Transition and Transformation in Africa

Anita Franklin & Roy Love

On the eve of the first non-racial elections in South Africa the continent seems poised on the edge of a new political era. For many in Africa and elsewhere the April elections will be reminiscent of the heady days of the 1960s when decolonisation and political sovereignty seemed synonymous with freedom and development. Three decades later, the euphoria has gone, Africa remains trapped in a web of underdevelopment. Nonetheless there is a tendency to view South Africa, and this dramatic moment in its history as exceptional and therefore infuse its future with all the hopes and broken promises of the region, and indeed the continent. South Africa's importance as an industrial centre is rivalled only by the symbolic power of black South African freedom.

Events can move quickly however, and whatever one says about South Africa at a given time may rapidly become outdated. Nevertheless, we know that the new South Africa will need to cope with intransigent national, regional and international issues. The very nature of the transition to a post-apartheid state is being shaped by these concerns. Meanwhile, the redistribution of resources like land loom large on the horizon as does the danger of civil war from non-participating or otherwise disruptive groups on the right and in KwaZulu and Bophuthatswana. And what of the military, the police and their rehabilitation? How does a nation come to grips with the crimes of the past when so many of the protagonists are still in powerful positions?

To tackle the massive legacy of unemployment, South Africa will be shaping its relations with its neighbours for decades to come. There will be a strong temptation to make further cutbacks to the employment of migrant labourers, with a view to redeploying those jobs to South Africans. Such a policy will aggravate the already difficult situation in states like Lesotho, Swaziland and, to a lesser extent, Botswana, where labour migration has provided a significant portion of their national income. Employment concerns will also create tension between the country's dependence on a prosperous regional economy for export demand and calls for protection from cheaper imported goods.

On the other hand, SADC awaiting South African membership, may very well be the mechanism through which South Africa can gently enter into a transition of its regional relationships. Some aspects of that transition will be easy, for instance, the cessation of South African support for destabilising agents like Renamo and Unita. Other aspects may prove more difficult, like relinquishing its dominance in the South African Customs Union. It must not be forgotten that South Africa's industrial and commercial power both stems from and provides a vehicle for international capitalist forces, with the consequent widening of economic and class differences that have been for instance, characteristic of Botswana in recent years, and which are evident in Mozambique as it emerges from the anarchy of destabilisation.
Events in South Africa, however novel in that country's history, exemplify themes which pervade the rest of the continent. These include the legitimacy of the democratic process, the role of external agency in economic and social policy, and the continuing colonial heritage, even at this late stage of the twentieth century, of sub-regional and ethnically based conflict. Elsewhere in southern Africa these themes remain dramatically in evidence. However pivotal the South African elections are, the spectre of societal disruption in Angola will not go away. The economic package forced onto Angola included super-deregulation of the economy which has encouraged the creation of a new class of poor as well as the very rich. In the absence of international powers policing these 'reforms' the level of civil violence has reached unprecedented heights, with Unita, a creature nurtured on Western complicity, refusing to acknowledge its electoral defeat and tearing the country and its people apart in a brutal bid to either share state power or split the country permanently. Further north, Mobutu likewise seems prepared to see civil society in Zaïre fall apart rather than give up the increasingly limited power which it is able to retain in Kinshasa.

Turning to West Africa and the Nigerian experience, there are parallels with southern Africa. Nigeria rivals South Africa for regional and continental dominance and is familiar with threats of national disintegration. West Africa also raises questions of external intervention. Ghana provides a clear example of the structurally adjusted state wherein various ministerial powers have been decentralised and problem solving is accomplished by prescription from the west. The recent imposed devaluation of the CFA highlights in a particularly overt way the continuing influence which the metropolitan power, and the ubiquitous IMF, exercises over this part of Africa. Throughout the region western exploitation through maritime trade, mineral extraction and fisheries thrives, as always on the backs of migrant workers, ethnically segregated labour markets and sub-regional rivalries. Democratisation is another important theme, with elections coming up in Guinea and Sierra Leone and the Rawlings victory still fresh in Ghana. In Côte d'Ivoire, the death of Houphouet-Boigny raises hopes for democratic change alongside fears of continuing clientelism, while the chronic recurrence of military rule in Nigeria illustrates the problems of establishing a democratically based civil authority where ethnic and class interests compete in an emerging capitalist industrial state.

Further north, in the Maghreb, progress towards a more democratic secular politics is halting and uneven, deeply compromised by economic crisis and state repression. Cautious moves towards political liberalisation in Mauritania are taking place in a context of recent ethnic conflict and tribal divisions and of deteriorating economic and social conditions, while in Morocco, the formal structure of a multi-party system and recent elections (1992) partly obscure the perpetuation of an authoritarian regime which has brutally repressed any serious opposition and whose ruthless pursuit of the annexation of the Western Sahara at all costs has been assisted by the support of the 'official' opposition (see ROAPE 53 and 58).

The failure of the UN to maintain the momentum towards a referendum on self-determination in the Western Sahara, and its effective acquiescence to Moroccan abuses of the 'peace process', is an indication of the bankruptcy of the notion of a 'New World Order' in which justice is effectively maintained by international procedures and law-keeping. Meanwhile, in the refugee camps near Tindouf, the POLISARIO has committed itself to political pluralism and economic liberalisa-
tion in the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. Hopes of political liberalisation in Algeria and Tunisia, which rose for a while at the turn of the decade (with elections in the latter in 1989 and in the former in 1990 and 1991), have faded as the threat of militant Islamism — arising in part out of the social crisis associated with economic reforms and austerity measures and in part out of a deeper crisis of legitimacy of the existing regimes — has led to heavy state repression. The secular opposition remains active but has little room for manoeuvre at the moment. In Egypt also, despite elections held in 1990, the growth of support for the Islamic alternative has been met with heavy state repression, and the prospects for further political liberalisation look slight. The economic 'benefits' of Egypt's involvement in the Gulf War as a leading member of the anti-Iraqi coalition have failed to rescue it from its deep economic difficulties and the structural adjustment programme eventually adopted under the auspices of the IMF has, for far, produced few signs of rapid economic recovery.

In the Horn the issues of external intervention and national disintegration reach a new apex as American influence seeks to reassert itself in both Ethiopia and Somalia, as bulwarks against the threat to western capitalist interests from the Islamic fundamentalism of the Sudan and across the Red Sea. Of interest in this region is how the discussion of disintegration is couched in terms of the 'national' problem in Ethiopia and Eritrea, the 'clan' system in Somalia, and 'tribal' politics in Kenya, all expressions whose meaning has been dictated by a European culture of dominance. Perhaps, despite a multitude of problems, the greatest hope for the remainder of the 1990s lies with Ethiopia, having shaken off autocratic rule for the first time in the country's history, and with Eritrea, emerging optimistically from three decades of war, insecurity and the collapse of its previously well-established industrial and commercial base. Here too, however, external agency takes many forms, as witnessed by the repatriation of exiles from Germany in response not to renewed opportunities in Eritrea but to German immigration laws and the consolidation there of 'Fortress Europe'.

And so to Tanzania, a country seldom in the Western news in recent years, itself indicative of a stability which survived the departure from centre stage of a charismatic leader, and one of the early socialist hopes of the independence period. As with neighbouring Zimbabwe, however, the hand of the World Bank and IMF has been at work; however, for all the damage they have done, they are beginning to learn at last from their mistakes.

Africa is a continent undergoing profound change, with numerous events and processes bringing hopes for progress as well as dangers of intensified crisis. If international and internal forces act to prevent much necessary transformation there are nevertheless, numerous transitions going on. In South Africa, however much the negotiations may have seemed to dilute the legitimate entitlement of the oppressed, there is still the prospect of a final end to racist brutality. In Malawi, the end of the Banda regime draws nearer even if a democratic, or even stable alternative is not yet clearly visible. The problems of smaller countries such as Liberia, Gabon, Central African Republic, Djibouti, Burundi and Lesotho demonstrate that instability is a function of the form rather than size of the nation state. While carnage and corruption continue in many parts of the continent, even the West appears finally to be developing an immunity to the allure of Unita, MNR, Mobutu and perhaps even Inkatha. The oppression of women continues everywhere but demands for change are on the agenda everywhere, and in South Africa, are even to have constitutional status. While the crisis remains
overwhelming there are, therefore, many signs that people are beginning to address themselves to solutions.

Future issues of ROAPE will continue to address these themes, recognising that they will present challenges to Africans for years to come, especially in the new global order (or disorder), associated with powerful trading blocs in North America, Europe and the Pacific Rim. In the broader context, however, we need also to reassess our theoretical foundations in a world in which the ‘end of history’ has been asserted; we need to examine whether our ideas and concepts with regard to ‘development’ remain sustainable. How do we address the challenge of the post-modernists if we are to continue to argue for the impoverished and exploited masses of urban and rural Africans? In this issue Sundet provocatively critiques the ‘developmentalist’ approach of a number of writers on Tanzanian political economy while Mbonile reports on the emerging class and economic divisions which are appearing in rural trading centres in the same country, reminding us of the reality from which so many of us are removed.

Where political stability is absent the problems are different. Hussein examines the way in which ‘clan’ politics in Somalia have inhibited the emergence of cohesive and democratically representative opposition groups while Markakis highlights the seldom examined problem of divisions amongst Somali people in Ethiopia who are faced with the challenge of how best to negotiate with the new government of the EPDRF. Other aspects of the crisis in Somalia are discussed by Doombos and Markakis, Salih and John Prendergast in an expanded Briefings section, itself indicative of the wide range of contemporary issues and problems faced by regions such as the Horn and across the continent as a whole and which cannot be ignored if we are to see the whole picture, framed still by the North as shown by Kevin Watkins in his review of the GATT negotiations.

Finally we return to South Africa. As the industrial giant of the African continent, future policy in this area will be crucial. In the Debates section, Ismail brings out the contradictions in seeking to introduce policies which simultaneously benefit labour in South Africa whilst remaining competitive in the global capitalist economy. The problems of Natal epitomise those of other parts of the country, showing that even where ethnic homogeneity is present, stability and equity still become victims of externally induced disruption, in this case from the apartheid state as well as Western backers. Gerhard Maré and John Wright report on a conference at the University of Natal where the problems associated with defining and understanding ethnicity and the nature of ethnic conflict in the particular context of class and history were debated; they also highlight the dangers of academic introversion and obsession with theory. However, although it is important, in Natal and throughout the African continent, to be relevant to the people in the street or village, in our analysis and comment, it is also imperative that we continue to recognise the context of exploitation and associated abuse of power which creates and sustains the regional and ethnic divides of the people of Africa, and which thrives on a colonial heritage that calls, even today, for unrelenting struggle for true liberation. This is an intellectual struggle as much as a political one but both have to be focused or the result will be a dissipation of energies and the moral neglect of oppressed peoples.
Trading Centres and Development in a Remote District in Tanzania

Milline J Mbonile

As a contribution to the ongoing debate about how to counteract the centralising tendencies of large urban centres, this article looks at the impact and role of small rural trading centres in Tanzania. It is shown that significant intra-district trade and labour migration takes place but that this remains limited in the more peripheral areas. The lack of wholesale outlets is a particular handicap in all areas. Tension between administrative or political decisions regarding location of various agencies and local business rivalries combine with regional ethnic differences to define the arena in which various contenders for class power are clashing, with the occasional arbitration, when necessary, of the more centralised agencies such as the Regional Development Associations, thus exemplifying the ultimate dominance of the centre, despite policies attempting the contrary.

Since the introduction of the growth pole policy in 1955 by Perroux which suggested that public investment programmes would have maximum effects on regional growth if concentrated in a small number of favourable locations, the main debate on the role of small towns (trading centres) focuses on their importance in rural development as a whole (Sharma, 1984:133). As the most peripheral link of urban systems it was assumed that they are centres of diffusion of innovations and urban services to the surrounding rural hinterlands (Aeroe, 1992:51). Also as marketing centres they link the hinterland and the world economy for it is at this level where the subsistence sector and the modern sector based on exports merge (Ahmed & Rahman, 1979:258). In addition, they are assumed to play an important role as strategic points for the extension of services and welfare to the countryside (Gould, 1988; Simon, 1992:43-4). In terms of conventional rural development policy they act as barometers in measuring the success or failure of most rural development policies since they are very close to the rural population (Southall, 1979:231).

Nevertheless, after several decades of research and application of the growth pole policy by planners, the perception of the role of small towns in development in the third world has changed tremendously. As stated by Southall (1979) and Pedersen (1990), in many developing countries few trading centres are seen to play a positive role towards rural development because they lack strong economic and political structures. Due to lack of a modern industrial base they create few non-agricultural activities. Most of them, as in the colonial period, act as administrative centres for resource extraction and control rather than service centres for rural development. As a result the local population sees them as
points of exploitation through which the capitalist system in general (local and international) sucks resources from rural areas.

In order to fill this gap in regional development planning Friedmann (1988) introduced the agropolitan approach which does not focus on small towns per se but on egalitarian rural development as a whole. In this approach emphasis is placed on changing agrarian structures as pre-conditions for development, and it encourages processes leading to social, economic and environmental change for the betterment of rural life. These include extension services, clean water supply, universal primary education, primary health care, etc. Unlike the growth pole policy the agropolitan approach focuses on smaller local units like households, extended family, neighbourhood, etc. The role of small towns as service centres for the rural areas is certainly emphasised. But it is also stressed that small towns with efficient services are necessary to increase the agricultural productivity (Pedersen, 1990:90). In addition, it is expected that with the increase of non-agricultural activities small towns may absorb some of the rural population which otherwise may migrate into large cities (Wekwete, 1990:131; Aeroe, 1992:56).

As a third world country Tanzania explicitly and implicitly did not lag behind in adopting these policies. As observed by Kulaba (1982), Briggs (1982), Tanzania/EEC (1987) and Choguill (1989) since the early 1960s Tanzania adopted the settlement schemes which aimed at transforming the rural traditional economies into modern economies by injecting capital into a few settlements which could act as centres of diffusion of new technology. These were later followed by the Villagisation Programme in 1967 which exploited the idea of concentrating scattered population into permanent villages. Besides transforming rural socio-economic development, Ujamaa villages were supposed to promote grassroots democracy and popular participation. The growth pole policy introduced in 1969 selected several regional capitals which were supposed to act as industrial centres. When this policy was combined with the decentralisation policy introduced in 1972 giving more powers to the regions and districts to coordinate development in their respective areas, they were supposed to slow down the growth rate of Dar es Salaam as the primate city. With pressure from bilateral and multilateral donors it culminated in the 1980s with the adoption of regional integrated programmes which have an agropolitan approach but are heavily funded by external donors. The introduction of this policy virtually divided the country into economic regions coordinated by donors, e.g., the Japanese in Kilimanjaro, the Germans in Tanga and the Norwegians in Rukwa. Practically, they drew up their own regional development plans which ran parallel to the local regional plans and as such increased external dominance over the countryside. This superimposed structure in rural areas undermined the confidence of the rural population in initiating self-reliance efforts and increased the expenditure of the state to service the regional administration (Campbell & Stein, 1992:131-2).

Other significant policies introduced by the government in the 1980s were structural adjustment policies. As the economy of the country almost stagnated in 1981 the government was forced to adopt the National Economic Survival Programme (NESP) whose main objective was to increase national production and exports by using existing local resources. When this programme failed due to over-dependence on foreign capital it was replaced by the Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP) which introduced several public enterprise reforms, lifted import controls and allowed own funds import schemes. It was under this programme that a number of demands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were accepted, after a long period of resistance and negotiation by the government aimed at ensuring that structural adjustment should have at least a human face. This marked the beginning of more market-oriented economic policies of the sort which were abolished by the Arusha Declaration which nationalised all the major means of production such as industry, commerce and large scale plantations. The limited success of SAP coupled with the need to solicit more foreign aid and investments led to its replacement by the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in 1986. The main measures taken by this programme included changes in marketing agricultural produce, further trade liberalisation and rehabilitation of production-related physical infrastructure (Kiondo, 1992:24).

Given that Tanzania imposed policies which affected both rural and urban areas, a number of research questions can be raised on the role of government in regional and micro-level development. In order to answer some of these questions this article examines the role of small towns (trading centres) in the development of Makete District, in the South West of Tanzania. More specifically it will attempt to answer three main research questions: what is the role of small towns in population redistribution and trade in the district? what is the relationship between these core areas (trading centres) and the hinterland (periphery)? what implications do they have in rural class formation and employment? Generally, Makete is considered an ideal place to study this relationship because it is one of the most remote districts in the country. Its mountains and poor communications virtually cut the district off from the rest of the country during the wet season, allowing a few major trading centres to dominate the district. As stated by Lwoga (1989) and Mbonile (1993), Makete is among those districts in the country which were created after the decentralisation policy in 1972. It has also benefited from the agropolitan approach through the introduction of Integrated Regional Development Programmes like the multi-purpose Makete Rural Transport Integrated Programme (ILO, 1990).
The Makete Migration Survey (MMS) was carried out between July 1991 and April 1992. Through the use of both structured and open questionnaires it interviewed 100 agricultural, 82 business and 78 wage employment heads of households to represent almost all major economic activities in the district. In general the sampling frame of the survey followed closely the district administrative structure of Tanzania which consists of divisions, wards, villages, ten cell leaders and households. However, since the division covers a big area it was decided that the main unit of study should be the ward followed by villages, ten cell leaders and then finally households. Since the main interest of the study was to examine the role of trading centres in the district, field inventories of all trading centres in the district were taken. As a result of this exercise the following major trading centres were selected for the study due to their size and importance:

**Bulongwa:** Headquarters of ward, division and Lutheran Diocese of South Central Tanzania, primary court, hospital, primary and trade school, retail shops, local and modern bars, hotels and lodgings, Danish International Development Agency, breeding post of donkeys, post office, churches, police post and milling machines.

**Makete:** District and Iwawa ward headquarters, retail shops, hospital, primary schools, hotel and lodgings, National Bank of Commerce, Regional Trading Centre, milling machines.

**Matamba:** Headquarters of ward, division, Pyrethrum Authority and Njombe, Makete and Ludewa Co-operative Union, National Bank of Commerce Branch, Health Centre, primary and post-primary technical school, churches, police post.

Although it was easy to identify the main trading centres the main problem arose in their classification as towns, or not. Nevertheless, it was decided to classify these small towns as trading centres because most of them had not reached the population threshold of 5,000 needed to be regarded as towns. Furthermore, the urban population of Makete District in the 1988 Population Census was 2,400 (2.3%) out of total population of 102,614 which suggest that the district is overwhelmingly rural.

After the selection of trading centres the next problem was the selection of agricultural households, which are important in the evaluation of the interaction between trading centres and the periphery. With the help of the district, ward and village administrations the wards and villages which were selected at random in each administrative unit were Iniho (Iniho Village), Iwawa (Isapulano Village), Kipagalo (Kilanji Village) and Matamba (Kinyika Village). Moreover, since ten cell leaders have about 10 households in large villages such as Iniho and Kilanjii about 30 households were selected from each village while in small villages such as Isapulano and Kinyika about 20 households were selected at random.

**Intra-district Migration**

Migration of people into trading centres or small urban centres is not a new phenomenon in Africa. It dates back to the pre-colonial period when trading centres like Oyo in West Africa, Pata in East Africa, Rodoam in Northern Africa
and Sofala in southern Africa were major centres of trade (Otite, 1979; Ahmed and Rahman, 1979; Kaniki, 1980). The present study investigated the extent to which the few trading centres developed largely during the post-independence period have influenced intra-district migration. The results of the investigation show that 309 (72.2%) of a sample population of 428 people in the major trading centres of the district are intra-district migrants (Table 1). The proportion of intra-district migrants is 60.4% in Bulongwa Trading Centre, about 82% in Makete Trading Centre and 61.1% in Matamba Trading Centre. The proportion of intra-district migrants is high in all trading centres because there is intensive in-migration of migrants from rural areas, especially following trade liberalisation in 1984. The influx of imported commodities after a severe period of scarcity and poor performance of peasant agricultural production combined with environmental factors such as drought, encouraged migration of a young population into trading centres or urban areas where they often survive by running petty businesses in the informal sector. It is interesting to note that Makete Trading Centre, which was only established in 1979, has managed to attract intra-district migrants from nearly all wards in the district, though the failure to attract migrants from peripheral wards like Kigulu and Mfumbi shows that both administratively and commercially it does not command the whole district.

In fact, unless communication is improved in a remote district like Makete, lack of universal interaction between the centre and periphery will continue. Poor communication appears to deter other development programmes in the district such as afforestation for timber production and construction of modern houses. In addition, field observation showed that some households returned to the ward of origin from Makete Trading Centre. As observed by Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990), Bryceson (1990) and Mborule (1993) during the period of worst recession and structural adjustment in the 1980s some households failed to cope with the severity of economic conditions in urban areas and returned to their area of origin. As a survival strategy, a proportion of households also moved some members of the households to wards such as Ikuwo where they could grow food and cash crops such as Irish potatoes and pyrethrum to supplement the meagre income they earned in business and wage employment.

The study also shows that the proportion of interward migrants to the main trading centres ranges between about 37% in Makete Trading Centre to about 66% in Bulongwa Trading Centre. Also trading centres attract most of the intra-district migrants from neighbouring wards. Bulongwa Trading Centre attracts most migrants from Kipagalo, Iniho and Iwawa Wards while Makete Trading

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 1 Intra-district in-Migration to Trading Centres</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ward of Origin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulongwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ikuwo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iniho</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ipelele</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iwawa</td>
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<td>Kigulu</td>
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<td>Lupalilo</td>
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<td>Lupila</td>
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<td>Mang'oto</td>
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<tr>
<td>Matamba</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mfumbi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mondwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukwama</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intra-Migrants</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sample Population</td>
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</table>

Source: Makete Migration Survey 1991/92
Centre attracts most migrants from Bulongwa and Lupalilo Wards. On the other hand, most migrants in Matamba Trading Centre are from Ikuwo and Mlondwe Wards. Generally, as stated by Ravenstein (1985) when he introduced the so-called laws of migration, there is a strong interaction between trading centres and the immediate hinterlands. In other words, proximity is an important factor in population redistribution in Makete District.

Activities of Intra-district Migrants

The level of interaction between the area of origin and destination can be determined by the kind of activities which the migrants do in the area of destination (Lee, 1966) and these may include agriculture and non-agricultural activities such as trade (Ottie, 1979:229; Silitshena, 1990:40). An examination of intra-district migrant activities at the area of destination in Makete reveals that a proportion ranging between 20% in Makete Trading Centre to about 46% in Bulongwa Trading Centre of intra-district migrants are engaged in agriculture at the ward of destination (Table 2). It is quite clear that due to lack of non-agricultural activities a significant proportion of intra-district migrants are still engaged in agriculture. As stated above, since business and wage employment cannot provide sufficient income for the household to subsist some members of the household continue to engage in agriculture. Nevertheless, in both Makete and Matamba trading centres the majority of economically active intra-district migrants are employed in non-agricultural activities. Generally, besides administrative roles, these trading centres also have more established public enterprises like banks, crop authorities, cooperatives, posts and telecommunication and hospitals. This indicates that there may be unequal distribution of infrastructure between trading centres which may result in more regional differentiation in future.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Bulongwa</th>
<th>Makete</th>
<th>Matamba</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Employment</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>28.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic/Unemployed</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Makete Migration Survey 1991/92

Further, in a trading centre like Makete there are some intra-district migrants categorised as domestic workers and unemployed. This problem is very common in most urban centres in developing countries in recent years due to both lack of wage employment and farming land. In fact, due to the high demand for land both for agriculture and housing near trading centres, only a few rich households can afford to hire or purchase land. Moreover, field observations showed that a high proportion of both domestic workers and unemployed are females. Two basic reasons can explain this sex differential in employment. First, it was found that most rural women have low academic qualifications. Consequently, when they marry in urban areas (which have different economic structures) they assume a subordinate role either of supplementing the meagre income of their husband or as purely domestic; alternatively, they remain unemployed. Second, due to male bias in traditional inheritance, relatives are more inclined to give capital to male children or relatives. Generally, most parents have the opinion that girls will marry into other clans which will care for them. The few women
who have well-established businesses tend to originate from the informal sector which resembles the rural barter system in marketing food and raw materials for making local beer such as sorghum and finger millets (Mbonile, 1993:274-5). The overall implication of this type of development shows that the migration of women into trading centres or urban areas reduces them to a subordinate role, contrary to typical rural areas, where they form the backbone of the peasant economy and frequently have greater independence.

Besides the economically active intra-district migrants there is a high proportion of children in each ward who accompany their parents to their destination and have not reached the age of going to school. Since most major educational institutions are located in major trading centres, wards with trading centres attract a proportion of intra-district migrants as students. For example, a high proportion of student migrants are found in Matamba Trading Centre because of Itamba Secondary School. On the other hand, Makete Trading Centre has a high proportion of student migrants because most children of wage employment and business households are educated in the trading centre.

Characteristics of Household Business

Diffusion between the centre and the periphery is dependent on factors such as size, location and the rank of the centre in the urban hierarchy, together with the social structure (Pedersen, 1990). In most developing countries these linkages are weak because most rural trading centres are located in areas where the population has a high dependency on subsistence agriculture and little purchasing power. Also, in most cases, spending from locally generated income tends to be seasonal (Wekwete, 1990:137-8).

This has implications for small business. In the present study, 82 business households sampled in the trading centres showed some of the basic characteristics and problems faced by business households in Makete District.

First, most of these households (42%) have retail shops but are also involved in informal activities or petty businesses (40%), processing (12%) and hotel/lodging

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 3 Household Business Type, Capital &amp; Problems</th>
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<tr>
<td>Business Type</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hotel/Lodging</td>
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<tr>
<td>Whole Shop</td>
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<td>Informal (gende)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Processing</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<tr>
<td>Source of Initial Capital</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
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<td>Wage Employment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Petty Business</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank Loans/aids</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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</table>

Source: Makete Migration Survey, 1991/92
(7%) businesses (Table 3). Since there are no business households in the wholesale trade most of them are forced to depend on the Regional Trading Centre (RTC) wholesale shop. During the period of the survey this shop was in financial difficulty following the general shake up of parastatals after trade liberalisation in 1984. This is the main reason why more than 90% of business households purchased commodities in the large trading centres, including Njombe, Mbeya, Makambuku, Tukuyu, Kyela, Iringa, Dar es Salaam and more recently, Tanga which involve travelling of between 100-1,000 kms each way. The few business households which obtain commodities from other retail shops within Makete are compelled to sell them at very high prices.

Generally, the main source of initial capital for business is agriculture, despite its strong subsistence economic base. In appreciation of the potential role of business in household employment, relatives rank second as a source of initial capital followed by petty business. Due to recession and general decline in the availability of wage employment as a source of employment in the 1980s, this source contributed only 12% of initial capital for business. Because of a lack of business education and experience very few households obtain or even attempt to obtain bank loans or aid.

The other intrinsic problem in the development of business in these trading centres is lack of capital. Nearly 84% of the business households have capital of less than Tshs 50,000 (US $125). The consequent low volume of turnover and the absence of big retail shops with capital of more than Tshs 2 million means very few wholesale shops are viable in these trading centres. When combined with a lack of transport, this prevents a number of shops from holding sufficient stock to last throughout the wet season when the district is almost cut off from the rest of the country. The problem is illustrated by Ladis Sanga of Makete Trading Centre:

*Most business households are compelled to walk to major trading centres or pay the high transport cost by using unreliable four-wheel-drive vehicles. When transport costs are high the commodities also become expensive and can miss the market. This problem generates other problems like low profit margin and lack of commodities. Also most shops rely on few wage employment workers in their localities like teachers who also walk long distances to the district headquarters to collect their salaries.*

Other problems include high taxes, problems of getting loans, lack of space and security. Besides the small size of the market and the limited capital, the other major business problem in Makete is lack of trading links. Very few wards trade with the headquarters (Makete); exceptions are Bulongwa, Iwawa and Lupalilo. Other wards like Lupila, Mang’oto and Ukwama have stronger trade links with Njombe Town; wards like Iniho, Ipelele and all Matamba Division wards (Ikuwo, Kitulo, Mlondwe, Matamba & Mfumbi) have stronger trade links with Mbeya District. Wards like Kigulu and Kipagalo have more trade links with Kyela and Rungwe Districts. As stated by Mwangonela (RTC Branch Manager in Makete):

*Unless transport is improved development of trade in Makete District will continue to be a nightmare even though the people of Makete living outside the district have shown wonders in business. Due to poor communication transporters do not want to carry commodities to Makete. They refuse tenders because they feel their vehicles will be destroyed and are forced to carry almost half of the cargo required because of steep roads. It is difficult to use buses since only one bus operates during the dry season and so monopolises transport cost.*
As pointed out by Shivji (1975) classes can be defined by using both their production roles and in their opposition to other classes, while the form and organisation of production and resultant conflicts change over time. As stated by Samoff (1979), in Tanzania and other third world countries, the major route to power and wealth is through education but this is far from equitably distributed amongst regions and across age and gender groups. In Makete District this unequal distribution of education has perpetuated social stratification which in turn has promoted class formation. Throughout the colonial period a few wards such as Bulongwa, Matamba, Mlondwe, Iniho and Lupalilo where the first missionaries settled had greater excess to primary education which later gave more access to higher education. As a result of this colonial legacy most of the intra-district migrants in wage employment are mainly from those wards (Mbonile, 1993). Actually during the post-independence period the petty bourgeoisie from these areas virtually became a de facto ruling class of the district.

However, it is important to note that at national level a different picture emerges. In former labour reserves such as Makete, education is an insignificant path to wealth and political power because of a limited higher education infrastructure which in turn hinders their penetration into influential positions in the modern sector. This problem was aggravated by the Arusha Declaration in 1967 which invested political and economic powers to politicians leaving professionals and small-holder farmers powerless and more impoverished. Nevertheless, by manipulating some of the principles of the Arusha Declaration, a number of business households emerged with a better opportunity to amass wealth, especially after trade liberalisation in 1984. In general, the rise of business households with a strong base in major urban centres outside the district gradually eroded the dominance of the educated class in development and policy making process in the district. Moreover, their economic power gives them better access to education for they can afford to pay the school fees which were introduced by the government in the 1980s to fulfil some of the structural adjustment conditions imposed by the World Bank and the IMF (Mbonile, 1993).

**Trade Links with Hinterland**

The usual view of the developmental role of growth centres involves the simultaneous filtering of innovations that bring growth down the urban hierarchy and the spreading of benefits resulting from the centre to the periphery (Sharma, 1984:141). As observed by Ahmed and Rahman (1979:259), in Sudan, trading centres with their large weekly markets are major centres of trade and other attractions. Since they are located in major administrative centres they also contain important rural institutions like co-operatives, schools and courts. The relationship between agricultural households and trading centres within the district confirms this important relationship between the centre and the periphery. Generally, most households sell their commodities through co-operatives (70%) followed by local markets (18%) and travel more than 6 kilometres to the trading post. As in all rural areas in Africa which have poor communication links with the centre, very few households use bicycles or motor vehicles, and the primary means of transport is on foot. The main commodities purchased in these major centres include essential commodities like soap, kerosene, salt and clothes plus some agricultural inputs like hoes, fertilisers and insecticides. Few households obtain luxury goods such as radios and beer from these centres which are sold at higher prices when compared to major trading
centres like Njombe and Mbeya (Table 4).

On the other hand, the monetary trade of these trading centres is weakened by the fact that most food trade in the district is done on a barter basis. It is quite common to find households in major wheat and maize growing areas meet in trading centres to exchange these crops. Nevertheless, besides being centres of barter trade, trading centres contribute significantly in the marketing and distribution of essential commodities to neighbouring areas. In order to utilise the local markets effectively, marketing days amongst neighbouring wards are mostly distributed in different days of the week: Makete (Thursday and Sunday), Kipagalo (Saturday), Usililo (Sunday), Ipelele (Sunday), Ukwama (Sunday), Lupalilo (Thursday and Sunday) and Matamba (Saturday).

