cent enrolment drop in 2005 (Dillon, 2004b), (New York Times, 2005b).

Moreover, those foreign students who have studied in scientific and technical fields are increasingly refusing to remain in the US and are returning to their
'homes' partly because of the fears the war on terrorism has inspired. These phenomena will have an important, though diffuse, negative impact on the US corporations' role as the centres of scientific, technological and cultural innovation for the planet as well as on the US balance of payments (since one of the largest exports is the sale of 'intellectual property' leases and licenses on these innovations). This development has even evoked cries of concern from establishment voices like columnist Thomas Friedman (who titled a column 'Losing our Edge?') and the New York Times editors ('Sanity on Visas for Students'), (Friedman 2004; New York Times, 2005a).

The war on terrorism has also involved increasing surveillance of US-based academics with the ensuing restriction of knowledge exchange leading to a situation reminiscent of the national state security organisation at the height of the Cold War. Many scientists in the 1950s and early 1960s were caught in a ‘cross-fire’ since they were convinced both that ‘free exchange of information was the lifeblood of scientific progress and that restrictions of this flow were either foolish or destructive’ and that secrecy was justified since ‘threats to national security overshadowed concerns for openness in science’ (Bok, 1983:156). There was widespread concern that knowledge production would be harmed by the ethos of secrecy imposed by the state (Bok, 1983:154-155). Indeed, Thomas Kuhn, in his immensely successful typology of the history of scientific communities (in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions), addressed this tension in an indirect but powerful way (cf. Fuller, 2000 for the Cold War context of Kuhn’s work).

Kuhn pointed out that it was perfectly possible to have scientific advances in periods of what he called Normal science (Kuhn, 1996:35-42). These periods do not need to have open communication and free movement of scientists for these advances to occur since they involve ‘puzzle solving’ activity, i.e., the rules of solution of the puzzle and its role in the accepted paradigm are already known. Consequently, puzzle solving activities could take place independently of each other and their results could be accumulated at a higher level without horizontal communication in the way that much of the research and production of the Manhattan Project was carried out. However, periods of revolutionary science required a publicly acknowledged crisis, an increasing set of recognised anomalies, and the widespread presentation of alternative theories that could become the core of a new paradigm. Thus at the very moment of crisis in a scientific community, the greatest openness is required for its resolution. Although Kuhn’s theory of the structure of scientific revolutions has been justly criticised on a number of counts, this contrast between normal and revolutionary periods of science and the different impacts censorship, political repression, and secrecy has on them, I believe, is still relevant to our thinking about knowledge as it was in the 1950s and early 1960s when it was the centre of a major national debate on secrecy (Dickson, 1984:134-139). This rekindled debate undoubtedly is just another aspect of the increasing conflict between the war on terrorism and neoliberalism, because the latter is dependent upon and is legitimised by the increasing pace of knowledge production and the institution of a state of permanent scientific revolution.

This debate about knowledge also has immediate consequences for African Studies, since it is obvious that normal science and research concerning Africa is in crisis. Whatever your view of neoliberalism, it is evident that the revolutionary knowledge necessary to deal with the social, economic, and ecological problems of Africa (which are the problems of an unconstituted humanity in extremis) are as sorely lacking as are the
material resources devoted to resolving them. To add to this obscurity a shroud over much of Islamic Africa that the war on terrorism legislation threatens to do, is to put the finishing touches on a plan to make Africa again (and even for Africans) a *terra incognita* with terrible consequences for all, including neo-liberals.

**Torture & Espionage: the Tyranny of the Secret**

The development of a new set of laws, administrative directives, and legal categories since the beginning of the war on terrorism has an epistemology driving it that is crucial to our understanding of the challenges we face. It is important to understand that there is a conception of truth behind this revival of the justification of torture. Elaine Scarry presents the now standard view of torture as a technique of power and not a method of truth seeking. For her, ‘the final product and outcome of torture’ is that ‘the conversion of the enlarged map of human suffering is an emblem of the regime’s strength’ (Scarry, 1985:56-57). This is an accurate description for the torture of inmates in the Nazi concentration camps by guards demanding either work or docility from its death-bound residents, but the present war on terror works with a different relationship between truth and power.

The war on terror we are living through today has an epistemology that is rooted in the notion of the Secret. The prime object of knowledge in the war on terrorism is to uncover the secret X, whatever the X might be (the location of person O, the plan to destroy Y, assassinate Z or overthrow government W, the money that financed action A, etc.). This type of epistemology is inevitably seeing the problem of knowledge to be one of overcoming deliberately designed resistance and obscurity to get at the truth. It is not an epistemology indigenous to our time, of course, but a revival of the epistemology of the Renaissance (Yates, 1964). Foucault richly described this epistemology by deploying Paracelsus’ notion of a ‘signature of all things’ (Foucault, 1970:17-45). In this epistemology, the world’s treasures are hidden secrets. But there are similitudes between the secret treasure and what can be observed providing the clue that can be read by a careful investigator. To illustrate this, Foucault quotes Paracelsus’ scientific methodology that compares the world with the power of a man’s speech:

> Just as the secret movements of his understanding are manifested by his voice, so it would seem that the herbs speak to the curious physician through their signatures, discovering to him their inner virtues hidden beneath nature’s veil of silence (Foucault, 1970:27).

In other words, truth is a pre-existing thing that has been deliberately obscured and needs to be brought into the light. But what if nature refuses to speak? What if the obstacles put in the way of the investigators have either a sinister or theodicic (i.e., deriving good from apparent evil) intent? Such a conception of knowledge logically leads to both torture and espionage in these circumstances.

The revival of torture and the explicit identification of knowledge with spying in the early twenty-first century is an inevitable consequence of the epistemology developed in the ‘war on terrorism’ that is rooted in the Secret. This epistemology has arisen in an intellectual atmosphere generated by the conjunction of the increasing influence of Leo Strauss’ esoteric hermeneutics and various forms of creationism in the ideological formation of many in the present politically hegemonic Bush Administration. For Strauss and the Straussians, most important political texts have an esoteric message that can only be deciphered by specially trained minds. This thesis has now been merged with the
creationist arguments of the past and takes the form of ‘intelligent design’ arguments intended to combat evolution theory. These creationist arguments underpin much of the intellectual framework of the Bush Administration (Strauss, 1952, 1968; Rosen, 2000; Behe, 1996; Shanks, 2004). Hence, the popular leftist view that the Bush Administration is a cynical intellectual vacuum is not accurate. It is simply that the elements of this superstructure are self-consciously obscurantist.

In the midst of this ‘back to the future’ intellectual world of esoteric meanings and theological designs of the Bush administration, the war on terrorism proclaims that the terrorist opponents in this war are resolute, subtle, and theologically informed evildoers acting from a hidden demonic substratum. Terrorists, unlike all other human adversaries, apparently do not have a social constitution whose causes can be investigated and countered. They can only be spied upon, tortured to find their inner sanctum and then be killed. That is why Alberto Gonzalez could write so frankly to President Bush (in the portion of a memo that is the epigraph of this article) that notions like ‘outrages upon personal dignity’ and ‘inhuman treatment’ are ‘undefined’ when applied to the Taliban and other terrorists, since, apparently, they are not subjects of the predicates ‘dignity’ and ‘human.’

Post-‘signature of all things’, Enlightenment epistemology of the seventeenth and eighteenth century provided a critique of the Secret as the object of knowledge by questioning the ‘design conception of nature’. For it was recognised that there need be neither an inner preformed truth hidden in the ‘recesses of the mind’ to discover nor an outer truth craftily embedded in nature. This critique undermined both torture and spying as models of truth revealing. On the one side, it was pointed out by Beccarria that torture, instead of revealing the truth, invariably made the body in pain susceptible to any suggestion, hence the ‘knowledge’ gained from the tortured is tainted and can as easily be false as true. Torture produced confessions, but they were all too often confessions of production (Beccarria, 1963). On the other side, spying presumed the ability to provide a non-interpretive and non-interactive channel between the object (the content of the secret) and the subject of knowledge. Yet it was realised that knowledge of the human universe, at least, was always interpretative and interactive. Spying, instead of being the path to truth, simply led to an illusion of objective knowledge.

Thus, according to most post-similitude epistemologies, the pain of torture and the expensive illusions that knowledge can be generated from one-way interactions create high costs for any citizenry to pay. Not simply because torture is a violation of the most basic concepts of human rights and spying is a fundamental desecration of the minimum trust necessary for all social scientific work. The US government’s presentation of its enemy as an almost cartoon-like Satanic nemesis and itself as a sanctified being is setting up a situation that can not lead to the powerful knowledge necessary to create the conditions for the end of terror on all sides.

Therefore, given the horrendous experience that Africa and Africans have experienced with torture and spying in the past, it would be inconceivable that any scholarly organisation involved in African Studies would ever collaborate with any such an enterprise, however it presented itself.

Against Mercenary Academics

The new war on terrorism conditions of academic work in Africa imposed by the US government are becoming mortally dangerous for US academics who abhor torture and spying, but who are increas-
ingly being confused with the mercenary intellectuals that are now like the contract workers in Iraq: ‘enemy combatants’ for the ‘war on terrorism’s’ opponents.

One way to deal with this problematic is to end the torture and spying implicit in the war on terrorism (cf. ACAS’s Petition ‘Resolution on the Study of Africa After 9/11’ on its web site: acas.prairienet.org). That, of course, is the basis of the various efforts meant to repeal the USA Patriot Act: to protest the denial of visas to politically involved intellectuals who have been invited to speak in the US, and to reject funding for research that is financed by the CIA, the Defense Department and other organs of US imperialism. However, this is going to take some time to accomplish and, given the result of the recent election, it is possible that it will take years.

Many US-based researchers, however, do not have years to wait. Some are in the midst of research efforts in Africa and others have Africa as their real home. They need to be able to differentiate themselves from their mercenary cousins in the eyes of Africans. How are they to do this? Whenever situations like this have developed a ‘natural’ solution followed: a process of differentiation of intereners that would be guaranteed by a trusted institution much like the Red Cross or Red Crescent (at least in most situations). In other words, the institution in question applies a credentialising seal that guarantees to the observer (or even the participants) that the researcher in question is not a mercenary in the pay of the military or intelligence services of a government. A way to separate science from the state or academic research from purported knowledge based on espionage and torture is desperately needed.

This suggestion is, of course, not so far fetched. After all, most universities’ code of ethics for research explicitly rule out any projects that even hint that they employ torture and espionage. The problem is that universities increasingly are being brought into the circle of the ‘war on terrorism’ just as, during the Cold War, universities winked an eye on questionable projects that violated (sometimes scandalously) professional academic ethics in the name of national security. What is required is an institution (something like an accrediting agency) that would vet projects and investigators and declare that they are not in violation of a code of ethics that explicitly prohibits the use of espionage and torture as part of its procedures and that the results of its research would be publicly accessible, especially to the subjects of the research. Can the ASA fulfill this role? If the ASA can not do it, what organization can?

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Endnotes

1. This paper was a contribution to a Roundtable on Attacks on Academic Freedom, Free Speech, and Free Press sponsored by the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (ACAS) during the African Studies Association meetings in New Orleans on 12 November 2004.

2. ‘The Manhattan Project’ was code name for the U.S. government effort to build a nuclear fission bomb during the Second World War. Due to security concerns, the development of the weapon was divided into many different tasks that were assigned to geographically separated teams whose members were supposed to know neither the ultimate purpose of their contribution nor the identity of the other teams involved.
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Zimbabwe’s Hide & Seek with the IMF: Imperialism, Nationalism & the South African Proxy

Patrick Bond

Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe’s 2005 fight with the International Monetary Fund illustrates adverse power relations in which financial pressure is specifically applied in the interests of economic (not political) liberalisation. However, whereas the IMF has no confessed interest in human rights and political freedom (and demonstrated as much in late 1990s Zimbabwe), Pretoria’s discourses do include good governance rhetoric. Combining pro-market and (surface-level) pro-democracy arguments allows Thabo Mbeki to serve as proxy for the IMF, which above all wants repayment on vast arrears, but which also insists on the full range of Washington consensus policy changes. To make those changes would undercut Mugabe’s patronage system, and might also generate popular unrest.

For South Africa, meanwhile, the objective appears to be an elite transition that keeps Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union/Patriotic Front (Zanu/PF) party in power after his retirement, maintains the splintering Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) as a token opposition, and imposes severe cuts in the social wage on the citizenry while opening the door for bargain sales of Zimbabwean assets to South African bargain basement shoppers. Yet contradictions in these projects occasionally appear, and it remains for the beleaguered left social forces to take advantage of the extraordinary opportunity to press home the critique of both international finance and regional sub-imperialism.

In southern Africa, the Bretton Woods Institutions have become sufficiently notorious within the political intelligentsia as to attract these words from leading African National Congress official Sidney Mufamadi (2005):

As we speak, the neoliberal orthodoxy sits as a tyrant on the throne of political-economic policymaking. The dominant social and economic forces are doing their utmost to hegemonise the discourse – both materially and in respect of how developmental processes are to be institutionalised and theorised. Among other things, they use such transnational governmental organisations as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation to shape the discourse within which policies are defined, the terms and concepts that circumscribe what can be thought and done.

This quote is worth keeping in mind, in part because of its author’s own close comprehension of World Bank activity in South Africa. That point we return to in the conclusion, but it serves to introduce the question of how the region’s dominant social and economic forces intend to hegemonise political transition in Zimbabwe. One objective is to bring the IMF back into play as a policy determinant, for the first time since 1999. Indeed, recall that a decade ago, Robert Mugabe’s regime was a successful protégé of Washington financiers. The World Bank (1995:23) gave his government the highest possible rating in its scorecard of neoliberal orthodoxy: ‘highly satisfactory’.

This judgment followed fifteen years of arm-twisting by the Bank and IMF, culminating in the 1990-95 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and a crash of both manufacturing and the social wage. As a result mainly of popular resistance, things began to go badly wrong for Harare’s elites soon thereafter. From 1996 to 2000, a series of overlapping worker/peasant/student/war veteran rebellions became a serious threat to
the ruling Zanu (PF) party. Mugabe adopted a zig-zag political-economic ‘policy’ based on a mix of carrots and sticks, combining frontal attacks on poor and working-class urban Zimbabweans with fiery anti-imperialist rhetoric.¹

At the heart of Harare’s fiscal crisis are Mugabe’s expensive carrots to disgruntled sections of society: large new pensions for tens of thousands of Liberation War vets (previously ignored or repressed) from September 1997; periodic payolas of various kinds to the army and police, including licence to loot the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the late 1990s civil war; on-again/off-again price controls from 1998 in order to prevent further ‘IMF Riots’ (which had broken out periodically during the 1990s); occasional gifts to key constituents during the early 2000s, such as very inexpensive rural electricity; and state-sponsored land invasions immediately following Mugabe’s defeat in a constitutional referendum in February 2000, as the opposition MDC became a threatening electoral force. The sticks we learned much more about during 2005; they don’t need recounting in detail, but include, in the words of South African Communist Party (SACP) general secretary Blade Nzimande (2005):

> ‘the wanton destruction of homes and community facilities’ for more than a million of the urban poor, and ‘anti-democratic legislation, including legislation directed against the right to assembly and against media freedom’.

**Durable Nationalism**

Mugabe’s alliances have generally been maintained the past five years, and both external and internecine rebellions have been crushed. Regular predictions that the ruling party will fragment - mainly due to ethnic factionalism - have never reached fruition. After three decades of control over Zanu (PF) and six years’ experience harassing a strong opposition party, Mugabe has an even stronger grip on his politburo. Evidence of his dominance during this period includes the expulsion, demotion or jailing of figures with substantial regional or sectoral powerbases, such as the giant old stalwarts Ndabaningi Sithole, Joshua Nkomo and Enos Nkala (1980s); failed party reformers Edgar Tekere, Eddison Zvobgo and Margaret Dongo (1990s); and tycoon Philip Chiyangwa, finance minister Chris Kuruneri, chief spokesman Jonathan Moyo and parliamentary speaker Emmerson Mnangagwa (2000s).

However, with Mugabe apparently now unable to raise basic hard currency for importing petrol, food and other vital necessities, the time is ripe for the next stage of what might be termed ‘exhausted nationalism’. When Simba Manyanya and I began using this phrase in 2002 (in *Zimbabwe’s Plunge*), as shorthand for Mugabe’s incapacity to deliver a higher standard of living, it was not clear that the nationalist project could be reinvigorated, at least in a manner the masses would find compelling. We cited Frantz Fanon’s (1963:204) *Wretched of the Earth*:

> A bourgeoisie that provides nationalism alone as food for the masses fails in its mission and gets caught up in a whole series of mishaps. But if nationalism is not made explicit, if it is not enriched and deepened by a very rapid transformation into a consciousness of social and political needs, in other words into humanism, it leads up a blind alley. The bourgeois leaders of underdeveloped countries imprison national consciousness in sterile formalism.

The problem of ‘exhausted nationalism’ also applies to South Africa, where SACP deputy secretary Jeremy Cronin once famously translated it as the ‘Zanufication’ of the ANC (he was hurriedly forced to apologise) (Sheehan, 2002). In turn, this is why the vigorous debate now underway on lending to Mugabe is
For it appears that Mbeki and the IMF have, to borrow the quote above, successfully shaped the discourse within which policies are defined, and indeed a proposed loan of $500 million from South Africa to Zimbabwe may circumscribe what can be thought and done. A reported $160 million of that was originally earmarked to repay the IMF, with the rest ostensibly for importing (from South Africa) agricultural inputs and petroleum. According to Pretoria spokesperson Joel Netshitenzhe, the loan could ‘benefit Zimbabwean people as a whole, within the context of their program of economic recovery and political normalisation’ (SAPA 2005a).

Much of the debate in South Africa concerns whether Pretoria is putting sufficient – or indeed any – pressure on Harare to reform, as Netshitenzhe refused to clarify speculation that both political and economic liberalisation would be conditions for the proposed loan.

Mugabe spokesperson George Charamba revealed the process on 14 August:

We never asked for any money from South Africa. It was the World Bank that approached Mbeki and said please help Zimbabwe. They then offered to help us (Mberi, 2005).

A Pretoria-based Bank economist, Lollete Kritzinger-van Niekerk, confirmed that her institution ‘is not ready to thaw relations with the ostracised Harare’ (Njini, 2005). Other reports – in the usually unreliable but consistently pro-government Herald – claimed that a top IMF official and a US diplomat also needed a backchannel. According to the IMF’s own Press Clips news service (18 August 2005):

The issue of the proposed loan from South Africa to Zimbabwe has taken a new twist amid relations that the US government approached South African president Thabo Mbeki to bail out Zimbabwe, The Herald

(Zimbabwe) reported yesterday. A highly-placed Western diplomat in South Africa, who is closely following the deal, told that IMF deputy managing director Anne O. Krueger approached President Mbeki and asked him to advance financial support to Zimbabwe ahead of the IMF summit set for next month, The Herald (Zimbabwe) reported yesterday.

The diplomat said Ms. Krueger made her move in the run-up to the African Union summit in Sirte, Libya, which was held from July 4 to 6. Ms Krueger is reported to have told President Mbeki that a South African loan would enable Harare to pay its dues to the IMF and, in so doing, strengthen the case against Zimbabwe’s expulsion from the institution. President Mbeki, the source said, was surprised that a high-ranking IMF official could make a case for Zimbabwe. However, Ms Krueger is reported to have pointed out that South Africa would lose more from Zimbabwe’s expulsion since no other country would want to assist Zimbabwe after that, and this would have a negative effect on the South African economy.

Notwithstanding some mildly adverse impacts on investor confidence and refugees, whether Zimbabwe’s ongoing economic crash is entirely negative to South Africa remains disputed. As Dale Mckinley (2004) has pointed out, a weakened Zimbabwe has merits for both Johannesburg capital and Pretoria politicians. In October 2005, Fitch ratings director Veroncia Kalema remarked to the Financial Mail that Zimbabwe ‘is a small economy. It could collapse and South Africa would be fine.’ The same article quoted Harare-based business economist Tony Hawkins on the ‘up-side’, namely, that:

South Africa has gained market share in exports, tourism and services. SA’s share of investment in Zimbabwe has also risen as there has been an element of bargain-basement buying by some mining and industrial groups. SA is also taking
significant skills from the country, especially scarce black skills in health, education, banking, engineering and IT. It would be too much to say that SA has benefited in net terms, but there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that it is securing some gains from the crisis (Bisseker & Ryan, 2005).

Whatever the net benefits of SA-Zimbabwe economic relations, there is obviously no political ‘normalisation’ under way, if by which is meant Mugabe’s agreement to hold serious democratisation talks with the MDC, to run genuinely free and fair elections, to unban the media and revoke extremist laws, to recall fascistic security forces to the barracks, and to provide emergency food and shelter in a non-politicised manner to the millions who urgently require it. In any case, Mbeki has repeatedly shown that these objectives are unimportant: by propping up Mugabe in the United Nations Human Rights Commission, by public commentary downplaying repression and vote theft, by silence at key junctures and by sending biased observation teams to monitor elections (Bond, 2004). Mugabe himself publicly rejected even the idea of negotiating seriously with the MDC.

