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Contents

Editorial...1

The Gaullist legacy: Patterns of French Neo-colonialism 4
Richard Joseph

The Zanzibar Treason Trial 15
Hank Chase

The Situation of Agricultural Workers in Kenya 34
Kerstin Leitner

Underdevelopment and the Law of Value: a critique of Kay 51
Henry Bernstein

Briefings...65

Debate...81

Reviews...96

Current Africana:
A Bibliography...115

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The current issue is a departure from earlier ones, each of which was organised around a single theme: class struggle, the state, multinationals. This gives us an opportunity to include some articles that have been submitted and not solicited, and also some which are responding to previous pieces.

Bernstein's contribution to this number relates to the theme of our inaugural edition: the nature and causes of African underdevelopment. His essay takes off from a recent important theoretical work on the subject, Geoff Kay's attempt to provide a 'Marxian analysis' of underdevelopment. Continued attention to this theme is warranted because, as Bernstein says, 'radical critics... think that they have provided an explanation simply by asserting the facts of exploitation in the Third World.' This latest round in the debate takes it a stage further in that the method used offers a correct starting point: seeking an explanation not in some aberration in the working of the international system (the 'unacceptable face'), but in the essence of the capitalist beast itself. However, the critiques offered by our contributors also indicate that the task is not yet complete; no totally convincing, scientific explanation has yet been put forward.

This task must continue for political reasons, too, for without a more accurate diagnosis, the strategy for liberation cannot be adequately spelled out. It is in this regard that this contribution relates to other articles which have a much more immediate political relevance. Joseph gives us in the English-speaking world a short outline of the rather different patterns of neo-colonialism that still dominate the French-speaking parts of the African continent, and thus suggest different methods of liberation. Chase's piece is, we feel, most timely. Not only is it filling a gap in the literature with a post-Independence view of Zanzibar politics, but its thorough sifting of the 'evidence' against Babu and others detained in mainland Tanzania and those awaiting carrying out of sentence on the islands...
directs our attention to the need for solidarity action to seek the release of these militants. Two contributions continue the debate about the state: Gavin Williams makes one incontrovertible political point: the need to give fuller attention to 'worker politics' and 'peasant politics'—a criticism O'Brien makes of Leys in his discussion of the Kenyan state. We thus hope that another of our articles, Kerstin Leitner's case-study of agricultural workers in Kenya, will stimulate more contributions which analyse the struggles of the exploited in Africa.

There are implications for solidarity action also in our Briefings section. The struggle of the Sahrawi people has not received the attention it deserves, especially in English-speaking circles; we hope the brief documentation we reprint here will be the first of regular attempts to brief readers and encourage solidarity action. We have reproduced some documentation from the mercenary trial in Angola—chiefly for what it reveals of the on-going organisation of mercenaries and of their forthcoming deployment in Rhodesia and elsewhere, rather than of the Angola war itself. Nor are we especially concerned in this selection with the legalities; in Zimbabwe, where increasing numbers of mercenaries are being used to put down the liberation struggle, they are given a legal status as part of the Rhodesian army. But with their paymasters and their channels of recruitment more fully revealed, there is some prospect for counteraction: for African states through the U.N. and the International Court, perhaps; and for solidarity groups, especially in the countries of recruitment—Britain, the U.S.A. and Western Europe—to further expose and limit the recruitment networks.

This latter is just part of the solidarity task now required in combatting the grand strategy for Southern Africa being hatched by the U.S., Britain and their African allies. Zimbabwe is at present the key to their efforts to promote a neo-colonial solution for the whole area. The outcome of the mounting struggle is likely to have a decisive effect on the liberation struggle within South Africa itself, and thus in turn on the options available for all the 'independent' states of the region, not only the Bantustans and their like, but even Zambia, Mozambique and Angola. Kissinger and Callaghan are realistic enough to recognise that it is too late simply to bolster Smith and they are also aware that a too obviously puppet, 'majority' regime would not now be enough to put an end to the guerilla struggle. Their strategy thus calls for, first, a range of economic measures and reforms which will quickly establish the framework for a neo-colony: ie. funds not just to buy out diehard whites but to guarantee the price of land, the sanctity of property and the future prospects for large farming and other business for those who choose to stay. At the same time, room will be made for aspiring black politicians and businessmen, for professionals and trained personnel, for master-farmers and a few of the land-hungry peasants within a new, 'multiracial' society.

A second part of the blueprint for a 'peaceful' solution—ie. one that is acceptable to all sides—is directed at the liberation movement. What Kissinger is looking for is a broad enough consensus among the
nationalists to limit the prospects for continued armed struggle after majority rule, but one that he hopes will exclude or curb the militant elements. His diplomacy will thus be aimed at the different factions within the movement, especially those least involved in the guerilla action, and to the neighbouring African governments who might influence the factions and their tactics. It will no doubt project an uncritical use of the slogan ‘unity’ and the hope that negotiations will be espoused at the expense of a politicised armed struggle—and clearly there are some politicians, both in the movement and in surrounding states, whose interests coincide with such an emphasis. Some of the documents that we have reprinted in our briefings indicate the mischief that neighbouring governments can cause when they interfere in the movement. Others indicate that contingency plans along the lines that we have outlined have been in preparation for some time. The possibilities of a resumption of British rule or some joint ‘peace-making’ force might have been beyond the toothless British lion on its own, but with Kissinger now very much on the scene, they have to be taken much more seriously. We hope that the unknown analyst whose scenarios we quote is at least correct in one respect: that premature disclosure of such plans for a peace-keeping operation might be counter-productive!

Lionel Cliffe & Katherine Levine

As we go to press, news has reached us of the arrest in Ethiopia of BAHRU ZEWDE, one of our contributors and a good friend to the journal during his three years at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. His arrest came only two weeks after his return to the country, to take up a lectureship in the History Department at the University of Addis Ababa. ESHETU CHOLE, Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the University, was arrested at about the same time. Readers are asked to protest in the strongest possible terms to the Ethiopian ambassador in their country and directly to General Teferi Banti, Chairman, P.M.A.C., Addis Ababa. A defence fund has been set up, and you are asked to send as much and as quickly as possible to Progressive Ethiopia Defence Fund, c/o British Ethiopia Information Group, The Basement, 103 Gower Street, London WC1E 6 AW, UK.
The Gaullist legacy:
Patterns of French
Neo-colonialism

Richard Joseph

France has maintained an economic and cultural stranglehold on its former colonies, backed by a significant military presence. Far from being decolonised, the former French colonies have experienced an increase in French economic entrenchment in the post-independence era. In important ways the mechanisms of French neo-colonialism are different from those of the British.

Tradition has it that in the scramble for Black Africa during the 1880s, Britain got the better of France. A policy of 'effective occupation', when put in the hands of army officers on the ground, resulted in the raising of the tricolour over large expanses of usually semi-barren, semi-populated territories. Such an assessment should not delude us about the degree of importance of France as an imperial power in Africa today, or about the central role of its ex-colonies in safeguarding and promoting the capitalist path to dependence in Africa. Just a few points illustrate this. The English-speaking world often sees French Africa as a plethora of petty military dictatorships which replace each other depending on their shifts in favour with their metropolitan patrons, or their degree of incompetence in managing domestic corruption and repression. In fact, France's overall African enclave is solidly balanced on the political economies of four states: Ivory Coast, Senegal, Cameroon and Gabon. These four states have all been governed by civilian governments since independence. Their regimes have been the same during this period, and only the death of Leon Mba of Gabon and his replacement by his hand-picked successor, Bongo, slightly alters a pattern of over seventeen years of unbroken rule by leaders of these countries: Houphouet-Boigny, Leopold Senghor and Ahmadu Ahidjo.

The second obvious point relates to the degree of economic importance of these states within the African continent, and the strategy of
unfettered capitalist penetration they all represent. The 'economic miracle' supposedly represented by Ivory Coast speaks for itself, so also does the mineral and oil wealth of Gabon. Senegal has perhaps been a bit wobbly because of the high reliance of its economic base on groundnuts, but this has been counterbalanced by the level of semi-industrialisation achieved and the general status and verbal sophistication of its President and its élites. Cameroon, in terms of its land-size, population, diversified agriculture, reserves in natural power and forestry and level of educational development (especially in the South), is one of the more strongly placed middle-level African states. But my point here is not so much to stress the economic structures of these four countries, and their own francophone periphery of micro-states, but rather on the bulwark they represent for Western imperial interests in Black Africa.

French Africa played a conservative role in pan-African organising during the 1960s. The crowning victory of this faction is, of course, represented by the contemporary character of the Organisation of African Unity. Indeed, the past two Secretary Generals of the OAU have been personal appointees of Ahmadu Ahidjo, the Cameroon ruler. Further circumstantial evidence is offered by the fact that when Mr. Schaufele, the American Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, attempted to marshall African support at the end of 1975 for the U.S. policy in Angola, he first visited Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Cameroon and Zaire. So, just as South Africa has been given responsibility for operating the southern flank of the American strategy in Africa, similarly France has been left in reliable charge of a significant part of the western and equatorial sector.

An English-speaking audience might approach these central questions of France's role with a certain amount of scepticism. Have not all former metropolitan powers sought to retain control over their ex-colonial periphery? However, the structure of relations between France and its ex-African colonies is much more formally and elaborately structured than that of Britain. Economic relations continue as they were in the colonial period, to be much tighter; France was always more protectionist than Britain. Excluding South Africa, the British colonies were responsible in 1914 for a little over five per cent of Britain's total exports, and accounted for eight per cent of British imports. These percentages rose during the interwar period, but by 1955 had returned to the 1914 level. In the case of France, however, the levels have been significantly higher. In 1935, Africa took 25 per cent of French exports and supplied 20 per cent of her imports. By 1949, 80 per cent of exports from Black Africa and Algeria were going to France, and France was providing 75 per cent of their imports.

There has been, of course, a diminution in this enormous trading dominance during the terminal and post-colonial years. But it is still at a level for Black Africa never achieved by Britain during the colonial era, namely, about 50 per cent of imports coming from France and 37 per cent of exports going to France (1968). A similar kind of comparison can be made in other domains, for example, currency relations. The colonial currencies were, of course, tied to
the pound sterling, but these ties were greatly loosened at the time of independence and Britain assumed no responsibility for the currency in its ex-colonial periphery. The situation within the franc zone, as we shall see, is of an entirely different order of integration and dependence.

Finally, there is a certain mythology still adhered to in the English-speaking world about relations between France and Black Africa. It is the notion that for reasons of 'grandeur', France has undergone financial sacrifice for its African dependencies. One can read in Volume 4 of Gann and Guignan's *Colonialism in Africa*, published in 1975, the following typical statement: '... after the territories became independent, considerations that were largely political induced France to maintain its financial contributions to the new African states.' Such an argument is usually reinforced by the fact that, during much of the post-World War II and post-independence period, France has transferred more than one per cent of its GNP to the periphery. Under the FIDES plans, 1946-64, France's public investment in tropical Africa was an estimated US $8 billion—many times that of the U.K. Of course, much of these inflated French sums went for the paying of French technicians and advisers as well as for the purchasing via government credits of materials and equipment within the high-price franc zone—and therefore were largely repatriated. Nevertheless, this figure does give us some indication of the degree of French economic interests—and stake—in Black Africa.

During the mid-1960s, the term *Cartierisme* became popular in metropolitan France for the point of view which held that the colonial periphery only represented an unprofitable drain on France's financial resources. The main reason why this term is much less in vogue today is not simply because of left-wing criticism of French overseas involvement, or a humanitarian renaissance in bourgeois France. Rather, it is because every study commissioned by the French government has proven that the overall balance of economic advantage has been decidedly in favour of the metropole. Indeed, the most recent of these studies, the Gorse Report of 1971, has been so caustic in its criticisms of the way France has structured its 'developmental' policies in Africa to the disadvantage of its poorer allies, that the Government has refused to make its findings publicly available, even to members of its own Parliament.

When de Gaulle came to power in 1958, the African territories were given the choice of opting for independence or being summarily cut off from France. There was no middle road, as was made brutally clear to Sekou Touré. When the general concession of territorial sovereignty appeared inevitable in 1959-60, the same Gaullist choice was presented to the embryonic African governments: independence and co-operation, or total abandonment. After the Guinean experience, de Gaulle was addressing a largely converted audience. While the leftist government in Mali preferred to keep the co-operation agreements restricted to a narrow economic field, most of the others accepted the arrangements by-and-large as drawn up by French experts. The basic principle was to be equality between France and its former territories: never was a principle more
perverted by its exact application. In nearly every domain—economic, monetary, military, trade and movement of population—Africa was given ‘equal’ relations with France. The same principle of free intercourse was applied to the wolf and to the sheep. Incidentally, in keeping with the general spirit of relations between France and the African dependencies, these official Agreements have never been published.

Looked at closely, it was hard to maintain, even on an ideological level, this pretence to equality, but all parties contrived to play their part in the charade until the cracks became too wide to paper over, twelve years later.

The Pillars of Indirect Colonialism
The first pillar on which France rested its neo-colonial structure was monetary in nature. The former colonial territories were to be accorded the grand privilege of remaining within the franc zone. In addition to the international support thereby guaranteed for their currency, there were also a series of arrangements allowing for the free convertibility of their local currency into French francs at a fixed rate of exchange. In fact, this has remained fixed since 1948. It is noteworthy that one of the first steps taken by African and Malagasy governments in their campaign against the co-operation agreements after 1972 was to control capital movements between their territories and France. The reason for this is that the freedom of exchange and capital flows has demonstrably acted to the benefit of French firms, free to repatriate their local profits, as well as the small indigenous Frenchified élites who have divided their periods of residence between Paris and the local capitals. Reliable estimates indicate that these transfers back to France have exceeded French public and private investments in the periphery. Furthermore, with the devaluation of the French currency by 12½ per cent in 1969, the currency of the African countries was automatically devalued without their governments being in any way consulted.

As a matter of comparison, after the 1967 British devaluation, only three African countries chose to follow suit. This element of choice over monetary policy, however meagre, is totally absent in the French dependencies. During the post-independence years, since most of the ex-colonies have continued in practice to take 50 to 60 per cent of their imports from France, this has meant that French inflation has been consistently imported into Africa. Under the co-operation agreements, foreign currency earnings of the peripheral countries must also be converted into francs and held in the French treasury. This has meant in practice that France has been able to make use of the foreign earnings of its ex-colonies as it sees fit. These foreign earnings have increased steadily during the 1960s. Moreover, not only have the central banks in the periphery always been in credit in the fonds de stabilisation in the French treasury, but it is argued that these earnings from Africa have served to limit, and in certain years prevent, France’s global deficit. Here we see one aspect of the French practice dating from the colonial period of treating the metropole and the dependencies as parts of a single economy. In a similar manner, the FIDES plans for the African territories were conceived as part of
French national plans.

The French have usually presented their support for the currency of the ex-African territories as an act of national generosity. In practice, the French government has usually kept a step ahead of balance-of-payment difficulties in these territories by forcing them to re-orient their import programmes to avoid entering into deficit with countries outside the franc zone. In general, France imposed conservative fiscal policies on these territories that had been long abandoned in France itself. These countries also had to undergo consultations with France on their import programmes under the co-operation agreements; trading deficits were deliberately fostered between France and the periphery, while high interest rates were imposed on government credits for imports from French firms. Whatever mechanisms have been utilised, it must be realised that the system of control France has been able to exert in this sphere has been smooth and automatic because, from the central financial agencies in Paris down to the local peripheral banks, France has maintained final authority and vetopower in the hands of its own personnel. This situation remains largely unchanged today, despite the reduced French presence in the West African and Equatorial central banks set up in 1973. Finally, the continued reliance of the financial ministries of many of these countries on high-level French advisers has only been an informal complement to the extensive formal structure of centralised bureaucratic control.

In the sphere of 'aid', trade and investment similar considerations apply. We have already indicated that the considerable 'burden' France has allegedly shouldered in aiding its African dependents is not apparent in any examination of the actual statistics. Not only has there been a marked decline during the 1960s in the amount of 'aid' France has allotted to its former African colonies, but this decrease has been further disguised by the inclusion in published figures of aid to French overseas departments, as well as the transference to the Co-operation budget of charges usually covered by other ministries, such as Defence. The French have regularly included, along with transfers from the French state, export credits for purchases from its own industries.

A few statistics gleaned from pirated charts from the Gorse Report are instructive. Between 1963 and 1969, the percentage of French 'aid' has dropped from one per cent of GNP in 1963 to just under 0.7 per cent in 1969. As a percentage of the French annual budget, this sum has dropped during the same period from 5 to 3 per cent. Conversely, the part of this Aid Budget that has been allocated to French overseas territories and departments has drastically risen from 13 per cent of the total in 1962 to 34 per cent in 1969. The final set of relevant statistics is the drop in public aid—as opposed to private investments and export credits—from 66 per cent of the total capital commitment to the periphery in 1963, to 54 per cent in 1970. Of this public aid, roughly a half—that is, higher than the terminal colonial period—has gone to pay the salaries of French technical assistants.
Detailed studies undertaken of specific countries have demonstrated the close congruence between this aid and the pattern of economic activities of French firms in these countries. French metropolitan agencies such as the FAC (Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération) and the CCCE (Caisse Centrale de la Coopération Économique) have proved in practice to be remarkable conduits for transferring state capital from France to African state agencies and from them to French firms implanted there. Up to 1970, for example, eight large colonial and transnational companies had procured 50 per cent of the CCCE’s ‘developmental’ credits.

French control also extends to local banking concerns—which, together with the lower rates of interest charged in the periphery to those in Europe, have led to appropriation of local capital formation by French concerns for their own purposes. Moreover, it is argued that because of the interlocking entrepreneurial and banking concerns in the French periphery, capital has been borrowed at low rates of interest in Africa only to be invested in Europe. The striking injustice of France’s trading arrangements with its underdeveloped partners is perhaps one feature of this overall system known to the anglophone world because of the debates on this issue stimulated by the entry of the United Kingdom into the European Common Market, and the insistence by some U.K. negotiators on the elimination of practices highly disadvantageous to the developing countries established under the first Yaoundé agreement of 1963. Generally, not only have these African countries been denied any real control over their political economies because of France’s domination of their monetary policies, but the reciprocal duty-free arrangements between France and the periphery has ensured the flooding of the local markets with high-priced French goods protected in multiple ways from external competition. Under the French system of surprix, African produce had been guaranteed prices in France above current world prices. But what is less stressed is the surprix paid in the African dependencies for French consumer goods, ranging from 23 to 105 per cent above world prices, easily cancelling French concessions in the other direction.

France was eventually forced after 1963 to extend these preferential arrangements to its EEC partners, in keeping with the terms of the Treaty of Rome. Yet the entrenched network of French trading firms, banks, ‘aid’ agencies and local advisers has not only served to limit the incursion of France’s partners into its protected domain, but has also enabled France to promote the diversification of exports from the neo-colonial periphery to the EEC—i.e. sharing the burden of quantity, quotas and support prices—while retaining for France the major share (50 per cent) of these countries’ imports of manufactured goods.

The French have also been selective regarding which exports from the periphery they would grant preferential treatment. They have been most protectionist regarding the very products of light transformative industries (textiles, clothing, leather products) essential for the early stages of industrialisation. Even when France’s former colonies gained access to ‘aid’ from the Common Market Fund, it turned out that the
francs, lire and marks had first to be handed over to the CCCE before the African beneficiaries could draw on their accounts (in French francs) to purchase the products and services to which the 'aid' was usually tied.

**Dependence and Privilege in the Periphery**

It is necessary to understand how the complex set of relationships between France and its post-colonial periphery has determined the political and socio-economic arrangements we generally find in these countries today. If, for example, we take the practice of supplying coopérants, or technical assistants, to Africa, by examining each of the threads of this practice, we end up with an intricate web ready to tie in knots any African country seeking to emerge from it. Individuals sent out from France to operate the system have simply 'assisted' in preserving rather than transforming what they found there. Of the 13,000 coopérants in Black Africa in 1969, half were theoretically there in a 'technical' capacity and the other half as teachers. The technical assistants were to be found scattered throughout the administrative hierarchy and research institutes, where they served as an effective fifth column controlling the flow of information from the territorial services to France and, in some cases, deliberately away from the local ministers (as allegedly occurred in the case of the discovery of large deposits of iron ore in Congo-Brazzaville).

Today, there is a strong call in Black Africa and Madagascar for the development of a relevant educational system and curricula, but these territories have depended so much on France for the staffing of their universities, colleges and schools that French educational models have become more entrenched during the expansion of the African educational systems since independence. In the co-operation agreements, the African states had to pledge to consult with France before the establishment in their countries of any higher education institution. France was also to be given first option in the recruiting of expatriate personnel. Entire university and secondary school systems were supplied, from the physical plant to details of curricula, examination systems, teaching materials and personnel regulations. It can be shown that the very African leaders who today call for the changing of this system are the ones most compromised by—and dependent on—it. Pressure from the popular, professional and entrepreneurial sectors of their populations may have forced these leaders to try and reduce the more visibly offensive aspects of the French presence, but these are the same leaders who then turn around and lament the failure of France to send them high-level experts. Léopold Senghor expressed his dismay at the abolition of the General Secretariat of Co-operation and the retirement of Jacques Foccard in 1974. These rulers have for so long seen their interests and those of France as identical, that it is they who have often been the ones to hold on to arrangements France is now prepared to let go. Hence, the spurious nature of much of the recent rhetoric about the transformation of these relations. The only countries which have made a significant break with the prevailing system so far are Mauritania, because of the alternative financial support it could obtain from the Arab world, and Madagascar, because of the fury of popular protest unleashed in
May 1972. Of course, for the other African client states, the immediate alternative to the French-imposed system would be a long-term programme of austerity and socialist reconstruction, the very antithesis of the ruling ideology.

The French have never attempted to disguise the economic rationale behind their culturally weighted co-operation programme in Africa, as this quote from one official report makes clear:

The most disinterested initiatives are not necessarily the least rewarding: the assistance France is able to grant—by the cultural impregnation it achieves—leads to the formation of cadres of less-developed countries and an environment favourable for the diffusion of our techniques and, subsequently, of our merchandise.

The fact that France found it necessary to get its African pro-consuls to agree to satisfy the greater part of their countries’ educational requirements from France, to obtain their military supplies and advisers solely from France, to consult with France before international conferences, to exercise the same financial policies towards other countries as France did, etc.—these cannot be dismissed solely on the basis of the tremendous guile of Gaullist politicians, or the hallowed traditions of Greater France. An equally important factor has been the concurrent structure of political power emerging in decolonised Africa. Even such a feature as the cultural hegemony of the French language has served to justify the ‘right to rule’ of members of the professional and bureaucratic élites in these states. They derive financial sustenance from the salaries and subsidies provided under the co-operation programmes and also secure the option of later moving on to metropolitan jobs armed with their ‘equivalent’ diplomas. France can therefore withstand criticism from her African protégés today, for she knows that they know how well she has served—and continues to serve—them.

A word must be said about the military factor. Right up to 1971, France had ten to fifteen thousand men from its armed forces stationed in Black Africa, and an equal number in the Force d’Intervention in the metropole ready to intervene at a moment’s notice in the periphery. An accurate assessment is complicated by the fact that to this estimate must be added an unstated number of French personnel serving as technical assistants in the African armies. As late as 1971, for example, a majority of senior Army officers in Cameroon were still French nationals.

Yet the obvious question about whom or what these troops were there to protect had still to be asked by the military regime which came to power in Niger in 1974. The new regime in Niger proclaimed that the country had no external enemies, and therefore no need for foreign troops on its soil. So just what was it these troops had been protecting—and against whom—for the previous fourteen years? The first obvious answer is that this system of strategic bases and military detachments was part of France’s own global defence network, rather than that of the individual African states. Yet it is equally true, and has been amply demonstrated in practice, that the French troops were stationed to protect the local Gaullist regimes from the very people
over whom they had been delegated to govern.

Since pride of place was given by General de Gaulle to the system of co-operation with the African countries within his overall policy strategy, a readiness by the rulers of these countries to echo Gaullist antagonism to the OAU, or support for Biafra, or cosiness with South Africa, was expected and usually forthcoming from them. But one obstacle to realising the extent of this collaboration was the excessive secrecy about relations within this Gaullist world. As mentioned before, the original co-operation agreements have not been published (and the same holds true, in general, for the revised 1973-74 versions). At times, what is known is far less significant than what is not. Just to give one example, a mutual defence agreement was not part of the co-operation accords signed by France with Cameroon on 13 November 1959. Yet, at the time the agreements were signed, Cameroon was the only territory in Black Africa in which French troops were involved in a counter-insurgency struggle; and detachments of these forces were to remain in the country during most of the next decade.

The French secret services have always acted in co-ordination with their local counterparts to neutralise potential challenges to existing (favoured) regimes; and, in Paris, Foccart and his agents have seen to the effective exile or liquidation of African dissidents. The French have more than kept up their side of the bargain. The conventional picture of French parachutists being brought in at a moment’s notice to reverse a coup d’état and restore a Leon Mba to power—as occurred in Gabon in 1964—is a dramatic representation of a much more prosaic train of events.

On the basis of the overlapping personnel and structures, the French have been able to use their military forces as counter-insurrectionary instruments in the most important centres of potential anti-government action, viz. the local army camps. There is a clear pattern to the use France has been willing to make of its military presence to control and determine local political arrangements. There are the obvious cases of direct intervention, either of a sudden decisive nature as in Gabon, or the more drawn out involvement in Cameroon and Chad (in the early and late 1960s, respectively). In view of these experiences, an apparently contradictory point to explain concerns the number of military regimes which have come to power in ‘French Africa’ since 1960. Yet, as I mentioned at the outset, the four critical states in the French enclave—Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Gabon—have been kept under ‘civilian’ governments. The use of the French military presence—or special intervention—has been of decisive importance in bolstering these governments at their moments of greatest challenge: Cameroon from 1959-64, Senegal in 1959-60, Ivory Coast in 1963 and Gabon in 1964-66.

What little information we do have indicates that the revised and unpublished new co-operation agreements between France and its African dependencies in 1973 and 1974 have introduced largely cosmetic reforms, increasing the number of black faces at key points, for example, on the board of the central banks in the periphery and
in the policy-making positions in the universities, and eliminating such obnoxious features as the rule that the French ambassador is automatically the doyen of the local diplomatic community.

Yet, to quote from Samora Machel: 'To decolonise a state means essentially to dismantle the political, administrative, cultural, financial, economic, educational, juridical and other systems which, as an integral part of the colonial state, were solely designed to impose foreign domination and the will of the exploiters on the masses.' From this standpoint, it is clear that the establishment of the intricate co-operation system of the past decade and a half was intended to prevent decolonisation in French Africa. The cultural umbrella of Greater France and la francophonie has more than served to camouflage France's domination of its African dependencies in every domain. It has also served to ensure that members of the new generation arriving in power, for whom the memory of the colonial period may be a hazy one, have been so brainwashed into valuing all things French, that the imperial power can further reduce its more visible presence, fully aware that its interests are in even better hands than before.

Such terms as decolonisation and neo-colonialism appear inadequate when applied to developments in French Africa since 1945. During the 1945-60 period when we should expect a disengagement of the metropolitan power in certain domains, we have instead seen a considerable increase in its economic entrenchment, and in the structuring of the peripheral economies to accord with its own interests. At the point of handing over power in 1959-60, the independent regimes were made to sign on the dotted line a set of agreements intended to ensure that the political, cultural and fiscal superstructures of the countries would protect and camouflage the economic basis carefully implanted. With the political and social hegemony exercised by the local ruling class, and the depoliticisation and repression of the masses and of the radical organisations, only an as yet unforeseen conjuncture could lead to the sweeping away of this dismal legacy.

AFRICAN YOUTH. We have received copies of the first, interesting-looking issues of this monthly Newsletter put out by the African Youth Movement for Liberation and Unity, a body operating in the USA but aiming to organise African students and workers abroad. It seems set on demystifying the bourgeois influence to which Africans are exposed in the west. The Newsletter is available—sub. $5.00 (institutions) $10 or. 50c. per copy—from K. Checole, Dept. of Sociology, State University of New York, Binghamton, N.Y. 13901, USA.—and is free for African students and workers in the continent.
The Zanzibar Treason Trial

Hank Chase

More than four years ago Sheikh Abeid Karume, Chairman of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council and First Vice-President of the United Republic of Tanzania, was assassinated. (Karume's two positions of authority reflected a fact which is worth emphasising: despite the union in 1964 of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the latter essentially retained its complete internal political autonomy, with the result that two entirely separate administrations ruled different parts of the nominally united country.) In the aftermath of an ensuing investigation—which involved the detention of approximately 1,100 people and the extensive use of torture—the Zanzibari authorities announced that they had uncovered a far-reaching plot 'conceived and master-minded' by Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu, a former leader of the nationalist movement and an important actor in the 1964 revolutionary insurrection which established the present Zanzibari administration, a cabinet minister in the Tanzanian government from 1964-72, and an internationally influential communist. This article briefly summarises the development of the Zanzibari social formation through the colonial period, traces the developments of the post-colonial period that resulted in Karume's assassination, reviews the process of transition occasioned by his death, and evaluates the subsequent mass treason trial which left more than 40 people under sentence of death.

A fuller version of this article, entitled Tanzania's Jailed Left, is available, in pamphlet form, from The Zanzibar Trial Fund, c/o 26 Loreburn House, Holloway Road, London N. 7, U.K., price 25p minimum. The Z. T. F. also produces a regular bulletin, Habusu, minimum price 15p, donations welcomed. It appears approximately three times a year.
Zanzibar comprises two major islands, Zanzibar and Pemba, and a smaller one, Tumbatu, lying approximately 40 miles off the Tanzanian mainland in the waters of the Indian Ocean. Its strategic location in terms of nineteenth-century trade made it an object of interest to British, Arab, Indian and African capital. The resolution of these diverse interests took the following form. In 1828, the Sultanate of Oman, ultimately responsible to its British overlords, colonised the islands. The dominant strata of the emerging African-Shirazi feudal social formation (based principally upon food production: a tribute was exacted from the Wahadimu masses by the African Zanzibari lords. Resident Arab traders had also recently imported clove plants from La Reunion in order to start clove plantations) were compelled to accept a subordinate role within the new Arab administration. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, Britain had formally assumed political sovereignty of the islands, and, through the medium of the Sultan of Zanzibar, presided over a developing clove plantation economy. The structure of this economy gradually developed to include a planter stratum, mainly Arab but also comprising, particularly on Pemba island, a section of the African-Shirazi population; an Indian commercial stratum which dominated the entrepôt trade and which, by its control of usurer's capital, gradually threatened to subordinate to it the increasingly indebted plantation stratum; a class of small-peasant landowners whose production was tied to the principal cash crop, cloves; a large class of landless labourers, mostly recent immigrants who were brought to the islands, permitted to squat on plantation lands, and allowed to engage in subsistence production, thus creating a pool of casual wage labourers for the weeding and harvesting seasons; and—during the middle years of the twentieth-century—an emerging urban proletariat, comprised mainly of transport and dock workers.

By the mid-1950s a nationalist movement had emerged with sufficient definition to reflect, though only in a partial fashion, the fundamentally antagonistic class differences of the Zanzibari community. Although the dominant nationalist organisations of this period, the Zanzibar Nationalist Party and the Afro-Shirazi Party, appeared to divide along racial or ethnic lines, Arab and African respectively, the operative cleavage was, in fact, class. The ZNP represented the interests of the plantation stratum. Indeed, the ZNP's alliance at the height of the nationalist struggle with the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party, which essentially represented the Shirazi/African section of the plantation stratum, reflected the fundamentally common outlook of all plantation owners; subordinating—though by no means ending—subsidiary differences between the various ethnic groups composing this stratum.

Despite its dominance by the plantation stratum, the ZNP was able to secure surprisingly widespread popular support, in large part because of its uncompromising demand for independence. The ZNP's mass base also included the poorer sections of the Indian community, the primarily Arab middle-level civil servant section of the colonial administration and those Africans, particularly the rich peasantry of Pemba, who were influenced by both the ZNP's demand for independence and its chauvinist appeals, which sought to divide the African masses into Wahadimu and more recently arrived squatters, the latter being
stigmatised as non-Muslim outsiders.

From its inception, the organisational coherence of the ASP was threatened by the class contradiction between the leadership and its mass base, the landless labourers and small peasants. The ASP leadership had petit bourgeois aspirations of inheriting the state apparatus and so enjoying the 'fruits of independence'. Its obsession with the fruits manifested itself in complete opportunism—it actually asked Britain to delay independence (the Zuwiya campaign); an intervention by the Tanganyika African National Union and Nkrumah was needed to convince the ASP to drop that slogan. The ASP called for the takeover of land without at any stage articulating a programme of land reform. The left wing of the ASP, which included its vice-president Kassim Hanga, did call for a comprehensive land reform programme. This demand was resolutely opposed by the ASP president, Abeid Karume, and its secretary-general, Thabit Kombo.