Trading centres also encourage trade with neighbouring districts. It is quite common to find dry fish from Mtera Dam in Iringa (Rural) District in most trading centres in Makete. Dry fish is also obtained from Lake Rukwa (Mbeya Rural) and Lake Nyasa (Kyela District). The major cereal crops of maize, rice and millet, which besides being food crops, are also used for brewing local beer (usabe, utupemba etc). It is the brewing of local beer which makes Makete import cereals from other areas despite the fact that in divisions like Matamba there is a surplus of maize which is sold in other places. Bananas for cooking and as fruits are obtained in Rungwe and Kyela Districts. These districts are also major sources of other fruits such as avocado pears and root crops such as cassava and yams. Ukisi area in Ludewa District supply pottery to several parts of South West Tanzania because it is the only area with China clay. On the other hand, Makete District sells commodities like Irish potatoes, wheat, peas, fruits (peaches, apples, apricots, pears, etc) and bamboo products to most of these neighbouring districts. Moreover, Irish potatoes are sold in most large towns in Tanzania as well as in the neighbouring countries of Malawi, Zambia and Zaïre. It is interesting to note that traditional networks dominate even in modern business. It is quite common to find businessmen from various areas and trading centres in Makete District trading in local markets in neighbouring districts (Ngweke, Mtema, Mande, Kine, Lumbira, etc) and vice versa. They manage to trade in all these trading centres because of mutual understanding amongst the people found in these trading centres known locally as ububija. In this arrangement, the trading partner (umbija) provides accommodation, food and sometimes even commodities for marketing.

As observed by Barwell (1988) travelling down and up the escarpment which covers a distance ranging between 20-50 kms mostly by walking and head-
Table 5 Sources of Commodities Traded in Makete District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>Estimated Distance kms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iringa</td>
<td>Iringa (rural)</td>
<td>fish, maize, onions</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ludewa</td>
<td>pottery</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Njombe</td>
<td>maize</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mbeya</td>
<td>Mbeya (rural)</td>
<td>rice, maize, beans, fish, onions</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mbozi</td>
<td>millet, beans</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rungwe</td>
<td>bananas, avocado</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kyela</td>
<td>rice, palm oil, bananas, cassava, sugar cane</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rukwa</td>
<td>Sumbawanga</td>
<td>millet, beans</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Songea (rural)</td>
<td>maize, beans</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Makete Migration Survey 1991/92

Loading which exposes the travellers to an arduous journey of several hours under different physical and weather conditions is not an easy task.

Antagonistic Centre-periphery Relationships

In conventional terms, development as a process is marked by two concomitant spatial tendencies which are concentration and dispersion. Concentration is the result of centripetal forces and dispersion of centrifugal forces. More often concentration leads to point location or clustering of human activities while dispersion brings about an even spread of such activities (Sharma, 1984:133). This diversified nature of development produces social and political tensions in the relationship between trading centres and the hinterland. A number of cases of conflict between the centre and the periphery at both national and global level may be cited, but as stated above, the main cause of these conflicts is a concentration of power in a few centres, a phenomenon found both in the colonial and post-independence periods which with time have generated centrifugal forces. An in-depth study in Makete District reveals several conflicts between the centre and periphery of which a few examples will be given to show how such conflicts may retard the growth in an area.

A major conflict has existed between Bulongwa and Kipagalo Wards about the control of the Saturday market which was formally located in Bulongwa Trading Centre. The people of Kipagalo Ward who claim to be the main producers of food which is traded at the market feel that they have been exploited by Bulongwa for decades. As a result, they demanded the market tax should be distributed equally between the two wards. When Bulongwa Ward refused on grounds that the market was in their ward, the people of Kipagalo Ward moved the market to Ijoka Road junction. After a lengthy period of negotiation it was agreed that the market should remain at Idunda which is on the border between the two wards. This conflict between the centre and the periphery has both political and economic implications. Open discussions with the people from both wards revealed that the conflict began during the early settlement of Ukinga area which subjected the indigenous population to the control of Wakinga ethnic group which originated from Nyumba Nitu near Njombe Town. Although currently the various ethnic groups in Makete District are intermixed, the Wamahanji, who are the main sub-ethnic group in Kipagalo ward, are more prepared to cooperate with other sub-ethnic groups such as the Wamagoma and Wawanji found in the
west of the district than with the main Wakinga ethnic group found in the east of the district. Economically the removal of the market from Bulongwa to Idunda means that some of the established businesses collapsed because they have lost their locational advantage and new infrastructures are to be constructed.

A challenge to Bulongwa as a core of development in Makete also arose when the site for building Mwakauta Secondary School was selected. The school started in the buildings of Bulongwa Primary School which is amongst the oldest schools in the district. However, because of lack of space and a challenge from other periphery wards the school was removed to Mwakauta Village in Iniho Ward. The whole idea of placing a government secondary school in Bulongwa Division was challenged by other divisions like Ukwama which considered themselves to have been neglected for years in the distribution of social services. A challenge also came from Makete Trading Centre, as district headquarters, because it wanted the secondary school to be located where children of high government officials in the district could benefit. Furthermore, the first headmaster of the school, from Kipagalo Ward, was seemingly transferred to the regional headquarters (Iringa Town) because he was a political challenger to the District Party Chairman who originated from Matamba Division (Uwanji area) in one of the core areas. His struggle to rise politically was frustrated because the district wanted to balance the power between the Wakinga and Wawanji ethnic groups. This challenge did not end at district level; at division level there was a strong challenge by Iniho, Ipelele and Kipagalo Wards over the leadership of the School Council. As a result, the secretary of the council, from Bulongwa Trading Centre, and who was among the founders of the school, was removed despite his strong support from Bulongwa Ward. Such centrifugal forces adversely affected the construction of the school which, during the survey, had reached the stage of students sitting for the National Examinations without the school having been registered. The construction of the school was completed only after the Makete Development Association based in Dar es Salaam intervened by giving more than Tshs 700,000. The Association decided to complete the construction of the school so that it would be recognised by the government which would then leave the Association to concentrate on other private schools. It managed to solve this problem because, based outside the district, it was in a position to promote centripetal forces which are essential in the development of the whole district.

A further example is at church level where rivalry was observed between Ukinga (as a former core area) and Uwanji when Uwanji area decided to remain with the Lutheran Diocese of Southern Tanzania based in Njombe when the Lutheran Diocese of South Central Tanzania was formed in the 1980s. Uwanji area decided to remain with the Wabena, despite ethnic differences, because they feared that by joining Ukinga area, they would not be allowed to form their own diocese. When the Southern Diocese was reluctant to give them the status of the diocese it was South Central Diocese which intervened and Uwanji was given its diocese status in 1992 as the Lutheran South Western Diocese of Tanzania. Similar challenges also occur at Diocese level where for example, the transfer of ministers on ethnic grounds may be seen as threatening the development of an area by the centre.

In Uwanji area (Matamba Division) there is a strong challenge against Matamba Trading Centre and Magoye Education Centre which for years have been the core of development in Uwanji area. The most conspicuous challenge was on the construction of the road from Matamba to Mfumbi. This road was constructed in
the 1980s through the effort of all the people in Uwanji so that it could link the entire area. As one of the fruits of self-reliance, it was given high publicity when it was inaugurated by the former President, Julius K. Nyerere. Despite its importance as a link to the people of Uwanji area, Matamba and Chimala business interests out-manoeuvred the people of Uwanji and diverted attention of the road to Chimila in Mbeya District which was important to their trade. The conflict between the centre and the aspirations of the people of Uwanji are clearly expressed by Burton Nhondya born in Matamba but residing in Iringa Town:

*The road from Matamba-Mfumbi was built to link villages in Uwanji area. It is not passable during the wet season and does not have trees which can prevent the vehicle from plunging into the cliff if it moves off the road. They decided to build it without looking into the economic importance. As a result the big businessmen both in Chimala and Matamba who were afraid of losing the market decided to contribute money to improve the road from Matamba-Chimala.*

Likewise there has been a dispute over the location of the district headquarters at Makete Trading Centre. The place chosen in Iwawa Ward was an open space in the lowlands where people could not settle because it was prone to frost. Furthermore, the area has volcanic ash which is not suitable for moulding bricks for building modern houses. In general, the people of Makete were in favour of the old Makete in Lupalilo Ward which has better soil for brick making. The poor location of the district headquarters discourages business from larger towns investing in housing in Makete Trading Centre. This challenge was also observed in two major institutions which are important in agricultural development of the district. Both the Pyrethrum Authority and Njombe, Ludewa and Makete Cooperative Union (NJOLUMA) have their headquarters in Matamba Trading Centre. Nevertheless, the district headquarters demands that these parastatals should be located at the headquarters for administrative reasons. Yet the District Member of Parliament, born in Bulongwa Trading Centre, continues to reside and operate from Bulongwa while his office is in Makete Trading Centre. This reluctance to move to the district headquarters has fuelled antagonistic feelings between Bulongwa and Makete trading centres, giving rise to new challenges to his position and keeping alive old feuds connected with previous political contests in which ethnic and centre periphery relationships were key factors.

**Conclusion**

This article has examined the role of trading centres in population redistribution and trade in a remote district in Tanzania. It also shows that the main trading centres have managed to attract intra-district migrants because they have a more diversified rural economy which has created better business and wage employment opportunities. They have also managed to reduce the distance travelled by peasants to major trade posts in the district to less than 10 kms. Moreover, they encourage trade with neighbouring districts which is important in the promotion of both regional trade and agriculture. However, lack of transport and capital means that these trade centres have less effective trade links with peripheral areas, especially in the wet season when the district is almost cut off from the rest of the country. Thus, unless the transport problem in Makete is solved and the subsistence economy improved, it is more likely that these trade centres will lose even the few intra-district migrants they have managed to attract to major urban centres in Mbeya and Iringa Region. Despite the introduction of agropolitan approach in development, the centre-periphery relationship is still
antagonistic towards rural areas. When centrifugal forces occur at micro-level their impact on rural development is detrimental. Only the more organised district associations like the Makete Development Association are able to inject centripetal forces which can, to some extent, unify the antagonistic forces. Even these associations usually fail to mobilise the less educated population because of their elitist composition. At local level, education can still be a major path to wealth and political power, but few make it to national level. As a former labour reserve the numbers of educated people who emerge from the district into the modern sector is very limited. It is business households, especially those residing outside the district in major urban centres, which have gradually dominated both the economic and political power of the district. Within this context, local political struggle is marked by ethnic, business and political interest groups in conflict over the limited resources left to the region and its districts by the centrifugal forces of a centralising development process. Who benefits from ‘development’, however defined at the local level, depends upon the outcome of these numerous micro-struggles, often neglected in the ‘development’ literature.

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Bibliographic Note


Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea

Hussein M Adam

'Somaliland' has reasserted the separate existence it had as the colony of British Somaliland before independence and union with the former Italian Somalia in 1960. It has avoided the devastation of warlordism that has afflicted the rest of Somalia through compromise politics between clan elders. However, its *de facto* statehood since 1991 has not received the international recognition accorded Eritrea in 1993. The experiences of Somaliland and Eritrea in the circumstances of their post-colonial union with other entities, in their liberation movements and in their current politics are contrasted. It is suggested that there can be mutual learning from Somaliland's consociational, ethnic democracy and Eritrea's 'radical social democracy', of an eventual, orchestrated multi-partism that eschews ethnic and religious divides.

*The Member States affirm* ... respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence (Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Article III, Paragraph 3).

It will take much courage for the OAU and its members to champion this unorthodox but politically beneficent reality. But once it gains local acceptance, bilateral and multi-lateral donors must harken to the needs of the Eritreas and Somaliland republics in precisely the same manner as they have the Baltic republics and other new European states (Michael Chege).

On 24 May 1993, Eritrea conducted an internationally monitored referendum to determine its future status; the vote was overwhelmingly for independence. The United Nations, the US, Ethiopia, Italy immediately recognised the new state. From May 1991, Eritrea had enjoyed autonomy but, two years later it was able to garner international recognition which 'invests it with a personality in the law of nations' (Visscher, 1968:175). Former Italian and British colonies in Somalia gained independence and formed the Somali Republic in 1960. On 17 May 1991, the resistance movement and important groups in the former northern British colony, dissolved the union and declared formation of the Republic of Somaliland. This entity has since existed bearing characteristics generally attributed to a 'state' but devoid of international recognition. Somaliland's leaders still ask why recognition of their statehood has been withheld.

This article seeks to probe such comparisons and provide a considered overall assessment. It offers some historical, constitutional/legal context before comparing and contrasting the two liberation movements and their implications. These comparisons with Eritrea allows us a deeper grasp of the Somaliland situation by illustrating its uniqueness and salient peculiarities.
It also offers a perspective on a general issue post-cold war Africa is bound to confront: how far the principle of territorial integrity should be subordinate to what some consider a higher principle — the principle of self-determination. From the point of view of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), self-determination is to be exercised only once, at the time of decolonisation from European domination, and it is not subject to continuous review. The emerging post cold war environment is beginning to nourish a new thinking that is both flexible and pragmatic. Kenyan intellectual Michael Chege recently reignited old Africanist debates with the perspective: ‘There is nothing remiss about altering state frontiers in the nobler interests of domestic tranquility and sustained economic growth, which are now so scarce in these lands’ (Chege, 1992:153).

This article will sustain such debates: useful insights into the operation of the principle of self-determination and its problematic elements could be gained by an analysis of Somaliland’s and Eritrea’s comparative claims to political sovereignty. African states are more likely to confront movements demanding regional autonomy and implying federalism or neo-federalism than those demanding outright secession. However, the crucial difference involves historical timing: recent experience suggests militarist suppression of regional autonomy movements could transform them into separatist movements.

This comparison has also policy implications for the new states: Eritrea and Somaliland could learn from each other’s experiences. From Somaliland, Eritrea could gain greater sensitivities and flexibility in matters involving ethnic/clan issues; Somaliland could profit from Eritrean methods to evolve class and other cross-cutting identities and institutions. Both Eritrea and Somaliland can learn from Somalia’s multi-party parliamentary era (1960-1969). The article provides greater details on Somaliland and only summary analysis of Eritrea because there is hardly any serious publications on Somaliland while publications on Eritrea excel in both quantity and quality.

Historical and Constitutional Background
The British created the Somaliland Protectorate in the 1880s as a source of food and water supplies for their colony of Aden across the Red Sea. Aden provided a major port and harbour facilities for British commercial and navy ships on the strategic route between England and the 'jewel' colony of India. British Somaliland consists of a cooler plateau, including the capital Hargeisa, and a hotter, humid coastal zone where its main port, Berbera, is located. However, nowhere is the diversity of climates and culture as great as in Eritrea. The people are homogeneous in language, religion (Islam) and customs: social pluralism manifests itself in clan rather than ethnic cleavages. A majority belongs to the Isaq clan-family subdivided into several clans; on the eastern border are two clans of the Darod clan-family, the Dulbahantes and Warsangelis; on the west are two Dir clans, the Gadabursi and the Issas. Under British rule, a small urban elite formed, led by educated and trading factions which established civic associations and eventually political parties. Somaliland has a territory of 67,000 square miles, slightly larger than Eritrea's 50,000 square miles; however, its approximately three million population is roughly the same as Eritrea’s. Somaliland has ample pastoral resources threatened by environmental degradation; there are also hopeful possibilities of uncovering oil. Limited areas of agriculture exist, while fishery resources are yet to be explored to their fullest extent.
Somaliland’s unification with southern Somalia to form the Somali Republic involved different steps from those taken to unify Eritrea into Haile Selassie’s Ethiopian Empire. In all Somali territories the struggle for independence assumed a multi-party form in spite of the relatively homogeneous nature of Somali society. In 1943, during the British Military Administration of most of the Horn of Africa (including ex-Italian Somaliland and Eritrea), a nationalist party was born — the Somali Youth League (SYL) which came to dominate southern Somali politics and to advocate Pan-Somalism and irredentism. The leading nationalist party in British Somaliland was established in 1945 as the Somali National Society which, in 1951 adopted a new name, the Somali National League (SNL). The two parties shared similar objectives as they also did with parties that rose to challenge them in their respective territories (Touval, 1963:85-14).

At least one southern opposition party, though it subscribed to independence as the main goal, differed radically from average Somali nationalist parties of the period. The Hizb al-Dastuur Mustaqil al-Somali (Somali Independent Constitutional Party, HDMS) represented the Digil-Mirifle clan-family, more dependent on agriculture than pastoralists elsewhere settled between the two main rivers, the Shabelle and Juba, with Baidoa as their main city. This is the area that recently suffered a man-made famine prompting US/UN humanitarian military intervention. This clan-family speaks a different dialect of Somali and practices a somewhat different way of life due to their agro-pastoral environment. The HDMS pursued regional autonomy and federalism. As late as 1958, HDMS President Jelani Sheikh bin Sheikh, reiterated in a speech to a party convention that ‘the party has become convinced that the only method of unifying the Somalis ... is through a federal constitution which accords full regional autonomy’ (Touval, 1963:96-97).

According to one account, when the British Somaliland delegation came to Mogadishu for union negotiations, HDMS leaders approached them and impressed on them the need to opt for federal arrangements. Northern Premier Mohamed Ibrahim Egal went back to Hargeisa to advocate a gradualistic approach, but other politicians organised demonstrations against him as a ‘power hungry opportunist’. The two Somalilands rushed headlong into immediate union — unconditional, unitary and poorly prepared. The UN voted to move up Somalia’s independence date from 2 December to 1 July 1960. The British Government went on to announce that the British (northern) Somaliland Protectorate would become independent on 26 June 1960, five days before the independence of the UN Trusteeship territory of (southern) Somalia. This hasty decision put incredible, undeserved pressure on the politics and administration of the two territories. No committee had been appointed and charged with the official responsibility for drafting the legal instruments for the Union, and there was hardly any time for consultations (Contini, 1969:9).

It was anticipated that a representative of the independent northern Somaliland and southern Somaliland states would formally create the Union through the signing of an international treaty. The north drafted an Act of Union, had it approved by its legislative body and sent it to Mogadishu. Following approval by the legislative assembly in the south, it was to be signed by two respective representatives. The southern assembly never passed the proposed Act. However, it passed its own Atto di Unione, significantly different from the northern text. The following summary of the legal loose ends surrounding what Touval has termed the ‘precipitate Union is offered by Rajagopal and Carroll (1992:14) as follows:
(a) The Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law did not have any legal validity in the South; (b) the approval 'in principle' of the Atto de Unione, which was different from the above text, was legally inadequate; (c) the declaration of independence by the Provisional President was legally invalid since no Act of Union had been signed prior to his election, in accordance with the Constitution.

The de facto union experienced a lot of problems. Right at the outset, the Somali sense of proportional balance was ignored. The south provided the capital city, the anthem, the flag and the constitution. The parliament elected a southern president who nominated a southern prime minister. His cabinet included four northern ministers out of fourteen. Southerners occupied key ministries such as Foreign, Interior and Finance. The ex-northern premier was appointed Minister of Education. The posts of Army Commander and Police Commander went to southern officers; a northern became head of the Prison Division of the police and the Assembly elected a northern deputy as its first president. The north gave up the possibility of joining the British Commonwealth while the south openly flaunted its links with Italy. Italian legal experts drafted the Constitution in an undisguised attempt to graft Italian multi-party democracy on to independent Somalia. Before the British had agreed to grant independence to Somaliland, Italian officials had finalised the Constitution. Northern politicians and lawyers had virtually no chance to make even marginal changes in the draft.

Eritrea is located along 1,000 kms on the west coast of the Red Sea on the Horn of Africa. Somaliland (the term utilised here to refer to the former British Somaliland) is similarly located, separated from Eritrea by the tiny Republic of Djibouti — formerly French Somaliland. Eritrea’s modest land surface offers a great range of environmental and ethnic variety: highlands, deserts, the savannah and the severe volcanic ecology of South Arabia and the Djibouti zone, some areas suitable for agriculture, others for pastoralism. Eritrea consists of several ethnic groups: the highland Tigrinyans, for example, are culturally linked to the Tigray of Ethiopia and they both profess Coptic Christianity though some of them profess Islam. The Bejas on the coast and bordering the Sudan, and the Afar in the south, are Muslims by religion and pastoralists by occupation when compared to the farming highlanders. The Afars live in Eritrea, Djibouti and Ethiopia. Eritrea is a pluralist society of farmers and pastoralists from diverse ethnic groups, languages, religions.

Italy colonised Eritrea and the southern part of Somali territories, Italian Somaliland. With southern Somalia, therefore, Eritrea came to share similar colonial administrations including armed forces, educational systems, official languages as well as selected aspects of urban life, architecture and cuisine. Those who have visited both Asmara and Mogadishu have noticed such similarities. Under Italian rule, Eritreans developed a modest working class and a miniscule trading elite and with these elements, early forms of modern national consciousness. Civic associations including trade unions flourished until they were suppressed by Haile Selassie in the 1950s and 1960s (Trevaskis, 1960).

After the defeat of Italy, the UN took up the fate of Eritrea and debated three options: (1) union with Ethiopia, (2) federation with Ethiopia, and (3) independence preceded by a ten year trusteeship under UN administration as was the case with ex-Italian Somalia. Haile Selassie obtained strong US lobbying support to link Eritrea to Ethiopia in exchange for a military base at Kagnew in Eritrea. The UN rejected option (1) and (3) and opted for (2) federation. It did not
take long before Selassie made it crystal clear that for him options (1) and (2) are one and the same; he had no tolerance for 'legislature' or a division of powers and totally ignored all constitutional elements of the UN pact.

The Politics of Union
Technically, the Ethiopian-Eritrean federation lasted from 1950 to 1962 when the Emperor unilaterally annexed Eritrea as an Ethiopian province subject to his brutal, dictatorial rule and ended all hopes implied in the status of federal autonomy. The exodus of Eritrean elites opposed to the union accelerated. In 1961 they established the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) from which, in 1970, a more ideologically self-conscious Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) emerged. Both groups engaged in hit and run tactics during their early years. The fall of the Emperor in 1974 brought some hope in that the new Mengistu regime proclaimed itself socialist in orientation and consolidated strong military and diplomatic links with the USSR and Cuba. Before long it became clear that Mengistu did not even intend to revive the abolished federation. He sought huge amounts of Soviet arms in order to crush the Eritrean resistance movement. The long struggle served to integrate ever widening circles of the population transforming it from a series of episodic military confrontations to a popular people’s war (Selassie, 1980).

The politics of the Somali Union are in two main phases: multi-party parliamentary politics giving room for negotiations and bargaining processes, and oppressive militarist policies under Siyad Barre. A few months after independence, northern irredentist nationalist feelings began to sour. The resultant resentments in the north were overwhelmingly manifested in the referendum on the Constitution on 20 June 1961. The SNL vigorously campaigned against the Constitution and advocated a boycott. Suffrage included all adult men and women, the latter voting for the first time. Estimates indicate that the north had a population of 650,000 in 1961; only 100,000 persons voted, indicating that at least half the electorate boycotted the referendum. In addition, out of the just over 100,000 recorded vote more than half opposed the Constitution (Lewis, 1965:172, 219 and note 5). The major cities of the north — Hargeisa (72%), Berbera (69%), Burao (66%) and Erigavo (69%) — all returned negative votes. In southern Somalia, the HDMS and at least two other opposition parties campaigned against the Constitution; however, the Government recorded more than one million eight hundred thousand votes in favour of ratification. An insignificant village called Wanla Weyn not far from Mogadishu is reported to have registered a yes vote higher than the total northern vote! This gave Northerners a new political term, Wanla Weyn used somewhat pejoratively for all Southerners. It is more than a geographic label, it is a Somali equivalent of Tammany Hall that implies ‘those who fear central government, those who participate in or condone political corruption.’ This is one of a series of events that convinced Northerners that their political culture is different from that of the south.

The newly formed Government did not pay heed to the warnings and in December 1961, the recently united Somali Republic experienced the first attempted military coup in sub-Saharan Africa. Sandhurst-trained lieutenants of the former (British) Somaliland Scouts resented the Italian trained commanding officers imported from Mogadishu. Led by the popular Hassan Keid, northern
officers felt corporate interests, personal ambition and regional grudges ignited following the 'precipitate union'. This abortive military coup had unmistakable secessionist objectives; however, the people, not yet ready for a radical break with Mogadishu, opposed it and it failed. Paradoxically, the absence of a legally valid Act of Union assisted their defence at their trial. The judge listened to different arguments but decided to 'acquit them on the basis that, in the absence of an Act of Union, the court had no jurisdiction over Somaliland' (Rajagopal and Carroll, 1992:14).

During the first five years or so, the Union experienced serious difficulties in amalgamating different administrative, judicial, and economic systems. A written form for Somali was not decided until under military rule in 1972. The post-independence bureaucracy, therefore, resembled the Tower of Babel: English, Italian and Arabic were all used as official languages in a haphazard manner. When UNESCO and other significant donors influenced the Government to adopt English in a unified educational system, southern civil servants were enraged and this exacerbated regional tensions. Northerners resented the involvement in politics of the civil service in the south; they believed it had learned about bureaucratic and political corruption from the Italians. In the north, songs and poems began to appear criticising the Union. In one of them composed in 1964 by poet and song writer Ali Sugule, entitled 'Let me remind you', he argues that the north would have gained better political and economic advantages had it refused to join Mogadishu until all the missing Somali territories joined Somaliland’s natural cultural and economic hinterland consists of Ethiopian Somaliland and Djibouti.

Northern politicians tried to manipulate the existing party and government system to reduce the inequalities experienced. Former Premier of the north, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, resigned from the cabinet and formed a new opposition party, the Somali National Congress (SNC) together with veteran southern opposition politician, Sheikh Ali Jiumale. The 1964 national elections were the country's first post-independence elections. Out of a total of 123 parliamentary seats (33 for the north, 90 for the south), the SYL won 54, the SNC 22 seats, the HDMS won nine seats and a left-leaning opposition party, the Somali Democratic Union (SDU), won 15 seats. The impatient and ambitious Egal decided that, given unequal financial and other resources, it was very difficult to defeat the ruling party, SYL. Soon after the 1964 elections, he joined the SYL and supported former Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Shermarke in his 1967 presidential elections against incumbent President Aden Abdullah Osman. The new President nominated Mohamed Ibrahim Egal as first northern Prime Minister of the Republic. Egal raised the number of cabinet ministers as he sought to include every major clan-family, as well as some members of his former party, SNC. As the post-independent years passed, national political parties degenerated: a general atmosphere of cut-throat competition, corruption, incompetence and irresponsibility afflicted the nation. Things got out of hand during and after the 1969 elections; the semi-democratic system began to teeter on the verge of collapse.

Conflicts with Ethiopia over the fate of Somalis living under the imperial flag, led the civilian leaders to Moscow for what they deemed adequate military assistance. Eager to obtain a strategic foothold in black Africa, the USSR obliged and helped Somalia create one of the largest and best equipped armies in sub-Saharan Africa. While visiting drought-stricken areas in northeast Somalia,
President Sharmarke was assassinated by a policeman on 15 October 1969. The parliament gathered on the evening of the 20th to choose his successor. During the early hours of 21 October 1969, Commander of the Somali National Army, Mohamed Siyad Barre engineered a successful coup and Somalia came under military rule.

For Somaliland, semi-colonial oppression came with Siyad’s military regime. Though highly centralised and authoritarian, initially the regime promised a series of socio-economic reforms under the banner of ‘scientific socialism’. In 1972, the Supreme Revolutionary Council decreed the Latin script as the orthography for Somali and conducted urban and rural literacy campaigns. For a while it seemed that Somali nationalism had reached its peak. Even in those calmer days, Siyad showed that he was more than willing to deprive the north of its fair share of development funds and projects. The area came to rely mostly on its local and foreign-based business and professional elite. Then, Selassie fell, and the Ethiopian civil war tempted Siyad to invade Ethiopia to ‘liberate’ the Somali-speaking region (so-called Ogaden) by military force. Cold war logic reigned supreme. The Soviets had trained a Somali army that Siyad increased to 37,000 at the onset of the Ethio-Somali War of 1977-78. The US had trained and equipped a larger Ethiopian army. New Ethiopian leader Mengistu brought Ethiopia under Soviet patronage as Somalia switched sides and came under the US umbrella.

Siyad dropped his socialist facade and adopted clanism (tribalism) as a manipulative tool to continue to hold on to power after a Soviet led Cuban-Ethiopian offensive pushed his army from the Ogaden. By 1982, he had built the army into a force 120,000 strong for internal repression. In rural areas he encouraged clan based conflicts and in urban areas clan based massacres by his notorious specialised military units. He singled out the Isaq clan-family in Somaliland for neo-fascist type of punishment. Somali scholar Ian Lewis confirms this from his own eyewitness account:

From the early 1980s, the north was administered by increasingly harsh military rule with savage reprisals meted out to the assumedly pro-SNM local population who were subject to severe economic, as well as political harassment. The north, as I saw when I last visited it in 1985, began to look and feel like a colony under a foreign military tyranny (Lewis, 1990:58).

Semi-colonial subjugation helped rekindle collective self-assertion which the northern clan-based opposition movement, the Somali National Movement (SNM) channelled into the declaration of the Somaliland Republic soon after the Siyad dictatorship fell early in 1991.

The Dialectic of Military and Socio-political Aspects
The long drawn out Eritrean struggle is too well known to need detailed recounting. It began as episodic ambushes in the 1960s, but by 1975-77 Eritrean armed struggles were able to open extensive liberated zones supported by external links in nearby Sudan and elsewhere: a gradual metamorphosis of the military struggle led to the crystallisation of a counter-government with an active social programme — operating clinics, schools, courts and political education campaigns (Gebre-Medhin, 1989). From episodic hit and run military tactics, the EPLF was been able to transform its small-scale military operations into a full-scale people’s war. Some of the Somali armed opposition movements never
graduated beyond episodic ambushes. The northern movement (SNM) transformed its armed struggles to a people's war during 1988 and after. The major southern armed group, the United Somali Congress (USC) led by General Aideed, was only able to do so at what was literally the last minute, the 1990-91 period.

Struggles against the Siyad dictatorship came to be symbolised by clan-based decentralised armed opposition groups operating from sanctuaries in Ethiopia. After failing in an anti-Siyad coup in 1978, military officer Abdullahi Yusuf automatically fled to Ethiopia where he established the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). This movement, which later atrophied, made a pioneering contribution: it showed others coming later, that Siyad's military rule could be challenged by armed groups based in Ethiopia. Following the SSDF's decline after a brief period of hit-and-run tactics, Siyad was able to entice many of its ex-fighters in Ethiopia to return and constitute the spearhead of his brutal wars against the Isaq in the north, and later against the Hawiye in Mogadishu. By 1990-91, the SSDF was reduced to a phantom organisation, though it is now active once again in northeast Somalia. It is the proto-political organisation that serves an official role in those regions.

The Isaq based Somali National Movement (SNM) formed in 1981, first tried to organise a movement from London but soon decided to move to Ethiopian Somali towns and villages close to the border with the Somali Democratic Republic. The SNM, it is alleged, was repulsed by Qaddafi and was forced to rely mostly on funds raised monthly by the Somali (Isaq) communities in the Gulf, in other Arab states, East Africa, and in various western countries. This self-reliant method gave the movement relative independence and obliged it to be accountable to its numerous supporters. Accordingly, it evolved a more democratic approach: it has held popular congresses periodically during which it has elected its leaders and evolved its policies. So far, only one leader has been elected to serve two terms (four years) — the energetic Ahmed Mohamed Mahamud 'Siilanyo'. Leadership rotation has been an article of faith. It held six or seven elections from 1981 until 1990. Contradictions among its leaders and supporting clans are handled politically not militarily. The SNM claims it bargained with Mengistu purely as a matter of political expediency. The SNM played an indirect role in the formation of the USC, an armed movement based on the Hawiye clan-family which inhabits the central regions of the country including the capital city of Mogadishu. It also encouraged a group of Ogaden soldiers who defected from Siyad's army to go to the Kismayu area and join their clan members in forming the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM).

By the mid-1980s Somali armed opposition movements were more like the youthful ELF rather than the disciplined EPLF. Led by externally based leaders, they were engaged in hit and run tactics. To a greater extent than the EPLF, the ELF had a leadership that led the struggle from foreign capitals where they were involved in fund-raising and information activities. Later on most of them were removed from their positions and replaced by leaders who were field fighters. By 1987-88 many of the SNM leaders abroad began to establish themselves in the field. By then they had become aware that they might lose their influence to field fighters. Dictators Mengistu and Siyad met in Djibouti in January 1986 on the occasion of the first summit launching the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). The two states opened negotiations aimed at normalizing their relations. The SNM was alarmed and began to discuss
alternative options. In 1988 the Ethiopian-Somali agreements were signed and Siyad disbanded his puppet anti-Ethiopian organisation, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSFL). His main object was to induce Mengistu to destroy the SNM. The Ethiopian dictator turned out to be more Machiavellian than Siyad on this issue: he did not disarm the SNM as Siyad had hoped. He told them to wind up military activities from Ethiopian soil but that they could go on living as political exiles. Siyad achieved the opposite of what he wanted. The SNM decided to take all the forces in their command and launch surprise attacks on government garrisons in the main northern Somali cities of Hargeisa and Burao.

