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Patrimonialism & Petro-Diamond Capitalism: Peace, Geopolitics & the Economics of War in Angola

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Introduction: Re-imagining the ‘Worst Country in the World’

The longest and most miserable civil war in Africa ... has also been the most misrepresented and misunderstood of the continent’s many colonial and post-colonial conflicts (Goldman, 1999).

This is not the time, it is suggested, to wait another six months for a new report. The guilty parties who are conspiring to undermine the Security Council resolution, and who are subverting a host of national and international laws, are getting off scot-free. It is time they were brought to book (UN Sanctions Committee chairman Robert Fowler (2000:18) Angola: Exposing an International criminal conspiracy, United Nations Sanctions Committee, ‘The Fowler Report’, May 2000)

In 2001 it seems almost a ceremonial ritual to begin a discussion of Angola by noting the tragedy of how this country, so ‘fabulously endowed but massively wrecked by conflict’ (Cramer, 1996:481), has come to occupy its present ‘position’ on the contemporary map of African politics. Hajari and Mabry (2001:24), for example, describe Angola as the ‘worst country in the world’ and outline the now familiar story of how one of Africa’s potentially richest countries now teeters on the ‘edge of the abyss’. For others, like Anthony Goldman of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), this is the ‘longest and most miserable civil war’ that Africa has ever known but, more importantly, it has also been amongst ‘the most misrepresented and misunderstood’ (Goldman, 1999:2). Various contributions to this issue of ROAPE also make a number of observations about how the conflict in Angola has been ascribed particular (simplistic) ‘causes’, singular explanatory factors which are somehow held to account for the conflict and its prolongation. As Goldman (Ibid.:1) observes:

At various stages, the violence has been characterised as anti-imperial and revolutionary, a Cold War proxy, or a brutal competition between rival elites for a wealth of natural resources.

Any analysis which reduces the causes of extensive social conflict to a single determinant should be treated with caution (Guimaraes, 1998; Kwamba et al. 1999; Marcum, 1978; Minter, 1994). Angola has after all been in the ‘extraordinary situation of no war/no peace’ (Messiant, 2001:308) for a quarter of a century now. One would expect a number of causal factors to have been in play during this time. Moreover, in that time its regime has had a changing material base which is ‘now centred on financial interests, whether legal or illegal, individual or collective’ (Ibid.:304). Many economists and political observers see the ongoing conflict in very simplistic terms
and fail to consider this shifting material base, using an often pejorative discourse to characterise the war. For the World Bank, for instance, 'greed' for diamonds and other lootable commodities has 'fueled' war, and little additional explanation is deemed necessary. Other economists talk of the 'belligerent investment in the continuation of war' or represent war in the country an 'incremental addition to sunk or past costs' (Cilliers, 2000:2). In a variety of important ways Angola is being drawn increasingly into the orbit of dominant economic ideological discourses of neoliberalism with implications for the way in which Angola's colonial past/post-colonial present is understood and accounted for (Abrahamsen, 2001).

Much is made, in many analyses, of the 'curse' of Angola's wealth in fomenting conflict. The relationship between natural resource abundance and war, which appears to have made the Angolan conflict self-sustaining, has frequently been misunderstood, however. Certainly, Cold War patronage has been replaced by 'resource war instrumentalisation' (Ibid.:3). Yet such an argument is not without its problems as a means of explaining the country's turbulent past. It is important not to obscure the crucial geographical, historical, sociological and cultural origins of the war, nor their continued salience (Chabal, 1998). On many occasions the political geography of the Angolan conflict has been misrepresented, or overlooked altogether, despite the various ways in which struggles for power, privilege and authority have been linked to the territorial power of the state and its perceived legitimacy. As Cilliers (Ibid.:1) observes, by the year 2000 the war had again mutated into a new kind of violent politico-economic interaction which operated across a range of geographical scales:

By the turn of the century Angola appears to reflect the political-economic agendas of a new, evolving mode of violent political-economic interaction at the sub-state, national and regional level.

The recent Fowler Report, which documented UNITA sanctions violations in an effort to 'name and shame', identified a number of international miscreants for their contribution to the crisis. It accused Burkina Faso and Togo of helping the rebel movement in exchange for diamonds; Bulgaria of violations of the arms embargo; and Belgium of allowing the Antwerp diamond markets to facilitate the trade in UNITA diamonds. In fact, the geography of international complicity in Angola’s war economy has been even more complex and dynamic. A number of private financial institutions (which according to the IFIs need less rather than more regulation) continue, like other transnational enterprises in Angola, to be part of the country's war economy. As such, they bear at least some responsibility for its prolongation – for its ultimate resolution and for the promotion of a peaceful settlement. Embargoes on oil and arms transfers to UNITA have existed since 1993 but have been openly flouted (Human Rights Watch, 1997, 2000). The Report even felt the need to urge the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to do more to monitor the application of sanctions against UNITA. This call led to some degree of prohibition on arms and fuel sales and delivery to UNITA, the prevention of the sale of diamonds by UNITA rebels, and the freezing of UNITA-owned funds and assets (De Beer and Gamba, 2000). Amazingly, however, only in June 2001 did SADC successfully improve the monitoring of Angolan air space with mobile radar equipment established in South Africa, thereby 'drastically reducing' the number of illegal flights to UNITA-held territory (Angola Peace Monitor, July 2001).
The Geography of International Complicity

This complex geography of international complicity also links UNITA to various US administrations in a number of interesting ways (see Wright, this issue). When Herman Cohen, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the first Bush administration (1989-1993), recently published his 'practitioner's memoir' (Cohen, 2000:xii), he described many 'typical African states' in terms of their 'tendency toward extreme harshness and murder to maintain power' (Ibid.:198). As with many other readings of African politics, Cohen fails to see or understand the historical or geographical construction of the 'weak state politics' he examines.
In an account that is almost surreal, Cohen inadvertently hints at the complex interplay of economic and geopolitical interests that have come together in the Angolan war. Describing US efforts to heal a rift between Jonas Savimbi and Mobutu Sese Seko, in order to strengthen UNITA’s negotiating position in relation to the MPLA, Cohen (Ibid.:97) recalls how:

"Mobutu received us on the terrace under a brilliant Riviera sky ... After ordering aperitifs, Mobutu ... said [to Savimbi:] 'In front of our American friend Cohen, I pledge to you that I will support you to the end'. He offered his hand and Savimbi took it. That was that. We then adjourned to the swimming pool terrace for the birthday party, with 250 guests and a jazz orchestra flown specially from Kinshasa for the occasion."

The result of this Riviera reconciliation was the resumption of arms flows to UNITA from the United States via the territory of Zaire. In an ironically-entitled conclusion ('Superpower in Africa: Mediator or Meddler?'), Cohen lists some of the lessons he ‘learnt’ from his involvement in Bush’s ‘aggressive policy of diplomatic intervention in African conflicts’: ‘starting early is better than starting late’; ‘talk to everyone’; and ‘beware of signature obsession’ (Ibid.: 222). Cohen’s book implicitly confirms that conflict management in Africa by superpowers is always subservient to their own perceived national interests and strategic geopolitical goals (Jackson, 2001). Peacekeeping and conflict management are represented as neutral and impartial enterprises but successive US administrations have preferred conflict management to conflict resolution in Angola, thus undermining claims to neutrality on the part of mediators and peacekeepers. The disappearance of cold war patronage has not made the geopolitical context of the Angolan war irrelevant: the ‘Orphan of the Cold War’ (Anstee, 1996) is now twenty-six years old and Angola remains, in a very real way, subject to the legacies of Cold War history. As Messiant (2001:291) has put it, ‘[t]he conditions of war ... have served to entrench various distinctive features of the Angolan state, some old and some rather new’. Many commentators, however, continue to have enormous faith in the willingness and capacity of the party-state to operate effectively in any post-war reconstruction, a view which suggests a rather naïve appreciation both of the nature of state power in Angola today and of its territorial configuration. Will an end to the war immediately imply more stringent standards of ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ by Angolan government officials and the international community? Are these ‘standards’ being promoted by international institutions out of ignorance of the nature of patrimonial states in Africa, as Chabal and Daloz (1999) would seem to suggest? Patrimonialism in Africa works, they argue, because attempts to institutionalise a rule-bound democracy, democratic politics and economic liberalism (attempts made partly at the behest of aid agencies) are frustrated by political processes on the ground. Any political settlement in Angola will clearly require ‘a major rethinking of development initiatives if an end to the war is to be more than an interregnum in the on-going conflict’ (Cilliers, 2000:345). Conventional development discourses have such a limited relevance to the Angolan context and a radical rethinking is required. True, the state in Angola is still the main economic and political actor, a position arising from the fact that it remains ‘the largest proprietor, the only exporter (and consequently the only agent generating foreign exchange), the major importer, the largest employer in the economy, the largest consumer of resources, the largest debtor and the largest investor ...’. (V.P. de Andrade, 2000:8). Yet this same state is also unable to carry out vital governance functions of law and order and social service provision in those areas it (periodically) occupies. War has thus pushed Angola from being a one-party state towards becoming a kleptocracy – and even something of a
‘phantom state’ – rather than towards becoming a multiparty democracy. It is a state with international recognition but one that does not necessarily perform many of the normal functions of a sovereign state. This state has an extremely limited concern for its own citizens; instead it seeks to serve an off-shore legality and the interests of transnationals scrambling for profit (Cilliers, 2000).

To date the process of negotiating a peaceful future has not been sufficiently broad and participatory – although, since 1997, civil society groups and church organisations have become increasingly vocal, for example in their condemnation of extravagant arms purchases (Vines, 2000). Nor has it been notable for much insight and forward planning. There has also been a growing realisation that ‘Angola has not responded well to peace-keeping on the cheap’ (Cilliers, this issue) and that the state ‘remains singularly unprepared to help the Angolan people’ (Cilliers, 2000:8). The evidence of the second and third UN Angola Verification Missions (UNAVEM II or III), for instance, would suggest that peace will likely result in a massive programme of demobilisation. It thus has little to offer soldiers and guerrilla fighters for whom war has been ‘mais um dia de vida’ (another day of life) for more than three decades.

Demilitarisation and demobilisation campaigns have enjoyed varying degrees of success but they remain poorly conceived and incomplete and need to be much more closely related to the particular case of Angola than in the past. One recent map of humanitarian access (see over) in Angola highlights just how little these organisations really know about UNITA rebels and their families or about their settlement and social organisation. Additionally, efforts to control trade in illicit diamonds and the other commodities that support the UNITA war effort reveal wider and more complex trends, including increasing cross-border trade and the growing size of the informal, unregulated (and often illegal) regional economy. Both sides seek the perpetuation of the militarised systems of control which they have instituted, a situation that will, for a whole variety of reasons, not be easy to change. Shortly after signing an agreement with the Congolese President on joint oil exploration along their common borders, for example, President Dos Santos recently declared that a contingent of FAA forces would remain in the Republic of Congo for the foreseeable future (IRIN, 2001).

In his analysis of the MPLA’s seismic shift from ‘Afro-Stalinism’ to ‘petro-diamond capitalism’, Hodges (2001) argues that the notion of a resource-cursed country is simplistic and needs to be criticised. He suggests instead that the country’s mineral wealth has allowed competing elites to pursue their exclusionist agendas since the 1970s and so ‘ruin’ their country, all the while talking of national liberation and ‘development’. Hodges examines the staggering military expenditures since the 1980s, the fluctuation in oil values and the economic mismanagement and widespread corruption of government officials. Mineral wealth in and of itself does not ‘ruin’ a country, he argues. What does is the uneven social distribution of this wealth and its (mis)appropriation by political elites who have long since lost the right to talk of liberation and development. The resources simply provide these strata with the means to promote their particular agendas. Oil and diamonds afford both sides access to a range of material resources and political connections beyond the borders of Angola. As Reno argues, oil is a key component in the regime’s ability to gain access to international political and material resources; not just to markets (as with diamonds) but also to ‘diplomatic channels and more politically connected commercial networks that directly advance the MPLA’s security strategy’ (2000:219). The use of private security armies, he suggests, is highly reminiscent of the forces employed in the defence of colonial development projects.
Attention needs to be focused not just on the oil and diamond industries but also on the range of financial institutions and banks that have often profiteered from the Angolan war. In 1998, for example, the US Import-Export Bank guaranteed a loan to Sonangol in exchange for the bank's investment in Cabinda's oil well services and a $360m investment in Angola's hydrocarbon sector (Reno, 2000). Oil-backed loans have taken all sorts of shapes and forms (HRW, 1999) but have been used regularly to purchase weapons. Thus a range of public and private lending sources are linked directly to the deaths of Angola's war victims and to the destruction of Angolan society. The presence of oil and banking businesses like these helps to generate the revenues which finance the MPLA government's war against UNITA (Global Witness, 2000). Joint ventures also provide further opportunities for individual Angolan officials in that in some cases these 'partnerships' can bring access to security companies and by implication to weapons procured on their own account.

IMF analyses of Angola suggest that the conflict is very similar to many other civil wars in Africa in that corruption becomes integral to the political system and leads to the construction of networks of loyalty and compliance through the distribution of patronage to key individuals (Ayoob, 1995; Collier, 2000). In this analysis, it is either greed or grievance which is held to explain everything, set alongside the rather vague 'economic causes' which are given for the continuation of war: Collier argues, for example, that it is the 'feasibility of predation' which determines the risk of conflict and it is this, rather than the 'grievances' of rebels, which drives Angola's war:

Diamonds ... made UNITA so rich that nothing that donors could offer would matter, while renewed predation offered massive rewards (Collier, 2000:18).

Excessive creditor pressure, so this argument goes on, is also risky in that it destabilises established patronage-based bureaucracies and could lead to 'anarchy rather than efficiency' (Charap and Harm, 1999). Against this, of course, it could be argued that the greater risk to Angola comes from international financial bureaucracies, like the World Bank and IMF, who ignore the nature of Angolan social and spatial relations, intoning instead the holy mantra of adjustment, transparency and economic efficiency. Their brutal reform policies and simplistic causal explanations seem designed to shift attention toward forms of 'predation' other than their own. More attention needs to be given to the ways in which highly contested neo-liberal ideologies of development are promoted by predatory IFIs that simply seek to lubricate Angola's emerging relations with the global system of trade and investment. This has been a common misunderstanding within the governance agenda of many international donors in Africa (Szeftel, 1998).

The World Bank, IMF and Security Council have the power also to affect significantly the success or failure of any future regional or international peace initiatives in Angola. At present the IFIs exercise their considerable leverage in ways that are inconsistent (even on their own terms) and often misplaced. Angola already has moved towards a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and is subject to inflation reduction measures, accelerated privatisation, a liberalisation of foreign trade, a revision of tax laws and commitments to reduce state spending and monitor government expenditures. But the country arguably still lacks appropriate and coherent donor policies and thus the conditional engagement of the IFIs needs radical rethinking. Are their alternatives and what might these look like? The first attempt at producing a Staff Monitored Programme (SMP) in 1995 was terminated within months because of the slow pace of reform and the fact that President Dos Santos had more pressing priorities than transparency and reform, such as the defence of
clientelism' (Le Billon, 2001:72). Structural adjustment has to be seen then in this context, with government encouraging the development of business enterprises and engaging in privatisation but also allowing major economic offences to be committed with impunity. Far from discouraging illegality, privatisation actually interacts with and underpins illegal activities in common use (Messiant, 2001:295). The Angola: Trade and Investment Guide produced by the Angolan embassy in the US says nothing of these illegalities, promising instead that ‘[n]ew regulations will reduce or eliminate business taxation’ (Embassy of Angola, 2000:7). A kind of patrimonialism clearly drives the expansion of economic activity in Angola and Angolans have had to adapt to this particular politico-economic order.
The Regional Geopolitics of Angolan Underdevelopment

Angolan has been the setting for a huge range of experiments (Maria da Conceição Neto, 2001:48).

Similar to the DRC, with which it [Angola] shares a long and unguarded border, governance in Angola extends only to the urban limits of Luanda, to most provincial capitals and to those areas where the Angolan armed forces, the FAA, are deployed. This does not imply that UNITA holds sway everywhere else. The reality is that large expanses of terrain remain unguarded and without policing or administration of any type ... (Cilliers, this issue).

Central to the factors promoting conflict in Angola has been the way in which the war remains fluid and inchoate in many places on the ground and the way in which it has regularly become part of wider, regional conflicts. Although the government has been successful in recent years at driving UNITA from large areas it previously controlled, UNITA’s guerrilla army FALA (Forces Armadas de Libertação de Angola) relies on the country’s informal economy, on seizing supplies from the FAA and on a kind of banditry practised for decades. Driven by logistics, fighting tends to be periodic, seasonal and spatially diffuse whilst ‘victories’ reflect not so much the strength of opposing forces but the weaknesses of their enemy. The administration of territory remains inconsistent and incomplete, sometimes temporary and invariably contested (Cilliers, 2000). Then forces of both sides are capable of splintering and disintegrating over time given their limited capacity to control state territory. The recent regionalisation of the war, as the MPLA has sought to isolate UNITA from its support structures in the DRC, Republic of Congo, Zambia and Namibia, could well contribute further to such disintegrative propensities. Historically a whole variety of different African states have become embroiled in one or more of Angola’s various periods of war. In the context of regional geopolitics and SADC, Angola has often figured ambiguously, occupying uncertain coordinates whilst rarely contributing to any regional consensus or coordination.

Yet for all the evidence of fluidity and change, the forces fighting over Angola have exhibited a remarkable tenacity and resilience. Both sides in the war still represent relatively coherent forces, fighting organised campaigns – which speaks volumes for the extent of support, intimidation and patronage available to both (Cilliers, 2000). Nonetheless commentaries and observations on Angolan development can only speculate about what is happening in some areas of UNITA-held territory or in those areas inside Angola which were traditionally sympathetic to UNITA but are now controlled by government forces. Many representations of Angola’s political geography thus only offer partial ‘truths’, an incomplete and partial picture.

The government has recently established the Commission for Peace and Reconciliation in June 2001 and continues its strategy of encouraging UNITA troops to desert Savimbi. The credibility of claims by both sides to be interested in peace and reconciliation remains badly damaged, however, particularly in this continuing climate of ‘spoils politics’ (Allen, 1999). In August 2000, a report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping focused on how local parties sign peace accords for a variety of reasons ‘not all of them favourable to peace’. This report focuses on ‘spoilers’, that is groups (including signatories) who can renge on accords, have independent income sources to buy guns, enrich the leadership and pay soldiers and ‘may even have the motive for war’ (UN, 2000b). In this context, Savimbi’s eligibility to stand in any future election seems extremely problematic. Contested by political parties predominantly from Luanda (some of which have merged to form stronger
opposition parties following the MPLA’s indication that there will be an election), there must be questions about the extent to which its results would be honoured throughout the country? Can the people of Angola be asked to believe that Savimbi and UNITA present a coherent political ideology which might offer something different from institutionalised criminality and corruption? What would be the implications for various material interests if a political settlement were reached and how would other interests be expressed if electoral democracy were to be realised?

One key area here is the oil industry which, although by nature capital intensive and providing only limited employment, has provided an increasing amount of the revenues used to service Angola’s estimated external debt of almost $11 billion (largely incurred by arms purchases). Angola may eventually supply more than 20 per cent of all US oil imports through Exxon, Mobil and Chevron – hence the shift of international support to the MPLA from UNITA.

The interconnections between petro-capitalism and Angolan debt and development are varied but one common thread concerns the diversion of crucial resources from oil revenues in favour of arms purchases and militarisation. Human Rights Watch have documented some of the complex international transfers of arms and small weapons which have linked Angola to a web of international criminality and corruption (Human Rights Watch, 1999). This work and some of the specific research HRW have conducted on landmines in Angola and Mozambique highlights the destructive character of this war, resulting in large numbers of civilian casualties and inflicting permanent physical disabilities on many Angolans. HRW have also looked at the complex international space of weapons flows to and from Angola in the 1980s and 1990’s and have shown how ‘international prohibitions on arms supplies to Angola were neither conditional nor enforced’ (Ibid.:1). The map of international arms transfers they construct centres on Russia, China and the USA but also includes Portugal, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Poland, South Africa, Slovakia, Ukraine, India, Israel and Kazakhstan. One of the largest standing armies in Africa has been equipped throughout this period with new tanks, armoured personnel carriers, multiple rocket launchers, surface-to-air missiles and howitzers – often bought with borrowed money, using future oil production as collateral.

Throughout the 1990’s, sanctions on arms transfers to Angola were being broken from all directions and the sense of frustration has been widespread: ‘[h]ow can allowing weapons to flow into Angola help secure peace? Angola needs reconstruction, not more weapons’ (Ibid.:4). Attempts to effectively estimate arms expenditure within the national budget in Angola have only ever told half the story, with sometimes less than half the actual amount being recorded. To further compound the shortcomings of the international community in forcing a reduction in arms expenditures by both sides and in enforcing international law, very few if any individuals have been prosecuted for violating arms embargoes in Africa (Cilliers, 2000:355). The recent UN conference on Small Arms Transfers in July 2001 was also problematically focused on a poorly defined notion of ‘illicit’ arms, without addressing state responsibility for weapons proliferation and offering only a ‘program of inaction’ (Human Rights Watch, 2001).

The war has allowed the government and UNITA also to extract premium payments on commodities sold to the garimpeiros (diamond diggers) of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul, themselves hostage to ‘mafia-like protection rackets’ run by the FAA, UNITA and local warlords (see De Boeck, this issue). This, too, is an aspect of the conflict which has been misrepresented and misunderstood by many commentators. The breadth and reach of these informal economic networks and their interconnections with war
make it essential that they become an important part of the calculations surrounding peace efforts. This not least because, as Reno (2000) argues, the candonga, the informal economy in Angola, involves many Angolan women (as producers) for whom exchanges between rural communities and urban markets have been severely disrupted by the war. This so-called ‘illicit’ economy is clearly not central to the patrimonial networks it serves (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Humanitarian aid has found its way onto these circuits, too, whilst many goods ‘disappear’ in a port like Luanda. As Messiant (2001:293) puts it:

The most important cases of embezzlement of public money and international aid, of plundering from banks and public enterprises and of systemic theft of goods at the port and airport in recent years, all remain crimes officially unsolved. The evidence suggests that such misdeeds must enjoy at the very least a degree of complicity in senior ranks of the civilian bureaucracy, the police or the army...The result of this is a generalized system of theft at the lower levels of society and of corruption (known as gazoza), of illegality and violence, aggravated by the impunity enjoyed by the government’s security forces...

Many goods are imported illegally from the DRC, particularly since the implosion of Mobutu’s Zaire in 1997. Without military force to back up the 1993 arms embargo, the two-way flow of diamonds and arms between Angola and Zaire is ‘impossible to stop’ (Human Rights Watch, 1999:10). Similarly, the networks that supply UNITA with the commodities for war, including food, fuel, arms, ammunition, training, proviant, tyres, clothing and medical supplies, involve civilian ‘entrepreneurs’ and political and military officials at various levels in almost every country of the region and sometimes beyond (Potgieter, 2000). Morocco, for example, trained several hundred UNITA officers in logistics and communications in 1998 (Human Rights Watch, 1999). A complex chain of military resources and commodities for UNITA’s war effort therefore extends across the map of Southern and Central Africa and beyond. Entebbe airport in Uganda, South Africa’s Gateway International Airport or the N’Djili airport in Kinshasa have been important trafficking hubs in the movement of military equipment to UNITA. Weapons destined for UNITA sometimes have been transported also by rail from Dar es Salaam to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika, from where they were ferried by boat to Kalemie in Zaire and from there by plane to UNITA forces in Angola (Human Rights Watch, 1999). A large part of the western Zambian economy, in particular, has become closely integrated into UNITA’s regional sources of support. There are now significant numbers of Zambians who derive a living from the Angolan war and who are (like so many others in the region) dependent on its continuation.

Without access to diamonds and having lost many of its external patrons, many have assumed that UNITA would not be able to continue its military campaign. Yet, UNITA’s involvement in other forms of ‘illicit’ trade across the region will make it difficult to apply pressure successfully on its diamond income. Moreover, it is worth recalling that much of UNITA’s arms and ammunition and war materiel has historically come from enemy seizures (Potgieter, 2000). Effective regional policing and capacity-building with regard to air traffic control and intelligence capabilities are also needed (Cilliers, 2000) – and are receiving increasing priority from SADC. Current systems for controlling arms brokers and shipping agents are diverse and inadequate, compounded further by the lack of international agreements and treaties and their inconsistent or non-existent application. SADC also needs to develop a more coherent role, particularly the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security which has delayed the development of agreed structures for conflict prevention and resolution.
Conclusion: A Geopolitics of Angolan Development

We are now moving into uncharted territory. The comfortable beliefs of the past no longer apply. Aid agencies have to learn to adapt (Duffield, 1994:97).

Each time Angolan mineral revenues are frittered away on extravagant arms purchases it is not difficult to see the case for efficient and transparent governance. It is much more difficult, however, to see how this can be operationalised in the Angolan context, particularly when there has not always been simultaneous and sustained pressure on UNITA and the Angolan government. The UN estimates that there are some 3.7 million people displaced by war in Angola today but nobody knows with any certainty just how many have suffered in this way or have suffered physical disabilities since the beginning of the wars in the early 1960’s. Few of these people can expect any assistance from their government in the short-term. Too many international humanitarian and development organisations fail to adequately comprehend the nature of the Angolan state, its geopolitics or its contestation by rebels and this has had serious consequences both for the prolongation of the war and for the reproduction of the (corrupt) state. Assis Malaquias (this issue) argues that ‘[e]vidence of the criminal nature of Angola’s political economy is irrefutable, abundant and mounting’ and that nonetheless NGO’s in particular have ‘unwittingly propped up the kleptocratic state’. The result of all this is to place the country’s poor in a dangerous and precarious position:

Angolans are caught between a criminal state that has impoverished and battered the people in whose name it claims to govern and a criminal insurgency that has an equal disregard for the people in whose name it claims to fight (Malaquais, this volume).

There is some talk of the ‘key’ role of Savimbi or the US (Wright, 1997) in determining the likely success of any further efforts at targeted economic sanctions. Four decades of conflict would seem to suggest, however, that there is no ‘key’ to this particular conflict. A far wider degree of national and international participation and cooperation is necessary if a lasting political settlement is to be reached. One measure of the difficulty of this task was the long list of recommendations in Angola Unravels, the Human Rights Watch report of 1999 which was aimed at a variety of countries and organisations. These included the Angolan government, UNITA, the ‘observing Troika’ (Portugal, Russia, the US), the UN Committee of Friends of Angola (China, Coté D’ Ivoire, France, Gabon, Russia, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, UK, US and Zimbabwe), the United Nations, the OAU, SADC, the EU, other members of the international community, and international oil and diamond dealers.

Much further critical research on Angola’s political economy is needed to understand the complexity of these international networks and to document their implications for Angolan society. As Robson (2001:6) puts it ‘there has been little research about Angolan society at the community level, either in the colonial or post-colonial periods’. Little research has been conducted, for example, on how Angolan disability organisations struggle for recognition of their political and economic rights in Angolan society and little is known about the experience of physical disability in Angolan society (historically or geographically). Angolans can and must participate directly in this research and its goal must be the emancipation of Angolan society. Pacheco (2001) argues that the easiest way of quantifying the social injuries inflicted by Angola’s different wars ‘is to chart the waves of people who have been forced to abandon their homes, communities and regions’. This process, he suggests, began in the colonial era when the colonial administration relocated communities under its pyscho-social action programme (Power, 2001). There have also been ‘terrible
psychological scars on much of the population, who have experienced intense personal trauma, and seen their families, communities and customs unmade by violence and poverty’ (2002, forthcoming). This kind of individual and communal suffering is much less easy to quantify, though it is clear that the level of urban impoverishment has escalated considerably during the war (Simon, this issue).

Preparing this issue of ROAPE for publication has been a challenging but nonetheless rewarding process, bringing together colleagues in a variety of countries. One of the major difficulties has been in gaining access to Angolan narratives of conflict and development, in making regular contact with Angolan colleagues and researchers. In the context of the poor coverage of Angola by African studies research, this issue attempts to bridge some gaps in the literature and build some bridges with Angolan writers and researchers. This journal welcomes contributions from Angolan colleagues and we encourage future submissions on neglected research themes relating to Angola. The current issue identifies a number of emerging research agendas that deserve further attention. First, many of the contributions focus on the ‘business of war’, on the role of private sector institutions in the prolongation of conflict. Additionally, many of the papers also examine the extent to which the MPLA has understood the business world and sought to find its place within it. With respect to territories held by UNITA, much remains unknown, including their social organisation and their links with wider (shadowy) regional economies. Many questions are also posed here about the nature and conception of ‘development’ in the Angolan context, in a climate of corruption and criminality and the violent struggle over the means of accumulation. The traumatisation, displacement, disablement and disenfranchisement of many Angolans must not be forgotten. How are different civil society groups beginning to press for change and to what extent have they been co-opted? Both sides in the war have imported significant volumes of weapons in the past whilst claiming to be brokering peace, just (of course) as an ‘insurance policy’. Before peace can become a serious prospect, such strategies must end and the fraudulent motives underwriting it exposed and condemned.

**Sumário: Paz, Geopolítica e a economia da guerra em Angola**

Em 2001 parece quase uma convenção para começar uma discussão de Angola anotando a tragédia de como este país. Algumas das contribuições a esta introdução de ROAPE fazem também um número de observações sobre como o conflito em Angola foi causas (simples) atribuídas, os únicos fatores explanatórios que esclarecem de algum modo o conflito e sua continuação. O relacionamento entre a abundância do recurso natural e a guerra que fez o conflito angolano ‘self-sustaining’ frequentemente foi confundida e entendida mal e não é sem seus próprios problemas nos termos de avançar uma compreensão do passado complexo do país. É importante não obscurecer as origens geográficas, históricas, sociológicas e culturais importantes da guerra nem de sua importância continuada. A geografia política do conflito angolano foi deturpada ou negligenciada completamente, apesar das várias maneiras em que se esforça para a potência, privilégio e a autoridade em Angola foi ligada à potência territorial do estado e de sua autoridade.

A realidade entretanto é que a geografia da participação internacional na economia da guerra de Angola foi complexa e dinâmica. Qualquer estabelecimento político em Angola requererá claramente repensando as iniciativas do desenvolvimento se um objetivo à guerra dever ser mais do que uma pausa provisória no conflito. Angola foi transformado de um estado do um-partido, não para a democracia multipartidário mas para um estado que fosse reconhecido internacional mas não necessariamente executando muitas das funções ordinárias de um
Editorial: The Economics of War in Angola

estado. Este estado tem uma orientação e um interesse extremamente limitados para seus próprios povos que dão prioridade preferivelmente ao lucro.

A riqueza mineral não arruina um país. O que a lata é a distribuição social desigual desta riqueza e de seu roubo pelos elites políticos que tem por muito tempo desde que perdido a direita à conversa da libertação e do 'desenvolvimento'. Os instituições financeiros internacionais vêem as guerras angolana como se não eram nenhuma diferente do que muitas outras guerras civis em África que o corrupção é integral aos sistemas políticos. Aqui, é o 'greed' ou a queixa que explicam tudo ao lado das causas econômicas muito vagas que são dadas para a continuação da guerra em um país como Angola. O risco o mais grande a Angola vem das burocracias financeiras internacionais como o Banco Mundial e o FMI que não apreciam a natureza de relações sociais e do espaço angolano, procurando preferivelmente a transparência deslocam a atenção afastado em outro. O Banco Mundial, o FMI e o conselho da segurança podem também significativamente determinar o sucesso de todas as iniciativas do futuro regional/internacional para a paz em Angola. O papel destas organizações em Angola necessitam repensando radical. Longe de desanimar a corrupção, o privatizagao articula realmente com técnicas ilegais que estão no uso comun. Assim muitas respetivações da geografia política de Angola assim oferecem somente verdades parciais, um retrato incompleto. Demasiado muito as organizações internacionais do humanitário e do desenvolvimento não compreendem adequadamente a natureza de esforços políticos e económicos sobre o controle do estado angolano e de seu geopolítica que está tece implicações reais para a continuação da guerra e para a reprodução (corrupta e criminoso) do estado.

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The Bitter Harvest of War: Continuing Social & Humanitarian Dislocation in Angola

David Simon

Angola’s seemingly endless civil war has generated untold human suffering through death, injury, displacement and destruction. The social cost of the return to war after the elections in 1992, and again after the abandonment by UNITA of the Lusaka Accords in late 1998 has arguably been greater than previously. This paper examines the human cost of this latest period of fighting, focusing on the scale and nature of displacement, the collapse of infrastructure and services, and the very costly international humanitarian operation. Paradoxically, the crisis has worsened since the Angolan army’s dramatic territorial gains against UNITA, as more displaced people become accessible and resources are stretched yet further. Economic dislocation is profound, health and educational indicators are alarming, while poverty is pervasive in both urban and rural areas. Resettlement and rehabilitation efforts are slow and limited; even if a durable and effective peace is eventually secured, the long-term challenges of human recovery, social reconstruction and participatory development will be immense. Critical questions are raised about the likely nature of this process.

Introduction

The scale and pervasiveness of Angola’s human suffering over more than three decades of war—longer than the country has been an independent state—can have few
precedents. Several times during this period, hopes have been raised of a lasting peace and the start of a crawl back to a semblance of what is often called ‘normality’, if that is an appropriate term for a situation where instability and conflict have become the norm for many people (see Sidaway, this issue). However, UNITA has resumed fighting each time, as a result of which new depths have then been plumbed. Such was the nature of the humanitarian disaster precipitated by the renewed conflict during 1998/9, when the Lusaka Accords were finally abandoned altogether by Jonas Savimbi’s rump wing of UNITA.\(^1\) The severe levels of malnutrition among populations in besieged towns like Huambo, Kuito and Malanje eased once reliable food supplies were restored following the Angolan army’s (FAA’s) lifting of sieges and its remarkable advances against UNITA during late 1999 and early 2000. Nevertheless, sporadic fighting has continued in most provinces ever since, although UNITA’s occupation is now confined to limited areas, especially along the country’s borders with Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). There has also, in consequence, been a resurgence of guerrilla-style ambushes, attacks and landmine incidents across the country, marking a return by UNITA to its traditional form of warfare, in which civilians are the principal victims (Simon, 2001).

Although the Angolan economy, as measured formally by GDP, has grown by an average of 6.5 per cent per annum since 1995, the incidence and severity of poverty have also increased. This reflects the direct impact of the war situation in much of the country, coupled with the principal source of growth being in oil production rather than in a broadly based process. Official diamond revenues have also increased substantially as a result of the FAA’s capture of the principal diamond mining areas in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces, and tighter sanctions against UNITA’s smuggled gems. The value of official diamond exports rose from $425 million in 1998 to $614 million in 1999 and by another 28 per cent to $739 million in 2000 (APM, 28 June 2000:6; APM, 28 March 2001). Oil revenues are largely responsible for the fall in the debt-export ratio from 240 per cent in 1998 to an estimated 175 per cent in 1999, despite an increase in public external debt from $8.782 billion to approximately $9.591 billion (Hodges, 2001). Estimates of Angola’s current public external debt range from this figure up to $12 billion.

Despite some delays and documented violations (see APM various issues; Le Billon 2001), international sanctions against UNITA have been tightened over the last couple of years. Of particular significance is the formulation since 1999 of a worldwide system to prevent trade in so-called ‘conflict diamonds’, championed by the UN expert panel on sanctions under Robert Fowler and by Peter Hain, the British Minister of State for African Affairs until early 2001. The system itself may not be implemented as scheduled before the end of 2001, but the initiative has already had positive spin-offs. A new UN expert panel has been pursuing further investigations as a prelude to tightening all sanctions and possible action against member states violating them.

This strategy aims to weaken Savimbi’s ability to purchase arms and hence to pursue his war,\(^2\) hopefully also thus making him more willing to consider peace talks. However, efforts to encourage a resumption of negotiations between the government and UNITA have until very recently been opposed by the authorities in Luanda and a growing civil society lobby, albeit for very different reasons. Given Savimbi’s record of broken commitments to peace, the government has been seeking a military victory as a means to ensure full implementation of the Lusaka Accord peace process, although some softening of this stance has been evident during 2001. Savimbi is no longer being branded a war criminal with a bounty on his head, and he is being encouraged to renounce violence as a precondition for talks. UNITA is also now
arguing for a resumption of talks but remains vague on key issues. By contrast, notable elements of civil society argue that such bilateral processes have always failed in the past and that the Angolan people have paid the price. Therefore a different, and more broadly inclusive, peace process is required. Importantly, such civil society initiatives are no longer restricted to Luanda, but are now evident in many provincial capitals and intermediate centres. Prominent actors in this respect have been the churches, both Catholic and Protestant, the GARP peace movement (established in 1999), COIEPA, a more recently formed alliance of citizens’ groups and professional associations (see Kibble and Vines, this issue) and several small NGOs. Independent journalists have also been important in publicising atrocities and bad faith by the main protagonists; however, the most outspoken of these have been subjected to official harassment since 2000 in an attempt to prevent criticism of the government and FAA.

The world has become accustomed to horror stories and the seemingly endless toll of death and destruction in Angola. Yet, when the direct and indirect death toll was at its peak of an estimated 1,000 people per day in 1993/94, the world’s attention was almost totally fixated on other killing fields, those of Bosnia and Croatia in Europe’s backyard. Thus, by a geopolitical quirk of fate, Angola – arguably one of the world’s most peripheral ‘wild zones’ in Euro-American eyes3 despite the importance of its oil – was all but ignored when its humanitarian needs were most acute. Fortunately, this situation has been partly remedied since then, but donor fatigue or exasperation with what often appears an endless and unwinnable war (see Cain, this issue), has meant that humanitarian assistance continues to fall short of needs, while – understandably – relatively little longer term development funding has been provided (see below).

One other casualty of the war and the inaccessibility of many parts of Angola, has been objective and comprehensive coverage of social and economic conditions. Media attention is skewed towards dramatic events and the few accessible areas, and coverage is therefore highly fragmentary. The war has also made extensive and intensive research on the ground extremely difficult. Only during lulls in the fighting, such as that in 1996/7, when prospects for a real peace seemed substantial, has it been possible to undertake work in many rural areas and smaller urban centres. In this respect, the insights into social conditions, survival strategies and community organisations in Huambo, Benguela and Malanje provinces, and in two bairros in Luanda, provided by the contributors to Robson (2001), are distinctive and extremely valuable.

The modest purpose of this paper is to collate an overview of the social impacts of the war and to bring the depressing findings to the attention of a wider audience. This task has involved a synthesis and critical analysis of material obtained exclusively by means of a systematic survey of secondary sources, especially the Angolan and foreign news media, reports by NGOs and international agencies working in the country, and seminars on Angola in the UK. Figure 1 (over) provides a reference point for the provinces and principal cities referred to in the text.

The Social Costs of War
The FAA claimed to control over 92 per cent of Angola’s territory in mid-2000, notwithstanding hit and run raids or short occupations by UNITA in many parts of Angola; that figure has been rising slowly since then. It has consequently been possible to restore state administration to a larger proportion of Angola’s territory than at any time since at least the 1992 election period. In Cuando Cubango and
Moxico provinces, some locations occupied by UNITA for close to 30 years are now in government hands. In areas deemed secure enough, this has enabled the gradual return home of considerable numbers of displaced people, albeit often still amid considerable uncertainty (see below).

However, the humanitarian crisis actually deteriorated through much of 2000 and early 2001, as food stocks held by the government and the World Food Programme (WFP) dwindled, and the number of needy increased as more territory came under FAA control. It is also important to bear in mind that sustained under- and malnutrition often have long-lasting effects, especially if children’s development has been stunted. Only a small proportion of the country’s arable land was cultivated during the 1999/2000 wet season; remining by UNITA and probably also the FAA has also rendered many previously cleared areas unsafe once again. Nevertheless, hopes that increased cultivation during the 2000/01 wet season would yield higher output, reducing or removing the dependence of many people on humanitarian assistance, were only partially fulfilled, because the harvest varied substantially by region.

In mid-June 2000 there was considerable press coverage of WFP warnings that the country was facing an impending food crisis of unprecedented proportions by the end of the dry season in September, under headlines such as *Crise alimentar pode ter consequências catastróficas* (food crisis may have catastrophic consequences) (*jornal de Angola*, 10 June 2000); *Fome mata milhões: quem nos salvará?* (Forest hunger millions: who will save us?) and *Deslocados entre a vida e a morte* (Displaced people between life and death) (both in *Folha 8*, 14 June 2000). Worst affected were the provinces of Huambo, Bié and Moxico, where the largest numbers of displaced people were being cared for, but the situation in Malange, Kwanza-Sul, Kwanza-Norte, Huila, Kuando-Kubango and Uíje also caused concern. At the end of May 2000, some 2.5 million displaced people were recorded countrywide, an increase of over 217,000 since the beginning of the year (*APM*, 26 July 2000:4). Two million of these were reliant on food aid. During July, 2,700 tonnes of food were distributed to 106 localities within Malanje province alone (*Jornal de Angola*, 29 August 2000). Appeals by the WFP for additional funding did not meet with the required response; only some 40 per cent of its needs were being met, but by late September, the WFP had its requirements covered until November (*APM*, 4 October 2000:3).

Food stocks were built up in provincial cities ahead of the rainy season, when roads and some airports often become unusable. Meanwhile, a 20 per cent cut in the number of food aid recipients was made during June and July 2000 in an effort to preserve some stocks for the critical months of September and October. The organisation’s original budget for the year 2000 of US$159 million was increased to $208 million (*Folha 8*, 14 June 2000). The situation in Kuito worsened in late 2000 with the closure of the city’s airport for emergency repairs following the crash of a plane after striking a pothole. Long-needed comprehensive repairs have been delayed since then, greatly reducing aircraft handling capacity. At that time, fighting in the hinterland drove more people to join the 70,000 already dependent on food aid there; some 3,400 tonnes of food were required each month, according to the UN. This is well beyond what could be delivered by road (*APM*, 3 May 2000:4; 4 October 2000:3).

The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA’s) mid-2000 review of the situation in Angola highlighted similar concerns, which were exacerbated by the continued insecurity of many road routes linking provincial capitals through the interior. As a result, over 70 per cent of all humanitarian assistance had to be transported by air, at far higher cost and with delays when
airports are closed for repairs (*APM*, 26 July 2000:4). By mid-2000 other UN agencies had fared even worse than the WFP in terms of the shortfall in funding under the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 2000, with health by far the most underfunded element. OCHA had received nearly 44 per cent of its $5.7 million target; UNICEF some 27 per cent of its $21.7 million requirement; the WHO 61 per cent of $1.38 million; the FAO only 10.5 per cent of its $10.37 million target; the UNDP a mere 1.4 per cent of $4.25 million; and the UNFPA 9.6 per cent of $2.4 million. On 8 July 2000, the UNHCR launched a separate appeal for $8.4 million for an emergency programme concentrated in Uige, Zaire and Luanda provinces. This was designed to target basic health and nutrition, water and sanitation, shelter, household essentials, and transport and logistics (*APM*, 26 July 2000:4-5).
Renewed Displacement

The increased level of UNITA attacks in Bié province in November 2000 sent some 7,500 people fleeing into Kuito city (APM, 29 November 2000:1), itself only beginning to recover from the prolonged siege of 1999/2000. In January 2001, a total of 19,663 newly displaced people were registered countrywide, and the February figure was even higher, at 23,511. Once again, most of these (over 14,000) originated from Bié province, and many sought refuge in Kuito. Bengo (4,025) and Kuando Kubango (2,150) were the next most important sources of displacement (APM, 28 March 2001).

At the end of March 2001, the situation in Mussende district of central Kwanza Sul province deteriorated sharply, with increasing rates of malnutrition and death. The UN's OCHA described conditions as 'critical'. Underlying this was an increase in landmine incidents, kidnapping and murder (Angop, 31 March 2001). Each such wave of displacement increases the demands upon government and World Food Programme relief services.

The particularly acute problems in Kuito have already been discussed above. The legacy of war and displacement are captured graphically in the words of a journalist who visited that city in September 2000:

Less than two hours' flight from the capital, Luanda, it is as though I have arrived on another planet. Today, after the bombings of spring '99, the town of Kuito looks more like a film set. Riddled with bullet holes, what were once buildings in the Portuguese style now conjure up an image of the end of the world. Police and militia patrol along the wide avenues. Children recite their lessons in one of the few schools to have miraculously been spared. Women trudge like indefatigable zombies from the refugee camp to the medical station, stopping off at the nutrition centre along the way. Malnourished old ladies wear identity bracelets just like the children. The only traffic is humanitarian aid jeeps, on a road that bends to reveal the warehouses of the World Food Programme (Angela Scillia, The EU-ACP Courier, No. 185, 2001, p.32).

The situation in Kuito deteriorated further through the first half of 2001, especially as a result of UNITA actions in the Camacupa and Cuemba districts and inadequate harvests in much of Bié province (see Fig 1). By June, some 200,000 people had once again become dependent on emergency food supplies from the WFP there (APM 4 July 2001:1) – a figure fast approaching that at the height of the 1998/9 siege by UNITA. Moreover, the incidence of severe malnutrition has risen steadily among new arrivals, from 45 new cases in February to 148 in March, 328 in April and 188 in only the first ten days of May 2001 (APM 7 June 2001:4). By mid-July, Concern, one of the leading humanitarian NGOs active in Angola, estimated the number of displaced people in Kuito at 300,000. Many recent arrivals had walked up to 100 km and were in poor physical condition. The incidence of pellagra is high – indicating prolonged dietary deficiency, especially of Vitamin B. As many as 200,000 more displacees were reportedly sheltering in and around Cuemba without access to relief supplies. Another 14-15,000 were reportedly in Camacupa, where the WFP has managed to deliver some food, albeit not enough (APM, 1 August 2001:1).

By July 2001, it seemed likely that closure of Kuito airport's runway for up to a month would be required in order to complete the repairs effectively. This would have a strongly negative impact on the increased number of aid-dependent people in and around the city and Camacupa (Guardian, 19 June 2001; Angop, 23 June 2001; APM, 1 August 2001:1-2). Three factors have combined to produce such an acute problem at present: reduced runway capacity over many months, increasing numbers of
displaced people arriving over recent months, and the suspension of flights for a week in June following missile attacks on WFP aircraft approaching Kuito.

By contrast, the situation in and around Huambo has improved markedly, to the point that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) decided to end its distribution of food and seed there in late May 2001. This reflects a return to cultivation by many peasants during the recent rainy season as a result of greater security and demining. Whereas about a third of the city's population suffered from severe malnutrition - and altogether some 300,000 people had been reliant on ICRC aid - at the end of UNITA's siege, the level was now down to some 2 per cent, comprising mainly people suffering from serious illnesses. Road convoys are also once again able to reach Huambo from the coastal city of Benguela (APM, 7 June 2001:4).

Efforts at Resettlement & Rehabilitation

Notwithstanding the ongoing guerrilla attacks and remining of previously cleared land, increased FAA control and improved security in many parts of the country have enabled the gradual return of substantial numbers of displaced people (deslocados) once demining has taken place. Of course, many people have nowhere to return to, if homes and villages have been destroyed or remain under UNITA occupation. Others may be too traumatised to contemplate living once more where they were brutalised or family members were massacred. As several of the contributors to Robson (2001) point out, many rural and small town communities have been uprooted more than once over the last few decades, and in some cases the most recent displacements have been the most traumatic. Some displacees have also opted to remain in the perceived greater security of urban areas, even in the abysmal physical conditions of dereliction, overcrowding, patchy or non-existent services, and poverty (see below) in which most deslocados find themselves.

Where possible, cultivable land is now being distributed to deslocados; for example, the government announced plans in late July 2000 to resettle 340,000 people in Huila province as from September (APM26 July 2000:5). At the end of September 2000, the municipal authorities in Caala (central Huambo Province) began the allocation of some 3,000 ha to 10,593 war-displaced families in order to cultivate maize, beans and vegetables using seeds and implemented donated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (Angop, 28 September 2000). Many of the estimated 300,000 displaced people in Huambo were in a similar position, and $1million was allocated to launch a programme there as part of the government's National Humanitarian Aid Programme (APM, 4 October 2000:4).

One of the largest scale resettlement efforts has been underway in Andulo, one of Savimbi's headquarters in Bié province until its capture by the FAA in mid-October 1999. Some 70,000 of the estimated 100,000 inhabitants in the district had sought or been forced to join the UNITA forces in the bush during their retreat. These people returned gradually and by late 2000, 69,700 were receiving assistance of food, clothing, health care and agricultural implements. Schools had reopened, although not all children were yet attending (Angop, 20 October 2000).

Many others are still unable to return. As a result, the policy now being adopted by the government and major relief agencies is to scale down their food distribution programmes and to incorporate such people into local rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes in their areas of refuge. In most rural areas, this involves including
them within agricultural programmes to enable them to provide at least some of their own subsistence requirements. The Red Cross recently followed the lead of the WFP in this regard, following good rains across most areas during February 2001, which enabled cultivation to commence. Conditions in December and January had been too dry. The WFP now regards six months as the limit of emergency feeding following displacement. This policy shift has the twin objectives of promoting self-reliance to avoid long term dependency, and of reducing costs in the face of the growing difficulty of raising adequate donor funds to cover the extensive feeding programme.

The scale of the emergency feeding programme can be gauged from the fact that approximately 1.3 million people, some 10 per cent of the national population, received food aid during 2000; the incidence of moderate and severe malnutrition was therefore reduced substantially. Overall, some 4 million people (roughly one-third of the population) received some form of humanitarian assistance during the year. This unwelcome statistic brackets Angola with some of the worst humanitarian crises yet tackled by the international community, especially when the longevity and principally war-induced nature of the problem are borne in mind. Nevertheless, an evaluation of the relief operation should be undertaken (see below).

**Exacerbated Poverty**

Poverty levels have been rising throughout the country as a result of the direct and indirect effects of three decades of war, not least the renewed and widespread fighting since 1998. By late 2000, the government estimated that some 61 per cent of the country's estimated 12 million inhabitants were living below the poverty line; approximately 10 per cent were classified as being in extreme poverty. Only 12 per cent of the economically active population were employed in the formal economy. These statistics were revealed by the Foreign Minister, João Miranda, at a round table meeting of southern African governments in New York on 9th September 2000 to coincide with the UN Millennium Summit (Angop, 9 September 2000).

Around the same time, a nutritionist from the United Methodist Church, Argentina Pinto, reported that approximately 80 per cent of Angolan children suffer from malnutrition. This astonishing figure reflects inadequate food intake as well as a diet lacking the necessary vitamins and minerals (Angop, 26 September 2000). Not exactly unexpectedly, these data reflect a marked deterioration from the 1996 situation, when UN statistics indicated that 6 per cent of under five-year olds suffered wasting (i.e. low weight for height), 53 per cent stunting (i.e. low height for age), and 42 per cent were underweight (UNICEF, *State of the World's Children 2000*). These are all indicators of moderate to severe malnutrition. In 1998, the infant mortality rate was 170 per thousand live births and the under-five mortality rate 292 (compared with the sub-Saharan African averages of 107 and 173 per thousand respectively). Average life expectancy was 47 years. These are some of the worst figures in the world. Agadjanian and Prata (2001) examine the impact of Angola's crisis on human fertility and reproduction.

Against this background, it is perhaps surprising that the UN Development Programme (UNDP) announced in mid-July 2000 that it was suspending publication of its annual Human Development Report for Angola, citing as reason the adoption of new procedures for its preparation (Actual, 15 July 2000:12). However, the UNDP's global *Human Development Report 2000*, published at roughly the same time, ranked Angola as 160th of the 174 countries for which data were available, in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI) for 1998; its figure was 0.405. This extremely low
level reflects the human cost of prolonged war and a lack of transparent public accounting in what is potentially a wealthy country. On the basis of per capita GDP alone, Angola would have ranked 139th. Only a handful of countries anywhere in the world had larger differences in ranking. In other words, the value of Angola's recorded production of oil and diamonds gives the country an artificially high ranking in terms of per capita income. According to the *Human Development Report 2001*, the 1999 HDI was marginally higher, at 0.422, ranking Angola at 146th out of 162 countries. In terms of per capita GDP, Angola would have been ranked 102nd. The per capita purchasing power parity GDP for 1999 was $3,179. By contrast, life expectancy at birth was a lowly 45.0 years.

These last two statistics highlight the grotesque distortions of life, death and the 'anti-development' policies pursued in Angola for so long. Most other countries with comparable average incomes have life expectancies of 10-15 years longer, while other social indicators are also far more positive. Although no reliable statistics are available, the high levels of displacement to urban areas, coupled with the lack of infrastructural maintenance and collapse of services, means that urban quality of life indicators are probably not significantly better than those for many rural areas. Ordinary Angolans certainly count for little in comparison to the control of strategic natural resources, as so clearly argued by Munslow (1999), Brinkman (2000), Hodges (2001), Le Billion (2001) and Malaquias (2001), among others. In this archetypal resource war, oil and diamond revenues are being monopolised by the very narrow political, military and economic elites to prolong the conflict, something that is directly against the broader popular and national interests. These latter would include positive development in terms of meeting at least basic human needs and improving the quality of life for the majority.

Urban crime remains high, and will continue to do so as long as insecurity, deepening poverty and poor economic opportunities remain the norm. Patrols by police, militias and private security firms in middle class and elite neighbourhoods have been increased over the last two years. This may help residents in the short term by promoting a sense of security and perhaps reducing burglaries and muggings. However, such measures fail to address the underlying problems of poverty and a lack of economic opportunities, and almost certainly have the effect of displacing such crime to other areas less able to afford privatised security or where the residents are less well connected politically and thus not regarded as priorities for police patrols. In other words, those people most adversely affected by the long term economic crisis and high level corruption are also bearing a higher burden of poverty-driven crime.