Setting the fake ‘reform’ rhetoric aside, what is instead revealed by the current crisis is another of Fanon’s insights, namely that Zanu (PF’s) sterile formalism now sharply contradicts further capital accumulation by Zimbabwe’s parasitical ruling class, a key faction of which desperately requires foreign exchange. (All Zimbabweans need foreign exchange, of course, just to spark their bone-dry carburettors, and to acquire essential medicines, spare parts, agricultural inputs, and manufactured goods that are no longer made by local firms following the 1990s de-industrialisation.) For the impoverished Zimbabwean masses, the povo, there is no economic bailout on the horizon, much less democratic leverage, only a choice of which financiers will worsen austerity in future years: the predictable money mandarins of Washington, or the new sub-imperialists of Pretoria, backed by a gullible media and superficially critical opposition parties, or both.

The IMF & Zimbabwe’s Povo

Consider the first lot, the Bretton Woods Institutions. Beginning in September 1980, when Zimbabwe formally joined, the role of the IMF was never to benefit ‘Zimbabwean people as a whole’. Five examples are illustrative (details are in Bond 1998):

1) By early 1982, finance minister Bernard Chidzero – later to head the IMF/Bank Development Committee – denied that ‘the IMF would impose any conditions as Zimbabwe was already restructuring its economy.’ Though it was ‘a sensitive issue not for public debate,’ Chidzero made statements to Parliament claiming ‘devaluation of the dollar is not imminent and is not being contemplated.’ Less than three months later, Chidzero announced a 20% decline in the currency, admitting it ‘had been under consideration for some months.’

2) In late 1982, interest rates were raised dramatically, a move Chidzero pointed out with pride to the World Bank in private correspondence.

3) In March 1983, an editorial by the government-owned Herald observed that ‘Zimbabwe has a democratically elected people’s government and therefore, the people, its supporters have the right to know what the IMF asked of this country.’

4) By 1984, Zimbabwe was paying vast proportions of export earnings to cover foreign loans, in part because of apartheid destabilisation of the region. As York University economist Colin Stone- man put it at the time: ‘there can be no doubt that Zimbabwe’s payments crisis
was partly caused by South Africa, and that this was the means whereby the IMF gained a lever on Zimbabwean economic policy.

5) The IMF soon terminated its $315 million line of credit due to Harare’s budget overruns, forcing more painful austerity. By early 1985, Mugabe complained of ‘pressure from the IMF to cut government spending on education and defence but the government has a way of overcoming this pressure’. Yet within a few years, Zimbabwe’s vaunted education programme was indeed under threat as Bretton Woods cost-recovery policies gained momentum.

The Bretton Woods Institutions applied neoliberalism across a variety of sectors, and maintained heavy pressure on Mugabe to continue the ineffectual ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ rural land policy. At a July 2005 land conference in South Africa, Mbeki told the audience that Zimbabwe’s failure to embark upon land redistribution prior to the chaotic takeovers of 4,000 white-owned farms from February 2000, was because ‘They slowed down to get the negotiations in this country to succeed’ since South Africa’s white farmers would be ‘frightened’ about the transition to democracy (News24.com 2005).

In reality, Harare’s 1993 Land Designation Act was ‘shelved,’ as Zanu (PF) member of parliament Lazarus Nzarayebani complained in late 1994, because ‘it is not in conformity with the World Bank and IMF’ and instead served government only ‘to save its face’ (Financial Gazette, 9 February 1995). In fact, South Africa’s first ANC land minister, Derek Hanekom, invited the same World Bank team that was preventing Zimbabwe’s land reform during the early 1990s, led by Robert Christenson, to guide post-apartheid policy. (That policy was also characterised by willing seller, willing buyer neoliberalism, and was publicly recognised as a failure at the state-sponsored land summit.) What of the last batch of IMF credits to Zimbabwe? Did these contribute to the welfare of all Zimbabweans and promote peace and democracy? The opposite conclusion is more logical. The IMF’s $53 million loan in 1999 was meant to release another $800 million from other lenders. The IMF’s stated objectives were straightforward: reversal of both the luxury import tax and price controls on staple foods. Details were confirmed in a March 1999 statement by leading IMF negotiator Michael Nowak:

There are two issues outstanding and these have stopped the IMF from making the standby credit available to the country. These issues are, one, we want the government to reduce the tariffs slapped on luxury goods last September, and second, we also want the government to give us a clear timetable as to when and how they will remove the price controls they have imposed on some goods (Financial Gazette, 12 March 1999).

Five months later, the IMF agreed to increase the loan amount to $200 million, but two more conditions were reportedly added: access to classified Democratic Republic of Congo war information and a commitment to pay new war expenditure from the existing budget. According to an IMF official,

The Zimbabweans felt offended, shocked, but they all the same agreed to give us the information, we got all the clarification we wanted. They had no choice … We have had assurances [that] if there is budgetary overspending, there will be cuts in other budget sectors (SAPA, 1999).

In sum, the IMF gave permission to penalise health, education and other badly-defended sectors on behalf of Mugabe’s military adventures and business cronies, and also ordered Mugabe to immediately reverse the only redistributive policies he had adopted in a long time: a) a ban on holding foreign
exchange accounts in local banks (which immediately halted the easiest form of capital flight by the country’s elites); b) a 100% customs tax on imported luxury goods; and c) price controls on staple foods in the wake of several urban riots. That deal quickly fell apart, however, when fiscal targets were missed. Harare was, quite simply, broke. The previous year, Mugabe had spent an historically-unprecedented 38% of export earnings on servicing foreign loans, exceeded that year only by Brazil and Burundi. With foreign debt at $4.92 billion, fully $980 million was repaid to foreign creditors, while donor aid fell from its 1995 peak of $310 million to just $150 million. But due to compound interest rates, barely a dent was made in the total foreign debt outstanding.

The IMF continued giving advice to impose austerity, both from its Harare office and via periodic high-level missions from Washington. The 2000 mission called for ‘tight monetary and wage policies … privatisation, civil service reform and trade liberalisation,’ according to the Herald (9 December 2000) newspaper. By mid-2001, finance minister Simba Makoni confessed to the Southern Africa regional session of the World Economic Forum in Durban:

We are committed to fulfilling these obligations, but it’s clear that our economy is in no state to generate sufficient funds to clear these arrears (Financial Gazette, 14 June 2001).

As a result, by mid-2005, Mugabe had run up repayment arrears of $295 million to the IMF, and more than $1 billion to other lenders, including the World Bank and African Development Bank. The total foreign debt that is either in arrears or will come due in the next decade is $4.5 billion, far more than the national GDP in a given year.

Was Zimbabwe punished for failing to make the most foreign debt payments since 1999? To almost everyone’s surprise, Mugabe was able to get away with the de facto default. No new long-term credit has been available, to be sure, but nor did the US Marines or other hostile military forces invade so to collect collateral, as was the practice a century earlier against defaulting Latin American countries. Instead, once Zimbabwe fell into deep arrears to the IMF, a convoluted official procedure began, culminating in the threat of expulsion. From 2001, the Zimbabwean finance ministry scrounged $1.4 million each quarter to make token payments on the debt, but from mid-2003 through 2004 found $16.5 million to send the IMF. This was also the point at which Zimbabwe ran out of petrol and many other essential imports.

Diplomatic Scuffle

By August 2005, Mbeki assumed that his offer of a $500 million credit could influence the course of an elite transition, aiming at installing a neoliberal, low-intensity democracy regime. That model would slightly sideline Mugabe by 2008 at the latest; permit Zanu (PF) to retain power – possibly in a government of unity by coopting MDC leaders – with the friendlier face of a technocratic president (the neoliberal former finance minister Makoni is usually tipped for the job) even if Mugabe still controlled the ruling party itself; and then open the economic borders up much more to Johannesburg capital.

Mugabe didn’t play along. Showing an impressive resilience and desire to hold on to maximum power at all cost, he visited China in August and then snubbed Mbeki in a brutal diplomatic manner. At an African Union (AU) meeting in Addis Ababa, according to the Sunday Independent (Fabricius, 2005),

Mugabe built an alliance of other leaders to defeat a South African tactical move to win two permanent seats for Africa on the United Nations security council …
Mugabe, Egypt and others spoke out against a compromise deal which South Africa had helped forge between the AU and the so-called G4, a coalition of four other nations seeking permanent seats on the security council – Germany, Japan, India and Brazil. Mbeki argued strongly at the AU summit in Addis Ababa in favour of the compromise as the only realistic way to get Africa permanent seats. But the Mugabe camp prevailed.

The summit rejected the compromise deal that AU and G4 foreign ministers, including SA’s Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, agreed on at a meeting in London … Mugabe and others argued against this, saying the lack of a veto would relegate African permanent members to ‘second-class status’.

During apartheid, differential voting power was always the basis for ANC and other democrats’ traditional insistence on ‘one person, one vote in a unitary state’, and their rejection of gimmicks such as the 1983 TriCameral Parliament (which reduced Indians and Coloured people to second class observer status and left out Africans entirely). Mbeki has periodically spoken out against what he terms ‘global apartheid’ yet often accepts unprincipled global reforms (Bond, 2004). Fortunately, the second-class citizenship he sought in the UN Security Council was not offered at the September 2005 heads of state summit. Hence, a more serious fight can be waged at some stage, instead of legitimising a UN under Washington’s thumb. This brings us back, though, to Mbeki’s vision that the IMF can be a vehicle for normalisation. As Nzimande (2005) reported to a Congress of SA Trade Unions central committee, the SACP was extremely concerned about the danger of a loan amounting to little more than extending the crisis-ridden shelf-life of anti-worker, anti-poor authoritarian policies and practices. We call on our own government to show the maximum resolve in ensuring that there are very clear requirements attached to any loan. These requirements must include guarantees that the loan will not be squandered on elite consumption or repression. But the requirements must also embrace a much wider package of commitments with clear time-lines … These wider issues are, in fact, essential for resolving the present financial crisis.

Pay the Piper, Ignoring the Tune?

And then Mugabe pulled a card from his sleeve no one thought he had: in September 2005 he came up with $135 million from having scrounged all foreign currency available, and paid the IMF a substantial downpayment, enough to earn a six-month reprieve on the expulsion threat (after the September payments, outstanding IMF debt was $160 million). Mugabe promised $50 million more by March 2006, and vowed to repay the full amount. (No one outside Pretoria really believes the IMF would expel Zimbabwe, given that China and many African regimes would oppose this in the IMF executive, where 15% of the vote would be enough to veto such a move.)

By all accounts, this was an irrational and costly gesture. Even high-profile business spokespersons who are ordinarily most aggrieved by Mugabe’s dirigisme were opposed to the payment, in part because rumours suggest the Reserve Bank raided Harare capital’s foreign exchange accounts. Conservative economic commentator John Robertson complained,

This is just diverting foreign currency from exporters to the IMF at an enormous cost. We are starving local producers of hard currency and this is exacerbating the problem (Zimonline, 2005).

Former Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries leader Eddie Cross (2005a, b) explained:
You have the specter of this smashed and abused country – like a mugged man lying in the street and being run over by the passing traffic – actually paying money to the IMF. Money taken from private schools and NGO’s, food agencies and exporters. $50,000 here, a million there. Money critically required for food, drugs, fuel – all basic necessities and the IMF has the audacity to welcome the payments! Shown the source of the funds they express shock and promise to investigate – but they still bank the cheques. I wrote to the Fund and said send the money back – we need the stuff more than you do to keep life and limb together – not even the courtesy of a reply …

Why is the IMF debt so important? The reality is that it is not that important. Paying our arrears to the Fund would not change our status one iota – we could not expect IMF support for any sort of stabilisation programme for some considerable time after the issue of the arrears has been dealt with and a workable recovery programme put in place. No, the reason why the IMF threat was finally treated with such deference is mainly political. African leaders – struggling with their image abroad and with economic and financial problems at home, did not want to see an African State expelled for misbehavior … And so we have the specter of the Zanu (PF) regime contradicting itself with respect to the IMF issue. One minute they do not matter and can ‘go to hell’. The next we are scouring the country for our last remaining sources of foreign exchange to make a meaningless payment to the Fund which will ensure that we are not expelled but are then left with insufficient resources to import essentials like food.

To make sense of Harare’s willingness to pay the IMF, peer pressure from Mbeki was certainly a factor, but the initial refusal of Pretoria’s $500 million loan suggests that Mugabe’s ego is so large, that he ignored the extraordinary sacrifices being made by his citizens over the prior months (with nearly every basic commodity in short supply), simply to massage his pride at repaying the IMF. Yet that pride also required repetition of the requisite anti-imperialist sentiments, including this statement during a visit to Havana a few days after making the first ($120 million) payment:

> We have never been friends of the IMF and we shall never be friends of the IMF. The IMF is never of real assistance to developing countries. It is wielded by the big powers. It is the big powers which dictate what it should do (Reuters, 2005a).

The obvious waste of such vast sums of hard currency on an institution that is never of real assistance was not, unfortunately, immediately capitalised upon by civil society activists, particularly the Zimbabwe Social Forum and the Zimbabwe Debt and Development Coalition. These groups were the two main hosts for the Southern African Social Forum and kept a low profile in order to gain permission for 3,000 local and regional activists to visit Harare municipal gardens from 12-14 October. That meeting itself developed an extremely militant rhetorical attack on regional neo-liberalism, and may decisively shift the African Social Forum to the left. Perhaps the confidence gained in the process will also translate into future protests against further IMF loan repayments (as was promised in one Social Forum workshop session hosted by the National Constitutional Assembly), but also a more robust social critique of Reserve Bank governor Gideon Gono’s radical rejigging of monetary policy in line with IMF and South African desires (in late October, the Zimbabwe dollar was devalued overnight from Z$26,000/US$ to Z$80,000/US$, to more closely correspond with the black market rate).

Meanwhile, on the same day Mugabe spoke out against the IMF in Cuba, the Movement for Democratic Change issued a pro-IMF statement. The MDC
South African government officials were also surprised by Mugabe’s payment, and over the subsequent weeks continued to maintain that negotiations for the additional $500 million were on track, merely delayed. The Cabinet had made one other similar loan to a country primarily so as to repay the IMF, three years earlier. It was Joseph Kabila’s unelected regime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the $45 million loan by Pretoria which allowed Kabila to clear enough of the old Mobutu arrears that a new IMF mission could enter Kinshasa and impose further liberalisation, in turn disproportionately benefiting South African capital. The Mobutu debts should be declared ‘Odious’ in international law, but their payment by Pretoria gained Kabila a new IMF credit, at the cost of renewed IMF control over the Congolese people (Bond, 2002).

The extent of Mbeki’s own commitment to getting the IMF back into Zimbabwe was revealed on 15 October. Addressing a forum of African editors, he explained:

We had indeed said that we were ready to assist, and the reason we wanted to assist was because we understood the implications of Zimbabwe’s expulsion from the IMF. What it would mean, among other things, is that everybody who is owed something by Zimbabwe would demand immediately to be paid. You would even get to a situation where they would seize anything that was being exported out of Zimbabwe because of that debt (Reuters, 2005b)

In reality, the IMF has never acquired much less used such power, but the hyperbole is telling. Private creditors presently dealing with Zimbabwe have various forms of security, because the government’s likelihood of nonpayment has been demonstrated for six years already. Instead, to explain Mbeki’s stance on the IMF and Zimbabwe, it is worth returning to our opening quote. It was Mbeki’s local government minister,
Sidney Mufamadi, who in April 2005 warned that the Bretton Woods Institutions mold ‘the discourse within which policies are defined, the terms and concepts that circumscribe what can be thought and done.’ Consider Mufamadi’s own borrowing from the World Bank in a loan that directly places Bretton Woods advisors in dozens of municipalities. The World Bank (2005) website explains:

The Municipal Financial Management Technical Assistance Project, totaling $15 million is the only active World Bank loan to South Africa. It supports the building of financial management capacity in more than 40 key municipalities around the country. The World Bank country office is also supporting the government in … [its] oversight role in municipal public/private partnerships.

On the same site, the Bank brags about its ‘support to Johannesburg’s iGoli’ (the city’s privatisation policy), allegedly a ‘model’ for South Africa. In reality, Africa’s largest water corporatisation quickly became a world-renowned site of brutal disconnections, prepaid meters and sub-standard sanitation for low-income townships – as well as heroic resistance by the Anti-Privatisation Forum and Jubilee South Africa, which combined to protest Paul Wolfowitz’s Johannesburg visit in July.

In contrast to activists, the key politicians prefer to ‘talk left, walk right’. Once we dispense with the rhetoric, this surreal financial game of hide-and-seek with the IMF unveils imperial/sub-imperial/dictatorial power relations uniting Washington, Pretoria and Harare. It remains for critics of the regimes to pursue a democratic, anti-neoliberal strategy – and too, for international protest against the Bretton Woods Institutions to now intensify.

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Endnotes

1. For background on neoliberalism and Mugabe’s rhetorical leftism, see, e.g., Phimister and Raftopoulos (2004); Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004); Bond and Manyanya (2003); Campbell (2003); Manyanya, (2003); Moore. (2003); Yeros (2002); Raftopoulos and Sachikonye (2001); Yeros (2001); Ajulu (2001); Dashwood (2000); and Poverty Reduction Forum and Institute for Development Studies (2000), Zimbabwe: Human Development Report 1999, Harare.

2. A few days later, MDC shadow finance minister Tapiwa Mashakada announced, ‘It’s high time that the government restore economic cooperation with multilateral lending institutions and pursue rational policies so that investment comes in.’

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Briefings

The Shifting Terrain of Land Reform in South Africa: The National Land Summit, July 2005

Ruth Hall

From 27-31 July 2005, the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs in South Africa hosted a National Land Summit, under the official slogan ‘a partnership to fast-track land reform: a new trajectory, forward to 2014’. The event witnessed the most significant public debate on land reform in the past five years. At the heart of the debate were the deficiencies of the current market-based approach and the extent to which the state should confront the vested interests of landowners by proactively negotiating for the purchase of land and, where this does not yield results, expropriate property.

The gathering, which took place in Johannesburg, was attended by 1,500 delegates from across the country, including representatives of political parties, government departments, churches, white and black farmers, farm workers, land claimants, rural non-governmental organisations (NGOs), banks and academics.

Background to the Summit

The call for a land summit has been a demand of the Landless People’s Movement (LPM) since its formation. At the National Land Tenure Conference held by government in 2001, the Minister promised to hold such a summit at which the fundamentals of policy would be revisited. Since then, the continued slow progress of land reform has given weight to the view that policy needs to be revised: while government reiterates its target of transferring 30% of white agricultural land into black ownership through land reform by 2014, after ten years less than 4% had been redistributed.

Debate on land policy has been characterised by a stand-off between government and landowners insisting on adherence to market-based land reform and rejection of this policy from large quarters of civil society. Many participants expected to see a re-enactment of this at the Summit, but the tone set on the first day broke new ground.

A Surprising Start

In their opening speeches, both the Deputy President, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka and the Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza, declared that the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ principle underpinning the current market-based approach was a key impediment to improving the pace of land reform and would need to be reviewed. The Minister acknowledged that the resources available have been inadequate, argued that the state should be a ‘market-maker’ and influence price determination, and asked the Summit to address the option of proactive land acquisition by the state. At the gala dinner on the first evening of the Summit, the Deputy Minister Dirk du Toit declared in his speech: ‘Today we have buried willing buyer, willing seller’. The next few days saw convergence at a
rhetorical level but ongoing uncertainty about what this would mean in practice.

**Preparations for the Summit**

In the run-up to the Summit, 25 organisations – NGOs, landless groups and the South African Communist Party (SACP) – embarked on discussions to identify substantive policy proposals as well as demands for a more consultative process of policy making beyond the Summit. As at previous national conferences, civil society organisations attempted to build a unified front around common policy demands, and submitted a joint memorandum to the Summit under the name of the newly formed Alliance for Land and Agrarian Reform Movements (ALARM). ALARM prioritised six key demands:

1) Scrap willing buyer, willing seller market-based land reform;
2) Commit to using expropriation actively and aggressively;
3) Re-open the date for restitution claims;
4) Declare a moratorium on all evictions;
5) Review the Communal Land Rights Act;
6) Commit to a consultative and democratic post-Summit process.

Daily ALARM caucuses during the Summit attempted to reflect on the day’s proceedings and to strategise and prepare pamphlets itemizing further demands for the coming day. Despite internal tensions and ideological differences, ALARM played a role in shaping the terms of the debate.

The National Summit was also preceded by provincial ‘Pre-Summits’, from which official reports were forwarded to the national event and provincial delegations were selected by the national ministry rather than elected. The degree of engineering of the process led to a degree of skepticism in civil society; some feared that it would be a window-dressing exercise aimed to defuse the demand for a Summit precisely by having one. However, the event was more fundamental than many had expected.

**Plenary Proceedings**

Although there had been little agreement in the provinces, the provincial reports tabled by agriculture ministers from each of the nine provinces reiterated a number of ‘decisions’ that echoed the demands of ALARM: an end to the willing buyer, willing seller approach; a moratorium on land purchases by foreigners; a moratorium on evictions from farms; and the re-opening of the restitution claims process.

International guests presented experiences with land reform, including from Zimbabwe, Kenya and Namibia. Arguably the most influential was a description of the Brazilian experience, which combines a market-assisted process of credit-based land purchases with a land occupation campaign by social movements. In the South African context where the debate has become polarised between those espousing the market as the only means of redistribution and those rejecting any purchasing of land from current owners for redistribution, the Brazilian experience suggested that the two need not be mutually exclusive. This input also endorsed the value to society of promoting small ‘family farms’ and added legitimacy to the view that, given a conducive environment, this sector can contribute substantially to the national economy.