Siyad used aerial bombing and heavy artillery to chase about one million of the population in Isaaq territories into refugee camps across the border into Ethiopian Somaliland. These momentous events finally brought the SNM into close, organic links with the population whom it claimed to represent. In addition to the SNM Central Committee, they were obliged to constitute a Council of Elders (Guurti) which proved most effective in resolving disputes, supervising the fair and just distribution of food and other assistance, recruiting fighters for the various fronts and, after the fall of the Siyad dictatorship, took the lead in disarming the mischievous young volunteer fighters, the so-called children's army. Nevertheless, there are still pockets of unrepentant youths roaming about with their armed vehicles, the 'technicals'. Siyad’s brutal counter offensive only reestablished his huge army’s control of the main cities, most of the countryside came under SNM control. By 1988 then, the SNM had liberated zones which were analysed by Basil Davidson as 'proof of a nationalist fighting movement’s efficacy, a demonstration of what is to come after victory, but also a vital means of achieving that victory' (Davidson, 1969:117-18).

The SNM military campaign of 1988 constituted an offensive so surprising and tactically destructive that the enemy was rendered incapable of careful, planned and effective resistance. Prior to this, the SNM utilised terrorist hit and run tactics, including selected assassinations of government officials and the freeing of political prisoners from maximum security jails. The guerrillas made effective use of superior local knowledge for hiding, sniping, sudden ambushes, quick escapes, timed to produce the greatest possible psychological effects. After 1988 the SNM, for all practical purposes, came to constitute a counter-government with all the responsibilities that go with that transformation.

The SNM tried its best to coordinate its use of violence with organisation, propaganda and information, although here, its record fell far short of that of the disciplined EPLF. However, it did subordinate violence as a means to clearly stated political ends. The Siyad’s oppressive military machine, on the other hand, used violence for war and for internal repression without any attempt to subordinate it to the overall objectives and operation of which it was a part. This element became even more pronounced following SNM’s strategic occupation of the north: sheer joy in sadistic excess, not even chastened by expediency, meant that the military regime deserved the label ‘fascist or neo-fascist’. The shocking destruction of Hargeisa and Burao (Somalia’s second and third largest cities), for example, does not seem to correspond to any rational political or military objectives. Had Siyad’s aim been to win and turn Hargeisa into an Ogadeni settler-city, as some alleged, he would definitely have needed houses to shelter them instead of the horrendous rubble confronting us today. Had he felt unable to win the war militarily, then surely he should have pursued a compromise with Isaaq leaders and elders. According to some, this was what a minority of his
advisers were advocating but a number of those advocating compromises were
jailed in the critical 1982-84 period. In 1991, Somaliland refugees returning from
Ethiopia could not believe the scale of the destruction they encountered; the
shock strengthened their resolve to support the independence proclamation.

A contrast between the EPLF and SNM military organisations offers insights into
their socio-political orientations. They both have in common the policy in which
politics must command arms and not vice versa. The SNM recalls a brief period
when its armed wing led by ex-Somali National Army officers took over the
organisation, but that was never allowed to last very long. The temporary putsch
was led by a talented former military officer of the Somali National Army,
Colonel Abdulkadr Kosar, who used to participate in OAU Liberation
Committee military training programmes. Apart from this, albeit crucial factor,
the two movements differ in several ways. First of all there is the time factor
which facilitates a ripening or maturing process: the ELF was active as of
September 1961; its splinter organisation, the EPLF, emerged in 1970 and
subsequently came to exercise hegemony and rule Eritrea since mid-1991.

In a much more decisive way than the SNM, the EPLF attracted strong, consistent
support from professional and working class Eritreans abroad. These exiled
groups created organisations for fund-raising, policy research and public
education abroad. Women are said to constitute over a third of the EPLF army,
while in the SNM small groups of women served mostly as nurses or in related
auxiliary services. In areas under its control, the EPLF initiated remarkable
experiments in social transformation and land reforms. The SNM has had no
'class struggle' approach partly because Somaliland has no significant agrarian
based class formation. The EPLF stressed mass political education while the SNM
approach on this was 'superficial'. It is important to stress that this is not due to
ignorance, neglect or sheer laziness; on the contrary, it is due to the EPLF, with its
radical marxist origins, wishing to go beyond 'flag independence' by transform-
ing civil society itself. The SNM tends to accept its own civil society and to rely on
its elders and its politics of compromise. The EPLF provided vanguard oriented
village and social organisations for democratic participation. The SNM relied on
surviving traditional and neo-traditional structures involving clan elders and
religious notables. Thus, embryonic forms of radical social democracy in Eritrea
and clan-based power-sharing or consociational democracy in Somaliland began
to emerge during the very different number of years of armed struggle.

Upon capturing ample supplies of Soviet made heavy armaments in 1984, the
EPLF transformed its guerilla army into a formidable, disciplined, well-
organised national army crucial in the 1992 onslaught against Mengistu's forces
and the capture of Addis Ababa. The SNM never graduated beyond a guerilla
army into a conventional army though it has an ample supply of officers trained
in conventional warfare. Its longer, disciplined and organised experience has
given the EPLF charismatic leaders and a core of dedicated cadres. The SNM has
striven for 'consensual leaders' partly because Somali pastoral society tends to
shun 'charismatic' leaders — in spite of Siyad's brutal attempt to impose his own
savage and distorted brand. EPLF congresses are run and directed by militants.
Somali pastoral democratic tradition which often militates against military
discipline and efficient administration, dictates that SNM congresses be open, at
times chaotic, always full of surprises, because they are full of compromises. The
potential danger facing Somaliland: pastoral 'anarchy'; that facing Eritrea:
'vanguard authoritarianism'. French researcher Gerard Prunier who travelled
within SNM liberated territories and attended the February-March 1990 SNM Congress held in Bale Gubadle, offers similar insights:

The first remark that comes to the mind when one travels through the SNM-held areas is what a perfectly well-adapted guerilla force it is — and what a poor regular army. The SNM is a close expression of the people . . . it is as much at home in its environment as the ubiquitous camel (1990-91:112).

Prunier noted that the SNM suffered from poor logistics, poor discipline and strategic incoherence (this third defect is probably a corollary of ‘pastoral democracy’). Lacking the heavy armaments of the EPLF, the SNM most mechanised equipment is ironically called a ‘technical’ — recoilless rifles and Zug automatic cannons mounted on Toyotas or other four-wheel drive (pickup type) vehicles, made world famous by media coverage of Mogadishu violence. The question of poor logistics is crucial: from a political economy point of view, this is what prevents the SNM from transcending its decentralised, voluntary, clan recruited guerilla militia phase into a centralised, disciplined army. Prunier concluded:

My estimate of the SNM (the real figures are ‘a military secret’ but my feeling is that nobody really knows them) is that it has about 4,000 regulars. But that figure means little, since it can bring together, in about a week’s time, ten times that number of fighters. In a pinch, every man (and even some women — I have seen them) can become a fighter. The problem is how to feed these people. Dispersed they survive more or less well in their respective areas; brought together, they quickly starve. Nowhere is there a sufficient store of food to enable a ten or fifteen thousand men army to stay together more than four or five days. And even if such a store of food existed, there would still be the problem of bringing it where it would have to be used (1990-91:112-13).

The Somali environment and resources favours organisational as well as survival strategies based on decentralisation, often extreme decentralisation. The political cultural context includes the segmentary clan system and anarchistic individualism. It is true that material conditions hinder the development of a centralised army just as they have obstructed the development of a centralised Somali state throughout history. It is also true that contemporary Somali public opinion is against the formation of a strong central army. Most of the Somaliland contacts interviewed during 1991 advocate the formation of decentralised locally-controlled police forces whose recruitment takes into account issues of merit, proportionality and clan balance. Many rejected the idea of a new ‘army’ — as a reaction to Siyad’s brutal army and in awareness of the socio-economic issues raised above. They favour popular militias to be raised as and when needed, drawing upon the SNM experience. Another consequence of SNM clan sensitivities is the belief that a clan cannot be ‘liberated’ or ‘developed’ by another clan. Thus, during the war, non-Isaq deserters who sympathised with the SNM were encouraged to operate alongside the SNM, but form their own units and, eventually, their own organisations. Each clan must learn to liberate itself. Even among the clans constituting the Isaaq clan-family, the SNM encouraged wide political and military space under its loose umbrella to avoid petty conflicts. Asked why the SNM did not fight with its allies in southern Somalia, an SNM volunteer responded in a realistic, self-critical mood: ‘Who knows, we might behave as badly down there as THEY have up here’ (Prunier, 1990-91:119). The key concern is ‘never again’ to let them ‘behave badly’ in the north.
Implications for Democratisation

Power Sharing Democracy
The democratisation form compatible with SNM experience may be termed consociational or power-sharing democracy (Steiner, 1991). Power-sharing facilitates reciprocal recognitions in societies fragmented by ethnic, clan, religious and/or linguistic cleavages. Consociational democracy (industrial versions of which are practiced in Switzerland, Belgium and Austria for example) recognises and acknowledges ethnic, clan or religious cleavages in constituting cabinets and parliaments, while civil service and army recruitment are conducted on the basis of both merit and proportionality — utilising mechanisms similar to those of affirmative action procedures in the US. Attempts at forming governments on the basis of grand coalitions are encouraged to reduce competition and potential conflicts. Each significant subgroup is allowed the right to veto legislation that is directly against an issue which it considers vital to its survival and well-being. Leaders must be endorsed by their own particular group in order to reflect the legitimacy needed to broker binding inter-group decisions and undertakings. In this connection, recent Oromo Liberation Front allegations that the new Ethiopian regime is creating 'artificial leaders' for the Oromos and other ethnic groups could, in the long run, jeopardise Ethiopia's embryonic experiment with 'ethnic democracy'. Since Ethiopia is so much larger in size and population than Eritrea and Somaliland, its initial attempts to establish consociationalism have appeared clumsy and confusing. Size also obliges Ethiopia to favour federalism and local autonomy to give consociationalism an implementation chance. On the other hand, the TPLF with its vanguard party experience, may be tempted to imitate Eritrea with its class oriented radical social democracy. Consociationalism is often strengthened by federal structures, decentralisation and local autonomy.

Ethnic or clan based powersharing democracy is facilitated if the groups involved share a common vision and common history (in this case the history of British Somaliland as a separate entity, memories of inequities with the south and Siyad's military oppression), the various groups occupy more or less defined areas and share similar perspectives on external threats. None of the groups exercises hegemony, they are more or less equal. It is also important that the Ethiopian and Somaliland experiments in 'ethnic democracy' not be overwhelmed by staggering socio-economic burdens. Ethiopia receives considerable external assistance but Somaliland has not even received its share as allocated by the UN. Problems are bound to arise if such a state of affairs is allowed to continue for long.

During its early years, the SNM represented an elitist, external, armed guerilla band claiming to represent the people in the north — the Isaq community in particular. Following their 1988 occupation of the north, Siyad's savage air and artillery attacks caused most of the urban population to flee to rural areas as displaced persons; a sizeable group of about 800,000 crossed the Ethiopian border to merge as refugees in several camps: Harchin, Dulhaad, Bele Abokor, Balyeleh, Harta Sheikh, Daror and Rabaso. In and around these camps, as well as among the displaced, the SNM began to emerge from the Isaq population. It is within this context that the elders — secular, clan leaders and the religious — came to play critical roles in organising the distribution of food aid and other forms of relief, in adjudicating disputes and in recruiting fighters for the SNM. They came to form a Council of Elders, or Gunrti in Somali which, as time passed,
Somaliland in Contrast to Eritrea

grew in importance. It is to constitute one of the two legislative houses proposed in the constitution to be drafted for Somaliland. The Guurti reached its pinnacle early this year when it called a Grand National Reconciliation Conference in Borama (a non-Isaq town) and helped elect independence era leader Mohamed Ibrahim Egal as the second President of the de facto Republic of Somaliland. In order to make a whole series of binding compromises, the Borama Conference lasted from February until May of 1993. In composition and functioning, the Guurti derives its inspiration from traditional Somali power-sharing style. In this way, consociationalism could facilitate an evolution to multipartism.

The February-May Borama Conference conducted several tasks. It spent considerable time adjudicating clan conflicts and disputes between neighbours since it views peace and reconciliation as its primary task. It discussed the major provisions of an anticipated Constitution and recommended, for example, that the structure of government be based on a President/Vice-President model rather than a President/Prime Minister model. They recommended the strict separation of the judiciary from executive and legislative powers and bodies. They formally endorsed a National Assembly or Parliament consisting of two chambers, a Council of Elders and a lower popular Chamber of Representatives. On an interim basis, both of these latter exist together with a President (Isaq), Vice-President (non-Isaq from the Borama area) and a Cabinet selected according to the initiatives of the President but sensitive to issues of merit and clan representativeness.

The Guurti is chosen according to traditional rules of protocol, historical precedent and proportionality. At present, Somaliland is trying to avoid the pitfalls of direct, competitive multi-party elections that negatively politicised clanism and produced chaos and the military coup during the 1960-69 period. Elections to the lower chamber consist of a series of mini-elections involving the groups and subgroups that are party to the Somaliland experiment. These have resulted in a chamber dominated by modern elites: former politicians, businessmen, teachers and other civil servants, leaders of women’s and other civil society organisations. At a recent regional meeting of a council of elders in Erigavo (eastern zone) participants recommended that, in the future, the Guurti be given more powers than the popular lower Chamber. The Borama Conference elected an electoral body of 150 (elders, politicians, SNM cadres, civil servant and civil society leaders) who went on to conduct competitive elections resulting in the election of veteran politician Ibrahim Mohamed Egal as the second Somaliland President (Abdurahman Tuur was President from 1991-93) and veteran SNM leader Abdurahman Aw Ali as his Vice-President. As a variant of liberal democracy, consociationalism stresses process over product: disappointed SNM leaders were encouraged to accept the results and bide their time until the next elections in two years time. A majority of the population — the elders in particular — have confidence in Egal as an experienced leader and wish to give him a second chance. It is indeed an irony of history that the person delegated to consummate union with ex-Italian Somalia is today charged with the task of guiding Somaliland out of the union!

Radical Social Democracy

Radical social democracy frowns upon ethnic, clan, religious and related cleavages, even prohibiting using such labels or forming organisations on their basis. It tends to stress a social class perspective to transcend primordial
cleavages. The EPLF version has a participatory democratic vision which may not prove easy to sustain in the long run. While Somaliland encourages unbridled market mechanisms, Eritrea appears bent on experimenting with its own form of planned or at least guided economy, though markets will be allowed to play economic roles.

The EPLF has declared that multipartism in the long run. At their recent Third Congress (February 1994), however, they have indicated that such a transition might take a further four years. Radical social democracy tends to lean towards one partyism. It favours popular participation in various levels of decision-making and administration and policies favouring distributive equity among the people. Radical social democracy encourages ongoing democratic participation in cooperative farms, social organisations for women, youth and professionals, trade unions, schools and universities, as well as within the armed forces and the ruling party. EPLF’s revolutionary experience not only facilitated such participation, it was indispensable for its success. Will the people sustain such high levels of popular involvement several years from now?

Radical social democracy tends to put a premium on exceptional leaders and dedicated cadres. However, as time passes, the tendency towards ordinary if not corrupt leaders tends to emerge — the ‘banalisation’ of politics (Bayart, 1993:228-259). In relying on the spontaneous virtues of revolutionary leaders, radical social democracy tends to overlook the need to establish detailed systematic checks and balances of power. While radical social democracy neglects electoral competition and related mechanisms, it stresses the substantive issues — emancipation of women, combating poverty, broadly based participation and social transformations. Consociational democracy concentrates on procedures and mechanisms, as well as elaborate traditional protocol in its Somaliland version, at the expense of democratic content.

One hopes Somaliland’s evolving consociational democracy will be blessed with at least a reasonable number of responsible and socially aware political parties and leaders with a vision of development that includes broad social benefits. Otherwise, development efforts would degenerate into a crude sum of individual entrepreneurial actions with large net costs to society. Once a stable power-sharing democratic system is in place, consistent efforts have to be made in order to both conserve and transcend ascriptive clan identities — otherwise a pastoral democracy would eventually degenerate into pastoral anarchy. Unless Eritrea develops greater sensitivities to consociational issues which could prove critical given its natural diversity and sociocultural, ethnic and religious pluralism, then the EPLF could find itself sitting on the slippery slope leading towards authoritarianism or conflict.

And now we must confront what could turn out to be a critical question: what would happen if minority groups, in their turn, tried to secede from these new entities? Does the right to self-determination cease to exist at ‘independence’? Both movements challenged this before, but how about now that the dagger is pointed at them? This is already partly the case with Eritrea and the Afars. To try and give a detailed answer to this intricate issue would require analysis of at least the following factors: vision, ideology and basic beliefs; resources, including organisational capacity; military capabilities and legal/diplomatic status. Both countries are very poor, however Eritrea’s infrastructures have not been as devastated as those of Somaliland. Eritrea hopes to rapidly develop its resources
to provide for all national minorities. Somaliland would offer a free market, an opportunity to use virtually open borders to trade from and to East Africa, through Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and from and to Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

We have already seen how even the SNM militia army is based on clans controlling their own particular territories. On the issue of military capabilities, the differences between Eritrea and Somaliland are vast. However it cannot be automatically assumed that the availability of military capacity in Eritrea would automatically lead to militarist policies and practices. The leader is in many ways a relatively free agent of history: it is he who will, ultimately, have to make the ethical choice between conceding or denying others the right to self-determination for which he and the nation had sacrificed so much during violent years of struggle. He also has several options short of repression and secession.

Eritrea has a clear advantage over Somaliland with regards to international recognition. In May 1993, Eritrea translated de facto into de jure statehood. With such a status change come numerous economic and political advantages, including having one's borders proclaimed sacrosanct. Therefore, what should happen if the Afars, for example, struggle to unite with their kin groups across borders into Ethiopia and Djibouti and Eritrea refuses: the international community would support and aid Eritrea, should it opt for coercive policies. Should such a scenario unfold, we can say that the wheel has come around full circle. Perhaps the best antidote against secession is democracy: federalism helps but can only be strengthened and made more effective through democratisation. Northerners were angered and bitterly disappointed by the 1960 Somali Union, but they did not opt for secessionist politics because they felt open parliamentary politics gave them a chance to right some of their felt wrongs during the 1960-69 period. Siyad's military regime offered no such hope pushing them to armed self-determination and secession.

Political decentralization along federalist lines is of course no panacea. To be effective it must be underpinned by democratic principles and institutions. These must include, above all, scrupulous observation of individual rights and the rule of law, safeguards for minorities and the separation of political power to check the rise of autocrats' (Chege, 1992:152) (emphasis added).

Conclusions
The 1960 temporary secession of Katanga from the then Congo (Zaïre) was engineered by white settlers and international mining and financial interests. Biafra represented an elite preemptive strike which eventually fizzled out once it became clear that the Nigerian army was not bent on Ibo genocide; on the contrary, Biafra was welcomed back into the Nigerian federation. Eritrea's and to a lesser extent Somaliland's claims to self-determination are grounded on a historic consciousness of oppression, surviving military annihilation perpetuated by indigenous systems of oppression. Unlike Biafra and Katanga, Eritrea and Somaliland also have stronger juridical claims: each had existed for eighty years or more as a distinct colonial territory. In this sense they are within the spirit, and the Eritrean's would also claims, the letter of the OAU code. Even though Somaliland as a historical project commenced with the defensive military actions of the overtly oppressed Isaq clan, simplistic clan claims have been radically altered through articulation in territorial terms — facilitating power-sharing
negotiations with non-Isaq clans within the territory as was achieved in Borama and other reconciliation conferences. A territorial approach also allows the SNM to avoid any suggestion about incorporating the sizeable Isaq population within the Haud and Reserved Areas of Ethiopia's Region 5 (Markakis, 1990).

At the international level, both law and state interests confer a powerful advantage to the existing states. The recent collapse of communism has allowed Western states to break this state sovereignty taboo in an enthusiastic rush to recognise the dismemberment of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Other parts of the world, especially Africa where the OAU code continues to exert its influence, have not been treated by the same standards. Prior to recent events, Bangladesh provided a rare case of a secession that won international recognition. This was due to geography — East Pakistan (Bangladesh) separated by Indian territory from West Pakistan — as well as the decisive intervention of the Indian army and India's diplomatic offensive. Compared to Somaliland, Eritrea had presented an impressive and energetic justification for separation aimed at external audiences — mostly sympathetic organisations and circles within Western societies. However remarkable, they were not enough to win international recognition. This came about through the most compelling argument of all — outstanding military success. Somaliland also won military success allowing it to proclaim a de facto Republic. During its long struggle, Eritrea was able to assist an ally in the neighbouring Ethiopian province of Tigray, the TPLF. As the Mengistu regime decomposed, TPLF forces in coalition with other Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) forces and backed by organised EPLF troops, armoured units and tanks, moved on to capture the capital Addis Ababa itself and install an EPRDF government. Outstanding military success, principle and kinship (the Tigrinya element) paved the way for Eritrean recognition by the new Ethiopian regime. Once Ethiopia itself stood ready to sanction the separation, the OAU ruling became irrelevant.

The clan structure and operations of Somali society could not permit the SNM to play a similar role with groups like the USC in the south. A 'clan does not liberate another clan' has been an SNM principle. Somaliland, like Eritrea, would like to separate with the blessings of Mogadishu which has yet to constitute a recognised central authority. There are important elements in the south who are sympathetic to the issue of autonomy (not independence) for Somaliland. It is possible that north-south conflicts could flare up again, creating a Yugoslav type scenario which could be highly influenced by the military and diplomatic posture of Ethiopia. An Eritrean-type scenario constitutes a second option. Should international opinion lean towards this solution, Somaliland would have to conduct a just and fair popular referendum to earn the international legitimacy now enjoyed by Eritrea.

For want of a better expression, a third option could be termed the confederal solution: a two equal states arrangement representing greater autonomy than say the federated state of Quebec. Internally, Somaliland may constitutionally have a President (who may automatically assume the title of First Vice-President or even Co-President of the Confederation). Somaliland would have and control its own police forces (army, in case armies are established); it would have its own separate parliament, cabinet and civil service. Somaliland could be admitted to United Nations membership (following the precedent of the Ukraine and Byelorussia, for example). Somaliland would gain virtually all the substance of an independent state retaining slim, practical links: currency, passports, jointly
shared foreign embassies. It is beyond the focus of this article to pursue such speculations. It is up to the people of Somaliland to exercise their hard won de facto self-determination the best way possible. Meanwhile, however, it is important to narrow the gap in political cultures. Since 1991, while Somaliland has rotated leaders through elections and solved conflicts through extended negotiations, the south has been dominated by warring warlords. There are pockets of local power sharing authorities in southern Somalia but the overall situation is held hostage (the capital city in particular) by intense faction fighting — a form of decentralised Siyadism. And so the final outcome in Somaliland remains indeterminate. Somalilanders hope that, in the long run, the de facto situation may become irreversible.

The United Nations has an inbuilt hostility toward dismemberment of states which are full members. Thus, the UN has been reluctant to provide Somaliland with the assistance its problems deserves. The UN has also avoided taking the military position it took versus Katanga. Following its debacle against General Aidid, the UN has shown more flexibility towards Somaliland: referring to its government as ‘the Egal Administration’ instead of the previous ‘community leaders of the northwest’. In one of his Reports to the Security Council, the Secretary General Boutros Ghali observed:

*I am aware of the very delicate question of the secession proclamation in the north . . . The deployment of UNOSOM to the north would not prejudice in any way the decision of the Somali people on their national future* (Ghali, 1993:21).

Few states in Africa are economically ‘viable’ in the strict sense of the term. Political rather than economic viability criteria were used to recognised most of the states that seceded since 1989. However, a discussion on democratic possibilities for Eritrea and Somaliland cannot ignore linkages with socio-economic developments. Perhaps one day both countries may discover oil and other mineral resources, but until they do, the spectre of serious underdevelopment will continue to haunt them. Long-range economic viability depends on the creation of a Horn of Africa Commonwealth or Common Market — an example of the potential fission and fusion of national borders based on free choice, reciprocal recognitions and mutual advantages. The Commonwealth would consist of the following core countries: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia/Somaliland. Currently, good relations exist between all these countries. Ethiopia forms a natural and potentially wealthy hinterland for Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia/Somaliland. A coordinating organisation has already been formed in 1986 consisting of the core plus Kenya, Uganda and the Sudan — the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD).

In evolving a radical social democratic state, the EPLF relied on its long military and socio-political experience as well as its marxist background. It is also a response to guiding a country as diverse as Eritrea which contains about nine major ethnic groups and three religious traditions. Some of the ethnic groups (the Afars, for example), have traditional structures similar to the Somalis; the Tigrinya on the other hand, have had centralised politics like the Amhara. Radical social democratic institutions attempt to penetrate and influence all equally. Hopefully, Eritrea will resist moves to quell pluralism; tolerating ethnic identities could turn apparent problems into assets. Should significant propositions demand it, Eritrean leaders would be wise to allow for multi-partyism well before the four year deadline. Bringing self-determination to Eritrea would be
incomplete unless, like Somaliland, the citizens are able to exercise the basic right to rotate their leaders regularly and freely.

Somaliland, a relatively homogeneous society like Botswana, is able to evolve its modern polity through an adaptation of relatively uniform tradition of religion, institutions, laws, language and attitudes. The country is experiencing an Islamic revivalism but not radical fundamentalism due to the lack of mature, charismatic fundamentalist leaders and, even more important, due to the potency of the clan factor in Somali politics. SNM fighters called themselves mujahidins — those waging Islamic Jihad. This was good for morale. Pockets of fundamentalists exist but not yet sufficient to create a critical mass. How will they be involved in party politics should they choose to participate? Marxism, on the other had, hardly penetrated SNM ruling circles and political thought. Once the break with USSR came in 1978, the most well-known Somali marxists went to Aden, then South Yemen, where they formed a party; others went to Addis Ababa to work with the SSDF; only a handful joined the SNM. They played no significant role though some of them may yet establish a social democratic party during the anticipated multi-party phase. Somaliland must be brought to learn that democracy involves more than power sharing procedures: there is the need to evolve policies and institutions that can combat poverty, that facilitate women’s emancipation, children’s welfare, minority rights, regulating the unbridled private markets as well as tackle and resolve other substantive issues. The issue of recognition and non-recognition aside, Eritrea and Somaliland have their special experiences to offer each other and to offer others in Africa who are willing to learn.

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Bibliographic Note
Beyond Developmentalism in Tanzania

Geir Sundet

Political analysis in the African context is generally associated with issues concerning development. And an evaluation of a country’s political system or situation is often equated with the success, or lack thereof, of its ‘development strategy’. Deeply entangled in the development debate are questions pertaining to the nature of ‘the African State’. Many contending theories on the ‘African state’ exist, many of which were developed, explicitly or implicitly, to explain the Tanzanian case. Most of these theories are a variety of ‘political economy’, concerned about assigning a certain class character or function to the state. To what extent does this mode of analysis shed light on the various African political systems? Numerous scholars have accused African states of reaching too far, too fast and achieving too little. It will be suggested here that the same scholars might themselves be subject to the same criticism.

The Political Economy Discourse

Tanzania’s political system and strategies have been a favoured subject for political analysis and scrutiny time and again. Even the most cursory review of changing state policies reveal deep ideological divisions within the Tanzanian state, yet relatively little academic attention is given to the different groupings that evidently exist within it, and the dynamics of the interaction between them. It is suggested here that this gap in the political literature is due to a preoccupation with placing the state, as a monolithic entity, in a totalising ‘development model’, rather than looking in detail at specific political processes, which is what might normally be expected of a political analysis.

A critique of the various development ideologies is beyond the scope of this article. It is the treatment of ‘development’ as such in the political economy discourse which is my concern. In the following discussion, therefore, no precise distinction is made between the different strategies of development, whether they be socialist, liberal or neo-liberal. I believe that such a formidable simplification is justifiable for the purposes of my argument, as it is the role, not the type, of ‘development’ both in the political discourse and in political practice that I address throughout.

‘Development’ has become integrated to such an extent in the African political economy discourse due to the notion that the primary duty of an African state, by virtue of its status as a ‘developing country’, is to ensure the nation’s development, through economic and social ‘modernisation’, ‘industrialisation’, and the ‘transformation’ of its agricultural sector. The reason for my stressing this rather obvious point is that the scholar emphasising the development role of the African ‘state’ might unwittingly be playing into the hands of the same ‘state’
which is under scrutiny. Because is it not from its role as a 'developer' of the
nation that the 'state' derives its legitimacy? Radicals and liberals alike assimilate
the study of politics to the study of development, because they take the role of
politics to be development. In the process, the study of political practice quietly
dissipates.

The wealth of contending theories on the nature of the Tanzanian state stands in
stark contrast to the dearth of in-depth material on specific political processes.
This article sets out to question the near monopoly such models have gained in
the academic community of political analysts concerned with Africa. According
to Harold Lasswell's formula, political analysis is concerned with 'who gets
what, when, how' (Lasswell, 1936). In the political economy discourse, the 'who'
generally denotes a 'ruling class' which controls the 'state', largely ignoring any
existing conflicts within the state. This pervasive trend recently led Lionel Cliffe
to comment that readers who 'believe the many texts about Tanzania's 20 years of
ujamaa, may . . . conclude that the country had no politics' (1991:106).

The article starts with a brief discussion of some of Shivji's theories on the
Tanzanian state. It then summarises a critique of the modernisation bias in
development theory as set out by, among others, Williams and Bernstein, two of
the most influential international critics of development ideology, both of whom
have commented specifically on the Tanzanian case. It then goes on to discuss
Ferguson's theory on development and depoliticisation. Finally the respective
scholars theories are tested against the specifics of Hartmann's analysis of the
Arusha Declaration, attempting to point out some of the methodological traps the
above mentioned scholars have fallen into due to their preoccupation with
development, an analytical slant which is here referred to as developmentalism.

Developmentalism in Tanzania
Politics in Tanzania have commonly been defined in terms of development.
Henry Bienen, one of the earliest analysts of the independent government,
succinctly asserted that 'TANU exists to develop Tanzania: this has become its
most generally formulated raison d'etre since independence' (Bienen, 1970:262)
(Endnote 1). 'Development' was inextricably associated with modernisation, and
since the uneducated masses of the people were seen as inherently backward and
intransigently 'traditional', political activity became defined as a means of
mobilising the people in state-led development efforts (Nyerere, 1968; Bienen,

Several marxist critics of the Tanzanian government, while agreeing with the
basic need for 'modernisation', see the ujamaa brand of socialism as a flimsy
cover for overt class oppression by the state bureaucracy. Shivji (1976) argues that
the Party imposed self restraint on capital accumulation, merely as a means of
subordinating and displacing the bureaucrats' main class enemy, the capitalist
petty bourgeoisie. By subordinating the national economy to state control, the
state kept capital accumulation within its own ranks. This, according to Shivji, led
to a highly precarious economic situation, as the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' was
hindered from making productive investments while they were free to consume
the revenues raised by the state. Thus the emergence of the inflated development
state was a result of conscious class policies by the leading politicians.

Shivji argues convincingly that the development model implemented by the
Tanzanian 'state' would not succeed in building a true socialist society. The politics of the Tanzanian 'state', however, is reduced to the conscious manoeuvring of the ruling 'class'. Internal factions and personalities (including Nyerere) are not considered. The 'who' of Lasswell's formula is reduced to the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie'. Shivji does not query the perceived need for state-led development per se, although, in the process that Shivji describes, the concept of 'development' serves as a legitimising smoke screen that obscures the exploitative politics that takes place.

The fallacies of the development ideology as it has been practised, and its political implications, are well documented (Heyer et al., 1981; Williams, 1985; Raikes, 1978, 1986, 1988; Bernstein, 1981, 1990; Coulson, 1982). The 'peasant mode of production' is seen by the government and development agencies as incompatible with modern development, so the state has attempted, with liberal help from international aid organisations and consultants, to modernise the economy through the establishment of settlement-schemes, state farms and industries, and through supporting progressive, 'non-traditional' farmers. In agriculture this is to be achieved through the implementation of modern technology such as tractors, improved seeds, fertiliser and pesticides. Due to the high cost of overheads and capital inputs these schemes are rarely economical and the intricate mesh of subsidies and administrative discretion has lead to a high degree of corruptness and inefficiency. Moreover, farmers are frequently forcefully displaced from their land in order to give way for development projects. Often this has disastrous consequences for the environment since development practitioners, despite their superior education, lack the local farmers detailed knowledge of the land. The ultimate transformation of the economy is supposed to originate in the urban centres through industrialisation, and since agriculture is by far the most important productive sector in Tanzania it has been expected to provide the resources for industrialisation, which will ultimately provide the means for modernising agriculture.