Sometimes official policies also contribute to increased poverty and thus vulnerability to crime and/or an increased likelihood that people thus affected will resort to crime. A good example is the forced removals and displacement to a tent town on the distant urban periphery of some 50,000 people in Luanda in July and August 2001. Following a cliff collapse in which several people were killed, the entire inner-city neighbourhood of Boavista was declared unsafe and the residents forcibly evicted by armed police and demolition teams. Although the government claims the safety of the (now former) residents of this established community to have been the only reason for this action, and has promised them new houses, evidence soon emerged that gentrification of the area through redevelopment may be the underlying objective. While such processes are hardly unique to Angola, the current context in that country is particularly unfortunate and this provides further evidence of the lack of a social conscience by the authorities. Likening the forced removals from Boavista to those of
South Africa under apartheid, *The Economist* (4 August 2001:50) concludes its report with the pointed comment that,

*With 1.2 m Angolans uprooted by the civil war and already heavily dependent on aid, no one is keen to find money for an oil-rich government to rescue the victims of its urban gentrification.*

**Health Concerns: the Resurgence of Epidemic Diseases**

War, large-scale human displacement and poverty have combined to create very favourable conditions for the rapid spread of several debilitating and potentially fatal diseases. Efforts at control include prevention (through immunisation and – where possible – improved sanitation and nutrition), treatment, and spraying or capture of the disease vectors. However, where the diseases concerned have become widespread, these measures are very inadequate in scale and coverage. In mid-September 2000, the Angolan council of ministers agreed to fund a three-year, US$35 million programme to tackle and prevent ‘the great’ endemic diseases of malaria, tuberculosis, leprosy, trypanosomiasis, diarrhoea and respiratory illnesses (Angop, 16 September 2000). The resurgence of these diseases, and the growing HIV/AIDS problem, have received more frequent media coverage of late. The following paragraphs summarise the situation and relevant counter-measures.

**Polio.** During 1999, an urgent immunisation campaign was mounted in the slums and shantytowns surrounding Luanda and other towns in order to check an epidemic of polio. The WHO-supported national immunisation campaign has been hindered over recent years by the war situation and political instability. Launched in 1996 at an annual cost of over US$1 million, the programme was targeted at children, in particular, on National Vaccination Day(s), the 10th and 11th June. For obvious reasons, the provinces of Malange, Uige, Mexico and Kuando Kubango presented the most difficulties. FAA and police members were deployed in some areas to augment health personnel in the house to house campaign (Agora, 3 June 2000). The 2001 vaccination campaign apparently reached over 1 million children under five in Luanda province, and was stepped up markedly in cities previously occupied or besieged by UNITA. Over 20,000 were vaccinated in Uige, and another 114,000 in Huambo, Caala and Ekunha municipalities in Huambo Province. Vulnerable children also received Vitamin A to guard against blindness from protein-deficient diets (Angop, 9 April 2001; 2 May 2001).

**Trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness).** This painful and chronic disease causes severe neurological disturbances and eventual death if not treated. It progresses slowly, but needs timely treatment to be effective. Tsetse fly control programmes had all but eradicated the disease before Angola's independence, but the ongoing war brought these to a virtual halt during the 1970s. Since the early 1990s, in particular, the flies have re-established themselves over wide areas and over 100,000 people are now suffering from trypanosomiasis. Drug treatments are expensive and risky; apparently successful trials have recently taken place in Angola of shorter, more intensive regimes of injection to reduce drug use (and thus cost) as well as the duration of treatment. Efforts are also being stepped up to screen the population most at risk to ensure early treatment of affected people. However, this is estimated to require 22 mobile screening teams, whereas there are only 5 operating at present. The disease is centred in seven provinces, namely Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, Bengo, Zaire, Uige, Luanda and Malange (APM, September 2000:4-6). In October 2000, the government
announced a plan to launch a $3mn campaign to combat trypanosomiasis through the Institute of Trypanosomiasis Control (APM, 2 November 2000).

**HIV/AIDS:** As elsewhere in southern Africa, the HIV/AIDS pandemic has spread rapidly, facilitated in Angola by the disruption of households, the predatory behaviour of armed fighters and bandits, and the difficulties of instituting effective awareness and prevention campaigns in war situations. Addressing celebrations of Angolan Health Workers’ Day on 25th September, the Minister of Health, Alberina Hamukwaia, disclosed that some 470,000 Angolans are estimated to be HIV positive. Approximately ten per cent of these have been officially registered (Angop, 27 September 2000).

**Malaria:** In common with several other countries in the region, malaria is currently the leading cause of non-violent death. The Minister of Health reported 1,276,000 recorded cases during 1999, leading to death in over 25,500 instances. Spraying, use of insecticide-soaked nets, and provision of cheap medicines are the major strategies being adopted by the government.

**Tuberculosis:** TB is associated with poverty and high density living; conditions in Angola have been highly favourable to its spread. Treatment and awareness for prevention are being promoted. It is likely that the association with HIV/AIDS, now common in South Africa and other countries, will emerge in Angola too once testing and research are enhanced. A recent report revealed that over 1,340 new cases of TB had been recorded in Luanda alone from April to June 2001 (Angop, 25 July 2001).

**Leprosy:** On 7 August 2000, the pro-government newspaper, Jornal de Angola, reported that approximately 6 people per ten thousand in Angola were leprosy sufferers, representing a severe public health problem. Kwanza Sul and Benguela appear to the worst affected provinces. There are 18 treatment centres countrywide, operated by the state, private bodies and churches. Some 12 per cent of new cases were among children; while 17 per cent of afflicted people suffered serious deformities and physical as well as social incapacitation. Most of these were unable to get timely treatment during the war.

**Measles:** Measles continues to pose a substantial risk to weak and undernourished children, in particular. A 10-day vaccination campaign in previously inaccessible areas of eastern Moxico province in early 2001 reached almost 21,200 under fives, but insecurity in some areas and transport shortages meant that this fell well short of the target of over 63,000. Over 18,000 of the children also received Vitamin A (Angop, 5 April 2001).

While vaccination and effective treatment are naturally important and are saving lives, disease represents only one of the factors making Angola one of the most dangerous countries in which to live. Pervasive insecurity, displacement and poverty – all greatly exacerbated by the ongoing war – lie at the heart of Angola’s problems. The great *confusão* (literally confusion, but in the context of the Angolan and the erstwhile Mozambican conflicts, given the much more figurative and profound meaning of disruption or catastrophe) produces the conditions in which these and other diseases can spread rapidly. Preventative and curative services collapse or are non-existent, and large numbers of vulnerable people are forced to take refuge in the bush or to live in high densities and often unsanitary conditions in camps or in overcrowded poor urban *bairros* and *musseques* (informal shanty or mud-brick areas).
Education

The war, budget cuts and inflation have devastated the formal education system. The gains made during the early years of independence have been reversed, especially during the 1990s. Teachers' salaries are now worth a mere $10 per month, inadequate even to cover a small fraction of living costs. Like many other public sector workers, they have been forced to seek other means of survival, or at least to do two or three jobs simultaneously. Many traditional leaders still perceive western-style education as inappropriate and corrupting of the youth. Facilities have been destroyed by the war; and displacement has created a profound mismatch between demand and supply (Guardian, 4 April 2000:19).

The statistics, however inaccurate, make horrifying reading. Roughly one million children of primary school age are not obtaining any formal schooling; the enrolment rate of all children aged 5-18 is estimated at a mere 48 per cent. One quarter of girls obtain no more than four years of schooling. The national examination failure rate after four years of schooling is over 30 per cent; dropout rates over the same period are as high as 20 per cent, while class sizes average about 80. Over half of all teachers are inadequately trained and qualified. Only 5.6 per cent of the government's budget is devoted to education, a quarter of expenditure in several other African countries with low levels of human development (Guardian, 4 April 2000:19).

Only where foreign NGOs, such as the Canadian-based Development Workshop, or other donors fund specific schools or community education programmes, is the picture less bleak. Adra, a local organisation of former teachers, organises regular seminars and community awareness programmes in Luanda, Benguela and Malanje, attempting to counteract the widespread sense of isolation and apathy felt by teachers, and to involve officials and parents in the life of the school (Guardian, 4 April 2000:19).

Recent Donor Funding

The generally improving security situation in late 2000 and the policy shift to institute a six-month limit on relief feeding for displaced people were reflected in a decrease in the total amount being sought by the UN's Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for Angola in 2001 – US$202 million compared with $260 million in 2000. Most of this is intended to fund relief operations. Only 52 per cent of the 2000 total had been funded by the beginning of October, a decline from 72 per cent of the 1999 total by the equivalent date. The principal elements of the 2001 appeal are food security ($145 million), co-ordination, security and support services ($20 million), and health and nutrition ($15 million). The WFP is seeking the lion's share ($155 million) and UNICEF $18 million. Some relief agencies are concerned at the growth of donor fatigue, especially in view of the obvious wealth being generated through the oil and diamond sectors but which barely touch the lives of the poor and destitute, while war continues to be waged. The agencies also rebut government charges that they are not doing enough by pointing to the government's restrictive visa policies and other hindrances that cost valuable time and money to work around (APM, 29 November 2000; 28 March 2001; Angop, 28 March 2001; Economist, 13 January 2001).

While it may seem churlish to question an international humanitarian relief programme that has been helping several million desperate people to survive in the face of constant danger (to aid staff as well as the recipients), a detailed evaluation of this difficult and costly operation is warranted. This would be of great value locally,
but also very useful to inform future operations in comparable circumstances. In addition to overall effectiveness and cost-benefit measures, it seems appropriate to assess the decision-making and review mechanisms relating to the use of airlifts, given the very high costs involved and the relatively modest volumes of relief supplies thus able to be transported, even though sometimes there was clearly no realistic alternative. Tendering and procurement processes should also be reviewed, given what is known about levels of corruption in Angola and some neighbouring countries, and about the nature of charter aircraft operations in Africa and beyond. Ultimately, it is important to know whether and to what extent interests associated with the protagonists or their backers have benefited from relief operations. Similarly, what proportion of relief supplies reached the intended recipients as opposed to being bartered with, given to or stolen by protagonists en route? Put most bluntly, have the relief operations in any way facilitated prolongation of the war, and have they been carried out as efficiently and effectively as possible in such admittedly difficult circumstances?

In terms of development – as opposed to relief – assistance, the European Union recently announced a $132 million poverty alleviation programme for the period 2002-5. This focuses on the most vulnerable and needy citizens, linked to water supply projects, training for some 20,000 teachers, and assistance to landmine victims (Angolan Mission to the UN, 27 June 2001). It is intended to provide continuity of assured funding for a reconstruction and development programme that will seek to complement short-term relief aid and which is in line with current British and European donor policy to prioritise poverty alleviation. However, in the Angolan context of pervasive dislocation and poverty, as detailed above, targeting the approximately 1.5 million people in absolute poverty will represent a considerable challenge in its own right. It is also not yet clear what proportion of the funds will be channelled through official conduits as opposed to development NGOs, which are more likely to be able to achieve such targeting effectively.

Bilateral assistance from individual donors continues to play an important role in specific areas or sectors. For example, in November, Italy and Angola signed a protocol on co-operation in respect of food security, with particular reference to agricultural production by war displacees in Bengo, Luanda and Kwanza Sul provinces. US$3 million of funding will be provided. Angola and Brazil are cooperating in the areas of personal development, information exchange, and technical assistance. Angola and South Africa instituted a bilateral commission in November to cover the full range of mutual interests. As two of the three principal economies in the region, a firmer partnership could enhance regional stability. Russia and Angola have recently enhanced their bilateral co-operation under their Economic, Technical, Scientific and Cultural Joint Commission in various economic, social and cultural sectors. China has signed an agreement to build a provincial hospital in south Luanda, on land donated by the provincial government and with work being bid for on public tender. Meanwhile the Japanese government has donated $16.9 million to cover socio-economic projects including the importation of rice, improvements to Luanda’s notorious water supply system and to health services through the purchase of medical equipment for 14 health centres in the capital (Angop, 17 November 2000; 20 November 2000; 21 November 2000; 12 February 2001; 27 March 2001; 30 March 2001; 2 April 2001). The British DFID-funded Luanda Urban Poverty Programme (LUPP) continues to finance health and sanitation improvements in the musseques, and other programmes (see Cain, this issue).
Infrastructural Rehabilitation & Reconstruction

Limited progress is being made with the rehabilitation of infrastructure destroyed during the war or rendered unusable through lack of maintenance. Most parts of Luanda and other large centres not destroyed by fighting are in a parlous state. Some areas remain too insecure, while domestic funds are limited as a result of the combined effects of forward mortgaging of oil revenues to pay for arms imports over recent years, alleged corruption and projects that benefit the elite. Direct and indirect (i.e. through national or provincial government or intermediary agencies) donor assistance is therefore prominent in many of the projects and programmes being undertaken.

Prominent examples of activity include the following: the Huila provincial government is spending $333,000 on the six main bridges linking Lubango city to its suburbs, while a bridge over the Nko River in Zaire province that had been destroyed by UNITA in January 1999 was repaired and reopened in early January this year at a cost of $24,000. The National Bridges Enterprise has also been installing two metal bridges over the Colongue and Kuito rivers to replace those destroyed on the main route linking Huambo and Benguela via Londuimbali (Angop, 22 October 2000; 9 January 2001; 14 February 2001). At a rather larger scale, the Brazilian transnational Odebrecht construction company has been awarded a $12 million contract to rehabilitate the Biópio hydro-electric station and dam in order to increase the electricity generating capacity to supply Benguela and Lobito cities (Angop, 21 November 2000).

One example of greater investment in social sector rehabilitation is the approval by the Council of Ministers in June 2000 of $54 million for phase 2 of the water supply project for southwestern Luanda, where water pumping has not occurred for 20 years. Phase one benefited some 600,000 people in Neves Bendinhas and Terra Nova suburbs as well as the city centre (APM, 26 July 2000:7).

Some provinces have also launched integrated, intersectoral programmes. Huila is concentrating on 7 of its 14 districts in a five-year programme to rehabilitate social and economic infrastructure and to boost housing construction and agricultural production. In June 2001, the provincial authorities in Huila also announced a rehabilitation and construction programme for 22 schools and four hospitals at a cost of $22 million. Similar investments will be required countrywide in order to begin to address the great infrastructural needs of this sector. Uige is seeking $80 million to rehabilitate its industrial and commercial sectors (Angop, 16 October 2000; 14 February 2001; 27 June 2001).

The spate of aircraft crashes in late 2000, usually shortly after take-off and with the loss of all those aboard, highlighted the parlous state of infrastructure, technical maintenance and quality control in the civil aviation sector. The country also has no integrated air traffic control system. Most crashes have been attributed to human error and mechanical failure. Virtually all the planes involved have been old Antonovs crewed by Ukrainians or other East European nationalities. One exploded on 31 October 2000 en route from the diamond mining centre of Saurimo to Luanda, and another crashed just after take-off from Luanda on 15th November 2000, with the loss of 48 and 57 lives respectively. In response, the Minister of Transport suspended operations involving Antonov 12, 24, 26, 30 and 32 aircraft, pending a thorough investigation, while the Director of the Angolan Civil Aviation Authority was replaced (Angop, 16 and 17 November 2000; Independent, 2 November 2000; APM, 29 November 2000).
Conclusions

Problems persist in some areas, but improvements in the overall security situation are enabling a very welcome effort to reintegrate people in agricultural projects in their areas of refuge if they cannot yet return home. Displaced people are now receiving emergency food for a maximum of six months, in an effort to avoid long term dependency, to promote self-reliance, and to avoid donor fatigue. This is reflected in the reduced – but still very substantial – aid budget for 2001. Achieving the above objectives will be far from easy, however, and many people are likely to require some support in certain areas of the country for a considerable period. The threat of renewed instability and UNITA violence may also undermine people’s confidence and thus willingness to invest time and meagre resources in reconstruction, especially in central Angola. Events in Bié province during the first half of 2001 underscore this point. The humanitarian crisis there, and especially in Kuito, Camacupa and Cuemba, has now reached critical levels as a result of widespread displacement and long-term malnutrition. Senior NGO staff have criticised the government for an entirely inadequate response to the plight of (newly) displaced people. By contrast, conditions in Huambo appear much improved. This highlights one key point, namely that conditions and prospects are now subject to substantial local variation.

The policy shift by the government and major agencies to time-limit relief supplies also appeared to take little account of the necessity for food aid to be provided until newly sown crops could be harvested – a period of several months. The importance of this is underlined by the fact that the displaced people may be farming in unfamiliar conditions, and are themselves frequently not in great physical or psychological shape. There is certainly a possibility that government reports will overemphasise the ease and success of reintegration and reconstruction programmes, with a resultant danger that people will be caught short if crops fail or instability returns as support mechanisms may have been withdrawn. The effects of displacement, especially if accompanied by torture, abuse, bereavement, as well as malnutrition, persist long after the event and after return or resettlement.

The issues highlighted above reflect the longer term consequences of prolonged war and economic mismanagement. Social infrastructure and services can be – and in the Angolan case have been – destroyed or disrupted very quickly in particular localities when war strikes. However, the problem facing the country now is that these services have been degraded and undermined countrywide through successive waves of conflict over 20-30 years. Great strides had been made during the first few years of independence in expanding and upgrading primary health care and education. However, since the early 1980s, this has all been undone, and the situation in most areas is now worse than in 1975.

Even in the few areas not directly affected by war, such as the cities of Luanda, Lobito and Benguela, the effects have been pernicious. This is due to the loss of qualified and experienced personnel (both directly through death, conscription and the like, and indirectly because of a lack of resources to pay a living wage), a lack of funds for maintenance and reconstruction of facilities and infrastructure, and even for recurrent expenditure on medicines, equipment and books. Meanwhile, the inflow of deslocados increases yet further the pressure on remaining staff, services and infrastructure, and contributing in turn to the downward spiral.

Those civilian staff still in post are often dedicated beyond the call of duty, but their effectiveness is hampered by the resource constraints and the necessity of trying to hold down two or three parallel jobs in order to try to make ends meet. In many areas,
too, political interference or harassment by militias, police and other paramilitary elements on both sides in the conflict has often exacerbated working conditions and heightened fears about their physical safety. Resignations continue at a high level, despite successive promises by the government over the last eighteen months that civil service salaries will be increased to offset recent inflationary cost spirals (see also below).

Infrastructural rehabilitation, albeit patchy and often slow, is proceeding in a growing number of areas, and to that extent is facilitating the movement of food supplies, other commodities and also people around the country. Virtual drought conditions in many areas before the rains arrived in earnest during February 2001 raised fears about a decline in agricultural output this year, but overall prospects have now been greatly enhanced. This is of considerable importance given the resettlement and reintegration efforts for long term displaced people, and the efforts to promote local self-reliance and food security. Continuing insecurity and the scarcity of appropriately skilled human and material resources, represent critical limiting constraints in many areas. The promotion of narrow elite interests, especially in urban areas, also sometimes represents an inappropriate use of resources and a further constraint to meeting the needs of the poor and vulnerable.

Reversing the fundamental and countrywide crisis of social services and infrastructure will be a long-term and slow process, even once fighting ends in particular areas. The restoration of what is somewhat euphemistically referred to in Angola as ‘state administration’ is an important first step. However, the inevitable priorities of emergency relief, medical care and rehabilitation, demining and clearance of other military ordnance, and the resettlement of deslocados, themselves represent formidable challenges in the context of prevailing conditions. In some areas, there has been inadequate progress even on these. Longer term tasks like reconstruction of physical and social infrastructure; restoring agricultural and non-agricultural production; tackling the recent resurgence of killer diseases like malaria and trypansomiasis and the spread of HIV/AIDS; trauma counselling and other measures to heal the psychological wounds of war, cannot even begin until security can be guaranteed and adequate resources and skilled personnel are available.

With each successive convulsion of war over the last three to four decades, the recoverability of existing communities and systems has declined. What is required now is orders of magnitude greater than ever before. Moreover, the levels of support required to help amputees, traumatised war victims, those suffering the debilitating effects of prolonged malnutrition, AIDS sufferers and so forth, will continue to increase and to be required at a sustained level for decades to come. The current and seemingly sustained high oil price represents a windfall opportunity for the Angolan government and people; to date, however, there is little evidence that this being exploited more than marginally. War payments and repayments, corrupt dealings, and ad hoc crisis management are still dominant.

Even assuming that peace, security and stability can actually be achieved, the transition from the politics of war and anti-development to a more pro-people and developmental trajectory will be painful. This will require a vision and reprioritisation that may be beyond the present leadership of the main protagonists, especially if space is to be created for inclusive, participatory and emancipatory policies that are locally sensitive. As Cain (this issue) points out, some valuable lessons in this regard can be learnt from the experience of the Community Rehabilitation Programme (CRP) of the mid-1990s. Whether the nascent civil society movement will become strong
enough to assert such demands – which form part of its vision of an inclusive peace and reconstruction process – in the short term currently remains doubtful. More likely, at least initially, is the re-emergence of familiar, state-centric and top-down developmentalist policies in line with the autocratic and dirigiste instincts of the current MPLA and UNITA leaderships.

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Endnotes

1. The Luanda-based breakaway faction, known as UNITA Renovada, formed in late 1998 when Savimbi returned to war, and which has disowned Savimbi, participates in parliament and favours peace, has failed to gain the support of most of the movement’s membership. Similarly, it should be pointed out that, although clearly dominated and controlled by the MPLA, the government remains technically the Government of National Unity and Reconstruction (GURN) established in terms of the Lusaka Accords, and the national army, the Forcas Armadas Angolana (FAA), similarly contains some former UNITA fighters.

2. Cumulative UNITA diamond revenues have been widely estimated at over $4 billion. Malaquias (2001:312) recently put the figure at $3.7 billion in the period 1992-97, with annual revenues in the range of $400-600 million, and an additional $300 million in 1999.


4. These poverty levels are apparently calculated, following UNDP practice, in purchasing power parity US$ terms. There may be some misreporting of the data in the media, because the figures cited here bear an uncanny similarity to the 1995 urban poverty levels (61 per cent in poverty, i.e. below $39/month per adult-equivalent; and 12 per cent in extreme poverty, i.e. below $14/month per adult-equivalent) cited in a talk by Tony Hodges at the Britain-Angola Forum, Royal Institute for International Affairs, London, on 13 October 2000.

5. On a more positive note, the World Food Programme estimated that the malnutrition rate for children under five among displaced people in government-controlled towns had fallen from over 30 per cent in June 1999 to 3 per cent in August 2000 (APM, October 2000:3).

6. The HDI is a compound index on a scale of 0-1, in terms of which countries scoring from 0.8 upwards are defined as having high levels of human development; those from 0.5-0.799 medium levels; and those scoring from 0-0.499 low levels of human development. The HDI comprises three elements, reflecting average life expectancy at birth, educational levels, and real per capita GDP in terms of purchasing power parity. As such it provides a broader and more useful basis for international comparison of quality of life than the traditional World Bank ranking based solely on per capita GDP in US$ terms calculated on the basis of exchange rates.


8. The base year for these data is unknown, but the war situation inevitably makes accurate recording extremely unlikely. National data for 1996 cited in UNICEF’s State of the World’s Children 2000 give a total enrolment for the first 6 years of basic education (grades 1-6) of 50 per cent, comprising 52 per cent of boys and 48 per cent of girls (figures which imply equal numbers of both sexes); in urban areas the rate was 64 per cent and in rural areas only 40 per cent. Today’s figures would almost certainly be lower, given the mass population displacements and infrastructural destruction of the last two years.
Bibliographic Note


The European Commission’s EU-ACP Courier, No. 185, 2001, contains a feature section on Angola. An invaluable monthly update on social, humanitarian, economic and political and military developments is the Angola Peace Monitor produced by Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) in London (www.actsa.org/apm/) – abbreviated as APM here. Daily news items in English, Portuguese and French from official sources like Angop, the Angolan News Agency, can be found on the Angola news website (www.angolanews.com). The Economist Intelligence Unit (EU) in London publishes an annual Country Report, and Quarterly Reports. Other sources cited include the Jornal de Angola (now available online at www.jornaldeangola.com), Folha 8, Agora and Actual newspapers (Luanda), the Guardian and Independent newspapers and the Economist and Africa Confidential magazines (UK). The UNDP’s annual Human Development Report is published by Oxford University Press, New York, and available online at www.undp.org/hdr/.
Making War & Lots of Money: The Political Economy of Protracted Conflict in Angola

Assis Malaquias

The civil war in Angola has mutated into a major criminal enterprise. Once regarded as a conflict caused primarily by ethnic and class divisions exacerbated by Cold War ideological rivalries, Angola’s protracted conflict is now a convenient cover used by the elites commanding the principal antagonists – the governing Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and the rebel Uniao Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) movement – to enrich themselves. The consequences for the country and its people have been devastating. Angola is being reduced to ashes: destruction, death and incessant suffering consume the daily lives of all but a few of its citizens. This article examines the internal and external dimensions of this war for Angola’s oil and diamond wealth.

A guerra civil em Angola transformou-se num empreendimento criminoso que as elites político-militares usam como um veículo para cobrir o acambarcamento desenfreado das riquezas nacionais. As causas históricas do conflito, principalmente as divisões político-ideológicas entre os movimentos nacionalistas, tornaram-se insignificantes depois do fim da Guerra Fria e do desaparecimento da União Soviética em 1991. Ironicamente, nem o fim deste conflito ideológico internacional conseguiu aliviar o pesadelo nacional em Angola. Assim, torna-se cada vez mais claro que a luta em Angola continua, e por vezes agudiza-se, porque proporciona condições ideais para as elites nacionais enriquecerem-se enquanto o País encaminha-se para o abismo. Deste ponto de vista, a guerra em Angola está um projecto racional para as cliques que detêm o poder político-militar: as pequenas elites no seio do MPLA e da UNITA. A monopolização do poder por estas elites proporciona-lhes oportunidades espectaculares para enriquecimento pessoal numa escala com poucos paralelos no mundo. Mais concretamente, enquanto a grande maioria das populações sobrevivem em condições sub-humanas, um punhado de indivíduos tem a oportunidade de acumular bilhões de dólares Americanos através da sua habilidade de capturar as receitas nacionais provenientes da exploração de petróleo e diamantes assim como através de comissões de compra de armamentos.

Este ensaio sugere que a sobrevivência de Angola como uma entidade viável, tanto em termos geográficos como político-económicos, dependerá da sua capacidade de livrar-se do aperto asfixiante aplicado pela corrupção do MPLA e a violência da UNITA.

Introduction

Angola is a fabulously wealthy African country endowed with abundant reserves of oil, diamonds, and other precious minerals. Paradoxically, this country of 12 million people is consistently regarded as one of the ‘worst country in the world’ (Hajari and
After more than a quarter century of civil war, the country teeters precariously on the edge of disintegration. This near-anarchy, however, has provided ideal conditions for rapacious national elites to pillage the country’s resources with the assistance of several multinational corporations – seemingly oblivious of the sub-human existence most Angolans have been forced to endure since independence from Portugal on 11 November 1975.

The optimistic dreams set free by independence quickly turned into a collective nightmare as the nationalist movements that led the anti-colonial struggle failed to find peaceful mechanisms to share power in a post-colonial state. In retrospect, the post-colonial state building project in Angola would have been extremely challenging even in ideal conditions – minimally, a united anti-colonial movement with visionary and transparent leadership committed to national uplifting, not personal aggrandizement – because important historical factors were bound to conspire against this new and brittle entity. Alas, the post-colonial state in Angola was just as artificial as the colony it replaced. Not surprisingly, therefore, ethnic divisions pre-dating colonialism remain intact and consistently act as powerful centrifugal forces. Historically, the complex processes of socio-political and economic development that were occurring in the geographical spaces from which Angola was carved as a colony were taking place mainly along ethnic lines. The colonial presence made these processes even more complex by forcibly absorbing into the colony diverse ethno-linguistic groups with incongruent histories and aspirations.

For many of these would-be African nations, independence provided the opportunity for reclaiming political, economic and cultural stakes within the new states. But such claims could not be tolerated in the state-centric Westphalian framework within which former European colonial possessions like Angola were forced to operate. Thus, most ethnic groups’ higher aspirations had to be sacrificed at the altar of modern state-building projects that often involved unpalatable negative-sum choices, that is, post-colonial African states could only be erected upon the remains of pre-colonial nations. From this perspective, Angola’s conflict is not unique. Africa’s post-colonial history is filled with examples of conflicts resulting primarily from various societies’ inability to reconcile pre-colonial aspirations with post-colonial realities. Angola’s uniqueness resides in the fact that, instead of devising a positive-sum framework for ending the conflict, the nationalist movements have created additional reasons and conditions for prolonging it. Thus, the fundamental causal factor – that is, lack of fit between pre-colonial nations and the post-colonial state – were aggravated by Cold War inspired ideological differences and, more recently, by violence and kleptocracy.

This article deals with the latest salient aspect of Angola’s protracted conflict, the interplay between violence and kleptocracy in shaping Angola’s post-colonial political economy. On one side, the governing MPLA – once guided by lofty Marxist-Leninist ideals – has opportunistically and completely abandoned the goals for which it fought against colonialism. Instead, it created a viciously oppressive, fundamentally intolerant, and thoroughly corrupt system where the head of state, along with his small entourage and their respective families and friends have transformed the few remaining viable portions of the state into their private fiefdom. In the process, this small group has grown spectacularly rich by embezzling billions of dollars in revenues originating from the exploration of offshore oil while the vast majority of the population lives in absolute poverty.
On the other side, UNITA has terrorised most of the country by conducting a brutally devastating guerrilla war since 1976. This group was once regarded as a legitimate opposition movement fighting to dismantle the MPLA’s one-party system and secure democratic representation for other ethnic groups, especially the majority Ovimbundu. To the contrary, UNITA has degenerated into a powerful private guerrilla force whose primary objective is inflicting unrelenting and indiscriminate suffering upon defenceless civilian populations while obliterating all infrastructures as a means to render the country ungovernable. Originally, this strategy was aimed at eroding the authority and legitimacy of the post-colonial state to accelerate its expected implosion. However, given the state’s uncanny ability to survive – through a blend of coercion and corruption – UNITA has redirected its efforts to plundering the country’s resources; first ivory, timber and gold, now diamonds.

Angola thus remains held hostage by two evil political/military enterprises with insatiable appetite for its wealth. The price, in both human lives lost and infrastructure destroyed, has been unacceptably high. The civil war has claimed more than 500,000 lives and has brought most of the country to a standstill. This article argues that, to survive, Angola must eventually find the means to extricate itself of MPLA and UNITA’s stranglehold on wealth and power. The few remaining viable institutions capable of developing alternative forms of governance – especially at the sub-state level – must be called upon to provide a bridge to a less corrosive political economy with the ability to eventually realise the great potential that Angola’s wealth represents.

This article provides an analysis of the forces and conditions that have shaped Angola’s post-colonial political economy. It is divided into two parts. First, it provides a succinct survey of Angola’s resource endowment to underline the point that this resource abundance has historically dominated Angola’s political economy. The second section examines why, in spite of Angola’s tremendous wealth, the overwhelming majority of Angolans live in abject poverty. It suggests that MPLA and UNITA elites – much like the Portuguese colonial settlers they fought against – have consistently and avariciously captured most of Angola’s wealth while the survival of the people in whose name they fought now depends on the generosity of international aid agencies. The article concludes by pointing out that, ultimately, Angola’s survival as a viable entity – both in terms of geography and political economy – depends to a considerable degree on its ability to extricate itself from the asphyxiating grip of MPLA’s corruption and UNITA’s violence.

**Angola’s Wealth**

Although oil and diamonds have dominated Angola’s political economy since independence, Angola’s mineral wealth expands much beyond these two valuable commodities. Scientific surveys have established that Angola can be subdivided into five main regional geological units, each containing a distinct combination of valuable mineral deposits. First, Pleistocene to Cretaceous marine sediments lie in a series of coastal basins on the western margin of Angola. These rocks hold the country’s oil reserves. Second, Quaternary to Tertiary sedimentary cover rocks, comprising sand, quartzitic sandstone, gravel and clay, extend over nearly half of Angola, including the entire eastern part. Most of Angola’s diamond production comes from these rocks. Third, Mesozoic to Palaeozoic sediments occur mainly in the Cassanje Graben, a north-central to north-western geological depression. Diverse sub-volcanic and volcanic bodies occur, including kimberlites and carbonatites along
a major south-west to north-east trend line across Angola. Fourth, Upper Proterozoic fold belts occur along the margins of Angola’s Precambrian shield, the most important being the West-Congo, Damara and Maiombe-Macongo. They are characterized by the occurrence of base metal mineralisation and a variety of industrial minerals. Fifth, Lower Proterozoic to Archean rocks form the Angolan, Maiombe, Cassai and Bangweulo shields and the Kwanza horst. Granitic-gneissic terrains, meta-volcano-sedimentary and meta-sedimentary (greenstone) belts can be differentiated. Complex Lower Proterozoic greenstone belts are present in south-central Angola (Riddler, 1997:16). In sum, Angola has vast resources in gold, platinum, nickel, chrome, iron, copper, manganese, kaolin, gypsum, quartz and zinc. In addition, Angola also has some of the most bountiful fishing grounds on the planet. Its extraordinarily diverse land is ideal for agriculture and dairy production. However, as explained below, oil and diamonds have dominated Angola’s political economy primarily as a result of the ongoing civil war.

Oil
The continental margin of West Africa comprises seven major oil producing areas or basins. They include: (1) Abidjan, straddling Côte d’Ivoire and the Tano and meta sub-basins in Ghana; (2) Offshore Benin, structurally defined by the Romanche Fracture Zone in the west and the Okitipupa High (in Nigeria) in the east with the western flank extending to Togo; (3) Niger Delta, located between Okitipupa High in the west and Cameroun in the east and including the Rio-Del-Ray-Cameroun-Fernando Po Basin; (4) Gabon Coastal, extending from the southern part of Cameroun, through Equatorial Guinea to Gabon, where it is bounded to the south by the Gabon Fracture Zone; (5) Lower Congo, extending from Congo to Angola, is bounded to the north by the Gabon Fracture Zone; and, (6) Kwanza Basin, stretching along the entire western coast of Angola (Akinosho, 1999:34).

Geologically, Angola is situated along two of the most productive basins in Africa: Lower Congo and Kwanza. Belgium’s Petrofina made the first commercial oil discovery in 1955 at Benfica in the Kwanza basin. Since then, twelve billion barrels of oil have been discovered. Major discoveries and aggressive exploration have made Angola the second largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria. Currently, Angola produces about 800,000 barrels per day (b/d). The level of production is expected to grow very quickly because, since the late 1990s, Angola has become a ‘global exploration hot spot’ (Oil and Gas Journal). The government predicts that oil production will reach 1 million b/d by 2002 (Beckwith, 1997:139) and 1.6 million b/d by 2006 (Bamber, 2001:3).

Industry estimates suggest that production could reach 2.5 million b/d within 15 years (Rissik, 2001:8). These estimates are based on the fact that current oil exploration has taken place primarily in shallow waters. Recent explorations in deep and ultra deep water have yielded colossal deposits that are expected to make Angola one of the most important non-OPEC producers in the world. In explaining the rising importance of Angola as a major theatre of oil operations, The Economist (10 June 2000) points out that:

Globally, companies hope to strike oil with four of every ten exploration wells drilled. In Angola’s deep blocks 14, 15, 17 and 18, that strike rate has been almost ten out of ten, and it has included such huge discoveries as Elf’s Dalia field in Block 17, which is believed to
contain more than 1 billion barrels, the equivalent of one-fifth of Britain's entire known reserves.

Since oil production takes place almost exclusively offshore, continuing civil war has not been enough to dampen widespread optimism about Angola's oil sector. Given this optimism, major multinational oil companies participating in the 'scramble' for some of Africa's most sought-after oil prospective territory paid US$900 million in signature bonuses in 1999 to explore the rich Angolan waters. Angola expects an additional US$3.5-5 billion per year in related investment by 2005 (Rissik, 2000:8; The Economist, 10 June 2000; Offshore, February & May 2001). Investment in Block 17 alone is expected to reach US$8 billion (Beckman, 2001:30). Alas, as with the earlier 'scramble for Africa' in the late 19th Century, Western powers' designs—mainly through multinational corporations—are having calamitous consequences for Africa's peoples. In Angola, for example, this new scramble has promoted both dependency and corruption. Angola's dependence on oil since independence cannot be overestimated. Oil accounts for 90 per cent of total exports that bring an estimated US$3 billion in annual revenues. However, as discussed later, these revenues have not been used to improve Angolans' living conditions. Instead, much of the oil revenue has found their way into the private pockets of the President and his small entourage. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi has been able to amass an equally impressive fortune by his control of Angola's second major source of revenues: diamonds.

Diamonds

Angola's diamond resources are possibly the largest in Africa (Premoll, 1992:32). Diamonds were first discovered in Angola in 1912. Since then, about 700 kimberlites have been identified throughout the country, most of them aligned along a southwest-northeast trend across Angola into the Democratic Republic of Congo. More kimberlites are expected to be discovered by a combination of satellite image interpretation and ground geochemical exploration, modern techniques being used successfully in other major diamond producing countries.

The erosion of kimberlite pipes, especially in Lunda Norte province, has produced significant quantities of alluvial diamonds that can be mined with relatively unsophisticated, even rudimentary, tools. Industrial mining of Angola's large number of kimberlite pipes would require significant investments. However, given the quality of Angola diamonds—approximately 90 per cent is of gem or near-gem quality—it would be realistic to expect considerable international interest in exploring this vast diamond wealth in the absence of war.

The Angolan government initially attempted to develop the diamond industry using the same formula that proved to be so successful in the oil sector. Thus, it divided known diamond fields into various blocks to be exploited under production-sharing agreements. Although major international diamond companies were granted permits, the continuing civil war and the government's inability to wrestle control of the countryside from UNITA rebels has hampered the development of diamond sector.

Still, even in conditions of war, on average Angola accounts for 5 to 8 per cent of the world's diamond production and exports (Premoll, 1992:32). In 1999 Angola produced about US$600 million in rough diamonds. However, as will be discussed later, a considerable portion of Angola's diamond exports in conducted illegally by UNITA rebels. But the rebels are not the only players in Angola's illegal diamond sector. Angolan armed forces (FAA) soldiers regularly participate in informal mining
operations on behalf of their superiors (Dietrich, 2000:178). There is also a large civilian sector engaged in illegal diamond mining. About 150,000 operators (garimpeiros), working individually or in small syndicates, brave dangerous military conditions to illegally mine diamonds and smuggle them into neighbouring countries.

Angola’s oil and diamond wealth alone should provide all its citizens with a relatively comfortable life, especially in those areas that have remained under government control. Why, then, do most Angolans – including approximately one quarter of the population living in the capital region – live in abject poverty?

**Angola’s Poverty**

Protracted military conflict in Angola has provided both MPLA and UNITA elites with opportunities for self-enrichment while terrorising and pauperising the population. Evidence of the criminal nature of Angola’s political economy is irrefutable, abundant, and mounting. The elites have not only robbed the country of its wealth but, equally reprehensible, they have also destroyed or atrophied the lives of most Angolans; several recent journalistic accounts paint a horrific picture. For example, in Luanda, the capital city of four million residents, only about 20,000 people have running water or modern toilets (Harden, 2000:3). Consequently, the city is:

> in a perpetual state of unabashed excretion. Men defecate in plain sight by the side of the road, squatting in heaps of garbage. Raw sewage seeps out everywhere, flowing directly from buildings into the streets, where it forms great green-black pools. It festers as an immobile sludge in the troughs that weave in and out among the labyrinths of gray shacks. Luanda’s own special aroma, without a doubt, is the stench of shit (Anderson, 2000:46).

Another reporter notes that,

> down the block from the glitzy local headquarters of the French oil giant TotalFinaElf, street children make their homes in four abandoned cars. They’ve removed the seats and covered the vehicles with pieces of plastic, cardboard and sheet metal. One car has sprouted a second floor. The ‘residents’ carry parcels for shoppers at a nearby supermarket, and cook their food in a fire among the rusting hulks. Two blocks away, another group of kids have set up housekeeping in the sewer. They climb down a storm drain; when it rains, they scurry out quickly (Masland, 2001:42).

Angola’s broader social indicators capture the country’s wretched conditions. As in most other conflicts, Angolan children have suffered disproportionately from the ravages of war. The infant mortality rate at birth stands at 170 per 1,000; infant mortality rate for children under 5 is 292 per 1,000; 16.7 per cent of children under 5 suffer from malnutrition; 41.6 per cent of children are underweight. General conditions are equally appalling: life expectancy is 42 years; 82.5 per cent of the population live in absolute and relative poverty; 59 per cent of the population survive without access to drinking water; 60 per cent of the population do not have access to sanitation, 76 per cent of the population live without access to health care; 3.2 million people require food aid; 13 per cent of the population is severely malnourished; an estimated 1.7 million people are internally displaced; the unemployment rate stands at 80 per cent; and, there has been one mine incident for every 430 people (Global Witness, 1999:2).
This picture, however deplorable, would not, in and of itself, constitute an indictment of Angola’s governing class, that is, Futunguistas, senior MPLA officials, and top military officers. The real measure of relative suffering it represents requires juxtaposing another set of images provided by the luxurious lifestyle of the ruling class. For example, in her latest shopping trip to Brazil, Angola’s First Lady Ana Paula dos Santos spent at least US$75,000 – a sum equal to the annual budget of a microcredit programme Mrs. Dos Santos runs for poor Angolan women (Masland, 2001:42). The First Lady may justifiably claim that she has been singled out for criticism. Alas, her comportment is the norm among members of MPLA’s ruling elite. This party’s early revolutionary zeal has been forever lost and has been replaced by an equally zealous embrace of the immense wealth generated by oil revenues.

**MPLA: Drowning in Oil**

MPLA came to power in traumatic circumstances at the end of Portuguese colonial rule. The process of decolonisation was precipitated by a military coup that deposed the regime of Marcelo Caetano in Portugal on 25 April 1974. The coup leaders were mostly military officers who opposed the old regime’s colonial policies. Therefore, one of their main objectives was to quickly end costly colonial wars. Thus, Portugal placed its colonies on the fast track to political independence. The former colonies of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, São Tome and Principe, and Mozambique were granted independence without major problems. This was facilitated by the unity within their respective liberation movements. Angola’s situation – where three armed liberation movements representing different ethnic and ideological constituencies were unable to find agreement on a common approach to decolonisation and beyond – was considerably more complex. Predictably, Angola’s decolonisation process quickly degenerated into a three-way civil war as the liberation movements attempted to grab power forcefully and individually – from the departing colonial authorities.

Each of the three liberation movements attempted to grab power with the help of foreign allies. Consequently, Zairian troops invaded Angola from the north in support of Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (FNLA) while South African troops invaded from the south in support of UNITA. However, only MPLA – given its ethnic power base around the capital city of Luanda – succeeded in seizing and maintaining itself in power with the help of Cuban troops. Thus, victory in a three-way civil war, not electoral success, provided MPLA with the mandate to govern post-colonial Angola. But MPLA could not capitalise on the ‘victory’ over its domestic and international adversaries and failed to establish the foundations for a strong state for several reasons. The initial difficulties were visible soon after the euphoria of independence subsided. As the political and military dust from the struggle for independence settled, the gulf between the new regime and society became apparent. This schism was the result of various domestic conflicts related to class, race, ethnicity, and overall inability to cope with the administrative challenges of post-colonial governance. The latter set of challenges were all the more daunting because the collapse of the colonial regime with the ensuing civil war precipitating a mass exodus of the settler community that held a near monopoly on the key economic and administrative positions.

This destabilising exodus notwithstanding, MPLA’s major post-colonial challenges were primarily political. In the war against colonial domination and during its first years in power, the governing MPLA proclaimed itself as a ‘movement of the masses.’
Gradually, however, members of the urban elite – constituted predominantly by *mestizos* or people of mixed race – used their superior education, political skills, and economic power to take control of the party and other sources of state power. But, instead of maintaining the existing strong ties with workers and peasants, the governing elite grew increasingly detached from the common citizen and used the repressive means of the state to preserve its privileged status now supported by the inflow of increasingly large oil revenues.

The oil industry expanded almost without interruption during the civil war, partly as a result of the government’s pragmatic policies for this sector and, more specifically, the attractive terms offered to multinational oil companies operating in Angola. Soon after its creation in 1978, and after acquiring 51 per cent of the Angolan assets of Gulf Oil and Petrofina of Belgium, the state oil company Sonangol, conducted seismic surveys and divided the territorial coast into fourteen offshore blocks. It then proceeded to sell exploration rights to foreign oil companies. Subsequently, an additional twenty blocks were allocated. Currently, some of the major players in the global oil sector, including Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, Elf-Aquitaine, BP and Shell operate in Angola. Predictably, in a decaying state, the infusion of vast sums of oil revenues has been conducive to corruption, not development.

Indications of oil-induced corruption in the MPLA regime began soon after it came to power. For example, in 1981 the Petroleum Minister, Jorge Morais was fired and replaced by Energy Minister Pedro Van Dunem after Morais accused Herminio Escorcio, president of Sonangol, of receiving bribes from foreign oil companies. Morais also charged that Escorcio had made unauthorised agreements to sell Angolan oil to Gulf Oil Corp. at cut-rate prices (*Business Week*, 21 December 1981:47). Since the early 1980s, a ‘Bermuda triangle’ has developed between Sonangol, the National Bank of Angola and the Futungo de Belas presidential palace: most of the revenues generated from oil exploration seem to simply seem to vanish. Closer scrutiny reveals that Sonangol, the National Bank of Angola, and the Ministry of Finance have little control over oil revenues. Most of these revenues are controlled exclusively by the Presidency. As Le Billon explains, control over oil revenues allows the Presidency:

> to sustain a clientele beyond the military apparatus, building a degree of legitimacy among those rewarded and allowing support or resistance to reforms, according to short-term expediency (p. 64).

Moreover, the Presidency is the only organ with the power to authorize major governmental expenditures through a system of dedicated accounts that fall outside public scrutiny. In addition, President José Eduardo dos Santos is said to have a personal oil account. This account is supplied by US$0.70 to 2.00 per barrel of oil produced in Angola. Thus, at the current level of production, the President ‘earns’ up to US$1.6 million per day or $584 million per year! These exaggerated powers of the Presidency, within an overall context of lack of public scrutiny, have enabled members of the presidential entourage to engage in various forms of corrupt practices, especially kickbacks resulting from military procurement and outright theft. For example, in 1999 the Angolan rulers spent about half of the US$900 million windfall resulting from the sale of oil exploration rights to acquire weapons, many of which were purchased purely for kickback potential. There are also indications that Angolan government officials ‘stole a substantial part of what they did not spend on weapons’ (Harden, 2000:3). Alas, since the $900 million was not recorded in the country’s published budget, the Angolan political and military elites could continue to pay little or no attention to issues of accountability and transparency.
In the absence of accountability and transparency and with the continuing influx of considerable oil revenues, the powerful ruling class has engaged in an unprecedented and frenzied theft of public funds for personal gain. Thus, foreign oil companies are indeed paying for ‘Angola’s main community development programme: the transfer of money to banks in Zurich and Geneva’ (Harden, 2000:3). Increasingly, as Misser (2001) and Valls-Russell (2001) explain in their analyses of ‘Angolagate,’ the stench of Angola’s oil-inspired corruption is beginning to reach the corridors of power in major Western countries.

Even the relatively meagre oil revenues that stay in Angola is equally controlled by the head of state through a small clique of family members as well as close political and business associates. For instance, one of the President’s sisters, Marta, is the owner of Angola’s General Motors dealership and another sibling owns the country’s only flour-milling plant. The President’s half-Russian daughter, Isabel, is involved in a number of lucrative businesses. In addition to owning several enterprises including Luanda’s popular nightclub ‘Miami Beach’, the President’s daughter is an executive in the Luanda office of the oil industry giant Conoco and a major shareholder in several oil-drilling joint ventures with foreign firms as well as in the recently created Angolan diamond-marketing monopoly Ascorp (Anderson, 2000:46).

Further evidence of greed and corruption among the ruling elite is provided by the Fundacao Eduardo dos Santos (FESA). This ostensibly charitable organisation has been transformed into a potent institution within the failed and crumbling Angolan state through the infusion of vast financial resources derived from obscure sources and ‘donations’ from foreign enterprises operating in Angola. Although FESA has been publicly engaged in some socially responsible undertakings like building of schools and hospitals, it functions primarily and privately as a large presidential slush fund.

Corruption has become such a way of life for the elite that some of its more powerful members no longer make an effort to deny its existence. For example, presidential spokesperson, Aldemiro Vaz da Conceicao admits that President Jose Eduardo dos Santos must ‘take care of his image’ because

\[
\text{while all of us who are around him are taking advantage of our positions for our material benefit, he is the one who is getting all the blame. All the fingers are pointing at him (Anderson, 2000:46).}
\]

Indeed, the small ruling class has enjoyed a luxurious life amidst widespread misery. As a result, most citizens – destitute and helpless – now regard the elite’s grip on the state as a nightmarish throwback to colonial times when power, prestige, and privilege were closely associated with class and race. This particularly vicious type of predatory post-colonial state has been used by UNITA as a convenient justification for its insurgency. Alas, for Angola, insurgency created its own evil.

**UNITA: Drowning in Blood**

UNITA’s insurgency was initially seen as an important counterweight to check the MPLA government’s excesses and ultimately provide alternative forms of governance. In both respects, that promise has not been fulfilled. In the post-independence period, UNITA has abandoned whatever revolutionary ideals it might have developed during the nationalist anti-colonial struggle. Ironically, the discovery of important diamond deposits in areas under its control had a profound and negative
effect upon the insurgency. Diamonds provided the rebels with the means to acquire considerable quantities of weapons and other supplies to continue waging war. As defeating MPLA either through bullets or ballots became an increasingly distant possibility, UNITA focused instead on making the country ungovernable and thus enhance its ability to engage in diamond mining. Now, people became dispensable, even disposable. Consequently, UNITA rebels changed their overall strategy in the direction of controlling land for the resources they produced, not for the people inhabiting it. This abandonment of classic guerrilla strategy seriously weakened UNITA both politically and militarily.

UNITA’s Insurgency: Changing Contexts

Insurgency refers to a protracted political and military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling a state through the use of irregular military forces. Typically, insurgencies are responses to chronic governmental ineptitude, corruption, and other forms of bad governance. More proximate causes include governmental insensitivity and ineffectiveness in meeting popular demands. Insurgent movements use a variety of means to achieve their ultimate political goal of eroding governmental control and legitimacy. These actions can include guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilisation (Snow, 1998:228).

Most insurgencies have a dominant political character. As mentioned above, they are precipitated by real or perceived governmental breakdown manifested in unwillingness or inability to redress the demands of important social groups. In other words, where good government does not exist, insurgent movements appear and use warfare as a means to eliminate bad governance. In this sense, insurgencies traditionally have a Clausewitzian character inasmuch as military actions are subjugated to the political purposes for which war is fought.

However, once initiated, the conduct of insurgency often requires the adoption of Maoist revolutionary strategy and tactics to overcome important initial military disadvantages. Specifically, the initial stages require considerable patience because governments are typically better armed than the insurgents. This important military disadvantage is often minimised through the adoption of a highly mobile guerrilla warfare strategy.

Guerrilla war refers to military conflicts using unconventional tactics. Historically, this has been the preferred tool of smaller and weaker insurgent forces involved in combat against much larger and stronger conventional armies. Guerrilla fighters are usually irregular forces who possess neither the weapons nor the training to engage in a conventional war to achieve their political objectives. This mismatch, however, is not always disadvantageous to guerrilla forces. First, this type of warfare is much cheaper to conduct. Second, guerrillas have an important advantage because they generally control the tempo of fighting; they choose when and where to strike (Minix and Hawley, 1998:371).

Unlike conventional wars, where the principal objective is the control of territory, guerrilla warfare seeks to undermine the exercise of central political authority within a country or region of a country. In this sense, although guerrillas may successfully control or even administer 'liberated zones', control of territory is not their overriding objective. Their main objective is to induce the collapse of the central government by de-linking it from the countryside and its population and, ultimately, de-legitimising it. These de-linking and de-legitimising processes often build on incipient dissatisfac-
tion with prevailing socio-economic conditions of decay caused by government incompetence, corruption, or both.

The dissatisfaction with poor governance often facilitates guerrilla movements' attempts to win 'the hearts and minds' of the alienated population with promises of radical reforms to eliminate real or perceived injustices. By building on the dissatisfaction of those segments of the population that feel ignored by the government – especially in the countryside – guerrilla movements are able to implant themselves in rural areas. Since guerrilla wars are primarily rural military conflicts, the countryside is vital to most guerrilla strategies because it opens possibilities for relatively secure bases of operations and reliable access to food. This is often a determinant factor for an eventual victory because, after achieving effective military and political dominance of the countryside, guerrillas can then move to encircle major urban areas and wear down government troops, a process that often lasts many years.

Expectedly, therefore, most guerrilla wars are long-term, protracted conflicts of attrition that seek to wear down a much stronger conventional army. Unlike conventional wars, where direct military contests between two opposing groups are the norm, guerrilla groups traditionally avoid direct military confrontations altogether. Instead, as mentioned earlier, the preferred strategy involves weakening the opposing force psychologically and militarily through surprise hit-and-run operations against isolated military installations and poorly defended communication, power, transportation, and supply centres. Thus, the ultimate aim of classic guerrilla movements is to sufficiently weaken the central government and induce its eventual collapse.

Significantly, the end of the Cold War had changed the character of insurgency movements around the world, including Africa where insurgent forces have created nightmarish situations. Now, African insurgents – in Angola, DRC, Sierra Leone, and elsewhere – can no longer place their conflicts within a larger international ideological context. Theirs have become non-ideological, non-Clausewitzian, and non-revolutionary conflicts. In the absence of a global ideological divide, both old and new wars are sustained by more regional, national, even local factors of political economy, ethnicity, religion, personal ambition, and greed. This change in the rationale for insurgencies has been accompanied by a significant shift in both rebel strategies and tactics. Current insurgent strategies like UNITA’s in Angola focus on the pillaging of natural resources, not necessarily the toppling of existing governments. Unconventional force is no longer primarily used to erode the government’s control of the countryside. Rather, it is used both to gain and secure areas rich in natural resources and to drive rural population away from those areas and into government-controlled urban centres.