The Summit was not without drama. ALARM tried to prevent the representative of the World Bank from speaking by distributing pamphlets calling on delegates to ‘Rise up and protest the World Bank!’ and interrupting his speech by using a particularly South African cul-
tural weapon: the toyi-toyi (militant protest dance), accompanied by enthusiastic singing. However, when he did eventually speak he promoted a number of demands tabled by civil society, including land taxes, subdivision of large farms, any selective expropriation – while still adhering to a ‘negotiated’ and market-based approach to land acquisition. The debate was clearly becoming more nuanced.

After two days of speeches by politicians, political parties, academics and international guests, delegates moved into commissions to discuss the three pillars of land reform: restitution, redistribution and tenure reform.

**Restitution**

A substantial number of delegates at the Land Summit were from rural communities claiming back their land through the restitution programme, and impatient with the pace of the process. Also present were people who had returned to their land but were disillusioned with the impact of restitution on their livelihoods. The restoration of rights to land had not led to development in the manner they had anticipated. A further grievance was the exclusion of those who had not submitted their claims before the deadline at the end of 1998. Resolutions of the Summit on land restitution were as follows.

**Pace of settling land claims:** It was widely agreed that the pace of settling claims was unacceptably slow; although most claims are now settled, the resolution of rural claims, most of which have not been tackled, must be expedited.

**Land acquisition:** There was a call for the state to negotiate more aggressively with current landowners for the purchase of land under claim and, where they are unwilling to accept the state’s offer to purchase, expropriate. Whether expropriation would speed up the settlement of claims was a moot point; bureaucratic delays have also held up the process.

**The debate about dates:** the Summit resolved that the lodgment process should be re-opened to those eligible claimants who missed the deadline in 1998 because they were unaware of, or misinformed about, the process. This clear demand tended to be conflated with a call to review the parameters of the programme: some delegates called for the right to restitution to be extended to those whose forebears had been dispossessed prior to 1913 (the cut-off date for claims), as far back as the start of colonial occupation in 1652. Despite having popular appeal, this appeared to be something of a political red herring.

**Development support:** The Summit called for improved planning and support to claimants who have returned to their land, including the provision of infrastructure, agricultural training and creation of small enterprises. Where they enter into partnerships with private sector developers, the state should assist to guard against benefits accruing largely to commercial partners.

**Improved communication:** There was a strong call for better communication by the Commission with both claimants and landowners whose land is under claim.

**Content of rights:** Delegates objected to restitution being limited to land and argued for a holistic approach that would recognise the loss of other property rights, specifically mineral rights and rights to water and forests.

**Restitution Truth and Reconciliation Commission:** The Summit proposed that, to promote understanding and to bring healing and closure, a commission similar to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission should be established to hear people’s experiences of dispossession.
Redistribution

Market-based land reform in its South African incarnation has meant in practice that not only is there no compulsion on landowners to sell, but even where they are willing to do so, they can choose to whom they will sell. Delegates complained that land purchase grants were insufficient and that landowners have been able to inflate prices and in some instances have chosen not to sell to land reform applicants. A credible threat of expropriation, coupled with below-market compensation was deemed necessary to encourage landowners to agree to reasonable offers. The Summit proposed a new direction for land redistribution.

Proactive role of the state: With the exception of Agri South Africa (AgriSA), representing the established commercial farming sector, there was consensus on rejection of the willing buyer, willing seller principle, and a call for the state to become the driving force behind land redistribution. The alternative to willing buyer, willing seller was ‘proactive acquisition by the state in response to identified needs, through negotiated purchase and where necessary expropriation’. There was a call for less bureaucratic processes and substantially increased resources to be allocated to the programme, including for staffing, to enable state agencies to engage in active negotiation with land owners and to expropriate land where needed.

Regulating land markets: Various measures were proposed to regulate land markets to reverse the growing concentration of landholding, including a ceiling on the size of land holdings, a right of first refusal for the state on all sales of agricultural land, and imposition of a land tax to curb speculation and bring under-utilised land onto the market. These proposals were not unanimous; AgriSA contested all measures proposed. There was agreement on the need for proactive subdivision of farms to make available parcels of land appropriate to the needs of smallholders.

Who should benefit: Although the issue was not extensively debated, the Summit resolved that specific measures should be taken to target the poor, women, farm workers and the youth. Implicit in this was a rejection of land reform as a means of promoting a black commercial farming class – though most speakers felt that a wide range of land needs should be addressed.

Payment and compensation for land: There was rejection of paying market prices for land. Except for AgriSA, the Summit resolved that the provision in the Constitution to pay ‘just and equitable’ compensation should be used to justify below-market compensation, taking into account various factors including past subsidies to landowners. There was a minority view that the Constitution should be amended to allow for confiscation with no compensation, in cases where land is unused or under-utilised, and where landowners have been abusive of farm workers.

Moratorium on foreign land ownership: Although not debated, the Summit called for a moratorium on foreign ownership of agricultural land but allowing leasehold. Some participants called for the redistribution of land already owned by foreigners and reparations for profits from speculative land purchases.

Constitutional reform: There was a call to insert a ‘social obligations clause’ in the Constitution, which would legally protect landless people who occupy land that is unused, underutilized or owned by absentee landlords or landowners who have abused farm workers. As in Brazil, this would allow land occupations to be regularized through expropriation from the former owner and titling of the new occupants.
**Local government role:** Delegates agreed that municipalities must play an active role in land reform by identifying local needs, releasing municipal land, identifying land to meet needs and providing services and support to beneficiaries. Delegates proposed a register of land needs and a comprehensive audit of public and private land so that information on who owns what can be made publicly available. Local land forums to identify land needs would need to include landless people themselves, municipalities, the departments of land affairs and agriculture, and landowners.

**Municipal commonage:** There was a call for municipalities to stop allowing commercial farmers to use commonage land, and instead to promote access for poor people and ‘emerging farmers’ (black but not poor) to this public resource.

**Models of land use and development:** The Summit issued a call for policy to revisit the dominant models of land use and agriculture and to prioritise public support for small-scale agriculture by investing in coordinated and better-resourced ‘post-transfer support’, including training, extension services, access to market and to finance. There was a call for a moratorium on ‘elitist developments’, such as new golf courses and game farms – a call reiterated by the President, Thabo Mbeki, just weeks after the Summit.

**Tenure Reform**

The insecure rights of those living on land owned by others – farm workers, residents of communal areas and people in informal settlements – continues to be a major grievance despite the existence of tenure legislation. Recent research has shown ongoing dispossession: evictions from farms since 1994 exceed the number of people benefitting from land reform. The commission on tenure reform focused on the rights of farm dwellers.

**Legal reform:** The Summit called for the revision of both the laws regulating farm dwellers’ tenure rights – the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 and the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 2 of 1996. Other than AgriSA, participants called for a new law to strengthen the rights of tenants and occupiers, to protect the tenure of second-generation tenants, to separate tenure rights from the employment status of tenants so that job losses do not lead to evictions, and to create a class of ‘non-evictable occupiers’, including those born and brought up on the farm.

**Moratorium on evictions:** The Summit called for a moratorium on the eviction of farm dwellers until a new law and systems for its enforcement are in place, including legal aid and retraining of police and magistrates. Delegates also called for the enforcement of burial rights for people living on private farms, protection of tenants’ livestock, and for effective prosecution and suitable punishment of those violating farm dwellers rights. The moratorium was opposed by AgriSA which argued that legal evictions should continue to be allowed.

**Services and planning:** There was also a call for public service provision, and to end the stalemate in which municipalities refuse to provide basic services such as water and sanitation to farm dwellers because they reside on privately owned land.

**Land for farm dwellers:** The Summit resolved that farm dwellers must be prioritised for redistribution so that they can become farmers in their own right, by confirming their rights to land they already occupy and use, or by providing land elsewhere. AgriSA conceded that expropriation could be a measure of last resort in order to secure farm dwellers’ rights, though it is not clear that the majority of its membership would agree.
Overlooked Issues

Although there were general calls for support and training for new farmers, agricultural policy was not addressed directly. The Department of Agriculture co-hosted the event, and many of its senior officials were present, but the central question of the link between land redistribution and agrarian reform was elided. In this sense, the event had populist appeal by conceding substantial ground on the state’s role in land acquisition, without addressing how land reform relates to wider economic and social processes, and whether it is located within a broader process of agrarian reform. The Deputy President hinted at this more radical agenda when she argued that, in addressing the underdeveloped ‘second economy’, the state must restructure the developed ‘first economy’.

The burning question of who should benefit from land redistribution was similarly skirted. In the past few years, preference and additional resources have been given to those who have capital of their own or are able to access substantial loans. At stake is the relative weight that should be given to providing land to the poor for subsistence purposes and modest ‘family farms’ versus supporting the emergence of a black capitalist farming sector in the image of the white commercial sector. In the hurly-burly of debating the approach to land acquisition, this issue was not tackled. Land reform, it seemed, would continue to be a programme purporting to be all things to all people.

Reflections

The importance government attached to the Summit was evident in the presence of many senior African National Congress (ANC) party officials and an unannounced visit by President Thabo Mbeki on the second day. Commentators and government officials have explained the ANC’s increased priority on land reform as due to its expectation of being challenged on its track record of delivery in the upcoming local government elections.

Private sector interests appeared to be more marginal at the Summit than the voices of the landless. Government appeared to be playing to a different audience: progressive civil society and the broader public. The state’s embrace of populist rhetoric may mark a new era of blaming white farmers for the failings of land reform, although many shortcomings noted at the Summit were due to inappropriate policy, weak and bureaucratic institutions and insufficient funding. What remains to be seen is whether this merely amounts to defusing opposition by embracing its discourse while retaining the fundamentals of the existing policy direction.

Fast-track on Which Path?

The status of the Summit resolutions is now unclear. Resolutions were tabled in plenary and objections noted, but the Summit was abruptly drawn to a close a day early, and without the tabling of final resolutions. Since then, government has referred to them as recommendations. The ‘post-Summit’ process to which most parties committed themselves has not yet materialised. Despite the dramatic claims of the Summit to be charting out a new trajectory for ‘fast-track’ land reform – a surprising use of Zimbabwean terminology – government has gone quiet in the two months since the Summit and it is not clear which of the proposals will be taken forward, when, how, and whether there will be further public participation in policy development.

Conclusion

Policy decisions are not easily taken in a forum as large as diverse as the Summit but, to the extent that participation was
possible, there appeared to be substantial consensus on key shifts in policy. Agri South Africa (AgriSA) was the sole organisation that objected to the review of the willing buyer, willing seller approach, the payment of below-market prices for land and a moratorium on farm evictions – though they did not object in principle to the selective use of expropriation in the interests of land reform. The question of who should pay for land reform was hotly contested. AgriSA argued that, since land reform is in the national interest, the public as a whole should carry the cost and therefore that increased funding from the National Treasury is needed in order to expedite the process while paying full market prices.

There was widespread acknowledgement that the approaches used in the first decade of democracy have been inadequate and that new policies and strategies are now needed to improve both the pace and quality of land and agrarian reform. Despite contestation on a number of issues, the atmosphere of the Summit was constructive and may mark the start of a new phase of more positive relationships in the sector. The resolution of this high profile event to review the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ principle guiding land reform grabbed the attention of national and foreign media and has undoubtedly altered the political environment in which land reform will be debated and implemented. However, there is little consensus on what will take its place, and what future role the state will play in intervening in or overriding land markets in the interests of a more radical redistribution of land.

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Tanzania: Is This a Pro-poor Gender-sensitive Budget?

Marjorie Mbilinyi & Mary Rusimbi

Formally established in 1993, the Tanzanian Gender Networking Programme, TGNP, is a leading feminist activist organisation which promotes gender equity, women’s advancement and social transformation at all levels of society. Working closely with more than 40 activist national organisations in the Feminist Activist Coalition, FemAct, and a web of grassroots groups and district-level gender networks, TGNP has taken an increasingly high profile in challenging neo-liberal ideology and promoting public debate on macro economic policy and the growth of inequality and injustice in Tanzania and Africa as a whole. Composed of highly committed staff and members, TGNP works closely with activist organisations, the media, and other partners in civil society.

The budget review reproduced below was presented at the weekly Gender and Develop-
ment Seminar Series, a public forum which is conducted in the national language, Kiswahili, so as to facilitate full participation of grassroots women and men. Through close ties with the media, the brief was widely reproduced and reported on in the mass media, and backed up by interviews with working people, young women and men and activists of all ages. Budget reviews are a part of the Gender Budgeting Initiative led by TGNP and FemAct which seeks to deepen democratic processes in policy/budget formulation and tracking at all levels.

Civil Society Reacts to Tanzania’s 2005 Budget

Tanzanian NGOs reacted skeptically to the 2005/06 budget presented by the Minister of Finance on 8 June where the country’s recent economic and fiscal progress was outlined as follows:

- GDP growth accelerated from 4.2% in 1996 to 6.7% in 2004, while inflation declined from 21% in 1996 to 4% in 2005;
- tax revenue has increased in recent years, as has the number of banks (from 2 in 1996 to 26 in 2005); and interest rates have fallen from 26% in 1996 to 14.4% in 2004.

Despite these positive signs, budget activists are voicing their concerns. Hakikazi Catalyst, an NGO based in Arusha, noted that while economic growth is essential for poverty reduction, it is not sufficient to address historical inequalities. Despite Tanzania’s recent economic growth, the country is unlikely to meet the Millennium Development Goal of reducing poverty by 50% by 2015.

Hakikazi Catalyst led a discussion on this year’s budget with village residents in the Arumeru district of Arusha. Participants complained that local governments have few opportunities to influence the resource-allocation decisions reflected in the national budget. They also argued that the resources that actually reach grassroots communities will not be adequate to meet the demands of quality and equity.

Hakikazi Catalyst discussions revealed that people believe that resources are not allocated fairly. Groups such as single and widowed women, children, orphans, youths, elderly people, and those living with HIV-AIDS have difficulty accessing basic services, such as basic health and education (especially post-primary education). While improving the quality of government services and people’s access to education and health could help reduce poverty, there are indications that these tasks are not a priority of district councils. What rural communities want is a budget that promotes equity, quality, and participatory budget processes. For further information, contact Emmanuel Kallonga at ekallonga@cybernet.co.tz.

Another NGO, the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP) based in Dar es Salaam, commented that the new budget continues to favour the national and international corporate sectors over working people and the poor. TGNP noted several positive aspects of the budget, however, including provisions for enhanced social service delivery, economic support for small producers and traders, and increased participation for civil society groups in budget formulation and monitoring. The following is a more detailed look at the budget by TGNP.

Resource Allocation

Some 33% of the total budget has been allocated to development activities. A large proportion of the development allocation will go to infrastructure development; there is broad agreement on the need for major construction of rural and village roads, railways, and bridges to support the growth of the rural economy. However, the bulk of the development budget is dependent on external financing, which compromises the sustainability of development plans and the
autonomy of decision-making on them. Of the remaining total budget, nearly a fifth is allocated to debt repayment, which diverts resources away from growth, development, and social service delivery.

TGNP expressed disappointment that a relatively small portion of the budget is devoted to salaries and wages. Many people, including government, civil society groups, international donors, and the private sector, agree on the need for a dramatic increase in the number of trained health workers to provide basic health care, life-saving services, and treatment for HIV-AIDS. Calls for increased staff have been raised in other sectors of the economy as well, such as agriculture, education, judiciary, and water and sanitation. There is a need not only for more workers but also for enhanced training and increased wages and other benefits.

Wages & Taxation
The proposed tax structure would harm the middle class and favor the very wealthy by imposing the same tax rate (30%) on both groups – a rate that is too high for the former but very low for the latter. Instead, TGNP recommends that the government create a lower tax rate for the middle class (not above 20%) and proportionately higher taxes for high and very high earners (at least 50% for the very rich). This would provide substantial revenue for the government while reducing tax burdens on the poor and middle class.

Employment & Livelihood
The budget lacks a clear, coherent strategy to enhance employment and sustainable livelihoods. In spite of the present crisis of employment and incomes faced by most Tanzanians, this was not a high priority of the budget.

The government’s main employment strategy appears to be to promote privatisation and micro-finance. The government’s proposals to enhance credit and micro-finance are promising, but TGNP believes more information is needed on whether their benefits would actually reach groups such as the poor, women, youth, and the disabled. Another major concern is the extremely high interest rates for micro-credit. The budget speech says that bank credit has grown by some 30% per year and that interest rates have fallen, but while that may be true for corporations and rich individuals, the poor continue to pay interest of 30% or more to micro-credit institutions.

In addition, the government needs to provide open information on privatisation agreements and on the degree to which private sector enterprises are hiring local residents and purchasing goods and services from Tanzanian-owned firms. Because Tanzania lacks concrete mechanisms to foster linkages within and between key economic sectors, the country is rapidly returning to the colonial structure of the past, when tiny export enclaves were surrounded by impoverished labor reserves.

Agriculture
To support the agricultural sector, the budget proposes fertiliser subsidies and credit-loan schemes, along with assistance for merchants and big agricultural producers that are exporting agricultural commodities overseas.

The government’s strategy of focusing on large agriculture enterprises rather than local producers may well boomerang, given the downward trend in global prices for traditional crops. TGNP recommends an alternative, holistic approach – one that would build on indigenous producers’ expertise in farming and livestock-keeping and link agriculture to manufacturing and services. The government should develop strategies to promote small-scale agriculture and livestock-keeping (particularly
among young people and women) as well as the diversification of the rural economy.

Health & HIV/AIDS

Gender activists were disappointed by the budget’s relatively small allocation to the health sector and by the very limited attention given to health and HIV/AIDS in the budget speech. According to the ‘state of the economy’ speech by the Minister of Finance, the government’s top priorities in the health sector include expanding the distribution of anti-retroviral (ARVS) drugs to HIV/AIDS infected people who can use them, strengthening the implementation of key health policies (including those targeting children), and promoting an anti-measles campaign. Resources also have been allocated to improving health-care quality and access.

According to TGNP, the national health budget should place higher priority on the wages and salaries of health workers, as well as on drugs and equipment. To ensure that the burden of health care does not fall disproportionately on the poor, major resources should be directed to supporting home-based approaches to health care and strengthening linkages to community health programs. Finally, private-public partnerships should be enhanced so that faith-based organisations and others providing public health services are adequately supported.

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**Enyimba Enyi: The Comeback of Igbo Nationalism in Nigeria**

Kenneth Omeje

Thirty-five years since the end of the Biafran War in Nigeria, ethnic armies and militias are increasingly dotting the political landscape and heightening the temperature of the Nigerian federation. These groups include the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) in the southwest, the Bakassi Boys in the southeast, the Taliban Nigeria Movement and other pro-Sharia groups in the north, and the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and other natural resource-based militias in the oil-rich south-south. In addition to these movements, new Igbo nationalist movements advocate a revival of the Biafran project. While these Igbo groups generally do not organise or advocate violence, they can offer very radical rhetoric that draws on the hopes and the experiences of the lost Biafran War of secession, as well as on older Igbo war songs: the *enyimba enyi* spirit. This briefing reports on the revival of Igbo nationalism in Nigeria, including the problems and challenges it presents.

*Nzogbu nzogbu, enyimba enyi, nzogbu (An Igbo war chant)*

This roughly translates to English as:

*Stampede to death, stampede to death, expedition-bound elephants, elephants, stampede to death.*

*Nzogbu nzogbu enyimba enyi* is probably the most famous Igbo traditional war song. The song rallies the people’s solidarity and their collective sentiments against any adversarial forces and threats that must be urgently combated and vanquished. It is also a song that evokes the idiom of the presumed bravery and
fighting prowess of the menfolk likened to the bulldozing power of elephants, which rely on their extraordinary body mass to trample and crush their adversary. It is therefore an idiom of optimism and faith in the people’s ability to defeat any adversary. Indeed, the enyimba enyi spirit subsumes the rhetoric of assured victory in any such eventualities.

Although rooted in history, the enyimba enyi discourse should not simply be mistaken for the traditional Igbo nationalism of the classical ‘Acheberian melodrama’ (derived from Chinue Achebe’s 1958 classical novel). For a people that have experienced the pain and tribulations of modern warfare, the rhetoric of a ‘battle-gear ed’ ethnic nationalism represents much more than the traditional or symbolic. The Biafran war, often described as the war of Igbo national self-determination (1967-1970), was more than an Igbo war because Biafra included a cross-section of minority ethnic groups in the former region of Eastern Nigeria. On the Nigerian side, part of the politics of winning the war entailed the deconstruction of Biafra both in physical and philosophical terms by severing the strategic ethnic minority groups on the shoreline of the Atlantic from this separatist project and depicting the project as an enyimba enyi rebellion. This strategy combined with a total blockade of the landlocked Igbo nation proved decisive in crushing the Biafran secession. More than a million people died in the traumatic 30-month campaign. Today, Igbo nationalism tends to revive the Biafran project.