In the 1963 pre-independence elections, the colonial administration, through a discriminatory delimitation of constituency boundaries, secured a victory for the ZNP/ZPPP alliance. Having lost its bid for a parliamentary majority, the ASP promptly attempted to form a governmental coalition with the ZNP/ZPPP, the core of which was the abandonment of its pledge on land nationalisation. Fortunately for the future of the ASP, the ZNP/ZPPP alliance declined this approach, demanding in addition the total organisational dissolution of the ASP.

In the period of the ASP Zuwiya campaign, a group of young radical Zanzibaris, many of whom were 'Arab' and 'Comorian' according to the colonial racial categorisation, became politically active. Led by A.M. Babu, this group joined the ZNP, which at that time was the only nationalist organisation demanding the immediate end to colonial rule. Emerging during the next several years as a coherent left bloc within the ZNP, this group became the organisational backbone of its mass work. It was as a consequence of this work that Babu served a six-month prison sentence during the final stages of British rule. As their political maturity developed, and the limits of the ZNP's demand for independence became more evident, this bloc laid plans to form a new political party, organised around a clear Marxist programme, and capable of uniting with left-wing elements of the ASP. By 1963, Babu had led the youth wing out of the ZNP and formed the Umma (Masses) Party.

In the last six months of 1963, the Umma Party made substantial gains in broadening its mass support, especially within the long-divided trade union movement and among the militant youth wing of the ASP. The rapidity of these gains and more crucially their character represented a serious, albeit still nascent, challenge to the ASP's hold over its mass base. These gains stemmed from the Umma Party's mass work among the dock and transport workers and the landless labourers, and its popularising of a political programme which called for a socialist reconstruction of Zanzibar based on a class dictatorship led by these strata. The ASP leadership responded to this challenge by attempting to reinforce the still-popular perception of the ethnic origin and (Arab-Comorian) character of the Umma Party.
However, the developing unity between the left wing of the ASP and the Umma Party, as well as the character of the mass work and the political programme of the latter, tended to undermine the long-term viability of the ASP leadership's ethnic approach. (These struggles were waged within the context of an anti-colonial united front, comprising the ASP, the Umma Party, the Zanzibar and Pemba Federation of Labour, the Federation of Progressive Trade Unions, and the All Zanzibar Journalists' Organisation.)

On 12 January 1964, one month after the British state had graciously granted to the Arab Sultan the nominal independence of his islands, the ZNP/ZPPP government was overthrown by an armed insurrection initiated by the Umma Party and dissident elements of the ASP youth wing. Karume became Zanzibar's President, its Vice-President was the ASP left-wing leader, Hanga, and Babu became Minister of External Affairs and Trade. Although the ASP unquestionably provided the largest base of political support for the new regime, its previously wavering leadership, (which within the past six months had tried to form a coalition with the ZNP/ZPPP), its lack of a developed political programme, (particularly as regards agrarian reform), its diminishing influence within the trade union movement, and its internal rift permitted the Umma Party to exercise a degree of political leadership disproportionate to its organisational strength in the period immediately following the insurrection. At a time when administrative skills were in short supply, the Umma Party also benefited from the consequences of the privileged class and ethnic background of some of their leading figures, whose formal education, for example, tended to exceed that of their counterparts in the ASP.

Not surprisingly, one of the first issues to be addressed by Karume and his associates was that of the ASP/Umma Party relations. Karume demanded, and got, a merger of the two organisations, all other political parties being banned. Although this merger gave Karume a greater degree of administrative control over the ex-Umma Party cadres it could not, of course, resolve the fundamental political differences, which were rooted in the clash over the class character of the new regime; although they also, more mundanely, reflected rival personal ambitions, tendencies towards ethnic solidarity, etc. Indeed, in so far as this merger tended to organisationally unite the ex-Umma Party cadres and the more militant left wing of the ASP, and helped transcend the superficial Arab-Comorian character of the Umma leadership, its long-term implications were not entirely favourable to the Karume bloc of the ASP. This was a fact clearly discerned by the astute Karume who, shortly after this merger, actively 'encouraged' major Umma leaders to depart Zanzibar. Among those who left the islands, following the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April 1964, were Babu, Salim Ahmed Salim and Ali Mafoudh. (Salim had been the editor of the Umma Party newspaper; he went on to serve as Tanzania's ambassador to the U.A.R., India and the People's Republic of China, and is at present their ambassador to the U.N. Mafoudh subsequently held the second most important post, that of Chief of Operations, in the Tanzanian People's Defence Force. All three of these men were directly implicated by the Zanzibari authorities in the alleged treason plot, although Salim was never charged.)
Karume was aided in this endeavour by the Tanganyikan President, Julius Nyerere, who was already uneasy about the general leftward drift of the islands, about the openly expressed Marxist views of the Umma cadres and their impact on Zanzibari policy, and about the possibility of a disruptive clash on the islands, which were of some strategic sensitivity to Tanganyika. Nyerere opened high positions in the Tanganyikan administration to the former Umma leaders, whose political impact was more easily diffused within the larger Tanganyikan administrative apparatus, especially in view of their lack of a mass base in the larger entity.

Despite the somewhat enforced departure of many of the more ideologically committed and administratively capable cadres, the ASP, under Karume’s leadership, achieved a number of historically important reforms on the islands. The politically dominant Arab/Shirazi ruling class was effectively suppressed. Some plantation lands were redistributed among the landless labourers, although most became state property, with their profits accruing to those who controlled the state apparatus. The islands, although essentially retaining their political autonomy, were united with Tanganyika to form Tanzania. There was a radical extension of the severely limited free education and medical programmes begun under the colonial administration. The ASP openly looked to socialist countries for political and economic support, one of the first African countries to do so.

Over the years, however, a number of less progressive characteristics developed alongside these revolutionary changes, threatening to overwhelm them. A serious trend of careerism emerged within the State apparatus, a trend rooted in the class character of the ASP and only partially constrained by that organisation’s superficial commitment to the ‘path of socialist development’. This led, at an early date, to the stifling of mass participation in decision-making, and eventually to the harsh administrative suppression of all serious criticism about policy, style of work, and so forth. One indication of the narrowing base of decision-making is that December 1972 marked the first ASP conference since 1962, ie. prior not only to the 1964 revolution, but also to the ASP’s official endorsement of the necessity for socialist development and its announced transformation into a ‘revolutionary party’. Moreover, this conference itself resulted from, and was only made possible by, Karume’s death.

This trend was acutely dangerous in view of the fact that a substantial proportion of those in positions of authority were not even administratively capable careerists, and owed their continuance in office solely to their loyalty to the Karume leadership. This leadership in turn not only tolerated careerist inefficiency, but actively sought to reinforce the position of its politically reliable lieutenants, not merely by suppressing criticism but also by preventing the development of more capable potential rivals. Thus the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council, dominated by Karume’s clique, prohibited young people from leaving the islands for advanced training. Indeed, the Zanzibari authorities even refused to permit its students to attend the University of Dar es Salaam. Nor, despite its announced intention, did the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council authorise construction of a university for the
islands' population.

In time, a clear Karume clique consolidated, exercising increasingly unchecked rule. As this process developed, a number of sincere ASP and ex-Umma Party militants attempted to voice their criticisms. These, however, were suppressed amidst the complete abandonment of any pretense of socialist legality. Arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention without trial, severe torture and summary execution were not uncommon. Indeed, by 1967 the Karume clique felt it necessary to make a public display of its intention to suppress criticism. Thus, most of the major left-wing ASP figures were charged with an entirely fictitious anti-Karume plot, publically denounced, and—without any pretense of a trial—executed in prison. With the death of Hanga, Twala, and others, the Karume clique proclaimed its complete dominance of the State apparatus. Although a few ex-Umma cadres and left-wing ASP members remained in the Zanzibari administration, the limits of their activity had been made clear, as had the penalty for transgression.

While the mass of the populace could escape from the worst of such excesses by political passivity, they could not so easily escape the consequences of the character of the post-1964 economic reorganisation. During the period of colonial rule the agricultural sector had been completely distorted, with a significant over-concentration on the export of a cash crop at the expense of domestic food production. As a consequence, clove production was relied upon to cover the costs of importing food. After the revolution this economic structure, which gave rise to serious difficulties whenever the price of cloves fell on the world market, was essentially maintained. Its consequences were exacerbated, however, by the ASP's decision to accumulate foreign reserves. The islands' economy remained bound to clove production for export, but restrictions were placed on capital outlay for the purchase of food and other essentials. It is important to recognise that this was not a policy aimed at accumulation for investment. There were literally no plans for the productive use of this capital, which sat in the London branch of the Moscow Narodny Bank, to the profit of that financial institution. Such investment as did occur was often spent on incredibly wasteful programmes, such as Africa's only colour television network. As a result of its hoarding, Zanzibar's foreign reserves climbed from less than $3,000,000 prior to the revolution to $80,000,000 in 1972. (This latter figure also reflected the very high price of cloves on the world market.) At the same time, however, an extremely critical food shortage developed on the islands in the years preceding Karume's assassination, leading to further disenchantment with the ASP leadership on the part of the islands' population.

By 1972, the long-standing latent opposition to ASP rule was beginning to assume a mass, public character for the first time since the suppression of the 1967 anti-Karume 'plot'. In response to this, the Karume clique prepared the way for another purge of potentially dissident elements, especially those whose historical role made them likely candidates for mass support. Early in 1972, Ahmed Badawi Quallatein, a former Umma cadre and a junior minister in the
Zanzibari administration, and Ali Sultan Issa, one of the Umma Party's cadres who still held a prominent position in the Zanzibari administration, were dismissed from office. Then in February a high-level delegation went to Dar es Salaam to demand the extradition of Babu and some of his Zanzibari colleagues. This demand was motivated by the fact that, as the negative aspects of Karume's leadership consolidated and intensified, Babu had emerged as the major critic of the ASP regime. The genuine mass support Babu still enjoyed on the islands had led the ASP, as early as 1967, to demand that Babu be dismissed from his cabinet position in the mainland government and returned to Zanzibar under the jurisdiction of the Zanzibari internal security apparatus. Nyerere, who had in 1967 turned Hanga over to Karume in such circumstances, declined the demand of the February 1972 Zanzibari delegation. He acceded, however, to the demand to dismiss Babu from his position as Minister of Economic Affairs and Development Planning.

It was in this context that Karume met his death at the hands of two assassins, each of whom had a strong personal motive for his action. Lt. Humud, whose burst of machine-gun fire actually killed Karume, had often spoken of his anger at the death of his father, who had died under torture in jail. Humud was also known to have publicly expressed his outrage at the suffering to the populace caused by the severe and unnecessary shortage of food. The other assassin, Captain Ahmada, had been coerced in 1967 into falsely implicating nineteen people in an alleged anti-Karume plot. These nineteen, who represented many of the major figures of the ASP left wing (like Hanga), were summarily shot without trial, many of them having been turned over to the Zanzibari authorities on the orders of Nyerere. Although rewarded for his role with a promotion to captaincy, Ahmada bitterly resented both the preceding threats and the resulting ostracism he endured from his former friends, who were—like most Zanzibaris—well aware of the falsity of the allegations against the executed men. Both Humud and Ahmada were former members of the Umma Party. In an ensuing police hunt Humud, Ahmada, and the only two other men actually involved in the assassination—a civilian named Chwaya and an army corporal—were killed allegedly as a result of a gun battle with police.

Immediately following the assassination, approximately 1,100 people—mostly ex-Umma Party cadres or ASP members thought to have been critical of Karume's rule—were arrested and interrogated. Their arrest simplified the delicate task of political transition, removing at a stroke most of the potential opponents to the continuation of the Karume clique's leadership. The results of their interrogation under torture also provided the crucial basis for allegations of a far-reaching plot to seize power on the islands, a plot allegedly involving all of the politically prominent Zanzibaris living on mainland Tanzania. In response to these allegations, several score of Zanzibaris living on the mainland, including Babu, were detained by the Tanzanian authorities, who could hardly have refused the request of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council in this respect, Karume being, after all, the First Vice-President of the Union government. The removal from the political scene of Babu—who still retained a significant, if suppressed,
mass following in the islands—permitted the consolidation of the old regime at a time when, as we shall see from the actions of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council, there was both serious popular opposition to the ASP, and confusion and disunity within the ranks of the ASP leadership.

The consolidation of the old regime occupied the next nine months, and this process laid the foundation for the Zanzibar Treason Trial. The issue of succession was of some complexity, since what was required was a public figure who had served on the Revolutionary Council under Karume’s leadership, whose accession would not in itself destroy the post-Karume factional balance on the Council, and who could not only legitimise and protect the continued role of the hard-line inner clique, but also manage to persuade the severely disenchanted populace that substantial reforms would be forthcoming. The person chosen for this task was Aboud Jumbe, whose popular image was that of a man who had merely acquiesced in rather than initiated policy under Karume.

Jumbe’s selection did not, however, resolve the conflict in the Council concerning post-Karume policy. At the risk of being overly schematic, we can roughly discern two opposing perspectives which were operative at the time. Seif Bakari, leader of the ASP Youth League and a colonel in the Zanzibar army, headed the recalcitrant, hard-line Karume clique, which included Ali Karume, the rather notorious son of the former leader. Bakari consolidated a position of great power under Karume by his complete subservience to the latter’s designs, especially regarding internal security. So strong was his link with the former ASP President that he was the second target of Karume’s assassins.

This faction’s first consideration was to ensure that their pre-assassination activities were explicitly legitimised, so as to forestall efforts to hold them accountable for all the political repression which had taken place. Their acquiescence in the selection of Jumbe, who was identified with the opposing faction, was probably elicited as the price of their legitimisation. Legitimisation was, of course, made easier by the at least passive complicity of all members of both factions in Karume’s misrule. Hence what was really at issue was the character of the legitimisation—ie. faintly self-critical or adulatory. Bakari pushed hard for the ritual deification of Karume, the essential maintenance of his administrative structure and policies, and the swift trial and public execution of all those who could be branded as conspirators in the alleged plot, ie. all of the detained ASP and ex-Umma Party cadres. This would serve not only to sever the link between potentially unreliable cadres and the growing popular criticism of Karume’s years of rule, but also to impress upon the populace that the consequences of political opposition remained the same as during Karume’s lifetime.

The opposing faction, whose principal representative Jumbe became, considered that the intensity of opposition to Karume’s policies required a rather different response. In their view, the successful transition to post-Karume rule, while retaining the entire surviving ASP leadership, necessitated an active, if limited and controlled,
campaign of reforms, notably with respect to the prevailing food shortage, administrative inefficiency, and the activities of the public security apparatus. Shortly after taking office, Jumbe relaxed restrictions on the importation of food and other essentials, releasing some of the island's foreign reserves to finance this measure. In addition, he permitted seventeen students, amidst much publicity, to attend the University of Dar es Salaam, and promised that more would follow. Jumbe also initiated a major public relations campaign to establish local Party seminars, which were intended to arouse enthusiasm for a promised ASP National Congress.

Jumbe's moves on the issue of the internal security apparatus were considerably more tentative, in part because the interests of his faction also required the removal—even if in a less permanent fashion than advocated by Bakari—of potential ex-Umma Party/left-wing ASP rivals, and in part because such moves were actively resisted by Bakari's group, one of whose major institutional bases was the security apparatus. The intensity of the clash between these factions, as well as the general sense of political uncertainty on the islands following Karume's death, may be gauged from reports which indicated that, just prior to Jumbe's state visit to Somalia in late 1972, an army squad visited the ASP Youth League headquarters and removed quantities of arms and ammunition, which the Youth League claimed were kept there in case of an emergency need to defend the island. Thereafter the Youth League building, which is in the centre of Zanzibar town, was guarded by Youth League members.

In December 1972, the ASP held its first party conference in ten years. Attended by more than 900 delegates from the islands, President Nyerere and other TANU leaders, delegations from 12 African countries, and representatives from Frelimo and MPLA, the Conference's main purpose was to endorse the developments of the post-Karume transition period. Jumbe's opening address laid particular stress on the issue of methods of winning mass support for the party, and on the theme of 'leaders should seek to serve the people, not to dominate others', implicitly acknowledging both the ASP's political isolation and one of its major causes. The crucial political issue of suppressing the left during the period of transition was expressed in the adoption of four resolutions. The first resolution outlawed former Zanzibar Nationalist Party, Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party (both reactionary organisations banned since 1964), and Umma Party members from holding positions in the islands government. A second resolution forbade former members of these groups from ever becoming full ASP members. A third resolution restricted the ability of non-ASP members to serve in the army or police. Lastly, a resolution was passed calling for the trial and public execution of all those found guilty in the alleged anti-Karume conspiracy.

Several months after the conference, ie. a year after the mass arrests, the Zanzibar treason trial opened. Eighty-one people were charged with treason, the eighteen remaining mainland detainees being tried in absentia, in contradiction to the laws of mainland Tanzania, as Nyerere refused to accede to the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council's extradition requests in the absence of some guarantee of an
equitable judicial proceeding. Nyerere’s refusal was based both on his knowledge of the continuing and widespread use of torture by the Zanzibari authorities, and on his criticisms of the other aspects of Zanzibar’s legal system.

A brief review of the legal system in Zanzibar may usefully serve as an introduction to the trial itself. There is essentially no separate judicial branch or structure in the Zanzibari administration. In so far as detained persons are actually brought to trial, they are charged by a People’s Court, the judges of which are ASP appointees, with no legal training, and indeed often only semi-literate. The defendant is not permitted a lawyer; the prosecutor—who presumably believes the case he’s presenting against the accused—serving as the defendant’s legal counsel. The application of the law in such a system clearly depends crucially on the character of the State, the functioning of its representatives, and their ultimate accountability to criticism and oversight by the masses. However, in situations where the State reflects a fundamental contradiction in the society between the dominant class strata and the vast majority of the labouring masses, a defendant’s interests require access to legal assistance independent from State control (although this does not infer that this sufficiently protects defendants against either the application or, more crucially, the character of the law in such situations). In short, the administration of justice in Zanzibar managed to combine the worst of both worlds.

The prosecution (and, of course, the defence) was in the hands of Wolfgang Dourado, the British-trained Attorney General, and one of only three men in the Zanzibari administration with a legal background. There were three lay judges, who were completely lacking in any legal training. While a detailed review of the prosecution evidence is obviously impossible here, some appreciation of its character may be gained from the following. In general, the ‘evidence’ against the accused constituted of: (1) the testimony of nine men who, having pleaded guilty and under sentence of death, awaited the outcome of their appeal for mercy to the Zanzibari authorities. These nine men implicated all but six of the remaining defendants. (2) The self-confessions of the remaining defendants, save again the six defendants against whom no evidence was ever introduced, and the eighteen held on the mainland. Every one of these self-confessions was repudiated in court, after a description of the severe torture which induced it. (3) The defendants’ personal and political links with Babu, which were matters of public knowledge and never denied by the defendants. (4) Circumstantial evidence regarding the whereabouts of Babu and others at the time of the assassination.

We may first consider the question of the self-confessions, both those which were retracted and those which were not. Their centrality to Dourado’s case was underlined by his concluding address to the court:

‘Coming to the prosecution case, it rests in the main on the evidence of nine of the accused who have pleaded guilty... Before they came to give evidence they were sentenced on their own plea of guilt and each of them was sentenced

23
to death... Part of the prosecution case rests on the statements made by the accused persons. Most of these admit guilt and in addition involve others in the plot... During the trial those who admitted guilt in their statements retracted them. They contended that the statements were improperly obtained and were therefore not voluntary statements. Because of the conditions in which these statements were taken they were forced to admit guilt and concoct lies and in other cases the investigating officers added to their statements in order to strengthen the case against them. The question that firstly arises is, are these statements admissible in law? The short answer to this question is that while they would be inadmissible in some systems of law, our system has no bar to the admissibility of such statements. Your Honour will observe that I am conceding that some form of arm-twisting was adopted in order to obtain these statements.'

Aside from giving an instructive insight into the Zanzibari legal system, some detail regarding the admitted 'arm-twisting' is pertinent. While a recitation of the catalogue of particular tortures suffered by the various accused may be foregone (one of the defendants, Hussein Mbaruk Kombo, described the interrogation room as resembling 'an abattoir, splashed with human blood'), it ought to be emphasised that it resulted in the deaths of at least three persons prior to the commencement of the trial. Reportedly, at least two others died in prison subsequent to the trial. Whether or not they were consciously murdered, it is clear from the testimony of several of the defendants that their painful deaths were used as threats by Zanzibari interrogators to exact 'confessions' from those among the accused who had not fully capitulated as a result of their own torture. Zanzibari interrogators also tortured two of the mainland detainees during an 'investigative' visit to Dar es Salaam. This was reportedly without the knowledge of the mainland authorities, who thereafter exercised greater control over such investigations.

In view of the extent and severity of torture on Zanzibar, the implicit acknowledgement of its use in this case by the Attorney General, and the defendant's courtroom retractions, one is hard pressed to put much confidence in that 'part of the prosecution case (which) rests on statements made by the accused persons'. Similar doubt must surely be entertained with respect to the nine defendants who pleaded guilty and implicated the remaining accused. Indeed, the defendants plausibly contended that these nine men were, subsequent to the threat or use of torture, persuaded to bargain their lives for those of the other accused. In response, the Attorney General could only argue that

'Some of the accused have put it to these nine men that some promise was held out to them if they gave evidence against the co-accused. If the prosecution wished to induce the nine accused to turn State witness in return for a promise of pardon or remission of sentence, this would have been done before they were charged. Suffice it to say that this was not done.'

The Attorney General then concluded this remarkable refutation of the defendant's allegations by earnestly reminding the judges that they

'would do well to remember that in this treason trial not a single fact has rested on the evidence of a convicted perjurer.'
The testimony of the nine men might have carried conviction, as indeed in another sense it did, despite the strong presumption of torture and their status as condemned appellants, if it had reinforced an otherwise strong prosecution case. However, excepting the testimony of the nine, and the unanimously retracted confessions of the other defendants, the prosecution was only able to establish the facts, well known to anyone faintly familiar with Tanzanian/Zanzibari affairs, that Babu was severely critical of the ASP’s administration of Zanzibar, that he and several of the other defendants were avowed communists, and that they had all met socially with one or another on numerous occasions.

The issue of Babu’s communist perspective, and his role in Zanzibari affairs, dominated the trial. As the Attorney General noted:

‘For a proper understanding of the prosecution case, it is necessary to study the character of the villain of the piece, Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu. As alleged by the prosecution, he has been the guiding force behind the plot... It was he who conceived the plot to overthrow the Government of the Afro-Shirazi Party as long back as 1968. He was the mastermind and the arch-instigator of the plot and it is therefore necessary to give some account of this accused person.’

Although we have previously briefly outlined aspects of Babu’s political history, it may be useful to extend somewhat these remarks, particularly with respect to Babu’s adherence to Marxism-Leninism. Babu established a Zanzibar office in official connection with Hsinhua (New China) News Agency in 1960. The resulting journal, Zanews, became the sole local outlet for the news of the international working class struggles, as well as the main introduction to Marxism-Leninism for the islands’ population. Although his affiliation at this time with the ZNP was based on its being the only nationalist organisation pressing for independence, it would appear, in retrospect, that Babu and his associates tended to overestimate the possibility of winning the mass of the African landless labourers and urban workers to the struggle for independence under an organisational umbrella dominated by the primarily Arab plantation stratum. Despite this misjudgment, however, Babu’s actual political practice was exemplary, and resulted in his being the only major nationalist figure to be jailed by the colonial authorities. Thus, in 1962, Babu was prosecuted by Dourado, found guilty of sedition, and sentenced to 15 months in jail. This sentence reflected both the character of his mass work, and the colonial authorities’ attempt to remove him from the nationalist struggle. Throughout the early sixties, Babu’s major concern was to politically consolidate his supporters around the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and force a successful break with the ZNP.

Having previously discussed the role of the Umma Party, we may briefly pass on to Babu’s role in the mainland administration. From 1964 through February 1972, Babu served continuously in some ministerial capacity, culminating in his heading the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning. Throughout this period, Babu was one of the leading supporters of Nyerere’s various progressive measures, although he was also one of the major critics of the restricted character of these developments. Thus, for example, while supporting the vaguely socialist character of the Ujamaa orientation,
Babu was sharply critical of its implications as regards industrial development. This criticism was based not only on his recognition of the limits of attempting to rationalise Tanzania’s subordinate status within the world capitalist economy, i.e. to make more efficient Tanzania’s reliance on primary commodity production, but equally on his perception that the emerging industrial proletariat provided the principal political bulwark against the bureaucratic and managerial forces which were the dominant faction of the ruling power bloc. Babu was also active internationally as a communist during these years, being the major African political figure to make an explicit Marxist-Leninist critique of the emergence and dominance of revisionism within the Soviet State. He was likewise active, particularly with respect to the Afro-American community, in propagating communism among elements struggling against various capitalist regimes. More recently, and despite limited facilities at present available to him, Babu has used his time in jail to produce a manuscript, in which he analyses the limits imposed upon development by the continued imperialist domination of Africa.

Naturally, Dourado’s characterisation of Babu differed considerably from the preceding summary. In the main, it consisted of the allegation that Babu’s presence prior to 1963 in the ZNP, his formation of the Umma Party, his pre-revolution alliance with the ASP, the subsequent merger of the two organisations, his criticisms of developments on Zanzibar, and his role as a cabinet minister in the Union Government, were all motivated by opportunism, i.e. by the personal desire for a position of authority and power. Aside from his mere assertion, Dourado’s assessment of Babu’s character rested upon the repudiated confessions of some of the defendants, the testimony of the nine condemned men, and two statements attributed to Babu, dating from 1961 and 1963 respectively.

Dourado’s interpretation of Babu’s political history contradicts all of the available evidence, which suggests that Babu could have retained his very prominent position in the Zanzibar administration by the simple expedience of foregoing political criticism of the ASP. Even after having departed the islands, his silence would not only have been financially beneficial (e.g. prominent Zanzibaris in the mainland administration were able to secure interest-free loans of Shs. 50,000 to Shs. 100,000 from the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council), but would also have forestalled the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council’s pressure on Nyerere to dismiss him from office. Yet another alternative would have been to forego his political criticism of certain trends in Tanzania so as to secure a wider allegiance within the cabinet, and thus defeat the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council’s efforts to have him dismissed from office. Babu pursued none of these courses, however, and the most plausible interpretation for his actions remains that he was a committed communist who was principally motivated by a genuine desire to serve the Tanzanian people; a desire manifest, for example, by his exemplary rejection of various privileges, e.g. a government car, associated with his cabinet rank. It may be added that the assertion of opportunism came poorly from a man who, in order to preserve his position as Attorney General, not only used his legal training to simultaneously prosecute and ‘defend’ men who, by his own admission,
had been tortured, but who was also willing to uphold the validity of ‘evidence’ so obtained.

The remaining evidence as to Babu’s political character took the form of two statements, one from 1961 and one from 1963, which allegedly respectively established that Babu had always opposed the ASP leadership, and that he was determined to seize power himself in order to establish a communist regime on Zanzibar. In a sense, of course, this proved the strongest part of the prosecution’s case, since it had at least a tangential relationship to well-known facts about Babu’s ideological position. It is, I think, useful to quote at considerable length the prosecution case in this respect, not only to reveal the use made of statements which pre-dated the trial by more than 10 years, but more importantly to underline the explicit anti-communism that was central to the administrative suppression of the left during the post-Karume transition.

‘In June 1961 elections that were some disturbances followed by rioting. Babu and his Party tried to lay the blame for this at the door of the Afro-Shirazi Party. The Commission of Inquiry that was subsequently appointed to look into the causes of the disturbances absolved the Afro-Shirazi Party from any blame. This so angered Babu that he published a Statement in his news bulletin—Zanews. In this statement he suggested that the Commission of Inquiry was a creation of the imperialists designed to undermine the progressive movement in Zanzibar... Subsequently in a case, on oath Babu stated that he accepted responsibility for the statement that he published. In his view the Afro-Shirazi Party should have been condemned for acting on racial lines which resulted in the flare-up and he goes on to say: “Some of the leaders are stooges and reactionaries as referred in the statement complained of. These are my honest views and I have no reason to change them.” ... In August 1963, Babu purported to join in a United Front with the Afro-Shirazi Party. The expression United Front is not a new one. History is replete with examples of this expedient resorted to by opportunists to use the support of others for their own ends until they manipulate themselves into a position whereby they completely take over power and dispense with the support of those whom they used. Even while this United Front is in existence Babu unashamedly in the greetings issued on the occasion of “independence” refers to the Umma Party as the People’s Party of Zanzibar and the following statement contained in the message is significant: “The people of Zanzibar and their Party the Umma Party while awaiting to take State power in their own hands...” I would wish to emphasise the significance of this statement because it is the prosecution’s case that Babu always had the intention of taking the reins of Government power in his hands. It is remarkable that the statement is made at a time when he has gone through a marriage of convenience with the Afro-Shirazi Party through the medium of the so-called United Front. ... The message is addressed to “Dear Comrades and Brothers” and Khamis Abdulla Ameir in explaining this said that the “Comrades” were the Umma Party members and the “Brothers” were those who supported them. The Umma Party is described as being the Vanguard of the whole oppressed people of Zanzibar. ... After the January 1964 revolution the Umma Party continued to exist as a separate entity. Babu did not on his own dissolve his Party. It was only after the late Mzee Abeid Amani Karume asked him to throw in his lot with the Afro-Shirazi Party, Babu apparently complied with the request. But he and his followers continued to be conscious of their separate entity and on more than one occasion they had to be warned to give up their activities as comrades. ... What policy really did Babu and his comrades wish to introduce in Zanzibar? The weight of evidence indicates that they were after scientific socialism. Witnesses like Miraji Mpatani, Badawi Qullatein and co-accused Ali Sultan Issa (who appear to understand their politics) stated that scientific socialism was communism. ... if one understands Babu he is not the type of person to respect the wishes of the masses. As leader of the Umma Party he spoke of a Vanguard Party. What in fact this means is that a bunch of unscrupulous tyrants posing as scientific socialists would impose their will on the masses. It is not what the masses desire that would count but what these
tyrants thought was the best for the masses. They would then proudly proclaim that they had introduced a "dictatorship of the proletariat".

Having established—by means of the testimony of the nine condemned men, the retracted confessions of the defendants, bland assertion, and the 1961 and 1963 statements—the existence of a plot, its political character, and its leadership, the prosecution was able to use every occasion between 1968-72 when one of the defendants had met another, as corroborating evidence of the plot. In view of their long-standing personal and political association, and given that Babu's house was one of the centres of the Zanzibari community in Dar es Salaam, the prosecution had no difficulty in establishing that a series of 'meetings' had taken place over the years.

The remainder of the prosecution case centred around the issue of Babu's fishing trip on the evening of 6 April, ie. the day prior to Karume's assassination. The prosecution alleged, through the testimony of the nine men and the defendants' retracted confessions, that this trip was for the purpose of landing Babu and his mainland followers on the islands on the night of the 6th, preparatory to a full fledged coup d'état.

'This last meeting on 2 April is an important one. It was on this day that Babu and his group agreed with the suggestion that the date for the overthrow should be 7 April 1972. The plan was that Babu and his followers in Dar es Salaam were to come by boat on the night of 6 April. They were to land at a point between the Cable and Wireless and the Starehe Club. Thereafter Babu was to remain in hiding in the house of assassin Humud. This house is in fact opposite the Starehe Club at Shangani.'

In as much as the boat never landed on Zanzibar, and Babu was known to have returned to Dar es Salaam by the afternoon of the 7th, ie. prior to Karume's assassination later that evening, the prosecution was compelled to suggest that Babu had been forewarned that the plot had been discovered, and hence had hastily returned to Dar.

'Many people, I am sure, would like to know why Babu and his group never landed in Zanzibar. Quite frankly, Your Honour we can only speculate. You will recollect that on the evening of the 6th the authorities had suspected that arms were missing. Could a radio message have been sent to Babu informing him of this? There were after all two radios in the boat. And was it the cowardly streak in Babu that prompted him to turn back and find shelter in the Haven of Peace leaving those whom he instigated to face the music?' (Emphasis added).

A close reading of the prosecutor's remarks in this regard is instructive, for in his opening address to the Court a year previously Dourado, in outlining the events of 7 April, implied that it was not until the afternoon of the 7th—ie. after Babu's return to Dar—that the authorities suspected that arms were missing from Bavuai Camp.

'Now we come to the day of the assassination. At 6 am on 7 April 1972, Ali Khatib Chwaya saw Ali Mshangama and reported to him that the Dar es Salaam group had not yet arrived. Later in the morning, Ali Mshangama, Ali Khatib Chwaya, Miraif Mpatani, Baramia and Ahmada and Humud met in Humud's house and expressed concern at the non-arrival of the plotters from Dar es Salaam.
The arms were in Humud's house and the plotters were worried about this... At about 12 noon on the same day, Ali Mshangama, Baramia, Hashil Seif, Amar Saad (Kuku) and Chwaya met at Amar Salum (Kuku's) house where it was suggested to Chwaya by Ali Mshangama, Hashil Seif and Baramia that the plot to overthrow the Government should be postponed until they got word from Dar es Salaam. At 3 pm on the same day, Baramia went to Humud's house at Shangani. There he saw Miraji Mpatani outside Humud's house. Baramia was told by Miraji Mpatani that Ahmada and Humud insisted that the plot should be carried out on that day as Ahmada was being sought by an army officer. By this time the authorities had already suspected that arms were missing at Bavuai Camp.' (Emphasis added).