These changes in the character of current insurgencies in Africa point to an abandonment of the intimate and reciprocal relationship between the political and military aspects of insurgency. Significantly, in the case of UNITA in Angola, it also highlights the fragility, and continuing erosion of the insurgents’ political base. In other words, new internal wars in Africa are no longer fought at the military level to achieve political objectives. War is no longer viewed as part of a broader contest for political loyalty and legitimacy that involves, first and foremost, winning 'the hearts and minds' of the people. In fact, now people are regarded as burdens, if not obstacles, whose removal by military means is justified. By removing people from, say, diamond producing areas, UNITA rebels can enrich themselves without the political and administrative costs of governing.
The new internal wars in Africa, like the one being fought in Angola, can be best described as criminal insurgencies. UNITA rebels demonstrate neither the ability nor the inclination to bring about new, more effective and inclusive forms of governance. More significantly, UNITA has not been able to articulate a coherent set of political objectives for continuing the civil war. Therefore, even in the unlikely event of state collapse leading to the UNITA capturing state power, it is unrealistic to expect significant changes from the rebels. UNITA’s trajectory since Angola’s independence illustrates this point.

After being defeated at the hands of MPLA and Cuban troops in 1976 during the early stages of the civil war, UNITA regrouped and initiated a protracted guerrilla war. Over time, and with the help of South Africa’s former apartheid regime, UNITA was able to control roughly the southeastern third of Angola. Evidently, on the basis of its record in administering the areas and populations under its control, UNITA has failed to demonstrate an inclination to implement forms of governance that would distinguish it from MPLA. Political participation in UNITA-controlled areas has been as problematic as in government-held zones.

During the Cold War, UNITA portrayed itself as a democratic organisation. However, its practice has consistently suggested that this has been a terrorist organisation all along, simply masquerading as a political movement. Peculiarly, UNITA’s terror has both internal and external dimensions. Under the whimsical and often paranoid leadership of Jonas Savimbi, UNITA has undergone regular and perplexing purges. Consequently, most of Savimbi’s key lieutenants have been either assassinated, sidelined, or forced to flee for their lives, often deserting into government-controlled areas. This has emptied UNITA of both legitimacy and its best political and military minds.

Without its best and brightest, UNITA has been unable to find coherent political and military strategies to achieve its ultimate objective of attaining state power. Instead, it has mutated into a monstrous military machine that has inflicted untold devastation upon Angola causing the deaths of more than 500,000 people. Not even the loss of their main headquarters of Bailundo in October 1999 has curtailed rebel attacks. In fact, the rebels have undergone a major restructuring process during much of the year 2000 and have reinitiated an intensive guerrilla campaign in 2001, bringing death and devastation ever closer to Luanda.

Disappointingly, the external forces that helped create this monster – especially the United States and South Africa – are neither capable nor willing to help destroy it. Now, especially after losing the first multi-party elections in September 1992 and returning to war, UNITA’s insurgency is entirely self-financed through illicit trade in diamonds. During the 1990s, the rebels have been able to sell diamonds worth more than US$4 billion. According to the Fowler Report (United Nations, 2000, paragraphs 15-49), UNITA used the revenues generated from the sale of diamonds to acquire arms and military equipment to transform itself into a powerful conventional army that posed a significant military threat to the government until 1999. In other words, UNITA was able to take advantage of the internal and international changes of the 1990s to develop ‘an international trade network’ that allowed it to secure weapons, petroleum and other supplies on the black market in contravention of UN sanctions and international condemnation’ (Sherman, 2000:699).

The Fowler Report recommended a series of international measures to limit UNITA’s ability to sell diamonds and purchase weapons. For example, it suggests that
‘forfeiture should be provided for where the legal origin of rough diamonds cannot be established by the possessor’ (United Nations, 2000, paragraph 109). In addition, the report recommends that ‘Member States of the United Nations should apply sanctions against individuals and enterprises discovered to be intentionally breaking United Nations sanctions relating to UNITA diamonds’ (United Nations, 2000, paragraph 110). Thus far, however, international attempts to stop the flow of diamonds from areas under UNITA control, most recently through a certification system established by the World Diamond Congress in Antwerp, have yielded only partial successes (Misser, 1999:10-11).

In response to the lacklustre record by the international community in curbing UNITA’s illegal diamond trade, Britain has recently proposed a more aggressive plan. The Hain Plan proposes:

the certification of all exports of rough diamonds; credible internal controls for producer and trader states; the use of forgery-resistant certificates and tamper-proof containers; the collection and sharing of production, import and export data; credible law enforcement and criminal penalties for those breaching the ban on blood diamonds; international oversight of the scheme; effective customs procedures; and self-regulation by the industry (MacAskill, 2001:15).

In the meantime, Angolan rebels are still able to mine diamonds worth US$120-300 million (Le Billon, 2001:69). Equally troubling, the black market for weapons that proliferated in former Eastern European states destabilised by the collapse of the former Soviet Union remain functioning and able to supply UNITA with significant quantities of weapons, albeit with increasing difficulty especially since UNITA’s loss of its airfields to government forces. Alas, as mentioned above, the significant financial and material resources accumulated over the last decade has enabled UNITA to complete a structural reorganisation and revert to its traditional posture as a guerrilla force. Thus, notwithstanding the government’s repeated claims that the war is almost over in the aftermath of its capture of UNITA’s main headquarters at Bailundo, peace is now just around the corner.

Although UNITA has recently lost most of its conventional military capacity, it is still able to mine diamonds from deposits scattered around the country. Many of these mines are located in areas that have been under rebel control since the early 1980s. Equally significant, UNITA has been able to continue selling them, through intermediaries, on the world market.

Given the implausibility of a sustainable peace settlement, especially as long as UNITA remains a military threat, Angola seems condemned to remain a hostage to MPLA’s corruption and UNITA’s violence, that is, it is caught between a criminal state and a criminal insurgency. Ultimately, Angolans will have to muster both the will and the courage to exorcise the country of both evils. President Jose Eduardo dos Santos’ decision not to be a candidate in the next presidential elections, even in the unlikely event that they are held in the next few years, is an important first step in this direction. A handful of nationalist MPLA leaders bitterly lament the abandonment of the revolutionary ideals that guided their long anti-colonial struggle. They feel betrayed by President dos Santos’ aloofness and the kleptocratic nature of his regime. Equally promising, a group of reform-minded military and political leaders have abandoned Jonas Savimbi and have attempted wrestle control of UNITA away from him. Potentially, alternative forms of governance can emerge from both parties’ disillusioned politicians. However, given the long history of mutual hostility, it is
unlikely that sustainable peace will be attained through leadership changes alone in MPLA and UNITA. A fundamentally different political architecture - minimally, more transparent, more accountable, and less violent - is urgently needed. Fortunately for Angola, neither the long colonial occupation nor the relatively short but equally devastating war imposed by MPLA and UNITA has been able to completely eradicate indigenous approaches to governance. Ultimately, the solution for the war in Angola resides at the sub-state level.

Conclusion

Even by post-colonial African standards, Angola’s recent history has been disappointing. This country was once justifiably expected to become an important regional political and economic player due to its rich endowment in natural resources. However, the greed of its leaders have turned Angola into a chaotic rubble where citizens must rely on international handouts while the leaders appropriate vast oil and diamond revenues for their personal use. Angolans are caught between a criminal state that has impoverished and battered the people in whose name it claims to govern and a criminal insurgency that has an equal disregard for the people in whose name it claims to fight.

Old explanations for the protracted nature of Angola’s civil war must be revised. First, the civil war in Angola can no longer be considered simply an unresolved Cold War dispute. The MPLA regime, once rigidly committed to Marxist-Leninist ideology, has become one of the United States’ new best friends in Africa. Conversely, UNITA – once Washington’s favourite ‘freedom fighters’ – currently operates with the knowledge that the United States now provides assistance to MPLA. Second, the war’s stubborn endurance can no longer be attributed solely to the post-colonial state’s inability to manage ethnic differences. It has become a convenient cover for small and powerful cliques on both sides to continue their criminal activities. More specifically, current conditions of war and near anarchy are particularly suitable to the elites pursuit of their primary objective: personal enrichment. This explains, to a considerable degree, why several peace accords between MPLA and UNITA have failed, even with significant regional and international assistance. For those who retain power in Angola, war is more profitable than peace. Thus, in a real and tragic sense, the conditions are in place for a self-perpetuating conflict supported by the availability of significant oil and diamond revenues.

Predictably, given MPLA and UNITA’s determination to prolong the conflict to maximise profit, the international community has withdrawn from direct and active participation in the search for a peaceful solution. But the international community’s disengagement is not entirely regrettable. Indeed, part of Angola’s problem has been too much international engagement. In many respects, MPLA’s abdication of governmental responsibilities has been made easier by the presence of numerous INGOs that effectively fill the vacuum that should be occupied by the state (Ostheimer). In other words, these organisations have unwittingly propped up the kleptocratic state.

Ultimately, Angolans must find the means to achieve sustainable peace as a first step in a long and challenging process of creating legitimate structures of governance capable of managing the equitable distribution of power and wealth. In this context, important lessons can be learned from the experience of other resource-rich countries—both internationally and regionally— that have successfully avoided violence as a mechanism to capture wealth and power. When all is said and done,
however, Angola’s future will depend on its capacity to develop strong mechanisms of accountability and transparency within a broader inclusive and tolerant political system.

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**Endnotes**

1. Angola has divided its oil concession areas into three bands: shallow water blocks (up to 500 metres), deep water blocks (500 to 1,500 metres), and ultra-deep blocks (1,500 to 2,500 metres).

2. Industry estimates suggest that the cost of developing one pipe would be at least US$1 billion, inclusive of road building and the construction of a power station to service the operation.

3. A small clique of the President’s close advisers who work at the presidential compound of Futungo de Belas.


**Bibliography**


Angola: New Hopes for Civil Society?

Steve Kibble & Alex Vines

How does emerging Angolan civil society help bring about needed peace and constructive international support when the entire recent history of their country has been of internal repression and war aided by external, mostly malign, intervention with a million and a half people killed since 1975? On the face of it, civil society seems unlikely to succeed where elite negotiations and UN interventions have been so spectacularly unsuccessful, but there are some hopeful signs and some possible points of pressure – not least the fact that civil society may have greater popular legitimacy (if rather less power) than any of the political parties and government institutions. None the less it is important not to romanticise the attempts of Angolans to organise themselves for self-help, peace promotion and the like. Many organisations do not last, there are divisions amongst and between groups and a lack of government structures able or interested in dialogue.

Angola tem a distinção de ser o local não somente de um dos a maioria guerras destrutivas sempre, mas também ser o ‘graveyard’ das tentativas em trazer sustentou a paz e a prosperidade a seus povos, apesar dos recursos naturais pródigos. Há diversas razões: Angola vale a pena lutar por, tendo recursos naturais especial do óleo e dos diamantes - não que a maioria da população viu todo o benefício destes.

O óleo e os diamantes foram usados pagar por quatro guerras ou para o consumo conspicuo pelo elite estes recursos permitiu os protagonistas angolan principais de resistir que pressão internacional lá foi para uma extremidade a armado conflito. The governo angolano pode usar o óleo, seu recurso mais valioso, manter seus cliente população e financiar o custo de outra maneira aleijando da guerra. Mesmo quando perdeu o controle dos campos do diamante aos rebels da união nacional para liberatacao total de Angola (União Nacional para a libertação total de Angola – UNITA), sob Jonas Savimbi, podia ainda comprar os braços em um em grande escala igualmente, as vendas usadas UNITA do diamante para suas forças armadas despesa aumentadas, ganhando um US$1.7 estimado bilhão entre 1994 e 1998 ngola era um penhor na política da guerra fria. A União Europeia, suport UNITA como um counterforce

MPLA (Movimento popular de Libertacao de angola / popular movimento para liberation angola) estado Savimbi usado UNITA como um militar máquina sivo seu absoluto dirij para potência, não obstante ' geral livre e justo ' UN-attested resultado 1992 geral e presidencial eleição, e taking vantagem acesso estrangeiro suport e ilegal controle diamante recurso além este crítico pessoal fator, Savimbi unbending finalidade eliminando a MPLA estgivem impeto falt cheio legitimacy MPLA. 3,7 milhão pessoa estão considerado guerra-afectado e angola algum mundo. Para fazer exame da vantagem de seus recursos ricos, Angola necessita a paz continua e o governance bom, nenhuns de que parecem provavelmente historia recente inteiro
do país foram do repressão interno e a guerra ajudado por externo, calunia na maior parte, intervenção com milhão e um meio pessoa matado desde 1975?

Em tal sociedade como faz emergir e cada vez mais a ajuda civil angolana confiável da sociedade traz paz aproximadamente neede e a sustentação construtiva internacional? A sociedade civil parece improvável suceder onde o elite as negociações e os interventions dos UN foram assim espectacularmente mal sucedidos, mas há alguns sinais esperançosos e alguns pontos possíveis da pressão - não menos o fato que a sociedade civil pode ter um legitimacy popular mais grande (se rather menos potência) do que alguns dos partidos políticos e instituições do governo a situação está mudando rapidamente.

UNITA de 1999 mld sustentou o um número derrotas militares pesadas nas mãos do governo, including ser repulsado de atacar a cidade do norte de Uige no fim de junho 2001. Em segundo, o governo recebeu os pagamentos substanciais estimados em US$900 milhão de companhias de óleo permitindo o de comprar um equipamento mesmo mais militar. Internacional os sanctions de encontro a UNITA pretendido dirigi-lo à tabela negociando e a isolate Jonas Savimbi conseguiram um impeto mais grande desde 1999. Terceiro fator é (se desigual) o crescimento rápido na sociedade civil ele é verdadeiro que a sociedade civil tem pouca força de alavanca sobre seu próprio governo e que muitas de suas demandas são indicativas; entretanto, ganharam internacional a sustentação que poderia jorrar aumento com pouco probabilidade que as forças armadas do governo poderiam ganhar e sustentar a vitória outright. Internacional os corporation estão também cientes da pressão crescente do consumidor no outro comercial áreas. Uma estratégia twofold para as organizações internacionais afiadas para terminar sofrimento dos povos angolan era seja aumentar a pressão em UNITA.

Há um mais largo e um coalition mais profundo através do desenvolvimento, das diretas humanas das organizações e entre reconhecer internacional e nacional dos NGOs multifaced a natureza do conflito e da necessidade para iniciativas internacionais e do nacional da paz. Isto parece poised para fazer exame da vantagem do profundo weariness da guerra da população angolana e da falta de todo o governo profundo de compromisso ao desenvolvimento ou a aliviar a pobreza estrutural.

Angola has the distinction of being the site not only of one of the most destructive wars ever, but also being the graveyard of attempts at bringing sustained peace and prosperity to its people, despite lavish natural resources. Over a million people in Angola rely on the UN World Food Programme to stay alive; 3.7 million people are considered war-affected. According to recent UN figures presented to the Security Council by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in its discussion on Angola, two million people are internally displaced. Hundreds of thousands of others have fled fighting to swell the ranks of refugees in neighbouring countries; 70,000 Angolans have lost limbs.

Angola has some of the worst health indicators in the world, with the mortality rate for children under 5 being 30 per cent only one in five people has access to sanitary facilities, one in three to clean water. According to the IMF, the government’s health budget in 1999 was 1.5 per cent of GDP. Annual inflation is put at 3,000 per cent, and basic salaries for public sector employees such as teachers are pitiful, the equivalent of US$20 per month. Gaining a livelihood is a constant struggle of buying and selling on the parallel market. UNICEF estimates that half of all Angolan children of school age are not at school; this is alarming when 45 per cent of Angola’s population of 12 million is below the age of 14. Recent budgets have allocated a meagre 7 per cent to education, compared with 22 per cent for defence and 11 per cent for the police.
Major concerns exist in relation to basic freedoms and human rights, despite some positive changes. Kofi Annan recently told the Security Council meeting that human rights monitors in Angola had been forced to curtail their activities. Citing 'daunting challenges' to strengthening the rule of law and press freedom, he said the security situation had also 'seriously constrained' international humanitarian work in Angola.¹

To take advantage of its rich resources, Angola needs continuous peace and good governance, neither of which appear likely. Oil production and the supporting activities are vital to the economy, realising some $5bn in oil exports in 1996 and contributing about 50 per cent to GDP. Hundreds of thousands of land mines remain, with fresh ones now being relaid, and many farmers are reluctant to return to their fields. Urbanisation now appears a permanent irreversible trend As a result, much of the country's food must still be imported. The government has showed no sustained commitment to development or alleviating structural poverty despite the existence of its National Community Rehabilitation Plan. Instead, amid allegations of massive corruption it concentrated until the Fourth War that started in late 1998 more on personal enrichment for the members of the elite. There were hopes of greater government transparency with the recent oil diagnostic agreement with the IMF, but the figures on government expenditure etc can only be made public with government permission – as yet unforthcoming.

**Fighting for Profit**

There are several reasons why war has proved so endemic. Angola is *worth* fighting for, having natural resources especially of oil and diamonds – not that the majority of the population have seen any benefit from these. Oil and diamonds have been used to pay for four wars or for the conspicuous consumption by the elite. The possession of such resources and wealth limits the influence of international pressure. These resources have enabled the major Angolan protagonists to resist what international pressure there has been for an end to armed conflict. Four other specific post-colonial factors add to the persistence of conflict. The Angolan government can use oil, its most valuable asset, to maintain its (largely urban based) client population and finance the otherwise crippling cost of the war. Even when it lost control of the diamond fields to the rebels of the National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola – UNITA), under Jonas Savimbi, it was still able to buy arms on a large-scale. Equally, UNITA used diamond sales for its increased military expenditure, earning an estimated US$1.7 billion between 1994 and 1998.

Second, Angola was a pawn in Cold War politics. The US supported, armed and supplied UNITA as a counterforce to the 'Soviet-backed and Cuban-protected' MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola/Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) state. The US policy of 'constructive engagement' with apartheid South Africa meant that the war was only ended when Gorbachev announced a change of foreign policy culminating in the Namibian settlement, the Cubans leaving Angola and the opening of negotiations between the MPLA and UNITA. Notwithstanding this, the US refused to recognise the MPLA government until UNITA's resumption of the civil war in 1992. UNITA, however, continued to be supported by Zaire and supplied from or through South Africa. Subsequent to this, the conflicts in Angola and the D.R. Congo are interlocked as part of a wider African war.
The third factor is Savimbi's using UNITA as a military machine to serve his absolute drive for power, using its access to foreign support and illegal control of diamond resources. Beyond this critical personal factor, Savimbi's unbending purpose of eliminating the MPLA is given impetus by the lack of full legitimacy of the MPLA. This leads to the fourth reason why negotiations have never stuck - the lack of unity amongst the anti-colonial forces that remain unresolved. Unresolved but continuous differences emanating from pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history look increasingly incapable of resolution, particularly not the kind of outside intervention based on a quickfix bloodless (for outsiders) premise. Chabal rejects as simplistic the common explanation that Angola is difficult to resolve because of the historical division of the country between the three main ethnic constituencies, Bakongo, Kimbundu and Ovimbundu, and seeks longer term answers.

He notes the extent to which Angola as a formal colony evolved in continuity with what had happened prior to the 'Scramble for Africa'. Angola had since the sixteenth century been linked with Brazil through the slave trade under the control of a creole elite based in Luanda. Even before the advent of direct Portuguese colonisation, there were profound differences between the rural and inland Africans and the coastal, city-dwelling creoles. The instituting of direct Portuguese rule (not completed until the last century) led to the immigration of poor white unskilled and uneducated Portuguese who, on the whole, failed to succeed as agriculturists. Unable to compete with Africans and without resources, they lived in the cities, in the labouring sector and barring Africans from the kind of jobs performed in non-Portuguese colonies in a climate of racism and petty discrimination.

Colonialism sharpened divisions between social, ethnic and racial groups, most notably between the creoles and the Africans of the interior. The coastal Kimbundu were, however, used to living in much closer proximity with the creoles of Luanda, the latter remaining in a Lusophone world in culture, language and world view. There were thus two frustrated groups with different attitudes and economic base - the creole elites and the Africans of the interior, especially the Ovimbundu. This provided the context for the growth of the anti-colonial movements and their key divisions. As well as this difference, Chabal points to an additional four external and four internal factors.

Externally, Zaire's position of support for the FNLA and opposition to the MPLA replicated division unlike the Mozambican anti-colonial experience where Tanzania applied the strongest pressure on anti-colonial movements to form a single alliance. Second, the two Angolan movements were backed by the two opposing super powers. Third, both the MPLA and FNLA had networks of support among individual, and often ideologically opposed, African countries. Finally, the FNLA was able to get early endorsement by the newly created OAU.

Internally the FNLA and MPLA represented totally distinct sets of interests - broadly the Bakongo 'African' elites of the North for the former and the Luanda creole community and its regional Kimbundu supporters for the latter. The second factor is a real or imagined or constructed racial difference: the FNLA labelling the MPLA Creole leadership as a non-African mixed race group with no understanding of the 'real' Africa, despite several African MPLA leaders. Third, ideologically the MPLA was strongly marxist and the FNLA vociferously anti-marxist, attracting strong Western, especially US, support. Finally, but perhaps most importantly, there were strong differences in leadership. In Angola the anti-colonial movements represented respectively the 'old' creole and northern African communities rather than a new
generation of leaders as in Mozambique. Neither of the leaders had any desire to compromise, particularly after the failed attempt in 1962 to merge the two parties. Savimbi leaving the FNLA, and his rejection by the MPLA, led directly to his decision to create UNITA, thus greatly exacerbating the potential for conflict.

This inheritance not just of competing nationalist forces, a not uncommon African situation, but a lack of legitimacy, shaped post-colonial Angola. The MPLA – though it controlled the capital and most of the country on independence day – was never granted the undisputed nationalist legitimacy which it aspired to and claimed. Additionally, according to Chabal:

*In contrast to Frelimo's unity, the MPLA was from the start riven by both personal and ideological divisions which became a way for the ruling clique to mark out their ideological differences with their political competitors.*

This led to Nito Alves’ 1977 pro-poor Africanist coup attempt, splitting the MPLA and instituting Stalinist repression. The MPLA leaders defined policy more in terms of the ‘correct line’ than in what was best for the country. Even the advent of the market economy after 1991 did little to alter this mindset, replacing Stalinism with corruption, with party becoming the gateway into the market.

Three separate peace agreements since independence in 1975 have all collapsed through mutual if uneven intransigence, and UNITA’s rejection of the 1992 elections won by the MPLA and the former restarting the war. The ‘peace’ until 1998 brought by the Lusaka Protocol of 1994 was essentially a period of ceased large-scale conflict, with little reconciliation at either local or national level, despite the GURN (Government of Unity and National Reconciliation). Mutual suspicion and repeated violations of the cease-fire, particularly by UNITA, occurred throughout the period of peace. The United Nations peace missions UNAVEMs I-III and their successor, MONUA, were for a time an important buffer force, but the U.N was unable and seemingly unwilling to disarm UNITA effectively or stop fresh arms flows into the country. No UN resources existed to monitor UNITA; nor did there seem any international political will to do so. Had the 1993 sanctions over its procurement of fuel and weapons been rigorously applied this might have changed, but enforcement was never seriously undertaken. The Lusaka Protocol was artificial in that UNITA’s military leadership believed they had not suffered a long-term reversal and the government’s military believed, and many still believe, provided them with the momentum for a knock-out blow.

**Changes towards Peace?**

The situation is changing rapidly, however. First, UNITA from mid 1999 has sustained a number of heavy military defeats at the hands of the government, including being repulsed from attacking the northern city of Uige at the end of June 2001. Second, the government has received substantial payments estimated at US$900 million from oil companies enabling it to buy even more military equipment. Oil companies under attack from international NGOs for helping fund the conflict with its consequent human rights abuses are, however, also pressing for an end to the war. Third, international sanctions against UNITA intended to drive it to the negotiating table and to isolate Jonas Savimbi has achieved greater impetus since the appointment of Robert Fowler, the Canadian chair of the UN Sanctions Committee in 1999. His report in March 2000 named individuals and companies ferrying weapons and munitions to UNITA in violation of UN sanctions. Those sanctions targeting UNITA
control of the illegal diamonds trade have begun to affect the organisation’s ability to fight, refuel and recruit. Savimbi’s claim in an interview with BBC Focus Africa on 13 June 2001 that he had 40,000 troops active in 15 out of the total 18 provinces is widely disbelieved and contradicted by deserters from his army. Savimbi maintains that the government must stop fighting before any negotiations could commence, whereas the government maintains its position that Savimbi must stop fighting, accept the Lusaka Peace Accord which UNITA signed (although Savimbi did not sign personally), disarm and become a normal political party – with the supposed carrot of UNITA, even possibly Savimbi himself, being able to enter the elections promised for 2002 (promised in 2000 for 2001). Of late Luanda’s rhetoric on Savimbi being a war criminal who would be put on trial has softened to allowing him to enter the democratic process after demilitarisation. International interest has increased due to Angola’s increasing importance in world oil production, but also because of the increasingly regional nature of the war and the dangers of instability to southern as well as central Africa it brings. Fowler’s replacement, the Irish ambassador to the UN, Robert Ryan, seems equally determined to keep driving the process forward although the Angola Monitoring Mechanism is now developing a reputation for being stale and tunnel-visioned, unable to report on corrupt individuals in the government supporting UNITA. In October the Security Council is likely to replace the Monitoring Mechanism.

Several Western governments are also beginning to shift their policy positions towards Angola. Finding that the government has over the last three years been unable to achieve a knock out blow on UNITA, they are now seeking ways once more to bring about dialogue between both sides on how to end the conflict.

Another change with great possible implications has been that after many years of silence and repression, there has from the late 1990s been a significant growth of civil society organisations and churches prepared to speak out, especially for peace, but increasingly aware of the need to link this to development and human rights issues. A limited opening up of civil society happened in 1991 – partly in response to post Cold War changes and the conditions of peace under the Bicesse Agreement, and partly a safety valve for internal unrest fears. Hundreds of associations and NGOs were formed, but most were oriented to emergency aid rather than development or advocacy, given the humanitarian crisis which unfolded after the renewal of war in 1992.

In January 1999 the Catholic bishops issued a pastoral letter stating that the war did not represent the voice of the people, called for reconciliation and condemned human rights abuses. Groups such as GARP (Angolan Group for Reflection on Peace) and GAP (Group for the Promotion of the Culture of Peace) and now COIEPA (Comité inter-clerical para a paz em Angola) have backed a Manifesto for Peace which has attracted thousands of subscribers. Angolan church and civil society delegations to the North containing members of the peace movement have called for a cease-fire, humanitarian corridors, and negotiations for an end to conflict. This new found confidence was shown in March 2000 when Angola’s opposition parties staged an unprecedented mass protest march in Luanda in response to the government imposing a 1,600 per cent rise in the price of fuel, an extra burden for already impoverished Angolans. In late July 2001, the Catholic bishop of Uige urged ‘frank dialogue’ with UNITA rebels, remarking that ‘insistent appeals to end the war in no way indicate that the government is responsible for the war, but, rather, that it is most responsible for peace’. These comments were on the anniversary of the 2000 pro-peace conference in Luanda.
It seems as though there is a wider and deeper coalition across development, human rights organisations and between international and national NGOs recognising the multifaceted nature of the conflict and the need for international and national peace initiatives. This appears to be poised to take advantage of the profound war weariness of the Angolan population and the lack of any profound government commitment to development or alleviating structural poverty.

Civil society faces major problems, however, in seeking peace, justice and desperately-needed reconstruction. But although President Dos Santos has consistently dismissed calls in public for any negotiations with Savimbi, his announcement in August 2001 that he would not stand for re-election was partly aimed at Savimbi. The progress to ending the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo also provides an opportunity for Angolan peace, as does the desire by neighbouring countries in southern Africa to see an end of refugee flows and neighbouring instability. Dos Santos and the Angolan government are beginning to see that UNITA can sustain war for a long time. Luanda and its allies still hope to weaken UNITA on the battlefield and force sufficient defections, a strategy which has had some success according to a recent defector, major Bernardo Paciencia Mota who told Jornal de Angola that ‘recent widespread UNITA attacks and ambushes sought to project a false image of rebel military strength which no longer exists’.

Angolan civil society is less sanguine about human rights occurring after the war, pointing to the need now to deal with issues of corruption, lack of social provision especially with the continuing impact of war devastation, and attacks on press freedom. The peace movement is renewing its call for peace now through a cease-fire and opening negotiations with UNITA, arguing that the government is in a strong position, making it an opportune time for negotiations when UNITA’s conventional capacity has been reduced, thereby avoiding UNITA turning to guerilla war. As well as it being unlikely that the government would agree to this, it is unlikely that the international community would support it. According to a Luanda-based NGO, the rebel leader is so discredited at present that most of the international community backs the government position, with a growing international consensus that Savimbi, himself, must be removed from the political arena.

In response the peace movement’s view is that even if Savimbi is more isolated, at a time when the government is claiming that it can win the war, there has never been a greater need for negotiations, which should not be confined as previously to the elite. This would give national reconciliation and peacebuilding a chance, having learnt from the failures of previous peace initiatives. As they point out

_The Bissese and Lusaka peace processes failed due to lack of good faith and commitment by the Angolan parties and the international community, lessons need to be drawn so that failures are not repeated._

Nor should the constituency that Savimbi has historically represented of the Ovimbundu, the poor and rural dwellers, be excluded or marginalised. First because this would not provide a check on the government’s capacity for corruption and lack of interest in social provision and human rights. Second one of the major lessons of the past thirty years has been that the government, in the eyes of the UNITA constituency, lacks legitimacy which has meant continued intransigence. At the same time the peace movement has also called on:

_the OAU and SADC [to] make serious commitments to assist the UN in its attempts to monitor and prevent UNITA sanctions-busting, and enact legislation or regulations_
making it a criminal offence, punishable under domestic law, for their citizens or other individuals operating on their territory to violate Security Council-imposed sanctions against UNITA.

It also wants increased support for the work of the UN Human Rights Division, mandate it to conduct investigative work on abuses, and ensure that its findings are published.

The Angolan government is anxious to re legitimise itself by holding new elections. Angola’s first nation-wide elections were held on the last two days of September 1992. They provided the first opportunity for Angolans to express their will in what the UN and other foreign observers concluded was a ‘generally free and fair’ process. With a turnout of more than 91 per cent (4.4 million) of registered voters, President dos Santos, the MPLA’s candidate, received 49.6 per cent of the vote against 40.7 per cent for Savimbi. In the election for the legislature, the MPLA won 54 per cent of the vote, against UNITA’s 34 per cent. Under Angolan law, failure of the winner in the presidential election to receive more than 50 per cent of the votes cast required an election run off. However, a run off was not held. Instead UNITA rejected the results and returned the country to civil war by remobilising its forces across the country. Less than a month after the elections, the ‘Third War’, had started.

Since 1999, government officials have given prospective dates for multiparty elections for late 2001, late 2002. Another postponement was signalled when on 23 August 2001 President dos Santos announced at an MPLA Congress that he would not stand when elections were held:

If they [elections] are held in 2002 or 2003, we have a year and a half or two and half years for a party to ready its candidate for the battle, and of course this candidate will not be called José Eduardo dos Santos.

The message President dos Santos was making is that there will be elections, but that these may not be in the next two years. This is a pragmatic assessment that the context for elections are not right. UNITA has ensured that many rural areas are unsafe and an assessment mission by the National Democratic Institute in August also concluded that elections could not be held any time soon. The MPLA also believes it will need more time to build up its support base. A limited liberalisation programme has been embarked upon in Luanda and along the coast. But provinces like Malanje are run like medieval fiefdoms and few freedoms are enjoyed in government or UNITA controlled areas.

This statement was also aimed at the MPLA, where pressure to step down has been growing upon Dos Santos who has led the country since 1979. A number of MPLA figures such as Lopo do Nascimento, Roberto de Almeida, João Lourenço and Marçolino Moco are known to be ambitious for the presidency. Dos Santos’ speech was also aimed at UNITA leader Savimbi, challenging him to make a similar statement in an attempt to prepare for eventual negotiations. It is also aimed at the international community, especially because of the collapse of Angola’s negotiations with the international financial institutions.

One interesting call is that the Luanda government should be called to account for using profits from oil revenue disproportionately in funding the war effort rather than meeting the humanitarian needs of its people. The peace movements wants its international supporters to apply pressure on the Angolan Government to be more
transparent in its oil finances and for international corporations to abide by standards of corporate responsibility and accountability.

Collectively, these corporations are well placed to use their influence with the Angolan government, business partners and eventually UNITA, to be transparent in their finances, to meet at least minimum standards for social services and human rights observance?

Oil is the main source of the government's revenue. Between 1995-1999, oil revenues comprised approximately 70 to 89 per cent of government revenues and approximately 85 to 92 per cent of exports, according to the IMF. In 2000, oil accounted for US$3.26 billion of government revenue. In 2001 the Angolan government announced that oil revenues would account for 90.5 per cent of the current year's budget, or approximately US$3.18 billion.

As Angola's war winds down, and defence expenditures decline there is increasing international interest in stricter fiscal management and transparency by the Angolan government. On 3 April 2000 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the government announced the beginning of a Staff Monitored Programme (SMP) which included a provision to monitor oil revenues known as the 'Oil Diagnostic'. This potentially could have marked a limited positive first step toward promoting transparency, accountability, and good governance in Angola. The World Bank and government of Angola supervised the Oil Diagnostic and, KPMG, an international accounting and consulting firm, implemented it. The diagnostic was not a comprehensive audit. It was principally a forward-looking agreement to monitor oil revenues; to help the Angolan government develop an effective mechanism for determining how much revenue the Central Bank should receive from oil production; and to encourage good governance. The first Oil Diagnostic study was completed in April 2001.

Co-operation between oil companies operating in Angola and KPMG has been good. The companies possess independent data on oil production and revenues paid to the government that is needed to compare with the figures provided by the government. Most of the major firms operating in Angola, such as Exxon-Mobil, Chevron and Royal Dutch/Shell have already provided KPMG with information. In 1997, BP recognised the company's involvement in Angola could be problematic 'if the government fails to live up to its commitments made to increase democracy, accountability, and transparency and if oil revenues continue to be the main source of income for the government.' Consequently, BP Chairman, Peter Sutherland stated that the company would 'insist as far as we can that such payments are transparent.'

Following this, and following pressure from NGOs and after negotiations with Sonangol and the government, BP told UK NGO Global Witness on 6 February 2001, that it will annually publish financial date on Angola, though without specifying when or in what format this would be done. In particular, BP committed to publish the total net production by exploration/production block; aggregate payments made by BP to Sonangol and the total amount in taxes and levies paid to the Angolan government. Additionally, BP noted that the amount of the signature bonus payment it made for the offshore concession, Block Thirty-One, was recorded in the 1999 annual report for BP Exploration (Angola) Limited available at Companies House in London. According to the New York-based Human Rights Watch 'BP set a new standard of fiscal transparency for oil companies in Angola. It is important that other companies follow this example.'
Following an assessment mission in mid-July 2001 the IMF allowed the Staff Monitored Programme to expire because of the government's lack of commitment to meet the targets. The government only met two of the nine targets and it appears that the government was unwilling to fulfil its obligations under the agreement. The IMF and Angolan government will hold further talks in October 2001 but unless there is meaningful progress over two quarters there will be no discussion over new loans. This is very serious for Angola, which desperately needs access to low interest, long term loans. It appears that the government just could not permit the level of financial disclosure needed to make the SMP a success.

The Oil Diagnostic and the SMP could be important steps in establishing transparency and governmental accountability, but this would require political will in Luanda to publicly assist this process and a willingness for the findings to be published and for follow-up report to be commissioned to examine discrepancies found in the figures.

International Oil Companies should encourage the government to support the oil diagnostic and to ensure that all future oil profit remittances are spent in a transparent manner and not for covert arms purchases or off-budget loan repayments. They should also assist the UN Sanctions Committee in trying to locate the source of UNITA fuel. Humanitarian aid and aid to indigenous civil society groups needs to be increased as well 'to bring about meaningful participation of Angolan society into the search for a lasting peace. The Lusaka Accords could have been better implemented if there were provisions for the substantial participation of Angola civil society in monitoring and implementation of the Accords. While the Angolan Constitution currently guarantees a variety of human rights, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have asserted that this freedom is not being enjoyed by journalists and civil society groups in Angola today. To effectively fulfill their role, freedom of expression must be guaranteed to indigenous NGOs, and the international community must ensure that all peace efforts substantively involve Angolan NGOs'.

According to one of COIEPA's leaders,

it has agreed, therefore, to intensify meetings with both the Government and Unita (of Dr. Savimbi) to create the space for formal dialogue. It was also agreed that we must intensify the campaign for an immediate and unconditional cease fire, urging both sides to base their decision on the suffering of the people, mainly innocent rather than on strategic military and legal arguments, which should give way, at this stage, to the moral argument.

COIEPA is also planning to establish Provincial Commissions, with Lubango being the first. They are also in the process of working with the rest of society, including government institutions for an all-encompassing Rede da Paz (Peace Movement), which according to a prominent activist 'should bring together all the groups and organisations working on Peace and Human Rights in the country. A meeting of the leadership of the groups involved in the Rede da Paz met in August to launch formally the coalition'. It is not only the government, however, which is sceptical on yet again seeking peace with Savimbi. Many others question how worthwhile these calls are, pointing out the unwillingness of either side to talk. A major stumbling block to negotiations is what are the pre-conditions to dialogue, including practical issues such as where any talks should be, who should attend and how?

It is true that civil society has little leverage over its own government and that many of its demands are indicative. They have, however, won international support which could well increase with the little likelihood that the government's armed forces could
win and sustain outright victory. International corporations are also aware of growing consumer pressure in other commercial areas. A twofold strategy for international organisations keen to end the suffering of the Angolan people would be to increase the pressure on UNITA (or elements of it) to come to the negotiating table whilst supporting civil society in enlarging the area of its intervention. A recent delegation of Angolan churches and NGOs hosted by UK NGOs told the UK government that Angola urgently needs peace to overcome the disasters caused by almost continuous thirty years of war. To start the process now would save lives and help in reversing the deteriorating humanitarian crisis. People need to be engaged in new ways to find a solution to it, involving the young but growing civil society. Angola has never had a democratic culture and needs to build one quickly. All previous peace agreements have been between the two elite antagonists. Overcoming problems of management (and mismanagement) of the polity and economy will be part of the search for peace. If the intended presidential and parliamentary elections take place in 2002, this will provide further opportunities for the multitude of civil organisations – churches, independent media, NGOs – to press the case for peace.

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**Endnotes**

1. See IRIN news reports at [http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN](http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN)


3. For such an analysis we are indebted to Patrick Chabal ‘Angola and Mozambique: the weight of history’ Working Paper 1998, available on the Internet from [http://www.kcl.ac.uk/deptsa/humanities/pobrst/pcpapers.htm](http://www.kcl.ac.uk/deptsa/humanities/pobrst/pcpapers.htm)

4. Since 1997, 40,000 people were killed in the suppression of the Alves coup calling for greater popular participation. This lead to the MPLA purging mass organisations and turning to Stalinist centralised political and economic control with few independent organisations being allowed.


7. See Canadian Inter-Church Coalition on Africa [http://www.web.net/~iccaf/humanrights/angolainfo/roundtable1199.htm](http://www.web.net/~iccaf/humanrights/angolainfo/roundtable1199.htm)

8. Ibid


10. Ibid
Diamonds are pure carbon which has been subjected to great heat and pressure to form into crystals that are 8-sided octahedrons when pressure and heat are right. The ‘fire’ in diamonds is their ability to separate white light into the colours of the spectrum, which can be enhanced by the way they are cut.

They occur at depths of 150km below, deep in the mantle of the earth, the layer below the crust. They remained there for along period before being brought close to the surface in volcanic eruptions, when gasses mostly molten magma build up and break through the earth’s crust. Diamonds are the closest you’ll get to touching the earth’s core.

The rock in which diamonds are found is called kimberlite (named after Kimberly mine in South Africa). Unlike most rocks from deep in the earth, it contains very little silica. Kimberlite is usually found in carrot-shaped ‘pipes’ – remains of long dead volcanoes in large, stable and ancient chunks of the earth’s crust (known as cratons), and are at least 1.5 billion years old.

Kimberlite is bluish in colour, is often called ‘blue ground’ and is highly reactive with oxygen; in Africa in the 100 metres or so close to the surface the diamonds are yellow. It is more strongly magnetised than the bedrock and so geologists gather magnetic readings by air. If they find strong signals, trial holes are drilled.

Alluvial diamonds are found in mineral gravel. Erosion carries diamonds down the slope because they are heavy. High quality gems sometimes collect in high densities in gravel and alluvium: the movement of the water sorts the gravel by size and weight. The first diamonds collected long ago in India were all from this source, not from deep mines.

Diamond production in order of importance: Australia, D.R. Congo, Brazil, Botswana, Russia, South Africa, Angola, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Central African Republic, Venezuela and Liberia (from Mining Journal/Terraconsult).
Garimpeiro Worlds: Digging, Dying & ‘Hunting’ for Diamonds in Angola

Filip De Boeck

This article offers a brief presentation of the diamond smuggling activities between the Angolan province of Lunda Norte and the bordering Congolese Kasai and (especially) Kwango region (and more particularly the administrative units of Kahemba and Kasongo Lunda. Over the past two decades these areas have become central in contributing to the ‘dollarisation’ of local economies in both Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo. As a result, national currencies in the two countries lost much of their significance throughout the 1990s. Whereas the major cities in Congo and Angola have in many respects become ‘village’ or ‘forest-like’, the ‘bush’ on the border between Congo and Lunda Norte is the place where dollars have been generated, and where villages have transformed themselves, at least temporarily, into booming diamond settlements.

Este capítulo oferece uma apresentação breve das actividades de trafico ilegal de diamantes entre a província Angolana de Lunda Norte e a região fronteiriça Congolese de Kasai e Kwango no período entre 1980-2000. Nas últimas décadas esta região fronteiriça tem sido um polo importante no tráfico de diamantes e também, na opinião do autor, um dos processos de ‘dolarização’ das economias locais em Angola e na República Democrática do Congo. Este processo, pelas suas características, está também ligado a um retomo à chamada economia Leopoldiana de ‘comptoir’, que dominou a região no período colonial. Apesar das similaridades com a economia colonial, o tráfico de diamantes a que se assiste hoje, baseia-se essencialmente no movimento de uma rede complexa de garimpeiros através da fronteira, na exploração artesanal de diamantes (escavação ...) e na comercialização ilícita do produto à escala global.

Este tráfico local, que rapidamente adquire dimensões internacionais, transporta jovens Congolese de Kasai e Kwango para a Lunda Norte controlada pela UNITA onde as escavações têm lugar, e ligá-los a uma rede de comerciantes e compradores ilícitos no mundo inteiro. Desta maneira mundos locais estão assim transformados em espaços globalizados, e várias dinâmicas socio-econômicas e culturais ligam diferentes regiões do globo: de Kasai e Kwando a Lunda Norte, a Luanda, Kinshasa, Bangui e Bujumbura, a Antuérpia, Bombaim, Beirute, Telavive e Joanesburgo. Neste processo, desenvolve-se um intercâmbio cultural e socio-econômico intenso que conecta realidades locais a realidades globais bem como realidades pós-coloniais a realidades coloniais. Esta interconexão de identidades, histórias e culturas que se gera nestes espaços de fronteira (não apenas fronteira física mas fronteiras socio-econômicas e culturais), que quebra e transcendê barreiras e normas previamente estabelecidas, cria espaço para novas formas, novos contornos e novas configurações sociais, economicas, politicas e culturais. Deste modo, fronteiras (no seu sentido mais lato — físico e social) constituem locos importantes de interpenetração, de criatividade e de profundas transformações sociais.
Introduction: Diamonds Between D. R. Congo & Angola

We went to school
Our diplomas sit at home
There is no work
Lots of emptiness
Ah, I want to go to Lunda

My pen will be my shovel
My exercise book will become my shovel
And when I will return to Congo
I will enjoy life
I will buy a beautiful house
And an expensive car
And things for the house
This is how life goes
This is how the world is
Bana Lunda, eat in the sweat of thy face
No witchcraft

This article offers a brief presentation of the diamond smuggling activities between the Angolan province of Lunda Norte and the bordering Congolese Kasai and (especially) Kwango region (and more particularly the administrative units of Kahemba and Kasongo Lunda) which, over the past two decades, have become most central in contributing to the ‘dollarisation’ of local economies in both Angola and D. R. Congo. As a result, national currencies in these two countries lost much of the significance throughout the 1990s. Whereas the major cities in Congo and Angola have in many respects become ‘village’ – or ‘forest-like’, the ‘bush’ on the border between Congo and Lunda Norte is the place where dollars have been generated and where villages have transformed themselves, at least temporarily, into booming diamond settlements. The ways in which the conventional rural-urban oppositions are deconstructed in these postcolonial frontier settings necessitates an imaginative theorising of that reality. For example, whereas the space of the city has often undergone a marked ruralisation, or ‘villagisation’, in terms of its architectural, urban and socio-economic (dis)arrangement, it also has become – in the collective instituting imaginary – the space of the ‘forest’, thereby mapping the hunter’s landscape, which is one of the potentially dangerous, frontier-like margin, onto the urban and thus ‘central’ landscape. It thus seems that, in the post-colony, modernity as exemplified by the city is not only contested or unfinished at its fringes (the rural hinterland), but also in its very heart, the polis, where the local logic of hunting and gathering has infused the urban world with its own moralities, its own ethics of accumulation, expenditure and redistribution, and its own specific pathways of self-realisation. Simultaneously, the rural periphery has (once again) gained in importance.

As elsewhere in the world, where processes of globalisation are played out in a context of frontier expansion at the periphery (cf Browder & Godfrey, 1997 on frontier urbanisation and the creation of ‘rainforest cities’ in the Brazilian Amazon area), the Congolese and Angolan hinterland has become most central in the capitalist dynamics and the dollarisation of local economies. As such, the diamond traffic, and
the phenomenon of dollarisation which has followed in its wake, are also emblematic of a return to a ‘Leopoldian’ comptoir economy.

The political economy of the comptoir has always been colonial in its very essence. In the past it contributed a lot to the urbanisation of the African material and mental landscape. The contemporary comptoir economy in Congo and Angola has continued to contribute a great deal to the frontier urbanisation of places such Mbuji-Mayi or Tshikapa (in the Kasai), Kahemba and Tembo (in southern Bandundu), as well as the Cuango (Kwango) river diamond settlements in Angola, or the diamond ‘ranches’ around Kisangani (see also Biaya, 1985; Nzuzi, 1995; Omasombo, 2001; Sabakinu, 2001). Through complex networks these local sites simultaneously partake in the formal diamond sector controlled by the licensed diamond companies that are active in these areas, the informal or garimpo ‘artisan’ market, with diamonds mined by unlicensed diggers – garimpeiros – and commercialised by licensed comptoir buyers, and in the ‘illicit’ sector which is fed by UNITA ‘blood diamonds’, mined by garimpeiros under UNITA control, and often commercialised through unlicensed buyers. In this way these local diamond worlds have often become globalised spaces, the economic and cultural dynamics of which are linked to many other different places on the globe, from Luanda, Kinshasa, Brazzaville, Bangui and Bujumbura, to Antwerp, Bombay, Beirut, Tel Aviv and Johannesburg. Against the canvas of the violent diamond frontier in Lunda Norte, as it came into existence from the mid-1980s onwards, has thus developed a whole cultural and socio-economic universe in which local and global, pre-and postcolonial meanings, practices and imaginaries have met and merged. Some of these new conglomerates of meaning, though, are part of much older historical trajectories and earlier rounds of ‘globalising’ dynamics. For example, the local Luunda people and their Chokwe, Suku and Shhinji neighbours along what is now the border between Congo and Angola, were formerly part of a larger regional ‘traditional’ local inter-village and long distance trading network which predated the colonial period and which hinged on the trade of such commodities as wax, rubber, ivory, guns and slaves.

These old trading routes connected the Imbangala in Angola with the Pende in what is now the Congolese Kwilu area (that is, roughly the same route which would connect Cafunfo in Lunda Norte and Kikwit in the Congolese Bandundu province today if there were a road). Cloth was then traded for slaves with the Pende. These in turn were bartered for more cloth and guns from the Imbangala. For this purpose, Luunda organised themselves in little groups, carrying goods into Angola by using the caravan-route up to Malange (via Tanda and Mwana Kapende, crossing the Cuango river near Mukidikidi). The same route would later be used by the first Europeans in the area, Portuguese who had come from Tanda. Alongside the trade with the Imbangala there were other caravan routes which connected the Luunda with the Angolan Holo, for example, from whom they procured salt.

Overall, then, in the 1980s and 90s diamond trade, the modes of commerce, the use of caravans to carry wealth in things or in people into Angola, even the trade routes themselves, did not differ drastically from their colonial and precolonial counterparts. It is therefore not surprising to see how the introduction of the new monetary and commodity relations created by the diamond trade in the 1980s reveals some strong parallels with the precolonial period as to the local response to foreign goods, money and the development of local notions of wealth, accumulation and expenditure (in terms of hunting and capturing diamonds and dollars). As such, the identities and histories which are being generated in the frontier space discussed here are shaped both through local and more global processes: they blend into each other.
and are therefore oft-times non-transparent, ambivalent, contextual, negotiable and polysemic. This is a world in which borders (between state lines, between ideas and between meanings) are continuously produced, maintained and crossed as an intrinsic part of a wider frontier process that, precisely by means of continuous border-crossings, generates powerful resources, economically as well as politically and culturally. As such the frontier space described in the remainder of this article forces us to rethink the profoundly colonial topos of the ‘frontier’.

Locating Lunda Norte: a Recent History of War, Dollars & Diamonds (1980-2001)

[...] in '73, early '73, it was the land of the diamonds, of those who became rich and fat of the diamond smuggling, the camanga, the secretive trade in gems: everybody had test tubes in his pocket, the niggers, the white population of bourgeois, the police, the PIDE; the administrators, the teachers, the soldiers, and at night, in the filthy circle of villages around the town, one bought the ore from people who came from the river or the border with glittering glass wrapped in small pieces of cloth, protected by the alert knives of their henchmen. Ramshackle huts and whorehouses under the eucalyptus trees, cotton bedspreads, dolls, older women with silver teeth, record players which spat out the panting groaning music from Congo, and happiness for the price of two hundred escudos in the sudden burst of laughter of a young black maid, who received us inside her with mocking mirth (Lobo Antunes, 1979; my translation).

The heart of the informal and illicit diamond universe (and this paper mainly deals with these two sectors) is situated along both sides of the borderline between northeastern Angola and the southwest of the Democratic Republic of Congo (that is, the Upper Kwango, Kwilu and Tshikapa areas on the Congolese side, and the Lunda Norte province on the Angolan side of the border). Although diamonds have long been part of Angola’s formal and informal economies (as testified by Lobo Antunes’ description above), Lunda Norte, traditionally home to Luunda speakers and related groups of Chokwe, Suku, Shiinji, Holo and Minungu, has witnessed the development of an unprecedented traffic of diamonds into Congo over the past two decades. In this brief article I will primarily deal with the main mining area along the Cuango valley in Lunda Norte, which is reportedly the source of 80 per cent of Angola’s diamonds (Duval, Green & Louthean, 1996:39). Angolan diamonds are, moreover, of extremely good quality. Before independence, alluvial deposits along five rivers in Lunda Norte (in the Cuango area around the Cafunfo and Lozamba mines, and more to the east in the Dundo-Lucapa area) were firmly controlled by DIAMANG (Companhia de Diamantes de Angola), in which Ernest Oppenheimer had secured a good interest for De Beers in 1920. Until the Portuguese withdrawal in the mid-1970s, Angola turned in over 2 million carats annually (2.4 million carats in 1974). After the nationalisation of DIAMANG the output plummeted to 500,000 carats and less (350.000 carats in 1975-76, good for an export income of $30 million).

In 1980 diamond production had increased again to 1.48 million carats, representing an export income of $225 million. Towards the mid-1980s, however, UNITA started attacking mine sites, causing DIAMANG to pull out in the Cuango in 1986 and dissolve itself later on during that same year. Due to the UNITA strategy, production broke down to 714.000 exported carats in 1985, still good for $33 million, and to 370.000 carats in 1986, worth $15 million. The price of the Angolan diamond on the global market dropped sharply during that period.
During this same period, and especially from 1983 onwards, there was a steady increase in Congolese diamond exports, due not so much to an increased production of the formal mining sector in Congo, but to a steadily growing input of artisanal diamonds dug up by local unlicensed diggers in Congo, as well as an influx of Angolan diamonds smuggled into Congo through informal channels. In Congo this went hand in hand with the legalisation of private comptoirs d’achat, who installed themselves along the border with Angola. During this time, also, Congolese started to cross the border with all kinds of commodities, ranging from cigarettes to gun powder, whisky, dried salted fish, matches, soap, cloth and transistor radios. These goods were sold or bartered in Angola in return for diamonds. The owners of these commodities would either work independently or with money from a diamond comptoir. Usually these traders (kamangistes, from kamaang/kamanga, ‘diamond’ in uLuund/uChokwe) would be people from the Kasai area, Bandundu or Kinshasa. They recruited local villagers of Luunda and Chokwe origin living along the Congolese side of the border to carry these goods into Angola and to act as scouts in these trading expeditions. In Angola, after a (nocturnal) trek of several days through the dense forest known as corta mata which lines the frontier between Kahemba on the Congolese side and Lunda Norte on the Angolan side, these caravans of carriers (pincheurs) would make contact with diamond sellers waiting for clientele in the villages around the major mines. These sellers are called cocseurs, middlemen between the diggers (creuseurs or karimber) and the buyers. At a time when commodities were scarce in Angola, the exchange rates were extremely favourable for the Congolese. Consequently, an increasing number of Congolese were drawn into the trade, notwithstanding the fact that the border between the two countries was officially closed and that crossing it meant exposing yourself to a lot of risks: not only did the numerous land mines in the area cause many deaths and casualties, but many were also imprisoned, tortured, looted, maimed, raped or shot by Angolan government troops and UNITA fighters on the one hand, or, upon returning to Zaïre, by members of the FAZ (Zairian Armed Forces) on the other hand. When people started to swallow diamonds to prevent soldiers and rebels from robbing them of their stones, many people ended up having their intestines slit open by these diamond-hungry soldiers and rebels.