The state's attempts to expand its control over the agricultural sector must be seen as an integral part of the overall development strategy, not simply as a manifestation of a class conflict between bureaucrats and the peasantry (cf. Shivji, 1976 and articles in 1986; Mueller, 1979; Saul, 1979). In Tanzania's case, where all industries were to be started and controlled by the state, it was necessary for the state to 'capture' the agricultural market so that a surplus of revenue for the reinvestment in industry could be skimmed off. This was not seen as putting any undue strain on the farmers as they would receive agricultural inputs at a subsidised rate and would also be provided with social services. In reality, of course, the state only returned a small part of the revenue to farmers, the rest being absorbed in unproductive industrial schemes that, instead of contributing to Tanzania's economic independence as intended, deepened Tanzania's dependence on foreign exchange for spare parts, fuel and other capital inputs (Havnevik et al., 1988). More still was absorbed through salaries and other perquisites of office in the expanding bureaucracy. Of the resources that were returned to the farmers, most went to the better off since they had the contacts that were necessary to receive preferential treatment from state officials. And government provided inputs were anyway mainly suited for wealthier farmers practising a more capital intensive farming (Coulson, 1982; Raikes, 1978, 1986).

Gavin Williams uses a criticism of developmentalist ideology as the main point of reference in his article 'Taking the Part of the Peasants' (Williams, 1976, 1985).
where he traces the roots of the rural political conflicts in Tanzania to the ideology of development. He argues that it is not capitalist dynamics that is the major reason for class conflicts and differentiation within the peasantry in Tanzania, but the position of the individual vis-à-vis the state, i.e., the developees vis-à-vis the developer. The state's attempt to gain control over the rural areas is generally resisted by a majority of the farmers as their interests are threatened by its extractive presence, while some, usually among the wealthiest, are co-opted by the state to cooperate through the provision of special benefits or they simply manipulate the state apparatus for their benefit through clientage strategies.

Williams takes a pure populist anti-state stance in viewing this conflict. He argues that state interference in the agricultural sector has led to the immiseration and exploitation of the vast majority of farmers. And although poor farmers resist oppressive policies through evasion, sabotage or outright defiance, and circumvent market restrictions by dealing on the 'black market', they have not been able to mobilise any organised opposition to state power. So only if the state agrees to relinquish its tight grip on rural politics will the farmers be able to define their own interests and prosper.

Henry Bernstein's articles provide an interesting supplement and counter-balance to Williams' arguments. The juxtapositioning of these two scholars views are particularly interesting since they both put great weight on the faulty ideology of developmentalism, yet take highly divergent views on the dynamics of (especially rural) 'class conflicts' in Tanzania, and what could be seen as the ideal role of the state in 'development'. Bernstein agrees with Williams' observations on the parasitical nature of the present bureaucracy in Tanzania and shares his abhorrence of the exploitative structure of the marketing system. But he does not see populism as a solution to Tanzania's political and economic problems. The 'state' is oppressive, Bernstein argues, because it lacks the political means to control exploitative tendencies within itself:

*the tendency to autonomy of the major parastatals makes it difficult to monitor and control their functioning in the implementation of strategy. This is expressed in their lack of accountability and discipline ... and is the effect of the political weakness of the Party and government* (1981:57).

This is a puzzling argument, seeing that Bernstein in the same article demonstrates that the development strategy of the Party and the government is essentially based on a misconceived faith in state-driven modernisation (pp.45-50). It therefore seems unclear to what extent tighter central control by state agencies would improve on the already faulty policies. It is perhaps even more surprising that the above quote appears in a section under the heading of 'Contradictions of State-Peasant Relations'. The only contradictions explored by Bernstein are those within the state, between its ideology and its practices. The open frictions he describes between the peasantry and the state seem quite logical and would be more aptly labelled as an open conflict rather than a contradiction.

In a later article Bernstein attacks Williams' populism more explicitly (1990a). Responding to Williams' call to 'take the part of the peasants', Bernstein responds 'which peasants?' (p.76). Pointing to the existing differentiation in 'third world' rural societies, he argues that a "'people's capitalism' is utopian" (p.76). From his socialist viewpoint he argues that:
Asking 'which peasants?' is necessary to identify those who, due to their social position (in class and gender relations, divisions of labour, particular ecological conditions, systems of exchange), would benefit from socialist co-operation, in however a preliminary a form to start with, and whose participation can be encouraged by immediate benefits in terms of the enhanced access to resources, control over production, and security of subsistence that co-operation makes possible (p.77).

What Bernstein does not tell us is who should ask these questions. Although he has, in other articles (1981;1990b), lamented the patronising behaviour adopted by 'developers', he is here himself suggesting that some undefined outsider (presumably the socialist scholar) should 'encourage' certain forms of 'socialist cooperation' for a targeted group's 'benefit'. This is stumblingly close to Nyerere's fatherly visions of guided participation. Just as the conventional 'developer' aims to protect the native from his own destructive backwardness, Bernstein passionately argues that peasants must be protected from their own capitalist tendencies. It seems doubtful that outsiders' prescriptions for socialist co-operation, which is what Bernstein calls for, can be expected to serve most farmers' interests. Is the country's experiences so far not a sufficient proof of this? It is hard to see how any genuine cooperation, socialist or not, can come from anyone else than the participants themselves.

Bernstein's arguments, slightly modified, do, nevertheless, raise the question of the role of the state in a more positive and realistic way than Williams does. Williams' argument that the farmers would be better off if the state kept out of the markets is well documented by the less than favourable record of Tanzania's state controlled agriculture. One might agree, however, with Bernstein's assertion that this is utopian. It is very difficult to see the Tanzanian state agreeing to leave the farmers to themselves — too many bureaucrats depend on the rural and parastatal administration for that — so in this respect Williams' recommendations are certainly utopian.

What is a crucial (and under-researched) topic is the question of how the state legitimises and attempts to achieve its penetration of the national economy and political life. And also the classical political questions of who is doing what and for what reasons. An understanding of these issues is central to any discussion of Tanzanian politics. It can be argued that arguments such as those presented by Williams and Bernstein do not really directly address the political issues. Instead of scrutinising the political dynamics that lay behind specific decision-making processes they outline the ideology or the class dynamics behind the political events, leaving the impression that they are the product of a monolithic, menacing development (and, in Bernstein's case, capitalist) machine. An advantage of this approach is that it leads to conclusions that can be applied to a wide array of developing countries that have similar characteristics. It does little, however, in the way of highlighting the specific tendencies at work within a particular nation, although such analysis is often indiscriminately applied for this purpose with a somewhat opportunistic choice of facts.

Ferguson's Attempt to Break Out of Developmentalism

One of the most stimulating recent contributions to the development debate is James Ferguson's *The Anti-Politics Machine* which is an anthropological analysis
of a Canadian integrated rural development project in a ‘remote’ mountain region of Lesotho. Although there are obviously important differences between the Lesotho and Tanzania scenarios, the originality and eloquence of Ferguson’s analytical approach provides extremely useful insights into the Tanzanian debate as well.

Ferguson finds himself in agreement with the criticism of development ideology outlined above, but he questions the tendency of political economists, such as Williams and Bernstein, to see policies as a voluntaristic result of certain goals and strategies. He argues that:

the political economists are often too quick to impute an economic function to ‘development’ projects, and to accept the premise that a ‘development’ project is primarily a device for bringing about a particular sort of economic transformation — a transformation variously glossed as ‘capitalist penetration’, ‘commoditization’, ‘capitalist development’, ‘the expansion of the capitalist mode of production’ etc. (pp.14-15).

Further, he questions the ease with which political economists attribute processes and past events to the interests of a ‘state’ or a ‘class’. Ferguson asserts that the result of a certain development policy is not necessarily the function of a state or class interest, but might be a quite unexpected result of a series of partly incompatible interests that merge to produce an unintended (and often surprising) outcome (pp.15-16).

Ferguson shows how the designers of the Canadian project in Lesotho saw as their aim to transform the targeted society from what was seen as its traditional isolation to become part of a national economy. This was not only a patronising endeavour inasmuch as the population itself was never involved in the planning of the project (and indeed opposed its policies more often than not), but it was also based on a stereotypical image of rural isolation that bore no relation to the reality of the situation. The developers expected the provision of markets, for example, miraculously to transform the region’s economy even if there was ample documentation that the region had been fully integrated into the southern African economy through production for grain markets and labour migration for at least 150 years!

The string of failures uncovered by Ferguson is long and familiar, but it is not a criticism of development per se that is his main concern. Ferguson’s aim is to describe the discursive dynamics of development practices. Why, he asks, do evidently misconceived development projects keep on repeating themselves? To what extent is the developer able to foresee the consequences of a development project? And what political role does development play in a ‘developing society’? Ferguson’s answer to these questions is intriguing. Instead of focusing on the failures of the Canadian project he concentrates on its (unintended) effects. While the project (unsurprisingly) did not bring about any radical economic transformation it substantially increased government presence, thus bolstering the ruling party’s political control over the region, which had been something of a stronghold for the main opposition party. Tax collecting became easier, new avenues for clientage practices were opened for state employees and allies, and an intensified militarisation took place. The Canadian developers, on the other hand, obviously received generous salaries for their development work while all this took place and seemed to learn little from the experience, and more than
likely moved on to another development project after this one was pronounced a failure and funding was discontinued.

The project therefore had profound effects in expanding state power. The project served the bureaucrats interests, just as it provided the expatriate developers with a decent living. Ferguson does not see the project, however, as a clear-cut product of these interests. There is no evidence that development was initially conceived of in these terms by some conspiratorial 'development committee'. Projects simply kept unchangingly reproducing themselves, Ferguson argues, because they happen to be useful to everybody who would have the power to change them (Endnote 2).

Ferguson, then, sees development as the African state's most important legitimising tool. What would otherwise be highly sensitive political practices (state expansion), are dubbed 'development' and thereby depoliticised. Development is therefore:

an 'anti-politics machine', depoliticising everything it touches, everywhere whisking political realities out of sight, all the while performing, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political operation of expanding state power (p.xv).

Dutkiewicz, Shenton and Williams have formulated a similar theory of the state in Africa, which describes the political processes as one of ‘étatization’ (Dutkiewicz and Shenton, 1986; Dutkiewicz and Williams, 1987). According to them, the development state is dominated by a ruling group (the state bureaucracy) which is steadily expanding its control over the economy in order to reproduce itself. Bureaucratic extraction eventually leads to 'the killing of the goose that lays the golden eggs', as the economy collapses (the African crisis) when the bureaucracy's needs exceed what can be sustained by the respective nations' productive base and foreign aid receipts.

Ferguson criticises the étatization theory for ignoring the political aspect of development policies and for giving the ruling class a false nature of unity (pp.267-75). This totalising theory, he argues, ignores the actual processes taking place within what is seen as the 'developmental state' (Dutkiewicz and Williams, 1987:41). The 'anti-politics machine' is not the result of the intended policies of such a monolithic ruling group, but the unintended result of the interactions of a complex web of personal actors and interests.

Ferguson's model provides an alternative to conspiracy theories which often inspire suspicion of over-simplification. It seems a bit unclear, however, to what extent Ferguson actually succeeds in painting a more realistic and specific picture of politics in 'developing countries' than the political economists. What exactly is implied with depoliticisation, and what politically sets 'developing countries' in this respect apart from other, 'normal' countries' politics? Before these questions are pursued we will return to the specifics of the Tanzanian case, summarising Jeanette Hartmann's article on the Arusha Declaration.

The Arusha Declaration Revisited
Although the meaning and appropriateness of the Arusha Declaration adopted in 1967 has been subject to intense debate, its profound political and symbolic importance is generally accepted. There is, however, a surprising paucity of
analysis of the political bargaining and compromising that led up to, and followed, the adoption of the Declaration. Jeanette Hartmann's article 'The Arusha Declaration Revisited' (1985) is a singular exception in this respect.

Hartmann explodes the conventional picture of the Tanzanian state as a monolithic entity. She employs a view of Tanzanian politics as being the interaction between three distinct groupings: the Government (meaning influential ministers of state), the Party and the President. She argues that each 'state organ functions independently of the other, introducing into the process of policy-making its own priorities and concerns' (p.1). Hartmann takes the political interaction between these entities seriously, rather than, as has been the dominant tendency, trying to make the case of one (or two) organ(s) being the dominant. Pratt (1976), for example, goes a long way towards arguing that Nyerere was the sole architect of Tanzania's politics, while Shivji virtually ignores Nyerere's role altogether. Saul (1979) stresses the importance and revolutionary potential of the ideologues within the Party, thus, moralistically, coming across as being more concerned with that which could and should be, rather than with that which actually is and is likely to be. Common to these, and most other scholars is a tendency to assign roles and degrees of influence, rather than describing actual processes. One might say that reality becomes relegated to the backseat in favour of academic and analytical fashion.

Briefly, Hartmann outlines the respective parties' stand on the policies of the Arusha Declaration as follows. President Nyerere was primarily concerned with the issues of maintaining political stability, foreign policy and the development of an egalitarian society. The Party's main preoccupations were with defining a more scientific form of socialism and with the strengthening of TANU (which would obviously bolster their own positions). The prominent figures in government expressed concern on the economic consequences of the proposed policies, their main interest being the achievement of economic growth rather than ideological 'correctness'. The Declaration was essentially Nyerere's brainchild. The political discussions were initiated in a speech by Nyerere to TANU's National Executive Committee (NEC) where he particularly stressed the importance of a policy of self-reliance — development should be brought about with the people's own efforts, not by foreign capital — and the Leadership Code as a means of achieving a more egalitarian society, starting with the example of the frugality of the leaders (Endnote 3). The more 'scientific socialist'-oriented NEC, unimpressed by the ideological wishy-washiness of 'African Socialism', managed to influence the President to put more emphasis on nationalisation, thus 'making public ownership an integral part of socialism' (p.3). Nationalisation also became one of the most publicised aspects of the Declaration (contrary to Nyerere's original intentions), although there was relatively little to nationalise in Tanzania. The NEC welcomed the Leadership Code as it appeared to give the Declaration scientific rigour and was seen as strengthening the Party.

The negotiations between the NEC and the President culminated in the published version of the Arusha Declaration. This, however, did not imply the end of the definition of its policies. The Government, particularly the Minister of Finance, Bomani and the Minister of State in the President's office, Jamal, expressed grave concern at the possible implications of the Declaration's defiant insistence on self-reliance in economic development. The Public Ownership Act, published a month after the Declaration, shows that the Government was not powerless to influence state policies. The Act, reflecting the Government's concern over
shortage of capital, 'clarified' Tanzania's policy of self-reliance to mean that foreign capital was still welcome as a contribution to the national development effort. Hence, self-reliance became defined in terms of political control over investment, rather than as economic self-reliance, as suggested by the Declaration. Moreover, the Act also established a distinction between ownership and management. So even if the Declaration had stated that 'The major means of production and exchange are under the control of peasants and workers' (p.3), it was made clear that this merely referred to ownership by the state, the representative of the peasants and workers. The actual running of the nationalised enterprises would remain with the existing management.

By paying attention to the evolution of the Arusha policies and the political actors that were involved in its formulation Hartmann argues that the 'Arusha Declaration was not an Act but a process' (p.9). Compare her interpretation of the adoption of the Public Ownership Act with that of Coulson:

*The Arusha Declaration had warned that 'loans and grants will endanger our independence'; however it did not say that overseas finances would be refused, and the policy was quickly clarified to mean that Tanzania would not 'bend its political, economic or social policies in the hope of getting overseas aid as a result' (1982:301).*

The use of the passive tense in what is the most authoritative account of Tanzanian politics is telling. Apparently, in the scheme of conventional 'political economy', there is no need to dip under the surface to see what political forces are at work in a country such as Tanzania. Tanzanian politics just happen according to some kind of magic system, which one might be able to divine by devising the right formula, considering class interests, development ideology, socialist strategies, etc.

The Arusha Declaration is arguably the most influential policy paper to come out of Africa, and probably the most frequently mentioned. It is therefore an astounding fact that, with the exception of Hartmann's work, these important processes have escaped academic attention for so long. This can to a large extent be seen as a product of the prevailing tendency to encapsulate third world politics in generally formulated theories, largely based on generalised and simplistic class analysis. The quest for the meaning of development is a main culprit in this respect, as it has absorbed the energies of some of the most talented and conscientious researchers of Tanzanian politics. In the study of the politics of development, the politics itself has quietly disappeared from the scene altogether!

**Beyond Developmentalism**

Reconsidering Ferguson's theory in light of the above observations, it becomes clear that his contribution to the understanding of third world politics might not be as revolutionary as he suggests. In a brief discussion of Tanzania Ferguson declares Nyerere a 'consummate “anti-politician”' (p.267). Evidently, by this he means that Nyerere has skilfully employed the rhetoric of development in order to achieve his political objectives, but in what way does this constitute an 'anti-politician'? It would rather seem that this is what makes a talented and successful politician. The inescapable conclusion is that Ferguson, albeit unconsciously, does not see 'real politics' play much of a role in countries such as Lesotho and
Tanzania. This is highly ironical, seeing that one of Ferguson's main points is exactly that developers view so-called developing countries as uniform societies working according to uniform dynamics, with uniform goals and objectives. Had he limited his observations to the development apparatus, as he promises to do in the introduction, he would not have fallen into the same trap; instead he goes on to try formulating another theory for third world development politics. And Ferguson's analysis of Lesotho's (and in passing, Tanzania's) politics is characterised by the same outsider's patronisation that he so convincingly diagnoses in development practitioners. As Samuel Weber warns:

A social and historical critique which does not consider the conflictual structure of its own discursive operations will only reproduce the constraints it is seeking to replace (quoted in Young, 1990:129).

Radical scholars, such as those discussed above, have extensively criticised much of the scholarship on Africa for attributing a primordial quality to 'traditional' societies, and for implying that these societies were inherently static and incapable of change without outside 'help'. It is perhaps the most pungent irony of developmentalism today that these scholars have replaced the notion of traditional staticness with a new notion of modern political uniformity. How can analysts convincingly exhort development practitioners to consider the realities of the societies with which they deal if they fail to do so themselves? It is time to go beyond developmentalism in the political study of African states.

Why is it that a study of the politics of an African state is met with different expectations than of a European or North American state? There is a need for general models, but while model builders concerned with 'developed countries' have a wealth of political case studies to build on, and against which they can be tested, the political theoreticians working on African cases have precious little of the sort, especially on the macro-level. Not that this seems to concern them greatly.

We have seen that Hartmann has shed new light on the political processes surrounding the Arusha Declaration. Another ground-breaking study of this kind is van Cranenburgh's study of the political forces behind the changing government policies on cooperative unions in Tanzania (van Cranenburgh, 1990). Such studies will, it is to be hoped, be more common in the future. Theories, such as etatization, are interesting and useful. But it is still puzzling that so much energy is spent on forming these theories on the political workings of the African state, when there is such a paucity of detailed accounts of actual ongoing processes — of which the Arusha Declaration is a prime example. Most aspects of the politics of each individual country cannot be framed within totalising methodologies. Politics will always be influenced by individuals, groups and ideas, and is it not the specifics of each particular case with which a political analyst normally would be expected to be concerned? Philip Abrams, in his article 'Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State', concluded that

the state is not the reality which is hidden behind the mask of political practice. It is itself the mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it is (1977:82).

Surely the 'developing state' with its 'development practices' could be suspected of presenting a particularly inscrutable mask. The time might have come to have a closer look at political practice.
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Endnotes

1 TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) was the ruling party on the Tanzanian mainland prior to 1977 when it merged with Zanzibar’s Afro-Shirazi Party and formed Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM). A constitution allowing for a multi-party system was adopted in 1992.

2 Ferguson draws parallels between ‘development’ practices and Foucault’s genealogy of the modern prison system which, although consistently failing to rehabilitate the criminals (the task it is supposed to be serving), fulfills a purpose for bourgeois society by producing a class of delinquents, thus isolating subversive element from society and giving increased legitimacy to the state (Foucault, 1979).

3 The Leadership Code barred government officials from participation in personal profit-seeking endeavours. It was repealed in 1991.

Bibliographic Note:


Debate

Industrial Strategy and Economic Development in South Africa: 1990-93

Faizel Ismail

Since the unbanning of the ANC in February 1990, both the ANC and COSATU strategies for transformation have undergone significant changes. Both the industrial and economic development proposals of the Liberation Alliance have been criticised by recent writers. This article critically reviews three significant critiques of the ANC/COSATU/SACP industrial and economic development strategies during the critical period of 1990-1993 when policy proposals were being adapted and formulated.

This article was written before the Merg Report discussed in this article was published; however, in an attempt to continue this debate, we will be carrying a full review of the 'Report' in the next issue.

The unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990, provided the context for the Harare Conference of ANC and COSATU economists, which took place in April/May 1990. When Raphie Kaplinsky put forward the theory of 'growth through redistribution', he captured the euphoric mood that prevailed in the country at the time. This strategy, or growth path, was distinguished by Kaplinsky from the earlier concepts of growth and redistribution (the notorious trickle down theory) and growth with redistribution (formulated by Chenery and pursued by the World Bank in the early 1970s). Kaplinsky (1990) argued that redistribution was necessary for growth to occur and suggested that it take place at a number of different levels, such as, ownership (of land, utilities, services, mining, manufacturing) power relations on the shop floor, education and health. The Harare document (Transformation 12, 1990) stated that nationalisation would be an essential part of the reconstruction programme.

However, the lessons of Eastern Europe on the role of state planning and nationalisation had already been absorbed into ANC/COSATU/SACP thinking prior to the Harare Workshop (Wolpe, 1990) and the concept of a mixed economy had begun to gain increasing support within the Democratic Alliance (Endnote 1).

As the political and constitutional negotiations gathered momentum the ANC was under increasing pressure to make compromises. These compromises were made as a result of its analyses of its own weaknesses and the strength of the state and capital, both domestic and international (Saul, 1993). Slovo's paper on the negotiating options open to the ANC ('Negotiations: What Room for Compromises?'), urged the ANC and the Alliance to bite the bullet and make substantial compromises at the negotiating table. The possibilities of radical social and economic transformation too, began to be narrowed down with the increasing pressure on the ANC by the international institutions (the IMF/World Bank and GATT). At the meeting with international businessmen in Davos, Switzerland, in early 1992, Mandela was forced to begin retreating on progressive ANC economic positions in an attempt to attract foreign investment (Saul, 1992).
COSATU theoreticians argued that South Africa did not actually ‘contain revolutionary possibilities at present’ (Freund, 1992) and opted instead for a ‘strategy of structural reform’ (Saul, 1992; Webster and Von Holdt, 1992). COSATU theoreticians (Joffe and Lewis, 1992) began to argue for a shift from the adversarial relationship that characterised relations between trade unions and capital in South Africa and for the negotiation of a ‘social contract’ between the state, capital and labour (Godongwana, 1992).

Both the ANC and COSATU have undertaken major research projects — the Macro-Economic Research Group (MERG) and the Industrial Strategy Project (ISP) — to develop policy proposals for a Democratic South Africa. Whilst both the research proposals of the MERG and the ISP have yet to be debated and adopted by the ANC, COSATU and the SACP, the overall approach of these organisations to economic development has already drawn significant criticisms.

This article will deal with the following issues: a review of three significant critiques of the COSATU/ANC/SACP approach (Harris, 1992; Gindin, 1993; Moll, 1991a, 1991b); a brief evaluation of the ISP policy proposals published thus far (Joffe et al., 1993), and in the concluding section we suggest ways in which it could contribute to a reconstruction and development programme.

Critiques of the COSATU/ANC/SACP Strategy
The most formidable and challenging critique has come from Harris (1992). Harris’ critique is devastating in that he argues that contrary to the expectations of the left forces in other parts of the world, there is no socialist strategy being pursued in South Africa; that the socialist forces are weak and the ‘watchword in South Africa is effectively that there is no alternative to capitalism’.

The evidence for this conclusion arises from his observation that the ‘big issues that were the touchstones of socialists in South Africa — nationalisation of the banks, mines and factories; nationalisation and redistribution of land; universal health care and universal equal education — have been effectively abandoned’. He argues that ANC politicians are hoping to share power in order to administer an existing structure into which they can introduce some marginal reforms. He concludes that on both political change and economic reconstruction, ‘democratic and left politicians have engaged in a real retreat’.

His wide ranging critique targets three of the underlying theoretical concepts on which the current strategies of the Democratic Movement have been built; that of ‘structural reform’, ‘tripartitism or corporatism’ and ‘growth through redistribution’. His critique of each will be briefly discussed.

First, he criticises the concept of ‘structural’ or ‘radical reform’ formulated by left-wing intellectuals close to COSATU (Saul, 1992; Webster and Van Holdt, 1992). He argues that the belief of the proponents of this strategy that structural reform will lay the basis for further reforms and empowerment is deterministic and weak as these gains can be easily eroded. Second, he argues that the strategy of developing tripartite forums (state, labour and capital) for negotiations favoured by COSATU and regarded as the ‘core of a new socialist strategy’ by these left intellectuals, is ‘a collaboration that involves no challenge to the agenda of business’. He acknowledges that the corporatist strategy of COSATU is not a narrow union based one, ‘but attempts to include the whole of civil society united behind a Reconstruction Accord’. Whilst accepting that some gains can be made by the working class from corporatist solutions he is sceptical of their success, and argues
that, in any event this is not a socialist solution. 'Strategic unionism', a concept coined by Webster and Van Holdt (1992) to distinguish it from 'business unionism', is criticised for being no different from the corporatist forms of unionism 'under which the labour movements in Britain, France and Germany were secured as allies of capital'. Third, he critiques the 'growth through redistribution' growth path elaborated by Alec Erwin as being 'empty and internally contradictory'.

Harris' critique is both interesting and challenging, yet we contend that it is not very helpful in taking the debate any further. First, his critique of the COSATU strategy of structural reform being reversible and not amounting to a socialist strategy only begs the question of what is the socialism to which he is alluding, and what does he think the real and irreversible path to socialism may be? The recent experiences of socialist reversal in Eastern Europe, Mozambique, Angola, Vietnam and Nicaragua suggest that the very concept and theory of socialism requires redefinition, and indeed all previous paths to socialism have proven to be reversible. Second, his argument that the strategy of corporatism is likely to fail and result in co-option (as is proved by the experiences of Britain, France and Germany) is tantamount to arguing that because it has not worked elsewhere it is unlikely to work here (surely the South African situation can be distinguished from that of Europe!). Third, whilst he correctly points out that the 'growth through redistribution' strategy is weak and lacking in theoretical content, his dismissal of it as being 'empty' is unfair. Erwin has clearly spelt out some of the key principles on which a more detailed strategy needs to be built:

Redistribution should be more than simple income transfers. It needs to be linked to a process of restructuring that redistributes economic power and skills in the economy and should involve the maximum number of people.

A second critique of COSATU's (or the ISP's) economic strategy comes from a Canadian trade unionist, Sam Gindin (assistant to the President of the Canadian Autoworkers Union, CAW) who had been invited to attend an ISP workshop in early 1993. In his response to the emerging ISP strategy, Gindin (May, 1993) observes that the dominant perspective in South Africa — both amongst the ANC and COSATU — is an unchallenging acceptance of the globalisation of the economy and the need to be competitive. He argues that the ANC, having been 'seduced' by this 'competitiveness' model, has begun to make constitutional compromises that are likely to produce a very weak state. In addition, he argues that COSATU economists — sceptical of the ANC — were prepared to accept this reduced or minimal role of the state (being sceptical of the ANC) in economic decision making, and were thus dealing directly with capital in the struggle over the terms of the new South African economy. However, since the implications of responding to the challenges of globalisation means that we will have to become competitive, Gindin argues that we should ignore it and develop alternate development paths. Gindin's solution therefore, is to develop 'growth models and industrial strategies that were more internally focused, more self-expansive'. He argues that 'the real challenge is to link South Africa's own internal “first world” and “third world” economies more productively, rather than to place central emphasis on exports to foreign markets'.

His proposed solution for the development of growth models that are internally focused, however, suggest either autarchy or de-industrialisation, both of which have frightening implications for income and welfare. First, the dictates of competitiveness imply that if we do
not develop the capacity to produce manufactured products at lower cost and higher quality than other countries, then we will either have to forego production of that product — moving towards de-industrialisation — or maintain high protective tariff barriers that keep these products out of our domestic markets. In a world that has become increasingly interdependent, autarchy is not a viable option and high protective barriers will be unsustainable if trade with other countries is desirable.

Second, the increasing lack of competitiveness (reflected in decreasing productivity) demonstrated by increasing imports and decreasing exports, will eventually result in de-industrialisation in any event (resulting in large scale job losses and reduction in the standard of living (Jenkins, 1992)). Third, his strategy of internally focused industrialisation can have negative distribution effects favouring rent-seeking industrialists who make high profits behind high tariff barriers, and discriminate against the poor who have to pay high prices for their basic wage goods (such as garments and footwear) which could be obtained much cheaper from elsewhere (Levy, 1992; Joffe et al., 1993).

Sam Gindin’s argument that the left should reject the challenges of globalisation and competitiveness is therefore, not only ostrich-like in its short-sightedness, but has dangerous implications for the economic future and living standards of the mass of the people.

The most consistent critique of the COSATU/ANC growth and industrial strategy that has come from the political centre has been stated by Moll (1991a; 1991b). Moll (1991a) has argued that a low wage, labour intensive, low skill export strategy is the only way that South Africa can meet the demands of international competition and rapidly create employment. Further, he argues that the ‘growth through redistribution’ strategy formulated by Kaplinsky and Erwin is ‘a dangerous fantasy’ (1991b), that it is similar to the macro economic strategies (‘macro-economic populism’) implemented in some Latin American countries (Chile, 1970-73; Peru, 1986-89; Brazil, 1986-89; Argentina, 1946-49) with disastrous results for the economy and the standard of living of the majority (Moll, 1991a).

Moll’s cautious approach to redistribution can be criticised on two grounds. First, his argument that a low wage, low skill, labour intensive growth strategy is the only strategy that can meet the demands of international competition and benefit the most is both undesirable and unviable. As some writers (Kaplinsky, 1992b) have shown, competing on the basis of low wages is only possible by increasing relative poverty (by devaluation), resulting in increases in absolute poverty. In addition, our own research in the footwear sector shows that attempting to compete with China (whose unit labour costs are US$50 in the lower end of the footwear sector) would mean reducing our current wage levels in the footwear industry five or six times (South Africa’s average wage in the footwear sector is approximately US$300 in the urban areas and about half this in the outlying areas). Attempting to reduce our wage levels to compete with China would mean increasing absolute poverty. Thus, the East Asian strategy of first increasing the export of low skill, low wage labour intensive goods (through labour repressive measures) does not seem to be viable. Instead, we will have to follow a path of higher skill, higher value added manufactured exports with modicum increase in wages (Levy, 1992). This would require us to ‘stretch’ our comparative advantage (Wade, 1991) towards more skill intensive industries while at the same time investing heavily in raising the average skill levels of the labour force (Wood, 1991). This need not be an over expensive operation.
Wade argues that the Koreans excelled at ‘learning by doing’, which increases the supply of the scarce skills; or more precisely, the Koreans excelled at learning by doing at low cost.

Moll’s reference to the disastrous results of the implementation of redistributive policies (macro-economic populism) in some Latin American countries are instructive. However, as he himself points out, they demonstrate rather well what redistributors in South Africa should avoid, but without suggesting exactly what can be done. The Chenery Model of redistribution favoured by Moll states that ‘political situations in developing countries do not allow radical income redistributions (nor would they be effective); instead, marginal increments to income should be channelled to poor people to be used as efficiently as possible’ (Moll, 1991a). It can be argued that those who put the case for incremental income redistribution, or ‘grow now, redistribute later’, should be aware of the real danger of following the Brazilian model of high growth and increasing inequality. Brazil was regarded as the economic miracle of the 1970s with GDP rising at an average annual rate of more than 10 per cent during this period. However, income distribution between 1960 and 1970 deteriorated (Haggard, 1991). Although Brazil, grew by an average of 7 per cent between 1940 and 1980 (Sachs, 1991), this growth continued alongside persistent and widespread poverty and extreme concentration of income, being more a case of ‘growth through inequality’ (Sachs, 1991). It is this latter growth path that we should avoid.

An Evaluation of the ISP’s Industrial Policy

This section will raise some issues we consider to be significant weaknesses in the research and policy proposals put forward by the ISP researchers thus far (Joffe et al., 1993). As the ISP has yet to present its final report, and the Economic Trends Group (closely linked to COSATU) is an ongoing research project, some of the issues raised here will probably be addressed in further reports. This section hopes to contribute towards identifying those areas that require further debate and research.

