War & the Forgotten Continent

Rita Abrahamsen & Ray Bush

As US and UK military forces invade Iraq the death of innocents in the Middle East will be added to those dying from AIDS, famine and preventable illness in Africa. The waging of war at any time, when not sanctioned by international law and the victims pose no threat to neighbours or invaders, is monstrous. It is even more so as US and UK resources are diverted towards the aims of death and destruction when millions in Africa are starving to death. In Iraq itself, the British Overseas Aid Group (Oxfam, Cafod, Christian Aid, Action Aid and Save the Children) warns of the humanitarian consequences of war in a country where more than 16 million are entirely dependent upon food aid. There has been little concern for the lives of those to be affected by military conflict as preparation to relieve the humanitarian disaster has taken second place to the creation of that disaster. The US will spend $12.5 billion a month on the war although it has offered $65 million to provide help with immediate humanitarian assistance. And when it is time for the reconstruction of Iraq, the US will offer only $50 million of a possible $1.5 billion to NGOs and the UN for the process – the rest goes to US companies, including those close to White House officials (The Guardian, 18 March 2003).

Meanwhile in Africa 40 million need famine and food relief. More than 14 million of these are in Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, another 15 million in southern Africa, while food relief is also urgently needed in parts of West and Central Africa. The crisis is the result of a complex set of factors, including a combination of drought, economic marginalisation and international and national food policies, which continue to harm Africa’s peasants and their ability to thrive. In this situation, the military aggression against Iraq and the missionary zeal of the Bush/Blair axis to promote their military solutions to regional conflicts pose enormous concerns for Africa. While Saddam Hussein’s policies have long been indefensible and his regime bestial, the launch of a military campaign to oust him rather than a tight inspection programme to ensure the non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, breaches international law and promotes US imperialist aggression. The UN charter has been flagrantly abused in the riding roughshod over international anti-war opinion. The west can always summon, it seems, money and materiel to defend the ascendant US oil and military conglomerates encapsulated in the Bush/Cheney White House, but it will not create conditions to stop mass death through starvation. In March this year the UN accused the international community of being so distracted by the desire to silence Saddam that not a penny had been received in response to an urgent appeal for funds to respond to famine threatening 1 million in the Central African Republic. Torn by a war that has displaced more than 150,000 people, the UN World Food Programme launched an appeal in January 2003 for $6.1 million but by mid-March, just before General Bozize seized power and suspended parliament, had not received anything.

A similar picture emerges from elsewhere. As 3.3 million Eritreans are confronted by famine, the UN has asked the industrialised world for $163 million only to receive $4
million. Burundi has received 3 per cent of the amount requested by the UN; Liberia 1.2 per cent; Sierra Leone 1 per cent; Guinea 0.4 per cent and Somalia, Sudan and DRC each less than 6 per cent of funds requested by the UN to avert humanitarian disaster (The Guardian, 18 March 2003). In short meteorological drought seems to be accompanied by the drying up of donor funds for famine relief.

African leaders have been wavering in their opposition to the war. Nelson Mandela certainly lent his considerable moral authority against conflict, and President Mbeki recently noted that war is ‘not in the best interests of the peoples of Africa’. Not the least this is because higher oil prices will undermine any possible economic recovery for non oil producers and erase any progress in debt relief – it would certainly undo any of the benefits from the 2002 deal with the industrial north to increase aid to Africa. So much for the improvement in economic relations between the leading industrial powers and Africa promised by the rhetoric of NEPAD. A presidential spokesman for Mbeki noted in January 2003 that war ‘would put paid to all the high hopes raised by … NEPAD … and therefore ensure that the people of Africa would continue to confront the reality of even further impoverishment’. Higher oil prices and falling aid budgets puts African development off the agenda. If Guinea, Angola and Cameroon did resist US bribery to sway them to support military action in the Security Council, it is to their credit. If it was simply that the US did not offer enough, fast enough and in cash rather than US commodities, then it will be to their shame. Elsewhere there certainly seems to have been a decay of principle. Djibouti it seems has not only its French garrison, but has also been hosting US troops. Another regional actor keen to replace Turkey as a safe haven from which to launch US attacks on the Middle East has been Eritrea. No longer, if ever, a bulwark against the onslaught of US adventure in the Horn, it has been visited by the Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and four times since September 11, 2001 by US Military Commander General Franks. Eritrea has also sent its own military commanders to Washington and employed Washington Lobbying firm Greenberg Traurig LLP (at an estimated $50,000 a month) to stress the importance of Eritrea’s geo-strategic position for US aggression. In the words of the lobbyists, ‘Eritrea provides the United States with a strategic advantage and hospitable atmosphere that cannot be matched in the region’ (Washington Post, 14 December 2002).

On the surface, one counter to the gloom arising from declining western concern for Africa and the continents famine, and right on cue with his moral concern of Africa’s suffering, has been Gordon Brown. In February 2003 the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer lamented the struggle for survival of Africa’s 14 million (sic) facing famine. He noted limited progress on reaching the millennium poverty reduction goals and with Clare Short, the UK Secretary of State for International Development, launched yet another new initiative to raise cash to resolve injustice in Africa. It is very simple. In return for African countries promoting anti-corruption measures and stable conditions for equitable and sustainable economic growth, the developed world will raise aid from $50 billion to $100 billion a year – this latter figure, it seems, is the sum necessary to meet the millennium development goals. Halving poverty means doubling aid. The money is to be disbursed through existing bilateral and multilateral mechanisms and the commitment from rich countries is intended not to add to poor countries debt burden. Most assistance, although the figure was unspecified, will be in the form of grants. The intention is that the west’s insistence on ‘tough conditionality’ will prevent the repeat of previous excesses, namely cash lining the pockets of corrupt elites rather than feeding the hungry (even when the corrupt elites are the allies of the west). Aid should not, moreover, be seen as
recompense for past injuries but ‘investment in a shared future’. There is mutuality then in the proposed new initiative.

The poorest and most populous continent represent the world’s next engine of economic growth – future consumers and producers with enormous potential purchasing power essential to the long term growth of industry and trade (The Guardian, 13 February 2003).

Brown concluded that ‘Every bit as much as the poorest, we stand to gain in a world more united, more just and more prosperous – a world that grows together, rather than apart’.

Brown’s position might be well-meaning, but like so much of New Labour’s policy towards Africa it is shot through with contradictions. First, while Brown pleads for greater international assistance to combating poverty in Africa, he simultaneously, and with apparent ease, finds money to defend the Bush/Blair war agenda. The Chancellor has set aside £3 billion for the military action in Iraq (www.news.bbc.co.uk, 27 March 2003). By comparison, the annual bilateral aid programme for Africa was £528 million in 2001/02 is set to reach £1 billion by 2005/06. After six years in government, New Labour’s development budget still only accounts for 0.33 per cent of GNP and will reach 0.4 per cent by 2005-06, a long way off the UN target of 0.7 per cent of national income (all figures from www.dfid.gov.uk and www.fco.gov.uk).

Not only do the resources devoted to the war on Iraq outstrip those devoted to Africa’s development, but as discussed above, it will also harm the prospects for growth on the African continent.

Second, Brown’s recent call for more aid to Africa remains steeped in the economic liberalism that has caused so much suffering on the continent in the last decades. Thus far, globalisation has not worked for the poor, and however many times the New Labour government repeats this mantra, it is unlikely to do so. On past experience, the united world to which Brown refers means closer integration and cooperation within the industrial north, whereas the manner of Africa’s integration into the world economy serves primarily to ensure the further extraction of profit by northern countries, not the creation of conditions for economic growth in the continent. Moreover, while Africa is told by its donors to liberalise and dismantle trade barriers in the name of globalisation and free trade, the rich countries continue to protect their domestic markets. When the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi visited Tony Blair in London in February 2003 he criticised trade policies and conflict in Iraq as deflecting the world’s attention away from tragedy in sub-Saharan Africa. Zenawi noted that while the developed countries criticise the presence of trade barriers in developing countries they do little to reform their own highly protected agricultural sectors. He perhaps understated his feelings when he noted, ‘There is quite a bit of hypocrisy by the west’ (The Guardian, 25 February 2003). The US spends more subsidising its 25,000 cotton farmers than it does on its entire aid budget for Africa. Food subsidies in the G8 countries total $300 billion a year, and according to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, such trade protection in the West is partly responsible for the current food crisis in Africa, as it makes it impossible for African commodities to compete in such highly protected markets (www.news.bbc.co.uk, 6 March 2003). Oxfam estimates that sub-Saharan Africa will lose $2billion a year due to tariff barriers in the industrialised countries (Oxfam, 2003). Brown’s suggestion and plea for more aid does nothing to change these structures of the world economy, and until there are changes in the rules of the game, principally on issues of trade, foreign investment and tariffs, but also on intellectual property rights, migration and asylum law in Europe, Africans will remain losers in the so called integrated and
globalised world economy. Increasing aid, targeting the poor, praising strides in educational achievement and so on, serves to relieve the guilt of donors and partially to improve the purchasing power of African elites. It is not enough to eradicate African poverty or famine.

Famine in Africa is persistent and it seems endemic under existing political and economic relationships within Africa and in the continent’s dealings with the West. This is not because the failure of rain necessarily creates mass death through starvation, but because the poor, who are the first to suffer the acutest form of starvation, seem largely powerless to transform their livelihoods to reduce risk of recurrent food and health crisis. More than 30 million Aids sufferers, most of whom do not have basic medical care, are unable to work. Village profiles of the healthy are inversely related to age: the old and the infirm care for the very young, many of whom are infected with HIV, while those who should be in the peak of fitness are largely motionless, unable to help with any part of the agricultural cycle. Faced with what seems are overwhelming odds of starvation and illness, development agencies in Africa and Africans themselves deal only with crisis management rather than development – however loosely that term might be defined. Is raising development assistance an answer to these crises? And has not the presence of assistance in Africa historically contributed to the conditions of the contemporary crisis? In the case of the current food crisis, the economic policies championed as the solution to Africa’s problems are certainly complicit. In the name of structural adjustment, state marketing agencies have been dismantled, subsidies for fertilisers and other implements abolished, exchange-rate liberalised, etc, leaving the poor peasant even more vulnerable to famine. Crippling debt repayments undermine the ability of governments to respond to the crisis. Aid it seems, is not simply the solution, but also part of the problem.

These themes resonate with three articles in this issue. In a challenging and provocative account of a development agency in Tanzania, Kelsall and Mercer highlight how development discourse on participation and empowerment can actually disempower people it declares it wants to help and that external agents, paradoxically are perceived as necessary to create the desire for local empowerment. In another essay on Tanzania, Lisa Richey provides a clear characterisation of the retreat of Tanzania’s health sector during structural adjustment and the pressure on it to provide effective care. She reveals just how the health sector has been impoverished and how donor concern with population policy has left the public health care system equipped primarily to supply contraceptives. And in our occasional Perspectives essays Roger Southall importantly examines, the character of democracy and the pressures for change in southern Africa. He examines themes linked to the clash in southern Africa between an authoritarian culture of national liberation and participatory democracy as well as those linked to the model of state power in the region – relevant elsewhere too perhaps- which despite democratic rhetoric and the accoutrements of democracy entrenches elites and promotes unequal patterns of accumulation generating an anti-developmental agenda.

Notwithstanding the war in Iraq and its consequences for Africa, the main purpose of this issue of RoAPE is a celebration of the work of Lionel Cliffe. Cliffe is a founding editor of this journal. He has worked in and on Africa for more than 40 years and has an international reputation for the force and quality of his radical scholarship and political activism. He has always strived for a commitment to independence and development in Africa. Essays here, in his honour relate to the pioneering
contributions that he has made on many different and important aspects of post-colonial African political economy. Cliffe is part of a generation of Africanists that set an agenda for research in Africa. He wrote convincingly about the character of famine and food security in the continent before it was fashionable to do so, setting the scene for much of his most influential work on academic thinking and policy initiatives regarding the continent’s food security. One of the main focuses of his work has been on problems of rural development, especially but not exclusively in southern and eastern Africa and the Horn. He has especially focused on questions of land tenure and reform and institutions for the democratisation of rural development. Peter Lawrence in his tribute examines the debates over the role of co-operatives in the building of socialism – what the role of cooperatives historically has been and what the benefits of rural co-operation are. He stresses, very much in the way that Cliffe has done in the examination of different country cases in Africa, the opportunity for cooperatives to boost the democratic imperative for socialist development despite the dominance of reactionary and conservative policy. In a second tribute, Henry Bernstein problematises the issue of the Africa’s agrarian question(s). He does this by challenging many assumptions regarding the possibility within the global context of distributive land reform. For Bernstein many of the possibilities for radical redistributive land reform of the 60s and 70s have been superseded by the resolution of the agrarian question for capital in the north, while the agrarian question in the south remains unresolved. Bernstein’s challenge to the historical significance of the agrarian question in Africa leads him to emphasise the fragmentation of labour ‘associated with and intensified by the global restructuring of capital that ‘discloses possibilities of (new) agrarian questions generated by the struggles of labour for means of livelihood and reproduction’. Bernstein then sets up a provisional exploration of these possibilities in the context of debates and political action for land reform in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

Cliffe’s concern with the democratisation of rural development, an understanding of the need to listen to peasants and to act on what they say rather than on what urban based politicians think small farmers needed, led him to explore the wider questions of African politics and political economy to which land issues gave rise. It also led him to be active politically in seeking to promote radical policy reform. This led him to insist donors needed, among other things, to understand what peasants and farmers, as well as liberation movements building new societies, understood by economic development and ‘good governance’ as opposed to what the donors understood by these terms. It also led him to assess the nature of institutions for development relating to state capacity and bureaucratic efficiency, the way governments and states allocated resources and why they chose to do so in the ways they did, and perhaps most impressively, to an understanding of democratic politics and social movements in Africa. This led Cliffe to write on his own and with others, pioneering and original studies of Ujamaa Socialism in Tanzania, government and rural development in East Africa, policy options for agrarian change in Zimbabwe, the dynamics of land tenure and agrarian systems in Africa, food and agricultural production in Eritrea and land settlement policy issues in Swaziland and South Africa.

In this issue Lloyd Sachikonye reflects on many of the issues relating to Cliffe’s concern with policy debates in Zimbabwe, land reform and resettlement. He reviews the contentious debates in Zimbabwe regarding the shifts in the strategy of resettlement and the agrarian transformations that have taken place in that country since independence. He goes beyond crude characterisations of the Mugabe regime
and challenges what seems to have become orthodox approaches to the erosion of Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector that has left more than 7 million (over half the population) in need of emergency food aid.

Cliffe’s activism and scholarship has also included a series of major election studies in Tanzania – the first book on elections in a one-party state – Kenya in 1963 when he worked for KANU and 1966, Botswana, 1982 Zimbabwe, 1980 and Namibia 1989. His work and commitment to the liberation of Eritrea is the topic of Tesfai’s essay in this volume. Cliffe supported the Eritrean liberation movement before it was fashionable among the left to do so. He visited ‘behind the lines’ in 1983 and 1987 and conducted a survey of food needs after famine and during the war. Tesfai shows the force and importance of Cliffe’s work on national liberation in Eritrea, how the role of the liberation movement, its links with the countryside and the centrality of the principle of self determination and autonomy were critical to the process of state formation.

One of Cliffe’s earliest collaborators in Africa was John Saul. In this volume Saul examines a range of the most dramatic challenges facing radicals in Africa as they look for strategies to get political and economic power from the logic of global capitalism. Saul looks for strategies that can deliver ‘more humane outcomes on the continent’ and he does this by providing a very important historical map reflecting on the debates on socialism as they had taken place in Dar es Salaam in the 1960s and early 1970s. But he goes beyond the historical past to address the realities of the contemporary neo-liberal panacea to Africa’s crisis like NEPAD and liberal democratisation, and he concludes with the necessity for a language and vision of socialism and for the continued revival of Africa’s revolutionary endeavour in the continents next liberation struggle.

Lionel Cliffe continues to be a protagonist for development with justice and democracy in Africa. His academic work, political activism and advisory work on the broad range of country cases over many years and including the many themes of ujamaa in Tanzania, land reform and his backing of Angola against the US/SA invasion during the apartheid years, being locked up with students in Zambia in the 1970s confirms the importance of practical commentary with political action. In his most recent work he has explored issues of political conflict, relief and rehabilitation and helped clarify the notion of complex political emergencies in the Horn and elsewhere. In 2002 his contribution to scholarship and in promoting broader public awareness of African affairs was recognised by the UK African Studies Association which gave him the Distinguished Africanist Award – referring at the awards to the role of this Review. Now in retirement from his academic post at the University of Leeds he continues to work in and on Africa and we hope he will continue to have a long and influential relationship with this journal.

References

Africa: The Next Liberation Struggle?

John S. Saul

This article brings into focus the immediate challenges facing progressives in Africa as they now seek to forge social and political initiatives that can hope to attain power and implement policies able to confront and ultimately to bend the apparent logic of global capitalism – thereby permitting more humane outcomes on the continent. Taking as a starting-point the moment of heightened reflection on such issues that occurred in Dar es Salaam in the 1960s and early 1970s, the article updates the insights of that period with reference to the even grimmer circumstances in which Africa currently finds itself. Suggesting that mere ‘reform’ (NEPAD, ‘liberal democratisation’) offers little real promise of meaningful and substantial change of the continent’s desperate situation, the article seeks to canvas the range of resistances in Africa that indicate the emergence of a more radical project of transformation. While acknowledging that it is easy to be pessimistic regarding such possibilities, the article identifies sufficient movement on the continent to suggest that Africa, in terms of the emergence of a ‘post-nationalist, post-neo-liberal’ revolutionary politics, now stands at a moment analogous with 1945. At that time few could have anticipated the speed with which African nationalist movements would win independence for their territories from colonial rule. The article concludes with the argument that, despite its current eclipse, the language and vision of socialism will have to become part and parcel of this continuing revival of Africa’s revolutionary endeavours and of its ‘next liberation struggle’.

This article assesses the revolutionary prospect in present-day Africa, taking as a starting-point that a ‘revolution’ is both necessary and possible on that continent. Appropriately enough, a preliminary version of the essay was given at a conference in honour of Lionel Cliffe’s retirement that occurred almost thirty years to the day from the publication of the first of our two volume ‘interdisciplinary readers’ on ‘Socialism in Tanzania’ (Cliffe and Saul, 1972). For it may be recalled that we began that volume with an extract from a piece that Giovanni Arrighi (another Dar es Salaam colleague of the period) and I had recently published entitled ‘Socialism and economic development in tropical Africa.’ That article asserted, as Cliffe and I summarised in the introduction to our own book, that ‘socialist construction is a necessary means to the end of development in Africa.’ Despite the elapse of time I personally see no reason, in considering the ‘revolutionary prospect’ evoked above, to change that premise in 2003.

It was, of course, with that premise in mind that many of us took seriously the struggle in Tanzania. We were not, I think, as naive in our hopes for progressive outcomes there as some of our latter day critics would like to think. After all, the kind of fine-grained research so many of us did – including, of course, Lionel Cliffe himself (I
think, in particular here, of his seminal article ‘Nationalism and the reaction to enforced agricultural change in Tanganyika during the colonial period,’ the foundation stone of his massive body of work on African peasantry and their world over the years) - had demonstrated the complexity of the situation on the ground. I would suggest that the materials published in our readers, and also much else published in and about Tanzania at the time, offer proof of our understanding of that complexity. And there was also our saying of the period, when confronted during our own long stay in the country with the deluge of visiting, primarily American, scholars who floated through Arusha-Declaration Tanzania: ‘If you came to Tanzania for six weeks you could write a book; if you stayed for six months you could write an article; but if you stayed for six years you didn’t know what the fxxx was going on!’

What, as expatriates, we did seek to do - alongside Tanzanians similarly inclined - was to help tease out, even reinforce, socialist possibilities from within the contradictory reality of the Tanzania of the time. Perhaps we did overestimate (a certain ‘optimism of the will’ was certainly at play) just how much might be accomplished along these lines. But it is significant, that Cliffe and I also cited in our introduction to that first reader Nyerere’s own warning to the effect that ‘we are NOT a socialist society. Our work has only just begun.’ And I don’t know how many times during that period I recited like a mantra the warning of Roger Murray— if only in an attempt to keep the full import of its possible implications at arms’ length - that ‘the starting-point for a lucid understanding of contemporary counter-revolutionary dynamics is a recognition that the historically necessary [socialism] should not be confounded with the historically possible’ (Murray, 1967:39). It is a warning that haunts me to this day (as the reiteration of this couplet in the very first sentence of the present essay will already have indicated). But so, too, does the more recent, more generalised, and even more chilling utterance by Adam Przeworski to the effect that ‘Capitalism is irrational, socialism is unfeasible, in the real world people starve ... the conclusions we have reached are not encouraging ones’ (Przeworski, 1991:122).

Surely one of the most positive things that one can say about Lionel Cliffe is that he has refused, over all these years, to yield to any such Przeworskian pessimism in his writing and in his practical activities on the ground in Africa. At the same time, no more now than then can we afford to ignore the kind of Greek Chorus that these sobering citations from Murray and Przeworski challenge us with.

The Socialist Imperative

Writing over three decades ago Arrighi and I came to the same negative conclusions as other colleagues at the time as to the impossibility of a newly emergent post-colonial Africa realising either economic growth or, (still less) a meaningful advance towards human development from within the then-present terms of its framing by global capitalism. Instead, we argued, ‘the key trend [is] towards increased subservience vis-à-vis a rationalizing international capitalism’, with development ‘effectively constrained by such a continental pattern’ and with, in consequence, a ‘Latin Americanisation of independent Africa ... well underway’ (Arrighi and Saul, 1973:53, 86). It was on this basis that we then suggested the ‘necessity’ of a socialist break by Africa from the global capitalist system. Were we guilty, as writers of the dependency school with whom our work was sometimes lumped were also said to be, of underestimating just what capitalism was capable of providing. Obviously, global capitalism has proven to be a rather more flexible and heterogeneous target than some within that school may have imagined at the time. And yet any such flexibility and growth potential as global capitalism could be argued to have had has not been much
in evidence with respect to the African case. Indeed, as Manfred Bienefeld was to write (in ROAPE) many years later of the now much maligned ‘dependency approach’ to Africa:

... both those on the right and the left would do well to remember that the present African crisis was most clearly foreseen by those looking at Africa from a dependency perspective in the 1960s. After all it was their contention that a continuation of a ‘neo-colonial’ pattern of development would lead to disaster because it would produce a highly import and skill dependent economic structure that would depend critically on external markets and external investors and decision makers; that dependence would eventually become disastrous in its implications because the long term prospects for Africa’s terms of trade were almost certainly poor; moreover, that dependence would be further reinforced because it would also create within African countries a degree of social and political polarisation that would lay the foundations for an increasingly repressive response once those contradictions became critical. Finally, that view was also very clear as to the fact that this entire edifice was essentially constructed on the back of the peasantry who would have to pay for it eventually. This describes exactly the present circumstances of Africa (Bienefeld, 1988:85-6).

There is, I hasten to add, no need here to debate the historical merits of the dependency school per se nor to discuss whether either Arrighi or myself – or indeed Lionel Cliffe – is now or ever has been a card-carrying member of that school. Although the current African crisis certainly has its roots in the nature of colonialism’s impact on Africa and in the kind of transition to independence that had been occurring there during the period that we were chronicling in the 1960s, it is the present situation on the continent that concerns us more centrally here. And, as regards this present situation, I would continue to argue on the basis of recent research I have undertaken with Colin Leys that Africa – given the specific nature of its current insertion into the global capitalist economy – remains unlikely, without a dramatic change of trajectory, to register significant advance. As Leys and I have concluded, the current plight of Africa is relegation to the margins of the global economy, with no visible prospect of continental development along capitalist lines ... Which does not mean that nothing is happening, let alone that no alternative is possible. It simply means that Africa’s development, and the dynamics of global capitalism, are no longer convergent, if they ever were ... Insofar as these economies remain unlikely to generate investment of a more productive and transformative variety - whether from (still extremely weak) domestic bourgeoisies, from international capital, or from complementary state initiatives – investment of the hit-and-run variety is likely to remain the commonest kind, with predictable lack of developmental results continentally, regionally and nationally. In sum, the dream of a transformative capitalism in Africa remains just that: a dream (Leys and Saul, 1999:17, 25).

Writing in the late sixties, Arrighi and I did quite specifically cite Murray’s warning, registering the counter-revolutionary potential of the new bureaucratic elites, the numerical weakness of the working class (and even the co-optability of some of its members), and the lack of ready availability of ‘the peasantry’ for revolutionary purposes. We noted the limitations of ‘the victorious ‘nationalisms’ of the fifties and early sixties, which seemed the crystallisation of an effective challenge to imperialism, but must now be generally reinterpreted, in light of independent Africa’s ‘false decolonisation’ (in Fanon’s suggestive phrase), as no real defense, but instead as so many myths designed to legitimate the dominant position of the new ruling classes.’ And we also marked the way in which this brand of nationalism had transformed
‘pan-Africanism, [which had] originally [drawn] upon a living tradition of racial and cultural themes and a sense of shared grievance ... from a radical force seemingly capable of offering real resistance to the further subordination of Africa to Western capitalism, into a conservative alliance guaranteeing the stability of existing neo-colonial structures (Arrighi and Saul, 1973:86).

Domestically we also acknowledged the fact that ‘class contradictions in independent Africa’ are ‘blurred by racial, ethnic and nationalist dimensions which hamper the development of subjective conditions favourable to radical change’, even concluding that ‘for some time to come class antagonisms are unlikely to contribute in a determinate way to the internal dynamics of contemporary Africa’ (Arrighi and Saul, 1973:84). And, finally, we analysed the dismal failure to find either appropriate economic strategies or non-authoritarian political formulas within such early quasi-socialist experiments of the time as Nkrumah’s Ghana and Touré’s Guiné (Arrighi and Saul, 1973:23-24).

It is worth noting, however, that against any temptation towards total pessimism we also set some store by certain aspects of post-Arusha Declaration developments in Tanzania. Even more crucially, we located a promise of continued radical advance in that part of Africa which had yet to be transformed by anti-colonial nationalism: ‘Hopes must instead be focussed upon the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, the implications of which are bound to have truly continental dimensions,’ we argued (Arrighi and Saul, 1973:87). Of course, we now know that the project of socialism has thus far proven to be a failure in Africa even beyond those first attempts in Ghana and Guiné (and in Tanzania itself). We also know that the liberation of southern Africa has fulfilled little of the promise of negating the counter-developmental hegemony of global capitalism that revolutionary nationalism in the ex-Portuguese colonies and Zimbabwe and a working-class driven transformation in South Africa seemed possibly to portend. For some, these more recent developments will merely provide a capstone to their sense of the economic and political defeat suffered by radical Africa and further underscore their sense that the continent’s continuing economic crisis intersects with social, political and cultural realities that yield only limited promise of any likely amelioration of Africa’s crisis. But need our ‘pessimism of the intellect’ really run so deep?

The Contradictory Present

I will not seek to precis here the history of failed nationalism and the morbid economic and political symptoms this has continued to produce across Africa although Leys and I have attempted, following the lead of Allan (1993) and others, a brief characterisation of this record in our Monthly Review article (1999). Our present subject is ‘liberation’ itself and perhaps more germane to this latter subject is a reconsideration of the various socialist experiments on the continent. I have also recently undertaken an examination of this all too tainted record (Saul, 2003) – including, amongst other themes, a retrospective analysis of the lessons to be learned from the Tanzanian experience of the 1960s and 1970s (see also Saul, 2002a, 2002b). Suffice to say that in these writings I have extracted lessons from both the economic policy-making and the political practices of progressive forces once in power in Africa, critiquing their too often imbalanced and overweening emphasis on technology, largeness of scale and regimentation in the former sphere and their invariably authoritarian tendencies in the latter. And these are lessons that could become relevant if, as and when regimes of more progressive, counter-capitalist intent once again assume power, even if it is also true that the terrain, both local and
international, for such practices will itself have altered substantially since the 1960s and 1970s when earlier experiments were in their fullest flower. Nonetheless, the immediate challenge facing progressives is a different one, that of once again seeking to forge social and political initiatives that can hope, eventually, to attain such power.

We will consider the prospects for such an outcome momentarily. Note, however, that the need both to conceptualise and attain to a more effective revolutionary practice will seem all the more important once one grasps the fact that – in the context of IFI-sponsored ‘economic fundamentalism’ (Mihevc, 1995) that has merely served to magnify the weakness of African economies and forced them to ‘compete’ ever more nakedly in a game they cannot possibly win – there is really little or no prospect of merely ‘reforming’ present-day Africa.\(^6\) True, by the 1990s, even the IFIs themselves had begun to manifest rather greater concern than previously regarding the costs of unqualified structural adjustment and to place a greater emphasis on the need for a marginally more assertive ‘enabling state’ (this problem being phrased in terms of the challenge of ‘governance’ [Moore, 1999]), for ‘poverty reduction,’ and even (albeit on a very modest scale indeed) for debt reduction. Yet the very modesty of such assertions serves merely to underline ‘the central weakness in the global economic structure which is preventing any effective moves to avert disaster: the remorseless demand to sacrifice all other objectives to that of meeting the ever more voracious demand for profit from the continuously swelling and increasingly redundant mass of capital’ (Shutt, 1998:161). Small wonder that Africa appears, in practice, as having merely been ‘redlined’ by many elements of capital, with the continent still viewed primarily as a ‘resource cow’ – a field for extractive activities in the spheres of oil, minerals (including, notably, diamonds) and agricultural production (and for debt recovery and arms sales as well), with only limited interest being expressed in the likely growth of markets and investment opportunities beyond those limits.\(^7\)

And yet, despite this, there are Africans who also seek not revolution but reform, from within and in Africa’s favour, of the global capitalist system - the Lagos Plan of Action and the ‘African Alternative Framework’ being early markers of this tendency perhaps. More recently, the new post-apartheid regime in South Africa (led by Thabo Mbeki and his ruling ANC) seems to have nominated itself as principal bearer of such a ‘dream’ – seeking to balance its markedly uncritical embrace of a neo-liberal economic strategy within its borders by presentation of a case for equity, for ‘partnership’ and for ‘solutions that are [not] in discord with the rest of the world’ (in the words of Trade and Industry Minister Alec Erwin) within the IFIs and the WTO). In doing so, it has chosen, quite self-consciously, to ‘exclude (indeed most often reject) alliances with increasingly radical local and international social, labour and environmental movements who in reality are the main agents of progressive global change’ (Bond, 2001:416).

Nor has the fact that South Africa’s own preferred capitalist development strategy has to date generated so little return and even in its own country dissuaded the South African government from this approach, as witness its most recent championing of the New Economic Partnership for Africa (NEPAD) in international circles. For NEPAD – drafted, it would seem, primarily by Mbeki and his advisors but then shepherded through the African Union (formerly the Organisation of African Unity) by the troika of Mbeki and Presidents Obasanjo and Bouteflika of Nigeria and Algeria respectively – is at core a sad, defeated document, evidencing the ever-deepening subservience of the African leaders that authored it to the ‘common-sense’ of a neo-liberalising, structural-adjusting global capitalism. Indeed, while written by African leaders, NEPAD reads like it could just as easily have been written in the offices of the
World Bank and the IMF. It is, after all, driven by two premises, the first being, precisely, that African economies and states must further ‘adjust’ their economies in order to provide the enabling conditions for their further penetration by global capital (with increased foreign investment presented as being the main key to progress).

More interesting, perhaps, is the second NEPAD foundation-stone: the promise that African states will seek to recast their political systems to conform more closely to the liberal, quasi-democratic structures of the West. Of course, the existence of more democratically responsive states in Africa would indeed be cause for celebration. And yet the enthusiasm (momentary in any case, as events would quickly prove9) of Mbeki and his colleagues for democratic outcomes seemed to speak primarily to the reality that ‘democracy of a sort has … been high on the agenda of western interests [themselves]’, the latter seeing ‘some limited form of ‘liberal democracy’ as both a possible means for helping legitimise their broader agenda, and a possible check upon state elites that have become just too corrupt to stabilise a viable business climate’ (Leys and Saul, 1999:25-6). Still, in playing, however opportunistically, to this audience, such African leaders are also being forced to connect to a more positive political development that has marked their own continent over the past few decades. This is the wave of democratic reform that swept across Africa, especially at the turn of the 1990s, and which was characterised by some changes of government, by the emergence of official oppositions, by greater media freedom, and by the opening up of further space for groups in civil society to openly practice politics (Wiseman, 1995).

Such space, once pried open, may indeed render more viable the assertion of popular interests in the long run. Still, in the short run, such developments have tended to be of a far more limited middle-class provenance, rather than marking the genuine empowerment of broader social forces – at best merely a ‘liberal democracy’ rather than a genuinely ‘popular democracy’ (on this distinction see Saul, 2001b, ch. 4). As such, much of what passes for democratic advance in Africa has achieved ‘little more than to stabilise property-threatening situations by a momentary re-circulation of elites’ (Leys and Saul, 1999:26). Moreover, given the latter reality, the (limited) ground of democratic advance that has been gained has been extremely difficult to hold. The NEPAD document itself premises its ‘hope’ for Africa on the fact that ‘democratic regimes … committed to the protection of human rights, people-centred development and market-oriented economies are on the increase on the continent.’ Yet, as activists in Africa have argued, these three terms are not mutually compatible: under African conditions, the third, ‘market-oriented economics’ easily negates the other two. In a related manner, Abrahamsen draws on the experiences of Zambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast and Kenya to demonstrate the way in which certain external pressures dovetailed with popular resistance to globally-driven austerity in Africa to drive demands (relatively successful in the short run) for greater democracy in those countries. And yet the waning of the original domestic thrust towards such a democratic outcome has seemed even more ineluctable:

There are few signs of a mutually reinforcing relationship between democracy and economic liberalism in Africa’s new democracies. The rapid deterioration of democratic standards in many countries has in large part … been caused by the pressures arising from the continuation of structural adjustment. These programmes threaten the consolidation of democracy by exacerbating social conflict and differentiation, while at the same time undermining the state’s capacity to respond to domestic demands … [A]lthough external pressure may have secured the survival of certain structures and procedures of democracy in Africa, the demand for economic liberalisation has at the same time impeded the consolidation of democracy. Instead of consolidation, the result has been a fragile
democracy, often little more than a facade, and this seems an almost inevitable outcome of the pursuit of simultaneous economic and political liberalisation in conditions of poverty and underdevelopment (Abrahamsen, 2000:135-6).

In short, the arrival of quasi-liberal democracy has not been readily sustainable in its own limited terms, let alone genuinely empowering of most ordinary Africans. And this has been particularly true, it would seem, in rural Africa where most Africans live and where, as Mamdani has vividly argued, the ‘subject’ (as distinct from ‘citizen’) status of ordinary rural-dwellers has almost never been successfully transcended (Mamdani, 1996).

We return by this route to consider the challenge introduced above: the building of movements of resistance, potential bearers of a ‘popular democracy’, that can actually take power in Africa. If nationalism, even in its liberation movement phase, can now be judged to have failed in producing the radical outcomes so necessary to address the requirements of the vast majority of Africans, what next? Are we not indeed driven back to starting, more or less, ‘from scratch’? If so, we must acknowledge that this will have to be done under bleak circumstances in terms of the global imbalance of power – and will certainly have to be done in conjunction with others struggling elsewhere to repeal the writ of unfettered global capital. At the same time, the moment can also be perceived, paradoxically, as being one of opportunity. For many of the left illusions of the past have also been smashed in Africa: any notion that nationalist movements, whether spawned by active liberation struggles or other more pacific means, could merely shift gears and deliver ‘socialist transformation’ to the masses by ‘benevolent’ leaders acting from above, for example, as well as any sense that stalinist practices, political or economic, had anything to teach us (a misconception that scarred so much of what was done in the name of socialism in Mozambique, for example, as I myself had occasion to witness at first hand). In this context, we may even wish to conceive, as I do, that Africa is standing on the brink of a crucial new phase of its history – a moment akin to that of 1945 when few could have anticipated the speed with which African nationalist movements would win independence for their territories from colonial rule (or, for that matter, the speed with which that independence would in turn be translated into neo-colonial domination).

The Radically Possible?

We must now explore the parameters of this moment, this threshold of renewal for liberation, more closely. First, to summarise: what we have in Africa is a mode of incorporation into the global capitalist system that seems unlikely to produce a significant measure of material and humane advance for the majority of people. It is also a situation where the road to significant reform within the system and to the advantage of the impoverished seems largely closed. Reinforced by the failure/defeat of socialism, a system has been established that, in the view of observers such as Robert Biel and David Plank, has stepped beyond both colonialism and neo-colonialism and towards the establishment of the ever more unmediated rule of global capital and its presently operative imperatives of capital accumulation (a circumstance Plank terms, writing of the African case, ‘recolonisation’ (Plank, 1993). This is a system in which policy has been downgraded merely to

\[\text{a question of ‘adapting’ a country in the South to fit into the system by creating local conditions (for example, reducing interference from local bureaucrats) so that capital could find its way without hindrance to the most promising sectors} (\text{Biel, 2000:232-3}).\]
But let us further note, with Biel, that this new system is also one that has created a fundamental problem for ‘the North’ and not merely in economic terms: ‘The ‘national economy’ is one of capitalism’s best inventions because it provides a good basis for social control … The new form of direct rule which I am calling ‘post-neo-colonial’ would be very risky’ (242-3). As he then focuses the point,

_The new vision may appear plausible to elites, since it presents the North and South as united within a single free-market economic model (in contrast to the division between Keynesianism for the North and development economics for the South which was characteristic of the post-war regime). But in reality the free market is an expression of profoundly unequal power relations, and the practical consequences of this are all too obvious to the masses: to give only one example, it leads to a virtual monopoly by the North of mass consumption._

‘All too obvious to the masses’: would that things were so simple! But the formulation does have the virtue of leading us back to the question of the ‘historically possible’: the question as to how, if at all, the current system of ‘capitalism in Africa’ might come to be radically challenged from below by those popular forces that are most disadvantaged by it.

We need not be too categorical about the precise components, sociological and ideological, of any such challenge. After all, as Post and Wright argued some years ago (in more general terms admittedly but ones that nonetheless have applicability to Africa),

_The working out of capitalism in parts of the periphery prepares not only the minority working class but peasants and other working people, women, youth and minorities for a socialist solution, even though the political manifestation of this may not initially take the form of a socialist movement. In the case of those who are not wage labourers (the classical class associated with that new order) capitalism has still so permeated the social relations which determine their existences, even though it may not have followed the western European pattern of ‘freeing’ their labour power, that to be liberated from it is their only salvation … The objective need for socialism of these elements can be no less than that of the worker imprisoned in the factory and disciplined by the whip of unemployment. These prices are paid in even the most ‘successful’ of the underdeveloped countries, and others additionally experience mass destitution. Finding another path has thus become a desperate necessity if the alternative of continuing, if not increasing barbarism is to be escaped (Post and Wright, 1989:151-2)._  

It is from some such range of ‘disparate forces’ (it is Post and Wright who so term them, but the catholicity of inclusion within the camp of potential agents of change – those who could eventually come to see liberation from capitalism to be ‘their only salvation’ – would not be alien to an Amilcar Cabral) that new movements of more radical provenance could yet be built in Africa.

As one might expect, there have been outcries of pain in Africa from those both angry at existing conditions and skeptical about prospects for meaningful reform, stirrings linked at least in part (as Leys and I have noted elsewhere [Leys and Saul, 1999]) to what Celestin Monga (1996) has termed the ‘collective insubordination’ of Africa and directed against not only parasitic governments but also IFI-induced austerity. For all the rather anomic form that this more radical amplification of ‘insubordination’ can sometimes take (the so-called ‘IMF riots’ for example) it nonetheless serves to bear out the conclusion of Riley and Parfitt (1994:167) to the effect that ‘African peoples have adopted many diverse strategies to challenge, deflect, or avoid bearing the costs of
austerity involved and to seek a political alternative to the politicians they hold responsible.’ Moreover, these authors also identify an impressive range of (primarily urban) actors – ‘lawyers, students, copper miners, organisations of rural women, urban workers and the unemployed, journalists, clergymen and others’ – whose direct action in recent years has shaken numerous African governments.

These initiatives take diverse forms, more and less organised; they are also highly ambiguous as to just how readily they can move people beyond (entirely laudable) resistances to authoritarianism and towards more counter-hegemonic perspectives on the global capitalist system that feeds and nurtures autocracy. Nonetheless, such initiatives do dramatise the importance, real and potential, of ‘street-level democracy’ and ‘political settings at the margins of global power.’ As Jonathan Barker (1999:13) focuses these phrases in his important book on the subject (one which includes a number of suggestive African case-studies):

The fragmentation of political space and the impact of global power on national institutions do not form the whole story. There has been a marked increase in the number, range, and energy of non-state, non-family, and non-business voluntary associations - a trend noted in Asia, Africa and Latin America. On a general level this trend is a social response to the expansion of market logic into social relationships that have more than economic meaning to people … Societies react against the reduction of land and labour and money to the status of commodities (Barker, 1999:13).

Fantu Cheru has also written with particular eloquence of such developments in Africa which he characterises as a virtual ‘renaissance’ of ‘popular resistance from below’:

The flag-bearers of this new renaissance are based in the church, the informal sector, human rights movements, grassroots ecology movements and development NGOs that have sprung up all across Africa in the last decade to articulate alternative visions of survival and democratic governance. They employ both overt and hidden forms of resistance, thus pressing demands on the state through the ‘politics of claims,’ non-payment of taxes and open insurrections. These new social movements advance the idea that development is a human right, and that its achievement requires popular participation and control (Cheru, 2000:124).

Certainly, the range of information on such initiatives is impressive, revealed in diverse scholarly accounts as well as web sites located in, and reporting on, a wide array of such undertakings across a wide range of African countries. And writers like Graham Harrison (2001) and others (Zeilig, 2002) have highlighted in their writings an additional range of such emanations elsewhere on the continent, running through varied resistances by youth, unions, women, in Mali, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Nigeria and elsewhere and including the pinpointing of specific assertions like that of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and the successful campaign against the World Bank’s policy on cashew nut processing in Mozambique.

True, Cheru also sees dangers in the fact that some of the most organised of such undertakings remain dependent for their financing from Western sources. But he does go on to emphasise, on other grounds, the importance of a ‘North-South popular alliance’ – judging that ‘in the context of the considerable power held by elites and firms that underpin the globalisation process … local-level resistance [in Africa] in isolation from potential allies in other countries and regions will have limited impact.’ For Cheru is frank about the difficulties of building from below:
In the specific case of Africa, the vibrancy of the new institutions of civil society contrasts with the paucity of their strategic power and resources. Organizing around daily subsistence increasingly consumes much of people’s energy and meagre resources, thus making the task of developing a counter-project exceptionally difficult and slow.

Still, the African experience has taught Cheru and others that there are no short-cuts via nationalist organisations, liberation movements or vanguard parties (the chimeras of an earlier moment of African struggles), towards mounting a bottom-up hegemonic project: ‘Instead of focusing on a unifying conception of society and transformation, we must look for a workable sense of cohesion to emerge out of seemingly irreconcilable modes of resistance waged from below’ (Cheru, 2000:119).

Interestingly, Barker also emphasises the fact that what ‘we frequently see [is] a dispersed series of piecemeal actions and only rarely observe the revolutionary overthrow of governing institutions.’ This is a reflection of what he calls the ‘scale mismatch’ between ‘hopeful localisms’ and the more negative impact of global determinations. The question remains then: how might the playing-field of this mismatch be levelled and the further crystallisation of a ‘workable sense of cohesion’ be facilitated? One response to this can be seen, perhaps, in those continental activities (meetings, information exchanges and intellectual endeavours, ranging from Jubilee 2000 to the African Social Forum to CODESRIA) that seek to link actors, initiatives and ideas from across the continent: thus Bond (2003b) cites such high-waters in this respect as the Lusaka Declaration of 1999 drafted by ‘leading African social movements and church organisations working on debt’ (and the beginnings of its attendant ‘African People’s Consensus’ movement), the Yaounde conference and the Dakar Summit of civil society-based organisations in 2001, and the ongoing work of the Accra-based African Trade Network and of the Southern African People’s Solidarity Network (the latter having embraced, in turn, the Jubilee debt cancellation movement, amongst other initiatives).

In more general terms, Colin Leys (in an interesting debate with Barker) has also underlined the importance of complementing Barker’s (and, in effect, Cheru’s) focus on the centrality of local initiatives with a sensibility that continues to emphasise at least equally the age-old imperatives of ideological coherence and political organisation as building blocks for effective struggle. Here he speaks of the required emergence of ‘unified’ and hegemonic projects:

> Looked at in one way it will necessarily be a multiplicity of projects, in different sectors, nations and regions, the aspirations of different groups, movements and peoples. Yet unless these unite to confront the political and economic power of the transnationals and the states that back them, they will ultimately fail … As a minimum it will require nation-wide movements and/or parties capable of exercising state power, and making it felt in supranational institutions (Leys, 1997).

For, as Fantu Cheru himself acknowledges,

> A comprehensive development alternative cannot go far without a basic change in power structures. Until this happens the popular sector can only pressure government for some policy changes and accumulate little victories here and there. This implies that the popular sector has to come up with a state agenda of its own and suggests entering the terrain of the nation-state: national politics (2000:128).

Fortunately, there have been some signs in Africa’s recent practice of precisely such developments. The emergence of an effective opposition party to Robert Mugabe’s
wretched rule in Zimbabwe out of a dense array of resistances within civil society there could be seen, at least briefly, as one particularly promising example, perhaps. Indeed, Patrick Bond was actually moved to write of this new Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), in its early years, as representing the birth in Africa of the first ‘post-nationalist and post-neo-liberal’ political party (Bond, 1999). In practice, the pull on the MDC in turn to conform to neo-liberal premises proved to be very strong (as had been true in the case of the Chiluba’s Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in Zambia before it) and in any case, Mugabe has proven to be ruthless in his ability to command violence and demagogy in his ability to hold power (while also manipulating the outstanding land issue to effect). Nonetheless, Bond and his co-authors Darlene Miller and Greg Ruiters have made a strong case for hailing the stirring of such coordinated resistances (keyed by trade unions but very far from being confined to their assertions) across the southern African region (Bond, Miller and Ruiters, 2000; see also Harrison, 2001).

My own most immediate exposure to such novel developments has come in South Africa. There the costs of the post-apartheid neo-liberal apostasy of the ANC and of its abandonment (in practice) of the basic needs of the mass of the South African population have been particularly high – even if the continuing (if somewhat fraying) legitimacy that the ANC enjoys in South Africa means that any move towards establishment of a new party to challenge it directly seems unlikely for the foreseeable future. And yet oppositional activities of a somewhat different sort have been sufficiently salient to warrant my titling the final section of a recent article (Saul, 2001a), one dealing with future prospects for progressive change in South Africa, ‘Starting from scratch?’ For there does exist a range of actors and organisations in what some South African writers have come to term ‘working-class civil society’ that have been critical from time to time of the direction post-apartheid South Africa has come to take and, as I have noted, they also speak of the necessity to begin to coordinate their critical outlooks and activities to exert far more pressure on the ANC than they have up to now.

Here my initial emphasis was on established organisations like COSATU and SANGOCO as possible bearers of this new politics, but more recent visits to South Africa have also impressed upon me the salience of a whole new range of grassroots initiatives and groupings: the Anti-Privatisation Forum, the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, the Treatment Action Campaign, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, the Concerned Citizens’ Forum in Durban, and the Landless People’s Movement (Cronin, 2002, Saul, 2002; see also, crucially, Desai, 2002). Of course, it remains far too early to speak with grand confidence of the attempt by various forces in South African civil society to link up more self-consciously, within and across sectors, in a popular alliance from below. But the fact remains that they have begun to take strength from each other and an encouragement to think beyond the parameters of their separate and more specific assertions. They may also take further steps towards the effective institutionalisation of a (heretofore often only implicitly) shared theory and practice of struggle. Despite the set-backs that have undermined parallel efforts in Zambia and Zimbabwe (referred to above) the signs of the first stages of building such a ‘structured movement’ – the phrase is that of Canadian trade union activist Sam Gindin, who conceives this brand of movement as being ‘something transitional that is more than a coalition and less than a party’ (Gindin, 1998) – in South Africa does find echo in other African countries as well, notably in Nigeria (cf., inter alia, Harrison, 2000). Such movements-in-the-making demand the most careful monitoring for they are amongst the most important bearers of an alternative future for the continent.11
Socialism?
I return by this route to the point at which I began, the evocation of Arrighi’s and my original argument that, with actually existing capitalism, world-wide and local, being so central to defining the problem in post-colonial Africa, ‘socialism’ had to be part of the solution. While taking seriously Fantu Cheru’s warning that there may be ‘no single formula for how individuals and communities go about ‘decoding’ the ideology of developmentalism or globalisation’ (Cheru, 2000:121), I continue to believe this to be the case. To so argue is, of course, to court not so much scholarly opprobrium as scholarly ridicule. James Krugman in his latest book, filled though it is with criticisms of the present functioning of the global capitalist system, nonetheless inquires sneeringly as to ‘who can now use the word socialism with a straight face’, concluding that ‘the heart has gone out of the opposition to capitalism’ (Krugman, 1999:5). And writers like Richard Sklar have made latter-day careers out of claiming to have gone ‘Beyond Capitalism and Socialism in Africa’ and seeking to carry the North American Africanist establishment with them to the right on such questions (see Saul, 2001b, 1-3 and ch. 2).

Even more disturbing is the mood on the continent itself. The wholesale move, noted above, of the ANC leadership – after its great victory over apartheid in South Africa – into the camp of neo-liberalism has been sobering enough. But what is one to make of the fact that even Julius Nyerere, who did contest until his death the irrational outcomes produced by global capitalism’s cruel grip on Africa, could nonetheless find himself proclaiming, in a defeated and sarcastic tone:

Throw away all our ideas about socialism. Throw them away, give them to the Americans, give them to the Japanese, give them ... so that they can, I don't know, they can do whatever they like with them. Embrace capitalism, fine! (Nyerere, 2000)

Indeed, even Arrighi, in his recent bleak up-date of the present plight of Africa within the capitalist world-system, finds none of the promise of a socialist future there, now merely hankering for some mild reformism to temper the winds that buffet residents of the continent (Arrighi, 2002). Meanwhile, the liberal/neoliberal ‘common-sense’ of the moment has also found its way deep inside the African academy: as Issa Shivji had already perceived a number of years ago, much that would have to be asserted there in order to distinguish a genuinely ‘popular perspective – [its] position on imperialism, state and class, class struggle, etc. – remains unsaid by its intellectual proponents for fear of being condemned as old-fashioned or demagogic’ (Shivji, 1991, as cited in Saul, 2001b:59-60).

No doubt something of this situation continues to exist in Africa, as elsewhere. And yet there are significant centres of intellectual resistance on the continent itself that contest an ascendant, if spiritually and economically bankrupt, capitalism in Africa (see Bond on, precisely, ‘African anti-capitalism’, 2003b): the pronouncements of those South African activists and progressive commentators whose assertions I noted earlier provide an example, as do those of others, continent-wide, who have grouped behind the undertakings of the African Social Forum and the like. This is not surprising since, speaking more generally, even James Krugman assumes that the current situation ‘will not last forever’, that ‘surely there will be other ideologies, other dreams’ – and that these may even ‘emerge sooner rather than later’ under present global circumstances. In this context it seems to me plausible to argue that we are standing on the brink of a crucial new phase of African history. As I have already suggested, the present can best be seen as a moment akin to that of 1945. Of course, it
is no easier now than it was then to divine for the current moment the precise parameters of the likely struggle against ‘post-neo-colonial’ domination. Or to answer the variety of questions that this moment will throw up: as Africans forge more effective organisations for resistance, for example, how will their new movements balance the rival claims to centrality of local, national, regional, continental and global sites of struggle in the focusing of their efforts? How will the trade-off of the relative priorities of plausible short-term reform against the necessary claims of long term structural transformation be handled? And (perhaps most importantly of all) in terms of what counter-hegemonic imaginary, or imaginaries, will this ‘post-nationalist, post-neo-liberal’ be cast?

African activists themselves will have to be in the front lines in answering such questions. But the undertakings of a new generation of researchers and writers focusing critically, if also supportively, on the kinds of resistances I have begun to sketch out here will be important – as once was the work of ‘the Dar es Salaam generation’ and its counterparts elsewhere on the continent in interpreting and amplifying earlier rounds of struggle. Certainly, we must continue to ask ourselves whether the relatively up-beat picture of contemporary resistance that I have presented here might again be too much the reflection of an ‘optimism of the will’, even if it does mesh with activities that are indeed visible and marked with genuine potential. Would a ‘realism’ that dictated a more ‘pessimistic’ response of ‘the intellect’ to the severe difficulties of building and sustaining resistance under current African circumstances be more appropriate? Let us merely conclude by saying that, whatever may prove to be the case in this respect, the fact is that the reported evidence of resistance is still too fragmentary, both relatively understudied and undertheorised: there can be little doubt that we must both engage with and know a great deal more about the immediate scope and long-term resonance of the various counter-hegemonic activities evoked both in the writings I have cited above and elsewhere.12

At the same time, we need also to ask ourselves what ‘realism’ actually connotes in the present African context. Not a retreat to passivity, or even to mere ‘reform’, surely. For, in concluding, I stand by my hunch that it will prove neither possible nor wise for Africans to avoid, in the long-run, the claims of ‘realistic socialism’ that Canadian political economist Greg Albo has juxtaposed self-consciously to the claims of ‘utopian capitalism’ in his discussion of the current parameters of global political economy. True, any such programme of ‘realistic socialism’ (Albo himself suggests the need for ‘more inward-oriented economic strategies’ and the devaluation of ‘scale of production as the central economic objective’) must be specified for Africa by such social forces as mobilise themselves to place a more progressive agenda on the table. Nonetheless, Albo’s broader premise – that positive outcomes ‘can only be realised through re-embedding financial capital and production relations in democratically organised national and local economic spaces sustained through international solidarity and fora of democratic co-operation’ – seems a good place to start. But this will only happen when Africans, with others, move to embrace the fact that the existing market-dominated global order – driven by ‘a minority class that draws its wealth and power from a historically specific form of production’ – is (in Albo’s words) ‘contingent, imbalanced, exploitative and replaceable’ (Albo, 1997:28-30, 41). That struggle continues, in Africa as elsewhere.

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Endnotes

1. An earlier version of this essay was first presented to the Conference on ‘Peasants, Liberation and Socialism in Africa,’ held to mark Lionel Cliffe’s retirement at Leeds University, May, 2002; the present text also draws on my paper ‘Rot, Reform and the Revival of Resistance in Postcolonial Africa,’ presented to the Conference on ‘The Political Economy of Africa Revisited’ held at the Institute of Global Studies, Johns Hopkins University, April, 2002. I am grateful to Patrick Bond, David Harvey, Colin Leys, Bill Minter and Pat Saul for comments on various drafts.