The Present Reinvention Process

Unlike, the Igbo nationalism that culminated in the Biafran revolt which had substantial consensus among the Igbo population throughout Nigeria and beyond, the present reinvention of Igbo nationalism is mostly championed by a motley collection of Igbo civil groups based at home and in the Diaspora, albeit the revival of the Biafra project is the central focus of both sides. The Diaspora strand of the ‘neo-Biafra movement’ is spearheaded by such American-based Igbo organisations as the Biafra Foundation (BF), Biafra Actualisation Forum (BAF), Igbo USA, Ekwe Nche, and Biafra Nigeria World (BNW). At the domestic front, the radical Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), headed by an Indian-trained, pro-Ghandian lawyer Ralph Uwazurike, is most dominant. Most of these neo-Biafra civil groups emerged in the past six years. MASSOB maintains very close links with its counterparts in the Diaspora (notably BF and BAF) and the latter supports and partly bankrolls the former (see BNW, 2002; BAF, 2003).

Being at the home front, MASSOB in a large sense crystallises the broad ideological discourses of the neo-Biafra movement into a practical plan. The organisation first hit the headlines in early 2000 when it started campaigning in many Nigerian commercial cities and Igbo towns to herald what the group called ‘the birth of a new Biafra’ (Uwazurike, 2000). This campaign culminated in the highly publicised Aba Declaration of 22 May 2000 in which, against all entreaties of the President Obasanjo administration, the MASSOB leader announced the birth of Biafra in an open air rally attended by hundreds of Aba traders. On this occasion, the MASSOB leader Ralph Uwazurike performed the symbolic hoisting of the Biafran flag at Aba to the excitement of his home fans.

The Aba Declaration has been followed by series of events and propaganda which, from the standpoint of MASSOB and its allies in the Diaspora, will help the groups to translate their dream of a new Biafra into reality. For instance, the MASSOB leadership has organised series of rallies to inaugurate different local and provincial chapters of the organisa-
tion in some major Igbo towns and elsewhere in the former Eastern region and beyond (BNW, 2002; Ogbuwezeh, 2004).

The Diaspora arm of the neo-Biafra movement has also initiated and implemented a number of relevant activities and events. Among the highlights of these events and activities include the acquisition and celebrated opening of the Biafra House in Washington, DC on 23 September 2001 with the erstwhile Biafran war leader Emeka Odomuegwu Ojukwu in attendance, the establishment of a shortwave radio broadcasting service Voice of Biafra International (VOBI) and the convening of the first international conference of Biafra in Greenbelt, Maryland (US) on 18 October 2003. The Washington-based Biafra Foundation and BAF are behind the above initiatives. The Maryland conference adopted an impassioned communiqué and part of its preambles reads (BF, 2003):

"With representation from Eastern Nigeria, Anioma, Europe, and throughout the United States of America and Canada, the first post-war International Conference on Biafra was concluded with the agreement that the conditions that led to the Biafra-Nigeria war are still present and worse, that the persecution of Ndi Igbo in Nigeria continues to dictate the overall and specific policies of the federal government. The effect of this has been the gradual destruction of the country itself, its economy, and its overall pride."

The conference resolved inter alia ‘to warn governors and functionaries of Eastern Nigeria to desist from collaborating with federal agencies in the harassment and murder of citizens of Eastern Nigeria, particularly members of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB),’ and pledged ‘to explore the possibilities of forming a government in exile in six months if the federal government fails to organise a conference of ethnic nation-

alities, in order for these nationalities to decide how they want to associate with one another’ (BF, 2003). Six months later on 17 April 2004, VOBI broadcast a message supportive of forming a Biafran government in exile without explicitly constituting the government or naming its functionaries. All the weekly news broadcasts of VOBI are usually analysed and published in the homepage of the Biafra Foundation. There are expectations that the next Biafra international conference will constitute the proposed Biafran government in exile (Awho-fawhori, 2004). Increasingly, many pro-Biafra groups in the US and elsewhere in the Diaspora commemorate the annual Biafra day (30 May – a date that coincides with the anniversary of the declaration of the defunct Biafran state in 1967) with such activities as peaceful demonstrations, public symposia, display of Biafran flag and similar artefacts, in support of the self-determination struggle of MASSOB.

Unlike the defunct Biafran Republic, the neo-Biafra movement does not advocate armed struggle as a strategy for the actualisation of Biafran statehood. Instead, the movement advocates the actualisation of sovereignty through ‘non-violence and non-exodus’ and pursue ‘negotiation, dialogue and consultation’ with key stakeholders, including the federal government, Igbo State governments and ethno-cultural organisations, as well as the minority ethnic nationalities of the oil-rich Nigerian Niger Delta (cf. Uwazurike, 2000; BF, 2003). MASSOB, which is at the home front, in addition, aims to reach out to and conscientise the Igbo public by proclamations of civil disobedience such as the 26 August 2004 stay-at-home day declared by the group’s leader ‘to protest against the intimidation and marginalisation of the Igbo and the Nigerian occupation of the Biafran territory for more than 39 years’ (Daily Champion 12 August 2004). MASSOB also declares the annual Biafra Day a public holiday for its fans and sympa-
thisers in Nigeria, an event that increasingly paralyse commercial activities in some major cities where Igbo traders enjoy preponderant control of open market business activities. Both MASSOB and the Diaspora-based Igbo groups that partly bankroll it occasionally make representations to various UN bodies and international human rights organisations to advance their cause. Beyond the self-confessed neo-Biafra organisations, there is a multiplicity of Igbo community improvement unions, trade guilds and other ethno-cultural groups both at home and abroad, which even though not established with the Biafra project in mind, have nonetheless become explicitly pro-Biafra.

Thus far, many prominent Igbo politicians, the pan-ethnic Igbo organisation Ohaneze Ndi-Igbo and the five Igbo State governments (henceforth ‘the Igbo establishment’) have carefully distanced themselves from the activities of the neo-Biafra movement and have also occasionally denounced the agenda of the organisations. The marked pluralisation of the Igbo establishment, it must be emphasised, espouses a more moderate but less focused, less ideological and arguably elitist agenda of ethnic nationalism, which a significant section of the Igbo grassroots populations consider to be both uninspiring and unattractive. MASSOB and other proponents of Biafra take advantage of the apparent confusion and lack of persuasive and mass-engaging agenda of the Igbo establishment to push through their more radical strands of ethnic nationalism. Thus largely defiant, MOSSOB, the dominant campaigner on the domestic front, maintains both open and clandestine operations and offices in some prominent Igbo towns and beyond and continues to mobilise sections of the Igbo grassroots, mostly traders and youths to its cause. There are growing incidents and allegations of harassments, incarcerations and disappearances of a number of MASSOB officials and activists in Nigeria due to government’s relentless crackdown (HRW, 2003; Ogbuwezeh, 2004).

**Chauvinism vs. Romanticism**

Whereas most people in Nigeria may not be aware of and familiar with the Diaspora-based neo-Biafra groups, MASSOB is well-known across Nigeria and the group generates mixed reactions from many Igbo and the Nigerian public. To many government officials and politicians, MASSOB tends to be largely portrayed as a platform for infantile opportunism and reckless adventurism. To a considerable section of the local civil society, however, MASSOB is seen as embodying the boldest ideals of the pro-sovereign national groups’ struggle. Yet, the relatively disgruntled Igbo traders and jobless youths see MASSOB representing a timely philosophical anchorage and inspiration for resistance. Yet to many who, irrespective of ethnic backgrounds, are either cynical or apprehensive about the viability of the Nigerian project, MASSOB ultimately evokes a ‘wait-and-see’ sentiment. How far could they go? What is their next line of action? MASSOB aside, why is there a proliferation of ethnic organisations, micro-nationalisms and ethnic militias in the present-day Nigeria? Where do we go from here? These are some of the concerns of many across the length and breadth of the Nigerian federation.

Like many ethnic nationalisms, the neo-Biafra movement ostensibly constructs and espouses a brand of nationalism that slips well into chauvinism as much as it romanticises the unstrategic and unreal. The websites of these civil groups are awash with clips, images and chants that eulogise Igbo sub-culture, war history, ‘heroes’, achievements and folkways, and conversely pour aspersions and indictments on the perceived adversaries of Ndi-Igbo (Igbo people) in Nigeria. They sensationalise what the Biafra Foundation (2004) calls ‘the exploitation...
and persecution of the Igbo by the Hausa/Fulani/Yoruba oligarchs and variously portray the latter with a range of highly subjective stereotypes.

The brand of ethnic nationalism largely constructed and propagated by the neo-Biafra movement leaves little or no room for constructive criticism and disagreement with the underlying philosophy, programmes and strategies. Hence, some of these organisations condemn and vilify different members of the Igbo establishment who have questioned and objected to the agenda and approach of the organisations. 2

Much is wrong with this approach. It creates ideological fault lines on at least two dangerous fronts. The first is an inter-ethnic fault line that exacerbates the structural friction and antagonism between the Igbo on the one hand, and the Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba on the other. Relations between the Igbo and the their two larger Nigerian rival groups have never been worse since the end of the Biafran war and, as opposed to dousing the tension, the adversarial rhetoric of the neo-Biafra activists and their allegations of conspiracy, subjugation and domination by the ‘Hausa/Fulani/Yoruba oligarchs’ clearly places the campaigners’ brand of ethnic nationalism on a strategic danger of reciprocal bigotry and hate.

The second ideological fault line is intra-ethnic. The brand of Igbo nationalism promoted by the neo-Biafra movement is inherently divisive and has therefore created a rabble-rousing followership among Igbo traders and youths who are increasingly at loggerheads with the Igbo establishment. The generational gap between the two opposing sides tends to compound the deepening friction. Whereas MASSOB’s fans and followers, for instance predominantly consist of young adults and youths aged 40 and below and who did not experience the Biafran war, the Igbo establishment comprise many war veterans and much older adults that have bitter memories of the pain and agony of the war. There are, however, a few members of the Igbo establishment who lend measured support to the neo-Biafra cause. The erstwhile Biafran war leader Emeka Odomegwu Ojukwu ranks prominent among the Igbo elites that support the neo-Biafra project and this causes some anxiety to the federal government. Ojukwu trivialises his support for the neo-Biafra movement arguing that Biafra simply represents ‘an opinion’, which in the context of the basic liberties guaranteed in a democratic society should be allowed to flourish (Ihenacho, 2004).

Normative Contradictions & Structural Limitations

Even though MASSOB and its Diaspora allies advocate non-violence struggle, a large and growing proportion of the group’s followers tend to favour militancy and chances are high that these zealots could take the struggle much farther than presently envisaged.

Nigeria is already awash with small arms and armed militias, which in the context of the several dysfunctionalities of the highly beleaguered state, fulfils in theory the minimum condition for a major conflagration. In this respect, the comeback and upsurge of the enyimba enyi spirit remains potentially detrimental to the Igbo as the human and material consequences of turning Igboland into a battleground for a major conflagration (albeit this is still most unlikely) or for the more probable scenario of intensified crackdown of insurgencies would be most colossal. A change of strategy to embrace a full-blown armed struggle by the separatist campaigners remains unlikely at least in the foreseeable future, as such action would not go down well with majority of the Igbo who are still reeling from the crushing defeat and setback of the previous war.
Without delving into the controversial arguments of whether or not there are sufficient justifications for MASSOB’s self-determination campaign, it suffices to say that MASSOB and its fans and allies do not seem to have the necessary political infrastructure, resources and authority to provoke a serious attention from both the Igbo establishment and the federal government. Indeed, as opposed to taking them seriously, the federal government is likely to continue to hunt and persecute MASSOB if the highly respected and influential Igbo establishment is not directly or indirectly supportive of their cause. It seems to be the case that MASSOB does not sufficiently understand the post-war dynamics and power game in Nigeria. Under an authoritarian political dispensation with weak democratic culture and institutions, it would be sheer naivety for one to expect the government to open up negotiations with a seemingly inconsequential movement that poses no serious threats to its hegemony and the state’s interests.

The experiences of various contemporary political insurgencies suggest that even militias and rebel movements that posed relatively consequential threats had hardly succeeded in forcing their governments to a roundtable until they were able to achieve de facto control of a significant territory of the state or to inflict sufficient and sustained disruption of the latter to render it inoperable or ungovernable. Nostalgic reflections, sophisticated propaganda, effusion of sentiments and pro-Ghandian alternatives would hardly achieve statehood in a neopatrimonial postcolonial setting where high stakes like oil (the life-blood of the state) are involved. Mahatma Ghandi, in all probability, could have hardly succeeded with his non-violence strategies in the twenty first century India if as opposed to the decolonisation of India from British rule his goal was, for instance to establish the sovereignty of Kashmir or Punjab.

Concluding Remarks

Beyond MASSOB, however, a fundamental question that needs to be urgently addressed is why 35 years post-Biafran war, ethnic armies and militias are increasingly dotting the political landscape and have heightened the temperature of the Nigerian federation – the Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC) in the southwest, the Bakassi Boys in the southeast, the Taliban Nigeria Movement and other pro-Sharia groups in the north, and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and other natural resource-based militias in the oil-rich south-south. The recently concluded National Political Reform Conference (NPRC), which many right-wing optimists originally thought could be the best political forum to address this conundrum, was repeatedly torn apart by issues of oil revenue distribution formula between the federal and subnational governments.

The final report of the national conference forwarded by President Obasanjo to the national assembly for consideration in July 2005 is still being contested by some of the aggrieved delegates to the conference who felt that the dominant pro-establishment faction connived with the conference executive committee to generate a status quo friendly report.

Where does all this leave Nigeria vis-à-vis the agitations and demands of the diverse resistant and separatist groups menacing state sovereignty and national and human security? It does not seem that there is an end in sight for the pro-Biafra project and for similar breeds of centrifugal micro-nationalisms in contemporary Nigeria.

Kenneth Omeje, Research Fellow, Africa Centre, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, West Yorkshire, UK; email: k.c.omeje1@bradford.ac.uk.
Endnotes

1. According to the Biafra Foundation sources, VOBI transmits on shortwaves at 7384 KHz (41 metres band) only on Saturdays between 21.00-22.00 hours UTC or 10.00-11.00 p.m. Nigerian time (see http://www.biafraland.com/Biafra_2003.htm); accessed on 21 August 2004.

2. Vilification of Ibo leaders who disagree with the neo-Biafra cause is one of the major weapons of propaganda used by the movement. VOBI weekly news analyses published in the AF website are full of such vilification accounts (see various editions of ‘This is the News Analysis Segment of the Voice of Biafra International Broadcasts’ in the AF website, but in particular, http://www.biafraland.com/newsanalysis080704.htm).

Bibliographic Note


Oil & Injustice in Nigeria: Ken Saro-Wiwa

Amnesty International

Ten years after the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, the struggle for justice for the people in the Niger Delta continues.

The execution of writer and human rights campaigner Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists, (the ‘Ogoni nine’) on 10 November 1995, raised a storm of outrage across the world. Their deaths highlighted the suffering of the Ogoni people in the oil-rich delta of the Niger river. The Nigerian government was widely denounced and the oil company Shell condemned for its ambiguous and belated interventions. But 10 years later, how much has changed for the people of the Niger Delta?

Ken Saro-Wiwa fought for an end to the environmental damage that was turning his homeland into what he described as a ‘wasteland’, endangering the people’s health and livelihoods. Today oil spills still blacken the land and pollute the waterways. Hundreds of gas flares burn day and night, filling the sky with soot and fumes. Operational practices such
as these, so close to people’s homes, farms and waterways, would not be tolerated in the countries where the oil companies have their headquarters.

The inhabitants of the Niger Delta remain among the most deprived oil communities in the world – 70% live on less than US$1 a day. In spite of its windfall gains, as global oil prices have more than doubled in the last two years, the Nigerian government has failed to provide services, infrastructure or jobs in the region.

The military government which executed Ken Saro-Wiwa and his companions was replaced in 1999 by a civilian government. Yet government security forces continue to kill people in the Niger Delta with impunity. Excessive force is used to protect the oil industry and restore law and order – and the human rights of communities are regularly violated.

The powerful oil companies operating in the region are perceived by communities and many activists on the ground as complicit in past human rights abuses. Some oil companies have admitted that their operations have contributed to fuelling conflict. In recent years, under pressure to demonstrate corporate responsibility, companies have developed voluntary codes of conduct, but these have not been able to reduce the negative impact of their operations in the region.

It is like paradise and hell. They have everything. We have nothing... If we protest, they send soldiers. They sign agreements with us and then ignore us. We have graduates going hungry, without jobs. And they bring people from Lagos to work here, says Eghare W.O. Ojhogar, chief of the Ugborodo community in Delta State.

On 4 February 2005, soldiers fired on protesters at Chevron’s Escravos oil terminal on the coast of the western Niger Delta. One man was killed and at least 30 others were injured. The protest was over the company’s failure to fulfil an agreement to provide jobs and development projects to the local Ugborodo community.

Just two weeks later, at least 17 people were reported to have been killed and two women raped when soldiers raided the town of Odioma. The attack was ostensibly to arrest members of an armed vigilante group suspected of killing 12 people, including four local councillors. Members of this group were reported to have been recruited by a sub-contractor of Shell’s subsidiary in Nigeria and to be responsible for security in an area where oil exploration was being conducted, despite their alleged criminal record. The suspects were not captured but 80% of homes in Odioma were razed.

The Delta’s marginalised peoples have no effective recourse against such human rights abuses. It is time for the Nigerian government to end the impunity enjoyed by the security forces for human rights violations past and present. It is time for oil companies and the international community to ensure that business operates within a framework of international human rights standards for companies, like the UN Norms for Business. Ten years after the ‘Ogoni nine’ were executed, it is time for justice for the people of the Niger Delta.

Editor’s Note: See ROAPE 66, 1995 for our Tribute to Ken Saro-Wiwa. Also see Caroline Ileka & Sylvanus Abua, ‘Nigeria: Conservation, Traditional Knowledge & the Commons’ in ROAPE 104/05, June/September 2005.
The shifting sands of Eritrean politics are never easy to understand. Eritreans themselves have to work hard to keep up. Foreign observers struggle to make head or tail of the complex alliances and divisions that characterise the Eritrean political scene. An attempt to map out these groups and parties is provided at the end of this article. Having acknowledged these difficulties, however, it seems clear that important changes are under way.

In January 2002 the EPLF Democratic Party was born. This was the result of the purge that took place in September the previous year, in which President Isaias Afeworki arrested eleven of his closest associates and closed all independent newspapers (Plaut, 2002). The EPLF-DP has since changed its name to the Eritrean Democratic Party, and is led by Mesfin Hagos, one of President Isaias’s few close and critical associates who escaped imprisonment because he was outside of the country (see Conversations with Eritrean Political Prisoners, Red Sea Press, 2005)

The intervening time has not been easy for the opposition; it remains fragmented and weak. But it has not been idle and in recent months it has attempted to revive its flagging fortunes. Meetings have been held in Africa, the Middle East, Europe and the United States. There has been vigorous debate. An attempt has been made to win over the powerful diaspora, whose remittances are so important for the finances of the Eritrean state.

These efforts have now begun to bear fruit. A meeting held in Khartoum between 18-22 January 2005 has been hailed as ‘truly historic’ (Competition, Co-operation and Change, Awate team, 2 February 2005 http://www.awate.com/artman/publish/article_3948.shtml). It is too early to conclude whether this assessment is correct, but a concerted effort is clearly now being made to unite the opposition. This briefing is an attempt to map that development.

The Khartoum Meetings

The first Khartoum meeting was supposed to get under way on 12 January 2005, but the start had to be delayed until 18 January while the Eritrean National Alliance (ENA) held a preliminary meeting in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa.

Thirteen groups formed the ENA in October 2002 as a loose alliance in opposition to the Eritrean government, but with close ties to Ethiopia (see note 2 below). Led by Herui Tedla Bairu it admitted receiving finances from the Sudanese, Ethiopian and Yemeni governments (Irin, 1 May 2003). In April 2003 it announced the establishment of a single military wing to launch attacks on Eritrean government targets. ‘It is not going to be against individuals, it is not going to be used against personnel, but things like institutions and the economy,’ Herui said. ‘Like, for example, the television and radio centres’ (Ibid.). Based in Khartoum and Addis Ababa, the ENA has denied accusations from other opposition parties that it is a tool of Ethiopian foreign policy.

When the Khartoum meeting got under way some senior opposition leaders were absent. This included the ELF-RC leader, Seyoum Ogbamichael. Despite this, it was a considerable achievement, overcoming the kind of vicious accusations that are characteristic of the politics of exile.

Over the last two years, the Eritrean body politic has been saturated with accusations and counter-accusations: you are traditional; I am modern; you are too soft...
on PFDJ, I am tough; you are too soft on Weyane (Ethiopian ruling party MP), I confront; you don’t stand up for Eritrean sovereignty and I do; you are not a democrat, I am; you are exclusionary, I am inclusive; you are hoping to get to power by riding on a Weyane tank, I am supported by the ‘people’; you are a Trojan horse, I belong to a ‘patriotic block’.

And this was at the level of our bigger and more experienced fronts and parties. Below the public radar, worse things were said - including accusing Front leaders of being murderers, weak or squandering their time eating chat (Awate, 2005).

After four days of discussions (not attended by all leaders – some left early, including Mesfin Hagos) a basis for agreement was reached. The parties agreed to form a united opposition grouping called the Eritrean Democratic Alliance. A second meeting was planned for 4 February 2005 in Khartoum. A seven person team was selected to oversee matters until the second meeting could take place.

It is not clear where the agreement to form the Eritrean Democratic Alliance left the ENA, or the other loose alliances – such as the ‘Block 1’ formed by the Eritrean Democratic Party, the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Eritrean Liberation Front Revolutionary Council in August 2004 (see declaration below) or the ‘4 +1’ grouping.