Employment, Basic Needs and Redistribution:

It is not surprising that the ISP researchers have not thus far addressed the need for employment maximisation and distributional questions as priorities, as they were concerned, in the first instance, with developing an industrial policy. As Michael Best has stated, ‘as an employment or distributional instrument, industrial policy is inherently flawed. Together, industrial policy and demand management can promote employment, but the task of industrial policy is to relieve the balance of payments constraint so that labour-intensive sectors such as construction, education, and health can be expanded without generating a trade deficit’ (Best, 1990:20).

In the long term the development of internationally competitive industries will both prevent de-industrialisation and expand employment. However, South Africa’s very high unemployment levels make the need to address the short term employment needs of the country critical. As employment creation is the significant distributor of income, this also has distributional implications. The failure to address this will take us along the path of the 50 per cent solution some writers have been warning us about where half the workforce remain outside the formal sector (Morris, 1993).

Second, the project set out as one of its objectives the development of the basic needs industries (Joffe and Lewis, 1992). However, the ISP report has emerged
with proposals to liberalise the low price end of production in some basic needs industries (garments and footwear) (Joffe et al., 1993), the effect of which will be to forego production in these sectors, making us reliant on imports to satisfy some of our basic needs. From a conventional industrial policy point of view, this approach is prudent. It can also be argued that imports of cheap wage goods at much lower prices than domestic producers can supply will benefit the poor the most (Levy, 1992). However, this benefit has to be balanced against the cost of the loss of jobs (thus increasing inequality and poverty) and de-industrialisation in the short term. Balancing these interests in a satisfactory way will require a great deal of discussion and debate within the organs of civil society (Nattrass, 1992).

As the ISP writers themselves admit, their industrial policy has a rather tenuous relationship with redistributional issues. Despite what we have said above, this is somewhat surprising as policy conclusions lead them to conclude that 'it is clear that the struggle to promote industrial revival almost certainly lies more in the domain of the social rather than the technical relations of production'. There are a number of areas where changing the social relations will increase productivity, growth and address the question of redistribution more explicitly. Beginning with the shop floor, it can be argued that changing the racial structure of jobs where the majority of the supervisory and managerial positions are occupied by whites will go a significant way in increasing co-operation and increasing productivity. In footwear for example a 1988 study found that whites represent 75 per cent of the management staff, that is, the professional, technical, managerial, executive and administrative categories (Ismail, 1993; see also Natrass's discussion of the Toyota factory). Moreover, black workers are unlikely to trust an all white management, which serves as a sharp reminder of the highly unequal nature of South African society. Black workers need to see black people not only as owners of informal and small enterprises but also as being integrated into the larger corporate sector before they are likely to feel that the racial inequalities in the broader society are being addressed. Their co-operation with capital will require that the benefits of increasing profitability and growth increases the possibility of access and opportunity to reach the higher rungs of the market economy, including not only ownership of shares within the company but ownership of the firm itself. Thus, increasing support to black business should not only be based on narrow efficiency and employment creation grounds but also on the need to change the social structure of society, characterised for so long by racial inequality.

In conventional economic terms, encouraging small black businesses (with potential to grow larger) will have the effect of reducing inequality in the society, thus increasing co-operation and stability, building black entrepreneurship and increasing Schumpetarian competition and facilitating inter-firm co-operation. It is only by giving the majority, of the people a real stake in the economy (demonstrated by black advancement in the higher echelons of the polity and economy) that negotiations between the major actors — business, government, capital and other organs of civil society — that the social corporatist model of development favoured by ISP economists is likely to succeed. Thus, I am arguing that these issues of racial and income redistribution need not be more explicitly incorporated within an industrial policy research agenda.

Following the NICs:
Reference is frequently made in policy
making circles to the successors of newly industrialised countries. However, there are some significant differences between the current international economic climate and that in which the East Asian NICs rose to success.

Export orientation/optimism: The arguments for export orientation have been made by many writers (Bell, 1990; Lall, 1993; Fallon et al., 1993). The ISP optimism for the success of such a strategy needs to be tempered by more detailed research into the possibilities of such a strategy succeeding in the present world climate. Despite the recent GATT settlement, there is evidence of continuing protectionism by the major economies, with the US threatening to retaliate against those countries (including South Africa) that do not open their markets to its exports. The American Embassy has constantly made representation to the South African government to reduce tariffs and increase market access to US Companies and to comply with its GATT obligations. (see '1993 National Trade Estimates Report — South Africa'). This is in marked contrast to the active role played by the US in opening its markets to the East Asian countries (in spite of their high levels of protection) in the 1970s. The highly successful record of the first tier NICs in a number of labour intensive export sectors (garments, footwear) and higher value added sectors, in which South Africa could develop its international competitiveness, as well as the recent aggressive entry of the second level NICs (Thailand, Malaysia, China) into global export markets, will mean that South Africa will enter a much more competitive, and hostile global marketplace, than the East Asians found in the 1970s.

Strong State: The key lesson from the East Asian experience is the need for a strong state to guide and lead the market (Wade, 1990). Such a state is required to intervene in the market, using a range of policy instruments — credit, investment, research and technology, trade policy — to develop strategic industries and develop international competitiveness. A new democratic state will be much weaker, both because of the pressure to decentralise power but also due to the increasing integration of South Africa in the world economy which will require the fulfilment of obligations to GATT, the IMF and the World Bank. As Trevor Manuel (ANC head of the Department of Economics) stated at the SACTWU Workers Rights Conference (18 June 1993), 'we are faced with a stark choice — either we make the necessary changes or the multilateral institutions outside of South Africa (like GATT, the World Bank and the IMF) will impose these decisions upon us'. The ANC has argued for a strong but slim state, though not much detailed research has yet emerged to give content to this. Whilst the ISP expressly state that 'without focused and effective support from the state, industry is unlikely to make the jump which is required to attain and sustain...global competitiveness', they give scant attention to the need to build capacity and restructure existing state institutions to effectively plan and implement policy recommendations made by the ISP.

No Regional (Southern African) Strategy

Finally, the lack of regional perspective in the current research of the ISP is a significant weakness. The Harare Document (1990), drawn up by the ANC and COSATU, makes an explicit commitment to 'seek to promote regional economic co-operation along new lines'. Research undertaken by the MERG project on regional integration has made the case for a mutually beneficial programme of co-operation, co-ordination and integration (Davies et al., 1993). Such a programme should include a regional strategy on industrial development. There must clearly be a range of
industrial sectors where the development of a regional strategy would be advantageous to both South Africa and the region, incorporating the expansion of trade, the development of infrastructural projects, particularly in electricity, transport and mineral beneficiation projects. With regard to secondary industry, footwear production provides an example where there has been an increasing tendency for the lower end of footwear production to relocate to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and recently some manufacturers have even considered moving to Zimbabwe (Ismail, 1993). A regional strategy might hold the possibility of developing the international competitiveness of the lower end of the footwear sector outside South Africa’s borders, but within the region instead of losing this sector to East Asia. Such a strategy would increase employment and income in the Southern African Region and increase the capacity of these countries to pay for imports from South Africa.

Before this were to happen, however, various steps would have to be taken to co-ordinate the SACU, SADC and PTA agreements in order for trade to flow freely across borders within the region, and without resistance from protectionist interests in South Africa itself. The political and institutional framework of the regional market is therefore complex and although it provides an outlet of a substantial proportion (according to some estimates, 40 per cent) of South African manufactured exports, it is also subject to the variations of several national currencies as well as overlapping bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. Subject to these, constraints, with relocation and decentralisation, the value of trade could obviously increase. However, the pressures of unemployment within South Africa may well counteract any moves to liberalise and relocate elsewhere in the region. In this sense the natural polarising influence of South African industry in the region may not yet have exhausted itself and represents a tension which will have to be effectively addressed.

Conclusion
This article has sought to evaluate the debate in South Africa on the links between industrial policy economic development and social transformation. We conclude by commenting on the ISP/COSATU industrial policy proposals and its links to a reconstruction and development programme. There are three ways in which industrial policy can contribute to such a programme. These are: first, the restructuring of the manufacturing sector in an attempt to develop its productivity and international competitiveness while at the same time challenging the existing racially based structures; second, increase in labour intensive employment in a labour surplus economy with high levels of unemployment and third, the development of the basic needs industries including not only those such as clothing, footwear and furniture but also industries that contribute directly to both economic and social reconstruction. This would include the capacity of the construction and building materials sector to relieve the housing shortage, and the electricity industry to provide the majority of households with electricity.

In these respects, the position of the ISP/COSATU can be criticised on a number of grounds. First, they have focused almost exclusively on certain supply side measures to develop productivity in the manufacturing sector. Thus, although they have developed detailed policies to restructure the manufacturing sector these have not focused sharply enough on the restructuring of power on the shop floor and black economic empowerment through the development of small and large black businesses.
In addition, there are significant dangers in the ISP and COSATU strategy of implementing its restructuring programme exclusively through the tripartite sectoral forums (e.g. in auto assembly and components, electronics and clothing and textiles) and the National Employees Forum (NEF). The dangers of this being an elitist compromise has drawn criticism from other writers (Morris, 1993). It is crucial for the interests of the unemployed, the informal sector and micro-enterprises to be represented in some way and one would hope that an ANC government will, when it is represented in the NEF, after the election on 27 April, ensure that all these interest groups are empowered to articulate and struggle for their interests within and outside these sectoral forums.

Whilst the ANC has gone along thus far with the broad policy proposals put forward by the ISP and COSATU it is unlikely that it can afford to do so to the same extent once in power. The demands of large unemployed masses of ANC supporters for jobs will be the most urgent issue the ANC will have to address. It is in this second area that the ISP industrial strategy has been the weakest. While it set the reduction of unemployment as an initial objective it has not addressed this objective in a concentrated manner. Public Works programmes which COSATU has supported, through the NEF, as a job creation measure will only make a marginal impact on the vast numbers of unemployed.

Third, the possibilities of significant employment creation in a mass housing provision project has not been adequately explored, although the ISP has investigated the capacity of the building materials sector (bricks and cement) to supply such a project. In addition, the ISP analyses of the basic needs industries (clothing and footwear) suggest that the bottom end, or the low value segment of these subsectors will be eroded by increased imports exacerbated by pressures from the Uruguay Round of GATT to liberalise our relatively high levels of protection here. Finally, regional southern African industrial strategy is necessary to ensure that jobs lost in South Africa are gained in countries within the region thus fostering greater industrial development amongst our neighbours as part of a programme of balanced and sustainable regional co-operation and development.

Rather than view the region as a backyard to be exploited, South African policy makers in a new, probably ANC dominated, government, should therefore encourage regional development in the same spirit of social and economic reform, to the mutual benefit of all, that they will hopefully promote within the boundaries of South Africa itself.

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Endnote

1 Prior to the Harare Conference, Joe Slovo had already published Has Socialism Failed?, a wide-ranging critique of socialist political and economic practice in Eastern Europe. Wolpe refers to Harris' paper on 'The Mixed Economy of a Democratic South Africa' and Alec Erwin's paper on 'An Economic Policy Framework.' Vela Pillay had also circulated a paper titled, 'Some Problems of a Mixed Economy in South Africa'.

Bibliographic Note


Briefings

GATT: a Victory for the North

Kevin Watkins

The seven year search for the Holy Grail of a Uruguay Round agreement has been concluded and neatly packaged as a triumph for liberal values, cooperation and global prosperity. Sadly, the packaging seriously misrepresents the product. In reality, the GATT deal has set the seal on a new world trade order in which the interests of the world’s poorest countries and people have been sacrificed to the self-interest of northern governments, and to powerful transnational companies (TNCs).

Supporters of the Uruguay Round agreement claim it will bring windfall gains for developing countries. These are supposed to derive from their share of a $213bn increase in world income, predicted by a widely cited World Bank/OECD study as the likely effect of the Uruguay-Round accord. In reality, the GATT deal has set the seal on a new world trade order in which the interests of the world’s poorest countries and people have been sacrificed to the self-interest of northern governments, and to powerful transnational companies (TNCs).

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After a decade in which market deregulation in the industrialised countries has conspicuously failed to resolve problems of mounting unemployment, the success of the World Bank and OECD in persuading commentators to uncritically endorse their $213bn figure was considerable, not least in view of the discrepancy between their claims and their evidence. For example, the projected income increase of $213bn sounds less impressive when expressed as 0.75% of global GDP; and it sounds less impressive still when distributional considerations are taken into account. According to the World Bank-OECD study, less than one-third of the $213bn increase in world income gains from the agreement will go to the South, with China and a few upper income south-east Asian countries the principle beneficiaries. Sub-Saharan Africa will actually lose income—an estimated $1.6bn—thanks in part to a loss of preferences in the European market. The lion’s share of the predicted gains, an estimated $80bn, will occur in the European Union (EU), with the US national income boosted by $19bn.

Weighting the Scales

Leaving aside the fanciful nature of the figures, this skewed distribution of benefits reflects the failure of the GATT to address two of the central problems facing the world’s poorest countries, especially those in Africa: namely, low commodity prices and debt. The former has wiped almost 10% off sub-Saharan Africa’s income since 1980, while the latter drains the region of over a quarter of its trade earnings. The marginal gains in prospect for the South also reflects the refusal of the industrial countries to consider applying in their domestic policies the free trade principles they espoused in the GATT negotiations.
Their double standards are reflected in the wide range of protectionist policies which will survive the Uruguay Round.

Take the case of textiles and clothing, which account for a quarter of all manufacturing exports from the South. Under the Uruguay Round accord the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), which has imposed arbitrary and discriminatory bilateral quotas on exports from the developing world since 1974, will be gently phased out from 1995 and abandoned in 2005. Tariffs will also be lowered. But the GATT agreement is heavily ‘end-loaded’, with most of the cuts coming at the end of the ten year period. Meanwhile, concessions granted to the US and the European Union will allow them to maintain relatively high tariff barriers. The industrial countries will also retain a wide range of safeguard mechanisms to protect their textile manufacturers against competition from sudden surges in imports. The upshot, as a masterly understatement in the Financial Times put it, is that ‘the impact on trade balances and employment in developed countries may not be drastic.’ While textiles sectors will continue to shed jobs in the North, this will result from intra-OECD competition rather than a boom in imports from the South.

The textiles stitch-up is part of a wider protectionist tapestry, in which northern governments have retained a formidable arsenal of weapons to control imports. Over the past decade, the enthusiastic commitment of northern governments to free market principles has been second only to their enthusiasm for protectionist practices. Most of these practices have taken the form of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), which effectively circumvent GATT disciplines. These range from ‘anti-dumping’ duties to quotas, ‘orderly marketing arrangements’ and ‘voluntary import restraints’, under which trade partners are invited to restrict supplies of exports or face trade sanctions. NTBs occur with a far greater incidence on imports into developed market economies from developing countries, than in intra-OECD trade. Currently, one-fifth of all developing country non-fuel exports are currently covered by NTBs, compared with one-tenth for industrialised country exports.

Non-tariff Barriers
Evaluating the implications of the Uruguay Round accord for NTBs is made difficult by the widely divergent interpretations placed on its provisions by different industrialised countries. For example, US negotiators have claimed that the new guidelines on dumping, which is deemed to occur when a product is exported at artificially low prices to expand market share, will allow for ‘national flexibility’ in the definition of what constitutes a normal price. This will enable the US Trade Representatives Office to continue its normal practice of artificially inflating dumping margins to maximise the countervailing duty on imports. The US also successfully resisted an attempt by south-east Asian countries to have anti-dumping investigations conducted by independent GATT panels, rather than national trade authorities. Many other non-tariff barriers (NTBs) facing third world exporters will remain intact, albeit under a different guise. For instance, ‘voluntary export restraints’ will be phased out, but there is sufficient ambiguity in the rules on ‘safeguard’ mechanisms to allow these to fill the gap.

The dilution of measures designed to remove NTBs reflects the political ambiguity upon which the negotiating positions of the key industrial countries have been built. For example, while the Clinton Administration might embrace free trade ideology on the world stage domestically when selling the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), its political base is a merca-
tilist Democratic Party with powerful protectionist currents. These came close to derailing NAFTA in a congressional vote immediately prior to the Uruguay Round deal; and it was partly in order to avoid a damaging re-run of the NAFTA debate that the Administration negotiated a series of protectionist opt-out clauses in the GATT agreement. These range from special provisions to protect US manufactures in sectors such as steel, textiles and financial services. In Europe, the French Government, an effective counterweight to the EU’s main advocates of free trade, the UK and Holland, was similarly able to achieve what Prime Minister Edouard Balladaur described as miraculous gains in the form of tariff and other concessions for Europe’s textiles, chemical, steel and foodstuff industries.

Even the reciprocal tariff cutting measures negotiated during the final phase of the talks was heavily weighted in favour of the North. Take the not untypical case of India. Under the terms of the Uruguay Round accord, Indian tariffs on industrial goods will fall by 55%, while the EU will cut its average tariff for India by 22% and the US by 18%. This explains why the Indian Ambassador to the GATT, Balkrishnan Zutshi complained that: ‘As far as market access is concerned, there is a feeling that developing countries have put in far more than they got in return.’ Sub-Saharan Africa has done particularly badly out of the tariff cutting exercise. While the average trade weighted tariff on manufacturing imports into industrial countries has fallen by 38% as a result of the agreement, for the least-developed countries, the overwhelming majority of which are African, tariffs will fall by just 19% and remain some two-thirds higher than on developed country imports. This reflects the continuation of tariff escalation, or the imposition of higher duties on processed products — a system of protection which reinforces other obstacles to diversification out of primary commodity production in sub-Saharan Africa.

This summary of the tariff cutting measures understates the degree of North-South inequity. Since the mid-1980s, developing countries across sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America have been lowering their tariffs on a unilateral basis under the auspices of World Bank-IMF structural adjustment programmes. Zambia, for example, has virtually withdrawn border protection from its textile sector, and average tariffs have fallen dramatically in countries such as Ghana, Zimbabwe and Tanzania. In Mexico, average tariffs have been lowered from over 50% to around 12% since the mid-1980s. Yet these tariff reductions were not considered in the context of the Uruguay Round bargaining process, in which the principle of reciprocity is supposed to ensure that the specious trade barriers are lowered on a mutual basis, on the grounds that they were not negotiated under GATT auspices!

For sub-Saharan Africa, the liberalisation of northern markets which will occur as a result of the Uruguay Round poses as many threats as opportunities. This is partly because the region lacks a strong manufacturing base to exploit new opportunities, and partly because the bulk of its exports currently enjoy preferential access to EU markets under the terms of the Lomé Convention. Generalised tariff reductions under the GATT agreement will erode sub-Saharan Africa’s Lomé preferences by around a third, according to preliminary estimates, exposing the region’s exports to increased competition from Asia and Latin America. Without counterveiling measures, which the EU has so far refused to contemplate, and the removal of the more overtly protectionist elements of the Lomé Convention (such as the Rules of Origin clause, which stipulates unrealistically high require-
ments for the processing of non-domestic inputs used in the manufacture of exports), this will almost certainly result in a loss of ACP market shares and the further marginalisation of sub-Saharan Africa in world trade.

In a suitably pessimistic joint statement issued after the final negotiating session, the African group of countries in GATT acknowledged 'the impact of the market access arrangements looks quite bleak given the modest exporting capacity of the region'. It also accused the GATT secretariat of using a trickle-down model of economic growth to overstate the benefits of the agreement for the region while ignoring the need for special provisions to protect the GATT's weakest members from unbridled competition. In keeping with the best traditions of GATT media coverage, their views were ignored.

A Victory for Order?

Defenders of the GATT have argued that, despite the warts, the agreement on offer is better than the alternative. This, they claim, was a 1930s-style protectionist Armageddon, in which the breakdown of the GATT would have been followed by cycles of retaliation and counter-retaliation. They point to the 'farm wars' of the 1980s, in which the US and the EU sought to out-subsidise each other in world markets as an illustration of the tensions which the liberal trading system would have come under. But while this scenario made for a compelling story, it always rested on a hopelessly naive misunderstanding of the nature of world trade.

The reality is that in an increasingly integrated world economy, where foreign investment flows and global production strategies have largely eroded the relevance of the nation state, it is transnational companies (TNC's) rather than governments which dictate the terms of trade policies. The largest 500 of these companies account for over two-thirds of world trade flows and a larger share of direct foreign investment, and therefore exercise a formidable influence over employment and prosperity. These TNCs rely on relatively open markets to pursue global production strategies, in which components are produced and assembled worldwide wherever production costs are cheapest. While governments may engage in rhetorical nationalistic sabre-rattling over trade, TNCs have no interest in trade wars which disrupt their ability to move goods from one country to another.

The 'victory of order over anarchy' school of thought also conveniently ignores the fact that adherence to free trade principles on the part of the industrial countries has gone hand-in-hand with an approach to trade policy which owes more to Lord Palmerston's gunboat diplomacy than to Ricardo and comparative advantage. In recent years, more than thirty developing countries have been threatened with trade sanctions under 'Section 301' of the US trade law.

This legislation gives the US Administration the right to impose unilateral sanctions on countries deemed to be following trade policies inimical to the interests of US corporations. China, for example, was threatened with punitive duties on footwear allegedly for failing to enforce compliance with IBM patents. In Brazil and Mexico domestic laws on intellectual property were amended to afford greater protection to US companies; and in the Philippines and South Korea laws restricting the access of US companies to domestic banking and insurance markets were relaxed following 'Section 301' threats. The EU has operated a parallel, albeit more discrete system of trade threats to prise open markets. For all the talk of multilateral order, the Uruguay Round will do little to end such practices.
Trade War by Diplomatic Means

This is for the simple reason that the Uruguay Round has transformed the GATT into an extension of what the last US Trade Representative, Carla Hill, referred to as 'crawler' diplomacy. Recourse to unilateral trade sanctions to open third world markets for investment and financial services represented part of a wider strategic reorientation of US trade policy. The aim of that reorientation was to address domestic problems, such as the trade deficit and unemployment, by expanding export markets in areas such as high technology and financial services — where US companies retained clear advantages. Similarly, the imposition on recalcitrant governments of US-style patenting laws was designed to lay claim to some $125bn in royalty payments, which the US Trade Representatives Office claims America loses as a result of patent violation. By forcing, with the help of the EU, the 'new issues' of financial services, investment and intellectual property on to the Uruguay Round agenda, the Reagan Administration was demanding the rewriting of the GATT in a manner consistent with US strategic interests. The South Commission, a body of development specialists and politicians, condemned this as a move designed to restrict the South's freedom to regulate foreign investment and introduce a multilateral regulatory system that would further strengthen northern TNCs. But the final agreement leaves no doubt that this is precisely what will happen under the new regime.

In effect, the Uruguay Round agreement will allow the US and other industrial countries to continue their trade war against developing countries by diplomatic means. Under the terms of the Uruguay Round agreement, developing country governments will be required to treat foreign corporate investors the same as domestic companies. This will open up lucrative markets for northern TNCs, which effectively wrote the agreement, but expose fragile domestic industries to crippling competition.

The new GATT intellectual property regime also conforms closely to that demanded by northern TNCs, which control over 90% of patents worldwide. Under the new rules, southern governments will be required to extend effective patent protection for a minimum period of fifteen years, substantially increasing both royalty payments to TNCs and the costs of imported technologies. Since access to these technologies holds the key to competitiveness and effective participation in world markets, developing countries are likely to become increasingly marginalised as the gap between 'knowledge rich' and 'knowledge poor' countries widens.

The new regime will also extend the range of patentable products to genetic resources, but only those worked on in northern laboratories. There are no royalty payment provisions for the peasant communities who have developed genetic materials used by TNCs to produce new seed and plant varieties and pharmaceutical products, despite the huge profits these generate. This has prompted huge demonstrations by farmers' associations in northern India, who claim the new regime institutionalises a system of genetic piracy by TNCs.

The World Trade Organisation

The post-Uruguay Round world trade order will be overseen by a new, more powerful body than GATT — the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Originally, the Clinton Administration opposed the creation of the WTO on the grounds that compliance with its rules would mean the US surrendering its right to impose unilateral trade sanctions. The fact that it ultimately endorsed the proposal underlines the extent to which the new institution will facilitate the
pursuit of the US's strategic trade objectives. First, the WTO entrenches the principle of 'cross-retaliation', that is, it allows countries to impose trade sanctions on goods if a trading partner breaches the new disciplines aimed at deregulating financial services and investment. This overturns the previous GATT regime, which only allowed retaliation across similar sectors. Second, the WTO, again in contrast to the GATT, will be empowered to force countries to comply with its rules, even where this involves amending domestic legislation. In other words, the WTO, like the World Bank and IMF, will become a powerful force for dictating moves towards deregulation and liberalisation in the trade policies of developing countries.

Agriculture Crisis Unresolved

Peasant farmers in the South can expect few benefits from the Uruguay Round agreement on agriculture, which was the flashpoint for a protracted confrontation between the US and the EC. During the 1980s, competitive dumping by the 'agricultural superpowers' resulted in the deepest and most protracted depression in world markets since the 1930s. Efficient agricultural exporters in the South, unable to compete with US and EC subsidies, suffered massive foreign exchange losses as a result; at the same time, staple food producers were undermined by competition from heavily subsidised imports, which depressed local markets and undermined efforts to build national food self-reliance.

Contrary to the received wisdom of GATT commentators, the new agreement will do little to change this picture. Under the Blair House accord, a US-EU agreement (which amended the original GATT agricultural resettlement), the volume of export subsidies will be cut by a modest 21%. However, concessions to the French Government will allow the EU to dump its entire stockpile of some 28 million tons of wheat and 900,000 tons of beef on world markets outside of the terms of the accord. The US also agreed to a shift in the reference year against which the percentage cuts in export subsidy volume will be measured — an arrangement which, translated into export terms, will allow for an additional 8 million tons of wheat and 350,000 tons of beef to be dumped on world markets. Having reluctantly conceded EU demands in these areas, the US has announced that it will expand its own export dumping subsidies under the Export Enhancement Programme from $1bn to $1.6bn.

The upshot is that pastoral farmers in the Sahel region of Africa will continue to face ruinous competition from heavily subsidised EU beef, and that peasant producers of food staples across the developing world will continue to see their livelihoods undermined by low priced imports of maize and wheat from mid-West and the EU. The resulting food security problems will be exacerbated by an obligation on developing countries to reduce restrictions on agricultural imports by 13% over the lifetime of the GATT agreement. As one commentator has succinctly put it, the level playing field in world agriculture will continue to run all the way downhill from Brussels and Washington.

The agricultural agreement is significant for another reason, in that it illustrates in stark form the profoundly undemocratic nature of the GATT negotiating process. In practice, the Blair House accord is a bilateral agreement negotiated in confidence by the US and the EU, where agriculture represents less than 5% of national income and employment. Governments in sub-Saharan Africa and the low-income countries of Asia, where agriculture accounts for as much as two-thirds of employment, were not even consulted over the
final text despite its profound relevance for the welfare of their citizens. The fact that the vast majority of developing countries, which account for the bulk of GATT members, were also opposed to the inclusion of intellectual property rights, financial services and investment on the Uruguay Round agenda further underlines the subordination of the GATT to US, EU and Japanese interests. One commentator has likened the participation of developing countries in the GATT to that of extras on the stage: the show can't go on without them, but nobody is interested in what they have to say.

**Free Trade or Citizenship Rights?**

Of course, it would be wrong to deny that the deregulation of foreign investment under GATT will create some new jobs. But at what price? In Mexico, free trade and deregulation have brought a massive boom in US investment along the border region. Attracted by low wages, minimal union rights, abundant child labour and the non-enforcement of environmental standards, US companies are relocating on a massive scale. The upshot is a social and ecological disaster. Border towns have been transformed into toxic waste dumps, groundwaters and rivers are severely polluted and living standards are appalling.

The Mexican experience starkly illustrates the dangers of deregulating markets and moving towards trade liberalisation in the absence of effective minimum social, economic and environmental standards. Without those standards, investment and jobs will gravitate automatically to sites marked by the lowest production costs, exercising a downward pressure on standards and the quality of life everywhere. This is precisely why the Social Chapter was drawn up to underpin the creation of a single market in Europe. Yet the WTO contains no provisions on environmental sustainability, and no measures to protect social welfare.

Ultimately, the GATT agreement offers a vision of world trade which is so far behind public aspirations and current thinking as to merit early despatch for carbon dating. What is needed now is a bold new vision of international trade, in which citizenship rights — North and South — are integrated into trade arrangements. That vision will also need to extend beyond the GATT’s narrow remit to addressing the wider problems facing developing countries: including low commodity prices and debt. It is unlikely to come from the team that brought you the Uruguay Round.

*Kevin Watkins, Oxfam, UK.*

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**The Forgotten Agenda in Somalia**

*John Prendergast*

This Briefing describes the withdrawal of international peacekeeping forces from Somalia on 31 May 1994 and provides useful insights into the real nature and dangers of ignoring the fundamental issues of human rights and, central to this whole debate, control of resources, principally land. It warns against the resurrection of militia attacks not only against each other but the population at large. Prendergast’s solution is a continuity, though different, by the UN (which costs roughly $310 million per year). Other critics of the UN role have suggested that a better solution would be withdrawal. ROAPE is interested in continuing this debate and welcomes comment.

The early days of humanitarian intervention as protection from extreme forms of human rights violations was trumpeted as one of the objectives by some of its architects and supporters. But after a series of humiliations and the
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recoiling from ‘assertive multilateralism’, human rights have become a forgotten issue, with the glaring exception of the ‘rights’ of the peace-keeping troops. Yet it is the possibility of another round of abuses in central and southern Somalia which threatens to return vulnerable Somali communities to the acute famine which characterised much of 1991-92 unless humanitarian intervention is not reoriented in a relevant and effective way. These most vulnerable communities in Somalia need to be identified and the reasons for their vulnerability need to be addressed; the UNOSOM military presence should gradually be restructured to protect those most vulnerable, especially women; more resources and diplomatic imagination must be employed towards resettling the displaced and rebuilding local government; and vocational and educational alternatives must be created for current and ex-militia members. Finally, culpability must be laid squarely at the feet of all of the militia leaders who have exploited Somalia’s population and resources in an absolutely criminal manner.

Famine and Human Rights

The famine that precipitated the December 1993 humanitarian intervention was rooted in the human rights disaster which followed the overthrow of Siad Barre’s regime in January 1991. The scale of destruction and loss was nearly absolute for thousands of families and hundreds of communities.

During the latter half of 1992, the Bardera-Baidoa-Luuq triangle degenerated into the most acute famine belt in the country. The people of the fertile Juba Valley had been repeatedly victimised by the scorched-earth tactics of the Somali National Front (SNF), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), and the United Somali Congress (Habr Gedir) militias as their forces looted livestock, seeds, tools, and grain, destroyed water sources, raped women and killed men. It was these actions, primarily by the SNF, which directly caused the famine. In the autumn of 1992, matters worsened considerably; Aideed and his forces were not only primarily responsible for the looting and extortion which prevented aid from reaching the starving, but the atrocities which created large refugee flows to Kenya. The livestock losses have been ruinous for many pastoral and agro-pastoral families with the result that traditional coping mechanisms — selling livestock and drawing on bakari (grain store) stocks — are no longer possible.

Ibrahim Mustafa, an official from the Somali NGO HARDA, called this period ‘the grave of our people’. Death tolls in Bardera in October 1992 were 385 per day; 20,000 people perished in Baidoa during the latter half of 1992, almost all being among the displaced and at least half were children under five. The UN World Food Program reported that one-half of the people the south-central part of Somalia (500,000) had perished by December 1992; estimates by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies concur. A Save the Children Fund (UK) survey of the displaced in Mogadishu
found that 85 per cent of households did not have children younger than 12 months old, and nearly a third did not have children younger than five years of age. Nearly a quarter said their farmland had been taken by others. In the Bay Region, UNICEF vaccination surveys found only 10 to 20 children under five in villages which should currently number 80 to 100.

Insecurity and banditry remain problematic throughout southern Somalia, while the militias patiently wait out UNOSOM's departure. Inter-clan conflict is intensifying over the rich agricultural land adjacent to the two major rivers, the Juba and the Shebelle, and the commercial gateway to this prized strategic region, the town of Kismayu. The SNA is attempting to spread its influence into the Bay Region and the Juba Valley. Further, Somalis have generally retreated to within their clan strongholds for security reasons, perpetuating a situation of mass internal displacement. In Gedo Region, the 1993 Gu harvest was extremely poor due to insecurity and climate, resulting in some population movement back to major towns from the rural areas, further stressing urban resources; it increased the desires of the Marehan sub-clan to move southward along the Juba River Valley to Kismayu, further destabilising tenuous clan relations.