2. Murray was another Tanzania hand of the period, although in this case writing about Ghana (Murray, 1967). It bears noting that, in addition to Arrighi, Murray and myself, others whose views are cited prominently in this text - Jonathan Barker, Manfred Bienefeld, Colin Leys and, of course, Issa Shivji – had work experiences and learning opportunities that overlapped with Cliffe’s in those exciting years of the 1960s and early-1970s in Dar es Salaam.

3. This was a formulation that Arrighi and I cited on several occasions in our own volume (Arrighi and Saul, 1973). As we further argued (22-3), ‘it may be … that the changes in surplus utilisation, which we see to be necessary for real development, are not possible under present historical conditions, particularly in view of the short-term losses in economic growth and, quite possibly, in political stability that would ensure from any serious attempt at disengagement from international capitalism or reform of the power base of the African governments involved. This question, however, by no means invalidates the historical necessity of the change itself, which should therefore be of central importance in socialist debate.’

4. As we further situated this reality (68), ‘the decisive fact about contemporary independent Africa is the continuance of its subservient economic position vis-a-vis the industrial centers of the West. This subordination originated, as is well known, in the pattern of trade and investment of colonial times, whereby Africa came to play, within the international division of labour, a role of supplier of raw materials and outlet for the manufactures of centers of accumulation. It is important to reemphasise that, as compared with other areas of the underdeveloped world, this ‘classic’ pattern of extractive imperialism has remained relatively untransformed in Africa.’

5. Something of the flavour of the times can be gleaned from our further comment (87): ‘Much more important, a successful socialist revolution in southern Africa would radically restructure neocolonialist relationships on the whole continent since, after a necessary (and admittedly difficult) period of reconstruction, it would act as a powerful pole of politico-economic attraction for the less developed and less wealthy nations of Tropical Africa. Our discussions should have dispelled any illusions concerning the nature and short-term prospects of the struggle in Southern Africa. Yet, at the present historical moment, this provides the main, if not the only, leverage for revolutionary change in sub-Saharan Africa.’

6. As Cheru (2000:121) has written of this process, ‘in the context of economic globalisation and onerous debt accompanied by disciplinary neoliberalism … economic adjustment and liberalisation have been forced down the throats of African people against the background of depressed commodity prices, declining foreign assistance, withdrawal of private lending, increased Northern protectionism and unsustainable levels of debt [with the result that] few African countries have achieved creditably in terms of any of the indicators that measure real, sustainable development. Instead, most have slid backwards into growing inequality, ecological degradation, de-industrialisation and poverty’ (this involving as well both ‘curtailing investment in social services and … incurring more debt’).

7. We are registering here the virtual impossibility of the present system – now driven more by the speculative activity of holders of financial capital than by the pursuit of ‘productive investment’ – to act ‘rationally’ at the aggregate level (and thus, for example, to render Africa an additional site for the system’s drive to realise itself as a transformative [and, in the long term, ever more profitable] engine of expanded reproduction). True, there are some within the system itself who may bewail that fact. See, for example, the rather heterodox World Bank document prepared in 1994 by Agarwala and Singh (1994) that does evoke (rather against the grain of most other World Bank commentary) the immediate need for the much more subtle ‘embedding’ of the market in the logic of local societies and polities and the much more slow and measured immersing of Africa, unprotected and vulnerable, into the acid-bath of the global marketplace. But, as Biel has argued (2000, ch. 11, ‘Permanent Subordination? Structural Adjustment as Control’, 231-2),
structural adjustment programmes have been a particularly blunt instrument in this regard, successful in ‘using the ‘debt’ as a lever to break resistance to the demands of the new accumulation system.’ And yet, however good SAPs may have been … at destroying the old, … this does not mean they could provide a basis for a stable self-reproducing set-up even within the confines of the current accumulation regime.’

8. Bond (2003a) has recently underscored the shallowness, in practice, of the African elite’s commitment on this front, as they have backed away from any meaningful implementation of the ‘peer-review’ mechanism promised under NEPAD and, in Mbeki’s case, refrained from giving any meaningful support to democratic forces opposing the authoritarian practices of Robert Mugabe in neighbouring Zimbabwe.

9. The grim denouement to Chiluba’s project in Zambia provides a case in point here of the limits and ambiguities of ‘merely’ anti-authoritarian mobilisation; the present transition from Moi to Kibaki in Kenya (greeted, understandably enough, with considerable euphoria) will also have to be tracked with close attention in this respect.

10. As Cheru adds (Cheru, 2000:128), however, ‘Here lies the dilemma of the people’s organisations … They will have to find the appropriate combination of strategies to handle effectively the contradictory trajectories of state politics, which is integrative or centralizing, and social politics, which is horizontal or centrifugal.’

11. Pan-African generalisations are dangerous, of course, especially with reference to a continent as diverse as Africa. Especially in the most marginalised of countries and/or countries of absolute crisis, near-collapse or firmly positioned authoritarianism the pace of change may be very different from that in the most developed of countries. As with the original post-1945 pattern of successful nationalisms across Africa, the pace of radical change, if, as, and when it comes, will be uneven, accelerating and decelerating erratically, and spilling over borders both by example and in more direct ways. Unpredictable in its detail as the progress of ‘the next liberation struggle’ may be, however, we still desperately require a more fine-grained mapping of socio-political contradictions and revolutionary prospects across the continent, something comparable, that is to say, to Allen’s brilliant cataloguing, in these pages, of diverse African polities a decade ago (Allen, 1993).

12. For a perspective on the brand of unity of theory and practice that might be expected to guide effective scientific work in the service of African transformation in the present conjuncture see Leys and Saul, 1998, where the Review of African Political Economy’s own project is the primary focus of attention.

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Land Reform in Southern Africa in World-Historical Perspective

Henry Bernstein

This paper attempts to place issues of land reform in South Africa and Zimbabwe in a ‘world-historical’ perspective. ‘World-historical’ is used in two senses. The first is that given by the ‘classic’ agrarian question and its tradition, concerning the role of agrarian transformation in the transition to capitalism, and especially industrial capitalism, in general. The second applies to the trajectories, and mutations, of the ‘classic’ agrarian question in the development of capitalism on a world scale and its historical and spatial coordinates. It is suggested that the moment of ‘globalisation’ from the 1970s signaled the end of the ‘classic’ agrarian question, as the agrarian question of capital, without its resolution in most countries of the South. At the same time, however, the ‘fragmentation’ of labour associated with and intensified by the global restructuring of capital discloses possibilities of (new) agrarian questions generated by the struggles of labour for means of livelihood and reproduction. This is illustrated in relation to South Africa and especially Zimbabwe as social formations that combine key aspects of previous phases of capitalism, given their belated, and limited, national democratic revolutions, and of the current phase of ‘globalisation’ and its fragmentation of labour. While schematic in presentation, the aim is to illustrate the relevance and utility of some wider theoretical and historical ideas to debate of land redistribution in South Africa and Zimbabwe today.

The ‘Classic’ Agrarian Question & Redistributive Land Reform

Following the seminal work of T.J.Byres (1991; 1996), it is useful to distinguish three aspects of the ‘classic’ agrarian question (AQ). AQ1 concerns the role of agrarian classes (different peasant classes, agricultural workers) in struggles for democracy and socialism. AQ2 concerns the transformation of the social relations of production and development of the productive forces in agriculture in transitions to capitalism. AQ3 addresses how such transformations contribute, or otherwise, to the accumulation necessary for industrialisation (what Byres terms ‘agrarian transition’). These three sets of concerns may be conveniently summarised as centred on the problematics of politics, production and accumulation respectively (Bernstein, 1996b).

The tradition of the ‘classic’ agrarian question – that of Marx, Engels, Kautsky, Lenin and others – was located in the transition from pre-capitalist (‘feudal’) to capitalist landed property and agricultural production. In light of the original, hence distinctive, transition to capitalism in Britain, the spatial as well as historical sources of the agrarian question thus sketched quickly extended to the peripheries, or adjacent
'backward' regions, of early capitalist industrialisation, notably central, eastern, southern and southeastern Europe (and Ireland) especially from the late nineteenth century.

By one of those profound ironies of modern history, the concerns of all three aspects of the agrarian question were adapted, combined and concentrated with particular force and fateful consequence, in the collectivisation of agriculture in the USSR. This aimed to resolve the problem of production (AQ2) by establishing economies of scale as a basis for mechanisation (and 'scientific farming' more generally). The analysis of 'socialist primitive accumulation' by Preobrazhensky in the Bolshevik debates of the 1920s had already proposed, in uniquely explicit fashion, a strategy for the taxation of agriculture as the basis of early socialist industrialisation (AQ3), if not necessarily through collectivisation. Preobrazhensky by implication and Stalin by deed marked a definitive resolution, of a certain kind, of AQ1 in Soviet conditions: of the tensions of the worker-peasant alliance, of the union of hammer and sickle, in the moment of October 1917 and its aftermath.

While the trajectory of the 'classic' agrarian transition was driven by concern with the economic and political problems and prospects of capitalist, and then socialist, development in the peripheries of northwest Europe where industrial capitalism was first established, this then extended further to the vast colonial, quasi-colonial and former colonial zones of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In doing so, its world-historical preoccupation necessarily underwent further modifications and shifts in emphasis in these different, and changing, historical circumstances shaped by the development of capitalism on a world scale. Of course, the formation and mutations of world markets and divisions of labour were highly uneven, with differential effects for agrarian classes in different places at different times. Those effects included, and might combine in variant ways, intensified exploitation by landed property now incorporated within (or established by) systems of colonial rule, including its means of taxation; the impact of devastating famines on entire regional peasannies when the mechanisms of colonial and quasi-colonial imperialism combined with moments of extreme climatic conditions; new forms of capitalist commoditisation, and their labour regimes, frequently linked to export production for international markets on plantations (in colonial South and Southeast Asia and the Caribbean, and in colonial and independent Latin America), on peasant farms (throughout Europe and in colonial South Asia and Africa), and on the estates of historic landed property (for example, in western Asia and North Africa, and increasingly on Latin America’s haciendas in the later nineteenth century).

Generally, the development of industrial capitalism, and the economic and political forms of its internationalisation, generated new pressures on agrarian classes of pre-capitalist provenance as it brought them within its circuits of production, exchange and consumption. The reproduction of landed property confronted conditions of competition in agricultural commodity markets and for land, as well as political pressures from its subordinated peasannies and the 'national' modernisation projects of urban bourgeois elements and states. Following initial processes of 'forcible commercialisation' (Bharadwaj, 1985) generated by colonial states (sometimes through existing or adapted 'feudal'/feudal-like mechanisms of extra-economic coercion), peasant farmers increasingly had to reproduce themselves as petty commodity producers under 'the dull compulsion of economic forces' (in Marx's term) or join the growing ranks of the proletariat (or at least the dispossessed).
In the profound social disruptions and political upheavals of such processes, the agency of peasant movements was often central to anti-colonial and national liberation struggles in major zones of the peripheries of modern imperialism. In these struggles, the legacies of older histories of resistance to the powers of predatory landed property (based in rent) and/or the state (based in taxation) often informed, and combined with, resistance to foreign domination (anti-imperialism), thus the socially explosive character of what Eric Wolf (1969) termed ‘peasant wars of the twentieth century’. These ‘peasant wars’ drew on historic traditions of struggle – and their mobilising ideologies, forms of organisation and collective action – but now in radically different conditions. If France’s political revolution – together with Britain’s economic revolution the key marker of the emergent epoch of capitalist modernity – manifested a dialectic of discontinuity and (or through) continuity in peasant struggles against aristocratic/‘feudal’ landed property, this would be repeated in many other places and times during the next 200 years, and with special intensity during the twentieth century in the peripheries of industrial capitalism. Major instances of such struggles that led to fundamental changes in agrarian property regimes include Russia and Mexico in the second decade of the century; eastern and southeastern Europe and China in the interwar period (continuing in China into the 1940s and 1950s); and in the postwar period Bolivia in the 1950s, Vietnam and Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s, Peru in the 1960s, and Nicaragua in the 1970s.

This brings us to a question of truly world-historical significance: what was the future of those extensive peasant classes of pre-capitalist provenance, once they had played their part in consigning their antagonistic other, predatory landed property, to the world of the past? Or, even more broadly – because it extends to regions where peasant farming lacked any historic relation to (‘feudal’) landed property (as in most of sub-Saharan Africa) – what was to be the place of peasant farming in processes of development led by independent states after the end of colonial (and quasi-colonial) rule?

In a number of socialist regimes in social formations where predatory landed property was overthrown by forces that included widespread peasant mobilisation – the principal scenario of that version of the ‘classic’ agrarian question sealed by the Soviet revolution – land and labour were socialised through various means, in more or less draconian ways and sequences, in the form of (producer) cooperatives, communes, collective and/or state farms, for example, in China and Vietnam. Where socialist (or soi-disant socialist) regimes emerged in formations with large-scale capitalist farming enterprises, the latter were usually nationalised and managed as state farms of one kind or another, for example, in Cuba, Algeria, Nicaragua, Mozambique and Ethiopia (where this was combined with anti-‘feudal’ land reform and massive rural resettlement).

In other ‘new states’ of the postwar period, including most postcolonial states in Africa, the conception of ‘national development’ also typically centred on industrialisation through the instrumentality of planning, requiring both the development of higher productivity farming and transfers from agriculture to support the project of industrialisation. To these ‘classic’ concerns (AQ2 and AQ3) developmentalism added two further common elements: first, the centrality of the state as guardian (or ‘trustee’ in the term of Cowen and Shenton 1996) and manager of ‘national’ development, with a range of policies and institutional means deployed to realize state-led agricultural and rural development; and, second, the eradication of poverty now became a principle of legitimation in the rhetoric of development strategy.
Rather than catalogue the various, sometimes short-lived, fashions in agricultural and rural development policy of the moment of ‘national development’, and familiar enough in recent African history, it is more fruitful to suggest their underlying dynamic. What virtually all shared – regardless of their specific policy design and implementation, let alone their divergent outcomes – was a logic of the extension and intensification of commodity production. This logic, prefigured by late colonialism in its ‘developmental’ phase, was manifested in state, and donor, planned and directed programmes to promote (more) ‘modern’ farming through technical innovation (including mechanisation), specialisation (not least in export crops), supply of credit and extension, parastatal marketing and distribution, and in some instances state farms and joint ventures with international agribusiness capital.

Connected to this logic, if less remarked, was the formation and development – likewise frequently under close state supervision – of cooperatives and other forms of agricultural association. These could be presented as farmers’ organisations while serving as links in a state-managed vertical integration of farming, in which marketing boards, crop authorities, agricultural development banks, research stations and extension services substituted for the agribusiness corporations and banks that pioneered, and at this time were intensifying, such integration of agricultural commodity chains in North America and Europe. Indeed in sub-Saharan Africa the ubiquitous parastatal crop authority, incorporating a range of functions upstream and downstream of farming, could be interpreted as an attempt to move beyond control of the conditions of exchange (the colonial marketing board model, including its means of taxation) to control of the conditions of production of small farmers.²

The logic of these kinds of developmental/productionist interventions interacted to varying degrees, and in varying forms, with distributional measures. The latter included policies targeted on ‘the rural poor’ (defined as ‘resource poor’ farmers, in Robert Chambers’ phrase, rather than the agricultural proletariat or semi-proletariat), such as the provision of special credit facilities, assets, appropriate technologies, and other employment and income generating resources. In addition, ‘rural development’ programmes and budgets focused on building social infrastructure (schools, clinics) as well as economic infrastructure (roads, bridges, irrigation works, marketing centres) in the countryside, and on the provision of public and merit goods (education, health care, clean water supply, electricity supply). Probably the most ambitious conception (if not result) of this moment of developmentalism, and most suggestive of its drive to comprehensive blueprinting, was the Integrated Rural Development Programmes of the World Bank and USAID in the 1960s and 1970s.

The moment of developmentalism – the acceptance of and commitment to state-led (‘national’) development, across a wide ideological spectrum – may seem to have been as short-lived from today’s vantage point as its dynamics were contradictory and its results mixed, which I return to below. To conclude this section, and its preliminary sketch of some world-historical coordinates of the agrarian question in transitions to capitalism (and once socialism), several further observations are useful.

First, the work of T.J. Byres (cited earlier) enhances recognition and analysis of some of the complexities of outcomes once different historical trajectories of ‘agrarian transition’ are identified and interrogated. These include instances in which:
1) the second moment of agrarian transition led to the third, that is, the resolution of AQ2 followed by that of AQ3 (most famously England and its capitalist ‘agricultural revolution’ followed by the world’s first ‘industrial revolution’);

2) AQ3 was resolved (capitalist industrialisation achieved) without any significant contribution of (an increasingly capitalist) agriculture to industrial accumulation (e.g. Prussia/Germany);

3) AQ3 was resolved (capitalist industrialisation achieved) with significant contributions of agriculture to accumulation but an agriculture of peasant (rather than capitalist) farming from which surplus labour was transferred by rent and/or tax (e.g. imperial Japan, South Korea and Taiwan after the World War Two);

While (1) encapsulates the original source of the ‘classic’ agrarian question, (2) and (3) certainly present challenges to received notions of any single, hence necessary, link between the resolution of AQ2 and AQ3. To these historical examples should be added a fourth instance;

4) AQ2 is resolved without the resolution of AQ3, that is, there is a substantial development of capitalist agriculture without comprehensive industrialisation.

It is this that is Byres’ main concern, connecting as it does to debate of the contemporary underdevelopment of poor countries as the absence or failure of comprehensive industrialisation. Here the principal focus is on the class forces (AQ1) that block transfers from an agriculture significantly growing in production and productivity (AQ2) to industrial accumulation (AQ3), whether, say, the power of landed property and agrarian capital in Latin America (de Janvry, 1981) or rich peasantries in India (Byres, 1991).

Second are issues of the varied and contradictory processes and patterns of redistributive land reform and their place in ‘agrarian transition’. While redistributive land reform was commonly a defining goal, and achievement, of the kinds of ‘peasant wars’ analysed by Wolf (1969), it is not a necessary condition of transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist landed property and production (see instance [2] above, Lenin’s ‘Prussian path’) nor does redistributive land reform necessarily lead to class differentiation in the countryside that generates classes of agrarian capital and labour (as predicted by Lenin’s ‘American path’ but see Korea and Taiwan in instance [3] above). Further, the emblematic slogan of redistributive land reform – that of ‘land to the tiller’ – was embraced in various political conjunctures by bourgeois modernisers and nationalists, socialists and communists, and of course, as a definitive principle, by agrarian populists. While associated with different class forces and political programmes, they all shared an antipathy to predatory landed property and its reactionary weight (political and cultural as well as economic).

The main kinds of redistributive land reform in modern history have been those produced by actual or attempted social revolution (like the ‘peasant wars’ noted), and those decreed by modernising states of relatively radical and conservative nationalist complexion, for example, Egypt and Iran respectively in the 1950s and 1960s. Also of note are those instances of externally promoted land reform, combining a conception of agricultural modernisation and/or a drive to contain or pre-empt more subversive politics (anti-communism), for example the land reforms under military occupation in post-second world war Italy, Japan and Korea, and the US-led ‘Alliance for
Progress’ in Latin America in the 1960s in the wake of the Cuban revolution. And in
the 1970s, suggested below as the last decade of any significant redistributive land
reform, were the (anti-feudal) land reform in Ethiopia and that in Portugal following
its belated democratic revolution (itself triggered by the collapse of Portugal’s
colonial wars in Africa). 4

Global Shifts

While controversy rages, and will continue to do so, concerning the causes,
mechanisms, and implications (including new contradictions), of changes in world
economy, politics and culture since the 1970s – notably in debates about ‘globalisation’
– there is little doubt that important shifts with far-reaching ramifications have
occurred of which that decade, in retrospect, was a crucible. A familiar list would
include the deregulation of financial markets; shifts in the production, sourcing and
sales strategies and technologies of transnational manufacturing corporations; the
massive new possibilities attendant on information technologies, not least for mass
communications, and how they are exploited by the corporate capital that controls
them; the ideological and political ascendancy of neo-liberalism in a (selective)
‘rolling back of the state’, including the structural adjustment programmes, economic
liberalisation, and ‘state reform’/’good governance’ agendas imposed on the
countries of the South (and former Soviet bloc). This is the context, and some of its key
markers, that spelled the end of developmentalism (as sketched above) in its various
manifestations of older and newer (state) socialisms, and of a wide range of bourgeois
and petty-bourgeois regimes with more and less plausible strategies and practices
(and politics) of modernisation.

In the longer view, it can be hypothesised that state-led ‘national development’
represented the culmination of a particular wave of state activism in capitalism (the
course of which was influenced by Soviet and then later state socialisms), from the
first world war through the uncertain recovery of the 1920s, the great depression of
the 1930s, the second world war, subsequent reconstruction, and the decolonisation of
Asia and Africa, to the unprecedented growth of the world economy in the 1960s. In
an even longer view, it is suggested here that the moment of developmentalism
incorporated – or at least coincided with – the last significant examples of
redistributive land reform in the modern period initiated by the French revolution,
and with its most intense struggles over (pre-capitalist) landed property concentrated
between, say, 1910 and the 1970s (the period par excellence of Wolf’s ‘peasant wars’).

Whether this is just coincidence or the effect of complex determinations is not pursued
here. It is useful to ask, however, why and how changes in capitalism since the
unravelling of developmentalism (and contributing to its demise) may have
transcended the conditions of the ‘classic’ agrarian question that had persisted until
then, at least in certain zones of the South.

First, in the sphere of agricultural production and trade, a number of notable features
also had their crucible in the 1970s (even when their effects only became evident
subsequently) or have emerged since then. Two of these features, with widespread
ramifications for globalising tendencies in agricultural investment, divisions of
labour and markets, are identified in the remarkable work of Harriet Friedmann on
the international political economy of food. One was the collapse in the early 1970s of
the postwar ‘international food regime’ dominated by the export of US grain
surpluses, and the domestic and foreign policies that underwrote it. The other,
connected, feature was the emergence of other ‘national’ agricultures, structured and
regulated on similar lines to that of the US, which thereby competed with the latter and undermined its dominance in world markets for grain (and other field crops, notably soya, which provide key inputs to industrialised livestock/meat production). Competitors with US agriculture now included not only the European Union but also what Friedmann (1993) termed ‘NACs’: ‘new agricultural countries’ (for example, Thailand and notably Brazil).

The collapse of the postwar food order in the 1970s, contextualised and compounded by other sources of turbulence in the world economy (not least those of exchange rate and interest rate volatility) generated ‘anarchy’ in international food markets. Ironically, until then the postwar international food order was relatively stable, for the peculiar reason of its regulation by a uniquely dominant ‘national’ agriculture, that of the US (and the ‘Atlantic pact’ negotiated between the US and Europe, cf Friedmann, 1993). The end of that hegemonic regulation – as both effect of and further stimulus to new forms of competition noted, and their impact on the contradictions of American agriculture and its structure of regulation – generated opportunities and spaces for global (rather than just international) regulation by transnational corporations as ‘the major agents attempting to … organize stable conditions of production and consumption which allow them to plan investment, sourcing of agricultural materials, and marketing’ (Friedman, 1993:52).

This globalising tendency is manifested in, inter alia, new forms of internationalisation of agricultural commodity chains; marked by the high profile of agricultural trade and its regulation in the agenda of GATT since the mid-1980s and now in that of the WTO; and intensified by biotechnologies and the drive of agribusiness (chemical and seed) companies to patent and monopolize genetic (plant and animal) material.

The ramifications of these globalising tendencies for the South are all the more potent because of the demise of developmentalism and the array of policy instruments and interventions it applied to promote, support, and sometimes protect, agricultural production, or at least particular groups of producers. However contradictory such policies and practices were, and however mixed their results, there can be little doubt that ‘rolling back the state’, combined with trade liberalisation, has had major (if not uniform) consequences for farming in the South and the modalities of its integration in commodity chains and markets, both national and international, and likewise for those whose simple reproduction is derived, at least in significant part, from agricultural labour and capital (and their particular combinations in petty commodity production), to which I return.

What are the implications of such globalising tendencies for earlier, (world-historical) conceptions of the agrarian question, even with some of the qualifications to them required by divergent historical experiences, and briefly noted and illustrated above? A first argument, starkly put, is that the ‘classic’ agrarian question – that of the transition to capitalism and the logic of its various elements (developing the productive forces in farming; releasing labour for industrial employment; reducing the cost of labour power through cheaper food staples; providing or facilitating the accumulation fund for industrialisation, and so on) – was the agrarian question of capital, and specifically industrial capital. In the context of transition(s) to capitalism, this was also assumed to be the agrarian question of labour as well as capital, inasmuch as these two definitive classes of an emergent capitalism shared a common interest in the overthrow/transformation of feudalism, and of pre-capitalist social relations and practices more generally.
The argument here then is that the ‘classic’ agrarian question is no longer a concern of capital on a global scale. Indeed, over-production in Northern farming with all its ramifications is now well established as a key structural tension of contemporary capitalist agriculture. In effect, the agrarian question of capital has been resolved on a world scale without its resolution – as a foundation of accumulation and national development, generating comprehensive industrialisation and wage employment – in most of the poorer countries of the South. This is not to deny that there might be other sources and mechanisms of (industrial) accumulation nor that an agrarian question (or questions) of labour might not be constituted in novel ways – or with a new significance – in the current conjuncture of ‘globalisation’ (see below).

However, a basic proposition about ‘globalisation’ applies here, albeit requiring careful investigation of its inevitably uneven and varied impact (alluded to earlier): namely that the circuits of domestic/‘national’ economies intersect with, and are increasingly shaped by, those of global patterns of investment, production, divisions of labour, markets for finance and commodities, and forms of regulation by transnational capital. While these are familiar, as well as contested, propositions, a further – more speculative and contentious – hypothesis is that ‘globalisation’ encompasses not only new degrees (and forms?) of the centralisation and concentration as well as mobility of capital but also processes of the fragmentation of labour.

While the fragmentation of labour can not be theorised adequately here, some markers of its tendency in contemporary ‘globalisation’ can be noted briefly. First, this fragmentation does not mean a reduction in ‘the global proletariat’, which Panitch and Leys (2000:ix) suggest ‘is not vanishing but expanding at a rate that has doubled its numbers since 1975’. Second, for most parts of the world any necessary association of proletarianisation with industrial work (or any relatively stable wage employment) has surely been ruptured. Even if ‘globalisation’ may generate an absolute growth in the numbers of jobs in manufacturing worldwide, as Kitching claims (2001), this is highly concentrated in parts of East and Southeast Asia (above all, in absolute terms, in China); more generally, as Byres (forthcoming) concludes from an important historical and comparative survey of labour force statistics: ‘Clearly, capitalist industrialisation, to the extent that it is proceeding (today), is absorbing a significantly smaller share of the labour force than in the past’. Third, Kitching’s further claim (2001:97) that the diffusion and aggregate growth of industrial employment ‘could’ have a significant impact on global income distribution over time (that is, between the working classes of different regions) seems extremely unlikely in the light of work by Arrighi and Silver (e.g. 2000) among others.

In short, the global army (or reserve army) of labour, defined by Panitch and Leys (above) as those ‘who now depend – directly or indirectly – on the sale of their labour power for their own daily reproduction’, is not only growing but pursues its reproduction in conditions of increasingly insecure and oppressive wage labour combined with a range of likewise insecure ‘informal sector’ (‘survival’) activity, typically subject to its own forms of differentiation and oppression along lines of class, gender and generation. This is hardly news to the vast majority of Africans and to many of those concerned with Africa.

Giovanni Arrighi (2002) focuses on the ‘world systemic and regional aspects’ of African (macro)economic crisis, suggesting the effects for African economies, with their internal structural weaknesses inherited from colonialism, of definitive global shifts generated by US responses to the crisis of profitability in the 1970s. These shifts centred on global linkages between the US (which became a magnet for international
financial flows) and the extraordinary growth of northeast Asia (itself facilitated by uniquely favourable US policies), and contributed to Africa’s (further) marginalisation in the world economy and its macroeconomic collapse from the 1980s. Peter Gibbon and his co-workers have produced a series of empirically detailed and analytically rigorous studies of changes in the functioning of commodity chains for African agricultural exports. These studies integrate shifts in the downstream links of global commodity chains (through corporate reorganisation and concentration, transport and inventory logistics, processing technologies, marketing strategies, etc) with the (differential) effects upstream of the liberalisation of internal marketing arrangements in African producer countries (e.g. Raikes and Gibbon, 2000; Daviron and Gibbon, 2002; Ponte, 2002b).

Connected with such shifts in both the general and more specific dynamics of the global economy – and its constituent financial flows, divisions of labour, commodity chains, markets, and forms of competition and regulation – there has been a corresponding fragmentation (or fracturing) of labour and its conditions of reproduction in sub-Saharan Africa, manifested in declining real incomes for the great majority of its people. Deborah Bryceson (1999:186) has summarised the sources of this fragmentation as a ‘collapse of real wages in the formal sector … the meaninglessness of an informal sector without a formal sector contrast, and the shrinkage of the peasant sector’. Her own recent studies have focused on the last of these, what she terms ‘deagrarianisation’ (Bryceson, 1996) or ‘depeasantisation’ (Bryceson, 1999). This is manifested in the growing proportion of rural incomes derived from or dependent on activities other than own farming, in conditions where the risks of farming have increased and its returns have decreased due, in significant measure, to the effects of structural adjustment and their contributions to the ‘fundamental problem … (of) African peasant agriculture’s inability to compete in today’s global market’ (1999:185).7 Bryceson’s case studies point to suggestive changes in gender, generational and familial relations and dynamics in processes of ‘depeasantisation’ (not least in her emphasis on the individualisation of economic activity), and she is alert to the avenues of class differentiation presented by shifting economic patterns of livelihood and reproduction in Africa’s countrysides (for example, new localised markets for product and services, as well as a generalised ‘scramble for cash’).

These observations bearing on the fragmentation of labour in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa can be briefly elaborated and several further points added. First, pulling together the approaches and conclusions of Arrighi’s explicitly ‘world-historical’ (and world systemic) perspective and Bryceson’s thematic of ‘deagrarianisation’ emphasises the fragility of the gains registered by African economies in their moment of developmentalism following independence. Arrighi (2002:12-17) provides an instructive periodisation of the moments of initial success and subsequent failure of various African economies from the 1960s to the 1990s; one of Bryceson’s examples (1999:179-80) shows how quickly a ‘success story’ of agricultural growth through the specialised monocropping of maize in Tanzania’s southern highlands turned into a ‘maize crash’.8

Second, in addition to the points derived from Arrighi and Bryceson – and in some ways intermediating between them – the studies by Gibbon and his co-workers illuminate the need to investigate the mechanisms specific to particular commodity chains, and their associated markets, circuits of capital, and so on, in order to differentiate the fortunes and prospects of particular branches of production and groups of producers, and their spatial and socioeconomic locations. At the same time,
the findings of such studies need to be related to more familiar structural considerations concerning the macroeconomic impact of changes in particular commodity chains on accumulation, employment, inter-sectoral linkages (beyond those within commodity chains), and so on, within the broader economy.

Third, Bryceson’s point about the ‘logic’ of the ‘informal sector’ is apposite: to the extent that the ‘informal sector’ has a part to play in processes of accumulation and economic growth, this is realised through its symbiotic links with the development of large-scale industry, via subcontracting, service and repair, reducing the cost of wage goods etc. And, one should add to Bryceson’s observation of the ‘collapse’ of real wages in the formal sector that of declining and/or increasingly insecure wage employment in manufacturing industry more generally.

Finally, it should not be forgotten that the crisis of development, livelihood and reproduction in sub-Saharan Africa has affected large sections of the middle class, as well as workers and ‘peasants’, with potentially important effects for struggles for access to resources – including land (see Peters, 2002) – and the politics of such struggles.

The Land Question in South Africa & Zimbabwe

Liberation from the rule of minority political regimes, whether colonial and/or of settler provenance, came later in the southern African region than in most of the rest of the continent (and rest of the world): Mozambique in 1975, Zimbabwe in 1980; Namibia in 1990; South Africa in 1994. For Mozambique and Zimbabwe, liberation was achieved in the decade when major shifts in the dynamics of international capitalism, noted above and soon to be termed ‘globalisation’, were beginning. For Namibia and South Africa, liberation came at a moment when a globalising capitalism was more apparent, and its effects further ramified by the definitive event in the reconfiguration of its international political relations, the end of the Soviet Union.

Second, the dialectic between the international conjuncture and its constituent forces and the trajectories of struggle, composition and balance of domestic political forces, resulted in a far more qualified settlement of national liberation/national democratic revolution than its militants and popular base had envisaged. The possibilities of advance in independent Zimbabwe were restricted inter alia by the provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement (in force from 1980 to 1990); those in South Africa were restricted by the ‘historic compromises’ of the transition of 1990-1994, itself partly the product of a mutual exhaustion of contending forces, as Engels once put it.

Third, then, while the political importance of the achievement of universal citizenship should not be underestimated, the limits to national democratic revolution were registered in continuities of historic relations of property, production and economic power. Fourth, this continuity was especially marked in the inherited distribution of land and its associated control of agricultural production which was, moreover, concentrated in large-scale capitalist farming, albeit juxtaposed with spatially and socially more extensive peasant farming in Zimbabwe than in South Africa. And, of course, both countries, and especially South Africa, were substantially more industrialised than other countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, the land question – deeply rooted in processes of encompassing, violent and racialised dispossession intrinsic to the formation of minority regimes in the region – was more central to the
course of liberation struggle in Rhodesia, and continued to be of greater political weight in Zimbabwe, than in South Africa at any time since the early 1960s.

In effect, both countries combine features of two different (world-)historical processes and moments: they are simultaneously among the last instances of national liberation from minority regimes of colonial origin – and with exceptionally unequal and racialised distributions of land – and they exemplify the effects of what I have termed the fragmentation of labour intensified (if not initiated) by ‘globalisation’, with its contradictions manifested with particular potency in the conditions of extreme social inequality that prevail in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

It remains then to examine, if only in the schematic fashion deployed throughout this essay, some of the positions in debates about land and farming in South Africa and Zimbabwe in relation to the ‘classic’ agrarian question and the end of its historic force in an era of ‘globalisation’, suggested above. One set of issues, much contested throughout the epoch of capitalism, centres on issues of scale in farming in relation to the social organisation of production and its labour processes, technical change and productivity. These issues are beset with their own theoretical and historical complexities and sometimes regrettably simple confusions, which can not be reviewed adequately here but which are touched on in what follows.

The essential starting point in relation to South Africa and Zimbabwe, is the dominance of large-scale capitalist agriculture just noted, which also signals the resolution of the ‘classic’ agrarian question in its second aspect (AQ2). For those who adhere to this position, the significant policy questions concern the effective use of ‘carrots and sticks to elicit the co-operation of capitalist farmers in moving in the right direction’, that is, to invest in ‘a wage labour intensive, technologically dynamic and internationally competitive farm production structure’ (MERG, 1993:194). This was formulated as part of a macroeconomic model and strategy for South Africa during its transition to democracy, but had just as much resonance for Zimbabwe at the end of the 1990s, following a decade of successful agricultural export performance. There is, however, a departure here from the agenda of the ‘classic’ agrarian question that is highly pertinent to current conditions. While one of the ‘functions’ of the growth of (labour) productivity in capitalist agriculture in that ‘classic’ version was releasing labour from farming for recruitment to a growing industrial workforce, the policy objectives of MERG (the Macroeconomic Research Group) for a democratic South Africa included generating more, and more stable and better paid, net employment in agriculture in those branches of (export) production that generate high value commodities through methods that are both capital and labour intensive. Again, if anything, this is even more resonant for Zimbabwe where perhaps one-sixth of the population in the late 1990s consisted of wage labour households on large capitalist farms (Rutherford, 2001a).

The MERG perspective explicitly counterposed the benefits of a large farm path for productivity and employment growth (as well as export earnings) to arguments for land redistribution and small-scale (‘peasant’) farming. These arguments are pressed across a wide ideological spectrum, from more technocratic to more radical varieties of populism and sometimes from an explicitly materialist position, emphasising or combining several distinct elements and demands. First are calls for land redistribution as a matter of social justice, of redress of the material and other violence of long histories of racialised dispossession. One version of this approach, with a clearly defined political rationale, advocates land redistribution to overturn the inherited, and continuing, economic and political power of large landed property as
part of the ‘unfinished business’ of national democratic revolution (Bernstein, 1996a; Levin and Weiner, 1996).

The advocacy of redistributive land reform as moral and/or political imperative is usually (if not necessarily) combined with, or reinforced by, arguments for the superior economic benefits of small-scale (‘household’, ‘family’, ‘peasant’ etc) farming. Thus Sam Moyo, for example, suggests the limitations of the Zimbabwean government’s ‘tendency to rationalize land acquisition and redistribution on the basis of historical grievances and political demands (which in their own right are legitimate) and not on the basis of valid economic and technical reasons for land reform’ (Moyo, 2000:27, emphasis added). The ‘economic and technical’ case for redistributive land reform appeals to ‘mainstream agricultural economics’ and its ‘global case evidence’ that smaller-sized farms tend to use their land more productively, in terms of higher unit yields and the use of labour’ (Moyo, 2000:8).

Such evidence and the claims made for it – associated with contemporary positions termed ‘agrarian neo-populism’ and ‘neo-classical populism’ by their critics – are, of course, highly contentious and embroiled in longstanding debates in agrarian political economy. There is no space here to explore this, although I should note my scepticism about the binary opposition that marks debate of the inverse relationship (between farm size and land productivity or yields), that is, between small and large farm paths of development. Too much of that debate, it seems to me, spins endlessly around deductive argument (from economies of scale and relative factor scarcities in poor countries by advocates of large and small farm paths of development respectively) and how it is applied to interpretations of the ‘global case evidence’, as Moyo puts it.

There is another echo here of the ‘classic’ agrarian question, if often manifested in a regrettably simple confusion – or conflation – of the kind mentioned earlier. This is the tendency of ‘neo-classical populism’ to conflate large-scale capitalist production and capitalist landed property, and to assume the intrinsic character of both as unproductive, inefficient, the source of rural poverty and oppression, and so on – thereby assimilating them, in truly anachronistic fashion, to the features of (‘predatory’) pre-capitalist landed property (the point of departure of the ‘classical’ agrarian question). Indeed, in some of the key texts of ‘neo-classic populism’, and their argument of ‘distortions’ generated by unequal distributions of land, it is impossible to know whether, and when, the latter refers to structures of landholding dominated by pre-capitalist landed property, capitalist landed property, and/or agrarian capital (large-scale production).

To observe this is not to endorse any unproblematic view of the (‘objectively’) progressive nature of large-scale capitalist farming and its conditions of existence, including markets in agricultural commodities and in land. For example, substantial areas of land may not be utilised because of shifts in demand and/or prices for particular commodities and/or because land can be more important as an object of investment in speculation rather than production. Such conditions, their effects and susceptibility to change, always have to be specified carefully, a task with analytical demands as well as those of empirical investigation. In the southern African context, then, it can not be assumed or simply asserted – as it often is on behalf of redistributive land reform – that land in large agrarian properties is generally (in empirical terms) or necessarily (on deductive grounds) ‘underutilised’ or otherwise socially ‘inefficient’. Pulling somewhat in the other direction is the critique of large-scale capitalist farming for its low levels of labour absorption or employment
generation, thereby implicitly recognising its higher levels of labour productivity and resonating another aspect of the ‘classic’ agrarian question that now has to be adapted to the historical conditions of ‘labour surplus’ economies in which neither rates of growth, nor forms, of industrialisation generate adequate employment or seem likely to (pace Kitching).  

This crucial point has been signalled several times already – in T.J. Byres’ observation quoted earlier, in the aspiration of the MERG strategy to promote labour intensive forms of highly capitalised and internationally competitive branches of agriculture in South Africa, and in the general thesis of the intensification/acceleration of the fragmentation of labour within ‘globalisation’ advanced in this article – and it brings us closer to what I term an agrarian question (or questions) of labour. This, I believe, is not only the crux of the matter in today’s conditions but has its own distinctive historical lineages in so much of sub-Saharan Africa, and perhaps southern Africa above all, flagged by ideas, and debates, about ‘worker-peasants’.

This is another vast area of issues with its own complexities and debates represented in a rich empirical and analytical literature which, again, can be touched on only briefly and selectively, and again requires further significant qualification to the world-historical perspective of the ‘classic’ agrarian question and some of its inherited, if often implicit (because so deeply embedded?), assumptions. The main issue here is the assumption of an agrarian question rooted principally, or even exclusively, in agrarian classes, that traverses the entire epoch of modern history from the first (agrarian) transitions to capitalism to the contemporary conditions of imperialism/globalisation’, above all classes of agrarian capital and labour, whether generated by the ‘self-metamorphosis’ (Lenin) of pre-capitalist landed property and the dispossession of tenant peasantries or by the class differentiation of peasantries free of landlordism. This schema presents various problems for historical comparison (Bernstein, 1996b), of which that most immediately relevant here is the centrality to the history of capitalism in Africa of the combination of ‘hoe and wage’ (Cordell, et al. 1996) – or wage and hoe, as some might prefer to put it in the context of the massive migratory labour regimes that supplied the mining complexes of southern Africa, and above all South Africa.

More generally, such conventional and pervasive distinctions/separations as ‘urban’ and ‘rural’, ‘worker’ and ‘farmer’, are blurred by the social logic of migratory labour systems. Ray Bush and Lionel Cliffe (1984), among others, have illustrated well the purchase of such conceptual categories/distinctions, that provide the conventions of discourses of ‘modernisation’, on official thinking about development in Rhodesia in the 1950s and 1960s and continuing in Zimbabwe after liberation. Their article in this Review nearly 20 years ago, written in the wake of the first round of (limited) land reform/resettlement after liberation in Zimbabwe, was noteworthy for its focus on ‘agrarian reform in labour migrant societies’, that is, in social formations where agrarian capital dominates land ownership and agricultural production and accumulation while combinations of ‘hoe and wage’ (or wage and hoe) are key to the reproduction of labour. They argued that land redistribution should be concentrated first and foremost on ‘the overwhelming majority of rural dwellers … the dependents of migrants, the worker-peasant or semi-proletarian class’, rather than rich peasants (as in colonial ‘progressive farmer’ policies) and ‘the near landless and jobless poor peasants, a kind of “sub-proletariat”’ (Bush and Cliffe, 1984:87).

Nearly two decades on, and in the very different conjuncture of Zimbabwe since February 2000, Paris Yeros also connects redistributive land reform with ‘semi-
proletarianisation’ manifested in ‘a workforce in motion, within rural areas, across the rural-urban divide, and beyond international boundaries’ (Yeros, 2002b:9). Moreover he does so in terms which revive some of the central motifs of the ‘classic’ agrarian question: ‘Zimbabwe’s mass land occupation movement, even if state-patronised and streamlined, remains an historic opportunity to break the inherited structure of the home market’. Redistributive land reform is necessary but not sufficient for the ‘widening of the home market’ which also needs state support to build ‘the requisite infrastructure … (for) dynamic accumulation … in the smallholder sector’ and ‘to co-ordinate inter-sectoral linkages’ to transcend ‘disarticulated accumulation’ (Yeros, 2002b:12-13, emphasis added; see also Moyo, 2003).

A final example, focused on South African conditions, is Gillian Hart’s recent work which argues ‘the need to dis-articulate or delink the land question from agriculture, and to re-articulate or reframe it in terms of the erosion of social security, and the moral and material imperative for a social wage’ (2002:12, also 42-3, 292). This is also formulated as ‘the moral and material imperative for redistributive social justice’, which has two aspects: redressing ‘the histories and memories of racialised dispossession from the land’ and addressing ‘the systemic crisis of livelihoods associated with the collapse of formal employment, and the palpable failure of neoliberal macro-economic policies on their own terms’ (2002:306-7). Hart continues that land redistribution as a political demand, justified by ‘the systemic crisis of livelihoods’ and distinguished from a ‘narrowly sectoral definition of agriculture’, opens ‘the way for organised labour and other social forces to engage with land and agrarian questions, and forge new alliances’ (2002:42-43).

While my own (tentative) proposal of a new agrarian question of labour in the context of ‘globalisation’, discussed next, is close to the rationale that Hart suggests, I find her formulations baffling. The need to ‘delink the land question from agriculture’ seems to refer to the great demand for adequate and secure (urban, peri-urban) residential/living space by South Africa’s dispossessed, a reading reinforced by the prominence – and emblematic value – Hart gives to the Bredell land occupation of July 2001 in her final chapter (2002:305-10). This is reasonably clear but it is not clear (to me) what Hart means precisely by ‘a narrowly sectoral definition of agriculture’: does it mean, for example, that land redistribution to provide a means of livelihood/reproduction entails setting aside the concerns of the ‘classic’ agrarian question with agricultural productivity growth, accumulation, macroeconomic linkages and the development of the domestic market (signalled by Moyo and Yeros in the context of Zimbabwe)? Also, her application of the notion of the ‘social wage’ to land redistribution for purposes of residence and/or farming is eccentric, to say the least. The concept of the ‘social wage’ refers to collective consumption as a flow of public goods such as health care, education, housing and transport, on a subsidised basis that, in capitalist societies, entails the redistributive use of (central or local) government revenue; it does not refer to the (one-off) allocation of assets to individuals or entities such as households or ‘communities’. Ironically, the most rigorous case for a development strategy for a democratic South Africa to which the social wage, in its proper sense, was central, was by the same MERG (1993) that advocated a large farm path of agricultural productivity and employment growth (see above).

Having sketched, however schematically, core elements of the social logic, and aspirations, of arguments for redistributive land reform in South Africa and Zimbabwe, and their resonances with, departures from, or adaptations of, the ‘classic’ agrarian question, it remains to indicate briefly the notion of a new agrarian question of labour and to comment on its politics.
An Agrarian Question of Labour?

As suggested, the starting point for considering the possibilities of a new agrarian question is the growing proletarianisation of labour combined with the forms of its fragmentation in an era of global capitalist restructuring: the relative shrinkage of (especially industrial) formal wage employment, as well as security of both wage- and self-employment, and their various combinations, and of real incomes derived from them – in short, that systemic crisis of livelihoods and of the reproduction of labour that Hart observes. Or, as Arrighi and Moore (2001:75) put it: ‘the underlying contradiction of a world capitalist system that promotes the formation of a world proletariat but cannot accommodate a generalised living wage (that is, the most basic of reproduction costs), far from being solved, has become more acute than ever’.

The ‘fragmentation of labour’ also suggests the need to jettison any remaining assumptions of a sociologically homogeneous proletariat, and to confront issues of translating into ‘political facts’ – of effective organisation and collective action – the ‘social facts’ of working masses that pursue their livelihoods (means of reproduction/ ‘survival’) through ever more disparate combinations of wage- and self-employment (agricultural and non-agricultural petty commodity production). Moreover, such combinations of activities, of course, are typically differentiated by social relations of gender, generation, and ethnicity – and also pursued in increasingly individualised ways as Bryceson suggests?

According to specific concrete conditions – political, cultural and ideological as well as social and economic – some (usually heterogeneous) groups in different places today may target land as a productive asset, and aspire to farming, as one form of activity among others, to confront the pressures on their reproduction exerted by the fragmentation of labour. It should be clear that while instances of this dynamic can involve sections of the poor peasantry in particular, the social boundaries of poor peasants with the proletariat of ‘footloose labour’ (Breman, 1996) are perhaps more porous today than ever before, and not only in the circumstances of social formations where ‘worker-peasants’ were historically so entrenched and pervasive.

This is to share something of the perspective of Moyo (2001) and Yeros (2002a, b), while remaining more cautious than they are about a global tidal wave of land struggles: Moyo perhaps from a more ‘peasantist’ position and Yeros who sees land struggles as virtually definitive of the politics of the semi-proletarian condition throughout the South. It is important to note that such contemporary struggles – for example, in Bolivia and Brazil (Petras, 1997, 1998; Wolford, forthcoming) as well as in Zimbabwe – do not replicate ‘peasant movements in the traditional sense’, as Petras (1997:21) observes for Latin America, that is, peasant movements of previous phases of the world-historical development of capitalism. Their social bases, and local leaderships, often comprise retrenched miners and plantation workers, and industrial and other urban workers, as well as the diverse strata of the rurally based ‘semi-proletariat’ and marginalised more generally and indeed, in some cases, of middle (and even rich) peasants and the middle class.

What are the implications of such manifestations of new agrarian questions of labour that combine struggles for land – encompassing smaller and larger, less and more organised, practices of land invasion, occupation, ‘squatting’ (and ‘foraging’) – with an intention and commitment to farm? The concerns of the ‘classic’ agrarian question are also relevant here, starting with the fundamental point – indicated earlier – that the political dynamic of these struggles must be separated from, and their rationale
assessed independently of, any assumption of the necessarily unproductive or socially ‘inefficient’ nature of large-scale agriculture and the intrinsic superiority of small-scale farming. Such assessment needs to account for specific concrete circumstances, of which prevailing forms of capitalist agriculture are a crucial factor, as are the typically neglected relations between agrarian capital and landed property (including their possible tensions, considered by Marx, Kautsky, Lenin and others in their analyses of ground rent). At one end of a spectrum would be ‘large uncultivated farms with fertile land near roads, markets and credit facilities’, such as those targeted for land occupation by the Movimento Rural Sem Terra (MST) in Brazil, according to Petras (1997:130). In this instance, bringing land into cultivation unambiguously adds to aggregate output as well as employment and income. At the other end of the spectrum would be the subdivision – and, in effect, destruction – of highly productive capitalist farm enterprises, and its associated threat to the jobs of farm workers, a prospect disclosed by the course of Zimbabwe’s ‘fast track’ land redistribution from early 2000.\textsuperscript{19}

A further set of issues with effects for the viability of farming on redistributed land concerns securing other conditions of production besides access to land, and how – and how effectively – this is satisfied, even in the favourable circumstances of the best targeted MST land occupations in Brazil (above).\textsuperscript{20} This connects with the tendencies to class differentiation intrinsic to the social relations and dynamics of petty commodity production, and the ways in which and extent to which these tendencies are realised (Bernstein, 2000). More sophisticated understandings of the historical trajectories of ‘worker-peasants’ in southern Africa (by \textit{inter alios} Bush and Cliffe, 1984; Levin and Neocosmos, 1989; Cousins, et al. 1992,) recognise these tendencies to class differentiation and their implications; it is not only that (typically female) rural ‘subsistence’ production ‘subsidises’ the wages paid to (typically male) labour migrants, but that remittances and savings from wage employment contribute to the monetary costs of reproducing farming, not least through hiring labour, and hence can contribute to accumulation (expanded reproduction) by some agricultural petty commodity enterprises. In effect, this discloses a further and distinctive source of fragmentation of labour among ‘worker-peasants’, subverting assumptions that they constitute a coherent class category or cohesive class force. In the absence of adequate public provision of the means of farming beyond access to land, it may be only richer peasant or ‘worker-peasant’ households (or indeed elements of the middle class) that command the resources (capital) to establish production on new and/or additional and/or better land acquired through redistribution.\textsuperscript{21} Even without marked inequalities of initial conditions, the normal tendency to differentiation may generate increasing inequalities between those who benefit from land redistribution, and – ironically – may do so even more in conjunction with structural and idiosyncratic or fortuitous factors that shape the (differential) fortunes in labour markets of those who combine hoe and wage.

None of these observations constitutes an argument against land redistribution but they advise consideration of the merits of redistributive land reform according to concrete analyses of concrete situations, without any romanticism about ‘peasants’ or indeed ‘worker-peasants’ or any general assumption of the superior productive virtues of either large-scale or small-scale farming. And concrete analysis becomes all the more demanding, as well as urgent, with recognition of the ‘many ways in which power fragment(s) the circumstances and experiences of the oppressed’ and of the challenges this presents to ‘translating social facts into political ones’ (Mamdani, 1996:272, 219).
Mamdani’s potent observations are exemplified well by the course of land and agrarian reform in democratic South Africa and independent Zimbabwe, with all the contrasts between them. Strategies claiming progressive credentials – across a range of large and small farm paths of development, as well as those ‘delinking’ the concerns of an agrarian question of labour from those of the ‘classic’ agrarian question – have failed so far to identify unambiguous class constituencies able to translate the ‘social facts’ of the fragmentation/crisis of labour into the ‘political facts’ of mobilisation around a coherent programme of demands and means. In South Africa this is manifested in the near stasis of redistributive land reform, which Hart among others emphasises, and in the absence of any effective policy ‘sticks and carrots’ to move capitalist farmers ‘in the right direction’.22

Zimbabwe presents a compelling contrast as the only case of sweeping, regime-sanctioned, confiscatory land redistribution in the world today and one that gets the attention of the international media, at least periodically: the most newsworthy ‘rogue state’ in the realm of property rights?23 The markers of its trajectory of land politics and policies since liberation are well known: the limited redistribution/resettlement of the early 1980s, constrained inter alia by the Lancaster House Agreement; following the end of the Lancaster House provisions the much more radical redistribution promised by the Land Act of 1992 and by the gazetting of 1471 large landed properties for compulsory acquisition in late 1997, both of which, however, delivered relatively little; and the comprehensive land occupations – ‘fast track’ resettlement – from late February 2000, sanctioned by a regime increasingly mired in political trouble substantially of its own making.

Whatever assessment one might make of Zimbabwe’s recent politics of land, it is pointless – or counter-productive – to present it, and its current moment, as the pursuit of struggle and exercise of will of any coherent, and idealised, collective class or other subject/agent, whether ‘peasant’, rural ‘community’ or ‘worker-peasant’. Such views are supported by neither the social nor political ‘facts’. The complexities and contradictions of the ‘social facts’ include, if not exhaustively: struggles over land within areas of ‘peasant’ farming and especially perhaps their frontiers; the dynamics and effects of patterns of substantial rural-rural migration since independence – discourses of ‘squatting’ and associated practices of eviction are not confined to the spaces of large commercial landed property (e.g. Nyambara, 2001); the extent to which, and ways in which, the gathering crisis of the reproduction of labour during the 1990s added instances of urban-rural migration in a quest for land to the tensions noted; the effects of shifts in land use, and claims on land, generated by new, and highly profitable, branches of export production and by the stratagems of eco-tourism capital and its practices of displacement and eviction (e.g. Hughes, 2001); how all these processes are shaped by, and shape, class and gender differentiation in the countryside (Cousins, et al. 1992); and, not least, the social location of farm workers in Zimbabwe’s class structure (Rutherford, 2001a).