There were also discussions in Khartoum of a range of difficult issues – including the position of Eritrea’s nine ethnic groups and their autonomy within an Eritrean state, the place of Sharia or Islamic law and the question of the armed struggle. None of these could be resolved at the meeting, but at least they were broached. Some issues were simply ducked. For example, there was no discussion about the question of the importance and urgency of demarcating the Ethiopian/Eritrean border as a precondition for improving relations between the two countries. Members of the Eritrean National Alliance, with their ties to Addis Ababa, relegated this to the status of a ‘secondary issue’.

Perhaps the real achievement of the meeting in Khartoum was that it took place at all, and that none of the participants walked out.

Despite holding preparatory meetings, the team selected to prepare for the next meeting was unable to bring the movements together on 4 February, as planned. The postponement was at the request of the Eritrean Democratic Party, which issued a press release thanking the other parties for accepting the postponement of the meeting until the third week in February, to allow Mesfin Hagos to conclude what it called a ‘personal and working’ visit to the USA (http://eritrea1.org/press/Press%20Release feb08.html). This included meeting senior members of the US administration.

Worrying, for the Eritrean opposition, was an attack in January 2005 on Eritrean forces by fighters belonging to the Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement, that left seven dead. This raised the awkward question of the armed struggle in a way that could not be postponed. The Eritrean Democratic Party felt obliged to issue a press release on 2 February 2005, denouncing the killings.

EDP has from its inception underscored that the process of democratising Eritrea cannot be accomplished through violence. The brutality of the regime and the use of reactive violence by a segment of the opposition will only delay the advent of democratisation and constitutional governance in Eritrea. Violence will not be the midwife of democracy and equality. The cycle of violence will only reinforce the enemies of democracy and peace.
This attack is particularly disturbing because it came at a time of intensified opposition forces efforts on the ground to narrow their differences and bring the parties together to achieve a common political platform under one organisational umbrella. We hope that despite the attack, the Khartoum meeting will be able to focus on constructive effort to strengthen the opposition and bring peace and stability to our country and the region.

We offer our deepest condolences to the families whose near and dear ones have been killed or injured in this barbaric incident’ (EDP Condemns the Killing of 7 Eritreans, Press Release, 2 February 2005; http://eritrea1.org/)

The Eritrean Islamic Reform Movement replied attacking the EDP for what it called a ‘fabrication’, without actually denying that the clash with government forces had actually taken place. Rather, they said that the armed struggle had been forced on them by the regime and that their party had never made any secret of its determination to continue the armed struggle during meetings attended by Mesfin Hagos (http://www.gabeel.com/NEWS/ENGLISH/Islah_statement_translated_by_gabeel_com_2_8_2005.htm).

Despite these differences, the Eritrean Democratic Alliance finally held its second meeting towards the end of February. The meeting elected a nine-member Central Leadership, chaired by Berhane Yemane ‘Hanjema’, as well as an executive office. Since then the leadership has been visiting the diaspora to establish branches and offices in Sudan as well as North America, Australia and Europe. The chairman of the executive, Hussein Khalifa, said it has established media offices in Sudan and Ethiopia and produced two editions of a magazine (Gulf Information Centre interview, 6 July 2005). The organisation is due to hold its third meeting in August, probably in Sudan, when its political positions will become clearer.

Relations with Ethiopia

The relationship between the opposition and the government in Ethiopia is probably the most difficult issue facing the Alliance. Given that Eritrea fought a two year war with Ethiopia from 1998 to 2000 that left tens of thousands dead, not to mention the 30 year war of independence, any ties with Addis Ababa would always be controversial.

It was therefore something of a defining moment when members of the Eritrean opposition decided to meet the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, in the presence of Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir in December 2004. What was critical about this gathering is that it not only included members of the Addis based Eritrean National Alliance, but organisations like the Eritrean Democratic Party, which had previously refused to have dealings with the Ethiopian government. Exactly what was discussed has not been revealed, but the two sides did talk about the border demarcation issue, Prime Minister Meles’s five-point peace plan and past relations between the TPLF and EPLF. Again, the fact that the meeting took place at all is important, since it broke new ground and eroded distrust.

Ethiopia has its own reasons to try to make links with the opposition. In the past both Ethiopia and Eritrea have used opposition parties to further their foreign policy objectives, including destabilising each other during times of conflict. The Eritrean opposition not based in Addis was taking a considerable risk in meeting Prime Minister Meles. It left them open to charges from Asmara that they were ‘consorting with the enemy’, since the border between the two countries has still not been demarcated after the 1998 – 2000 war.
If meeting the Ethiopian leader was controversial, the decision to elect Berhane Yemane as Chairman of the EDA was even more divisive. As the leader of the Eritrean Revolutionary Democratic Front (best known by its Tigrayan initials Se.De.Ge.E.) he is most closely aligned to Ethiopia. Not only did he serve with the Tigray People’s Liberation Party (the party controlling the current Ethiopian government) during the war against President Mengistu Haile Mariam, he also led his forces into Eritrea behind the advancing Ethiopian troops during the 1998 – 2000 border war.

In an extensive interview he is unapologetic about the role his organisation played (Awate, interview with Berhane Yemane (‘Hanjema’) 29 March, 2005; http://www.awate.com/artman/publish/article_4040.shtml).

After explaining that he believed that Badme (the disputed border town that was the flashpoint that ignited the war) belonged to Ethiopia he says:

*We went in there to help the people while they lived in caves. We helped them gather about their belongings. We helped resolve disputes between the people, we guarded against the environment of chaos that war brings. We helped co-ordinate the delivery of emergency supplies. We did this for nine months, and all the while, the people’s front [EPLF] was reduced to watching from a distance. When the right time comes and the people are free to speak, they shall be a witness to the type of help we provided. I have no doubt about that.

This is part of our organisation’s history and is something that makes me very proud, at an organisational and personal level, because I was there personally.

For many Eritreans this is little short of heresy. Eritrean forces that entered the country as the Ethiopians advanced were seen as traitors and collaborators. Worse still, they were associated with the mistreatment of their fellow countrymen during the Ethiopian occupation. This included the rape of Eritrean women by Ethiopian troops and the looting and substantial destruction of a number of towns, including Senafe and Tserona (see Partial Award, Central Front Eritrea’s Claim, Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, 28 April 2004, pp. 19-29.) For these reasons Eritreans have found it difficult to understand why the EDA chose Berhane Yemane as its chairman.

**Conclusion**

Relations with Ethiopia are only one of a range of issues that the EDA will have to debate. There is also the difficult question of armed struggle referred to above. If this is rejected (and it would require some EDA members changing their stance on the subject) how is the Eritrean government to be opposed?

As numerous reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch indicate there is next to no democratic space in Eritrea today, which tolerates no dissent. Then there are the perennial questions of language and nationality, which have dogged Eritrean political organisations for decades. These are all divisive questions, which will have to be faced if the opposition is to thrive and finally pose a real alternative to the current regime in Asmara.

**The Eritrean Opposition**

Below is a list identifying the current state of the Eritrean opposition. It is drawn from a number of Eritrean websites (particularly Awate) and discussions with Eritreans. It is broken down into the following headings: organisation, the leaders, ‘Blocks’, Notes and whether they are in an Eritrea National Alliance (see notes 1 & 2).
Eritrean Democratic Party: Mesfin Hagos, Dr Asefaw Tekeste Mohammed Nur, Ahmed, Semere Kesete (student leader, formerly with MDC); Block 1; Former EPLF, signatories of the G15 or G13 (see note 1); N.

Eritrean Liberation Front: Abdallah Idris, Hussien Khalifa, Hassen Asad, Yohannes Zeremariam; Block 1. Original Eritrean Liberation Movement, founded 1958; Main Base Sudan; Y.

ELF / Revolutionary Council: Seyoum Ogba michael, Ibrahim Mohammed Ali, Mengisteab Asmerom; Block 1; Y.

Eritrean Federal Democratic Movement: Beshir Ishaq, Dr Jelaedin Saleh; Block 1.

Eritrean Co-operative Party: Hruy Tedla Bairu; Y.

ELF / National Congress, Dr Beyene Kidane, Ahmed Naser; 4 + 1 formed 31 July 2004; formerly ELF-RC; Y.

Eritrean Revolutionary Democratic Front: Berhane Yemane; 4 + 1; Formerly ELF; Y.

Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Eritrean Kunama: Qernelios Osman; 4 + 1; formerly ELF; Y.

Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation: Ibrahim Haroun, Amin Ahmad; 4 + 1; formerly ELF; Y.

Eritrean Peoples Movement: Adella Adem (formerly EPLF) plus Mohammed Ibrahim 'Secretariare' (ELF); 4 + 1; N.

ELF / United Front: Dr Osman Abubeker; Block 3; Y.

Eritrean Democratic Opposition Movement (Gash/Setit): Ismael Nada; Block 3; Y.

Eritrean People’s Democratic Front: Tewelde Gebresellasie; Block 3.

Eritrean National Democratic Front: Mohammed Osman Abubeker; Block 3; Y.

Eritrean Initiative Association: Yesmin Mohammed Ali; Block 3; N.

Others

Eritrean Islamic Party for Justice and Development ‘Alkhalas’ (formerly Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement and before that Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement): Khelil Mohammed Amer, Hamed Turki; Y.

Eritrean Peoples Congress (Harakat Al Islah): Mohamed Taher Shengeb, Saleh Selman; Islamists, the political wing of the group denounced by EDP for killing Eritrean soldiers; Y.

Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (Arduf): Muhaydin Mafatah.

Eritrean National Alliance: Herui Tedla Bairu; General Secretary (an Alliance, not a party) based in Ethiopia. Deny being under Ethiopian control.

Notes

1) Declaration of Common Understanding between EDP, ELF and ELF-RC.

We would like to announce to the Eritrean public that in the bilateral meetings between the leaders of the three parties, Eritrean Democratic Party, Eritrean Liberation Front and Eritrean Liberation Front’ Revolutionary Council, which were held in Frankfurt on 8th and 12th Aug 2004, the leaders reached a common understanding to set a stage for all national forces to work together and agreed on plans for a course of action. Issues that were raised during the meetings included the following:

Current situation and plans of the dictatorial regime; the present situation of the Eritrean opposition forces; regional and International stands on matter concerning Eritrea and their reflections on the opposition camp; regional peace and stabilisation of inter-regional relations; political assessment of existing stands [of the opposition] on fundamental issues; practical plans on common undertakings.

The three organisations, on top of having serious discussions about the above-mentioned issues, declared that they have similar views on issues concerning unity of the people and the territory, Eritrean sovereignty, freedom in making one’s political decision and process concerning democratic transition. They have also acknowledged the fact that they will prudently and responsibly deal with unresolved issues either while pursuing future coordinated struggle or resolve them within a democratic atmosphere.

Based on this initiative, the three conferring organisations agreed to include those groups that did not get the chance to participate in the meetings or have been undertaking similar initiatives, in setting up a larger platform for a co-ordinated mode of struggle and for national dialogue in the shortest time possible. Although the three organisations have already proposed and agreed on place and time of the larger meeting, they are willing to amend the plan in accordance with the other group’s time constraints and circumstances.

In order to shorten the existence of the dictatorial system, to protect the country from dangers that try its sovereign existence, to introduce a participatory democratic system, we pledge to
continue to struggle unyieldingly. Down with the dictatorial System, Eternal Glory to our Martyrs.


2) Eritrean National Alliance members (October 2002). The National Charter was formalised by the signatures of the heads of the political organisations, parties, and independent individual listed below:
1. Eritrean Liberation Front
2. Eritrean People’s Congress
3. Eritrean Islamic Salvation Movement
4. Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council
5. People’s Democratic Front for the Liberation of Eritrea (SAGEM)
6. Eritrean Revolutionary Democratic Front
7. Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Eritrea Kunama (DMLEK)
8. Eritrean Democratic Opposition Movement (Gash Setit)
9. Eritrean Initiative Association (Jema’at Almubadera Al Eritrea)
10. Eritrean National Democratic Front
11. Eritrean Cooperative Party
12. Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization
13. Eritrean Liberation Front - National Unity Organization

This document was signed on 22 October 2002 (source: http://www.eritalliance.org/Charter/Political%20charter%20of%20ENA.asp).

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Sierra Leone: Dirty Aid, Dirty Water

World Development Movement

In ROAPE 104/05 we carried the following (abridged) ‘stop press’ item.

The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) is spending UK aid money on a public relations campaign to pursue a privatisation agenda in Sierra Leone. Documents obtained by development campaigners the World Development Movement (WDM) show that in June of this year DFID advertised for an ‘international consultancy’ firm to both advise the Sierra Leonean government on privatising state enterprises, including water, and to run a communications campaign to promote privatisation. Six of the eight short-listed companies are British; they include Adam Smith International and PriceWaterhouseCoopers; both companies have previously been contracted by DFID to promote privatisation in developing countries. So concerned are WDM about the government’s latest move that they have written to DFID asking a series of specific questions about the contract and querying its legality.

In response to the WDM press release of 30 August 2005, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) has issued its response. WDM responds to this statement, point by point.

DFID says: ‘The Government of Sierra Leone asked for international support to advise on reform that would help boost the economy, stimulate investment and reduce the financial burden on the government.’

WDM says: There is little evidence to show that the work that DFID proposes to fund and its eventual outcome ie, water privatisation in Freetown, will achieve any of these objectives. In particular, it is a myth that water privatisation stimu-
lates investment which reduces the financial burden on government. In Tanzania, for example, the water privatisation in Dar es Salaam was accompanied by a loan of $143 million from the World Bank and international donors to pay for improvements to infrastructure. However, it is the Government of Tanzania and Tanzanian taxpayers who will eventually need to pay back this $143 million. Moreover, the Tanzanian government allege that the private firm involved, City Water, made less than half of the small $8.5 million investment that they were contracted to make, as part of this deal. That was one of the reasons cited for the cancellation of the City Water contract earlier this year.

In Ghana, the privatisation of water has been on the agenda for ten or more years. In the early stages, strident claims were made that the potential private operators would invest tens of millions of dollars into the system. Over the years, these claims have been gradually dropped, so as to make the contract more attractive to private investors. As a result, the scope and scale of the privatisation project has also been reduced. Now, the present contract makes no demands on the operator to provide capital to the project. Instead, the entire water and sanitation capital investment burden rests with the Government of Ghana and its taxpayers.

In the specific context of Sierra Leone, WDM has been unable to find any evidence that the various options for reform open to the water company in Sierra Leone have been assessed and we have found no evidence that water privatisation is likely to bring more benefits than, say, public sector reform in Sierra Leone. This issue is compounded by the fact that we can find no evidence that a Poverty and Social Impact Analysis has been carried out, to explore the impacts of privatisation on poor communities. As for the communications component of DFID’s proposed contract, there is no evidence that paying international consultants to conduct a pro-privatisation public relations campaign, such as the pop song and video done in Tanzania in the late 1990s, will contribute to the above objectives, and perhaps more importantly, that it will achieve DFID’s stated aim of achieving poverty reduction. WDM believes it is a waste of UK taxpayers’ money.

These issues form the basis of WDM’s concerns about this contract and it is on these grounds that WDM has taken legal advice and written a letter to DFID asking for a response to these and other concerns.

DFID says: ‘DFID does not force developing countries to privatise their water or any other service as a condition for the receipt of aid. That is a matter for individual governments.’

WDM says: The fact that in March 2005 the UK Government announced it was committed to ending the imposition of economic policy conditions in return for UK bilateral aid, does nothing to mitigate the fact that water privatisation has been a condition for Sierra Leone receiving World Bank and IMF loans and debt relief for over six years.

The history of the conditions applied to international support to Sierra Leone in recent years is covered in the timeline that WDM has pulled together. This illustrates the role that the World Bank and IMF have played in pushing a major privatisation programme in Sierra Leone.

The UK is a key player in the setting of World Bank and IMF conditions. Gordon Brown has been Chairman of the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) of the IMF since 1999. The IMFC meets to decide on overall strategic direction for the IMF. According to the UK Government, it is ‘the main forum for discussing IMF policies at the Ministerial level’. It has 24 members and meets twice a year at the Spring and Annual
meetings. The UK also holds 4.96% of the votes at the IMF, more than 43 African countries have in total.

Hilary Benn is the UK’s Governor on the Board of the World Bank where the UK holds around 5% of the vote. The UK is now the biggest supporter of the World Bank’s work. DFID currently gives 12% of its aid to the International Development Association (IDA), the only part of the World Bank requiring funding from rich countries, which makes the UK proportionally the largest donor to the World Bank. When measuring the total amount of actual aid money given to IDA, the UK is second only to the US.

The UK must accept its share of responsibility for these institutions imposing this policy on Sierra Leone since 1998.

It is true that Sierra Leone now has a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that, according to the rhetoric of the UK Government, is ‘country owned’ and involves consultation with civil society. However, civil society groups involved in consultations around the PRSP say they were not made aware that GVWC was one of the 24 companies slated for privatisation. In fact, in the PRSP, the water section makes no reference to privatisation, and the private sector section of the PRSP makes no reference to water.

The fact that the PRSP includes loan conditions ‘cut and paste’ from previous agreements between the Government of Sierra Leone and international donors suggests that claims of ‘country ownership’ are bogus. The past history of water privatisation loan conditions and the influence of the World Bank and IMF over the PRSP mean that we will never know whether the Sierra Leone Government would have freely chosen to privatise water in Freetown.

In addition to the major role that the UK plays in these international institutions, by announcing this contract, DFID is firmly stamping its approval on the Sierra Leonean privatisation programme and moreover, it is funding work that is designed to overcome the expected ‘public resistance’ to it.

DFID says: ‘DFID spend on consultants has fallen from 10% of the total aid programme in 1997 to 5% last year.’

WDM says: In 1997-98, DFID’s total bilateral programme was £1,042 million,6 10% of which is £104 million, while in 2003-04, the total DFID bilateral programme spend was £1,972 million,7 five per cent of which is £99 million. It therefore appears as if the actual programme spend on consultants has not significantly altered since 1997. Regardless of how much money DFID is spending on consultants, WDM’s criticisms of the privatisation contract in Sierra Leone are specific to this contract and DFID’s claim in this context is irrelevant.

Endnotes

2. See WDM’s press release; www.wdm.org.uk
5. DFID (2005), Sierra Leone: Support to the National Commission for Privatisation Secretariat (NCP) for implementation of the privatisation strategy 2005-2010: Project memorandum and framework.
Alex La Guma: Twenty Years in Cuban Memories

David Gonzalez

2005 marks the 80th anniversary of the birth of Alex La Guma, and the 20th anniversary of his death. Both are remembered in Cuba, the country where he lived and produced many works that we continue to locate and collect.

Justin Alexander La Guma was born in Cape Town on 20 February 1925, in a working-class family, the son of a well-known South African freedom fighter. He spent his early years in the ‘Sixth District’, a proletarian Coloured neighbourhood that exerted a strong influence on his character (Rixaka, 1986:17). He tried unsuccessfully to fight – at age thirteen – in Spain with the international brigades and, a shortly after, in World War Two (La Guma, 1981b:8). Having spent his adolescence between demonstrations, public protests and reading, he began to work at a factory of predominantly Black workers as a clerk, a labourer and finally a bookkeeper. Here he experienced the economic exploitation that he had read about: he joined the workers’ union and was discharged for organising a strike (Ibid. pp. 8-9). He joined the Communist Youth League in 1947 and the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1948.

But 1948 was marked by the rise to power of the National Party that would institutionalise the abominable apartheid regime. In spite of decreasing legal options for transformative actions, Alex stood out as a leader and organiser of mass movements. By 1950 he was a member of the District Committee of the SACP (banned that year) and of the Executive of the Coloured Peoples’ Congress, to the founding of which he actively contributed. His political activities did not prevent him from forming a home: in 1954, he married Blanche Herman, with whom he would have two children, Eugene (1956) and Bartholomew (1959).

Alex played an outstanding role in the efforts to create a multi-racial alliance in a ‘Congress of the People’ scheduled to meet in July 1955, in Kliptown, to adopt the Freedom Charter. Solely to prevent his presence there, he was arrested and then freed as soon as the meeting was over. This was the first of a long series of imprisonments that he would suffer. Simultaneously, the writer was emerging within Alex. He recalled:

Well, one of our papers, the New Age, asked me to write for them. Journalistic work linked me to a reality that I still only partially knew: I interacted with many people, studied the conditions under which they lived, made interviews, wrote on various events. That was around 1955. I think that I inevitably moved near to fiction writing, since no other means offered me better possibilities of expressing my life experiences and ideas’ (Ibid.).

In his works in New Age, ‘Africa South, Liberation, Fighting Talk’ and, by the early 1960s, Black Orpheus, he managed some veiled criticism against the system (Omo Asein, 1986:6). In 1956 Alex was arrested, together with 155 others charged in ‘The Marathon Treason Trial’ that extended until 1961 and concluded with the acquittal of all the accused. In jail, Alex began to write his first novel: A Walk in the Night, one of the rare remaining testimonies of Cape Town’s Sixth District, a neighbourhood marked for obliteration:

The laws that racially segregate the various urban areas decreed that this would become an industrial area for Whites, and so the old neighbourhood was razed to the ground. My home, therefore, disappeared from the face of the earth (La Guma, 1981b:8).