With this issue resolved, the prosecutor's case was completed, as was that offered by Dourado in his capacity as defence counsel. In addition to the evident weakness of the prosecution case, it foundered on a number of logical inconsistencies, perhaps the most glaring of which related to the character of the alleged military details of the coup, and their relation to the sequence of events which actually transpired on 7 April.

In his opening address, Dourado outlined the main military details of the alleged plot.

'With regard to obtaining arms in Zanzibar assassin Humud and assassin Ahmada were to organise the stealing of these arms from the Bavuai camp. Among other matters agreed at the meeting of 2 April 1972 were:—
(a) Suleiman Sisi was to lead the attack on Mtoni Camp, and Ahmada was to be responsible for the capture of Bavuai Camp, Army Headquarters and Army Radio School, all of which were at Migombani,
(b) Ubago Camp was considered to be out of target and it was presumed that it would automatically surrender.
(c) Malindi Police Station was to have been captured by an armed group under the command of Humud, Control would thereby have been gained of all police vehicles fitted with radios.
(d) Ziwani Police Station was to be attacked by some of the police officers who were recruited. Askari Yusuf Ramadhan would have taken part in this operation.
(e) Amour Dugheshi was to take over State House,
(f) After the capture of the Radio Station it was to be under the control of Badawi, Miraji Mpatani and Mtendeni.
(g) The Airport was to be guarded by a company led by Ali Sultan Issa.
(h) The Afro-Shirazi Party Youth League Headquarters would have been under the control of Baramia.
(i) Khamis Abdulla Ameir would have been responsible for preventing any counter attack.'

In short, according to Dourado, a plot against an extremely security-conscious regime (backed by a substantial army and police establishment), masterminded by one of the major political leaders of the 1964 revolution (Babu), involving military figures of the armed insurrection in 1964, as well as the former Chief of Operations of the Tanzanian army (Mahfoudh), and carefully planned over a four-year period, consisted of sending one man (Ahmada) to seize control of Bavuai Camp, Army Headquarters, and the Army Radio School; one man (Dugheshi) to take over State House (judging by Dourado's concluding summary, Dugheshi was to have been particularly busy: 'Amour Dugheshi attended the final meeting at which he was assigned the task of arresting the late Mzee Abeid Amani Karume and taking him to the Radio Station and of capturing State House'); one man (Baramia) to control the ASP Youth League Headquarters, ie. the
armed centre of command of Karume’s major internal security figure, Seif Bakari; and—evidently having a spare man available—left one man (Ameir) to deal with any counter-attack. It is pertinent to note that most of the defendants allegedly assigned key military tasks were not members of the Zanzibari Army, and hence could not have relied on a chain of command to secure the services of the troops. Moreover, although Africa has seen several military coups involving a relatively small number of strategically placed officers, the Zanzibari Army contains a parallel structure of ASP political commissars—whose commander was Seif Bakari—to prevent just such an occurrence. In addition to suggesting a rather implausibly daunting military conception the prosecution’s allegations as regards the particulars of the coup d’état were undermined by the fact that, possibly excepting the theft of arms, none of these planned events transpired. Indeed, the only event which may actually have occurred, the theft of arms from Bavuai Camp, could only be tied by the prosecution to Ahmada and Humud, the only people directly linked with the assassination of Karume.

The rather unlikely nature of this plot was highlighted by the alleged behaviour of Mafoudh, the former Chief of Operations of the Tanzania People’s Defence Forces, who, according to Dourado’s closing summary, after four years of planning was reduced to wandering around on the day of the alleged coup in an attempt to borrow spare weapons, indeed, a company of men, from a man who, over a period of several months, had made it plain that he wished to have no part in the alleged plot.

The judges, however, were not so unimpressed with the logic and evidence presented by the prosecution. As a result of the Zanzibar treason trial the following sentences were passed: of the eighteen mainland detainees fourteen, including Babu, Mafoudh and Dugheshi, were found guilty and sentenced to death; the nine men whose testimony formed the main basis of the prosecution case had already been sentenced to death and they still awaited the outcome of their appeal for mercy; thirty one of the remaining detainees on the islands were found guilty of treason, of whom twenty were sentenced to death and eleven received 15-year jail sentences; four were found guilty of the lesser charge of misprision of treason and sentenced to 10 years in jail; against six, the prosecution offered no case and they were ordered released after having spent more than two years in prison; twelve of the defendants on the islands were found innocent, as were four of the mainland detainees. The case against defendant 77, Ali Salim Hafidh, provides a useful standard against which to evaluate the verdicts and sentences imposed by Ame Mohamed and his two colleagues. Dourado’s summary of evidence against Hafidh consisted entirely of the following:

‘At the meeting of the 2 April, Amar Salim Kuku said that Ali Salim Hafidh was to have come with Babu and the others by boat. Apart from this, the prosecution has not adduced any evidence against this accused.’

Ali Hafidh was sentenced to death.
For the condemned men there were three sequential appeal steps prior to execution—the High Court, the ASP Supreme Council and the Chairman of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council. To date, only the first step has been reached. Haji Pandu issued his ruling on 10 November 1975—twenty four sentenced to death, and twenty nine others sentenced to various terms of imprisonment totalling 361 years. Five of the detainees have died in detention. The prospects of the defendants in the custody of the Zanzibari authorities continue to be, as they have been from the beginning, a function of domestic political developments. Meanwhile, these men await the outcome of these developments in prison conditions which have thus far produced two deaths since the completion of the trial in May 1974.

The mainland authorities refused to recognise the legal validity of the treason trial, except in so far as it found four of the mainland detainees innocent. They continued to hold the remaining fourteen in preventive detention, neither releasing them nor returning them to Zanzibar for execution. This remains their status today, more than four years after their original detention; they have never been charged by the mainland authorities with any crime, there are no prospects that Nyerere’s government will ever bring them to trial, and their families whom they are rarely permitted to see, are generally without a direct source of income. Although conditions inside Ukongo Prison, Dar es Salaam, where the mainland detainees are held, are superior to those enjoyed by their co-defendants on the islands, the treatment accorded these men is such as to cause concern.

In a recent letter smuggled out of Ukongo, Babu denies his guilt, demands once again to be tried in a mainland court, and recounts his treatment under detention, which, in view of his former position, may be presumed to have been equal or superior to that afforded the other mainland detainees. According to Babu, at 3 am on the morning of 13 April 1972

‘My house was surrounded by the para-military police, armed to the teeth, and in typical Gestapo tradition, banged my door in the name of the law and order, walked in, arrested and handcuffed me, with loaded sub-machine guns pointed at my head. ... Although I was shown no arrest order or a search warrant, and much less told what all this brute force was in aid of, yet a gang of secret police walked in along with the armed gendarmes, and started ransacking my house and taking anything which they thought they wanted. ... While they continued with their ransacking my house, they ordered me out of the house, leaving my terrified family behind. I had no choice. They had already handcuffed me and so they literally dragged me out of the house, helter-skelter, and shoved me into a waiting van in which were additional armed gendarmes.’

While Babu’s description may sound exaggerated, it is not. Arriving at his house later that morning, I found it in utter chaos from the police search, with furniture, books, etc. strewn all about, his children—and those of his relatives who lived there also—completely terrified and unwilling to leave each other’s company, and his wife and the rest of the household quite literally hysterical from the treatment accorded them. To this date the evidence thus acquired, including photographs of Babu and other Umma Party cadres with Che in Cuba, Marxist theoretical works, etc., has not been returned.
Babu was taken directly to Ukongo Prison, where

'I was stripped, searched and then thrown into an isolation cell which I later came to know was reserved for the leprosy cases. I had to spend the rest of the night on a bare wet cement floor in this cell of 6 feet by 7. I remained in this cell for exactly two weeks in complete isolation without being allowed out for fresh air, even for half an hour.'

Babu was then transferred in chains to Tabora Prison where he spent the next 10 months, 7 of which were spent in solitary confinement. During this time he was never informed of the reason for his arrest, which contravenes the law—the Preventive Detention Act of 1962—under which he was detained, and he was never even questioned, being left simply to sit in his cell. The duration and cost of train travel between Dar es Salaam and Tabora precluded his wife from being able to visit except on one occasion, and he was not to see his children for more than a year. After 10 months Babu was returned to Ukongo. Since then conditions, while varying, have generally been worse than during the first 12 months, particularly as regards food. This can now hardly be expected to improve with the appointment of a Zanzibari, Mr. Mwinyi, as Minister of Home Affairs and thus directly in charge of the detainees.

As we have previously noted, the fate of the condemned men is a function of the political developments in Zanzibar and on mainland Tanzania. The major post-trial development in this respect is the growing economic and political integration of the two constituent elements of Tanzania. With the consolidation of Jumbe's limited reform regime, Zanzibar's economy has been guided into a more typical and rationalised pattern of peripheral capitalist development than had previously been the case. Central to this development has been the diversification of economic production and State investment. Increasing State investment has been planned for domestically consumed agricultural products such as tobacco, rice and sugar. In order to solve the still serious situation regarding domestic food supplies, the Zanzibar government is distributing free food crop seeds and fertiliser to the peasantry, as well as loaning needed farm implements. Characteristically, the ASP regime has announced that those who fail to devote a sufficient proportion of their potential yields to food production can expect a prison sentence. Import substitution industries are also being developed, as, for example, in the planned match factory to be located just outside Zanzibar town at Walezoe. A limited export capacity aimed at the East African market is represented by the State's projected investment in a car battery factory and a tyre retreading plant. Tourism also gets its share of investment, including a $6,000,000 luxury liner for island-hopping. With the increasing investment of its foreign reserves in the areas of import substitution industries, tourism, etc., the Jumbe regime has created an economic structure more capable of integrating, particularly in conjunction with mainland Tanzania, into the world capitalist market. (Zanzibar's budgeted 1975 income of Shs. 218.4 million almost doubles the 1974 figure, Shs. 116.6 million. Its projected 1975 surplus of Shs. 55.7 million indicates the significant change in the proportion of investment to reserves from the days of Karume's rule.)
One consequence of this trend is the increasing possibility of extended political integration with mainland Tanzania, albeit of a still restricted character. Recently, President Nyerere has forced this issue by calling for the integration of TANU and the ASP. The ASP, in turn, has formally endorsed the call for the integration of the two ruling parties. The ultimate character of this measure is, however, likely to be very circumscribed, principally by separating the issue of party unity from that of administrative unity. Thus, it is most probable that Zanzibar will retain its sovereignty with respect to judicial proceedings, economic development, etc. Zanzibar has already resisted measures to unify foreign reserve holdings. Thus Dourado recently noted that,

'This is a very sensitive issue. If our foreign reserves were amassed it was done with the sweat and toil of Zanzibaris. Union with the mainland was not created to enable big brother to live at the expense of younger brother.'

This has been a significant sore point between the two, nominally united regimes. Indeed, in recent years mainland Tanzania has passed through a period of severe economic difficulties which resulted in its barely having sufficient reserves to cover four weeks of imports. During this period of crisis, Zanzibar refused to transfer any of its reserve holdings to the mainland, which left the latter even more exposed to the political demands of its international creditors than had previously been the case.

In any event, the significance of extended political integration with respect to the condemned men is twofold: either Nyerere, as President of a united TANU/ASP, may assume somewhat more control over their fate, or the ASP, as a gesture of unity, may transfer this case to Nyerere’s office, without in principle surrendering their control of judicial proceedings on the islands. (It is important to recognise that, despite his inaction, Nyerere does have both meaningful political leverage on this issue, and the ultimate legal responsibility for these men. As Union President, Nyerere is the only official elected by Zanzibaris, who since the 1964 revolution have never had any institutional method, such as elections or mass criticism sessions, for endorsing or opposing the ASP regime.) In either event, Nyerere would then be in a position to exercise his prerogative of presidential clemency, with, of course, his unstated guarantee that these innocent men would never again be permitted to be politically active. Although such a scenario is by no means more than a tentative possibility, and although it would amount to a de jure recognition of the legal validity of the Zanzibar Treason Trial, it represents the first sliver of hope since April 1972 for more than forty condemned Zanzibari revolutionaries.

Bibliographical Note
Much of the information quoted here is from the Tanzanian Daily News (various dates), Africa Confidential (various dates), and Habusu (see note at beginning of this article). See also 'Colonialism and Class Formation in Zanzibar' (unpublished paper by Harkishan Bhagat and Haroub Othman) and Zanzibar: Background to Revolution by M.F. Lofchie (Princeton, 1965).
The Situation of Agricultural Workers in Kenya

Kerstin Leitner

The most numerous and most degraded workers in Kenya are the agricultural workers. Their wages are below subsistence. The position of women workers is especially bad. An examination of the Kenya Plantation and Agricultural Workers’ Union reveals its failure to improve its members’ conditions in any way. In the absence of support for workers in the higher echelons of government, the only hope is for strengthened organisation among the workers themselves.

Historical Perspective
Wage employment had been introduced by the European settlers under the protection of the colonial administration. The settlers who came to Kenya rented so much land from the colonial government that they needed African labourers to cultivate it. Yet most of them lacked the funds for the labour force that they needed. Three methods were therefore adopted:
1) forced labour for so-called communal projects (ie. road construction), but also for work on private farms, in particular, bush clearing;
2) the squatter system—a version of wage employment, where, in place of much of the money wage, permission was given to use farm land free of charge;
3) migrant labour, ie. workers work on the farm only part of the year, often to earn money for a certain target, for instance, to pay taxes.

The squatter system could be relatively rewarding to a worker’s family. If they achieved a surplus on ‘their’ piece of land and marketed it, they received a far greater monetary income than the small wage they got from their employer, and it exceeded the income their relatives could realise from farming activities in the reserves.

Superficially, this form of employment appeared to have little to do with wage employment. And in those cases where the European
masters developed a strong paternalistic attitude towards their African employees and built schools for the farm-workers’ children, gave them medical help, and ‘civilised’ them by sending them to church, both sides—the European farmer as well as the African employee—seemed to have a good bargain.

However, in the years after the world economic crisis in 1929, which caused a big slump in Kenya’s settler economy, farmers evicted squatters and destroyed their shambas. It then became obvious that this type of farmer-squatter relationship had nothing to do with any form of ‘communal’ life or even feudal master-servant relations. The one who owned the land could expel those who cultivated the land if it was in his interests. No legal protection existed for the squatters and no compensation was paid to them for their lost property. If they did not agree to leave, they were forced out.

The reason they had to shift was not that there was not enough land for all (the most common motive for a traditional African society to make some of its members migrate to other areas), not was the same solution applied as at the end of slavery at the coast, where a landlord-tenant system developed. The European farmer was an agricultural capitalist. He wanted to produce goods which he could sell either on the colonial urban market or on the world market. Developments there governed the pattern of his farm production. Consequently, once the settler farmers had to adjust the pattern of their production to market demands, the squatter system interfered with the new cultivation method, their existing labour force became too expensive and the workers were dismissed. In this case, squatters were either replaced by migrant labourers or they were only allowed to plant certain crops, for instance, maize and beans, which reduced their income considerably.

Under pressure from the colonial administration, the settlers accepted the legal fixing of minimum wages, which, however, did not mean that all of them adhered to these stipulations. The colonial government’s interest was twofold: firstly, it was interested in stabilising the labour market in Kenya, because this would reduce tensions with and among the African population and help to keep ‘law and order’ more easily. Secondly, it was put under pressure from the British government to make the colony financially self-sufficient, which in turn could only be achieved if tax revenues were increased. As regards increasing tax revenue from the African population, the administration thought it best to limit the number of wage labourers, whilst ensuring that their income made tax collection possible. The result was the ‘Kipande’ (or ‘ticket’) system (see below), and its enforcement by the police and other administrative authorities, with all the discrimination and repression of the African workers this entailed.

Agricultural trade unions were economically unnecessary, since the colonial officers could negotiate directly with the settlers, and they were politically difficult to form because of open repression by the settlers and the administration. Another factor was that the squatters and migrant labourers employed other, less institutionalised forms of resistance, like illegal squatting, or they switched to other economic
activities, like trading. Thus, it was only when it became obvious that the government was unable to solve the social and economic problems which arose out of wage employment, and after the economy had experienced a certain growth and became dependent on an enlarged, permanently working labour force, that trade unions were allowed and a system of collective bargaining established. Although this stage was reached in Kenya's urban areas in the late forties and the now existing industrial trade union system has been established since 1952, the agricultural workers were among the last to form their union.

The development of an internal market economy was only accidental, and was restricted whenever it interfered with the settler economy (eg. the prohibition on the growing of export cash crops by African farmers). Besides, capitalism outside the settler economy only developed in a few areas, and the process was spontaneous and regionally uneven.

To summarise, European colonialism laid the foundations for a capitalist mode of production in Kenya's agriculture, which in turn served the capitalist centres. Colonial capitalism was introduced through cash crops like coffee, tea and sisal, which did not originate in East Africa, and by land alienation and the changing of land tenure patterns (private replacing clan ownership).

The methods applied to abolish the precapitalist modes of production were as brutal as those in the European countries during their phase of primitive capital accumulation in the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and again during the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Those who denied or neglected this systematic origin of oppression in Europe became revisionists, reformists and conservative social-democrats, who were unable to fight successfully against capitalism in its most atrocious form: imperialism and fascism. And those who see colonialism merely as a system in which Europeans, Asians and Arabs stood against Africans will turn out to be supporters of a neo-colonial political economy. Looking back at historical developments in this way means looking at the post-independence period with an approach which analyses to what extent Kenya's agriculture is still governed by capitalistic principles, what this means with regard to the integration in a post-colonial international economy and what repercussions this has for the agricultural workers and their union.

Forms of Employment
The way in which agricultural workers in Kenya are employed reflects three patterns of capitalist development. The first is one where the employer is interested in keeping labour costs as low as possible, regardless of means. The second is where agriculture lags behind other economic sectors, and therefore wants to have as few permanently employed workers as possible, in order to hold constant labour costs down. And thirdly, in those agricultural areas where capital accumulation is slow, precapitalist, family-based production mingles with wage employment and thus a proletariat proper (defined as a class whose members reproduce their labour power out of their
In the mixed-farming sector, where medium-sized farms owned by individual farmers still prevail, the ticket system is commonly used, although this system is no longer included in any of the collective agreements, Industrial Court awards or the Regulation of Wages Order of 1970. Under this ticket system, a worker receives a card for 30 days and, as soon as he has completed 30 days of work, he is paid. If he works every day except Sunday, he is paid within 5 weeks, if he misses some other days he gets his wage correspondingly later. By this system, a worker employed on a ticket is only paid ten times a year by his employer, if he works six days a week. According to the Legal Notice No. 223 of 1965, for the agricultural industry the rates for a monthly contract (male workers) were Shs. 60/-, and for a ticket contract Shs. 70/- (ie. $10). Thus, a man on a ticket contract fell short by Shs. 20/- per annum of the wage of a worker on monthly contract. The same difference occurred between the wage rates fixed by the Industrial Court in 1969 for the coffee industry. The annual cash income was 4-5 per cent less than that of a worker on a monthly contract, and in regard to all the fringe benefits, he was considered to be a casual worker to whom the conditions of service for the permanently employed did not apply. For instance, there is no holiday entitlement.

The reason why employers have not switched to terms of monthly (permanent) employment is obvious. For the farm workers, it is nearly impossible to change their employment conditions without assistance from an outside institution, because the employer is inclined to lay off any worker immediately if he raises a controversial issue. One striking example was given in April 1972, when farm workers on a coconut-farm at the coast went on strike. Not only did the farm management lay off all workers who went on strike, but they also victimised all workers by changing wage payments to daily rates. Since the labour administration in charge of this area was unsympathetic to the strike, the union did not get much help from them for the re-establishment of monthly pay and the reinstatement of the discharged workers.

But even where the ticket system has been replaced by monthly contracts, as, for instance, in plantation agriculture, it does not necessarily mean permanent employment, as the following example shows. When, in the coffee season of 1969/70 and 1970/71, farms were hit by drought and coffee-berry disease, most of the labour force was declared redundant. Two years earlier, the farmers had got agreement to an even worse arrangement. They had asked the union to agree that, because of their difficult financial situation, labourers should be laid off for some time without being discharged. By this provision, the farmers tried to keep the workers at their disposal and also to avoid paying them their termination benefits (Industrial Court Case No. 37/1969). Although the union did not sign the agreement in the end, it did not prevent the farmers from using this method. Many workers near Nairobi tried to find employment elsewhere. This suited the farmers, as they could then claim rent for the houses that the workers still occupied (Sunday Nation, 22.10.72).
Later, during the 1972/73 season, a record year due to good rains and successful control of coffee-berry disease, the farmers faced a labour crisis, a shortage of 10,000 labourers. During the previous year, also a good one, they had only employed casual workers and so cut costs by avoiding fringe benefits payable to permanent employees. This was the cause of the labour shortage; let us see what the authorities did to overcome it.

After the coffee-picking season had started, the farmers sent out recruiting teams with lorries to the villages to collect workers. The Ministry of Labour concentrated its efforts on finding accommodation for ‘temporary resident labour’, although the Minister admitted that it was more important to obtain a permanent labour force. The Kenya Coffee Growers Association tried to overcome the shortage with the offer of a 17 per cent wage increase, which the union immediately accepted. Yet the farmers who had complained most about the difficulty of finding coffee pickers rejected the new wage rates and threatened to go into cattle farming. Faced with these objections, the executive officer of the Kenya Coffee Growers Association hastily came out with the statement that the new agreement did not affect small farmers, but only owners of big plantations and members of the Association. In practice, the Association always showed an inclination to use the incapacity of some farmers to pay reasonable wages as a justification for keeping wages low in the whole industry. In 1969 its representative argued before the Industrial Court: ‘Any further increase in wages or more expensive fringe benefits forced upon the Respondent’s members will be regarded as unjustly punitive as a result of being a member of the Respondent Association, which is repeatedly the target of the Claimant’s demands, whilst the rest of the industry, because it is not organised, can pay its labour almost anything it likes, and is left in peace to do so by the Claimant.’ By this statement the KCGA showed that, in fact, the fixing of wage rates is hardly a means of regulating labour demand and supply under present conditions in Kenya’s coffee-growing industry. Neither were any of the other authorities—the labour administration or the trade union—able to cure the shortage. The union officials, paralysed by internal quarrels, signed the agreement for higher wage rates and did not even bother to improve other conditions of work; the labour administration only sought to find ways and means to hold labourers on the farms for the picking season to make sure that Kenya’s most important export crop was picked.

The basic problem which has to be solved in the coffee industry is the seasonalism characteristic of all agricultural production. Coffee is ripe for picking throughout Kenya from the end of October to the end of February, and in any particular location within about four weeks. During these four weeks, a farmer needs as many pickers as possible; the more he gets, the better the chances are that the coffee is picked at the right time. According to estimates of the KCGA, a farmer needs at least three pickers per acre. During the rest of the year, however, only one worker per every two acres is needed. Not surprisingly, big estates and co-operatives can cope better with this problem, since they can fall back on the wives and children of their permanent workers or of their members respectively. Small-scale farmers can do the necessary
work during the year themselves, and need excess labour only during the picking season. But because they have to pay the workers before they have received the money from their marketing societies, and are thus unable to make calculations for the year ahead, they want to pay as little as possible to their pickers.

So far, a system which stabilises the labour force in agriculture has not been found. In general, it is left to the employer whether he employs a worker on permanent or casual terms. The collective agreements lack any provisions that workers are entitled after a certain period of service to employment on permanent terms, or that farmers have to put a certain percentage of their labour force on a permanent basis. Nor have any organisational measures been taken to supply excess labour when it is needed by securing a living wage for the workers and their families throughout the year.

The only exception is the tea plantation industry, which agreed to put a worker on permanent terms after three months’ continuous service. But here, objective conditions as well as the economic structure are more favourable to such a regulation. First, tea can be plucked throughout the year, except for June and July, when the bushes are pruned. Therefore, the demand for labour is more even over the year. Secondly, capital centralisation is more advanced in the tea than in the coffee industry. A company like Brooke Bond Liebig Ltd., which owns approximately 25 per cent of the acreage under tea cultivation in different areas, can, of course, afford to keep its labour force even in slack periods, whereas a small-scale farmer will not have comparable funds at his disposal. Small tea growers offer just the same insecure employment as do small coffee growers, and pay lower wages, as we shall now see.

Wages and Wage Differentials
The wage rates paid in the four branches of agriculture (sisal, tea, coffee and mixed farming) differ remarkably: up to 100 per cent for the same type of work. The task allocation and the combination of various wage rates are left to the discretion of supervisors and managers. Although the workers offer increasing resistance to this organisation of the work process, it has been altered neither by collective agreements nor by the law. (According to the Kenya Coffee Growers Association, 44 strikes were recorded between May 1963 and August 1965 on coffee estates, of which 20 were caused by a controversy over tasks, 9 over dismissals, 8 by the demand for the dismissal of the supervisor or headman. Strikes were staged for similar reasons on the tea estates.)

Wages per week (of 46 hours unless stated) on monthly contracts fixed by agreements in April 1973 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tea (Kericho Area) 45.5 hrs.</th>
<th>Coffee</th>
<th>Sisal</th>
<th>Mixed Farming</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Sh. 117/-</td>
<td>117/-</td>
<td>104/-</td>
<td>85/50 (46 cents per hr.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>92/50</td>
<td>100/10</td>
<td>93/60</td>
<td>52/- (36 hrs.) (36 cents per hr.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Yet these wages are somewhat misleading, since no farmer can be forced to pay these wages unless he is a member of one of the employers' associations and thus a party to the collective agreements. In fact, sample studies in the smallholder tea-growing area in Kiambu reveal that hired labour may earn more on smallholder farms at a particular time than on estates. In October 1972, farmers paid their male workers between Shs. 5/- and Shs. 6/- per day, and offered meals. In contrast, female workers got less than they would earn on the estates, namely, Shs. 3/- on an average, and only occasionally Shs. 4/- plus meals. It is noteworthy that monthly contracts are rare and that the actual incomes are remarkably lower than those provided for in the agreements.

The same study showed that, on an average, the workers got Shs. 65/- to Shs. 80/- a month, plus either free accommodation, food or free land use (I am grateful to Mr. Dirk Walther for these figures).

Summarising, agricultural workers in smallholder farming areas are paid less over a longer period, despite the fact that, during harvest, they may get higher rates than are provided for in agreements. Secondly, it is significant that women are paid 40-50 per cent less than their male colleagues. This is not only the case on the smallholder farms, but is a provision included in the agreements.

Why this differentiation exists is impossible to understand without knowing about structures of power and domination in a wage employment system. In general, the justification for the lower payment of female workers is sought through task allocation. Typical male tasks like bush/land clearing, digging and house construction are considered to be harder work physically than typical female work like picking, planting and weeding, and therefore thought to deserve better pay. Although some employers concede that the so-called 'female' tasks require a dexterity and skill that women possess more often than men, equalisation has not taken place, because of the interests of employers. By reserving certain tasks for female and male workers respectively, they keep the pay for a considerable number of tasks low. The low wages women receive, and which in turn lower the income of the family as a whole, provide the employers with cheaper labour, as women are employed in agriculture in increasing numbers and their low wage also contributes to keeping the general wage-level down.

As domination patterns of the so-called modern society extend far into the workers' families, the men like to think of themselves as the ones who have to earn enough to maintain their families, so they have not fought actively against the discriminatory pay rates of their wives. As long as male workers are not willing to accept that their women are making a necessary contribution to the family budget through their wage labour, there will be little hope that the male-dominated trade unions or other organisations will make the discriminatory pay rates for female workers an issue in trade disputes. (How little unionists are conscious of this problem is amply demonstrated in the following quotation from a COTU document of 1973. In its comment on the ILO Report on Incomes, Inequality and
Employment, it is stated: ‘COTU believes that a job, like freedom or a wife (my italics), is a birth-right of every citizen.’ Recent strikes for better pay organised in some districts by female workers’ groups may make their male colleagues aware of this problem.

Certainly, there are some labourers who take a higher wage home at the end of the month. These include those who do piecework. During the peak season, a good tea plucker can collect enough leaves to give him or her a daily income of over Shs. 6/30, or Shs. 180/- a month. An average coffee picker can get between Shs. 9/- and Shs. 12/- a day.

There are many small-scale tea farmers who do not stick to the union-association agreements. In the tea-growing areas of the Kiambu District, rates per kilo vary between 16 and 20 cwt., much lower than on the plantations. Although pluckers often get meals in addition to their wage, and although they are not obliged to work as many hours per day as pluckers on the tea estates, they still earn less.

It is not that workers on tea estates are less exploited than on small-scale farms. If anything, the rate of exploitation of labour on tea estates is greater than on small farms. For instance, the union signed an agreement under which estate workers are bound to work 10 hours per day if the supervisors want them to, thus clearly neglecting legal regulations that the normal working day should only be 8 hours long. Fortunately, on many estates workers refused to work 10 hours, despite the fact that all hours exceeding 8 hours per day have to be paid as overtime, and union officials were reluctant to help enforce the provisions of the agreement they had signed.

But even if a worker earns Shs. 80/- p.m. or Shs. 9/- to Shs. 12/- per day, he/she still earns less than an unskilled worker in one of the urban industries. Let us take a family on a tea plantation in the Kericho area as an example. Assuming the man and his wife work on a monthly contract, then they will get Shs. 117/- and Shs. 92/30 respectively per month. Let us assume, further, that one of their children works part-time and earns an additional Shs. 35/-, then the family’s monthly income amounts to Shs. 244/30. (It is noteworthy that in all four agricultural branches, rates for juveniles are still negotiated and fixed, although children under the age of 16 are not allowed to be employed except as apprentices, according to the ‘Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children Act’. In practice, on many farms children of 11-13 years old work regularly and up to 6 or 8 hours a day.)

In April 1973, the following industries paid their workers in the lowest grades (according to the agreements):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Engineering Nairobi</th>
<th>Motor Engineering Nairobi</th>
<th>Oil Industry</th>
<th>Dock Industry</th>
<th>Oxygen Industry</th>
<th>Local Government Nairobi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi</td>
<td>Shs. 370/50</td>
<td>Shs. 290/-</td>
<td>Shs. 372/40</td>
<td>Shs. 416/75</td>
<td>Shs. 480/-</td>
<td>Shs. 230/- + free housing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

41
Thus an agricultural worker’s family can obtain a similar income to a single worker in an urban industry only if three members of the family work.

For the employer, wages are only one factor of the production costs; for the workers, they are the means to reproduce their labour power and their family. The employers normally keep records of their labour costs, and whenever the union asks for a wage increase they can easily calculate the sum by which labour costs will swell. For the union, the situation is much more difficult. Not only is it difficult to get reliable figures for the monthly expenditure of a worker’s family, but it would also be inadequate to take the present situation for granted. For instance, the diet workers live on may be within the scope of their purse, yet seriously insufficient from the medical point of view. The only statistics available so far are a list of retail prices for low-income households in Nairobi which earn less than 400/- p.m. and a cost-of-living index which reveals that, in these households, 52 per cent of the monthly expenditure is spent on food alone.

Despite the lack of reliable statistics, the union compiled a price list of daily family consumption as a justification for wage demands. Using this as a basis, I made a list of an adequate diet, after consultation with a nutritional expert. I assumed that prices in up-country shops are more or less the same as in Nairobi. A family of two adults and four children would have to spend Shs. 317/10 on foodstuffs only.*

Bearing in mind actual wages, it is obvious that no worker’s household can possibly spend so much money on food. Therefore, despite the unreliability of the price list, it still indicates that, in general, agricultural workers in the lowest grade have to economise either on their diet, their clothing or their children’s education.

Very often it is argued that agricultural workers need less money than urban workers, since they can grow their own foodstuffs. Yet nowadays on the plantations, workers get no land which could secure their personal consumption. Secondly, this argument extends the working day of an agricultural worker far beyond the working day of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Shs.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 pints milk</td>
<td>1/56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800 gr. maize</td>
<td>-/63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tea</td>
<td>-/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 gr. sugar</td>
<td>-/68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 gr. cooking ghee</td>
<td>1/44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meat (beef)</td>
<td>1/75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 kg. potatoes</td>
<td>-/66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 eggs</td>
<td>1/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 gr. butter</td>
<td>-/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bread</td>
<td>-/85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bananas</td>
<td>-/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250 gr. oranges</td>
<td>-/50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 gr. beans</td>
<td>-/80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 gr. tomatoes</td>
<td>-/40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>salt, curry</td>
<td>-/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>charcoal</td>
<td>-/30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The assumed daily requirements were as follows

Daily total: Shs. 10/57
an urban worker and is, as such, discriminatory. Furthermore, actual practice shows that those who still sit on their small patch of land and work as casuals for other farmers earn even less than their fellow-workers on the plantations. Most probably they are already below the poverty datum line, and survive only because they grow some of the foodstuffs themselves or are paid in kind by their employers. (A poverty datum line was last fixed for Kenya by the Carpenter Commission in 1954. In the Commission’s report, the PDL for a family of 1 adult, 1 wife and 2 children was set at Shs. 169/70 per month, and Shs. 312/- per month was already considered a desirable minimum wage.) They are the ones who, because of their low monetary income, are excluded from the consumption of goods and services which have been set as ‘socially necessary’ by post-war development: European-style clothes, school education, modern medical services etc. No less important, social-economic differentiation in the rural areas, i.e. the emergence of a kulak-peasantry on the one hand, and the proletarianisation of other members of the local community, changes traditional communal relations towards what is at best a paternalistic employer-worker relationship. It furthers neither a trade-unionist consciousness among the workers, nor the necessity for the employers to recognise the union, except on the mostly company-owned plantations. Accordingly, the union faces a series of problems in organising agricultural workers representing the interests of all workers who are employed in the agricultural sector.