The ‘political facts’ include how all the above are mediated through the often fragile political alliances and erratic practices of local accumulators and the similarly erratic, and contested, interventions of the local state, in which ‘native’/‘stranger’ distinctions, ‘squatting’ and eviction also feature (e.g. Hammar, 2001); the continuous if ‘low profile’ local land disputes and occupations from the moment of independence, moving to ‘high profile/high intensity’ occupations in 1997-8 (Moyo, 2000, 2001); the multiple ambiguities of ideological representations of farm workers, and their political sources and effects (Rutherford, 2001b); the insertion of the war veterans, as a nationally organised political force, in this intensification of land politics in the late...
1990s and their role in the moment of February 2000 (Moyo, 2001); the reasons why, and means by which, Mugabe’s politically embattled regime (finally) declared its support for, and sought political benefit from, sweeping land redistribution, after twenty years of vacillation and inconsistency.\textsuperscript{24}

In reviewing the various instances, locations, timings, and agents of land occupation during the upsurge of 2000, Moyo (2001) acknowledges its ‘numerous localised and contradictory waves’; the great range of actors involved, with a focus on the actual or aspiring ‘leadership’ of party politicians, state officials, war veterans and chiefs, acting in concert with or independently of national directives from ZNLWA (the war veterans’ association) and ZANU(PF); and the heterogeneous social mix of participants from rural ‘communities’ to some members of the urban middle class and, one should add, the unemployed urban youth mobilised by ZANU(PF) that a number of observers noted.

Nonetheless, my own view is that recent land redistribution in Zimbabwe represents a significant, and ‘objectively progressive’, expression of a (new) agrarian question of labour, albeit with all the specificities, limits and contradictions indicated – which a dialectical (rather than romantic) view of history suggests is always the case of any advance. Some of those specificities, limits and contradictions can be summarised briefly by way of conclusion. First, and linking to an earlier phase of land questions in the history of capitalism, the ownership and distribution of land was a potent factor in the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and continued to be so after independence. Since 1980 (and even more so since 1990?), the significance of land was highlighted by both historical legacy – the continuity of a structure of landed property rooted in racialised dispossession (hence ‘unfinished business’ of national democratic revolution) – and the contemporary ‘fragmentation’ of labour as a feature of ‘globalisation’, and experienced as mounting pressures on the reproduction of labour in both agricultural petty commodity production and wage employment, and the ways they are linked (in hoe and wage/wage and hoe). It is the latter that aligns Zimbabwe with the systemic crisis of livelihoods and reproduction of labour in the South more generally, and the former that focuses the concerns of an agrarian question of labour in Zimbabwe with particular force on large landholdings as ‘(white) settler’ rather than capitalist landed property.\textsuperscript{25} Both aspects are key to the structural conditions of possibility of radical land redistribution in Zimbabwe but did not make it inevitable: it (finally) happened in a distinctive and highly charged political conjuncture with its own fortuitous, improvised and opportunistic features.

This is the second point: that a redistributive land reform was sanctioned opportunistically by a political regime that is oppressive, corrupt and desperate, and perhaps increasingly divided as its political bankruptcy became more evident in the face of challenges to it. On the other hand, as various commentators have observed, the antinomies of the MDC (Movement for Democratic Change) brought it to a very tricky position on land redistribution; its deployment of a discourse of ‘human rights’ comes unstuck on the fact that property rights are so deeply embedded in currently hegemonic (neoliberal) versions of that discourse. Third, then – given the conditions of rule by ZANU(PF), both nationally and locally, especially in rural areas; the generalised crisis of reproduction for so many Zimbabweans, including many of the middle class as well as workers, ‘peasants’ and ‘worker-peasants’; and the alertness to opportunities for acquisition of land by the rural bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie, and party and state cadres at all levels – it is not surprising that the processes of land occupation and division involved such a mix of social forces, in so chaotic a fashion,
and subject to such localised variation of instigation, leadership, participation, method and outcome (who got what).

What the effects of these processes will be for the viability of farming on land thus occupied and divided remains to be seen. I would emphasise, however, as my fourth and final point, that any view of the progressive nature of the land redistribution that has occurred needs to be clear minded (and tough minded) enough, on one hand, to recognise its costs and, on the other hand, not to assume certain benefits as a given, as unproblematic. The costs are likely to include not only the loss of employment – and continuing or further political marginalisation? – of many farm-workers, and especially those who do not gain access to redistributed land, but also, at least in the short term, the loss of productive capacity both physical (farm infrastructure and equipment) and technical (agronomic and managerial), and its effects for economic activity and employment upstream and downstream of farming, for exports and for foreign exchange earnings. As for benefits, these can not be derived from any generalised assumption of the productive superiority of small-scale farming (pace Moyo); in any case, Yeros’s correct observation of the need for state provision of infrastructure – and other conditions of productivity growth and ‘dynamic accumulation . . . in the smallholder sector’ – does not mean that such provision will be made, and indeed is unlikely to be made in current (and foreseeable) circumstances? If the absence of such provision provides additional opportunities for ‘dynamic accumulation’ by smaller-scale (i.e. black) agrarian capital, and hence increased class differentiation in the countryside, this does not constitute an argument against radical land redistribution, in my view – and may even be enlisted in support of it (see endnote 25).

The most pessimistic scenario is that in which redistribution fails to make any (significant) aggregate contribution, directly and indirectly, to the livelihoods of those subject to the fragmentation of labour and its pressures on reproduction, as well as threatening the maintenance, let alone growth, of aggregate agricultural output (or marketed agricultural output) in Zimbabwe.26 I think that this is as unlikely as the scenario that envisages the rapid formation and extension of a highly productive and dynamic ‘smallholder’ agriculture from land redistribution. Even if the former proved to be the immediate outcome, however, the process of land redistribution will have redefined a key zone of the terrain of future social struggle, and thereby will also help clarify the challenges of identifying, understanding and assessing agrarian questions of labour in a new, globalising, conjuncture of capitalism.

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Endnotes

1. This essay started as an improvised amalgam of elements of two then unpublished papers (Bernstein 2002, and forthcoming) in a presentation to the conference of the Leeds University Centre for African Studies (LUCAS) on 3-4 May 2002, an event that provided the opportunity of a tribute to Lionel Cliffe. It moved towards its present shape as a presentation to the African History and Politics Seminar of the University of Oxford on 28 October 2002. The responses on both occasions encouraged my attempts to utilise a framework proposed earlier (Bernstein, 2002) to locate issues of land reform in Southern Africa in a ‘world-historical’ perspective. The earlier parts of this essay draw on that paper, and I aim to limit references as much as possible to works not
cited there and in Bernstein (forthcoming), which contain fuller bibliographies. What follows should make clear my view that the 1970s, in effect, was the final moment in the long history of capitalism when the three terms of the title of the LUCAS conference, namely ‘Peasant, Liberation and Socialism’, could thus be conjoined in any meaningful agenda. I am grateful to Ray Bush and Paris Yeros for comments on a first draft of this paper, although I have drawn on their comments rather little as their important disagreements with some of the positions advanced here merit separate debate to do them justice. Yeros locates agrarian questions in a theoretical approach to imperialism and development strongly influenced by Samir Amin and Alain de Janvry (see Yeros, 2002a, and note 17 below).

2. The innovative work of Benoit Daviron (2002) suggests that state management and regulation of export crop production and marketing in the South, both colonial and post-colonial, was also key to a long period – from various points in the second half of the nineteenth century to the 1980s – in which it provided favourable competitive conditions for smallholder cultivation, also linked to the emergence and functioning of national and international product standards and futures exchanges for commodities like cotton, cocoa, coffee and rubber.

3. The common core of redistributive land reforms is wide-ranging change in property rights in land, effected by political means. Three forms of this most relevant to the current discussion are, first, redistribution of property rights of pre-capitalist landed property to tenant or otherwise dependent peasants, commonly resident on that property and farming its land; second, the expropriation and subdivision of landed properties farmed as single (usually capitalist) enterprises, which typically entails physical resettlement of those who acquire property rights in the subdivided land; and, third, the expropriation of landed properties farmed as single (usually capitalist) enterprises, property rights in which are transferred to state or other public entities that continue to organise large-scale production on them.

4. I have omitted instances when intense struggles for redistributive land reform were defeated, as in parts of India in the late 1940s, or the gains of major land reforms were overturned by counter-revolution, as in Guatemala in 1954 and Chile in 1973. In other cases with long histories of contestation over land without radical and comprehensive redistribution, the struggle can continue in ways that achieve more limited but significant successes through skilful political alliances and tactics, as Borras (1999) argues for the Philippines.

5. Although it can be argued, of course, that their insertion in international divisions of labour and markets has obstructed resolution of the agrarian question in its fuller or extended sense, that of AQ3 and the contributions of agriculture to industrialisation, in most countries of the South from their colonial incorporation through their histories since political independence (Bernstein, 1996b).

6. The world of ‘unorganised’ (or ‘fragmented’ as it is termed here) labour is well ‘mapped’ for India by Harriss-White and Gooptu who observe that ‘Out of India’s huge labour force, over 390 million strong, only 7 per cent are in the organised sector’. And, they continue: ‘Even the term “organised” is seriously misleading because only half of the 7 per cent is unionised and in the vanguard of working-class politics’ (2000:89).

7. This is perhaps too sweeping an assertion in the light of the studies by Gibbon and others cited, and in the light of the distinctly non-competitive nature of world markets for many agricultural commodities, which, interestingly, Kitching (2001) considers the single greatest economic obstacle to achieving ‘social justice through globalisation’ (see also Gibbon, 2002).

8. See also the excellent monograph of Ponte (2002a) on what happened to maize as a cash crop in one area of Tanzania’s Southern Highlands following market liberalisation; Ferguson (1999) provides a compelling, and salutary, reminder on a larger scale, of the trajectory of Zambia’s Copperbelt from exemplar of an African ‘industrial revolution’ in the 1950s and 1960s to subsequent economic disaster zone.

9. Meagher (1995) is an incisive analysis, incorporating this insight, of the ‘informal sector’ in sub-Saharan Africa.

10. In articles that address issues of the middle class and ‘civil society’ in Tanzania, Peter Gibbon (2001:432-7) suggests a process of ‘districtization’ as the middle class tries to secure the conditions of its reproduction, and Tim Kelsall (2001) illustrates the role of ‘an insecure and often opportunistic middle class’ in the NGO game.
11. Bernstein (2002) identifies and discusses several of the different currents within contemporary agrarian neo-populism.

12. Two seminal works of contemporary agrarian neo-populism are the books by Keith Griffin (1974) and Michael Lipton (1977); it was in a review of the former that Chris Scott (1977) coined the term ‘neo-classical populism’. That Griffin and Lipton hold to their positions is shown by the recent article by Griffin et al. (2002) and the Rural Poverty Report 2001 (IFAD, 2001) of which Lipton was the intellectual architect (see Bernstein, 2002). A special issue of The Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 4 No. 1 (January 2004), edited by T.J. Byres, will address in considerable depth and detail the theoretical arguments, empirical evidence, and policy prescriptions of Griffin et al. (2002).

13. Griffin et al. (2002) is a notable example.


15. ‘Labour surplus’ is used here in a more colloquial sense of economies with a pervasive lack of productive employment, not in the more structural(ist) sense of the Lewis model which might argue that African economies are labour scarce, on which see Karshenas (2001).

16. By contrast, Ben Cousins et al. (1992) suggested that the numbers of ‘worker-peasants’ in Zimbabwe were declining, while those of agricultural petty commodity producers, of a ‘lumpen semi-peasantry’, and of a rural petit bourgeoisie were increasing, by the early 1990s. Achieving any statistical precision on the numbers of people distributed between these, or other, social classifications applied to various strata of the peasantry and of ‘worker-peasants’, is, of course, impossible, not least because of the porous social boundaries of adjacent categories and the effects of Zimbabwe’s encompassing economic misery of recent years. Robin Palmer (2000:18) comments acerbically on the fetishism of (fictitious) numbers, and how they are reproduced, in the targets of various government resettlement plans in Zimbabwe over the years since Muzowera’s short-lived regime.

17. It will be recalled that the subtitle of Lenin’s The Development of Capitalism in Russia was The Process of the Formation of a Home Market for Large-Scale Industry, and that the failure or incompleteness of this process is one of the key referents of ‘disarticulated accumulation’ formulated by Samir Amin in relation to Africa and Alain de Janvry in relation to Latin America (with its much greater development of large-scale capitalist agriculture and industry relative to most of sub-Saharan Africa).

18. Which is more problematic for agrarian neo-populism, focused on ‘the rural poor’ (e.g. IFAD, 2001), than it ought to be for a materialist analysis. Moyo (2003) is starting to explore the implications of possible class trajectories of landed property and production (AQ2) following on from the multi-class character of land seizure/redistribution in Zimbabwe (AQ1).

19. Yeros (2002b:11, citing a UNDP interim mission report) suggested that perhaps as many as one million people (160,000 households) had acquired seven million hectares of land by the end of 2000. Moyo (2003:6) in a preliminary, and as yet incomplete, assessment of who got what (redistributed land) notes that official data suggest over 200,000 beneficiaries on ten million hectares by the end of 2002, with about 60 per cent of the area redistributed in smaller acquisitions and about 40 per cent in larger acquisitions.

20. Part of the challenge for the MST in Brazil, as Wendy Wolford (forthcoming) points out, is how skillfully it can negotiate state support, not least credit facilities, for groups which have seized land under MST leadership.

21. As Richard Levin and Michael Neocosmos observed (1989:244), ‘those who clamour the loudest for land reform are often those who already have access to the means of production’. More generally, I have suggested elsewhere (e.g. Bernstein, 2002) that rising ‘entry’ and reproduction costs of agricultural petty commodity production, and growing numbers of those who can not afford such costs, have effects for rural class differentiation that are as important as they are neglected; those who are in this situation are likely to belong to Bush and Cliffe’s ‘sub-proletariat’ or the ‘lumpen semi-peasantry’ of Cousins et al.

22. I attempted to explain some of the reasons for this in Bernstein (1998), partly drawing on the important work of Mahmood Mamdani (1996) and also elaborating some of the problems of
'stereotypical' versions of large and small farm paths of development advocated for South Africa by MERG and the Liptons, Michael (1996) and Merle (1996), respectively. I find the research programme and publications of PLAAAS (Programme in Land and Agrarian Studies) of the University of the Western Cape the most useful single source of information on and analysis of land and agricultural policy in South Africa; Turner (2002) is the most recent ‘status report’ from PLAAAS on the course of land and agrarian reform in South Africa.

23. Which country ‘with the highest concentration of private land ownership in the world’, passed a land reform bill in January 2003? The answer is Scotland: ‘Some landowners have threatened legal action, saying the bill, which gives crofting communities the right to buy their land even if the landlord does not want to sell, is akin to President Mugabe’s land grab in Zimbabwe’. A Conservative Party Member of the Scottish Parliament similarly spoke of ‘this Mugabe-style land grab’ which ‘has nothing to do with land reform and everything to do with other parties being obsessed by replaying the class war of 200 years ago’ – presumably the Highland clearances of which Marx wrote (1976:891-5); The Guardian (London), 24 January 2003.

24. Nick Amin (1992: 150) observed of the 1992 Land Act at the time that ‘Land redistribution on the scale planned is … not likely to be a financially viable option. Against this, of course, is the view that the ruling party sees swift action to redistribute white-owned land to blacks as the only way to win back dwindling support’.

25. This points to another set of issues which there is not space to consider here: that of the formation of black landed property and agrarian capital. These are not the same thing, as emphasised earlier; indeed while individual black acquisition of large landholdings might be accounted positively in terms of redressing the inherited structure of landed property, the formation and growth of a dynamic class of black agrarian capital is more relevant to the agrarian question(s) of labour suggested in this essay. Bernstein (1996a, 1998) gives some brief examples and discussion of black agrarian capital in South Africa before and after the end of apartheid. It seems that something approaching 20 per cent of large landed properties (800 or so, of approximately 4,500) were owned by black Zimbabweans by the late 1990s; there were also said to be upwards of 50,000 ‘master farmers’, or ‘small-scale indigenous (agrarian) capitalists’ (Yeros, 2002b:11). If numbers here are also imprecise – and confusing (because some measures of racial distribution count the numbers of large landed properties while others count their size, i.e. land area?) – more serious is the lack of systematic information about how these properties are farmed or otherwise used; is it reasonable to assume that ‘master farmers’ (the ‘rural petit bourgeoisie’ of Cousins et al. 1992) are likely to be active agrarian accumulators in branches like cotton production?

26. It is most likely that, in the short term, ‘fast-track’ land redistribution made some contribution to the crisis of domestic food production that affects Zimbabwe currently. Drought is a key factor in production shortfalls, while the spatial and social distribution of hunger appears to be influenced also by the politics of the regime’s food distribution practices.

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From ‘Growth with Equity’ to ‘Fast-Track’ Reform: Zimbabwe’s Land Question

Lloyd M. Sachikonye

This article represents a provisional attempt to explain the changing and competing strands of the debate surrounding the ‘land question’ as it has unfolded in Zimbabwe in the past 23 years. As in most contexts of land reform, the debate is highly political whether packaged in nationalist or technocratic rhetoric. Since independence, three phases of land reform debate can be identified: the early independence years from 1980 to about 1989, the period of structural adjustment and afterwards from 1990-1999, and the current phase which commenced in 2000. The paper concludes by providing an update on the short-term repercussions of the ‘fast-track’ reform programme for the agricultural sector, food security and the wider economy.

In October 2002, Zimbabwe’s massive land reform programme launched two years earlier drew to a close. According to official estimates, a total of 11 million hectares, including the best arable land, had been transferred from about 4,000 mostly large-scale white commercial farmers to about 300,000 small farmers. In addition, up to 54,000 mostly medium and large-scale black commercial farmers had been selected to receive land, although by early 2003 only about 60 per cent of them had actually taken up the offer. This was the largest, and most controversial, property transfer in Zimbabwe’s post-independence history. While it had been originally intended to acquire 5 million hectares more systematically over 5 years (beginning in 1998), the land reform programme started in 2000 soon acquired a new dynamic resulting in the acquisition of 11 million hectares in two years. By any standards, the land redistribution programme of 2000-2002 was impressive in scale. The latest reforms brought the total amount of land acquired from the white commercial farming sector since independence to 14.5 million hectares, out of the 15.5 million they owned in 1980. The ruling Zanu-PF party has described the programme as an ‘agrarian revolution’ or the Third Chimurenga, ‘the third uprising’. Today, only about 600 white farmers own land in Zimbabwe, while several hundred more continue to contest the acquisitions in courts.

However, while the Zimbabwe Government claims that it has now settled the ‘land question’ once and for all, the country is in the grip of its worst food shortage crisis in decades. Up to half of the country’s population of 13 million is presently vulnerable to hunger, and there has been a notably cynical use of food as a political weapon against the opposition. While the 2001-2002 drought was a contributory factor to famine, so was the disruptive character of the land reform programme. The programme was characterised by considerable violence leading to loss of life by black farm workers and white farmers, and accompanied by chaos in the resettlement process itself. There are considerable doubts about the sustainability of the programme, and the capacity
of agriculture to generate growth, foreign exchange earnings and self-sufficient food
security in the short- and medium term appears to have been placed in jeopardy. This
paper does not provide a full account of all the dimensions of Zimbabwe’s land
reform, but aims instead to sketch an analytical context in which the imperatives and
dynamics of Zimbabwe’s land reform programme may be understood.¹

A Changing Debate

At the height of the liberation struggle in the late 1970s and during the early
independence years, the main debate in Zimbabwean politics revolved around
‘socialism’ and ‘egalitarianism’. The principal nationalist parties, PF-ZAPU and
ZANU-PF, espoused some commitment to building ‘a socialist society’ after
independence. The technocrats in the newly-independent state in the early 1980s
designed economic and social policies with the overall objective of achieving what
was termed ‘growth with equity through planned change’, in order to arrest a

The ‘land question’ was central to ‘liberation’ and the aspirations for socialism that
began with growth with equity. In those early independence years it was fashionable,
as it still is today, for senior politicians to remind citizens that the main motivating
factor behind the liberation struggle was ‘land’ – the restoration of ownership of land
expropriated by colonial settlers. Independence was therefore an act that would lead
to the recovery of an important material and symbolic resource. After all, nowhere
else on the continent (with the exception of South Africa, Namibia and Kenya) had
there been such a massive colonial expropriation of land. As time went on, the notion
that the liberation struggle had mainly been about land became a cliche and one
which gained widespread currency not least amongst the erstwhile ‘freedom fighters’,
now widely known, and feared, as ‘war veterans’. According to this perspective, the
liberation struggle was not primarily about building ‘democracy’ and the institutions
and values which sustain it, but about land. This undoubtedly goes some way
towards explaining the violence and authoritarian values which have accompanied
the current land reform process.

As stated above, this article represents a provisional attempt to explain the changing
and competing strands of the debate surrounding the ‘land question’ as it has
unfolded in Zimbabwe in the past 22 years. As in most contexts of land reform, the
debate is highly political whether packaged in nationalist or technocratic rhetoric.
Since independence, three distinct phases of the land reform debate can be identified:
the early independence years from 1980 to about 1989; the period under structural
adjustment and afterwards from 1990 to 1999; and the current phase which
commenced in early 2000. The contributions of Lionel Cliffe were significant
particularly during the first phase of this debate, but as this article will demonstrate,
the issues that he highlighted, and the challenges that he identified, have not lost their
relevance, resonance and urgency for the current phase (Cliffe, 1986; 1988a; 1988b;
Cliffe and Stoneman, 1989).

The Land Question in the 1980s

The structure of land-ownership and use was clearly inequitable at independence.
About 6,000 white commercial farmers owned 15.5 million hectares of land, while
8,500 small-scale African farmers had 1.4 million hectares. The rest, an estimated
700,000 indigenous communal farming households, subsisted on 16.4 million
hectares. In other words, these households occupied less than 50 per cent of the agricultural land, and 75 per cent of that land was in agro-ecological regions IV and V, that is, drier and less fertile. There was therefore a keenly-felt sense of historical injustice and deprivation over the question of land, and it was one of the most contentious issues negotiated at the Lancaster House conference. Nationalist negotiators at the conference subsequently remarked that there had been a promise by the UK and US to contribute significantly to land purchase to redress the imbalances in land ownership. Whatever the case might have been, that promise was not enshrined in the independence constitution which instead contained onerous clauses on the protection of private property, including land. At independence, land reform therefore focused on settling people by central government on land acquired from large-scale commercial farmers on a ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ basis. The cost of the land was relatively expensive, and as Cliffe observed:

*the independence constitution tied government’s hands by entrenching property rights so that only under-utilised land could be compulsorily purchased and only then by immediate payment of the full value in foreign exchange ...* (Cliffe, 1988a).

There were to be no changes to clauses relating to provisions in the constitution relating to land until 1990, and this significantly restricted the government’s room for manoeuvre on the land question in the 1980s.

Nevertheless, this was the context in which the government embarked on a land reform programme whose centrepiece was resettlement of the landless and the poor on newly-acquired land. The programme had the overall objective of resettling 162,000 families on nine million hectares of land. If that objective had been achieved during the first decade of independence, it would have represented a transfer of about 23 per cent of the households from the congested communal areas onto new land; this was not to be. Due to resource constraints and limited political will, only about 48,000 households had been resettled by mid-1989, while another 4,000 had been allocated land which they had yet to take up.

What then were the major strands of the debate on the land question during this first decade of independence? The first strand questioned the desirability of the resettlement model as the way to proceed on land reform. It was argued, for example, that the redistribution of the large-scale farms would result in an overall decline in output and in the number of people gainfully employed in agriculture. This line of argument urged a slow-down of resettlement, and it received expression in several reports published during this period (Kinsey, 1982; World Bank, 1983). Arguing against any significant redistribution, it was the sort of position which received the support of the land owners as represented by the influential Commercial Farmers Union (CFU). The debate about the feasibility of the ‘resettlement model’ continued with interventions from several scholars, especially Cliffe, against the above-mentioned position underpinned by the CFU (Moyo, 1986; Weiner, 1988). The claim that there would be a 60 per cent drop in production and employment if the target number of 162,000 were to be resettled on 9 million hectares of land was disputed by Cliffe:

*the first assumption is that the land taken over would be just as productive as that which is left. That will certainly not be the case if government takes over the underutilised land first of which there is a significant amount. There will then be a much less than proportionate drop in output and jobs from land taken over; the new settlers and their production will largely add to the overall output ...* (Cliffe, 1988a).
Even so, the anti-settlement lobby remained quite influential, and its arguments were now couched in terms of ‘conservationism’ based on the claim that resettlement had resulted in a degradation of the environment! Yet there was plentiful evidence that land redistribution through resettlement was achieving success through substantially improved yields. For instance, a mission of the British Overseas Development Administration (ODA) undertook an evaluation of the resettlement programme and concluded that:

*it had made impressive strides towards achieving its principal objectives, in particular the short run political objective of contributing to post-war reconstruction and stability. The majority of families settled had benefited considerably through the provision of increased opportunities for income generation and the availability of services such as health and education (ODA, 1996).*

This assessment corroborated an earlier study conducted by the Zimbabwe Comptroller and Auditor-General who concluded that the resettlement exercise had been well planned, that it had benefited mostly the landless rural poor, and that the standard of living of most settlers had improved as a consequence of increased incomes and access to clean drinking water, sanitation, housing and schools. By the 1990s, even the initially skeptical analysts who had made pessimistic forecasts in the 1980s appear to have changed their position in the face of evidence that land reform ‘helped beneficiaries to increase their level of household income significantly’ (Kinsey, Deininger and Hoogeveen, 2000).

However, alongside these positions on land reform in the first decade, there were other important strands in the debate that deserve some attention. These related to broader approaches to reform as well as the political determinants that needed to be taken into account. There were three possible paths for land reform. The first was a capitalist path which would go slow on land distribution, and continue with ‘improvement’ in communal areas (CAs) based eventually on individualised holdings. Large-scale commercial farmers grouped under the CFU propounded this position. In the 1980s, they still retained considerable influence in the agrarian sector and over agricultural policy, especially through their determination of crop prices and agricultural wage levels in annual negotiations with the government. As the decade proceeded, they shifted their ground to accommodate commercialisation of peasant farming rather than see it as a threat to their interests (Cliffe, 1988a). This was partly in response to a determined intervention by agribusiness in providing inputs to smallholder agriculture as well as from other business interests that stood to benefit from a recovery in the CAs. The agricultural bureaucracy and an emerging black farming bourgeoisie veered towards this capitalist path by the end of the 1980s.

However, at this point there remained an alternative path to land reform. As Cliffe argued, this could be found in Zimbabwe’s legacy of peasant militancy, reinforced by struggles of workers and by a minority of radicalised politicians and civil servants who still sought to pursue some of the democratic and liberating aspirations of the liberation struggle (Ibid.). Such a path to land reform would have required the mobilisation of the peasantry and the emergence of a less bureaucratically-minded cadre to work in countryside. The idea mooted in the national transitional development plan for 1982-1985 of forming Peasant Associations – as a medium of class-based mobilisation – would have been an important step in this direction. However, this path was not seriously opened up and pursued.
Instead there was greater likelihood for a statist, top-down path (Ibid.). Advocates of this statist strategy included chiefs and headmen whose powers over the allocation of land were re-asserted in the post-independence period. State support for these interests, as well as those of master farmers, furthered the prospect of marginalising the views and interests of communal farmers and the landless poor in a land reform programme ‘from above’. Finally, the broader question pertaining to reform was still whether resettlement, no matter how significant the numbers involved, would succeed in resolving pressures on the congested CAs. Population projections of the Central Statistical Office (CSO) in 1985 estimated that by 2000, there would be an extra 500,000 rural households against a projected resettled 162,000 households. The conditions in the CAs were bound to deteriorate, rather than to be ameliorated. This was the crux of Zimbabwe’s agrarian question, which even the latter-day massive ‘fast track’ programme have not addressed adequately.

The Interlude in the 1990s

In the 1990s, on the whole, there was less urgency attached to resolving the land question. This was perplexing in view of the earlier impetus, and the expiry of the restrictive clauses of the Lancaster House constitution in 1990. Less than 20,000 new settlers received land between 1990 and 1997, signifying a substantial slow-down in land reform. By 1997, the total number of resettled households amounted to 71,000 – a far cry from the original target of 162,000 households. A total of 3.4 million hectares (constituting about 22 per cent of former large-scale white commercial land) had been made available to those 71,000, while about 500 indigenous commercial farmers had graduated into becoming fully-fledged commercial farmers. About 80 per cent of these new commercial farmers had bought farms from their own resources, while the remainder rented the government’s leasehold farms which had formerly been run by white farmers (Zimbabwe Government, 1998). The official explanation for the slowdown in land reform in the 1990s was that land acquisition through the ‘willing seller willing buyer’ approach significantly limited the scope of spatially matching land supply with demand for resettlement. Land sold in small parcels was expensive to develop for resettlement. In sum, according to this position, scarcity of land, exorbitant prices of available land in the market and the inability of the government to pay the prices asked limited its capacity to achieve its reform targets (Ibid.). It was estimated that by the mid-1990s, land prices had increased three-fold since the late 1980s and that unless the amount of land for sale increased, it was doubtful whether the government was capable of purchasing land in sufficient quantities to implement a new programme (ODA, 1996). Although two legal developments in the form of a Land Acquisition Act (1992) and the 14th constitutional amendment were passed during this period, there was still little political will and momentum for land reform.

In general, the political pressures for land reform in the early and mid-1990s were less intense than before. The Zanu-PF had comfortably won the 1990 and 1995 elections, sweeping about 95 per cent of the parliamentary seats. Despite a low turn-out, President Mugabe had been re-elected by a wide margin in the 1996 election. Opposition parties were fragmented and weak, and thus unable to mount a credible challenge to the incumbent party. Until 1998, there was little organised pressure from peasants and the landless.

It is important to recall that most energies and attention during this period were directed towards an economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP), which was a turn towards neo-liberal economic policies underwritten by the World Bank and the
IMF. The five-year programme which commenced in 1990 was premised on orthodox conditionalities that included public sector reform, trade liberalisation, deficit reduction, and in general the creation of a ‘favourable climate’ for capital. The programme promised 5 per cent annual growth, expansion of employment opportunities and poverty reduction. Economic liberalisation initially appeared to offer prospects of advancement for the emergent black bourgeoisie, including the ruling elite (Sachikonye, 1995). Opportunities for enrichment went hand in hand with an increase in corruption, which had steadily grown since the late 1980s. This was the context in which the government extended its focus on land reform so that for the first time it would also cover the ‘emergent black large-scale commercial farmers’ (Zimbabwe Government, 1990).

What then were the main strands of the debate on the land question during this second decade of independence? The strands related to a new dimension of providing access to land for the ruling elite, as a counterweight to the established white agrarian bourgeoisie. Other key issues of debate concerned the question of which other social groups should be the principal beneficiaries of land reform, and the extent to which the reform process had been transparent. A significant development in 1990s was the emergence of a growing group within the ruling elite who sought access to land ownership. The political and economic environment of liberalisation was favourable to this aspiration, which found expression in leasing of state land to cabinet ministers, parliamentarians, judges, senior army officers and civil servants. Although the majority of this elite lacked farming experience and did not derive their livelihoods mainly from land, state land was made available to them at concessionary rates while the more pressing needs of the poor and landless were given less attention. The subsequent publicity given to the long list of elite beneficiaries by member of parliament, Margaret Dongo, provoked a heated discussion about the government’s commitment (or rather lack of it) to a land reform programme that would benefit the poor. At this point, 90,000 households still needed land in order for the land reform programme to reach its original target of 162,000 households. The main element of this debate was a justification of the process of ‘embourgeoisement’ through state-facilitated access to land. Inevitably, there were strong critiques of this development, due to both the potential for corruption or cronyism embedded in the process and the resulting deepening of inequalities.

This was the immediate background against which donors began to insist concertedly on transparency in any future land reform programme. For example, an international conference with donors organised by the Zimbabwe Government in 1998 stressed that such a programme should be implemented ‘in a transparent, fair and sustainable manner, with regard to respect for the law, and broadened stakeholder as well as beneficiary participation; and that it should be affordable, cost-effective and consistent with economic and financial reforms’ (Communique, 1998). A mission which prepared a report a year later for the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the European Union (EU) was even more emphatic when it advised that conditions should be attached to any future support as that would help to ‘eliminate gross abuses such as the use of funds for the purchase of land from land owners who may have been allocated state land under an earlier process’ (DFID and EU, 1999). This new insistence on transparency and accountability irked the Zimbabwe Government. For the government, this appeared as part of the broader discourse on ‘good governance’, which the Blair government propagated with more zeal than the Conservatives under John Major and Margaret Thatcher.
Another strand in the discourse related to the social groups which should be given priority in a new reform programme. There was greater emphasis, on the part of donors, on poverty reduction which would in turn require a more systematic selection of beneficiaries from among the poor; that is, ‘those living in congested communal areas and those with farming aptitude as well as vulnerable groups such as farm workers’ (Communique, 1998). The case for alleviating the marginalisation of farm workers in future land reform was also highlighted in a number of detailed studies on the poor conditions under which they worked and lived (Amanor-Wilks, 1995; Sachikonye and Zishiri, 1999). In addition, such land reform should address more adequately gender aspects especially the issues of equal access and ownership of land, and the involvement of women in planning and implementation processes.

Finally, another element in the debate related to the inherent limitations of any land reform programme that did not contribute to recovery in the congested communal areas themselves. In the 1980s, it had been observed that while an improvement approach to the CAs relying on the supply of improved varieties of crops with the necessary inputs and credit and on widening access to markets and extension was desirable, it was not sufficient to meet the central problem of CAs (Cliffe, 1988b). Siphoning off the population through resettlement did not necessarily give sufficient elbowroom to contain land pressures particularly in overcrowded, low-potential areas. More sweeping transformations of the CA agrarian systems were therefore necessary, and perhaps around improvements in ‘household arable-ox-ploughing-common grazing’ (HA-OP-CG) arrangements (Ibid.). The communal areas reorganisation programme, proposed by the government in 1986, had been a major attempt in this direction in re-planning villages and separating land by residential, arable and grazing use. However, a government-sponsored land commission concluded that the programme had not made much progress by the mid-1990s. The main reason for the lack of progress had been ‘the over-centralisation of government with the relevant technical ministries using top-down methods of planning and implementation’ (Rukuni Commission, 1994). It was against this background that some donors stressed that land reform should be part of a general re-organisation of agriculture through a revised national land policy with a view to promoting greater efficiency of land holdings in both communal and resettlement areas. As the government itself had acknowledged, overcrowding in the CAs continued to make them environmentally, socially and economically unsustainable (Zimbabwe Government, 1998). The resettlement programme launched in the 1980s had failed to decongest the CAs, partly because the selection of individual households from scattered villages had not created any ‘meaningful elbow-room’ (Ibid.). This was the broad context in which the planning of a new phase of land reform known as the ‘Land Reform and Resettlement Programme, Phase 2’ was conceptualised and designed in 1998. Soon afterwards, political dynamics would propel the land question to the forefront, and this takes us to the current phase, which began in earnest in early 2000.

The Land is the Economy, the Economy is the Land

Three inter-related developments brought a new but unprecedented intensity to the land question in early 2000. These were renewed agitation for land ‘from below’, that is, from peasants in a number of districts where congestion had reached more critical levels, the lack of progress in donor support for a new phase in land reform, and finally, the government’s defeat in the referendum on constitutional reform. In mid-1998, there were a series of more or less spontaneous occupations of commercial farms adjacent to overcrowded communal areas in Svosve in Mashonaland East.
province, and in several districts in Masvingo province. These short-lived occupations were an eloquent reminder to the government that a new impetus should be given to land redistribution. However, what distinguished this spurt of occupations from later ones was that they were largely peaceful and spontaneous, and thus not orchestrated or directed by state institutions. The lack of progress on the government’s Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase 2 (LRRP) and the Inception Phase Framework Plan (IPFP) related to funding and doubts about the government’s commitment to transparency in the proposed reform. Even so in 1999, the World Bank and a number of governments (the Netherlands, Sweden and the US) had agreed to provide technical support amounting to about US$6 million in the preliminary phase of the programme. The absence of any indication of more substantive support, and the referendum defeat, clearly irked a government which was experiencing a deep economic crisis. In addition, the military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was proving expensive and adversely affected a weakened fragile economy (UN, 2002). With general elections expected in mid-2000, this was a conjuncture which created apprehension within the ruling elite and government. There was anxiety that the election outcome would mirror the referendum result. In sum, the conditions were set for a major drama in Zimbabwean politics.

Given that its predominant political base is largely confined to the rural electorate, the resolution of the land question became an immediate political imperative. As it became embroiled in the 2000 and 2002 election campaigns, the land question acquired new dynamics as the government aimed to settle ‘once and for all’ this vexing social and economic issue. However, at this conjuncture a certain ‘siege mentality’ was also developing within the ruling elite, especially the political leadership. The suspicion was directed at large-scale commercial farmers, who were accused of supporting the Movement for Demoratic Change (MDC) opposition party and mobilising farm workers to ensure the referendum defeat, and towards the donor community, particularly Britain, for dragging their feet over financial support for the proposed LRRP.

What then have been the main strands in the debate on land during this current phase? The first strand propounds and justifies the ‘fast track’ reform programme, which has been pursued since early 2000. The second strand continues to insist that the programme requires transparency and accountability in the context of ‘the rule of law’, while a final strand asserts that related issues of democracy, human rights and citizenship have to be addressed in the land reform programme if the objective of equity is to achieved.

The official position originally found expression in the policy framework document of LRRP phase 2, which set out the objectives of the new phase as the acquisition of 5 million hectares for distribution amongst 91,000 families and ‘youths graduating from agricultural colleges and others with demonstrable experience in agriculture’ (Zimbabwe Government, 1998). It is important to note that this figure of 91,000, when added to the 71,000 already resettled, would have amounted to the original target of 162,000 set out at independence. The official position was also now more explicit about the need to incorporate the gender dimension, poverty reduction, as well as the special needs of farm workers, although this did not proceed beyond rhetoric. Meanwhile the political dynamics of the post-referendum situation spurred an increased role for the ‘war veterans’ under their mercurial leader, Chenzera Hunzvi, who began to launch ‘land occupations’ (or land invasions as they were termed) from February 2000 onwards. Those land occupations were accompanied by considerable
violence and disorder which the police largely condoned, presumably as a result of ‘political instruction’. In spite of several court orders issued to the ‘land invaders’ to vacate and allow for a more orderly distribution, the occupations continued up to and after the 2000 election. More than 150 people, including farm workers as well as 13 white commercial farmers, were killed, thousands of others injured and displaced as a consequence of the orchestrated violence (Kibble and Vanlerberghe, 2000).

The land occupiers consisted of war veterans, peasants, youth mostly belonging to Zanu-PF, but also members of the elite including army and police officers and politicians. There was now no clear selection criteria; it was more of a ‘free for all’ reform programme. Underpinning this fast-track phase was the People First – Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Programme, published in June 2001 (Zimbabwe Government, 2001). There were significant new elements in this programme, and importantly, the amount earmarked for acquisition rose from 5 million to 8.3 million hectares in 2001. The number of intended beneficiaries from amongst the poor and landless expanded from 91,000 to 160,000 in 2001 (in what was now dubbed the A1 model), while an additional 54 000 medium-scale and large-scale commercial farmers were also to become beneficiaries of the A2 model (Ibid.). As one report observed:

*the methods of land acquisition, settler selection and provision of settlement support were changed to a completely government-driven approach so as to ensure the rapid completion of these three tasks while spreading infrastructure developments over three years* (UNDP, 2002).

The ‘fast track’ programme has been much more wide-ranging than originally planned. The target has increased to 11.4 million hectares and the average farm size is significantly between 39 and 45 hectares, and in October 2002 the Lands Minister, Joseph Made, announced that about 300,000 families had been settled under the A1 model. By the time of the presidential election in March 2002, the ‘fast-track’ programme had by far exceeded its original objective of land redistribution. However, as we seen above, this was at an enormous cost in terms of intimidation, violence, displacement, lawlessness and disruption to production. There were large unanswered questions relating to the provision of basic infrastructure and services to the settler-families, to the financing of the purchase of the acquired farms and indeed to the sustainability of the entire reform programme. It was not clear whether the state’s position of ‘the end justifying the means’ would ensure a sustainable programme, and this became more doubtful in the post-presidential election period in 2002 when Mugabe’s victory was disputed and targeted sanctions were applied.

There has, however, been another strand in the debate about the modalities of implementation of land reform during this phase. This strand argues for a peaceful redistribution of land in accordance with the rule of law, and emphasises the need for transparency at all stages of the process. The core of the Abuja Agreement between the Zimbabwe and British governments, brokered by the Commonwealth in September 2001, stressed the explicit linkage between land reform and good governance. This alternative approach argued for better and systematic planning of the reform process so as to ensure its long-term sustainability. This approach was advocated by the courts, until they were staffed by judges more sympathetic to the government position in 2001, by the commercial farmers body (the CFU), and by most donors and independent analysts. The standard position of this set of forces was that while the need for land distribution was clear, the methods that were used to achieve it were deeply flawed. Perhaps the most extensively argued version of this position appears in the above-mentioned UNDP report, which observed that:
• the land reform process could have been more participatory with the involvement of rural communities;

• the process could have been more transparent; and that

• the selection of beneficiaries could have been improved with priority given to those in greatest need, and those already with some experience in agricultural production (UNDP, 2002).

Furthermore, with about 300 000 families resettled, the overall outcome of the programme was already over-ambitious. From the UNDP’s perspective, the programme was not likely to be sustainable. It was argued that ‘the economic consequences of trying to implement such a large programme, without considerably extending the time-frame would be negative because of the resources it would drain from the government budget and private capital’ (Ibid.). The massive cost was confirmed in an estimate by the Minister of Agriculture, Joseph Made, who estimated that US$3 billion (up from US$1.9 billion) would be required for infrastructure and credit over a 5 year period (Herald, 28 March 2002). According to this perspective, the current land reform process is riddled with enormous problems, which could potentially derail it.

Yet another strand in the debate raises broader social and political issues relating to the land reform process. These primarily relate to issues of social and gender differentiation, the position of farm workers and question of citizenship. As observed in an earlier section, the process of social differentiation underlies any land or rather agrarian question, and during the 1980s this issue had featured in analytical studies (Cliffe, 1988a, Weiner 1988; Moyo, 1986; Sachikonye, 1989). In the current phase, there does not appear to be a systematic consideration of the constellation of social or class interests involved in the reform process, and their different access to the benefits of the process. While the A1 model has been primarily aimed at the poor and landless from the communal areas, it is common knowledge that some of the beneficiaries are people in urban areas including others holding jobs.

As far as the A2 model is concerned, it is clear that well-connected members of the ruling elite are taking advantage of it to acquire commercial farms at ‘a song’, although the model was meant to accommodate those with farming skills, experience and start-up resources. There is growing published evidence that the ruling elite has allocated to itself some of the best land (Daily News, 6 September 2002). Newspapers have been awash with stories of a frantic scramble for such land by cabinet ministers, governors, senior army and police officers, top civil servants, war veterans and others connected to this elite. Thus privileged members of the elite, through patronage or clientilism, have become beneficiaries of a process which should have been largely aimed at poverty reduction through decongestion of communal areas. As white farmers leave for neighbouring countries or relocate to towns, this elite gets its cut from the much-vaunted land reform. This material imperative behind land reform may have been initially under-estimated because the political factor had loomed larger in the context of the 2000 and 2002 electoral contests. It is, however, an imperative which has now become quite significant in economic and political terms. The sharing of spoils allows for ‘instant accumulation’ with state backing, and beneficiaries are now more likely to be beholden to the Zanu-PF than to an opposition movement advocating ‘transparency’ in the land reform process! However, it remains doubtful whether this increased number of ‘part-time’ and ‘cell-phone’ farmers will keep the newly-acquired farms sufficiently productive to maintain the sector’s contribution to GDP growth, food security and foreign exchange earnings.
Furthermore, present indications suggest that the gender dimension has not been seriously addressed, and relatively few women have been beneficiaries of the reform process. While female-headed households constitute about 35 per cent of all households in Zimbabwe, they comprise only about 16 per cent of those resettled. While this strand of the debate on the land question has been sensitive to the specific needs of vulnerable groups such as women, and the poor more generally, it has been apprehensive about the possible hijacking of the reform by better-off social groups, including the ruling elite. This outcome may be explicable because the reform has been state-driven from ‘from above’, but it complicates, if not postpones, rather than resolves the land question. At the stage of setting up the necessary infrastructure and providing the key services such as extension and credit, the social differentiation issue will loom very large and yet the state-driven debate says little about it.

A related issue which the land reform process has thrown into sharp relief is that of citizenship. This arose because of state discrimination against farm workers in the reform exercise. The programme has caused the lay-off of an estimated 150,000 farm workers (or about 900,000 people if their family members are included), according to the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers’ Union (GAPWUZ) (Zimbabwe Independent, 27 September 2002). By early 2003, the number of farm workers who had lost their jobs had increased to between 180,000 and 200,000, or about two-thirds of the original farm work-force. Most of them have been displaced, and have become destitute resulting in a humanitarian crisis. Much less than 5 per cent of the original workforce of about 300,000 have been provided land under the reform programme. However, it is not only the loss of jobs, regular incomes and livelihoods which the workers have suffered. Schools and health facilities on most acquired farms have been closed. Up to 100,000 primary school-children lost their education on closure of the schools. The new farmers who have taken over the farms tend to employ far fewer farm workers, and few have the resources to re-open school and health facilities.

As food shortages worsened during the course of 2002, the retrenched farm workers were in a desperate situation. A survey carried out in mid-2002 observed that they were in dire need of food because they no longer had any alternative source of income with which to sustain themselves (FCTZ, 2002). Previously, they sometimes had access to subsidised maize from commercial farmers, but this was discontinued with the latter’s evictions. Children of farm workers have become more vulnerable to under-nutrition because supplementary feeding schemes have come to an end. Furthermore, a number of analytical studies have criticised state xenophobia especially towards migrant workers. The state has ignored the plight of most farm workers ostensibly because some are descendants of migrant workers from Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia (Moyo et al. 2000; Sachikonye, 2001). This category of farm workers is estimated to form about 26 per cent of the farm worker population. Clearly, the land reform process has had differential outcomes; there have been beneficiaries but also victims as a result of its mode of implementation.

Finally, it is unlikely that the process will attain the objective of significantly relieving land pressure in the communal areas. The 300,000 households (from both rural and urban areas) that have been resettled represent about 1.5 million people, thus constituting about 10 per cent of the population. Although the proportion made up of communal area households is not immediately clear, this would still leave a considerable proportion of households subsisting in the overcrowded CAs. There have already emerged serious complaints from the communal areas especially in the three Mashonaland provinces about lack of access to resettlement, and absence of transparency in the land reform process itself (Daily News, 6 November 2002).
Moreover, the homes and property rights of families which have been resettled have been taken up by the landless and by an influx of people from urban areas who have become unemployed due to the economic downturn. Too much hope appears to have been placed on the objective of decongestion of CAs given the little investment that has been ploughed into them to date. While their population continues to grow, the CAs remain congested and under-invested with little prospect for growth.

Postscript & Conclusion

This article has traced the different phases through which the debate on Zimbabwe’s land question has been conducted. It highlighted Lionel Cliffe’s contribution to the development of this debate, particularly in the 1980s. As he retires from full-time academic life, he can look back with a mixture of satisfaction and disappointment as the analytical issues he tackled and synthesised are still at the centre of the debate, yet the fact that the agrarian question is still unresolved is the source of great concern. Moreover, the current methods employed to tackle the agrarian question have been more draconian and chaotic than anybody foresaw in the mid-1980s when Cliffe carried out his field studies.

In sum, there have been two broad positions on how the land question should be resolved. The official ‘statist’ position has emphasised the need for land redistribution through acquisition of large-scale commercial farms for resettlement. However, the focus on numbers of those resettled or needing resettlement, both in the 1980s and in the current phase, has obscured other vital dimensions such as infrastructure and service support to make the reform sustainable. While constitutional and financial constraints hampered comprehensive resettlement during the first two decades of independence, at least a limited attempt was made to provide that necessary support. On the other hand, while the constraints on land acquisition in the current phase have been largely removed, if in draconian fashion, it is uncertain whether the necessary infrastructure and service support will be made available to the resettled households thus putting the reform’s sustainability into question. Furthermore, this statist approach has been less sensitive to issues of social differentiation, and therefore selection of beneficiaries, and to issues of equity particularly in relation to the interests of the poor, women and farm workers. The statist position has also been ambiguous on how the congested CAs can be resuscitated developmentally. Often the impression given has been that resettlement is a panacea, and that acquisition of large-scale commercial farms will finally resolve the land question. It will not be as simple as has been implied.

The second broad position has recognised that while no land reform could be accomplished without a central role played by the state, it has counseled that other issues, in addition to land acquisition, are also important. These include processes of social differentiation to the extent that better-off peasants and emergent agrarian bourgeoisie tend to monopolise access to the benefits of reform to the detriment of the poor and landless. Other issues relate to transparency in how land and support services are distributed, and the levels of participation ‘from below’ in the reform process itself. Equity and citizenship issues are not ignored in this perspective, which recognises the importance of safeguarding the interests of vulnerable groups that tend to be marginalised in land reform. Finally, this second position views the land question as indeed part of a broader agrarian question in Zimbabwe which is about the relationship between urban and rural areas, and between industry and agriculture. This broader agrarian question still needs to be defined and addressed. For now, however, it is quite clear there have been significant, if not irreversible,
changes in the ownership and control of land in the period 2000-2002. The impact of these changes on social relations in agriculture will be profound. None of the protagonists – the commercial white farmers, the Zimbabwe and British governments – comes out clean on this land issue. For many years to come, it will be debated whether the outcome could have been different if the commercial farmers and the British government had been more accommodating, proactive and far-sighted, and the Zimbabwe government more consistent, prudent and transparent.

Be that as it may, about 90 per cent of white commercial farmers have now had their farms acquired by the state. Over 400 of them have left the country, while more than 3,200 have relocated to the towns and cities (Financial Gazette, 17 October 2002). However, their compensation claims, which are quite financially significant, remain to be met. As we observed above, more than 150,000 farm workers are conservatively estimated to have lost their livelihoods, and the wider economic implications of land reform will not be fully clear for some time. Nevertheless, preliminary forecasts suggest that the contribution of agriculture to GDP and foreign exchange earnings will decline significantly in the 2002-2003 season. Commercial agriculture contributed US$765 million in exports in 2001, representing about 38 per cent of Zimbabwe’s total exports. There will be significant declines in the production of tobacco, soya beans, maize and wheat from this sector in 2002-2003. This should be viewed against the background of an economy which has contracted by 7 per cent in GDP in 2002, and in which inflation is about 200 per cent, and in which there is a mounting debt burden. With unemployment estimated at between 60 and 70 per cent, outward migration due to economic hardship has involved up to 1.5 million Zimbabweans (or nearly 10 per cent of the population) leaving for ‘greener pastures’ in South Africa and the West in the past five years (Matlosa, 2002). The immediate prospects of a recovery therefore appear dim.

While land reform was ostensibly aimed at wider distribution of an important economic resource, the process itself was both opaque and chaotic. Extensive patronage was rampant leading to the ruling elite getting more favourable access to land, and in some instances resulting in ownership of multiple farms by individuals. This scramble for land was another indication of the predatory tendencies of the elite, some of whose members were already tainted by corruption scandals (such as the War Victims Compensation Fund in the 1990s), and by military and economic adventures in the DRC (UN, 2002). If it had been properly carried out, land reform would have provided a positive opportunity for a central developmental mission rather than a predatory role to the state. While land reform provided a short-term electoral advantage to the Zanu-PF government, its long-term sustainability, without requisite domestic and external resources, hangs in the balance. The situation needs to be retrieved. It would be unfortunate if Southern Africa’s one-time bread-basket degenerates into ‘a basket case’.

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Endnotes

1. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Conference on ‘Peasants, Liberation and Socialism’ organised by the Leeds University Centre for African Studies, in May 2002 in honour of Lionel Cliffe on his retirement.

2. A slogan used by Zanu-PF over and over again in its 2000 election campaign.
3. The A1 model provides for the decongestion of Communal Areas (CAs) and for farms that are relatively small but adequate to sustain a family as well as produce a surplus. They can be of two types: villagised or self-contained. On the other hand, the A2 model is aimed at providing commercial farms to applicants with experience in agriculture, preferably those who would have been trained as master farmers. Applicants also need to show evidence of access to enough capital to develop the farms into viable units. In addition, they need to demonstrate the ability to repay the cost of the farm as determined by the government (UNDP, 2002). Successful applicants receive 99-year leases with the option to purchase.

Bibliography


Rural Cooperation & the Renewal of Rural Socialism in Africa

Peter Lawrence

This article examines the debates over the role of co-operatives in the building of socialism and more generally their possible role as important organisations for boosting production and creating opportunities for collective decision making in capitalist and transition economies. It does so by putting centre stage the benefits of rural co-operation as well as the historical pitfalls. It stresses the opportunity for cooperatives to boost the democratic imperative for socialist development even at a time of neo-liberal ascendency.

Producer cooperation has long been regarded as a critical building-block of socialist development, closely linked as it is to the idea of collective decision-making by a labour force which controls the means of production. The ‘forced collectivist’ model of rural cooperation exemplified by the Soviet experience, with its ‘statist’ overtones, gave way to the Chinese version – an apparently ‘bottom-up’ approach – more popular with the peasantry. A further variant of rural socialism, best represented by Tanzania’s Ujamaa, attracted socialists from around the world especially because it appeared to offer something different from the state or social democratic ‘socialisms’ on offer up to that time.¹ The Tanzanian version appeared to present a mix of traditional socialist beliefs – the importance of control over the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy – with a degree of participation from below, especially in the rural areas where most of the population lived and made their livelihoods. The rural socialism of Nyerere’s Ujamaa suggested a break with the top-down collectivisation of state socialism. People themselves were to be enabled to build producer co-operatives from the bottom up, building on the egalitarianism and ethic of communal land holding that Nyerere held existed in traditional villages (Nyerere, 1968a; 1968b).

Thirty-five years on, many of the attempts at rural socialism have ended in failure. In both developing and ‘transitional’ economies, the predominant ideology of liberal economics has pushed agricultural sector policy in the direction of re-privatising the state-owned farms and estates, establishing private property rights to previously collectively farmed land, encouraging the commercialisation of independent small-holder farmers and promoting the further development of contract farming. In the current climate, talking of the possibilities for socialism through rural co-operation might appear particularly utopian. However, it is argued here that it is important to take another look at rural cooperation, particularly in the light of the contemporary shift to de-collectivisation, and suggest a different, and more optimistic, conclusion from the events of the last 10-15 years as they have affected the rural sector in Africa and elsewhere.