During that same period, ‘illicit’ mining became rampant. These mining activities reached a peak in 1991-1992, during the Bicesse peace process period leading up to the Angolan presidential elections. The election process indeed provided a brief period of rest in Angola’s ongoing civil war (Anstee, 1996); immediately after it became clear that the sitting MPLA president, José Eduardo dos Santos, had won the elections, the peace process collapsed and UNITA took control of a large percentage of the Angolan territory. It is during this period that ‘the war of Lunda’ (epaka Lunda) started in Lunda Norte. Control over the Cuango Valley was indeed one of UNITA’s main objectives. In December 1992, for example, UNITA attacked the town of Cafunfo. In Cafunfo, UNITA had been living in cohabitation with MPLA during the period of peace leading up to the 1992 elections. Previously, UNITA had already tried twice to drive MPLA out of Cafunfo in 1981 and 1984, but had met with no success. This time, however, they did succeed and briefly gained control over the Cafunfo diamond mines, killing the expatriate staff, sabotaging the mine’s equipment and executing those suspected to be anti-mutim (an anti-terrorist brigade founded by MPLA during the election process but viewed by UNITA as consisting of MPLA spies). During the following months, the town of Cafunfo was subjected to an MPLA counter-attack, both on the ground and from the air.
In October of 1994, the MPLA again took control over Cafunfo with the help from mercenaries from the South African security firm Executive Outcomes. The government failed to stop or control, however, the parallel (alluvial) mining activities along the Cuango river, and up to the end of 1997 Cafunfo remained a government outpost in a territory largely controlled by UNITA. With the mining activities under the control of UNITA, the character of the diamond trade drastically changed. The previous bartering expeditions by Congolese became rare with trade becoming more sedentary and also more monetised. It is mainly along the Cuango river that the illicit UNITA mining brings onto the stage tens of thousands of Congolese garimpeiros, unlicensed diggers, known as bana Lunda (children of Lunda), also called basali nteke or basali ya mbongo, ‘those who work money’. From 1992 onwards these, often penniless, Congolese youngsters, most of them from an urban background,6 started to pour into Lunda Norte to dig for diamonds in the areas under UNITA control (De Boeck, 1999a; on the political economy of the Angolan diamonds see also Misser & Vallée, 1997; on criminalisation more generally see Bayart, Ellis & Hibou, 1997). Although local villagers in Lunda Norte were sometimes forced to work in UNITA mines or provide other services, UNITA’s labour force thus consisted primarily of Congolese. UNITA itself organised a system of several checkpoints (poste avancado) along the border. There the Congolese Bana Lunda could buy a guia, a kind of permit issued by UNITA, which gave them the right to cross the border into Angola. Usually a guia would mention the name of one of the UNITA mines along the Cuango to which the person in question had to direct him – or herself.

Given the fact that tens of thousands of Congolese entered7 – and still continue to enter – Angola in this way (although in lesser numbers now and no longer controlled by UNITA as before), very quickly life in the diamond mining camps became better organised and more settled.8 The camps’ internal security was taken care of by UNITA soldiers, but more often by artivistes – Congolese employed by UNITA to supervise and, if necessary, arrest, punish or execute the workers. The artivistes controlled the digging activities very closely, making sure that no diamonds were stolen, or that nobody entered the mining sites during prohibited hours.

Congolese diggers usually organise themselves in ‘stables’ (écuries). These are cooperative units of young men from a same ethnic, regional or urban background. Usually, the ‘stable’ is headed by a patron or comprador, who feeds and looks after the divers and diggers working in his unit. Very often this leader is also the dona moteur, the owner of the small boat and oxygen motor by means of which the divers (plongeurs, kazabuleurs) can remain under water for hours, scraping mud and gravel (mutsanga) into sacks. These are then hauled up by the mwetistes, who will also make sure that the boats do not float away; to this end long sticks are used. The ‘stable’ may also contain diggers (creuseurs or karinbers) who will dig small but deep circular holes, mazimba, in which only one person fits, or larger holes, called 4x4, in which several persons may dig at the same time. Some of these holes are dry; others, near the river, contain water; these are called terrance. Buckets (balde) of sand are lifted out of these deep holes by means of long sticks (santoro). Whenever diamonds are found, and after UNITA is paid its due, the remaining profits are split, in order of importance, between the members of the ‘stable’: the largest part will go to the dona moteur, followed by the divers, the diggers, the mwetistes and, finally, the lavador. The latter is responsible for sifting the gravel. All the sifting takes place at a central ‘washplace’ (laverie). The sifted gravel (bikedi, bisayi, ngala-ngala) is thrown back into the water.

In some UNITA controlled areas there are also women and girls, usually those without an encadreur (that is, without a ‘husband’ in the mine), who transport sacks
(bens) of gravel to the designated sifting areas. By way of compensation these women receive a sack of sand for every ten sacks they transport. Other women work as femmes tamiseur, sifting or washing the sand. By way of compensation they too are given mutsanga by the authorities. Some also try to ‘steal’ or ‘cut diamonds’ (kuzengd) by throwing them back into the water and retrieve them at the end of the day, unseen by the guards and artivistes who control the washplace. In the UNITA territories, nobody is allowed access to the mining sites after the end of the working day (although in some places, rotating shifts of divers and diggers work around the clock). The ‘stuntmen’ or choqueurs, though, work in a clandestine way during the prohibited hours. They sift the mutsanga which was left during working hours, or they steal sacks of mutsanga to hide them in the forest. When captured, these choqueurs are usually shot on the spot and their bodies are thrown into the river. One boy told me:

We share our mutsanga (the sand hauled up from the river or dug up from an open mining site in order to be sifted) with the soldiers from UNITA. When we find a diamond in our part of the mutsanga we have to declare it to UNITA. If you don’t and try to hide the diamond UNITA may even kill you. They will lash you with a cord (ngonzi) until your belly is swollen. Sometimes they whip you up to 200 times. Then they will start to hit you with a spade. I personally was whipped and then sent to ‘the hole’ in the mine of Kanzu because I tried to hide a diamond. UNITA digs a large hole, some 5 to 10 metres deep. They cover the top and just leave a small opening so that you can enter the hole. After having confiscated my diamond UNITA threw me in the hole where I stayed for a whole week. Fortunately, my friends brought me some cassava mush from time to time. To do that they had to bribe the artivistes who then allowed them to throw the food down the hole. There wasn’t any water to drink, though, or to wash yourself with. There where many other people imprisoned in the hole. Every time some food was thrown down to us, everybody rushed towards it and started to fight. We had to sleep in our own faeces.

When I was there, two Luba boys died alongside me during that week. You can shout up to the soldiers all you want, but they won’t come to help you. Only when someone comes to bring food you can inform them of the dead that are lying there. They then go to inform the friends of the dead person. His friends will have to pay money to the soldiers in order to be allowed to haul up the body. But sometimes the corpses are just left to decompose there together with the other prisoners who are still alive. When I finally came out of the hole I was taken to the home of one of the other members of my écurie [literally 'stable': small, and often ad hoc, co-operative units of young men in the frontier context of life in Angola. Usually these young men share the same ethnic or regional background, or have grown up in the same neighbourhood in their city of origin back in Congo :FDB]; I had been beaten up very badly, and after a week in the hole my health was very poor. My mates washed my wounds with hot water, and rubbed my body with VICKS [a pomade] until my health returned to me (Field notes 1998/notebook 84).

Most Congolese women in Lunda Norte try to ‘marry’ or associate themselves to well-established Bana Lunda or UNITA officers (De Boeck, 1999b). While the men work in the mine or the river, the women are responsible for the household and also guard the diamonds which their husbands bring home. Many of these women are also active in commerce, selling all kinds of foods and commodities or running small bars and restaurants. Such ‘mining marriages’ (libala ya carrière) are cooperative economic units in which all the revenues will be equally shared between the man and the woman. Usually these marriages break up upon returning to Congo. For the women involved it is a way to protect themselves or establish themselves as ‘women of weight’ (basi ya kilo) or ‘big women’ (grandes femmes).
The sedentarisation of camp-life accompanied the monetisation of the diamond transactions. Dollars made their appearance in Lunda Norte on a large scale around 1990. This dollarisation of the diamond scene strongly affected the circulation of the local currencies in the area: the Kwanza on the Angolan side, and various currencies in use on the Congolese side (cf. Kabuya Kalala & Matata Ponyo, 1999). As such the dollarisation caused a strong devaluation of these local and national currencies and impacted heavily on the formal and informal economy alike, giving rise to the birth of local money circuits and cellular economies linked together by the dollar. In October 1995, in an attempt to stabilize the Zairian currency (then the nouveau Zaïre), the Kongo government unsuccessfully tried to introduce new rules for diamond buyers to fight the increasing dollarisation of the economy, requiring that 50 per cent of the traders’ hard currency be lodged with the central bank, and that diamond deals take place in local currency only. Dealers estimated that diamond purchases fell by as much as 70 per cent in October 1995 after the new rules had been introduced. Since diamonds are one of the few sources of hard currency available, the Kongo government was quick in announcing modifications to the new rules, allowing purchasers to buy diamonds in hard currency once again.

Despite this precedent the Kabila government made a similar move in September 1998, in another bid to nationalise the ‘informal’ diamond production through the creation of a state comptoir, the Sasmip (Service d’achat des substances minérales précieuses). With an injection of 250 million of the newly launched Congolese franc into the national diamond market, this state comptoir was meant to buy diamonds from local prospectors, and in local currency, to resell them for dollars to the officially recognised comptoirs. Only hours after the installation of the Sasmip, however, trading conditions in Brazzaville were relaxed, causing a huge trader exodus out of Congo (cf. Lewa, 1998). As a result the Kabila government quickly renounced its attempt at nationalisation. However, the same happened again in late 1999 when Kabila Sr. restructured once more the diamond trade, cancelling all diamond purchasing licenses and banning foreign currency transactions. This pushed the legitimate diamond trade once again into illicit but well-established circuits in Brazzaville and elsewhere. In 2000 the D.R.Congo instituted a diamond-exporting monopoly, awarded to International Diamond Industries (IDI), an Israeli firm headed by Dan Gertler. This monopoly was repealed in April 2001, only some weeks after Kabila Jr. came into power after his father’s assassination. The official reason for instituting the monopoly was to reduce smuggling, increase official state revenue and prevent conflict diamonds from entering the formal trade. It is not clear whether the latter two goals were achieved (cf. Dietrich, 2001), but smuggling through Brazzaville certainly increased due to this policy.

In the early 1990s the Bana Lunda’s and UNITA’s diamond output started to flood the international market. The ‘illicit’ UNITA diamonds traveled from Lunda Norte and other places in Angola such as Huambo, via cities such as Kinshasa or Brazzaville, to Antwerp. An increasing volume of diamonds arrived in Antwerp outside of the De Beers controlled single-channel CSO (Central Selling Organisation). UNITA diamonds also continued to be spirited out of Angola illegally after the UN-brokered November 1994 peace treaty of Lusaka, despite the increasing efforts by the Angolan government and its armed forces (FAA, Forças Armadas Angolanas) to push UNITA out of Lunda Norte and contain the garimpeiro effect. In fact, the Angolan government voted a new law destined to control the movement of goods and people in mining areas, and to curb illicit digging. Endiama (Empresa Nacional de Diamantes), a state diamond company which was founded in 1981 to represent the government interests in the former DIAMANG, was authorised to negotiate directly with foreign
companies wishing to invest, and was given exclusive exploration rights to prospect, mine and trade diamonds, either solely or in joint ventures (with various companies of Portuguese, Canadian, Australian, Russian and Brazilian origin).

In 1997 the MPLA government, in an attempt to deprive UNITA of diamonds, tried to get the diamond territories around Dundo-Lukapa under its control. In December 1997, the Angolan armed forces started to launch attacks against UNITA strongholds along the Cuango river, such as Luremo (cf Angola Now, June 1997, 1 (2)), burning down villages and forcing thousands of civilians to seek refuge in the cities or across the border in Congo. In November 1998 the town of Luremo was cleared of all inhabitants and declared a ‘neutral’ domain. The government troops were assisted by security firms working for foreign mining companies active in the area. Many Congolese garimpeiros and other civilians were killed during those attacks in which MPLA troops frequently hunted down Congolese diggers from helicopters. Many more were forced to return to Congo, in a massive refoulement known amongst Congolese as sayi-sayi.

As in the early ‘90s, when rumours about the fabulous riches of Lunda Norte were echoed and amplified in urban popular Congolese street and music culture by such musicians as Pepe Kalle and others who, in doing so, greatly contributed to the shaping of the Bana Lunda mythology and youth culture, anecdotes about the hardships endured by Congolese in Lunda Norte during the sayi-sayi period quickly found their way into Congolese popular cultural expression, as in basali nteke, a song by King Kester Emeneya on his 2000 best selling album Longue Histoire, Volume 2 (Paris, Calbass Productions):

Sango ya mpasi po na basali nteke
Bwale oyo fomona na mboka mopaya
Ntongo etani na nazuwi ya ngai lisanga
Nlandi nzela ya moluka nzela oyo ya mokitano
Ekomi biso na Angola
Mawa
Tokomi ko nyokwama lokola bibwele
Mayi ya komela nani akopesa yo mawa
Biloko nyonso se na Kwanza, baninga
Yaweh, Allah, yokela biso mawa
Bikalamu na yo awa o nse

Sad news for ‘those who work money’
The misery we encounter abroad
One morning I am with my group
I follow the road searching for success
When we arrive in Angola Sadness
We are treated no better than animals
Who will give you a little bit of water to drink?
Everything is for sale in Kwanza only,
friends
Yaweh, Allah, have mercy on us,
Your creatures here below.

Interviews I conducted with numerous returnees reveal that, from May 1997 up to the rekindling of the Angolan civil war in December 1998, numerous Congolese in Lunda Norte were also robbed of their possessions before being chased across the border by MPLA troops, under the motto ‘you came empty handed, you leave empty handed’ (boyakimabokopamba, bokozonga mboko pambla). Actually, many of the Congolese Bana Lunda were caught between hammer and anvil, for the UNITA fighters as well started to attack and rob them, revenging themselves on these garimpeiros for the fall of Mobutu, who had always been a close ally of Savimbi and UNITA.

With the military unrest and renewed warfare in Lunda Norte since 1997/1998, the number of Congolese diggers in UNITA mines has certainly decreased, but some are still active even today. At the same time, Congolese have reverted to the system of bartering and trading (pinch) which existed before 1992, but which never completely disappeared. UNITA, for its part, has returned to the strategy which they tried so successfully during the 1980s, namely attacking Lunda Norte mining sites belonging
to the government and allied foreign investors. Generally, it has remained as dangerous to travel in the province as before.

Early 1999 UNITA had lost the control over most of its mining sites along the Cuango river and had retreated to Muhetu Grande, Malanje and the area around Capenda Camulemba, in the company of some estimated 1,500 Congolese (estimates by garimpeiro eye-witnesses, interviewed in Kinshasa in 1999 upon their return from Angola). During the same period a larger Congolese contingent of some 3,000 persons was reportedly still present in MPLA controlled areas in Lunda Norte. During 2000 and 2001, growing numbers of Congolese garimpeiros started to access Lunda Norte once again and continue to do so at the moment. At the same time an increasing number of Angolan villagers are fleeing UNITA attacks and crossing the border into Congo. In August and September 2000, for example, due to increased fighting, some 15,000 to 20,000 Angolans were reported to be seeking refuge from the war in Kahemba's western parts, around Bindu and Kulindji (personal communication with UNHCR headquarters in Kinshasa, September, 2000).

With the disappearance of Mobutu and the arrival of Kabila, UNITA indeed lost one of its major international backers and most of its trading network in Congo. This network had been largely controlled by some of Mobutu's own sons and close kinsmen (De Boeck, 1996), who broke international sanctions by trading arms and petroleum products against UNITA diamonds. Since 1997 UNITA has had to repeatedly reconstruct a new network for smuggling its diamonds out of the country. After the defeat of Congo-Brazzaville's Lissouba, UNITA allegedly started to export its diamonds by way of Zambia and (since the Ugandan-Rwandan directed 'rebellion' against Kabila started in August 1998) also Uganda and/or Rwanda, and other countries such as Togo and Burkina Faso, despite a new UN embargo (UN resolution 1173) imposed upon UNITA in June 1998. Until quite recently, the Angolan government thus continued to see relatively little benefit in direct foreign exchange earnings from this diamond traffic.

The official diamond production of 1992 was still good for 1.3 million carats, or $270 million. In 1996, however, the Angolan government estimated that the $5 or $6 million a month of officially declared production was less than a tenth of the total Angolan output, which until then was largely controlled by UNITA. Experts estimated that in 1996 the Lozamba diamond sites, slightly to the south of Cafunfo, were probably earning UNITA between $300-350 million and $660 million a year (Financial Times, 3 May 1996; Angola Peace Monitor, 1997, 9 (3)). In that period the MPLA government's diamond revenues (through its state diamond company, Endiama) probably amounted to $100-150 million a year. In 1996 the Angolan diamond import into Belgium was good for 820.153 carats. In 1997 it increased to 1.004.581 carats, and in August 1998, during the UN embargo year, import had risen to 1.514.746 carats, testifying to the fact that diamonds are very war-resistant. In 1996, most of the imports still consisted of UNITA diamonds; this situation has changed. Whereas UNITA still controlled the export of approximately $250 million in rough in 1998, and $300 million in 1999, after heavy military losses starting in Andulo in late 1999, its revenues dropped significantly in 2000, probably totalling no more than $100 million, still more than enough, though, to make a small guerilla army function. According to a recent ASCORP (Angola Selling Corporation) report, quoted by Dietrich (2001), state revenues, on the other hand, have risen from 1.0 million carats valued at $180 million in 1998, to 1.1 million carats, valued at $263 million in 1999 and 1.2 million carats, valued at $371 million in 2000. ASCORP itself (a marketing company comprising the Angolan state, represented by Sodiam (Sociedade de Commercialização
Garimpeiro Worlds: Digging, Dying & ‘Hunting’ for Diamonds in Angola

de Diamantes) and a Belgian and an Israeli firm) was instituted in February 2000, shortly after De Beers’ CSO announced a unilateral embargo on Angolan diamonds in October 1999. Its monopoly replaced the six official buying companies previously active in Angola and de facto took over the leading role from ENDIAMA. Not unlike the IDI monopoly in D.R. Congo, ASCORP was intended to increase state revenue, which it apparently did very well, as well as legalise and thereby contain the existing garimpo situation, and prevent diamonds mined by UNITA from being exported through the official channels in Luanda (as frequently happened in the period between 1995-1998, when Angolan government and army officials regularly engaged in deals with UNITA in Lunda Norte; cf. Hodges, 2001:160). As in the Congolese case, it is difficult to assess to what extent these goals have been met so far.

The Socio-cultural & Historical Imagination of the Diamond Frontier

The brief description of the Lunda Norte reality which preceded does not do justice to the internal dynamics which inform and shape this frontier’s actors’ lives and practices. The diamond frontier described here is not only an intermediate geographical reality on the periphery of two different states. The Lunda Norte frontier setting is very much also a state of mind. It provides a physical and mental landscape in which local and global imaginaries meet and, eventually, merge. The Lunda Norte diamond frontier is thus not only political or economical, but above all also socio-cultural and historical, in an inventive pot-pourri between ‘rural’ and ‘urban’, local and global, ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ categories, practices, mentalities, relationships and belief systems.

Until recently, the notion of ‘frontier’, as a spatial reality and as a metaphor to evoke the politics and poetics of military, political, cultural and/or economic penetration, continued to be used as a key feature to imagine and convey the hegemonic processes of modernity’s construction from the metropole’s perspective. In recent years, the notion of frontier has been resurrected and recycled along these lines in the context of globalisation. It has been used to describe once more what is basically a colonial encounter of local and more global worlds in a postcolonial context. Here the notion is again functioning, in the minds of many, as a kind of short-hand to describe a one-way process of socio-economic and cultural exploitation and homogenisation, put in motion by the West as motor of this global development. One of the consequences of this conventional view is a renewed conceptualisation of the frontier as a homogeneous, unidirectional and polarising process. However, such a perspective hides the fact that the frontier, and certainly in its specific regional Congolese-Angolan materialisation, was and is, a very complex and fluid social space in which a centre and a periphery can no longer be assumed or postulated in an unproblematic way.

The chaotic and deviant forces that structured the unfolding of the long Congolese-Angolan frontier history reshaped once more in the (post-)colonial period, where they solidified in yet another constellation, and this predominantly in relation to the urban locale. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, the hunter’s landscape is mapped onto the city by the Bana Lunda. In their practice of ‘hunting’, ‘capturing’ and ‘taming’ diamonds and dollars in the present-day context of trans-border traffic, former responses to specific, historically contextualised forms of mercantilism are thus carried into the present, in an attempt to get a grip on an economic, political and mercantile landscape that shares multiple characteristics with the trading practices
from the past, but that is also significantly different in many ways. In that respect, it is no doubt a perceptual error to concentrate exclusively on the centre, or the city, in order to understand, for example, the production of 'modern' male African identity. For the Bana Lunda of the 1990s, 'hunting' (diamonds and dollars) constitutes a crucial part of the active capturing of the urban space, for it allows them to refashion the city (and thereby 'modernity', the West) in their own terms, which are those of long-standing moralities, rooted in local past. Congolese youngsters' engagement in a global economy of diamond export and dollarisation is thus shaped from an utterly local perspective. To conquer the city and shape their own moral and social economies in this urban space, they tap into (pre-)colonial sources and routes of rural identity-formation, thereby negotiating and reinventing the content and architecture of the intermediate postcolonial world in which they find themselves. As such the passage into Angola is a contemporary version of a much older strategy of self-realisation, as hunter and warrior, in that it constitutes a veritable rite of passage, modelled upon the old mukanda circumcision ritual, to which Bana Lunda explicitly refer when they discuss their experiences in the Angolan diamond fields. As in the former mukanda, the passage into Angola makes one endure pain: it makes one physically strong and hard, gives one stamina, and teaches one to endure a 'beating'.

Even today the image of the hunter thus continues to have a strongly epistemic power which offers the possibility to remake both identity and place, and to generate – to some extent at least – a socially viable environment in the midst of chaos and change. It is important, however, to stress that the past (represented in the form of hunting logics, the village morality of capture and redistribution, the 'rural' modes of 'self-making' as hunter and warrior) which is thus carried into the present, is not a static model, issuing out of some form of 'synthetic nostalgia' reflecting the yearning for a shared past that seems to be irretrievably lost. On the contrary, the past becomes a source for active engagement with the present, in ways that give shape to very creative and outgoing forms of collective imagination and action.

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Endnotes

1. The Congolese boomtowns of Tembo and Kahemba, in the administrative units of Kasongo Lunda and Kahemba respectively, are a good example of these dynamics. In 1984 the cité of Kahemba officially counted 10,522 inhabitants (quartiers Kahemba, Mobutu and Sukisa) (Institut National de la Statistique 1995). Ten years later the population of Kahemba had multiplied tenfold, with small aircraft flying in almost daily with goods and people from Kinshasa. Today the town of Kahemba is reducing in size again, due to the difficulties of accessing Angola since the end of 1998.


3. For a recent overview of formal mining activities in Lunda Norte see Dietrich 2000a. It must be pointed out that the boundaries between formal and informal, but even more so between legal, illegal and illicit are far from clear-cut and not always easy to draw in this context. The dividing lines between what is illicit, illegal and illegitimate are constantly shifting and are susceptible to various political and economic pressures, as well as to the daily realities lived by the Congolese
garimpeiros who certainly would not consider their activities to be illicit or illegal.

4. The person reselling the commodities on the local Angolan markets (referred to as praça or merkade) is called kandongueur.

5. This episode has strongly marked the imagination of the garimpeiro experience in Angola, as attested by a recent song, Bana Lunda, sung by J.B. Mpiana of the orchestra Wenge Musica, on his hit album Feux de/'amour (1997) (see introduction). On the period of renewed warfare between the Bicesse treaty and the Lusaka protocol see Africano, 1995; Anstee, 1996; Maier, 1996; Vines, 1995.

6. Although called Bana Lunda, most of the youngsters included in this category are not ethnically Luunda. The Bana Lunda category is a multi-ethnic one, including Yaka, Chokwe, Pende, Yansi, Mbala, Suku, Koongo, Luba and many other Congolese ethnic groups. With the local Luunda people who live on both sides of the frontier they often share a common socio-cultural universe. Historically, most peoples of the southern Congolese savannah belt owe a great deal of their ritual and political institutions to the Luunda and Chokwe spheres of influence. In the modern diamond trade, ethnic Luunda have regained some centrality, for they use their 'autochtony' to try to secure a central position in the diamond trade which takes place on their ancestral lands but which is dominated by outsiders, or to regularise their garimpeiro status under the new governmental approach as advocated by the Angolan Selling Organisation (ASCORP). Over the years, they have also constructed far-reaching networks of small Luunda communities in Luanda, Kinshasa and other urban centres. This more global ethnic Luunda network was recently strengthened by the shift in military power after Mobutu's overthrow. Most of the 'Angolan' troops employed in Congo to sustain Kabila in his 1997 march on Kinshasa, or to fight the rebels in the Lower Congo in 1998, were in fact former Katangese gendarmes, mostly Luunda from Katanga but also from Bandundu. Some of these had left Congo in the 60s, while others entered Angola after the Shaba wars in '77 and '78, or even later. Most of these gendarmes were incorporated into the Angolan armed forces, while retaining their own political structure. A large part of these Luunda gendarmes returned to Congo when Kabila came into power, but today a considerable contingent of gendarmes and their families still lives in camps around Luanda (such as Viana) and elsewhere in Angola (personal observation, January 1999).

7. Dietrich (2000b:174) cites a Financial Times article which made mention of 50,000 garimpeiros, most of them Congolese, in August 1992, even before UNITA's return to war.


9. In 1997, UNITA's Congolese activistes were forcefully sent to the UN demobilisation points, whereas an important number of real UNITA rebels remained behind in the bush of Lunda Norte. Those Bana Lunda who were not pushed back across the border into Congo by MPLA were often forced by remaining pockets of UNITA rebels who did not disarm to join them, in view of an envisaged new attack against Kabila (In the spring of 1997 UNITA troops had already been responsible for the 'battle of Kenge', in the Congolese Kwango province, where they fought alongside Mobutu's army, in an attempt to stop Kabila's march to Kinshasa).

10. Typical for such attacks is one of many assaults which occurred on 8 November 1998, in the Yetwene diamond mine, 50kms from the town of Lucapa in Lunda Norte. The mine is owned by the Canadian DiamondWorks and an Angolan company. At the time of the assault, six people were killed, including two Britons and a Portuguese, and five others taken captive. The captors were believed to be rebel UNITA forces. The mine was producing between 5000 and 6000 carats of high quality diamonds a month, valued at about US$200 a carat.

11. Whereas the income from diamonds in 1991 is estimated by the Angolan government to represent 1,02 % of the BNP, it only represents 0,99% of the BNP in 1994, whereas the total volume of exported diamonds increases during that period (Jeune Afrique, 1996: 202).

12. See also the report by Global Witness, 'A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict' (December 1998) (www.oneworld.org/globalwitness/). Different figures are quoted by Hodges, 2001:149ff.

13. The Turnerian liminal structure of the rite of passage, with its symbolism of death and rebirth, is rendered in a horrifyingly literal way in the young mwana Lunda's account of his imprisonment in the 'hole' by UNITA, quoted earlier in this contribution.
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The Clinton Administration’s Policy Toward Angola: An Assessment

George Wright

This article assesses President Bill Clinton’s foreign policy towards Angola within the context of United States’ post-World War II foreign policy, Clinton's overall foreign policy, and his approach towards sub-Saharan Africa. In September, 1992, multi-party elections based on national reconciliation were held in Angola. After losing those elections to President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) Jonas Savimbi and his National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) returned to warfare, quickly gaining control of over 70 per cent of the country. The Bush administration responded to Savimbi's actions by proposing a new round of negotiations based on ‘power sharing', designed to give Savimbi and UNITA another chance to gain state power. President Clinton extended diplomatic relations to the Government of Angola, but also promoted the power sharing solution. In 1984 an agreement was made between the Government and UNITA, which led to a government of national unity in 1997. Savimbi, however, continued to terrorise the Angolan society. Two central questions raised in this assessment are: 1) Why was Savimbi able to sustain his military option? and 2) Was the Clinton administration actually committed to ‘national reconciliation' in Angola? The current analysis shows that: 1) Savimbi sustained his military option because UNITA earned over $3 billion smuggling diamonds, enabling him to purchase ample supplies of weapons; and 2) as long as Western business interests made profits there, the instability wrought by Savimbi was acceptable to the hegemonic interests of the United States.

Este artigo pretende a avaliar a política internacional do presidente Bill Clinton com respeito a Angola. Is to serdfeito atraves da análise desta política no contexto da política internacional dos Estados Unidos pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial, e da política internacional de Clinton, especialmente sua postura com relação ao sub-Saharan Africa. A presidência de Clinton foi a primeira administração pós Guerra Fria. Assim foi vista por alguns comentaristas oportunidade para re-definir a política internacional dos Estados Unidos.

Este ponto levanta uma questão, 'Seria a política de Clinton em Angola consistente com administrações anteriores, ou poderia ele encontrar uma maneira de terminar o ciclo de violência causado por Jonas Savimbi e sua União Nacional para Total Independência de Angola (UNITA) neste país?"Nos anos 80 o presidente Ronald Reagan orquestrou a desestabilização de Angola com três objetivos: 1) Retroceder o governo independente extremista liderado pelo Movimento Popular de Liberação de Angola (MPLA); 2) Desafiar o apoio Soviético e Cubano no governo Angolano; 3) Instalar substituto Norte Americano para
Savimbi e UNITA dentro do poder do estado. Isto aconteceu apesar do governo Angolano ter concedido que companhias internacionais de Petróleo, incluindo Chevron, podem operar em Angola. Incapaz de derrotar o governo Angolano, a administração de Bush promoveu a ‘reconciliação Nacional’ e ‘democratização multipartidária’ para conceder a UNITA uma oportunidade de obter o poder do estado. Os Estados Unidos presumiram que Jonas Savimbi e UNITA viriam a vencer as eleições de Angola em 1992. No entanto, quando ele perdeu as eleições, Savimbi retomou a guerra aterrorizando a população civil. Os Estados Unidos respondeu as ações de Savimbi propondo uma nova série de negociações baseada na ‘divisão de poderes’, com a intenção de dar uma outra chance a Savimbi de obter o poder do estado.

Duas questões centrais são levantadas nesta avaliação sobre a política de Clinton com relação a Angola: 1) Por que Savimbi foi capaz de manter sua opção militar?; e 2) A administração de Clinton estava mesmo comprometida com a ‘reconciliação nacional’ em Angola? A análise que acabamos de fornecer mostra que o objetivo da política de Clinton em Angola era colocar pressão em Savimbi para que ele cooperasse com o governo de Angola na promoção de ‘divisão de poder’. Além disso, Clinton não estava preparado para tomar qualquer medida concreta, como por exemplo, implementar ratificações do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas contra UNITA, para debilitar o poder de Savimbi. Tendo sido contido pelas forças armadas Angolanas perto do fim de 1994, Savimbi concordou com o acordo de ‘divisão de poder’ (O protocolo Lusaka), mas ele também se recusou a desmobilizar completamente seu exército. Em 1997, membros da UNITA uniram-se com o governo Angolano em um governo de união nacional, porém Savimbi continuou a manter a presença militar no país e mais combates foram retomados entre o governo e a UNITA em 1998, o que continua ocorrendo até esta data.

Introduction

This article will assess President Bill Clinton’s policies toward Angola within the context of United States post-World War II foreign policy. When Clinton assumed power in January 1993, some members of the African advocacy community in the United States believed that his administration would reverse nearly three decades of United States policy towards Angola, a policy driven by the logic of Cold War containment militarism. The policy that Clinton inherited consisted of four phases. In the first phase, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger provoked an internationalised civil war in 1974 aimed to confront the Soviet Union which supported the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) led by Agostinho Neto, and to prevent the MPLA from capturing state power. The second phase occurred in the 1980s, with Ronald Reagan’s support for destabilisation of the Angolan-MPLA government carried out by South Africa and Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). An objective of the destabilisation project was to ‘roll back’ the Angolan government because it was committed to an independent; planned political economy, and to enable Savimbi to seize state power.

The United States’ actions in Angola were part of its concerns that nationalist movements would gain power throughout the southern African region, including South Africa, and weaken the United States’ hegemony over that region. In the third phase, President George Bush supported a national reconciliation process (the Bicesse Accords) establishing multi-party elections in September 1992. Between 1988 and 1992, Bush provided ‘non-lethal’ support to UNITA, with the assumption that Savimbi and UNITA would win those elections. In the fourth stage, the United States did nothing to curtail UNITA when Savimbi resumed warfare after he had lost the presidential race to the incumbent President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, and UNITA had been defeated by the MPLA in parliamentary elections.
Starting with the Carter administration, the United States promised diplomatic recognition to Angola; and by implication, legitimacy to the MPLA government. However, Carter was unable to make that move, partly because of pressure from Cold War-militarist lobbyists outside the administration. Following Carter the Reagan and Bush administrations continued to raise the proverbial ‘cross bar’ with demands of what the MPLA government must do to gain United States recognition. Those demands included extending recognition:

- when the Cuban military personnel, who were dispatched to Angola to help defend the country, agreed to leave the country;
- when the Cubans left the country;
- when the MPLA government agreed to multi-party elections; and,
- when the multi-party elections had been completed.

However, neither Reagan or Bush extended recognition to Angola. When Savimbi refused to accept the results of the elections and resumed military aggression against the government, Bush’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, said that both parties were responsible for the violence, and that a new round of negotiations should commence to take into consideration UNITA’s ‘security concerns.’ This position gave Savimbi a green light to continue his pattern of violence and political obfuscation and recalcitrance.

The human and material costs of the destabilisation campaign, conducted by the United States, South Africa, and UNITA up to 1991, were egregious. Over one million people were killed, directly from the war or war-related causes. Those killed represented ten per cent of the population and were mainly civilians, most of whom were children. Some 100,000 people lost limbs as result of anti-personnel land mines, leaving Angola with the highest number of amputees per capita of any country in the world. An estimated 10 million active mines remained. Furthermore, over 50 per cent of the population were dislocated. Four million people were displaced, most forced to migrate to over crowded cities and towns, forcing people to live in extreme squalor, disease and crime. Another one million or more people were refugees, finding safety in neighbouring countries. The destabilisation project also destroyed the Angolan infrastructure, including most health clinics, hospitals, schools, bridges, rail lines, telecommunication facilities and electric grids. In 1990, the established costs for the devastation was $30 billion.

With Savimbi’s return to warfare after the September 1992 elections, UNITA quickly gained control of 70 per cent of the countryside, including a number of the provincial capitals. Over the weekend of October 30, UNITA attempted a coup d’etat in Luanda. The coup failed, largely, because local civilians rose up in defence of the government. Over the next several months, thousands of Angolan civilians were murdered, injured, or made homeless and destitute. Therefore, when Clinton entered the White House, the underlying question was whether his administration would stop the cycle of violence in Angola, or whether entrenched Cold War-militarist/right-wing interests in and around the United States imperial state would undermine efforts to bring peace and stability to Angola? This question is underscored by the reality that the Cold War was over, providing the United States with the opportunity to reassess its Cold War-militarist foreign policy. A second question was: ‘How did Clinton’s
approach to Angola relate to his administration’s overall policy towards sub-Saharan Africa? To address these questions this article will:

- characterise United States foreign policy since 1945, with an emphasis on Clinton’s foreign policy project;
- explain Clinton’s policy toward sub-Saharan Africa;
- describe Clinton’s policy toward Angola; and
- assess the results and implications of Clinton’s Angola policy.

**United States Global Hegemony**

The objective of the United States’ imperial state is to achieve uncontested hegemony over the entire world capitalist system. Robert Cox (1993) explained hegemony to mean not only dominance over the world capitalist system, but also that dominated groups willingly consent to the dominant power’s intellectual, moral, and political leadership. Thus a central function of United States foreign policy was to create an optimum global environment for capital accumulation (markets, labour and raw materials). The United States assumed global hegemony as World War II came to a close, emerging as the dominant political-economy in the world.

I have explored the historical evolution of US foreign policy towards Angola elsewhere (Wright, 1997). Under President Reagan, that policy was based on Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker’s ‘linkage’ formulation, whereby, if the Cubans left Angola South Africa would withdraw from Angola and support Namibian independence. Moreover, with the Cuban out of the country, an opening would occur allowing Savimbi to gain power. In 1985, Soviet General-Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, came to power with the intent to liberalise the Soviet Union’s political economy and integrate into the global capitalist economy. At that point a ‘managerial’/‘Globalist’ tendency led by Secretary of State George Shultz began to dominate Reagan’s foreign policy. That tendency began to co-operate with the Soviet Union on arms control and the resolution of regional Third World conflicts, always in terms advantageous to the United States. This co-operation led to the United States and the Soviet Union mediating the December 1988 Tripartite agreement among Angola, South Africa and Cuba, mandating South Africa’s withdrawal from Angola; a 27-month phased Cuban withdrawal and independence for Namibia. Nevertheless, this agreement would not have occurred if the combined Angolan and Cuban forces had not defeated South Africa at Cuito Cuanavale in 1988 (Campbell, 1990; Wood, 1991; Windrich, 1992:69-74).

The Bush administration managed the end of the Cold War with the goal of gaining hegemony over the former-communist states, involving political economic and military tracks. The political track included promoting ‘national reconciliation,’ ‘multi-party’ democratisation, and establishing a ‘civil society;’ while the economic track involved commitment to neo-liberalism (monetarism, privatisation, deregulation, cutting back-social spending, weakening labour, etc.). The latter approach was implemented mainly through International Monetary Fund-administered structural adjustment programmes. The military track was dominated by efforts to undermine the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ and reassert United States military primacy (Panama, the Persian Gulf War, Somalia). Besides the specific objectives in targeted countries, Bush
wanted to justify the maintenance of huge military expenditures, and to remind the United States' allies that their economic stability would still be dependent on United States military protection. New foreign 'threats,' particularly United States-defined 'rogue'/ 'backlash' states (North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Cuba), and 'international terrorism' also became rallying points to justify United States military spending and intervention. Before the end of Bush's term in office the Soviet Union disintegrated, East Berlin was incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany, and the other East European countries became dependent 'capitalist democracies.'

**Clinton's Foreign Policy & Africa**

The 1992 Presidential election occurred at a historical moment when some political observers believed that United States foreign policy-makers would move away from relying on militarism to further that country's hegemony (e.g. DeGrasse, 1993). The Clinton administration wanted to continue restructuring the global economy, based on neo-liberalism and democratisation, claiming that those policies would promote economic growth. Clinton proposed this to be done through: 1) multilateral co-operation (G-7/8; OECD, etc.); 2) the fostering of international treaty regimes (World Trade Organisation, NAFTA, etc.); 3) the intervention of the International Monetary Fund; and 4) the use of monetary mechanisms and control of financial markets to penetrate markets, and/or coerce competing states. As Peter Gowan (1999) explains in *The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance*, Clinton institutionalised geo-economic strategies that the Reagan and Bush administrations had implemented in *ad hoc* fashion. The focus of the administration was: 1) the containment of Western European and Japanese economic independence; 2) continued integration of the former communist states into the neo liberal project; and 3) deepening United States economic penetration into East and Southeast Asia, where six of the ten so-called 'Big Emerging Markets' were.

Although Clinton's foreign policy emphasised geo-economic strategies, his administration continued to implement militarised strategies. Rather than take advantage of an assumed 'peace dividend,' and make drastic cuts in expenditures, Clinton continued huge military spending. After the Republican Party gained control of the House of Representatives in 1994, in an effort to appease opposition on his political Right, Clinton increased military spending more than the Pentagon had requested (*New York Times*, 1994). Central to Clinton's geo-strategic policy was the enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe (the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary). The intent of that decision was: 1) to entangle those states in a United States-controlled military command, while forcing them to implement neo-liberal reforms; 2) opening-up those countries as markets for United States arms sales; and 3) (provocatively) gaining hegemony over a Russian sphere-of-interest. The Clinton administration also confronted the so-called 'rogue'/ 'backlash' states. This policy had multiple objectives, including, on the domestic level, justifying military spending, and destabilising and/or 'rolling back' those regimes. Support for United Nations sanctions against Iraq, and the regular bombing of that country by the United States and Great Britain were part of that policy. Further, the administration initiated counter-insurgency operations in Colombia, under the guise of confronting 'narco-terrorism.' The Clinton administration also led the dismantling of Yugoslavia, including carrying out an air war during the Bosnian and Kosovo phases, under the banner of NATO. The United States objectives in Yugoslavia included: 1) 'rolling back' a state that refused to cooperate fully with the IMF structural adjustment and was still committed to ethnic and cultural diversity; and 2) establish the Balkans as a 'forward base' of operations
for future NATO interventions into the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The Clinton administration's approach toward Africa was integral to its overall foreign policy, which emphasised a geo-economic strategy, as well as carrying out a military option. Clinton's economic policy towards sub-Saharan Africa was characterised by a shift from foreign assistance to trade and investment policies. This was reflected in a 25 per cent cut in development assistance towards Africa by the Republican-controlled Congress. In the mid-1990s, the late Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown, took steps to open sub-Saharan Africa up to United States trade and investment if the African states implemented neo-liberal economic reforms, which included privatisation, stabilising currencies, dismantling trade barriers, and protecting intellectual property. The United States' intent was: 1) to participate in bilateral and multilateral efforts to support those African countries that pursued meaningful economic reforms; 2) to support efforts to improve essential government and non-governmental institutions and the physical infrastructure; 3) to help create a private sector-led growth-oriented business climate that would generate trade opportunities and attract both domestic and foreign investments. This would include trade promotion, business facilitation and direct support for United States firms. This policy was translated into the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, which was introduced in Congress.

Importantly, the United States had little direct economic interests in sub-Saharan Africa. United States trade with that part of the continent constituted less than one per cent of total United States foreign trade (imports and exports), and only four per cent of United States total trade with the Third World. Also, the United States' direct investments in sub-Saharan Africa represented less than two per cent of United States' total overseas investments. Most of that investment was in the oil sector (Nigeria, Gabon, and Angola). Moreover, France, Germany, Great Britain and Japan were sub-Saharan Africa's leading trading partners, with the United States having less than a seven per cent market share. Those European states had a 30 per cent share, while Japan had a seven per cent share. Clinton's African initiative implied that the United States was trying to penetrate markets its allies, particularly Great Britain, France, and Germany held in Africa. Clinton's African initiatives were occurring when United States trade with South Africa and Nigeria was expanding by nearly 25 per cent. In fact, South Africa purchased 50 per cent of United States exports to Africa. The administration also advertised United States firms investing in Africa averaged nearly 30 per cent in returns between 1990 to 1997. This was in contrast to eleven per cent worldwide, 14 per cent in Latin America, and 12 per cent from Asia and the Pacific Rim (see Feldman, 1997:7-12).

In March, 1998 Clinton visited Africa for twelve days, the longest visit any United States President had ever made to Africa. He visited Senegal, Ghana, Uganda, Botswana, Rwanda, and South Africa — states that were supposedly going through transition to democracy. His rhetoric stressed 'African solutions to African problems,' and that economic growth and multiparty democracy went hand-in-hand. While in Africa, Clinton tried to sell his Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. He stressed that United States markets would be duty-free and quota-free for African-produced goods, including textiles and clothing. He also stated that the United States would support the formation of duty free zones if countries were making progress towards liberalisation. Clinton further proposed prescriptions for debt relief, involving bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, based on a case-by-case basis. Part of the rationale of Clinton's geo-economic approach was that opening United States markets
to dependencies in the Third World would generate surplus to service debt owed to United States commercial banks. Debt reduction (or elimination) was imperative for sub-Saharan countries because they were under crushing debt, as well as the yoke of IMF structural adjustment.

Central to the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act was the linkage between economic growth and democratisation. The philosophy behind this was that democracy led to ‘good governance’ and ‘broad economic growth and accountability.’ During the 1990s, there was movement in sub-Saharan Africa towards multiparty democracy and elections in Africa, including developments in Benin, Botswana, Malawi, Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, and South Africa as well as Angola. The United States implemented programmes, which provided funding and training for party formation, electoral systems, civic political education, and capacity-building for the media.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Democratic (Party) Institute for International Affairs were main facilitators for those programmes. Clinton’s main priority in sub-Saharan Africa was the ‘democratic’ transition in South Africa. The United States viewed South Africa as southern Africa’s growth-engine, a low cost supplier, and the logical base of United States firms’ operations for all of sub-Saharan Africa. The United States actually declared that South Africa was one of the world’s Big Emerging Markets; putting it on the list with China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Mexico, Argentina, Poland, and Brazil. The Clinton administration also continued the United States policy of calling for Zairian President Sese Seko Mobutu to work with pro-democracy forces, leading up to the moment when Mobutu was challenged by the Laurent Kabila-led Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo movement.

On the surface, the Clinton administration’s military approach towards Africa appeared to be one of retreat. This was reflected in the United States’ withdrawal from Somalia, a decision made mainly because of the death of eighteen United States soldiers. This withdrawal was a reaction to the ‘Vietnam Syndrome,’ where the public was strongly opposed to United States troops being killed in Third World conflicts. Moreover, the Clinton administration actively undermined efforts by the United Nations to intervene in Rwanda to prevent the genocide there in 1994. Furthermore, because the Cold War was over, Africa was no longer a battleground for United States-Soviet Union competition. Nevertheless, during the 1990s, 32 countries experienced some form of internal violence, including civil or regional wars. These wars were no longer politically ideological, but instead were generally provoked (and prolonged) by the collapse of state structures, and the ensuing internal and/or external-derived competition over natural resources. Some of the reasons for the collapse of states were external debt, and the lack of control of capital, and the impact of structural adjustment, underscored by the historical underdevelopment (Kaldor, 1999; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Chris Allen (1999) explains that these conflicts were characterised by their ‘heightened intensity and scope of conflict and a quantitative increase in victims, the great bulk of whom are civilians rather than those under arms.’

But in reality, the Clinton administration played an active military role in Africa. Between 1991 and 1998 the United States provided $227 million in training and military equipment to 34 SSA countries. In 1996 the administration also formed the
Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), which was designed to train African military personal for peacekeeping and humanitarian rescue operations. Between 1996 and 1998 the ACRI trained personnel from 22 countries; in 1999 that figure reached 39 countries. The United States also provided military training to African military personnel through the International Military Education and Training Program and the Joint Combined Exchange Training Program. The latter program trained personnel from 34 countries. In 1999 the US Department of Defense established the African Center for Strategic Studies, supposed to train African military officers in an 'academic' curriculum. Hartung and Moix (2000) explained that:

"skills and equipment provided by the United States ... strengthen the military capabilities of countries involved in some of Africa's most violent and intractable conflicts."

Hartung's observation can be understood by examining the developments in Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo starting in 1997. In May, the Clinton administration did nothing to prevent the overthrow of Mobutu by the Laurent Kabila-led ADFL. That movement was backed by Uganda and Rwanda, regimes that the Clinton administration had supplied with military training and weapons, as well as UNITA. The United States expected that Kabila would immediately establish a timetable for multiparty elections, and that he would begin to co-operate with 'pro-democracy forces.' But Kabila refused to call for elections, banned any political activity in the country, and stated that his priority was to integrate the national economy and infrastructure. Kabila also refused to allow human rights organisations to monitor alleged mass killings, and the ongoing fighting, as well as surrounding himself with members of his own ethnic group. Because of these actions Uganda and Rwanda backed the efforts of the rebel Rally for Congolese Democracy in its effort to force Kabila to concede to a national reconciliation process, or to overthrow him.

Kabila was supported militarily by Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and the Sudan. Importantly, the United States provided training and weapons to eight of the nine belligerents in that conflict. Kabila was assassinated in January 2001, and the government was taken over by his son, Joseph, while the crisis remains unresolved. At the time of writing, an inter-Congolese Dialogue has commenced in an effort to find a solution to the crisis. An estimated two million people were killed in fighting in the eastern part of the country between 1997 and 2000.

Clinton's Policy towards Angola

The Clinton administration extended diplomatic recognition to the Government of Angola headed by President dos Santos on 19 May 1993. This occurred even as UNITA maintained intransigence in negotiations held in Abidjan, mediated by UN Special Representative Margaret Anstee. Two days after the United States recognised Angola, UNITA representatives left the negotiations and Savimbi continued his country-wide military offensive focusing on capturing Huambo, the second largest city in the country. Clinton's action was not a reversal of policy – instead it was aimed at putting pressure on Savimbi to co-operate in a new round of negotiations that would complete the national reconciliation process. The objective of the United States was to pursue a 'balanced' policy to get the Angolan government and UNITA to negotiate under United Nations mediation. Importantly, Herman Cohen, President George Bush's Assistant Secretary of State, stayed on in that capacity until early May 1993. As Clinton stated:
It is my hope that UNITA will accept a negotiated settlement and that it will be part of the government. I intend to continue working closely with UNITA to achieve a lasting peace settlement and a vibrant democracy.

Nevertheless, UNITA continued to occupy nearly 70 per cent of the national territory and continued its siege of Huambo. The United States actively encouraged the Government of Angola to co-operate with the national reconciliation process (which it was willing to do). Moreover, the Clinton administration continued to place pressure on UNITA to co-operate. That pressure included:

- support for United Nations' resolutions placing the responsibility for the collapse of the elections, negotiations, and violence on UNITA;
- support for UN Security Council economic and arms sanctions against UNITA in 1993, and travel and banking sanctions in 1997; and
- a declaration that it would not allow the Angolan government to be overthrown by UNITA. The United States also abrogated the Bicesse Accords 'Triple Zero Option', which had declared that the government could not purchase weapons to defend the country. This decision was designed to offset the fact that Savimbi had captured diamond fields in the northeast, which enabled him to purchase weapons from the international arms market.

Having captured Huambo, Savimbi agreed to return to negotiations. In Lusaka the UN Special Representative, Aliouin Blondin Beye, mediated discussions between the Angolan government and UNITA. The discussions centred around concessions to UNITA, which included a power sharing formula. Thus, UNITA would be given cabinet and ministerial posts and governorships. Savimbi was also offered a vice-presidential position. While these negotiations were occurring, UNITA ignored the cease-fire and continued to fight against the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). The FAA was able to rout UNITA in its stronghold of Jamba. The Clinton administration requested that the FAA not capture Huambo, leaving UNITA in control of the city. But President dos Santos' government decided to capture the city. A settlement was signed between the Angolan government and UNITA representatives on 20 November 1994 (Savimbi did not attend the ceremony). The Lusaka Accord was put into place and the United States agreed to 7,000 UN peacekeeping troops being deployed to monitor the quartering of the country's army, UNITA's guerrilla forces, and the integration of those forces into an national army. The Clinton administration convinced the Republican-controlled Congress to agree to supporting this deployment 'because it represented the last piece in a regional settlement in which the United States had significant economic and diplomatic investment.'

Between 1995 and 1997 the United States provided the United Nations Angola operation with $100 million, representing 30 per cent of the operation's expenditures in Angola. To lend support to the national reconciliation process, Clinton met with President Dos Santos in the White House on 8 December 1995. Despite active pressure by the United States in the mid-1990s to demobilise his military, Savimbi maintained a large conventional force in the country and refused to demobilise the UNITA troops completely. He also did not abide by the cease-fire agreement, and continued to occupy territory throughout the country. UNITA purchased massive amounts of conventional weapons from annual earnings of over $600 million from selling diamonds (United Nations Angola Sanctions Committee 2000). In April, 1997,
designated by the Lusaka Protocol, a faction of UNITA selected by Savimbi joined the Angolan government, along with other political parties, to form a government of national unity. This occurred only after UNITA issued a sworn statement that it had disarmed and demobilised its troops, which it obviously had not done. The United States reacted as if national reconciliation had in fact been achieved. Nevertheless, Savimbi maintained a military presence throughout the country, and implemented countrywide terrorism. This led to the passage of sanctions in 1998 by the UN Security Council against diamond trading with UNITA. In late 1998, full-scale fighting between the FAA and UNITA resumed. The UN Security Council declared that UNITA was responsible for the warfare. The following year the FAA gained control of UNITA’s bases in Andulo, Bailundo and Jamba. This counter-offensive forced UNITA to abandon a large amount of military equipment and devolve into a guerrilla force once again. Nevertheless, Savimbi continued terrorising the populace throughout the country.

Foreign Aid, Trade & Investment in Angola

The humanitarian crisis in Angola continued relentlessly during the 1990s. During the fighting between 1992 and 1995, one thousand people died each day from war related causes (see Simon, this issue). Moreover, over two million people were displaced, and 300,000 Angolans crossed over into neighbouring countries. The number of people who died declined after 1995 because the fighting subsided. However, the number of people who were displaced or became refugees continued to climb, while the population in the cities exploded. When fighting between UNITA and the FAA resumed in 1998, the number of dying and injured people reached previous levels found between 1992 and 1995 (Tvedten, 1997). The number of people who died in the 1990s is estimated to be over one million, and the total number of displaced persons was 3,500,000 (USAID 2000). By the 1990s the United States was providing half of the Angola’s humanitarian assistance, including aid for food security, child survival, and health care. Most of the other half was bilateral assistance provided by European governments and multilateral aid from the European Union as well as from private donors, such as Save the Children, Red Cross, CARE, World Vision, and Medicins Sans Frontieres. The total humanitarian assistance the United States provided Angola between 1993-2000 was over $500,000,000. USAID channelled monies to non-government organisations (Catholic Relief Services, Vietnam Veterans of America, World Vision, Christian Children’s Fund, Africare); international financial organisations (the World Bank); and United Nations agencies (World Food Program, UN Development Program, UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO, and WHO). Most of this aid was coordinated by the Angolan government, through the Community and National Reconstruction Program. However, the United States also aimed to circumvent the government to promote the expansion of a (private sector-led) civil society.