Possibilities and Limits of Trade Unionism in Agriculture
The first agricultural labour union to be formed was the ‘Sisal and Coffee Plantations Workers Union’ in 1959, followed by the ‘Tea Plantation Workers Union’, ‘General Agricultural Workers Union’, and the ‘Kenya Union of Sugar Plantation Workers’ in 1960.

The first three mentioned amalgamated in 1963 to form the ‘Kenya Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union’ (KPAWU). It was not accidental that the first agricultural workers’ union was formed on estates near Nairobi. The relatively close relations with workers in town allowed the union idea to spread there. Workers further away in the Rift Valley and Nyanza Province then followed suit. The amalgamation of the three unions was meant to strengthen the organisational ability; but if one looks at the history of the KPAWU, it appears that the process of amalgamation directed all the energy and imagination of union officials into efforts to force the elected leaders out of office. Between 1963 and 1968, none of the secretary-generals remained in office for longer than two years, and no-one’s office lasted for the whole period.

The Kenya Union of Sugar Plantation Workers (KUSPW) was originally asked to take part in the amalgamation, but did not do so. The organisational mess within the union and the lack of any pressing need for the sugar workers in Nyanza Province to join hands with workers elsewhere were the most important reasons. Tribalism, and the distance of the Nyanza sugar workers from their colleagues at the Coast, might have contributed. In addition, the involvement of Dennis Akumu, a very experienced unionist and later head of the union federation, COTU, who took over as leader of KUSPW in 1965
in struggles for control of the trade union movement made amalgamation an increasingly difficult political task.

Looking back on the history of the KPAWU, the most eye-catching fact is that, because of the long-lasting fights among the officials, the ablest trade unionists left the union. These were dissatisfied that it had become more important to secure their position in the union than to represent the workers' interests, and they joined institutions or organisations in the agricultural sector which are more powerful than the union, under present internal and external circumstances, can possibly become. Of the five former secretary-generals, I traced one in the Agricultural Finance Corporation, one as personnel manager in the factory of the Kenya Pyrethrum Marketing Board, and one as the executive officer in the National Union of Kenya Farmers.

To represent farm workers poses the same problems as organising urban workers. As well, there are additional problems which complicate union organisation in the rural areas. For instance, no trade unionist is legally authorised to enter the premises of an industrial firm without the permission of the management. But if he does not get this permission, the workers can either meet in a bar, their union offices or their residential areas. Farm workers do not have similar alternatives; they normally live on the employers' premises, and a bar or union office does not exist. Furthermore, employers or managers sometimes only give permission for a trade union meeting to take place on condition that a representative of the management is present. Under the 'Trespass Ordinance', workers and trade unionists are thus still hindered from moving freely from farm to farm and talking about trade union affairs among themselves.

Secondly, communication between elected officials outside the farm and farm workers is very bad indeed. The high rate of illiteracy among the workers and the irregular postal services in the rural areas make written communication nearly impossible. The telephone is normally out of reach for the workers, because it is the private line of the farmer. In most cases when conflicts arise on farms, the farmer informs his employers' association and/or the labour office. If one of the latter thinks fit to inform the union, then the union will be called in, if not, the union officials will hardly learn about the dispute.

Another difference from urban unions is that agricultural workers are spread much more over the country than any other workers' group, and therefore the lack of a well-functioning inter-union network affects this union more than others. It is difficult for its secretary-general and the other national officials to keep in personal contact with farmworkers by travelling around.

The result for the KPAWU is that the workers hardly know what is written in the collective agreements and cannot control their implementation. Nor is the union leadership able to discuss with the workers which provisions would best serve their interests. The only possibility the union leaders have at the moment is to find out about
the problems of their members and to investigate the causes for unofficial strikes, in order to bring them up as issues in the joint negotiations with the employers or in the Wages Council.

The organisational weakness of the KPAWU is certainly aggravated by the circumstances given above, but they do not completely explain why these weaknesses still persist. Although the agricultural workers are the biggest single group of the wage-earning labour force (180,000 in 1972), only 25 per cent of all those employed in the industry are union members, which is by far the lowest degree of union organisation in any industrial sector in Kenya.

In order to fully understand the inefficiency of the union in organising workers, the political and economic aspects of agricultural development in the last ten years has to be considered.

With members of the African élite (politicians, high civil servants, army and police officers) going into estate farming and employing labour, the union as the representative or potential representative of these labourers becomes automatically the antagonist of these farmers. In a situation where politicians are still dependent on popular support, any conflict between them and the union could make the politicians lose popular support in their constituency. On the other hand, politicians are not really interested in organising political support; the decline of KANU as a political party is the best proof of this. Therefore politicians and sometimes civil servants try to use the unions as mediators between themselves and the workers, a fact which makes younger trade unionists who derive their standing from an organisationally strong union talk about others as 'sitting in the pockets of politicians'.

In fact, most power struggles are attributable to this kind of pressure from outside the union. But pressures can only be successful if they combine with the interests of internal factions.

A case in point was the opposition to the national secretary-general, Philip Mwangi, in 1972. The year before, the union had run into serious financial difficulties, which brought the secretary-general to propose to his national officials in November 1972 that all their salaries (including his own) should be reduced. This proposal, not surprisingly, sparked off an open controversy over the leadership of the union.

While it raged, another question arose as to whether contributions to the National Social Security Fund would also be reduced. A telephone call to the NSSF office in Nakuru then revealed that the union had not sent in the contributions for its employees since January 1969. Accused of having stolen the money, the secretary-general was arrested on 7 January 1973, but the court decided, in June 1973, that he had no case to answer. Being charged with a criminal offence, Philip Mwangi was, however, suspended from office, and his assistant was appointed as acting secretary-general by the central council of the union. But two months later, the acting secretary-general stated during a press conference that Philip Mwangi was 'ousted' in January
1973, and demanded that he should also ‘be removed from office’ in COTU, in which he held the post of the Second Vice President. At the same press conference, the KPAWU officials announced the union's practical disaffiliation from COTU, a complete reversal of the union’s standpoint under Philip Mwangi.

When the charge against Philip Mwangi was dropped, the constitutional provisions demanded that his suspension be repealed, with immediate effect. But nothing like this happened, because the controversy among the KPAWU leaders and their different attitude towards the two COTU factions reflected the general political conflict of Kenya today.

In the last few years, the African farmer-businessman became the model in Kenya. Under the KANU Government, private farming instead of co-operative or state farming was encouraged, and trade and industry were Africanised without structural changes in ownership and decision-making patterns. In order to maintain the present development path, persons in all social classes and institutions must be loyal to it. From this angle, trade unions are strategic organisations, because they have the potential to control a whole social stratum, and all recent union elections have been fought and all factions built over the issue of electing those who guarantee the status quo and its further existence. Administrative shortcomings and failures have only served as the vehicles for this controversy.

The results for the representation of the workers' interests are clear. The example given above of the coffee industry indicates that no real negotiations took place between the employers' association and the union officials. Originally, the agreement of 1972 between the Kenya Coffee Growers Association and the KPAWU read, ‘The Association offered and the union agreed’ (the sentence was later changed to ‘it was agreed’). More important, only minor changes were offered by the employers (concerning wage rates, annual holiday, public holidays) and all other provisions were kept unchanged. The union was not prepared to use the relatively weak position at that time of the farmers to negotiate better conditions and terms of service. The union officials not only failed to improve conditions for their members, but they also forfeited the chance to participate actively in the determination of the development of the industry whose workers it supposedly represents.

The financial difficulties the union faced in 1973 can be partly attributed to the fact that it lost between 10,000 and 15,000 members, or between a quarter and a sixth of its membership, in the years after independence. Between 1964 and the end of 1969, the number of sisal estates decreased from 54 to 30, and the number of employees from 26,750 to 10,000. This decline of sisal production was the result of conditions on the world market. Besides, these farmers were Europeans and many wished to leave Kenya. As a result, the estates near Nakuru, Thika and Machakos were normally subdivided and smaller plots sold to African farmers, who started to plant coffee or to raise cattle, with varying success. In other parts of the country, especially in the Rift Valley Province, European settlers were bought
out and the existing labour force abandoned. In a few cases, the workers bought the farm themselves, more often other African families became the new owners and tilled the soil themselves, and did not need to employ labourers.

This development was not spontaneous, but had been envisaged in KANU's 1962 election manifesto:

'The problem of the unemployed landless will be vigorously tackled and resettlement in the Scheduled Areas has a part to play in meeting their desperate needs. At the same time, we are aware that this process cannot continue indefinitely. We cannot afford to fragment economic farms which are making a vital contribution to our national prosperity into units producing little more than subsistence. The main solution will lie in our determination to increase agricultural efficiency in all areas. This will provide a basis for rural and cottage industries and for regular agricultural employment to absorb the landless.'

The KANU government did not intend to change political-economic patterns which had been introduced in Kenya through European colonialism. In fact, in 1969, before the second parliamentary elections, when KANU gave account of its agricultural policy in its 'KANU Manifesto', it became obvious that policy measures and objectives had changed after 1963 only in one respect, the Africanisation of Kenyan farms. It said that land consolidation and registration had been chosen 'as a prerequisite to the intensification and modernisation of agricultural production'. It further stated that the government had aimed 'to resettle African farmers on land previously occupied by foreigners' and to prohibit non-citizens from buying land; it promised to acquire 'all abandoned and mismanaged farms for the purpose of resettlement of those who are now landless' and to 'stamp out speculation in land, particularly in urban areas'.

Yet, as long as the policy of generalising the principle of private land registration is followed, land remains a commodity which is exchangeable against others and is thus open to speculation. No legal provision can hinder a farmer from selling his developed plot in an area where land prices are high, and using the money to buy a bigger plot somewhere else where prices for land have remained low. (This was done, especially by African farmers in the former Kikuyu reserves who moved into the Rift Valley.) If cheap land becomes scarce, not only will prices rise but, if the price is kept low by the State, competition between willing buyers will become fierce. The present conflicts over land redistribution in the Rift Valley Province, and the political tensions in and around Nakuru, are one expression of the agricultural political economy in Kenya today.

In other areas, around the former African reserves, the government followed a different policy. There, land transfer is conducted on a willing-seller/willing-buyer basis. The one who offers most will get the farm, therefore. Consequently, those who receive high incomes will be at an advantage. (See, for instance, the case in 1973, where the KPAWU wrote a letter to the Minister for Labour in which they complained that Brooke Bond (Leibig) Kenya Ltd. wanted to sell one of its farms in the Limuru area and that the workers wished to buy it, but that 'four prominent people' had offered the company more,
and it would be likely that they would get the farm. The union asked the Minister to intervene so that the workers could take over the farm as their own.)

The control over land becomes more difficult for the community, the more private landowners are established, and in as much as land is made private, it becomes inaccessible for the non-owner of the land, except as a tenant who has to pay rent to the landowner—a system which developed, especially at the Coast, after the abolition of slavery.

An agricultural capitalist has to realise a ground rent first of all. This ground rent is the easier to realise the better the natural fertility of the land, and it is the higher the bigger the plot of fertile land, since the farmer is more likely to get statal and parastatal assistance. For instance, in one area, farmers are only entitled to receive loans from the Agricultural Finance Corporation if they cultivate 50 acres and more. Through this provision, the vast majority of farmers in that area are excluded from access to cheap loans. The result can clearly only be an improvement in the economic position of the already well-to-do farmer and the consolidation of his socially powerful position within the local community.

Another aspect of this private capitalist development is that decisions on what shall be produced are not made on the basis of who needs what, but on the basis of what gives the owner of the farm the highest monetary return. Agricultural expansion policies are not governed by the consideration as to how best the Kenyan population can be provided with foodstuffs, but how much foreign exchange has to be earned by the agricultural sector in order to buy goods on the world market, in particular for the industrial sector.

Probably the most serious problem stemming from the present political economy is that land is still considered to be the most important social security. This is true for most workers, even those employed in urban industries, because there is no social security scheme which provides workers with an income to live on after retirement. Many a worker and a large number of trade unionists use their wage or salary to improve their farms or to buy land. They cling to the illusion that they can have a less alienated and better life if they establish themselves as prosperous farmers rather than as employees. It is a conservative ideology, nourished by political leaders whose social-economic position has long taken them above such anxieties. In fact, the conflict between KPAWU officials in 1972/73 could be seen as a fight between two factions of which one—the suspended secretary-general—was more inclined to follow a proletarian-trade-unionist line and the other to further petit-bourgeois, statal interest. The background of Philip Mwangi's arrest in April 1973 was that he had refused to calm down workers on the farm of a 'big shot' who had not paid his employees for several months.

Yet men like Philip Mwangi are rare among Kenyan trade unionists, and they can only survive if they have sufficient property to fall back on. (Indeed, Mwangi was, in fact, let out of custody after two other
unionists had given the security for a Shs. 100,000/- bail. The judge did not accept the bail on the trade unionists' salaries nor on the properties of their unions, but only on their personal assets. Mwangi's family survived by means of a small farm and a transport business. Kenyan trade unionists often claim that only if they were financially independent could they do their union jobs independently. But this attitude is only a variation of Kenya's official ideology. Historically, the present stage reflects a decline of trade union activities, aspirations and possibilities to gain political influence. In 1963, the union leadership did make an attempt to define its standpoint on general agricultural issues in two policy pamphlets. It was the first and the last time that KPAWU officials did this explicitly.

Conclusion
Starting from a description of the situation of agricultural workers in 1972/73, I have tried to discuss how much the Kenya Plantation and Agricultural Workers Union has effectively influenced the living conditions of the workers. As the second part showed, the union's influence is almost nil. In Kenya's agricultural sector it is not the union which pushes for higher wages and thus forces the employers and government to respond to workers' demands. It is the other way round: there are offers which the union can accept or not. This 'bargaining' process reflects a political situation in which power does not lie in the hands of workers and their organisations.

The remarkable differences in wages and living conditions among agricultural workers in comparison to urban workers indicate different accumulation capacities and profit rates of enterprises. Obviously, an international company like Brooke Bond (Leibig) Ltd., pays better wages than a small-scale farmer, but it also exploits the workers' labour power more by using it more intensively.

Most likely, the rate of surplus value on these company estates is higher than on small farms, because the estate managements who control the employers' associations hold their wages level lower, corresponding to the general low wage level, than they could in fact afford to pay. This over-exploitation of the agricultural labour force continues because capital accumulation in Kenya's agriculture has to remain attractive for international companies. They in turn are needed to stabilise the present social-political system, because the ruling class would not be able to secure its present consumption needs without capital inflow from abroad. Any factor worsening accumulation conditions in Kenya's agricultural sector will therefore lead to even worse living conditions for Kenya's agricultural workers, unless the union or the State represented by the labour administration intervenes actively.

As this article has shown, this prospect is highly unlikely. Any trade unionist who gets involved in a trade dispute with an employer who is at the same time holding political office will find himself confronting the administration as well as the employer and the employers' association. Labour administration officials tend to see that labour laws and legal provisions are followed by the employers only if it is politically opportune. In other words, if a dispute
implies changing the present hierarchical structures, the workers and the union cannot count on active participation of labour officials in it. Therefore, in many disputes the workers can only rely on their own organisation. The question whether it will gain strength and overcome its present weaknesses will partly depend on the union leadership. At present, this leadership is split into a faction which sees its union job as a means of gaining personal influence and wealth, and a faction which wants the union to reorganise in such a way that it gains strength as an organisation. Only if the latter succeeds would a split between the movement at grass-roots level and at official union level be avoided. In such a case, there could also be some hope of the union becoming a part of a process which determined Kenya's future agricultural development.

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Underdevelopment and the Law of Value: 
a critique of Kay

Henry Bernstein

The article provides a brief but useful summary of Kay’s book, fully acknowledging the importance of its contribution to the current debate. Bernstein does not agree, though, with Kay’s emphasis on the category of merchant capital as central to the development of underdevelopment, as he does not think that it explains the changes in the conditions and relations of production in the Third World. He also criticises Kay for omitting any discussion of the internationalisation of capital in the present period of large-scale industrialisation in the Third World, and of the politics of oppression. The level of abstraction on which Kay’s analysis operates is seen as both its strength and its weakness.

In a recent and important book, Development and Underdevelopment: A Marxist Analysis, Geoffrey Kay has pointed out that, although some radical critics have tried to provide alternative explanations of underdevelopment explicitly in terms of the development of capitalism on a world scale, they have remained largely at the level of asserting the facts of exploitation or using descriptive concepts (eg. dependence, centre-periphery, etc.).

Kay starts his book from two premises, or, rather, two aspects of a single argument. First, that contrary to the apparent expectations of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, capitalism has failed to develop in other societies as it did in its countries of origin. However, this can be explained in Marxist terms and, moreover, in direct opposition to the radical theorists, it can be shown that ‘capital created underdevelopment not because it exploited the underdeveloped world, but because it did not exploit it enough’ (Preface, p.x). Second, the explanation behind this statement (which, we can take it, is intended to provoke) is to be sought in an examination of the law of value as set out in Capital (p.12).
In his first chapter (Production, Consumption and Surplus), Kay formulates some of the basic propositions of historical materialism in terms of a 'law of social reproduction' which shows that all societies must fulfil certain needs of production and necessary consumption (to reproduce both the producers and the means of production). We are able to distinguish different modes of production by the different ways in which production and necessary consumption are carried out, that is, by the different ways in which the material process of production and the social process of production are organised, how they are combined, and how the product of surplus labour is distributed.

In the next three chapters, Kay states and illustrates some of the basic categories of the capitalist mode of production in a most concise and lucid manner (and with greater accuracy and benefit than is evident in many 'summaries' of Capital). Chapter 2, on 'Surplus Value and Profit', deals with the categories of commodity and value, with the source of capitalist profit in the appropriation of surplus value, with the measure of value by the labour time socially necessary to produce a commodity at a given level of the productive forces, with the nature of wages, and so on. Chapter 3, on 'The Accumulation of Capital', compares accumulation by merchant capital on the basis of petty commodity production with appropriation in the process of capitalist production itself—'whereas the circuits of the independent producer and merchant capital intersect only in the market, those of the wage-labourer and the industrial capitalist converge in the sphere of production' (p.70). Kay shows how the process of capitalist development leads to the socialisation of labour, ie. the extremely complex division of labour and co-operation within and between production units which produces the collective worker, and to the socialisation of capital, ie. the concentration of capital manifested in the increasing size and capital requirements of production units, and the centralisation of capital manifested in the increasing size and diversification of units of capital under unified control (giant corporations, consortia, etc.).

The fourth chapter ('Productive and Circulation Capital') considers the different forms that capital assumes at different moments in its circuit. As it passes through the spheres of production and circulation so capital changes; in one it is productive capital, in the other circulation capital. These two forms are as distinct from each other as the activities to which they correspond: the production of commodities in the one case; the buying and selling of them in the other. But in capitalist society the circuit of capital does not merely embrace the spheres of production and circulation, it unites them: they remain distinct, but they are inseparable. So it is with the two forms of capital that operate within them: while each has its own distinguishing features, they share the common property of being capital and are governed by its general laws (p.86).

The nature of circulation capital is elaborated according to Marx’s analysis of merchant capital in Volume III of Capital.

The general features of merchant capital are the same in every type of society in which it operates—capitalist or non-capitalist. It has no direct control over the labour process and is always dependent upon the class which does, even where it dominates this class. Secondly, it must always engage in unequal exchange to appropriate part of the surplus product of society. Thirdly, as
capital it is always driven to accumulate and in this way acts as a medium through which the law of value is brought to bear on all parts of the economy, particularly the sphere of production. The repercussions of those features, however, do differ with the nature of society (p.94).

In non-capitalist society, merchant capital is the only form of capital and has an independent class existence, whereas in capitalist society it is only a moment of the circuit of capital and is subordinate to productive capital. Kay further follows Marx in the emphasis on the contradictory nature of merchant capital which, on the one hand, encourages the development of commodity production, thereby dissolving existing social relations, but, on the other hand, accumulates and invests in the sphere of exchange which withdraws value from the sphere of production, with the result that merchant capital itself is unable to effect the transition to capitalist commodity production. Kay concludes that ‘The history of underdevelopment is the fullest expression we have of these contradictory tendencies of merchant capital to both stimulate and repress the development of the forces of production, to both open and block the way for the full development of capitalism’ (p.95).

This emphasis is elaborated in the next chapter on ‘Merchant Capital and Underdevelopment’. I shall return to this issue in my critique of Kay, but we should note that this chapter includes a useful discussion of the theory of unequal exchange (pp.107-119); and also the elements of a periodisation, which can be sketched as follows. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, merchant capital from Europe accumulated vast amounts of wealth on the basis of the commercial empires established in the Third World. At the same time, this expansion of merchant capital was eroding feudal social relations in Europe itself but, true to its nature, was unable to transform these. This was to be the historical mission of industrial capital (from the late eighteenth century), which necessarily had to struggle against merchant capital, bringing the latter under its dominance. However, merchant capital continued to function as the dominant form of capital in the Third World, though now under the hegemony of industrial capital, for which it obtained means of production (agricultural and mineral raw materials) and reliable and cheap means of consumption (food for a growing industrial proletariat in Europe). In addition, merchant capital had the function of creating markets in the Third World for industrially produced commodities. In this process, and precisely because of the penetration of capital in the form of merchant capital, the forms and relations of production in the Third World did not develop on capitalist lines, despite the social destruction caused by the extension of capitalist domination.

A third phase was introduced as a result of the Depression of the 1930s which brought to a crisis the contradictions of merchant capital and the colonial trading system it operated (eg. the crisis of profitability engendered by its inability to control production and thereby raise the rate of exploitation). From this time, industrial capital began to penetrate the social formations of the Third World, to develop a proletariat, and so on. However, industrial capital itself has been unable to transform the economics of the Third World, despite its inroads, and this forms the subject of Kay’s sixth chapter.
This process of industrialisation, however, differed not only in its historical context from that which had taken place earlier in the developed countries, it was also, and largely as a result of this difference, structurally quite dissimilar. It was partial: not just in the sense of being restricted to certain branches of industry—the processing of primary commodities for export and import substitution of consumer goods—but in that it only offered employment to a limited section of the proletariat (p.126).

After reviewing some of the data on industrial growth and employment (pp.127-130), Kay then presents an explanation of why industrial capital in the Third World employs highly mechanised techniques of production despite the abundance of unemployed and cheap labour. This is the most technical part of his argument, which I am unable to summarise adequately, but it should be pointed out that here, for the first time, Kay goes beyond Capital in developing certain concepts which focus more sharply on the relations between the capitalisation of production, the rate of profit, and the accumulation process. He correctly points out that the conventional use of the concept of the organic composition of capital (which is used to explain the tendential law of the rate of profit to fall) involves the simplifying assumption of the same rate of turnover of constant capital and variable capital (and, additionally, the various elements of constant capital—machines, buildings, raw materials, etc.). This assumption severely limits the analytical power of the concept, and Kay constructs a distinction between the organic composition of the commodity (corresponding to the conventional sense of the organic composition of capital) and the organic composition of production, which takes into account the differential life-span of various elements of capital in the production process. The two organic compositions are likely to have different values, and the implications of this are traced through an analysis of amortisation of investment and the rate of profit, and their connections with rates of turnover (of capital and commodities), accumulation, and employment effects.

In the course of this exposition, Kay establishes a further distinction between a relative rise in the organic composition of production (which boosts the rate of profit) and a more fundamental absolute rise which depresses the rate of profit, returning us to the classic position. The outcome of the argument is that the syndrome of capital-intensive industry/massive unemployment in Third World countries is perfectly logical according to the conditions of contemporary capitalist production and accumulation—'It is a normal feature of capitalist development, and, as such, is independent of any particular form of ownership or dependence' (p.153). The methodology of Kay's argument undermines the abstracted discussions by economists of 'the choice of techniques' and the utopian reformism of the employment programmes that are the current fashion with many development experts (especially the liberal wing of the profession). However, we must return in our critique to certain features of Kay's argument in 'Industrial Capital and Underdevelopment'.

In the following chapter ('The Acceleration of Capital'), the theoretical analysis of modern capitalist production and accumulation is continued with a discussion of the intensification of labour. This is distinguished from rises in the productivity of labour. When the latter
occur (as a result of the development of the productive forces) the ratio of necessary to surplus labour-time in the working day is reduced, the value of labour power together with that of other commodities is reduced (as they take less time to produce), and the rate of exploitation is increased. The intensity of labour is a different concept which relates to the organisation of the labour process itself, and which compounds the value of production as measured simply by labour-time. When labour is intensified (through speed-up, 'rationalisation' of work techniques, closer supervision, and other methods of bringing the worker under tighter discipline), the value produced in a given time is increased. 'The intensification of labour increases the rate of profit in two ways, by increasing the absolute amount of surplus value and reducing the period of its production and realisation' (p.164). In the second section of this chapter, Kay discusses 'Fordism'—the introduction of assembly-line and other mass production methods—from the viewpoint of increases in the intensity as well as the productivity of labour. He emphasises, as even more important, the significance of these sweeping changes in the production process as an element of ruling-class strategy in the conjuncture of international working-class assault on capital in the early decades of the twentieth century.

The theme of the class struggle, and how it determines the political strategies which are an essential element of capital's drive to accumulate, comes into its own in the final chapter on 'Crisis and Recomposition'. Here Kay applies his analytical categories historically, albeit in a highly schematic way. The key 'moments' of his periodisation are the capitalist crisis of the 1930s (including the crisis of merchant capital in the Third World already referred to), and the post-war recomposition of a strengthened social capital, achieved through economic and political means (including 'decolonisation').

As the turnover of capital increases so history itself speeds up. Whereas an initiative in the nineteenth century could prove viable for nearly a hundred years, it now exhausts its possibilities in less than half that time. The measures that capital once used to out-maneuvre labour are turned against it with unprecedented speed. Capital must now change the terms of confrontation more rapidly than ever before; moreover the scope of the recomposition it must undertake increases while its room for manoeuvre is steadily diminished. Every move that capital makes is determined by the requirements of accumulation which demands not only a greater socialisation of production but a greater socialisation of capital itself. Its last major recomposition, conceived between the wars and executed after 1945, was a massive step forward. The new methods of production pioneered by Ford greatly accelerated the concentration and centralisation of capital; the new role of the state blue-printed by Keynes provided the organisational framework for capital as such. Within this framework capital was able not only to articulate a conscious programme for its own accumulation; but even, to the extent that it out-flanked early revolutionary movements and incorporated key working-class institutions into the state [i.e. trade unions and parliamentary labour parties—H.B.], it has planned the class struggle itself. But now this plan is faltering not only on the limitations of industrialisation in the underdeveloped world, but in the developed countries themselves (p.183).

I have given a fairly full exposition of Kay's work because of the importance of its intervention in the current debate. Compared with some of the verbose volumes with which we are assailed, Kay's book is short, analytical, rigorous within the framework he adopts, and
demands careful scrutiny as a serious attempt to recast the issues of capitalism and ‘underdevelopment’ in terms of categories derived and developed from *Capital*.

**A Critique of Kay**
The following questions establish some criteria for assessing any Marxist analysis of the Third World: does the analysis construct the specificity of the backward capitalist social formations in the functioning of capital on a world scale? What does it tell us about the forms and relations of production, the mechanisms of exploitation, and their relations to the global accumulation and reproduction of capital? How does it help us in the analysis of the state, the class structures and struggles in the ‘underdeveloped’ countries?

It is clear that the analysis of merchant capital is the core of Kay’s theory of underdevelopment: ‘This apparent paradox (the persistence of merchant capital in its independent form but simultaneously under the domination of industrial capital) is the *specifica differentia* of underdevelopment, and its emergence as a historical fact in the course of the nineteenth century marks the beginning of underdevelopment as we know it’ (p. 100). The periodisation here does not contradict what was sketched above. The epoch of global primitive accumulation through the amassing of wealth by merchant capital in Europe was the final phase of the ‘pre-history’ of capitalism. Underdevelopment begins, in Kay’s view, with a new phase of development of the world market under the hegemony of industrial capital. It is necessary to dwell on the thesis that industrial capital employed merchant capital as its agent of integration of ‘backward’ areas (pre-capitalist forms of production) into the developing world market.

Kay uses several different formulations to describe the relation between merchant capital and industrial capital. At many points he describes merchant capital as the ‘agent’ of industrial capital, elsewhere it is the ‘representative’ of industrial capital, sometimes merchant capital is termed ‘the form of existence’ of industrial capital in the Third World (eg. p. 105). This last formulation has a quite different emphasis from the others. The ambiguity expresses the difficulties of transposing Marx’s ideas about merchant capital and how it functions in pre-capitalist societies to the epoch of modern capitalism.

Kay argues that merchant capital was able to retain its independent form because industrial capital was interested in the Third World from the viewpoint of exchange rather than as an area of direct investment and accumulation. The independence of merchant capital was maintained, therefore, vis-à-vis the producers (and consumers) of the Third World whom it exploited through unequal exchange, while it lost its independence in that this function was now subordinated to the needs of industrial capital, which inhibited the profits and accumulation of merchant capital. In so far as this last aspect is expressed as a struggle between fractions of capital (see p. 123), it is difficult to see how merchant capital could be merely a ‘form of existence’ of industrial capital.
However, what casts more serious doubt on Kay's elevation of the category of merchant capital is that the rise of industrial capital required a new pattern of trade—no longer a trade in luxury items (gold, spices, ivory, precious textiles and craft manufactures), but a constant supply of commodities in bulk as industrial raw materials. This change in the composition of trade could not be effected without intervention in the production of the new commodities required. Changes in production had to be carried through on a massive scale, either through direct investment to establish mines and plantations, or indirectly through ways of controlling the production of millions of peasants. Kay does refer to a reorganisation of production but states that this could be left to merchant capital. As he wants to maintain the classic definition of the latter as operating strictly in the sphere of exchange, this is unsatisfactory—as we shall argue in relation to direct investment in production and the development of petty commodity production.

In... countries exporting agricultural commodities, production was undertaken by expatriate-controlled plantations which appear at first sight to be a form of fully developed capitalist production. In those countries which exported minerals we again encounter what appears to be capitalist production. For both mines and plantations employed wage-labour, and in many cases the firms involved were subsidiaries of productive firms in the developed countries. In some ways it would be wrong not to recognise these undertakings as capitalist, for they possess all its formal qualities. On the other hand they have certain features which suggest that it would not be completely correct to treat them in this way. Firstly, they invariably relied upon migrant labour which stayed for only a relatively short time, and until the end of the Second World War they never set about creating a permanent labour force. This was not an accidental development but shows every sign of being part of a carefully conceived strategy of low wages. Their second peculiarity is essentially a different expression of this strategy; namely, the very low degree of capitalisation. The main element of production was living labour, the vast bulk of which was illiterate and unskilled, working with the assistance of very few instruments. It can, of course, be claimed that neither of these features changes the fundamental character of these enterprises as capitalist but merely defines them as a particular type of capitalist enterprise. Whatever one decides on this question the broad issue seems unchanged; that the reorganisation of production in the underdeveloped countries which industrial capital required, needed only a minimum involvement on its part so that the major responsibility for this task could be, and was, in fact, carried out by merchant capital (pp. 102-3). (Emphasis added).

Kay exaggerates the low degree of capitalisation involved in establishing mines and plantations (which often require first-stage processing facilities, eg. sugar-mills), and the infrastructure they require—roads, railways, ports, etc. More important, however, is the question of the exploitation of labour. Because it was often migrant labour, which could be secured cheaply, why does this make the way in which it was employed any less capitalist? Capital always seeks to depress the cost of labour and therefore it is ridiculous to suggest that cheap labour as such negates capitalist production—"Plantation production and mines run with cheap labour bear few resemblances to modern industrial production" (p. 123). The argument about cheap labour also clashes with Kay's assertion that capital created underdevelopment because 'it did not exploit (the underdeveloped world) enough', and poses the question as one of the forms of exploitation rather than simply its degree. This question has various ramifications which will be discussed in what follows.