I start by considering the prospects for rural co-operation from the standpoint taken by Lionel Cliffe in the early period of Ujamaa and running through his work on rural
Building on What Exists

If there is an invisible line running through Cliffe’s work from the late 1960s through to the present, it is the advocacy of a combination of land reform with elements of co-operation which build on what has previously existed and been experienced. Writing with Luttrell and Moore in 1971, Cliffe argued that one of the bases for developing socialist production relations in the Lushoto district of Tanzania was the traditional system of labour exchange (Cliffe et al. 1975). Writing 17 years later on Zimbabwe, Cliffe (1988) argues much the same principle for building cooperatives in Zimbabwe – arguing for settlement schemes to entail the kind of co-operation in smaller groups with which farmers have some familiarity, rather than working collectively in ‘large-scale, technologically complex farming’ of which they have little knowledge, let alone experience. Again, 12 years after that, writing on land reform in South Africa:

... any kind of cooperative or collective organisation of production is notoriously complex and difficult to introduce and maintain – desirable though such aims may be in terms of equity and social cohesion. Such challenges and difficulties are compounded in circumstances where the members of the group are moving on to new land, where there is limited sense of community, and where the only types of farms with which they are likely to be familiar are those of the individual family plot or the authoritative management of a capitalist farm, rather than any form of a self-managed activity (Cliffe, 2000:282).

There is a great deal of evidence to support a picture of forms of co-operation among small-scale agricultural producers in developing countries. The co-operative labour exchange parties of Lushoto referred to above are but one element of such mutuality. Other elements in that Lushoto case concerned the co-operative construction of private houses, schools, dispensaries and roads and the collective holding of land for grazing, though this latter was in the process of disappearing with the onset of land shortage (Cliffe, et al. 1975)

In most developing countries, there is considerable co-operation in the provision of credit. Poor small farmers cannot borrow from formal financial institutions, so they borrow from each other, whether for productive or consumption expenditure (Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998; Udry, 1994). Sometimes forms of co-operation are effectively forced on smallholders. For example, group lending is increasingly common. The borrower group effectively acts as collateral through the peer monitoring of its members. If one reneges on the contract, the lender will not lend to anyone in the group again. There is some debate about whether these schemes work effectively, but they do make co-operation an incentive (Wenner, 1995). There is a further question of whether these informal cooperative arrangements in finance
outlive financial liberalisation, as formal lending expands (Besley, 1995; Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998).

The exchange arrangements are based on reciprocity enforced by peer pressure and widely held information about these exchanges. These are not simultaneous exchanges, but ones involving an implicit contract. There is always the possibility of non-reciprocity. But there is a strong incentive to reciprocate where failure to do so means withdrawal of further reciprocal contracts in the future. Such withdrawal will not only be from the person who has been defaulted, but also from others who, as a result of local information, will know not to engage with the defaulter (Ligon et al. 2000).

It would be mistaken to believe that because these forms of co-operation and collective action exist, that producer co-operation is still on the agenda. It is true that there are examples of continuing producer co-operation in countries which do not have a commitment to collective, let alone socialist, solutions, as for example in Côte d’Ivoire (Woods, 1999). Indeed what is most evident in the literature is the gradual shift over a long period from communally organised production systems with strong mutuality towards a more competitive individualistic organisation of production. Yet what is also evident is an increasing fragmentation of land, even, or especially, in areas of land consolidation (Livingstone, 1986). Much of the argument about the sustainability of very small landholdings revolves around technical issues to do with diseconomies of scale and the impossibility of introducing an efficient mechanised agriculture. Pooling land holdings as a co-operative solution to this technical problem has potential gains for all participants.

Yet much of contemporary policy pushes smallholder agriculture with clear property rights to encourage investment and ‘modernisation’ of production. The model is a classical capitalist one in which farmers compete in the increasingly global agricultural markets. Farms become larger and totally commercial. The successful grow, while the remaining small farmers presumably either subcontract or go out of business. The other approach is to see fragmentation as sustainable and as a way of keeping the rural populations in gainful activity (Livingstone, 1986). And a third approach is to accept part of the latter strategy but encourage forms of cooperation as a means for those farmers to increase productivity and incomes.

One important issue so far ignored in this discussion is class formation. Nyerere’s Socialism and Rural Development explicitly refers to the development of capitalist production relations in parts of the country stemming from the ‘widespread introduction of cash crop farming’. He argued that ‘the small-scale capitalist agriculture we now have is not really a danger’. Yet very early on in the academic analysis of ujamaa villages, class differentiation within villages was clearly identified (Awiti, 1975; von Freyhold, 1979). Its most apparent manifestation was in the difference in farm size, farm incomes, and employment of permanent and casual labour by rich, implicitly capitalist, farmers. A second manifestation was in the political power within ujamaa villages held by the richer farmers. Other accounts noted the ways in which such farmers formed villages in order to maintain their control over land and labour. The top-down, bureaucratic approach to rural co-operation requires results. If these results involve turning a blind eye to such distortions of co-operation, then it is hardly surprising that the process fails to deliver increased output and higher incomes for all participants. The alternative of expropriation of rich farmers’ property by the collective requires a political will which a political party with strong rich farmer participation is unlikely to have and where rich farmer resistance is likely to deter even those who see the nature of the
A bottom up approach, which mobilises the poorer farmers, is likely to be more successful, as in China, but is unlikely to be pursued by a party which is strongly influenced by rich farmer interests. It is also important to understand that allying the ‘poor and middle peasants’ against the rich does not mean that the former are happy to pool their land. Farmers’ attachment to their piece of land should not be underestimated, which is why incorporating substantial household plots in the collective organisation is such an important element of success.

Building on what exists is building from below and supporting these forms of cooperation, as farmers demand support rather than forcing support on them. This may also be an unrealistic strategy since the very bureaucrats who are charged with bringing such support to the rural areas may well be those who see the future in the richer more technically advanced farmers who are unlikely to form co-operatives and who may see them and the state support they might get as a threat to their positions. Clearly the principle of building on what exists is important. Practical implementation will vary and will depend on outcomes of political struggle between rural classes for the ear of the bureaucracy. This links to the issue of political competition in multi-partyism and the degree to which nascent co-operatives could pursue their objectives through a democratic political process in which their votes count. The decline of ‘vanguardist’ socialism with its leaders, hierarchy and discipline potentially facilitates this process.4

De-collectivisation: Keeping What Worked

It is instructive to read accounts of the demise of collective farms in the so-called transitional economies (Davis, 1997; Divila and Sokol, 1994; Kitching, 1998b; Pockney, 1994; Swain, 2000). Where collectives worked, their members have been slow to claim their share of the land. The collectives were integrated into a system in which they had state support and guaranteed markets. Their members were as ready to enter into private competitive farming, as independent peasants have been to enter collectives. Potential loss of security has dampened many farmers’ desire for the break-up of the collectives, although this differs from country to country and between regions in countries in part according to the relative success of collective farming. In Hungary for example, the collective system was designed to create a ‘symbiotic’ relationship between successful small private plots and successful collectives (Swain, 1985). Collectives sub-contracted to private plots and supplied them with necessary inputs, while their ability to do this depended on their success as a collective. So that individual members had an incentive to make the collective farm a success not least because they were further incentivised by the ability to sell their household produce directly to decontrolled markets. It is not surprising then, that the process of returning to private family farming is slow (Swain, 2000).

The symbiotic relationship which evolved in Hungary, was also a feature of Soviet collectivisation. What has been remarkable about the process of de-collectivisation has been the maintenance of the collective-private plot relationship by farmers whom we might have expected to want ‘their’ share of the land. The old collectives have been turned into joint stock companies with the former members as shareholders and the former management continuing to manage. Reading Kitching’s (1998a, 1998b) accounts of Russian de-collectivisation reveals one of the ironies of transition. Under the new system, collectives are increasingly sub-contracting to household plots labour-intensive activities where there are no economies of scale, while maintaining production and service activities where there are such economies. The irony is that this intensifies the decentralisation to household plots which was a feature of
experimentation under state socialism and which held out the prospect of a successful collectivist alternative to capitalist development. A further irony is that just as in the time of state socialism numerous ways were found to circumvent the rules and conduct organisational experiments, in the time of de-collectivisation various devices, including the setting up of a limited liability company quoted on the stock exchange, have been used to maintain as many as possible of the old forms of co-operation (Swain, 2000).

What these two accounts of de-collectivisation also reveal is that people who left the co-operatives, took their shares and decided to try farming alone, did not do as well as they were expected to do by those who argued for the break-up of the co-operatives into small-scale farms. Part of the reason, as Kitching suggests, might be that the post-socialist state, certainly in Russia, did not offer independent farmers the kind of support the co-operative members got on their private plots from the kolkhoz in its new or old form. The conclusion which can be drawn from these pioneering studies of de-collectivisation, is that co-operative members well understood the advantages of the old system and while they were happy to lose the socialist bathwater, they did not want to lose the co-operative baby.5

Begging the Question: Why Push Co-operation?

For socialists, co-operation has always been regarded as part of the process of developing collective decision-making by labour through its ownership and control over the means of production. Proposals for workers’ cooperatives and for labour-managed economies, as part of this process, have a long pedigree. As Estrin (1989:169) notes, these ideas are associated with nineteenth century utopian socialist thinking. Workers’ co-operatives satisfied the socialist goals of workers’ control over their own labour power, through democratic decision making over production, reducing alienation, humanising the workplace and producing a more egalitarian distribution of income (Estrin, 1989:171-2; Vanek, 1977:167; Putterman, 1986:3).

However, there are issues of incentives and motivation and of monitoring of performance. Consideration of these has usually led to the conclusion that output and productivity of such co-operatives is likely to be lower than under a hierarchical organisation found under capitalism where the output of the workers is monitored to ensure work discipline (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972:778; Putterman, 1986:21). While competition produces losers and winners, under co-operation, everyone is a winner if they play the game. After all, in game-theoretic economics, co-operation is usually the best strategy, but it requires commitment. Commitment to the welfare of the group may be a strong motivation in individual behaviour, and ideological commitment to the co-operative ideal might move individuals to behave more altruistically (Putterman, 1986:71). Co-operative members may well be prepared to be more flexible in their participation in work if they believe that through cooperation and control over their productive activity, they achieve greater security of employment (Estrin, 1989:171).

This gives two main motives for pushing co-operative solutions: first, an ideological one based upon the need for collective decision-making about commonly owned property. Secondly, a practical one: for groups of small agricultural producers, the development of capitalism is a slow process, and their ability to increase productivity is constrained by their lack of access to more technologically advanced solutions. The process of developing co-operative approaches to agricultural production may also result in a strengthening of a collectivist ideological base, which sees the possibilities of similar solutions in other sectors of the economy.
This will undoubtedly depend on context. Within a context of the dismantling of ‘socialist’ structures, as in Hungary, it is difficult to see the persistence of a co-operative as a joint stock company, as anything else than the development of capitalist enterprise, even if its members are shareholders. After all, there is nothing new about such ESOPs (Employee Share Ownership Schemes) and they figured highly in Hungarian ideas about enterprise transition.

Yet in the case of many sub-Saharan African countries, the pursuit of rural co-operation makes sense whether in countries with explicitly socialist strategies or not. In pre- and post-colonial Africa, rural co-operatives were promoted by very different political regimes. This existence of forms of cooperation within very different regimes continued after independence. Woods’s (1999) account of co-operatives in Côte d’Ivoire is instructive. He notes how the agricultural parastatals, specialising in the production of single export cash crops, sought to organise individual farmers into co-operatives as part of a relationship in which the farmers would adopt the techniques of production given by the parastatals and in return the latter would purchase the farmers’ crops. But to do this efficiently required grouping farmers into co-operatives. To do this was seen to be in line with a characterisation of rural villages as not being ‘structured around class divisions’ thus enabling the parastatals ‘to draw on traditional communitarian values such as reciprocity in getting peasants to join rural co-operatives’ (Woods, 1999:496-7). This is the kind of support, which characterised the role of the producer co-operatives of state socialism. Pooling land for the cultivation of crops which benefit from scale economies in mechanical and biological inputs, such as grain, while encouraging farmers to use their household plots to cultivate labour intensive crops and rear animals, is an obvious model. What is interesting about the Ivorian case is that the top-down approach to organising co-operatives did not work. According to Woods, this was because of ‘conflicts between ethnic, age and class groups’. In the aftermath of structural adjustment, the ‘retreat of the state’ has resulted in the loss of the monopoly power of the parastatals and the growth of independent producer associations, which see their role as ‘re-animating’ rural co-operatives, although as yet they do not have the resources to do so. The model may be ‘privatised’, but it is still co-operative.

Marshall and Roesch’s (1993) study of the Nampula ‘green zones’ in Mozambique again shows this paradox of moves to liberalisation resulting in more voluntary cooperation, This is more obviously a survival strategy, as compared with the top-down more forced-collectivist state socialist strategy that preceded it. Here the authors see possibilities for co-operatives as popular movements mitigating the effects of a shift towards capitalist development. There are obvious questions here. What happens as the economic situation improves and the need for a defensive coalition to survive the transition recedes? What does it mean to have the co-existence of rural co-operation within the framework of a capitalist economy? Can such cooperation, renewed in conditions of adversity act as a basis for a more popular-based movement for rural socialism?

Coexistence
De-collectivisation in the transitional economies is clearly seen by its proponents as part of the capitalist development of the countryside. The existence of rural co-operation, whether voluntary or under pressure from the state or private capital or both, clearly cannot be read as signifying a process of socialist development. While the new rural institutions are based on capitalist legal forms – e.g. joint stock companies, their internal organisation continues to resemble previous collectivist-
household plot structures in which the members, now shareholders, still ‘own’ the means of production, perhaps rather more closely than they did before. Of course, they are integrated into a capitalism that is both national and global but their internal organisation sends a different ideological message: co-operation can work. This co-operation may be a stage in the development of large scale rural capitalism in which the farm joint stock companies become listed on the stock market as corporate co-operatives, and the small shareholders sell their shareholdings to institutions and revert to a status of semi-agricultural proletariat which they became under the old regime. It may also be the location for the assertion of values that counter competitive capitalism. It may also be a holding stage while non-agricultural development draws large sections of the rural population into industrial and service employment, after which a true agricultural capitalism emerges.

**Conclusions**

It is clearly possible for democratically managed producer co-operatives to exist under capitalism, and for co-operatives under state or ‘actually-existing’ socialism to contain co-operatives which are far from democratically managed. Under whichever dominant mode of production, there is a role for rural producer co-operation in a process of agricultural development. There is a rationale for individual small farmers to join together in forms of co-operative activity alongside continuing private activity; for land reform schemes to incorporate the possibility of co-operation as part of a process of making those reforms viable; and for co-operative members undergoing ‘de-collectivisation or structural adjustment’ to re-group to gain the benefits of a democratic co-operative organisation. Much of this logic is economic. For sub-Saharan Africa, the agricultural sector is the major source of income and of export earnings. Co-operative solutions are still very much on the agenda as part of a ‘development’ process. For socialists there is also a political logic. Pursuing collective and democratic solutions that work is an important part of the process of persuading others that such solutions are more rational than ‘competitive’ capitalism. Making rural co-operation work could be a way (certainly not the only way) of influencing the course of that process in a socialist direction, an objective which has been at the root of Lionel Cliffe’s work, which this article celebrates.

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**Endnotes**

1. See for example Arrighi and Saul (1973) and Saul (1979), two collections of essays which span a decade of thinking on the course of African (and socialist African) development and the nature of socialist development.

2. See for example Bernstein (1998:14) on the South African case: ‘... the dominant tendency is to preserve (and expand) the most ‘efficient’ (‘progressive’) branches and enterprises of capitalist agriculture, and to appendage ‘emergent’ farmers to them ideally and in practice: tutelage and apprenticeship in effect’.

3. Deininger (1995) proposes individual rather than collective production as a solution for the transition economies, but cooperation in services such as credit, inputs and marketing, where there are economies of scale. He advocates competition between these ‘service cooperatives’ in order to increase efficiency, and he makes no suggestion that service cooperatives might form the basis for production co-operation.
4. I owe this very helpful point to John Saul.

5. It is interesting to compare these experiences of de-collectivisation with Bramall’s (1993) study of Chinese de-collectivisation. He finds that it did not account for the post-Maoist agricultural boom and that voluntary co-operation did not provide an effective substitute.

Bibliography


Land & Liberation in Eritrea: Reflecting on the work of Lionel Cliffe

Alemseged Tesfai

This article examines the contribution Lionel Cliffe has made to a characterisation of the war of liberation in Eritrea. It does so by looking at the specificity of the Eritrean case and the dimensions of the struggle for liberation including the military strategy of the EPLF and the strategy for land reform.

In an article written in the late 1980s, Lionel Cliffe identified some of the major characteristics that had distinguished the Eritrean liberation struggle from other similar movements at that time (Cliffe, 1988). It was these factors, I believe, that had attracted not only Cliffe, but also such scholars of distinction and international renown as Basil Davidson, the late Abdulrahman Mohammed Babu, Alain Fenet, Mary Dines, Francois Houtart and many others, to support the Eritrean cause and to help it gain the international exposure that had eluded it for so long.

The Eritrean liberation movement, especially after the emergence and eventual dominance of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), had been something of a maverick among the similar movements of the day. Unlike most African liberation struggles it was not fighting a European colonial power or a minority-dominated state like apartheid South Africa. Nor did the enemy fall into the ‘neo-colonial, repressive, puppet pattern of states’ as had existed in Vietnam, El Salvador and the Philippines (Cliffe, 1988:87).

Ethiopia was a black African state with historical economic and cultural claims over Eritrea and it mustered substantial Western support. Haile Selassie was a feudal monarch with considerable global prestige and substantial help from the US, including in his attempt to crush the Eritrean revolution. The sympathy and support, moreover, that Eritreans might have had from the Soviet Union, its allies in the Eastern Bloc and China during the Haile Selassie era, dwindled by the mid-1970s. It was at that time that the declared marxism of the Mengistu regime had won them over to the side of the Dergue. With the Eritrean revolution maintaining its own marxist line, it could not gain the type of US support that the contras in Latin America or Jonas Savimbi in Angola managed – and neither did it seek such support.

Although Cliffe recognised that the ability of the Eritrean revolution to sustain itself for so long without outside support was a major achievement, he also expressed some doubts about the benefits of its longevity (Cliffe, 1988:88). By the 1980s, the EPLF had developed the strategy of self-reliance to a level probably never achieved by any liberation movement before or since. Early on the movements needed to survive by snatching the enemy’s guns to use them to fight him with; this probably necessitated self-reliance. As time wore on, however, spontaneity gave way to the conscious and deliberate development of the principle, such that it became the distinguishing feature...
not only of the EPLF as an organisation, but also of its cadres. By the time Cliffe visited the liberated areas in 1983 to head a food assessment team it had turned into a beehive of activity working to sustain the strategy of self-reliance.

Cliffe’s slight misgivings about this strategy emanated from at least three observations. The fact that the EPLF could not hold the towns that it had liberated in the late 1970s because it could not counter or resist Ethiopian air bombardments worried him. If it was to proceed with the struggle for liberation it needed the anti-aircraft guns that were not available to it. Second, since by the early 1980s, the EPLF had withdrawn to the mountains of Sahel for positional warfare, he was concerned that this would lead to the professionalisation of the army and its eventual alienation from the people. Last, Cliffe saw in the EPLF’s building of strategic-training, logistics and administration centres, a reduction in the possibility for a negotiated and political solution (Cliffe, 1988:88-90).

But these were cautious remarks within a larger and more wholesome appraisal and appreciation of the effectiveness of the strategy itself. Cliffe was well aware of the historical events and reasons that had led to the split within the ELF and to the emergence of the EPLF. The earlier ELF’s division of its forces into religious and regional units had created disunity and havoc within its ranks. Some of these had gone on to form the future EPLF.

Cliffe, however, had no illusions that this task would be simple. He observed, for example, that the initial confinement of the ELF to the Western Lowlands of the country had led to ‘a definition of Eritrean nationalism that appealed only to the Islamic-Tigre speakers …’ but that this had later begun ‘to be transcended as people from other areas reacted to the indiscriminate reprisals the Ethiopians took against all elements of the population.’ This shift in or broadening of the power base was what had strengthened the EPLF, although it was to remain somewhat of a stranger in the ELF dominated areas of the Western Lowlands for quite a long time.

Along with others like David Pool and Jordan Gebre Medhin, Cliffe saw ‘the process of land reform promoted under EPLF auspices in the highlands as a decisive step in forging a genuine involvement by the peasants especially the poor and landless, in the broader struggle …’ (Cliffe, 1988:94-95). But that was in settled agricultural areas. The same rules, he implied, could not be expected to apply in the predominantly pastoral and agro-pastoral communities of the lowlands. Conscious of the fundamental differences in the systems of land tenure in both regions of the country – village (diesa) and extended family ownership (risti) in the highlands and state ownership (demaniale) in the lowlands – Cliffe was aware that uniform standards of land reform and social transformation could not be applied in both areas. Referring to the class-based land redistribution in some highland villages, he cautioned that it would be difficult to ‘conceive of an approach for egalitarian development among livestock herders’. He saw here, a potential basis for cleavages along the lines of religion that needed to be removed.

His fascination with the EPLF’s programme of land reform as a means of garnering the peasantry’s participation in their social transformation was unaffected. The EPLF was not seeking to replace the old system with one of its own making. The traditional tenure and redistribution laws and practices were to remain intact – the beneficiaries, however, were to change. Thus, land previously concentrated in the hands of a few endas or extended family units was redistributed to the communities. The process of redistribution itself followed the old traditional practice, thus ensuring that power was being transferred to the people.
Commenting on the EPLF’s statement and belief that ‘the task of organising the economic life of the masses must start from above and below simultaneously’, Cliffe noted:

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\text{It is such an interplay between a development dialogue, involving the Front and people's own organisations, and their mutual engagement in mobilisation to change the lot of the people and simultaneously to generate the widest support for the struggle, and the creative and sensitive approach to these tasks, that constitutes the uniqueness of the Eritrean revolution and also forms the platform for its several other achievements (Cliffe, 1988:102).}
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But this was half the story as it involved only the predominantly settled agricultural communities of the country. The differentiation of the peasantry in the pastoral lowlands was based not on land but on herd ownership, where the EPLF, ‘fought shy … of instituting some redistributive measures with regard to livestock’. However, Cliffe argued that there would be a need at some point for the EPLF,

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\text{to take these pastoral and agro-pastoral societies seriously, not as examples of a more backward, ‘nomadic’ life style but as having an arguably more adaptable system of coping with arid environment, and to work out a strategy for development that makes economic and environmental sense in these areas but that does get the class equation right. How to build on the poorer peasants who depend on livestock while not completely alienating the richer herders is one of the more crucial future tasks of the Eritrean revolution (Cliffe, 1988:103).}
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And Now …

Much has happened since Cliffe wrote the above article over fifteen years ago. Yet much of Cliffe’s cautionary observations remain pertinent. With the benefit of hindsight and some of Cliffe’s more recent thoughts on Eritrea, it is possible to briefly comment on his past perceptions.

Although Cliffe was a great admirer of the EPLF’s military prowess, ingenuity and resilience, he probably placed too much emphasis on Ethiopia’s air and technological superiority over the EPLF to the extent of worrying about the Front’s ability to step out of its trenches, recapture towns and maintain them until independence. In fact, the same year that the book in which his article was published, 1988, the EPLF divisions left their trenches in Sahel to completely annihilate the strongest and most entrenched of Ethiopia’s three major frontlines. Thus, the EPLF scored, what Basil Davidson described in a BBC interview as one of the greatest victories by a liberation front anywhere in the world since Dien Bien Phu. It happened that Davidson was visiting the EPLF base areas at the time.

There were two reasons, I think, that were responsible for the neutralisation of Ethiopia’s air superiority. First, the perception had grown, especially among Eritrean combatants, that fighter planes were, at best, a deterrent to daylight movement that caused some damage some of the time. Yet even that ‘deterrence’ proved more psychological than actual, eventually warplanes were discounted as decisive factors in the outcome of major battlefield confrontations. True, by then, trench and underground shelter security had been greatly improved and there was some upgrading in the air defence system of the people’s army. But this had not been of such a level as to make any significant dent in Ethiopia’s air superiority. Afabet and Massawa, from its liberation in February 1990, and other such towns and their people suffered constant harassment and significant loss of life from air attacks but even the
civilian population learned to live and persevere through the ordeals until total liberation in 1991.

The second factor was the ineptness, in this regard, of the Ethiopian air force. They simply never really made full use of their obvious advantage, even with the active support they were accorded by Soviet, East European and even South Yemeni pilots. Puzzling instances abound where the Ethiopian air force would fail to take opportunities that sometimes exposed the Eritrean army to positions of defencelessness. Such an instance, for example, is the massive and exposed EPLF troop withdrawal from Barentu, a town in the west to the base areas of Sahel in 1985, a trek that took over a week to clear men and materiel out of harm’s way.

Reflecting further on Cliffe’s cautionary note regarding the EPLF’s strategy for liberation is a second military point. This is the view he expressed that positional warfare would professionalise the army and alienate it from the people. This was, I think, a valid observation but not from the point of view of the professionalisation of the army. Even today, over eleven years into independence, the Eritrean army can hardly be classified as professional. This is because it still consists, in most leadership positions, of former liberation fighters who have not really changed their old ways. The army also still retains a majority of young draftees into the national military service that await demobilisation. The mind-set of professionalism amongst Eritrean soldiers may yet be long in coming.

EPLF tradition had always had a negative attitude towards national armies, which it had seen as agents of repressive regimes, such as those of Haile Selassie and Mengistu. They were always depicted as causeless, brutal and the antithesis of the liberation fighter, who stood for people’s rights and salvation. It was a genuine feeling, genuinely preached to and accepted by every recruit into the EPLF. With the long withdrawal of the EPLF into the mountains of Sahel, the picture of a besieged and helpless population waiting to be salvaged by its sons and daughters may have settled inside the mentality of every combatant and, along with it, the feeling or the attitude that he or she knew best for the country and the people.

This development is, of course, the inevitable consequence or product of liberation fronts that win. Presumably, the longer and the more protracted the struggle the more entrenched the attitude. A population that is thankful to its liberator is often ready to submit to his or her direction. The problem always arises when the people begin to assert their views and to pose them as the alternatives to the existing line. For this reason, Cliffe’s word of concern remains valid.

The third and final point that I want to comment on deals with the central importance that Cliffe had given to land reform as a means of harnessing popular support for the EPLF and as an important element in enhancing the unity of Eritrean society. Cliffe had high hopes about the EPLF’s attempts to find a solution to the difficult problem of land reform. In 1994, the Land Commission of Eritrea hired Lionel Cliffe and Issa Shivji, who had just chaired a national land commission in Tanzania, as short-term consultants. Their findings were probably far removed from what had fascinated Cliffe in the 1980s. In its long dealings with the population and with land matters, the EPLF was concluding that only a radical shake-up of the traditional system could solve the explosive problems that it had been harbouring. After the Ethiopian Dergue’s reforms of the late 1980s, land ownership in the highlands had divested to the various villages whose members were supposed to recycle their plots through redistribution by lot, at fixed periods of not less than seven years. Although this had
its roots in the old diesa system, it had been considerably altered. To accommodate villages with smaller land, the Dergue had merged the land of adjoining villages, thus removing some age-old borders. In other, older diesa areas, the formerly mandatory redistributions had long stopped with the result that those in possession were becoming virtual owners blocking new ones from their rightful claims. The system thus lacked coherence and consistency.

A more important problem for the EPLF was the dichotomy in the system of ownership in the highlands and the lowlands. In the former, village or extended family ownership was a state-recognised traditional right. On the contrary, following an Italian decree of over a century ago, all land below 1,500 metres had become state owned, the demaniale. To the Front, this was manifestly unfair and called for rectification and standardisation. Other more classical problems such as landlessness, fragmentation and parcellisation of holdings, endless land litigation on trespassing, village and plot borders were also motives for seeking a more radical change.

In 1992, the EPLF Central Committee, which also acted at the time as the national assembly, passed a directive that declared all land in Eritrea state-owned. It announced the formation of a Land Commission, which was to draft a land proclamation based on a study of the Eritrean land tenure system. In February 1994, the Land Commission presented its findings and a draft proclamation to the Third Congress of the EPLF. It was to become the law of the land in August 1994.

The Proclamation declared all land state-owned but retained the traditional rights of citizens to access land in the form of usufruct rights in perpetuity, as opposed to ownership in perpetuity or permanent access in the form of periodic redistributions. Holders of such rights of usufruct, according to the new law, are permitted to lease their land, but land sales are prohibited. Women are entitled to equal access both to agricultural land and to a plot in one’s own village for the purposes of building a dwelling home.Usufruct rights are also inheritable. Since land belongs to the state, village ownership and, therefore, village boundaries are no longer recognised, although villages are allowed to retain their traditional grazing, water and other such rights. The same law applies to pastoral and agro-pastoral areas with the provision that pastoralists maintain their traditional grazing rights unless expressly stated otherwise by law.

Cliffe’s reaction to this legislation was, of course, predictable. As a far cry from the old attempts that had captured his imagination, the proclamation failed to impress both him and Issa Shivji. They were of the opinion that the traditional tenure system was rational and should have been retained. The idea of state-ownership, therefore, did not go well with them, both in principle and for the complex administrative problems of implementation that they thought the government would be unlikely to handle efficiently.

Second, they found the idea of doing away with village borders highly objectionable. They saw the village as the most important social element of national political and economic coherence. They were also skeptical about the alterations envisaged regarding the fragmentation and parcellisation or fragmentation of individual holdings. They maintained, on the contrary, that the practice had developed as much in response to fairness in distribution as coping with ecological changes and fluctuations. They also preferred to see land conflicts settled by traditional means of resolution and not in courts of law. Cliffe’s major misgiving about the Proclamation related to the conditions of the pastoral population. The draft proclamation, he felt,
made only a passing mention of that important sector and, consistent with his earlier concern, he intimated that such a handling of the matter would not bode well for future developments.

Almost eight years after becoming law, Land Proclamation 58/1998 is still only partially in use. The traditional rights to plots for dwelling houses are being distributed more or less in accordance with traditional rules and practices. However, the dieza system still operates in the highland areas where it is predominant, albeit without the attendant periodic redistribution. In a few areas, informal redistribution of agricultural holdings have been put into effect by some of the more active administrators. Apart from this, the old system remains intact in the highlands. Nothing substantial has also happened to effect the changes that had been perceived as essential to bridging the gap between the land tenure systems of the highlands and the lowlands of Eritrea. The idea of instituting a regime of access to land through a system of rights of usufruct in perpetuity has thus not yet occurred.

Various reasons, including the last war with Ethiopia, are often sited as the chief cause for the delays in the full implementation of the Land Proclamation. Cliffe would probably welcome such delay as he will probably see a chance here for the government to review the law.

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Bibliography


Democracy in Southern Africa: Moving Beyond a Difficult Legacy

Roger Southall

The peace dividend in southern Africa may serve to underpin NEPAD’s bid for economic growth and development. However, it is by no means so clear that the region is embarked upon an unambiguous progression towards the consolidation of democracy. Indeed, there are deeply worrying indications that the democratic wave which broke upon the region’s shores in the 1990s is now moving into reverse. Most particularly, it can be argued that a developing crisis of democracy in southern Africa is characterised by first, an increasingly explicit clash between an authoritarian culture of national liberation and participatory democracy; and second, by a closely related model of state power which, even if obscured under democratic garb, entrenches elites and promotes highly unequal patterns of accumulation and anti-development. It is therefore necessary to move forward to a more advanced conception of democracy which links liberal democratic rights to conditions which combine increased political participation with greater social and economic equality.

The winding down of the wars in Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), together with the launch of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), are touted by certain leading politicians as providing a platform for the continent, and more specifically, the southern African region, to make a ‘great leap forward’ both politically and economically. Indeed, it is a central tenet of NEPAD that there is not only a new vision and determination amongst African leaders to extricate their countries from impoverishment and exclusion from the fruits of the globalising world, but also that the African peoples have now arrived at a point where they will no longer tolerate poor leadership. NEPAD therefore declares the promotion of democracy and human rights as one of its principal aims, and has linked this to promises of the creation of an African Peer Review Mechanism which, under certain conditions, will measure governments’ performance against clear standards of accountability, transparency and participative governance. Emboldened by Africa’s new commitment to universal standards of good government, international investors will be encouraged to respond positively to Africa’s desperate need for investment capital, thereby boosting growth and enabling the continent to launch a new, massive and determined assault upon the poverty of its peoples.

However, if NEPAD’s goals of democracy and development are to be realised, it may well be that that will eventuate in spite of, rather than because of, the behaviour of the elites who are formally proposing them.
Liberation against Democracy?

The post-Second World War struggles for national liberation, which swept away colonial empires throughout Asia and Africa, was one of the most dramatic developments of the Twentieth Century. These struggles took numerous different forms, yet they were all characterised by the rejection of racism and imperialism, and the demands of previously nationally oppressed peoples for sovereign equality with the colonial powers. The outcome has been the world we know today: a world-system which is composed of formally equal, sovereign states, yet which is simultaneously characterised by dramatic disparities in power and wealth both between states (most notably, North versus South) and within states (not least those now free of direct colonial bondage). In other words, in so far as national liberation struggle was a struggle for the democratic equality of people, as opposed to the democratic equality of peoples, it is as yet dramatically unrealised. As has been pointed out by a pantheon of radical scholars and activists, much of the responsibility for this incomplete revolution lies with the workings of the global political economy which, especially following the collapse of the USSR and the state-directed socialism it propagated, has fostered increasing economic inequality (and indeed, is presently sucking more capital out of Africa than it is putting back in). Yet part of the responsibility, at least in southern Africa, appears to lie with the logic of national liberation struggle itself, for that logic appears reluctant (or unable) to engage with democracy, whose own logic it has subsumed. Or in other words, once having attained national independence, the inexorable logic of national liberation seems to be to suppress rather than to liberate democracy.

In broad terms, the national liberation struggle in southern Africa took place in two waves. First, nationalist movements fighting against colonialism gained relatively easy successes in those parts of the sub-continent which, given the post-war decision to abandon the 'burden of empire', were given away by Britain without much of a fight. These were overwhelmingly non-settler territories, of limited economic value, where in any case the metropolitan power was confident of being able to reap continued benefits through strategic investments, largely (although by no means exclusively) in mining and agriculture. Not surprisingly, in retrospect, although they cultivated many heroic myths necessary to nation-building, the nationalist movements concerned were undeveloped in the sense that their relatively easy conquest of state power opened them up to post-colonial domination by individual leaders (Kaunda, Banda) who, when faced by the eruption of social contradictions or conflicts which had been contained by anti-colonial struggle, resorted to imposition of an artificial national unity via declaration of the one-party state. However, precisely because the national movements in such countries had never really been required to develop much muscle in their struggle against colonialism (in the form of organisational discipline or ideological coherence), they were to prove susceptible in the long term to erosion from below, most particularly because the state-directed economics they cultivated ran foul of international capital. Subsequently, the remedies of structural adjustment, pushed by international creditors from the early 1980s, proceeded to accentuate internal crises of production and unemployment, thereby provoking internal opposition and calls for the restoration of multi-party democracy. The first wave of nationalist movements therefore eventually fell victim to their own contradictions and inadequacies, upon which somewhat fragile structures of democracy ('free' elections, multi-partyism and individual liberties) have been erected since the early 1990s.
It was in the second wave of national liberation struggle, directed against a colonial power reluctant to depart (Portugal) and settler dominated political economies which claimed (Rhodesia) or enjoyed (South Africa) political independence, in which – because much greater determination was involved, not least in the form of armed struggle – that the authoritarian logic of the phenomenon came to greater fruition. This will be explored in particular relation to developments in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. It will be argued that where the authoritarian logic of the liberation movement has been enabled to become wholly dominant, it has had potentially or in reality drastic results, as demonstrated by the present unfolding of the historic tragedy of Zimbabwe. In contrast, where this logic has had to, or is presently engaged with, a struggle for hegemony with counteracting forces of liberal as well as participatory democracy, as in South Africa (and to a lesser extent in Namibia), the outcome (i.e. authoritarianism or democracy) remains in the balance. What is this logic of national liberation struggle, in which the baneful appears in the long run to overcome the benign? I would argue that it is made up of the following key elements:

**Emphasis upon ‘The Nation is One’**

It is a commonplace that the colonial powers carved Africa up into arbitrary units which combined and divided disparate peoples, and which restructured relations of inequality between them, to the relative advantage of some ‘tribes’ and to the detriment of others. The anti-colonial movements were therefore faced by the challenge of forging nations out of diversity and uneven development, a task rendered even more difficult where colonialism had imported immigrants from other continents and had arranged them in a hierarchy of racial advantage and oppression. Not surprisingly, therefore, precisely because it was a key strategy of colonialism and apartheid to *divide and rule*, the national liberation movements’ response was to argue the ‘oneness’ of the ‘oppressed nation’ which was struggling for liberation. Yet, as much as struggling to *liberate* their ‘nations’, national liberation movements were struggling to *create* them. It was in this context that historic or structural differences between diverse peoples and races were suppressed, a context which also inexorably simultaneously reinforced patriarchy by denying the significance of inequalities of gender. Of course, even though the liberation struggle demanded the forging of a national(ist) myth (the creation, for instance, of a Zimbabwean ‘people’ where there had been none before), the reality on the ground of uneven development and racial hierarchy could not but intrude, in a form or forms which dangerously threatened any notion of a monolithic national unity or which demanded major ideological ingenuity (or contortions) to maintain one.

On the one hand, for instance, the emergence of two rival nationalist movements in the then Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), rooted amongst the minority Matabele, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), rooted amongst the more numerous Shona, were to engage in a struggle for nationalist hegemony. This resulted successively in a pre-independence alliance, the ZANU dominated Patriotic Front (PF), forged in 1978, to create a united force which could push for victory against the settler regime; the decision of ZANU to fight the pre-independence election of 1980 separately as ZANU-PF; the post-electoral formation of a government of national unity, in which ZAPU (and the settler party, the Rhodesian Front) served as junior partners to ZANU-PF; the subsequent dissolution of ZANU(PF)-ZAPU unity in 1982 and the former’s deployment of the by now ZANU-PF dominated national army (backed by North Korea) against so-called ‘western dissidents’ in a brutal campaign in which up to 20,000 people were killed; and
subsequently, ZAPU’s effective admission of defeat and its signing of a unity accord in 1987 prior to its agreeing to dissolve itself into the ruling party in 1989.

On the other hand, in South Africa, where the idea of ‘African nationalism’ was rendered considerably more problematic by that country’s pre-existing constitutional independence and more so by the greater demographic presence of three ‘racial’ minorities (whites, Coloureds and Indians, the latter two of which were – like Africans – racially oppressed), and where there was no dominant African ‘tribe’ or group, national liberation struggle as waged by the African National Congress (ANC) revolved around the construction of an ideology and practice of ‘non-racialism’. However, although this was a construct forged around universalist values which assumed racial equality (in contrast to the racial inequality which was explicitly fostered by apartheid), it simultaneously allowed for a de facto racial coalition founded upon an African domination which was guaranteed by sheer weight of demography. Most certainly, the sensitivity of the ANC to the need to respect racial and cultural diversities if individual rights are to be respected and domestic peace maintained is one of the great achievements of the post-apartheid dispensation, and unlike Zimbabwe, there has been no hint of an attempt to move towards the creation of a one-party state, (if only because the existence of competitive multi-party democracy is one of post-apartheid South Africa’s strongest international selling points). Nonetheless, the triumph of non-racial democracy is compromised by at least two tendencies. The first is the clear desire of the ANC to centralise power, and to constitute South Africa into a dominant-party state under its own hegemony; and the second is the willingness of the dominant African hierarchy to exploit the racial ambiguities of post-apartheid South Africa, by playing the ‘race card’ whenever that might appear to be convenient, most notably when criticism of the government, as evinced by white-dominated opposition parties is dismissed – whatever its inherent merits - as ‘racist’ and intended to shore up continuing white privilege (Mare, 2001). Further dynamics and implications of this are explored below.

Of course, in the post-liberation context in former settler-dominated states, where key sectors of the economy remain dominated by a white minority (and to a lesser, although not insignificant extent by Indians), race becomes inextricably entangled by class. This offers the peculiar advantage that assaults upon continuing white economic and institutional power, invariably led by an emergent post-colonial black bourgeoisie, can be versed either in benign racial terms of ‘black empowerment’ as in contemporary South Africa, or in crudely xenophobic terms, as in contemporary Zimbabwe. Whilst there can be no questioning of the historical legitimacy and necessity for ‘leveling the playing fields’, the advantage of ‘racial liberation’ rhetoric is that it usually serves to obscure growing class divisions and inequalities amongst the formerly racially dominated. This is hugely facilitated by nationalist control over the state machinery.

The Capture of State Power:

Armed struggles waged by southern African liberation movements were directed at the wresting of state power from colonial and/or settler control, which was buttressed by both military and economic might, and indeed by international support from the major capitalist powers. Throughout the region, the liberation struggles were unequal, for although fought by and on behalf of the many against the few, they were also battles conducted by the weak against the strong. Of course, the odds were to be evened up to some extent by strategic and military support offered by the former Soviet Union (and other Eastern bloc countries, such as East Germany and of course ,
notably Cuba) to allied liberation movements (MPLA, Frelimo, ANC, SWAPO and ZAPU), yet both the political and military requirements of the confrontation enforced realisation of a culture of hierarchy, covert operation and discipline. Given the adoption of a socialist world view by the different liberation movements, and their resultant endorsement of national liberation struggle as simultaneous with yet preceding class struggle (in the sense that national struggles for democracy, fought by an alliance of differentially oppressed national classes, were seen as steps on the way to a succeeding struggle for the realisation of socialism), Leninist notions of vanguard leadership and democratic centralism predominated. In short, the formal equality of comradeship gave way not only to a functionally necessary hierarchy of leadership, but to endorsement of the latter as anointed by the unraveling of history and of the class struggle. What is important for the post-liberation phase therefore is not so much the extent to which such tendencies compressed, ignored and often denied ‘struggles within the struggle’, but that they promoted a culture in which opposition to established leadership and received theory was regarded as both illegitimate and reactionary. Ironically, therefore, there was a tendency for democracy (and its questioning of received truths) to be transmuted into anti-democracy.

These tendencies are demonstrated most dramatically through the construction of dominant party states. ‘National liberation’ struggle was directed at ‘nationalist’ capture of states which had previously been monopolised by ‘aliens’, whether colonial administrations or settlers. Colonial administrations were the more easily expelled, for on the whole – by the time that nationalist struggles had matured – they were ready to quit. Settler states were more complex, precisely because the settlers saw themselves as having no ‘home’ to go to, for indeed, they regarded where they were, in Africa, as their ‘home’. In effect, they disputed the monopoly of the liberation movements to represent ‘the nation’, claiming that they too were Namibians, Zimbabweans and South Africans. The concept of ‘nation’, they claimed, had to become wide and inclusive.

Triumphant national liberation movements did not attempt to dispute this claim, and all – initially, at least – embraced the idea of ‘reconciliation’, of opposed racial groups coming together to form coherent, cross-racial communities. This vision has come to be most widely celebrated in Bishop Desmond Tutu’s vision of South Africa as ‘the rainbow nation’, as composed of many colours. Yet the idea of reconciliation was based on conditions. The first was that to become part of the new nations, white settlers had to surrender racial privilege. The second was that they whilst they could continue to participate in politics, they would have to do so on terms dictated by the liberation movements. The third was they would have to concede and share economic power. Their moving into office after winning pre-independence/liberation elections was not the same as the liberation movements having captured state power, for the machinery of state (or at least, at its apex and intermediate levels) was still largely peopled by whites. The early years of liberation have therefore been characterised by what, in contemporary South Africa, has become colloquially referred to as ‘transformation’. Yet in practice, central to ‘transformation’, has been the triumph not so much of the nation as of the party over the state.

Today, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa are all ‘dominant party states’. In its most elemental form, a dominant party is a party which, by reason of its popular support and/or its control of state machinery, is able to reproduce itself in power by virtue of its winning successive elections. Yet commonly associated with party dominance are other phenomena, notably the fusion of party and state, and the denunciation of minorities who mobilize on issues vital to them and the delegitimisation
of opposition. The growth amongst power-holders of a ‘culture of entitlement’ to state
resources, and even to resources not owned by the state, is an inevitable result.

The demographic composition of ex-settler states is almost guaranteed to produce,
and indeed, reproduce early victories for liberation movements after they have
transformed themselves into political parties. SWAPO, for instance, has now won
three successive parliamentary elections, conducted under a proportional representa-
tion electoral system (PR), by progressively larger margins: 57.3 per cent of the vote in
the pre-independence elections of 1989, 72.7 per cent in 1994, and 76 per cent in 1999.
Similarly, the ANC – also competing under PR – won 62 per cent in the 1994 ‘liberation’ election and 66 per cent in the second general election held in 1999. Even
though some commentators propose that the ‘fairness’ of these elections has been
compromised by, for instance, a predisposition of supposedly ‘Independent’ Electoral
Commissions to favour the new ruling parties, and point out that these victories have
been obtained in conditions of declining voter turnout, no serious observer has yet
suggested that the overall popular legitimacy of either SWAPO or the ANC has yet
been compromised. The fundamental basis of the ‘dominance’ of both SWAPO and
the ANC remains the overwhelming majority support of the electorate. Not so,
however, in Zimbabwe, where – notoriously – ZANU-PF dominance is now
maintained only by widespread electoral fraud.

Elections in Zimbabwe are carried out under the first-past-the-post, Westminster
style, electoral system which, conveniently for ZANU-PF, tends to provide a more
seats for parties who win elections than they would be entitled to under PR (although
whites competed for a disproportionate number of 20 reserved seats in the first two
democratic elections of 1980 and 1985). ZANU-PF secured 63 per cent of the vote and
57 seats out of 80 in the ‘common roll’ ‘liberation’ elections of 1980, and 77 per cent of
the vote and 64 seats in 1985. Subsequently, having merged (or absorbed) ZAPU-PF
(which had won 24 per cent and 19 per cent of the popular African vote in 1980 and
1985 respectively) in 1989, ZANU-PF won 116 out of 120 elective parliamentary seats
in 1990 and 78 per cent of the votes and 118 elective seats in 1995. However, these
latter two victories were held in conditions of severely reduced voter registration
(only around 32 per cent of eligible voters participated in the election in 1995), and
were conducted under conditions which increasingly designed to reproduce ZANU-
PF hegemony. As noted by Jonathan Moyo (1992:145-46) with regard to the 1990
elections (before he jumped aboard Mugabe’s bandwagon to become his Minister of
Information before the 2000 election), not only had ZAPU-PF been cajoled and bullied
into joining ZANU-PF, but the delimitation of constituencies and administration of
the election systematically favoured the ruling party. Furthermore, just in case things
might have gone awry, constitutional reforms brought about before the election had
resulted in the creation of 30 non-elective nominated seats in parliament, appoint-
ment to which was in essence made by Mugabe. When, therefore, serious opposition
to ZANU-PF was to burgeon prior to the parliamentary elections of 2000 in the form
of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the scene was already set for an
unequal battle. And that battle was to made even more unequal by the deployment by
ZANU, unchecked by the state, of systematic violence against its competitors,
compound by political subjugation of the judiciary, intimidation of the independent
media, and not least, rigging of the elections. The reign of terror which has now
gripped much of Zimbabwe, following the shameless rigging of the 2002 presidential
election, now extends to what human rights workers are describing (at least in the
rural areas) as a ‘systematic political cleansing of the population’. This includes large
numbers of young girls being taken off to camps run by ZANU’s youth militia, and
subjected to rape and forced concubinage (Lamb, 2002; also Sachikonye, 2002).
ZANU-PF’s clinging to power represents an extreme case of a party which, having lost its popular hegemony, has had to resort to securing its electoral dominance through authoritarian and blatantly undemocratic means. At one level, this is manifestly because Mugabe and his cronies refuse to give up the material fruits of power (even if, ironically, their actions are shattering the capacity of the economy to produce the wealth on which they seek to thrive). Yet at another level, it is almost certainly the case that they simultaneously retain an ideological belief in ZANU-PF’s historical mission to liberate Zimbabwe from its legacy of colonial oppression. Indeed, Mugabe and ZANU-PF have increasingly come to identify their own continuity in power as embodying the security and integrity of the state. Because ZANU-PF purports to embody the nation, anyone or anything opposed to it is equally seen as opposing the nation, and becomes the enemy.

This syllogism is relatively easily maintained in the face of opposition to the regime from the white farming community, or the white community in general. They can be easily dismissed as aliens, as settlers, as ‘Rhodesians’ who have rejected the hand of friendship offered to them by black Zimbabweans, who have continued to cling to white power and privilege, and who look to Britain as the ex-colonial power to maintain imperial domination of the economy. Yet less easily dismissed are those black Zimbabweans who populate or support the MDC. Of necessity, their claim to majority support has to be utterly rejected by reference to ‘popular victories’ for ZANU-PF in both parliamentary and presidential elections. Yet rather more important even than that is the need to denounce them as disloyal, as in league with the white farmers and as a front for the British – in a word, as Un-Zimbabwean, as traitors to the nation. In chilling echo of the Khmer Rouge, Didymus Mutasa, ZANU-PF’s organisational secretary, declared, in regard to a country with 12 million people: ‘We would be better off with only six million people, with our own people who support the liberation struggle’ (Lamb, 2002). The struggle against the domestic opposition, (or rather ‘enemy’) has now become ‘The Third Chimurenga’.

There are rather too many similarities in Namibia for comfort. Although Lodge (2001:191) has noted the ‘awkward fit between the patriotic legitimacy and moral status assumed by former liberation movements and the more restrained entitlement usually claimed by political parties in liberal electioneering’, he argues that Namibia’s electoral politics appear to conform to a regional trajectory whereby victory by a dominant liberation movement in a founding election, characterised by high levels of voter participation, is followed by subsequent electoral contests which result in an enlarged majority for the ruling party, alongside an increasingly fragmented opposition and declining levels of voter participation. On the whole, discontented ruling party supporters do not change sides, but simply stay away from the polls. This kind of electoral trajectory, suggests Lodge (2001:226), is unlikely to change until there are major alterations in social structure and the composition of the economy (as would appear to have happened in Zimbabwe).

Even if SWAPO’s legitimacy is not yet being questioned by the sort of crisis which is confronting ZANU-PF, there are worrying indications of an inherent authoritarianism. This is demonstrated, for instance, by the party’s reluctance to engage with its own history, to ‘break down the wall of silence’ with regard to its past treatment (including torture) of various internal dissidents during the liberation struggle. Their demand to be heard, for their maltreatment to be acknowledged, has to be waged in an atmosphere of continuing fear, even though they do not constitute any sort of political threat. Yet even more worrying has been the centralisation of power within the Presidency, with Sam Nujoma not only having manipulated a change in the
independence constitution which enabled him to stand for a third stint in office in 1999, but also giving indications that he is fishing to stand for yet another, fourth term. (Most noticeably, he has dismissed Hage Geingob, his seasoned, highly regarded prime minister of twelve years and thereby a potential successor). Meanwhile, his admiration for Mugabe seems to know no bounds: he has echoed the latter’s rejection of the ‘good governance’ provisions of NEPAD as colonially inspired, he has threatened to arrest and deport homosexuals, and very recently, he has not only openly backed Mugabe’s land grab policy but has himself turned up the pressure upon Namibia’s own white farming community, threatening them with expropriation. To be sure, much of his rhetoric can be dismissed as bombast, yet he seems bent on creating the impression that SWAPO without him has no future and that only he can maintain national unity. (Flanagan, 2002; Maletsky, 2002).

Nor is there a sufficiently coherent, organised and united opposition to cause the ANC much serious discomfort in South Africa. There is no single party or combination of opposition parties which, at the present time, constitutes an electoral threat, for they are divided along grounds of race, culture and ideology, and many analysts suggest that a sea change in South African politics will only occur if and when there is break in the alliance between the ANC, the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and the formation by the latter elements of a new party of the left. Hence it is that the ANC has been able to embark upon a strategy of the centralisation of power which, increasingly, is muddying the distinction between party and state. Key elements of this strategy are: the strengthening of the institution and machinery of the presidency relative to other senior branches of the civil service; the ‘deployment’ of ANC appointees to most senior positions and high offices of state, and the regular ‘redeployment’ of ANC personnel between parliamentary and other public positions (this facilitated by the party list system which allows for the replacement of individual legislators without the inconvenience of by-elections); the erosion of parliamentary independence relative to government (notably via the subordination of the parliamentary committee system to party discipline); the assertion of central control over the provinces, notably by the ANC central hierarchy’s selection of its party’s provincial premiers; the contemporary effort to undermine parliamentary opposition via the passage of floor-crossing legislation; and, not least, the imposition of party discipline to muzzle internal party debate and criticisms. Critics also allege the ANC’s determination to erode the independence of the South African Broadcasting Corporation, and to render it as obsequious to government as it was under the formerly ruling National Party.

The debate about the consequences of the ANC’s status as a dominant party remains extremely divided, with on the one hand, doomsayers predicting that the country has embarked upon the path of post-colonial, African decline, the more optimistic continuing to propose that limits set by the constitution, the weight of business and civil society, and an alternative historical tradition of participatory democracy amongst the constituent elements which compose the contemporary party will allow space for democratic institutions and traditions of accountability to become entrenched. Or to put it another way: the optimistic scenario is based upon assumptions that it is the very complexity of the South African situation, and the fact that the democratic settlement was based upon the agreement to coexist and cooperate of countervailing forces which could not defeat each other, that will work to constrain the more authoritarian values and practices of the ANC in power. Most commentators agree that a key aspect of any such successful consolidation of democracy will be action taken in advance to avoid a reproduction of Zimbabwe’s deliberately racialised scenario.
The Elision of Race & Class

Lloyd Sachikonye (2002) divides Zimbabwe’s post colonial history into three phases. First, during the decade which followed independence in 1980, ZANU-PF consolidated its power through both ‘iron-fist’ measures (the suppression of dissidence in Matebeleland between 1982 and 1987) and the subsequent alliance with ZAPU-PF. Second, between 1990 and 1998, civil society organisations expanded in quantitative and qualitative terms on the back of the increase of working, middle and professional classes promoted by economic growth in the 1980s. However, although economic hardships increased, opposition parties remained largely moribund, even as the regime became increasingly authoritarian. Hence it was left to civil society groupings (trade unions, human rights and civil society organisations) to launch a series of general strikes and political campaigns around both economic and political grievances in 1997 and 1998 and to mobilise against a draft constitution (proposed by the regime) which left authoritarian powers of the presidency unchecked. The third period, after 1998, has been one in which tendencies towards even more increased authoritarianism (buttressed by the ‘war veterans’) and a creeping militarisation of politics have been resisted by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a major opposition party formed in 1999 and woven out of a broad coalition of social forces such as youth, students, trade unions, the middle classes and business. It is broad movement, dedicated to dislodging ZANU-PF from power, which only narrowly lost the 2000 parliamentary elections and was only ‘defeated’ in the 2002 presidential election because the regime was able to use its control of the administrative and coercive apparatuses of the state to secure victory for Mugabe.