Alex wrote the novel as ‘a practice, an exercise of a sort’ and not for publishing
Facing many odds, A Walk in the Night appeared in Nigeria. Years later, Nigerian Nobel Prize playwright, Wole Soyinka, commented that Alex ‘achieved in 90 pages what other African writers had tried to achieve in the course of many years’ (Omo Asein, 1986:3). Success stimulated Alex to continue writing (La Guma, 1981b:9) but also determined his banning: his written or oral statements could not appear in the South African media. This did not deter Alex: in 1964, And a Threefold Cord (La Guma, 1964) appeared (the last novel to be published abroad while Alex was still living in South Africa), an additional reason for the repressive organs to harass him. He argued:

I don’t think that there should be any contradiction between politics, that is, the peoples’ struggle to attain a higher level of social living, and literature, because both are complementary. […] the individual does not exist isolated from his community, and the interests of the community exert their influence on him (La Guma, 1981b:9-10).

After the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, the regime decreed the state of emergency, banned the ANC and Alex and thousands others were detained for five months. From 1961 to 1966 he and his wife suffered still many more imprisonments (testimony of his widow, Blanche La Guma, collected in 1987 by the author), so by 1966 the leadership of the ANC, now underground, instructed them to leave the country. Having moved to London with his family in 1966, Alex continued his political work as an outstanding ANC figure while pursuing the literary exercise that would place him among frontline African fiction writers. The Stone Country, his third novel, appeared in Berlin and London in 1967: the plot profits from his prison experiences when describing ‘a specific facet of life in South Africa’ (La Guma, 1981b:11) beyond his own Coloured community – in which the apartheid regime enclosed him, physically and mentally – and extending to the problems of Blacks, Asians and Whites with generalisations of universal applicability to humans in a social conflict (Ibid.). He recalled having attempted to achieve ‘a social document, but seen through a particular situation’ (Ibid.). Consequently, Stone Country definitively established Alex as an author of world scope. He explained:

I try to achieve a universality of opinion and ideas because … even if you have to write within a framework, a particular environment, or to depict a particular environment … I believe that anyway, within that environment universal ideas can be expressed … Although the scenery might be seen in a particular environment, your ideas and your writings are not confined (Mbachu, 1987:1970).

The plot of his fourth novel, In the Fog of the Season’s End (1972), spins around the efforts of a grassroots revolutionary and is full of the author’s life experiences from the times in which he worked for an oil company (La Guma, 1981b:9). With his clear ‘insider’s’ vision and his literary insight, Alex anticipated major South African events and contributed ‘a prophecy about the nature of the armed struggle to put an end to apartheid’ (Mbachu, 1987:1970). Furthermore, the novel ‘marked the convergence of his fiction with his prolonged position as an intransigent revolutionary’ (Ibid.). Political commitment and literary creation – obvious since his early age – now fused.

Alex was living in Cuba and had a place in the history of South African literature
when his fifth and last novel, *Time of the Butcherbird* (Heinemann, 1979) – described as a 'novel of an awesome power' (*Rixaka*, 1986:18) – appeared. Alex now sets his work in the rural universe to demonstrate that even if in urban areas 'revolutionary thought and political ideas are more easily disseminated' (*La Guma*, 1981b:13), that objective and subjective conditions had been brewing for the rural struggle (Ibid. pp.12-17). Alex also contributed many memorable short stories,

... characterized by a sensible and encouraging reaction against the realities of apartheid. La Guma transcends what is topic and reveals, in a laborious quest to the details, the universal truths that crisscross apartheid's borders in its implications. [...] Alex La Guma's stories [...] prepare us for a more in-depth and elaborate exploration of the central subjects and situations of his five novels. [...] All these later works contribute to define the personality of this extraordinary talent that certainly constituted one of the more outstanding and vigorous voices of the African literary scene of our days (Omo Asein, 1986:6).

Asein grouped Alex' short stories into three main categories: first, those with an immediate interest in ‘the national situation and individual conflicts emanating from the collision between the non-White and, occasionally, the Whites’; second, those that ‘explore the wider subject of apartheid’, mainly its prison brutality; third, those with ‘a defined ideological focus and a proposition that glorifies the fundamental value of a revolutionary action’ and the ‘supreme sacrifice’ of revolutionaries (Ibid. p.10) Here we might single out ‘Thangi’s Bicycle’, a short story placed in Vietnam, a country that Alex visited and admired, thus renewing, in his literary endeavour, his profound internationalist call.

Alex was also active in organisations of militant intellectuals: he attended Congresses of African and Afro-Asian Writers in Stockholm and Beirut (1967) and the Havana Cultural Congress (1968); He received – from Indian Prime Minister Indira Ghandi – the *Lotus Award* (1969), the highest of the Association of Afro-Asian Writers of which he would become Secretary-General in 1979; and from Congolese President Dennis Sassou Nguesso – the African Literature Award in his capacity as ‘Africa’s most outstanding writer’, as well as the ‘Order of Officer of Arts and Letters’ from France’s Ministry of Culture (1985). Commenting on all his awards, Alex underlined that he wrote because there was a struggle in his country and, with his usual modesty, observed that, beyond his literary abilities, they constituted firstly ‘demonstrations of solidarity with the struggle of the people of South Africa’ (*La Guma*, 1985c). His works were translated into 14 languages (Ibid.).

**Alex La Guma in Cuba**

In his ‘South African Analysis of Jose Marti in Cuba’ (*La Guma*, 1982b), Alex gives us an idea of the lack of objective information about Cuba in his country, recalling that Cuba’s history only occupied half a page of the textbook that Cape province students had access to when he went to school (Ibid. pp.2-3). But after the 1959 revolution

our people begin to know more about Cuban history from the viewpoint of mass struggle and the ideology maintained during the many decades that the struggle lasted. As a consequence of this, we consider that solidarity between the revolutionary people of Cuba and the people who struggle in our country has strengthened (Ibid. p.3).

Alex first travelled to Cuba in 1968 for a Cultural Congress, when he delivered a well documented paper (*La Guma*, 1968c) and told the Cuban press that Cubans reminded him a lot of South Africans because of their different races; but he
was most impressed with the way in which ‘such a small country is building socialism right in the teeth of imperialism’ (La Guma, 1968d). Ten years later when posted as ANC Permanent Representative to Cuba, he declared:

Many of us, when we arrive in Cuba, we think that we have returned to our fatherland: to the fatherland as it will be some day. Here there are peoples of various races: Blacks, Coloureds, Chinese; people who have created a new society, and we say: ‘Ah, in South Africa we will see these same scenes’. There might be different experiences, different particularities, but, in general, we see the image of our future (La Guma, 1981b:7-8).

Before fixing his permanent residence in Cuba, Cuban ‘Arte y Literatura’ Editorial House had translated to Spanish and published Stone Country (La Guma, 1977), In the Fog of the Season’s End (La Guma, 1979d) and also his short story ‘Vestido de raso’ (La Guma, 1978). A couple of years after his arrival to Cuba his last novel, Time of the Butcherbird (La Guma, 1981c) would also see the light for Spanish-speaking readers at large. Alex welcomed these publications because they ‘contributed to giving Hispanic communities an idea of what is going on in our country’.

Furthermore, his paper to the Havana Cultural Congress had been published in a leading Cuban magazine (La Guma, 1968c); he had also been interviewed by the Cuban press (La Guma, 1968d) that also regularly published articles that mentioned his works (see, e.g. González, 1968, and Bayo, 1969). At least three articles written by Alex on political or cultural topics had appeared in Cuban periodicals – particularly Tricontinental magazine – towards the late 1960s and early 1970s (La Guma, 1968a, b; 1971).

In Cuba, Alex worked tirelessly. In the last seven years of his life he collaborated with several Cuban publications (La Guma, 1979a, b; 1980b, c, d, e; 1981a, b; 1982a; 1983b; 1985a; c; 1986), notably Tricontinental review. He delivered papers at seminars of various institutions, among them the Center for Studies on Africa and the Middle East (CEAMO) (La Guma, 1983a, 1984b), the Cuban Movement for Peace and Sovereignty of Peoples (La Guma, 1984a, 1985b) and the Cuban Institute of Friendship with Peoples (La Guma, 1982b). Reviewing some of those texts, we discover that they are not limited to literature, culture or the struggle against apartheid that, not surprisingly, concentrate most of his works. We find reflections of a global scope related to the arms race and disarmament, the role of the Non Aligned Movement and the scourge of mercenaries among others (see, e.g. La Guma, 1979e, 1980a, 1981d & 1984c). His political activism and, beyond that, his humanistic and internationalist nature inclined him to debate conflicts such as the Vietnam war, and his own trajectory as a committed intellectual led him to study the character and the works of Cuban hero, José Martí. Among his inconclusive projects, Alex also cherished the idea of writing about Cuba:

Personally, I confront a dilemma: the great affection I feel for Cuba on the one hand, and my commitment with our struggle on the other; I would like to write a book about Cuba (La Guma, 1981b).

Nevertheless, a premature and sudden death prevented this: A massive heart attack surprised him on 11 October 1985, a date marked for solidarity with prisoners of apartheid in South Africa and Namibia. Alex was buried in Havana, after a funeral ceremony in which Jesús Montané Oropesa, member of the Political Bureau of the Cuban Communist Party, and Alfred Nzo, Secretary-General of the ANC, spoke. A few weeks before his death, when returning to Cuba after a lengthy tour, Alex complained about the lack of time to pursue all the literary projects that were revolving in-
side his mind. But he was not in the least pessimistic with regards to his agitated lifestyle:

'Between my political activities and other activities in which I am involved, I also try to keep up my literary work, and this will always, of course, depend on time and opportunity. But I will persevere' (La Guma, 1985c).

Alex left unfinished the manuscript of a novel – of which we only know that ‘the plot has to do with the development of the present struggle in South Africa’ – (Ibid.) and the outline of a book dedicated to Cuba. But what he did manage to complete make him stand out as a paradigm of a militant intellectual. With his typical modesty, he argued:

What I might have produced in the field of literature emerged from the moving influence of our people’s commitment with the battle to survive the attacks of apartheid, to overthrow the racist regime and to establish a democratic South Africa. If literature is linked to life, then the life of our heroic people should inspire all the writers of our country (Rixaka, 1986).

We might also regret that Alex’ premature death prevented him from seeing the end of apartheid. But he was aware of that risk: Alex’ condition as ‘a political fighter, an internationalist and a revolutionary writer’, as Alfred Nzo pointed out at his funeral (Sánchez, 1985:54), assured his full conviction about the inevitability of victory, irrespective of the moment of the time or place where death might catch up with him.

We Cubans, who enjoyed the privilege of having Alex among us in the final years of his life, have the privilege of being the custodians of his mortal remains, together with a portion of his intellectual production. We have, therefore, a role to play in the collection, conservation and dissemination of a part of his memory and of his ideas that are a patrimony – beyond his own people, for whose freedom he dedicated his life’s efforts – of revolutionaries in every corner of the world.

David Gonzales, CEAMO, Havana.

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1985c, Taped interview. Havana, Radio Habana-Cuba, 28:30 minutes.


Deep Down in Darfur: Nothing is as we are told in Sudan’s Killing Fields


Ahmat Acyl Aghbash is known about by few, and then mostly for his grisly end: he stepped backwards into the spinning propellers of his Cessan aeroplane in 1982. The plane was a gift from Libya’s Colonel Muammar Gaddafi; for ten years, Ahmat Acyl was both a commander in Libya’s multinational pan-Saharan ‘Islamic Legion’ and the leader of a Chadian Arab militia known as the Volcano Brigade. Today, Acyl’s fighters from the Salamat of south-central Chad, and the Sudanese intermediaries who smuggled their weapons, can stake a good claim to be the original Janjawiid – the Sudan Government-backed militia now infamous for genocidal atrocity in Darfur.

Acyl’s name crops up in most histories of the long-running wars between Libya, Chad and Sudan. His supplier’s name doesn’t. It was Sheikh Hilal Mohamed Abdalla, whose Um Jalul clan’s yearly migration routes took them from the edge of the Libyan desert in Northern Darfur to the upper reaches of the Salamat River where it crosses from Sudan into Chad. Renowned for their traditionalism, their camels and the vast reach of their seminomadism, the Um Jalul were a logical intermediary for Libya’s gun-running. Their encounter with the Salamat militia, first social, then commercial and finally military, forged the Janjawiid, which is now headed by the Sheikh’s younger son, Musa Hilal. Acyl preached an Arab supremacist ideology, advocating the rule of the lineal descendants of the Prophet Muhammad and his Koreish tribe over Muslim lands. Specifically, the Juhayna Arabs, a group that includes both Salamat and Um Jalul, should control the territories from the Nile to Lake Chad. Darfur, an independent Sultanate until just ninety years ago, lies in the centre of this land, with its fertile massif and access to the headwaters of the Salamat River. The Koreishi ideology, mobilised via a shadowy group known as the ‘Arab Alliance’ or ‘Arab Gathering’, motivates some of those involved in today’s vicious war for Darfur. Understanding this hideous violence demands a grasp of complex local histories that is possessed by few Sudanese and fewer foreigners. Generally relegated to a footnote of Sudanese history, as Gerard Prunier explains in Darfur:

*The ambiguous genocide, Darfur warrants its own political ethnography. Without this, it is not possible to understand the events of the past two years, nor the weighty moral and legal questions that surround them.*

Darfur’s is indeed an ambiguous genocide. Between 60,000 and 150,000 are said to have died during the crisis and some two million now live in camps. But the crudity of the violence obscures fine-grained particularities of motive that only make sense within the unique history of Darfur and its neighbours. Theirs
is no centralised blueprint for racial annihilation, but rather a shading of different agendas and opportunistic alliances, facilitated by a cruelty that has become routine. The pivot of these is the Um Jalul, and its aspiring leaders’ links with Chadian Arab militias, Libya’s grandiose ambitions and – more recently – Khartoum’s security cabal.

The Um Jalul are a clan of the Mahamid, who are in turn a section of the Abbala ('camel-herding') Rizeigat tribe of Northern Darfur and Chad. Their Bedouin roots can be traced back at least five centuries, when their patrilineal ancestors crossed the Libyan desert, entering Darfur from the northwest. The Abbala Rizeigat were thus in Darfur when the Fur Sultanate emerged in the early seventeenth century and a part of its bilingual Arab-Fur identity from the outset. In the mid-eighteenth century, the Sultan granted the Baggara ('cattle-herding') Rizeigat jurisdiction over a huge area of land southeast of the Sultanate’s heartlands. Known as hawakir, such territorial grants are the basis of Darfur’s land tenure today; who controls them is the subject of bitter political struggle. The Baggara’s Abbala cousins, more mobile and living in the more densely administrated northern lands, were less fortunate.

Until today, many Abbala Rizeigat ascribe their role in the current conflict to the fact that they weren’t given territory a quarter of a millennium ago. The Baggara Rizeigat by contrast are neutral. Other Abbala also did not receive hawakir. After annexing Darfur on 1 January 1917 – almost the last territory to be added to the Empire – British colonial officials attempted to tidy up the confusion of Darfur’s ethnic geography.

Another Northern Darfur Arab group, the Beni Hussein, were collected in one district over which they were given control. The Abbala Rizeigat had their eyes on a territory north of the region’s centre; but the leading families of their two main sections – Mahamid (including Um Jalul) and Mahariya – could not agree on who should be paramount chief, or nazir.

Since 1925, there have been at least six attempts to unify the different sections under a single leader. None has succeeded. One stratagem used by the rival sheikhs to increase their chances was to enlarge their numbers by attracting followers from Chad. The Um Jalul had an advantage here: there are more Mahamid than Mahariya clans in Chad, and in the 1970s the Chadian sections were armed by Libya and organised by Acyl. He enmeshed Darfur in Chad’s racial war; and, pursuing his provincial ambition, Sheikh Hilal inadvertently led the Um Jalul into a maelstrom.

As we turn the political ethnographic lens, we find that the contours of Janjawid mobilisation correspond to the political fractures and family power struggles within the Abbala Rizeigat. Heads of Mahamid lineages have key positions, while most leading Mahariya families are uninvolved. Meanwhile a third section, the Ereigat, plays a different but equally critical role. After British annexation in the 1920s, the Ereigat had few camels of their own. Some got jobs at the colonial police stables, and their sons in turn went to school and joined the police and Army. One of these boys, Abdalla Safi el Nur, rose to become an Air Force general and was Governor of Northern Darfur at the time when the Janjawid mutated from a tribal militia tolerated by the Sudan Government into brigades organised under Government Military Intelligence. Another scion of the Ereigat became an army general and, now retired, heads Sudan’s parliamentary defence committee.

Meanwhile, the Baggara Rizeigat (the southern cattle-owning branch), who are far more numerous and powerful, are themselves divided. Though several are leading lights in the Arab Gathering, the
paramount chief, Nazir Saeed Madibu, is trying to steer a neutral course. This is far from the whole story of the origins of the Janjawid but it is a means to understanding who is fighting on one side of this war and why, and for recognising that extreme violence is the choice of a small minority.

Such is the poor state of basic documentation of Darfur that these facts have not been narrated. Unfortunately, this is still the case. Prunier’s account makes not a single mention of these key figures, Ahmat Acyl, Hilal Abdalla and his son, Musa, nor of the Koreish and its manifestos, nor indeed of the Abbala Rizeigat and the Um Jalul. The history of the Darfur rebels, the eventual enemies of the Janjawid, is equally important and also little documented. They spring from convergent resistance movements based among Darfur’s three largest non-Arab groups: the Fur, the Zaghawa and the Masalit. Multiple versions exist of the origins of the two main rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), not least among the members of the two groups themselves. All concur that the SLA has sympathies with the Southern Sudan-based Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), and took both arms and advice from the latter in 2003, but that it emerged independently of the SPLA two years earlier from an alliance of Fur militias and Zaghawa desert fighters. The SPLA’s late leader, John Garang, who was made Sudan’s First Vice-President in late June and has since died in a helicopter crash, fought for a secular, pluralist and united Sudan dominated by Sudan’s non-Arabs – an alliance of Southerners and the marginalised groups in the North – though many in his movement have made the case for a separate Southern state.

Until 2003 – when SPLA members helped to write the SLA manifesto – the main SPLA role had been to train Masalit volunteers who crossed from Sudan into Eritrea. A couple of battalions of these Darfurian rebels were transferred to Southern Sudan, from where they planned to return home to bolster local self-defence units. Thwarted by the Government, many deserted and went back home in 2001. The SPLA then lost interest in Darfur, while the local rebellion quietly gathered force. After reconnecting, in January 2003, Garang and Darfur’s guerrillas regarded each other with ambivalence. The SLA could indeed become part of a grand alliance of Sudan’s marginalised peoples but Darfurian leaders fear that they will be manipulated – and with good cause.

The SLA was catapulted to prominence before it could develop internal political institutions so that it is an amalgam of village militias and rural intellectuals marshalled by indigenous warrior tradition and the discipline of former Army NCOs. The Fur and Zaghawa wings have often disagreed and on one occasion, even fought each other. The origins of JEM are even more controversial. The leadership is drawn from the ranks of Darfurian Islamists, widely believed to have received funds from Islamists abroad. In contrast to the amateur public relations machinery of the SLA, JEM runs a sophisticated political bureau.

JEM’s roots lie in the fragmentation of Sudan’s Islamist movement in the late 1990s, as the twin dreams of national development as an Islamic state, and the emancipation of all Muslims as equal citizens, disintegrated into internal squabbling. The implosion of the Islamic project was clear when, in December 1999, President Omar al Bashir dismissed the Government’s eminence grise, Hassan al Turabi, sheikh of the Sudanese Islamists, and later put him in jail. Darfur’s Islamist leaders were already disaffected. Handicapped by the latent Arabist racism of the leadership, which haunts, as it always has, almost entirely from Khartoum and the Middle Nile Valley, few Darfurians had risen to the
A clandestine Black Book, which appeared in Sudan at this time, documented the racial and regional domination of the Sudanese state by those drawn from riverain Arab groups. There are many conspiracy theories concerning the origins of the SLA and JEM, but Prunier’s account – that the Darfur rebellion emerged as a direct consequence of a memorandum of understanding between Garang and Turabi in 2001 – is among the unlikeliest.

Putting forward such a claim requires strong supporting documentation, of which Prunier provides none. The critique in the Black Book was aimed, in fact, at Turabi as well as Bashir. Following the 1999 split and Turabi’s imprisonment, President Bashir and his lieutenant, Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, relied increasingly on their own kinsmen, security officers and Islamist cadres drawn from precisely the same Nile Valley tribes fingered in the Black Book. Alarmed at its haemorrhage of support in Darfur, Khartoum’s security cabal turned to one of the few senior military figures from Darfur, General Abdalla Safi el Nur of the Ereigat Rizeigat, who responded by putting his kinsmen into key local security posts.

The alliance between Khartoum and the Saharan Bedouins is one of convenience. Accustomed to seeing Sudan through an ‘Arab vs. African’ lens, many observers have missed the fact that there is more than one kind of Arabism at work: the riverain Arabism of Bashir and Taha, coloured by the Islamic movement’s orientation to Arab civilisation, is a far cry from the Koreishi beliefs of A cyl’s Bedouin acolytes. Khartoum’s ruling elites regard the Darfur Arabs as no less backward than their non-Arab neighbours.