57
The case of peasant commodity production appears to conform more to Kay's idea of merchant capital mediating between pre-capitalist forms of production and industrial capital. However, this is not as straightforward as it appears, and we cannot let the matter rest with the statement that 'production remained in the hands of peasants who either undertook it willingly or as a result of political compulsion of one form or another' (p.102). The salience of coercion by the colonial state indicates that the supply of agricultural commodities could not be secured simply through the conditions of exchange but involved class struggles between capital and peasants at the level of production itself. The peasants' status as 'independent' producers was undermined in two fundamental ways. First, peasants were commonly directed what to grow, and in what quantities, with the quality of their produce subject to regulation, as well as the prices they received. Peasant protests and actions against these conditions of production occurred in many colonial countries. Second, as the peasantry became more involved in commodity relations (which were under the ultimate control of industrial capital), the coercion to produce certain crops became increasingly economic, that is, more items of consumption for their own reproduction had to be purchased with cash which could only be obtained through the production of commodities or wage-labour (eg. on plantations).

In his classic work on The Agrarian Question (1899), Kautsky pointed out that capital does not necessarily control agricultural production in the same way as it does industrial production. (Kautsky's important work has not been translated into English in full. However, an extremely useful summary translation by J. Banaji appeared in Economy and Society in April 1976.) The growth of large-scale capitalised farms (enterprises corresponding to factories in terms of economic calculation) is not the only form or measure of the penetration of agriculture by capital. In some situations it is more beneficial to capital to dominate agriculture by controlling the conditions of reproduction of the small farmer rather than by expropriating him. This means that capital is spared certain costs it would have to bear were it to directly organise agricultural production.

This theme has been elaborated in recent years, specifically in attempts to theorise the social formations of the Third World, in the concept of 'the articulation of modes of production'. The concept denotes that a social formation may consist of elements of different modes of production which are subject to the domination of one mode. The relations between the dominant mode and the elements of other modes which it subjects to its own laws of functioning (the articulation, in other words) constitutes the specificity of a concrete social formation. In the case of peasant production in the Third World, the dominant element is capital, which subjects the immediate production units (peasant households) to its own requirements—for raw materials, but also (and contra Kay) appropriates surplus labour and therefore profit from them. While the institutional forms of this process may appear mercantile (marketing co-operatives, marketing boards, import-export companies) the situation is one in which the direct producers are working for capital, they are producing value which capital appropriates, albeit in a more mediated form than is the
case with classic wage-labour. Capital obtains both the materials it requires as use-values for industrial production, and appropriates part of the value of the labour contained in the commodities as exchange-values. The peasant has to cover the costs of reproduction of labour, and of the means of production, from his family's production of subsistence and cash crops. (It is not the case that subsistence production consumes necessary labour, and commodity production surplus labour—as I have argued, commodities are produced to obtain items of necessary consumption. From the viewpoint of the peasant there is in fact no 'surplus' labour—all labour is necessary labour. The fact that capital can extract a profit even at such low levels of labour productivity is the key to the pauperisation of the majority of peasants in the Third World).

These mechanisms also operate in producing the traditionally cheap labour of the mines and plantations. The relatively low degree of capitalisation is more crucial with respect to the advance of variable capital rather than constant capital. Wage-labour of the 'colonial' type represents the limiting case of capital having to pay only enough for the worker to reproduce himself individually and on a daily basis. The costs of maintaining the worker's family and the generational reproduction of labour power are borne by the worker's family, which is still engaged in agricultural production in the home village. These general points bring us back to the question of the forms of exploitation of petty commodity producers and of wage workers in enterprises that have been able to operate profitably with a high degree of wastage of labour (both conventional 'turnover' and the incidence of sickness, accidents and deaths caused by the conditions of work in plantations and mines).

It is an 'unpalatable fact that capitalism has created underdevelopment not simply because it has exploited the underdeveloped countries but because it has not exploited them enough' (p.55). In this respect Kay reacts polemically against the radical critics who think that they have provided an explanation simply by asserting the facts of exploitation in the Third World. Kay instead turns to certain aspects of the analysis of exploitation in *Capital*. Although he does not refer to Marx's distinction between absolute and relative surplus value, he clearly bases his definition of capitalist exploitation on the appropriation of relative surplus value:

The more productive highly paid worker... produces his wage in a much shorter time and is therefore able to perform much more surplus labour. By implication, therefore, the affluent workers of the developed countries are much more exploited than the badly paid workers of the underdeveloped world... What meaning can be given to the (radical) claim that exploitation is the cause of underdevelopment if the rate of exploitation is higher in the developed than in the underdeveloped countries? (p.54).

Again, Kay's emphasis here on how much labour is paid is theoretically gratuitous at this point (and 'the affluent worker' is a category of bourgeois sociology if ever there was one)—the question is one of the forms of production and exploitation (to which the question of the productivity of labour is tied).
If the forms of production and exploitation in the Third World (at least in certain sectors of the economy) are not the same as in the advanced capitalist countries, then there can be no direct comparison of rates of exploitation. On the one hand, there is full proletarianisation of labour in industrial production, and the accumulation of capital on the basis of an unprecedented development of the productive forces and the appropriation of relative surplus value. This allows the rate of exploitation to be calculated, in principle, directly in terms of the ratio of surplus to necessary labour in the working day. In the Third World (at least in agriculture), there are a variety of forms of production and remnants of pre-capitalist social and ideological relations articulated with a dominant capitalism. This means that the rate of exploitation and its significance cannot be calculated in the same way. Certainly the low productivity of labour means that the product of ‘surplus’ labour is small compared to that of necessary labour (which includes the labour of the whole peasant household or family of the migrant worker), but necessary labour (simple reproduction) does not involve any advances by capital, therefore making possible ‘super-profits’. In absolute terms the mass of profit aggregated from the production of many peasant producers will be much less than that extracted from the labour of a comparable number of industrial workers (due to the differential productivity of labour), but this cannot justify the statement that the peasants of the Third World have not been ‘exploited enough’. The forms of exploitation are different and they exemplify the operation of absolute surplus value and intensification of labour (without development of the productive forces), rather than the mechanisms of relative surplus value. By exerting pressure on the conditions of reproduction of the peasantry, capital can force the peasant household to both extend and intensify its hours of labour (as well as reducing its consumption). Again, in this process capital is saved the costs of supervision and management it incurs when it directly organises production. As Kautsky pointed out, the poor peasant household in order to survive disciplines itself to the benefit of capital. To extend and intensify labour in order to meet the demands of capital is to increase the rate of exploitation, whatever the form of production involved. The points made here obviously do not encapsulate the whole of ‘the agrarian question’ in the Third World. For example, the strategic issue of rural class formation has not been touched on.

In concluding this section, we cannot agree with Kay’s formulation of merchant capital. He argues that its nature is simultaneously the same (as in its pre-capitalist history) and different when it becomes an agent of productive capital—but the emphasis is on the basic similarities of merchant capital (exploitation in the sphere of exchange), regardless of the epoch and mode(s) of production concerned. In the epoch of modern capitalism, the forms and function of merchant capital are different from those of precapitalist periods, and the analysis of merchant capital (as a unitary category) cannot explain the changes in the conditions and relations of production in the Third World. Kay’s argument is a variant of what may be called the ‘superimposition’ model—capital superimposing itself on pre-capitalist forms of production—rather than a ‘penetration’ model in which capital comes to control the processes of production even if it
does not take on the function of organising them directly, and is free in certain conditions from the necessity to develop the productive forces.

There is a subsidiary strand of Kay's argument about merchant capital. This is the idea that, even had industrial capital wanted to establish itself directly in the Third World, it would have been very difficult because of the history of depredations by merchant capital. Furthermore, it was the mode of operation of merchant capital that established the structures of underdevelopment in such a way that the penetration of industrial capital since 1945 has been unable to transform them.

Again, there is an ambiguity in Kay's emphasis. At one point he says that industrial capital 'would have found the environment unwelcoming because of the degree of social disruption brought about during the first phase of mercantile development' (p.103, my emphasis). Elsewhere he says that 'The degree of social incoherence that arose (from this mercantile development) would have made the establishment of industrial capitalism impossible even if this had been historically practical' (p.99, my emphasis). The unsatisfactory difference in emphasis here is symptomatic of Kay's basic error in making the category of merchant capital central to the 'development of underdevelopment' rather than focusing on the forms of production and exploitation (through direct or indirect control of the processes of production) that were established. As a result of this failure, his statements about the nature of the social formations penetrated by capital are necessarily descriptive and extremely vague—a high degree of 'social incoherence' and 'social disruption', which means very little.

In contrast, the concept of the articulation of modes of production poses questions about how capital 'decomposes' pre-existing social formations and reproduces some of their elements in a new articulation subjected to the functioning of capital. In very general terms, this provides a framework for constituting theoretically the specificity of different social formations according to their pre-capitalist nature, the forms of capitalist penetration, their rhythm and degree, and the resulting articulation. Kay does touch on the question of class alliances between capital and 'archaic' social elements, explaining these by the form of capital as 'independent merchant capital' (p.104), but if his use of this category is unacceptable, then the explanation fails. Again, the articulation approach poses the question of such alliances in more rigorous terms of production—the economic and political mechanisms of control (including 'traditional' modes of tribute and labour-service exacted by pre-capitalist ruling groups and usually intensified or even invented under colonialism) to bring peasant production in line with the needs of capital, supplying the latter with commodities and labour for plantations, mines, transport, etc. As has been stressed, this could be accomplished with few changes in the forms of the labour process or instruments of labour of the peasant household.

Moving forward to the present period, that of the movement of industrial capital into the Third World, Kay again employs a dual
argument. One is historical in form and derives from his analysis of merchant capital. While industrialisation marks a new phase of underdevelopment, 'capital could not wipe out its own industry and begin as though nothing had happened previously: it was forced to operate in the conditions of underdevelopment it had itself created. . . (industrialisation) took place in conditions of deeply established underdevelopment which it could not overcome but only reinforce' (p.124). The second argument, developed in the chapter on 'Industrial Capital', has been outlined. Here Kay analyses the nature of industrial capital in general and concludes that its inability to generate employment in Third World countries 'is a normal feature of capitalist development and, as such, is independent of any particular form of ownership and dependence' (p.153).

The first argument (or assertion) is of little help because nowhere in his analysis of merchant capital has Kay stated what the structures of 'deeply established underdevelopment' are (what forms of social relations between capital and labour they involve), which tends to render 'underdevelopment' simply and negatively synonymous with lack of development of the productive forces. He sometimes describes merchant capital as an external economic force (eg. p.103), but the level of abstraction at which industrial capital is analysed precludes such a distinction—'It is just as profitable for local capitalists to adopt techniques of production that fail to absorb all the available labour as it is for international firms' (p.153). The point here is not that Kay's abstract analysis of industrial capital is methodologically incorrect. On the contrary, it is necessary but insufficient to establish the specificity of the industrialisation now occurring in many Third World countries. Very broadly, Kay's analysis of industrial capital (and the level of abstraction it employs) provides a starting-point from which two further levels of analysis have to be developed: one concerning the contemporary nature of the internationalisation of capital, the second concerning the forms this process takes in the industrialisation of the Third World.

Samir Amin and others have pointed out that Third World industrialisation employing the same techniques of production as are used in the advanced capitalist countries, but paying workers significantly lower wages, represents a new form of 'super-exploitation'. In other words, capital is able to extract a higher rate of profit. In considering this point (which, of course, goes right against Kay's 'under-exploitation' argument) we do not subscribe to the conclusion that Amin and his Third Worldist epigones draw, namely that workers in the advanced capitalist countries 'share' in and 'benefit' from the exploitation of the proletariat of the Third World. The important issue is how the level of wages, and its effects on the rate of profit, are determined by the course of the class struggle. A totally vicious and systematic oppression of the working class has been the condition for these 'miracles' of economic growth proclaimed for some Third World countries, of which Brazil is the pre-eminent example (an example which is being increasingly emulated, eg. in India with the help of the CPI, the 'Communist Party of Indira').

This politics of oppression, and the class alliances and state apparatuses
which are its conditions of existence, are an essential element of the present phase of development of international capital, a theme which Kay does not touch on. The level of abstraction at which his analysis of industrial capital remains bestows a formal equivalence on the investment decisions of 'local capitalists' and international firms, but in Latin America, for example, there is no longer any indigenous productive capital of any significance. What did exist has been expropriated by the wave of further penetration of international capital in the 1960s. On this whole question there is a peculiar gap in Kay's perspective. On the last page of his book, he notes that 'the underdeveloped world is an ideal laboratory for capitalist experimentation (in oppression)' (p.187). However, he continues—'new methods of controlling civilian populations can be tried out in relatively quiet backwaters'. Quiet backwaters—Brazil, Turkey, Chile, India, South Africa, Zaire? The kind of state that has formed or is in the process of formation in these countries has the function of destroying proletarian opposition and controlling large urban, working-class populations in the interests of a new phase of capital accumulation.

This relates to perhaps the most curious features of Kay's book, that while the internationalisation of capital features in his analysis of the epoch of underdevelopment characterised by merchant capital, there is no discussion of the internationalisation of capital in the present period of large-scale industrialisation of parts of the Third World. Moreover, Kay makes no reference to Lenin's work on Imperialism (nor to other classic works such as those of Luxemburg and Bukharin). He does not consider finance capital in the Leninist sense at all—whether to reject, qualify, or attempt to develop this category. Similarly, he restricts imperialism to the sense of colonial empire as against the Leninist sense of a stage in the development of capitalism on a world scale. I am not suggesting that Lenin's (brief) work on imperialism should be treated with any reverence superfluous to its scientific contribution, but the latter has to be assessed through subjecting it to criticism, eliminating its mistakes (of method and substance), and developing those of its categories and arguments that are valid.

Conclusion
The strength of Kay's book, and the example it sets, is of a rigorous Marxist approach (which requires no qualification, such as 'neo-Marxist') based on a reading of Capital. Proceeding from the level of abstraction at which the fundamental categories of Capital are established, to a periodisation of the development of capitalism, and its characteristics in each period, and to theorising the specificity of different 'types' of capitalist social formations, is fraught with difficulties and requires scrupulous attention to method. Kay's central use of the category of merchant capital, and his view of how it both retained and lost its autonomy with the rise of industrial capital, is a particular reflection of the general problem which confronts Marxist analysis of the Third World (and raises the spectre of dualism)—which is that the social formation in question appear to be, to varying degrees, both capitalist and non-capitalist. Capitalist because they have been penetrated by, and subjected to, the needs and laws of functioning of capital; non-capitalist because their forms
of production (though decreasingly) have not been transformed. That is, the large-scale industrial enterprise (the characteristic unit of production analysed in *Capital*) has not developed as the dominant element in their economies.

However, the unit of production and the capitalist *system* are not equivalent, as Kay tends to make them. The way in which he uses his two main categories—a dependent merchant capital unable to effect the transition to capitalist production, and industrial capital which functions in the same way in advanced and backward capitalist countries—by-passes the specificity of the Third World on both counts. On the first, the maintenance of 'non-capitalist' forms of production is emphasised and attributed to the intrinsic qualities of merchant capital in general, irrespective of the historical epoch in which it is operating. This fails to pose the question of how the conditions and functions of production were radically changed although its forms (such as the peasant household) were retained. On the second count, the identity of the operation of industrial capital in general is stressed, which fails to pose the question of the particular conditions of current capitalist industrialisation in the Third World (the class struggles and shifting alliances; the forms of the state that guarantee the expanded activities of capital). The first mistake stems from an erroneous application of one of the categories of *Capital*, the second from a direct application of a level of abstraction that requires a number of intermediate steps before its use in concrete analysis. However, Kay's book demonstrates by both positive and negative example that the purpose of going back to *Capital* remains how to learn to go forward from *Capital*.

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Briefings

The Saharan Struggle

Little is known in English-speaking countries of the struggle of the people in Western Sahara led by the POLISARIO Front, against a decolonisation deal which has attempted the carving up of their territory between two greedy neighbours. An outline is offered in the following documents:

Popular Front for the Liberation of Saghuiia El Hamra and Rio de Oro (F. Polisario): Declaration before the Liberation Committee of the O.A.U.

The Sahraoui people are living through a dramatic stage of their history. Just at the moment when they were preparing to pick up the fruits of their heroic struggle forcing Spanish colonialism to end its unjust occupation of our country, African forces, manipulated by imperialism, are trying to take the place of European colonialism for the first time in the history of our Continent.

The Sahara saw the beginning of Spanish colonial occupation in 1884. Due to the heroic resistance of our people, this occupation was only accomplished in 1934, the date of the treaty of definitive annexation. Spain found our country a free and stable one within its geographic, human and political borders, separated from its neighbours. Sahara had, of course, neighbouring relations with Mauritania, Algeria and Morocco. The relationship had its ups and downs. Sahara had a social and political system which was historically different from that of Mauritania and Morocco, which are now claiming our country under fictitious historical relations.

In both Mauritania and Morocco, political power was vertical in a way that decisions came only from the top, power belonging to one person (the Emir in Mauritania and the King in Morocco). In Sahara, political power was organised horizontally; it was a real collegial democracy. Decisions were, and are, taken within a particular political organism: Djamaa, an assembly composed of 40 persons chosen according to their capacities or their specialisations. This assembly appoints a President at every meeting. His functions are limited just to one session.

The resistance to Spanish occupation, which lasted until 1934, started a refugee movement towards neighbouring countries. The resistance movement led by our ancestors found a reflection and an organised prolongation in our Revolution. The Sahraoui Revolution against colonialism and the reactionaries and annexationists began to appear here and there, among the different levels of our society, from 1964.
An underground youth and workers movement started both within the country as well as in the neighbouring countries. For four years, we were not able to go beyond the underground activities, due to the alliance between the fascist government of Madrid with Mauritania and Morocco. It was necessary to wait for the birth of a general consciousness within the country, a fundamental basis for our action, to announce our first Sahara liberation movement in 1966: the Sahara National Liberation Front. This movement was opposed by tough repression from the Spanish fascist authorities. Strongly determined to regain its national sovereignty, our heroic citizens started in 1970 a generalised manifestation all over our country demanding our independence. As you can guess, the repressions of the fascist forces had a severity never seen before. Our first leader, Mohamed Basiri, was arrested at that time and died due to the criminal torture of the Spanish legion, while hundreds of militants were arrested and tortured and others were killed by the colonialist bullets.

This event crystallised our action and we became conscious that colonialism was a criminal act of strength which it was necessary to fight by force. On 20 May 1973, we started the armed revolution; since then our popular forces lead a war without mercy against the fascist occupation. Faced with this war, the colonial power could not resist, and the United Nations and the OAU interfered to re-affirm our right to self-determination and Independence. The administrating power pretended that the Sahraoui people wanted union to Spain. In reality, General Franco tried what the fourth French Republic did not achieve in other African countries. To support his annexationist pretensions, the colonial government said, furthermore, that the country did not have the constitutive elements of a state able to assume international responsibility. That is how Spain invented the idea of only 90,000 inhabitants, to argue that there was a lack of the human element. Having realised that this kind of pretence would not fool anybody, Franco's Government proceeded to new manoeuvres, hoping to complicate the problem and thus extend their presence in the country, for it was at this time that the fabulous riches of Bu-Craa's phosphates had just been discovered. That is how Spain initiated a criminal annexationist plot with the Governments of Morocco and Mauritania, secretly and individually to claim our country. To each one of them Spain offered finance for economic projects, such as the fish society IMAPEC in Mauritania and the irrigation dams in Morocco.

At least the future expansionists had certain scruples at the beginning—a fear of being denounced by the other African states that had just started to overcome, through the OAU, the dangers of war that blew across Africa after the territorial demands of the 1960s, of which the most painful example was that of Mauritania. In fact, the sovereignty of Mauritania was contested for ten years by Morocco, and so far it has not been recognised by that country.

Mauritania and Morocco's policy with regard to our country was dominated until 1974 by the fact that both would respect, at the right time, the free determination of the Sahraoui people, namely their independence. This policy, expressed before the OAU, the United
Nations and all the international and regional organisations, had the machiavellian and inhuman intentions of dividing our country. In fact, a secret partition plan was decided upon in September 1972 between Hassan II and Ould Daddah, the latter being then officially on holiday at Rabat. Knowing that the Sahraoui people, determined within their revolution and based on their inalienable rights to self determination and independence, would refuse all foreign demands, the expansionists gave themselves to manoeuvres aimed at avoiding the right of independence of our people. They asked the 26th session of the General Assembly to ask for a consultative judgment from the International Court of Justice, even though they had in fact approved all the resolutions of the United Nations previously adopted concerning our inalienable right to independence and self-determination.

The 29th session of the Assembly, in its 3292 resolution, asked the International Court for a consultative opinion and decided to send 'in loco' a mission of inquiry of the decolonisation committee. In reply, the Court declared that there never were sovereign links between our country and the expansionist states, and that the Sahraoui people should have the right to self-determination and independence, according to Resolution 1514 of 1960. The Commission of Inquiry of the Decolonisation Committee concluded in the same way and certified that the Polisario Front is the only national political force; therefore, in the 30th session, the General Assembly could do nothing else but recognise the independence of the Sahraoui people. Rejecting law, justice and truth, the expansionists, with the complicity of the colonial power, decided to murder our people, dividing them in spite of their will and the international obligations. That was what they decided at Madrid, on 14 November 1975. The consequences of this criminal act, which is first of all an insult to the OAU, are a threat to peace, security and stability in this area and in the whole of Africa:

1) The Sahraoui people are determined to resist foreign occupation till all signs of occupation disappear. At this precise moment, our people are faced with a real genocide situation by the enemy forces. The Moroccan Royal Armed Forces, led by the criminal Dlimi, are engaged in a real extermination of our people, using methods seen earlier among the Nazi forces. People, including women and children, are burnt alive, others are hanged at public places. Torture is a daily practice. Every Sahraoui has his daily ration. As a result of this drama, thousands and thousands of men, women and children have run away from their homes to the liberated areas under the control of the Front. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees, the International Red Cross, the Organisation of African Unity, and other international and humanitarian organisations are witnesses to this dramatic situation.

2) The aggressive occupation of our country, by African forces in an African context, constitutes a denial of a basic principle in the stability of our continent: the one of the inviolability of borders inherited from colonialism by which principle Africa managed to prevent dramatic wars among brothers.
3) This occupation constitutes a renunciation of the right of peoples to self-determination, a right that is an achievement of the struggle of the people of Africa and of the Third World.

4) The Sahraoui people are determined more than ever to give battle to the new African colonialists. The aggression against our country from the governments of Rabat and Nouakchott involves this area in a war of heavy and unforeseen consequences.

After this brief outline of the development of this problem, ladies and gentlemen, allow me to describe to you the actual situation inside the country. The expansionist countries occupy only the seaside cities which were given to them by the fascist Spanish Army. The Front fights them inside the cities and attacks them in their own countries. For instance, the battles 150 km. inside Moroccan territory, where the annexationist forces suffered heavy losses estimated at hundreds of dead and wounded and enormous quantities of weapons: the Abatih battle, the one at Lemsead, and the Chbika battle. The Front is also at your disposal to show you their officers and sub-officers and the army men arrested during those battles. In the south, in Bir-Oum-Grein, where fifty Mauritanians were shot; in Bentili, Zeuerat where our revolutionaries blew up the railways, in Nouadhibou, where the aggressive Mauritanian army lost many of their men and where a harbour was destroyed.

The Front controls the territory outside the cities which were given away by the fascist forces of Spain to the Moroccan army. In the liberated areas, a political and administrative system for Sahara was created within the framework of our Front: first, provisional National Council was created. This body exercises legislative functions during the transitional period; second, Executive Committees were created to administrate the country. The rallying to our cause of 77 members of the old Territorial Assembly, of six deputies of the 'Cortes', the mayors of the four main cities and the Assistant General Secretary of the Government strengthened our national unity.

In the liberated areas, the difficulties in the settlement of the population that ran away from the occupied cities are certainly numerous, but the Front has initiated enormous efforts to overcome them, placing our citizens in zones where life is organised in all senses: health, education and food. The humanitarian and international organisations have also intervened to help our people.

The Sahraoui people call urgently for help from all African peoples, and to the OAU asking them to support this just cause and question the aggression against our country, as an imperialist and colonialist plot. The OAU, one of whose fundamental principles has been broken by two of its members, must assume its historical responsibilities and oppose criminal aggression against an African people. The Polisario Front is the only legitimate authority to discuss the problem of decolonisation of our country before the OAU Liberation Committee as well as other international authorities.

Maputo
19 January 1976
Since this statement early this year, the situation on the ground for the Front and the sufferings of the Sahraoui people have worsened. Equipped with US planes, the Moroccan airforce has been conducting a small-scale ‘territorial denial’ operation similar to those of the Americans in Vietnam. But in a country made up of either steppe or virtually tree-less desert, without the rice paddies and jungles in which to hide, the strafing and bombardment from the air have left the people without sanctuary. Almost all of them have had to seek refuge across the eastern border in Southern Algeria. Despite the difficulties of operating in this terrain, the Front’s extreme mobility is allowing them to continue effective resistance against the occupation on the ground.

A Statement by Sahraoui Red Crescent
Since 31 October 1975 the Sahraoui people has been faced by an extermination war, waged by the governments of Rabat and Nouakchott which are aided and abetted by the Spanish colonialist authorities. The tripartite agreement concluded in Madrid on 14 November 1975, as well as flouting the opinions of the International Court of Justice in the Hague, as well as defying the decisions of the United Nations, as well as being an insult to the universal conscience, has, in fact, in the occupied territories of the Western Sahara, been interpreted as full genocide. More than 100,000 women and children are indeed living the tragedy of an exodus imposed by the barbarity of the occupiers, arising as much from rejection of foreign domination as from the primary instinct for self-preservation. Plunderings, arrests, summary executions, rape and burning are the daily lot of the areas and towns which are at the moment under the control of the new colonialists.

More than 100,000 women and children have managed to escape, through tragic flight, from the occupied territories and besieged towns which are subjected to a reign of terror and cut off from the world by barbed wire barriers and swarms of armed police. Without food or equipment to face the desert, its snares and its climate, they are fleeing from an enemy that is chasing them, mining the tracks, slaughtering flocks and poisoning wells. Some of the refugee camps, like Tifariti and Bir Lahlou, have been bombed with napalm. Others have been subjected to rocket and heavy machine-gun fire. From West to East, from all corners of the country, civilian populations are flocking to find shelter, protection and help. The international press has been able to see on the spot the inhuman conditions in which these women, children and old people are living and trying to survive. The press has been able to visit the Guelta, Amgala, Matlani, Tifariti, Tighissit, Mahbes, Hassi Robinet and Tindouf camps, the last two in Algerian territory. They did not hide their surprise, indignation and emotion when faced with this spectacle of human beings in peril.

The Sahraoui Red Crescent is deploying its utmost efforts, which are however limited by its own resources, to give shelter to the vulnerable populations or quite simply to enable them to survive. Despite the assistance provided by international humanitarian organisations and in particular the Algerian Red Crescent, the task is tremendous and the difficulties manifold. The ever-increasing numbers of refugees, the
distances they have to cover, the insufficient means of transport, the limited food supplies, the shortage of medicines, the land and air harassment by Moroccan and Mauritanian troops, are all obstacles that must be surmounted whatever the cost.

It is the intrinsic logic of criminal undertakings not to back out from the direst of actions, even if this means physically destroying a whole people. Besides, it is already in tens of thousands that the Rabat leaders are settling their nationals in the Western Sahara. This is designed to falsify the meaning of a possible referendum for self-determination. The tricks and manoeuvring will deceive no one.

International opinion cannot remain passive or indifferent to the tragedy being lived through by the Sahraoui people. The whole world must become aware of the catastrophe. That shows the responsibility of each and everyone.

* * *

There is now available in English a useful booklet which sketches in the background to the Sahraoui struggle by a journalist who spent a week with the guerillas last year. John Gretton: Western Sahara, The Fight for Self Determination, 1976 (75p) available from The Anti-Slavery Society, 60 Weymouth Street, London W1N 4DX. He also emphasises the interests that are at stake in the attempt to take over this sparsely populated, arid area. There are iron ore and copper deposits, and probably oil. But the prize is the phosphate deposits at Bu Craa—whose known reserves are twice those of Morocco, the world's largest producer after the two superpowers and the biggest exporter. International capitalist interests share with Morocco a concern to get access to these sources of wealth. In the last few years there has been an additional reason for the Moroccan Government's involvement. With a dominant position in the export of phosphate, the country followed the example of the oil countries in the early 1970s and raised phosphate prices five fold—but only at the cost of cutting back supply. Their price fixing would obviously be severely curtailed if the Saharan deposits were lost to them and put under national control.

What the booklet does not mention are the broader strategic factors which make the US only too willing to supply the Moroccans with the air power to carry out their sub-imperialist role: that the Western Sahara, with the bases on the neighbouring Canary Islands (also a communications and staging post for South Africa), and an arch-conservative regime in Morocco, provide a crucial link in the global military network of the NATO powers. They represent the gateway to the Mediterranean and also in turn to the northwest of the African continent, as well as standing astride crucial Atlantic sea and air lanes.
Interview with Professor Lars Rudebeck, Uppsala University, Sweden, Member of International Commission of Enquiry on Mercenaries, Angola, 1976

Q. What do you have to say about the conduct of the trial and the procedures?

A. Well I think the main thing that all of us stressed, including the American lawyers, was that the procedure was very fair and that the manner in which the trial was conducted was very dignified. Every chance was given to the defendants to defend themselves and to present arguments and their version of the facts and even the procedural rules in force were interpreted in favour of the defendants a couple of times, especially when the British lawyers suddenly appeared in court when the trial had been going for four days.

About the legality, which is not the same thing as the fairness of the procedures, it can be stated quite clearly that the trial was based upon two kinds of laws; one was an international law about to be born and which has not yet been codified but has been expressed in three or four UN resolutions and in a couple of resolutions from the OAU. And then there was also a 1966 revolutionary Angolan law and MPLA law that makes it possible to condemn to death enemies of the people. There was also the normal Angolan Penal Code which, like that of other countries, condemns 'paid crimes to order'. These were the legal bases of the trial. It would have been possible to do as the allies did in Nurenberg and to sort of regard the acts committed by the mercenaries in a moral and human sense so obviously criminal that anybody has a right to condemn them. But this was not the procedure the Angolan authorities chose to use.

Q. And very briefly, what about the sentences—how do you interpret them?

A. I think there was heavy pressure upon the court and upon the Angolan government to mete out severe sentences. So, in a sense, the fact that not more than four people were condemned to death was a sign of clemency. The reason for this was the necessity the Angolan Government felt to demonstrate that Angola is serious about mercenaries, that it cannot be accepted that people come to Africa arms in hand just to kill and plunder so everybody who plans to do the same thing knows what he has to expect, if he is caught.

Q. Politically, of course, what is significant are these broader implications for Africa and for future activities, but first of all what did you find out through your participation in the commission about the patterns of recruitment of these mercenaries and of mercenaries generally?

A. From a sociological point of view, the pattern of recruitment was very obvious. All but one of the thirteen accused were young men of working-class origin with a low level of education. They came from families who in general seem to have always voted 'Labour'
and they had a sort of passive consciousness of belonging to the working class. But I think all of them were people who had left school at the age of fourteen to sixteen and who then joined the army—either the American or the British—and spent long periods in the army. They came out without any professional training, they had had difficulty in finding jobs; they had jobs and then had been fired or had left them and most of them were unemployed. They had debts, divorces, had trouble with the police. I think its fair to say they were the kind of people who had been, in a sense, marginalised by capitalist society and then used by that same society to defend its interests in the Third World, in the periphery.

Q. And the machinery by which they were brought into Angola and recruited, the organisation behind them?
A. Well, as you know, recruitment had been carried out very openly, very publicly both in the U.S. and in Britain. In the States, Bufkin, the chief recruiter, even had T.V. programmes where he presented recruited people and publicised for recruitment of more people. They have a very fancy journal called 'Soldier of Fortune' which contains nothing but articles about people who go abroad to fight—brave men, guns in hand; women with sub-machine guns and long hair—magnificent photos and articles about violence, brutality, sex. One of the Americans who was executed had in fact advertised himself in this magazine—where he offered himself as a mercenary prepared to go anywhere. In Britain there was Banks, who recruited very openly and put advertisements in the papers with phone numbers that people interested could call. They then came to London where they were gathered in some house and in one case, funnily enough, even in a church. They were given equipment, money—a first week's pay of £150 in new American dollar bills—and after that they were very quickly taken in groups to London airport where they were equipped with some kind of identity card—SAS identity card (Special Advisory Services). And with this card they were able to pass through the police control and customs without passport, which was very handy, because some of the soldiers did not have any passports, because they were wanted by the police and could have no passports issued. One story which I think is illuminating was told by one of the defendants in court in Luanda. He said that when he presented his SAS card the police in charge at London airport did not want to accept it. He said it was phoney and he could not pass with this. Then the leader of the group gave the officer a phone number to call and he received in 15 seconds an answer that it was okay. And when they came to Kinshasa they were received in a very public and official manner by the customs authorities and by Holden Roberto and the Zaire authorities.