It has been during the third phase that land has moved to the center-stage of Zimbabwean politics. Prior to the land invasions of early 2000, the rural population was composed of 4400 large scale farmers on 11.2 million hectares; 1 million families (6.5 million people) on 16 million hectares in the ‘communal areas’; 10 000 small scale commercial farms on 1.2 million hectares; 70,000 black resettlement families on 3.5 hectares; and a state farming sector of about 0.5 million hectares. Although land reform measures undertaken in the early 1980s were impressive, the government’s attention to the land question thereafter fell away until in 1997 it announced that 1,471 commercial farms would be acquired and resettled. But why then did the government thereafter scale down its demand to 350 farms by the end of 1998, and why by the end of 1999 had the government not taken or bought any?

As David Moore (2001) points out, the imperative for speedy ‘settlement’ of the land question in 2000 did not come from an aroused peasantry, but from the politics of a regime facing economic crisis, its loss of allies within civil society and its being forced into a corner by the ‘war veterans’. The War Veterans Association (WVA) was an interest group which had arisen in the early 1990s based upon dissatisfaction with a poorly implemented demobilisation programme carried out after independence, and which in 1995 had persuaded the state to issue larger pensions to war veterans than the 1980 settlement had allowed for. However, because disbursement of these allowances rapidly became entangled in all sorts of improprieties, the WVA in 1997 demanded payment (with the apparent support of the army). The result was a massive Z$4.5 billion pay out, which could only be financed by the rapid devaluation of the currency and the imposition of extra taxes which brought the regime (and the WVA) into immediate confrontation with capital, as with the urban working and middle classes. It was in this context, and also that of the added financial drain caused by the regime’s military involvement in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo on the side of President Kabila, that civil society took political form in the
shape of the foundation of the MDC. And it was after ZANU-PF’s defeat in the February 2002 referendum on the proposed new constitution that the regime ‘decided that the reserve army of the unemployed should become an army of land invaders’ (Moore, 2001:263). Hence it is that the majority of the veterans are drawn from unemployed youths in the cities; and indeed, Moore argues that the leading force behind the invasions is the army. The seizures of white land constitute a campaign of ‘primitive accumulation’ by the military and political members of ZANU-PF’s ruling coterie, and that rather than Africanising or socialising capitalist agrarian production, the land seizures seem to be installing a land-ownership system which, if anything, is going backwards historically by reproducing feudalism (or some other set of pre-capitalist relations) in which the war-veteran, land invaders are being drawn into vassal-like subordination to those who are being awarded the farms.

It is in this crisis-ridden, highly complex context that the rhetoric and actions of the regime have become racialised. The strategy of primitive accumulation, of keeping Mugabe’s principal military and political cronies (and the war veterans) on side in conditions of mounting economic and political crisis, demanded the immediate delegitimation of the white farming community as racist, of having rejected the politics of reconciliation extended to them after independence, as exploitative, and not least, of being in cahoots with a British government which retains imperialist designs. Hence it is, likewise, that the MDC is accused of aiding and abetting imperialism, of having sold out the liberation struggle and of having aligned itself with ‘the whites’ and the agendas of international capitalism. They have denied their birthright, and by implication, therefore thoroughly deserve any rough-house treatment that they get.

In any former settler colony, continuing racial inequities in ownership skewed in favour of a white minority are perpetually available as a cause for political mobilisation, on grounds of justice, equality or just plain jealousy. And unequal land ownership is peculiarly visible, as well as having particular association with white conquest and colonial exploitation, a connection which speaks readily to African nationalist sentiment. Hence the inherent instability of the land settlements at independence (or ‘liberation’), even if they are buttressed by ‘reconciliation’ rhetoric and ‘free seller-free buyer’ arrangements based upon legal recognition of land titles. As the Zimbabwe case illustrates, relative stability can be rapidly transformed by crises which have rather little to do with the land question as such. Hence the new feeling of vulnerability of the white farming community in Namibia, where some 30.5 million hectares are farmed by whites and only 2.2 million hectares by blacks. ‘The whites are being driven out’ one of the few white farmers to have sold out recently is reported to have said: ‘In 20 or 30 years’ time I don’t imagine there being any whites left in southern Africa’ (Flanagan, 2002). Whether exaggerated or not, such prophesies are likely to be self-fulfilling: the age profile of the white farming community is likely to increase as younger whites move out, and property prices are likely to move into relative decline. Not surprisingly, the Zimbabwe land-grab has given rise to urgent claims that land reform in South Africa, where the government’s present plan is to transfer one-third of all agricultural land held by white commercial farmers to black farmers by 2015 (Nxumalo, 2002), is moving too slowly. Unless swifter progress is made, it is often said, South Africa will render itself liable to Zimbabwe-style land grabs.

Even if the analogue is inaccurate, if only because it misses the point that it is the army rather than ‘the landless’ which has provided the motor power behind the land invasions in Zimbabwe, the fact remains that liberation movements are bound by
their credo to an agenda of redistribution, of righting historical wrongs. Yet they are simultaneously constrained by the nature of the post-colonial settlement, whereby black assumption of state power remains confronted by white control over the economy. In South Africa, of course, this dilemma is particularly acute, precisely because the continent’s most advanced industrial economy is dominated by powerful international companies, as well as South African corporations and finance houses. Some of these have already indicated their willingness to relocate operations overseas, supposedly to render themselves more internationally competitive, yet doubtless this is also to minimise the political risk of co-habiting with a former liberation movement, even one like the ANC which for the moment has embraced free market capitalism.

In this situation, the post-settlement ANC has had little choice but to make a virtue of gradualist ‘black empowerment’. A stilted, marxist rhetoric may still be de rigeur in party debate and publications, yet the class struggle it is waging is more likely to be that of ‘the patriotic bourgeoisie’ than that of a black working class which is increasingly alienated by government policies which are depicted as pro-capital and failing miserably to stem the tide of unemployment. Even if, in the long course of history, white economic domination is likely to be challenged far more by demographic shifts such as markedly increased black access to secondary and tertiary education, industrial and financial skills, public employment and expanded wealth-making opportunities than by legislative requirements demanding ‘employment equity’, the public focus of black empowerment is likely to remain that of black entry into the higher reaches of industry, and black ownership of companies. In the rhetoric of yesteryear, the national democratic revolution provides the foundation for socialism. Ergo, promoting black embourgeoisement becomes not only the ANC’s patriotic duty, but its fulfillment of its historical agenda. Conveniently, however, the post-Soviet world has changed, and socialism to all intents and purposes is dead. The ANC may now (at times) claim to have embraced social democracy, yet if it has, then it is a Blairite version which prioritises wealth-creation over welfare, and opportunity over equity. ‘Black empowerment’ is thus readily transformed into a black middle-class enhancing construct which celebrates the non-racialisation of, rather than the abolition of, poverty and inequity. (The distribution of income in South Africa remains one of the highest in the world. Even though the proportion of the highest income group which is black has increased markedly over the last three decades, the proportion of households in the poorest four income groups that are African has also increased) (SAIRR, 2001:374-76).

As Gerry Mare (2001:99-100) observes, the simplification of South Africa’s complexity into racialised compartments (as suggested by President Mbeki’s famous ‘two nations’ speech) that ignore class and other differences (such as gender) is ultimately anti-democratic, for it ignores the voice of the poor:

... the context of the continued racialisation of South African society cannot but be the continuation provided by the explicit or implicit utilisation of the notion of ‘colonialism of a special type’, with its clear, and hence, unproblematic, divide into white settlers and black indigenous population. The race epithet in the two nations classification is, therefore, descriptively, quite correct, but analytically static and inadequate to the demands of understanding the dynamics of a South African society that has to place itself with rampant international capitalism, and growing internal divisions between rich and poor, also black rich and poor. Within this perspective, the continued enrichment of the black middle class and bourgeoisie does not serve as a contradiction to the two nations theory, as black people, of whatever class position, have already been homogeneously defined as ‘the poor’.
It is this context that Kenneth Good (2001) subtitles his recent exploration of liberalism in Africa as *Elites against Democracy*.

**Democracy against Liberation?**

The conventional wisdom hails the 1990s as the decade of Africa’s ‘second independence’. The corpse of state socialism was found buried under the ruins of the Berlin wall, and popular forces for change in Africa were provided space to flourish. Dictators who had previously been propped up by the Western powers had the rug pulled from their feet, and a wave of competitive elections occurred throughout the southern African region (as elsewhere throughout the continent): Namibia 1989, Zambia 1991, Angola 1992, Lesotho 1993, Mozambique 1994 and South Africa 1994 all joined Botswana as ‘multi-party democracies’. These transformations were correctly celebrated, for popular enthusiasms indicated that ordinary people were **Voting for Democracy** (Daniel, Southall and Szeftel, 1999). Considerable gains were made: new constitutions, new commitments to human rights, and new acknowledgements of the liberal democratic values of diversity, individual liberties, checks and balances, and the necessity of the accountability of rulers to their voters. Of course, progress was uneven, with Angola, for instance, being plunged back into civil war by Jonas Savimbi’s incapacity to accept coming second in an election. Yet even allowing for such setbacks (as well as other alarums such as were sounded by electoral losers who provoked constitutional crises in Lesotho in 1994 and 1998), multiparty democracy has begun to entrench itself as a *system*, based upon, not least, the increased presence and muscle of ‘civil society’ in the form of trade unions, numerous non-governmental organisations, expansion of the cohort of professionals and of the middle classes in general, and so on.

Despite these very real advances, democracy has as yet played only a limited role in bringing about the liberation of the mass of ordinary people of the region from the scourges of poverty, low health and educational status, widespread unemployment and indeed, fear of the state. Electoral democracy was viewed as a harbinger of - in the words of the ANC slogan – ‘a better life for all’, yet its gains appear to be popularly regarded as real but disappointing (as indicated, for instance, in declining voter participation in successive elections). Why is this?

Part of the problem is structural. A regional pattern is emerging which views the future consolidation of democracy through an emphasis on the *procedural* and *regulatory* aspects of the conduct of elections. That is fine and good in so far as it goes, but in that it has given rise to dominance of the electoral arena in most countries by a single party, the basic premise of liberal democracy – alternating governments – is effectively undermined. Opposition parties as a result tend to be under-capacitated and under-funded, even if they are not actively harassed and intimidated by the ruling party (as in Zimbabwe). Similarly, there is a major issue concerning accountability: for instance, a recent survey (conducted for the Electoral Task Team (ETT) charged with considering changes to the way South Africans choose their representatives) found that only 60 per cent of respondents felt that the existing electoral system provides for individual parliamentarians to be held accountable, 25 per cent said bluntly that it didn’t, and only one in five believed that Members of Parliament try their best to look after ordinary people’s interests or listen to what they have to say (Southall and Mattes, 2002). And if parliamentarians aren’t adequately accountable, nor are the other instruments of state. For instance, in a recent report, Amnesty International has recorded how a combination of high crime levels and use of police for political purposes has led to systematic human rights violations in SADC
countries, these including arbitrary arrest, unlawful detention torture, summary execution, excessive use of force in arrests and public order policing. In most such countries, ‘the prospects are minimal for independent and impartial investigations of complaints’ (Amnesty International, 2002:65).

At one level, democracy – which should be about the betterment of people’s lives – can address such structural problems by engineering better structures and rendering them effective. Electoral systems can be refashioned to promote greater accountability (for instance, responses to the ETT survey suggest that voters would approve of the introduction of multi-member constituencies within a framework that would maintain overall proportionality); public funding can be extended to ensure that opposition parties are adequately resourced; governments can sign up to and implement international human rights conventions; institutions (such as ombudsmen and specialist commission) can be established, or capacitated, to provide proper checks upon the authorities; and so on. Indeed, there are numerous worthy projects around the region, often funded by well-intentioned ‘donors’ and implemented by governments themselves or NGOs, which are directed at bringing about such improvements. No-one should discount their importance, or the beneficial impact they can make. And yet, and yet, what they will add up to? The answer that Ken Good (2002) would give is ‘not very much’, for in his view it is the liberal model of democracy itself that is wrong, and unable to meet the needs of southern Africa’s people.

Good argues that when the liberal democratic model is chosen, where everything revolves around the act of voting in periodic elections, ‘elitism and inequalities readily flourish’. Voting for governments and politicians is absolutely necessary, yet it is also manifestly insufficient as a means of empowering citizens to control elites, who are principally concerned with self-aggrandisement. In practice, the essential function served by elections under liberal democracy is to get elites elected, and the brief acts of voting and counting are open to wide abuse, whether in the industrialised West or in Africa. Furthermore, liberal democracy allows capitalism to flourish. Capitalism creates inequalities and injustices which liberalism, which favours a non-interventionist state and a non-participatory citizenship, is unwilling or unable to resolve. No wonder, he argues, that ordinary people are becoming increasingly disillusioned with electoral democracy, which does little or nothing to improve their material comforts, yet leaves autocratic elites untouched!

Good takes a particularly gloomy view of the dominant party systems as they operate in southern Africa. Parliamentary checks upon executives, as written into constitutions, have effectively been nullified by the predominance of ruling parties which operate in a hierarchical and disciplined fashion; PR systems as implemented via closed party-list systems in Namibia and South Africa extinguish the accountability of representatives to their electors between elections; centralisation of power, including concentration of power of preferment, in the hands of the presidency, encourages autocracy (exhibited by various presidents’ sense of their own indispensability); the weaknesses of opposition parties and their incapacity to provide viable alternative governments represents ‘a near contradiction even in liberal terms’ (Good 2002:15); the lack of effective accountability allows state profligacy and elite corruption and enrichment to proceed virtually unchecked (unless revealed and contained by intra-elite convulsions, jealousies and rivalries); demands for accountability from outside the elite is deflected, and those raising questions abused or ignored; the media is regularly brought under control or intimidated; and independent institutions designed to impose restraints upon government are undermined.
This elitist model is based more upon American example than social democratic practice as exemplified in the Scandinavian countries, where deliberate political attempts have been made to ameliorate the effects of inequalities produced by capitalism. The deregulation of industry and globalisation have been exported to Africa in the form of structural adjustment and neo-liberalism. However, whilst the US model of unbridled capitalism can be productive of enormous wealth, it is also productive of extremes of riches and poverty. ‘Where deregulation, flexibility and downsizing are uncritically embraced, the quest for equality and justice is abandoned’. In the US the rich are getting richer, and the poor, poorer. Within the apparent prosperity, the incomes of eight out of ten persons have stagnated or fallen over the last two decades, whilst those of the advantaged have increased markedly. By the end of the 1990s, the richest 1 per cent of American households received after-tax income which was the same as that received by the 100 million people with the lowest incomes combined. This group of 2.7 million people owned 39 per cent of national wealth, and half of all stock market shares. The share of income received by the top quintile had reached 49 per cent by 1998 (Good, 2002:71-76). This ‘ruthless economy’ is married to liberal democracy, which is a form of polity which was devised during the first great wave of democratisation in the Nineteenth Century when capitalism was being threatened by the rise of socialism and social democracy. Liberal democracy arose, in response, as a means of incorporating the masses into politics in an orderly way, not through ‘irrational’, participatory interventions such as strike action, but in voting for competing elites at periodic elections. ‘The old democratic ideals of justice and equality were shorn-off as dangerously ideological, while Lockean beliefs in the rights of individual property ownership remained’. Elitism accompanied by popular passivity came to characterize the main tendencies within the liberal form of democracy (Good, 2002:76).

Central to Good’s interpretation is the argument that, fundamentally, the liberal democracies of southern Africa are all of a kind. To be sure, the Zimbabwean regime stands out in the enormity of its ‘state lawlessness, economic destructiveness and contempt for the people in sustained and awful combination’, yet all harbour kleptocracy, autocracy and elitism. Botswana is exceptional in its generally good governance and South Africa can rightly boast one of the most advanced liberal constitutions in the world. Likewise, Presidents Festus Mogae and Thabo Mbeki both present far more amiable faces to the world than the wretched Mugabe. Yet all three regimes operate through dominant parties, centralising presidencies, and the negation of opposition. Singularly and collectively, the ruling elites of southern Africa have demonstrated that they are less interested in democracy than they are in pursuing their self-interest and retention of power. Protests about human rights violations and abuse of constitutions in neighbouring states are overlooked and suppressed, buried in African leaders’ concern ‘not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries’.

The defining instance of such leaders’ contempt for popular opinion has been the way in which they have ganged up to protect Mugabe. For instance, despite clear evidence by domestic and international observers, and to its immense credit, the SADC Parliamentary Forum, that the 2002 Presidential election was, in effect, rigged, most African official observers groups and African governments lined up to proclaim the election ‘free and fair’. The head of the South African observer team labeled the election ‘flawed but legitimate’, the ANC congratulated ‘the people of Zimbabwe’ for a successful election, and the government in Pretoria, led by a party that only a few years ago was calling for international solidarity with the struggle for democracy in South Africa, proved unable to make a stand for democracy, despite the fact that it
was the prime mover behind the NEPAD project for African Peer Review of governance and democracy. As Ray Bush and Morris Szeftel (2002: 11-12) have recently opined:

*The collusion of African regimes in their support for Mugabe's abuse of power is an indictment of African government's failure to relinquish power despite having little popular support. Instead they cling to office until state coffers are drained in the support of governing class strategies for capital accumulation … it is not the winning of office that counts – it's the losing and ability, and integrity of political elites and their followers, to accept the will of the majority.*

The lesson of Zimbabwe, they say, is the need to get beyond the misuse of sovereignty (state power) as a way of furthering private wealth accumulation and to get past ‘the idea of democracy as the adoption of some formulaic liberal prescriptions’. Africa’s struggles for genuine development rest upon governments enjoying a genuinely democratic mandate that will give them the means to negotiate more effectively with a global capitalism that is presently condemning the continent to continuing subjugation and servitude. Yet is such a liberating version of democracy possible?

**Towards More Meaningful Democracy**

It is not necessary to agree with all that Ken Good says to recognise the challenge that his work presents. For instance, some would argue that he underplays the extent to which democracy and constitutionalism can take root even under conditions of the lengthy dominance of a political system by a dominant party (the Congress Party in India went down to defeat after nearly forty years in office in 1975); others would argue that there are differences of *kind* between (at least) Botswana and Zimbabwe; yet others would urge that his approach is incorrigibly ‘Afro-pessimist’ and that, flawed though it may be, the human rights and governance situation in southern Africa (and Africa more widely) today is far improved on the situation as it was just over a decade ago; and many would propose, alongside Bill Clinton that ‘it’s the economy, stupid!’ and that given a chance, economic growth – centred upon a dynamic South African industrial heartland – will, despite all Good’s protestations, lead to the slow but steady betterment of the conditions of life of the region’s people. All such arguments could, probably, make some reasonable mileage. Yet the thrust of his thesis remains: democracy in Southern Africa is centred around electoralism, is otherwise fairly hollow, and does not, on the whole, make a lot of difference to ordinary people’s lives. Indeed, its association with a capitalism that is largely unregulated is actually promoting greater, not lesser, inequalities.

So what is to be done? Good’s answer is that the region should move towards more participatory democracy. The original model of (a popular and participatory) democracy was provided in ancient Athens, where – originating in an insurrectionary movement by the lower classes – democracy represented political power wielded actively and collectively by the ‘demos’, that is, all those who were defined as citizens; citizenship excluded women and slaves. However, just as the exclusion of blacks from civil rights until the 1960s does not disqualify the United States of that era from being considered a democracy, nor should the limited definition of citizenship which applied in Athens detract from ‘the reality and significance of its participatory democracy’ (Good, 2002:168). Elites of wealth and education existed but did not dominate political society; rules had to be observed by all; direct popular power was exercised by ordinary citizens in the Assembly; agendas for meetings were drawn up by a Council whose members were elected by lot and forbidden to serve for more than
two annual terms; any citizen could speak; decisions were made by simple majority; and attendance and occupancy of important official positions was remunerated so that no citizen would be excluded on financial grounds. These, and other similar provisions, resulted in a conception of citizenship which was ‘profound’. Ordinary men saw themselves not just as isolated individuals but as citizens with ties and responsibilities to the wider community; democratic ideology encouraged the distribution of wealth and the exercise of political power only by the wealthy; and poorer citizens were enabled to prevent their exploitation by the rich.

Good sees this model a having been rediscovered in the popular struggle against apartheid, as embodied most notably in the United Democratic Front (UDF) and COSATU. From the Durban strikes of 1973 on, black workers began the transformation of the internal resistance movement which moved away from the exiled ANC’s concentration on external assault upon the apartheid state. They forged a democratic movement within the country, which was harnessed to independent working class action. This gave rise to a style of politics which emphasised grassroot participatory democracy, or ‘people’s power’ as evidenced by the appearance of street committees and people’s courts that were organisations concerned with dispute resolution and self-government. Such locally based initiatives were seen as foundations for democracy, for the UDF argued that conventional parliamentary democracy would work to exclude the bulk of ordinary people. The basic principles of democracy were seen as (i) periodically elected and recallable leadership; (ii) collective leadership; (iii) mandates and accountability; (iv) reporting and reporting back; and (v) criticism and self-criticism. Meanwhile, the development of a trade union movement which steered clear of ‘the futile quest for the revolutionary overthrow of the apartheid state’ led to engagement with both capital and the state, and the exertion of countervailing power, whilst simultaneously exemplifying a grassroots industrial democracy which emphasised the direct election of shop-stewards and the accountability of leaders. Good argues that, faced by an internal culture of democracy that threatened its elitist practices (long honed in exile), the post-1990 ANC was quick to shut the UDF down. In contrast, COSATU’s strength meant that a labour-repressive policy was not possible, and indeed the ‘new South Africa’ saw the creation of a relatively labour-friendly industrial regime. However, workers’ organised muscle has been steadily eroded by the ANC’s pro-capitalist policies, industrial restructuring and increasing unemployment. The potential of the highly promising experiment in participatory democracy has therefore not been realised. Nonetheless, nowhere else on the continent does the capacity, vested in an industrial working class, to challenge autocratic elites exist – although on how popular power in South Africa can be revived and sustained Good is disappointingly vague. He refers to that challenge as ‘an unending struggle’.

The principal problem for Good, as for other theorists of the same ilk, is that although participatory democracy constitutes a major advance on liberal democracy, it leaves ‘several fundamental questions unresolved, including how the conditions of its existence are to be adequately secured’ (Held, 1987:280). As David Held elaborates, whilst it appears true that people learn to participate by participating, it would be unwise to assume that increased participation by itself will produce people who are more democratic, cooperative and dedicated to the common good. It is wiser to assume that people will not perform morally or intellectually better than they do at the moment. Perhaps more fundamentally, it is questionable whether participation necessarily leads to consistent and desirable political outcomes. Tensions and conflicts can arise between individual liberty, distributional questions (social justice)
and democratic decisions (majority rule). What then, given the difficult heritage of autocracy (which has deep roots in both the colonial order and the liberation movements) on the one hand, and the inadequacies of the liberal model on the other, is the way forward to more meaningful democracy in Southern Africa? It is all too obvious that there just aren’t any easy answers. However, democratic theory does provide various pointers. For instance, following Held, we can argue for a conception of democracy which:

First, recognises the fundamental importance of a number of liberal tenets, notably concerning the centrality of an ‘impersonal’ structure of public power, of a constitution to help guarantee and protect rights, of a diversity of power centres within and outside the state, and of mechanisms to promote competition and debate about alternative political platforms.

Second, accepts that centralised state institutions are necessary devices for enacting legislation, enforcing rights, promulgating new policies and containing inevitable conflicts between particular interests. Representative electoral institutions, including parliament and a competitive party system, are an inescapable element for authorising and coordinating these activities.

However, because such liberal arrangements do not in themselves adequately specify the conditions for the possibility of political participation by all citizens, or how government institutions can actually regulate the forces (such as powerful corporations) which shape everyday life, the realisation of democracy will demand that:

Third, societal conditions should facilitate political participation. However, although citizens should not be obliged to participate in politics they should be obliged to accept democratic decisions unless they can be proved that the latter have violated their rights

Fourth, grossly unequal distribution of material resources should be altered in order to create conditions of political equality. It follows that political equality demands a tough conception of distributive justice. Distributive justice will demand, in particular, the recognition of the necessity of minimising inequality in the ownership and control of the means of production. In other words, whilst the right to private ownership is a fundamental condition of democracy, it is equally the case that the realisation of democracy demands that there must be clear restrictions on private ownership.

Fifth, different sets of strategies and policies will need to be applied to different sets of people to achieve a broad equality of economic conditions. Alleviating the conditions of the least well off while restricting the scope and circumstances of the most powerful would apply to a variety of areas marked by systematic inequality (wealth, gender, race and ethnicity) where it can be shown that such inequality undermines or limits pursuit of democratic decision-making. However, this agenda is in no way compatible with attacks on personal, social and cultural differences.

Sixth, clear limits should be put on the extent of liberty which citizens can enjoy. The liberty of some individuals must not be allowed at the expense of the majority of citizens. So some people will no longer have scope to accumulate vast resources at the expense of others.

Overall, seventh, it must be recognised that democracy must be based upon a political system that enjoys legitimacy. Yet a political system is unlikely to achieve lasting
legitimacy if it is deeply implicated in the creation and reproduction of systematic inequalities of power, wealth and income. Only a political order that places the transformation of those inequalities at its centre will enjoy legitimacy in the long run. Is all this all pie in the sky given the global and domestic inequalities, and the weight of history, which so circumscribes democracy in southern Africa today? Pessimists would say that it is. Progressives would say that, at the very least, advances must be made in the right direction. This must mean confronting the difficult legacies left by both colonialism and the struggle to achieve liberation, and indeed, the limitations of liberal democracy. In this regard, Good is absolutely correct in pointing out that precedents exist within the region, most particularly in southern Africa, which point to a form of democratic society which would go beyond the limitations of the liberal model. It is therefore incumbent upon progressive activists to debate the principles upon which a more advanced type of democracy should be based.

This is precisely the reason why the African Peer Review Mechanism proposed by NEPAD must become the property of Africa’s people. Leaving it to the rulers will likely result in its becoming yet another instrument to camouflage their undemocratic forms of domination.

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Women’s Reproductive Health & Population Policy: Tanzania

Lisa Ann Richey

Population policies have rarely been linked to economic policy, although the promoters of economic liberalisation also support the embrace of population policy as important to the economic wellbeing of African states. Using a case study from Tanzania, I argue that population policies with a limited focus on fertility reduction may continue to be successful in the context of post-adjustment African health care systems, but policies that aim for the larger goals of improving women’s reproductive health will be severely limited. Tanzania’s donors and lenders promoted Neo-Malthusian types of population policies aimed primarily at reducing childbearing as a partial solution to the country’s economic crisis. However, in the mid-1990s, the international discourse on population shifted toward a new dependent variable of ‘women’s reproductive’ health. The notion of reproductive health reunites population and development issues in the context of basic health care provision. Improvements in the reproductive health of Tanzanian women will require more than simply the effective provision of contraceptives. This article argues that the challenges of improving reproductive health are unlikely to be met without a revitalisation of public health care provision in African countries.

Population policy is not usually considered one of the instruments of economic liberalisation. In fact, the rare work that has linked these two issues together has concluded that structural adjustment policies threaten the goals of population policies (Grown, 1994; Palmer, 1991). The Tanzania case appears to support many of the predictions about women’s reduced access to health care and lowered economic status. However, it does not reflect a decrease in women’s use of contraceptives, or an increase in actual or desired fertility. This article argues that structural adjustment policies and related reforms have not been in conflict with the old Neo-Malthusian policies concerned primarily with increasing family planning use and decreasing fertility, but they are in conflict with the new generation of population policies that focus on women’s reproductive health and well-being.

The following sections review the expected relationship between population policy and liberalisation and the relationship between the state, donors and lenders in promoting population policies in the third world. I then turn to the specifics of National Population Policy for the Tanzania case. In Tanzania, liberalisation measures and population policies were actually promoted by the same international interests as appropriate responses to Tanzania’s economic crisis. I describe the ‘success’ of this policy as measured by fertility rates and contraceptives. I then problematise this ‘success’ by analyzing the realities of family planning within
Tanzanian clinics. The final section draws conclusions about the role of local, state and international actors in population policy implementation in liberalised Tanzania. I argue that population control has been an important part of the bundle of recommendations given to African countries under the rubric of structural adjustment. The resulting retreat of the Tanzanian state from the health sector, coupled with an upsurge in donor interest in population, has led to a public health care system equipped primarily to supply contraceptives.

Linking Population Policy with Economic Liberalisation

Harrison (2001) describes the politics of adjustment as constituting a framework of the ongoing power wielded by international financial institutions by virtue of states’ ‘permanent crisis’ of indebtedness. This web of relationships, both historical and ongoing, is an important component of analysis for policy implementation in contemporary Tanzania. The gendered impact of liberalisation stemming from structural adjustment is now well documented in theoretical analyses (Palmer, 1992; Elson, 1995; 1991) and empirical studies (Gladwin, 1991; Afshar and Dennis, 1992; Beneria and Feldman, 1992; Cagatay, Elson et al. 1995). However, these disparities are rarely linked with the objectives of population policy. Nonetheless, in third world development, many of the major proponents of economic liberalisation – individual and institutional – are the same as those advocating population policies, and the countries targeted by these policies are often identical.

The World Bank is clearly a significant institutional actor in promoting economic liberalisation, and while the Bank has become a player in health care reform (see Standing, 2002), it is not usually considered to be among the most powerful actors in the population field. The most prominent actors in the international population arena are the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), and the Population Council. Yet, perhaps because the Bank is not associated with promoting a population-control agenda, it is able to push for these goals without incurring the same backlash that might be aimed against more overt population actors. Gibbon’s (1991) work in the early 1990s suggests that the Bank has long embraced population control as one of its regulatory measures used in the third world. The Bank laid out a popularised version of its role in population issues in 1994. While the Bank does not stress the existence of a population policy to limit fertility as a prerequisite for its development investments, it does point to the ‘political acceptability of fertility regulation’ as the ‘most critical issue to address’ in poor countries (1994:86). The Bank also notes: ‘donor influence has to be used judiciously to increase political and public sensitivity to the health and welfare hazards of unrestrained reproduction’ (1994:6). The Bank traces projects supporting population activities as far back as 1970 loans to Jamaica for family planning.

The World Bank’s role in problematising population is similar throughout Africa as shown in evidence from Williams’ (1995) study of discourses on population, agriculture and environment. He demonstrates that ‘the basic diagnoses and policy recommendations of all these documents are remarkably consistent with the policies and practices which the World Bank has espoused since its foundations’ (1995). Williams shows how the Bank ignores both historical evidence and geographical variation, instead representing all of Africa ‘as deriving from a generic process engendered by the reproductive and economic activities of numerous people, activities whose adverse consequences they neither intend nor recognize’ (1995:173). The Bank’s representation of Africa as a catastrophe of overpopulation, agricultural
crisis and environmental degradation, and of Africans as neither understanding nor controlling these processes, calls forth the ‘development’ experts from outside to cope with the development crises and promote the common good. A detailed examination of the Tanzania case study will clarify the means used to intertwine economic policy and population policy, thus substantiating Williams’ interpretations of the tone of the World Bank’s overall Africa discourse.

The limited literature that speculates on the relationship between population policy and liberalisation concludes that structural adjustment and economic reform, in general, are not congruent with the goals of population policy. It is important to note that population policy here is intended as fertility reduction. Grown (1994) argued that structural adjustment measures should have been halted because they would hurt population objectives by worsening third world women’s economic status. In an earlier work focusing specifically on Africa, Palmer (1991) predicted that women in adjusted economies would be constrained into higher fertility and less participation in ‘market-oriented activities’. Palmer explained the relationship between adjustment’s effects and continually high levels of fertility when ‘deterioration of women’s economic status, by leading to further uncertainty, locks women even more tightly into survival strategies which emphasise fertility and dependency’ (Sadik cited in Palmer, 1991:4). The links between women’s status and fertility have been well documented in work such as Oppong (1989) and Youssef (1988). Following these arguments, in adjusted African economies we would expect to see women wanting to bear more children who can contribute to the household economy, while increasing the mothers’ status within their families and communities. In sum, we would expect higher levels of desired fertility in countries that have undergone structural adjustment.

Furthermore, as the factors contributing to a greater desire for high fertility rise, Palmer (1991) and Grown (1994) suggest that women’s access to contraception will be reduced. ‘The increasing poverty of the third world curtails the ability of governments and individuals to finance population programmes’ (Grown, 1994:65). Similarly, Cornia, et al. (1987) argue that cuts in the health care sector that accompany liberalisation result in decreased access to contraceptive and abortion services. However, these authors did not take into consideration that in cases like Tanzania, donors absorb nearly all of the costs of the National Family Planning Programme. The main donors funding the lion’s share of the Tanzanian National Population Policy are USAID and UNFPA. Other donors active in the health sector include Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the World Bank. Therefore, to understand social sector spending priorities, it is critical to consider donor interests and willingness to pay, as well as government financing.

From the few studies on adjustment and population, we would expect that fertility rates would be maintained, if not increased, because women would desire larger families than in previous generations, and family planning services would become increasingly less available for those women who did want them. From this scenario, it would appear that economic and population policies would be in opposition because fertility rates would not decline. In contrast, as I will elaborate later, we have seen a clear decline in Tanzanian fertility rates. Yet, declining fertility alone is not enough to suggest a synergy between the goals of population policy and economic adjustment. In the 21st century, population policy has come to mean far more than merely decreasing rates of fertility. The advancements in the international discourse on what a population policy should do call into question whether such policies can be effectively implemented in the context of post-adjustment health care provision.
Because population policy is so intensely donor-driven and donor-funded, this international discourse on population shapes the implementation of policies in aid-recipient states such as Tanzania.

Population control through fertility limitation was the mainstay of population policies until the mid-1990s. In 1994, a shift – paradigmatic or rhetorical – took place in the mainstream population and development debates. This radical shift in the official discourse on population came after the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo (see Hodgson and Watkins, 1997; Sinding and Caldwell, 1997; Jain, 1998). An international consensus was generated to support changing the goals of population policies from demographic targets and contraceptive goals to improving ‘women’s reproductive health’ (see Presser and Sen, 2000; Lane, 1994 for a literature review). Women’s empowerment, reproductive choice, and the overall health of women and their children are now recognised as important arenas for population interventions, both as ‘development’ ends and as a means of creating a conducive environment for choosing lower fertility. This stands in contrast to earlier population policies which had aimed primarily at decreasing national fertility rates through more effective methods of contraception. Thus, population policy in a post-Cairo environment aims at improving the reproductive health of women, not simply on decreasing their levels of fertility. This new generation of approaches to population policy may find itself at loggerheads with the realities of adjusting economies. State withdrawal from social sector service provision coupled with decreasing resource flows from donor countries to the third world exacerbates existing conditions of insufficiency. Some have suggested that health care provision serves as the ‘welfare arm of structural adjustment’ and is critical to the process of economic recovery (Kabeer and Raikes, 1992). We cannot expect that population policies will in fact improve women’s health, choice, and empowerment, when women have no access to health care that is not contraceptives. In the following discussion, I demonstrate how population policy has been directly, if subtly, linked to economic liberalisation in Tanzania. After introducing the Tanzanian case, I will move to an analysis of the history of the population ‘problem’ as it evolved in discussions between the Tanzanian government and the IMF and World Bank.

**Donors, Lenders & Population in Tanzania**

Tanzania was one of the first countries in sub-Saharan Africa to begin offering contraceptive services in 1959, yet has been one of the last to declare an official population policy in 1992. Tanzania was also one of the most outspoken third world countries promoting the idea that population was not a major problem for development at the 1974 World Population Conference in Bucharest (see Finkle and Crane, 1975). However, in 1992 Tanzania adopted a National Population Policy very similar to that of other third world countries. This made a significant statement to the international community and signified an important shift in the way that the Tanzanian state was approaching its population ‘problem’. Given Tanzania’s reluctance to declare an official population policy that defined its population as a ‘problem’, why did the government finally agree to do so in 1992?

In the early stages of Tanzania’s independent political history, the state defined its population ‘problems’ as those of migration from rural to urban areas and provision of services by the government, particularly in education and health. The Tanzanian government was reluctant to separate out issues of population from a holistic approach to development focused broadly on poverty. However, during the 1970s
and 80s, explicit debates were ongoing over the scope and direction of population interventions and the possibility or need for a policy.

Over time, the Tanzanian state’s approach to population has gradually shifted to become more compatible with the priorities and understandings promoted by its donors and lenders. Historically, the Tanzanian government has maintained a strategically ambiguous stance in its declarations and approaches to population (Richey, 1999b). This ambiguity exists in both the document of the National Population Policy itself and in the directives promoted by the state for its implementation. Nonetheless, the aspect of the population policy that is, in effect, given the most priority is family planning. This organisation of a family planning programme as the main or only implementing arm of population policy related to fertility reduction is typical in population policy implementation (Jain, 1998). The family planning sector is most visible because it receives the most attention and funding from international donors, the critical sources of ‘development’ interventions in a time when state-funded health care is rapidly declining in both quantity and quality. Kiondo (1995) documents the ongoing ‘donorisation’ of important social services in many areas as one of the main forms of development privatisation taking place in contemporary Tanzania. The donors’ emphasis on family planning stems from the way that population is understood as a ‘problem’ in a global discourse that emphasises reducing fertility levels as a prerequisite to ‘development’. Such a demographic emphasis is no longer explicit in the post-Cairo agenda, but the problem of overpopulation and a desire for fertility reduction is still under the surface of most interventions. It could be argued that the Tanzanian state, weakened by its dependence on international aid and loans and the conditionalities accompanying its structural adjustment programmes, has become more receptive to the agenda of its international donors and lenders in tackling many development issues, including population.

Tanzania’s economic history leading it to the negotiating table with the IMF in 1980, and the subsequent signing of an Economic Recovery Programme in 1986 is well-documented (see, for example, Gibbon, 1995). In brief, Tanzania, like many other African countries, found itself at the brink of economic crisis in the late 1970s. It was forced to take on structural adjustment policies which in Tanzania have meant processes like market liberalisation, currency devaluation, liberalisation of foreign exchange transactions, privatisation of key parastatals, tax reform, bank privatisation, civil service reform, and elimination of subsidies. By the mid-1990s, liberalised Tanzania embraced a business-friendly market-orientation. Private investments boomed and consumer goods became readily available for those who could afford them.

Structural adjustment also resulted in the introduction of user-fees for health care services and rising school fees. Literacy rates declined from 90 per cent in 1986 to some 84 per cent in 1992 (other estimates put literacy at only 68 per cent in 1991) (Raikes and Gibbon, 1996:291), and down to 68 per cent by 1995 (UNESCO). This is not surprising in light of the results of Rose’s (1995) study of 78 third world countries that found education suffering in countries undergoing adjustment policies.

The greatest impact of adjustment on the social sector is its limitation of government deficit funding (Raikes and Gibbon, 1996:291). This led to falling morale among workers in this sector who have long been experiencing a drop in their real incomes as a result of adjustment policies (Raikes, Alanagh, 1992). Simultaneously, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has placed further demands on the already-fledgling health sector
Currently, the health care sector is overburdened by increasing numbers of patients who wait longer and longer before seeking treatment often to find that medicines are unavailable and staff are engaged in second-economy survival activities. For example, nurses in Dar es Salaam were observed ‘boiling disposable syringes in order to be able to sell the new ones to improve their low and dwindling real official incomes’ (Tibaijuka, Rugemalira and Kikuli, 1995).

Statistically speaking, Tanzania has long been in the midst of an ecological and development crisis, and, in spite of recent economic ‘stabilisation,’ it is still one of the poorest countries in the world (see Turshen, 1999:100, 101). Maternal mortality remains disturbingly high at 1,100 deaths per 100,000 live births, a figure that is even above average for sub-Saharan Africa (World Development Indicators Database, World Bank, April 2002). Tanzania’s state of ‘projectitis’ in the 1980s when there were more than 2000 development projects in the national development budget has been replaced with a new ‘reformitis’ where donor-funded reforms are the focus of development attention (Therkildsen, 2000:62). While donor aid has, for the most part, resumed to Tanzania, it is not at levels comparable to the 1970s. Like the rest of Africa, Tanzania lost some of its geo-political importance to donors with the end of the Cold War, and donor fatigue has set in amongst even Tanzania’s staunchest supporters. Still, the official proclamation of a National Population Policy signifying the state’s recognition of a population ‘problem’ has made Tanzania’s population sector an area of growing donor interest.

In the context of years of economic decline and the constraints imposed by structural adjustment policies, the ‘successes’ of the National Family Planning Programme provide an ironic contrast with the failure of state-provided health care. This translates into local clinics that are mere shells without medicines or basic supplies, but where most of the contraceptives being promoted by the family planning programme and supplied by donors can be found. The expanded notion of ‘women’s reproductive health’ as an objective for donor funding under the population rubric becomes more significant in a context like Tanzania where formal health care needs lying outside the scope of donor-funded projects are not likely to be met at all.

In Tanzania, the contentious history of population issues (see Richey, 1999a) required that donors act ‘judiciously’ in promoting calls for a national population policy. During the 1980s, changes began to take place in the perceptions of Tanzanian officials about their population ‘problem’ and appropriate solutions. Of course, this shift did not come out of nowhere. It was embedded in a changed way of thinking about Tanzania’s overall approach to development. The formulation of the National Population Policy involved the intersection of government, donors and international organisations. Diverse organisations with different but convergent goals gained influence in Tanzania simultaneously, so while this did not have the overt intention of a common front organised to bombard the government with anti-natalist propaganda, it did have that outcome.

By the mid-1980s, almost no government funds were available for financing the development or implementation of the National Population Policy. The state acknowledges that ‘due to these budget difficulties the national population programme is mainly financed by multilateral and bilateral assistance’ (United Republic of Tanzania, 1994:28). Therefore, the Tanzanian National Population Policy was, from its inception, a policy that would be dependent on donor funding and shaped by donor interests. Not only were funds unavailable from the state for funding
the policy, but also the same donors who were promoting population issues were being called upon to fund other aspects of Tanzania’s development budget. There are varying interpretations of what the lack of government contribution signifies. It may be an indicator of insufficient political commitment toward the population issue (as it has been understood at various times by donors and analysts in Tanzania), or it may be that the Tanzanian government is simply being strategic by putting its money into areas where donors are less readily available, given that external funds for population issues may be more easily forthcoming (see Richey, 1999b).

Tanzania’s population issues were taken up in the first Paris Club meetings between the state and international lenders. The World Bank statement given at the Consultative Group for Tanzania meeting in June 1986, the first of such meetings since 1977, stated:

*We also expect to initiate studies on longer term issues such as education and training needs in Tanzania, and we will in response to the minister’s request examine the possibility of support in the population field* (World Bank, 1986:3,4).

The Bank uses careful language to avoid any possible implications that its policies had an impact on the decision of the government to develop a national population policy. However, one informant stated during an interview that ‘Tanzania was forced into a policy by conditionalities which are not written down’ because donors want to control population if they are to give aid.

The World Bank Social Sector Representative at the Dar es Salaam Mission Office stated in an interview with the author that he ‘could not remember’ if the Bank had been involved in any way with the formulation of the National Population Policy, but he did not think that they had been involved. He also stated that the Bank was supporting a health and nutrition project worth $47 million, including a ‘tiny component to support the Population Planning Unit (PPU) [part of the Planning Ministry responsible for developing and coordinating population policy].’ According to the Bank’s own data, the ‘tiny component’ was $9.5 million (World Bank, 1994:118). During the interview, the Bank official went on to explain that the PPU was supposed to be co-financed by the United Nations Family Planning Association (UNFPA), but due to some ‘mistake of communication,’ the Bank ended up financing the whole thing. The position of the World Bank and IMF on Tanzania’s population ‘problem’ is rarely discussed in official documents, as the Bank is reluctant to be identified with pushing for a population policy. However, from the documents and records of the Paris Club Meetings, we can observe their stance on these issues.

The Bretton Woods institutions’ interpretation of whether or not Tanzania had a population ‘problem’ was initially vague and depended on the context of discussion. Yet by the late 1980s it was clear that population had begun to be perceived as an impediment to economic development. The 1986 Economic Recovery Programme drafted by the Tanzanian government in collaboration with the World Bank and the IMF stated: ‘Tanzania is a relatively thinly-populated country. There is a place and ample space for large private farms …’ (United Republic of Tanzania, 1985:30). However, by the June 1988 report, the Tanzanian government, in conjunction with the IMF and World Bank, attributed the need for cost-sharing to the problem of over-population. The document stated:

*Rehabilitation and development of the [social] sector will also be affected by the expansion of the requirements to the sector given the high rate of population growth. With these problems*
in mind, the Government is now reviewing how beneficiaries can make a more direct contribution to the financing of such services (United Republic of Tanzania, 1988:8).

When justifying the potential for private enterprise in agriculture, the country was ‘thiny populated’, but when discussing government provision of social services, Tanzania became over-populated. In 1988, the World Bank’s report to the Paris Club meeting stated clearly its interest in Tanzania’s population ‘problem’:

In addition to these key priorities for economic management, there are longer term development challenges which face Tanzania. Among these are the preparation of a population policy, to reduce over time Tanzania’s present high rate of population growth, and to take account of its impact on the urban areas and on the provision of social services. The present growth rate of close to 3.5 per cent per annum imposes an intolerable strain on basic services, on the labour market and on the environment. It needs to be brought down to a manageable level as rapidly as possible (World Bank, 1988:8).

The World Bank’s report to the Paris Club the following year blames deteriorating social services on the population problem and reiterates the need for population control. In this report, the Bank asserts that ‘Tanzania faces a serious population problem’ (World Bank, 1989:20). As a solution, they commend the government’s development of a population policy with a strong demographic agenda:

The Government has developed a national population policy with the objectives of reducing fertility rates by 30 per cent by the year 2000 … reducing the proportion of women marrying before the age of 20, minimum spacing of 2 years between births, and attaining a higher contraceptive prevalence. To achieve these objectives and more, over the coming years it will be necessary for Government and for donors to concentrate efforts on expanding family planning services and provision of contraceptives throughout the country … (World Bank, 1989:21).

The Bank here clearly spells out what it wanted in a population policy namely specific targets for lowering fertility. Interestingly, in the period between the 1988 and 1989 reports, the population growth rate supposedly had decreased (without the help of a population policy) from 3.5 per cent to 2.8 per cent, but this was given no explanation. Such a dramatic drop in rates of growth in one year would be impossible. Of course, a likely scenario is simply that a different source of adjusted data was used; however, it would seem that for the Bank, the ‘real’ population growth rate was a question of expediency, not one of correct data. While it might be difficult to ‘prove’ that Tanzania’s structural adjustment loans were held hostage until a population policy was instituted by the government, this was the case for Egypt (see Kaplan, 1976 cited in Morsy, 1995:165) and Kenya (see Hodgson and Watkins, 1997). The Bank’s statements as that cited above suggests that there was more than a casual relationship between the World Bank activities in Tanzania and the preparation of a particular kind of population policy to bring down Tanzania’s population growth rate.

The sudden notice of a population ‘problem’ by its lenders had a significant impact on the Tanzanian state. The government used the population policy to show that it had properly recognised and was dealing with its problem. The report prepared by the government for the same consultative group meeting in 1989 responded to the Bank’s abrupt concern with the population problem, reassuring the Bretton Woods establishment that:

Given the critical role of population-related programmes in overall socio-economic development, the Government has finalised the preparation of a population policy which
will be adopted during the ESAP period. The main goals of the national population policy are to reinforce national development ... More specifically, the population policy will initially concentrate on expanding and strengthening maternal and child health and family planning programmes ... (United Republic of Tanzania, 1989b:15).

The Tanzanian Finance Minister at the 1989 Paris Meeting clearly situated population issues within Tanzania’s structural adjustment package: ‘Population issues will also receive special attention under ERP II’ (Msuya, 1989:10). To the displeasure of its donors and lenders, the government engaged in strategic foot-dragging that prolonged the actual adoption of the policy by over a year. By 1991 when the National Population Policy was still not finalised, the report prepared by the government for the consultative group meeting in Paris in June reassured the lenders that: ‘In population, the Government has prepared and this year will formally adopt and announce its population policy for the 1990s’ (United Republic of Tanzania, 1991b:5).

Tanzania’s donors, like its lenders, have been interested in promoting fertility reduction through a population policy as one way of dealing with declining social services as the state withdraws from service provision. One example from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) conveys an official understanding of the problem of population for development in liberalised Tanzania:

As in other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, rapid population growth has been associated with poor economic performance. The consequences of rapid population growth are felt acutely and visibly in the public budgets for health, education, and related fields of human resource development. It is obvious that expansion of and improvements in the quality of these services is unlikely to happen without first controlling the rapid population growth (TDHS, 1996/7:2).

The donors’ interpretation suggests that the rapidly growing population has led to Tanzania’s economic problems and, thus, that the population growth must be tackled before expanding or improving the services related to ‘development.’ Warwick argued that donors were responsible for a narrow interpretation of the problem of population in the eight countries of his study. Even though their styles and power vary, ‘donor influence extends from creating the conditions that lead governments to become aware of a ‘population problem’, through defining the organisational forms and dominant emphases of family planning programs, to pressuring for specific results in implementation’ (1982:97). A government official involved in the Tanzanian National Population Policy stated in an interview with the author: ‘The time element is important – bring the population growth to zero as quickly as possible. Donors think this is urgent and government should be more active and quick.’

The link between population policy and adjustment policy was important in bringing the Tanzanian state closer to the position of its donors and lenders. Donors and lenders were able to successfully shift the state’s perspective on its population ‘problem,’ cumulating in the 1992 declaration of Tanzania’s National Population Policy. Barrett and Tsui’s quantitative cross-national study, found that the existence of a population policy holds symbolic value for international aid money. They conclude that ‘[population] policies indicate countries’ receptivity to outside assistance, flashing the green light to donor agencies seeking appropriate beneficiaries’ (Barrett and Tsui, 1999). If a country adopts a population policy, it is 12.5 per cent more likely to receive USAID funding, and of those countries having received funding, adopting a policy increases the countries’ expected assistance nearly threefold (Ibid.). Given Tanzania’s political economy and reliance on donor funding
this relationship between population policy and increased donor assistance is particularly important.

**Tanzania’s ‘Success’ in Family Planning**

If we follow the analyses and hypotheses of previous work, the simultaneous implementation of economic reform and the population policy should have been a lesson in policy failure. However, contrary to the expectation that population policy implementation would be thwarted in the context of structural adjustment, Tanzanian implementation through its National Family Planning Programme claims a striking level of ‘success’ if policy implementation is assessed on narrowly demographic indicators. The population policy was successful in terms of increasing levels of family planning and decreasing the total fertility rate. In the next section, I will show that the larger reproductive health goals that are meant to be the centrepiece of the post-Cairo generation of population policies have not been successfully implemented. At the national level, Tanzania has officially embraced the post-Cairo agenda with the 1998 introduction of a new ‘Reproductive Health and Child Survival Strategy’ (see Bangser, 1999). Nonetheless, by maintaining an implicit focus on population control, Tanzania’s population policy as implemented, is antithetical to improving reproductive health and upholding reproductive rights.

Regarding the demographic accomplishments of the National Family Planning Programme in Tanzania, an independent consultant of USAID was reported to have said about 1993 that ‘a miracle has been wrought’ (United Nations Population Fund, 1994c, annex E). Family planning was offered in approximately 90 per cent of Tanzanian health clinics by 1996. Between the early and mid-1990s, Tanzanian family planning use nearly doubled, and continued to rise slightly at the end of the decade as shown in Table 1.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>TDHS 1991/92</th>
<th>TDHS 1996</th>
<th>TRCHS 1999</th>
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<tr>
<td>any method</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>any modern method</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>16.9</td>
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*Source: 1991/92 and 1996 Tanzania Demographic and Health Surveys and 1999 Tanzanian Reproductive and Child Health Survey*

The Family Planning Programme has been effective in disseminating information about its work, and knowledge of contraception is quite high (in 93.5 per cent of all couples, both knew a modern method of family planning according to the 1999 TRCHS). Hollos and Larsen (1997) and Richey (1999a) also found that knowledge about family planning and contraceptive methods was nearly universal among their respondents in three regions of the country. Trends in fertility preferences have shifted during the period of the 1990s, with fewer married women wanting another child ‘soon’ and more wanting no more children (TDHS,1996/97). Table 2 shows that there has been a decline in the Tanzanian total fertility rate over time.

However, this striking fertility decline should be read cautiously when assessing the impact of the National Population Policy. We do not know how much of this fertility decline can be attributed to increased contraceptive use. Another cause of lower
fertility rates is infertility – higher in Tanzania than in neighboring countries. Larsen’s (1996) work suggests that higher levels of infertility in some regions may be partly responsible for the appearance of a lower total fertility rate. Furthermore, Lloyd, Kaufman, and Hewett (1999) argue that Tanzania still has lower levels of contraceptive use than expected when compared to other African countries with similar levels of educational attainment. Another possible factor in lower fertility is the high rate of HIV/AIDS infection throughout the country. Recent scholarship has shown that HIV itself has a direct impact on reducing fertility (see Baylies and Bujra, 2000). It is not my point here to assess the efficacy of the family planning programme on fertility. Also, I am not conducting any analysis of the relationship between the family planning programme and HIV/AIDS, a topic whose importance clearly merits its own discussion. Instead, I argue that whatever its effect on demographic goals, successful implementation of population policy in the post-Cairo era demands far more than simply decreasing fertility and we can see the results of funding and management priorities in the state of Tanzanian health care. As a Senior Ministry of Health Official lamented in an interview with Bangser, ‘There is no money to get a toilet fixed now much less implement effective health programs’ (Bangser, 1999:188).

In sum, we know that donors have succeeded in funding a national family planning programme that has raised awareness, access and use of contraceptives throughout the country. Therefore, the relationship suggested by Grown (1994) and Palmer (1991), that fertility decline could not take place in a structurally-adjusted context does not hold true for the case of Tanzania. In fact, it has been suggested by Larsen (1997), Kamuzora (1993), and my own qualitative field research, that the economic hardship precipitated by structural adjustment and its related decline in social services may have led to a desire for fewer children. However, it is important to remember that population policy in the post-Cairo environment aims to improve health, not just to reduce numbers. Fertility reduction dependent on economic hardship puts population policy squarely in contrast to economic policy in achieving its goals.