Despite orchestrating the destabilisation of Angola, the United States has conducted economic relations with Angola since the 1960s, when the Portuguese government opened its African colonies to foreign investment. At that point, Gulf Oil began operating in Angola. Once the MPLA came to power in 1975, Gulf Oil began to provide the government with approximately 65 per cent of its foreign exchange. Also, the Angolan government had a longstanding policy of trading with Western corporations, expressed in Angola’s 1985 Foreign Investment Law. During the 1990s, Chevron and other United States oil companies, including Exxon and Mobil, along with Elf Acquitaine, FINA, and British Petroleum, operated in Angola, in concert with SONAGOL, the state-run oil company. By the end of the 1990s, Chevron had invested
$4 billion in Angola. In 1994, the Angolan government passed a new foreign investment law to encourage further investment. Elements of that legislation ensured that foreign companies were guaranteed equal treatment; opening nearly all sectors of the economy to foreign investment, including infrastructure development; and permitted private commercial banking. In December 1997 Coca Cola proposed building a $33 million bottling facility near Luanda while FC Shaffer invested $120 million to rehabilitate the sugar industry. By 1999, Angola was the second largest site for United States' investments in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, in 2000 the Angolan government signed an agreement with the IMF to identify and implement economic reforms to ease state controls, improve public accounting procedures, and encourage private investment.

In the 1990s, as with investments, the largest portion of United States/Angolan trade was in the oil sector. In the late 1990s, Angola produced 750,000 barrels per day. The prospect of producing over one million barrels per day in the near future was based on recent discoveries of huge deepwater reserves off of the Angolan coast. Overall, 75 per cent of Angola's exports was oil, of which 90 per cent was exported to the United States. In fact, seven per cent of total United States oil imports were provided by Angola. United States imports from Angola represent about fifteen per cent of its total imports from Africa; and about four per cent of United States exports to Africa. Through the 1990s, the United States was either the number two or three source of Angola's imports, behind Portugal while the United States was Angola's number one export market. Further, Angola was the United States' third largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, behind Nigeria and South Africa.

United States' policy towards Angola aimed to protect the oil sector and to encourage trade and investment with Angola. This was evident in the 1980s when the Reagan administration extended over $230 million in United States Export-Import Bank credits and loans to Angola for oil sector purchases. Also Reagan's administration was firm in its position that it did not want South Africa or UNITA attacking the Cabinda oil installations. The Clinton administration provided a $350 million Export-Import Bank loan, which included guarantees and insurance for United States oil equipment exporters. In 1997, a 40-person trade mission, including representatives from Amoco, Chevron, Caterpillar, and General Motors, visited Angola to encourage investment and trade opportunities. This mission was promoted through the Department of State and Department of Commerce and the privately run United States-Angola Chamber of Commerce. In 1998, the United States shifted its policy towards Angola from encouraging national reconciliation to trade and investment priorities. While in Luanda, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Witney Schneidman, declared,

*The United States Government believes it is time to move our economic relations forward with Angola despite the current political-military problems in Angola* (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

This shift corresponded with Clinton's promotion of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (which was passed in May, 2000). Also in 1998, the United States and Angola agreed to form the Bilateral Consultative Commission 'to expand cooperation between the two countries,' including discussion on commerce, transportation, energy, and economic and financial matters.
Conclusion

Despite the willingness of the Angolan Government to co-operate with UNITA to forge national reconciliation, the decade ended with Savimbi still continuing to carry out his campaign of terror throughout the country. This reality poses two key questions: 1) Why was Savimbi able to sustain his military option; and 2) Was the Clinton administration actually committed to ‘national reconciliation’ in Angola? There are three factors that contribute to Savimbi’s continued military option. The first is the motivation of Savimbi himself. From his actions, it is clear that Savimbi thought that he could defeat the Angolan government militarily to gain control over the Angolan state. He has always demonstrated his obsession with his goal to become the Angolan president; and certainly that is what drove him during the United States/South African destabilisation campaign in the 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, after Savimbi and UNITA lost the 1992 elections, he calculated that the United States would not place any pressure on him to co-operate fully with the Angolan Government, therefore he understood he had a green light to carry out his agenda (Wright, 1997).

A second factor that sustained Savimbi’s military approach is that UNITA has earned over $3 billion smuggling diamonds since 1992. This wealth allowed that organisation to purchase massive quantities of weapons, fuel and supplies. This was achieved in the face of United Nations sanctions designed to prevent that very outcome. In fact, in 1999, when warfare resumed, the international community requested that the United Nations Angola Sanctions Committee, then chaired by Canada’s United Nations Ambassador Robert Fowler, investigate the source of UNITA’s revenue and acquisition of weapons and fuel. In March, 2000 the UN Angola Sanctions Committee issued findings, which reported that a diamond smuggling network included intermediate brokers, African government bureaucrats and ministers and diamond traders and marketers in Antwerp and Tel Aviv. The report also documented that UNITA purchased weapons from the international arms market and from specific countries, including the Ukraine and Bulgaria. The reasons the sanctions were not enforced were: 1) the United States and Western European countries did not possess the political will to implement those sanctions; and 2) the diamond trade and the arms sales were too lucrative for the parties involved. That UN Angola Sanctions Committee made a series of recommendations, which the international community began to gradually implement. However, as of October 2001, those recommendations have not yet been fully implemented.

A third reason that Savimbi was able to continue to conduct violence in the 1990s was that the United States chose to consider the Angolan government and UNITA as political equals in the national reconciliation process. There could have been a shift in that formulation at the moment when Savimbi resumed warfare after losing the 1992 elections. If the Bush administration had declared Savimbi’s (and UNITA’s) resumption of violence as an act of terrorism, Savimbi could have been isolated politically. This would have forced the United States to reassess the political equation in Angola. It would have also given the Angolan government the legitimacy to challenge UNITA to the point of defeat. Nevertheless, the United States persisted in casting Savimbi’s aggression and the Government’s response as a ‘civil war,’ rather than ‘terrorism’ on the part of Savimbi, and demanded that both sides co-operate. However, the United States’ commitment for Savimbi to gain power extended back to the Central Intelligence Agency’s initial contacts in 1974, and was so deep that the Clinton administration could not reframe the crisis. Only as recently as 1998 did the United States stop insisting on Savimbi’s participation in the national government,
obviously too late to save lives. Further, the United States’ disregard for the true nature of Savimbi’s behaviour also showed the United States’ lack of concern for the well-being of the millions of Angolans who lost their lives or suffered owing to Savimbi.

What does this imply relative to what the United States expected from the Angolan national reconciliation process? One of the reasons why the United States required ‘national reconciliation’ and multi-party democratisation was that those processes would force radical-nationalist regimes to accept electoral co-operation with the United States’ surrogates who had participated in the destabilisation campaigns of the 1980s. The United States’ intention was to create a situation where the surrogate group would gain political legitimacy as well as state power. This was the case in Angola where the US wanted Savimbi and UNITA to win the 1992 elections. When Savimbi returned to warfare after the elections, the US showed its true intent when the Bush administration redefined the national reconciliation process to include power sharing, thereby providing Savimbi another chance to capture state power. The MPLA-controlled government did co-operate with the national reconciliation process, but President Dos Santos was also committed to retaining the MPLA’s electoral legitimacy and to defending the country against Savimbi’s terrorism. Nevertheless, Clinton’s approach towards Angola showed that national reconciliation was not necessarily the United States’ objective in that country. This conclusion can be understood by examining the following results. The Angolan government had committed itself to national reconciliation and economic liberalisation, both models that the US promoted. Moreover, the oil transnationals were able to expand their operations in the Cabinda oil fields while the diamond merchants, such as De Beers, profited from the legal and illegal diamond trade. Also, the international arms dealers had both the Angolan government and UNITA as markets. Therefore, the ‘chaos’ and ‘instability’ in Angola were profitable for the hegemonic interests of the United States.

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Endnotes

1. While visiting Africa in 1998 Clinton apologised for not doing more to stop that genocide, where the United States actually made matters worse.

2. Between 1950 and 1989 the United States provided $1.5 in arms to sub-Saharan Africa; $250 million of that assistance going to UNITA between 1986 and 1992

3. Angola backed Kabila largely because he was opposed to UNITA using Zaire as a base of operations, unlike Mobutu, who had allowed UNITA to operate there

4. In 1984 Chevron purchased Gulf Oil.

References


Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?¹

Allan Cain

The article argues that despite ample justification for donor fatigue, the international community has, in fact, stayed engaged in Angola during the last decade. Investment in humanitarian and development/rehabilitation programming can be understood as a donor strategy for influencing regional stability and building peace. The war raises risks for the major powers who have progressively increased their stake in the lucrative Angolan petroleum economy. The Community Rehabilitation Programme (CRP) launched in Brussels in 1995 had a clear agenda to help consolidate the peace process launched in Lusaka in 1994 and the donor financial support necessary to make the plan viable.

The author argues that the CRP programme incorporated some of the essential elements for effective peace building. These fundamentals included: institutional reform, rural-urban economic equilibration, social and infrastructural rehabilitation and community buy-in. The opportunity to have a real impact on the peace process was missed due to the failure of key implementing actors to put an effective operational programme in place in a timely manner. Donor's and more importantly communities, lost patience and the CRP was effectively sidelined. When a belated extension of state administration was attempted in 1998, the CRP mechanism was already moribund. A strategic opportunity to involve communities in the process of civic reconstruction paid for by international donors was wasted. Lessons from these failures can be drawn and the analysis applied to develop improved strategies for engaging communities, local government and other actors such as donors. A renewed programme for alleviating the Angolan humanitarian crisis and at the same time contributing to the peace process is proposed through strengthening communities' capacities and investing in civic institutions.

Background: Angola’s Relationship with International Donors

Angola’s historical legacy from the 1980s was as the regional focal point of resistance against apartheid and South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia. Angola attracted some Scandinavian aid and became the focus for technical co-operation from the Eastern Block but was boycotted by US. With the resolution of regional conflict in Southern Africa and the end of the cold war Angola liberalised its economy and increased its potential for western donor assistance and support from the multilateral financial institutions. Angola’s steadily expanding oil sector and the increased
involvement of the major western powers in exploration and extraction has brought Angola firmly into the world economy. United States policy has shifted radically in ten years from what had euphemistically been called 'constructive engagement' (involving activities of destabilisation of the Angolan state) to a policy of real engagement. Meanwhile the focus of conflict in Africa shifted from Southern to Central Africa during the decade but Angola being geographically transitional and part of both regions remained deeply embroiled in ongoing conflicts.

The Angolan peace process, launched in 1991 with an accord between the Government and the rebel movement UNITA, had by the end of 1998 collapsed for a second time leaving international mediators on the sidelines, no longer able to influence events. Years of accumulated mistrust produced an environment of fear in which the chief opposition party is reluctant to relinquish the security of their arms and commit themselves completely to the parliamentary process. Since the signature of the Lusaka protocol in 1994, high level shuttle diplomacy between the belligerent party leaders, mediated by the UN, failed to bring UNITA on board as a stakeholder. The post-Lusaka attempt at building a peace process failed to trickle down to soften the fears and suspicions of communities at the grassroots, in what remains a divided country.

Planning for humanitarian assistance to Angola has been largely framed within a consecutive series of donor appeals presented by the OCHA (previously DHA) co-ordination unit (UCAH) and the UNDP's Round Table process through their designated Angolan Government partners – Minars and Min.Plan. The appropriateness of strategies to some degree is dependent on the effectiveness and analytical capacities of these two UN structures. International humanitarian agencies and donors, under UN co-ordination with NGOs active on the ground mounted a very successful emergency operation through 1993 and 1994, keeping tens of thousands displaced by war alive in besieged towns throughout the country.

Only in late 1994, after months of protracted negotiations with the UN as intermediary and with increasing Government successes on the battlefield, did the two sides come to an agreement in Lusaka. A cease-fire agreement was signed and a political deal made which gave UNITA a share of power in a national reconciliation government (GURN). A detailed process was spelled out in the Lusaka Accords by which UNITA was to demilitarise and turn the vast territory which it controlled over to State administration. UNITA further was obliged to accept the outcome of the 1992 elections and send their elected deputies to participate in the Parliament as the leading opposition party. They in turn would be offered a share in governance by appointing a number of ministers and senior government administrators at various levels. UNITA was also guaranteed a proportion of places in the national army and police forces.

The architect of the agreement was the then Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Alioune Blondin Beye. Maitre Beye acted as mediator and conducted a three-year programme of shuttle diplomacy between Luanda and the UNITA 'capital' Bailundo in an attempt to fully implement the Lusaka process; the focus of this diplomacy was the leadership of the Government and UNITA. The churches and civil society groups had no formal role in this process.
Donor Fatigue or Donor Exasperation?

Donor's have attempted to adapt their strategies to the reality of Angola's cycles of war and cautious movements towards peace and can best be understood within the framework of their own countries' interests. Those interests are a configuration of humanitarian, economic, strategic and regional concerns. Investment in humanitarian programmes could be viewed as a rational attempt of major players in the international community to protect their economic stakes and supply lines. Angola supplies between seven and ten per cent of the United States' petroleum imports. The achievement of peace and regional stability is therefore a strategic concern of the major world powers. Angola’s cycles of war and successive collapse of approaches to reconciliation could be interpreted as a series of successive failures at peace building. Why then does the international community stay engaged? A senior European diplomat lecturing Angolan humanitarian organisations in the days before the ill-fated 1992 elections, stated categorically:

this [the election] was Angola's last chance with the international community. Donors were tired ... and would give up on Angola if this opportunity for peace and development were not taken. Angola could not expect more patience from the international community.

Unfortunately, neither peace nor development were secured by the 1992 Elections. Ironically, those elections demonstrated an overwhelming commitment by the Angolan people to the principal of democracy (over 90 per cent of those eligible voted), but one of democracy's principal international proponents, the US Government, delayed almost six months in recognising the elected government. In the meantime, Angola had descended once more into civil war. The international community failed to demonstrate a solid resolve to support the results of the election. Margaret Anstee, the UN Secretary General's Special Representative in Angola, had described her earlier experience of managing international support for the election process 'like flying a 747 with only enough fuel for a DC8.'

While some donors have at times scaled back their contributions to Angola, it must be questioned if this is an indication of 'donor fatigue' or an indication of their exasperation with the limited capacity of implementing actors to deliver assistance due to the constraints of the war. Despite the post-election failure to the international community to respond politically it is clear that donors have in fact maintained a significant focus of attention on Angola in subsequent years. The donor's public pledges to the 1995 Community Rehabilitation appeal illustrate their willingness to re-engage in Angola despite the post-election failure. Table 1 (over) demonstrates the relative attention given by international donors to Angola in relationship to other humanitarian crises.

Community Rehabilitation: A Missed Opportunity to Consolidate Peace?

The Community Rehabilitation Programme (CRP) was launched in Brussels on 25-26 September 1995 at a Round Table Conference of the Angolan Government and their civil society and donor partners. The CRP was primarily an attempt by the international donor community to provide the means to smooth the way for the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol – a Marshal Plan for Angola, to provide a carrot in the form of almost one billion dollars of promised rehabilitation and development assistance to rebuild a war-damaged infrastructure and kick-start the economy.
Table 1: The Disasters that Donors Prefer – UN Agencies Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1998 Requested $m</th>
<th>1998 Received $m</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1999 Requested $m</th>
<th>1999 (until 29 April) Received $m</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>80.97</td>
<td>58.14</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>62.86</td>
<td>26.40</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>8.97</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>28.75</td>
<td>14.49</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>28.66</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>20.25</td>
<td>13.02</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>27.92</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>79.04</td>
<td>33.83</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>65.66</td>
<td>9.52</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>206.00</td>
<td>192.20</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>198.43</td>
<td>25.20</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>56.47</td>
<td>52.29</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>265.50</td>
<td>179.35</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>459.34</td>
<td>254.02</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>359.40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total/Average</td>
<td>941.84</td>
<td>618.38</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>1,046.54</td>
<td>249.16</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Economist 15 May 1999

This well conceived programme was formulated through an extended process of national community consultation beginning shortly after the signing of the November 1994 Lusaka Protocol and culminating at the Round Table meeting in September. The CRP principals presented at Brussels provided an excellent base consensus between local communities, the Angolan Government, opposition parties and the international donor community upon which to rebuild the nation after many years of war. The generous promises of the donors underlined the commitment of the international community to the CRP principals but above all demonstrated the importance they gave to consolidating peace in Angola.

The conceptual framework of goals and priorities set out by the CRP in Brussels, provided an umbrella under which most UN Agencies, many government departments and a substantial number of international donors and NGOs were prepared to plan their programmes. Most of the above actors defined their programmes as being at least philosophically within the CRP whether or not they ran their programmes through the ‘Trust Fund’ structures set up by the UNDP and Government or in parallel employing their traditional bilateral procedures.

Despite the good intentions of the donor community, the high expectations aroused in Angolan communities and the good start made at Brussels to engage both the Government and the political opposition, the CRP process began to falter before it was able to have any serious impact. In fact the programme was never seriously implemented largely due to the failure of two of the parties (the Government and UNDP whose roles were to facilitate the management of a Trust Fund on behalf of the donors to screen and fund local communities’ project initiatives). The actual demand put on the Trust Fund by communities themselves, measured in the number of project requests received by the CRP Trust Fund indicated the relevance of the CRP programme as it was originally conceived. Economic and social rehabilitation projects accounted for each 45 per cent of the requests and infrastructural rehabilitation projects for the remaining 10 per cent of the requests.

The failure in the implementation of Community Rehabilitation needs to be evaluated for what can be learned as lessons for future programmes, so that opportunities such as this one will not be wasted in the future. Two essential ingredients for peace-building, donor resources and community motivation, were never effectively brought together by the CRP programme managers. Very little progress was made in meeting
the CRP's development objectives of the consolidation of peace and national reconciliation and the rebuilding of the economy based on community linkages. The slow movement toward these goals reflects the optimistic assumptions that were implicit in the Brussels Round Table plan: that the Lusaka Accords would be implemented in a timely manner and that the Angolan Government had committed itself to implement the economic and legal structural reforms which would be essential to permit local community economic development. In fact there was an increasing sense of 'loss of ownership' of the CRP process by the Angolan Government. The predominant perception in certain provinces and by certain donors was that programme was owned by UNDP.

UNDP's own bureaucratic system of financial planning, reporting and monitoring – imprecise and overlapping sets of definitions of programme and project boundaries – made budgeting a difficult process for non-UN personnel to understand. Government, donors and communities each became frustrated and impatient with programme procedures and tended to look for a means to circumvent them. The use of the UN Trust Fund as a pool to finance both the programme administration, necessary office infrastructure rehabilitation, capacity building as well as community-based projects, without sufficient separation of these functions, prevented programme managers from monitoring the overall financial situation of the CRP. The problem became a serious constraint for local government and donors who needed clear and accurate financial reporting in order to plan and carry out their functions within the CRP. The lack of transparency of reporting systems hid the fact that only a small proportion of the UN Trust Fund money was invested in community-based projects.

Ultimately, loss of donor confidence was reflected by their failure to meet financial commitments made in Brussels. The slow and incomplete implementation of the Lusaka peace process led to further donor loss of patience and their continued focus on humanitarian and emergency activities.

Government did not implement the expected structural adjustment reforms that were considered as preconditions for major donor investment. The national private sector did not engage because the Government failed to carry out the promised monetary, banking and legal restructuring which would stimulate local small and medium scale private sector development. Potential local entrepreneurs lacked confidence due to the slow movement on the peace process and the failure to guarantee free movement of people and commodities around the country and between the cities and rural areas.

The strategy to build capacity in the national and provincial offices of the Ministry of Planning to manage the CRP was largely ineffective. Only in a very few provinces had the CRP management units been well integrated into the provincial planning offices. Perhaps the most worrying result of the failure of the CRP to deliver expected results was the progressive loss of engagement of the local community and NGO sector. This loss of confidence was provoked by extremely long and complicated project approval processes (some small projects took 3 years from conception to the release of funding) or the complete failure of delivery of promised funding. These delays undermined the confidence of communities in their own local leaders, associations and Angolan NGOs who were involved in mobilisation, designing and negotiation of promised project support. Serious damage was done to the credibility of these local actors as well as the image of UNDP who were too often seen by local partners as the owners of the CRP programme. Only five community-based projects were completed out of 159 requests processed by mid-1998 when the CRP programme was suspended.
The CRP's early successful community mobilisation at the programme conception stage ironically proved counterproductive due to frustrated community expectations. Even community consultation was eventually recommended to be curtailed until results on the ground could be demonstrated. Raised expectations were transformed into disillusionment by the slowness of the CRP to meet its project funding promises.

The Programme's potential for contributing to the building of peace in Angola was significant. The process of the extension of state administration was originally conceived through the CRP as one of engaging communities in a process of rebuilding social and physical infrastructure within a framework of local level economic development. This process was to have involved communities, civil authorities and an emergent indigenous private sector providing employment opportunities to demobilised soldiers from the two previously warring parties.

The Lusaka political process became so drawn out and the extension of state administration so delayed, that the CRP became de-linked from the process. When the government belatedly extended state administration in 1998 to a large number of municipalities abandoned by UNITA, there was no attempt to employ the CRP model. Occupation of municipal centres of administration by military and police forces became the norm with little attention given to civic services and community involvement.

Failure of the Government to successfully implement an effective extension of state administration was one of the reasons given by UNITA for their eventual rejection of the Lusaka peace process. The CRP was a lost opportunity to engage the international donors and local community partners in a national plan to build sustainable peace in Angola.

**Cycle of Failure & the Marginalisation of International Actors**

Despite compliance to the letter of most of the clauses of the Lusaka agreement and UN certification of UNITA demilitarisation in early 1998, by September 1998 UNITA still, in reality, had refused to disarm. At this stage its military capacity was such that it was able to reoccupy many of the rural districts that they had formally handed back to state administration. By early June 1998, the guerrilla actions and low level fighting across the country had started escalating. In December a bloody conventional war in the central highlands had resumed and by mid-1999 violence has spread to other provinces in the north and west of the country. The Security Council mission – MONUA – had, as one of its mandates, the verification of the demobilisation and disarming of UNITA. The Angolan Government saw UNITA's failure to demobilise as an indication of the complicity of the international community. The failure of the MONUA mission led to widespread mistrust of the UN and undermined the credibility of international actors in the humanitarian and human rights fields as well. The potential for the UN to act as a credible interlocutor or mediator between the warring parties was eliminated.

The crisis by mid-1999, characterised by severe shortages of most emergency commodities, was not necessarily due to donor neglect. In fact, the response to the 1999 Consolidated appeal (written by OCHA in November 1998), had been generally positive but the humanitarian assistance planners had not calculated a return to war into their planning scenarios. The needs were reassessed in mid-1999 and scaled up twofold. The subsequent problems were not due to the donor's response but the capacity of delivering assistance in the face of intense military confrontations,
insecure roads and besieged and damaged airports. The humanitarian co-ordination (undermined by the Government's general suspicion of the UN) was not capable of negotiating right-of-access or safe corridors to reach the hundreds of thousands of displaced in the government-occupied towns and provincial capitals without compromising the international boycott against dealing with the militant wing of UNITA. Better access had to await the improved fortunes of the government forces on the battlefield and their guarantees of safe passage for humanitarian aid. Some members of the humanitarian community fear that their neutrality has become compromised and that they are in no position to guarantee that the rights of all the displaced and civilian war affected on both sides of the lines of conflict will be respected. Further fears are raised that the displaced have been used and could potentially be abused as pawns in the ongoing war. Urbanisation, the forcing of rural populations into overcrowded, under-serviced cities to become dependent on over extended government infrastructure has been part of UNITA's strategy for two decades. It is feared that vulnerable communities could be used to create security buffers or forced to settle in strategic areas in order to stabilise militarily insecure zones.

Rights-based Humanitarian Action

Worrying trends have been highlighted by a recent OCHA mission to Angola which noted with evident concern that the protection needs of IDPs go largely un-addressed. They note the increasing reports of 'forced displacement, forced relocation and forced return',

International humanitarian actors have been increasingly vocal, calling for warring parties to respect the rights of the displaced and vulnerable groups (such as children and women). An emerging 'rights-based' strategy based on a set of norms, accepted under international common law as the standard of protection of civilian populations is beginning to form a framework for humanitarian action. Linked to these rights is a demand for minimum standards to be respected in dealing with affected communities within humanitarian emergencies. In the context of Angola, this approach provides common ground upon which humanitarian actors who have had little leverage on the warring parties can stand firmly. The norms also provide guidelines that can be negotiated with government for acceptance as minimal pre-conditions for resettlement and the protection of the displaced. The approach facilitates co-ordination, and potentially defuses political dispute between international and local and government actors. Commonly accepted standards shift focus on to operational concerns and provide a basis for a coalition of interests (for example between local government and international partners) in confronting abuses and violations of rights.

The emerging rights-based approach to humanitarian action risks however, seeing displaced and vulnerable communities as essentially powerless victims of the crisis. By adopting minimum standards, the role of communities in achieving these conditions as participants could be ignored. The rights based approach to date has primarily addressed itself to the warring parties, government and the humanitarian community (donors, international agencies, NGOs); communities are seen as victims or potential victims rather than actors. NGO programmes have largely depended on the participation of communities in the provision of humanitarian assistance and in rebuilding after conflict. A rights-based strategy will need to evolve further in order to ensure that communities are not just consulted but become focal to the process of rehabilitation, resettlement and the achievement of their rights.
Future Options: Community Rehab II?

Many of the aims of the old 'community rehabilitation programme' are still valid today – increasingly so as more of the national territory becomes accessible with areas around some of the provincial capitals safe for resettlement. The underlying aim of community rehabilitation in engaging communities as stakeholders has an important stabilising role in building peace and national reconciliation.

Communities are the first line humanitarian response for a large proportion of displaced families. OCHA estimates that out of approximately one million confirmed newly displaced people, more than half, that is, 555,000 (55 per cent), are integrated into local communities of the provincial capitals or the municipal towns, while about 450,000 are living in camps or are included in temporary resettlement programmes (OCHA, April 2000). If one uses OCHA's estimates of reported displaced this proportion integrated into communities increases to 75 per cent. If one accepts the Government's numbers which include the estimated half a million absorbed into the nusseques of Luanda, the proportion increases to over 80 per cent.

Despite current Angolan Government optimism about the war drawing to an early close, insecurity for communities of war displaced and humanitarian workers has deteriorated in recent months as the war reverts to a new phases of guerrilla action and rural destabilisation. While some provisional resettlement in the hinterland of provincial centres may be possible, the process of the return of the displaced to their areas of origin is likely to be slow. A significant proportion of those who originally fled their villages over the decades of war may never return. Others, when they do return, will find their ancestral land appropriated by others. It is probable that the prevailing thinking that 'resettlement' is the panacea or the appropriate strategy within the current context, is overly simplistic. While the political crisis in Angola remains unresolved the complex nature of the humanitarian emergency is likely to continue. War affected communities have been forced to develop sophisticated strategies in order to be able to survive, some of which have involved acquiring the skills to keep their families alive in the hostile and sometime violent urban environment; women entering the economy of micro-scale marketing to earn sufficient cash to feed their children; families drawing down whatever social capital can be obtained from kinship and cultural solidarity; intensive cultivation and foraging of marginal and non-formal lands to find sustenance or income to ensure family survival. Community-based approaches which strengthen local capacities and skills to cope and survive within the humanitarian crisis are often also appropriate in later phases of resettlement and rehabilitation; investment in community capacity building is rarely wasted. The strategy can assist in meeting immediate needs but may also produce long term positive results that can not be previously anticipated.

Some donors have identified the need to develop more sophisticated and flexible approaches to the Angola crisis. The British Government has adopted a two-track strategy, which maintains support for emergency humanitarian action but also invests in an urban poverty alleviation strategy. The UK's Department for International Development (DFID) Luanda Urban Poverty Programme supports family survival through micro-finance to women and sustainable water and sanitation services in the marginal nusseques of Luanda, where Angola's largest concentration of war displaced have settled.

The US Government have adopted an approach, breaking away from traditional American aid policy, of supporting three parallel programming streams: emergency
aid through OFDA and Food for Peace, transitional/rehabilitation activities as well as longer term development (USAID). This approach recognises the complexity of the Angolan crisis and the fact that short, medium and long term actions are needed and can be undertaken today. The strategy also reflects a decision taken by the US Government to become a stakeholder in Angola and a realisation that a resolution of the Angola crisis is important to the stabilisation of the region and in turn important to the protection of US strategic and economic interests.

The European Union being one of the largest donors to Angola has tended to be slow and less able to respond quickly to the cycles of the evolving Angolan crisis. Its emergency programmes such as ECHO and humanitarian support through NGOs has provided the necessary short-term aid but was slow to set up the mechanisms to respond to the commitments that they made to post-Lusaka Accord community rehabilitation in Brussels in 1995. The European Union’s equivalent to the CRP was called the PAR (Programme of Assistance for Reconstruction). The PAR was launched with a budget of 55,000,000 ECU but like the parallel UNDP supported programme administrative and co-ordination structures with the Angolan Government were time-consuming to put in place. Like the CRP, the programme was finally in place just as the Lusaka process began to unravel. Unlike many other donors who withdrew their support for community rehabilitation as the security deteriorated with the return to hostilities in December 1998, the European Union did not close their PAR programme. Fine tuning and geographic refocusing and perhaps administrative inertia allowed the EU to leave the PAR programme framework in tact and is now in a unique position of having a flexible community-focused mechanism in place that can be adapted to the current needs of communities – some of whom may be able to return to rebuild their villages in the near future.

The international donor community by and large, remains without clear policy direction on Angola. However, the most innovative have maintained flexible multi-pronged approach. While the international community stands firm on political support for the legitimate elected Angolan Government reflected in renewed support for strengthening sanctions against UNITA, there is also a prevailing sense of exasperation or inability to contribute to building essential peace and national reconciliation. Almost all donors call for improved Government accountability, commitment to assuming their own responsibilities to invest in humanitarian action, good governance and bringing an end to the war quickly so that resources can be re-channelled into social development. Some donors realise that they can play a role through building community capacity and assisting the Government in achieving some of the above goals through the strengthening both of local institutions and civil society.

Allan Cain, Director, Development Workshop, Luanda.

Endnotes


2. Evaluation of the Community Rehabilitation Project UNDP/ANG/96/100 – Annex 10, UNDP Luanda 1998, shows a table of Trust Fund Expenditures for the different components of the programme.


7. Planners sometimes use as a rule-of-thumb a calculation: for every two years of displacement to an urban environment approximately 50 per cent will not return.


9. DFID’s Luanda Urban Poverty Programme is developed in partnership with Development Workshop, CARE, Save the Children and the Provincial Government of Luanda.
Oil & War in Angola

Jedrzej George Frynas & Geoffrey Wood

This article investigates the impact of oil on the war in Angola. It demonstrates that mineral wealth has not only financed Angola's war but has also intimately shaped the contours of the conflict. MPLA's access to oil revenues and UNITA's to diamonds can help to explain the duration and character of the conflict, and, to some extent, even the timing of military operations. The logic of the 'resource curse' has had a major impact on the make-up of Angola's political economy and has been decisive in the erosion of state legitimacy, which in turn has had important consequences for the prospects for peace. The activities of foreign oil companies have affected the shape of the conflict; the intense competition for oil concessions has led to a number of different companies seeking the favour of the Angolan state elite through dubious charitable donations, weapons deals, and other forms of assistance. On a theoretical level, the article questions liberal assumptions about the positive effects of trade on peace.

Angola has considerable natural resources—oil and diamonds. Yet, according to social indicators, it is ranked 160 out of 174 countries by the UN Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2000). That this underdevelopment was fuelled by the conflict between the government and the UNITA rebels is perhaps obvious. But, inversing the argument, to what extent did the trade in oil and diamonds intimately shape the contours of the conflict, as some observers suggested?

This question must be seen in the context of mainstream liberal beliefs in the positive effect of trade on world peace. As early as 1908, Norman Angell (1933, partly re-published from 1908) boldly argued that war no longer pays. In a typical exposition of his views, he stated:

The structure of modern banking and finance have set up a vital, and, by reason of the telegraph, an immediately-felt interdependence. Mutual indebtedness and worldwide investment have made the financial and industrial security of the victor dependent upon financial and industrial security in all considerable civilised centres. For these reasons widespread confiscation, or destruction of industry and trade in a conquered territory, would react disastrously upon the commerce and finance of the conqueror (Angell, 1933:122).

While the views of early international relations scholars on international conflict were more nuanced than sometimes acknowledged (see Osiander, 1998), Angell's account was followed by many other liberal writings which assumed that growth in trade promotes peace (e.g. Selfridge, 1918; Viner, 1937; Deutsch, et al. 1957). More recently, scholars supplied an impressive array of trade-conflict models and quantitative investigations, which demonstrated that economic interdependence lowers the probability of interstate conflict (e.g. Polachek, 1980; Oneal and Russett, 1999; Snidal,
1991). These findings have been challenged inter alia by neo-marxists and some neo-realisists such as Waltz, while the cumulative results of the empirical literature have been ambiguous at best (for an excellent literature review, see Barbieri and Schneider, 1999). However, the liberal views have had a considerable influence on real-world decision-makers in the developed world and have fostered the view that, by promoting trade, transnational corporations (TNCs) contribute towards world peace. Symptomatic of this influence, an influential United Nations report (1979:321) remarked in the 1970s that TNCs 'may promote the exchange of knowledge among peoples and countries and contribute to co-operation among governments'. In recent years, another version of liberal theory – the Kant-inspired democratic peace theory (see e.g. Doyle, 1986; Chan, 1997) has become more fashionable and the focus has shifted from economic development towards democratic reform. Nonetheless, the 'trade promotes peace' proposition has remained influential.

Following the logic of liberally inspired scholarship, the war in Angola (or any other African war) would have been less likely, if there had been a greater level of economic interdependence between Angola and the other countries involved (Cuba, the Soviet Union, Zaïre, South Africa and the US). Setting aside non-economic explanations for armed conflict, this reasoning may have validity in the context of African wars to an extent. However, we believe that conventional trade-conflict models pose several difficulties for the analysis of contemporary armed conflicts in Africa and elsewhere.

Above all, as Barbieri and Schneider (1999) pointed out, formal trade-conflict models presuppose that 'nation-states are rational unitary actors who try to maximise national welfare', a notion long abandoned by political economists. However, even if war does not provide overall net gains for a nation-state, specific interest groups, firms or individuals may obtain gains above the cost of their involvement in the war effort. Recent scholarship on civil war (see e.g. Keen, 1998; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998 and 2000; Reno, 1998) has provided abundant evidence of economic benefits of violence to certain groups. Far from being an irrational activity as liberal thinking suggests, war is 'a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection' (Keen, 1998). As demonstrated inter alia by Keen (1998), governments may use economic violence to reward supporters or maintain access to resources, army officers may gain opportunities for looting or engaging in illegal trade, while specific private firms may gain trade monopolies or lucrative contracts. As violence can be an economic opportunity for many participants, evidence on contemporary wars challenges many liberal assumptions such as, for instance, the assumption that combatants aspire to win a war. Indeed, as Keen (1998) argued, 'opposing' parties in a conflict may have a shared interest in war. Selective economic opportunities created through violence explain why actors may opt for the conflictual solution in preference to agreements even if this entails considerable losses at the aggregate level. Thus, the Angolan war may continue despite its aggregate negative effect on national welfare as it positively impacts certain groups and individuals.

Secondly, formal trade-conflict models fail to distinguish between the impact of different forms of economic activity. In their thought-provoking work, Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2000) asserted that there are major differences between the effects of natural resource trade and other forms of trade. Based on their econometric analysis, they found that natural resource exports had the largest single influence on the risk of an outbreak of civil war, as these exports provided easily lootable resources which helped to overcome collective choice problems of potential participants in a conflict. The effect of natural resource exports was non-linear; the highest risk of war was present when around a quarter of gross domestic product was generated by such
exports. At this level of GDP share, the risk of conflict was around five times higher than in societies without such resources (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2000). Recent econometric work (e.g. Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000), general qualitative studies (e.g. Keen, 1998) and case studies on countries such as Sierra Leone (e.g. Davies, 2000) provide further support that dependence on natural resources dramatically increases the threat of armed conflict. Thus, Angola's oil and diamond exports may have increased, rather than decreased, the likelihood of conflict.

The third critique is related to the second, namely that models of interstate conflict have failed to build upon insights gained from work on intrastate conflict. Economic approaches to interstate and intrastate conflict are built upon different assumptions based on the distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign power. On the most basic level, much of the former focuses on the effects of wealth creation, while much of the latter (at least in the African context) focuses on failures of wealth redistribution. Thus, whether we classify the Angolan war primarily as civil war (that is, internal war) or, given the previous heavy involvement of other states, as interstate conflict would call for the application of a different theoretical approach. However, as demonstrated inter alia by Reno (1998), the distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign rulers is partly artificial. Indeed, Pegg's (1998) insightful work reveals that many non-sovereigns may actually function more effectively. This has important implications for conflicts. As Kaldor (1999:2) argued, the 'new wars' involve a 'blurring of the distinctions between war (usually defined as violence between states or organised political groups for political motives) and organised crime (violence undertaken by privately organised groups for private purposes'). When it comes to the economics of the 'new wars', distinctions between internal and external or between aggression (attacks from abroad) and repression (attacks from inside the country) lose meaning (Kaldor, 1999). The Angolan war questions the validity of the liberal distinctions. The MPLA-UNITA conflict had many traditional features of an internal war but it involved the active participation of many foreign countries and, more recently, it spilled over into neighbouring countries, most notably the Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo-Brazzaville and Namibia.

Based on these criticisms, this article challenges the straightforward liberal trade-conflict relationship by investigating the effect of the oil economy on the Angolan conflict. In addition to the use of secondary sources, this investigation is based on interviews with individuals in London, Johannesburg and Luanda – including senior oil industry staff and analysts, former mercenaries and members of non-governmental organisations.

We suggest that oil resources played a major part in prolonging and shaping the contours of the conflict in various forms: from funding the war to eroding the legitimacy of the state. Before we engage in this discussion, we start with an overview of the development of the Angolan oil industry. This is followed by a discussion of the relationship between war and the oil industry, the main body of the article.

**Oil Industry Overview**

Angola's oil industry was firmly established during the colonial period. The first oil exploration licences were already granted before the First World War and the Petroleum Company of Angola (Companhia de Petróleos de Angola – Petrangol) began oil production by the mid-1950s. By the time of the Portuguese withdrawal in 1975, Angola was already established as an oil producer and oil was the most important export commodity. Oil production was dominated by the Cabinda Gulf Oil
Company (CABGOC), a subsidiary of the US firm Gulf Oil (later taken over by Chevron in 1984), which started oil exploration in the Cabinda area in the 1950s and started production in 1968.

Following Angola's formal independence, the MPLA government created a national oil corporation, the Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis (Sonangol) in 1976. Despite instituting major reforms in the oil industry, the government emerged as highly pragmatic in its dealings with Western oil companies. The companies were allowed to continue operations and expand along previous lines of business, although the government forced them to form joint ventures and production-sharing agreements with Sonangol – not unlike more pro-Western states such as Nigeria.

Sonangol formed joint ventures with those companies, which had already been producing oil in Angola, and acquired equity stakes in these ventures. Sonangol and the other joint venture partners shared the operating costs in proportion to their equity stake. They also shared the crude oil in the same proportion, so Sonangol was the owner of a substantial share of the produced oil. For instance, of the nine oil cargoes scheduled for export delivery in November 2001, as many as four came from oil allocated to Sonangol (compared with three for Chevron, one for TotalFinaElf and one for Agip). However, the foreign oil companies remained the actual operators of the oil blocks so they continued to run the day-to-day operations. Production-sharing agreements were signed with respect to areas opened up for oil exploration and production after 1975. In such an agreement, the foreign company served as a contractor to Sonangol. The contractor advanced all funds towards running costs and investments, which were reimbursed through a share of the oil once oil production started. In both types of arrangements, the foreign oil companies remained firmly in the driving seat as far as organising the logistics of production was concerned.

Following independence, foreign oil companies have opened new oil exploration areas off the coast of Angola. Successful oil exploration, particularly by Gulf/Chevron and the French firm Elf-Aquitaine, sustained the interest of foreign companies and resulted in major new investments. Oil production in the 1980s tripled from around 150,000 barrels/day to around 460,000 barrels/day in 1989 and continued to rise throughout the 1990s (Table 1). According to figures for mid-1999, Chevron and Elf (now part of the TotalFinaElf group) were by far the biggest operators in Angola, accounting for 62 per cent and 22.9 per cent of total oil production respectively (Table 2). The biggest export market was the United States.

As Hodges (2001:126) pointed out, the Angolan oil industry entered a new stage of its development in the 1990s. Advances in oil extraction technology have opened the way for the exploitation of

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Oil Production in thousand barrels/day</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>460</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<td>1981</td>
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<td>1987</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>745</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>735</td>
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Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (various years).
vast deep water (200 to 1000 metres below sea level) and ultra deep-water reserves (deeper than 1000 metres); 17 new oil blocks (Blocks 14-30) were awarded in deep water areas. Major discoveries were made in Block 14 (Chevron), Block 15 (Exxon-Mobil) and Block 17 (Elf), most notably, Elf-operated giant 'Girassol' field expected to eventually add some 200,000 barrels/day to Angola's production capacity. The first deep-water oil field, Chevron's Kuito field, began production by the end of 1999.

From an international perspective, Angola's offshore oil is particularly attractive for geological reasons. Owing to offshore discoveries, Angola was reportedly third in the list of countries making new oil finds in 1999, behind Iran and Saudi Arabia (African Energy, July 2000). Around two-thirds of Angola's deep-water exploration wells have struck oil, compared with a historical world average of around 15 per cent. Angolan seismic data makes it relatively easy for firms to accurately target their drilling. This is of considerable importance to oil firms given that a single deepwater exploration well can cost up to US$30 million (Financial Times, 7 January 2000). In addition, Angola was attractive owing to favourable petroleum taxation and relatively low operating costs.

Unsurprisingly, the oil discoveries in the 1990s incited much outside interest in Angola’s oil. This was best demonstrated by the award of the ultra deepwater oil blocks 31-33 in 1999, which will be operated by BP, TotalFinaElf and Exxon-Mobil. Despite only limited seismic information being available, the foreign oil companies were prepared to pay over US$900 million in ‘signature bonuses’ – down payments for the exclusive right to explore for and produce oil in the delineated areas – for the blocks. This was considerably more than signature bonuses paid in the early 1990s. Since the 1999 bidding round, it has become apparent that government interference in the oil industry may diminish Angola’s attractiveness for foreign investors. The government now insists that the Floating Production, Storage and Offloading Vessels (FPSOs) for offshore oilfield development must be leased, rather than purchased. This would mean earlier revenue flows for Angola, but somewhat reduced returns for oil firms. Furthermore, the government puts pressure on foreign oil companies to lease equipment and procure services from Sonangol joint ventures and subsidiaries which supply helicopter services, carry out seismic work or provide drilling equipment. This may affect oil company profitability but may also affect quality of services and introduce opacity into decisions about how oil fields should be developed (Financial Times, 16 November 2000; African Energy, April 2001). Nonetheless, owing to the advantages mentioned earlier, Angola is still considered a highly attractive oil region.

According to a recent report, Angola’s oil industry was forecasted to be able to attract investment worth some US$15.6 billion between 2000 and 2005. This was even expected to surpass US$11.2 billion investment in Nigeria – where the government is hoping to expand the country’s oil production from just over 2 million barrels/day to 3 million barrels per day by 2003. The figures demonstrated that Angola has entirely

<table>
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<th>Table 2: Angola’s Oil Production by Operator, mid-1999</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chevron</td>
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<tr>
<td>barrels/day</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
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Source: Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, 5 November 1999.
upstaged other historically significant sub-Saharan oil producers such as Gabon (US$1.6 billion investment expected in 2000-2005) and Cameroon (US$1 billion) (*African Energy*, January 2001). With investments rising, the consultants Wood Mackenzie predicted Angola's oil production to grow from less than 800,000 barrels/day today to some 1.4 million barrels/day by 2005 (*Financial Times*, 7 January 2000). Given the recent delays caused by Sonangol, this prediction may yet turn out to be too optimistic. But a steep rise in Angola's oil production and oil revenues is inevitable. In the meantime, Sonangol plans to offer more ultra deepwater oil blocks for bidding and major plans for the expansion of gas production — a by-product of oil production — are being drawn up.

**Oil Industry & Armed Conflict**

The MPLA-UNITA conflict seriously affected the Angolan oil industry and put oil operations at risk. This was exemplified when UNITA forces overran the Soyo oil fields twice in 1993. UNITA caused considerable destruction to the only vulnerable onshore oil fields, operated by Belgium's Petrofina. As a result of the closure of a loading terminal and shelling by UNITA forces, Texaco's nearby offshore wells also ceased production. This reduced Angola's oil production temporarily by almost 15 per cent from 555,000 barrels/day to 474,000 barrels/day (*Petroleum Economist*, various). It took Petrofina almost five years to fully revive the onshore fields (*The Times*, 8 July 1997). Despite most recent successes of the Angolan army against UNITA, the threat of military attacks has continued. As recently as August 2001, UNITA killed nine people in an attack on the village of Anha do Norte, Benguela province, the site of Sonangol's planned new oil refinery (*Angola Peace Monitor*, 5 September 2001).

Oil companies faced other threats including kidnapping and killing of oil company staff and sabotage of oil installations. Although the South African-UNITA war against the government was backed by the US government, Chevron — a US company — did not avoid becoming a military target. Indeed, South African commandos mounted a failed attempt to blow up Chevron's oil installations in 1985, which put over 100 US oil staff at risk (Brittain, 1998:20-23). In the late 1980s, US oil companies also faced the risk of retaliation from their home country government which supported the UNITA war effort. In 1986, the US administration under Reagan pressured American oil companies and sub-contractors to withdraw their interest in the Angolan oil industry to protest the presence of Cuban troops in the country, which prompted Chevron to sell 20 per cent of its shares in CABGOC to the Italian firm Agip. The US Congress prevented the Export-Import Bank from disbursing new loans and insurance for sales to the Angolan oil industry for a period of time (Library of Congress, 2001). Potentially, there is also a threat of future disputes over the delineation of maritime boundaries in oil-rich areas, especially with the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Furthermore, the prospect of oil revenues helped to escalate the conflict. Reminiscent of the troubles in the Niger Delta, the failure of the Angolan state to redistribute the oil resources in any just way has prompted local unrest. This was most pronounced in the Cabinda enclave where most of the Angolan oil has been extracted to date. Grievance over state neglect and the prospect of huge oil revenues were undoubtedly the main factors in the armed conflict of the Cabindan separatist groups including the Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) — which has now split into two rival groups — and Frente Democrática de Cabinda (FDC).
As the most serious consequence, the war delayed the development of onshore oil production. Angola does have substantial reserves onshore (including considerable areas east of Luanda), but exploitation of these reserves has been slight owing to the security situation. Nonetheless, oil operations in Angola were perhaps less risky than some observers assumed. A comparison with Nigeria is illuminating. Foreign oil companies in Nigeria faced many considerable risks including military coups; cash-flow problems caused by the government’s failure to pay its share of joint venture funding; civil unrest in oil producing areas in the Niger Delta; and protests by international pressure groups (Frynas, 1998).

In contrast, Angola had a relatively stable government from 1975 to date. As in Nigeria, the Angolan state oil corporation had problems paying for its share of joint-venture funding. But oil companies in Angola faced fewer funding problems than in Nigeria, as the government consented to alternative funding arrangements for joint ventures from an earlier stage, whereby the foreign partners secure a financial package for a given project and the loans are paid back in oil. By being almost exclusively based offshore, oil companies in Angola had also relatively little to fear from either the local communities or armed groups such as UNITA or FLEC. As the local civil society groups were less influential and the offshore oil companies in Angola had created less destruction than their counterparts in Nigeria, Angola attracted considerably less attention from international environmental or human rights groups. Furthermore, while oil companies in Nigeria had to deal with and accommodate numerous stakeholders including the federal government, state governors, local government authorities, non-governmental organisations, local chiefs and youths groups, operating in Angola was relatively straightforward. In Angola, oil firms were largely freed from having to satisfy the competing demands of different interest groups, as there was only one major group to pay off – the central Angolan government, who in turn had the responsibility of distributing gains through the state and military elites. Indeed, at least one multinational oil firm interviewed by the authors of this article preferred to operate in Angola if compared with Nigeria, as the Angolan situation was not as ‘messy’.

In addition, as indicated earlier, a pragmatic government petroleum policy also helped to minimise any socio-political risks. The case of Gulf Oil is usually cited as an example of the cordial relationship between oil companies and the government from independence. Despite being a US-owned company, Gulf avoided nationalisation and was able to expand its activities in Angola without serious government interference. This can be contrasted with Nigeria where the assets of BP were nationalised in 1979 (albeit for political, not economic reasons) and, more recently, the government tried to wrest some of the so-called ‘marginal oil fields’ from the foreign companies and to re-allocate them to indigenous firms (Frynas, 1998) while the year 2000 oil licensing round ended on a sour note with a disagreement between the government and the oil companies over contractual terms (Guardian, Lagos, 25 October and 7 November 2001). In terms of security threats, the Angolan government provided some of its best troops to protect oil installations. Indeed, Cuban troops were used to protect Gulf Oil installations during the 1980s. This created an ironic situation whereby US companies were protected by communist troops against US-supported rebels, and also made tax payments to the Angolan government, which were in turn used against those rebels (Le Billon, 2001). Therefore, the Angolan War caused much lower socio-political risk to foreign investors in the oil sector than could perhaps be expected. While the effect of the war on the oil industry was not excessive, the presence of oil greatly affected the war.
Oil: Funding the War

As the most obvious impact on the war, Angola’s oil wealth funded arms purchases by the government. Before 1990, this was less important as Angola received military assistance from the Soviet bloc. Cuban troops and Soviet equipment did not come entirely free and oil played a major role in paying for them. But, with the end of the Cold War, foreign assistance stopped and oil greatly gained in importance. According to the IMF (1999), the government spent some 36.3 per cent of total expenditure on ‘defence and public order’ in 1997, an increase from 24.6 per cent in 1993. With the absence of Cold War patrons, this military expenditure became almost wholly dependent on oil revenues, which constituted over 90 per cent of the country’s export revenues.

While the origins of the Angolan war were of political nature, the contours of the war are closely related to fluctuations in oil revenues, and access by the competing sides to other natural resources, most notably diamonds, but also tropical hardwood, and – until Angola’s great herds of elephants were virtually wiped out in the 1980s – wildlife products. The presence of oil resources, as well as other natural resources, can help to explain the duration and character of the conflict and, to some extent, even the timing of government offensives in the 1990s.

Without the oil and diamond revenues, the government and UNITA would have found it much more difficult to continue waging the war after the departure of foreign powers. Oil and diamond revenues also shaped the character of the war by allowing both sides to continue the capital-intensive warfare, which began with South Africa’s and Cuba’s entry into the war in 1975. Rather than using handguns and light artillery as in many other conflicts in Africa, both sides were still able to afford expensive jet aircraft, attack helicopters and tanks.

Access to oil resources can also, to some extent, explain the timing of the government’s military campaigns against UNITA in the 1990s, which was particularly visible in the case of the 1999 military setbacks and advances. Unfortunately, any figures on the Angolan economy and finances, whether official or unofficial, are somewhat inaccurate. But, as Table 3 suggests, the decline in the oil price during 1998 resulted in a sharp slump in export earnings. The average annual price of the Cabinda crude – the largest Angolan crude type – fell from US$18.11/barrel in 1997 to US$11.73/barrel in 1998, with the price falling to as low as US$8.40/barrel on 10 December 1998. This came at a particularly bad time for the government given that full-scale war had resumed. UNITA was able to seize back over 90 of the 272 areas it had handed over to the government in terms of the Lusaka Accords (UNDP, 1999; Mail and Guardian, Johannesburg, 2 February 2000; c.f. Government of Angola 1994), although this was partially due to the fact that the bulk of the army’s elite troops were committed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in support of Laurent Kabila.

Having suffered from half a year of defeats by UNITA in early 1999 and from financial difficulties amidst low oil prices, the Angolan government was saved by an oil-backed loan and oil company payments. With the assistance of the Finance Minister Joaquim David, the government was able to obtain a US$575 million loan arranged by Warburg Dillon Read – the investment banking arm of UBS – in mid-1999. As only part of the loan was used to re-finance a previous loan, it included substantial ‘fresh’ funds, which could be spend on new weapons (African Energy, various; Global Witness, 1999). Shortly afterwards, some US$900 million was paid by multinational...
Table 3: Oil Prices and Angola's Earnings from the Oil Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average price of Cabinda crude per barrel (US$) (million USS)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>17.84</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>15.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>14.98</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>16.37</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>19.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>18.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>11.73</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oil prices were computed from daily Platt’s figures; export earnings were reported in UNDP (1999).

It seems that the bulk of the $900 million of signature bonus revenue was rapidly spent on weaponry and backhanders (Independent, 11 June 2000; Global Witness, 1999). Indeed, major deliveries of heavy military equipment including tanks reportedly arrived in Luanda in late July/early August (Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 September 1999). The 1999 oil windfall – and the withdrawal of a section of the elite troops based in the DRC – led to the government launching a major counter-attack on UNITA in September 1999 (Agence France Press, 29 December 1999). This led to the government gradually reasserting its control over the central, northern and eastern regions, representing an almost complete turnaround of the military fortunes (Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, 18 January 2000). Meanwhile, oil prices recovered from the low levels in 1998, with an annual average of US$17.40/barrel in 1999 for the Cabinda crude (US$27.20 in 2000 and US$24.91 in the first half of 2001). UNITA was forced to revert to hit-and-run guerrilla tactics, although it has retained effective control and/or the ability to hinder movements by government forces over large areas of the countryside.