Q. What is now important for the future is of course the problem of mercenary recruitment for other countries, particularly in Southern Africa. What did you learn of these trends? What can be done to stop this?
A. That is a difficult question, because very powerful forces are behind it. But I think it is important to put pressure, in all kinds
of ways, upon the governments in the United States, in Britain and other western countries where recruitment is going on. To apply the laws that already exist that make it illegal to recruit soldiers for foreign armies. Such legislation exists in the U.S., they have I think the Neutrality Act and in Britain the Foreign Enlistment Act which could be used although it isn’t done. Our Commission also recommended a draft Convention against Mercenarism, which is to be presented to the U.N., and a Liaison Officer will continue our work by, for instance, publishing a White Paper on Mercenaries in Africa. It is a fact that recruitment goes on, at this moment, for Zimbabwe and for Namibia, perhaps two thousands, we were told in Luanda, are gathering to carry on the struggle against the liberation of Southern Africa. And this is done very very openly. One incident at the trial illustrates this. The court received a telegram from Bufkin, the chief recruiter in the U.S., which was read aloud to the audience. In it Bufkin demanded that the American defendants should be released because they were, according to him, to be regarded as prisoners of war and not as criminals, but he ended his telegram with the following words: ‘I am at present recruiting for Rhodesia’.

* * *

Extracts from the Verdict of Mercenaries Trial, given on 28 June 1976, Luanda.

From a critical assessment of the evidence, it has been found that in Camberley, Surrey, Great Britain, there is a legally existing agency, registered on 14 August 1975, which operates under the registered name of ‘Security Advisory Services’, and which uses the abbreviation S.A.S., which initials, by calculated coincidence, are absolutely identical to those of the ‘Special Air Service’, a top section of the British armed forces. The said agency is run by John Banks, an ex-paratrooper, Leslie Aspin, a gun-runner and British secret service agent, and Frank Perren, an ex-marine, assisted by Terence Haig, a so-called F.N.L.A. spokesman in England. It was Haig who admitted that the agency handled incredible sums of money coming from the United States of America, ‘but not from any private company in that country’, and funds channelled through President Mobutu of Zaire. James Hilton, another person having links with the organisation, corroborated that the agency had at its disposal 42 million dollars coming from the United States of America. The money reached the coffers of S.A.S. through messengers from Zaire, from a doctor in Leeds, through bank transfers made in Belgium through the Zaire embassy in London.

At the same time Gerald Ford, president of the United States, in a filmed interview given to Tom Brokow, an NBC reporter, on 3 January 1976, confirmed that American Federal Government funds were being diverted to the war in Angola, since the United States was co-operating with friendly countries engaged in the Angolan conflict. Furthermore, a secret report drawn up by the National Security Studies Centre in Washington D.C. Vol. I, No. I, reported that the CIA, coming to Holden Roberto’s help, had just invested a further 50 million dollars in the Angolan conflagration, and this
within the framework of direct United States involvement in that conflict. This open intervention in the tragic events in Angola had been recommended by the top-secret ‘40 Committee’ headed, among others, by Kissinger and William Colby, CIA director, and was a part of the ‘New Look’ of American foreign policy which, as a result of the debacle in Vietnam, was intended ‘to change the colour of the corpses’.

Thus, the facts indicate that the S.A.S. was a CIA subsidiary in Great Britain. Did the British government know this? S.A.S. did its mercenary agency advertising in newspapers and over the radio. The departure of the recruited mercenaries was given sensational coverage by the press. The London police organised and protected a meeting of mercenaries in the basement of a church at Tower Hamlets, East London, on the amiable pretext that they were a film team. At London Airport there was no control of any kind, it being sufficient for the mercenaries without passports merely to show a paper with the S.A.S. initials on it to be able to pass freely through the exit doors. What is more, Harold Wilson made it clear that he knew about the recruiting of mercenaries and that it involved ‘vast sums’ of money and correct lists of British military units, although he refused to answer the question as to whether or not he thought the CIA was involved in the business.

However, the CIA involvement had been publicly revealed by John Banks himself, who had pointed out that the liaison agent was one Major James E. Leonard, assistant military attaché at the American embassy in London since June 1972. Therefore, how can there be any doubt about the active complicity of the British Government, at a time, moreover, when that government was officially calling for the recruitment of forces for Israel?

It is therefore clear that the major capitalist powers were agreeing among themselves on a programme for the overthrow of the People’s Republic of Angola and that, having realised that direct military intervention was unviable, they resorted to private armies, which they regimented, armed and paid. And the defendants were in fact the instruments for the action of this political orchestration!

* * *

But it was the S.A.S. agency that proceeded to recruit mercenaries for Rhodesia and mercenaries for Angola. The latter numbered 128 and, divided into two groups, they were sent to Kinshasa via Brussels. And the agency was preparing to send 500 more mercenaries the following fortnight. These mercenaries were contracted for a period of six months, at a rate of pay of 150 pounds a week paid in American dollars, and their job, on the battlefronts or as members of military support groups, was to join the forces of the anti-nationalist F.N.L.A. group, for the purpose of helping it to overthrow the legitimate government of the young People’s Republic of Angola, that is, to ensure that the F.N.L.A., using violent means therefore, should gain political control of the country. All the defendants were perfectly conscious of that mission!
In the United States of America, the mercenary agency work for Angola and Rhodesia was done mainly by one David Bufkin, a man involved with an illustrated publication devoted to promoting the myth of mercenarism and called 'Soldier of Fortune'. And the advertising for the agency work was done in that magazine as well as in newspapers and on television. Approved candidates were sent to Kinshasa, via Paris or Brussels, and under the tutelage of the Zaire embassy in Washington. At the same time, the F.B.I. had precise knowledge about this traffic in war prostitutes and did nothing to disturb it.

The defendants with American passports were thus contracted by Bufkin, for a monthly pay of 1200 dollars, tax-free and supplemented by various cash bonuses. They were quite conscious that they were coming to Angola to join the military forces of the F.N.L.A., whose design and venture was directed towards the sanguinary seizure of political power.

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Neo-Colonial Manoeuvrings in Zimbabwe

The following extracts come from a document, a 'think piece', apparently commissioned by the British Foreign Office last year, which happened to come into our hands. The author, an independent analyst not, it seems, directly employed by the F.O., was asked:

"What would be the most appropriate and acceptable form of peacekeeping force to minimise violence in Rhodesia during the transition to majority rule?"

Possible Scenarios

1. A sudden collapse of the white administration.
   In these circumstances the only kind of occasion for any form of external task force to become involved might be after a nationalist regime had assumed power. The only ‘appropriate’ function it might perform would be to assist in the evacuation of those whites who wished to leave the country or who had been declared undesirable. As most whites in Rhodesia have connections with South Africa and the United Kingdom, it would be logical that they should provide the administrative personnel and logistical back-up for such an operation.

2. Variations on a negotiated transfer of power
   a. External pressures on the nationalist politicians applied perhaps by Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Botswana or some of these, and on the Rhodesian administration (applied by South Africa) prove sufficient for compromise political settlement to emerge which might exclude the most militant nationalists who reject anything short of the immediate implementation of majority rule. Such a settlement might be on the basis of the alleged agreement between Zambia and South Africa in Lusaka during late 1974—a rapid sharing of power in government leading to political parity within a year or two and followed by a black parliamentary majority within a further two or three years. The fact that a section of the nationalists refuses to accept such an agreement leads to insurgency in outlying areas and
violent outbreaks occur between rival groups in the urban areas. . .

if white Rhodesia (rather than submit to pressures for majority rule). . .

chose to adopt a 'scorched earth' policy there is probably little that

South Africa could do to prevent it. Although such an eventuality

seems unlikely, the fact that government ministers have in the past

hinted at this means that it cannot be totally ruled out. Similar

reservations exist about whether the neighbouring black states would

be willing to or capable of exerting effective pressure on the various

nationalist groups. Zambia, for instance, is probably in a position to

exercise considerable influence over the former ZAPU element of the

reconstituted African National Council; whereas the ZANU element

(for ethnic/geographical reasons) probably depends to a greater extent

on support from Mozambique and Tanzania. This complicates the

situation, since it might turn out that these countries found them-

selves ranged on different sides—the one perhaps supporting a nego-

tiated settlement, while the other favoured a resumption of the fight-

ing. In this situation the political problems associated with an

'acceptable' composition for a peace-keeping force would be almost

insurmountable. However, the problem would be considerably eased

if Zambia, Mozambique and Tanzania were united in their approach

and supported the same interests within Rhodesia with a view to

securing a negotiated transition to majority rule. In this situation

there would be two aspects to the task of peacekeeping: (i) the

maintenance of security along Rhodesia's borders to prevent infiltra-

tion; (ii) the maintenance of security in Central urban areas where

the white population is concentrated. In the case of (i), this might

be achieved by Zambia, or joint Zambian/British?/New Zealand?/

Australian?/(or even Rhodesian security force) patrolling along

Rhodesia's north-western border; a Mozambique or joint Mozambican/

Tanzanian?/New Zealand?/Australian?/Canadian? force along the

north-eastern and eastern borders; and a South African/joint South

African/British?/Botswana? force along the south and south-western

borders. Internal security (ii) would depend largely on the degree of

trust between the black and white element in a provisional administra-

tion during the transitional phase to a black parliamentary majority

(or any other agreed definition of majority rule). If these relations

were good, Rhodesian security forces (perhaps reorganised) might

make a major contribution, although it is likely that there would

also have to be some supervisory force (probably British) which was

acceptable to both black and white elements in a provisional administra-

tion. The necessity for an emergency operation to evacuate whites

would diminish if the transfer of power took place in an orderly

manner. However, it is likely that there would still be a number who

would wish to leave rather than accept black rule of any kind and it

would be a sensible precaution if some arrangements for their

assisted emigration were worked out in advance. . .

The nature and degree of support neighbouring black states might

afford to the nationalists in Rhodesia would depend upon the state of

inter-nationalist politics. The failure of the Rhodesian administration

to negotiate a settlement with the nationalists could provide the

opportunity for a temporary focus of unity as nationalist guerillas

from all the groups reverted to armed resistance. Although there seems

little doubt that Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique would support a
recourse to armed resistance on the part of the Zimbabwe nationalists if negotiations had proved abortive, they might still be prepared to encourage a recourse to negotiation if there was any indication of a change of heart in the white community. The dangers of an escalation of violence in Rhodesia for the neighbouring black states are real enough and to be avoided if at all possible. On the one hand, their support for an effective and united guerilla movement might invite retaliation by Rhodesia (this possibility has been talked about in Rhodesia in military circles); on the other, if divisions and conflicts between and within nationalist groups resurfaced (perhaps as a result of the failure to maintain the momentum of the armed struggle and to dislodge the administration in the urban and semi-urban areas) there is the possibility that such tribal and political rivalries could spill over into the domestic politics of neighbouring black states. President Kaunda’s past and recent actions against unruly foreign nationalists illustrate his concern on this potential threat to Zambian security. Similarly, it was reliably reported that at the Lusaka talks in November 1974, Samora Machel, Mozambique’s President-designate, took a serious view of this kind of problem. ‘He also said that unity was the most important thing; he did not want any tribal split in Rhodesia because this would affect unity in Mozambique. He called the Shangaan Ndebele and said that a Shona-Ndebele division would have adverse effects on Mozambique because both Shona and Ndebele live across the border in Mozambique.’ (From a confidential report by a senior nationalist participant who attended the Lusaka talks).

*(The document goes on to suggest two other variants of this scenario: a) ‘coup’ by the Rhodesian security chiefs, who ‘become convinced that the situation cannot be militarily contained’ (another example of prompting or wishful thinking perhaps?); b) stalemate between the guerrillas occupying the rural areas and the white regime in the central/urban areas. In this latter case, ‘all parties (including Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique) might have an interest in some degree of supervision during renewed negotiations. . . An ‘appropriate’ force under these conditions might be relatively large and have several roles to play’.)

3. *Inter-state confrontation or serious inter-communal violence.*

(In these circumstances, the paper argues, it would be impossible to raise a U.N. force, so . . .). The one and only possibility which could conceivably get around these difficulties would be intervention by British as the theoretically responsible colonial power, although there would have to be collaboration with other countries. . ., base facilities in Zambia and Mozambique, for example. However, given the UK’s refusal to countenance the use of force in Rhodesia. . . it is difficult to envisage a reversal of this position at a time when British security forces are preoccupied by Northern Ireland and in the process of being subject to cuts in defence expenditure.)
Conclusion
The variables are so numerous and their interaction so complex that it is clearly not possible to anticipate with any degree of confidence the way in which the situation in Rhodesia will develop and plan accordingly. Nevertheless, the subject is extremely important. . . "To be forewarned is to be forearmed". . . The fact that a peace-keeping force (even the mere suggestion of the idea in certain circles) might prove counter-productive (by making white Rhodesians more intransigent on negotiations or by raising rather than reducing violence) ought also to be considered. . .

A number of points call out for consideration:
1. The timing of any operation is as important as the composition and function of the peace-keeping force. Premature disclosure of such plans could prove harmful to the purpose of reducing violence or preventing it and to the chance of promoting negotiated solutions.
2. This paper gives no detailed breakdown of the technical and logistical requirements in each different situation. This can only be done by someone with the professional competence and expertise which the author does not have.
3. The whole question of finance would also have to be analysed closely as would the question of which countries have the necessary degree of experience, trained manpower and equipment to make a relevant contribution to any peace-keeping operation (this would be quite apart from their political qualifications).
4. It would seem that any peace-keeping operation in Rhodesia would benefit from a plan worked out in advance for the assisted emigration of whites who might wish to leave or those who might be declared undesirables by any nationalist government, thereby removing potential sources of tension and facilitating the smoothest possible transition from white to majority rule.

Some Questions about the Chitepo Report and the Zimbabwe Movement
The Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into the Assassination of Herbert Chitepo in March 1975 was published in April this year. There are two basic findings:

i. that he was killed by a bomb put in his car as part of a plot involving the whole of the then leadership of ZANU's army;

ii. this and other killings were in turn a product of internal feuding that was entirely 'tribal' in origin.

Since then, the army commander Josiah Tongogara, provincial commander Joseph Chimurenga, and Chitepo's bodyguard have been charged with the murder and are on trial as we go to press. The findings of the Report have been used by some present factions as ammunition in the present power struggle; more sympathetic observers still, however, see it as confirmation of the factionalism and lack of commitment of ZANU and the Zimbabwe movement as a whole. It is worth offering a short critique of the Report, and the events from late 1974 on that it describes, for what might be learned about the movement, and the present prospects for the armed struggle.
or for some negotiated solution. As one of the few outsiders that has been able to communicate with some of the fifty-odd who have been detailed in Zambia since the murder, I pose the following questions which summarise the main reasons for doubting the two theses of the Report:

The Actual Killing
a) If it was a bomb, as ZANU claimed all along, why did the police state publicly for so long that it was a mine—a ‘guerilla weapon’, they claimed? And why did they not explore the possibility, dropped at the word go, that it could have been planted elsewhere? In other words, was there any attempt to get evidence for the Report’s conclusion that this was not the work of agents of Smith or other imperialists?
b) Evidence for the alleged planting of the bomb, described in great detail, could only have been obtained from the accused; how was that testimony obtained? I know the answer to that; I have seen the scars!

The ZANU Split
In the long term these broader matters are politically the most crucial. As well as holding the key to the character of those detained, it is clear that many of the leading cadres in the present new phase of struggle are not a totally new crop but are for the most part those that managed to escape the Zambian round-up. To query the Report is not to claim that all elements within the ZANU that existed, in exile in 1974, were exemplary cadres. It is also accepted on all sides that there was a split—indeed, that it was a two-way split—a rebellion at the front based on grievances against the leadership in turn related to one of two factions within that leadership. But what was the basis for it?
a) Are we to believe the differences within the Dare (the military council) were purely ‘tribal’, occurring as they did most conveniently at the time that the detente exercise was just under way?
b) In fact it was known to observers at the time that there were sharp disagreements within the Dare and between the members and Kaunda. That being so, which opinion did the rebellious faction represent? Some of the answers are indicated by their past and recent actions—among the men named in the Report as part of this group, Sinyanga, a lawyer friend of Kaunda’s right-hand, Chona, earned his bread as a Lonrho executive; the principals, Mukono and Mutambanengwe, have subsequently identified not with the armed force but with the ANC external wing.
c) Why does the Report accept only this faction’s version of the background? Why, for instance, is it assumed that as Chitepo was a Manyika he was on their side? Even when to do so then involves an explanation of why he was acting so strangely—i.e. seemed to be on the other ‘side’. Again, it was known that Chitepo had taken a hard line over continuation of the struggle.
d) To go beyond the legalities, whose interests were served by the death of Chitepo and the subsequent imprisonment of all those elements supporting continuation of the guerilla struggle?
e) The scenario, where understandable grievances from the front are raised, while a more opportunistic group makes a bid for the leadership,
at a critical moment in the struggle, whereupon the host government intervenes—this same basic pattern has now been played out, with variations, for the fourth time in Zambia. It conforms to what went on in 1971 in ZAPU, when over 100 cadres were detained in Zambia, some later being sent back to Smith. It is what happened in 1973 when Chipenda, with Zambia protection, first tried to split MPLA. Then similar goings-on occur in SWAPO just at the time Vorster wants to divide them over the issues of entering constitutional talks. Is this all coincidence?

Lionel Cliffe

The following press release, issued by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party, recently reached us from Ethiopia. Evidence grows of the increasingly repressive nature of the Dergue in response to continuing political agitation among the popular forces released during the February 1974 Revolution.

Recent Events in Ethiopia
The Ethiopian fascist military junta continues to massacre scores of militant workers, students, teachers, women, peasants, etc. in an attempt to destroy the EPRP, against whom it has declared an open war of extermination.

The junta’s open war against the EPRP shows that the junta has failed to win any mass base and that it is using total terror and force to stay in power. Summary executions, mass arrests, brutal torture are all used on a massive scale in order to destroy the EPRP. The latest of such shootings occurred on September 24, when junta-ordered soldiers opened fire and killed scores of workers and other popular masses who were peacefully demonstrating in Addis Ababa. In the capital, in Kaffa, Harar, Wollo, Tigrai, etc. the fascists are massacring countless revolutionaries. The Israeli-trained elite fascist force called ‘Nebelbal’ (Flame Division) has already baptised itself with blood and has been moved to Addis Ababa in force. Daily, the killings and arrests continue without let-up.

Undaunted, the EPRP and the oppressed masses continue the struggle. Workers of the public sector have already gone on strike, defying death as strikes are punishable by death. Others will also follow. In the countryside, peasants led by the EPRP and its armed-wing, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Army, continue to resist and struggle. In the face of this bloody repression, which manifests the vile nature of this criminal regime, the EPRP has the necessary task of resorting to legitimate self-defence and responding to reactionary violence with revolutionary violence of the masses. Workers, poor peasants, democratic officers and soldiers (of whom quite a few have deserted to join the ranks of the EPRP Army), students, teachers, women, oppressed nationalities—in short, all the popular sector stand with the EPRP. This is our strength, our force. This is why the isolated junta and its mercenary intellectuals want to destroy us. We shall vanquish!!

26 September 1976
Debate


We are no less dependent on European traditions intellectually than we are economically. This has obvious implications for the development of revolutionary theory and for political practice in Africa. Our dependence often manifests itself in the wholesale application to contemporary African conditions of certain conceptual frameworks, propositions and prognoses which were developed in certain concrete historical contexts, and in certain particular social structural contexts, to which our own subject of investigation may not be exactly identical. This, I believe, is an error to which Nsari’s contribution to the debate on Tanzania may be attributed.

In order not to be misunderstood, I must state immediately that I am not by any means suggesting that Marxism-Leninism, or Nsari’s interpretation of it, is inapplicable to a sound analysis of the Tanzanian, or Tanzanian-type societies, as some ideologists would argue. On the contrary, I would like to argue that if we are to use Marxism as a living science, we have to regard it as a method rather than a series of dogmatic statements. In other words, we should avoid all age-old slogans which do not derive from concrete analyses of concrete situations. Of course, slogans are revolutionary when appropriately formulated to suit particular revolutionary situations. If not, we render them sterile and our science irrelevant.

I am not trying to suggest that the author’s essay is an exercise in sloganeering, either. But I am of the opinion that he could have proceeded in a more scientific, that is more cautious, and therefore more constructive manner. Ideally, the most scientific analysis of Tanzanian society would consist of the following three steps: (1) an analysis of the pre-colonial modes of production and the accompanying polity/ties or social arrangements, the social relations of production following the fundamental materialist premise that in order to live, eat and drink, and make history, people must produce the means of this livelihood, and that, consequently, they necessarily enter into certain social relations; (2) an examination of the impact of colonialism and imperialism; and (3) an analysis of the social structure of independent, or post-colonial society.

Now, how does Nsari proceed? Right from the word go we are told that the advance to socialism anywhere ‘requires the smashing of the bourgeois state and the establishment of the proletarian state so as to enforce the dictatorship of the proletariat’. But surely this argument presupposes the existence of a bourgeois class and its own state? Is it appropriate for the author just to assume these social phenomena,
without establishing their existence and manifestations? When Marx used these broad categories of 'bourgeoisie' and 'proletariat', he meant that class of men, during the high tide of classical capitalism, who owned and controlled the means of production, and that class of men and women (the majority of humanity) who did not own the means of production but who sold their labour-power to the former class in order to live. If we are to use the same categories in the Tanzanian case, we have got to show that similar social relations do obtain there. On the contrary, our author seems to assume that the country has a certain social structure, the nature or image of which is common knowledge. The argument that 'the bourgeois state cannot be used by the proletariat to build socialism' assumes that an unestablished 'proletariat' is already in control of some unestablished 'bourgeois state'. In the very same first paragraph, we are told that 'Failure to grasp this fundamental truth is what precipitates the Chiles of this world'. But what useful parallels can be discerned between Allende's Chile and Nyerere's Tanzania to justify this warning?

In what is supposed to be a class analysis of the state, we are reminded that the 'colonial state was not a state which came into existence as a result of internal class struggles' and that 'the territory called Tanganyika was not even a nation'. But what is the significance of these observations for political practice? Instead, we are taken back into British colonial history in Tanzania. It is rightly pointed out that the colonialists used military force and ideological manipulation, but he gives not a single example of either the use of force or the resistance, armed or otherwise, of the people. There is almost nothing about African history. That the colonial state 'chose the sons of chiefs and trained them in the school at Tabora' does not tell us to what extent 'bourgeois ideology' permeated the consciousness of the people. Although 'It was from among them that the colonial state chose its clerks and teachers and the church its catechists', but it was also from the same milieu that the future nationalist leaders would emerge. Social reality often has this contradictory nature. Was it not for the above reasons that the colonial regime passed legislation to prevent African civil servants from participating in politics? After all, did Nyerere not have to give his teaching profession up in order to participate fully in TANU activities?

Genuine nationalism is progressive and should be supported, because it seeks to expel foreign domination. Whether the struggle for national liberation leads to fascism or socialism does not depend on anyone's will, but on the world situation and the relationship of forces within the country in question. In other words, what is essential is an analysis of the relationships of class forces.

Can we, with any certainty, assert that political independence everywhere only means a formal change in the relationship between the colony and the metropolis? Can we not distinguish between outright neo-colonies and those countries which are not so securely neo-colonial? Indeed, like most former colonies, Tanzania assumed a neo-colonial status at independence. For instance, the Five Year Plan then in force was based on the recommendations of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. This Plan was, among other things, capital-intensive, because it was expected that foreign capitalist investment and 'aid' would be forthcoming in substantial sums. The Asians continued to dominate the export-import sector of the economy. Foreign interests continued to control the major sectors of the economy. The Army continued to be British-trained and led. The educational system was colonial-oriented.

Has the situation changed to any significant extent, or has it remained basically as it was at independence, that is, a neo-colonial state? Although the President published his pamphlet, 'Ujamaa—The Basis of African Socialism' in 1962, socialism was conceived of as an attitude of mind rather than a practical way of life. The real landmark in the history of post-colonial Tanzania, I believe, is the Arusha Declaration, which was published in January 1967. The latter document emphasised self-reliance and the insufficiency and shortcomings of aid. In September of the same year, Ujamaa was made the official policy of the country. It was defined as an arrangement whereby people came to live and work together for the good of all and to enable the state to provide social services. Further, the Leadership Code was a blow to privilege. There have been significant nationalisations and attempts to democratise the Army and to transform the educational system in order to render it more relevant.

What have these apparently revolutionary changes amounted to? A wide reading of the literature leaves one with the impression that the villagisation programme was ill-planned and that the original enthusiasm of the peasants has been superseded by force. Besides, it has been more successful in poorer areas where the relative absence of prosperous farmers meant that there was little resistance. Wealthier peasants and TANU bureaucrats used Ujamaa to further their own interests, and the latter also found ways of avoiding infringement of the Arusha Declaration. The nationalisations have not been thoroughgoing nor entailed full socialisation. Little has been done to expropriate the Asian commercial class. Aid continues to come in from imperialist countries, including economic expertise from the United States!

How do we account for the apparent failure of a ruling party committed to socialism to transform society fundamentally? Is it fair to characterise TANU as just another petty-bourgeois party in league with imperialism? For one thing, its foreign policies, particularly on the question of national liberation struggles, could not be more progressive and could not negate the interests of imperialism any better. Could it not be due to objective constraints that its domestic policies are seemingly Fabian-inspired? In an expansive colony in which a national movement (a class alliance?) comes to power peacefully and inherits little-developed productive forces, an overdeveloped state apparatus and a predominantly 'peasant' population, is this not to be expected? In an underdeveloped country in which there is no large working class, in which the peasantry is not particularly radicalised and there are no democratic organisational traditions, does it not follow that any transformation will have to be the brainchild of the bureaucratic elite?
What, then, must be done? The immediate task is certainly not to antagonise the leadership of the movement with which the masses of the people identify. It seems that the main reason why some of the basic democratic socialist possibilities have not been consumated is precisely because there is no committed manpower to spearhead the struggle for the emancipation of the masses. The idea for Tanzanian socialists, therefore, is to participate more fully, and to struggle for the further democratisation of, and the full participation of the oppressed people in, TANU in order to wage an effective struggle against the right wing and to expose the limitations of official party philosophy. Little further progress can be made without the control of the party organisation by the progressive people themselves who, in turn, will transform the party to enable it to transform society.

On theoretical questions, it is very essential for African socialists to resist the temptations of doctrinaire socialism. This is a real danger because of the lack of original Marxist studies and analyses of African societies and movements. It is therefore easy for would-be African socialists to adopt ready-made programmes. We desperately need a scientific study of the class structure of Tanzania and its implications for political activity. We cannot go on assuming the existence of classes almost in the same way as we do in Western capitalist countries, as some ‘Marxists’ do. Neither can we eliminate them from the face of the earth, as the ‘African Socialists’ do. Least of all can we concede that the proletariat is very small and weak, and still go on to advocate proletarian revolution.

A. Mahleka

There is no theory of petit-bourgeois politics
In R.A.P.E. 5, Colin Leys reviews the debate between Shivi and Saul on the nature of the post-colonial state in Tanzania. This debate has now been extended to Uganda by Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Class Struggles in Uganda’, R.A.P.E. 4, and John Saul, ‘The Unsteady State’, R.A.P.E. 5. Despite their differences, both Mamdani and Saul use a concept of petit-bourgeois politics with which they purport to explain events in Uganda. As Leys (5:45-6) points out, the concept of petit-bourgeoisie is not defined in any Marxist way, that is in terms of the social relations of production, distribution and exchange. The theory of petit-bourgeois politics is not a theory at all, but a tautology, as ‘empty’ (Leys 5:43) as the idea of the ‘over-developed state’ through which the petit-bourgeoisie is alleged to act.

Both Mamdani and Saul proceed from an unmarxist separation of the ‘political’ from the ‘economic’. Mamdani reduces political conflicts to their ‘economic’ base, by labelling the protagonists as classes or as fractions of classes. These classes and fractions are all lumped together as elements of the petit-bourgeoisie. Saul, following Poulantzas, separates politics from the social relations of production. Not only do conflicts take place within the political sphere, but they have their origins there. The class basis of politics is established by labelling the participants in politics ‘petit-bourgeois’. The claim of both writers to a Marxist analysis rests on their attempt to establish the class basis
What, then, must be done? The immediate task is certainly not to antagonise the leadership of the movement with which the masses of the people identify. It seems that the main reason why some of the basic democratic socialist possibilities have not been consumated is precisely because there is no committed manpower to spearhead the struggle for the emancipation of the masses. The idea for Tanzanian socialists, therefore, is to participate more fully, and to struggle for the further democratisation of, and the full participation of the oppressed people in, TANU in order to wage an effective struggle against the right wing and to expose the limitations of official party philosophy. Little further progress can be made without the control of the party organisation by the progressive people themselves who, in turn, will transform the party to enable it to transform society.

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of politics and, in Mamdani's case, to show that political conflicts were manifestations of class struggles. On examination, these struggles turn out to be conflicts among different fractions of the petit-bourgeoisie, within the given framework of imperialist domination. What defines the petit-bourgeoisie? If political conflicts take place within the petit-bourgeoisie, what then makes it a single class?

Both authors define the petit-bourgeoisie as a class by their political activities, and then purport to explain their political activities by their class base. They do not examine "the relations between classes—that is, between the many who labour and the few who appropriate the fruits of that labour, the specific forms of appropriation and the political and ideological means to secure and support it..." (Mamdani 4:26). Thus, the petit-bourgeoisie are not defined by their own production and market relations, nor by their relations with workers and peasants.

Mamdani initially refers to three groups, traders, kulaks and civil servants, as sections of a single class, the petit-bourgeoisie (4:34-5). Each of these three groups derive their incomes from different activities, and from different ways of appropriating a share of the surplus value of the labour of other classes. There is no apparent reason for classifying them as members of a single class. This leads Mamdani into remarkable inconsistencies of terminology. The petit-bourgeoisie has several sections/fractions, defined alternately by their different economic activities and by their ethnic identities. "A fragmented class in the fifties, at independence the petit-bourgeoisie was divided into two classes"—the Bugandan and non-Bugandan petit-bourgeoisies. These classes are defined by the "political expression of this fact", the existence of separate Bugandan and Ugandan states which "expressed the separate political base of each petit-bourgeoisie" (4:44). In 1966, the contending parties within the UPC are identified with two sections of the "petit-bourgeoisie proper", kulaks and traders, who, by a semantic twist, now become a class separate from the "governing bureaucracy" (4:46). And in 1971, excluded from control of the state, the "petit-bourgeoisie proper" appears to act as a class to seek new bases of power, notably within the armed forces (4:54). As Saul (5:26) rightly points out, Mamdani simply ascribes political conflicts to particular sections of the petit-bourgeoisie. Since all of the competing political parties recruited intellectuals, and found voters and supporters among the peasantry, Mamdani distinguishes them by the class character of their predominant element. These are the traders, kulaks and chiefs in the respective cases of the UPC, the KY and the DP. The ascription is validated by assumption. Bagandan traders are a secondary group because the dominant parties in Buganda are distinguished as parties of kulaks (KY) and chiefs (DP). Similarly, outside of Buganda, kulaks either do not exist, or where they do, they played second fiddle to traders (4:38). No evidence is cited in support of these propositions. Their truth-value appears to be implicit in the schema itself.

Mamdani purports to explain political conflicts by redescribing them as instances of conflicts among classes, or rather among fractions of
the petit-bourgeoisie. His description is validated by assumption rather than by evidence, and his classes are defined by the very political conflicts which they purport to explain. Since politics is the business of the petit-bourgeoisie, peasants do not take part in politics, except to support the parties of other classes. When farmers do take part in politics, they are kulaks. Workers do not normally take part in politics. After the strikes of 1945 and 1949, they were simply divided and incorporated, apparently by the colonial state with the help of British TUC advisers (4:39-40). After independence, they were subjected to the ‘hegemony’ of the petit-bourgeois state, an odd use of the term, since the only example given of hegemony is one of blatant repression (4:44). How all this was achieved, and why it could be, is not discussed. But this is not a problem for the theory of petit-bourgeois politics. The ‘masses: urban workers and middle peasants’ (41) can only be followers of parties led by others. Since this is true by assumption, we need no analysis of what issues were used to secure the support of workers and peasants, and why they should accept the political leadership of other classes.

Saul does recognise the problem of defining traders, kulaks, civil servants and politicians as members of a single class (5:14-15). He solves it by defining the class in terms of its political practice. Thus, these groups are members of a class because ‘these different positions in production and the economic sphere do, in fact, have the same effects at the political and ideological level’ (Poulantzas, cited 5:15). The African petit-bourgeoisie appears not to exist within the social relations of production at all. It is not merely ‘weak’, but ‘relatively unformed, and not yet divided, in any unequivocal manner, into constituent elements diversely rooted in the production process’ (5:19). Reflecting ‘the absence of a determinate class standpoint in the production process’ (Murray, cited 5:18), the political actions of the petit-bourgeoisie can take any form whatsoever: ‘It is precisely this social uncertainty and susceptibility to multiple determinations and influences which makes the dimension of consciousness so crucial to the analysis’ (Murray, cited 5:21). Apparently, being does not determine consciousness; consciousness determines being!