True adherents of the Koreish ideology reciprocate by dismissing the riverain tribes as half-caste ‘Arabized Nubians’. However opportunistic, the Khartoum-Janjawid alliance proved an effective machine for devastation. Between February and August 2003, the SLA’s mobile forces ran rings around inept Government garrisons; Khartoum’s response was a merciless campaign of assault by militia and air force. Janjawid brigades now became Military Intelligence’s strike force, allowed to promote whatever local agenda they saw fit, provided they contained the rebellion. It worked, at hideous human cost.

By early 2004, the SLA was losing ground, and later rebel offensives into Eastern and Southern Darfur were halted, using similar tactics. Since the beginning of this year, the level of organised violence has dropped dramatically, but half of Darfur’s people are confined indefinitely to displaced persons’ camps. Lacking local knowledge about what is actually driving the Darfur conflict, many have given it their own spin, particularly over the notion of ‘genocide’. Both its diagnosis and reaction to it are fraught with ambiguity. One approach was followed by the United States Government. Following a Congressional resolution in May 2004, the State Department dispatched a team of investigators to refugee camps in Chad to ascertain whether the Sudan Government was committing genocide. On 9 September, Secretary of State Colin Powell reported,

> genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the Jingaweit [sic] bear responsibility and genocide may still be occurring.

In international law, a determination of genocide should demonstrate both that a crime is committed that fits the definition in the 1948 Genocide Convention (actus reus) and also specific intent on the part of the perpetrator (mens rea) ‘to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’. Powell had good evidence for a pattern of atrocities that looked like genocide. He had no proof of
intent. But to equivocate – as his predecessor, Madeleine Albright, had done over Rwanda a decade earlier – risked being pilloried. State Department lawyers were encouraged by the reasoning of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Faced with the problem of proving genocidal intentions when the accused denied them, the tribunal’s judges ruled that it was legitimate to infer intent from the ‘general context’ of extreme violence directed against a group. Another good reason for making this inference is that it is almost impossible to reach a conclusion about genocide while it is actually occurring, meaning that the Genocide Convention would only be good for prosecutions after the fact. Powell’s phrasing was, however, curiously passive. He did not say that Khartoum’s leaders and their militia were genocidal criminals; in the next breath he said that US policy would not change.

A different approach to determining genocide was adopted by the International Commission of Inquiry into Darfur (ICID), set up by the United Nations Security Council, which reported in January 2005. The ICID detailed the same pattern of abuses as in the State Department report. ‘However’, it continued, the crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at least as far as the central Government authorities are concerned. Generally speaking the policy of attacking, killing and forcibly displacing members of some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group. Rather it would seem that those who planned and organized attacks on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from their homes, primarily for the purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.

In short, the killings in Darfur looked like genocide but were actually a by-product of defeating the rebellion. The Commissioners, all of them veteran independent human-rights specialists, had shied away from the fence that the Americans had so readily jumped. But the Khartoum Government – despite trumpeting the ‘no genocide’ finding – could take no solace from a report that found that ‘the crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide’, and which noted that individuals – including Government officials – may have possessed genocidal intent. Unlike Powell, the ICID recommended a specific course of action, namely referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC). In March 2005, the US set aside its long-standing opposition to the ICC, and allowed the Security Council to refer the Darfur case to The Hague. The prosecutor is currently examining a sealed list of 51 individuals identified by the ICID. Although indictments are many months away, the prospect of extradition to face prosecution has prompted a shiver of fear among Khartoum’s security chiefs. The blades are whirring just behind them.

The ICID determination is based on a higher standard of proof than that of the State Department. It is open to complex legal dispute; much hinges on primary purpose and double effect. Could it not be argued that genocide is a predictable corollary of counter-insurgency conducted in a certain manner? And is there not reason enough to deduce as much from the previous two decades of warfare in Sudan – and indeed from other modern wars? On the other hand, the 1948 Convention identifies genocidal intent in a precise way, and hard legal work needs to be done if that is to be broadened to include genocidal outcomes as a secondary impact of other aims.

By the time the ICID began its work, Sudan Government Military Intelligence and the Janjaweed had largely completed theirs. Mass murder and burning had been replaced by pervasive fear that kept Darfur’s two million displaced people...
and refugees in their places of exile. African Union ceasefire observers were on the ground, along with an array of international humanitarian agencies. As a result, the ICID’s main brief was to identify the scope of the crimes and the individuals responsible. As the Hague Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia has shown, the most effective way to prosecute crimes of genocide is to begin with multiple instances of mass murder and group-directed war crimes and then to deduce that these cumulatively amount to genocide. Both empirically and legally, the ICID took a serious and thought-ful position, which will doubtless be scrutinised and contested as the ICC goes about its work. Prunier, however, has no truck with such nuance. He opens his discussion by characterising the ICID report as part of ‘a coordinated show of egregious disingenuousness’. ‘The semantic play’, he writes, ‘ended up being an evasion of reality. The notion that this was probably not a ‘genocide’ in the most strict sense of the word seemed to satisfy the Commission that things were not too serious after all.’

Given the subtitle of his Darfur and Prunier’s previous work on the Rwanda genocide, this is a disappointingly inadequate conclusion. After the question of genocide, the most controversial issue in Darfur is the death rate. The question of how many people have died is important, but desktop demography is hazardous when the methods of data collection are varied and have not been fully scrutinised. Prunier is not alone in hanging strong claims on the fact that, in one survey of refugees, 61% said that they had seen a ‘family member’ killed. As a general index of horror this is a compelling statistic. But it is impossible to make any numerical inference until one knows what the investigators meant by ‘family’. Demographers distinguish the household (usually defined as those who eat together daily, and usually used as the unit of enumeration) from the family, which commonly stretches far wider than those five or six individuals. Until there is a thorough population-based survey of mortality in Darfur, all estimates for deaths from violence, disease and hunger will remain conjecture.

Prunier has some good sources but often treats them casually. In his catalogue of international neglect of the conflict he says that Justice Africa failed to mention Darfur in its October 2003 briefing. There were in fact four paragraphs that month on Darfur, which had been covered in every issue of the briefing since March, including a warning on 27 May that the strategy of ‘arming local militia’ would, if followed, ‘run the risk of creating a vicious internecine war targeting civilians’. Prunier does provide a competent sketch of the history of Darfur and the position of the conflict within the politics of Sudan and the region. And his account is valuable in locating Darfur within the politics of the Central Sahara and the long-running three-cornered wars between Libya, Chad and Sudan. He correctly describes pre-colonial Darfur as an ‘ethnic mosaic’ rather than a region with a binary polarized ‘Arab’–‘African’ identity divide. He notes the ambiguity of the term ‘Arab’ (though he doesn’t explore the varieties of Arabism); he makes useful points on the politics of the Umma Party, the main party in the ruling coalition toppled by the current Sudan Government, and the Darfur Development Front in the 1960s and 1980s and on Libyan-Sudanese relations in the 1970s and 1980s. Errors and omissions are inevitable in any analytical narrative of Darfur but Prunier omits entirely the central protagonists. He is also too sweeping in his account of the role of international mediation in Sudan.

International efforts to find a solution to Darfur’s agony are now in the hands of the African Union, which Prunier dismisses as ‘the politically correct way of saying “We do not really care”’. But American, British and other international support to the Kenyan-headed
North-South peace process followed a similar formula of ad hoc multilateralism, and did bring an end to 20 years of comparably vicious war. Darfur’s peace process is in some respects more challenging. Having sealed its big win in the North-South peace, the Sudan Government is playing for tactical advantage while the rebel leadership is deeply divided. The political issues that divide the belligerents have yet to be thrashed out; the agenda for negotiations is itself a matter of acrimony.

The place of Chad at the mediation table is also controversial. Chadian President Idris Deby was brought to power in 1990 by a three-cornered alliance of Zaghawa, Chadian Arabs and Sudanese security. This coalition fell apart when its members went to war in Darfur, and the ailing Deby is desperately playing divide-and-rule among his own Zaghawa kinsmen to prevent another civil war in Chad.

Meanwhile, the best hopes for a settlement may come from connecting external peacemaking to internal initiatives. Darfur’s own provincial aristocrats, the paramount chiefs – including the ruling Arab families – are seeking an exit from their predicament: one that restores a conservative social order and salvages their tribes’ reputation. If the Janjaweed are to be politically decapitated, it may be through the efforts of these hardened old tribal chiefs, arguing that for the Government and its allies to submit to their mediation is a better option than extradition to The Hague and a cell in a Dutch basement.

Editor’s Note: This review first appeared in The Times Literary Supplement, 12 August 2005. See ROAPE No. 97 (September 2003) for a review of the Black Book of Sudan.

Insecurity remains pervasive in Darfur despite a recent decline in direct fighting between government and rebel forces. Meanwhile since the UN’s conclusion that this catastrophe was not genocide, the explanatory dichotomies that had clarified this conflict have been lost. And with them it seems the media coverage. These two important books provide the reader with a timely analysis of the political and ethnographic histories that lie behind the last three years of violence in Darfur.

Both works conclude that the war is the fault of a half-century of ‘partly unintended and partly deliberate policy’ (p. 109) of African discrimination by Khartoum that culminated with the mobilisation of proxy militias to fight the resultant rebellion. These books differ, however, in their approach and their conclusions. Whilst Prunier looks from the ‘top-down’ at the twentieth century political history of the province, Flint and de Waal describe from the ‘bottom up’ the emergence and constitution of the actors and ideologies employed to fight.

Darfur has a perhaps uniquely complex political-ethnography. Its population, unified by Islam and the Arabic language, is divided into between forty and ninety ethnic groups scattered in a complex ‘ethnic mosaic’ or ‘moral geography’ of land allocation, tribal cohesion and party affiliation. Before the current conflict, identity was never fixed or defined by polar divisions, whether Arab/African, or even farmer/nomad, but was fluid and contextual.
That these relations changed was the fault of three factors. First, the expansion of the Northern deserts due to the continuing Sahelian drought; second, the importation of weaponry and Arab supremacist ideologies from Darfur’s neighbours Libya and Chad and third, the fragmentation of Northern Sudan’s Islamic unity following the repeated failures of the current regime’s Islamist ‘Revolution’. As many observers were anticipating the end of the 20-year long civil war between North and South in 2003, these converged and the ‘first Genocide of the twenty-first century’ was born.

Gérard Prunier, known most widely for his lucid account of the genocide in Rwanda, has written a comprehensive if uncontroversial political history of Darfur from 1916 (since it ceased to exist as an independent sultanate) until early 2005. Relying heavily on secondary sources, the central fact of Darfur, in this account, is that it is far away and, except for bloc voting, entirely worthless. Subsequent central governments allowed traditionalism to thrive, and low-level violence to fester. Almost no state investment found its way to Darfur. It remained poor, unintegrated, and politically disorganised.

Prunier identifies an overlapping of ‘false consciousness’ and escalating resource conflicts at the source of the latest war. Whilst since the 1980s Arab nomads and African farming groups had competed violently for land, since the 1990s these conflicts were increasingly entwined with a racist ideology of Arab supremacy fomented by Libyan and Chadian factions in the 70s and 80s. When Darfur’s Africans rebelled in 2003, fearing disenfranchisement under the terms of the North-South peace agreement, a divided and weak Islamist regime in Khartoum mobilised this ideology to guarantee their survival. Somewhat intentionally, somewhat as an accident, Darfur slid into crisis.

Prunier has written a timely political history of Darfur, intended for a public audience hungry to understand why this region collapsed so brutally. Stressing the importance of political, rather than atavistic or solely ecological variables, Prunier’s account rightly rejects any essentialist analysis of Darfuri ethnicity. He describes in depth the motives and regional politics behind Libyan and Chadian involvement, and the failure of Sudanese political parties from the 1960s onwards. Rather than a comprehensive analysis this book is an often excellent summary of existing secondary sources. Furthermore, his rage at the inaction of the international community, despite the ‘moral indignation and its attendant media coverage’ (p. 128), does not interfere with his calm dissection of its cause.

Nevertheless, despite its benefits, this is an account that bears the taint of determinism. Knowing where he will end, he does not convincingly capture the local ethno-politics behind the ferocious violence. Perhaps less forgivable is that the Ambiguous Genocide is occasionally let down by a casual style and poor editing. For example, in describing how, when news of Darfur broke in 2004, ‘suddenly everybody got frantic’; or in the repetition of two almost identical paragraphs on pages one and fifteen. These failings aside if it were not for the simultaneous release of Julie Flint and Alex de Waal’s work, Prunier’s book would certainly be one of the best available.

Whilst Prunier presents a picture of violent political and societal racism shared and manipulated by Sudanese Arabs ‘unsure about the purity of their Arab credentials’ (p.163), Flint and de Waal present a much more convincing picture of minority political strategies implemented by proxy.

Launching rapidly into a fast pace and highly structured account, A Short History of a Long War differentiates between and describes the internal politics of the
armed factions and ethnic groups and takes the reader up to the death of Southern rebel leader John Garang on 30 July 2005.

Julie Flint and Alex de Waal are both highly experienced Sudan scholars and their expertise is plainly evident. They take the reader on a chapter by chapter tour of the structural history and actors in the war including detailed analyses of the origins of the Janjaweed, the different rebel factions and the ebbs and flows of the fighting itself. Avoiding all generalisations, the authors describe the emergence of an Arab supremacist ideology, but also the dispossession of the nomadic communities and the collapse of the ‘old order’ of ethnic cooperation. In this account there is no central policy of genocide but rather a series of opportunistic land-grabs, historical grievances and private motives which allowed a very small number of ideological combatants to unravel Darfur’s social order. In their conclusion they describe ongoing peace efforts – not of the international community – but of the majority of Arab tribal leaders in Darfur even in the face of resistance from Khartoum.

Flint and de Waal’s book, flowing easily in a clear and convincing style, uses original primary and secondary sources to explain the process of politicisation and organisation behind the war. Most impressively, the book forces the reader through genuine horror, including eyewitness reports of violence but, unlike Prunier’s jaded anger, Flint and de Waal’s activism demands from the reader that he/she contemplates action not despair.

The most significant difference between the two books is in their account of the importance of the Naivasha peace talks and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on 9 January 2005. For Prunier the government is a unitary agent sworn to defend Arab supremacy, weak in capacity but deftly controlling events through informal channels and deceit. The CPA in this view is nothing but a means of ‘de-fanging’ (p. 105) the SPLA rebels and perpetuating Nile Valley Arab domination of Sudan. For Flint and de Waal, Khartoum, though manipulative and weak, is also often paranoid and myopic rather than supremely Machiavellian. This doesn’t reduce the moral responsibility of Khartoum for the massacres in Darfur, but presents the CPA as essential and a ‘tremendous achievement’ (xiii) that must not be dismissed or neglected by the international community.

Flint and de Waal’s is the better book for the informed or expert reader but the failings of these two analyses are in a final account complementary. Whilst Prunier excels in the politics of regional interference, Flint and de Waal often skim over Darfur’s complex history in favour of a readable and detailed ethnography.

Both books refuse the myth of a good/evil side in this war, and offer a grey-scale of incompetence, ignorance and selfishness from all sides. This leaves the reader confronted with the more disturbing reality of a conflict – like many in Africa – that is cyclical, structural and most importantly profoundly unnecessary.

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Endnotes


From 1993 to 1998, career United Nations civil servant Erik Jensen was at the forefront of the referendum effort in Western Sahara. During the latter four years of his tenure, Jensen headed the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). Since leaving the mission, Jensen has taken up academic posts in the United States and England.

Jensen’s book on the Western Sahara conflict was published as an occasional paper of the International Peace Academy (IPA). Jensen brings to bear his intimate knowledge of MINURSO’s dual effort to identify an electorate for the referendum while maintaining a dialog between the Moroccan government and the Western Saharan nationalist movement, the Polisario Front. Jensen backs this up with more than enough well referenced historical context to make the average non-expert reader comfortable with the complexities of the United Nations administered peace process since 1988. As IPA president, David Malone, wrote in his forward, ‘Useful to policymakers, civil society organizations, and academics, Jensen’s book provides a treasure trove of behind-the-scenes lessons on conflict mediation’ (p.10).

Jensen’s meticulously detailed account makes a significant contribution to what is now known about the initial – but now largely abandoned – referendum process in Western Sahara between 1991-2000. It also adds much to the previously published accounts of such former MINURSO insiders as Ambassador Frank Ruddy (‘What I saw in Western Sahara: The referendum that wasn’t and the one that could still be’, *Mediterranean Quarterly* 9/4, Fall, 1998; Ambassador Charles Dunbar, ‘Saharan Stasis’, *Middle East Journal* 54/4, Autumn, 2000; Adekeye Adebajo, ‘Selling Out the Sahara: The Tragic Tale of the UN Referendum’, Occasional Papers Series, Cornell: Institute for African Development, Spring 2002; and Marrak Goulding, *Peacemonger*, London: John Murray, 2002). Jensen also offers some insight into the peace process since 2000, which was dominated by the efforts of former US Secretary of State James Baker until his departure in 2004.

Largely a chronological narrative, Jensen structures his book into nine chapters. For the reader’s benefit, *Anatomy of a Stalemate* includes five annexes of relevant United Nations documents, a list of acronyms and a select bibliography. Though there are some scattered errors of typography (p.41), citation (p.37, note 12), and history (p.107), the text is otherwise very clean.

Following a brief preface, Jensen’s first chapter is introductory, and frames the central problem that preoccupied the mission for most of the 1990s: ‘who is a Sahrawi, who is a Western Saharan, and who should be entitled to vote’ (p.13). Jensen then provides a brief introduction to the conflict and the work of the United Nations in Western Sahara to the present. The next two chapters respectively deal
with the broad history of Western Sahara to the end of Spanish colonialism (i.e., 1975-1976) and the efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU, now the African Union) and the United Nations to resolve the conflict (1976-1988). Though both Morocco and Polisario had ostensibly agreed to the same proposal in 1988, chapter four covers the United Nations initial efforts to reconcile their conflicting interpretations before and after the Secretary General unilaterally declared a ceasefire in 1991. As the all important voter identification process got underway in 1994, Jensen personally enters the picture, first as head of MINURSO’s Identification Commission in 1993 and later as head of the mission in 1994. Though the narrative is sufficiently brisk, the identification process described in chapters five and six includes a variety of details, from the negotiated composition of voter application forms to the process of resolving the contested status of OAU observers.

What becomes clear early on in Jensen’s account is that the UN Secretariat believed the point of MINURSO was not a referendum (despite the mission’s name) but a means for sustained dialog between the parties. Most observers assumed, as did most MINURSO employees, that the Secretariat’s peacekeeping department was sincere in their efforts hold an honest referendum in Western Sahara. Jensen, however, claims quite the contrary. ‘Although not made explicit,’ he writes, ‘it was my impression, subsequently reinforced by word and in action, that I was not expected to succeed’ (p.59). Indeed, Jensen earlier described ‘the launch of identification … as a means of locking Morocco and the Frente Polisario into regular and nonviolent interaction’ (p.15) rather than an end in itself. Thus Jensen wastes no time in dispelling the myth that the mission in Western Sahara was about upholding international law or providing the Western Saharan with their long denied right to self-determination. Confirming a claim made earlier by Adebajo, Jensen notes, “[Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali] had not really expected the referendum as envisioned in the settlement plan to prove possible” (p.83). The preferred settlement would come from ‘direct negotiations’ (p.83) inspired by the outcome of identification, and later ratified through a referendum. In fact, all three relevant secretaries-general – Pérez de Cuéllar, Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan – have shared this view and constantly disparaged the chances of holding an authentic referendum in the face of Moroccan intransigence.

One of the most interesting aspects of the book is Jensen’s brief account of his own personal initiative to settle the conflict outside of the 1991 Settlement Plan’s winner-take-all framework. After the identification effort stalled and MINURSO’s force-size was reduced to a skeleton crew in mid-1996, Jensen began approaching both sides, using the impact and likely product of identification, which they were able to deduce, as ‘the premise for talking’ (p.88). Though Jensen does not say it outright, the results of voter identification seemingly favoured Polisario at that time, giving Morocco a strong reason to seek a compromise formula between independence and integration. This initiative led to a secret high-level meeting between Morocco’s crown prince – now king – Mohammed and several key figures in the Polisario’s leadership in August 1996. This effort was partially undermined by the appointment of Baker as Kofi Annan’s Personal Envoy to Western Sahara. Ironically, Baker took on the job believing that a compromise autonomy agreement was at hand but, as Jensen chronicles in chapter seven, both sides reverted back to the 1991 Settlement Plan believing that their interests would be better served. Chapter seven then goes on to trace the final two years of the identification effort following the Baker-negotiated Houston Accords of September 1997 and Dunbar’s succeeding Jensen in early 1998.
Chapter eight deals with the two unfruitful autonomy-referendum proposals offered by Baker in 2001 and 2003 following the abandonment of the original referendum envisaged under the 1991 Settlement Plan. Given Jensen’s familiarity with the range of acceptable settlements and his expertise in conflict resolution, one would hope that he might conclude by suggesting new avenues for peace in Western Sahara. Sadly, the final chapter is mostly a review of the ground covered and a dim assessment of future prospects for peace and self-determination.

While Anatomy of a Stalemate is perhaps the most thorough history of the United Nations efforts in Western Sahara to date, Jensen’s book refuses to address some of the accusations of malfeasance leveled against MINURSO, including a strong institutional bias towards Moroccan interests. Jensen is largely dismissive of such claims, and simplistically attributes these ‘efforts to discredit the UN’ to ‘one right-wing US critic’ (p.74) – i.e., Ruddy.