Politicians on all sides have manipulated the situation to varying degrees, stirring up ethnic tension and encouraging exclusion, especially at the political level. On the other hand, there have been talks between Rahanweyn and Marehan elders, as well as between the Ogadeni and Rahanweyn in Middle Juba Region which should be encouraged and built upon: 'Elders are the key element in clan reconciliation, not warlords or the UN. Only elders can solve disputes over blood debts, property or grazing rights'. The UN Secretary-General's visit to Baidoa in November 1993 highlighted the ability of Aideed's SNA to disrupt peaceful pleas by the victims of civil war for protection.

Identifying the Most Vulnerable
Most of the victims during the past three years were specifically targeted because of their weakness and vulnerability (a function of their lack of military strength or minority status in an area); because of clan or sub-clan affiliation; and/or because in the case of many agrarian communities — of valuable farmland coveted by other clans — a problem which pre-dated the civil war and intensified during it. A number of displaced interviewed by this author said that some people have changed their clan affiliation (i.e., taken on a new clan identity) to protect themselves. Smaller groups, fearing domination, may petition to join a larger group. Besides getting some measure of protection, this allows these smaller communities to participate in food or seed distribution from which they might otherwise be excluded by local authorities. For example, in the Middle Juba Region, the Jaron and the Heemie were Rahanweyn sub-clans but many of their number are now saying they are the Leyson sub-clan of Rahanweyn, a much larger sub-clan. They fear being looted so they went to the Leyson elders to ask to be put under their protection.

The map of Somalia's clans is potentially being redrawn possibly at the expense of the weakest of Somalia's ethnic groups — its own form of 'ethnic cleansing' in the form of 'clan cleansing'. Thousands of refugees and internally displaced fear returning to certain areas because of the perceived potential of being targeted based on their clan affiliation. This is not only an issue in Bay, Gedo and Middle Juba Regions, but also in Lower Juba and Lower Shabelle as well, where Bantu, Rahanweyn and Digil farming communities, as well as smaller groups from
the port city of Kismayu, have been besieged by Ogadeni, Marehan, and Majerteen refugees and targeted by the SNF, SPM and SNA, with full financial backing from the economic elite within the sub-clans that support them. Ethnic re-adjustments are bound to occur during periods of intense civil war when people seek security within their own clan areas. The unknown variable, and one which must diligently be investigated, is the extent to which these readjustments are forced.

Many of the militarily impotent Rahanweyn and Bantu communities, and some of the coastal peoples of mixed descent south of Mogadishu, such as the Bajunis have been the principal victims as the conflict increasingly moves toward the river mouths and the some of the best irrigated farmland in Somalia. The perception amongst the Rahanweyn community is that if international forces left, they would again be overrun by either the militias of the Marehan, Ogadeni or Habr Gedir; the same is true for the Rahanweyn, Digil and Bantu populations of Lower Juba Region. Various Darod sub-clans (Majerteen, Ogadeni, and Marehan) have, for years, been moving slowly into the Juba Valley and Kismayu, using the upheaval of the last three years to intensify their land-grabbing in some of Somalia’s richest agricultural areas, using their newly acquired wealth to not only weather the famine, but prosper. Typically, in mid-October Jess’ Ogadeni forces— allied with Aideed— captured Jilib on the Juba River north of Kismayu.

Protecting the Most Vulnerable

As UNOSOM draws down its troop presence at the regional level, the resumption of major militia activity and advances is almost guaranteed. Already, inter-clan fighting is increasing, encouraged by UNOSOM’s passive approach to violence between Somalis. In some regions there is a spillover of militia activity from major towns—from which the international troop presence had dispersed these militias—to smaller towns and villages or along the road networks. For example, in Bay Region there was fighting in Qansa Dhore and Dinsor and security again began declining on the roads as early as October 1993. Throughout 1993, claims by UNOSOM that South Mogadishu was the only real trouble spot throughout the country was inaccurate, as banditry and insecurity have remained endemic problems throughout most of the regions of southern Somalia, targeted at both Somali civilians (who demonstrate their fear by remaining by the hundreds of thousands as the newly urbanised displaced and as long-term refugees in neighbouring countries) and international NGOs. Conversely, sweeps and patrols by French forces out of Baidoa into the villages gave farmers enough of a sense of security to return to the rural areas and plant earlier in 1993 helping to reignite commercial activity, a key ingredient of famine prevention strategy by local communities.

As the reduced UN force plots its mandate, thought should be given to placing small detachments of international forces outside the major towns in areas judged to be most vulnerable to raids and attacks from the militia forces. Troop presence should be stepped up at harvest time and in support of post-harvest marketing activities, as well as for the protection of grain storehouses and livestock of militarily weak communities.

Alliances between clans and control over towns and villages shift regularly. If anything, the Somali militias are patient, and will re-emerge if and when the UNOSOM presence is reduced. A UN official acknowledged that the Somali National Front (Marehan), for example, has not demobilised and their
militia have hidden their weapons.' Their emphasis on political involvement and public de-emphasis of the military option, has led many observers to conclude perhaps prematurely that the SNF as a militia has broken up. But when asked about his community's ability to defend itself against the SNF or Aideed's SNA, one sheikh in the Bay Region said, 'We are counting on the Americans', which was echoed by many of the displaced.

Given the draw down of UNOSOM troops, a much lower cost (i.e., lower technology, less reliance on air transport), more dispersed troop presence must begin to be established. Satellite towns and villages would benefit greatly from small, preventive, irregular patrols, and from an expansion of the seasonal Harvest Escort Program, which escorts farmers to markets in order to sell their goods, encouraging urban to rural repatriation, thus lessening the need for an extremely large and costly UNOSOM troop presence in major towns, ostensibly mere to protect humanitarian services for the displaced and vulnerable.

Protecting Women
The fact that there are significantly more women-headed households — widowed by the civil war — who need to be rehabilitated in the agricultural sector points up particular needs. Although women usually were the primary cultivators in southern Somalia, husbands have traditionally provided whatever physical protection the household had against banditry, which many women will have to address for the first time. However, many of the women in displaced camps indicated that they would stay in the towns instead of returning to agro-pastoralism, primarily because of security, particularly attacks by militia or bandits. Rapes, abductions, and forced marriages (the latter two being short- and long-term versions of sexual slavery) were common during the civil war and remains a significant problem.

Assigning Culpability
In developing future responses to the ongoing Somali crisis, it is critical to remember what triggered the intervention in the first place:

The primary cause of the disaster was the ferocious fighting between the heavily armed clan-based forces of the so-called 'warlords', all dubious relics from the [Siad Barre] era, who seek to rule Somalia and have wrought such devastation and suffering, especially among the less bellicose southern cultivators who produce most of Somalia's grain (I. M. Lewis).

Specific responsibility should be placed at the feet of the militia leaders who helped organise these atrocities. No advantage should be given to any of these warmongers either by conferring external legitimacy on any one of them or particularly targeting any one of them. Considerations about their future (imprisonment, war crimes trials, banishment from the political process) should be carefully weighed against the pragmatic search for reconciliation and containment of conflict. Nevertheless, as the militias reorient their positions in an attempt to take advantage of any developing political process, the international community should remember and publicise what they are responsible for. Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal (Africa Rights, UK) graphically point to the importance of an honest analysis of the root causes of the Somali

To define the problem as a humanitarian crisis that demands a charitable solution is politically naive and drastically narrows the range of options ... When the stress is on material assistance, without considering the underlying power relations and the human rights context, the result is to prolong human suffering ... Aideed aims to 'liber-
ate' the farms and rangelands — but only for the benefit of his own followers. Meanwhile, his rivals plan to restore property to 'legitimate' owners — to restore the former elite to power. Either way, the minority farmers will remain powerless and on the edge of hunger.

The optimistic argument would be that it is not too late to begin to address these issues. Beyond that, future 'humanitarian interventions' should be open-eyed about the power politics which produce famine, and the impossibility of avoiding substantial engagement, with all the attendant risks and responsibilities.

John Prendergast, Director, Horn of Africa Project, Center of Concern, Washington, DC.

The Somali in the New Political Order of Ethiopia

John Markakis

With the collapse of the military regime which ruled that country between 1974 and 1991, Ethiopia entered a season of political ferment. The collapse signalled the defeat of forces that had dominated Ethiopia throughout this century, and made possible the political self-assertion of subordinate and minority groups. Whether the end result of this process will be a fundamental and historic change in the political life of this country is as yet uncertain. In the meantime, many political organisations have emerged to represent long suppressed population groups, and they are claiming a share of power in a proposed decentralised state structure whose constituent units are ethnically defined. Among them are more than a dozen organisations claiming to represent the Somali people of Ethiopia.

Given their history of alienation and irredentism, Somali participation in the process whose declared goal is to restructure the Ethiopian state on the basis of self-governing ethnic communities came as a surprise. It was welcome by the aspiring architects of the new state who came to power in Addis Ababa in May 1991. The Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), created and controlled by the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), had a blueprint of the new political order ready before it came to power. Theoretically, this is based on the TPLF's own avowed commitment to national self-determination. From a practical point of view, since ethnicity had become the dominant force for political mobilisation in Ethiopia during the violent reign of the military regime, especially mobilisation of opposition groups, it could not be ignored. The participation of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), whose claim to represent the largest ethnic group in the country made it a key player, hinged on this point; that is, political recognition and self-government for ethnic groups. The representatives of the United States government, who also took part in the preparation of a new government for Ethiopia, supported a strategy designed to entice most existing and potential political actors to participate. Indeed at the time, an appeal to ethnicity appeared to offer the only hope of forging the political consensus required by the new rulers, if they were to rule Ethiopia peacefully, and the EPRDF embraced it.

The victors in the Ethiopian civil war went to considerable lengths to ensure that representatives of the main ethnic groups and organisations could attend the 'Democratic and Peaceful Transitional Conference' held in Addis Ababa in July 1991, a little more than a month after the EPRDF came to power. Although it was felt there was little hope of securing Somali acceptance, they nevertheless asked for Sudanese help to locate representatives of the long moribund Western Somalia Liberation Front.
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(WSLF). The Sudanese found them hiding in the midst of war-torn Mogadishu, fearing Hawiye revenge for their long association with Siad Barre’s regime and the mindless violence sweeping the Somali capital. They were flown to Khartoum, where they met with EPRDF representatives.

The leader of this delegation was none other than Abdi Nassir Sheikh Aden, the veteran Ogadeni nationalist leader, who began a long career as one of the founders and director of the subversive Ogaden Company for Trade and Industry in the 1950s, and who had been Siad Barre’s choice as Secretary General of the WSLF since 1983. Another member of this group was UgaZ Mohammed Abdi, a veteran of the 1963 uprising in the Ogaden and, at this time, defence chief of the WSLF. In Khartoum, they were shown the draft Charter for the transitional government of Ethiopia, a remarkably liberal document which guaranteed not only the right of nationalities to administer their own affairs, but also their right to independence if they so wished. On this basis, the WSLF veterans accepted the invitation to attend the conference held in Addis Ababa in July 1991.

They represented an organisation that had no real presence within Ethiopia after the defeat of the Somali invasion of the Ogaden in 1978. Controlled and manipulated by the Siad Barre regime, the WSLF had become a pawn in the domestic politics of the Somali Republic, and the Ogadeni were enroled in the clan coalition which sustained that regime. Office in the WSLF became a sinecure for compliant veterans, while younger and more militant members left the organisation in disillusionment and many of them went abroad. Disillusion turned to outrage when Siad Barre betrayed the cause of the Ogaden in a quid pro quo with Mengistu Haile Mariam, the Ethiopian dictator. When the two beleaguered tyrants met in January 1986 under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in Djibouti, they negotiated a deal that was sealed with a Peace Accord between the two countries signed in April 1988. Siad Barre sold out the Ogaden in exchange for the expulsion of the Somali National Movement from Ethiopia. The fact that the WSLF was not even able to register a protest destroyed what little credibility it had left.

Mogadishu’s unsubtle exploitation of Somali irredentism in Ethiopia and heavy handed control of the WSLF had always been resented by many Ogadeni militants, but their attempts to resist it had never succeeded thanks to the efficiency of Siad Barre’s security services. Many attempts were made to form what was called a ‘front within the front’, but none succeeded. It was not until the final betrayal by Siad Barre that defectors from the WSLF were able to form an autonomous organisation abroad.

The Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF) is said to have been formed in the Gulf in August 1984, but a public announcement of its existence was not made until March 1986, in Kuwait. Its founders were members of the WSLF, and some of them were its representatives in the states of the Gulf. Sheikh Ibrahim Abdulah, the chairman, was WSLF representative in Abu Dhabi. Abdulahi Mohammed Sadi, its most prominent member, was WSLF representative in Kuwait. In February 1987, Abdulahi distributed ONLF documents at the Islamic Conference in Kuwait, and the Arab press took notice of its existence. Soon afterwards, he was expelled from Kuwait and found refuge in Norway. The initial ONLF policy statement defined the Ogaden as ‘an oppressed nation colonised by Ethiopia’, and pledged to establish an independent Ogaden state with full sovereignty in line with the aspirations of its peo-
pie. This was a departure from their redentist aspirations of the WSLF, and for the next few years the ONLF struggled to get out of the shadow of the older movement and establish a distinct identity. The gradual unravelling of the Somali state into warring clan fiefdoms created a conducive climate for a reassessment of the merits of Somali irredentism and the assertion of Ogadeni political autonomy. However, the claims sometimes made by ONLF supporters of the sudden birth of an Ogadeni nation and its aspirations for independence seemed a bit premature, to say the least. The ONLF had yet to make its presence felt, when the military regime collapsed in Ethiopia, and was not invited to attend the conference in Addis Ababa in July 1991. It seemed also that the ONLF had yet to make up its mind about the unfolding situation in Ethiopia. Ibrahim Abdulah, its chairman, a teacher educated in Arabia, was against involvement with the new regime in Addis Ababa. In a public meeting in Amsterdam held at the time of the Addis Ababa conference, and attended by the author, the ONLF members present openly disagreed among themselves about the position of their organisation and its relationship with the WSLF.

The Democratic and Peaceful Transitional Conference of Ethiopia was held in Addis Ababa during 1-5 July 1991. It was attended by representatives of 24 'nationality movements'. A few of these had existed prior to this time such as the WSLF, which was allotted two seats. Most of the others were formed in Addis Ababa on the eve of the conference, at the behest of the EPRDF. Among the latter was an 'Issa and Gadabursi Peoples Movement' which was allotted one seat. Representatives of a few multi-ethnic political groups were included to make a total of 87 participants. The EPRDF has 32 seats, and with the support of the OLF which had 12 seats was in full control of the proceedings. The main task of the conference was to approve the Charter for the provisional government of Ethiopia prepared by the EPRDF in collaboration with the OLF. In the preceding month, the EPRDF had managed to present its objectives to the leaders of the main groups, and while most thought them too good to be true, they were willing to give the new regime time to prove itself. Indeed, they had no other choice. In the conference, only one vote was cast against the resolution that accepted the referendum in Eritrea, and four abstentions were registered on the final vote on the Charter.

The Charter provided for the establishment of a Council of Representatives, which was more or less a replica of the conference, although provision was made for the inclusion of a few more ethnic groups. Each ethnic group was allotted a number of seats, and these were divided among the organisations claiming to represent it. The only condition was that they accept the Charter, and that their representatives had not been members of the defunct Party of the Working Peoples of Ethiopia set up by the previous regime, or its security apparatus. Although they bargained for more, the Somali were allotted four seats, of which the WSLF took three. The fourth went to the ONLF, whose leadership had gathered belatedly in Addis Ababa. Both organisations share the same Ogadeni clan base, and their adherence to the Charter signifies an identity of political objectives. Understandably, they came under pressure to unite, and pronouncements to that effect were made on several occasions in the months that followed. They opened a joint office in Addis Ababa after the conference, and resolved to call an 'Ogadeni national congress'. Later on, Abdi Nassir announced the two had a 'unified leadership' and were working as one (Ethiopian Herald, 23 March 1992). In reality, they were competing for political support among the Ogadeni,
although only the ONLF appears to have made much of an effort.

The first ONLF congress was held in the Ogaden in February 1992. It chose a leadership in the form of a central and an executive committee, and Sheikh Ibrahim Abdulah as its chairman. Being essentially an exile organisation, the ONLF was conscious of the need to cultivate support in the region, and exerted some effort in that direction. By contrast, while it has roots and a clear image in the Ogaden, the WSLF remained organisationally moribund. Abdi Nassir Sheikh Aden toured the region to rally support, but had little help. For example, Ugaz Mohammed Abdi, WSLF spokesman in Addis Ababa and one of its representatives in the Council of Representatives, made not a single visit to the Ogaden, a region he had not set foot in since 1964.

Having adopted ethnicity as the guiding principle in the design of the new state, the new Ethiopian regime faced the task of delineating ethnic regions to serve as its constituent units. Given the fact that more than eighty distinct ethnic groups have been identified in Ethiopia, this was risking opening Pandora's box. However, the committee set up to demarcate the regions had its task made comparatively easy by work done under the previous regime, which had founded an Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities to prepare a regional self-administration scheme of its own that never materialised. The committee's report was discussed in the Council of Representatives in November 1991. It was adopted with some revisions, and a provisional map appeared.

Using mainly linguistic criteria, the map divided Ethiopia into twelve ethnic regions plus two regions for the multi-ethnic cities of Addis Ababa and Harar. Nine of the regions each contain a number of ethnic groups, and they are divided into zones and districts designed roughly to fit ethnic criteria. Only three regions are ethnically homogeneous; the Somali region, Region 5, being one of these. This region includes not only the Ogaden, but the area in the north bordering Djibouti, as well as southern Bale and part of southern Sidamo. The last two regions had been the domain of the Somali and Abo Liberation Front (SALF), which had a mixed constituency of Oromo and Somali and a blurred identity, and operated in tandem with the WSLF in the 1970s. Like the WSLF, SALF in the 1990s was a phantom organisation with no presence in Ethiopia, but it was not forgotten by the EPRDF. It asked the Sudanese to bring Wako Gutu, the legendary Oromo rebel leader, and some of his companions from Mogadishu to Addis Ababa in time for the July conference. After being briefed by EPRDF representatives in Khartoum, the veterans who had fought against Ethiopian rule for nearly three decades were forced to consider the political implications of ethnicity, something they were never troubled with before. With ethnicity now the cardinal principle of political organisation, a mongrel like SALF had no place in the new scheme. Consequently, the Oromo were forced to part with their Somali comrades and to choose a name with a clear ethnic image. They divided, some opting for the name Oromo Abo, while Wako and others chose United Oromo. They went to the conference and later to the Council of Representatives separately with these names.

The regional delineation was a fair dispensation, and the Somali had no cause for complaint. Indeed, Ugaz Mohammed Abdi, one of the WSLF members in the Council of Representatives, declared it 'a victory for Somalis' (Ethiopian Herald, 29 January 1992). Region 5, the Somali region, shares an extensive border with Region 4, the Oromo region, which is the largest of all. Over-
lapping claims were inevitable, and when it came to the elections, which were based on this scheme, confusion and conflict were unavoidable. The map itself was withdrawn to contain the conflict. However for the time being, the lid was kept on Pandora’s box.

To put the self-government scheme into operation, elections were held at the local and regional levels in April and June 1992 respectively. Intense political activity, an unprecedented experience in Ethiopia, preceded the elections. Political parties, nearly all claiming an ethnic identity, proliferated. The lead was given by the EPRDF, which had no intention of losing control of the political process it had initiated. It quickly promoted the formation of affiliated organisations in most regions of Ethiopia’s invariably named ‘peoples democratic organisations’ (PDOs). The prototype was the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organisation (OPDO), founded even before the EPRDF came to power. In many areas the PDOs competed with factions claiming to be the genuine representatives of their ethnic group. A plethora of organisations emerged to represent ethnic minorities that found themselves encapsulated in regions dominated by large ethnic groups. Only a few groups were formed to oppose ethnicity as a political principle and to defend Ethiopian unity. It should be noted that nearly all these political factions were little more than coteries of urban petty bourgeois elements and intellectuals, mostly resident in Addis Ababa, the number of schoolteachers involved in them is impressive. Actively assisted by the resources of the state, including the EPRDF guerilla army, the PDOs harassed and intimidated the opposition, creating an atmosphere of crisis, and finally provoking the withdrawal of many opposition organisations from the elections, the suspension of elections in several areas, and earning the censure of international observers. Not surprisingly, the EPRDF and its affiliates won throughout the country, except in the Somali region.

Probably because it was deemed a hopeless venture, Region 5 was the only one where no attempt was made to set up a PDO affiliate, and the Somali were left to their own political devices. They reacted characteristically by forming more than a dozen clan and lineage based groups to resist domination by the Ogadeni clan. Thirteen had registered with the Electoral Commission by mid-1992, and some more appeared later. They included the Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front, the Horiyal Democratic Front, the Ethiopian Somali Democratic Movement which claims to represent the Ishaq living in the Haud, the Democratic United Party which claims to represent the Hawiye of the southern Ogaden, the Democratic Action League formed by Issa, a group representing the Rer Barre cultivators in Kelafo, and another representing the Shekash clan which is dispersed throughout the Ogaden.

Two other groups sought to rally support across clan and lineage lines on the basis of Islam, as their names signify. An Islamic Solidarity party formed around a well-known and respected cleric, and pursued a moderate course for unity in line with Somali political tradition. It accepted the Charter, and maintained amicable relations with other Somali political factions. The Islamic Unity party belongs to the modern militant fundamentalist creed, preaches world Muslim unity, and is linked to similar organisations in the region. Led by relatively unknown persons, most of whom are thought to have been educated in the Arab region, it clashed violently with other Somali political factions in the period leading to the elections, and ultimately refused to participate.

There was no lack of incidents in the
Somali region during this period, and not a few lives were lost, including that of an UNHCR employee who was killed in Gode. Drought and threatening famine made the situation worse. Tension reigned in many districts on the border between Regions 4 (Oromo) and 5 (Somali). At least eleven districts with mixed ethnic population became bones of contention. Tension reached a peak during voter registration, when people were asked to declare their ethnic identity, and each side tried to reinforce its claim on the basis of numbers. No election was held in three districts because of ethnic clashes, while the results in another eight were disputed. The city of Dire Dawa is claimed by the Somali as the capital of their region, but this claim is strongly opposed by the Oromo, and both sides were asked by the central government to desist until after the national elections scheduled to be held in 1994.

A major breakdown was averted, and the elections in Region 5 were probably the fairest in Ethiopia. Certainly, they produced the most diversified results. Out of 48 districts claimed by Region 5, elections were completed in 37, each district sending three representatives to the regional assembly. Out of the total of 111 seats, the ONLF won over 70, the WSLF 9, the Democratic Unity Party (Hawiye) 9, the Ethiopian Somali Democratic Movement (Isaqaq) 7, the Islamic Solidarity 7, the Democratic Action League (Issa) 6, the Horiyal 3, and the Rer Barre 1.

The regional council met initially in Dire Dawa, where it was addressed by the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Tamrat Layne, who said the event proved that 'Ethiopian Somalis are Ethiopian citizens of Somali stock.' (Ethiopian Herald, 26 January 1993). He also advised them not to press their claim to Dire Dawa at that time, and the assembly chose Gode as the temporary regional capital. The choice of this remote and isolated location, in preference to Jijiga for instance, was dictated by the fact that it lies deep in Ogaden country. The assembly also chose a flag and a symbol for the region, but not a name, because the preference of the majority for the name Ogadenia is not accepted by the other clans. The assembly elected a regional executive committee of 19 members. Twelve of these, including the chairman and vice chairman came from the ONLF. Abdulahi Mohammed Sadi was elected chairman, that is, chief executive of the region. Forty-five years old, he is a graduate of the Somali National University and has pursued further studies abroad where he spent many years representing the WSLF. Seven seats went to other parties, except for the Rer Barre and Horiyal factions. The members of the executive committee are divided into a number of committees in charge of regional affairs. According to the transitional scheme, only foreign affairs, defence, and external economic cooperation are excluded from the mandate of the regional government.

Decentralised schemes tend to complexity and duplication. Region 5 is divided into 48 districts, which are the administrative units (woreda) of the former provincial administration. Each of these elects its own executive committee of nine persons, three of whom comprise the chairman, vice-chairman and secretary of the district, while the other six are divided into two committees in charge of social services and development respectively. A number of districts are grouped together to form zones, of which Region 5 has nine. Zonal administrative committees comprise members of the regional council elected in the districts within each zone.

In order to enable the regions to fulfil their responsibilities, the central government proposed to transfer all assets, personnel, records, from the central ministries and other state agencies to the regional governments. The chair-
man of Region 5 and other members of the regional executive spent the early part of 1993 in Addis Ababa searching for these assets and negotiating their transfer to the region. They were grimly amused to discover that most of the assets and much of the personnel assigned to the provincial administration of the Ogaden by former Ethiopian regimes could not be traced.

Finding trained personnel promised to be a major problem. Although little was said officially on the subject, it was assumed that regional administration employees ought at least to be familiar with the local language. Potentially, this could evolve into an ethnic barrier in regional administration employment. At any rate, there couldn't be many trained non-Somali Ethiopians who would consider working in Gode. Nevertheless, by mid-1993 the regional administration had managed to put together a skeleton professional staff of about 100 Somali. The police commissioner is a former military chief of the ONLF. He is responsible for establishing an all-Somali police force under the sole authority of the regional government.

The head of education is a former dean of the Somali National University. The choice of language having been left to the regions, Region 5 decided to use the Somali language and Latin alphabet at the primary level and English at the secondary. So far, no provision has been made for teaching Amharic, still the language of government in Ethiopia. One woman has been included in the regional executive committee responsible for industry.

The Somali regional government faces a formidable task in any field of development it chooses to embark. Even by Ethiopian standards, the region it rules is isolated and impoverished. Gode, the capital, is not even connected by telephone with the rest of the country, nor by any modern transport links. The only potential resource available are the natural gas fields discovered in Kalubo and Hilala south of Gode. Developed with Soviet Union assistance under the military regime, they are now part of a World Bank project that awaits the approval of the central government. The previous regime also built a 3,000 hectares cotton farm in Gode, and a dam for irrigation and hydroelectric power on the Shebeli river. Finally, there is a modern military air base at Gode built by the United States under the Haile Selassie regime to bring Somalia within reach of the Ethiopian airforce.

The pastoralist economy of the region has been undermined by two decades of intermittent war, repeated and massive population displacement, the interruption of trade with and through Somalia, the influx of refugees from that country, and frequent drought. Famine was a constant threat during the past two years. No taxes were collected by the state during this period anywhere in Ethiopia, and the budget of regional governments was met by central government subsidy. From now on, however, the regions are expected to raise their own revenue through taxation, and this will present the government of Region 5 with a delicate problem, given the weak economic situation of the pastoralists and their strong aversion to taxation.

The region has already experienced its first internal political upheaval. In July 1993, when the chairman of the regional council returned to Gode after a prolonged stay in Addis Ababa, he was accused of misappropriating funds granted by the central government to the region, and he together with the entire regional executive committee were removed from office. A new executive committee was elected, headed by Hassan Jire Qalinle, an ONLF member and former pilot of Somali Airlines.
Prospects

To many observers there is an air of unreality about events in Ethiopia these days. From both within and outside the country many find it difficult to believe that a brave new political world has dawned in this afflicted corner of Africa. A number of questions hang over the experiment that is being tried. The first concerns Pandora's familiar box. Despite the fact that it is an essential factor in political practice throughout Africa, and it could hardly be otherwise, ethnicity has never been considered a suitable principle in state craft design because of its alleged divisive nature. The new regime in Ethiopia argues that what has proved divisive, in fact, is the attempt to deny ethnicity the political recognition it merits. The last thing to emerge from Pandora's box was 'hope' — a sentiment long overdue for the masses of the Ethiopian people. How eminent it is, however, remains uncertain.

Given the proven impossibility of determining its essence, the first question — insistently raised nowadays by a new generation of social anthropologists, whose predecessors invented the concept — is whether the ethnic group in truth is a figment of the anthropological imagination rather than a social fact. In Ethiopia the problem of definition has been facilely side stepped by making language the criterion of ethnic identity. This raises a second question, which is whether 'ethnic' groups thus defined have the demographic coherence, social integrity, shared material base, and the political solidarity required to make them suitable building blocks of a larger political structure. If not, then intra-ethnic, rather than inter-ethnic, conflict is likely to be the order of the day.

Indeed, signs of this have already appeared in Ethiopia, and notionly in the predictable political fragmentation of the Somalia clan lines. Similar splintering along regional, clan, and lineage lines, as well as religion and dialect has effected other ethnic groups, and it seems likely to acquire momentum as communities mobilise to fight for resources that are coming under regional control. Self-government is meaningless unless it produces tangible material results, and there hangs a third question, which is how can the poorest and least developed country in the world support what is probably the most complex, delicate and expensive system of government.

These questions do not touch upon the intentions of the regime in power. There are many in Ethiopia who doubt its sincerity, and for them such questions are academic. According to one school of thought, to which most aspiring 'ethnic' politicians frustrated by the manoeuvres of the PDOs belong, maintains that the new scheme is but the latest ploy used by the Abyssinians of the north to retain control of the imperial state; albeit this time under Tigrayan hegemony. Whereas the imperial regime invoked God, and the military trusted in Marx, the Tigrayans resorted to tribalism in order to divide and rule. This is the line taken by the Oromo Liberation Front, for instance. There are many others who reject ethnicity and regard the present scheme as the prelude to the disintegration of Ethiopia. They also see it as a ploy by the regime to retain power.

The existence and breadth of the opposition raises a final question, which is whether the new regime can retain control of the country for long, whatever its intentions might be. For example, while it managed to out-maneouvure and reduce the OLF to political impotence for the time being, it is far from certain that it can win lasting political support from the vast Oromo population through the Oromo Peoples Democratic Organisation. The same applies to
many other ethnic groups. If it fails to do so, then it will have to resort to force to retain power, and the experiment will be over.

The Somali politicians in Ethiopia are sensitive to the manifold ambiguities of the situation, but they don't display any ambivalence towards regional self-administration. They appear determined to gain as much as possible from the scheme, and profess hope for the future. Only the Islamic Unity faction came out against it. Asked how he can reconcile a life long struggle against Ethiopia with his present position in the Council of Representatives, Ugaz Mohammed Abdi replied with his own question: to wit, 'isn't this what we fought for all along?' Understandably, pan-Somali unity is not a subject fit for discussion anywhere these days. Moreover, if the relative strength of the ONLF means anything, it could be that irredentism is losing favour among the Somali in Ethiopia. That could not be simply because the idea at present seems farcical, but also because it had long become clear that the struggle of the Somali in Ethiopia for political freedom was futile as long as it was perceived as a territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia. This was an argument used by the ONLF to good effect.

John Markakis is in the History Department at the University of Crete, Rethymnon.

The data presented in this paper were gathered during the summer of 1993 in Ethiopia and came from interviews with persons referred to in these pages.

Those who wish to know more about the background of organisations and events mentioned here can consult John Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge University Press, 1987; Zed Press, 1989).

Somalia: State and Society in Turmoil

M A Mohamed Salih & Lennart Wohlgemuth

On 15 January 1994, an international conference on 'Somalia: State and Society in Turmoil' was organised by the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies in Uppsala, Sweden. The conference was attended by representatives of eight Somali factions, the indigenous peoples of Somalia, ministers from the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland, Somali peace and intellectual groups, Somali and Northern NGOs, representatives of human rights groups, representatives of Nordic development authorities and a number of concerned observers from the South and the North. The conference reviewed the developments in Somalia and Somaliland since the collapse of the Siad Barre regime and the UNSOM intervention in December 1992. The participants reviewed achievements and drawbacks of the peace conferences, the politics of reconciliation, and relief and rehabilitation.

The following is a summary of the conveners' report which was adopted by the conference participants:

The Somali crisis is rooted in the Somali colonial past and post-colonial mismanagement of state and society. The contradictions between the state drive towards modernisation and civil society based on clan and kinship, have not been democratically resolved. The highly centralised post-colonial state monopolised a highly centralised power structure which, on the one hand, used the clan as a base of the Somali society and, on the other, denied the clan base to create contact points between modernism and traditionalism. The centralisation of power also meant a centralisation of the means of coercion and their alleviation from scattered, regionally-contained to national conflicts with dire consequences on the Somali nationals in the Horn of Africa.
many other ethnic groups. If it fails to do so, then it will have to resort to force to retain power, and the experiment will be over.