Poulantzas explains the political vacillations of the petit-bourgeoisie by their ‘intermediate position—strung out between bourgeoisie and proletariat—and its ‘petty bourgeois individualism’ (Saul 5:15). It may therefore swing either to the side of the bourgeoisie or to the side of the proletariat. But as neither of these classes, on Saul’s account, took part in the politics of Uganda, the petit-bourgeoisie appears to be able to do whatever it likes. As Leys (5:42-3) points out, Saul now brings in the overdeveloped state as the decisive factor in his ‘political equation’ (5:15,19). Since the state is governed by the petit-bourgeoisie, and since their politics is indeterminate, the state may turn in any direction, depending on the ideology of those who come to control it. Like many members of the African ‘petit-bourgeoisie’, Saul appears to think that ‘What we need is a good ruler, with a progressive ideology.’

At this point, political analysis gives way completely to identifying goodies, Nyerere and Nkrumah (5:22-3,30), and distinguishing them
from the baddies, notably Obote and those on the left, including Nyerere, when they are misguided enough to go along with him (5:13,37). No grounds are stated for distinguishing goodies from baddies, other than Saul's personal evaluation of them, and the obvious point that Obote was no socialist (5:30). But, then, surely 'it is perfectly clear that Nkrumah was no socialist; the manner in which he presided over the decimation of the CPP left-wing in the early 1950s and his stifling throughout the years of any genuine working-class militancy, offer proof of that' (adapting Saul on Obote 5:30). Progressive policies depend on those of the petit-bourgeoisie who 'identify downwards—"committing suicide" in Cabral's expression, and "reincarnating" themselves "in the conditions of workers and peasants" ' (5:29). This is not theory, but wishful thinking. It is difficult to see why kulaks and traders might be expected to surrender their privileged position within peasant communities, and there is considerable evidence to show how they ally with one another and with local bureaucrats to consolidate it (Saul, and Thoden van Velzen, in Cliffe and Saul, ed., Socialism in Tanzania, 2). Similarly, there is considerable evidence of the determination of bureaucrats to maintain their distance from and authority over the uneducated workers and peasants (Raikes, Coulson, in R.A.P.E. 3). Cabral was writing about a situation in which a 'petit-bourgeois' leadership, denied access to the colonial state and its resources, was forced to identify with the interests of peasants if they wanted to carry on their struggle. Naturally, the politics of the petit-bourgeoisie, or of any other class, cannot be established a priori (5:19). But they cannot be analysed separately from the politics of workers and peasants. Since, according to the theory of the petit-bourgeois state, workers and peasants only come on to the political stage as first, second and third citizens musing about the doings of their betters, or as riotous mobs, directed by the contending factions of the petit-bourgeoisie, there is, by definition, if not in reality, neither workers' politics, nor peasant politics. (By contrast with both Mamdani and Saul, numerous recent studies have examined the politics of workers, peasants, traders and craftsmen: Cohen and Sandbrook, The Development of an African Working Class, Jeffries, R.A.P.E. 3, Peace, and Williams in de Kadt and Williams, Sociology and development, among many others). Nor can the politics of the petit-bourgeoisie be analysed separately from an analysis of the dominant, metropolitan bourgeoisie, in relation to which the African commercial class, as well as rich peasants, bureaucrats and politicians, are characterised as 'petit'. In both papers, the domination of imperialism is taken for granted. It is not part of the specific explanation of political conflicts.

Mamdani's analysis does enable him to distinguish different class interests among the 'petit-bourgeoisie', albeit at the price of inconsistent terminology and the arbitrary attribution of a specific class character to political parties and events. He points out that state, and party, officials may use the rhetoric of socialism in expanding state economic activity, and thus the patronage at their disposal, while limiting the opportunities for private capitalist activity by indigenous classes outside their control (4:51,56). This is significant for Uganda, as it is for Tanzania and Ghana. This does not prevent state and party
officials from using public resources for private capitalist activity, despite laws and leadership codes, as Saul rightly points out for Uganda (5:27). Saul points out that Mamdani does not take explicit account of the holders of political rather than bureaucratic office. Saul attributes to this 'political class', along with its personal aggrandisement, the task of regulating conflicts among classes (5:18). As he shows, the 'over-developed' state is not always sufficiently developed to fulfil the task of promoting capital accumulation (cf. Mamdani, 4:48), and regulating class relations. But the problem of the 'unsteady state' is not the 'relative autonomy and volatility' (5:18) of the 'political class', but the dependence on politicians, bureaucrats, traders and merchants on state patronage for access to the money, jobs, contracts, licences and land from which they derive their living. The state is unable to regulate conflict and promote capitalism because it is unable to enforce its own rules regulating the competition for the resources of the state itself (cf. Turner, R.A.P.E. 5). The regulation of conflict requires a state capable of standing above the immediate political struggle for patronage and advantage. For all its relative autonomy, there is no reason within Saul's and Mamdani's theories why we should expect the petit-bourgeois state to do other than satisfy the immediate acquisitive interests of 'petit-bourgeois' politicians, bureaucrats, traders and kulaks who control it. The very business of politicians, 'to stitch together alliances and to rally constituencies' (5:20), apart from feathering their own nests, makes them most unlikely candidates for the task of administering the state in the interests of the whole petit-bourgeoisie. This is not to deny the salience of questions of public policy in Ugandan politics. But both Saul and Mamdani do not examine them except as manifestations of the interests of particular ethnic, religious or institutional groups.

This leads both authors to focus narrowly on certain political divisions, primarily ethnic and religious, to which Mamdani adds the conflict between kulaks and traders on the one hand and bureaucrats on the other over the nature and extent of state economic activities. The ethnic and religious categories with which people identified themselves are taken for granted. Saul does recognise that these 'fractions' are 'produced in the field of political practice alone' (Poulantzas, paraphrased 5:19). But, in discussing Uganda, he does not analyse how the exigencies of political and economic competition, as well as historical circumstances, produced particular forms of ethnic and religious identity. Ugandan politics cannot be adequately described by the statement 'Politics really was about tribe and religion. . . .' nor explained by adding that ' . . . it never ceased to be about the petty bourgeoisie as well' (5:29). We have no reference to the conflicts between classes within particular kingdoms and districts, nor of the conflicts over monarchy, other than in Buganda. Saul does not even discuss the issues of 'feudalism' and monarchy in Buganda, which dominated political conflict from independence to 1967. Since there is no detailed consideration of the interests and issues in Ugandan politics, there can also be no consideration of the dilemmas facing the left in Uganda, both before and after left-wingers were expelled from the UPC in 1964. By implication, those on the left who, after 1964, continued to seek to work within the UPC and within institutions like NUSU, the students union, were mistaken (5:29-31,37).
But there is no discussion of the alternative courses of action open. Nor does Saul consider the activities of those Marxists who, after being expelled from the UPC, did call for the organisation of a separate socialist party, without actually forming one, and opposed any support for or collaboration with the UPC. Yet, after Amin came to power, some of these Marxists asked left-wing students to collaborate with the regime. Although the students refused, they themselves collaborated with Amin until they found that their own lives were endangered.

Obote’s attempt to reinstate himself in power by an armed invasion was clearly adventurous both in its conception and by virtue of its failure (Mamdani, 4:55, Saul, 5:13,37). But we cannot evaluate the invasion from the point of view of the left without even mentioning that the invasion was supported by FRONASA (Front for National Salvation), and by its independent forces, both within and outside Uganda. They maintained this support, even after Obote had changed the plans to which they had agreed. Hindsight has shown them to be mistaken. But it was not clear at the time, to comrades inside as well as outside Uganda, that the invasion was doomed to failure. And to suggest that the continuation of Amin’s regime offers better conditions for struggle than might have been afforded by the success of the invasion, is to repeat the appalling errors of the Comintern’s social-fascist policy between 1928 and 1934. It does not require what Saul calls ‘the correct theoretical vantage point’ (5:34n) to realise the need to organise an autonomous resistance movement. The commitment of forces to the invasion proved to be disastrous. This was the outcome of a political calculation, not of ‘petit-bourgeois’ theoretical errors. The guerilla struggle by FRONASA in late 1972 and early 1973 was unsuccessful. But the failure of the left to sustain an effective resistance movement inside Uganda, led by Marxists, results from real practical problems, and not from their inability to understand the need for a resistance movement based on ‘a more class-conscious mass base of peasants and workers’ (5:37).

Both Saul and Mamdani operate with an implicit theory of petit-bourgeois politics. On examination, the theory proves to be tautological. Political conflicts are explained by showing their class basis in the petit-bourgeoisie. The petit-bourgeoisie are defined by the very political conflicts which the concept is used to explain. This absence of any theory leads Mamdani to a schematic reduction of political conflict to instances of conflict among classes. Saul attempts to cover up the emptiness of his theory by filling it with mixed metaphors such as ‘refraining from boiling away the specificity and irreducibility of political fractions, while at the same time retaining the necessary bite of class analysis’ (5:28). Lacking a firm empirical and theoretical basis for evaluating political decisions, Saul offers us ex cathedra judgments on important events such as the attempted invasion, to which he fails to give proper consideration. Neither Saul, nor Mamdani, provides a Marxist analysis of Uganda, which examines production, market and state relations to provide an empirical foundation for its analysis, and for our political judgments.

Gavin Williams
Bonapartism and Kenyatta's Regime in Kenya
In his otherwise excellent review of Colin Leys' book, Underdevelopment in Kenya, in R.A.P.E. 3, Geoff Lamb omits examination of what I regard to be the most questionable element of Leys' analysis, the Bonapartist character of the Kenyan state. Lamb points out the onedimensional nature of Leys' analysis of the classes in Kenya. Leys gives a detailed and insightful analysis of the development of the dominant foreign and local bourgeois classes in Kenyan peripheral capitalism, but in the end he 'fails to provide an adequate account of the nature of the oppressed classes in Kenya and their varying relationships to and struggles against monopoly capitalist domination' (Lamb, p.87). But Lamb fails to follow this up with a critique of the analysis of the class nature of the state which Leys has erected on this inadequate foundation.

What is of greatest importance in this book is Leys' effort to push his analysis beyond the limitations of the 'heavily economistic character' of much of underdevelopment theory to an understanding of the mechanisms of neo-colonial domination and processes of class formation within Kenya.

Leys argues that modern Kenyan politics are similar in certain important respects to mid-nineteenth century French politics as analysed by Marx in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. According to Leys, Marx found that the basic contradiction of Bonaparte's rule was that,

the government, the state apparatus, was independent of any single class, yet in practice it could not do without class support, and could not prevent its policies fostering the interests of certain classes, even if it wished to. Yet this enhanced the political power of these classes, and so undermined its own independence of action; therefore it also worked constantly to counteract the political power of the classes whose economic power it was simultaneously building up (p.207).

Bonaparte came to power through breaking the political power of the French 'middle class', yet his economic power increased its strength and thereby renewed its political power. In the case of Kenya, it was the British bourgeoisie whose power was 'broken' by independence and the rise of Kenyatta's government. Yet, as Leys has clearly shown, Kenyatta's policies have constantly fostered the economic interests of foreign capital in Kenya and enhanced its ability to exert political influence there, thereby undermining the independence of his regime.

In his efforts to remain in power without relying too closely on any particular class or group of classes, Kenyatta has, says Leys, followed Bonaparte's example in expanding the bureaucracy to provide an independent power base for the regime. Leys quotes Marx:

an enormous bureaucracy, well-gallooned and well-fed, is the idée napoliénne which is most congenial of all to the second Bonaparte. How could it be otherwise, seeing that alongside the actual classes of society he is forced to create an artificial caste, for which the maintenance of his regime becomes a bread-and-butter question? (p.209).

90
Leys counterposes this analysis of the ‘Bonapartist’ neo-colonial state with Fanon’s analysis of the ‘bourgeoisie of the civil service’. He criticises Fanon for oversimplification in portraying the neo-colonial state as merely the means by which national puppets serve foreign interests in their country in order to enrich themselves. In contrast, Leys starts out

from the essential fact that in this situation the leader is not the agent of any one class, but enjoys a measure of independence. Marx sees this independence as in the long run rather illusory, partly because the leader cannot in reality be ‘the patriarchal benefactor of all classes’ as he would like, and finds that he ‘cannot give to one class without taking from another’; but even more because the development of the capitalist mode of production was steadily eroding the position of the pre-capitalist classes in France, so that the balancing act of bonapartism would eventually be bound to give way to the solid weight of bourgeois domination (p.211).

Hence, Louis Bonaparte’s regime in France was purely transitional in character, possibly only in this unresolved middle stage of the class struggle in France and sure to disappear once the bourgeoisie had gained sufficient economic and political power to impose its will on French society. However, in conditions of underdevelopment, although a Bonapartist regime is limited by the impossibility of benefiting all classes alike, Leys maintains that the development of the capitalist mode of production does not necessarily progressively erode the position of the pre-capitalist classes. On the contrary, it usually must preserve them as a pre-condition for capital accumulation at the periphery. Thus, for Leys, the independence of a Bonapartist government in an underdeveloped country ‘seems even more significant’. And, therefore,

What was for Marx a purely transitional and relatively short-term phenomenon may become, in some circumstances, a generic form of government at the capitalist periphery; and the content of bonapartist rule reflects the complexity of the contradictions involved, as well as the increasing difficulty of integrating them and of relying on class hegemony rather than force (p.211).

The argument is compelling; Leys has offered us a model of neo-colonial states which corresponds to the economic model of permanent primitive accumulation at the capitalist periphery. Moreover, it is a model which attempts to overcome the oversimplification of Fanon’s analysis and come to terms with the difficult analytical problems of comprehending the complexity of class structure and dynamics in conditions of peripheral capitalism.

However, it is a flawed model, whose content contradicts some of the results of Leys’ economic analysis of Kenya. In the first instance, this weakness evidently stems from a misinterpretation of Marx’s account of Louis Bonaparte’s rule in France. Marx makes it very clear that, when he talks of the ‘independence’ of Bonaparte’s government, he is dealing with appearances. After discussing Bonaparte’s efforts to build a state independent of all classes, Marx concludes:

And yet the state power is not suspended in mid-air, Bonaparte represents a class, and the most numerous class of French society at that, the small-holding [Parellen] peasants (The Eighteenth Brumaire, p.123).
Thus, the contradiction facing Bonaparte's rule was that his defence of *individual private property* on behalf of the small-holding peasants actually favoured the commercial, financial and, ultimately, industrial interests of those who were able to use their (larger-scale) individual property as capital, i.e. the bourgeoisie.

Leys' analysis in the early parts of his book clearly should lead to the conclusion that the actual situation in Kenya is crucially different in this respect from Bonaparte's France. Kenyatta's post-independence record demonstrates, despite all his 'African socialist' and 'rural development' rhetoric, that he distinctly does not represent the peasantry in Kenya. Leys seems to recognise this when he persuasively argues that the meagre benefits which the rural masses in Kenya have gained under Kenyatta's rule (i.e. small parcels of land through the resettlement schemes) have been given them because of political expediency in the face of worker-peasant militance, and the need to secure the capitalist basis of the economy and large-scale private property through a process of individualisation of land tenure throughout the country. But when Leys comes to analyse the nature of the state, his comparison of Kenyatta's with Bonaparte's rule seems to imply, if not explicitly assert, that Kenyatta does somehow nevertheless represent the Kenyan peasantry.

Thus, it is of fundamental importance to penetrate the similarities at the level of appearances in the two cases, and comprehend the essential differences in their origins and dynamics. Louis Bonaparte rose to power in France as the patriarchal representative of the large but scattered small-holding peasantry, through smashing the political power of the financial bourgeoisie and big landowners. In this context, he could attract the support of all other social classes in France which suffered under the hegemony of financial and landed capital. In particular, he gained support from petty bourgeois elements and from industrial capital. The position of the latter in mid-nineteenth century France is especially important. French industry got a late start and was at a distinct competitive disadvantage with the older, larger and stronger British industries. It therefore required for its development a state which provided protection at home against British competition and followed aggressive economic policies abroad, in order to secure markets and sources of raw materials. But financial and landed interests dominated French capitalism and controlled the state in their own interests, which were accommodated to British industrial supremacy. French industrial capital, being too weak to intervene on its own account, therefore welcomed Bonaparte's intervention as a means of smashing the hold of the financiers and landowners on the state. With their chief rivals firmly controlled, and individualised private property secured, they were in an improved position to establish their own economic and, ultimately, political hegemony within France as the necessary basis for challenging the international supremacy of British industry.

Kenyatta's regime has played a very different role in Kenya. Kenyatta began in the terminal colonial period as a representative of a would-be bourgeoisie, a coalition of various relatively privileged petty bourgeois African elements who aspired to replace the departing British and the
Asian commercial bourgeoisie. They were deliberately encouraged in their ambitions by the British, who sought to use them as a counterweight to the growing militance of the workers and peasants, who were mounting a serious challenge to the viability of a neo-colonial solution in Kenya. Kenyatta's populist patter, and the resettlement of large numbers of landless on small parcels of the settler farms, were in this context clearly sacrifices which had to be made to appease and quieten the masses. Kenyatta thereby helped to create a small-holding peasantry with an interest in individual property, in his efforts to promote and defend the larger actual and desired property interests of his own class, the auxiliary bourgeoisie in formation.

In his early chapters, Leys paints a vivid picture of an African élite manipulating the state apparatus and various economic activities turned over to it by the British, in order to establish itself as the ruling, if externally dependent, class in Kenya. In recent years, this auxiliary bourgeoisie has demonstrated a high level of class consciousness and cohesion, as it has increasingly succeeded in concentrating economic and political power in its own hands. To do this, it has had to implement occasional new resettlement schemes—though increasingly grudgingly—and has had to bomb the masses with populist rhetoric, in order to secure their acquiescence if not their support. Meanwhile, it has systematically liquidated the genuine populists in its midst. It seems evident that Kenyatta's regime is the conscious agent of this class, with Kenyatta and his family among the biggest beneficiaries of its policies. This conclusion, however, seems to evaporate in Leys' later discussion of the relative 'independence' of the state. Since it tends to obscure these basic aspects of the Kenyan state, Leys' comparison of Kenyatta's Kenya and Bonaparte's France confuses our understanding, if it is not altogether mistaken.

There is, however, a contradiction in Kenyatta's situation which is similar in its form to that which faced Bonaparte. This contradiction stems from the basic fact of the neo-colonial domination of Kenya: Kenyatta's regime, by using the state to favour the interests of the economically weak African auxiliary bourgeoisie—ie. by fostering and defending private property and capitalist conditions of production—actually serves the interests and increases the economic and political strength of the multinational companies which operate in Kenya and control vast amounts of developed forms of capital. Thus, Kenyatta's regime constantly renews the power of the European (and more recently American) bourgeoisie, the very class whose power it was supposed to have smashed at independence. In short, in order to become a bourgeoisie at all, the Kenyan élite had to become an auxiliary bourgeoisie in the service of an authentic bourgeoisie which lives elsewhere. But that, of course, was the plan from the start. In Kenya's situation as regional centre for international capital in East Africa, this reduced role is still a very lucrative one.

To the extent that Marx's analysis of the state in Bonapartist France helps us to understand this contradiction facing Kenyatta's regime, the comparison of the two situations is useful. However, the class content of the two cases differs fundamentally, and must be analysed.
concretely and carefully. The principal differences lie in the facts that Kenyatta does not represent a peasantry but a bourgeoisie, and that the class whose interests his policies primarily serve is ex-colonial and foreign. But above all, as Leys does point out, while mid-nineteenth-century France was in transition to full-fledged independent capitalism, modern Kenya is securely confined within the distorting structures of dependent peripheral capitalism.

So far I have concentrated on what I have suggested is a misreading of Marx's account of Bonaparte's rule in France in Leys' analysis of the neo-colonial state in Kenya. However, the problem goes much deeper than that, to the one-sidedness of Leys' class analysis, which Lamb has correctly identified. Although Leys has given a detailed and compelling account of the rise of the African auxiliary and petty bourgeois classes, in the end, workers and peasants do not appear as economic and political actors in the process. As Lamb notes, Leys fails to transcend the economistic bias of the work he criticises, but rather reproduces it on another level by confining himself to a description of the general economic conditions of the oppressed masses. The working class is seen as small, disorganised and subject to the manipulation of corrupt trade union leadership, without reference to the seriousness of previous struggles or the prospects for future ones. All small-scale agricultural production is seen as occurring within what Leys regards generically as 'peasant modes of production', without distinguishing among them or concretely analysing their specific structures and dynamics, or the earlier involvement of their actors in the Land Freedom Army, etc. Ultimately, Leys' analysis of the oppressed classes stops where it should begin, with the bland statement that 'the class character of the masses... is inevitably complex and ambiguous compared with the rapid and largely unambiguous crystallisation of an African auxiliary bourgeoisie, and of various petty bourgeois strata' (p.172). The result is a feeling that Leys regards the defeat suffered by the masses in the transition to neo-colonialism as permanent. The reader is thus left unprepared to interpret the recent expressions of popular discontent, the bombings, the Kariuki incident or the significance of the recently announced formation of a revolutionary socialist party by Kenyans.

In drawing his parallel between Kenyatta's rule in Kenya and Bonaparte's rule in France, Leys seems to mistake the monetary acquiescence by Kenyan workers and peasants, in the neo-colonial step-up imposed after their earlier rebellion was crushed, for acceptance of, if not active support for, Kenyatta's regime. Having thus apparently established the passivity of the Kenyan masses and the insignificance of internal class struggles, Leys then focuses on conflicts between national and foreign bourgeoisies as the dominant contradiction in the neo-colonial situation. The result is a singularly gloomy outlook which overvalues the power and independence of the auxiliary bourgeoisie and portrays neo-colonialism not as the 'last stage of imperialism', but as merely another phase in the development of a vigorous and resurgent imperialism. While it may be true that imperialism is a lot more adaptable and less immediately moribund than the somewhat apocalyptic leftist accounts criticised by Leys give it credit for, in the final analysis, Leys fails to give us anything...
but a different, more pessimistic, opinion. Both opinions fail to achieve validation through the kind of documentation which can only come from a detailed concrete examination of the economic, political and ideological conditions of the masses and their class struggles.

By now it should be clear that the results of such a concrete analysis are very unlikely to support the Bonapartist thesis for the case of Kenya. However, the question of the general relevance of the Bonapartist model to the study of neo-colonial states remains. Its most likely relevance would seem to be to the more genuinely populist regimes in Africa. In investigating such cases, the transitional character of Bonaparte’s regime must be kept in mind; does contemporary Bonapartism correspond to a transitional phase in the development of peripheral capitalism, in the way Louis Bonaparte’s regime corresponded to a phase in the development of French central capitalism, or can it achieve the kind of semi-permanence in conditions of underdevelopment which Leys suggests? It seems to me most likely that Bonapartist regimes, to the extent that they are possible in the modern Third World, will reveal themselves to be as unstable and short-lived as the original. For, the decisive contradiction facing such a regime—as a form of state power—is between small-scale property on the one hand and, on the other, larger-scale, capitalised property, both national and foreign. The long future predicted by Leys for the Bonapartist state at the periphery is the product of his failure to grasp this point and his consequent focus on the conflicts between national and foreign capital, Leys’ analysis of this point merely demonstrates the necessity and relative permanence of the neo-colonial state as a generic form of government at the capitalist periphery. The prospects of a specifically Bonapartist neo-colonial state are an altogether different and more problematic question.

Jay O’Brien, Khartoum
Reviews

‘Workers’ Self-Management in Algeria’: A Review

John Hagel III

This review article assesses the main issues in Algeria’s post-Independence development experiences: how much do they owe to an earlier revolutionary upsurge involving the peasantry? How viable has been the strategy of forced industrialisation based on oil and gas revenues? Which class(es) control production? These issues of the 1960s have been brought very much to the fore again by the unique exercise carried out in Algeria in recent months. Following a second stage agrarian reform, trying to establish cooperatives not merely on former settler lands, the FLN government allowed extensive public participation for the first time with the discussions around the National Charter. This long and detailed statement of a ‘socialist’ strategy was subject to sustained debate through many thousands of meetings before being amended and passed in a referendum. The exercise seems to have been a response to left criticisms of the drift to a state capitalism dominated by a technocracy. It remains to be seen how far this is the first step toward a more democratic pattern or whether it preempts more profound changes. This survey of the earlier trends and debates on development strategy will serve as useful background.

Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organised and educated by its leaders, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them. Without that struggle, without that knowledge of the practice of action, there’s nothing but a fancy dress parade and the blare of trumpets. There’s nothing save a minimum of readaptation, a few reforms at the top, a flag waving; and down there at the bottom an undivided mass, still living in the middle ages, endlessly marking time.

_The Wretched of the Earth_, Frantz Fanon.

The emergence and evolution of the workers’ management system in post-independence Algeria may be considered significant on a variety of levels. It represented spontaneous innovative response by the Algerian workers to the grave political and economic crisis which Algeria experienced at the time of independence in 1962. On a more general level, the system later institutionalised by the Algerian government constitutes one of the few attempts in modern history to entrust the management of agricultural and industrial enterprises to the workers within the enterprises. It therefore provides an excellent historical case
study for the evaluation of the role and performance of worker-
managed enterprises.

Not surprisingly, therefore, this rare development has been the sub-
ject of heated disputes in which the political sympathies of the
participants have often obscured a number of fundamental points.
At a time when radical movements in many countries of the world
were becoming seriously interested in the possibilities of a de-
centralised and democratic socialism, the Algerian experience was
eagerly publicised as a revolutionary and socialist milestone. This
characterisation was strengthened by the Marxist rhetoric adopted
by Algeria's flamboyant first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, as well as
by the reputation which Algeria soon received as a haven and guerilla
training base for revolutionary exiles of other countries. Despite this
publicity, few efforts have been made to investigate the workers'
management system within the historical context in which it emerged
and evolved.

(London, 1971) should therefore be welcomed as a significant contri-
bution to the historical understanding of this system. Perhaps equally
importantly, this book represents the first systematic Marxist class
analysis of the evolution of the system available in the English
language. Even more broadly, this book goes beyond the specific
historical experience of Algeria to evaluate a wide variety of
theoretical issues. In one respect, the study of the emergence of
workers' management is presented as a basis for the refutation of
Frantz Fanon's model of violent decolonisation and particularly his
contention that the peasantry and colonial lumpen-proletariat con-
stitute potentially revolutionary classes in the decolonisation process.
However, the study discusses a number of other issues relevant to
Marxist theoretical analysis, including the objective and subjective
class formations in developing countries, the
central role of the subjective factor of class consciousness in the
revolutionary process, and the problems of economic development
experienced by countries within the context of a global capitalist

The introductory chapter of Clegg's study provides a brief summary
of workers' management within both Communist and Western
European capitalist countries. He concludes that

Both socialist and capitalist states are in fact seeking to contain class conflict
through participation. Despite the formal differences in their ideologies, the
ruling groups in both societies are using the same mechanism to preserve their
economic, social and political control.

This introductory section also includes an equally brief survey of the
emergency of the nationalist movement in colonial Algeria and the
outbreak of armed struggle in 1954.

Clegg then describes the unprecedented exodus of the vast majority
of the European settler population during 1962, and the profound
economic crisis produced by the abandonment of virtually the entire
modern agricultural sector and of a heterogeneous collection of industrial and commercial enterprises. In the midst of the crisis, the workers in the abandoned enterprises spontaneously seized the initiative, proceeding with the reopening of the enterprises and the resumption of production. Clegg challenges the widely-held assumption that the workers acted on the basis of a commitment to socialist ideological principles, and suggests an alternative explanation:

... it seems clear that many of the spontaneous initiatives taken by the workers amounted to an attempt to preserve their jobs, and therefore income, at the expense of any outsider, whether capitalist, ex-combatant, peasant or seasonal worker. ... many of the permanent agricultural workers on the large estates in the coastal plains had been geographically distant from a war that had mainly taken place in the mountains and the large towns. They regarded the ex-combatants, who were mostly peasants, not as heroes of the liberation struggle but as outsiders and competitors (p.48).

He also points out that the initiatives towards workers' management were undertaken exclusively by the permanent agricultural workers on the modern settler estates and the workers in the abandoned industrial enterprises and that, with few exceptions, the peasantry in the traditional agricultural sector were not involved.

The initiatives of these workers confronted the internally divided political leadership with serious policy dilemmas, and the book describes the formal, legalistic structure of workers' management presented in the government decrees which officially recognised workers' management as the system of management for the abandoned European enterprises. Clegg analyses in considerable detail the vagueness of the decrees in certain crucial areas, and is particularly critical of the absence of any clear statement regarding the appropriate relationship between the individual worker-managed enterprises and the supervisory administrative agencies. As a result, the infrastructure of supervisory and service agencies evolved on an ad hoc basis gradually usurping a variety of managerial functions—especially in the areas of financing, supplies and marketing—which rendered the management committees virtually impotent. This process of increasing bureaucratic control, Clegg argues, can only be understood within the context of the evolving class conflict between the petit-bourgeois elements firmly entrenched within the administrative structures of the state and the workers.

In the years after independence, Algeria witnessed a continuous struggle for power between its emergent national bourgeoisie and the working class, with the mass of the peasantry and the unemployed as disillusioned and impoverished on-lookers. _Autogestion_ [workers' management] stood at the centre of this conflict (p.74).

This study identifies two underlying contradictions which provide a framework for the study of the political and economic development of post-independence Algeria. First, Clegg emphasises the class implications of the mass exodus of European settlers, but points out that the emergence of the worker-managed enterprises represented an incomplete revolution: 'A sizeable proportion of the means of production had been seized by the workers but the state and party remained outside their control'. (p.184). This situation created an inevitable tension
which could only be resolved if the petit-bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie, solidly established within the state administration, could restore their own control over the means of production, or if the workers could extend their control to include the political and economic superstructure.

The outcome of this struggle was profoundly influenced by a second contradiction: the resumption of production by the workers in the abandoned enterprises constituted an objectively revolutionary development, since it involved a transfer in the ownership of a substantial segment of the means of production from the European settlers to the Algerian workers, but the transfer was accomplished by a working class which lacked a well-developed class consciousness. 'It was the practice of revolution with no concomitant theory', (p.182). Clegg emphasises the importance of this second contradiction: 'a large part of the success or failure of the Algerian revolution depended, in the last analysis, on the ability of the working class to grasp the political implications of [workers' management]' (p.163). It also explains both the initial failure of the workers to expand the struggle by seizing control of the political and economic superstructure, and the ultimate emasculation of workers' management by an increasingly self-conscious bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

Clegg's study is situated within the framework of this class analysis, seeking to penetrate the rhetoric and purely formal structure of workers' management elaborated in government decrees to determine the extent to which the decrees were actually implemented. It studies what occurred within a number of individual worker-managed enterprises and thus provides a convincing argument that the structures which evolved were far less democratic than the decrees would indicate. The most general trend seems to have been for the foremen and the most senior workers to take over the managerial positions in the new system, thus reinforcing the traditional labour hierarchy which had prevailed prior to independence. Evidence also indicates widespread interference by government and party officials in the elections within the enterprises.

Even the most democratically elected management committees, however, experienced significant limitations on their autonomy as a consequence of the authority invested in the supervisory agencies established to 'assist' the worker-managed enterprises. The management committees were thus deprived of virtually all authority in the crucial areas of financing, supplies and marketing. The fragmentary evidence available indicates that the worker-managed enterprises were successful in maintaining previous levels of production. The failure of most enterprises to operate profitably can therefore be attributed primarily to the inefficiency of the administrative infrastructure and not to the management of the enterprises themselves.

Clegg analyses the colonial economic structures, detailing the obstacles which have impeded economic development, as well as presenting a highly suggestive analysis of the class structure which prevailed in Algeria at the time of independence. He defines the various classes in Algeria in terms of objective criteria—relationship to the means of
production—as well as subjective criteria—the existence of distinct forms of consciousness which arise from the objective economic conditions experienced by the members of each class. Emphasising the crucial role of class consciousness in the formation of a revolutionary class, Clegg argues that the peasantry adhere to a 'traditional' value system which encourages submissiveness to the 'natural order' and which therefore obstructs any realisation by the peasantry that they, as a class, have the ability to affect their position in society. While cautioning that the specific situation of the urban working class in a developing economy such as Algeria encourages a similar form of submissiveness, Clegg nevertheless maintains that objective conditions increase the possibility of class consciousness within this class, and he cites the re-opening of the abandoned enterprises as an example of class activity which demonstrated at least a rudimentary consciousness.

Clegg's analysis of the class structure of post-independence Algeria stresses the relative weakness of the commercial and land-owning bourgeoisie and the corresponding importance of the petit-bourgeois elements within the administrative structure which have gradually consolidated their control over the economy. The position of the bureaucratic petit-bourgeoisie or bourgeoisie becomes particularly crucial in societies where a substantial portion of the means of production is owned and controlled by the state but where the workers have not developed mechanisms to ensure control over the state machinery. Most studies of post-independence Algeria have largely neglected the influential role of the middle-level administrative personnel, which provided a high degree of continuity from the colonial administration and which were maintained and often strengthened as a consequence of the scarcity of trained personnel within the nationalist movement.