Oil windfalls similarly paid for the large amount of defence spending – and looting – in 1993 enabling the government to reverse military setbacks which resulted from UNITA’s resumption of war after an earlier failed peace initiative. While we cannot trace in detail the actual decision-making processes, it is obvious that oil resources influenced the direction of the war.

Oil, War & the ‘Resource Curse’

Oil revenues have not merely provided the means needed to wage war but had a more general impact on Angola’s political economy. Like other petro-states, Angola suffered from the phenomenon known as the ‘resource curse’ (for a review, see Ross, 1999). Despite being well endowed with natural resources, the country suffered from underdevelopment and conflict. The arguments linking the resource curse with poor economic growth are well known so we do not need to reiterate them. But it may be useful to sketch the political linkages in brief, as they bear an important influence on conflict in Angola.

Oil revenues, like other resource rents and foreign aid, are relatively easily obtained. The number of ‘taxable subjects’ is very small, if compared with general taxes levied on the population. One of the key effects of relying on oil revenues is the neglect of non-oil tax revenues. Since non-oil taxes are of little importance, the ruling elite has less incentive in nurturing other economic sectors, providing basic infrastructure or even ensuring a basic social peace. Frequently, the rulers are not required to provide
much tangible support to investors themselves, apart from a suitable legal-contractual environment. Oil companies in sub-Saharan Africa have often built their own access roads, provided their own security and, being enclave economies, they relied little on local business linkages. In the words of de Soysa (2000), sub-soil assets ‘provide quick profit and largely require material resources rather than extensive human co-operation for their extraction’. As a result, oil resources undermine good governance and political accountability to society.

These arguments find resonance in Angola where we find an enclave oil sector providing few linkages to the local economy, being mainly located outside Angola’s onshore boundaries. Good governance is undermined as oil provides the source of patronage for political networks and allows the ruling elite to enrich themselves without giving much attention to the needs of the larger population. In the absence of an indigenous capitalist class, the state represents the principal source of advancement and means to access resources; Hyden (1983) once referred to such states as balloon-like, ‘floating above society … punctured by excess demands’. Indeed, Angola is an extreme example of Hyden’s archetype. The state is in a position to monopolise wealth, has a particularly narrow social base, yet has to sate the voracious demands of an albeit, small parasitic state bourgeoisie. At times the state’s area of authority has stretched little beyond the outskirts of Luanda and other coastal urban centres. The core of MPLA support has always rested with the heavily Europeanised coastal peoples; from their small educated elite has come Angola’s rulers. The Angolan economy has always centred on the extraction of raw materials: slaves, and later oil and diamonds; in the absence of a significant industrial base, significant wealth can only accrue from direct involvement in the natural resources sectors, or indirectly via the state which distributes natural resource revenues.

The logic of the ‘resource curse’ may drive Angola’s armed conflicts in a number of important respects. Since resource accumulation depends principally on access to the state and the state lacks accountability in sharing revenues, conflicts over access to power are aggravated. As the creation of resources is not dependent on human co-operation, competing groups are more likely to resort to violence in order to obtain control over state revenues. A prime example of this mechanism is the struggle by Cabindan separatist groups for access to oil rents.

The war also serves as the perfect excuse for the rulers to justify economic underdevelopment, corruption and lack of accountability of political institutions. While the Dos Santos administration may genuinely desire a peace with UNITA, the war has frequently been used by senior MPLA officials to justify the lack of accountability of political institutions, the slow progress of economic and political reforms or the absence of real political freedoms. An end to the war would put enormous pressure on the government to provide economic development, a minimum of social services and accountability, which is contrary to the current system of rent accumulation for the elite. This is not to suggest that Dos Santos prolongs the war on purpose, but rather that the current Angolan political economy dependent on exploitation of natural resources lowers incentives for finding a peaceful solution. As natural resources provide abundant ready funds for arms and self-enrichment, a return to peace may provide relatively small economic opportunities for the warring parties compared with opportunities related to natural resources extraction under war conditions. At the same time, natural resources wealth lowers the leverage of external actors for facilitating peace. A comparison between Angola and Mozambique is illuminating. Seemingly, both countries have much in common. Both are former Portuguese colonies in which a coastal elite gained political
dominance following independence, and both underwent civil wars pitting government forces against rebel movements based in the underdeveloped and historically ultra-exploited interior. In both cases, the rebel movements were supported by the apartheid government in terms of its destabilisation policy. The latter continued for over a decade not only on account of a desire to weaken hostile governments in the region, but also due to the rich pickings apartheid's generals personally accrued from the resultant trade in wildlife products.

However, whilst Renamo, the rebel movement in Mozambique, gained a reputation for wanton brutality that eclipsed even that of UNITA (see Hanlon, 1991), it accepted - and largely abided by a peace settlement and the outcomes of the resultant elections - which it lost. The different experience of Mozambique highlights the dubious benefits of Angola’s richness in natural resources. In Mozambique, Renamo leadership was effectively bribed to participate in the 1994 election by a US$11 million donation (and a subsequent US$5 million top-up) by the government of Italy and other donors (Economist, 13 August 1994; Mozambiquefile, Maputo, 1/1998). It has lived with the peace partially due to the very modest financial returns accruing to leaders from holding parliamentary office and the positions its former military leaders have gained in the armed forces. In contrast, UNITA in Angola has access to very much greater revenues in illicit diamonds from areas under its control, a trade it would have to relinquish in part, should peace occur. The ruling party in Mozambique, Frelimo, whilst undoubtedly corrupt, does not have access to billions of dollars in oil revenues that can be easily diverted in the interests of ‘national security’ during wartime. In Frelimo’s case, wealth has accrued to leadership through dubious deals linked to privatisation (Cardoso, 1999): the sold off properties are of greater value owing to peaceful trading conditions. Following from the above contrast, the presence of natural resources in Angola lowers incentives for a peaceful solution à la Mozambique.

War conditions can directly provide major business opportunities to specific interest groups. As Hodges (2001) argued, the militarisation of many parts of Angola – in conjunction with the isolation from the outside society and weakness of the civil society – allowed some provincial governors to turn their provinces into private fiefdoms for exploiting business opportunities. The war enhanced the power of the Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas de Angola – FAA) and allowed many senior FAA officers to pursue private business activities including the ownership of private security companies – one of Angola’s prospering non-oil sectors of the economy (Hodges, 2001:61-65). Finally, the Luanda-based elite, especially around the President, was able to benefit from many war-related economic opportunities. One stark example of the link between the war and the government beneficiaries was the British Virgin Island registered CADA (Companhia Angolana de Distribuição Alimentar). CADA has reportedly been awarded a US$720 million five-year contract to feed Angola’s armed forces in 1999 (Global Witness, 1999). Dos Santos reportedly obtained control over CADA just before the resumption of war in December 1998. As Global Witness (1999) pointed out, the more the army consumes, the more those who are associated with companies such as CADA can profit. As elsewhere in the world, defence contracts are amongst the most profitable avenues for side-payments. Most of these profit-making opportunities depend on income from natural resources which would mostly disappear if Angola returned to a lasting peace. Therefore, some private actors may fear that their profitable business relationships will be interrupted by peace.
War & the Role of Foreign Companies

As the previous discussion showed, oil revenues provided both the means needed to wage war and – through ‘resource curse’ effects – rendered a lasting peace a more distant prospect. But oil companies have also influenced Angola’s political economy much more directly.

In addition to paying taxes and signature bonuses, oil companies helped to directly fund the government’s clientelist networks. This was evident in oil company payments towards ‘social development’ initiatives, notably the Eduardo Dos Santos Foundation (Fundação Eduardo Dos Santos – FESA) discussed in detail in Messiant (2001). A less known recipient of oil company funds is Ajuda de Desenvolvimento de Povo (ADPP), which presents a potential scandal in the offing. ADPP is the Angolan arm of the bizarre Danish aid grouping cum cult – Tvind,3 founded by the Danish recluse, Mogens Amdi Petersen.4 Tvind is ostensibly committed to promoting Leninist ideals and to promoting development in the third world. In practice, money raised is shifted between a complex web of fund raising outfits (including charity shops), development projects, and offshore tax havens. Tvind is a substantial landowner in Latin America, and engages in unsustainable logging of tropical rainforests and owns plantations notorious for poor labour conditions. In Angola, ADPP has close links to Futungo and its activities are strongly supported by the authorities. Indeed, Rikke Viholm, the head of ADPP, is on the board of FESA. A number of oil companies – including TotalFinaElf, BP, Agip and Chevron – have been making substantial donations to Sonangol’s official Social Bonus Fund (which in turn, routes money to ADPP) and/or to ADPP directly. The secretive manner in which these donations are being spent has led Africa Confidential (15 September 2000) to charge that the social spending of oil companies in Angola could become ‘another vehicle for (extending) credit to the Angolan elite’.

Since FESA, ADPP and similar initiatives are associated with the Angolan government, oil companies feel that they have little choice but to provide some funding. However, payments could serve business interests. The importance of such contributions was not unimportant; for instance, in the bidding process for oil blocks, companies enhanced their bids by pledging varying amounts as contributions to Sonangol’s Social Bonus Fund (subject to the award of the block). Messiant (2001) argued that payments to FESA and, by implication, ADPP and other social initiatives, offered a double advantage to foreign firms of ‘being close to the source of power while also making a display of charity’. Therefore, such payments were not merely the result of government compulsion but promoted rational business strategies.

A crucial problem of oil company payments – whether petroleum taxes or payments to FESA – is that we do not know the actual payments made by the companies to the government, which discourages government accountability to its citizens and in turn assists the persistence of the government clientelist networks. There are signs that oil companies may soon become more transparent about their payments to the Angolan government. Under IMF pressure for more accountability, the government agreed in 2000 to an ‘oil diagnostic’ study as part of IMF’s Staff Monitored Program for Angola to be carried out by the consulting arm of KPMG. Its main aim was to detail and compare the government’s oil revenues and spending. Oil companies co-operated with KPMG as Sonangol gave them permission to provide KPMG with substantial information. However, the study was criticised as having a number of flaws: it was not a proper audit and had no mechanism to audit any discovered discrepancies; it did not involve any retrospective examination of flows of money via the oil sector; it
did not investigate the use or misuse of oil revenues by individuals within the government; and, at the end of the study the government was expected to assume responsibility for future monitoring of oil revenues. Above all, the Angolan government has control over the flow of information from the study, so it may decide to suppress some controversial details.

While the KPMG study was already in progress, BP announced that it would publish the following information annually on their operations in Angola: total net production by oil block; aggregate payments by the company to Sonangol in respect of production-sharing terms; and total taxes and levies paid by BP to the Angolan government as a result of their operations including signature bonus payments. The decision was hailed as a major step by some non-government organisations, most notably Global Witness, an NGO which previously campaigned for the disclosure of such information by oil companies. However, BP has not yet commenced oil production in Angola at the time of writing (November 2001), so the most tangible information provided by the company to date was its payment of US$111 million as signature bonus for its share in Block 31. Production was scheduled to start from the Girassol field in the TotalFinaElf-operated Block 17 by the end of 2001 (BP’s share of the block was 26.67 per cent compared with TotalFinaElf’s 40 per cent share) but we learned in an interview with a senior BP staff that the company is not planning to release any information on taxes and levies paid immediately. BP claim that information based solely on one block would contravene the existing confidentiality clauses in the current production-sharing agreements as this would disclose specific information on the contractual terms of a specific block. BP is aiming to start publishing all the consolidated payments to the government as soon as its second producing venture goes onstream – the Kizomba field in the Exxon-operated Block 15. As a consequence, unless the results of the KPMG study are published, it will take another two to three years until more tangible information is available on oil company payments. Meanwhile, none of the other oil producing companies in Angola followed BP’s lead in offering to publish their payments to the government. Without the transparency of the largest producers – especially Chevron and TotalFinaElf – the data on payments to the government will be highly incomplete. Therefore, companies may continue to contribute to the lack of accountability in the oil sector.

Beyond extending credit to the elite, foreign firms and individuals played an active role in supporting the war effort on both sides. The prospect of obtaining oil and other mineral concessions prompted Lonrho (under the control of Tiny Rowland) to provide direct financial and logistical assistance to UNITA’s war effort and to lobby the US and British governments on behalf of Savimbi in the 1970s and the 1980s (Bower, 1994). Brokering of financial deals for arms supplies to the MPLA in the 1990s was related to contracts for lifting Angolan oil. Glencore, an oil-trading firm with experience in high-risk locations in Africa (see e.g. Frynas and Mellahi, 2001), facilitated such oil-backed loans for arms purchases. In the 1997-1998 period, Glencore reportedly arranged syndicated loans worth some US$900 million, mainly through Banque Paribas. Under the agreement, Glencore lifted between 50,000 and 100,000 barrels/day and made payments for the oil into escrow accounts used for the repayment of the loans (African Energy, August 1998). Heritage Oil and Coastal Oil are also reported to have provided loans for the government to purchase weapons during the 1992-94 period – the most violent phase of the Angolan War (Vines, 1996). The ultimate prize of these deals was access to oil resources.
Firms such as Lonrho and Glencore were involved in international oil trading, but Angola's oil wealth also attracted international arms traders, private security firms and middlemen with connections to the defence industry or foreign security services. When oil blocks 31-33 were awarded in 1999, three companies related to arms trade and private security specialists were awarded minority shares in two of the blocks. These were Prodev (15 or 20 per cent stake in Block 32 operated by Elf), Falcone Oil (10 per cent stake in Block 33 operated by Exxon-Mobil) and Naphta Israel Petroleum (5 per cent stake in Block 33). As these companies have little expertise in the oil industry, there have been suggestions that the award of oil licences was related to previous arms deliveries and the provision of private security services. For instance, it has been suggested that Naphta benefited from its links to Levdan – an Israeli security firm. Previously, Naphta executives reportedly admitted that the firm paid Levdan for helping it to secure oil concessions in Congo-Brazzaville (African Energy, June 1999; Global Witness, 1999; Africa Confidential, 14 May 1999).

Specific firms in the oil business may also benefit from close links with the combatants in Angola, inter alia through business relationships with private security outfits such as the South African firm Executive Outcomes (EO) which trained soldiers and fought on behalf of the Angolan government. Unfortunately, the business dealings of EO were so secretive that even many of their former mercenaries knew very little of them, although some revelations appeared in the media. For instance, EO's conquest of Soyo oil installations benefited Strategic Resources, a Pretoria-based EO associate and shareholder in Heritage Oil, which later received oil concessions in the Soyo area (Reno, 1998:64). The Canada-based Heritage Oil, whose Board of Directors includes Anthony Buckingham (the company's founder and former chairman) – a former British Special Air Service (SAS) officer and former director of EO/Sandline, was able to obtain various oil concessions in Angola in the early 1990s. Indeed, it was reported that it was Buckingham and Heritage Oil, which had brought EO into Angola in early 1993, not vice versa (Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, 24 January 1997; Observer, London, 19 January 1997). Similarly, Branch Energy – another EO associate – received major diamond concessions (Mail & Guardian, Johannesburg, 24 January 1997 and 9 May 1997). In the words of two Observer journalists, EO was 'the advance guard for major business interests engaged in a latter-day scramble for the mineral wealth of Africa' (Observer, 19 January 1997).

By paying bribes, arranging collateralised loans for the government or providing arms and security protection, smaller firms in the oil industry or trading firms had a competitive advantage vis-à-vis the largest competitors in obtaining access to the oil resources. But the armed conflict did not only benefit some of the smaller firms. Elf-Aquitaine was amongst the beneficiaries owing to its high-level connections in France and its association with French arms exports to Angola. Previously, the French military intervened on behalf of Elf in Africa and French politicians lobbied foreign rulers on the company's behalf, as demonstrated in the revelations that President Mitterand colluded with the German Chancellor Kohl to facilitate Elf's illicit acquisition of an East German oil refinery (Le Monde, Paris, various). Details of Elf's involvement in Angolan arms deals are not entirely clear. However, some evidence emerged as a result of French judicial investigations into the so-called Angolagate scandal involving allegations of corruption, tax evasion and illegal arms exports to Angola in the early 1990s. It emerged, for instance, that Elf provided financial assistance to the French interior minister at the time of the arms supplies – Charles Pasqua – and his party, by inter alia providing company airplanes for Pasqua's trips to Angola and elsewhere in Africa. Charles Pasqua and Jean Christophe Mitterand (the
son of the President) had both personally profited from a deal involving oil concessions and the illegal sale of well over half a billion US dollars worth of surplus Russian and central European made arms to the Angolan government. The arms sold included helicopters, MiG fighters and missiles purchased for an amount equivalent to one-third of the Angolan budget for 1994. Major weapons suppliers included Osos Praha, Slovak-based ZTS (suppliers of armoured vehicles including T-72 tanks) and a range of Russian manufacturers. In addition, French made surveillance systems were supplied, which were later used in an unsuccessful attempt to track the whereabouts of Jonas Savimbi's satellite telephone and to kill him (Le Monde, Le Figaro and Africa Confidential, various).

This deal was initiated in 1992-1993 when, as noted earlier, the Angolan authorities were under intense military pressure from UNITA. Central to the deal was Pierre Falcone of the trading firm Brenco and the Franco-Brazilian firm Falcone Oil mentioned earlier. A close associate of Pierre Falcone, Russian-Israeli businessman Arcadi Gaydamak acted as the broker for purchase of the Russian weaponry, which was routed via Brenco subsidiaries. The deal was an extraordinarily complex one. It involved the purchase of Angola's debt to the former Soviet Union and the sale of weapons by Falcone and Gaydamak, in return for the sureties extended against future oil production and oil concessions. The financing was routed via the Swiss-based firm Glencore mentioned earlier, founded and owned by Marc Rich. In addition to Pasqua and Mitterand junior (who's role in the affair allegedly included money laundering), the scheme involved other senior figures in French politics. Mitterand junior, Falcone and Gaydamak were subsequently prosecuted by the French authorities. Although Mitterand was later released on a technicality, Falcone continues to face charges in France, and Gaydamak remains on the run (Le Monde and Le Figaro, various). Angolan President Dos Santos has repeatedly claimed that both Falcone and Gaydamak acted with the blessing of the French authorities, and are being unjustly prosecuted, and that the exposure of the Angolagate scandal represents a campaign of 'brainwashing and defamation' directed against his government (Africa Confidential, 9 March 2001).

As noted earlier, it is not clear whether Elf was in any way involved in Angolan arms deals, although this was notably alleged in a memorandum submitted to the French court by a Belgian arms trader (Africa Confidential, 6 April 2001). However, French oil interests appear to have benefited from French assistance, according to the Angolan President himself. After Falcone was arrested by French police, Dos Santos intervened on his behalf with the French authorities. In blunt language, he stated:

_We interpreted his [Falcone's] actions as a gesture of goodwill and friendship of the French state and, for that reason, my government took decisions which allowed a spectacular growth in co-operation with France in the petroleum, economic and financial spheres (Le Monde, Paris, 16 March 2001, own translation)_

The main beneficiary of this 'friendship' was Elf-Aquitaine which received further oil concessions from the Angolan government.

The experience of Elf-Aquitaine and the other smaller oil firms demonstrates that specific firms may gain a competitive advantage vis-à-vis their competitors by brokering and financing arms supplies, providing security protection or by becoming associated with such deals. The reward of such war-related strategies was the acquisition of exclusive oil concessions and contracts.
Private Profits & Prospects for Peace

There are some signs that the business opportunities related to peacetime activities have grown for the Luanda-based elite. For instance, the commander of the FAA is said to have acquired important business interests in the tourism sector – hotels and a game park, which would directly benefit from a lasting peace. Until now, such business opportunities have been insignificant; for instance, efforts to rehabilitate Angola’s wildlife reserves yielded only limited success so far. It is unlikely that non-resource income can reach the levels of oil and diamond revenues for many years or even many decades to come. However, resource-dependent business activities related to the war cannot continue indefinitely. Drawing on the historical experience of other countries including the US, there comes a critical stage when the early ‘robber barons’ may want to legitimise their business interests and become ‘respectable’ citizens. The announced retirement of Dos Santos may perhaps be an important sign of such a development. If Dos Santos were a classic warlord, he would probably not consider quitting. As the Angolan elite escaped the trap of warlordism, the prospects for peace would appear to be greater in Angola compared with Liberia or Sierra Leone.

As with the Luanda-based elite, there are some signs that the business opportunities related to peacetime activities have also grown for foreigners. Foreign businessmen and middlemen such as Pierre Falcone and his associate Arcadi Gaydamak could make money from peaceful activities in Angola. Indeed, Falcone’s and Gaydamak’s trading firm Brenco obtained a minority share in Angola’s first private investment bank Banco Africano de Investimentos (BAI) in 1997 and was involved in an Angolan rail project (Le Monde, Paris, 12 January 2001). Certain activities such as Brenco’s rail project are impeded by the war. Even if a firm originally obtained oil licences or government contracts owing to its association with private security interests or by arranging loans for arms purchases, it may find that future exploitation of its resources could benefit from peace, or at a minimum, peace would make no difference to profit accumulation. Furthermore, the early ‘robber barons’ or ‘business adventurers’ in the oil sector may want to legitimise their business interests and become more ‘respectable’. Indeed, firms such as Buckingham’s Heritage Oil have more recently tried to gain respectability. Being listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange in 1999 was probably part of that strategy, which in turn allowed Heritage Oil to obtain funds from capital markets in order to develop previously acquired oil concessions.

If we are correct in this assessment, then peace efforts in Angola may greatly benefit from the dynamic developments of the most recent past. However, private profits from war-related activities may remain high for some individuals and groups. Some FAA generals and state officials have built their businesses directly around war-related business opportunities. Individuals such as Falcone, Gaydamak and Rich got involved in Angola because of their expertise in arms dealing and their ability to adapt well to high-risk business locations, which reflected a pathology found across Africa whereby natural resources attract arms traders, security experts and middlemen whose services are rewarded through valuable mining concessions and commercial contracts. Therefore, prospects for peace will depend to a certain extent on the relative importance of ‘the peace dividend’ to the various influential actors in Angola’s political economy.

From this perspective, a peace in Angola will be more likely, if ‘peace-dependent’ business opportunities grow and the warring parties increasingly transform themselves from ‘entrepreneurs of war’ into ‘respectable’ businessmen and investors.
Concluding Remarks

This article demonstrated that mineral wealth has not only fuelled Angola's war but has also intimately shaped the contours of the conflict. MPLA's oil revenues in conjunction with UNITA's diamond revenues can help to explain the duration and character of the conflict and, to some extent, even the timing of military operations. Furthermore, the logic of the 'resource curse' has had a major impact on the make-up of Angola's political economy and has been decisive in the erosion of state legitimacy, which in turn has had important consequences for peace prospects. Therefore, an end to Angola's war can only be sought by explicitly recognising the central role of the oil wealth in any peace settlement.

The oil industry as a whole would benefit from a lasting peace. Oil production would no longer face threats of military attack, a comprehensive development of onshore oil resources would no longer be delayed and Angola's economic development would provide a more sympathetic business environment to operate in. Furthermore, large multinational firms such as Statoil or BP – eager to improve their ethical image worldwide – could avoid some of the reputational risks of being associated with war and corruption. However, specific oil firms gained a competitive advantage owing to the conflict: by being associated with private security interests (Heritage Oil), by being able to rely on support of home government officials with clandestine links (Elf) or by mediating financial deals for arms purchases (Glencore). In all three cases mentioned – Heritage Oil, Elf and Glencore – access to oil resources depended on high-level connections in the Angolan government. This was in turn related (although by no means exclusively) to addressing the economic and military needs of the combatants or by being associated with groups and individuals which could address those needs. In the meantime, all oil companies provided the government with the resources needed to wage war.

Oil companies themselves have denied any complicity in the war and have portrayed themselves as 'neutral' bystanders amidst political turmoil. Typically, they argued that – given the rivalry between different firms for access to oil – a single firm had no leverage to unilaterally support political reforms and peace initiatives. However, it would be wrong to regard foreign companies as entirely passive actors or, as Bayart (2000) put it, 'dupes' of the local prince with whom they negotiated. It is incontestable that oil firms ultimately depend on concessions provided by the government; they are used by the Angolan elite to provide funds for war and self-enrichment and they are regularly played against each other by Sonangol. At the same time, oil companies also have some autonomy in their decisions. For instance, BP was able to announce its transparency move regarding oil payments and to withdraw from ADPP funding which did not endanger its long-term commercial interests in Angola and helped the company's international reputation. Oil companies may also use 'the local princes' to forward their own interests. For instance, Elf-Aquitaine reportedly used highest level connections in at least one other African country to gain favours with Dos Santos. The suggestion that foreign businesses are simply 'dupes' in the service of African rulers is as misleading as the past claims that African rulers are merely passive actors at the periphery of the international capitalist system.

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Endnotes

1. It should be emphasised that destabilisation was not only ideologically driven but also an elaborate scam. Whilst the military was officially supposed to be supplying UNITA and Renamo with free weaponry, they were in fact sold to the two rebel movements in return for ivory, skins and hardwood to the personal benefit of a small number of senior officers (see Mozambique Update 16).

2. Renamo lost the 1994 elections (the first democratic elections held in Mozambican history), but was only narrowly defeated in 1999. Whilst it has periodically threatened to resume the war, it has never come close to doing so.

3. An excellent source on Tvind activities – and that of the associated religious grouping Humana – is the website of Tvind Alert, which is dedicated to exposing Tvind’s activities worldwide (see www.tvindalert.org.uk). Further information on Tvind can be gained from the numerous websites dedicated to exposing religious cults.

4. This charismatic cult leader started his career as a school teacher in Denmark in 1961. After being dismissed from his job, he opened up a travelling school, later developing its activities into a vast network of charities, front companies, plantations, and offshore bank accounts. Petersen became a recluse in 1979, and surrounds himself with an ageing harem of senior female members of the cult. Cult members are forbidden to pronounce his name, and have to refer to him as 'de andre' (the other). He is a close personal associate of Robert Mugabe and Sam Nujoma, and has announced his attention of constructing a building in Zimbabwe ‘that can be seen from outer space’. He is currently on the run from the Danish police for tax evasion.

5. Pierre Falcone was born in Algeria in 1954, the son of a Neapolitan father and a Latin American mother. Falcone’s father was an arms trader who sold weapons to Venezuela and Argentina. Falcone ultimately succeeded his father in the trade, becoming involved in weapons deals in Colombia, and later, to the Slorc junta in Burma. There have been frequent allegations that Falcone – until recently seen as an ‘untouchable’ – has close links to French counter-intelligence, and weapons firms such as Thomson. Falcone has personal links with senior members of the US Republican Party and holds French, Brazilian and Angolan nationality; he is a close associate of Angolan President Dos Santos.

6. Arcadi Gaydamak (sometimes spelled Gaidamak) was born in the Ukraine. Allegedly he was a member of the former Soviet KGB. According to his ‘official’ CV, Gaydamak moved to France during the Perestroika years, setting up business as a house painter, prior to opening a translation bureau and, later, acting as a comprador for foreign firms seeking contacts in Russia, Kazakhstan, Madagascar and Angola. Gaydamak later acted as a hostage negotiator, securing the release of French hostages held in Dagestan and Serbia. He also established himself with a weapons dealer, selling former Soviet Bloc weaponry to groupings in Colombia, and later Angola, and probably has personal holdings in excess of those held by Pierre Falcone. There have been allegations that Gaydamak may have links to French counter-intelligence. He holds French, Israeli, Angolan and, possibly, Canadian nationality.

7. Born in 1934 in Antwerp as Marc Reich. After a spell at Philipp Brothers (now Philipp Salamon), Rich set up on his own. He was a major supplier of oil to the apartheid regime in violation of UN sanctions (supplying an estimated 15 per cent of the covert shipments to South Africa), and broke US trade embargoes by purchasing oil from Iran. He has also been linked to the laundering of money gained by dubious privatisation deals conducted by Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky. Since 1983, he has been wanted by the US authorities for at least fifty counts of wire fraud, racketeering, trading with the enemy, and evading more than $48 million in income taxes, but was pardoned by outgoing US President Bill Clinton, allegedly in return for his ex-wife, Denise’s contributions to the Democratic Party, including $700,000 to Hilary Clinton’s successful senate election campaign. However, it should also be noted that the Israeli government lobbied intensively for his release. Rich holds US (he claims to have renounced it, but the State Department denies this), Spanish, Israeli, and, possibly, South African nationality. Again, it has been alleged that Rich has links with Western intelligence agencies, in this case the CIA, for whom he acted as paymaster in controversial cases. He is also alleged to have Mossad links, acting as go-between to Iran at various stages, also assisting Jewish emigration from ‘enemy countries’.
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War in Angola: a Soviet Dimension

Vladimir Shubin & Andrei Tokarev

This article addresses the political and military relationship between the Soviet Union and Angola between 1961 and 1991. It examines some of the problems between the two countries and is based on newly available archival material and interviews. Soviet policy towards Southern Africa and Angola has been the subject of a lot of academic research in the West, especially during the ‘Cold War’, yet many aspects remain controversial and contested.

The USSR & Southern Africa

Soviet involvement in Angola and its support for the MPLA strained Moscow’s relations with the West and with Washington in particular. Some politicians and academics believe that it was the main reason for the end of a so-called ‘first detente’ between the two ‘superpowers’. It is a paradox that of all the liberation movements in Southern Africa it was the MPLA that had a very complex and at times far from rosy relationship with Moscow. The contemporary situation in Angola and the ongoing confrontation between the Luanda government and UNITA cannot be properly assessed without an understanding of the history of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. But that history, as well as the history of Angola’s resistance to Pretoria’s aggression cannot be written without reference to Moscow’s involvement in it.

Russia interfered militarily, albeit indirectly, in Southern African affairs a century ago. About 200 Russian volunteers, including officers, joined the Boers in their fight against British Imperial forces. Six decades after the end of the Anglo-Boer War the southern part of the African continent became a battlefield again. The first shots came from the forces of liberation on 4 February 1961 during an abortive attempt to storm
prisons in Luanda. It was followed by military struggles waged by the ANC in South Africa, Frelimo in Mozambique, SWAPO in Namibia and ZAPU and ZANU in Zimbabwe.

The USSR had once again to determine its attitude to the war in Southern Africa which is best illustrated by its position on South Africa using newly available archive documents from Moscow. Details of the forthcoming confrontation in South Africa was received in Moscow in October-November 1961 when Moses Kotane, SACP General Secretary and ANC leadership member, came to the Soviet Union together with the SACP Chairman Yusuf Dadoo to attend the CPSU Congress. Here they raised the question of the desired forms of struggle at their meetings with CPSU International Department officials.

The approach of the Soviet’s was summarised in the words of the CPSU International Secretary Boris Ponomarev: ‘You know better’. Having taken a cautious position on the question of armed struggle, Ponomarev requested and received official permission from the Central Committee to convey the following to the SACP leaders:

Taking into account the situation [in South Africa] we agree with the opinion expressed by comrades Kotane and Dadoo. At the same time the intention of the SAPC to take a course of armed forms of struggle places on the Party great responsibility. It is necessary not to counterpoise one form of struggle to the others but to combine skilfully all these forms. The armed struggle is a struggle of the broad mass of people. It means that in the conditions of the preparation for the armed struggle the political work to win the masses acquires decisive importance. Without consistent political and organisational work among the masses victory is impossible ...

The position of the CPSU leadership was conveyed to Moses Kotane after Umkhonto we Sizwe had carried out its first actions (Russian State Archive of Modern History [RSAMH]); thus Moscow neither instigated nor agitated for the armed struggle. It respected the decision taken by the South Africans themselves, while warning against over-emphasis on the armed struggle. A similar approach was used towards other liberation movements including the MPLA of Angola. In describing the Soviet attitude and actions in this case we have to rely on the accounts of witnesses and participants in the struggle because there is a lack of accessible documents. The late Petr Evsyukov (‘Camarada Pedro’), who for a decade and half had been responsible for contacts with the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies in the CPSU, recalled in his memoirs that

the International Department knew about the existence of the MPLA from various sources, mainly from press publications, although Portugal was thoroughly hiding the information on the events in Luanda (Evsyukov, 1993).

The first representatives of the MPLA, Mario de Andrade, who acted as Chairman while Agostinho Neto stayed in Portugal under police supervision, and Viriato da Cruz, came to Moscow ‘in the second half of 1961’. That visit was after the beginning of the armed struggle, and when ‘an important decision to begin multi-sided assistance to the organisation was taken’ (Evsyukov, 1993). Then some months later, Neto managed to escape from Portugal and ‘immediately came to Moscow. The negotiations with him ended quite successfully’.

Like the period of the Anglo-Boer War, Russia/USSR rendered its political support and limited military assistance to the warring side that in its opinion was fighting for a just cause. The second reason for involvement and again similar to the previous
Russian involvement was a rivalry with another powerful country, with Britain in the earlier period and with Moscow's Cold War adversary, the USA in the early 1960s. There is a tendency, especially typical for Western academics and politicians, to look at the armed conflict in Southern Africa (and especially in Angola) mainly through the distorting glasses of 'superpower rivalry' during the 'Cold War'. Thus, Chester Crocker wrote in the preface to his memoirs:

This book tells the story of peacemaking in Africa the 1980s. It is a record of an American diplomatic strategy which helped us to win the Cold War in the Third World (Crocker, 1993:17).

But such a 'victory' looks rather bizarre. After all, what happened with Washington's proteges in the region? Who rules Namibia in the contemporary period: SWAPO or the DTA? Who becomes President of Angola: Dos Santos or Savimbi? And who became the first President of democratic South Africa: Mandela or Buthelezi?

Although relations between the USSR and the US did play a role in Moscow's decision-making on Southern Africa (just as the confrontation between Russia and Britain during the Anglo-Boer War), the Soviets did not regard assistance to the liberation movements and African Front Line States as simply waging 'the Cold War'. In the language of those days, their actions were regarded as part of the world 'anti-imperialist struggle', which was waged by 'the national liberation movements', the 'Socialist community' and the 'working class of capitalist countries'.

The history of Soviet relations with the Angolan liberation movements and of the military involvement in that country, as in Africa as a whole, still has to be written. Practically all information on Soviet assistance to the other freedom fighters, even of a purely humanitarian nature, for many years had been 'hidden' from the public in the USSR and abroad. It was not until 1970 that Vassily Solodovnikov, the head of the Soviet delegation to the International conference in solidarity with the peoples of Portuguese colonies, held in Rome, noted in Pravda, that Moscow was supplying to the liberation movements 'arms, means of transport and communications, clothes and other goods needed for successful struggle' and that 'military and civilian specialists are being trained in the USSR' (Pravda, 7 July 1970).

The assistance was really versatile. 'Camarada Pedro' recalls a fascinating incident. In urgent cases the leadership of the liberation movements who knew his 'nom de guerre' - Pedro Dias - and the number of his 'P.O.B.' could send him a letter by ordinary international mail. A letter once came from Agostinho Neto complaining of the shortage of cartridges for Soviet-made TT pistols asking for them to be sent urgently. To confirm his request and to avoid a mistake he enclosed a cartridge in an envelope. This was probably the only case in the history of the postal service (Evsyukov, 1993).

Financial aid was also provided. In 1973 for example, the MPLA received $220,000 compared with $150,000 for PAIGC and $85,000 for Frelimo (RSA ModH, Collection 89, inventory 38, file 40). The money came from the 'International Trade Union Fund for assistance to left workers' organisations, attached to the Romanian Council of Trade Unions' which was established in 1950 on the initiative of the Soviet Party to render material assistance to 'foreign left parties, workers' and public (non-governmental) organisations, which are subjected to persecution and repression'. While there are many stories about 'Kremlin gold', and Moscow played a leading role in the distribution of allocations, originally only half of the contributions to this fund
came from the USSR. The remainder came from China, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, Hungary and the GDR. Bulgaria joined later, in 1958. China withdrew in 1962 after the Sino-Soviet split.

It should be underlined that although the move towards marxism of the leaders of the liberation movement was welcome in Moscow, it was not regarded as a pre-condition for Soviet assistance. As Rostislav Ulyanovsky, Ponomarev's Deputy, and leading Soviet expert on the 'Third World' said to the Soviet delegation to the above-mentioned conference in Rome: 'We don't request ideological loyalty from the liberation movements'.

Moscow's support to the MPLA (and later the government of independent Angola) was especially important because it was often provided during periods when other countries could not or did not want to offer assistance. Moreover, it is our view that the Soviet Union's contribution was not limited to political support and material assistance. It also resulted in the encouragement of non-racialism in Angola and in Southern Africa in general. A special role in it was played by the instructors and staff of the Soviet civilian and military training centres.

The Soviet Union & the MPLA

We can now glimpse at the most crucial periods of Angolan-Soviet relations. While it remains the case that most of the archive documents pertaining to the Soviet position towards Angola are still inaccessible, we can use oral history as well as written memoirs that have begun to appear in Russia during the last decade. Particularly useful are the memoirs written by Karen Brutents, former Deputy Head of the CPSU International Department. He was a member of the Soviet delegation to the MPLA Congress in December 1977 and later became adviser to President Gorbachev. Brutents believes that Angola became:

one of the key points of rivalry between the USSR and USA in the 'third world'. In the context of its irrational logic Angola occupied a place completely disproportional to its significance and the confrontation there (just as the events in the Horn of Africa) noticeably influenced the Soviet-American relations as a whole and the destinies of the détente (Brutents, 1998:204).

He continued:

Our support to the MPLA was dictated not so much by ideology, as [others] often think, but rather by pragmatic considerations: it was the only national movement ... which waged a real struggle against colonisers. A relative role of the ideological linkage is testified by a fact that at a certain moment the CPSU CC Politbureau even took a decision to recognise the MPLA's competitor – FNLA headed by H. Roberto, who was later proved to be connected with the CIA. And only bureaucratic delays and especially the protests of some African leaders and of the Portuguese left prevented its realisation (Brutents, 1998:205).

'Camarada Pedro' recalled another story that is at odds with the idea that Soviet involvement in Angola was a well thought-out 'pragmatic' decision. Nikita Khrushchev, the CPSU First Secretary and Soviet Prime-Minister, heard about the launch of the GRAE – Holden Roberto's 'government in exile' – while on holiday in the Crimea. He was angry that the USSR had not yet recognised the new government. He bypassed the CPSU International Department (the body which dealt with the MPLA and the liberation struggle in Angola in its various aspects) and the decision
was urgently taken. Moreover, this happened while the MPLA leader Agostinho Neto was visiting Moscow. The Department Deputy Head, Dmitry Shevlyagin was ordered to inform Neto of the recognition on the eve that it was announced. According to Evsyukov who was an eyewitness, Shevlyagin's statement sounded like a death sentence for Neto. Evsyukov who accompanied Neto has remarked:

*On the way to the hotel I was feverishly thinking how to save the situation. I knew well what Holden Roberto represented and understood even better that we had made a mistake, betraying our friends ... The only man who could correct the situation and save the MPLA was Alvaro Cunhal, General Secretary of the Portuguese Communist Party.*

Fortunately, Cunhal was in Moscow and Evsyukov suggested that Neto should call on him immediately and ask him to intervene. 'Camarada Pedro' who spoke perfect Portuguese, went to Cunhal's room and explained the situation 'in two words'.

Cunhal was a hero of anti-fascist struggle in Portugal and enjoyed high prestige in the USSR. So, 'the next day and on the following days no information on our recognition of [Roberto's] government appeared in Pravda and it could not appear'. On the contrary, *Pravda* published another article so different in content that the US Embassy phoned the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to find out who authored it (Evvyukov, 1993).

Moscow's relations with the MPLA deteriorated when Neto signed an agreement with Roberto in late 1972. That agreement marked the creation of the joint front that according to Evsyukov, 'completely disoriented the MPLA members and supporters, as well as us' (Evvyukov, 1993). Neto led the MPLA delegation to Moscow in January 1973 and tried to convince his Soviet interlocutors that the agreement with FNLA meant 'a new stage for the movement'. That stage would open the opportunity for the MPLA to reach 'vital centres of the country' and even if Holden Roberto became the President of the new united front, Neto as Vice-President would control the Secretariat, supplies and military affairs, and that his organisation would 'continue to exist as the MPLA but in alliance with the FNLA' (Shubin, 1973). Neto also spoke about the danger of infiltration of Portuguese agents into the ranks of the MPLA and 'strange behaviour' of some elements that were trying to use 'tribalism and regionalism', apparently hinting at growing tensions within his organisation.

The confusion caused by an alliance with an 'arch-enemy' aggravated differences within the MPLA to such an extent that Army General Victor Kulikov, the Chief of General Staff (a future Marshal of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief) wrote in correspondence to the CPSU Central Committee about the 'actual termination of the liberation struggle in Angola due to a split in the MPLA'. A slightly watered-down version of that view was supported by Ulyanovsky. His memorandum approved by the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, had a title, 'On the situation in the MPLA leadership' (RSAMH, collection 89, inventory 46, file 104)? In particular, the Soviet Ambassador in Lusaka was instructed to meet both Neto and his rival Daniel Chipenda in an attempt to reach unity in the movement.

By the time of the April 1974 Portuguese revolution, which opened the prospects for Angola's rapid transition to independence, Moscow's relations with its old friend the MPLA were at its lowest ebb. It took the Soviet leadership some months to make a final choice and to resume supporting Neto and his followers. Our evidence here contradicts a position argued recently that claimed:
The situation in the capital [Luanda] and countryside rapidly deteriorated during the summer and autumn of 1974. With the left increasingly ascendant in Lisbon and Luanda, officials began turning a blind eye to Soviet shipments of small arms to the MPLA. Thus when whites again rioted in November, they were met and armed by African self-defence committees, nominally controlled by the MPLA and armed with more advanced weaponry than before (Zegeye, Dixon & Liebenberg, 1999:395).

These authors have not indicated their source of information on the arms supplies, but in any case they imply that the Soviets were supplying arms to Angola during 1974; that was far from the case. Moreover, for several months after the Portuguese revolution officials in Moscow remained hesitant regarding a choice between Neto and Chipenda.

At that stage there were two so-called ‘revolts’ within the ranks of the MPLA against Neto’s leadership: the ‘Eastern Revolt’ led by Chipenda who was based in Zambia, and the ‘Active Revolt’ in Cabinda and Congo-Brazzaville. According to Paulo Jorge, MPLA Central Committee Secretary and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chipenda ‘was a person who on MPLA’s behalf was in contact with various organisations, including international support organisations and the embassies’; and when the ‘Eastern Revolt’ took place, they suspended their assistance ‘for a while in order to understand what had happened’. ‘... even the Soviet Union suspended their assistance. We had to explain the situation to them’ (Sellstrom, 1999:17).

This task of ‘explaining’ was made easier following the broad support for the MPLA inside Angola that followed the April 1974 Portuguese revolution. The Soviet attitude became much more positive towards the end of 1974. In December, Moscow received an MPLA military delegation headed by Henrique (Iko) Carreira (who after the proclamation of independence became first Angolan Minister of Defence). He spoke about the MPLA’s political hegemony in Angola but admitted its ‘weakness from the military point of view’. Carreira also emphasised MPLA’s ‘strategic and tactical alliance’ with the Movement of Armed Forces (MFA), which was in power in Portugal at that stage (Shubin, 1974).

Several ‘fact-finding’ and later solidarity visits by the Soviets to Angola also helped. These trips included one ostensibly ‘to study the local educational system’ made by Navy Captain Alexey Dubenko (future Admiral and the first Soviet military attaché in Angola). Another important Soviet visit was a delegation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, headed by Alexander Dzassokhov. He was an eyewitness to the triumphal return of Agostinho Neto to Luanda on 4 February 1975. In the last days of April 1975 ‘Camarada Pedro’ followed them together with Gennady Yanaev, then Chairman of the Committee of Soviet Youth Organisations - the same Yanaev who took over from Mikhail Gorbachev as Acting President for three days during a so-called ‘coup’ in Moscow in August 1991.

Moscow supported the Alvor agreements of January 1975 between MPLA, FNLA and UNITA but resumed supplies to the MPLA against the background of the growing assistance to the movements rivals from the West, South Africa, Zaire and, for a certain period, from China. In particular, a core of the brigade, manned by the MPLA activists, underwent a crash course of training in Perevalnoe, in the Crimea (‘Ngongo’, 2000).

The most crucial moment in Soviet-Angolan relations was on the eve of Angola’s independence. Georgy Kornienko, who was the First Deputy Foreign Minister, wrote in his memoirs:
In the Angolan episode of the ‘Cold War’ like in the majority of its episodes ... Washington said ‘A’, but in this case as well, Moscow did not refrain for a long time from saying ‘B’ (Kornienko, 1995:166).

He believed that the worsening of Soviet-American relations was shaped by Moscow’s perceived influence in Angola and explains the failure to advance the talks on strategic arms and why Brezhnev’s visit to the USA was postponed and then did not take place at all. It is likely however, as the former Head of the Southern African Department at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vladilen Vasev has noted, that if the issue of complaint for Washington was not Angola, the US would have found another excuse for ‘cooling off relations with Moscow (Interview with Vasev, 15 January 2001).

Kornienko commented on the ‘sad consequences of the two approaches of Soviet foreign policy - state and ideological - and the institutional confusion related to it’ (Kornienko, 1995:166). According to him, after the independence of Angola ‘the civil war, provoked by US actions, began to flare up’, the Soviet MFA together with the Ministry of Defence and the KGB prepared a proposal, approved ‘by and large’ by the CPSU Politbureau. This proposed giving the MPLA all kind of political support and ‘certain material support’, but not to get involved in the civil war in Angola ‘in the military sphere’. Yet some days later the CPSU International Department, headed by Ponomarev, having secured the signatures of Marshal Grechko (the Defence Minister) and the KGB Chairman Andropov, managed to get Gromyko’s support to meet MPLA’s limited requests for arms supplies.

The fallacy is indisputable, so popular among the Western leaders and mass-media, that Moscow asked Cuba to send its troops to Angola. Both Kornienko and his boss Andrei Gromyko, as well as Grechko and Andropov actually discovered that Cuban combat troops were on the way to Angola from a message of the Soviet Ambassador to Guinea. He had informed Moscow about forthcoming plans for Cuban planes to land in Conakry. It is important to note, however, that Cuba informed Moscow earlier about the first stage of their involvement. Petr Manchkha, then the Head of African Section at the CPSU Headquarters informed SWAPO President Sam Nujoma on the forthcoming arrival of 500 Cuban instructors in Angola (Shubin, 1976).

There were only two Soviet citizens in Luanda on the eve of Angola’s independence: they were the Pravda correspondent Oleg Ignatyev and TASS correspondent Igor Uvarov. The first group of Soviet military instructors did not arrive in Luanda until 16 November. The group headed by Captain Evgeny Lyashenko left Moscow on October 31 by a scheduled Aeroflot flight and next day arrived in Brazzaville. It had a specific technical and purely defensive mission - to train Angolans in the use of ‘Strela’ (‘Arrow’) portable anti-aircraft missile launchers. Zaire, which supported FNLA, had obtained Mirages from France and the MPLA leadership anticipated air raids on Luanda. The group was transferred to Point-Noir within seven days and on 16 November it was joined by a larger group of instructors headed by Colonel Vassily Trofimenko. Five days after the proclamation of Angola’s independence, over 40 Soviet military specialists arrived in Luanda (Tokarev, 2001).

Soviet involvement in Angola produced many ‘unsung heroes’. The historians still have to recall the name of the Deputy Commander of Air Transport Wing from the town of Ivanovo. On the eve of the Angola’s independence he risked his life and the life of his crew to airlift urgently two Katyusha rocket launchers from Brazzaville to Point-Noir, where the runway was unfit for the heavy Antonov transport aircraft.
These rocket launchers were then further moved by a Cuban ship to Luanda and played a critical role in rebuffing the attack of Mobutu/FNLA troops against Luanda at the time.

Soviet assistance to the MPLA government was crucial to its success in the ‘second war of liberation’ 1975 to 1976. However, the relations between Luanda and Moscow soon faced a new test. In May 1977 some forces within the MPLA, headed by Nito Alves and using leftist slogans, arranged an abortive coup d’état. And, when Neto came to Moscow on an official visit in August, he surprised his Soviet interlocutors with a sudden statement. According to Karen Brutents, at the start of the Angolan President’s meeting with Leonid Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders,

after traditional common phrases Neto suddenly turned to the theme of the recent military mutiny in Luanda and, ignoring diplomatic nuances, said: ‘Here I came, because such a thing – mutiny – happened, and I wanted to find out from you personally, has Moscow taken part in a conspiracy against me or not? Because, as I have been informed, many of your people have been involved’ (Brutents, 1998:494).

The situation was aggravated because Brezhnev, who was already partly incapacitated, did not immediately reject the accusation. Instead, he began to read from a prepared text regarding ‘the good situation’ in the USSR and ‘the expected excellent harvest’. It looked as if the Soviets were avoiding an answer to Neto’s accusation and therefore confirmed his fears. It was only later that day that a Soviet official announced an ‘addendum’ that rejected Neto’s accusation and confirmed that Moscow had not shifted its support from Neto. It seems that the rumours of Soviet involvement in ‘Alves’s coup’ was deliberately spread by Western circles as well as forces within Angola who questioned close links with Moscow.

Moscow’s relations with Luanda survived this episode but the Soviets still suffered some ‘casualties’. According to Brutents, ‘Angolans ... claimed that some of our advisers were involved in the intrigues of the Angolan military against Neto as a weak and hesitating man, etc. As the result the Soviet military representative in Luanda, N. Dubenko was recalled’ (Brutents, 1998:296). It was not only the military that took part in ‘Alves’s coup’. Alongside Dubenko’s first name was Alexey, and it looks like he became a scapegoat, although after his return to Moscow until his untimely death he continued his service in the Ministry of Defence, dealing with the liberation movements.

The Soviet Union in Angola

According to General Roberto Leal Ramos Monteiro ‘Ngongo’, Angola’s current Ambassador in Moscow, over 6,000 Soviets came to Angola ‘to teach in military schools and academies and to train our regular units’. Over 1,000 Soviet military visited Angola for ‘shorter periods of time’ while 6,965 Angolans underwent military training in the Soviet Union (Ngongo, 2001). Figures, provided by the Moscow Institute of Military History are even higher: ‘up to 1 January 1991, 10,985 Soviet military advisors and specialists visited Angola, including 107 generals and admirals, 7,211 officers, 1,083 warrant-officers and midshipmen, 2,116 sergeants, petty officers and privates and 468 civilian employees of the Soviet Army and Navy; 6,985 Angolans were trained in the Soviet/Russian ‘military educational institutions’ up to 1 January 1995 (Rossiya (SSSR) v lokalnyh voinah, 2000:104)
Most of the Soviet military in Angola served with the Angolan government army, but some with the ANC, SWAPO and, earlier, ZAPU. Their role has been grossly distorted by many Western and South African authors either because of their ignorance or reliance on poor intelligence sources. Thus, a British academic (and a former editor of the *African Confidential*) Stephen Ellis and his co-author, a renegade from the ANC and SACP who used an ambitious (and deceiving) pen-name ‘Sechaba’ (‘People’) claimed in their book ‘Comrades against Apartheid’ that in September 1987 the Angolan government offensive against the SADF-backed UNITA was ‘supervised in part by a Soviet General Konstantin Shaganovitch’ (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992:183). The fact is that there had earlier been a Soviet Chief Military Adviser in Angola whose family name was similar – Shakhnovich, although his first name was Vassily and not Konstantin. The General left Angola for the USSR in 1980 and before long died in Moscow. One of Shakhnovich’s successors was Lieutenant-General (from 1983, Colonel-General) Konstantin Kurochkin, First Deputy Commander of the Soviet Paratroopers. Ellis and ‘Sechaba’, it seems, managed to merge someone that was dead with someone alive. Kurochkin himself left Luanda in 1985, though he paid several short visits later to Luanda (interview with Kurochkin 25 September 2001).

The British journalist Fred Bridgland went even further than Ellis and Sechaba. He took ‘General Shaganovitch’s offensive’ as the title for a whole section of his book describing military actions in Angola. Moreover, the non-existent ‘Konstantin Shaganovitch’, according to Bridgland, was ‘a known chemical warfare expert’, and this is used to substantiate the claim that the Angolan Brigade that faced the SADF had ‘chemical weapons in its armoury’ (Bridgland, 1990:62). It was on the contrary however, as we shall see later; it was South African troops that used chemical weapons in Angola.

At the same time Bridgland (and his friends) grossly miscalculated the number of the Soviet military in Angola: ‘Intelligence agencies estimated that Shaganovitch had about 950 fellow Soviets in command and training posts in Angola’ (Bridgland, 1990:17), while the man in charge of them, General Kurochkin said that the strength of ‘the Soviet advisory apparatus’ he headed was ‘about 2,000 people’ (Kurochkin, 2001:2).

The Soviets suffered casualties in Southern Africa, just as the Russian volunteers many decades earlier. According to the Angolan Ambassador, 15 Soviet military (including aircraft crew members) had been killed in Angola in the period up to 1991, and according to Russian military historians, by the same date 51 people were killed or died and 10 were wounded. There were, in particular, many heroic and tragic moments experienced by the Soviet military during the ‘battle of Cuito-Cuanavale’.

**Cuito-Cuanavale**

The history of the ‘battle at Cuito-Cuanavale’ and its effect on the further developments in the region remains controversial. In the opinion of Chester Crocker who headed African affairs in the US State Department during Reagan’s administration, the decisive positive shift in the process of negotiations on the political settlement took place before the major battle started. Fidel Castro, on the other hand, declared that the history of Africa would be divided into two parts: before and after Cuito-Cuanavale. For his part former a top SADF commander claimed in his memoirs that his forces had no intention to take Cuito-Cuanavale whatsoever. Further research is needed, and to start with here are extracts from the diary of a Soviet veteran, who
had been serving at Cuito-Cuanavale for several months in 1987-1988 (Jeronimo, 10 October 1987):

**10 October 1987**: ‘... On October 1 ‘assessors’ [Soviet advisors] of the 21st and 25th brigade returned from the operation on the river Lomba. There ... a misfortune happened. They were ‘covered’ by a shell from a high-velocity South African gun. As a result Oleg Snitko, an interpreter, suffered a blown away arm and a broken leg. He died in 36 hours. Others were unlucky as well: four were wounded and shell-shocked ...