**Realities of Reproductive Health in Tanzanian Clinics**

Some of the goals of Tanzania’s National Population Policy – particularly those aimed at increasing the distribution and use of contraceptives – have been successful. Yet, local level implementation shows that other important needs of women’s reproductive health are not being met by the policy’s implementation. In this section, I describe the context in which the population policy operates. I am using national survey data together with data collected during fieldwork conducted in Swahili in 10 clinic sites (equally distributed between urban and rural areas) in Morogoro, Ruvuma and Kilimanjaro Regions of Tanzania. I conducted interviews with family planning service providers and engaged in participant observation at each site. Regions were chosen to represent areas of high, medium and low rates of contraceptive use, and clinic sites were chosen in consultation with district and regional Maternal and Child Health (MCH) coordinators to reflect a variety of service provision scenarios.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Trends in Tanzanian Fertility</th>
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<td>Total Fertility Rates</td>
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*Source: 1999 Tanzanian Reproductive and Child Health Survey*
I elaborate on what may be the most important and yet least analyzed level of population policy implementation – the clinic. Contraceptives are usually provided within an integrated clinic structure designed for family planning and maternal and child health services. This clinic may be situated within different types of health care structures: (1) a dispensary, the smallest type of health facility designed to serve a ward with a population of about 6,000; (2) a health centre, with 20 to 30 beds that is supposed to function as a small hospital; or (3) a hospital, which may be classified as District, Regional or Consulting. Private services are available for a fee from some church-based or NGO providers (such as the Marie Stopes or UMATI – the Tanzanian Family Planning Association). Still, three-fourths of all family planners obtain their contraceptives from government sources (Bureau of Statistics, Planning Commission et al. 1997a:53), underscoring the importance of state service provision in women’s reproductive health care.

The relationship between development ‘inputs’ and their delivery systems reflects the political conflicts of service provision between state, donors, businesses and users. While contraceptives are now readily available at clinic sites, the structures in which they are delivered speak to overall deterioration of the Tanzanian health system. For example, clean water supply was a problem in all of the clinics where I worked. Even the regional hospitals, which were supposed to have running water from the tap, usually had to rely on buckets of water gathered from a shared water point in the hospital. This was not surprising considering that the matched national data available from the Service Availability Modules show both not only low, but decreasing, percentages of government clinics with running water during the 1990s. The percentage of government hospitals in the matched sample with running water was 85 per cent 1991, but dropped to 77 per cent in 1994. For health centres, 53 per cent had running water in 1991, but only 40 per cent had it in 1994. Dispensaries were even less fortunate with only 32 per cent with running water in 1991 and 27 per cent in 1994 (Ngallaba, Bardsley et al. 1994:7-11).

Another reproductive health input, blood pressure cuffs that are critical for screening patients who may not be compatible with hormonal contraceptives, were available at the regional hospitals, but were conspicuously absent from most other clinics, particularly rural ones. When I asked about them, I was often told the following: ‘There had been one in the past, but it had broken and had never been replaced.’ Lack of proper lighting, particularly for pelvic exams, is a serious problem for inserting intrauterine devices (IUDs) or conducting examinations. The national situation for electricity parallels that for running water. In 1991, 87 per cent of government hospitals in the matched sample had electricity, but in 1994, only 85 per cent had it. For health centres, 24 per cent had electricity in 1991, and 23 per cent in 1994; while in dispensaries, 15 per cent had it in both the 1991 and 1994 samples (Ngallaba, Bardsley et al. 1994:7-10). National data show that access to electricity declined during the 1990s. In fact, the most recent facility survey notes that less than 1 per cent of government dispensaries had a working light source, laboratory or refrigerator (National Bureau of Statistics, 2000:24). During one day of clinic observation, I observed service providers attempting to do a pelvic examination for an IUD insertion in a rural health centre where there was no electricity and no battery or solar-powered light. In this context, service providers had a difficult time seeing well enough to conduct the exam and were faced with the dilemma of how to cope when the environment itself limited their ability to provide good quality of care. Opening the curtain would violate the client’s right to privacy, as the examining room looked out onto the busy hospital courtyard, so one service provider tried to manipulate the
curtain to let in a thin stream of light while the other attempted to perform the examination. After asking for my help, the service providers complained that it was difficult to perform even a basic examination under these circumstances.

In my interviews with service providers, supplies were mentioned at every service provision site as a problem – particularly disposable supplies (called ‘expendables,’ although they hardly seem ‘expendable’) such as sterile gloves and bleach or other solutions for sterilizing instruments. As early as the 1992 National Family Planning Programme Annual Report, the Ministry of Health wrote that ‘there was in all regions visited, an acute or chronic shortage of expendable supplies especially gloves, antiseptics, cotton wool, gauze, disinfectants and local anesthetic for minilap (female sterilisation)’ (United Republic of Tanzania, 1992:8). The problem had yet to be resolved by the late 1990s. At one health centre, the service providers explained the dilemma of providing quality service when sterilizing solution and gloves are often unavailable:

There is always a problem with bleach and gloves: they say that bleach is expensive and the government can’t afford it, so usually we just use boiling water because if we tell them [the clients] to go and buy it they won’t return.

Boiling could provide an alternative method for sterilisation; however, boiling water itself presented a problem, as most clinics were without electricity and also lacking in kerosene. At an urban clinic I was told: ‘If a client needs a procedure done with sterile gloves, such as a pelvic exam or IUD insertion, she has to buy them.’ The following example from participant observation in an urban clinic and family planning training site shows the difficulties in providing high quality of care in the absence of basic supplies:

I observed another client who had come in the day before with an IUD that had slipped out of place. However, she came too late in the afternoon (according to the service provider), so they told her to come back today. This time, she forgot to bring her own bleach to sterilize the instruments, so there was a long wait and discussion over what to do. Finally, the older nurse, said to use the small amount of bleach they had remaining in the clinic [from the supplies brought by students during family planning training] and do the removal and reinsertion.

This example shows both the reluctance on the part of service providers to remove the IUD on demand, and the shortage of basic supplies in a popular urban clinic. I was also told at two sites, that if they run out of syringes for injections, clients must buy them from private pharmacies and bring them to the clinic. At another rural clinic a service provider told me:

We now use setrimide instead of bleach – if someone comes for an IUD and there are no supplies [of setrimide], we give them another method for the time being, and then when the supplies come they can get them.

The same service provider told me that there was no examination bed (they were using a wooden table), flashlight, no blood pressure machine, scissors, screen for privacy of clients, and no kerosene to use for sterilisation. It is important to note that this service provider in a rural clinic was aware of the sorts of supplies which would be necessary for upholding a high standard of quality of care, and she tried to innovate whenever possible. Yet the dissonance between the demands of ‘modern’ family planning and the clinic space where she worked was irreconcilable.
One of the most startling contradictions between family planning supplies and those for all other health needs is that contraceptive pills are likely to be the only pills found in state clinics. In clinics where I worked there was either a complete unavailability or frequent stock outs of even the most rudimentary antibiotics. A District Medical Officer explained some of the underlying reasons for the chronic shortage of antibiotics in government clinics. Government dispensaries and health centres rely on kits from the Essential Drugs Programme (EDP) (provided by donors, but in the process of discontinuation in 1996) which are distributed once per month to each site regardless of its catchment size. Sites with larger catchment populations and/or sites where people have more health problems (due to environment, lifestyle, poverty, etc.) run out of drugs more quickly than other sites. The government is supposed to increase the varieties and quantities of drugs in the kits, but has not done so on account of the worsening economic conditions in the country. Therefore, shortages of antibiotics are chronic in both urban and rural government clinics (Personal correspondence, 30 April 1998).

A Maternal and Child Health regional coordinator explained during an interview that one of the most serious reasons for the high maternal mortality rate is the lack of antibiotics in the hospitals. In other interviews, almost all service providers mentioned a problem with getting basic medicine such as antibiotics for treatment of infections. A rural service provider stated: ‘If you go to the regional capital for medicine, there isn’t any – there are also no trays, scissors, nothing.’ I observed women who were diagnosed with reproductive infections being informed that the clinic had no medicine, and that they were supposed to go to the local pharmacy and buy antibiotics. I often heard women complain that they did not have money to purchase drugs.

‘Family planning’ as understood within a ‘reproductive health’ approach controlling entails both preventing unwanted pregnancy and supporting healthy childbearing. Therefore, antibiotics should be an integral part of providing for reproductive health. My understanding is that antibiotics were not considered to be ‘family planning’ supplies under the Tanzanian National Family Planning Programme. If women’s reproductive health problems were diagnosed but not treated because of a lack of sufficient medicines, these women were, in effect, forced to continue with infections untreated. Untreated infections can lead to more serious reproductive problems, including infertility. In an interview response, a physician at a regional hospital told me:

Many women have problems with infertility – far more than in the past – hali ya maisha (it is a fact of life) especially for young women. Many come to be treated only after they get complications – before, they treat STDs (sexually-transmitted diseases) themselves, sometimes using traditional medicine.

I was told by physicians at both government and NGO hospitals that the number of sick patients who were treating themselves first with traditional, less costly medicine was increasing. Only if that traditional medicine did not work would they come to be treated at the hospital, by which time their condition had often worsened. I was told at many clinics in rural areas and even in urban hospitals that those who were ill would not bother coming to be treated because they knew that the clinics had no medicine. Also, in my interviews with individual women, a majority of users and nonusers of family planning mentioned the cost of health care as one of their most pressing concerns, since the government no longer provides free care and medicines as it did under earlier socialist policies.
The effects of Tanzania’s deteriorating health sector on women’s reproductive health have been confirmed by national level surveys. As household-based surveys, these are interesting statistics because they would be sensitive to any shift in health-seeking behaviour from the public to the private domain; that is, if women began using private clinics when they found the government ones lacking. In the interval between Demographic and Health Surveys, the number of visits that women made to receive prenatal care decreased from a median of 5 visits in 1991/92 to only 3.9 visits in 1996/97 (TDHS, 1996/97:107). Furthermore, more women are giving birth at home (49.5 per cent compared to 45.5 per cent) and fewer are assisted by any sort of trained personnel (53.1 per cent in 1991/92 compared to 46.7 per cent in 1996/97). Similarly, child health has also suffered, as fewer children with diarrhea were taken to a health facility or provider (59.5 per cent in 1991/92 compared to 56.3 per cent in 1996/97).

Using the World Bank’s Health, Nutrition and Population Statistical Database, with assistance at delivery as the proxy for women’s reproductive health access (as described by Standing, 2002), we can see a disturbing picture over a longer period of time as shown in Table 3.

In 1977 half of the births were attended by health staff, while by the mid-1990s, only 38 per cent were attended. Alarmingly, it would seem that Tanzanian women had more access to reproductive health care in the 1970s than they do today. The data show an improvement in access after the institution of the National Health Policy in 1974 with its Maternal and Child Health component, but from the mid-1980s we see a steady, unfaltering decline.

The impact of HIV/AIDS and related illnesses on the already-declining public health sector can only be hypothesised. Yet as Tibaijuka (1997) reminds us, ‘the deplorable state of public health facilities in the country will continue to contribute to the spread of disease, including HIV.’ The Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), issued a recent statement ‘refuting the continuation of user fees in health and education in Tanzania’ where they document the continuing unavailability of medicines and supplies, in spite of the introduction of user fees in some areas (www.tgnp.co.tz/refuting.htm). They also explain that exemptions for certain aspects of reproductive health care are not actually functioning in government hospitals, pointing to research from Kondoa District where maternity patients are denied hospital discharge after delivery until all fees are paid.

As the Tanzanian state withdraws from the health care sector, the only services and supplies that are available without payment at government clinics are family planning. In light of the global discourse on ‘women’s reproductive health’s’ emphasis on ‘quality of care’ received by clients in family planning clinics, Tanzanian clinics are supposed to be brought up to standard for providing family planning services. Most of this ‘improvement’ is predicated on re-structuring other clinic activities (if there are any) so that family planning will have its own room. Ideally, clients will be counseled and examined in rooms that guarantee their privacy. USAID funds limited improvements to clinics that will be used as training sites for family planning courses. While these improve-

<table>
<thead>
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<th>year</th>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>74</td>
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<td>1984</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>38</td>
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ments offer ‘higher morale’ for family planning service providers, the improvements brought into the clinic by its association with ‘modern’ family planning are often only a coat of paint over crumbling walls. In an ironic twist to the struggle in the 1970s to integrate family planning services in the last decade into government primary care clinics there has been a failure to integrate other services into what have become, in effect, family planning clinics.

Conclusions: Local Bodies, National Policies & International Actors

Tanzania’s population policy can be viewed as a ‘success’ if evaluated solely on the basis of fertility reduction goals, but it has, thus far, failed to make significant improvements in women’s reproductive health. Responsibility for the limitations in implementation of a reproductive health agenda rests in the relationship between the Tanzanian state and its international donors and lenders. Population policies, like that of Tanzania, represent a state’s participation in an international community advocating a global and hegemonic discourse on the ‘problem’ of population. However, the role of the state is contingent, shifting from one context to another. The Tanzanian state must negotiate its priorities with those of its donors while struggling to maintain legitimacy as the main provider of basic health care services.

This task has become ever more evasive in the context of the increasing challenges of integrating HIV/AIDS with all other reproductive health needs. Baylies and Bujra (2000) suggest that the old debates about the efficacy of the ‘developmentalist state’ may need to be reopened by the demands that AIDS presents. As I argue elsewhere (Richey, 2002), over-population has been rapidly eclipsed by HIV/AIDS as the dominant problem to be addressed by reproductive health policies. The specter of AIDS must be addressed in any discussion of comprehensive health policies or programmes. This claim was bolstered by a recent UN report on the national population policies of all countries where the major finding was that the most significant demographic concern in the world is now HIV/AIDS (UN Population Division, National Population Policies 2001 database, www.un.org/esa/population/publications/npp2001/NPPdownload.htm).

The defining element of the Tanzanian development landscape is still ‘post’-structural adjustment. The effects of adjustment policies on various aspects of Tanzanian women’s lives are in need of further empirical documentation. However, my research in family planning clinics suggests that the intended benefits of improved reproductive health are not realizable without a revitalisation of Tanzania’s public health care sector.

Donors’ success in funding contraceptive provision and in implementing the National Family Planning Programme stands in stark contrast to the rapidly deteriorating health care structures into which these interventions are inserted. ‘Modern’ family planning comes to the clinic with its own set of tools and supplies. These things distinguish it from other less-funded, and therefore, apparently less important, clinic activities.

The weakened position of the Tanzanian state vis-à-vis international donors and lenders as a result of its signing on to structural adjustment policies contributed to the state’s willingness to adopt a particular kind of National Population Policy in 1992. Consequently, donors were amenable to funding the lion’s share of the policy’s implementation through family planning programmes. Family planning, narrowly
defined, has shown some successes in liberalised Tanzania. Yet, population policies and adjustment policies in Tanzania have been at odds with one another in the realm of meeting women’s reproductive health needs. Family planning access is certainly necessary, but not sufficient, particularly in light of Tanzania’s falling indicators on the status of reproductive health.

Is the state of affairs at the clinic level of policy implementation in Tanzania a deviation from expected outcomes in other parts of Africa? There are strikingly similar population policies in all third world countries with policies (see Barrett, 1995), deriving in no small part from a rather narrow conceptualisation by international donors as to what ‘counts’ as a population policy. Analogously, structural adjustment policies have been based on the same neo-liberal principles. Therefore, it is likely that similar points of congruence and discontinuity exist between population policy and economic policy in other ‘high fertility’ ‘low development’ contexts of the third world.

The post-Cairo shift in the international community’s official understanding of population policy provides an important opportunity for states like Tanzania. The notion of ‘women’s reproductive health’ as a goal of population policy contributes a new language for the articulation of a more comprehensive approach to population. This much-needed shift from narrowly-demographic priorities to including women’s priorities may provide a chance for mobilizing population resources in ways that offset some of women’s structural adjustment losses. However, as De Waal (2003) has recently argued provocatively, the HIV/AIDS pandemic in highly-affected countries threatens further and greater losses in regressive processes of demography, economy and governance, if AIDS is not addressed by both governments and donors as one of a country’s top two priorities. The importance of state leadership and capability is now being recognised, but decades of dismantling and emasculation can not be reversed as the international community switches channels back again from ‘NGO’ to ‘state.’

In liberalised Tanzania, the role of the state is to act as an intermediary between the global population discourse promoted by donors and lenders and the local realities of Tanzanian clinics. When the state is unable to set its own agenda, international actors must be held accountable for the impact of their policies at all levels of implementation. Thus, while structural adjustment has not proved to be antithetical to a narrow conceptualisation of population policy, limited to increasing family planning use and reducing fertility, it has thwarted the policy’s intended outcome of meeting reproductive health needs. Population policy and its donors cannot operate from a generic global blueprint or assume that family planning services can be discretely implemented within a collapsed health care system. Population policies must take into account the local realities of liberalised Tanzania and shape interventions accordingly if women’s reproductive health is their goal.

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Empowering People? World Vision & ‘Transformatory Development’ in Tanzania

Tim Kelsall & Claire Mercer

Ideas of participatory development and empowerment have become central to contemporary development discourse. This article identifies two axes of tension within this discourse. First is the disturbing thought that by empowering a ‘community’ a development project can disempower groups or individuals within that community. Second is the paradox whereby external agents are perceived as necessary to install internal desires and capacities for individual and community autonomy. The article presents empirical data from research into two projects by the NGO World Vision in northeast Tanzania. The aim is to show that the dilemmas of development in practice turn around these axis of tension, as the attempts to empower the ‘community’ benefit disproportionately an elite – the idea of development as ‘empowerment’ inserted into the community from the outside.

During the past decade NGOs have succeeded in capturing an increased share of official development aid. NGOs of various hues assert of themselves, as do their advocates, that they are uniquely equipped to facilitate a ‘grassroots’ or ‘bottom-up’ kind of development, and that they have the skills and dedication to ‘empower’ the poorest of the poor by utilising a participatory approach (Cernea, 1988; Clark, 1991; Drabek, 1987; Edwards and Hulme, 1992; Fowler, 1988). Such claims resonate with sections of the donor community disillusioned with inadequacies of state-based development in Africa, and they chime also with a global ideological climate hostile to the state. This article examines the shifting meanings of ‘participatory development’ and ‘empowerment’ as conceptualised and practised by NGOs in the light of research into two World Vision projects in northeast Tanzania. We begin by discussing some of the ambiguities in the discourse on ‘empowerment’, followed by an examination of World Vision in Tanzania, before discussing general insights issuing from two ‘Area Development Projects’ (ADPs) that illustrate some of the contradictions of contemporary mainstream development discourse.

Participatory Development & Empowerment

‘Empowerment’ has occupied a central place in mainstream development discourse since the early 1990s. Following recent debates within the development literature ‘empowerment’ is understood in this article to refer to the process by which poor and disenfranchised men and women come to be critically aware of their socio-political and economic situation within their local (national, or international) context (Friedmann, 1992; Kabeer, 1994; Rowlands, 1997). Empowerment therefore has certain psychological elements. To ‘be empowered’ involves a qualitative change in an individual’s self-perception, and therefore in his or her ability to actively alter the
'status quo'. The process of empowerment involves the poor and excluded actively articulating their social and political needs within the context of a variety of 'oppressive relationships' which range from the domestic and private to the international and public.

Empowerment is closely linked to notions of 'participatory' development. Only if people participate in choosing, setting and pursuing development goals will they be empowered. Participating is part and process of being empowered, of becoming, in other words, autonomous. In liberal understandings of empowerment, it is individual men and women that should participate and that ought, thereby, to be empowered. This is linked to the central role of the rational, self-authoring, autonomous individual self in liberal philosophy and ideology. In marxist or communitarian thinking by contrast, collectives, either in the shape of classes or communities, are the more natural targets for empowerment, insofar as this language is used. Mainstream development discourse, for its part, tends to be conducted in a broadly liberal idiom. But its discourse contains an internal tension, as we hope to show, since it sometimes equivocates on the question of whether it is poor individuals, poor classes, or poor communities that should be empowered, and thus the priority for development strategy.

It is important, one might argue, for development thinkers and practitioners to be clear about whom it is that is becoming empowered. This is because the empowerment of collective subjects, such as communities, is compatible in principle with the disempowerment of specific groups, and/or large numbers of individuals within those communities. In particular, it is compatible with substantial economic inequality, as well as with the infringement of certain 'rights' held to be essential to the ability of the individual to make choices. Despite these tensions, much of the literature glosses over such questions by simply referring to the empowerment of 'the community', the 'poorest', the 'marginalised', the 'beneficiaries', or just 'women' (Cleaver, 1999). There are two central problems here; first, is the assumption of a homogenous 'community' (or group of women, or the 'marginalised') who are to become 'empowered'. As mentioned above, this ignores the fact that communities are not level playing fields in which everyone works harmoniously for the equal benefit of all, but are cross-cut along lines of class, race, gender, ethnicity, age, and so on (Desai, 1996; Galjart, 1995; Midgley et al. 1986). Second, if it is the community that is to be empowered, where are the boundaries of that community to be drawn? The household, extended family, lineage, village, ethnic group, region, even nation, are all potential contenders. Once again, empowerment at any one of these levels of community is not incongruent with disempowerment at others. These tensions are reproduced in the dilemmas and contradictions of liberal development discourse: exhortations to respect cultural diversity and the rights of communities exist side by side with injunctions to improve education, encourage equality and erase patriarchy (Williams and Young, 1994). Such contradictions, as we shall see, are reflected in both the discourse and practice of World Vision’s development projects. Exploring these ambiguities is important, since transnational NGOs – World Vision being the biggest – play an increasingly large role in the provision of welfare and development services to the world’s poor.

Empowerment discourse also raises a set of problems familiar to debates on freedom and the subject; problems which turn on the contradiction between autonomy and heteronomy. Principally, how is it possible for external interventions to install internal capacities for autonomous action? (Rahnema, 1992; Nelson and Wright, 1995). The perceived necessity on the part of development agencies to inject 'change-agents',
‘motivators’ and ‘conscientizors’ into target communities implies that those communities are unable of their own volition to realise what their ‘interests’ are, or what the ‘oppression’ against which they must fight might be. In this light, the agenda of ‘empowerment’, which is often read as an attempt to strip away from subjects the encumbrances which constrain and imprison their ‘true’ selves, facilitating an efflorescence of their innate potentialities, is equally entitled to be understood as a project which secretes an insidious form of power, subjugating and subjectifying its objects in the process of fabricating them as ‘subjects’. In short, the ‘beneficiaries’ or ‘cooperants’ in development projects, are only able to achieve their autonomous destiny by being transformed from outside. In the course of this transformation, their old selves, expressed through a variety of ways-of-being in the world, stand to be destroyed. In other words, the ‘gains’ of empowerment entail, as their obverse, ‘losses’ (Foucault, 1982; Laclau and Zac, 1994; Williams and Young, 1994; Sandel, 1992). The tension between autonomy and heteronomy emerges clearly in our discussion of World Vision’s relation to its target communities.

World Vision Tanzania (WVT)

In the core values of World Vision Tanzania we find inscribed both of the aforementioned aspects of empowerment. World Vision regards itself as an, ‘international partnership of Christians’, the mission of which is to, ‘follow our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ in working with the poor and oppressed to promote human transformation, seek justice and bear witness to the good news of the Kingdom of God’ (World Vision, 1992). It focuses on ‘transformational’ development, which is community based, involves a special concern for children, and accords women and men an equal respect. It is an approach that ‘celebrate[s] the richness of diversity in human personality, culture and contribution’ (World Vision, 1989), at the same time as seeking, without apparent irony, to ‘change unjust structures affecting the poor’ (World Vision, 1992). The NGO ‘give[s] priority to people before money, structure, systems and other institutional machinery’ (World Vision, 1989). Participation is regarded both as a means and an end to the development process.¹

World Vision has been working in Tanzania since 1981. It receives a proportion of its funding through ‘sponsorship’ of local children by Western individuals, and a proportion from official development aid. At the time of fieldwork it was the largest international NGO in the country, involved in 72 projects with a target population of over 2 million people. Initially, it worked through local churches and local governments (forming projects known as Church Community Development Programmes, CDPs), but more recently it has pioneered a new approach, the Area Development Project (ADP). An ADP covers all the villages in a local government Division, creating a parallel structure of development administration.² Each village elects a Village Development Project committee (VDP), and also elects a representative to a committee which coordinates the Area Development Project. Also represented on the ADP committee are special representatives for health and water, local government councillors, and a Project Coordinator (PC, a World Vision employee). The ADP meets once a month and provides a forum in which the progress, problems and achievements of the various projects are discussed, through which requests from VDPs for new projects are filtered, and where a bridge is provided between the ADP, World Vision, and the local council. All its representatives are volunteers. The ADP employs local government extension officers and community development officers on an ad hoc basis. A proportion of the funding for ADP projects is contributed by villagers, who also contribute labour. World Vision makes up the shortfall.
The aim of World Vision Tanzania is eventually to register ADPs as independent, largely self-sufficient, NGOs. It has a number of indicators for helping determine when an ADP is ready for independence. The indicators incorporate a number of ‘observable changes in the value system of people and community as a whole’, including an increased ‘spirit of cooperation and sharing’; increased interest toward ‘productive endeavours’ as opposed to ‘indulgence’ and ‘vices’; increased desire to study and share the Word of God; a shift from ‘apathy and resignation’ to ‘positive attitudes toward development’; ‘increased confidence’, ‘feelings of self-worth’, and ‘dignity’ (World Vision Tanzania, n.d.). More practically, it is expected that the ADP will have a core community group or committee facilitating development and sustaining people’s participation; people should have a steady source of income to meet basic needs, and there should be an established network for resource generation, relations with government, and NGOs (Ibid.). To this end, the focus of World Vision’s approach is on ‘community capacity building’. It has a dynamic Capacity Building Division at its Arusha Head Office, dedicated to strengthening the capacity of both its own staff and the communities with which World Vision works.

World Vision’s desire to encourage participation and democracy within the structures of the ADP, together with its emphasis on targeting the poor, challenging unjust structures, respecting gender equality, and increasing production, identifies it as the type of organisation suitable to advancing the empowerment agenda in Tanzania.

We see people coming together in communities to plan and implement programmes for their own development … We have a dream where … transformational development empowers the people of Tanzania to be responsible for their own development (World Vision, 1995).

World Vision aims to create active citizens able to choose, articulate and pursue their own goals within a broad community consensus. Such an endeavour clearly resonates with more secular notions of ‘empowerment’. For WVT, the participation and empowerment of the communities with which they work is the central objective of the Area Development Programme. In other words, the concrete manifestations of development projects (such as schools, health facilities) are not simply an end in themselves. They are rather the means by which to foster participatory development and community empowerment.

The ADPs

Research for this article focused on two of WVT’s ADPs based in the northeast of Tanzania; Moshono ADP³ in Moshono Division, Arumeru District (Arusha Region), and Sanya ADP⁴ in Siha Division, Hai District (Kilimanjaro Region). WVT have had a presence in both areas since the early 1980s. The Moshono ADP was begun in 1991 and is something of a showcase project. It comprises 14 villages, with a total population of around 70,000 people. Its main purpose is:

To change the attitude of the people of Moshono towards development and enable them to realise their state of underdevelopment, appreciate their own development, plan and utilise their local resources (World Vision, 1996:1).

To this end the ADP sponsored projects in agriculture, water, health, education and evangelism. Similarly, the Sanya ADP is involved in much the same types of development activity, though the project in Sanya is not considered to be of ‘showcase’ quality and its future was uncertain at the time of research. World Vision
Tanzania has worked in the area since the early 1980s and the current ADP covers all 15 villages in Siha Central and Siha East wards, involving an estimated population of 60,000.

Research on the Sanya ADP focused on two villages in the project, in which interviews were conducted with VDP members and members of the Village Government. In addition, focus groups were held with groups of male and female participants respectively. ADP meetings were attended for both projects. To gain an overview of the way in which the Moshono ADP functioned, interviews were held with a selection of ADP committee members from a range of different villages. Noticeable in both cases was the elite status of ADP and VDP representatives, the majority of whom had previous experience of representing their communities in Village Government, as either employees or elected members.5

**Bottom-up Commandism?**

Two significant factors emerged from the interviews and focus group discussions. First, discussions in Moshono revealed an agreement that the ADP was more effective and efficient than the District Council in distributing services to the community.6 The main difference was that World Vision’s planning process was simpler. Government projects passed up a hierarchy of development committees which conducted various investigations before reaching the full council, from there they went to regional development committees, then to the central government and finally back down again. It could take three years between a Village Development Committee deciding, for example, that it wanted iron sheets for a school, and the sheets’ delivery. At any stage of this process the idea could be squashed by political interests, the materials could be diverted elsewhere, or the money might fail to come because of budgetary crises. All informants also claimed that materials donated by World Vision reached their intended destinations, because the VDPs had the strength and self-confidence to resist political interference, should it occur. In addition, the World Vision planning process was transparent and easy to understand, from the stage of a community deciding on something to the stage of it receiving materials and completing a project. By contrast, government officials and politicians would sometimes arrive out of the blue and make promises of materials, and some time later, if they were lucky, materials would just arrive.

The second interesting finding was that it was difficult to assess the content of people’s participation, or to distinguish any difference between that and ‘mobilisation’. Representatives’ explanations of how the planning process takes place were patchy and inconsistent. However, from the various responses it is possible to piece together an ideal-type scenario: Ideally, the community would decide in a Village Government meeting on the kind of project to pursue. The VDP together with the Village Government would be given the task of making plans, and it would begin to organise people for contributions in money and labour. At the same time the VDP would take a request to the relevant committee of the ADP. If the ADP committee agreed to the project it would be aired at the ADP full council and if passed there (which would depend in part on the contributions already made by the community), it would organise to apply for money or to allocate existing materials. While continuing to organise the community, the VDP would supervise the employment of those materials. While inscribing a participatory moment there are definite commandist overtones to this model. These were reinforced by the language used by some of the representatives to the ADP, which suggested that community input into
the actual decision making process was minimal, and limited only to articulating in broad terms what type of project they would like to see. For example:

We meet once a month and give a report to Village Government. The VDP is between the ADP and the Village Government, and when we want our projects to be implemented we go to the Village Government where the sub-committees are automatically informed and they then go to the wananchi and inform them about the projects (Moshono ADP).

Another informant stated that:

It is difficult for people to refuse to contribute because they have water problems, so everyone wants to contribute. We communicate with the wananchi through holding a joint meeting with Village Government, where we explain to the wananchi about the intended project (Moshono ADP).

If able-bodied people failed to contribute money or labour to the Moshono ADP it emerged that they would be fined: ‘We call a village meeting and we decide together what the fine will be for people who don’t contribute’. If a person was unable to pay a fine, his or her property could be confiscated. One representative explained how they were fortunate in their village to have a lock-up, where non-participants could be put overnight or for an unspecified period. This however had only been resorted to on a few occasions. Significantly, this particular informant frequently used the term kuhamasisha (to mobilise) in describing relations between the VDP and ordinary villagers. The informant was asked whether there was a difference between kuhamasisha (to induce, motivate, mobilise) and kushiriki (to cooperate, participate). She responded, ‘They’re the same; aren’t they?’ Whether individuals are empowered through this type of ‘participation’ is at least open to question.

The blurred line between participation and mobilisation was further evident in discussions with villagers from the Sanya ADP. In particular, the extent to which people felt any kind of ‘ownership’ of the project was highly questionable. Several informants outlined the manner in which projects were often hi-jacked by village elites, and the manner in which the majority of the residents were required to ‘participate’ through mechanisms more easily recognisable as forms of ‘mobilisation’. This is evident from the following three encounters:

It took a long time to lay the pipes because the community had to participate, to pay the workers for their labour. When the project started as a World Vision project it was not seen as a community project and people thought, ‘this is a World Vision project, it’s not our work’. It took us a long time to educate people that they had to contribute, they didn’t understand, they thought it was all the work of World Vision and that World Vision was providing all the money, so it took time to educate us all … when the villagers were told that they had to contribute money they thought the leaders were trying to cheat them out of the World Vision money and use it for themselves (VDP in Sanya ADP).

CM: What does WVT do in the village?

VDP: It helps with water and schools. Through child sponsorship the goal is to manage to have good schools and clean water for the children.

CM: Who decided on these goals?

VDP: They are the ideas of the church priest and the village leaders (VDP in Sanya ADP).
WV came through the churches, they started the KCCDP9 which was lead by church leaders, and village leaders were also invited because they are the people who lead the farmers to do the labour, but villagers did not know how the project was going on (VDP in Sanya ADP).

Several points emerge from these comments about the nature of WVT’s participatory planning process. First, it appears that the concept of participation has been presented to the community in terms of contributions of cash and labour. Certainly, it is clear that this is how the villagers have interpreted the WVT project, and their contribution to it. Second, the villagers are represented (by a resident) as passive subjects waiting for development to be done ‘for’ them. WVT is seen as the active agent mobilising residents who need to be ‘educated’ about their role in the development process. Third, it appears that the goals of the project were not decided upon following a full consultation process with the entire community: certainly, the community now feels little ownership of the goals or the project process. Rather, it has been the traditional village leaders (church elders, church employees, and members of village government) who have had the greatest influence over the ADP. Finally, villagers seem to be generally uninformed about the project, its mechanisms, its representatives, and WVT itself. When asked directly, none of the women present at a group discussion in one of the villages in the Sanya ADP knew who their village representatives on the ADP committee were. In a second village, where WVT had been less active in terms of project work, even less was known about the NGO and the project. Many respondents in focus group discussions did not even seem to be aware that they were part of the Sanya ADP. Evidence points toward the ‘empowerment’ of an elite, not toward that of poor individuals, nor the ‘community’ as a whole.

**World Vision in Moivaro**

Greater insight into these issues was provided by an intensive study of Moivaro Village, Moshono ADP. The Village Government in Moivaro was well-resourced, with a new office, a Village Executive Officer who always came to work, and a village messenger. It appeared relatively effective in mobilising its population for development. World Vision’s ADP had assisted in the rehabilitation of school classrooms, the provision of improved maize seeds to 50 farmers, the supply of improved dairy cattle to 25 farmers (based on the ‘Heifer-in-Trust’ pass-on scheme), the laying of a section of water pipe, construction of a tank at the water source, and the distribution of maize as famine relief. But this is not to say that villagers were being empowered. Delving beneath the surface of these showcase ‘successes’, research suggested that – at least for some people – mobilisation for development was inspired by fear of reprisals as much as by enthusiasm for the projects. One explanation for this was that the collective goods for which contributions were induced tended to accrue more to the wealthier members of the village. One example was provided by the village school. The building of extra classrooms and teachers’ houses at the school at Shangarau ought to have benefited all the villagers. However, for some villagers the burden of paying school contributions was greater than for others. Contributions could add up to over 10,000 Tshs a year. The researcher was told that some parents could not afford to send their children to that school, and that some children did casual labour or petty trade so as to be able to pay fees. The high level of contributions for various projects was raised time and again by poor farmers in Moivaro. They felt that the Village Chairman was not sympathetic to their situation: he was an aggressive man who could not be argued with. His main support base was among members of the village elite. To their minds he was rich, failed to consider those who were poor, and forced through decisions with which not everyone could easily comply. The issue would
repay further research, but there is at least *prima facie* evidence that World Vision’s presence in Moivaro accelerated the exploitation of the poor by the rich.

The clearest insight into the relative lack of success World Vision have had in transforming the life of the community in Moivaro was provided by the cows project. The project was of a similar type to that pioneered by another NGO working in the area – Heifer Project International (Heifer Project had already donated a number of cows to Moivaro). Under the terms of the project, cows were supposed to be distributed, by the VDP, to people who could afford to keep a cow but who could not afford to buy one. They were then supposed to return two female offspring to the project, one of which would be passed on to another poor farmer. However, the role of the VDP in this endeavour, and also the process by which the VDP came to be constituted, was opaque to ordinary villagers. Research disclosed that members of the VDP, together with the PC, selected a number of poor farmers to go for training in expectation of receiving heifers. Subsequently, several farmers could not afford to spend two weeks away from their families. Instead of looking for other poor farmers, the Village Government, and certain members of the VDP, chose to allocate cows to themselves or their relatives. Of the 25 cows, three went to sub-village chairmen and seven went to either members of the VDP or their spouses. Most of these people were not poor. Research based on a previous, participatory wealth-ranking exercise (Kelsall, 2000), indicated that in total, five farmers in the top wealth group received cows, four in the second, four in the third, four in the fourth, and four in the fifth.11 Many of these farmers already had milk cows. Some had more than one.

The way in which cows were distributed, and people’s lack of knowledge about the VDP, had caused some resentment in the village. In January 1996, in the face of complaints from villagers about the way cows had been allocated, and on the advice of the former PC, the largely invisible VDP was called to account in a village meeting – its shadowy members were expelled, allegedly for allocating cows in a secretive and ‘friendly’ way. Other members, mostly new, were elected. But this empowering moment proved not to be sustainable: the subsequent committee, again drawn largely from the village’s elite, seemed hardly more disposed to involving poorer members of the village in their decisions. Neither was it furthering World Vision’s stated aims of gender equality. A young female representative had been prevented from representing the village at the ADP by the VDP Chairman, in collusion with the village Chairman and possibly the woman’s husband.

Very few people we spoke to knew the members of the VDP. A few were able to name one or two people on the committee; only one knew both the representatives for his sub-village. Few villagers understood how it was supposed to work. Most did not know how often it met, or where it gave reports. Some knew that it gave reports at village government meetings, although one person said these were read by the village executive officer. It seems also that it was the sub-village chairmen who were in charge of mobilising labour and contributions for World Vision projects. These findings seemed to confirm what we were told by one member of the original VDP, that, *VDP imemezwa na serikali* (the VDP has been swallowed by the government).

Notwithstanding the relative success of service provision, it was clear that the type of development sponsored in Moivaro was not particularly participatory, nor was it leading to any discernible psychological empowerment of the poor. Instead, as in Kilimanjaro, development projects tended to trace a groove worn both by colonial development schemes under which labour was mobilised by the chief or headman, and by self-help schemes associated with the post-colonial government’s policy of
'Socialism for Self-Reliance'. One explanation was that World Vision’s respect for community self-determination left development coordination in the hands of people who simply emerged as leaders. Such people tended to be part of established elites, and their interests were not always identical to those of poorer villagers. The problem for developmentalists – over whether it is the individual or the community that is the target of their interventions – is posed with particular starkness here.

At the time of fieldwork little effort was being made to bypass these elites and conscientize the poor directly. A notable exception was provided by an interview with a poor farmer who was a member of the original VDP. She had recently been to a workshop organised by World Vision and was vocal in stressing her right and responsibility to interrogate leaders about the use of funds for development projects. Whether she was successful in practising this right is another matter. Ironically, she had only attended the workshop because she had received a missive from the village chairman instructing her to do so. The example is illuminating: an outside agency – World Vision – is required to ‘empower’ an actor inside the community. Yet the vector for its intervention is another actor – the village chair – whose interests are potentially opposed to its objectives. Thus, both contradictions – between the internal and external (autonomy versus heteronomy) and those peculiar to the internal (homogeneity versus heterogeneity) are, in this example, articulated and instantiated.

This articulation is repeated in another, perhaps surprising, finding of the research. While poor villagers in Moivaro often had complaints about the VDP, they were unanimous in their belief that World Vision was a good thing, and a bonus to the community. Failures to elevate the poor notwithstanding, the presence of WVT in Moshono was generally welcomed: while the poorest might express desires for an increased share of the benefits WVT provided, they expressed few signs of wanting to be ‘empowered’ in an individualistic sense. Behind their statements one could discern a desire for increased control over their lives, but this could equally be understood in terms of gaining increased access to patrons, as to becoming ‘self-directing’, ‘self-sufficient’ or ‘autonomous’. Extrapolating, we might venture that both empowerment and development are interpreted locally in an idiom of clientelism, which sutures the divide between rich and poor. If so, this places local notions of development closer to particularistic, ‘post-development’, communitarian ideas than to the universalisms characteristic of liberal development discourse (Rahnema, 1992). WVT itself is not averse to speaking in this register (see below).

Evidence from Sanya suggests that the ‘benefits’ of World Vision’s intervention were also locally inflected. In the case of the Sanya ADP on Kilimanjaro, part of the attraction of the ADP for the villagers was the prestige and status associated with the international NGO project. Such concerns form a central part of the wider socioculturally constructed Chagga notion of *maendeleo* (development). Local understandings of *maendeleo* on Kilimanjaro have been historically concerned with the region’s linkages to the outside world and its relative modernity compared to most rural areas (and probably some urban ones) in Tanzania. To be actively involved with a big development project instigated by a large international NGO which is helping to provide the community with better, more modern facilities (such as schools, health centres, and water projects) is an inherently ‘good thing’ according to the Chagga notion of *maendeleo*. Whether or not certain individuals or whole communities are empowered as a result of participation in this process is not an issue of major concern.12 Ironically, *maendeleo* resembles more closely an earlier, ‘technical fix/service provision’ model of development. This model was initially pursued by WVT.
in Kilimanjaro, although it has now been superceded, in theory if not unequivocally in practice, by an empowerment-based model.

**Conclusions: Who Wants to be Empowered?**

In conclusion, we should state that the aim of this article has not been to provide prescriptions for the development community, since such prescriptions are not easily forthcoming. Its aim rather has been to describe the contradictions, ambiguities and ambivalences in the theory and practice of development as empowerment.

A major tension has been identified in World Vision’s understanding of ‘community empowerment’. It should be recognised first that the promotional literature of a large international NGO needs to be sufficiently vague that a variety of parties can read into it something of their own *weltanschauung*, and second, that in order to succeed even NGOs of an evangelical bent must evince some degree of pragmatism. Together these facts explain in part the puzzles of an NGO which claims to want to elevate the position of women and the poor, while at the same time channelling its interventions through established elites, and even regarding the strengthening of capable elites as an indicator of project success. At the same time it should be stressed that World Vision staff were intelligent people who genuinely wrestled with these issues. While they could not be credited (or discredited) with holding rigidly to notions of equality in income or power distribution, the results of this study were received with disquiet and prompted a memorandum to members of the Capacity Building Division regarding the importance of targeting more effectively the ‘grassroots’.

The comparative lack of concern with formal equality in favour of a belief in the obligations of leaders to the less fortunate members of society has much in common with the idealisation of ‘community’ or ‘moral economy’ evident in certain ‘post-development’ writings. Indeed, a Chinese poem, which also opens a section of *The Post-Development Reader* (Rahnema and Bawtree, 1996) entitled ‘Towards the Post-Development Age’, adorned the wall of the Capacity Building Division. The poem reads: ‘Go to the people. Live among them. Learn from them. Love them. Start with what you know. Build on what they have. But of the best leaders when their task is done, the people will remark: ‘We have done it ourselves’ (Ibid. p. 275). Unfortunately, the evidence presented here, in particular that from Moivaro, suggests that elites often fail in their responsibilities toward poorer groups, and may in fact use access to external resources to augment their exploitation of them. At the time of research WVT was pioneering a new methodology of ‘Appreciative Inquiry’ in certain villages, although it had yet to make an impact in Moivaro. Utilising metaphors of ‘personal growth’ and ‘moving in the direction of light’, Appreciative Inquiry was a participatory approach designed to build on self-identified community strengths. A methodology which elicits ‘strengths’ by means of ‘participatory’ appraisal, and which eschews any kind of language of structured power relations, runs an obvious risk of reproducing existing inequalities and perpetuating patterns of development which date from the colonial period if not earlier.

Another, perplexing contradiction, is that between empowerment as a state of being which is internally achieved and empowerment as something for which, at the very least, the *catalyst* lies without. Our review of the experience of the communities with which World Vision works suggests that the meaning of ‘development’ is still externally determined, and that the idea of ‘development’ as ‘empowerment’ is no different in this respect. In time target communities may partially internalise or appropriate such meanings, as Chagga have done with ideas of modernity, and to a
lesser degree, with ujamaa socialism, but a time-lag should be expected before the idea of empowerment, so fashionable in development circles, resounds within these communities.

World Vision’s own solution appears to be to build more directly on the indigenous. Indeed, if Appreciative Inquiry is successful in promoting an improved ethic of responsibility on the part of leaders to lead, it might fit more perfectly with extant aspirations. Progressive thinkers, by contrast, face not just the practical difficulty of concretising the notions of abstract equality to which they aspire, but also the disturbing possibility that equality can only be instituted via insidious processes of heteronomous transformation.

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Endnotes

2. Tanzania’s local political and administrative structure runs from sub-village level, through ward, divisional, district and regional levels. Elected councils exist at village and district level. Previously the party-state hierarchy stretched down to roughly every ten houses. Since Tanzania’s multi-party transition, the ‘Ten Cell’ is de jure an organ of the party, although its differentiation from the state is not always easily established on the ground.
3. Research by Tim Kelsall was carried out in Arusha between September 1996 and July 1997.
4. Research by Claire Mercer was carried out in Kilimanjaro between October 1996 and May 1997.
5. For example, the Moshono ADP Chairman was also the Village Chairman of Moshono village, having previously worked for the government in Tanga Region. The two female representatives interviewed were both members of the Village Government and leaders in UWT (Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanzania, Union of Tanzanian Women). Another informant was a Village Chairman, sitting on the ADP because the elected representative was ill. One was a Village Executive Officer in a neighbouring village. The chairman of the ADP water committee was the district councillor for Moshono ward (who sat on the ADP ex officio), and another representative was a member of Village Government and elder in the Lutheran church.
6. Efficiency being measured in time not cost. Comparable data on the latter were unobtainable.
8. i.e. Claire Mercer.
9. Kyungukyelwa Church Community Development Project, the previous WVT project which has now expanded to become the Sanya ADP.
10. At the time of research Tsh 10,000 was equivalent to roughly $15. In 1997 the real GDP per capita for Tanzania was $580 (UNDP, 1999).
11. There were five wealth groups in total; one recipient could not be traced.
12. It is worth noting that the word ‘empowerment’ does not have a direct translation in either Kiswahili or Kichagga.
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‘The Workers’ Struggle’: A South African Text Revisited

Martin Plaut

In April 1982 workers from across South Africa met at the congress of the non-racial trade union movement, the Federation of South African Trade Unions, Fosatu. The federation was just three years old, but in that time it had grown five fold, from around 20,000 workers to over 100,000 (Baskin, 1991:25, 29). What they heard was a speech that must rank as one of the most important statements of principle ever delivered to a South African labour movement. Although the Fosatu general secretary, Joe Foster read it, the speech reflected the work of many people. Its authors have never been revealed, but the hand of Alec Erwin – Fosatu’s first general secretary, and currently South Africa’s Minister of Trade and Industry – was almost certainly among them.

The speech, entitled ‘The Workers’ Struggle – where does Fosatu stand’ went beyond charting a political course for the movement. It attempted to define how workers, as a class, should situate themselves in the struggles that lay ahead. In so doing it looked beyond the end of apartheid to the form of society that would emerge a decade later, once the African National Congress took power. These were the most ambitious of goals. For that reason alone it deserves to be remembered. But its significance goes well beyond that, and can best be judged by the response that it evoked. Not to put too fine a point on it, the liberation movement, in the form of the ANC and South African Communist Party, panicked. They realised that they were being outflanked on the left, and that they would have to re-assert their assumed role as the natural leadership of South Africa’s oppressed. Exactly how this was done has never been revealed in detail and no academic has investigated exactly what took place.

Having sad that, it is not hard to see why their reaction was so severe. The speech – which was then adopted as Fosatu policy – challenged the most cherished beliefs of the ANC and SACP. It provided a brief tour of South African history in which it asserted that there had never been a working class movement in South Africa (a direct repudiation of the Communist Party’s position): that the ANC engaged in ‘populist’ and ‘opportunistic’ politics to bolster its position in exile and had failed to support the international labour struggle (such as Solidarity in Poland) because of its links with the Soviet Union. Finally, and most tellingly, there was the prediction that because the ANC was a populist mass movement, it would in the end go the way of all other anti-colonial movements in Africa and turn on its own supporters in the working class. The speech concluded that:

It is, therefore, essential that workers must strive to build their own powerful and effective organisation even whilst they are part of the wider popular struggle. This organisation is necessary to protect worker interests and to ensure that the popular movement is not
hijacked by elements who will in the end have no option but to turn against their worker supporters.

While not repudiating the ANC, the Fosatu statement spelled out the movement’s limitations, and demanded action to ensure the protection of workers’ interests. As one leader put it: ‘Of course we want Mandela to be Prime Minister, but we must make sure that when he is, workers control him’ (Freedman, 1987:434). The critique was devastating. It also held out the implicit threat that Fosatu would be the launch pad from which a workers party would be formed – possibly on the lines of the Workers Party in Brazil. The reply was provided by the African Communist, which was then much more than just the theoretical journal of the South African Communist Party (SACP). It was the mouthpiece of the Congress Alliance. Fosatu was labelled as ‘syndicalist’ and the union federation was accused of attempting to substitute itself for the Communist Party as the party of the working class (African Communist, 1983).

The ANC did more than issue angry denunciations. It mobilised to ensure that it not only won the unions to its cause, but to its political perspective. Within four years it had managed to exert enough political muscle to persuade the South African union movement to reform itself as the Congress of South African Trade Unions, Cosatu, adopting the Congress label as an indication that its loyalties lay with the Congress Alliance. They had also managed to arrange a meeting with the new Cosatu leadership in Zambia, at which the Cosatu general secretary endorsed the exiled movement as the leading element in the liberation struggle (Southall, 1995:295). Those opposed to this development could do little more than complain that Naidoo had acted without mandate in taking this position and ‘should not have agreed to Cosatu struggling under the leadership of the ANC’ (Baskin, 1991:100). These were, in reality, quibbles after the event. The ‘workerists’ (as they were labelled) had been outmanoeuvred by the ANC and its ‘populist’ supporters within the union movement.

The speech, and the stir that it caused, could be seen as little more than an historical footnote, was it not for the continued problem posed by workers and their place in South African society. For a start there is the burning question of the policies pursued by the ANC since it achieved power. Patrick Bond has documented the gradual drift away from any socialist principles, as the former liberation movement came under intense pressure from capital to change its policies (Bond, 2000). On an individual level, many of the trade union leaders of yesterday became the cabinet ministers of today. And those that have not climbed the greasy poll of politics have ascended the ladder of capitalism:

*The group that benefits most from the post-apartheid order is a fledgling black middle class. It consists of a growing number of independent entrepreneurs, a managerial aristocracy in high demand and a new political bourgeoisie eager to join in the consumerism of their former oppressors (Adam, Slabbert & Moodley, 1997:174).*

In October 2002 Cosatu attempted to challenge the ANC over its privatisation of state-owned assets. The two-day general strike was generally perceived to have been a flop, as it elicited only limited support from workers. Despite this there is considerable nervousness among the ruling elite about labour and its relationship with the ANC and SACP. The threat, long heralded, but so far never fulfilled, of the unions re-asserting the independence first hinted at twenty years ago haunts the Congress Alliance. That is why Joe Foster’s speech remains as relevant today, as it was when he first delivered it.
The following is a shortened text of the keynote address given by the Fosatu general secretary, Joe Foster, at the Fosatu Congress, April 1982, and endorsed as Fosatu policy. The practical policies which relate to proposals to change the Congress that relate to the situation that prevailed at the time, which were at the end of the speech, have been omitted.

Fosatu Congress, April 1982
Joe Foster

Three years ago, almost to the day, we met in this very same place to form Fosatu. Today we have set as our theme – the Workers’ Struggle – in an attempt to further clarify where we as worker representatives see Fosatu stand in this great struggle. As these unions grow then the question is what role do they play in the wider political arena. There has been a great upsurge in political activities over the last few years and many different political groups are looking to the union movement to state its position. We must be sure our organisation and our leadership can confidently state its position and continue to organise in the way that will strengthen and not weaken that position. The purpose of this paper is to set out the issues we should debate if we are to meet the challenges.

Working Class Movement
As a trade union federation we are clearly concerned with workers and their aspirations. If we were to think in terms of our members only, we would have a very limited political role. If, however, we are thinking more widely of the working class then we have to examine very much more carefully what our political role is. In particular we need to look at this role in the South African context. If we look at the advanced industrial countries then we see what can be called working class movements. These are a number of different organisations – trade unions, co-operatives, political parties and newspapers – that see themselves as linked to the working class and furthering its interests. These working class movements are, therefore, powerful social forces in those societies. In the capitalist economies these working class movements have power and organisation yet politically the working class is still subject to policies and practices that are clearly against their interests as the activities of Thatcher and Reagan show. This is increasingly leading to intense political and organisational activity to give the working class and the union movement a clearer direction so as to gather together the working class movement into a force that will more definitely put workers in control of their own destiny.

In the Socialist countries similar battles are being fought. Whilst social, political and economic relations in these countries have been greatly altered and there have been great achievements to the benefit of workers, there is still a need for workers themselves to control their own destiny. So Solidarity was not struggling to restore capitalism in Poland, its struggle was to establish more democratic worker control over their socialist society. Now my purpose in briefly looking at the working class movement in the advanced industrial countries was twofold:

- Firstly, so that we can be clear that worker activities such as strikes and protests do not in themselves mean that a working class movement or working class politics exist. These latter are more than that; they are large-scale organisations with a clear social and political identity as the working class.
Secondly, I wish to show that the pure size of working class organisation is itself no guarantee that workers will control their own destiny. In fact as the struggle of Solidarity shows, even the fact that a country is said to be socialist does not guarantee that workers control their own destiny. In short it could be said that workers must build a powerful and effective movement if they are to succeed in advancing their interests against some very hostile forces, but they must also ensure that this movement is able to take a clear political direction.

The experience of the great working class movement in the advanced industrial countries is a very important guide and lesson to us. However, it cannot provide all our answers. Firstly, in South Africa we cannot talk of a working class movement as we have defined it above. Secondly, whilst there is undoubtedly a large and growing working class its power is only a potential power since as yet it has no definite social identity of itself as working class. The questions we should, therefore, address ourselves to, are:

- Why has no working class movement emerged?
- What are the prospects for such a movement emerging?
- What role can Fosatu play in such a process?

**Political History & Workers**

It is not possible in a paper such as this to deal fully with all the developments in South Africa’s history that have led to the non-existence of a workers’ movement in South Africa. South Africa’s history has been characterised by great repression and the major political and ideological instrument for this repression has been racism. Yet the major effect of this repression has been to very rapidly establish a large capitalist economy. Racism, and the violence and injustices associated with it, is a very stark and clear form of repression. Alongside this only about 5-10 per cent of population has ever had the franchise. Clearly, therefore, there is a very identifiable oppressive force and the major political task of the oppressed people has always been to attack that oppressive and racist regime.