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The question of state formation and state reconstruction has been raised. Two contradictory bases for restructuring the Somali state, or states, have been proposed: modernisation or traditionalism. It appears from the discussion that the social basis for a new Somali state, or states, has not transcended the age-old discussion about modernisation and traditionalism. The discussion is still rooted in either revivalist or radical transformation. Others prefer to leave the present process to take its own momentum, hoping that the genesis of the new state or states structures will emerge from within a post-war Somali society. One key question requiring resolution is what alternative political frameworks will need to be developed, with what kind of institutional structures and for what purpose.

One of the issues which was discussed but which needs much more consideration: what are the Somali really fighting for? Knowing more about whether the magnitude of the present violence is important in identifying the problem and seeking solutions based on that knowledge. The issue of ownership of farmland is central to the conflict and must be resolved if there is to be a just and lasting peace. Several proposals on how to reach a peaceful settlement have been proposed:

1. The Somali people hold the key to their future and any imposed or externally-driven peace initiatives will have the same fate as the others. However, external support, without intimidation, bias or arrogance, is essential in re-building the lives of millions of displaced Somali.

2. The reliance on Somali grassroots organisations and leadership in the search for peace. This should not be seen as a mere matter of consultation, but of working together with the Somali people wherever they are with a clear bias towards those who live in Somalia and meet the daily challenge of maintaining peace and order.

3. Those who deal with the Somali issue should respect Somali traditional political institutions and value system. A dialogue between what these institutions can offer and their limitations, on the one hand, and the requirements of a modern state or states on the other, is an important ingredient in the search for possible scenarios and possible solutions. Institution-building is better served by arrangements from the bottom-up than by imposition of political visions alien to the Somali.

4. Grassroots, local and regional level structures have to be strengthened if peace is to become established among the Somali communities. However, a one-sided concentration on regional level interventions without due consideration to the political mechanisms and dynamics which hold the regions together is dangerous.

5. To search with the Somali people for new definitions and structures of sustainable peace and security. Comprehensive security cannot be attained by food relief alone. It has to be followed by reconstructing the social services, the economy and the infrastructure that can give people the opportunity to look for alternative means of livelihood. Livelihood security is an important ingredient to physical, psychological and other forms of security.

6. Respect for human rights is an essential component of peace and reconciliation and a necessary basis for a Somali state, or states.

7. Democratic processes and practices are governed by constitutional arrangements. In the build-up towards such constitutional arrangements, mi-
nority groups human rights should be respected. This was considered one of the most important ways of securing peaceful co-existence without domination.

8. Issues pertaining to past injustices and inequity have been discussed with an honest appeal towards forgiveness. This would help to correct what went wrong within the individual and its implications for peaceful co-existence in a secure society.

Questions of political representation in peace-making in Somalia have been raised by some participants who criticised top-down approaches to conflict resolution. Reference was made to successful experiences of reconciliation between the Somali peoples themselves. Furthermore, while many locally-driven peace and reconciliation conferences have succeeded, without any external intervention, some costly externally driven peace initiatives failed to materialise. Two related points have also been raised: a) proper political representation at a time of change and instability and b) political representation could reinforce the peace process only if it is a reflection of representative political institutions.

The economic, social and political roles of the Somali women have been highlighted. Somali women have been in the forefront in the struggle for peace. As the main bread-winners during the war, Somali women were able to contribute to the survival of their families, relatives and neighbours. This delineates women's role in society and the need for special programmes aiming at improving their decision-making and other relevant skills and capacities to participate fully in re-construction and development.

The issue of minority groups is one of the issues which has been neglected by the Somali themselves and to a large extent by the international community. While some of these groups are minority Somali clans others fall outside the Somali clan structure. The participants raised questions pertaining to the fact that some of the minority groups have legitimate demands, including respect for political, property, language and human rights.

The participants voiced concerns about:

a) Environmental degradation as a result of the war and stoppage of the import of gas and other petro-products as alternative sources of energy; b) The irresponsible fishing practices by international companies in the Somali territorial waters; c) Industrial and hazardous waste dumping by international waste dumping companies; d) Much of the country is being littered with millions of mines and requires an urgent de-mining operation, before rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country can be entertained. This shows that the war has disastrous consequences in almost every aspect of Somali life, from death and displacement to the environment.

The UN intervention in Somalia has been criticised and there were mixed reactions from the Forum. While they have generally commended the UN role in saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of people who would otherwise died of hunger and the civil war, some have voiced concern about the manner in which the UN mission has been conducted. UNOSOM-2 was found by some not being up to its objectives. Its departure from the initial mission and its concentration on the military aspect has caused pain and suffering for the Somali people.

The regional context of the Somali conflict and its ramifications has been highlighted by several participants. The quest for regional co-operation in the face of mounting economic and political pressures is seen as a means to resolve
The Somali crisis has drawn attention to the question: ‘what went wrong?’ In our view, this question should not be addressed by way of a post-mortem. Unlike those who regard the past in the case of Somalia as an aberration best forgotten, and certainly not to be re-lived, we believe that the past is always with us. No ‘fresh start’ can be divorced from the past. Indeed, if it is to prove a meaningful exercise, a fresh start must be linked to the past. In this sense, an understanding of what went wrong is indispensable to the search for solutions to the present predicament. While it would be too much to expect that we can provide the answer to such a complex question in this Briefing, what we hope to do is to explore certain paths that have already been identified and seem promising in the quest for such an answer.

The notion of ‘state and civil society in crisis’ highlights the two components that concern us. Although there is an evident artificiality in the conceptual separation between them, it might be useful to keep the two separate for purposes of analysis. All the more so, since some of the analytical approaches we will explore focus on one or the other of the two. At the end, we will want to consider the question of compatibility between Somali society and the post-colonial state.

The importance of kinship, i.e., clan, relationships is the element highlighted in all attempts to explain Somali political behaviour. Having been introduced in the first scholarly study of Somali society by I.M. Lewis three decades ago (1961), it appears to have been validated by current history. Lewis’ thesis is that the segmented clan system remains the bedrock foundation of pastoral Somali society, and ‘clannishness’ — the primacy of clan interests — is its natural divisive reflection on the political level. Lewis’s thesis is the starting point of many subsequent studies. Said Samatar, who wrote the first study of the Somali state with David Laitin (1987), accepts this thesis and describes how clannishness pervaded and made a mockery of the political system in independent Somalia. Generally, the persistence of this phenomenon is regarded as harmful. Said Samatar regards the segmented social structure as a recipe for ‘institutionalised instability’ (1990). Omar Osman Rabeh (1988) was moved to denounce the ‘nomadic mentality’ for...
inter- and intra-state conflicts. The increasing cooperation between Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya and the Sudan was discussed. The role played by the Ethiopian Government in opening its borders to the displaced Somali, active preparation and participation in the Somali peace process and placing the role of the OAU in the regional political agenda has been highlighted and appreciated.

The role of foreign assistance was appreciated and discussed at length. However, it was stressed that aid ought to be equitably distributed and directed to the Somali in need. A number of cases of failure were pointed at, where the donor agencies had acted with no or very little contact or consultation with the recipients. Openness and accountability to the final recipient will also increase effectiveness. It was noted that Somaliland has received very little international aid and support.

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Society and State in Crisis: What Went Wrong in Somalia?
Martin Doornbos & John Markakis

The Somali crisis has drawn attention to the question: ‘what went wrong?’ In our view, this question should not be addressed by way of a post-mortem. Unlike those who regard the past in the case of Somalia as an aberration best forgotten, and certainly not to be re-lived, we believe that the past is always with us. No ‘fresh start’ can be divorced from the past. Indeed, if it is to prove a meaningful exercise, a fresh start must be linked to the past. In this sense, an understanding of what went wrong is indispensable to the search for solutions to the present predicament. While it would be too much to expect that we can provide the answer to such a complex question in this Briefing, what we hope to do is to explore certain paths that have already been identified and seem promising in the quest for such an answer.

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Ahmed I. Samatar published his own study of Somali political life in 1988. In this and subsequent publications, he criticises the approach pioneered by social anthropology as a historical and conceptually confused. The first criticism refers to the fallacy of assuming that the structure of Somali society survived essentially intact the imperialist intrusion, its integration into the global economy, the commercialisation of pastoralism, its subordination to a centralised state, etc. The second criticism is levelled at the alleged confusion of kinship with clannishness. According to Ahmed Samatar, the traditional kinship structure was based on the communal mode of production, and was governed by cultural and political norms and institutions, like the rer and the xeer, which regulated intra and inter-clan relations, including conflict.

The changes wrought by the experiences of the past one hundred years, particularly the partial commoditisation of production, have transformed Somali society, according to Ahmed Samatar. New social strata have emerged: pastoral producers, merchants, petty bourgeoisie, intelligentsia. These have been caught in a deepening economic crisis, the result of Somalia's dependence on the global market, and are forced to compete in a situation of material and social insecurity not regulated by traditional norms and institutions. In this struggle for survival, individuals seek support on the basis of generalised kinship, but outside all traditional norms and rules that formerly regulated intra and inter-group relations. It is this situation that gives rise to clannishness, that is, the pursuit of kinship interests without restraint and at the expense of everything else. In this perspective, clannishness as currently manifested is not a reflection of the survival of traditional kinship relationships, but of their transformation and decay.

Writing in the same perspective, Abdi Samatar, Ahmed's brother, has documented the transformation of the economy and society in northern Somalia, now Somaliland (1989). These authors, and others as well, pin the blame for the political disintegration of Somalia on a ruling class, made up of the intelligentsia and petty bourgeoisie, for exploiting clannishness to promote their own interests; 'politicising tribalism', is what Yousuf J.A. Duhul calls it (1993). No allowance is made for the constraints imposed on politicians by the structure of Somali society. If the clan structure is indeed so important, it is difficult to see how politicians can operate outside it.

Hussein M. Adam (1992) believes the transformation of Somali society has given the clan a 'trade union' role to defend its members' interests. Among the interests it defends is that of clan recognition and prestige as well as social justice. This is not necessarily a negative role, for it expresses the traditional equalitarian ethos of Somali society. When this ethos and the traditional clan balance is upset, as it was under the Siad Barre regime, then a struggle to reestablish it is inevitable. Hussein argues that elite manipulation is a factor in the assertion of clannishness, but it is not the sole cause. One needs to ask why the people respond so readily to the call for clan solidarity, in peace and war. He believes it is because clan consciousness is anchored in real socio-economic processes, a point that is taken up below.

Whether one regards clannishness — the primacy of clan interests — as a reflection of traditional Somali society, or of its transformation and decay, it is agreed that this phenomenon matured in the bosom of the modern state, a
system of rule with which Somali society had no previous experience. Therefore, the nature of the state and its relation to Somali society is of crucial importance. In referring to the state here we do not mean simply Siad Barre's regime, which is widely blamed for the tribalisation of Somali political life. The pattern that Siad Barre perfected was laid down before he arrived on the political scene.

This pattern was introduced under colonial rule, and was accepted uncritically by the Somali nationalist movement in the 1950s. It was then that a number of complex, interrelated, but alien concepts were adopted to govern Somali political life. Among them was the imperative of the 'nation state', the unitary and highly centralised system of rule, the western model of representative government, the bureaucratic mode of administration, a western code of law and justice. Most crucial of all was the assumption that a minuscule western educated class would rule Somalia; naturally, it seemed, since only they could administer a modern state. What followed is well known, but simply put; Somali traditional institutions and customary authority were discarded, and the degrading of traditional values and norms began. In the field of conflict resolution, for instance, traditional practice was thought not only irrelevant but a violation of state authority.

What also followed was the shift of power away from the interaction between the various pastoral groups within what was basically a stateless society (like a mini-system of international relations) and the consequent dislocation of the time-tested process of conflict resolution. Instead, significant aspects of this were transferred to the urban-based administrative and political centre, which thus became an important new element and player in this field. Soon enough the centre began to relate and to respond more to the needs and interests of new emerging categories like merchants, traders, exporters, urban property owners, than to the ongoing requirements of pastoralism. Pastoralism instead, in the perspective of the new classes, began to be treated less as a distinct way of life and more as an economic resource to be tapped. The political initiative was taken away from the pastoral sphere and the political marginalisation of the pastoralists began (Doornbos, 1993).

In Somalia as elsewhere throughout Africa, the post-colonial state had certain salient features which are not unrelated to its failure to win popular acceptance. Highly centralised, it sought to impose a uniform set of rules and policies of alien origin on highly differentiated societies. Highly authoritarian, it stifled normal political competition which reflects the balance of domestic social forces, and created explosive opposition pressure that could only be contained by force. As a result, force became the main instrument of rule, and eventually state power was claimed by those who wield the instruments of force, the military. Throughout Africa, it is the military who are defending the post-colonial state.

Left to their own resources, the military in Africa would not be able to perform this function for long. Were it not for the generous support they receive from abroad, they would have been overwhelmed by domestic opposition, and not a few African states would have collapsed by now. For various reasons, foreign powers and international organisations are committed to the preservation of the state pattern wrought by imperialism in Africa, and they have offered support to every embattled regime in the continent. The Horn, more than any other region, has been affected by foreign intervention. Both the East and the West have come to the aid of all the states in this region, at one
time or another. The result was to escalate violence far above the level that domestic resources permitted, and to delay the inevitable collapse. Now with the end of the cold war rivalry, the military underpinning of authoritarian regimes in this region has been pulled away, accelerating their collapse. However, international agencies appear on the scene and they have a need to have state systems restored.

Throughout Africa, whatever the ideology of the regime, the state controls the production and distribution of material and social resources. The struggle for resources, therefore, is waged through the agency of the state, because access to state power provides access to resources. In Somalia, as well as in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan, state control of the economy reached extreme proportions under the pseudo-marxist military regimes which ruled these states in the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1980s, all three countries experienced sharp economic decline. As a result, material insecurity and the struggle for resources intensified sharply, and so did the conflict for state power.

Another characteristic feature of the post-colonial state in the Horn is the monopolisation of state power by one or several groups and the consequent exclusion of the rest. The Amhara in Ethiopia, the Arabs in Sudan, and the MOD (Marehan, Ogaden, Dolbahanda) clan coalition in Somalia are well known cases. Equally well known is the fact that the monopoly of state power afforded these groups privileged access to resources. It was in order to protect this privilege that the state became the oppressor of those who challenged the monopolisation of power, and in the final horrific phase of the conflict the state waged wars of extermination against its own subjects.

Reference to the other countries of the Horn was made in order to establish a comparative frame that might help us to put the experience of Somalia in a clearer perspective. As noted, the other states in the region shared the characteristics described above and also became engulfed in violent conflict. Deprived of foreign support as a result of the end of the cold war, the states in the region began to crumble. The collapse of the post-colonial state is a regional, not solely a Somali, phenomenon. Ethiopia has had a similar experience already, while Sudan and Djibouti are likely to share this experience in due course. What is meant by collapse is not a change of regime, but the fragmentation of existing state units, and the reconstruction of political systems on the basis of entirely new principles. Having lost Eritrea, Ethiopia is now experimenting with a novel pattern for state organisation based on ethnicity. Should this experiment fail, Ethiopia will face disintegration.

In the analytical perspective sketched above and in a regional context, the collapse of the Somali state does not seem such a mystery. What is puzzling to most observers is the fact that the parties to the Somali conflict are not regional, ethnic, religious or linguistic groups — as in Ethiopia, Sudan and Djibouti — but clans and sub-clans of what was previously acclaimed as one of the very few ‘nation states’ in Africa. Conflict of the sort that occurs in the other states of the Horn is defined as ‘ethnic’, a label that carries its own facile causal explanation. However, for a nation to fall apart at the seams (clans) and to dissolve its own state, is something that negates the concept of the ‘nation state’ as developed in the West and adopted in Africa. According to the concept, the possession of its own state is a categorical imperative for a nation; isn’t this what nationalism is all about?

There are two possible approaches to the solution of the puzzle. One is to assume the Somali do not constitute a
nation, at least not in the conventional definition of the term. The other is to assume that the state imposed on the Somali was not suited to the needs of this nation. There is some truth in both assumptions. A concept lacking rigorous definition, the 'nation', certainly was not conceived with nomadic pastoralist societies in mind, although the Somali meet all the conventional criteria. One feature of these societies is that they do not create states, unless they subjugate sedentary communities. In the Horn, pastoralists did not create states of their own, nor did they acquire them by conquest. Barth (1973) and Khazanov (1983) maintain that the absence of political superstructures among pastoralists is explained by the mode of production which neither needs nor can afford state institutions.

Khazanov observes that the pastoralist production cycle is guaranteed in the lower levels of social organisation, and it is these levels that exhibit political autonomy normally. Somali traditional political practice conforms with this observation. It was clan sub-divisions that performed autonomous political roles. Hussein M. Adam makes a related point when he states that clan consciousness is rooted in real socio-economic processes. The implication is that to the extent that Somali society remained in the traditional pastoralist mode, it had no need for, nor could it afford the post-colonial state that was imposed on it. Perhaps, it is no accident that the most intense reaction was registered in northern Somalia (now Somaliland), where the pastoralist mode is predominant.

Following this line of thought, one can say there was a mismatch between a society whose traditional mode of political practice was, according to Lewis (1980), 'democratic to the point of anarchy', and the highly centralised, authoritarian, militarised and violent post-colonial state ruled by a tiny, westernised elite class. This mismatch is the essence of the Somali problem, for even in the best circumstances this arrangement would have proved troublesome, and the circumstances were not good. The situation was exacerbated by the monopolisation and exploitation of state power which had two dimensions. One was the exploitation of the majority in the rural sector — nomads and farmers — by the urban minority, and the other was the rise to political hegemony of the clan coalition labelled MOD.

Of course, as argued by Abdi Samatar and others, Somali society did not retain its pristine nomadic pastoralist character during the post-colonial period. The new social strata that emerged — merchants, petty bourgeoisie, intelligentsia — found their material and social welfare depended very much upon the state. For the latter two groups, the state became their sole employer and patron. With the influx of foreign aid — Somalia was especially favoured (Ozay, 1971) — the state emerged as a relatively abundant source of resources and, inevitably, it became the bone of contention. Because competition took place at the level of the state, a measure of aggregation was necessary so that clans could compete effectively at this level. Therefore, the scope of clanshanness expanded from the lower levels of agnatic kinship to the full clan and even the clan family. In this expanded form, the clan came to rival the nation.

This was the pattern of the civil war during the 1980s, and remains the pattern of the current conflict. In the struggle for positions in the state of the future — this is what the internecine struggle is about — the clan is the invariable controlling element. Solutions to the ongoing conflict, and prescriptions for a new state model must take this into account. More to the point, the design for a future state must take into account the factors, intimated
in this presentation, that elevated clan-
nishness to such political heights, in
order to avoid another mismatch be-
tween society and state. With this in
mind, one cannot help but wonder how
useful the various formulas of alien
origin that are pressed on the Somali
people will prove. The Somali must
look for inspiration into their own
culture and political tradition for the
solution to their problems.

It might be worth raising these points in
a wider perspective. As pointed out
already, the collapse of the Somali state
system is not unique. There is a grow-
ing incidence of disintegration of state
structures in Africa and elsewhere (ex-
Yugoslavia) and the trend may well
accelerate in the years to come. The fact
that Somalia was one of the first in-
stances of total collapse on the African
scene may not be too surprising in the
light of the extent and sharpness of the
mismatch between the post-colonial
state and the nature and structure of
Somali society. This means also, how-
ever, that the Somali may likewise be
among the first in Africa to devote
attention to entirely novel principles of
restructuring state civil society relation-
ships. Unexpectedly, perhaps, there is a
unique moment and opportunity to
take the lead in rethinking and reshap-
ing the post-colonial state in Africa.

Somalia's special features require unor-
thodox and original thinking about
what might be appropriate institutional
solutions in a largely pastoral context.
Above all, it will require approaches
which allow a larger role to the
pastoralists themselves in developing
the kind of institutions, codes and
contractual arrangements they consider
most appropriate in running their own
affairs. This is not necessarily a plea for
a 'non-state' or 'anti-state' position. It is
just to underscore that no matter how
compelling the centralising inclinations
of post-colonial states and ruling classes
have been, working towards the con-
struction of a different 'balance of power'
between state and 'civil' institutions
would seem not impossible and highly
desirable (Doornbos, 1993).

Having said that, however, it is by no
means evident that one will succeed in
any approach at state reconstruction
after the collapse of it in Somalia. For
any such state formation processes to
succeed, there would need to be either
some very compelling reasons to want
to have a common state framework, or
else a single overriding dominant power
that just lays it down, as the Romans
did. Of the latter there is no chance
neither in Somalia nor elsewhere in
Africa today. As for compelling reasons
to share a common political system, this
might be either a common enemy, or
some very obvious advantages one
would expect to derive from sharing a
political framework. For Somalia, the
common enemy has practically disap-
ppeared (and made place for enemies
within), while the advantages of pool-
ing resources are not so directly evi-
dent.

Perhaps one may well need to face the
prospect of diffused, 'decentralised
power' for some time to come, unless
the logic of going together suggests
itself. The fact that Somalia did for some
time constitute a state cannot be consid-
ered a sufficiently convincing reason to
go back to it again, given its dismal
performance again, unless one finds
there were elements in it that are still
worth retaining or building upon. Also,
it is not good enough to want to have a
state because the UN wants it as coun-
terpart, mailbox or for fear of blank
spots emerging on the political map of
Africa. Re-establishing peace and re-
conciliation which the UN came for is
one thing; building a common state is
another. The two should not be con-
fused.

In short, there is a need to think very
hard as to why one would want to have a
common state to begin with, and if so, what kind, with what structures, and for which and whose purposes.

Martin Doornbos is at Institute of Social Studies, The Hague and John Markakis is in the Department of History, University of Crete.

Bibliographic Note


From Conflict to Concord: Regional Co-operation in the Horn of Africa

On 12 July 1993, a Symposium was hosted by The UN Economic Commission for Africa with the support of the US Institute for Peace in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The following document is excerpted from their final communique.

The Horn of Africa is a region that has become a metaphor for disaster. It is a region where one of the longest wars in modern times was fought, lasting 30 years. The end of the war, both in Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1991, brought about the end of Mengistu Haile Mariam's marxist rule in Ethiopia. The successor government of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) whose forces overthrew Mengistu's regime, has been engaged in serious attempts at democratic restructuring of the Ethiopian state. Earlier in the same year, President Siad Barre's regime was overthrown in Somalia and the successor government found itself unable to command a following among most of the Somali clans. Consequently, Somalia, one of Africa's few homogeneous nations, became a living example of a Hobbesian state of war of each against all, with no central government to ensure a modicum of law and order.

In Sudan, a devastating civil war is still raging in the southern region. Peace negotiations, which are yet to be conclusive, are still underway between the government and SPLA factions. The only option is a lasting solution that would avert the disastrous consequences of war and channel all resources towards national and regional socio-economic development. Eritrea's political future has been settled, in the formal sense, with the April, 1993 referendum. The military victory of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) over the Dergue army in May 1991 and the coming to power of forces peacefully, convinced the international community of the appropriateness of holding the referendum. The outcome has justified that conviction.

Finally, stability in Djibouti, which was once an island in a sea of regional conflicts, has recently been sorely tested in this regard.

Spin-offs from these developments in-
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Spin-offs from these developments in-
elude human displacement on a large-scale, starvation, suffering, and an inevitable army of refugees dependent on emergency assistance to meet their basic needs. Having collectively assessed the multi-faceted challenges of peace, stability, and rehabilitation in the sub-region in the light of obvious development priorities and current global realities and situations, we became convinced of the need to articulate a bold vision for reconstruction; a vision that encapsulates the fundamental requirements for overcoming the destructive legacy of conflict and for attaining enduring peace, stability and economic prosperity.

Drawing insights from the many shared experiences between the people of the sub-region in terms of certain commonalities in cultural heritage and material conditions of life, and drawing lessons from its post-colonial political history, in what follows, we have spelt out the components of this vision, namely, the need for a durable and lasting peace based on tolerance of diversity and heterogeneity; the need for a human-centred approach to development policy planning and implementation; the closely related need for accelerating sustainable development based on the human and natural resources of the region; the need for cooperation between countries in the sub-region in critical areas of mutual benefit to advance their development prospects; and the need to establish an effective linkage between emergency assistance, rehabilitation and long term development in interventions by the international community.

The measures advocated in this document will require a willingness on the part of political leaders, opinion leaders, and governments in the sub-region and their development partners to act with decisiveness, boldness and responsibility to achieve the significant gains that can be made over time. In the interest of the sub-region's future, we believe that what is being asked of the key actors is achievable. The costs of not acting now, however, are forbidding. For these reasons, we hope that all actors involved will embrace the recommendations made in this document with the seriousness they deserve.

Convened by Professor Bereket Habte Selassie, and taking the form of both an academic conference and a policy forum, the symposium brought together over 150 policy and decision-makers from both government and the private sector in countries of the sub-region, as well as opinion leaders, scholars, experts, representatives of United Nations agencies and of other international organisations.

The symposium was formally opened by Ato Seyoum Mesfin, Foreign Minister of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia who also delivered the keynote address. An opening address by Mr. Layashi Yaker, UN Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of UN ECA, was delivered on his behalf by Dr. Sadig Rasheed, Director of the Public Administration, Human Resources and Social Development Division of ECA. A special session of the symposium was addressed by Professor Wole Soyinka, the Nobel laureate. His topic was The Horn of Africa: Paradigm for Our Mutual Dilemma.

The specific objectives of the symposium were to reassess the persistent condition of interminable political strife, economic decay, hunger, starvation and human suffering in the sub-region, with a view to articulating a vision of renewal and reconstruction, and to find areas of common ground for mutually beneficial and harmonious arrangements for cooperation among these countries. As a prelude to a definition of fruitful terms of cooperation among the political communities in the Horn of Africa, it was our hope that the sympo-
rium would ask whether the sovereign state could continue to serve as sole setting for public policy and action with respect to the region’s daunting difficulties. In spite of important accords reached by African heads of state, the Economic Commission for Africa and the Organisation of African Unity, it remains the case that among communities in the Horn movement of goods and services is severely restricted, natural human resources are inadequately pooled, and there is no efficient division of labour in the provision of urgent public service. The objective of the symposium was to determine how best to overcome these and similar barriers to mutually beneficial and harmonious arrangements.

In an atmosphere free of formality, the symposium examined the issues with disarming honesty. A recurrent observation in the debates was the need to find bold and imaginative solutions to the problems of the sub-regions. The discussions were focused on four main themes, followed by a summary of the main issues: the social and cultural context; the political dimensions; the international dimensions of the problems of the sub-region, including the role of the international development institutions in providing solutions; the international dimensions of the problems of the sub-region, including the role of the international development institutions in providing solutions.

The Social and Cultural Contexts
Attention was drawn to the historical and cultural bonds tying the diverse peoples of the Horn together. Commonalities in cultural heritage are reinforced by shared experiences in the material conditions of life. A number of speakers noted that the hardships and dislocations of war and famine have not severed these ties. On the contrary, forced migration of large segments of the population have brought ordinary citizens from throughout the Horn into contact with each other. One aspect of this is evident in the emergence throughout the Horn of common themes in popular music as a vehicle of self-expression. The symposium concurred that these shared experiences provide a foundation for innovations in institutional co-operation and build on these shared experiences. This in turn will help to avoid unnecessary imprisonment in cultural myths. The countries of the Horn should draw inspiration from their common socio-cultural heritage for action in areas of conflict resolution and in mobilising their people for self-reliant development.

Lessons of Political History
From the debate on the political dimensions of the crisis in the sub-region emerged the view that remedies to the legacy of conflict and strife must be grounded on a realistic understanding of past failures. It was established that co-operation between countries in the region must be based on a solid foundation of tolerance of diversity between peoples within countries. Country-specific discussion focused on such matters as the Ethiopian experience of the politics of exclusion and domination; the Djibouti and Somalia experiences of clan politics in state and civil society; and on ethnicity, religion and regionalism in Sudanese politics. Examination of the distinctive experiences of particular polities enabled a comparative assessment of common political questions in the region. This facilitated a better understanding of the main political challenges and the responses that are required to build effective political institutions and to achieve lasting peace.

Reconstruction & Development
It was noted that economic reconstruction and development in the sub-region must be centred around both policies of human development and by efforts to
enhance co-operation between countries. Concrete action was needed to stop the decimation of human beings, to demobilise soldiers and retrain them for productive work, and to invest in human capacities and capabilities through the adequate provision of health care, education, training, etc. In the final analysis, it is people who create growth and they must be equipped and empowered to exercise their capabilities. Development strategies must be oriented towards achieving self-sustained and environmentally sustainable growth and development by internalising the forces of growth, enhancing individual and collective self-reliance and diversifying the structure of production. In relation to economic co-operation, squandered opportunities and benefits — in consequence of the failure to co-operate in and co-ordinate economic undertakings — are considerable. Consensus was reached on the need to avoid wasteful duplication to pursue the advantages of economies of scale, to utilise the gains from collaborative exploitation of complementary resource endowments and to reduce the vulnerability to risks imposed by the vicissitudes of nature and intensified international pressures. To substantiate these claims, participants tried to identify those material and human assets of the region that are favourable to co-operative endeavours and integrated economic institutions. Beyond this, the discussion characterised existing fetters on co-operation such as protection of the powers of the state, particularly those of centralised states; entrenched bureaucracies; and constraints imposed by international financial institutions. Once again, the removal of economic barriers dividing states must proceed in tandem with the removal of domestic restrictions on economic life. Particular emphasis was put on measuring the success of new policies and projects in terms of their practical impacts on human development and the people at the local level, enhancing popular participation in development, and on drawing on the wealth of tradition and culture.

International Support

In the consideration of the international dimensions of regional co-operation, the symposium attempted to come to terms with the new conditions created by the conclusion of the cold war. On the one hand, the end of the cold war may eliminate or weaken a powerful cause of regional rivalry and instability. On the other hand, it may divert the interests of well-endowed countries away from Africa in favour of those parts of the world to whom they bear closer cultural and strategic connections. To mitigate these adverse effects, the Horn would have to demonstrate commitment to peace, good governance, reconstruction and development. The ability to carry out this commitment may, in turn, depend on a resolve by countries in the Horn to foster mutual co-operation. There was also a consensus that even the most determined efforts at co-operation and integration cannot go far without the encouragement and support of the international community, particularly the North American and European communities, as well as the help of international aid institutions. But such assistance must move beyond emergency relief to support country efforts in reconstruction and human-centred development; and inter-country co-operation in areas of mutual benefit, designed to achieve long-term development and transformation in the sub-region. The symposium found it appropriate to launch an urgent appeal to the UN to initiate, without delay, legislation that would prohibit the plundering of Somalia’s natural and marine resources.

Conclusions and Follow-up

One conclusion on which the sympo-
sium converged was best expressed in the keynote address by Ato Seyoum Mesfin:

It is now becoming increasingly obvious that closer co-operation among countries and their economic integration is not one option among many that states have to ensure a better life for their respective peoples. It is the only option they have.

In this regard, developing viable institutions of co-operation and revitalising existing ones, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) is a major challenge. Allied to this is the institutionalisation and activation of mechanisms for the peaceful prevention and resolution of conflict by the countries of the Horn.

It was further agreed that movements toward greater freedom and openness across states can be speeded by political pluralism and popular participation, cultural diversity and clear commitment to and protection of rights within states. There was, however, no consensus on the order of importance to be followed in the pursuits of these inseparable aims. There was agreement that shared political ideals are essential to co-operation in reaching non-political objectives. Whether or not shared political visions should be in place prior to the initiation of non-political co-operation or integration was not resolved. Some felt that economic co-operation and integration, irrespective of political differences, would promote material progress, thereby opening the way for political reform and renewal. All stressed the importance of the political will to co-operate and move towards eventual integration.

Recommendations of the symposium include the maintenance of open borders across all the countries of the Horn; visa requirements and all other legal restrictions on the free movement of peoples throughout the Horn should be abolished; and customs unions and other measures that would encourage free movement of goods and services should be adopted. In the interest of establishing durable peace and stability in the sub-region, the free movement of arms in the region must be halted and there should be concerted efforts at arms reduction. Public expenditures on the military should redirected to more productive sectors, and regional security arrangements should be pursued with vigour.

Within the region, refugees and migratory labourers should be accorded enforceable rights that would enable them to be productive members of the region. A concerted effort should be made — by governments and citizens alike — to identify collective goals that can encourage a spirit of solidarity among people in the region. For instance, women everywhere in the Horn suffer from the same afflictions. Co-operation in the improvement of women's and children's lives can engender wider forms of solidarity. Conservation of the environment, interstate transport and communication, energy use and development are all areas where progress cannot be made without collective action by political communities in the Horn.