In a footnote, Jensen cites an unprecedented internal United Nations audit that ignored many of the accusations against MINURSO, including Ruddy’s whistle blowing to the early termination of his contract with MINURSO. Yet both the New York Times and Human Rights Watch, following up on Ruddy’s claims, investigated and discovered that the Moroccan government had made serious efforts to compromise the process.

Similar charges were leveled by the testimony of former MINURSO peacekeepers and independent academic researches before such bodies as the United Nations Fourth Committee and the United States Congress. Jensen, more than any other participant in the five-year identification effort, could have provided some insight and perspective on the Moroccan government’s alleged efforts to fill the polls with non-Saharans, and MINURSO’s apparent willingness to accommodate it. Instead of clarifying the historical record, Jensen ultimately elides over this unseemly aspect of the United Nations in Western Sahara. What little attention Jensen gives such claims is explained away all too easily. ‘Moroccan heavy-handedness,’ Jensen argues, was to be expected because MINURSO ‘depended, as always, on the parties’ willing cooperation,’ (p.74) even if it meant tolerating acts meant to ‘predetermine the outcome of the referendum’ by controlling ‘the composition of the electoral body’ (p.100). And yet the fact that ‘the Security Council never so much as whispered the word sanction’ (p.75, his emphasis) – i.e., against Morocco – is incidental to Jensen’s analysis.

Not only is the history presented in Anatomy of a Stalemate incomplete, so is the analysis of Western interests. No conflict is an island, and Morocco’s importance to the West has much to do with the problem of Western Sahara’s irresolution as the mutually exclusive interests of Polisario and Morocco. Western interests might be more glacial in their movement, but that does not exempt them from interrogation. Like a good diplomat, Jensen steers clear of these more controversial topics. In presenting his diplomatic experiences, Jensen has made a strong contribution to what is known about the botched referendum in Western Sahara; yet Jensen’s unwillingness to overcome his diplomat’s perspective has severely impaired the scope of his historical analysis.
Africa’s Media: Democracy and the Politics of Belonging by Francis B. Nyamnjoh; Published by Zed Books, pp. 308; Reviewed by Desmond Smith.

Francis Nyamnjoh’s monograph presents an overview of Africa’s media and situates them within ongoing attempts to democratise various states on the continent. As a survey the book offers a useful primer on some of these countries’ separate paths towards or away from democracy; it employs a political economy perspective to analyse key players and agencies, and some of the processes within the media which have led to the current situation, together with some of their more obvious shortcomings. It also offers a profile of Cameroon and some of its media, using ethnographic accounts and a brief survey of certain media encounters since independence within the country’s one-party state.

In the introduction, Nyamnjoh pauses to take stock of Africa’s level of technological development, not only with regard to ‘traditional’ mass media such as the broadcast and print media but also to the relatively ‘new’ IT medium of the worldwide web. This latter is something of a digression so early in the book, given that Africa as a continent is not yet at the forefront of frequent IT use for political purposes. Moreover serious analytical research into the real, as distinct from potential, role(s) of IT in democratisation – in Africa as elsewhere – is still somewhat in its infancy, and it is therefore moot whether realistic assessments can be made of its role in mass politics at this early stage.

However IT’s early appearance in the text does tie in with one of the themes of the book which is the relationship between African communities and the state and authority on the one hand and, on the other, the evolved and evolving forms of communication and dialogue – or lack of them – available to citizens.

Nyamnjoh seems to be ambivalent about essentialist explanations of African media and culture. He is rightly sceptical of the idea that there are somehow elements of African political and cultural behaviour which do not admit of rational explanation. Yet he appears to be less critical of analyses which invoke ethnicity and tribalism to explain those African polities which have been repeatedly overwhelmed in the past by the authoritarian or despotic behaviour of their elites. Critical analysis must surely also point here towards a lack of developed political and civic institutions, and the uncertain outcomes of mobilisations and struggles over a protracted period in many African states. These struggles have not infrequently been predominantly between those political actors with the political and economic clout to engage in the political arena. Yet these same actors, if and when they have finally come to power, have frequently been possessed of very short memories of what it was they were initially struggling about.

Certainly as Nyamnjoh repeatedly points out, in Africa – again, as elsewhere – the political performances of key players once they achieve power can fall woefully short of the political rhetoric they have employed in rallying mass support to attain that power. It may well be one of the mass media’s more important roles in a democracy to keep these shortcomings and failures steadily in the public eye, in spite of authority’s strong proclivities for amnesia. The media might ideally be seen as a conduit for challenges, open or implied, to the status quo, and for critiques and dissent to abusive regimes. Political and cultural atavism, in this context, would therefore indicate a lack of alternative channels for political mobilisation and consequent frustration at local levels with the state’s performance ‘on the ground’, not the primacy of ethnic or communal politics.
Njamnjoh refers intriguingly to *radio trottoir* ‘epitomised by rumour and political derision’ as playing ‘a significant role in the lives of ordinary Africans’. He points to the overwhelming preponderance of the transistor radio as a source of news for Africans whose access to printed news is often severely limited, either through rural isolation, the financial priorities of potential audiences (given the relatively high cost of newspapers) and/or low levels of literacy. Yet tantalisingly there is simply not enough flesh and bones in Njamnjoh’s account for a casual reader to assess the significance or indeed the ‘flavour’ of *radio trottoir* and its actual role in African political mobilisations. It is not even entirely clear from his account whether *radio trottoir* should be taken to refer simply to informal information networks, equivalent to the ‘bush telegraph’ of former times, or whether it is also to include the kind of political gossip and rumour-mongering which exists independently of the mass media but also finds an outlet on the airwaves.

Western commentators, usually at a comfortable distance, have tended to focus approvingly on local media which have lent their platform to critics of the political status quo. There appears to be an assumption that such oppositional media, including radio stations, could be a force for democratisation; yet such mass appeal without journalistic responsibility and the mechanisms for verification and accuracy can also act counter to democratic interests.

Case studies from Latin America and South East Asia indicate that radio as a popular source of information can become a genuine conduit for oppositional and critical voices in times of rapid political change. This has indeed sometimes been the case. In Latin America in the 1980s, for example. *Radio Venceremos* in El Salvador was seen as an underground radio station which struggled to present the left-wing guerrillas’ case against established elite agendas, and instruments of suppression, in the battle for hearts and minds in that country’s civil war.

Yet local radio, partly because of its distance from the political centre and partly through lower journalistic standards of verification, can just as readily become a megaphone for unsubstantiated political gossip and elite rumour-mongering. This can rapidly descend into populist, not to say demagogic, distortions and manipulation.

The Philippines, also in the early 1980s as it happens, offers a useful case of these opposing tendencies. *Radio Veritas*, a Roman Catholic radio station in Manila added its relatively influential voice to the small oppositional ‘mosquito’ presses which were increasingly critical of the dictator, Ferdinand Marcos, who by then had outstayed his welcome for well over a decade. He was finally ousted in 1986 through what in effect was a US-condoned military coup which, partly thanks to the media climate of regime criticism, had received popular support in a much-vaunted ‘People Power Revolt’.

However, shortly thereafter in the late eighties, as disaffection with the incoming government of Cory Aquino continued among the country’s poor and dispossessed, a local radio station in the crisis-torn southern region of Mindanao was effectively hi-jacked by a radio broadcaster backed by right-wing elites and the Philippine army, who started exhorting his listeners to ‘hunt down, in the name of democracy, […] all hotbeds of communism’. These he defined on air as, in effect, any NGO or other organised group who resisted his threats and blandishments to contribute to the funds of the right-wing paramilitaries sponsoring the radio station.

His broadcasts became a torrid and dangerous amalgam of rumour and mis-
reporting, culminating in hysterical reports of illegal caches of arms being unearthed at a local monastery. The reports were completely erroneous: the ‘illegal caches’ were the invention of an over-zealous local army captain. Yet the radio broadcaster, Jan Pala, subsequently confessed to ‘hugely enjoying [this power] game’ and admitted his model had been the ‘Big Lie’ techniques of Goebbels and Nazi and other psychological warfare.

It has been precisely these techniques of media-promoted abuse (of factual reporting and ultimately the human rights which depend on it) which in the last two decades have led, in the Philippines, Rwanda, the Congo, Kosovo and elsewhere, to indiscriminate killing of vulnerable communities defined through, and castigated for, their different beliefs, be they religious, cultural or ideological. The genocidal murders witnessed in Rwanda were certainly strongly encouraged by the broadcasts of Radio Cinq Collines, which incited and then fanned ethnic hatreds, with apparent impunity.

Thus radio trottoir, whether it is the irresponsible political gossip around the village pump itself, or the unchecked reporting of such gossip, is a two-edged sword. Moustapha Thiombiano, a radio broadcaster from the Ivory Coast who has experienced the potential threat of such unrestrained broadcasting at first hand, has said in interview that he believes that in Africa – as elsewhere:

La radio est bonne, la radio est dangereuse et il ne faut pas la mettre dans les mains d’un fou (‘Radio is good, [but also] radio is dangerous, and it should not be in the hands of a madman’).

In his book Njamnjoh advances little detailed evidence to allow the reader to examine critically whether the instances he cites have advanced the cause of democracy or that of demagogy. It is also difficult to gauge the ‘tone’ of the manipulations and distortions he alleges without illustrations from the media sources he alludes to but does not quote verbatim. It is exactly here that detailed case histories would illuminate the nuanced potential of media power to inform and perhaps even mobilise populations for political change or, conversely, to bolster reactionary forces intent on avoiding genuine criticism.

Njamnjoh has chosen as a case study a country profile of Cameroon and its media. It is not entirely clear why this country in particular has been singled out to illustrate Africa’s media rather than countries such as South Africa or Nigeria where struggles for democratisation have been both more protracted and more highly contested. The veritable mass mobilisations in both these areas, together with struggles over, and contributions from, the country’s mass media have there produced tangible results, more susceptible of detailed analysis than those of a country still locked in an effective one-party dictatorship with few present indications of imminent political change.

However, Cameroon’s colonial past has determined that at independence the country was four-fifths Francophone, and one-fifth Anglophone, and this cultural and language divide is still alive today. On the face of it, this factor alone would make it atypical of the majority of African states. Questions of ethnicity and political opposition to the status quo here become complicated by considerations of linguistic representations in both broadcast and press media, in addition to those debates about non-elite access to the media, political and economic power in a country which since independence has known only one-party rule.

In 1982 Cameroon’s first President, Ahidjo, was succeeded by his prime minister, Paul Biya. Faced with popular discontent, Mr Biya has allowed multi-
party presidential elections in 1992, 1997 and yet again in 2004, but these have consistently been perceived as neither free nor fair nor even, by many, as worth taking part in at all. The electoral commission has been ridiculed as a rubber stamp for the ruling party, with electoral rolls widely perceived as fictitious.

Cameroon has one of the best literacy rates in Africa, yet the country’s continued development is hampered by a level of corruption that is among the highest in the world. Cameroon as a whole is hardly flourishing, but Anglophone Cameroon is totally starved of development. The question then remains: how to get development and greater democracy without the country deteriorating into civil war?

President Biya is not by all accounts a particularly tyrannical man. The press appears to be free and several private radio stations appear to flourish. Yet ordinary Cameroonians know practically nothing about their president and they get to see him even less. The general citizenry, and rural Cameroonians in particular, are kept largely in the dark about government policies, aside from pro-government ‘information’ – the kind of ‘developmental journalism’ prevalent in some developing countries during the seventies and eighties which has now been fully-discredited elsewhere. Any discontent is furthermore controlled by the omnipresent police and gendarmerie. The government, in short, is rarely if ever called to account.

Opponents in the church have attempted to use their own (private) newspapers to denounce and hector Mr Biya, but until now he has refused to go. Meanwhile, applications for a private church radio station have been stymied by the government using the simple and oft-employed tactic of refusal to issue a licence. Clearly the ruling party, in this one-party state, fears outspoken and influential critics, and they consequently fear a radio station run by the church. The parallels with Radio Veritas and its role in helping to oust the Philippine dictator Marcos in 1986 spring to mind. Yet without any obvious political opening in the near future it is difficult to see, let alone analyse, what contributions oppositional radio – or indeed any mass media – might contribute to effective democratization in Cameroon.

Nyamnjoh’s book is, in sum, a useful survey of selected aspects of Africa’s media. Certainly it raises numerous interesting questions about the roles of the media in future movements towards real democratization on the continent, as distinct from what he calls the lip-service of ‘face-powder democracy’. This he rightly suspects is little more than window-dressing for gullible potential Western sponsors.

Interestingly, the BBC World Service asked listeners in 2004 whether radio phone-ins should be banned, following a call to halt them in the run-up to general elections in Ghana, where it was feared that potentially ‘defamatory or careless utterances’ might result in election violence. African listeners, many of them significantly from Nigeria, responded with an overwhelming affirmation of the need for free media, including radio, in Africa with comments like: ‘[they are] the only watchdog [to criticise] our governments’ and ‘government[s] should stop monopolising the media to communicate what they want’, and ‘Africans need self-realisation [to wipe out] the culture of intolerance’ in order that ‘self-seeking politicians [can no longer] manipulate the people […] for personal gain’. Other listeners observed variously that African governments and society in general must acquire ‘the capacity to hear the voice of the “man on the street” and consider his [sic] opinion’ and that ‘radio [phone-ins] provide the easiest access to voicing one’s opinion’. However, one listener did recognise that ‘citizens in rural areas
[of Africa] are being fed with a lot of political rhetoric through phone-ins’. These comments suggest that Africans are becoming increasingly aware of the value of the media, however flawed, in expanding and defending the slow gains of democracy.

Democratisation in Africa will be a journey – as elsewhere – along a long and doubtless winding road, which will hopefully enable its citizens to learn, among other things to detect and resist the facile rhetoric of both Western and African demagoguery, but also to tolerate dissent. Nyamnjoh’s monograph is perhaps one starting point for the debates and struggles which lie ahead. However further studies might usefully build on this general picture with more detail. This would provide valuable source material for more nuanced assessments of the various roles Africa’s media are actually playing currently within broader attempts at democratization, as seen at street rather than ‘bird’s eye’ level.

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This book has been written at a time when ‘the development project’ is increasingly uncertain and contested. The beliefs about what will and will not lead to real positive change in Africa are divergent, although the current focus of the Washington consensus, and most international donors and NGOs, is that the answer lies somewhere in combining an increase in aid, cancellation of the debt and dropping trade barriers to goods from Africa. The focus of the Make Poverty History campaign encapsulates this approach, which was echoed in the G8 discussions in the summer of 2005.

The author rejects the recipes on offer and is overtly frustrated with the quality of the analysis of the problems of Africa to be found both among the donor and NGO communities in UK. The book has been written out of a strong belief that the solutions being offered now do not and cannot address the challenges of getting Africa out of poverty because they ignore the realities of the nature of the African state and politics in Africa. Few readers of ROAPE would argue with that point, as the journal has grappled for years with the nature and operations of different states in Africa.

Including the importance of politics and state actors in Africa is clearly critical to any analysis of the problems of continuing poverty in Africa, and how to tackle them. Taking this issue as central enables the author to raise many pertinent and important issues that need to be taken seriously in the current debates about how to move forward internationally and nationally. He stresses, rightly in my view, the importance of state intervention in development; however, this is something even the World Bank now acknowledges even though relations between them and states in sub-Saharan Africa are highly problematic. Lockwood is right to warn that states are ignored at the peril of the development agencies. His analysis of the failure of conditionality – one approach intended to bring African states into line in terms of their policies and practices – to change the behaviour of most states in Africa is well grounded in research, and he rightly highlights the reality that aid keeps flowing whether the conditions of that aid are met or not. The imperatives of aid
mean that performance is often divorced from rewards; the money needs to be spent and in the absence of clear alternatives it continues to go to countries that are hardly reformed or reforming.

Writing with passion about the failures of current thinking and analysis among development agencies is also very welcome. It is easy to share Lockwood’s frustration with the proposals being bandied about and the growing consensus across all kinds of agencies that is poorly rooted in good analytical, critical thinking.

It is also to be welcomed that the book recognises, although almost in passing, the importance of colonial relations and their continuance into modern day African states, something that much development analysis completely ignores. Lockwood tries to unpack and explore the realities of aid flows, and highlights the fact that they are substantial, and yet apparently ineffective in many ways in Africa. So why, he wonders, should doubling aid be an effective tool for solving poverty? He similarly explores the arguments and data around the issues of debt and trade, and assembles a lot of facts and figures to question current orthodoxies. He returns to some older policy prescriptions around increasing agricultural production, diversification, and industrialisation to seek for ways out of the cycles of primary commodity production and low productivity that keep Africa poor in a context of declining terms of trade globally. But it is in the very process of unravelling the realities of aid, trade and debt and seeking alternative approaches that the book is weakest.

First, the performance in Africa is compared, in every way unfavourably, with the states of East Asia. While this comparison is fashionable, it is not illuminating. The history, geography and political economy of East Asia and the continent of Africa are different along almost every dimension and the congruence of factors that enable major changes to take place in the East Asian economies do not apply in Africa today. These include, for example, the inherited state and bureaucratic structures, access to cheap and unregulated labour, state repression, major flows of foreign direct investment from the region, and the trading conditions of the recent past. Even Lockwood admits that the global terrain has changed, and the threat of China to other newly industrialising countries is going to pose a massive challenge for Africa.

Second, the analysis of East Asia is, inevitably, quite superficial. The problems become much worse in relation to the analysis of the problems in Africa, because Africa is a continent with highly diverse countries, contexts and states. While a huge number of facts and figures are mustered to support his arguments, the level of generalisation involved in presenting the situation in Africa as a whole is often too broad to be meaningful. The data presented are often highly questionable given the paucity of good quantitative data available on Africa. The comparison risks, at times, becoming relatively meaningless. This is more so when he compares the idea of ‘developmental states’ to be found in East Asia, with the ‘non-developmental states’ in Africa.

Lockwood is upfront about his belief that capitalism will provide the answer for Africa, a socialised capitalism that is aimed at using growth for development and development for growth. He has no analysis of the negative impacts of capitalist development, not even in relation to some of the core issues he is exploring such as growing social inequalities, environmental degradation, and corruption. The capitalist model followed in East Asia is the model for Africa to aspire to; the negative aspects of the model are glossed over. The model of socialised capitalism presented is one where cor-
ruption is limited or under control, where privatisation works to the benefit of the consumer, where things work. There is often an almost unconscious contrasting of everything that is wrong in Africa, with an idealised context where bureaucracies work impartially, patronage does not exist, corruption is limited, the private sector deliver efficiently and effectively, clientalism is replaced by formal democratic structures and so on. I suspect that behind the East Asia model, which was overtly presented, Lockwood has a relatively uncritical view of the way things work in the United Kingdom. The contrasts he made often felt as if they were with the ‘promotional material’ of life in Blair’s UK. I found it hard to think of anywhere, any bureaucracy, any company or country, that fitted the ideal types that seem to underlie his analysis.

The sense that Lockwood was comparing Africa with UK as well as East Asia seemed implicit in the title. This distancing of Africa, the vast generalisations, and the comparisons with almost idealised ‘other places’ – especially East Asia – detracted significantly from the power of some of his arguments. He does recognise the problems of over-generalisation and looks towards the end of the book at case studies of countries that are said to be improving faster in Africa, including Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania, but again these are so brief and presented at such a level of generalisation that it is hard to really understand in any detailed way the problems or the solutions being tried in those countries. He, anyway, sees them as all very limited in their ability to break away from being states that are anti-developmental and does not feel they hold out great hope for the future.

The way the book is written labels all African states as anti-developmental; the history and political economy of every country is elided into statements that are supposed to apply continent wide; and every state is engaged in ‘spoils politics’, with only one – Ghana – identified as having a strong civil society able to even start negotiating with the state around development issues. The way the data are presented leads to an over-simplification that sometimes hide more than it reveals.

Having said that, the book is intended in part to be a polemic and was expected to be a shot across the bows of the G8 and subsequent meetings in 2005, urging them to relook at the data and to explore the effectiveness of the current approaches to promoting development in Africa- aid, trade and debt. He has developed a range of policy recommendations around, for example, agriculture and diversification, industrialisation and exports, retrenchment, the role of the civil service, patronage, the role of civil society, corruption that are hard to grapple with when discussed Africa-wide, but which could provide useful questions and even a framework for analysis within individual African countries. Many good points are raised through the discussion that the development community do need to take seriously and engage with. Unfortunately the way the book is framed, comparing Africa unfavourably on every dimension with East Asia, and beyond that implicitly with northern countries, ultimately undermines the power of his arguments.
Books Received

1. Oil & the spectacle of culture in Nigeria by Andrew Apter, Univ of Chicago Press, $24.
5. Rigged rules & double standards: trade, globalisation & the fight against poverty, OXFAM.
6. Gender, development & Trade by Maree Keating (ed.), OXFAM.
7. Mugged: poverty in your coffee cup, OXFAM.
10. Rethinking the rise & fall of apartheid: South Africa & World Politics by Adrian Guelke, Macmillan, £18.99.

19. Trading away our rights: women working in global supply chains, OXFAM.
20. Women reinventing globalisation by Joanna Kerr & Caroline Sweetman (ed.), OXFAM.