So what has developed in South Africa is a very powerful tradition of popular or populist politics. The role of the great political movements such as the ANC and the Congress Alliance has been to mobilise the masses against the repressive minority regime. In such a situation mass mobilisation is essential so as to challenge the legitimacy of the state both internally and internationally. Where virtually all the population is voteless and oppressed by a racial minority then a great alliance of all classes is both necessary and a clear political strategy. Furthermore, building such an alliance was a great task. The ANC had to overcome racial division so as to rise above the divisive racism of the oppressors. They had to deal with the opportunistic tribal leadership, to organise thousands upon thousands of people and they had to do all this in the face of harsh repression by the state. In achieving this there is little wonder that they ANC rose to be one of the great liberation movements in Africa.

In this context it is also easier to see and understand why the trade union movement acted in a particular way. The racial divisions in the working class, linked as they were to other objective factors, made it possible for capital to quite quickly suppress any serious challenge to their supremacy. It was possible to create the conditions that led to a politically tame union movement and thereby forced more militant and progressive unions to bear the brunt of state action, which in turn affected the politics
of these unions. Furthermore, at all times there were occasions when workers resisted by strike action, protest and organisation. Yet this by itself cannot constitute a working class movement. Whilst the unions were prominent they were always small and weakly organised both nationally and in the factories. They could not provide an organisational base for a working class movement as we have defined it above.

Progressive and militant unions were continually the subject of state harassment, but, never managed to seriously challenge capital nationally or on a sustained basis. As a result the effective political role of progressive unions and of worker activity was to provide a crucial part of any popular struggle and that was to give it its ‘Worker Voice’. No mass popular movement can be effective or be seen to be effective if it does not have some worker involvement or representation. By the 1950s with the growth of South Africa’s industry and the size of the working class the need to include workers became essential and as a result SACTU became an important element of the Congress Alliance.

In these circumstances the progressive trade unions became part of the popular struggle against oppression. They did not and probably could not have provided the base for working class organisation. There is of course no doubt that their activities have been very, very important in creating the conditions that led to the emergence in the last 10 to 15 years of the present progressive trade unions. However, these unions are operating in a different environment.

Workers and their struggle became very much part of the wider popular struggle. An important effect of this development was that capital could hide behind the curtains of apartheid and racism. The political energies of the oppressed masses and of international critics were focused on the apartheid regime and its abhorrent racism. The government and Afrikanerdom became the focus of the attack. In fact the position was such that learned liberal academics saw in capital the great hope for change despite the fact that capital and its lackeys were undoubtedly the major beneficiaries of apartheid.

Capital did its very best to keep in the political background and as a result this helped prevent the creation of capital’s logical political opposite which is a working class political movement. However, of crucial significance was that capital was growing rapidly and changing its very nature into a more monopolistic, technologically advanced and concentrated form. Its links internationally were growing, as was its importance for international capital. We find, therefore, that behind the scenes of the great battle between the apartheid regime and its popular opponents that the capitalist economy has flourished and capital emerges now as a powerful and different force. It

- is highly concentrated in truly gigantic corporations;
- has access to international information on how to deal with working class challenges;
- has access to the state’s security information;
- is able to rapidly share and assess information;
- is able to use the objective circumstances in its favour such as unemployment and influx control to weaken worker organisations;
- is now an important part of international capital and cannot therefore, be lightly discarded by international capital;
• is able to hide behind politics and as a result can hide its sophisticated attacks on labour because no-one is paying any attention.

Yet as the upsurge of popular political activity emerged again in the 1970s some of its new forms such as Black Consciousness also place little emphasis on capital. So there is a growing gap between popular politics and the power of capital and as a result the potential power of workers. It is in this context we should look at the likelihood of a working class politics emerging.

**Need for a Working Class Movement**

The growing size of the economy and the dramatic changes taking place in capital, have created important new conditions in the economy. We also have to take into account the speed and manner in which the economy has developed. In discussing the working class movements in the advanced industrial economies, we have to bear in mind that in most cases they took about 100 years or more to fully develop. Industry started first by building larger and larger factories and bringing people together in these factories.

The new capitalist had to struggle politically with the older ruling classes over labour, land, taxation policy, tariff protection, political rights and political power. The mechanisation became more important and there was a definite change in production processes. As this happened the skilled workers who had usually given leadership to the craft unions found themselves in a very difficult position. As a result leadership problems in the organisation of trade unions and the political environment, developed in a complex and relatively slow way.

In South Africa this has been condensed into 60-70 years and from the outset large-scale capitalist enterprises dominated. The birth of capitalism here was brutal and quick. The industrial proletariat was ripped from its land in the space of a few decades. At present capitalist production massively dominates all other production. There are no great landlords on their agricultural estates and there is no significant peasantry or collective agriculture. Virtually everyone depends for all or part of their income on industry or capitalist agriculture. The working class has experienced a birth of fire in South Africa and they constitute the major objective political force opposed to the state and capital. There is no significant petty bourgeoisie or landed class that will assist in the organisation of workers:

• the great concentration of capital has also meant a greater concentration of workers. These workers generally have a higher level of basic education and skills than before and their links with the past are all but broken so that more and more a worker identity is emerging;

• this is reinforced by the sophisticated strategies that are designed to ‘deracialise’ industry and some other areas of society. The effect of this is to divide off certain privileged members of Black society leaving workers at the bottom of the privilege pile;

• the concentration of workers in industry has also concentrated them in great urban townships;

• the particular structure of the South African economy with its high degree of state involvement, price controls and heavy dependence on international markets has made it a very sensitive economy. As a consequence attempts to
‘buy off’ the major part of the working class will fail. It is more likely that as some readjustments of privilege are attempted that it will have to be workers that suffer through inflation and the lack of basic commodities;

- the above factors and South Africa’s international economic importance are likely to force capital into the political open and as a consequence develop a worker response;

- although capital can at present hide behind apartheid it is also the case that if workers organise widely enough they can get great support from the international labour movement. Also international public opinion has to be carefully watched by capital because both international and South African capital are dependent on their links with the rest of the world.

These then are some of the important factors that are favourable to the development of a working class movement in South Africa. However, this does not mean that this will automatically happen. To understand this, we need to look at the present political environment more carefully to see both the present political tendencies and to establish why some active leadership role should be played by the unions and Fosatu in particular. Workers need their own organisation to counter the growing power of capital and to further protect their own interests in the wider society. However, it is only workers who can build this organisation and in doing this they have to be clear on what they are doing. As the numbers and importance of workers grows then all political movements have to try and win the loyalty of workers because they are such an important part of society. However, in relation to the particular requirements of worker organisation, mass parties and popular political organisations have definite limitations which have to be clearly understood by us.

We should distinguish between the international position and internal political activity. Internationally, it is clear that the ANC is the major force with sufficient presence and stature to be a serious challenge to the South African state and to secure the international condemnation of the present regime. To carry out this struggle is a difficult task because South Africa has many friends who are anxious to ensure that they can continue to benefit from her wealth. The fact that the ANC is also widely accepted internally also strengthens its credibility internationally. However, this international presence of the ANC which is essential to an popular challenge to the present regime places certain strategic limitations on the ANC, namely:

- to reinforce its international position it has to claim credit for all forms of resistance, no matter what the political nature of such resistance. There is, therefore, a tendency to encourage undirected opportunistic political activity;

- it has to locate itself between the major international interests. To the major Western powers it has to appear as anti-racist but not as anti-capitalist. For the socialist East it has to be at least neutral in the superpower struggle and certainly it could not appear to offer a serious socialist alternative to that of those countries as the response to Solidarity illustrates. These factors must serious affect its relationship to workers;

- accordingly, the ANC retains its tradition of the 1950’s and 1960’s when because there was no serious alternative political path it rose to be a great populist liberation movement. To retain its very important international position it has to retain its political position as a popular mass movement. This clearly has implications for its important military activities.
Internally we also have to carefully examine what is happening politically. As a result of the states’ complete inability to effect reform and the collapse of their Bantustan policy, they are again resorting to open repression. Since 1976 in particular this has given new life to popular resistance and once again the drive for unity against a repressive state has reaffirmed the political tradition of populism in South Africa. Various political and economic interests gather together in the popular front in the tradition of the ANC and the Congress Alliance.

In the present context all political activity, provided it is anti-state, is of equal status. In the overall resistance to the regime, this is not necessarily incorrect. In fact without such unity and widespread resistance it would not be possible by means of popular mass movements to seriously challenge the legitimacy of the present regime. However, the really essential question is how worker organisation relates to this wider political struggle. I have argued above that the objective political and economic conditions facing workers is now markedly different from that of 20 years ago. Yet there does not seem to be clarity on this within the present union movement. There are good reasons for this lack of clarity.

As a result of repression most worker leadership is relatively inexperienced and this is made worse by the fact that their unions are weak and unstable organisationally. The union struggles fought against capital have mostly been against isolated companies so that the wider struggles against capital at an industry or national level have not been experienced. This also means that workers and their leadership have not experienced the strength of large-scale worker organisation nor the amount of effort required to build and democratise such large-scale organisation. Again state repression and the wider political activity reinforce previous experience where the major function of workers was to reinforce and contribute to the popular struggle. Politically, therefore, most unions and their leadership lack confidence as a worker leadership. They see their role as part of wider struggle but are unclear on what is required for the worker struggle. Generally, the question of building an effective worker organisation is not dealt with and political energy is spent in establishing unity across a wide front. However, such a position is a great strategic error that will weaken if not destroy worker organisation both now and in the future. All the great and successful popular movements have had as their aim the overthrow of oppressive – most often colonial – regimes. But these movements cannot and have not in themselves been able to deal with the particular and fundamental problems of workers. Their task is to remove regimes that are regarded as illegitimate and unacceptable by the majority. It is, therefore, essential that workers must strive to build their own powerful and effective organisation even whilst they are part of the wider popular struggle. This organisation is necessary to protect and further worker interests and to ensure that the popular movement is not hijacked by elements who will in the end have no option but to turn against their worker supporters.

Broad and complicated matters have been covered and it is difficult to summarise them even further. However, I shall attempt to do so in order for us to try and examine the role that Fosatu can play in this struggle.

- That worker resistance such as strike action helps build worker organisation but by itself it does not mean that there is a working class movement.
- There has not been and is not a working class movement in South Africa.
• The dominant political tradition in South Africa is that of the popular struggle against an oppressive, racist minority regime.

• That this tradition is reasserting itself in the present upsurge of political activity.

• However, the nature of economic development in South Africa has brutally and rapidly created a large industrial proletariat.

• That the size and development of this working class is only matched by its mirror image which is the dramatic growth and transformation of industrial capital.

• That before it is too late workers must strive to form their own powerful and effective organisation within the wider popular struggle.

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**References**


AGOA, Lesotho’s ‘Clothing Miracle’ & the Politics of Sweatshops

Peter Gibbon

The ‘Africa Growth and Opportunity Act’ (AGOA) was signed into US law at the end of August 2000. Perhaps the most important provision of this version of the Act (AGOA I) was that it conferred duty-free status to clothing articles directly imported into the US from beneficiary countries, until 30 September 2008. To command beneficiary status, countries had to meet a series of political and economic conditions, with the result that 38 countries are currently included in benefits. In addition, beneficiary countries have to have an export visa system approved by the US Customs Department. As of early March 2003, nineteen had done so. The only important clothing manufacturing country in Africa that remains excluded from AGOA benefits is Zimbabwe.

AGOA distinguishes between ‘Lesser Developed Beneficiary Countries’ (LDBCs) – those with per capita incomes below US$1500 in 1998 – and other African countries, with regard to clothing rules of origin. At least until 30 September 2004, LDBCs have access on the basis of a single-stage rule, that is, one requiring only assembly and finishing in the country of origin. Non-LDBCs, such as Mauritius and South Africa, enjoy access only on the basis of a three-stage rule. That is, yarn spinning, fabric weaving or knitting and assembly and finishing must take place within a country of origin, in another beneficiary coun-

try, or in the US. A cap of 3.5% of all US imports by volume applied to AGOA preferences generally. A second version of AGOA, AGOA II, was signed into law in August 2002. Besides reclassifying Botswana and Namibia as LDBCs, this increased the cap to 7%, as well as resolving problems of eligibility for fully-fashioned knitwear and for articles made from merino wool.

In relation to the clothing trade between the US and Africa, AGOA removes quotas imposed by the US under the Multifibre Arrangement for certain products made in Mauritius and Kenya and prevents any further quotas being imposed. This gives African countries an important technical preference in relation to quota-bound ones. In most quota-bound countries, quota is traded. This typically adds a cost of US$2-3 per dozen to the US landed price of a number of major product types, including men’s cotton trousers and shirts. As far as tariffs were concerned, all countries’ clothing exports face US duty rates averaging 17% of landed value – although there are considerable variations between product types, with cottons rated mostly

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<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>89.1</td>
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<td>6 Anglophone LDBCs</td>
<td>224.6*</td>
<td>341.3</td>
<td>560.2</td>
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Source: US Department of Commerce, Otxa; *5 countries

Table 1: Clothing Exports from Africa to the US, six Angophone LDBCs, 2000-02 (US$m)
around 13% and synthetics at around 25%.

In other words, AGOA gives eligible African countries an average price advantage of 17% plus quota cost over other countries into the US market, until their aggregate US market share reaches 7%. Furthermore, it gives LDBC countries the chance to export into the US market on the basis of the most liberal rule of origin available, until the end of September 2004. The supply response to this has been spectacular, at least in Anglophone LBDCs. Total US clothing imports from sub-Saharan Africa rose from US$748.4m in 2000 to 1098.0m in 2002 (42%). From the group of six Anglophone LBDCs in Table 1 it more than doubled, to US$560m, over the same period (Table 1). The most spectacular success story has been that of Lesotho. Table 2 traces the development of Lesotho’s exports in more detail, since 1990.

Lesotho: the Industry, the Owners, the Customers

The clothing industry in Lesotho dates from the early 1980s when a number of South African companies (including SA Clothing Industry’s sportswear division) opened plants in Maseru, partly in order to take advantage of cheap labour for ‘exports’ to South Africa, partly in order to avoid sanctions on overseas exports, and partly to take advantage of Lesotho’s special derogation to the Lomé Convention rules of origin into the EU. Lesotho also offered various FDI incentives, most of which still remain. These include a company tax level of 15%, tax exemptions on dividends and on imported plant, and concessionary interest rates on working capital. These incentives are not exceptionally generous by international standards. The real attractions of Lesotho are its wage rates, its AGOA status, and its good communications infrastructure – in particular its easy road access to the port of Durban. With prevailing wage rates (see below) and AGOA, jeans from Lesotho can now be landed cheaper in the US than Mexican ones.

The first Far Eastern investment occurred in 1986, with the opening of the Taiwanese-owned Lesotho Haps. By the end of 1991 four further Taiwanese plants had opened, as had one from Hong Kong and the South African-owned jeans producer H D Lee (later part of Celrose, itself a subsidiary of the Edgars retail group). Amongst the Taiwanese investments were two larger players that have played a leading role ever since: China Garment Manufacturers (CGM) and C & Y Garments, owned by Nien Hsing. By the end of 1991 total employment stood at around 8,000 and the balance of exports had already shifted to the US.

Growth continued throughout the 1990s, although its pace slowed during 1992-96. Although the number of companies operating in Lesotho doubled in this period, only one large new player entered the scene, United Clothing (owned by Carry Wealth of Taiwan). By the end of the decade total employment was around 19,000. Production was based at an industrial estate adjoining Maseru railway station, and at a smaller estate

| Table 2: Exports of Lesotho to the US & EU, 1990–2002 (US$m) |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| to US       | 24.5        | 27.0        | 50.8        | 55.1        | 62.4        | 61.7        | 64.9        | 86.5        | 100.2       | 110.7       | 140.1       | 216.7       |
| to EU       | 25.6        | 18.2        | 18.2        | 14.7        | 13.5        | 12.6        | 12.7        | 4.5         | 0.8         | 0.2         | 1.6         | 3.2         |
|             |            |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             |             | n/          |

Sources: US Department of Commerce, Otexa; Eurostat; ECU/Euro: US$ exchange rates based on rates for 31 December in relevant year.
constructed outside Maputsoe, 100 km north-east of the capital. A period of explosive growth began in late 1999 when it became apparent that AGOA was likely to be approved. In 2000 a fourth large Taiwanese player (Precious Garments) opened a plant with 2,500 workers. Subsequently Precious, CGM, Nien Hsing and Carry Wealth all added additional capacity, either by building new plants or buying existing operations (including two of the original group of South African companies). A new industrial estate (Thetsane) with only huge units was opened on the road from the capital toward Mafeteng, and the Maputsoe estate was extended. By 2001 the four largest Taiwanese companies had a combined labour force of around 20,000, and a further large new investor, Kings Ang, had appeared. Total employment was by this time between 25-30,000 range. By 2003, when most of the new capacity referred to above had come on stream, it had reached about 40,000 in a total of 54 plants. As a result, for the first time in the country’s history, private employment exceeds public employment. According to Lesotho government officials, more large companies would have invested if it were not for constraints on land.

CGM, Nien Hsing and Carry Wealth are all partially globalised – CGM in South Africa and Nicaragua, Carry Wealth in Indonesia, El Salvador and PR China, and Nien Hsing in Mexico, Nicaragua and Swaziland. CGM has integrated upstream into textiles near Durban and Nien Hsing is doing the same in Lesotho itself. Nien Hsing’s global sales in 2001 were US$293m. This, according to the group, corresponded to 2.5% of the US jeans market. Carry Wealth, recently listed on the Hong Kong stock exchange, had sales of around US$147m in 2001.

Exports comprise roughly 60% jeans and 40% knits. All knitted fabric is currently imported, although some denim is now woven locally. The main end-customers are Old Navy (Gap’s lower market segment format), Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and some large US importers. The chains mentioned source from all the global operations of Lesotho’s leading manufacturing firms. In some cases the stimulus for these manufacturers to set up in Lesotho came from the chains themselves.

Labour, LECAWU & the Lesotho Workers’ Party

In common with the clothing industry in most developing countries, the Basotho workforce is 80% female and mostly comprises rural migrants under 30 years old.

In contrast to the export sub-sectors of most of Africa’s other clothing industries, Lesotho’s is characterised by a relatively high level of union organisation. By 2003 the Lesotho Clothing & Allied Workers’ Union (LECAWU) claimed a total membership of 19,000 (47.5% density) of whom 11,000 were fully paid up. There had been only 4,000 paid up members at the end of 2001.

LECAWU first rose to public prominence in early 1998 when it organised a strike over wages and conditions at one of CGM’s plants (Basotho Jeans). Violence occurred after management refused to negotiate and workers broke into storage areas and burnt stock. The police were called, one worker was shot dead and 45 were injured. This was followed by the dismissal of the entire workforce, selective re-employment and new hiring. The dismissed workers blockaded the plant and four were arrested for beating new employees. LECAWU unsuccessfully took CGM to court over the dismissals.

Between 1998 and 2001 LECAWU followed a twin strategy of trying to organise the largest companies and pressurising government to create a body where binding collective bargaining could occur at a national level. Factory
wages were in practice set unilaterally by government, through minimum wage regulations issued by the Wage Advisory Board on Labour. The latter followed recommendations from the Central Bank. By October 2001 LECAWU felt strong enough to initiate a national campaign of action including a stay-away and a march on the Ministry of Labour, aimed at a wage increase of 60% and the inauguration of a tripartite bargaining council. The government conceded only a 6.5% increase, but within a few days the recently formed Lesotho Textile Exporters’ Association (LTEA) offered workers an additional 10% and the stay-away ended. LTEA represented most of the largest Taiwanese companies, operating a total of 20 plants between them. Subsequently, according to LECAWU, full union recognition and collective bargaining have been achieved in 9 plants and partial recognition in a further 22.

In November 2002 LECAWU launched a second national campaign, including a demand for a wage increase of 90%, to a level calculated as adequate to meet the basic needs of a family of 5-6 people. Members of LTEA this time offered 12%, which LECAWU appears to have accepted.

In an African context, two exceptional features of LECAWU have been its creation of a political party and its use of US trade unions and US and European NGOs to promote its agenda, in both cases with rather mixed results. The Lesotho Workers’ Party was founded in August 2001, following a decision by a LECAWU congress, with the objective of contesting the next general election. The party’s executive is made up almost exclusively of LECAWU leaders (80% of them women), although it aims to represent the interests of Lesotho’s working class generally. Its objective is ‘to secure decent standards of living, social security and fair conditions of work and life’. In the May 2002 general election it obtained only 7,788 votes (1.4% of the total). Nevertheless, because of Lesotho’s proportional representation system this was sufficient to secure a parliamentary seat for its leader, the former LECAWU secretary general Macaefa Billy.

Global Campaigns & Local Outcomes

LECAWU’s involvement with external organisations dates from 1994 when it provided much of the evidence used by the US Department of Labour’s Bureau of International Affairs to write a report on child labour in Lesotho. This stated that 5-15% of the workforces of several Taiwanese-owned companies were aged 12-15, that children were sometimes forced to sleep in factories overnight and that they were fed only bread and tea. This report continues to feature on the Department of Labour website as the latest word on Lesotho’s labour conditions and on as such is still used by anti-child labour organisations such as Global March, even though the conditions in question are no longer general.

Since 2001 LECAWU has collaborated with at least six fact-finding missions by US and European trade unions and NGOs, in an effort to strengthen its bargaining position with employers. Each of the missions arrived at a similar list of problematic conditions obtaining in Taiwanese-owned plants (Table 3).

In most cases the missions do not state how many workers were interviewed, how they were selected, or even what the incidence of the reported conditions was. But it seems clear that the following conditions are quite common: wage levels for machinists are lower than the current LECAWU-LTEA agreed rate of M650 (US$81)/month; compulsory overtime; inadequate protection of workers against inhalation of dust; locking of emergency doors; verbal abuse; and harassment of LECAWU activists. Four of the missions, those by the Ethical Trading Action Group (ETAG, Canada) (twice), the Union of Needle Trades,
Industrial and Textile Employees (US, UNITE) and the Clean Clothes Campaign (Netherlands) have been prologues to public campaigns in developed countries. These have been directed at Hudson Bay (Canada), Gap (both in two cases) and Wal-Mart, in each case embodying a threat of boycott. It is too soon to gauge Wal-Mart’s response to the Clean Clothes campaign, which was launched only at the end of December 2002. But Hudson Bay and Gap reacted very differently to the two ETAG campaigns. These differed from those of UNITE and Clean Clothes in that they publicly named not only end-customers but suppliers. Sun Textiles was named as a problematic supplier of Hudson Bay and Nien Hsing/C&Y Garments of Gap. Hudson Bay responded by dropping Sun Textiles, while Gap reacted by pressuring Nien Hsing/C&Y to recognise LECAWU and establish a collective bargaining procedure (UNITE’s campaign against Gap post-dated Nien Hsing’s adoption of these changes). Clean Clothes’ subsequent decision to name problematic suppliers to Wal-Mart was prompted by LECAWU’s fear that the latter company might follow Hudson Bay’s example and simply drop the offending suppliers.

Issues & Dilemmas

In conclusion, three issues arising from the ‘politics of sweatshops’ will be mentioned, along with the dilemmas that they pose. The first is that of preferential trade agreements and maquiladorismo. The new generation of US and EU preferential trade agreements and offers are widely criticised for promoting industrial development in the third world of

| Table 3: Problematic Conditions Reported by US & European Fact-finding Missions to Lesotho, 2001-02 |
|--------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| N plants visited | SOMO | ETAG I | ETAG II | UNITE | CCC | EDS |
| N workers interviewed | 10 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 21 | 1 |
| Low wages | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Compulsory overtime | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Incorrect overtime payments | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| No free provision of adequate face masks | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| No air conditioning/heating | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Restricted number of toilets/toilet visits | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Locking of emergency exits | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Child labour | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Workforce casualisation | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Physical and verbal abuse of workers | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Sexual harrassment | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Refusal of time off for funerals | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Failure to give lighter employment to pregnant staff | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Arbitrary dismissals | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Harassment of LECAWU activists | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Body searches on leaving factory | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Money-lending by supervisors | * | * | * | * | * | * |
| Extortion by supervisors of bribes to obtain employment | * | * | * | * | * | * |

Key: SOMO: Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (Netherlands); ETAG: see text; UNITE: see text; CCC: Clean Clothes Campaign; EDS: Episcopal Divinity School (US); £: not clear if all 21 visited; n/s: not stated
are all plants that are created in the process therefore by definition sweatshops? If not, what criteria should be used? Even the apparently least contentious issues become cloudy as soon as they are examined in detail. What definition is appropriate, for example, for child labour? According to US labour law, anyone below 18 is a child. Under British labour law, those aged 16-18 are ‘young persons’ – neither children nor adults. Under Lesotho’s labour laws 15 year olds may work. The presence of 15 year olds is cited as an instance of child labour by US and Canadian NGOs, however. A similar issue concerns wage levels. In relation to what yardstick are specific wage levels unacceptable? Different fact-finding missions to Lesotho variously use the government-set minimum, LECAWU-LTEA agreed rates and an ILO-based definition of the Lesotho ‘family wage’ as points of reference. Which, if any, of these is relevant and what kind of international comparisons also should be factored in (ones related to developed countries, countries with similar GDPs per capita, or what)? Finally, should the migratory nature of the industry be taken into account in this connection? Does it make sense to demand wage levels whose implementation, given local capabilities and distance to market, would probably lead to a shift of orders to lower-cost locations?

The third is that of how to fight against sweatshops, once a definition has been agreed. This question has become all the more pressing as most leading brands and private labels in the US and some parts of the EU have started to take specific actions in relation to allegations of use of sweatshops. On the one hand, action seems to follow more directly when specific suppliers are named. On the other, the Hudson Bay response to the naming of a supplier is almost certainly more common than the Gap one. Gap’s probably reflects not only a more sophisticated ‘brand politics’ within Gap, but also the relative importance of the supplier concerned. More broadly, two other considerations also should be noted. Both are based on findings from interviews conducted by the author with large clothing retailers and other importers in the UK and Scandinavia. First, for brands and high street private labels, bad publicity concerning a single supplier or a group of suppliers in a specific country induces a very high degree of caution about using any supplier from this country, unless the buyer is already heavily involved there. Second, up to a half of all clothing imports do not go to brands or leading private label retailers, but to various other kinds of outlet through a much longer chain. There is no brand vulnerability and no use of codes of conduct for this tranche of imports, and hence ‘anti-sweatshop politics has no purchase in relation to them. In other words, ‘successful’ versions of anti-sweatshop politics as they are now practiced tend to target suppliers where wages and working conditions are probably already above average, and may thus widen the gap between these and the rest rather than having a wider impact.

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Decade of ‘Trade Not Aid’

Carol Thompson

For a new post-cold War foreign policy, trade pacts are more important than missiles, and the instruments of diplomacy are markets, not armies (President William Clinton, November 1993).

... the first place to start on the economic front is to make sure we have free and fair trade with the African continent. The US textile industry fears low cost imports from Africa (President George W. Bush, February 2001).

The US Trade and Development Act for Africa (formerly African Growth and Opportunity Act-AGOA) has been promoted as a benefit for the continent, with recent statistics showing increased imports from Africa. But the new imports are a few textiles, apparently made under sweatshop conditions.

This brief discussion of the US Trade and Development Act (T&D) raises challenging questions as an appeal to begin dialogue with Latin American activists/scholars about the impact of ‘free’ trade agreements. Decrying its inequity, global social movements have been able to forestall the implementation of the Free Trade Act for the Americas (FTAA). But it appears that Africa already has its FTAA, in the T&D Act.

It is not too late to negotiate modifications to the law. We need to document fully what the impact of the US Trade and Development Act has been since its inception in October 2000. We can learn by working with Latin American activists to compare the impact of trade instruments on developing economies.

A dialogue among activists for both continents could address the following types of questions:

- What are the advantages and disadvantages of the trade treaties? Who benefits?
- How do the Latin American (NAFTA/FTAA) and African (T&D Act) treaties differ?
- What are the environmental impacts of the trade agreements, especially for patenting of life forms (IPRs) and for setting of national standards for environmental protection?

Globalisation or Imperialism?

The pessimistic prediction about the impact of globalising forces on Africa has become dire reality. President Bouteflika of Algeria, and of the OAU in 2000, summarised:

A new map of the world is being drawn up, and an entire continent – Africa – is purely and simply being rubbed out. No area has been marginalized in the world economy as sub-Saharan Africa with its share of world trade slipping to 2.1% in 1998.

The continent of Africa finished the 20th century with trade profiles not much different from when the continent entered the century: its exports (including South Africa) are non-processed minerals and agricultural products.

African governments have not ignored advice to promote ‘non-traditional’ exports, increasing production of horticulture, for example. However, those policies quickly confronted the ‘fallacy of composition’, for as more countries exported flowers or game meat, the increased quantity available reduced prices. This fallacy, where simultaneous expansion of export volumes by several countries actually reduces export revenues, has also hit traditional commodities, such as bananas, cocoa, coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco.
Furthermore, as the African continent has increased its exports, the industrialised countries importing these goods maintained or increased their trade barriers. The World Bank estimates that if North America, Europe and Japan eliminated all barriers to imports from sub-Saharan Africa, the continent’s exports would rise by 14%, an annual increase in revenue of $2.5 billion.

**Trade Not Aid**

Since 1993, US policy has emphasised ‘trade not aid’, and therefore, there were high expectations for the US Trade and Development Act. At last, the US would open up its markets. Trade with Africa has been minuscule, with imports from just four countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Gabon and Angola) comprising 92% of total imports by the US from Africa (overwhelmingly oil imports from the last three).

A major promise echoing in the halls of Congress during the five-year discussion (1995-2000) of the T&D Act (formerly AGOA) was for entry of African textiles into the US market. The final Act was more than a disappointment, perhaps a mockery. Only textiles made with US thread and yarn could enter the US duty free, unless the African country is ‘least developed’. If apparel is wholly assembled in Africa from fabric woven in the region from local thread, it is subject to increasing annual quotas.

Further, if Congress establishes that the new imports reduce employment in the US, then the Act can be revoked (a major violation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which explicitly prohibits unemployment as an excuse for trade barriers).

Finally, by 2005, all quotas on textiles should be removed under WTO; by 2009, all tariffs. Any country will be able to compete for the US textile market. The T&D Act, therefore, sets up Africa economies to start new industries for trade with the US, when they will very likely lose out to competition by larger, more experienced producers within five years.

During the more than 40 years of discussions for the GATT, culminating in the WTO, the US was largely responsible for the agricultural exemptions from liberalisation measures until the 1980s. Although the WTO was to eradicate agricultural subsidies, they have risen, not decreased. During the Clinton presidency, the US spent an average of $14bn per year on farm support. The 2002 law raises subsidies to about $19bn per year for 10 years. ‘Trade not aid’ is a hollow slogan if subsidies artificially lower prices, prohibiting either free or fair trade.

Given this record, a change of policy by the US in the Trade and Development Act might well be heralded on the African continent. However, the Act legalises ‘double standard’ practices instead of eradicating them. To give just one example, Section 409(b) outlines US agricultural trade objectives by giving ‘highest priority’ to other countries’ ‘expeditious elimination of all export subsidies worldwide’ while ‘preserving US market development and export credit programs’ – both of which are forms of subsidies.

**Rejoinder & Activism**

Many NGOs have opposed the original Africa bill and now are discussing how to transform the T&D Act. One coalition is the Africa Grassroots Response Initiative whose goal is to build a support network between social justice leaders in Africa and America. NGOs in Zimbabwe held a conference that exposed the duplicity of the T&D Act – from favouring intellectual property rights (IPRs) for giant corporations, but not for farmers, to requiring ‘national treatment’ of foreign firms by African governments.
Zimbabwe: Political Constructions of War Veterans

Norma Kriger

In this briefing, I draw attention to three different kinds of political constructions about Zimbabwe’s guerilla war veterans. The first political construction revolves around a discourse of ‘true’ and ‘fake’ veterans. This construction of veterans is linked to a politics of legitimation and de-legitimation and has been used since independence. The second political construction, the heart of the paper, looks at how the law has been used to construct veterans and the war. The numerous veterans’ benefits which emerge from a discussion of the role of law in constructing veterans’ rights suggests a third political construction: the veterans’ portrait of themselves as victims of official neglect.

Beginning in February 2000, the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) played a critical role in orchestrating electoral violence and in invading and occupying chiefly white-owned land. For the ruling party, ZANU(PF), war veterans had symbolic value. Through their links to the liberation struggle for political independence, veterans were supposed to legitimate the ruling party’s new war for economic independence, signaled by the land invasions, and to intimidate the opposition. For the opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), it became more useful to focus on the role of youth involved in electoral violence, land invasions, and land occupations. Far outnumbering the war veterans, the youth were patently too young to have participated in the liberation struggle in the 1970s. The opposition thus rejected the ruling party’s liberatory claims and instead presented the land invasions and electoral violence as the last gasp of a dying regime seeking to stay in power. This battle between the MDC and
ZANU(PF) for party legitimacy drew on a discourse about ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ war veterans and ‘self-styled’ war veterans. The discourse about ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ veterans has also been used for legitimation in struggles among war veterans, within the party, and by liberation war participants who seek the same status and benefits of ex-guerillas. In May 2000 a group of war veterans, themselves marginalised in post-war politics, formed the Zimbabwe Liberator’s Platform for Peace and Development (ZLPPD) to dissociate themselves from the ZNLWVA which was centrally involved in organising the land invasions. A ZLPPD spokesman said:

True war veterans are not involved in these invasions. It is only a vocal few that are being manipulated by politicians and mainly political hooligans who are involved.1

ZANU(PF) leaders, like Solomon Mujuru, have also at times attacked leaders of the veterans’ association as inauthentic veterans.2 At the December 2002 ZANU(PF) conference in Chinhoyi, ex-detainees, restrictees, and political prisoners seemingly made progress in their longstanding quest to be treated as war veterans when the party agreed to pay them the same benefits as war veterans.3

Appeals to ‘true’ and ‘fake’ veterans constitute one kind of political construction of veterans which has its political uses. The use of a discourse about ‘authentic’ veterans and those masquerading as veterans is not new; it has been an invaluable symbolic resource for the ruling party and the veterans since 1980. Talk to any veteran, real or not, and one gets a sense of the complexities of who is considered a war veteran and what are the hierarchies.4 For example, people who left the country to fight but who were told to serve as teachers in refugee camps consider themselves to have been freedom fighters. Those who fought on the front often see those who stayed in camps as less than real veterans. Those who stayed in camps often argue they suffered more: Rhodesian bombings, terrible food shortages, and so on. The youth who provided logistical support to the guerillas, who call themselves collaborators, also regard themselves as liberation war veterans. Indeed, even during the war, uneducated combatants sought to discredit more educated combatants, whom they saw as a threat to their power in the guerilla organisation, by labeling the new-comers ‘sell-outs’ and colonial spies.5

Apparently unaware of the post-independence power of symbolic politics, some observers participate too readily in the discourse of ‘real’ and ‘inauthentic’ veterans. Recent studies of Mugabe question, as then Home Affairs Minister Dumiso Dabengwa did in 1997, whether the ZNLWVA leader, Chenjerai Hitler Hunzvi, was a war veteran because he never actually fought.6 Others merely endorse uncritically opposition claims that President Mugabe’s shock troops are patently too young to have served in the liberation war and deny the role of war veterans in the land invasions.7

A second kind of political construction of war veterans occurs through the use of the law to provide state benefits for war veterans. The legal incorporation of guerillas into a modern legal system inevitably rested on fabrications. Unlike state armies, guerilla armies lack detailed records. More importantly, guerillas had no rights during the war. The law is used to create rights for them retroactively.8 To illustrate how the law has been used to politically construct both ‘the war’ and ‘veterans’, I draw on three pieces of legislation: the War Victims Compensation Act of 1980 that provided for war disability pensions, the statutory instruments of 1989 that provided for counting guerilla years of war service toward years of state service for the purposes of calculating retirement pensions, and the War Veterans Act of 1992 that provided...
for state schemes to assist veterans. In the process of demonstrating the use of law to politically construct war veterans, some of the material benefits that veterans have secured from the government over time should also become apparent. The full array of state provisions for war veterans include not only additional legal benefits but also assembly pay for two years (1980-1), demobilisation pay for two years (about 1981-3), and preferential job access. The point is that the image of veterans as victims of official neglect is yet another political construction by veterans themselves, often with the support of the official and opposition private media until 1997 when veterans won generous war service pensions (Z$2,000 per month; then about £125) and huge lump-sum payments (Z$50,000; then about £3,000). Again, some observers miss how veterans and others have used the image of veterans as neglected and forgotten to appeal for state resources, and accept uncritically that veterans have been among Mugabe’s forgotten and neglected victims.9

War Disability Pensions

The first post-independence legislation which incorporated and provided for guerillas was the war disability pensions legislation in 1980.10 This legislation legitimated the war. Whereas the Rhodesian legislation for war disability pensions defined the armed conflict as ‘acts of terrorism’,11 the new law defined ‘the war’ as

the armed conflict which occurred in Zimbabwe and in neighbouring countries between the 23 December, 1972, and the 29 February 1980, in connection with the bringing about of, or resistance to, political and social change in Zimbabwe.12

This was a definition of the war that denied ZIPRA’s big battles in 1967-68, ZANLA’s celebrated 1966 battle of Chinhoyi, and ZANLA’s attack on Altena Farm in the northeastern Zambezi valley area, which occurred on 21 December 1972 and which is usually taken as the start of ZANLA’s protracted armed struggle.13 The starting date of the war was later changed to 11 November 1965,14 and still later to 1 January 1962.15 It is unclear why 29 February 1980 is used as the closing date of the war. It refers neither to the date of the signing of the Lancaster House agreement (21 December 1979), independence day (18 April 1980), or any other significant day.

The 1980 legislation incorporated guerillas as having performed ‘unpaid combatant duties’. Thus the law transformed guerillas from ‘terrorists’ to legitimate ‘combatants’.16 A major element in calculating disability pensions is earnings at the time of injury or death. The law stipulated that the guerillas were to have the same earnings as members of the national army, and their ranks and seniority were to be taken into account. This required the two guerilla armies to relate their ranks to the national army ranks. Hence the lowest ranking guerilla would be assumed to have been earning a regular private soldier’s pay. The Act does not define ‘combatant duties’. In practice, though, combatant duties did not require actual fighting, probably because most guerillas did not fight inside Zimbabwe. The law also recognised that ex-guerillas would not be able to provide evidence of the date of their war-related injuries, and so they were simply paid from 1980.

War Service & State Pensions

In 1989 the government granted ex-guerillas in the uniformed services (i.e. the police, the army, and the prisons service) and in the public service the right to include their war service years towards calculating their years of pensionable service.17 Ex-combatants were included under a provision for ‘employees who did not elect or were not allowed to contribute to retirement pensions.’ The fiction here is obvious:guerillas were
nobody’s employees, they did not get paid, and there never was an issue of pension contributions. An ‘ex-combatant’ was to mean:

*a contributor [to retirement pensions] who participated actively in the liberation struggle as a combatant before the 18 April 1980, otherwise than as a member of a uniformed force of the then Government of Rhodesia.*

There is no definition of what it meant to ‘participate actively’ in the war other than that participation was required until the day of independence, 18 April 1980. Note that the war disability pensions legislation defines the war to have ended on 29 February 1980. There was also a provision to exclude guerillas who had joined the Rhodesian state sector before independence. These would have been ex-guerillas who had responded to Bishop Abel Muzorewa’s amnesty offers in 1978 and 1979. Again, note that the war disability pensions legislation did not require war disabled guerillas to have fought for liberation until the end of the war.

Having entitled ex-combatants to pensionable service, how was one to calculate their years of war service? Because such records were not available, years of war service were estimated based on ex-combatants’ age at the time the regulations were introduced. For example, those less than 31 years old in 1989 (i.e. those who were 21 years old at the time of the cease-fire) were deemed to have spent five years in the liberation struggle. This was the minimum possible number of years of war service. These were generous proxies for war service years, given that most recruits did not serve in any capacity for five years.

**War Veterans Act of 1992**

The War Veterans Act of 1992 provided for state schemes to be introduced to benefit war veterans. From the name of the Act, it is clear that the legislation represented a shift from the language of ‘ex-combatants’, who had come to be stigmatised in the society, to ‘war veterans’, which it was hoped would provide new respect to the ex-guerillas.

‘War veteran’ meant any person who had undergone military training and who had participated consistently and persistently in the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and in neighbouring countries between 1 January 1962 and 29 February 1980 to bring about Zimbabwe’s independence. Apart from the use of ‘veterans’ rather than ‘combatants’, what is new in this Act is the explicit requirement that veterans only needed to have had training rather than any actual military service. As already noted, the vast majority of guerillas were never actual combatants in the war.

In 1997, two months after President Mugabe had granted veterans war service pensions and other benefits in terms of the War Veterans Act, the Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, who administered pensions, introduced an amendment to redefine war veterans to include those people who were detained, restricted or imprisoned in Zimbabwe for political reasons. Political detainees had to have served at least two years in prison or restriction. The purpose of the amendment was to enable this group to enjoy the same benefits as war veterans. Subsequent amendments incorporated detainees (each time defined differently) as war veterans but excluded them from veterans’ pensions and other benefits. In 1999, parliament passed one such amendment but the president refused to sign it. Even before the big pay-outs to veterans in 1997, a backbencher, Aeneas Chigwedere (now a Minister), had introduced a Political Detainees Bill, 1996 modeled on the War Veterans Act to give detainees the same opportunities for state assistance as war veterans; this bill did not become law. At the December 2002 Zanu(PF) Conference...
in Chinhoyi, as mentioned earlier, it was agreed to pay ex-detainees, restrictees, and political prisoners the same benefits as war veterans.19

Conclusion

At least three political constructions have been identified. First, the ruling party, the MDC, the veterans, other liberation war participants, and the media have all appealed to the notion of ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ veterans in a politics of legitimation and de-legitimation. Second, the incorporation of guerillas into the legal system through the provision of pensions and other benefits has rested on the retroactive political construction of veterans and the war. This brief review of pensions legislation has identified numerous political fictions:

- that the guerillas had been doing combatant duties, when in fact most had not really been involved in combat;
- that one could retrospectively calculate potential earnings by creating equivalencies between guerillas and Rhodesian combatants;
- that one could use age at independence as a proxy for the number of years of war service;
- that one could date the start and end of the war;
- that one could treat veterans as ‘contributors’ to pensions during their years of war service;
- that one could treat all war-injured veterans as if their injuries had occurred in 1980;
- that one could differentiate guerillas merely on the basis of their military training from other liberation war activists, such as political detainees, restrictees, and prison-

Third, the brief documentation of some legal provisions of state rights - for the war disabled, for veterans in state service, and for war service pensions for all veterans – suggests that the image of guerillas as victims of official neglect is also a political construction. In attempting to understand politics involving veterans and appeals to the liberation war, it is useful to keep in the forefront the high political valence of symbolic appeals and political constructions.

Norma Kriger, e-mail: kriger@jhu.edu

Endnotes


2. In August 2001, the credentials of Joseph Chinotimba were maligned by Solomon Mujuru, the former Zimbabwe National Army commander and ZANLA commander; see ‘Chinotimba Attacks General Mujuru’, Zimbabwe Standard, 5 August 2001.


4. Charles Pfukwa, himself an ex-combatant, has written an unpublished paper on the hierarchies among liberation war participants.


6. Stephen Chan (2003), Robert Mugabe. A Life of

8. Ruti Teitel (2000), Transitional Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, argues that a key feature of reparatory justice in transitions is the retroactive creation of rights for individuals who were politically persecuted by the previous regime.


10. The Victims of Terrorism (Compensation) Act Chapter 340.


15. As I write this piece, the Quote of the Day in the *New York Times*, 31 January 2003, is from Judge William G. Young of the United States District Court in Boston, sentencing Richard C. Reid who traveled on a trans-Atlantic flight with a bomb in his shoe: ‘You are not an enemy combatant, you are a terrorist. You are not a soldier in any army, you are a terrorist. To call you a soldier gives you far too much stature.’ See Pam Belluck, ‘Unrepentant Shoe Bomber Sentenced to Life’, *New York Times*, 31 January 2003.


**COSATU Condemns Repression in Zimbabwe**

Patrick Craven

The Congress of South African Trade Unions condemns the continued brutal repression of activists, through arrests, beatings and torture, by the government of Zimbabwe, following the two-day general strike on 18-19 March, organised by the opposition MDC. In COSATU’s view, those participating in the strike were exercising their right to protest in support of democracy and their socio-economic demands and were not subverting the government.

COSATU demands the immediate release of MDC Vice-President Gibson Sibanda and all other activists who have been arrested, including a number of trade unionists, several of whom were tortured. In one documented case, the husband of Viola Shamu, an official of the agricultural and plantation workers’ union was kidnapped, severely beaten and left for dead. Her two young children were also assaulted and she herself has had to go into hiding. Other union officials and members report attacks on union offices, and threats against their lives and safety.

patrick@cosatu.org.za. Acting COSATU Spokesperson
The Sociologist & the Egyptian State
Mona El-Ghibashy

The tale of persecuted Egyptian sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim epitomizes the state of Egyptian politics at the turn of the 21st century. The government’s throttling of civic groups, the US factor, the centrality of the judiciary, the divisions among Egyptian intellectuals – all are thrown into high relief by its three year long saga, which ended on 18 March 2003.

On that day, Egypt’s highest appellate court acquitted Ibrahim of all charges. In February and December 2002, this court twice overturned lower ‘state security’ court verdicts sentencing Ibrahim to seven years in prison on charges of embezzling foreign grant funds and ‘tarnishing Egypt’s image abroad.’ Egyptian law stipulates that if the high appeals court overturns a verdict for the second time, appeals court judges themselves preside over the final retrial. The final ruling came as no surprise to seasoned court-watchers. The high appeals or Cassation Court, established in 1934, is one of Egypt’s most independent institutions and still retains the confidence of the public, which has lost faith in most symbols of Egyptian state authority.

It is doubtful that the regime anticipated the remarkable internationalisation of the Ibrahim case and the attendant scrutiny heaped on Egyptian domestic politics. Recent cosmetic reforms such as the appointment of Egypt’s first female judge and the designation of Coptic Christmas as a national holiday appear to be attempts to paper over the negative fall-out of the case. A dual Egyptian-US citizen, the Arab world’s most prominent academic, and a fixture on the international lecture circuit, Ibrahim’s initial arrest in the summer of 2000 was interpreted as nothing more than a slap on the wrist. In the face of growing international condemnation, however, it became clear that President Hosni Mubarak’s regime was using the case to send a message to both domestic and international audiences. To Ibrahim’s supporters abroad, the regime appeared to say that Ibrahim’s prominence and US citizenship would not protect him from arbitrary prosecution. To domestic human rights activists and reformers, the government singled out an unusually well-connected advocate to reinforce the message that the Egyptian government will tolerate participation in politics – not to speak of dissent – only within proscribed limits.

In Search of a Cause

Egyptian observers were surprised, but not shocked, when American University in Cairo (AUC) sociology professor Saad Eddin Ibrahim was arrested at his home on 30 June 2000 and held for 45 days in prison. The 1990s was a decade of steadily increasing regime repression on every front. The 1995 legislative elections featured widespread rigging in favour of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and some of the worst violence in the nation’s electoral history. In the same year, the regime began to refer members of the reformist, non-violent Muslim Brothers to military tribunals. Only a day after Ibrahim’s second conviction on 29 July 2002, 16 leading Muslim Brothers were sentenced by a military tribunal to prison terms of 3-5 years. Torture was widespread in police stations, and the country’s many political prisons swelled with detainees from both the Brothers and the radical Islamists Gamaa Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad. The government kept a tight grip on political party formation and rarely licensed new publications. Continuous emergency rule since 6 October 1981 criminalises any gathering of more than five people. Even the relatively independent professional syndicates took a hit when in 1993 the government rammed through Parliament a law inter-
vening in their internal elections and in 1996 when the government placed the Bar Association under sequestration. After a protracted legal battle, the latter order was lifted in 1999 and elections held in February 2001.

But Ibrahim’s high-profile trial and conviction by a state security court in May 2001, and second conviction on 29 July 2002, raise the obvious question of why an avuncular academic with close ties to the regime is receiving such treatment. Most accounts have pointed to Ibrahim’s satirical article in Arabic, which coined the term ‘republico-monarchy’ (gumlukiyya) to describe Syria, Iraq and – bitingly – Egypt, where Mubarak is widely rumoured to be grooming his son Gamal as his successor. Mubarak was said to be personally angered by Ibrahim’s crossing of this ‘red line’. Other rumours abound about Ibrahim’s increasingly tense relations with Egypt’s first family, and their growing displeasure with his behavior. Another oft-mentioned story is Ibrahim’s plan to set up a commission to monitor the fall 2000 elections, as he did in 1995. At the trial, defense lawyers were keen to point out that the Court of Cassation, the country’s highest appellate authority, indirectly endorsed many of the report’s findings by ruling that over half of the representatives elected in 1995 gained their seats through rigged contests.

Ibrahim’s censure may also reveal heightened tension in US-Egyptian relations – the client state may be trying to send a message to its patron by humiliating an American citizen. The regime has done similar things in the past. Gamal Abd al-Nasser smeared the journalist Mustafa Amin as an American agent in order to imprison him. Anwar Sadat desperately tried to shock the US into taking him seriously again by imprisoning 1,536 leading intellectuals and dissidents (and placing the Coptic patriarch Shenouda under house arrest) a month before he was assassinated on 6 October 1981.

Ibrahim’s second conviction came nine days after the signing of the US-brokered Machakos framework agreement between the Sudanese government and the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Egypt was not invited to attend the five weeks of marathon talks preceding the agreement, though a united Sudan has been a consistent theme of Egyptian foreign policy due to Egypt’s pressing interest in retaining access to Nile water. By reconvicting Ibrahim, the regime may have been returning a diplomatic slap in the face. It is also possible that the regime was broadcasting its discomfort with the Bush administration’s increasingly pro-Israel stance and imminent plans to invade Iraq.

The US response to the second conviction was swift and harsh. The Bush administration let it be known that it would not be giving $150m in additional aid to Egypt specifically because of Ibrahim’s treatment, though it was not public knowledge that such additional funds were earmarked in the first place. US commentators and editorialists went on the offensive, questioning why $2 bn of civil and military assistance is given annually to Egypt when it jails and humiliates US citizens. The furor in Egypt over the US defense of one of their own while remaining silent on the detention and torture of thousands of Islamist activists lost Ibrahim any domestic supporters he might have had. Instead of rallying round their compatriot, the US response further alienated Egyptian intellectuals from Ibrahim and reinforced their initial suspicions that he received special treatment.

At Home & Abroad

Despite the concern of international human rights groups, foreign governments and press about the Ibrahim case, the domestic Egyptian response was noticeably muted. If the right-wing Weekly Standard described Ibrahim as ‘Egypt’s Sakharov’, Egyptian intellectuals viewed
their jailed colleague, and his carefully cultivated self-image as the Arab world’s leading democracy advocate and human rights defender, with a decidedly jaded eye. They would scoff at Thomas Friedman’s assertion that ‘If there is no room in Egypt for Saad Ibrahim, then we will only get more Mohamed Attas.’ Quite apart from the vicious smear campaign against Ibrahim in the semi-official and government-oriented press, thoughtful, respected intellectuals aired their deep differences with Ibrahim well before he became the target of the state’s unsolicited prosecutorial attention.

Perhaps most alienating for Egyptian intellectuals are Ibrahim’s complicated but unquestionably close ties to the regime, a relationship his defense team highlighted in both trial and retrial, calling a parade of character witnesses from Egyptian officialdom, including the director of a government-affiliated research center and an MP from the ruling NDP. Board members of Ibrahim’s Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development Studies were a virtual who’s who of Egyptian society, including current Minister of Youth, Alieddine Hilal. At both trials, much was made of a 1994 conference on the future of the Mubarak regime and Egypt’s Islamist movement held at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, which Ibrahim and other Egyptians attended. To bolster Ibrahim’s nationalist credentials, character witnesses for the defense reported that Amr Moussa, then foreign minister, had instructed the attendees to thank their hosts and return to Cairo immediately if anyone suggested that US aid dollars could be used a bargaining chip in future US-Egyptian dealings.

For three years, by order of Minister of Information Safwat al-Sherif, Ibrahim hosted a half-hour show on state-controlled TV on Friday evenings (peak viewer time) entitled ‘Away from the Limelight’, in which he lectured viewers about the evils of terrorism and the importance of supporting ‘civil society.’ He was also close to Mubarak personally, serving as thesis supervisor for First Lady Suzanne Mubarak at AUC and professor of Gamal, and drafting numerous policy papers and official speeches featuring the term ‘civil society’, which the regime eventually adopted. Ibrahim was also a fixture in the groups of academics meeting periodically with Mubarak and sent abroad to represent the semi-official Egyptian view.

More broadly, Ibrahim has become identified with the so-called Cairo peace camp, which has advocated a move toward normal relations and cultural exchanges with Israel. This stance is highly controversial among Egyptian intellectuals who are sharply critical of the 1979 Camp David accord and oppose normalisation with Israel until such time as the outstanding issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict are resolved. Economist Nader Fergany, lead author of the UN Arab Human Development Report, maintained in the pages of the London-based al-Hayat that Ibrahim represents American interests in the region, as evidenced by his support for normalization and his public attention to the ‘Coptic question’. Fergany and his fellow critics perceive Ibrahim’s focus on discrimination against Egypt’s minority Coptic Christians as springing less out of genuine scholarly concern than an ear for what plays well in the West. In the view of these critics, some of whom are Copts, a focus on Copts as a minority could lead to the rise of separatist politics in Egypt, of which only Israel is the beneficiary.

In short, while they denounce Ibrahim’s trial in a state security court, many independent intellectuals feel that the Ibrahim case is not a civil rights case to rally around. This feeling is ironically reinforced by the international outrage over his second conviction. As one leftist activist said off the record:
I just feel that Ibrahim hasn’t sacrificed anything before his recent ordeal. He was never imprisoned, never persecuted by the government, indeed he was a son of the regime. I’m totally against throwing him in jail, but it seems to me he’s now paying the price of his choices.

But while they don’t necessarily identify Ibrahim as one of their own, NGO activists do perceive that one of the regime’s primary goals in targeting Ibrahim was to intimidate them.

State Knows Best

In record time, the government rushed through Parliament on 3 June a new bill regulating NGOs to replace the law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Constitutional Court in June 2000. The new bill gives the government the power to dissolve an NGO without court order (Article 42), prohibits NGOs from working in politics (Article 11), requires government approval of funding from foreign agencies before NGOs can access it (Article 17) and requires government approval of candidates running in NGO board elections. The bill was ratified by Mubarak on 5 June 2002. Opposition, independent and even some government MPs opposed Article 42 and called for reinstating the stipulation in an earlier law requiring a court order to close down an NGO. Deputies also put up a fight about Article 11, arguing that it is naïve to exclude NGOs from working in politics on the pretext that parties are the proper venue for political activity. In the words of a Muslim Brother MP:

If an NGO works to raise literacy, this is politics. If an NGO works in garbage collection, this is also politics. Anything that contributes to the public interest is political.