**27 November 1987**: Today is hardly different from the previous days. [Our brigade is] under fire, the neighbouring brigades were under fire too.

There is a dead silence on the Soviet radio about Angola...

The enemy continues firing at Cuito. At 6 p.m. a salvo was delivered by [rocket launchers] Kentrons ... I could not get through to Cuito for a long time. Finally they informed me that shells exploded right on the [Soviet military] mission territory. They haven’t yet informed about the results.

**28 November 1987**: All the night and morning there was a tiring, exhausting silence: not a single shot, no sound of an engine, nothing. Because of it we couldn’t get a sleep for a long time. Besides, we were worried what happened in Cuito.

At 6.00 we found out that Colonel A. Gorb was killed, an aged man, very quiet, kind and polite ... Everybody respectfully called him ‘Dyadko’ ['Uncle' in Ukrainian or Belorussian]. He has spent over a year in Angola.

The same veteran implies that there was a love hate relationship between the South Africans and the Soviets. He noted that:

*South Africans are remarkable gentlemen ... I believe firing on our camp was not envisaged in their plans.*

Why? Because before March 11 [1988, a day of severe fighting at Cuito-Cuanavale ] they sent us an ultimatum: ‘Soviets, leave Cuito-Cuanavale, we don’t want to touch you’.

*The leaflets were in English: ‘Soviets, we don’t want to touch you’. The Angolans brought those leaflets to us: ‘Here it is written in English, we don’t understand ...’*

We informed Luanda about it. The order came from Luanda: ‘You, over there, take care of your security. Don’t leave the Angolan brigade, but take care of your security ...’ (Interview with Jeronimo, 28 October 2000).

However, some actions of the SADF could hardly be regarded as ‘gentlemen’s behaviour’:

**29 October 1987**: At 14.00 we received awful news. At 13.10 the enemy fired on a nearby 59th Brigade with chemical shells containing a poisonous substance. As a result many were poisoned, four are unconscious, the Brigade Commander bleeds when he coughs. The Soviet advisers in this brigade were affected as well. The wind blew to their side, and all of them are complain about very severe headaches and nausea.

*This news made us very worried, the matter is that we don’t have even the most obsolete gas masks.*
The debacle of South Africa and UNITA at Cuito-Cuanavale, and the advance of Cuban, Angolan and SWAPO forces towards the Namibian border, created favourable conditions for the completion of talks on the so-called Angolan-Namibian settlement. Cuito-Cuanavale led to acceptable conditions for Luanda and Havana and for signing the December 1988 New York agreements. The Soviet contribution to the success of these agreements was made mostly by Ambassador Vasev and, at a later stage, by Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin, whose memoirs, a ‘rejoinder’ to his American counterpart Chester Crocker’s ‘High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood’, will be soon published in Moscow.

According to Adamishin, the US ‘programme-maximum’ of Washington at the peace talks included not only the withdrawal of South Africans and Cubans from Angola, and independence for Namibia, but ‘an additional prize’ as well of ‘bringing Savimbi to power or at least to share power’. The US nevertheless had to ‘lower the stakes’.

_To us it was easier in a certain sense. We always proceeded from the point, that what is suitable for our friends will be suitable for us as well. We’re not for anything beyond it and didn’t ask_ (Adamishin, forthcoming:150).

Although Adamishin is critical of some aspects of the Soviet actions in Southern Africa, he also writes:

_If we had not come to the assistance of the MPLA, seven thousand miles from our borders, who would have benefited from it? Little doubt, it would have been the RSA ...What would have been further developments in the region, if the racist RSA had grabbed Angola in addition to Namibia? However many years more would her domination by force over the region have continued? How many years more would apartheid have survived?_

_... the RSA would not have left Angola of its own will had it not faced the dilemma: to wage a large-scale war against the Cubans, to declare total mobilisation, to risk a lot of white blood or to search for a compromise ..._

_It is clear that the Cuban factor was not the only one, the [Pretoria] government had constantly to look back at the situation in the country. But the Cuban military pressure brought about the equilibrium on the battlefield, which was a forerunner of the talks that followed. However the Cuban role became efficient due to our support, including first of all, the supplies of arms_ (Adamishin, forthcoming:151-152).

Some scholars speak and write about the Soviet ‘withdrawal’ from Angola, dating it from the New York agreements. However, Moscow’s military assistance continued for at least two and a half years, albeit in a diminishing volume. Its end almost coincided with the ‘dissolution’ of the USSR’s, after the conclusion of the Bicesse Accord on the political settlement, about to be resumed, this time from the government of Russia, when on the one hand, Savimbi’s refusal to honour his obligations became evident and, on the other hand, when, in the mid-1990s Russia’s foreign policy became motivated by her national interest and not by a desire to please the West at the expense of old friends in other parts of the world.

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Endnote

1. Dzassokhov later became a member of the CPSU Politbureau and now is President of the Republic of Northern Ossetia - Alania in the Caucasus.

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‘Here in the City, Everything has to be Paid for’: Locating the Community in Peri-urban Angola

Paul Robson & Sandra Roque

The following article is a preliminary summary of research carried out for ADRA and the Development Workshop Angola about communities, solidarity and collective action in peri-urban areas of Angola. Full reports in Portuguese and English will be published as Development Workshop Occasional Papers. The strategies of development organisations in Angola have increasingly focused on ‘strengthening civil society’ and ‘governance’. This is positive, though they cannot be seen as magic formulae. The many changes in Angolan society (before and after Independence) have had the result of weakening social cohesion, and migration to peri-urban areas as one of the most important changes. This makes it more difficult to develop the relationships of trust and the mechanisms of accountability that are the basis of a strong civil society and good governance. Strategies need to directly address these issues rather than assume that they exist.

Why Research on Communities, Solidarity & Collective Action?

 Certain development organisations in Angola have followed a community-based approach that has attempted to help groups of people at community level carry out development activities that respond to their own interests and preoccupations. Others have gone further, and followed a ‘civil-society rebuilding’ approach, rebuilding the social fabric through creating mechanisms by which people have the opportunity to work together. This approach is also of interest to certain official donor organisation who wish to promote ‘good governance’ and ‘civil society’.

The usual advice to development organisations following these approaches is to build on organisations and mechanisms that already exist. The implicit assumption is that there usually are existing organisations or mechanisms by which people meet basic needs. Development organisations in Angola however report a mixed experience in creating or strengthening community organisations; there have been some successes but also many difficulties particularly in peri-urban areas, where almost half the population now live. Some organisations expressed frustration at the apparently ‘complicated’ or ‘corrupted’ peri-urban populations who do not want to co-operate with each other even when a clear, rapid benefit should result. Development organisations report that they do not fully understand what are the pre-existing solidarity mechanisms on which they are trying to build, and are unsure whether their strategies are adequate for the current context of Angola.
Development organisations have therefore raised the question: have ‘traditional’ mechanisms for collective action survived the turbulent conditions faced by Angolan communities in the recent past? Are there existing, hidden mechanisms which help Angolan communities to survive, which are continuations or modifications of older indigenous mechanisms or new ones developed in the cities?

ADRA1 and Development Workshop Angola therefore carried out research during the year 2000 on organisations for collective action in peri-urban areas of Angola, which aimed to understand better the forms of organisation that exist in Angola for collective action, particularly peri-urban areas, and how organisations and mechanisms for collective action have adapted to the large-scale migration to urban areas. It involved trying to better understand processes of change such as migration and installation in peri-urban areas, and followed on from research in 1996 and 1997 on how rural and peri-urban communities have been affected by war, displacement and the many other changes of the colonial and post-colonial periods in Angola.2

The research was carried out in Luanda, Lubango and Huambo. The three cities differ in a number of aspects, and together represent areas with different recent histories, different patterns of recent migration, and differences in urban form. The research involved in-depth individual or group interviews with ‘leaders’ of the communities and a wide range of other residents (men and women, recently-displaced people and longer-established residents, people of different origins and age groups).3

**The Impact of Migration on Social Networks**

The initial hypotheses of the study were that solidarity in peri-urban areas would be found, based on two foundations:

1) The survival of traditional institutions (like ondjuluka)4 where attitudes of solidarity would be strongly present; that these institutions, even when they have been transformed by contact with the urban environment, would have adapted and continued to be the basis of local forms of solidarity;

2) Social networks established between neighbours, with strong social ties, that would create various mechanisms and forms of solidarity between these people.

This idea was reinforced by another hypothesis: that peri-urban bairros would be found to contain zones with a certain social homogeneity (in terms of ethnic group, of region of origin or date of arrival in the bairro).

The research revealed that even in rural areas traditional institutions, including traditional institutions of solidarity, had been transformed in the last 100 years. In the colonial era, occupation of land by settlers had influenced settlement patterns and broken up villages; forced labour migration had removed men from villages for long periods; taxes and compulsory crops disturbed the rhythm of village life and traditional institutions; village leaders came to be seen as part of the colonial administration and not defenders of traditional institutions.5 The growing influence of Christianity throughout the colonial period had an important impact as the Christian missions sought to undermine traditional communities and values and replace them with their own image of community. After Independence, and particularly from 1983 onwards, rural areas were de-stabilised by a form of ‘dirty warfare’ that promoted fear and sets out to reduce the trust that holds together rural communities.7
This transformation has been most marked in the west-central areas of Angola – the areas of the Ambundu and Ovimbundu ethno-linguistic groups, which have been most affected by colonisation and dirty warfare. These areas are also the ones that were the origin of migratory flows to the cities included in this study. This probably means that many of the migrants to the cities brought with them weaker rural institutions of solidarity than had been thought at the start of the research, and it has not been possible for migrants to adapt them as the basis of new, local forms of solidarity.

The research also revealed that peri-urban bairros only rarely contain zones with a certain social homogeneity (in terms of ethnic group, of region of origin or date of arrival in the bairro). The social heterogeneity of these areas is partly due to the very complex migratory flows to the cities (in terms of origin and type of migrant, and in terms of the time and method of migration). It is also due to the difficulty that new migrants have in finding (in the now crowded cities) a piece of land or a house close to other people from their region or close to their extended family, and to the intensity of movements of people between bairros. "Where you manage to find a space is where you have to live". Thus ‘the people are mixed together'; people from the same area do not necessarily arrive in the city at the same time, or settle in the same area. This applies in all the three cities studied, Luanda, Huambo and Lubango.

Social heterogeneity has not allowed traditional institutions to continue among people living close to each other, given that these traditions were not shared by neighbours, and has consequences for the density and extension of social networks. Trusting social relations are not necessarily established with neighbours and relationships with neighbours are often loose, with the result that local social cohesion is weak and social networks are few and fragile. ‘Neighbourliness is not usual.’ Social networks exist, but usually they are not built on relations between neighbours. There are some exceptions to this rule:

- Older, higher density areas that have been occupied for a number of decades and where people have remained neighbours throughout this period and have been able to create stronger social bonds (though these areas have also been affected by the intense movement of people between bairros);
- Certain areas of ethno-linguistic homogeneity (but not all) such as certain community of Bakongo origin;
- The densest social networks are not based on people who are neighbours, but on other types of social relations;
- Family and extended family relationships;
- membership of churches.

Although the help of other members of an extended family is vital for a migrant in getting established in the city, tensions arise when migrants live with relatives for some time; migrants try to find their own house (or place to build one) as soon as possible and this is often in another bairro. Extended families thus tend to be spread between a number of bairros. It is rare for members of a church to be made up of residents of a certain neighbourhood, or for neighbours to be members of the same church.
Solidarity in Peri-urban Areas: Fragile & Limited

Thus migration to the peri-urban areas of the main cities has weakened social networks, while traditional institutions of solidarity may have already been weakened prior to migration. As a result, expressions of the spirit of solidarity, that the research had expected to find, have been reduced to a few extreme situations: funerals and sickness, most frequently when money is not required in order to help. Even in these cases solidarity is most frequent when it involves a family member or a very close friend. The exception is the membership of churches, who organise themselves for mutual assistance. Churches seem to be the only places in which people are ready to contribute with money and other items for the creation of funds, which can be used for the times of necessity of members of the church. Even so the most usual funds are those for the extreme situations mentioned above: funerals and sickness.

Another factor that reduces the continuation of traditional institutions of solidarity in peri-urban areas seems to be the transition to the use of money in day-to-day transactions. ‘Here in the city, everything has to be paid for’ state many interviewees expressing the shock of contact with a new way of life in which it is necessary to earn money. The use of money to mediate exchanges, and the expectation to earn money for small services and favours, removes these services and favours from the realm of symbolic exchanges and the dynamic of ‘generalised reciprocity’.12 This ‘generalised reciprocity’, still found in certain rural areas, is a dynamic of continuous exchanges in which everybody knows that they will be able to count on others in the future, if and when this is necessary. As a result of this change from mutual favours to financial transactions, the traditional forms of solidarity are little practised. Partial exceptions are found in some communities of Bakongo origin in Luanda, whose particular experience of migration has led them to adapt some of the characteristics of traditional solidarity to urban contexts. Another exception and example of adaptation of traditional solidarity seems to be found among the Nhaneka-Humbe residents of peri-urban Lubango who are the native population of the region, even though today they probably do not make up the majority of residents of the city.13

The difficulty in earning a living is another factor that has a negative impact on social relations in peri-urban areas. As interviews expressed it with regret, ‘in the city everything costs money’ and it is necessary to earn this money. This takes up a good deal of time, to do business and to be in the market place. ‘Life is difficult’ so little time is left over to spend with neighbours and little money is left to help them when required.

Collective Action: Almost Non-existent

At the start of the research it was hypothesised that organisations for collective action would be found in peri-urban areas, established on the basis of

- Communities where forms of solidarity were present involving different participants and social groups;
- Social networks with various bases (common origin, family, common interests and activities, being neighbours);
- Zones with some social homogeneity, where social linkages are stronger and forms of solidarity more frequent.
In practice it was found that peri-urban residents do not spontaneously organise themselves to tackle the problems that they face. Peri-urban areas lack basic services such as water, sanitation education and health, but people have sought individual solutions to these problems often at great cost in time and money. Rarely have collective solutions been sought. One exception is within the membership of churches, some of which have within them organisations for helping members in times of difficulty. Almost all residents of peri-urban areas appear to be regular and frequent church attenders. The feeling of belonging and the possibility for participating in the forms of collective action appear to be important motivations for being church members.

Another exception is when collective action is encouraged by development organisations from outside the community, who have begun to help residents organise committees to manage water points and to participate in the maintenance and management of primary schools. As noted above however, they have found this difficult and have expressed frustration at the apparently 'complicated' or 'corrupted' peri-urban populations who do not want to co-operate with each other even when a clear, rapid benefit should result.

'Failure to cooperate for mutual benefit does not necessarily signal ignorance or irrationality' (Putnam, 1993). There are clear reasons why people fail to cooperate even when it would be in their interests to do so. The dilemmas of collective action are well-known: if one person makes an effort to contribute to a collective solution for a common problem, how can he or she be sure that others will not benefit without contributing? In the absence of a credible mutual commitment, each individual expects the other to defect and so all end up with the result that no-one wants: an unwillingness to cooperate.

A credible mutual commitment is most likely to occur when those involved belong to the same, strong social networks and already have experience of working together. People who know each other can exert pressure on each other to contribute, and can hold each other to account. Those who already have experience of working together have developed a greater expectation that each will contribute. Trust develops. But this depends on the broader social context: or what Putnam describes as the 'social capital' of a community, the level of trust, the level of positive mutual expectations and the strength of social networks.

In the peri-urban bairros of Angola, the level of social capital is very low and under great pressure. Situations where there exist the conditions for collective action are rarer than had been thought at the start of the research. The practice of solidarity is rare between neighbours and is found only in certain extreme situations or is confined to certain groups. Social networks are rarely created locally: they are more often dispersed. The population of peri-urban areas is often heterogeneous both with respect to ethnic or geographical origin and with respect to the length of residence in the bairro. The traditional norms of solidarity have almost disappeared, rules of reciprocity have been weakened, and social networks are confined to specific groups or widely dispersed. The level of trust, and the expectation that one will be able to hold others to account, is low and there are few examples of successful voluntary, cooperative action to build on. If money is contributed to repairing a water pipe, the expectation is that the money will disappear and that it is difficult to hold to account those responsible: people are unwilling to contribute further. Only among certain groups, and among members of churches, is there an ability to hold the members to
account and to develop trust, and thus create an expectation that voluntary cooperation will bring results.

Another difficulty in peri-urban areas is that problems that could be resolved through collective action often require the participation of other organisations (water companies, the Ministry of Education, other state bodies and companies). Community collective action can contribute to resolving the lack of services, but also requires an input from outside, often from the State. These outside bodies are thus part of the equation of the dilemma of collective action, and peri-urban residents have little expectation that they will play a positive role. There is a little expectation that users’ monetary contributions will be used to maintain the service, or that service providers have the resources, or willingness, to maintain a service. Service providers have little contact with peri-urban areas, and are not accustomed to ways of working that involve participation of, or negotiation with, local communities. The state institutions that do have most contact with peri-urban residents (local Administration, Residents’ Committees and Sobas do bairro) are mainly involved in resolving local conflicts and minor problems: they do not have experience in facilitating contacts with service providers or in encouraging active popular participation in the resolution of local problems. They are not accountable to the users of services or residents in general. They are accountable to higher levels of government.

Organised communities might be able to hold to account the Ministries and State Companies that should provide them with services. But peri-urban residents are unwilling to organise themselves when the expectation is that the chances of successful collective action are low and the various Ministries and State Companies are unlikely to respond! The lack of a likely response from above is one of the reasons that peri-urban residents give for not organising themselves (Robson, 2001).

**Breaking out of the Dilemmas of Collective Action?**

There are strong reasons why development organisations should continue to work in peri-urban areas in Angola: about half the population of Angola lives in the cities and will probably continue to do so. And there are strong reasons why development organisations in Angola should continue to follow a community-based approach, or go further and follow a ‘civil-society rebuilding’ approach. ‘Working together’ is a necessary step in resolving the many practical problems that peri-urban residents face: it is unlikely that many of the practical problems of peri-urban areas will be resolved without residents working together in some way.

Residents who have experience of working together are more likely to demand accountability from local government and the State. This could be part of a process of rebuilding an accountable State and be an important contribution to rebuilding the social fabric of a country so strongly affected by war and to ‘making democracy work’. There is a growing interest within Angola, and among donors and development organisations, in ‘good governance’ and ‘support to civil society’: there is beginning to be a realisation that a strong civil society and good governance depend on mechanisms of accountability, and relationships of trust and reciprocity. Strategies towards civil society and governance need to directly address the low levels of social cohesion, trust and accountability rather than assume that these attributes exist: strategies should concentrate on strengthening grassroots civil society, rather than government structures and civil society organisations that both still lack reciprocity with, and accountability to, society as a whole. Supporting organisations for collective action may build up experiences of mechanisms of
accountability, which are an essential part of democratic governance. However, supporting collective action is not going to be straightforward. It involves breaking out of the dilemma of collective action: why be the first to contribute when the expectation is low that anyone else will contribute? In present conditions (the great number of difficulties that peri-urban people face and the lack of institutional responses) social capital will probably not be created without specific actions. The usual advice to development organisations for developing community organisations (to build on organisations and mechanisms that already exist) is not relevant in situations where social change has been rapid and severely weakened the basis for pre-existing organisations or the spontaneous creation of new organisations. The community-based approach is unlikely to be successful if it means assuming that there are 'communities' with a shared history, values and interests that can be mobilised: a new community-based approach is needed that helps to build communities and organisations, though how to do this is less clear.

It would seem to be necessary to work simultaneously at two levels: first, strengthening social networks and second, strengthening collective action. One should reinforce the other. At the first level, creating spaces and social activities for people to build new social networks may be a contribution to rebuilding social capital. Apart from the churches, peri-urban areas offer few opportunities for developing social networks. At the second level, assisting the development of forms of co-operation and collective action that have the best chance of success (water committees, commissions of parents at schools and some others) may prove to be positive experiences that contribute to rebuilding social capital and encourage further collective action. They will need to be developed with care and only if they meet strongly felt needs. In addition there will be a need to facilitate contacts between community organisations and service-providing organisations, to begin the process of developing reciprocal relationships between them.

Strong social networks and successful collective action, on a small-scale, exist within the membership of churches. There remains the question as to whether it is possible to extrapolate the experience of churches and what the consequences of this might be. The strong bonding social capital within churches is not matched by bridging social capital between them; and it is the latter that might contribute to resolving common social problems and contribute to greater democratisation and rebuilding the social fabric.

The heterogeneity of *bairros* has weakened pre-existing forms of solidarity and collective action. This may not be a problem for building new organisations, and could be an opportunity, in that there is less risk of creating *bairros* with strong internal cohesion but isolated from each other (and with potential conflict between them). But social networks and collective action in socially heterogeneous *bairros* will not emerge spontaneously: specific outside interventions will be required.

This will undoubtedly require development organisations to sharpen their skills in social mobilisation and in facilitating relationships. It may also require development organisations (and their funders) to take a longer-term approach whereby resolving immediate problems is seen as part of a larger challenge of rebuilding community and institutional capacity. There are at present few strategies for dealing with the consequences of rapid urban population growth in Angola (or elsewhere in Africa for that matter). Understanding the social changes that have accompanied this rapid urban population growth, and rebuilding social capital and the capacity for collective action, need to be components of this strategy.
**Endnotes**

1. The Angolan non-governmental organisation ‘Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente’.

2. Some of the resulting papers are available in English as Robson (ed.) (2001).

3. This was a qualitative research strategy, which involved ongoing analysis of the data in parallel with the data collection, adaptation of the questioning as the field of inquiry became clearer, and selective probing to try to reveal the systems that determine the actions of people and groups, the relations between people and institutions, and attitudes and values. Questionnaires that were adapted as the research progressed, thus permitting exploration of particular topics as wider questions were clarified.

4. An Umbundu word for a form of mutual assistance where a large group of people come together to help someone with an agricultural task, building a house or something similar.

5. The literature about social change in the colonial period in Angola is less extensive than the comparable literature in other countries of the region, but valuable sources are Heimer (ed.) (1973), Childs (1949), Pacheco (1991), Pacheco (2001), Neto (1999, 2000, 2001).


7. There has been little research about destabilisation in rural areas in Angola, particularly in the 1980s; see Green (1994) and Nordstrom (1992) about the impact of this type of warfare in Central America during the same period. Minter (1994) is a useful source about destabilisation in Angola.

8. The areas where people originally spoke Kimbundu and Umbundu respectively.

9. Displaced people become displaced in a wide variety of circumstances, another under-researched area. Only some flee their area of origin in groups, and even these groups tend to break up, the further displaced people travel. Many have been forced to flee a number of times, and this breaks up further the original group. The common belief about displaced people in Angola that “they flee in large groups and take their leaders and social structures with them” only applies for those in certain inland towns and inland camps for displaced people. Displaced people in the larger towns, and nearer the coast, have travelled further and been forced to flee more times, so are more likely to have arrived in a family unit or even as an individual; see also Andrade (2001).

10. There is an active housing market in most peri-urban areas. New arrivals can rarely afford land or housing close to people from their own area of origin who arrived previously. People move house (and *bairro*) to avoid paying higher rents, or to move out of rented accommodation and into their own home (which is more secure).

11. There are areas of the three cities where most residents are from the Central Plateau, but neighbours come from different parts of the Central Plateau and social cohesion is weak.

12. See Putnam (1993) for a discussion on forms of reciprocity and their importance.

13. Expressions of social cohesion and of solidarity were found more frequently in a socially heterogeneous *bairro* of Lubango than in one in which almost all residents came from the Central Plateau and spoke Umbundu. In the former were some long-standing residents of local origin who had maintained social networks in the *bairro* as the population increased. In the latter, residents came from various parts of the Central Plateau, and suffered enormous economic pressures that hindered them in developing social networks. Ethnic homogeneity of a *bairro* does not always lead to frequent expressions of social cohesion and of solidarity.

14. See OXFAM (1999) and INE (2000) for information about the low level of public services in Angolan cities and the high costs for poor people in accessing basic services.

15. Much of the following analysis is based on Chapter 6, ‘Social capital’ of Putnam’s book *Making Democracy Work*. 
16. 'The Prisoners' Dilemma', the 'Tragedy of the Commons', David Hume's example of two farmers who do not help each other to harvest their crops are the best-known examples of the dilemma of collective action.

17. Trust in the sense of a calculated expectation about the reliability of others, not 'blind faith'.

18. Social capital is here used to describe attributes of a group of people or community, and not the attributes of individuals (as it is used by some authors).

19. There is a tendency among development professionals to assume that where there is poverty people tend to mobilise, create strong social networks and support each other. Moser (1996) shows that in some circumstances, when poverty and social crisis cross a threshold of vulnerability, social capital becomes so low that each family turns in on itself and stops supporting the community of which it could be part. Social capital is used up rather than generated by adversity.

20. For example, water points can be managed by a community while a city-wide water company has to be responsible for water collection, treatment and mains distribution. A community may take responsibility for managing the local collection of rubbish while a city-wide authority has to be responsible for its ultimate transport and disposal.

21. In Huambo and Lubango the administrative system includes Sobas do bairro. Although the term Soba originally means a village chief, and although they are often referred to as 'traditional authorities', very few peri-urban Sobas come from the family of Sobas or have other characteristics of traditional authorities. They rarely represent the vestiges of rural institutions in the urban context.

22. Robert Putnam concludes his book by arguing that 'Building social capital will not be easy, but it is the key to making democracy work.'

23. Though donor agencies of Western countries still tend to centre their thinking about democratisation around elections and not around mechanisms of accountability; to emphasise physical reconstruction in reconstruction and development programmes with less attention to the mechanisms for maintaining and managing the infrastructure; and to link the promotion of the private sector with democratisation with little attention to managing the tensions between them.

24. See Colletta and Collen (2000) for a discussion about bonding social capital and bridging social capital

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Thriving on War: The Angolan Conflict & Private Business

Philippe Le Billon

With their huge demand for arms and substantial natural resource revenues, Angolan belligerents have made Angola a 'dream country' for savvy businessmen able to juggle political relations, arms dealing, and natural resources brokering. Recent investigations by the French judicial system, the UK-based NGO Global Witness, and UN sanctions monitors have cast a new light on the arms deals and corruption that plagued Angola throughout the 1990s. This Briefing retraces the rise of two businessmen who benefited from and participated in the Angola tragedy. Their careers highlight the inadequacies and ambiguities of the international community and international law in terms of regulating businesses during armed conflicts. Recent initiatives bringing about more transparency and accountability in the use of resource revenues are important steps forward, but an international legal framework is required to take into account the commercialised nature of contemporary wars and war economies.

Arms Deals & Business Associates

The resumption of hostilities in Angola following the collapse of the Bicesse Peace Accords in late 1992 and the failure of the Lusaka Protocol in 1998 have led to a renewed demand for arms by both belligerents throughout the 1990s (Human Rights Watch, 1999). With the end of direct foreign state sponsorship following the 1988 New York and 1991 Bicesse agreements and the reluctance of foreign powers to take sides militarily in the renewed conflict, networks mixing former governmental networks and businessmen thrived on this demand.

In the context of this peace process collapse, UNITA's objective remained the takeover of the state. Now claiming that it did not disarm during the period leading to the elections in order to defend its expected electoral victory from any military reaction of the MPLA, UNITA's military structure remained ready to strike against a much weakened governmental army. With Luanda as ultimate military objective, UNITA rapidly extended its territory in order to secure increasing revenues – through the control of diamond-mining areas – and losses for the government – through the destruction of infrastructure including on-shore oil installations. While previous support, most notably by the US, had provided UNITA with significant reserves of arms, additional income for rearmament was nevertheless necessary to sustain its military offensive, especially given the intensity of shelling on besieged towns such as Huambo and Kuito.

UNITA's long experience in diamond mining and dealing, dating back to the late 1970s, was put to good use to increase revenues, through the development of new partnerships; the most important with David Zollmann, a partner in the Antwerp based diamond trading company Glasol (UN, S/2000/1225). Long established in Zaïre, and with family ties there notably in the management of cobalt mining consortium Gécamines, Zollmann was reportedly approached by Manuel Roque da Silva – himself in-
formed through his close ties with late President Mobutu – to assist Jonas Savimbi in setting up a large diamond operation in the Cuango. With the assistance of his brother Maurice, and in partnership with the current chairman of Gécamines George Forrest as well as UNITA, Zollmann created the Cuango Mining Corporation, the largest UNITA-controlled mining operation before the imposition of UN sanctions in 1998. The corporation sold licences, taxed sub-buyers and recruited a large workforce – estimated at 100,000 and from whom UNITA took half the gravel production and best diamonds – from neighbouring Zaïre through an agreement with Mobutu. To facilitate his operations from Zaïre, Zollmann reportedly secured and operated through a position as Consul of Chile.

With the fall of its allies in Kinshasa and Brazzaville in 1997, UNITA partly reoriented its land-based logistics through Zambia, with Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, and Rwanda also providing safe transit and trading places. Furthermore, government offensives put additional pressure on UNITA to abandon its main diamond area – Luzamba in southern Cuango valley – in early 1998, although it reportedly did so only after the most lucrative diamonds had been mined out. Zollmann claims that in 1997 he had ‘closed all the diamond purchasing operations in any country or area where political instability or war prevails’ (Republikein, March 2000). In particular, he reported to have closed diamond buying operations in the former Zaïre, now the Democratic Republic of Congo, assessing that the situation there would degrade while UNITA preferred dealing with Lebanese diamond buyers also willing to trade arms.

The value of diamonds produced under UNITA’s control for the period 1992 to 2000 is estimated at US$3 to 4 billion, but the level of net revenue for UNITA is unknown (Cilliers and Dietrich, 2000). As a result of a government take-over of mines in compliance to the Lusaka Protocol, the depletion of existing mines in the absence of new investments, UN sanctions imposed in 1998 against UNITA diamond trade, and successful governmental offensives, UNITA-controlled production fell from a peak of US$600-760 million in 1996 to US$100-150 million in 2000 (Le Billon, 2001). The government also set up a diamond marketing monopoly controlled by Ascorp – a joint venture between the government and two diamond-marketing companies from Belgium and Israel, headed by Lev Leviev – as well as improved diamonds certificate of origin to reduce possibilities of UNITA laundering diamonds through legitimate channels. However, diamond-buying in the provinces is still carried out through largely unmonitored intermediaries, providing UNITA with the opportunity of accessing these channels. Although UNITA retains access to mining sites and smuggling networks, as well as holding an important stockpile of diamonds, it currently faces logistical and financial difficulties in translating this wealth into a military capability (UN, S/2001/966). UNITA has therefore been limited to guerrilla warfare since its military defeats in 1999, and largely relies for its supplies on the predation of local populations and trade.

Throughout the 1990s, UNITA was not the only belligerent benefiting from diamonds: government army units and generals greatly benefited from the trade, with or without the backing of President dos Santos who used concession licences as a mode of clientelism (Hodges, 2001). Despite the importance of diamonds for elite clientelist networks, the bulk of the revenues on the MPLA side comes from oil. However, the high level of debt of the MPLA government severely limits its ability to make direct payments for arms; it thus requires intermediaries to leverage credit, usually on future oil revenues. Intermediaries associated with France and Eastern European countries have
been the most influential; the former with access to oil-collaterised credit, and the latter with a surplus of cheap arms. The demand for arms increased following the offensive by UNITA troops throughout the country in late 1992, which rapidly threatened key interests of the MPLA government. By early 1993, the on-shore oil installations in the northwest had been taken over and largely destroyed by UNITA, as well as most diamond areas of the northeast. UNITA also gained control of most provinces, including the provincial capital of Huambo, the second largest Angolan town. These battles for the control of the population led to the heaviest civilian death toll ever.

With UNITA closing on Luanda, the regime of President dos Santos approached many countries for assistance. In France, contact was established through Jean-Bernard Curial, the former southern Africa specialist of the French Socialist party now heading a parastatal company supplying food and drugs to developing countries for the French government (Le Monde, 13 January 2001). While the French President at the time, François Mitterrand, was of Socialist ‘persuasion’, the government was under control from the right wing and its Minister of Defence was said to be a supporter of Savimbi (Ibid.). Thus, officially, France would not support dos Santos.

Curial nevertheless rapidly met with Jean-Christophe Mitterand, officially in charge of African affairs for his father until 1992, who suggested that he might contact Pierre-Joseph Falcone, a Franco-Brazilian arms dealer operating as an intermediary for Sofremi (Ibid.) – an export-specialised consortium of French security equipment companies, 35% of which is controlled by the French state and under the de facto management of the Ministry of Interior. Charles Pasqua, the Minister of Interior, used Sofremi as the arms exports branch of a parallel French foreign policy (Le Figaro, 11 December 2000).

In a long tradition dating back to the networks, or réseaux, installed by Jacques Foccart to serve French interests in Africa under De Gaulle, French politics in Africa has been under the influence, if not control, of parallel authorities sideling official ministers such as Foreign Affairs, Defence, or Cooperation (Glaser & Smith, 1992 & 1997). Parallel French diplomacy orchestrated by Pasqua during the early 1990s targeted much of Francophone Africa, Algeria, Angola, and Sudan (Le Figaro, 11 December 2000). With dwindling petroleum reserves in the traditional sub-Saharan Africa areas of French influence (Cameroun, Congo, and Gabon), Nigeria and Angola appeared as promising. For the French oil company Elf – now merged with Fina and Total – and some French officials, the economic stakes were perceived to be too high to risk siding solely with UNITA while the US was already shifting support to the MPLA; even by 1993 Elf had not yet publicly confirmed the huge block 17 reserve that would lead to the oil rush on Angola. Support for both sides was the favoured strategy and Falcone was given a green light to sell arms to dos Santos’ regime, using an oil collaterised loan. Falcone received the assistance of Arkady Gaydamak, an Ukrainian national and economic adviser to dos Santos who has been decorated in France by Jean-Charles Marchiani – a close associate of Pasqua – for assisting in the liberation of French pilots captured by Bosnian Serbs. Falcone’s company – Brenco International – was also reportedly involved through its subsidiary Setraco-Myanmar in assisting the French oil company Total negotiating a gas contract in Burma with the provision of military helicopters (Christophe, 2000).

The Time of Accusations

Both Zollmann and Falcone have been publicly accused of profiting from the Angolan tragedy. Ironically, Falcone, who worked with the government, is now behind bars pending judgement on tax
fraud and arms trafficking, while Zollmann, who worked with UNITA, launched a court action against British foreign office minister Peter Hain for libel over false accusations of UN sanction-busting. While there were no UN sanctions on UNITA diamonds at the time of Zollmann’s operations, one is nevertheless left to wonder about the lack of international law able to protect civilians from the conduct of wartime business entrepreneurs.

International Law

While Falcone’s lawyers ‘do not see anything that might deny Angola the right to defend itself from the manoeuvres of a terrorist group condemned by the UN’ (Le Figaro, 24 February 2001), the ‘Triple Zero’ clause of the Bicesse Accords banned both the government and UNITA from acquiring lethal weapons. Although the ban on arms sales was lifted in October 1992 by Russia, the United Kingdom and partially by the United States, France had maintained it (African Business, May 2001). The Lusaka Protocol subsequently reinstated a ban for all parties by prohibiting resupply with ‘any military equipment, lethal or otherwise’ of all military forces. This was confirmed in February 1995 when the UN Security Council called for both the ‘Government of Angola and UNITA during UNAVEM III’s presence in Angola to cease any acquisition of arms and war material’. To defend Falcone, and to protect his regime from accusations of corruption, President dos Santos wrote to President Chirac asking for the French state to withdraw charges against Falcone for tax evasion and arms trafficking and consider a procedural cancellation of charges for arms trafficking – which were reinstated after only a week – a diplomatic victory (Le Nouvel Observateur, 24 May 2001).

Although President dos Santos may have overstated the case when arguing in a blunt statement to the new French Ambassador in Angola that ‘[thanks to] Mr. Pierre Falcone ... democracy and rule of law were preserved in Angola, millions of people were saved from the genocide that was near at hand’, his view has some undeniable credit in the realpolitik of power struggle in Angola (23 February 2001 cited on www.angola.org). The inability, or unwillingness, of the UN mission and international community to actually enforce an arms import ban on both belligerents – for lack of capacity and disarmament mandate, or fear of losing a weak ‘momentum for peace’ or jeopardising commercial interests – would suggest that a unilateral embargo on one of the parties should not be imposed until that party has been recognised as the main impediment to peace. This happened in 1993 with UNSC resolution 864 banning UNITA fuel and arms imports. A key responsibility of international institutions assisting in conflict resolution should have been therefore to prevent business people from facilitating arms purchases by UNITA – even if the argument can be made that arms imports by the Angolan government gave Savimbi the pretext not to demobilise his troops and to pursue rearmament.

Beyond this lies the question of the actual beneficiaries of arms purchases. Although the arms imported undeniably assisted in the protection of civilians from UNITA aggression, some were also used in the abuses committed by governmental troops and the hegemonic pursuit of power by the regime. Arms imports also constituted one of the key economic transactions for the regime in Luanda, with Global Witness arguing that, ‘what started as an emergency to maintain the fight against UNITA, has become the vehicle for looting’. Media reports on the findings of the French judiciary and declarations from protagonists seem to indicate that the arms deals were indeed marred by corruption, which Falcone often justifies as facilitation payments.

According to copies of contracts obtained by Le Monde, the arms deals orchestrated
by Falcone between late 1993 and 1994 amounted to a total of US$633 million – most of them involving Czech (Osos Praha) and Slovakian (Zts) arms companies (Le Monde, 13 January 2001). The financial agreement reportedly involved the sale of the oil share of the state oil company Sonangol on the Palanka oil field operated by Elf, through Glencore, a Swiss trading company founded by Marc Rich – an apartheid-era South African sanctions buster and tax evader in the US recently amnestied by President Clinton. Payments would then transit through a bank account held by Osos Zts at a Paris branch of Paribas, on which both Falcone and his associate Arkady Gaydamak has power of attorney, before being redistributed towards various accounts (Le Figaro, 11 December 2001). A police search in France led to the discovery of 300 names of individuals and companies receiving financial transfers, many of them in cash, by Falcone’s company Brenco.

Among these beneficiaries are some prominent public figures and politicians in France, Angola, but also the US. A most appetising one for the media was former-President Mitterrand’s son Jean-Christophe, who admitted receiving US$1.8 million from Brenco International, on a Swiss bank account between 1997 and 1998, but denied it was linked to arms deals, claiming that it was instead linked to oil-collaterised loans (African Business, May 2001). Gaydamak also claimed that profits were not made on weapons but on trading the oil financing the arms deal (The Guardian, 26 March 2001). Other prominent French figures included Jacques Attali, a former close adviser to late President Mitterrand and Chairman of the Bank for European Reconstruction and Development admitted receiving about US$250,000 from Brenco and the BAI, an Angolan bank in which Falcone has interests (Le Monde, 24 January 2001). Paul-Loup Sulitzer, a best-selling writer close to circles of power, admitted receiving US$130,000 for ‘advice on media matters’, and Bernard Poussier, the former director of the Sofremi, was lent 600,000 francs (Le Monde, 24 January 2001). At a more political level, the enquiry has investigated the possibilities of ‘retro-commissions’ that would have benefited the political party of Charles Pasqua, the Rassemblement Pour la France (RPF) through the Association-Afrique-Orient, which reportedly received more than US$200,000 from Brenco in 1996 (Le Parisien, 6 June 2001; Le Monde, 24 April 2001).

Prominent Angolans close to the deal also reportedly received payments, including Elídio de Figueiredo, the former Angolan Ambassador to France and homme de confiance of President dos Santos in Paris, to the amount of US$18 million, various generals, as well as the director of a trading company (Le Monde, 24 January 2001). French judicial authorities also examined Monaco-based bank accounts of dos Santos (African Business, May 2001). As summed up by the new director of Sofremi following an internal audit, ‘Falcone has greased everyone during all those years’ (Le Figaro, 9 January 2001). Financial support also extended to the US with $100,000 donated (and later returned) to the Republican presidential campaign by Falcone’s wife as well as a lesser amount to the Democratic presidential campaign (Arizona Republic, 3 March 2001).

Regulating Businesses in War

War is overwhelmingly bad for most businesses because of the high uncertainty and insecurity putting at risk investment, staff, production, and trading. Yet some businesses maintain viable economic enclaves, such as offshore oil industry or militarily protected mines, while networks of brokers and risk-taking entrepreneurs thrive by linking war zones to international markets. Most of these businesses take the view that their activities are not political in nature, and more the victims than the accomplices of belligerents. Many critics, how-
ever, argue that armed conflicts and repressive or neglectful governance will continue as long as businesses sustain flows of resources without being held accountable to host populations.

The case of Angola appears to confirm this latter argument. Ten years after the Bicesse Accords and with billions of dollars spent on both military and peacekeeping, Angola finds itself in the same nightmarish situation. Even if the regime of dos Santos has clearly won military security for itself and a sufficient – often commercially motivated – degree of international legitimacy, this has occurred at the expense of the vast majority of the population. While the growing non-violent opposition movements can improve the political scene and governance in Angola, the country is not sheltered from further corruption or even new conflicts given the lack of legitimacy and self-interest of many in the state apparatus.

On UNITA’s side, Savimbi has lost all but the ability to sustain a murderous and extremely unpopular guerrilla warfare discrediting its opposition to a regime largely perceived as corrupt. Dealing either with oil or diamonds, businesses sustained dos Santos’s regime despite corruption and economic mismanagement or Savimbi’s bid for power despite political defeat. Even if the return to war in 1992 may not have significantly depended upon the support of businesses for belligerents, the collapse of the Lusaka Protocol had much to do with their financial ability to rearm.

On the one hand, a much earlier ban on UNITA diamonds might have deterred large players in the industry to work, directly or indirectly, with Savimbi. On the other, the political strategy of integrating UNITA diamond business interests into the formal economy has not been pursued systematically and sufficiently openly. Parallel initiatives, including military attacks on UNITA controlled mines, have undermined this strategy and reduced trust between the belligerents.

More generally, the integration financial controls in the Bicesse Accords, for example through the channelling of oil and diamond revenues through an internationally supervised escrow fund allocating these to social and peace consolidation activities, would have reduced the ability of both parties to rearm and thus assist in preventing a return to war.

Unless an international legal framework is strengthened to stop the deadly complicity of private commercial actors, warlords and governments benefiting from war economies will continue to thrive. In particular, a regulatory framework should deprive belligerents of revenues allowing them to follow a double agenda of transition to peace and rearmament – as happened twice in Angola. The current work of the French judicial system on arms trafficking and tax evasion demonstrates that a legal regulation of business during wartime and transition to peace is feasible and potentially effective. Mechanisms with universal jurisdiction have to be devised and the work of the UN Security Council in regulating economic activities for the sake of peace improved. Both delays in deciding and monitoring appropriate sanctions and difficulties in their implementation by individual states with vested interests call for an international mechanism to control the activities of businesses during wartime and transition to peace. As such, business dealings with belligerents within the framework of a peace process should come under an internationally supervised mechanism of tax collection and budgetary allocation using escrow funds and strict sanctions to ensure compliance. If successful, and in the absence of an alternative financing mode, opting out of a peace process should become a costly if not financially impossible alternative for belligerents.

Pressure from local and international advocacy NGOs also proved most significant. After demonstrating the role of diamonds in financing UNITA, Global Witness launched together with other
NGOs the 'Fatal Transactions' campaign against 'conflict diamonds', which received large and sustained media coverage (Global Witness, 1998). De Beers quickly declared a halt to its purchase of Angolan diamonds, and proclaimed its 'ethical' stance. In July 2000, the biennial World Diamond Congress in Antwerp agreed to take concerted action to stamp out trade in conflict diamonds. The intergovernmental 'Kimberley process' gathering governments, industry, and NGOs is now aiming at creating a global anti 'conflict diamonds' certification scheme by the end of 2002. In the meantime, most affected countries have set-up their own certification, with varying degrees of effectiveness.

The Kimberley process on conflict diamonds is a major step towards an international regulatory trade regime over commodities involved in war economies. Over the last two years, the UN also has taken unprecedented steps to end the bankrolling of belligerents fuelling conflicts and impeding peace by 'naming and shaming' sanction busters, including heads of states, and calling for member states to criminalise sanction busting. Yet, while the naming and shaming strategy of the UN expert panel had some impact, no one was indicted among people having reportedly played a key role in financing and arming UNITA. Similarly, most of the oil industry resisted calls by advocacy groups such as Global Witness for full transparency and accountability. Despite significant progress being made through the audit of the Angolan oil accounts required by IMF as part of its Staff Monitored Program, an international agreement establishing worldwide rules in these domains for the oil industry need to be explored (Global Witness, 1999; Human Rights Watch, 2001). More boldly, the international community should examine the establishment of a legal regulatory framework for businesses in war – including a permanent UN sanction monitoring mechanism, an investigation and international warrant capacity under Interpol, and a universal jurisdiction held by the International Criminal Court. Meanwhile, at the time of writing (August 2001), more than 150 people have died in the latest UNITA attack in Angola while the government is expelling and destroying the houses of 13,000 poor families in the centre of Luanda to develop a residential and leisure complex for the oil industry.
Business & War in Angola

Jakkie Cilliers

As the international community's enthusiasm for peacekeeping has declined, it has sought effective and alternative ways of effecting peace without the risk of troop deployment. Imposing various conditions on the warring parties has been an obvious alternative. This is the thinking behind the sanctions presently applied, albeit with limited effect, on the Angolan rebel movement, UNITA, and the various attempts at structural adjustment programs imposed on the government in Luanda.

Angola has not responded well to 'peacekeeping on the cheap'. The three failed UNAVEM missions in that country is evidence enough. But ultimately the responsibility for the continuation of the war in Angola lies with the conflicting parties themselves. UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, has demonstrated that he cannot be trusted by the international community, and UNITA has responded to peace overtures in Angola only when it sought to consolidate its battlefield gains or avoid military reverses. The track record of the governing party, the MPLA, is little better, yet the 1992 elections were sufficiently free and fair to leave little doubt as to the legitimacy of the MPLA government as the legal representative of the majority of the broader Angolan populace.

The Angolan war is at heart a civil war that has now been fought for 40 years by successive generations of Angolans. Similar to the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo, with which it shares a long and unguarded border, governance in Angola extends only to the urban limits of Luanda, to most provincial capitals and to those areas where the Angolan armed forces, the FAA, are deployed. This does not imply that UNITA holds sway everywhere else. The reality is that large expanses of terrain remain unguarded and without policing or administration of any type within which the majority of people have to fend for themselves and are open to be abused by either side. These unprotected people know of no life other than war and most face the dilemma of either being internally displaced or being forcibly drafted into one of the armed forces.

War has transformed Angola from a predominantly rural society to one where about half the population lives in the cities. The urbanisation is accentuated by successive large waves of population displacement from the rural areas. The result is great social stratification and inequality. Most of the urban population is concentrated in the huge informal settlements that now surround all major cities. The residents of these settlements depend on the informal sector as their major source of income and employment, and use it to supplement low public sector wages, where these are available. Angola's social indicators, including health and education are bad, even by sub-Saharan standards, reflecting the precarious living conditions of much of the population. Contrasted to this are the enormous opportunities for enrichment available to certain well-placed individuals in the political system, largely because of the revenues available from the oil industry.

Today, several years after the Lusaka Agreement was signed and after the loss of thousands of lives, the situation in Angola remains a stalemate. The military momentum that started with the effective destruction of UNITA's conventional military capabilities in 1998 and the capture of Bailundu and Andulo the following year has since petered out. Insecurity has returned to the larger part of the countryside and human suffering has intensified. Despite the purchase of military equipment worth hundreds of millions of dollars, the FAA remains unable to defeat UNITA, a guerrilla movement that sus-
tains itself through coercion and the income gained from the smuggling of diamonds through links to regional smuggling economies that render national boundaries meaningless.

Recent months have again brought a glimmer of hope that the negotiations toward a political and military settlement could resume. Civil society is more active than before, the churches are speaking out in favour of peace, during July 2001 UNITA proposed a six-point plan for ‘Resolving the Angolan Conflict’ that includes an agenda for negotiations, and President Eduardo dos Santos has recently announced that he intends to step down. All of these may collectively provide a new impetus towards peace. But the dynamics of the Angolan civil war have frustrated the hopes of the region and the international community for a resolution to the conflict in the past and may do so again. Most analysts argue that the ongoing war allows a ‘system ... that cultivates cronyism and arbitrariness, and requires opaqueness in the management of state resources ...’ that ultimately benefits only a small number of what Tony Hodges has termed:

closely interrelated Luanda-based Creole families who were active in or identified with the MPLA ... [and] to a limited extent ... a wider layer of the urban population, through such mechanisms as state or parastatal employment and subsidies for fuel, water and electricity.

According to this view, peace threatens the vested interests of various elites engaged in the Angolan war economy. Considerable research by the World Bank and others supports this analysis by providing a new focus of the age-old phenomena of war profiteering.

The traditional argument is that only the start of peace could imply an end to the massive mismanagement of the Angolan economy. By implication, ‘good governance’ must be delayed until the end of the war and can only be implemented during the post-conflict phase. But students of war agree that the best counter-insurgency strategy is good governance, implying that accountability, development and delivery should not be delayed in anticipation of an elusive peace that has withstood the Alvor, Bicesse and Lusaka agreements.

Even though the colonial ideological framework that provided the motivational context to earlier wars of liberation in Africa has all but disappeared, the techniques through which insurgency and counter-insurgency are fought remain unchanged. Wars using these techniques remain a contest for popular acquiescence, support and participation, although within a changed global context that provides new means with which to engage the enemy. Without a motivational context (the racial and ethnic dimensions of the war), a population support base (for UNITA this is the Ovimbundu), a geographical safe area (previously in the planalto and now in the expanse that is eastern and south-eastern Angola) and the means to continue the war (income from diamond smuggling) the Angolan war cannot continue. An end to the war or movement toward negotiations requires an appropriate political initiative, but also effective counter-insurgency strategy and an approach that engages the population and the motivation behind the conflict. This is not possible while powerful interest groups in Luanda continue to have a vested interest in the maintaining the shadowy systems and administrative mechanisms that allocate resources and award contracts, concessions and other economic opportunities.

It is not only peace that requires the restructuring of governance in Angola but also the effective prosecution of the war. Good governance, by definition, is sensitive to the improvement of the quality of life of its citizenry, to their protection and development, and is not a
post-conflict project, but part and parcel of the war itself. For Angolans and international actors who have an interest in peace, the reform of the predatory state is crucial.

That governance requires reinvention in Angola is no new or startling revelation. The IMF and World Bank have engaged the Angolan government on this subject over several decades. On each occasion rising oil prices or sales of future oil production have allowed the government to avoid substantive structural adjustment – and has done so again in 2001. Despite four staff monitoring programmes, the Angolan government has sidestepped the conditions others wish to impose. But Luanda has only been able to avoid the transparency and good governance dictates of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund by selling the household silver – a process that will soon reach its limit. Having built up external arrears to the maximum that international banks would approve, given its low credit rating (external is estimated at between US$9 billion and 11.5 billion) Angola now cannot obtain credits for military procurement and consumption through normal banking facilities or from official credit export agencies. Instead, it has started using current oil revenues to make cash payments, using future oil revenue as collateral for loans.

By the late 1990s, almost all the oil physically available to the government through SONANGOL (amounting to almost half of the governments’ total oil revenue) was committed to the servicing of oil-guaranteed loans. More recently it has started provided for an equity stakes to companies with linkages in the international arms industry as an alternative means of payment in kind for arms contracts.

This is similar to the situation in the D. R. Congo where Laurent Kabila entered into any number of questionable commercial engagements before his assassination to purchase regime protection against foreign aggression.

Since the end of the Portuguese colonialism in 1975 almost all sectors of the Angolan economy (apart from the oil industry) have stagnated or declined due to a lack of physical security, skills shortages, macroeconomic instability, distortionary economic policies and the deterioration of physical infrastructure and services. Angola has shifted from being a net exporter of food to being heavily dependent on international food aid. This shift is epitomised by the collapse of coffee production where current exports average about 1% of the level reached in the early 1970s. The domestic manufacturing industry and mining sectors have a similar history, though diamonds are a recent exception. The period of renewed warfare in 1993 and 1994 had a particularly devastating impact on the non-oil sectors.

Angolan oil production has risen almost six-fold since 1983 and the trend is set to continue, making the country one of the most promising places in the world for oil exploration. But instead of using the extra cash to fund development projects, ‘oil resources have provided opportunities for enrichment on a fabulous scale at the summit of the system.’ Angola’s ‘oil nomenclatura’ have benefited handsomely from the ‘oil-financed patronage that has been a fundamental part of the strategy pursued by Futungo de Belas for the consolidation and conservation of political power.’

With the collapse of the once prosperous coffee industry amongst others, Angola has become over-dependent on oil, leaving it perilously exposed to the sharp price fluctuations that affect the oil market. In the process the MPLA government has squandering its massive non-renewable natural heritage in a manner that will leave little for future generations. Ironically the high and rising oil revenues
have encouraged complacency about the dismal state of the rest of the economy, now characterised by decaying infrastructure and high transaction costs. Today the Angolan oil sector is an extreme case of an enclave economy with almost no links to the rest of the country, employing only an estimated 10,000 Angolans and with little or no linkages to other sectors.