Clegg's study of the peasantry in the traditional agricultural sector does not adequately investigate their social institutions and cultural traditions. In this regard, Michael Launay has written a provocative book entitled *Les Paysans Algériens* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1963) which is based on extensive field research in the agricultural districts surrounding Oran in western Algeria. Clegg does not use this in his own study, though he does briefly mention one, cultural phenomenon which emphasises the importance of a better understanding of traditional peasant social institutions:

The authoritarian, nepotistic and corrupt nature of some [management committees] was not the result of any overt manipulation by the administration. It was the product of the social and cultural superstructures of the pre-existing colonial society. These... were carried over into post-colonial Algeria because the fact of independence itself was not enough to change the prevailing systems of values. The partial imposition of a socialist economic organisation, whatever its form, does not imply a de facto modification of cultural norms. (p.170).

Having outlined the class structure at independence, the study then examines political events during 1963-68 within the context of a 'deepening class struggle between the emergent bourgeoisie and the proletariat'. (p.124). Describing the progressive limitations imposed on the autonomy of the worker-managed enterprises, Clegg seeks to
explain the absence of more effective opposition from the workers, once again emphasising the crucial role of class consciousness in influencing the outcome of class struggle. Throughout the post-independence period, the administrative bourgeoisie evolved an increasingly well-defined value system and ideology as it sought to overcome the internal factionalism which had been the legacy of the struggle for independence. At the same time, numerous factors hindered a similar development among the workers. As a consequence, they were ultimately unable to defend their interests or to perceive the class basis of the antagonism to workers’ management by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

The Leninist and Trotskyite sympathies of many of the advisors to Ben Bella predisposed them towards a reliance on the state as a ‘guardian’ of the revolution, while at the same time making them suspicious of the spontaneous, unrestrained activity of the workers. Few of them appeared prepared, however, to undertake a systematic class analysis of Algerian society following independence. Such an analysis would have clearly revealed ‘the ideological and structural hostility of the bureaucracy to anything that threatened its position’. (p.114). Those advisors who were aware of the continued entrenchment of the petit-bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie within the administration called for a ‘radical administrative reorganisation’ under the supervision of the party. However, the party had largely collapsed upon independence and the militants within the administration lacked any organised support which could ensure such a reorganisation.

Unable to resolve this dilemma, the advisers continued to favour an active role for the state in the administration of the worker-managed enterprises. The decrees instituting the workers’ management system reflected this orientation and provided the administrative bourgeoisie with an opportunity to extend their control over the worker-managed enterprises. In particular, the decrees failed to provide any well-defined statement regarding the appropriate relations between the individual enterprises and the supervisory agencies. Furthermore, they stipulated that state-appointed directors would share authority within the enterprises with the elected management committees, but failed to define their relevant jurisdictions. Also, the most democratic of the management organs, the workers’ assembly (consisting of all permanent workers within the enterprises) was placed in a very weak position vis-à-vis its elected representatives within the managerial hierarchy. From Clegg’s account, it would appear that the minor contributions which the Marxist advisors may have been able to make to the cause of workers’ management by capitalising on the initial internal factionalism of the administrative bourgeoisie were considerably out-weighed by their negative role in obscuring the reality of class antagonism and in cloaking the decisions of this bourgeoisie in Marxist rhetoric.

There is considerable need for a more detailed study than Clegg’s of the internal factionalism which underlay the vacillations of the policies of the Ben Bella and early Boumedienne administrations. Such a study would help us understand the complex internal evol-
tion of the administrative bourgeoisie and its emergency as the pre-
dominant class in Algeria. A significant step in this direction would
be to integrate William Quandt's excellent study (Revolution and
Political Leadership: Algeria, 1945-1968, [Cambridge: MIT Press,
1969]) of the post-independence Algerian élite within the frame-
work of the class analysis offered by Clegg. This approach, for
instance, might explain the ultimate success of the Oujda group—the
military-civilian faction led by Houari Boumedienne—within the
government as the only faction able to rely on organised support
from outside the narrow administrative élite. In the absence of
effectively organised opposition by the trades unions, the party or
the management officials within the worker-managed enterprises,
the army inevitably emerged as the most important factor in deter-
mining the outcome of factionalism.

The final chapter seeks to place the specific experience of workers' 
management in Algeria within a broader, theoretical context. In one
sense, the entire book constitutes a sustained critique of the position
that the peasantry in the Third World constitute a new global
'proletariat'—that they have become the agency of social change
within the world capitalist system. Clegg argues, against Frantz
Fanon and Herbert Marcuse, that the objective conditions of the
peasantry (as well as of the sub-proletariat or lumpenproletariat) pre-
clude the development of a class consciousness which is a necessary
characteristic of a revolutionary class.

Clegg's criticism of Fanon I think both over-simplifies and distorts
Fanon's model of violent decolonisation and relies on an inadequate
analysis of the nationalist struggle in Algeria. Two examples of Clegg's
criticism of Fanon can be cited:

The appeal of this Manichean division [the division between the advanced
capitalist societies and the developing societies of the Third World] lay in its
simplicity. For the 'wretched' it subsumed all local contradictions within a
global contradiction; it removed the necessity for any critical analysis (p.180).

The lack of critical analysis of the modes of class formation stems, once again,
from Fanonist-inspired simplifications... the internal class contradictions of
the indigenous society were largely subsumed under the wider definitions of
race and colour (p.185).

In fact, though, Fanon sees the indigenous class formations previously
subsumed by this over-arching division in colonial society become
progressively more important as the nationalist struggle seeks to
eliminate this Manicheanism. In one respect, The Wretched of the
Earth is a warning about the antagonistic relationship between the
national bourgeoisie and the peasantry, and the dangers involved in
ignoring it during the nationalist struggle.

The conventional emphasis of Fanon's view of the cathartic effect of
violence has also obscured the fact that he perceived several levels of
violence in the development of the nationalist struggle. Initially, the
violence inherent in the colonial situation is manifested among the
colonised in such forms as tribal wars, religious myths and ecstatic
dancing rituals. Eventually, these manifestations of violence are
superceded by spontaneous and sporadic acts of violence against the real target: the coloniser. However, he warns that, if violence remains on this level, it is doomed to failure:

The leaders of the rebellion come to see that even very large-scale peasant risings need to be controlled and directed into certain channels. These leaders are led to renounce the movement in so far as it can be termed a peasant revolt, and to transform it into a revolutionary war. They discover that the success of the struggle presupposes clear objectives, a definite methodology and above all the need for the mass of the people to realise that their unorganised efforts can only be a temporary dynamic. (Fanon, pp.135-6)

This transformation from a peasant revolt into a revolutionary war is accomplished by a militant faction of the bourgeois nationalist movement which becomes disillusioned with the urban leadership and which therefore moves into the rural areas and seeks closer interaction with the peasant population. Even once this transformation has occurred, however, the success of the revolutionary war is not assured, since there are numerous obstacles which threaten the peasant-based movement. The chapter on 'The Pitfalls of National Consciousness' emphasises the parasitic nature of the national bourgeoisie and urges that 'the combined effort of the masses led by a party and of intellectuals who are highly conscious and armed with revolutionary principles ought to bar the way to this useless and harmful middle class.' Far from offering a highly simplistic and Manichean analysis, Fanon presents an urgent warning against the tendency to view the nationalist struggle as simply between coloniser and colonised, while obscuring the class antagonisms within the nationalist movement itself.

*The Wretched of the Earth* in fact constitutes a veiled critique of the policies adopted by the Algerian nationalist provisional government—contrary to the 'traditional' interpretation of the book offered by commentators like Irene Gendzier:

Fanon was a true believer in the cathartic impact of the Algerian Revolution, and if he erred in his evaluation of its long-range effect on the country and its people, it was out of a total and unrestrained enthusiasm and commitment to the Algerian cause. (Frantz Fanon: A Critical Study; Pantheon: New York, 1973, p.192)

Yet Gendzier discusses Fanon’s increasingly close ties with the General Staff of the Algerian nationalist army at Ghardimaou in Tunisia in 1960-61. Fanon’s collaboration with the political commissariat of the army occurred during the period in which the tensions between the military leadership and the civilian leadership were becoming progressively more noticeable, particularly over the issue of the negotiations then under way between the Algerian provisional government and the French. In view of the increasing factionalism within the leadership of the nationalist movement at this time, Peter Geismar’s explanation of Fanon’s attitude seems quite plausible:

He made three excursions to the general staff encampment in order to lecture on the pitfalls of a successful struggle for national liberation. His greatest concern, by 1961, was that a Moslem bourgeoisie would replace the European settlers without any real restructuring of Algerian society. (Fanon. Grove Press, New York, 1971, p.179)
Far from demonstrating a total and unrestrained enthusiasm, Fanon appears to have become deeply concerned over the outcome of the nationalist struggle. His book in fact constitutes a highly perceptive critique of the potential weaknesses in the Algerian nationalist movement and a premonition of the future course of events.

On another level, Clegg also maintains that ‘involvement in the revolt against the French did not transform [the] consciousness [of the peasantry and the sub-proletariat]. Fanonism... lacks a critical and dialectical analysis of the process of the formation of consciousness’. (p.181) However, Clegg himself, while appropriately emphasising both objective and subjective factors in his class analysis of Algerian society, tends to view class consciousness as a direct reflection of the objective material conditions of a particular class, and demonstrates little recognition of the vital role which an external agency might perform in the transformation of an existing level of consciousness. Clegg further generalises from his analysis of the Algerian situation to conclude that the peasants have never played an objectively revolutionary role in any revolutionary struggle in this century.

And yet Clegg is accurate in maintaining that the peasantry in Algeria never advanced beyond ‘the desire to recreate a seemingly mythical past’ to achieve ‘a conscious commitment to a revolutionary ideology’ (p.101) Does such a conclusion constitute a refutation of the thesis that the peasantry represent a class at least potentially capable of developing a revolutionary consciousness, as Clegg maintains, or is it possible that certain necessary conditions were simply not fulfilled during the nationalist struggle, which might have catalysed their revolutionary consciousness? Clegg has ignored the latter possibility and the impact which this might have for events following independence.

Although the leaders of the initial insurrection in 1954 had concentrated on the task of organising a rural-based guerilla struggle, the increasing re-integration of petit-bourgeois and bourgeois elements within the nationalist leadership and the effective counter-insurgency tactics of the French culminated in a profound shift in tactics in 1958. Rather than seeking a military victory over the French, the nationalist leadership decided to focus its attention on diplomatic campaigns designed to mobilise international opinion behind the demand for Algerian independence. The French army had largely succeeded in destroying the network of political cadres that the nationalist movement had established during the early years of guerilla warfare. Similarly, any semblance of a co-ordinated military command among the guerilla units disintegrated as regional guerilla leaders consolidated their own autonomy and limited their activity to sporadic harrassment of French troops. The nationalist leadership progressively abandoned all systematic efforts to organise either the peasants or the urban workers and, in terms of ideology, never advanced beyond vague nationalistic slogans. Thus, at the time of independence, the nationalist leadership had acquired considerable prestige and popularity, but had proved unable to organise the populace adequately or to raise its consciousness regarding the tasks which remained following independence.
Similarly, Clegg fails to present a critical evaluation of the motives and tactics of the most active supporters of the workers' management system in the post-independence period. As has been the case with other groups in the Algerian political system, such as the army and the wilaya (regional) leaders, the advocates of workers' management both within the trade union and within the enterprises themselves tended to view the issue primarily as a device for strengthening their own positions within the political system. All the supporters of workers' management tended to over-emphasise their own influence within the administration, therefore neglecting the crucial task of organising the workers and the peasants, concentrating instead on directing appeals to the government leadership, particularly Ben Bella.

Throughout the post-independence period, the trade union leadership sought to overcome their origins as a mere adjunct of the FLN, and their primary objective remained the defence of the organisational autonomy of the union. While there were many dedicated partisans of the workers' management system—particularly among the middle-level cadres in the union—the failure to engage more actively in the tasks of organising the workers and the peasants suggests that the union leadership preferred to rely primarily on appeals to various factions within the administration as a means of defending trade union autonomy. Although the leadership clearly hoped that their appeals on behalf of workers' management would mobilise popular support for the union, they proved either unwilling or incapable of engaging in systematic organising efforts.

Clegg's analysis of the managerial hierarchies does not sufficiently emphasise that the workers' management system created a new privileged stratum of workers, or, more accurately, reinforced one which had previously existed. This stratum, consisting of the managerial officials who had frequently been the foremen and senior workers prior to independence, retained and strengthened many of the privileges that they had previously enjoyed. They, therefore, acquired a vested interest in the workers' management system and quite naturally emerged as the most vigorous opponents of efforts by the administration to encroach upon their managerial autonomy. This group was prominently represented in the series of workers' conferences held in 1963 and 1964, and it is not surprising that the resolutions adopted at these conferences condemned the administration's policies but rarely condemned the widespread absence of democratic procedures within the individual enterprises. The former expressed the interests of the officials, while the latter might have seriously threatened their own positions. Unwilling to organise the majority of the workers on their behalf, the management officials similarly relied primarily on appeals to Ben Bella and the administration in the form of periodic resolutions.

Clegg correctly argues that the mass of workers remained primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with the satisfaction of immediate instrumental goals. Hence, their hostility towards the administration was limited to resentment over the failure of the workers' management system to provide them with adequate material rewards. This would explain the relative success of the Boumedienne regime in
narrowly limiting the autonomy of the management committees while simultaneously expanding the welfare benefits received by the workers. The minimal opposition which met these measures clearly illustrated the superficial commitment of the workers to the workers’ management system as a means of control over the enterprises.

A more detailed analysis of the nationalist struggle and of the supporters of the workers’ management system in the post-independence period therefore reveals the absence of any external agency able or willing to undertake the task of organising either the peasantry or the urban workers. The Algerian struggle for independence was organised by a heterogeneous coalition of petit-bourgeois and bourgeois nationalist forces, which progressively abandoned the original tactics of organising workers and peasantry for guerilla struggle, and instead relied on diplomatic negotiations as a means to achieve independence. Following independence, the various groups which might have resumed the tasks of organising the workers and the peasantry—particularly the trade union and the management officials within the worker-managed enterprises—proved unwilling to pursue this strategy. Hence, Clegg’s observations regarding the relatively low level of political consciousness prevailing among the workers and the peasants reflect this situation. They do not constitute an effective refutation of the thesis that the peasantry represent a potentially revolutionary class in non-industrialised societies.

Despite these faults, however, Clegg’s class analysis of post-independence Algeria is valuable as a framework for a study of the evolution of economic development policies adopted by the administrative bourgeoisie following independence. Although these policies have evolved considerably in the period 1962-72, and although persistent factionalism hampered the early efforts to formulate a comprehensive economic development policy, the factions within the administrative bourgeoisie have been united by a common commitment to the principles of economic nationalism. This consensus is revealed in widespread acceptance for certain fundamental propositions: (1) that the growth of the Algerian economy should be promoted primarily, if not exclusively, by reliance on domestic resources and capital and that, as a consequence, reliance on direct foreign private investment should be minimised wherever possible; (2) that the absence of linkages among Algeria’s economic sectors should be overcome through the increasing internal integration of the economy, which should be given a priority over an increase in export trade and (3) to the extent that export trade should be promoted, every effort should be made to reduce the existing dominance of France as Algeria’s primary export market.

Prior to independence, the statements of the nationalist movement regarding appropriate economic policies for Algeria remained extremely vague, although they stressed the need for expropriating the large landholdings of the European settlers in the modern agricultural sector, and placed a high priority on the implementation of an extensive programme of agrarian reform in the traditional sector. Agrarian reform was emphasised as a means of improving agricultural production and generating a surplus which would serve as an important source of
investment funds to promote economic development. These statements favoured a high degree of mechanisation in the agricultural sector, making it essential to collectivise agricultural production rather than distributing the land in individual plots to the peasant. Since the European agricultural sector had already been highly mechanised, the proposals for agrarian reform focused on the problems involved in modernising the traditional sector and gradually abolishing the structural dualism that had characterised Algerian agriculture during the colonial period. While occasional references were made regarding the participation of the peasant in the formulation and implementation of agrarian reforms, the structures that would permit such involvement were never specified.

However, the massive exodus of European settlers in 1962, and the abandonment of the large estates in the modern agricultural sector, threatened to precipitate a profound economic crisis. Whereas the discussion of development policy during the nationalist struggle had focused primarily on the issue of agrarian reform in the traditional sector, the attention of the new administration shifted rapidly to the immediate problem involved in maintaining the existing levels of production in the modern sector. The spontaneous resumption of production by the agricultural workers on the abandoned estates minimised the potential crisis, and the internally divided administrative bourgeoisie proved unable to impose an alternative form of management on the abandoned estates. The internal factionalism in the administration, and the relatively strengthened position of the landed bourgeoisie in the traditional sector, also effectively blocked any initiatives in the direction of agrarian reform in the traditional agricultural sector during the years initially following independence.

As a consequence, one faction in the administration increasingly perceived the worker-managed enterprises in the modern agricultural sector as a means, not only of maintaining existing levels of production, but also as a source of potential surplus for investment in other sectors of the economy. As long as the Marxist advisors to Ben Bella could persuade him of the potential contribution which this ‘vanguard’ sector might be able to make to economic development, workers’ management received at least the reluctant support in an influential faction within the administrative apparatus. At the same time, however, a second faction, led by Bachir Boumaza, the Minister of National Economy, and by Ahmed Mahsas, the Minister of Agriculture, vigorously opposed the workers’ management system and consistently sought to reduce the autonomy of the enterprises. This faction favoured the centralisation of control by the administration over the means of production and the mobilisation of Algeria’s large reserves of labour through large-scale promotion of labour-intensive enterprises rather than the promotion of capital-intensive industrial development.

This faction, through its control of key economic ministries, succeeded in progressively restricting the managerial autonomy of the worker-managed enterprises and, as Clegg demonstrates in his study, the inefficiency of the administrative agencies charged with supervising and servicing these enterprises was largely responsible for the continual
deficits of the worker-managed enterprises. Unwilling to divert scarce investment funds to these enterprises, the tendency was that ‘the profitable areas of self-management were used as a milch-cow, while the rest were allowed to stagger on towards increasing debilitation’ (p.160).

The increasing evidence of a rapprochement between Ben Bella and militant supporters of the workers’ management system, in the latter half of 1964 and the first months of 1965, precipitated a military coup, and renewed factionalism emerged within the administration, as each group manoeuvred for a favourable position in the new government. The military coup had considerably strengthened the position of the Oujda group led by Houari Boumedienne, and the influence of this group is reflected in a significant shift in economic policies. Efforts to expand agricultural production were progressively de-emphasised, as the focus of economic development policies shifted to the accelerated expansion of capital-intensive heavy industry financed by growing revenues from petroleum and natural gas operations.

The petroleum policies of the government focused on three objectives: (1) expansion of oil and gas production rates, (2) an increase in the government revenue per barrel of oil produced, and (3) greater control by the state oil company, SONATRACH, over the operations of the foreign companies holding producing concessions. The importance of the oil industry can be measured by its increasingly dominant role in generating government revenues, its potential as a cheap source of energy for the industrial sector and its potential as a source of raw material for expanding Algeria’s new petrochemical industry. In fact, under the influence of the theories of Gerard Destannes de Bernis (a French economist), the petroleum industry is at present viewed as the key link in the integration and industrialisation of the Algerian economy. (These theories are succinctly stated in an article written by de Bernis and Sid Ahmed Ghozali, president of SONATRACH, entitled ‘Hydrocarbons and the industrialisation of Algeria’ which appeared in the *Revue algérienne des sciences juridiques, economique et politiques*. March 1969.) As the largest foreign-dominated industry in Algeria, the petroleum industry represented an opportunity for the administrative bourgeoisie to strengthen its control over the economy through a policy of progressive nationalisation, without directly challenging the position of the existing landed or commercial bourgeois strata.

The strategy favoured by the dominant Oujda group emphasises long-term economic development but, with its focus on capital-intensive industrialisation, it has failed to resolve two of Algeria’s most pressing economic problems—a high unemployment rate, and extremely low living standards in the traditional agricultural sector, which continues to employ the largest share of the labour force. The unemployment problem has been somewhat reduced by encouraging large numbers of Algerians to seek employment in France each year, but this constitutes a major form of dependence on the French economy which the administrative bourgeoisie is anxious to reduce. Another tendency has been to force the worker-managed enterprises in the modern agricultural sector to employ a larger labour force, yet this also
constitutes an unacceptable solution, since it diminishes the overt unemployment rate largely by increasing the rate of disguised un-employment, while at the same time further reducing the meagre profitability of the enterprises.

The aggravation of the unemployment problem as a result of current investment policies, and the continuing necessity to import substantial quantities of agricultural products, has once again shifted attention to the original issue of agrarian reform, particularly in the traditional agricultural sector. The recent announcement of an ambitious agrarian reform programme appears to have as its objectives the expansion of production in the traditional agricultural sector and the re-orientation of cultivation in the modern agricultural sector, diminishing the surface covered by vineyards and other traditional export crops, while increasing production for domestic consumption. As with all agrarian reform programmes, however, the crucial phase is that of implementation, and it will only be when this stage has been reached that it will be possible to determine whether the administrative bourgeoisie feels sufficiently confident to challenge the position of the landed bourgeoisie and to mobilise the peasantry in an ambitious agrarian reform programme.

In conclusion, the evolution of development strategies adopted by the administrative bourgeoisie reveals a close correspondence to the evolution of this class itself and to its consolidation of political and economic power. Thus, in the initial years, when an internally divided petit-bourgeois nationalist movement struggled to retain its control of the administrative apparatus and confronted the spontaneous seizure of a substantial segment of the means of production by the workers, an influential faction argued for the necessity of endorsing the workers’ management system as the only alternative to the threat of a massive economic crisis. As the threat of economic crisis receded and as the internal unity of the administrative bourgeoisie increased, a new faction emerged, arguing persuasively that the administration must centralise economic control over the worker-managed enterprises. However, this faction favoured a strategy of economic development based on investment in labour-intensive enterprises, and mass mobilisation of Algeria’s reserves of unemployed labour. The administrative bourgeoisie proved unable and, more importantly, unwilling to undertake this task, and a third faction shifted the attention of the administrative bourgeoisie to the great potential represented by Algeria’s petroleum and natural gas reserves. This approach enabled the administrative bourgeoisie to consolidate its political and economic power at the expense of a predominantly foreign sector of the economy, and spared it, at least temporarily, from the difficult and hazardous task of mobilising the rural peasantry. However, certain obstacles, such as a stagnant agricultural sector and growing unemployment, may significantly restrict further development. The ability of the administration to overcome these obstacles will provide an important indication of their current strength.

The Somali drought which came finally to an end in June of this year is generally agreed to have been the worst in the living memory of a people by no means strangers to lack of water; and it produced the conditions for a national catastrophe. The way in which these conditions were met by the government of Somalia so as to prevent an irrecoverable disaster to hundreds of thousands of nomads and semi-nomads is a story of courage, honesty, determination, and of a unity of effort not before seen in modern Somali history, or, perhaps, in any Somali history that we know. By the time that good rains began to fall, this year, somewhat more than 260,000 nomads were in twenty government relief camps, while upwards of another million people were receiving government relief outside the camps: altogether, between a quarter and a third of the country’s whole population.

From first to last—in this particular context, from late in 1974 until May of 1975—Somalia lived under the threat of a massive loss of human life, not to speak of animal life. Few animals could be saved. Rough estimates made in July indicate that the loss of cattle has topped one million beasts, that more than half a million sheep and goats have died, and that the loss in camels is also around half a million. Yet the loss of human life has been, in all the circumstances, relatively small: about 11,000 inside the camps (mostly of children who arrived at the camps in a condition that proved to be beyond saving), and about 7,000 outside the camps.

Any realistic evaluation of the meaning of this loss of circa 18,000 people has to be set against the enormously greater loss of life which must have occurred—as it occurred, for example, in Ethiopia—if no honest and efficient government had been to hand. Few with any knowledge of Somalia will think for a moment that any such government was to hand before the revolutionary changes initiated by the military take-over of October 1969. It is the best possible evidence for the honesty, efficiency, patriotism and sound political practice of the new regime initiated in 1969 that it has been able to confront this drought with such a remarkable degree of success. To that one may add the evidence of what it has done since channels of relief were established.

By June the emergency was over in that abundant rains were falling. But what to do with nomads who had lost their cattle and other stock as well as losing, through long drought, a large proportion of their grazing grounds? They could not be left where they were. They were asked, accordingly, to follow an old Somali precedent and, en masse, agree to become cultivators; they were also asked, following no such precedent, to become sea-fishermen and even to depend upon fish for a diet.

What happened? Most of those outside the camps had conserved some of their cattle and, with continued help in food, have been able to resume their way of life. But this was not the case, as I have said, with most of the 268,597 who formed the final total of people in the
camps. As it was, some 60,000 of these had a few cattle and other stock left to them, and decided in June-July to try their nomad life again. Another 60,000, or thereabouts, were sceptical about the government's guarantee of settlement, and stayed around the northern towns on continued relief. About 20,000 agreed to enter old or new fishing communities along the northern and northeastern seaboard, where they will form fishing cooperatives. Another 10,000, or thereabouts, likewise agreed to become fishermen at the old seaboard towns of Brava and Kismaayo.

But 110,000, or rather more, said they would become cultivators; and this is what they are now in process of becoming, with government aid, in several large settlements on the middle Shebelle and upper Juba rivers. What is more, the latest indications at the beginning of September 1975 (as I heard them on the spot) were that most of the 60,000 sceptics had lost their scepticism, and were now eager to join the others in the new farming settlements. This they should be able to do before the end of this year. The new settlements are being firmly established with temporary housing, bush schools, village clinics, a sufficiency of water, and land for cultivation cleared by bulldozer which, this year, will total some 6000 hectares. It is thought that these new settlements will become self-sufficient in food in two years' time, and capable of entering the market in four. Meanwhile, about 2000 students from Somali training colleges and the university at Mogadishu have joined government personnel as teachers, technic-ians, organisers, instructors and general factota—another good indication, if ever there were one, of the revolutionary nature of this government's policies and attitudes.

None of this could have been done by any government of the old pre-69 "parliamentary bourgeois" type. Nor could it have been done without foreign aid, though the aid, even if often indispensable, must generally be seen as having a less decisive value than the nature of the regime. The most generous and effective aid was given by the Russians. They lent Somalia, for instance, 15 large transport planes for two months. These planes ferried some 110,000 people from assembly points in the north to dispersal points in the south; a fleet of 165 six-wheel trucks, eventually given to Somalia, were also pro-vided by the Russians in order to carry people on the ground. Other countries also gave solid aid. Sweden promised 5000 tons of grain, but sent 10,000. There were also other countries that promised, but did not give, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for whom the fate of their co-religionists in Somalia appears to have been a matter of more or less complete indifference. Of all the Arab countries, it appears, only Iraq proved generous. Britain also gave something; the United States gave almost nothing.

In this whole story, one for the most part with a happy ending, Professor Lewis' symposium plays its useful part in the record. Com-piled last February, at the worst moment, its object was to set forth the facts and state the case for aid. This it does in a very sympathetic if, so to speak, strangely a-political way. The key factor in the whole rescue operation, that of the nature and attitude of the regime and their revolutionary implications, is almost completely absent here;
and, unless I have missed another reference, we do not even find the name of Somalia's revolution until we are more than half way through. Even when we have a clear reference to politics, this is one that is unfortunately misinformed. On page six Professor Lewis tells us that a new political party has been launched. The facts are that this new party, the party of Somalia's revolution, was billed for launching before the end of 1975, but because of a failure in the production of a sufficient number of politically educated and competent potential members, will not now be launched in the immediate future. And is it quite enough to tell us that: "The Somali government clearly seeks to avoid at all costs the deplorable delays and suppression of information which so aggravated the tragic effects of the recent Ethiopian famine" (also page 6)? The Somali government can easily be shown to have done just that: but over and beyond speed and full information to all inquirers, there has also been a most radical and root-and-branch determination to save lives and transfer stricken populations.

This determination, or so it appeared to me last January, was fully evident when this report was compiled. Some description and explanation of it, and of the reasons for it, would have helped readers of this symposium to understand that aid to Somalia must be a truly good cause, if only because none of it would be wasted. One therefore hopes, now, that the International African Institute will ask Professor Lewis to edit another report: this time on how the Somali drought has been confronted and overcome. For the need for continued aid undoubtedly remains. The new settlements and fishing communities are firmly in being, but they still need a lot of things: food while they are working to become self-sufficient; bulldozers to clear more bush; tractors to plough cleared ground; water-producing equipment; medical supplies: or, if they are for future fishermen, power-driven boats and nets and know-how. We are all in debt to Lewis for knowledge of Somalia. We should remain so.

Basil Davidson
Vincennes to assemble a political dossier that would be useful nationally and internationally in action taken to demystify the causes of the famine and the results of the 'aid' being sent to relieve it. Members of the Collectif and of other groups represented at the June meeting united to form the Sahel Information Committee, and to publish the dossier of papers discussed that day. By the authors' own admission, the file is incomplete and uneven: but it serves a specific political purpose—to break the wall of official silence surrounding the Sahel famine and to explain the real origins of the current situation. This is a text written by militants for activists, not by theoreticians for academics.

Divided into three sections, the book opens with the theme that development has meant exploitation in the former French colonies of the Sahelian zone. The imposition of such export crops as cotton and groundnuts not only exhausted the soil and reduced the amount of food grown, it also transformed an exchange society into a monetary economy, which permitted the metropolitan power to extract cash in the form of taxes. The higher the taxes and prices of imported products, the lower the earnings for export crops, the greater the acreage devoted to cotton and groundnuts, the shorter the fallow period, the lesser the productivity of the land—and so on, in a downward spiral that destroyed the ecological equilibrium, provoked an accelerated advance of the desert, and caused populations to migrate southward. Examples given of this type of 'development' are the cultivation of cotton in Upper Volta (pp 97-112) and groundnuts in Mali (pp 113-123).

The second section deals with the post-colonial period and the ways in which aid has served the purposes of neo-colonialism, aggravating the dependency of African nations on western capitalism. Aid has allowed the development of the infrastructure necessary to international industrial and agricultural companies: in no instance have the people of the Sahel benefited from this aid, which in fact has been instrumental in extracting national resources. Nor are the African governments innocent in this perversion of assistance—food relief has been used by them to increase their power over the people, and grain has been sold rather than distributed, enriching merchants and functionaries.

The section opens with a brief account of the economy of each country, demonstrating the structure of dependency in the Sahelian zone (pp 127-156). There follows an account of the response of international organizations (the UN, its specialised agencies, the World Bank) and private enterprise to the drought. Finally, there is an exposé of the imperialist strategy behind 'food aid' (the USA PL480 programme as an instrument of economic penetration, the role of OECD, the policy of the French government).

Part three contains five case studies (Senegal, Upper Volta, Niger, Chad and Mali) of which the one on Niger is the longest and best documented, and that on Chad perhaps of greatest political significance. In Niger, workers' strikes, boycotts of government farms, the abandonment of groundnut production by the peasants, and demon-
strations by students and teachers provoked a violent social and political crisis that ended in a coup d'état by the army. In Chad, the National Liberation Front (FROLINAT) has for years been waging an armed struggle against government and French troops: the recent overthrow of Tombalbaye has done nothing to change the situation.

A number of annexes complete the book, reproducing earlier texts of the *Collectif* and the testimony of some supporting associations. 

Meredeth Turshen

**Pastoral Nomads and Development: a select annotated bibliography**

This short guide to the literature on nomads and development lists 150 books and articles, arranged in three very broad categories, with no index; only thirteen are actually annotated. The selection is deliberately narrow, confined to items explicitly on pastoral nomads, despite the fact that the list "was compiled in response to a request by Christian Aid for a practical guide to the literature". The reason, therefore, for its existence is the recent drought in the Sahel and Ethiopia and the issues this raised for Africanists and relief organisations: the relationship between food shortage and capitalist agricultural development schemes, and the problem of what forms of relief would do least long term damage to those in need. Both of these are considered in the pamphlet's introduction: indeed they are its main focus. The bibliography, however, carefully omits any work for which these are the central concerns, such as Meillassoux on the Sahel or Bondestam on the Afars of the Awash Valley in Ethiopia (see this *Review* No. 1, and the bibliographical supplement to No. 2). Apart from anthropological data, what one would learn from the sources cited is only what has in the past proved ineffective or damaging, and the degree to which capitalist agricultural development schemes have resulted in food shortages in nomad areas—not why this should be so, and thus not what is the most effective political strategy to follow. The bibliography therefore fails in its principal object, though it is still a handy partial introduction to its subject. For those who can read French, the recent *Secheresse et Famines du Sahel* edited by Jean Copans (Paris, Maspero) is far more use, both in its text and bibliography.

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<td>Mujaju, A B</td>
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<td>NORTH-EAST AFRICA</td>
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<td>Ethiopian Student Union</td>
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<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party</td>
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352 Shaw, T M
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