Yet when it came to Article 17, there was near unanimity that the administration had the right to approve foreign funding, most vocally from some independent and opposition deputies. In the parliamentary debate on 3 June, several MPs parroted the government’s claim that the Saad Eddin Ibrahim case is a clear-cut example of the misuse of foreign funds for suspect purposes. As nominally independent deputy Mortada Mansour said:

We have a clear example of a professor who received foreign funding and it turned out he was backed by America. I’m not against social research but I call on all social research to be made in Egypt.

Former state security officer and government MP Gamal Abu Zekri said:

Foreign funding is very dangerous. We must be careful because it’s a back door for Zionist infiltration and incitement to sectarian strife.

This last claim was expressed in somewhat more sophisticated fashion by the late leftist writer Sanaa al-Masri in her book, Funding and Normalization, which argues that foreign funding of NGOs invariably has strings attached – namely promoting normalization with Israel. NGOs also fight the common perception that those who accept grants from abroad are personally corrupt. As Liberal Party MP Ragab Hemeida said, ‘Many NGO members wrote reports to outside agencies, were made rich and began driving around in [their] Mercedes.’

The bill’s swift railroading through Parliament offers solid evidence of the government’s success in stigmatizing foreign funding, often the major means of support for NGOs who monitor the state’s human rights practices and issue periodic, detailed reports on torture, arbitrary detention and other abuses. Largely as a result, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) has significantly curtailed its activities and drastically scaled back its acceptance of grants from foreign governments. The Group for Democratic Development had already closed up shop two years ago, citing the
inhospitable environment for human rights advocacy. Had it not been for the Ibrahim case, parliamentary opposition to the NGO law would likely have been stronger. But lost in the parliamentary clamour over foreign funding was the fact – pointed out by Ibrahim in a statement to the court – that the Egyptian government is the recipient of the lion’s share of foreign funding in Egypt.

Throughout Ibrahim’s trial and retrial, the rhetoric of state security prosecutors and prosecution witnesses revealed a dominant state jealous of its prerogatives and unwilling to conceptualize politics as anything other than a zero-sum game. Prosecutors insisted on the right to prosecute despite the EU’s signed affidavits absolving Ibrahim of the embezzlement charge, the right of the state to monitor and intrude upon the activities of NGOs, the right of the state to be free of ‘defamation’ and the right of the state alone to decide what is best for society, with minimal input from representatives of society itself. This conception of an omniscient, suspicious, omnipresent state is a sobering legacy of the July 1952 revolution, the fiftieth anniversary of which preoccupied the public reflections of Egyptian’s Egyptians during the summer of 2002.

**Spotlight on the Judiciary**

One of the most unexpected by-products of the Ibrahim case is the international attention focused on the Egyptian judiciary, the least pliant branch of government. As Ibrahim himself has pointed out many times, there are two court systems in Egypt, one fair and the other an adjunct of the government. Yet many commentators have lumped them together as susceptible to both domestic political control and international pressure. As Simon Tisdall wrote in *The Guardian* on 1 August 2002:

> One of Egypt’s most glaring institutional problems is that the courts, operating under state of emergency decrees first enacted in 1967, are the creatures of those in power. Ibrahim’s persecution could not have happened without Mubarak’s consent.

A 28 February, 2003 *New York Times* article suggested that the appeals court decision in December 2002 overturning the lower court conviction was a result of the US threatened withholding of aid. Even after the appeals court handed down its final acquittal on 18 March 2003, news accounts continued to suggest that the verdict was a response to international pressure.

It is important to maintain the distinction between the two court systems involved in the Ibrahim case. Twentieth century Egyptian politics is in part the story of the judiciary’s struggle to retain its autonomy from an overweening executive branch. After 1952, one of the most common strategies by which Egypt’s successive military-republican regimes have tried to contain the judiciary is the establishment of parallel ‘state security’ and military court structures whose verdicts can be more easily controlled. Judges in military courts are officers appointed by the minister of defense (who is in turn appointed by the president) and while state security court judges are civilians, they are not immune from subtle inducements via the government’s ministry of justice. These extra-ordinary courts have long been used to ostracize and humiliate political dissidents and challengers under a legal patina. In 1954 and 1959, scores of communists were tried and convicted before military tribunals, and since 1995, the Mubarak regime has regularly referred members of the non-violent, reformist Muslim Brothers to military courts. Recently, state security courts have become the regime’s preferred venue to try corrupt ministers and MPs, to give the impression of a serious government war on corruption in high places. Stitching the parallel court system together is near-continuous emer-
gency rule since 1967, which gives the government wide powers of detention without charge or trial and enables the referral of civilians to military courts.

At the heart of the Ibrahim case is the tussle between the normal and extraordinary courts. Ibrahim was tried and convicted twice before a state security court, while it is the high appeals court that has overturned these verdicts and delivered a final acquittal. Judges on Egypt’s high appeals court, supreme constitutional court, and administrative courts have an impeccable reputation for impartiality and autonomy, drawing on a long tradition of independence and corporate resistance to executive interference. Perhaps because of this there is no lifetime tenure for Egyptian judges, the mandatory retirement age set at 64. During the Nasser years, judges were among the most consistent and powerful sources of opposition to the regime, and as a result, the government orchestrated a vindictive purge in 1969 that dismissed and transferred 189 of the most independent-minded judges. The dismissal was in response to a public statement issued by prominent judges blaming Egypt’s 1967 defeat by Israel on the lack of democracy and rule of law. One of the dismissed judges was Yahya al-Refai, who was later reinstated in his post by Sadat but continued to be a forceful advocate of judicial autonomy from the meddlesome ministry of justice.

While al-Refai was the head of a high appeals court circuit, he drafted several comprehensive proposals for judicial autonomy from the government which he submitted to President Mubarak, to no avail. Upon retirement, he opened a private legal practice and continued his activism, becoming a central figure in opposition proposals for constitutional reform and an end to emergency rule. On 5 January 2003, al-Refai wrote an open letter of resignation from the legal profession, detailing the myriad ways in which the government corrupts judges by among other things, offering lucrative posts to retired judges such as governorships and government consulting work. One expects a ruckus when a legal titan of al-Refai’s stature drops such a bombshell, yet instead a deafening silence greeted his disclosures. The government’s flagship daily Al-Ahram refused to print one of its own senior columnists’ commentary on the event. The incident reveals the extent to which the government fears the touchy issue of judicial corruption. While al-Refai’s contentions confirmed suspicions that some judges were subject to government pressures, they also made clear that the judiciary had preserved its spirit of resistance and many judges retained their upstanding professionalism.

Unbeknownst to the government when for whatever reason it decided to go after sociologist Ibrahim, it was inviting international dissection of its appalling human rights record, shaky economic governance, and indiscriminate political persecution of Islamist activists and avuncular pro-regime academic alike. The image of the Mubarak government has been indelibly tarnished abroad as a result of the case, belying the myth of a reformist, secular regime whose president foretold the evils of international terrorism, as Mubarak likes to repeat. If a silver lining is to be detected at all in this unfortunate and depressing affair, it is the internationalization of the details of the case and the broadcasting of important developments in Egyptian domestic politics. What the Ibrahim case shows above all is that the government has yet to snuff out independent thought and initiative in Egypt, and that politically resourceful citizens – judges, academics, journalists, doctors, lawyers, students – will continue to struggle for the replacement of rule by law with rule of law.

Mona El-Ghobashy, e-mail: me27@columbia.edu
Expanding Petroleum Production in Africa
Richard Knight

Deepwater exploration and development initiatives are generally expected to be sustained worldwide, with offshore West Africa emerging as a major future source of production (International Energy Outlook 2001).

Oil and natural gas provide a significant resource that could be used to promote African development. Currently twelve African countries produce and are net exporters of oil. Approximately 40% of Africa’s population lives in these countries. Yet Africa remains the poorest and most economically marginalised continent.

Both the developed and developing world depend on oil and natural gas for electricity, heating and transportation. Oil provides 40% of the world’s energy consumption – more than any other source. The industrial countries accounted for 58% of world consumption of petroleum in 2000 with the US consuming over 25%, compared to 3.4% for Africa. Despite concern about global warming and the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol that seeks to reduce production of greenhouse gasses, oil production and consumption is projected to increase significantly.

Africa’s Economy

Africa, with 13% of the world’s population, provides just 2% of world exports. The three largest oil producers, Algeria, Libya and Nigeria, provide 30% of Africa’s exports. Africa’s exports consist largely of crude oil, other petroleum products (including natural gas) and minerals. But the majority of people in Africa earn their livelihood through agriculture, primarily with low-input, traditional farming practices.

Africa oil and gas exporting countries have become extremely dependent on the revenues generated. In Algeria, oil and natural gas products account for 97% of exports, 30% of GDP and 60% of government revenues, in Nigeria 95% of exports, 20% of GDP and 65% of government revenue. As a result these countries are greatly impacted by the price of oil.

Crude Oil

Africa produced 7,814,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) in 2001, accounting for 10.3% of worldwide production. The continent has 7.3% of proven world oil reserves. The three African members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) – Algeria, Nigeria, and Libya – accounted for 66% of the continent’s oil production. As members of OPEC, production quotas theoretically restrict their oil output.

Natural Gas

Africa is also an important source of natural gas producing 12 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/d) in 2001, 5% of world

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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>Other Africa</td>
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<td>% of World Total</td>
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* Included in “Other Africa”

commercial production. Africa holds 7.4% of proven reserves. The majority of proven reserves are in Algeria and Nigeria but some 20 countries have proven reserves. Algeria accounted for 63% of Africa’s product in 2001, followed by Egypt (17%), Nigeria (11%) and Libya (4%).

**US Involvement in African Oil**

Petroleum dominates US economic ties with Africa. The US receives approximately 15% by volume (18% by value) of its crude oil imports from Africa. Energy related products, primarily crude oil, was $14.3bn and accounted for 67.8% of all imports from sub-Saharan Africa in 2001. As a result, US imports from Africa are dominated by Nigeria (27%), Angola (14%), Algeria (11%) and Gabon (8%) with South Africa (18%) being the only non-oil exporting country of significance. Investment in the petroleum industry represents 73% of all US direct investment in Africa. Ironically, one country in Africa where the US has significant direct investment but little in the petroleum industry is South Africa, where Mobil and other US oil companies were forced to pull out as a result of the US anti-apartheid movement. The US currently has oil import and investment sanctions on Libya and Sudan.

**Expanding Production**

Africa, especially the West African countries along the Gulf of Guinea, has the fastest rate of discovery of new reserves in the world. Despite quotas, Africa’s OPEC members are seeking to boost production. As Business Week noted recently, the governments of Nigeria and Algeria, both members of OPEC, have struck agreements with Western companies that will lead to an additional 1.5m barrels in capacity. This new capacity represents a 70% increase over their current quotas and both countries are pushing OPEC to increase their quotas. Nigeria is seeking to double proven reserves and production by 2010. Libya, with the lifting of UN sanctions, can now buy oil equipment and hopes to increase production from its current 1.4m bbl/d, which is far less than the 3.3m bbl/d it produced in 1970.

Africa’s non-OPEC producers are also increasing production. Angola’s production has increased 600% since 1980 and is expected to be more than 1m bbl/d in 2003. Production in Sudan in averaged 227,500 bbl/d in 2002; it could surpass 300,000 bbl/d in 2003 and reach 450,000 bbl/d by 2005. Sudan’s estimated current proven reserves of crude oil are 563m barrels, more than twice the 2001 estimate. Chad is scheduled to start producing in 2004 with production anticipated at 225,000 bbl/d during the early years of the projected 25-30 years of production. Oil has been found off the coast of São Tomé and Príncipe but exploitation has not yet begun. São Tome signed an agreement in 2002 with Nigeria to develop oil in the Gulf of Guinea where the two have overlapping territorial claims. Under this agreement Nigeria gets 60% of oil produced, São Tomé 40%. São Tomé appears to be unhappy with the agreement and recently it was announced that Angola would lend its know-how in negotiations with Nigeria. Angola will also lend its assistance in

### US Crude Oil Imports: 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Thousand Barrels</th>
<th>% of US Imports</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>3,966</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>117,254</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>14,430</td>
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<td>Congo (Kinshasa)</td>
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<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>Africa Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>World Total</td>
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</table>

Source: Energy Information Administration
the auctioning off of São Tomé’s explorations blocks scheduled for later this year.

A number of other countries are exploring for oil. Morocco has granted a number of exploration contracts including two for off the coast of Western Sahara to Kerr-McGee and TotalFinaElf. Polisario rejected these contracts as it sees Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara as illegal. UN legal council Hans Corell issued an opinion that noted that Morocco did not have sovereignty over the territory and was not the administrative power. In his opinion he said that the contracts were not illegal but that any further exploration and exploitation would be if it did not correspond to interests and wishes of the people of Western Sahara. The SADR, the Polisario-formed government of West Sahara, a member of the African Union, subsequently entered into its own agreement for the area with Fusion Oil.

Africa is also increasing its production of natural gas. Production increased by 10.7% in 2000 over 1999 including an 81.4% increase by Nigeria and a 23.1% increase by Egypt. Production in 2001 was about the same as the previous year. Nigeria’s production has increased from 0.6bn bcf/d in 1999 to 1.3 bcf/d in 2001. There are a number of projects planned that will increase African natural gas production and consumption. The West African Gas Pipeline will supply Nigerian gas to Benin, Togo and Ghana. Nigeria has built a $3.8bn liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility on Bonny Island that it is expanding. In Angola, ChevronTexaco is planning a $2bn LNG plant that will convert natural gas from offshore oil fields to LNG for export. Egypt’s natural gas production has doubled in the past few years to about 3 bcf/d and several LNG projects are being developed. Pipelines are being planned from gas fields in Mozambique and Namibia to South Africa. Sasol Ltd., the South African company that produces synthetic fuel and chemicals, is in the process of converting its feedstock from coal to gas.

### Equatorial Guinea: An Explosion of Growth

Mobil discovered major oil deposits in Equatorial Guinea in 1996. As a result Equatorial Guinea, with a population of just 470,000, has suddenly made it into the big time. In 2001 Equatorial Guinea produced 181,000 bb/d of oil, a one-year increase of 60%. The value of crude oil imports increased from $28,302,000 in 1997 to $361,784,000 in 2001. Currently there are no good estimates of total reserves. US direct investment was $1.7bn at the end of 2001. The US imported 5,465,000 barrels (14,970 bbl/d) in 2001. In the first six months of 2002 oil imports jumped to 8,390,000 barrels (46,350 bbl/d). In dollar terms, total US imports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Millions of Dollars</th>
<th>Petroleum Industry Millions of Dollars</th>
<th>% Petroleum</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2,484</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,498</td>
<td>1,473</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>D</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>301</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo (Brassaville)</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>3,068</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,763</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15,872</td>
<td>11,649</td>
<td>73%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: US Department of Commerce; D = Suppressed. In Nigeria total investment is less than petroleum. In 2000, Cameroon: US investment was $266m ($265 in petroleum). In 2000, Gabon: 99% of investment was in petroleum, a figure likely to have increased.
increased from $66.64m in 1998 to $445.44m in 2001, almost exclusively in oil.

The largest producer is ExxonMobil, producing 145,000 bbl/d in 2001 from the Zafiro field in which it has a 71% interest. Significant expansion is in the process including a $695m in the Zafiro Southern Expansion Area with production scheduled to start in 2003. Nigeria had challenged Equatorial Guinea’s claim to sole ownership of the Zafiro field but in September 2000 the two countries signed an agreement on their maritime border in which Nigeria gave up any claim.

Marathon Oil Corporation announced an expansion in December 2002 that will increase gross liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) production to 16,000 bbl/d by October 2004 from 2,700 bbl/d today. The project will also increase gross condensate production by 8,000 bbl/d. The US imported $65,806,000 of liquefied petroleum gasses in 2001, up from zero in 1997.

It remains an open question if this new wealth will benefit the majority of people. The country’s real gross domestic product has been growing at an amazing rate: 65% in 2001, 16.9% in 2000 and 71.2% in 1997. In 1991 agriculture accounted for 58.4% of GDP; in 2001 this fell to just 8.5%. In 1991 Equatorial Guinea had exports of just $98m, mostly agricultural goods (cocoa and timber). In 2001 it had exports of $2,186m, mostly oil. Per capita GNP was $1,170 in 1999, up from $370 in 1994 and is still rising. But as the World Bank has noted:

<table>
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<th>Equatorial Guinea Oil Production</th>
<th>Thousands of barrels per day</th>
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<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
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</table>

important issues arise associated with the impact and distribution of oil wealth.

The majority of the population lives by subsistence agriculture.

While oil discoveries and rapid expansion of oil exports have caused a striking improvement in economic indicators, there has been no impact on the country’s dismal social indicators (World Bank).

The government’s long-term economic record is poor. President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo came to power in a coup in 1979. He was elected in 1996 but those elections were, according to the US Department of State, ‘marred by extensive fraud and intimidation.’ He was elected again in December 2002 by over 99% after opposition candidates withdrew claiming irregularities intimidation. He was elected again in December 2002 by over 99% after opposition candidates withdrew claiming irregularities.

Conclusion: The Contradiction of Oil

Petroleum dominates Africa’s economic relations with the world. Africa remains the poorest and least developed continent. Some countries have been producing oil and gas for decades, but a number of new countries are just beginning to produce and they will begin to receive significant oil revenues in the next few years. Nigeria, where 70.2% of the population lives on less than $1 per day, has a GNP per capita of $260, less than net oil-importers Ghana ($390) and Kenya ($360), and a far cry from South Africa ($3,170). Western industrialized countries have clearly benefited from African oil, as have the oil companies (and their shareholders) and privileged elites in African countries. The question remains to what extent ordinary Africans can and will benefit, and if African countries will successfully use
their oil wealth for economic diversification and development. The track record so far is not good.

Richard Knight, e-mail: rknight1@juno.com. Reprinted with thanks to ACAS.

Endnotes

1. The African countries that produce and are net exporters of oil are Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, Sudan and Tunisia. Congo (Kinshasa) is a small net exporter of some 2,400 bbd. Côte d’Ivoire exports oil, including to the US, but is a net importer. Ghana and Morocco produce small amounts of oil but need to import to meet most of their needs. South Africa produces 30,000 bpd plus 184,000 bpd in synthetic oil production but needs to import over one half of its needs. São Tome and Principe and Nigeria have agreed to jointly develop oil in a disputed offshore region. Chad is projected to begin exports in 2004. The official name for Congo (Brazzaville) is Republic of Congo. The official name of Congo (Kinshasa), formerly Zaire, is Democratic Republic of the Congo.


5. Production figure does not include gas flared or recycled. BP p.l.c., Statistical Review of World Energy 2002

6. The UN sanctions on Libya have been lifted but the US sanctions remain. The sanctions were first imposed in 1982 when President Reagan ended US imports of oil from Libya. At the time the US was importing 150,000 barrels per day with a value of $2bn a year. Also banned was the export to Libya of sensitive oil and gas technology. A total ban on trade was imposed in January 1986. Exxon and Mobil pulled out of Libya in 1982; five other US oil companies remained until President Reagan forced them to pull out in 1986. US companies hope to return and have, with the US government’s permission, met with Libyan officials and visited assets abandoned when sanctions were imposed. See ‘US Will End Libya Oil Buying, Technology Sales’, Wall Street Journal, 11 March 1982 and Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State, Background Notes: Libya, July 1994.


8. ’Is OPEC About to Lose Control of the Spigot?’, Business Week, January 20, 2003

9. The figures here for Sudan are from the Energy Information Administration and vary some from those of BP cited above in part because of date.

Oil: Shifts in the Balance

Western Sahara Campaign

In something of a ‘double whammy’ for the Moroccan government’s designs on Western Saharan offshore oil, another survey company has expressed its concern over the political risks of the Rabat-sponsored project, while Fusion Oil, contracted to undertake oil exploitation for an independent Western Sahara, has received the backing of a big player in the global oil industry.

Meanwhile, Kerr-McGee and TotalFinaElf have announced they intend to proceed with 3D seismic surveys of Western Sahara’s seabed, following examination of the results of the 2D survey carried out by now-repentant TGS-NOPEC of Norway last year. But they are reportedly finding it rather harder to find a contractor than they did two years ago. ‘I can confirm that we are sceptical of entering into contracts off Western Sahara’ said Jan Soevik of the seismic company Multiwave. ‘We are very careful with this and wish to maintain high ethical...
standards,’ he continued, saying that the company ‘don’t want to risk something similar’ to the wave of protest divestment that hit seismic company TGS-NOPEC last year after its involvement in the controversial oil exploration ‘licensed’ by the Moroccan government in Western Saharan waters.

Meanwhile, UK firm Premier Oil has done a deal with North-West Africa specialist Fusion Oil which includes an option to participate in future exploration of Western Sahara’s oilfields after Saharan independence. The deal sees Fusion receive $10m and also covers stakes in offshore exploration in Gabon, Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania. Deepwater oilfields offshore Mauritania are expected to go into production in 2 years time, yielding 75,000 barrels a day. This has heightened interest in Western Sahara’s oil.

In October 2001, Morocco signed exploration deals with Kerr-McGee of the US and TotalFinaElf of France for Western Sahara’s waters. In February 2002, the UN Under-Secretary General for Legal Affairs wrote that while those contracts were not illegal, further exploration, or any exploitation of oil and gas would be if ‘in disregard of the interests and wishes of the people of Western Sahara’. In May 2002 the SADR signed a deal with Anglo-Australian company Fusion Oil which gave Fusion rights to offshore oil exploitation when an independent Western Sahara takes its seat at the UN – thus not involving any scramble to profit from the resources while the political status of the territory remains unresolved.

Premier Oil attracts considerable criticism for its involvement with the military regime in Burma. So it’s interesting to see them involved in Fusion’s project in Western Sahara, which explicitly supports international law and the rights of the Saharawi people. The oil industry is concerned about cleaning up its image – the best way to do this is with acts, not just words, and this is such an act.

Source: Stavanger Aftenblad-Norway, Financial Times, Upstream Online; Sahara Analysis No. 23, June 2003; e-mail: wsc@gn.apc.org

Swords into Ploughs:
Women Want Global Peace!
Linda Akullu Ayoub, Co-ordinator, PAWLO

On Tuesday, 8 April, 2003, the Pan African Women Liberation Organization (PAWLO) and the Global Pan African Movement (PAM) organised a Peace Meeting on the Global Militarisation of Women’s Lives. The meeting attracted up to 150 participants, which included human rights activists, policy makers, youth and students at Kampala’s Nile Conference Centre. This meeting was organised against the need to:

1. Reiterate the right of all the world’s peoples to a happy, prosperous, just and enduring peaceful and secure world;
2. Evaluate the relevance of the UN, and the legality and legitimacy of the US-led war against Iraq;
3. Evaluate respect to commitments made to women in Beijing 1995, where, among priority issues of concern, world governments committed themselves to respecting and upholding the rights of women before decisions related to war are taken;
4. Critically reflect on the situation of intermittent armed conflict in Af-
frica; DRC, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Burundi, Sudan, and the continuing search for comprehensive political settlements of the same;

5. Reflect on global disarmament as a practical possibility.

In-depth background presentations by experts were made on: engendering decisions related to war, a post-Beijing 1995 assessment, engendering the search for comprehensive settlement of Africa’s political and armed conflicts, the relevance of the UN System, its legality and legitimacy in the US-led war against Iraq, and global disarmament. After an intense and forthright discussion, the meeting unanimously, inter alia, resolved as follows:

1. To strongly condemn the US-led coalition against Iraq for its defiance and disregard of the UN System and international public opinion;

2. To strongly deplore and condemn the wanton and horrendous loss of life inflicted by the US-led coalition, on the Iraqi people, of whom women and children form a majority;

3. To demand global justice as a strategy to global peace;

4. To vigorously engender all peace and development processes in the African region;

5. To mobilise the diverse African networks for peace building work;

6. To provide active but critical support and engenderment of the process of building the African Union;

7. To vigorously work towards a reinvention of the UN system, that will act truly in favour of all the world’s peoples, of whom women and children are a majority;

8. To work towards an exploration of global disarmament as a practical possibility;

9. To work towards dissemination and follow-up of these resolutions with stakeholders and friends of Africa, in the African region and, within the African diaspora.

Kenya Post-election Prospects

Lionel Cliffe

The following briefing by Anders Näorman was compiled in the heat and excitement immediately following the dramatic elections in Kenya at the very end of 2002, which saw the defeat of the candidate nominated by the ruling party, KANU, to succeed Daniel Arap Moi, President for 28 years, and its replacement as the dominant party in Parliament. His briefing usefully sets out the voting patterns province by province, and gives some of the electoral and party background to these events, in particular setting out the ethnic dimension of voting.

The emergence, at last, of one major effect coalition of personalities with their local bases of support in the new party, the Rainbow Coalition, and its electoral success have the potential to mark a decisive turning point in Kenya politics. Even after a further few months it is still too early to declare whether a significant new chapter in Kenya politics is emerging. The briefing is correct in its conclusion that one crucial potentiality is that the new party set up and the election
results could move Kenya on from a pattern of ‘ethnic politics’. But there are other crucial dimensions which offer yardsticks of whether a break with the past is occurring. The ‘ethnic politics’ itself has to be understood in terms of its structure, not just the identification of individual voters or activists with candidates from their own region or background. This pattern has been an expression of and has been supported by a pyramidal network of patron-client relations, topped by regional big men, who in turn have been in fluctuating inter- and intra-party alliances. This emerged as long ago as the late 1950s, when the colonial government only allowed parties to be formed on a district basis that is how Moi himself emerged. The pattern gave rise to the opposition of KANU and KADU in the immediate post-Independence period. The ethnic pattern was briefly, and ultimately unsuccessfully, challenged with the formation of an ideologically based party, the Kenya People’s Union, in 1966. And it was still the internal dynamic within the one party state that was in existence throughout the 1970s and 80s. This patronage network was accurately described by Colin Leys (as well as many later writers) back in 1975.

Most crucially that patronage pyramid depended on and in turn spawned and reproduced the massive degree of corruption so characteristic of Kenya. Thus a move away from ethnic patronage will also be a decisive element in the achievement of another yardstick for change. But anti-corruption can be pursued by other means. Some measures were enforced on the Moi regime by the IMF and World Bank and donors – but these were diverted or undermined by those in power. And yes, some of those who benefited are part of the new government. For Kenya, the most immediate marker on which they will judge Kibaki’s government is the introduction of such measures. Amongst a lot of rhetoric some steps have already been taken; officials have been dismissed and some of the activists around transparency issues are in government.

More generally the extent of the change in government personnel is another marker, and even some cynics have been encouraged about the extent to which critics and those outside the inherited party and parliamentary political networks have been included: environmentalist protestor, Wangari Maathai, John Githongo the anti-corruption activist and several others. One of the key voices from the old Parliament that echoed these and challenged the very bases of politics, Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o (a ROAPE author in the past) is Minister of Planning. What other African country is appointing planning ministers – they went out of fashion with structural adjustment!

Another key marker that Kenyans will be looking to is whether the rather aborted process of constitutional change continues and is seen through. The only constitutional change put through at the moment of change to multi-partyism in 1991 was the repeal of the clause which allowed only one party. So much more is needed to reform a constitution which is still a colonial inheritance. The Review Commission headed by Yash Ghai has been given a new lease of life, which is encouraging.

One further set of indicators which many Kenyans are looking to are efforts to come to terms with some dreadful and defining moments in the recent past. The murder of the former Foreign Minister, Robert Ouko, and other political assassinations; the former government’s role in unleashing ethnic cleansing particularly around the 1992 and 1997 elections; the grabbing of public lands and utilities; the massive gold slaves scandal of the 1990s. One among the very active civil society organisations, the Commission for Human Rights and Justice, has even called for a truth and reconciliation commission to go into such matters.
Certainly they can’t just be quietly laid to rest if there is to be a new politics.

Whether all of these changes take place in turn depends not just on the new personnel in government and the new party. Their commitment is likely to be shaped by the extent of popular pressure for such changes. Thankfully, the last ten years of mainly extra-parliamentary struggle has generated a remarkable range of civil society organisations in Kenya. They are already showing they will assiduously monitor the new government. Their efforts and stamina, together with trade unions and peasant bodies, will be crucial.

Lionel Cliffe: e-mail: l.r.cliffe@thurgo.unet.com

Reference


Elections in Kenya

Anders Närman

At the New Year of 2002/3 it became clear that Kenya had just experienced one of the most significant political changes since Independence. Mwai Kibaki took office as president after a landslide election victory with the National Rainbow Alliance (NARC) replacing the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) as the ruling party in parliament. There was a strong feeling of euphoria among the people and many saw this as a new start for the country after years of decline. To many Kenyans their difficult living conditions for a prolonged period had been correlated to the former president Daniel arap Moi and KANU. However, we cannot forget that Kibaki is one of the longest serving ministers in the cabinet led by Moi and his predecessor Jomo Kenyatta. From the early 1960s to 1991 he served the Kenyan Government as Assistant Minster, Minister and Vice-President. During his long stretch as Minister of Finance he was responsible for the economic policies of the nation. In addition to Kibaki, the new Cabinet contains many of the NARC MPs – former prominent KANU officials. Consequently, the future is to a large extent relying on the same individuals that were in power under Moi.

Just like when Moi took over the presidency in 1978 we have now seen another smooth transition to power of Kibaki and his NARC cabinet. When Kenyatta died, Moi did not face any large open opposition. Still, few expected him to remain in office for close to a quarter of a century, especially as Kenya was rocked by the effects of a military coup in less than four years. This might serve as a strong reminder that under the surface Kenya had never been a haven of harmony. The government through politically motivated murders and detentions without trial had handled political opposition ruthlessly. Since the 1960s Kenya had at least a formal multiparty system but KANU was finally declared to be the only legal political party in the 1980s forcing many dissident voices such as the well-known ‘Mwakenya’ to act underground. Cultural expression of resistance, such as those of the Kamirithu group were banned by the authorities. In the early 1990s after strong pressure from the donor community Kenya entered a new phase of multi-party elections. Only now, the third time around, has the opposition been able to unite in such a way that the potential for substantial change may be achieved.

This briefing will give some of the background to Kenyan politics up to the 2002/2003 election. The outcome will be analysed from a national and a regional point of view. For reason of comparison
we will give reference to the district set-up that was in place at the time of the election in 1992. It has been illustrated in accounts of previous elections that an important issue during the two first elections has been the ethnic/regional factor (Cowen and Kanyinga, 2002; Rutten et al. 2001; Närman, 1996). As this report is written shortly after the election, some of the data given might still be only preliminary, but this will not change the over-all picture.

The Search for one Presidential Candidate

Before the election rules changed in the early 1990s, Moi was not really challenged by any alternative presidential candidate, whatever people might think about him personally or his way of ruling the country. However, many Kenyans in the country or in exile were regarding themselves as a potential head of state and as the opportunity arose, it was obvious that a number of hopefuls emerged. In reality the task to challenge Moi in the presidential election was not an easy one.

Apart from rigging of elections a government and president in power has many instruments at its disposal to gain extra votes which was how constituency borders were drawn up to favour certain politicians; another was the complex voting system which required presidential candidates to have a spread of votes across the Provinces. Similarly, Mutahi Ngunyi argued in the 1990s that:

*Ethnicity and ethnic alignments are outward manifestations of either intra-elite conflicts or shifts in alliances. Similarly, patron-client relationships within civil society are either mechanisms of balancing the constellation of elite assemblage around the 'pork barrel', as the case is with the Moi regime, or mechanisms for ensuring the client is perpetually tied to the coat-tails of upper class patrons.*

He uses this to argue that:

*so long as the elite has the monopoly of organising politics in Kenya, civil society will remain polarised and the development of a democratic ethos will be stunted.*

This insight that the ethnic/patronage nature of politics is as much a result of class dominance as ethnic identities offers a crucial understanding of the challenges ahead (Ngunyi, 1996).

Further, a government can promote development projects in a sympathetic region, or use state funds for electioneering. In fact, so many public resources have been used by KANU that it has had serious repercussions on the national economy during the 1992 and 1997 elections. Even in the latest election, Uhuru Kenyatta was accused of using considerable state funds for his own election expenditures. We have also been accustomed to clashes between various ethnic communities in the build up towards elections – partly as a result of differences created between different local communities as part of the political struggle.

To find one common opposition candidate for the position of president should have been clearly the main task to oust Moi. In the initial stages a possibility seemed to emerge as the first major opposition group – the Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD) – was formed by among others a former Vice President, Oginga Odinga and an ex-Minister, Kenneth Matiba. Before the election this alliance was broken as neither of the two could allow the other to stand as a single presidential candidate. FORD was replaced by two new parties: FORD Asili (the ‘real’ FORD, led by Matiba) and FORD Kenya (for Odinga). Matiba, like Kibaki, who formed the Democratic Party (DP) were both members of the largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, while Odinga belonged to the
second largest – the Luo. As these three major candidates shared the ethnic vote from the two largest communities between themselves it was easy for Moi to win backed by only 36% of the electorate.

Given the experiences from 1992 the effort to identify a new candidate was intensified before the 1997 election. At that time, only Kibaki was left as a major challenger but a few new names now regarded themselves as potential candidates. After Odinga died there was a struggle for the position as head of FORD Kenya, which eventually led to the chairmanship being taken by Kijana Wamalwa (a Luhya ethnically). A loser in this battle was Odinga’s son, Raila Odinga, who eventually took over a smaller dormant party – the National Development Party (NDP). Before voting one further candidate built up a considerable strength among the electorate, Charity Ngilu, who was given a political base in taking the chairmanship of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). With her coming from the Kamba community it was apparent that all four largest ethnic groups were represented by one comparatively strong challenger each for the presidential election. This time Moi was able to get 40% of the votes to win.

With the turn of the century it seemed as if history would repeat itself, but without Moi as a contender. The opposition was not showing much progress in finding the new president among themselves. Once again Kibaki, Wamalwa and Ngilu were declaring an interest in trying, but soon realised (this time) the need to work together towards a joint solution. Through intensive discussions a decision was taken in the middle of September 2002 to have Kibaki as the presidential candidate for what was then known as the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) – the others settling for prominent positions in a new government. However, at the same time we can see how the internal politics within KANU simultaneously paved the way to make Kibaki into a strong candidate for the presidency.

A main contributory factor in the events leading up to the election was the split within KANU. President Moi proposed as his own sole candidate to take over, the son of his own predecessor – Uhuru Kenyatta. Against this option many leading politicians within KANU regarded themselves as better qualified to be selected. In the political game we also noted a major change in party structures with the merger of KANU and NDP. In principle, NDP was dissolved and its members went over to join KANU, but with a fundamentally new organisational hierarchy. Under party president

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Note: OO: Oginga Odinga; MK: Mwai Kibaki; KM: Kenneth Matiba; DM: Daniel arap Moi; CN: Charity Ngilu; KW: Kijana Wamalwa; RO: Raila Odinga; SN: Simeon Nyachae; UH: Uhuru Kenyatta.
Moi, four vice-chairmen were appointed, leaving the incumbent (George Saitoti) with no party post. Instead, he was replaced by Uhuru Kenyatta, Kalonzo Musyoka, Musalia Mudavadi and Katana Ngala – all of whom played different roles in the elections. Another of the officials that had been regarded as close to the president was Joseph Kamotho who was replaced as Secretary General by Raila Odinga.

As the Moi choice of Uhuru Kenyatta was becoming non-negotiable, the KANU party split into parts. Nyachae, who left to join the Ford People party, was banned from meetings with the ruling party, which he still represented in Parliament (at least in principle). Within KANU three main contenders emerged as potential candidates: Odinga, Musyoka and Mudavadi and later, Saitoti; they were to be known as the Rainbow Alliance – building strong ethnic support among themselves. Most government members of the alliance were either sacked from their posts or resigned. One exception in his return to the KANU mainstream was Mudavadi who was eventually appointed to be vice president after Saitoti. Mudavadi was to bitterly regret his move back to KANU after the elections as he lost his parliamentary position. In his disappointment he even refused the offer to come back as an MP through the back door after being nominated.

In September 2002 after a few months of political debate and negotiation the first suggestion of a ‘super’ alliance emerged while the Rainbow Alliance was still at least in principle part of KANU. This was about the same time as Kibaki had been selected as a joint candidate for NAK. It is something of an irony that the opposition had found their joint election platform – NARC – around the time of the celebration of Kenyatta Day (20 October). Kibaki was now to be the sole candidate of the alliance to fight against Kenyatta for the presidency. Only Nyachae stubbornly declared his continued interest, backed by the FORD People party. With this the scene was set for the coming elections and from opinion polls it was soon clear that NARC and Kibaki was heading for a landslide victory. What had not been possible in 1992 and 1997 was made to be a reality in 2002. The Kenyan opposition politicians were able to reveal a political maturity (or was it clever strategic speculations), and put forth a joint candidate for president. It is obvious from the comparison given that NARC was able to play the ethnic card better than previous challengers. Kibaki was able to secure a comfortable majority of 62% against the closest rival Uhuru Kenyatta at 31%. Of the three other candidates only Nyachae managed to get 6% in his home constituency in Kisii. Compared to the two previous elections Kibaki was now able to secure a strong national following, as seen in Table 1.

The difference between the 1992 and 1997 elections to the most recent one is mainly that Kibaki is now seen as a national leader, while previously he was more of a Kikuyu candidate. In the first two elections President Moi was able to gain from the division among his opponents, not least on an ethnic and regional basis. At the same time he was able to secure a clear majority in the Coast, North-Eastern and most of the Rift Valley provinces. As noted Moi never reached more than some 40% of the votes in 1997, and slightly lower for 1992. This is distinctly below the combined 44% achieved by the two original FORD candidates – Odinga and Matiba in the first multiparty election. Similarly, the joint NARC leadership of Kibaki, Odinga, Wamalwa and Ngilu had a total of 58% in 1997. It can now be a matter for speculation what could have been managed earlier if Moi had been challenged by just one major opponent. The euphoria that surrounded Kibaki in the last election is more related to the potential to create a new situation, than to the person of the new president.
The Ethnic Factor

The role of ethnicity and local community support in the Kenyan political structure can be illustrated by the figures for Central province. In 1992 Kibaki got more than 80% of the votes for his home district Nyeri, and had an absolute majority in Laikipia and Kirinyaga. Apart from these two Kikuyu dominated areas he had a strong following in Meru and Embu, inhabited by the two groups with the same names, with a close affinity to the Kikuyu. On the other hand, he had less than 20% in the ‘Matiba’ areas dominated by the Kikuyu: Kiambu, Muranga and Nakuru. Without the Matiba factor, in 1997, Kibaki votes was as high as 89% in Central province. This time even the two districts of Muranga and Kiambu were behind Kibaki with some 85% in each one of them. At the same time, the loss of support in Eastern province can be explained by the entrance into the presidential race by Ngilu, getting a clear majority in her Ukambani (Kitui and Machakos) region.

In both 1992 and 1997 Moi had a substantial following within his own home area of Central Rift Valley province, as well as in the arid and semi-arid areas of the country. As part of his strategy he was also able to gain sufficient support by a close alliance to some important politicians at the coast, and among larger ethnic groups such as the Luhya and Kamba. As the other candidates were only able to acquire a majority in their direct home regions Moi was able to get the highest vote. This was possible with almost no support whatsoever in the capital Nairobi, and among the large ethnic groups of Kikuyu and Luo.

In 2002 the position of Kibaki among the Kikuyu was challenged by Uhuru Kenyatta from Kiambu district. However, it was only in that particular area that his absolute supremacy was threatened in Central province. Besides Kiambu, Kenyatta was able to retain some of the Moi support in North-Eastern province, the remote areas in northern Rift Valley, Eastern and Coast provinces. It is also likely that the Moi (and KANU) legacy gave Kenyatta the necessary assistance to gain a majority in the Central Rift Valley Kalenjin areas. Apart from losing in these regions Kibaki has a majority all over the country, with the exception of Kisii. In the latter district the third candidate – Nyachae – got close to 90% of the votes behind him.

The strong position for Kibaki in other parts of the country gives the image of a national leader. As part of this, he managed to bring in a number of key politicians from different ethnic groups. Apart from his earlier support in Embu and Meru in Eastern province it was possible to gain the Kamba vote by the alliance to Ngilu and Musyoka. The potential Luhya Vice-President (Wamalwa) had a strong majority in Western province. Similarly, the strong position in NARC held by Odinga and Saitoti helped to bring in the Luo and Masai votes respectively; all five were subsequently given key portfolios in the first Kibaki cabinet. From the above it is obvious that the ethnic and regional factor plays a central role in gaining support for a prospective president in Kenya. Speculation in the mass media have also followed similar lines prior to the election with very little giving a clue to its outcome. This, however, does not mean that Kibaki and his team have no ambitions to put Kenya back on the right
track again in terms of socio-economic development. The main issue argued is that in order to win elections it is not the contents of politics, but an ethnic arithmetic that matters. At the same time NARC is a symbol for many as a new hope and a better future.

The Parliamentary Elections

The formation of NARC as an alliance of various parties was a new phenomenon in Kenyan politics. Previously, no other political organisation had been able to bridge the ethnic differences in a similar way. An essential question is whether NARC will take advantage of the present unity or if original party politics will emerge from within the alliance. A power struggle might also emerge in the consolidation of the new parliamentary majority. Further, it will be important to find out whether it will be possible to keep up a national profile against numerous burning regional issues to solve. The trend during the 1990s was one of constant changing of alliances, leading to a number of party splits. In 1992 there were four major parties, all easily identified ethnically: FORD Kenya (Luo), FORD Asili and DP (Kikuyu), while KANU represented all other minor ethnic groups. Only the Luhya community was split among all parties, except the DP.

In 1997 new parties emerged, creating new ethnic loyalties, while KANU and DP remained constant. From FORD Kenya Odinga had broken off with the NDP, with a majority of the Luo votes – making it the third largest party in Parliament. Safina also had its origins in FORD Kenya, with its chairman, Paul Muite, the only leading Kikuyu in that party. With Ngilu as a presidential candidate the SDP got strong support from Ukambani (the land of the Kamba).

While NARC is said to be an alliance of certain political parties it is obvious that the same ones were still being put forth in the last election; in fact, both FORD People and SDP had their own presidential candidates. It seems that the DP was the only party that was effectively disbanded with the formation of NARC. Another factor might also be of significance in the newly elected Parliament. Compared to the last one there are now many new names voted in, which possibly indicate a new commitment to achieve a real change in national destiny. Previously, more than anything else, Kenyan politics has been a way to acquire personal wealth and influence.

Table 2 gives a clear regional and ethnic structure in the voting pattern for the three major parties. In the new Parliament, NARC was able to win not less than 126 out of the 210 seats yet they claimed that this had been in spite of cheating by KANU in many of the constituencies they lost. At the same time, the winning alliance was to a large extent made up of either former parliamentarians from KANU/NDP, or DP. As shown, the only part of the country that was difficult to capture was the North-Eastern province. Of course, a lot of the continued national image will depend on the possibility to keep the loose coalition together.

It is clear of the fairly recent association many of the new NARC MPs had with KANU and president Moi. We can note that NDP had merged with KANU less than a year ago and out of the ex-KANU parliamentarians (including NDP), at least three – Saitoti, Musyoka and Odinga – had left and joined in the formation of NARC, as they had been rejected as presidential candidates. The question now is have they given up these ambitions, or are they waiting for a new chance in a post-Kibaki era. While Saitoti and Musyoka have long been regarded as close to Moi, we can also see how Odinga has switched his alliances representing Ford Kenya, NDP, KANU and NARC in the three parliaments since the introduction of multi-partyism.
The new NARC cabinet seems ethnically/regionally and slightly more gender balanced with three women as opposed to only one during the KANU regimes. Even if some outspoken MPs were included in the list of ministers, some of the radicals were excluded – such as Koigi wa Wamwere.

A serious setback came as an immediate response to the announcement of the NARC Cabinet. Among the excluded MPs within NARC were Joseph Kamotho, William ole Ntimama, Nyiwa Mwendwa and Otieno Kajwang, arguing that the original NAK alliance of Kibaki was given too many posts. Only the future can tell if this disagreement will lead to further divisions, or if the new political mood will dominate. Kibaki answered the critique by saying that he had appointed a fair government. Still, it is important that these kinds of threats be taken seriously.

Reports from the initial government meetings confirmed the popular feeling that had been noted in the streets among jubilant people. Some of the ministers tried to impress on the electorate that they were taking up the national challenges of development by having a high profile directly after taking office. For example, Saitoti voiced his keen interest in reforming the educational sector at an early stage. At the same time the new Minister of Foreign Affairs Musyoka issued statements on new initiatives, not least in the eastern African region. This sentiment seems to be mutual in the warm congratulations for Kibaki from many African counties. In Uganda some of the newspapers were now praising Kenya as the new model for democracy. There were also clear indications coming from western countries in reiterating the offer of renewed development assistance.

A lot of promises came from the new ministers as soon as they were appointed. From an economic point of view it is questionable if all these pledges can be honoured with the resources available. Even at a time of development euphoria it is important to keep the balance with a realistic overall economic planning. Two priorities would be the fight against corruption and to counter open forms of violence within the country.

A key issue will how KANU will act in its new role as opposition. In fact, only KANU and Ford People were to be found in opposition as the smaller parties indicated that they would co-operate closely with NARC. It will also be important to see how Kenyatta will handle himself in the role as leader of the opposition. While it would have useful to have Mudavadi on his side, he turned down the nomination. Prominent KANU losers and former Ministers such as Nassir and Biwott saw their role on the opposition side as a new challenge for them.

**The Future?**

Since Independence, politics in Kenya has largely been a game of ethnic and regional affiliations. At the same time, political office has been a matter for individual benefits, more than an instrument for national development. In early 2003 a new opportunity has been opened under the new president Kibaki and a party for national unity – NARC. During this early period of euphoria, it is essential that the Kenyans will not forget the experiences from its political history. A potentially better future can be a reality if national development issues are the priority. However, there is still the danger of a return to the politics of ethnicity and personal self-interest. After all, NARC is built on a delicate ethnic/regional balance to achieve its first objective – to take over power. We can now only wait and see how that power will be used.
References


Apart from the above references the briefing is built on newspaper articles from The Daily Nation, The East African Standard, The Times, and the BBC News of the World.

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Basil Davidson Receives the Amilcar Cabral Medal

Lionel Cliffe

In March 2003, the Government of Cape Verde presented Basil Davidson with a special award: the order of Amilcar Cabral (First Class) ‘in recognition of his links with the country and his involvement with its liberation struggle’.

The award is named after Amilcar Cabral, who was born in the islands of Cape Verde, but who is famous for his leadership of PAIGC, the liberation movement of what was then a single Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

But Cabral was remarkable not just for founding a movement and leading a struggle; he was also one of the most innovative of theorists of the African revolution, working out a strategy for struggle based on a class analysis of a colonial society that had not been subject to settler colonialism like those in southern Africa (his 1969 text in English, Revolution in Guinea, is still worth studying for its topical relevance not just as history; his 1973 study Return to the Source is a profound insight into the ‘colonial interruption’ of African history and the cultural dimensions of the needed renaissance. Nkrumah paid him the ultimate compliment of plagiarising word-for-word his thoughts on ‘Class Struggle in Africa’. He was assassinated in 1973 and so did not live to see the liberation of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde in 1975.

Nkrumah came to London in 1960 and was a frequent visitor to the Davidson home. The two men stayed closely in touch as the struggle got under way in Ghana in the 1960s. Basil also recounts how Cabral and PAIGC would keep him and other supporters informed of their progress, so that they could make the case (for the struggle) to the outside world and chart progress. Basil made the first tour of the liberated areas of Guinea-Bissau in the mid-1960s (reported on in his 1969 The Liberation of Guinea by Penguin) and was there when the Portuguese army coup set off the revolution in the metropolis in 1975 (described in No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky).

Given that long connection with Cabral and the PAIGC, Basil was particularly honoured to receive an award in the name of an African nationalist leader whom he admired so much. He also was especially pleased to receive an honour from Cape Verde, a country he had studied and written about after it gained its separate Independence in the 1970s.
Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa

It is unusual today to come across scholarship tackling African politics from a marxist angle. The question whether the concept of the working class is applicable to African socio-political realities gave scholars grey hair for decades before the debate eventually died out. The title of the collection is therefore a bit unfortunate as the concept of ‘class struggle’ will no doubt deter a certain audience. The average (non-partisan) reader will probably set about reading the volume with a degree of scepticism. And for non-partisans the marxist jargon might be troubling at times.

Reading on from the more theoretical introduction on the Russian revolution and the history of marxism in Africa (Zeilig and Seddon), one nevertheless realises that this approach allows us to ask different questions about pertinent issues such as for example, the economic reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, and the newly unfolding political dispensation of the 1990s. The focus of the book is firmly on popular struggle against capitalist exploitation, protest which in many instances has resulted in quite effective political opposition. It gives an overview of the different parties and (labour) movements active in countries such as Zimbabwe (chapter by Gwisai), Zambia (Larmer), Nigeria (Viniiika), Egypt (Alexander and Renton) and South Africa (Dwyer), the challenges they face and the issues they address. Unfortunately ‘francophone’ and Central Africa are not represented.

Although the collection goes way beyond an ‘activist’ pamphlet or essay, it is not a typically dry, distanced or scholarly account either. All authors are in some way personally involved in socialist movements or worker parties and know the topics they are writing about very intimately. All case studies are accompanied by an interview with a leading activist, such as Femi Aborisade, a leading Nigerian socialist, campaigning against privatisation policies. These mini life-stories give the book a special touch by actually giving voice to activists involved in a variety of political projects for (socialist) change.

At the end of the collection, lists of relevant African contacts who campaign for social and political change are included. This approach gives the reader a very strong sense that ideology is not dead in Africa. It provides an antidote to the whole Bayartian ‘politics of the belly literature’ which has dominated the study of African politics ever since Bayart’s book came out in 1989 and which has neglected the global picture in which African political and economic systems have evolved. Maybe not all of the chapters provide cutting edge analysis of the African political economy. Some of the material might remain a bit on the ‘introductory’ level for the expert. Nevertheless, the merits of Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa lie in its particular focus on popular (workers) mobilisation for change in Africa. It is thus not just a statement against neo-liberalism. The editor and authors convincingly demonstrate that labour remains a relevant category for analysis, neglected in most contemporary studies of African politics.
Like much research carried out inside the World Bank regression analysis bubble, this is totally ahistoric and ignores some of the most important research in the field. But one curious outcome of this lack of context is that, seemingly without noticing, the report challenges some of the World Bank’s basic neo-liberal tenets and effectively says that what the international financial institutions have done in post-war countries in Africa has been wrong and encouraged a return to violence. Thus the report is both challenging and intensely annoying.

The contradiction is illustrated particularly clearly in a discussion of commodity prices. Chief economist Nicholas Stern in his introduction points out that ‘price crashes have been associated with severe recessions that directly increase the risk of civil war.’ No mention is made of the World Bank’s role in encouraging over-production of primary commodities, nor of the US role in sabotaging the international coffee agreement which triggered the civil wars in Rwanda and Colombia. But ignoring this lack of context, Paul Collier and his colleagues at the World Bank Development Research Group then call for the international community to pay as much attention to these shocks as to the less important but more ‘photogenic shocks such as earthquakes’. They urge grants when prices collapse. And they criticise the IMF for only offering non-concessional finance when there are commodity price shocks, and the United States for increasing the subsidy for its own cotton farmers which further ‘depresses the price to cotton farmers in low income countries.’

The report argues that it would be ‘particularly helpful’ in preventing war if the poorest countries could ‘diversify out of dependence on primary commodity exports’, but ignores the role of the World Bank in deindustrialisation and pushing countries back in dependence on a few commodities. It cites the success of China and India of becoming major exporters of labour-intensive goods, without mentioning, as Joseph Stiglitz repeatedly does, that these countries succeeded by ignoring the World Bank prescription. Similarly, Collier and his colleagues highlight the problem of ‘marginalised countries’ without asking, as Ankie Hoogvelt does in *Globalization and the Postcolonial World* (Palgrave 2001), how they came to be marginalised. Naturally, Hoogvelt is not in Collier’s long list of references. But at least they admit there is a problem.

The report lays most of the problems of war at the door of the countries themselves. A discussion of Zaire’s failure to reform makes no mention of decades of US (and World Bank and IMF) support for Mobutu despite his know corruption and unwillingness to reform. Boxes on Angola and Afghanistan on facing pages make no mention of the central role of the US in promoting insurgents in both civil wars.

Perhaps the biggest challenge to World Bank orthodoxy is the suggestion that perhaps the free market is not the cure all for civil wars. The study finds that ‘poor’ economic policy, as defined by the Bank, does not increase the risk of war, but that trying to ‘improve’ economic policy immediately after a peace settlement does increase the risk of a return to war. ‘The results suggest that social policy is relatively more important and macroeconomic policy is relatively less important in postconflict situations than in normal situations’. Indeed, ‘if opportunities exist for modest trade-offs that improve social policies at the expense of a small deterioration in macroeconomic balances, growth is, on average, significantly augmented.’ In particular, the report recognises the importance of inequalities as
roots of civil war and calls for ‘an explicit long-term strategy for intergroup redistribution’ and for directing resources to formerly rebel-controlled areas because ‘market forces will ... probably agglomerate activity in a way that is disadvantageous to the rebels.’ And they call for more stress on rehabilitation of key infrastructure destroyed by war, because of the high rate of return. These are points that some of us some of us have been making for the past decade (see, for example, Hanlon (1996) Peace without Profit). Collier and his team fail to note that present World Bank market-driven policies still make it impossible for a government to intervene to improve intergroup redistribution, while restrictive IMF fiscal policies still block post-war reconstruction. They do, however, remind readers that the World Bank was created for post-war reconstruction in Europe, and remark that aid policy ‘has evidently lost this original insight.’

The report challenges the current donor fetish with rapid elections. Economic and political stability ‘is a necessary precondition for democracy rather than the other way around.’ Indeed, ‘even moderate change in political institutions is a risk factor in itself; political institutions must be stable’. Thus they conclude that ‘at low income levels democracy may well be highly desirable for many reason, but it cannot honestly be promoted as the road to peace,’ and pressure for institutional change actually increases the chances of a return to war.

Collier and his colleagues do see the central challenge: ‘Low and declining incomes, badly distributed, create a pool of impoverished and disaffected young men who can be cheaply recruited by “entrepreneurs of violence”’. But can the IMF and World Bank make the radical change to their policies that continue to widen the gaps?

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