Thus far, the mechanisms adopted by the international community to break the self-perpetuating cycle of greed, corruption and war-profiteering in Luanda (in itself an impediment to peace as argued earlier) have carefully avoided the engagement of the oil industry. The reasons are self-evident. Angola is the largest African oil producer outside of OPEC and already provides some 7% of the oil needs of the United States. What some have termed oil diplomacy, the ability to engage domestic interest groups in countries such as the US, France and to a lesser extent Britain and Norway through the leverage of multibillion-dollar oil companies, has proven an effective substitute for a normal foreign policy by the Angolan government. Yet few countries present the international community, and the UN Security Council in particular, with the opportunities to engage the business sector in reforming the state as Angola does now.

The insistence by some in business that 'the role of business is to do business' is practical nonsense in a country where oil revenues comprise 90.5% of the 2001 national budget of about US$3.18 billion. The US$2 billion oil revenue that the Angolan government receives each year is used almost entirely for non-productive purposes: military expenditure and consumption. Many would argue that even the massive military expenditure is not optimised, focused as it has been on large capital expenditure items (and associated pay-backs) singularly unsuited to countering UNITA's guerrilla tactics. Angola is in a unique situation and is more vulnerable to pressure than many believe partly due to the nature of its oil wealth: concentrated in deep-sea areas that require massive financial investments and specific expertise. Only a handful of companies, the so-called 'supermajors', such as Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon, BP Amoco, Texaco, Chevron and Total-FinaElf have the capital and expertise to exploit Angola's deep-sea oil deposits. Elsewhere, such as in Sudan, the fact that oil fuels the civil war is well established but pressure on Talisman Energy, the Canadian firm that has been at the recipient end of considerable attention, could be self-defeating. If Talisman is forced to disinvest from Sudan, companies from Malaysia will probably replace it or China with little or no scruples when it comes to exploitation and profits. This is not the case in Angola.

Most multinationals have common goals, and larger corporations with massive capital investment, such as the supermajors in the oil sector, are more interested than most in protecting their reputations which are vulnerable to exposure on stock markets in places such as New York, London and Frankfurt where socially-conscious investments are increasing. The growth in the size and power of major corporations in Europe and North America has been matched by a demand for accountability, particularly following the series of environmental disasters (such as the Exxon Valdes) and exposure of sweatshop practices by footwear companies (such as Nike).

Angola is often described as the hottest oil exploration destination in the globe and it is therefore a destination that few companies can resist. In the massive emerging oil supermarket that is Angola, responsible oil companies certainly wish to be seen to be part of the solution, not part of the problem. Although many corporations have adopted codes of conduct or social responsibility policies, few include human rights standards. Most of these codes lack implementation meas-
ures and independent audits. Furthermore, in practice, many of these goals are simply discarded-usually because companies fear being undercut by a competitor.

Multinational companies acting individually face many challenges when they operate in zones of conflict. Andrew Mack has listed a number of these dilemmas. If companies fail to act, they risk being accused by NGOs of a lack of concern for human rights. If corporations seek to pressure corrupt or repressive governments to adopt greater transparency and accountability, or show greater concern for human rights, they may put themselves at a political and therefore economic disadvantage. By doing nothing, companies risk being accused of complicity with human rights abuses and worse. If corporations try and promote positive change privately with the government, they may be accused of doing nothing by outside critics. If they try and raise issues publicly, they risk being rebuffed by officialdom and accused of unwarranted interference. If corporations refuse the demands of corrupt politicians and officials they risk losing business to less scrupulous competitors. If they accede to these demands, they risk being attacked for complicity with corruption. If corporations seek to compensate local communities for any environmental damage or loss, they can rarely be certain that the compensation will reach those for whom it is intended. However, failure to offer compensation is almost certain to generate resentment. If corporations rely on governments to provide security for their operations they risk being blamed if forces repress peaceful protest or being associated with government repression. If corporations employ private security they risk being blamed for inappropriate behaviour of those staff.

The business environment for large multinational engagement in war-torn and undemocratic countries is, therefore, complex and challenging. But there is an increased expectation that responsible business should accept a role in ensuring political stability and social development in partnership with the international community. This is even more important where the social fabric is fragile and where foreign, capital intensive corporations dominate the economy, as is the case in a number of mineral-producing African states. This is a role hitherto placed in the vanguard by international watchdog organisations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and also by the media, but has necessitated an approach where hyperbole has sometimes replaced analysis. It is also a role that can increase significantly when standards are established for business engagement in fragile, corrupt and war-torn societies where governance is weak and predatory. The precedents for such conditional engagement already exist. Home country regulations such as the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions of 1977 is legally binding on companies based in OECD countries. The proposition here is relatively simple. The UN Security Council and representatives of the dominant business corporations capable of exploiting capital-intensive resources such as deep-sea oil should assume a leadership role in the establishment of legally binding criteria for engagement in these endeavours in countries such as Angola.

Whether this is undertaken on a country-by-country basis or through binding regional and international agreements, common standards need to be agreed upon for the protection of all who wish to engage in the commercial exploitation of oil and other natural wealth in war-torn societies. An agreed standard would benefit the corporations, the populace and the international community.

Angola presents a paradox of immense mineral-based wealth and development potential co-existing with disastrous economic collapse, social dissolution, pov-
Angola: 'Back to Normal'
James D Sidaway

On 10 August 2001 an anti-tank mine placed by UNITA on the railway line between Luanda and the provincial city of Dondo derailed a train at a point 150 kms from the Angolan capital. The train was wrecked, a fire started and UNITA gunned down fleeing passengers. There were over one hundred fatal civilian victims. Another atrocity of Angola's war. Another few lines on the inside pages of metropolitan newspapers.

A world away, here in Singapore, I heard the event reported on the BBC world service; I have to admit that I was not shocked. As has often been remarked, we so easily become accustomed or anaesthetised to such reportage. And over the years, I have heard of so many appalling things from Angola's long war. But what the BBC correspondent said next made me wonder if I had misheard him. The BBC reported that the attack was unusual in its proximity to Luanda. The correspondent felt that UNITA were sending a signal to an US delegation who were visiting the capital. An indication, he said, that things in Angola 'were not yet back to normal'. Not yet back to normal?

'SNormal' might signify an absence of war, a sense of a future, security of a sort, access to and benefits from the positive elements within modernity; development, education, effective health services and so on. Of course for many, a normal everyday life is not easy. There are many countries, places, families and lives where normality consists of struggle, violence or disarray.

Salman Rushdie, who perhaps has a sharper sense of the normal/abnormal than most of us, offers some thoughts on this in Angola. Rushdie reviewed an eyewitness account of the aftermath of the collapse of the Portuguese colonial regime in Luanda and the ensuing struggles between the MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA by the Polish journalist Ryszard Kapuscinski (1988). Kapuscinski's account is unusual, being one of the few attempts by a foreign correspondent to capture the dynamics of that moment as seen through a series of anecdotes and fragments of human reportage. Although it is not wholly outside a certain European narratival of Africa as exotic/erotic (think Joseph Conrad, another Polish writer a century ago), and whilst it should also be read with attentiveness to European and Polish baggage (see Tighe, 1996) Kapuscinski has provided an accessible account of the mundane (un)reality of Angola's fraught entry into post-colonial statehood.

The English-language edition of Kapuscinski's book is entitled Another Day of Life, stressing the everyday quotidian reality of the Angolan situation. His human stories from Portuguese hotel owners, the MPLA soldiers he travels with, the checkpoints he crosses, the women and men he meets on his travels are about everyday life in extraordinary times. Another day of life (mais um dia de vida) signifies too that Kapuscinski and those he travels with and encounters have survived another day, against the ever present risk of ambush, mines, shootings, accidents, the arbitrariness of
erty and human suffering on a tragic scale. It is a country where the suffering and exploitation will continue unless the international political community consorts with the international business community to bring an end to the conflict. Political action through the UN Security Council, such as binding common investment framework for engagement in the oil industry, could make a significant contribution both to those who continue to search for a military victory by Luanda or for a peace agreement with UNITA.

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life/death in a war zone. Salman Rushdie (1993:203) comments on Kapuscinski’s writings in the following terms:

What kinds of life should we call ‘ordinary’, here in the late twentieth century? What is ‘normal’ in these abnormal days? For many of us, any definition of the quotidian world would still include notions of peace and stability. We would still, perhaps, wish to picture everyday life as rhythmic, based on settled and repeating social patterns. Ryszard Kapuscinski’s work seems to be based on his knowledge that such conventional descriptions of actuality are now so limited in application that they have become, in a way, fictions.

With this in mind, we might ask about the return of the normal in Angola. When it returns, what normality will Angola be ‘back to’? A seventy year old Angolan woman alive today would have seen:

- As a young child the violent ‘pacification’ attempts of Portugal to extend ‘effective’ control and the extension of forced labour amidst the rationalisation of colonial authority born of Salazar’s national-colonial Estado Novo;

- As a teenager, the expansion of settler colonisation, infrastructure and the brief relative political quiescence during and after the second world war, when normality was interrupted elsewhere, but when the ‘neutral’ Portuguese bourgeoisie and colonial companies profited massively from selling raw materials to combatants on all sides;

- As mother of young children, the rise of modern anti-colonial nationalism, the uprisings and insurgency of the early 1960s and the brutal Portuguese countermeasures;

- In middle age, the arrival of a full scale anti-colonial war. Portuguese countermeasures are unable to defeat Angolan nationalism, despite the fractures and divisions within the nationalist movement. Weapons and colonial troops flood into the country, culminating in the mid 1970s with Portuguese abandonment, the proclamation of the República Popular de Angola amidst political chaos, ideological fracture and civil war.

- As a grandmother, the MPLA’s rhetoric and practice of socialist construction, South African invasion, the arrival of Soviet advisors and Cuban troops, massive tank and air battles, hyperinflation, widening economic and social dislocation.

In the last few years, the proclamation of a peace process, the arrival and departure of a United Nations administration, a brief uneasy peace, elections and a dramatic return to civil war, amidst the MPLA’s final abandonment of its socialism and the wholehearted embrace of a corrupt comprador role with attendant elite conspicuous consumption and some of the most dramatic socio-economic disparities in the world. More recently she may have heard the announcement by Angola’s president on 23 August 2001 that he would be standing down in 2002 with his statement that:

I think I have accomplished my mission, the mission of my generation (dos Santos, cited in Brittain, 2001:14).

Not only has Angola’s ‘normality’ (as other contributions to this special issue of ROAPE have documented) been many years in the making, but it is profoundly connected with others. Indeed, it would be utterly impossible to imagine or describe without reference to transnational flows of oil, gems, weapons and capital (especially Swiss bank accounts, European and American multinationals). Nearly 9% of the oil consumed in the United States now comes from Angolan
waters. It is harder to account what proportion of the diamonds that pass through Antwerp’s dealers and De Beer’s offices are mined in Angola, or just how many billions of dollars extracted from these and other trades are in Western bank accounts. But Angola is symptomatic of how malign combinations of imperialism, cold war, the power of money, minerals (western demand for oil and diamonds) and violence may interact. Angola’s situation is a product of these interactions. What has become normal in Angola emerges out of profound connections to other modern norms, to all our normalities.

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La société civile et la lutte pour la paix en Angola

Pierre Beaudet


Genèse

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Genèse

À la fin des années 1980, le processus de libéralisation facilita cependant certaines avancées. En 1991, une nouvelle législation (loi 14/91) permettait la liberté d'assemblée et d'association. Diverses ONG purent alors se mettre en place, notamment l'Association civique angolana (ACA), qui devint en quelque sorte l'incubateur de plusieurs activités associatives. L'ACA fut un «événement» dans le paysage social angolais. Mise en place par certains anciens responsables politiques (dont Joaquim de Andrade) et administratifs du MPLA avec l'appui de certains secteurs de l'Église catholique, l'ACA put profiter de ce mariage inhabituel, d'une part au moyen de ses connaissances des méandres du pouvoir, d'autre part du fait de la protection de l'Église.

Par la suite, on assista à la prolifération de groupes communautaires, de syndicats, d'associations professionnelles, de groupes de jeunes et de femmes. Parallèlement, des regroupements de caractère régional (ANAs), comme «l'Association des originaires de Bie», de l'est de l'Angola, de Sangkula, de Kwanza Norte, prirent forme, à cheval entre l'urbain et le rural. Créées par des professionnels ou des hommes d'affaires en provenance des communautés déplacées et originaires des diverses parties du pays, mais résidant dans les grandes villes (surtout Luanda), ces «ANAs» étaient jusqu'à un certain point répondantes des structures traditionnelles.

**Travail Politique**

Jusqu'à l'élection de 1991, plusieurs ONG s'investirent de manière importante dans la politique, participant avec et dans les partis au processus de paix et de démocratisation. L'idée simple au départ était qu'il fallait élargir l'espace démocratique et l'institutionnaliser sur la scène politique et que, sans cet élargissement, le développement associatif allait plafonner.

De cette idée émergèrent deux approches. Pour certains, il apparut nécessaire de s'investir dans la «troisième force», une galaxie de partis et groupes politiques cherchant à se positionner à l'extérieur du MPLA et de l'UNITA. L'espoir était de pouvoir éventuellement constituer une force assez puissante pour, au moins, avoir sa place au soleil sur l'échiquier politique. Mais rapidement, cette hypothèse fut confrontée aux faits. D'une part, la «troisième force» ne put réussir à se coaliser, à s'organiser, à se donner une identité politique claire et alternative. D'autre part, le climat politique devint tellement polarisé entre le MPLA et l'UNITA qu'il n'y avait plus d'espace, en pratique, pour une autre voie.

Aussi une deuxième hypothèse fut formulée par plusieurs associations à l'effet de se tenir à l'écart du processus politique comme tel, mais de se constituer en une «force de pression», un mouvement social capable d'influencer les acteurs politiques mais non de s'y substituer. C'est dans cette veine qu'un groupe comme l'Agencia para o desenvolvimento rural et ambiente (ADRA) put s'inscrire et gagner en influence. De manière générale, en plus de s'investir sur le terrain du développement, ADRA s'inséra dans un travail de longue haleine pour la démocratisation, la paix et la justice sociale. Ce tournant permit aussi à la plupart des ONG de ne pas être entraînées dans l'implosion post-électorale de 1992, quand la guerre civile éclata de nouveau pour amener le pays au bord du gouffre. Grâce à cette définition d'elles-mêmes comme organismes indépendants et non-partisans de la société civile, elles purent maintenir leur espace et continuer leur travail.

**Croissance et Professionnalisation des ONG**

La guerre de 1992 – 1994 fut particulièrement terrible du point de vue de l'impact sur la société. La destruction des infrastructures, l'afflux des déplacés, la
désintégration de l’État créa un chaos grandissant dans de multiples régions et agglomérations urbaines, notamment, à Luanda, Huambo, Malanje, Benguela. Jusqu’à un certain point, cette situation permit, paradoxiquement, une accélération du côté de la société civile. Certaines associations furent dissoutes (surtout celles qui s’étaient trop investies dans le processus politique). Mais celles qui survécurent trouvèrent un terrain fertile pour accentuer leur action. À défaut d’État, mais aussi par leurs propres initiatives, certaines ONG réussirent à s’imposer comme acteurs importants sur le terrain, d’abord pour organiser la survie des populations, notamment des déplacés, ensuite pour se faire le porte-parole des «sans voix», dans un contexte menaçant de conflits et de polarisations. En étant forçées de se replier du terrain de la promotion des droits et de la réconciliation, les associations de la société civile purent investir davantage dans les dimensions sociales et économiques. De manière générale, l’État était enclin à laisser faire, pour se désengager du secteur social et se concentrer sur les activités militaires.

Fait à noter, ce développement fut seulement possible dans les zones contrôlées par le gouvernement angolais. Dans les régions sous l’influence de l’UNITA, pratiquement aucune association indépendante ne put prendre pied. Progressivement, ce développement a conduit certaines ONG angolaises à se professionnaliser, à acquérir de nouvelles capacités dans le cadre de programmes à plus grande échelle, et en tant qu‟intermédiaires des agences internationales. C’est ainsi que des associations comme ADRA-Angola, Developpment Workshop et plusieurs initiatives émanant des Églises en sont venues à construire des appareils sophistiqués, capables à la fois de mettre en œuvre, de planifier, d’évaluer. Peu à peu, cette nouvelle réalité devint connue au point où les organismes de l’ONU purent à partir de 1994 reconnaître le rôle des ONG et les appuyer dans leur travail.

Les ONG angolaises en bref


- Ce furent principalement des associations de ressortissants de diverses provinces (l’«Association des amis de Nambuangongo», «l’association des natifs de Libolo.») Ces groupes se sont constitués pour apporter une aide matérielle de base aux communautés de leurs régions d’origine.
- Parallèlement, les églises ont enregistré légalement leurs ONG (qui fonctionnaient auparavant sous l’égide des églises). On pense notamment au Conseil des églises chrétiennes (CICA) à l’Alliance des églises évangéliques (AEA), à Caritas (Église catholique).
- Plusieurs ONG se sont depuis mis en place. La plupart sont membres du Foro dos ONG de Angola, une table de concertation créée en 1991. On compte notamment Acção para o desenvolvimento do Angola, le Centre culturel Mosaiko (créé par les Pères dominicains), le comité de lutte sur le SIDA, l’ACM (le YMCA de l’Angola), la Campagne pour l’interdiction des mines antipersonnelles.
- Deux ONG ressortent cependant du lot tant du point de vue quantitatif (nombre de projets et d’interventions) que du point de vue qualitatif (diversité, professionnalisme, implication des communautés). Il s’agit
Les défis

Lorsque le deuxième processus de paix fut mis en place à la fin de 1994, les ONG angolaises étaient sensiblement renforcées : multiplication des activités et des programmes, renforcement des structures, réseautage et alliances stratégiques, extension des interventions dans plusieurs secteurs et régions, etc.

Un exemple probant de ce développement est l'ONG angolaise, ADRA, qui a connu tel qu'évoqué auparavant une croissance fulgurante. À partir de ses bases traditionnelles à Luanda, Huambo, Huila et Malanje, l'association s’est étendue vers d’autres régions du pays, créant des regroupements locaux impliqués dans la réhabilitation et la réconciliation, la prise en charge des besoins de base des personnes déplacées. Au cours de cette période, ADRA a également repris le flambeau de la promotion des droits, de l'éducation civique, de la culture et de la paix. ADRA gère actuellement une vingtaine de projets de grande envergure avec un personnel de près de 250 personnes.

Bien sûr, cette croissance rapide a connu également des ratés. Sur le simple plan administratif, les ONG ont eu beaucoup de difficulté à dépasser les cadres traditionnellement restreints et à court terme de leurs actions. À ce problème de professionnalisation s’est ajoutée la question de la démocratisation, de façon à éviter la dérive vers une certaine bureaucratisation : car le succès de ces organismes est dépendant dans une large mesure de la mobilisation des communautés, qui doivent être perçues non pas simplement comme des bénéficiaires, mais comme des agents actifs de leur développement.

Le développement des ONG rencontre également plusieurs autres obstacles. Malgré plusieurs tentatives de constituer des réseaux et des synergies durables, les diverses coalitions mises en place (dont FONGA) n’ont pas réussi à jouer un rôle utile, en partie parce qu’elles deviennent trop facilement l’enjeu de luttes internes à caractère politique. Une autre sérieuse limitation est l’étroitesse du champ social couvert par les ONG, qui sont surtout actives en milieu urbain et périurbain, mais très peu en milieu rural. On pourrait dire certes que la population angolaise a été urbanisée de force ces dernières années, d’où l’importance quantitative et qualitative des communautés de «deslocados», mais cette réalité n’explique pas tout. Le «préjugé pro-urbain» des ONG est lié à d’autres facteurs, dont un manque d’expérience dans les zones rurales et aussi, bien évidemment, le problème de la sécurité.

Les ONG n’ont pas non plus réussi à s’arrimer beaucoup avec des mouvements sociaux urbains d’autres types, par exemple les syndicats et les groupes de femmes. Encore là, plusieurs facteurs sont en jeu, dont le manque de ressources et de temps dans un contexte où les ONG ont multiplié leurs activités avec les communautés de «deslocados» en milieu urbain et périurbain. Néanmoins, des tentatives de constituer un mouvement syndical indépendant, notamment chez les enseignants, et qui auraient pu contribuer à ouvrir l’espace social de manière significative, ont été négligées par les ONG. De la même manière, des efforts ont été consentis pour incuber un mouvement des femmes mais n’ont pas abouti, entre autres, faute de moyens.

Pourtant, il existe dans ces secteurs des initiatives intéressantes bien que fragiles et incertaines. Au niveau syndical par exemple, des tentatives sérieuses de mettre en place des syndicats réellement indépendants existent au niveau des enseignants et des infirmières. Le fait que la jonction ne se soit pas faite avec les ONG témoigne davantage d’un manque de perspicacité de la part des ONG.
Finalement, fait à noter, l’interaction avec le secteur privé est très réduite, d’une part parce que celui-ci est encore émergent (du côté des micro-entreprises par exemple), d’autre part parce qu’il tient à renforcer ses liens avec l’État et les milieux dirigeants (du côté des grandes entreprises).

Les Églises

Les divers projets et organismes mis en place par les Églises catholique et protestante ont également connu un important développement. Dès le départ, les Églises disposent d’une énorme base institutionnelle, non seulement du fait de l’attachement de la population aux diverses confessions, mais aussi par l’infrastructure acquise pendant des années grâce à l’action missionnaire.

Jusqu’à récemment, cette force a été utilisée de manière inégale et hésitante : aucun mouvement de masse d’ampleur n’a été mis en place par les Églises, comme cela a été le cas par exemple en Afrique du Sud ou en Amérique latine. Pendant longtemps, l’Église catholique est restée liée dans l’imaginaire social à l’héritage colonial. Les Églises protestantes pour leur part se sont segmentées sur une base régionale (le nord, l’est, le sud), ce qui a eu aussi pour effet de les diviser dans le contexte de la grande polarisation entre le MPLA et l’UNITA. Un dernier facteur inhibant a été la prédominance au sein des Églises de l’approche caritative, ce qui les a empêchées de mobiliser pleinement les communautés. Encore aujourd’hui, on constate que les programmes qui prennent le plus de place au sein des Églises sont de type traditionnel (distribution de vivres, de vêtements, de biens divers).

Mais durant la dernière période, cette situation a évolué positivement. D’une part, la segmentation qui prévalait auparavant dans ces milieux s’est atténuée, de façon à ce que les diverses Églises impliquées travaillent maintenant davantage en concertation et en coalition. Ce processus a été fortement encouragé par les partenaires internationaux des Églises angolaises, notamment les ONG liées aux Églises européennes et canadiennes. D’autre part, un certain renforcement organisationnel a eu lieu, permettant d’insérer dans leur problématique des méthodologies participatives et inclusives.

Plus récemment, l’Église catholique, qui était restée bien prudente jusque-là, s’est partiellement commise dans le mouvement pour la paix. En mars 1999, elle lançait un mouvement Propace pour relancer la revendication pour la paix.

La société civile et la lutte pour la paix

D’une certaine manière, les associations de la société civile angolaise ont donc profité de la période 1994 – 1998 pour se consolider, d’où les nouvelles et récentes initiatives pour la paix, qui restent cependant vulnérables (dans un climat de grande polarisation), mais qui sont demandées par la population desservie par les associations.

La population veut la paix, elle le demande de diverses façons. Cette revendication s’inscrit dans un contexte politique et militaire très lourd : le ressentiment contre l’UNITA, et en particulier contre Jonas Savimbi, est partagé par de larges secteurs ; par contre, le gouvernement n’a pas une très haute cote de confiance, non seulement par la façon dont la guerre est menée, mais aussi de par sa réputation de corruption et de détournement des biens publics.

À court terme, tout apaisement des combats sera certes bienvenu, mais à moyen terme, l’opinion sait qu’il n’y a pas de solution sans une transformation en profondeur du pouvoir. Aussi, la plupart des ONG sont.realistes : dans un avenir prévisible, le pays restera sous le contrôle...
du MPLA. Au mieux, un certain espace sera consenti aux autres forces politiques et à la société civile. Au mieux, l'UNITA (sans Savimbi) pourrait se réinsérer sur le terrain politique, mais il faudra du temps pour qu'elle se refasse une crédibilité au-delà du cercle de ses appuis traditionnels. Quant aux tiers partis, ils sont beaucoup trop faibles, du moins à court et à moyen terme, pour représenter la possibilité d'une alternance.

**Extraits du "Manifeste pour la paix" du GARP**

Seul le dialogue peut mettre fin au massacre, dirigé vers tous les groupes et toutes les aspirations de la société civile. Contrairement à ce que pense le gouvernement, la guerre ne pourra mettre fin à la guerre. On ne compte plus les morts, les pertes matérielles, sans compter les 700 000 nouveaux déplacés. La guerre vise le pillage des ressources du pays et la destruction des capacités individuelles des citoyens, sans aucune justification idéologique et politique. Seule la mobilisation de la société civile peut renverser cette tendance. Son but est de promouvoir le dialogue interne, d'impliquer tous les acteurs, de trouver les solutions pour mettre fin à l'holocauste angolais.

C'est dans ce contexte que s'inscrit la campagne actuelle pour la paix, qui est une initiative courageuse et nécessaire. En avril 1999, celle-ci a pris forme sous l'égide d'un certain nombre de personnalités presque toutes identifiées aux ONG et aux Églises angolaises. Divers projets sont en cours. Sans être explicite, ce travail s'adresse surtout au gouvernement : c'est lui le vrai pouvoir, encore plus maintenant qu'au paravant (compte tenu des déboires de l'UNITA), c'est lui qui peut améliorer la situation et transformer sa «victoire» militaire en avancée démocratique.

**L'Union européenne et la paix en Angola**

L'Unita sous la direction de Savimbi a failli dans la mise en œuvre des mécanismes proposés par le Protocole de Lusaka, et porte la responsabilité principale dans le recommencement de la guerre en Angola. En défiant de manière persistante les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU, Savimbi a choisi le chemin du conflit plutôt, dans un cheminement qui met en doute ses intentions à propos de la réconciliation nationale en Angola. L'UE demande à l'UNITA de cesser immédiatement ses activités militaires et réaffirme sa détermination à appuyer les efforts internationaux pour renforcer les sanctions proposées par le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU contre l'UNITA. L'UE encourage le gouvernement angolais à créer un environnement approprié pour favoriser la démocratie et l'établissement de l'état de droit sur les plans politique, social et économique. L'UE estime que le gouvernement a une responsabilité particulière dans la promotion des droits humains, les principes démocratiques, la bonne gouvernance et le renforcement de la société civile, y compris dans les zones qui étaient auparavant sous le contrôle de l'ONU.

**Note:** Extraits de la déclaration de la présidence de l'Union européenne, 17 janvier 2000.

**Civil Society & the Fight for Peace in Angola**

*(English summary)*

**Pierre Beaudet**

**History:** The author outlines the history of civil society in Angola from its relative restriction at independence through the attempt to subsume it in the one party state period to the emergence of the ACA in 1991 and the subsequent proliferation of community groups.
At first some of these groups tried to take part in politics but given the polarisation between the MPLA and UNITA this became impossible. Therefore, others became pressure groups, which saved them from destruction in the 1992-1994 war. Because of the resulting chaos the surviving groups gained in importance, but only in MPLA areas. No independent associations could form in UNITA controlled regions. In 1994, UN bodies recognised the roles on the NGOs. By the time of the second peace process in 1994, the NGOs were much stronger, for example the ADRA had 20 large projects and 250 employees.

There were some failures, for administrative reasons and because professionalism could lead to lack of democracy. Internal politics have prevented synergies. They are also almost exclusively restricted to urban areas. They have not connected with unions or women’s groups. Although attempts have been made to establish independent unions the NGOs have ignored them. They have little contact with the private sector, which cultivates its links with the state and ruling circles.

The Churches: The churches have the advantage of an existing infrastructure and attachment of the population. Their projects have grown but they have not set up a mass movement, they have been divided and their efforts have mainly been charitable. Latterly, this approach has changed, partly due to foreign encouragement and the Catholic church is now getting involved in the peace movement.

The Peace Movement: Civil society and the NGOs have grown stronger in the period from 1994 to 1998. Their demands for peace are made in a highly charged political context. There is widespread resentment against UNITA, and Savimbi in particular, but no real confidence in the government.

Short term, the NGOs are calling for the end of combat but recognise that in the medium term the MPLA will stay in power. UNITA could become a political force if it drops Savimbi and takes the time to build its support. At present, there are no credible third parties to form a possible alternative government. The current peace campaign, launched by the NGOs and Angolan churches, is mainly addressed to the government, which alone has the power to improve the situation.

Landmines: A Worse Fate Still to Come?

Steve Wright

As the number of countries joining the ban on anti-personnel mines slowly rises, Landmine Action has been investigating the weapons being stockpiled and invented to replace those banned. It seems that Governments, the military and manufacturers have not learned from the problems with landmines. They are stockpiling and quietly developing alternative mines that may be inhuman, dangerous and, in some cases, potentially as lethal as the weapons they are supposed to replace.

As most of this work is happening in secret, there is a complete lack of public awareness of the potential problems. Yet this is not futuristic, space age weaponry – some of these systems will be ready for action within the next couple of years, others are already in use.

In the movies, 'Jaws' was the hidden horror that would rip your legs off and turn your insides into offal. In reality, such a fate is most likely to be delivered by a man made anti-personnel land mine,
At first some of these groups tried to take part in politics but given the polarisation between the MPLA and UNITA this became impossible. Therefore, others became pressure groups, which saved them from destruction in the 1992-1994 war. Because of the resulting chaos the surviving groups gained in importance, but only in MPLA areas. No independent associations could form in UNITA controlled regions. In 1994, UN bodies recognised the roles on the NGOs. By the time of the second peace process in 1994, the NGOs were much stronger, for example the ADRA had 20 large projects and 250 employees.

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ostensibly banned by the Ottawa Convention, but still maiming and killing an estimated 25,000 people a year.

A new report by Landmine Action reveals that NATO governments are investing in mine-like technologies, some of which are specifically designed to get around the landmine ban. They include anti-vehicle mines with anti-handling devices or sensitive fuses like the German AT-2, which can be detonated by the proximity of someone wearing a wrist watch. The Italian government destroyed its entire stock of AT-2 mines in 1997. But the UK's Ministry of Defence holds an estimated 100,000 in stock. On the horizon however, is a new generation of victim-activated technologies that look and operate nothing like 'traditional' mines.

They include so-called 'self-healing' minefields developed by Sandia Laboratories in the US. These mines have ultrasonic sensors and a piston-driven foot, enabling them to hop 30 feet in the air. Equipped with primitive neural network systems, such 'intelligent' mines are able to detect the distance to neighbouring mines, sense when some are missing and leap around until the pattern is virtually re-established.

Other victim-seeking lethal technologies identified by the report include 'off-the-shelf' systems such as the automated, camera-mounted, concealed machine guns produced by the US company Autauga Arms; the French Ruggieri DIPS area-denial system, which consists of a multiple grenade launcher, capable of firing a variety of disorienting chemical and wounding ammunition; or the dart-firing Robart, of the Rand Corporations Arroyo Urban Operations team. Already on the horizon are formidable autonomous systems based on the Australian company Metal Storm's variable-lethality enforcement guns, which can fire ammunition electronically without mechanical triggers, in salvos at a rate of 90,000 rounds per minute. With reputations and big contracts at stake, some of these sci-fi alternatives have, like Star Wars, promised more than they can deliver. Systems most likely to find favour are ones using tested technology and these include the taser landmine based on high voltage electroshock devices manufactured by the US companies Tasertron and Primex Aerospace. Once the device lands, it is immediately capable of victim activation by a trip device and a variety of other sensors. When activated, barbed darts are fired in a 120-degree multi-directional pattern, reaching out between 15 and 30 feet. Then 50,000 volts are pulsed through the target, sufficient to paralyse through an inch of clothing.

Not surprisingly, Amnesty International is calling for a suspension of all trade in taser devices as part of their 'stamp out torture' campaign. The government of the US is now conducting a new review of its landmine policy – coordinated by the National Security Council. President George W Bush is also due to decide on the status of US alternative anti-personnel mine programmes. The odds are that he will agree to unleash this arsenal on future generations.

Thanks to Landmine Action for permission to reprint this edited version from their autumn 2001 newsletter, info@landmineaction.org

ANGOLA has 15,000,000 landmines

Angola On-line

Marcus Power

Angola's relationship with the global information 'superhighway' has been an interesting and rapidly changing one. Over the last few years a variety of different agencies, institutions and actors in Angola have engaged with the world wide web as a way of disseminating their
ostensibly banned by the Ottawa Convention, but still maiming and killing an estimated 25,000 people a year.

A new report by Landmine Action reveals that NATO governments are investing in mine-like technologies, some of which are specifically designed to get around the landmine ban. They include anti-vehicle mines with anti-handling devices or sensitive fuses like the German AT-2, which can be detonated by the proximity of someone wearing a wrist watch. The Italian government destroyed its entire stock of AT-2 mines in 1997. But the UK’s Ministry of Defence holds an estimated 100,000 in stock. On the horizon however, is a new generation of victim-activated technologies that look and operate nothing like ‘traditional’ mines.

They include so-called ‘self-healing’ minefields developed by Sandia Laboratories in the US. These mines have ultrasonic sensors and a piston-driven foot, enabling them to hop 30 feet in the air. Equipped with primitive neural network systems, such ‘intelligent’ mines are able to detect the distance to neighbouring mines, sense when some are missing and leap around until the pattern is virtually re-established.

Other victim-seeking lethal technologies identified by the report include ‘off-the-shelf’ systems such as the automated, camera-mounted, concealed machine guns produced by the US company Autauga Arms; the French Ruggieri DIPS areal denial system, which consists of a multiple grenade launcher, capable of firing a variety of disorienting chemical and wounding ammunition; or the dart-firing Robart, of the Rand Corporations Arroyo Urban Operations team. Already on the horizon are formidable autonomous systems based on the Australian company Metal Storm’s variable-lethality enforcement guns, which can fire ammunition electronically without mechanical triggers, in salvos at a rate of 90,000 rounds per minute. With reputations and big contracts at stake, some of these sci-fi alternatives have, like Star Wars, promised more than they can deliver. Systems most likely to find favour are ones using tested technology and these include the taser landmine based on high voltage electroshock devices manufactured by the US companies Tasertron and Primex Aerospace. Once the device lands, it is immediately capable of victim activation by a trip device and a variety of other sensors. When activated, barbed darts are fired in a 120-degree multi-directional pattern, reaching out between 15 and 30 feet. Then 50,000 volts are pulsed through the target, sufficient to paralyse through an inch of clothing.

Not surprisingly, Amnesty International is calling for a suspension of all trade in taser devices as part of their ‘stamp out torture’ campaign. The government of the US is now conducting a new review of its landmine policy – coordinated by the National Security Council. President George W Bush is also due to decide on the status of US alternative anti-personnel mine programmes. The odds are that he will agree to unleash this arsenal on future generations.

Thanks to Landmine Action for permission to reprint this edited version from their autumn 2001 newsletter, info@landmineaction.org

ANGOLA has 15,000,000 landmines

Angola On-line

Marcus Power

Angola’s relationship with the global information ‘superhighway’ has been an interesting and rapidly changing one. Over the last few years a variety of different agencies, institutions and actors in Angola have engaged with the world wide web as a way of disseminating their
activities, information on opportunities or their perspectives on Angolan affairs. Kwacha, the UNITA press agency has its own site, for example, as does the Angolan parliament and a network of NGO's coming together as ANGONET. The following list is intended to offer a broad selection of useful and relevant websites which currently retain information about Angola and publish regular updates on the contemporary situation there. Despite the stereotypical representation of Angola as adrift and disconnected, recent changes in the use of electronic sources of information have increasingly linked the country to a number of regional and international movements and organisations. Accessing Angolan sites outside Angola can often take some time however due to disruptions in electricity supplies and with server maintenance.

**ANGONET: Http://www.angonet.org/**
Check here for a range of information and sites on Angola linking a variety of NGO's and aiming to share resources and knowledge relating to development issues.

**University of Agostinho Neto (UAN):**
Http://www.uan.ao/ Main UAN site.

**Angolan Parliament:**
Http://www.parlamento.ao/
The official parliamentary site.

**Orientation Angola:**
Http:// ao.orientation.com/en/home.html/ General Angola site with information on travel currency rates, temperatures, accessibility etc.

**UNIPA (rebel movement Angola):**

**Republic of Angola:**
Http://www.angola.org.culture/ Official Government site with good links

**Angola Press:**
Http://www.angolapress-angpop.ao/ Has information on Angolan newspapers and some articles.

**UN peace-keeping mission to Angola:**
Http://www.un.org/DEPTS/DPKO/Missions/monua.html/ The MONUA site includes information on present and previous UN missions to Angola.

**Journal de Angola:**
Http://www.jornaldeAngola.com/ The site of the major national newspaper.

**SAFERWORLD:**
Http://www.gn.apc.org/sworld/ The global arms trade watchdog including material on Angolan illicit arms trade.

**IPE Resources related to Africa:**
Http://www.csf.colorado.edu/ipe/africa.html Offers extensive data sources for news and analysis on Southern Africa.

**Media Institute for South Africa (MISA):**
Http://www.misanet.org/ Focuses primarily on the need to promote free, independent and pluralistic media. Looks at freedom of political expression in Southern Africa.

**Overseas Development Institute:**
Http://www.onedeworld.org/odi/ Development resources and details of recently published research.

**BBC World Service:**
Http://www.bbc.co.uk/ In addition to the World Service broadcasts which have focused on Angola, the BBC's Focus on Africa magazine (available on-line) has some published articles on the country.

**Africa Business:**
Http://www.wafbis.com/ Interesting material on Angolan business agreements and 'opportunities'.

**The Africa Centre:**
Http://www.africacentre.org/ Details and copies of relevant publications and other resources.

**Africa Analysis:**
Http://www.africaanalysis.com/ Has news articles on Angola plus discussion and analysis.

**African Cultures:**
Http://www.africancultures.about.com/ Information on African cultures and ethnic groups.

**Africa News Online**
Http://www.africanews.org/ A variety of links to African/Angolan news sources.

**Africa Intelligence (Fr)**
Http://www.africaintelligence.com/ Tracks current developments with news and reviews of key issues. Also available in French.

**Africa Online:**
Http://www.africaonline.com/ Has good archive and search facilities with a range of material on Angola.

**AllAfrica:**
Http://www.allafrica.com/ Information on political background, development issues and conflict resolution.

**Africa Film & TV:**
Http://www.africafilmtv.com/ Has information about film and television distribution developments and other information on media sources in Angola.
Alternative Religion Africa:

Central Africa Watch/New Congo Net (NCN):
Http://www.marekinc.com/NCN.html/ (formerly known as Zaïre Watch this site aims to monitor the transition to democracy and also includes links to MetroNet Afrique, which provides business briefs on Africa.

Global Witness:
Http://www.globalwitness.org/ Has good reports on conflict, oil and diamonds in Angola and other parts of Africa.

Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA):
Http://www.idasa.org.za/ Aims to promote democracy and a ‘culture of tolerance’ in Southern Africa.

Organisation of African Unity (OAU):
Http://www.oau-oua.org/ Has details of OAU position and involvement in conflict resolution.

Southern Africa Research and Documentation Centre:
Http://www.sardc.net/ Information on relevant research.

The Mail and Guardian (South Africa):
Http://www.mg.co.za/mg/

O Centre d’étude d’Afrique noire (Centre for Research on Black Africa):
http://www.cean.u-bordeaux.fr/enbrefportugais.html>Information about research published in French.

The Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE):
Http://www.roape.org/ Information on previous Angola articles published by ROAPE.

SABC News (South Africa):
Http://www.sabcnews.co.za/ Regular news and information updates.

Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF):
Http://www.msf.org/ Information on landmines and MSF presence in different provinces.

Amnesty International:
Http://www.amnesty.org.uk/ Details of Amnesty’s position and publications.

Norwegian People’s Aid (Angola):
Http://www.angola.npaid.org/ Information on Norwegian development aid efforts and landmines.

Links to Africa:
Http://www.linkstoAfrica.com/ Check here for useful weblinks on Africa and to other Angolan sites.

NIZA:
Http://www.niza.nl/ Research in the Netherlands on Angola

Other useful web sites:

Directory: www.woyaa.com/index.html comprehensive directories of links to arts, news, business contacts, commercial information and information on education, travel, tourism and more.

Directory: www.africances.fr Dedicated to French-speaking Africa

News:

News:
www.esperanto.se/kiosk.engindex. link to online local newspapers in Africa


Connectivity/information:
www3.wn.apc.org/Africa Good site on African connectivity & links relevant to policy, implementation, projects, views and international organizations and initiatives, such as the African Information Society Initiative.

Environment & Development Information:
www.ids.ac.uk/eldis/eldis.html Hosted by IDS at Sussex University.

Online discussion on social & economic development: www.globalknowledge.org Continuing discussion on issues of harnessing information technology for development; provides many links to interested organisations and individuals.

Field reports & books: www.idrc.ca www.idra.ca/acadia Site consisting of documentation on rich field experiences of the International Development Research Centre, including its new ‘acadia’ site on communities and information society in Africa.

NGOs: Sites that provide numerous links to NGOs in Africa and the world over.
www.wn.apc.org www.oneworld.org

There has been a modest increase in the rate of English-language book publication on Angola in recent years. Understandably, perhaps, these volumes have virtually all focused on aspects of national history, political economy and the seemingly endless war and its disastrous consequences. Social scientists seeking anything more detailed than the occasional press reports about social conditions and the exigencies of life for particular communities and regions within the country, have had a frustrating time. The publication of this volume - a revision and translation of the original Portuguese edition - therefore represents something of a landmark.

The research reported here was undertaken in late 1996 and early 1997, when prospects for peace seemed reasonable as the Lusaka process was moving forwards after a fashion. Indeed, the purpose of the research was to investigate local conditions in areas with very different war experiences, in order to help prepare the ground for postwar reconstruction and the involvement of local communities in it. The subsequent return to all-out war in 1998/9 will have exacerbated conditions for the inhabitants of many of the settlements surveyed here; however, this does not undermine the value of the book.

A particular feature of the coverage is that Luanda receives only modest attention, in a relatively brief final chapter surveying two contrasting informal bairros and the community organisations that exist there. Paul Robson's chapter is illuminating but predominantly descriptive. Following Robson's introductory essay and an overview of the historical context to Angola's present-day crisis by Maria de Conceição, the bulk of the book is devoted to two long chapters on areas that had been almost totally out-of-bounds to outsiders for many years.

Fernando Pancheco's detailed survey of four contrasting settlements in Huambo province describes graphically the repeated displacement and destruction suffered by three of these communities over the preceding 25-odd years. The research design consciously sought diversity of settlement types and histories, and impacts of war and displacement. Some people had been displaced two or three times, each time having to try to rebuild lives and livelihoods as best they could in a context of periodic if not always continual risk. There is much useful information on both the physical and human environment, interspersed with extended and insightful commentary. The human scale of the very personal and local tragedies, of the courage and perseverance he outlines makes the account all the more vivid as a contrast to the mind-numbing scale of the familiar national-level catalogues of death and destruction.

Among the highlights are the subsections on how traditional authority structures have mutated and have acquired very different meanings in the four specific contexts, and on the state and its services. Pancheco reminds us not to assume that the withdrawal or absence of state administration means that there is a total vacuum. On the one hand, official neglect provided openings for UNITA to extend.
its support (and not only in terms of military occupation). On the other hand, local communities or groups of people have organised as best they could, and informal traders provided some links with urban centres. Importantly, too, he argues that peace should not simply be taken by the government as the signal to extend its bureaucratic reach into such areas. After all, the state is viewed with suspicion by many inhabitants, and is associated as much with exploitation and control as with welfare and development. Accordingly, Pancheco argues, in a manner consistent with some 'soft' strands of postmodernism (although not alluding to any theoretical perspectives), that:

They are not waiting for Godot. In these areas it would be a crime and a folly to present the idea of a paternal state, one which will return to take care of the inhabitants’ needs. Instead, the discussion must be about actions to validate and improve initiatives that have already begun. There is a historic opportunity to build new institutions that are more sustainable, a chance that should not be wasted (p.110).

The other main chapter compares the experiences of four distinct groups of displaced people (deslocados) in Benguela and Malanje provinces. These two cities became centres of refuge for hundreds of thousands of people fleeing the fighting. Based on 230 interviews among people in a carefully structured sample, the three authors illustrate how differences in where the displacees had initially settled, the extent to which they have been able to link up with support institutions, and how far they have gone in their process of return to their areas of origin, have influenced their experiences of displacement.

This provides a nuanced and dis-aggregated picture of survival strategies among people of diverse backgrounds and entitlements in what is certainly a noteworthy contribution to the literature on internal displacement. Of course one could find faults, such as the dearth of statistical data on the interviewees in the empirical chapters, the uneven balance between narrative and analysis, and the limited number of locations in which work was undertaken. However, these would be to miss the point. The research was undertaken under difficult and sometimes dangerous conditions; the authors make no claims of wider relevance and do not indulge in grand extrapolations. The insights into life for ordinary people in unexceptional places after a generation of war, add substantially to our knowledge and underline the scale of the future challenges that will face Angolans in rebuilding their country. The Development Workshop deserves great credit for bringing this material to a wider audience through the English-language edition.


Rich in oil and diamonds, among other natural resources, Angola is home to one of the poorest and most conflict-afflicted population in the world. Although the Angolan civil war following independence in 1975 was not started over the control of natural resources, but more broadly over the control of the state, the hypothesis that Angola's natural resource wealth represents a curse for its population is a common one. Beyond the simplified description of a rich country of poor people, long time observer of Angola Tony Hodges balances his journalistic and economist skills to provide a detailed account and analysis of Angola’s political economy since independence.

As Hodges demonstrates, the paradoxical situation of this Southern African
country is closely linked to political economies of war, abuses, and neglect imposed by belligerents upon its population. As such, Angola's wealth is not a curse in itself, but it allows ruling elites competing for power since the early 1970s to pursue their exclusionist agendas and ruin their country while calling for national liberation and development. Mostly focusing on the 'governmental side' represented by the MPLA regime, Hodges uses a wealth of statistics, insightful anecdotes, and a detailed political analysis to describe the historical process that led to and prolonged the Angolan tragedy. Hodges best explains how, since the mid-1980s, Angola has become heavily indebted and dependent on its mineral rent due to staggering military expenditures and destruction, fluctuating oil prices, economic mismanagement, and widespread corruption. Building on his collaboration on a partly censured UNICEF report, Hodges also demonstrates the consequences of the irresponsible behaviour of the ruling elite.

If greed and economic mismanagement have much to do with the contemporary misery of most Angolans, important other factors are at work. Hodges' book does not pretend to provide a comprehensive reading of the more political aspects of the conflict. Following a brief history of the country in chapter two, ethnicity is, however, only touched upon in chapter three for its basic political significance and used as a backdrop to an analysis of poverty and other social problems affecting the country as well as the emergence of competing post-colonial elites.

Chapters four and five on governance and failed reforms, as well as chapter six exposing the redistribution of the oil rents and other forms of clientelism provide the most valuable information in the book, illustrating the continued process of 'presidentialisation' taking place in Angola. In this regard, more analysis on internal conflicts within the MPLA and civil society would have been useful to argue about the limits of clientelism as a strategy for President dos Santos and to point out, despite future rising oil revenues, to the possibilities of political change.

While diamonds are mostly associated with UNITA's war economy, Hodges also rightfully points out in chapter seven to the importance of diamonds as a form of patronnage for the government. A more balanced account of the practices and place of UNITA as well as common people in the political economy of Angola would have been most welcomed. Despite the wealth of information now available from defectors and splinter groups, too little work has been published on UNITA since Fred Bridgland's work published in 1987. Furthermore, despite a comprehensive global picture, more space could have been given to the voices of the victims as well as that of the perpetrators.

If the Angolan situation undeniably deserves a more political and anthropological reading, Hodges wrote a most useful book for anyone interested or working in Angola. It will also be an important contribution to scholars, advocacy groups and development agencies working on the political economy of mineral dependent and conflict-affected countries. Because of the war and beyond it, Angolans deserve a sound and just management of their vast mineral resources. The facts and insights provided by this book undeniably requires a rapid translation into Portuguese of an up-dated edition and its widespread distribution within Angola.

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Despite a growing chorus of concern within the international community about the global trade in small arms transfers, rhetorical interest has not always been matched by effective action. The principal thesis of this study, arising out of the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT), is that the 'illicit arms trade' involves key breaches of international humanitarian law and human rights. Weapons transfers imperil people's lives and involve insurgents as well as abusive state forces. An expanded definition is developed in a number of chapters and Running Guns clearly spells out some important concrete steps that governments can act on to counter this deadly trade. This book highlights the 'grey area' of arms deal making where agreements are struck in third countries in order to evade national laws and covert arms supply lines used by governments. Through nine chapters the book focuses primarily on the supply side of the black market and on the West European and North American governments that have declared opposition to the 'illicit arms trade'.

The first of four main sections to the book seeks to show, in an 'almost fictional' way (page x), how a Slovakian arms manufacturer was linked to the battlefields of Sudan and how one former Russian KGB major went on to run a thriving business in Africa supplying arms and mercenaries to various conflict zones. This vast and complex international business is seen then to be typified/personified by particular individuals and places, linking Khartoum and Valenciac, Dubnica with Kinshasa, N'Djamena with Bratislava. A review of international law then follows which identifies the emergence of customary laws which limit state actions in this area. Much of the attention focuses on the effectiveness of arms embargos in limiting the building up of arms and the build up of arms over long periods of time. As Chiara-Gillard argues 'UN embargoes do nothing to head-off situations of violence' (p. 35). The second section looks at specific sources of supply like governments which can trade in both legal and illegal arms and also explores the impact that internationalisation of arms production has had. Mathiak and Lumpe (chapter three) examine covert gun running to countries like Angola during the Cold War and highlight the 'recycling' of weapons in many other conflicts. Governments continue to supply a variety of non-state groups in Africa in a way which ultimately fuels conflict and political instability. Throughout the text, the interplay between domestic gun markets and internationals arms traffic is understood as complex and dynamic. If the supply of arms by governments to guerrilla forces is to be stopped the authors advocate that this 'must be balanced with responsible state-to-state arms transfer policies' (p. 76).

A third section examines how some arms are structured and provides examples of the logistic and operational requirements involved in moving weapons around. 'Mechanics of the trade' looks at the role of brokers and shippers and explores the various different loopholes that exist in national and international legislation. Wood and Peleman (chapter six) argue that smuggling thrives in Sub-Saharan Africa in particular because the continent lacks sufficient skilled air traffic controllers, radar equipment and trained personnel to monitor the 'vast air space between the southern border of Egypt and the northern borders of South Africa' (p. 141). The final section seeks to identify points of leverage for limiting this illicit arms trade, pin-pointing obstacles to effective enforcement of international law and assessing a variety of diplomatic initiatives. The chapter by Ted Leggett (chapter nine) looks in particular at South Africa and the 12,000 firearms murders a
year that the country is experiencing. The country’s reputation for ‘passing sterling legislation without the capacity to enforce it’ is highlighted despite the development of the South African Gun Control Charter. The role of the international community appears as central here too in that this is offered as a source of support in the struggle to establish political order and promote ‘development’ in addition to limiting the influx of illicit arms.


The opening chapter (Jakkie Cilliers) argues that studies of the ‘economy of war’ still represent a neglected field of research, especially in terms of the way in which insurgent groups fund their campaigns. Exploring different typologies of resource wars and the different factors that have enhanced their salience in recent years, this chapter concludes that ‘Angola therefore demonstrates the dynamics of a new type of regional and economically determined insurgency war, much more closely linked to the regional informal economy and even the global economy and its criminal component than previous wars’ (page 16). The second chapter presents a theoretical framework for the political economy of the Angolan ‘abundant resource war’ (Phillipe LeBillon).

Subsequent chapters provide an interpretative account of the internal and regional dynamics of the war (Richard Cornwell), its global and arms dynamics (Hannelie de Beer and Virginia Gamba) and ethnic roots (Assis Malaquias). A separate chapter is devoted to the role of humanitarian aid during the war (Andrea Ostheimer). Four chapters are devoted to the diamond industry (all by Christian Dietrich). The first of these quantifies the formal diamond mining sector, followed by a separate focus on UNITA’S mining and smuggling capacity. Two further chapters are devoted to UNITA logistics. The first presents an overview of UNITA’s logistic support structures (Jakkie Potgieter) and the other more specifically on airborne support to UNITA (Johan Peleman). A chapter by Duncan Clarke also provides an interesting overview of the oil industry. The chapter on the real war economy (William Reno) investigates the linkage between oil and diplomacy. Richard Dietrich investigates the ethical considerations of multinationals doing business in Angola. In the final chapter Jakkie Cilliers returns to some of the themes raised in the first chapter about insurgency and resource wars and looks to the future of Angola.
OPEN CALL FOR PAPERS

PORTUGUESE/AFRICAN ENCOUNTERS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CONGRESS

BROWN UNIVERSITY, PROVIDENCE RI, USA

April 26-29 2002

The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University invites submissions for an interdisciplinary conference on “Portuguese/ Africa Encounters” to be held at Brown University on April 26-29, 2002. This conference is organized with the Luso-African Studies Organization of the ASA, the Center for African Studies at Eduardo Mondlane University in Mozambique, and the Center for African Studies at the Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa in Lisbon, Portugal. All proposals will be reviewed by a committee comprised of members of all co-organizing institutions.

The organizers invite submissions that explore the last 150 years of Portuguese-African Encounters and their ramifying global effects. The conference will be organized into five interdisciplinary workshops that assess the state of scholarship and consider the direction of future research on the following themes:

- Colonial Practices: Portugal in Africa
- Contemporary Legacies and Relationships
- Africa in Portugal / Portugal in Africa
- Beyond Africa and Portugal
- The Encounter in Today’s Global Context

The workshop format will maximize the quality of discussion by requiring the circulation of papers for critical review well in advance of the scheduled meeting. Although by no means exhaustive, a number of questions for possible consideration in each theme are discussed below in the conference précis. A more detailed description of the conference and related congress events is also available on the web at: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Watson_Institute/programs/gs/news/portafricaconf04_02.html