There are more costly public services such as health care and higher education where all stand to gain by sharing the burden and costs through planned division of labour. The establishment of inter-state co-operative institutions involving several sectors such as public administration, management and finance, energy transport, communications and health will be required. These institutions can take the form of centres of excellence in training and research to advance skills and capabilities to deal competently with the challenges facing the region. An urgent priority is the need to establish a regional centre or programme in an existing centre for
research into areas related to co-operation in the Horn. The support of the UN Economic Commission for Africa should be solicited in this regard.

Honouring the basic rights of individuals and communities are everyone’s business. In this sphere of life, where co-operative action can begin at once, citizens and citizens’ groups can take the lead in order to set an example that governments can emulate. Last, the free flow of ideas is a potent instrument in forging regional solidarity. Gatherings such as the symposium can prefigure worthy interactions among peoples in the Horn to which we all aspire. The symposium stressed the need for organising joint meetings by the counties of the Horn to speed up action on areas of co-operation as related to substantive aspects raised in this communiqué. The symposium took note of the offer given by Sudan to host the next meeting on solidarity of the people of the Horn, provisionally scheduled to be held in Khartoum in December 1993.

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD)

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) covers six East African countries — Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan and Uganda, covering an area of more 520,724 km² and a population of over 126 million people. The overall growth rate, which averaged 3 per cent per annum in the early 1970s, has now reached 3.2 per cent — one of the highest in the world. The total population of the six countries is estimated to reach 168 million by the end of the century. Already, nearly half the population is under 14 years of age. IGADD is increasingly playing a vital regional role not only in environmental issues but political ones as well — as in the case of southern Sudan.

Nearly 80 per cent of the area covered by these countries consists of arid and semi-arid lowlands which receive an average of less than 400mm of rainfall per year. Farmlands stretch over 36 million hectares and permanent grazing areas and range lands cover another 139 million hectares, but more than 40 per cent of the total area is made unproductive by severe environmental conditions.

The recurring and severe droughts and other natural disasters between 1974 and 1984 caused widespread famine, ecological degradation and economic hardship in the Eastern Africa Region. Although individual countries made substantial efforts to cope with the situation and received generous support from the international donor community, the magnitude and extent of the problem argued strongly for a regional approach to supplement national efforts.

In 1983 and 1984, the six East African countries took action through the United Nations to establish an intergovernmental body for development and drought control in their region. In 1985, Ministers from the six countries prepared an agreement on the establishment of IGADD, agreed on its rules, the secretariat structure, and on a Strategy to Control Drought. In January 1986, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government met in Djibouti and signed the agreement which officially launched IGADD with the Secretariat Headquarters in Djibouti, Republic of Djibouti (rue Georges Clemenceau, Box 2653, Djibouti).

Objectives and Functions

- To co-ordinate and supplement the efforts of member states to combat the effects of drought and other related disasters, to assist their developmental efforts and help them to deal with the problems of medium
research into areas related to co-operation in the Horn. The support of the UN Economic Commission for Africa should be solicited in this regard.

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Objectives and Functions

- To co-ordinate and supplement the efforts of member states to combat the effects of drought and other related disasters, to assist their developmental efforts and help them to deal with the problems of medium
and long-term recovery and rehabilitation.
• To appraise the international community of the very severe problems caused by drought and other related disasters.
• To appeal for and mobilise all resources necessary to implement emergency, medium and long-term programmes, set up by the member states; and for financing operations within the framework of sub-regional co-operation.
• To identify projects of regional interest submitted by Members states and assist in securing resources for project preparation and implementation.
• To assist Member states in setting up guidelines and action programmes for combating drought and desertification and following up the implementation of drought-related activities of sub-regional interest.
• To assist Member states and existing bodies in the sub-region in securing funds for their individual programmes.

For more than a decade, the already delicate environmental balance has been seriously disturbed by recurrent droughts and other natural disasters. These, in turn, have brought about extreme fluctuations in agricultural production, sometimes halving or doubling annual yields, which, in turn, create enormous problems in achieving overall development.

Clearly, the long-term and comprehensive improvement of these circumstances and the living standards of the peoples requires an approach that stretches beyond national boundaries and resources. Recognising this, the six nations agreed to work together in a broad-based effort and introduced the concept of IGADD.

The Mandate
IGADD helps its member states to further their development despite the effects of drought and other adverse environmental conditions that hold back progress. It works at three different levels, as defined in the Plan of Action (1986).

• Emergency measures provide immediate relief to the victims of drought and other natural disasters. IGADD helps affected countries assess the magnitude of the problem; appeals for assistance; and co-ordinates relief measures at the sub-regional level, including mobilisation and distribution of food aid, animal feed and emergency water supplies; provision of health care, and the rehabilitation of agricultural production.

• Short and medium-term efforts directed toward the recovery from drought and its effects, and toward establishing a new base for development in the IGADD countries, especially action to improve food security; increase crop production; rehabilitate range lands; develop fisheries, water resources and energy systems; control desertification; and develop infrastructures and training.

• Long-term programmes for regional development aim at re-establishing a productive and sustainable ecological balance in the sub-region. Through the integrated development of agriculture and of rural economics, the aim is to achieve sustained increases in food and agricultural production; the optimal use of soil, water and other natural resources; and the development of physical infrastructure and human resources.

How IGADD Works
IGADD works with the governments and departments of its member nations, and with national, regional international agencies and organisations to promote development. Having defined its priorities, IGADD concentrates on co-ordinating development policies and
mobilising assistance. It also initiates sector studies, prepares regional project proposals and mobilises appropriate financial and technical assistance for their implementation. It mobilises national and regional experts and uses the expertise of international consultants. In 1986, IGADD assisted in the preparation of 63 sub-regional and 154 national projects for presentation to the international community at a donors meeting in March 1987. In 1990 the Executive Secretariat finalised two Regional Strategies on Food Security and on Desertification Control which now form the two axis of its activities for the 5 Year Programme 1992-1986.

IGADD’s Five Year Programme, 1992-1986

Within its three levels of action IGADD concentrates on:

- The Establishment of Documentation and Information Services.
- Disaster/Drought Preparedness, Early Warning, Food Information and Remote Sensing.
- Improving the Efficiency of Agricultural and Food Production.
- IGADD Environment Assessment Monitoring and Information System for Environment Management.
- Household Energy.
- Rangeland Management.
- Agricultural Research, Training and Extension.
- Water Resources.
- Bio-diversity and Quarantine.
- Fisheries.

IGADD’s Structure

IGADD is governed by an Assembly of the Heads of State and Government. The Assembly determines the main objectives, guidelines and programmes of the Organisation, and elects a Chairman from among the member states in rotation. It has a council of Ministers from the member states, which formulates policy, examines and approves the programme of activities and allocation of funds and adopts the organisation budget. The Council is chaired by a co-ordinator who is elected from among the members for a term of two years.

The Council appoints an Executive Secretary for a term of four years, renewable once, to head the Executive Secretariat which implements the resolutions and programmes of action through its three divisions of Administration and Finance; Planning, Research and Information; and Operations and Programmes Co-ordination. The Secretariat facilitates the co-ordination of development policies and resources within the region, assists members nations in formulating development projects in food security and environment protection sector, assesses emergency needs, and reinforces national infrastructures necessary for implementing sub-regional development policies.

The Executive Secretary also represents IGADD in negotiation with governments and international organisations and, subject to prior approval of the Council of Ministers, is empowered to sign agreements with these states and organisations.

Source of Funds

IGADD and its activities are financed by annual assessed contribution from member states; grants and donations from the UN system, donor countries and agencies, intergovernmental and international bodies, and from regional and international financial institutions and non-governmental organisations. IGADD current donors are Canada, European Economic Community, France, Food and Agriculture Organisation, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Organisation of African Unity, Sweden, United States of America, United Nations Sudano Sahel Organisation, and the World Bank.
Community Development in Cape Verde  
Paul Robson

The Cape Verde Islands are a group of semi-arid islands in the Atlantic 450 kilometres west of Senegal. The islands are part of the Sahel belt, with low and fluctuating rainfall. It is only rarely that enough rain falls at the right time for maize or other crops to survive resulting in sporadic famine that punctuates Cape Verde's history. In recent years rainfall has halved: long-term average precipitation fell from 360mm in 1961 to 180mm in 1991. As a result Cape Verde has to import about 70 per cent of its food.

Cape Verdeans have responded to famine and lack of work by leaving rural areas for urban ones and by emigrating overseas. Typically, Cape Verden males have enlisted on whaling boats and then sought work in the northeastern United States, France, the Netherlands and Portugal. Thousands of Cape Verdeans were forced to emigrate to cocoa plantations in Sao Tome in the late 19th century. There are about 300,000 people on the Islands but many more Cape Verdeans in Massachusetts and western Europe. Remittances from emigrants are an important source of income for Cape Verde; one in three families receiving something from relatives abroad. As well as emigrating, Cape Verdeans have moved to the capital Praia and one of the 'spontaneous settlements' adjoining it, Ponta d'Agua. Farming has become a woman's occupation: only a quarter of farmers were women in the 1960s, but by the late 1980s half of all farmers were women.

Overall the country earns approximately US$50m from exports, and spends about $85m in imports. The trade gap is funded equally from foreign aid and emigrants' remittances. The country has few resources apart from its people and its geographical location, and is vulnerable to changes in transport technology or shipping routes.

After independence, the PAICV government followed an inward-looking economic policy with state control of imports, exports and foreign exchange, but also managed to attract considerable foreign aid to balance the budget. The PAICV argued that the limited foreign exchange reserves had to be carefully controlled. A state import company had a quota of foreign exchange to import essentials (foodstuffs, animal feed, medicines); private traders then had quotas with which they could import whatever they thought was in demand (car parts, cement, clothes, videos).

In the late 1980s, the government came under pressure to liberalise the economy, even though Cape Verde was not in debt. This meant encouraging foreign investment, allowing part-ownership of state companies by foreign capital and the establishment of foreign and offshore companies. The new Movement for Democracy (MPD) government is keen to move ahead with this more quickly, and apparently with a smaller role for the state in overall control of the economy. Cape Verde has been encouraged to 'open up' and join the world economy, but unfortunately it is joining as a peripheral participant, with few resources and little importance.

The two main political parties have talked about 'maximising the possibilities offered by Cape Verde's strategic location' as part of a strategy for economic development. It is not yet clear what that might mean in practice. Tourism has been mentioned, though it is uncertain whether Cape Verde can break into an already crowded world market. For tourism to have an impact on local employment and to mesh with the local economy it would have to be
carefully developed to prevent a situation where hotels import their own food, construction materials and even workers.

Off-shore banking has also been mentioned. In most countries, however, this has had little impact on local employment, as the available jobs are highly skilled and it is easier for a bank to bring workers from abroad than train local workers. The general secretary of the Women's Organisation of Cape Verde doubts whether women would benefit from this sort of foreign investment: 'poor women, struggling to keep a family, won't find work in this sort of company.'

Redundancies from government service and from state-owned companies, have been mooted. Some people, such as the Secretary of State for Social Affairs, foresee a period of austerity. 'But this will be limited and we are not interested in creating more poverty, we already have enough. Economic change will lead to increased self-sufficiency and an entrepreneurial spirit. Foreign investment will be attracted and the informal sector of the economy will expand and create jobs. Attention needs to be given to attracting foreign capital, and to overcoming the lack of legal status and access to credit suffered by producers.'

Others are more doubtful. A community leader in Ponta d'Agua thinks privatisations will increase poverty by driving down the cost of labour, 'though it's hard to see how you can make labour any cheaper in Cape Verde'. A trade unionist thinks 'liberalisation will mean the elimination of small businesses and greater domination of the economy by big and foreign companies.' One Cape Veredian development expert sees increased imports as the biggest result of economic liberalisation, outstripping any possible attraction of foreign investment. 'How can Cape Verde compete with production in countries which have the latest technology? Local production will suffer because of the big mistakes the government is making by liberalising the market for overseas goods without import protection. The informal sector is complementary, it cannot replace large job losses in the formal sector.'

New economic policies may also mean phasing out the public works' programme, FAIMO. Everyone recognises that there is less need now to build more roads, and the drought has limited the number of trees that can be planted. But alternative employment is not easy to envisage. Some of the alternatives being mooted (such as giving ex-FAIMO workers loans or grants to being animal-raising) have many drawbacks. As a member of the MPD's Executive Committee says, 'There is a lot of money to finance credit for small projects, but the capacity to carry them out is small.' The experience in Ponta d'Agua has been that animal-raising depends on imported animal feed, which is expensive and available only erratically. The local market is not large enough to absorb another 25,000 pig breeders. Local meat is probably dearer to produce than Argentinian meat which, with import liberalisation, could be imported easily. A number of Cape Veredian non-governmental organisations are developing credit schemes and advising possible small entrepreneurs. But all believe the market niches in which people are being encouraged to create their own employment, such as carpentry, animal breeding, resale of clothes, are reaching saturation point. The question is whether it is possible to develop satisfactory alternatives before economic liberalisation has an impact.

The population of outlying areas of Praia is growing quickly, probably at 20 per cent a year. Ponta d'Agua is one such neighbourhood. Fifteen hundred people lived here in 1987, but 8,000 are
expected to live there by the end of the century. Women are a high proportion of the population and a high proportion of heads of household. Most of the residents of Ponta d'Agua are poor migrants from the countryside with few material or educational resources, who could no longer make their living in arid rural areas. The government has begun to take a greater interest in planning settlements such as Ponta d'Agua and in ensuring that an essential infrastructure gets built. But most people have built their own houses and a lot depends on the initiative of the community itself.

However, some European funding comes from International Workers Aid, a network of 16 non-governmental organisations from 12 European countries, whose constituencies are their national labour movements and who have been supporting the initiative since 1989.

The Ponta d'Agua Initiative

The Ponta d'Agua initiative has a number of aims. The first is to help and develop the organisations created by the people living in the neighbourhood, so that they can plan and take responsibility for the area's future development. The second is to improve the infrastructure of the neighbourhood, providing better water supply, schools, health and social facilities. This involves drawing on the community organisations, which participate in planning new facilities, take part in their construction, and help to manage and run them. The European funding organisations and the Municipality of Praia are providing resources which can be used for some of the materials for new and upgraded infrastructure and facilities. The community itself, though, has been the key to many of the initiatives. Funding from European organisations has been planned on the basis of the community's own decisions and priorities. Local people will continue to maintain and run the new services after the funding from Europe has ceased.

The third aim is to support economic initiatives in Ponta d'Agua. The need to create jobs is a major concern for all in Cape Verde, and many residents of Ponta d'Agua have no guaranteed employment. Providing loans and support to those who attempt to create jobs for themselves has been a key strategy. A fourth aim is to ensure that development of Ponta d'Agua takes into account the needs of women by reducing the physical burdens and costs of their domestic tasks, increasing their possibilities of earning an income, and including them in planning.

When Marcela, a mother of ten, first came to Ponta d'Agua, there was little there. 'My house is about twenty years old, and then there were very few houses, just places for goats and cattle.' Ponta d'Agua is now a neighbourhood of more than 4,000 people, most of whom have left the interior of Santiago Island to escape the drought. Most people seem to regret having left: 'The rural areas are better when it rains, then you have everything', says Marcela. 'There was good grass then and everything was easy. Cape Verdians are all farmers when there is water, but now there is no water.'

Inacia, a widow, who has lived for three years in Ponta d'Agua, has managed to scrape and sacrifice to get her plot of land, house plans and build a one-room house. She moved from the interior of the island to be closer to her children, all but one married with their own responsibilities. Life is hard for them too, and they cannot help her much. She wants to build another room onto the house, but does not have the money.

Spontaneous housing is usually built around the edge of towns, where there is less building control and more free
land. But the people who live in such areas depend on access to town centres for their incomes, so they try to avoid being too far away leading to dense housing on the edge of the town. Governments have, in the past, been tempted to knock down spontaneous housing and build again, often further from the city centre. But this has proved an expensive solution, and people are unwilling to live in new housing areas which may be inaccessible. Statistical studies from several countries have shown that water supplies, health facilities, sanitation, better income are more important to the urban poor than nice-looking housing.

The people of Ponta d’Agua have built their own houses, often a room at a time when they had enough money, making their own concrete bricks, seeking help from family and friends, and buying in a little skilled labour when required. There were no community facilities at first, and little guarantee that they would not be moved on at some time. Ninha has lived in Ponta d’Agua for nine years but cannot afford the 8,000 escudos ($100) necessary to register her house. Without the legal documents, she cannot get credit from a bank and does not feel secure enough to invest more time in improving her house. As a result most residents are too poor to legalise their houses fully.

Elaine describes herself as a survivor. Pregnant with her fourth child, she runs a small, well-stocked shop. Her mother, who still lives in the interior of the island, and her part-time (he has another, older woman) husband also helps. Elaine came from the interior of Santiago Island because of the lack of rain. She built her house herself, making the concrete blocks with the help of her brother and husband, and buying in some skilled labour.

It is recognised now that upgrading shanty towns is a complex process which must be carried out in stages. Public investment in community facilities, as well as directly improving well-being, shows that the government is interested in the area, is not going to knock it down, and that it is therefore worthwhile for the residents to make their own improvements to individual homes or community buildings. Identifying the first steps can be difficult; but this makes the participation of the urban communities essential in planning and making improvements.

The Ponta d’Agua project was the first urban community development initiative in Cape Verde. Until the mid-1980s, Cape Verde had concentrated on rural development, but it then became clear that urban growth was accelerating. Infrastructure has been provided and upgraded, improving access to water, schools, health services, and sport and cultural services. Particular attention has been paid to ensuring that women gain access to the new facilities and to credit, and active participation by the people of Ponta d’Agua in planning and carrying out the project has been encouraged.

Water
The most important practical problem identified during research for the Ponta d’Agua initiative was the difficulty of getting water. Through the partnership between the community, the Municipality and the European funders, three water points — small buildings with a door, locks, taps and rests for buckets — have been completed. One takes water from the reservoir for the town (situated at the north end of Ponta d’Agua area). The other two are fed by a water lorry which comes daily and pumps water into the tank on the roof of each water point. The water is provided by the town water company which sells water to the water committee of Ponta d’Agua, set up by the residents to manage the water points as a subcom-
mittee of the Neighbourhood Committee which oversees the project. The water committee employs two women to look after the water points. Nelinha and Conceicao each work eight hours a day, organising the queue, collecting the money, unlocking and locking up the water points, and arranging small repairs. They agree:

It's much better now than it used to be. Women used to have to spend a lot of time in the queue, often from ten in the morning to three in the afternoon and sometimes they waited three days and still didn't get water.'

The money collected pays for the water, a small wage for the women and small repairs, and feeds a separate fund for any future work required in the neighbourhood connected with water. If a large-scale repair should be needed in the future, the neighbourhood committee would be able to contribute something and would probably thus find it easier to find donations from other sources. The average amount of water used by people in Ponta d'Agua has now gone up to nine litres per day, although this is still less than a third of the amount used by people in the town centre who have piped water. The saving in women's time is significant. One woman, Te, says: 'Water used to be a problem, I used to go to Sao Filipe (5 kilometres away, outside Praia) it's a long way for your legs or you have to pay to ride in a car, and you might have to wait from early morning to midnight. I now save all that time and work.'

The Sports and Cultural Centre

For the youth of Ponta d'Agua, the building of a sports and cultural centre has been the most important symbol of their community's development. Moving to the city, living in the same area as people from other villages and other islands, young people need to remake social networks. This requires social spaces, places to meet. A teenage girl, Preta, put it this way: 'The cultural centre is the most important, it's needed for sports and for music, so that there is more happening in the neighbourhood.'

The centre is in the open air, surrounded by a high wall and terraces, with a concrete pitch in the centre which can be used for sports, bands or discos. Young people assisted voluntarily in many aspects of the building work, such as the loading and unloading of the sand and stones from the lorries, and clearing the pitch before relaying. Other parts of the work required qualified workers, and even machinery. There are also two rooms which will be available for study, adult education classes, cultural events and educational films.

The Primary School

A two-storey building to house a primary school was officially inaugurated in July 1992. A single-storey school had been contemplated, but the Ministry of Education requested a larger building given the large number of children and the area's rapid population increase.

Previously, primary school children were crowded into the rented rooms of houses, with 30 or more children in a living room. A teacher at the school says: 'The results this year have been much better. Children can really concentrate. They couldn't when they were studying in people's houses.'

Some of the work on the new school was carried out by paid, skilled building workers living in Ponta d'Agua. Teams of volunteers were mobilised when extensive unskilled labour was required. The school was built on the site of an old animal pen where a dozen families were living in shacks made from old packing cases and sacking. The project provided materials and plots so that these families could build their own homes, freeing the site for the school.
The Health Post
Following the completion of the school, work began on a health post. Again paid construction workers were used, with teams of volunteers helping when required. A small building had originally been contemplated, but the area's population growth has been so rapid that a larger health post is being constructed. Residents of Ponta d'Agua will no longer have to go to the centre of Praia for medical treatment.

Credit Scheme
The urgent need for employment led to the creation of a small rotating credit fund, to enable people to carry out economic activities. Some people use credit to increase trading turnover.

Ninha sells groceries door-to-door. She walks with her wares on her head, selling wherever there is custom. She took a loan to buy more goods. 'When you have money, you shift more, and you earn more.' In Cape Verde, the petty-trading sector has become intensely competitive. At times the streets of Praia are crowded with women trying to resell used clothes bought from middlemen who import them through Senegal or The Gambia. The Ponta d'Agua project has made efforts to increase the number of loans towards production activities which could generate more income and jobs within Cape Verde and which have linkages for future economic growth. But these are risky and require more support. Before extending credit, the project staff, together with the Institute of Co-operatives, analyses the business ability of the applicants, the market for products and the availability of raw materials, and discusses these issues with applicants. Credit for households maintained by women has been encouraged, and a large majority of the users are women, although most stick to petty-trading and other low-risk activities.

Celestina: Sausage-making
Celestina borrowed 15,000 escudos to help with her sausage-making business. Home-made sausages used to be in big demand from both individuals and bars. Because of the increase in sales of factory-made sausage from the Mini Mercado only a few people still ask for Celestina's sausages. When this competition began, Celestina had trouble in selling and some of her produce went bad as she has no refrigerator. Her business, which had brought her about 10,000 escudos a month, collapsed and she is now working as a servant in a house, receiving 3,000 escudos a month. She still has about 6,000 escudos to repay and is finding this hard.

The opening up of the Cape Verde economy has meant rapid changes in the economic environment and more competition from imports. It is difficult for a very small business to pick up the market signals, keep their market niches, and know what resources and competing goods are going to be available. There have been both good and bad experiences with the credit scheme. Many of the beneficiaries are poor and illiterate and with little experience of business, and require assistance in the use of credit; others see credit as a big risk and are reluctant to be involved.

Ricardina and Mendes: Pig Butchers
At the back of Ricardina and Mendes' house, tied to the post of an outside kitchen, is a pig due to be slaughtered. In the corridor of the house is a table holding a pair of scales, a small knife, and a large machete for butchering. Ricardina has been butchering pigs for about four years. She used to butcher goats, 'but salted goat meat is hard to sell, so you have to sell all your goat meat the same day. Pig meat can be salted, so there's less chance of it going off before it's all sold.'
When Ricardina’s husband, Mendes, a construction worker, was out of work for eight months in 1991, the couple asked for a loan for the butchering business, which allowed them to buy more pigs and increase their turnover. All the money was paid back as at that time they were killing two to three pigs a week and had good sales. Now, sales are slow, there is not much money around, and they kill only one pig a week on average.

One of the success stories is the painters’ group, who used credit to compete more effectively in the job market. Jubileu belongs to a group of eight experienced house-painters who used to work for building subcontractors. They found that many painters earned very little, and that subcontractors might delay paying them or not pay at all. To strengthen their position they formed their own group, which makes it easier to get work and lessens the chances of being exploited. They used credit to buy brushes, ladders, and other equipment as a group.

Implications for Women

‘If women are not emancipated the country is not emancipated’, says Arlete Freitas, secretary of the Women’s Organisation of Cape Verde. ‘Women are 54 per cent of the population; there are now women in neighbourhood committees, and Cape Verde now has a woman pilot. But for many women, life is still hard and uncertain... Their roles seem to be multiplying. Women’s interest are often different from men’s and must not be ignored or assumed to be the same.’ Many women are co-wives or deserted wives responsible for the children of temporary relationships. Many receive little in the way of help from the fathers. Many women are self-employed petty traders; they are the main water-carriers, the main washers of clothes. They are household managers, struggling to balance school fees, clothes and food for each day. Arlete sees men’s failure to support their women and children as a cultural as well as an economic problem. ‘Men say they don’t have children, the women do.’ Even with marriage women take on the responsibility of educating children; the man stays with the resources, and he does not form part of the family nucleus. We are in a country of emigration where the men have left, the women staying with the responsibility of the house and children. ‘Cape Verdeans are naturally farmers, and big families provide the labour necessary for an agricultural workforce. Women see the need for lots of children: they are the security, the treasure chest.

The Ponta d’Agua project has done several things for women, particularly reducing the time they spend obtaining water. Despite their involvement in the life of the neighbourhood, however, their participation in managing the project has not been strong. A few women, such as Auta Querida, feel able to give an opinion. She is a member of the neighbourhood committee. Her situation is difficult: her husband has three wives and many children to support elsewhere. She has started business as a street seller, but as she has little finance, is mainly selling grogue (a locally-made rum) made by aunt in the countryside. ‘Life is sad, life is very expensive’, she feels. Te agrees: ‘Men and women have the same aspirations, and the same ability to talk. Women’s participation in improving the neighbourhood has increased, but there are a lot of women stationary because of lack of work.’

Auta Querida thinks other women should be more involved in the life of the neighbourhood and should receive more encouragement. ‘If you have something to say, it’s for talking about, not for holding in. Maybe women are ashamed to participate in meetings, or they have nothing to say, or maybe they weren’t invited.’ More women may be
encouraged to participate by first involving them in issues that concern them directly. Paula and Manuela, with their pre-school, and Nelinha and Conceicao, who staff the water points, have become more involved in wider issues, but feeding the family is their primary concern: 'If it were for a salary, to receive something, they would participate, but not for nothing. Life is too difficult for that.' As yet there is little in Ponta d'Agua to help develop social links between women. There is house-to-house visiting, and there is the water queue, but often women are in a hurry. There are for example, no sports in which women participate. A 16 year-old girl said, 'There's a girls' football team in the secondary school, but not in Ponta d'Agua; there are no girls' teams in the neighbourhood.' Lack of male support for their children, low levels of skills and confidence, and limited social links constrain women, and require wider strategies.

Community Management

An important part of the project has been the involvement of the community in planning and management. The project began by training community members in project management, followed by research to identify issues, needs and willingness to participate. The neighbourhood committee has continued to function and to supervise the project, meeting every other Sunday, with information provided by the project staff about budgets, funds available, work priorities and needs for community inputs. The staff have continued to train the committee in management skills. Encouraging such a committee has meant working to create a feeling of community and convince people that it is worthwhile to participate. There is a strong history of participation in rural areas in Cape Verde, where everyone knows each other, but in the towns people are from different areas and do not all have the same interests.

Bringing people together on particular issues has generated more interest and participation. Mario Costa is a secondary school teacher living in Ponta d'Agua. He first became involved because he felt strongly that there should be a better primary school, and then his interest opened out to wider issues. A number of women have become involved through their interest in the problem of water and the lack of a preschool. From this basis, subcommittees have been formed which will be trained to manage the various sub-projects: water, the health post, the school.

The Impact of Pluralism

Before 1989, there was only one political party, PAICV (African Party for Cape Verdean Independence). People of some influence in Ponta d'Agua tended to belong to PAICV and to see it as their duty to encourage other residents to participate in the project. With the advent of multi-party democracy, some of those who were active joined the new Party, MPD. Other community activists felt that the project was working mainly to benefit the MPD electorally, and stopped participating. Opinions seem to be split about the impact of a multi-party system on a local initiative. Some felt that it left a vacuum at a local level: 'In the time of PAICV there was clear local leadership, and regular meetings of the Party. Now the MPD has not met locally, there is no clear person to resolve local problems.' Others felt that it created splits in local committees:

In politics, everyone is pushing you their way, and I'm here with a lot of children to look after, so it all depends. Why don't the political parties meet together, why do they want to be the only boss? If the country is democratic, we must unite and work, it's for us to have work and rights and live the way we want to, not to say 'I'm PAICV, I'm MPD'. On the other hand, some felt that in the long run it could mean that
people would see the difference more clearly between a neighbourhood initiative and party politics: Now there is openness and democracy. You can't say people are members of the committee because they belong to a party. They have to come out of the population, be informal leaders who can mobilise the population. Two years after the elections, the neighbourhood committee is functioning again. But the project staff had to work hard to create a committee in which people of different political parties could work together.

Voluntary Work

Voluntary labour has been used at times in the project for work on the school, health post and sports centre, and will be used for future work. Voluntary work was organised through informal networks in the neighbourhood. Santos Goncalves, a respected member of the community, said, 'For participation I used my network of friends and contacts. If I needed someone I didn't know, I would ask a friend to make the contact.'

Voluntary work is justified by the limited budgets available, either from the Cape Verde government or from foreign funders. The increased sense of responsibility that such participation brings when it comes to maintaining and operating such facilities is another justification. But there is clearly a limit to this kind of participation: although formally unemployed, many people need to spend their time in seeking work or generating an income in other ways.

Organising voluntary work in an urban neighbourhood can be complicated. A former member of the neighbourhood committee explained that many people in the community are not used to dealing with money and budgets, and that 'they need to know how they will benefit, who will benefit. Participation in work needs to go together with participation in the management.'

Expectations

At first, everyone thought they were going to give employment to everyone. This hasn't happened, so people are demoralised (Paula Varela, Ponta d'Agua).

A project of this kind can deal with only some of the preoccupations of poor people who live in neighbourhoods like Ponta d'Agua. Bigger issues, like the vulnerable position of women or the lack of jobs, take longer to resolve. It was necessary to explain that the project could not solve everything and that the initiative and participation by the community would be important. The participation of key members of the community in managing the project was essential to help people understand what could and could not be expected. However, the presence of this kind of initiative can spark off other processes. The existence of a Committee in Ponta d'Agua, and the fact that people in the neighbourhood were beginning to work together on community activities, has encouraged the residents to look at, and lobby for, other improvements outside the original ambit of the project. They have forced the Municipality to link Ponta d'Agua to the electricity grid, to begin to legalise building plots, and to improve the main road into the area, thus gaining some recognition of Ponta d'Agua as a part of the town.

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Japanese Strategy in Africa: the Case of Mozambique

Makoto Sato

On 13 May 1993, six soldiers of the Japanese Self Defence Forces (SDF) arrived in Maputo to participate in the UN Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). They were the first contingent of a group of 53 members to be dispatched to Mozambique, and the first military force in Japanese history ever stationed on the African continent. In fact they were the second military force dispatched overseas since the defeat of Japan in the Second World War; since 1992, 1,800 persons have been dispatched to Cambodia to participate in the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

Although the Japanese legislative passed a bill on Co-operation with the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in June 1992, public opinion has remained divided on the merits of the law, and on an adequate way and method of Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping. In particular, there is strong opposition against SDF participation because of the Constitution which prohibits the use of military power to solve international conflicts. Many people believe that dispatching the SDF overseas is unconstitutional, and some people argue that the existence of SDF itself contradicts the constitution.

Let us put the constitutional issues aside. We can wonder how many Japanese understand the realities of the war in Mozambique; who is fighting against whom; what are the primary causes of the war, and what are the major obstacles for regaining peace? There is no systematic opinion poll indicating an awareness of the Mozambican situation by the Japanese. Such indifference by the media is in sharp contrast to the media's concern for Cambodia. Nevertheless, judging from the personal experience of the author, less than ten percent of the population seems to understand the basic structure of the Mozambican conflict, the two counterparts of the civil war, the international implications, and its relationship with South Africa in particular. Such profound ignorance of the nation is again in contrast to the comparative awareness of the Cambodian case. What on earth is 'international co-operation' for Japan when its troops are dispatched overseas under conditions that the sovereigns of the state, the Japanese people, do not even know the parties of the conflict? How can it be possible that the SDF effectively contribute to the peacekeeping in Mozambique without knowing the concrete situation there? This symbolically shows the fundamental contradiction of the Japanese involvement in ONUMOZ; that such a contradiction is not accidental but a result of previous Japanese policies towards Africa.

The Japanese Understanding of Mozambique in the last Decade

In the past ten years there have been three major historical events concerned with Africa which have attracted the serious attention of many Japanese:

1. The Famine Campaign in 1984-5;
2. The Anti-Apartheid movement since 1988, and

Mozambique has been a feature in all but the second event. The failure to connect the Anti-Apartheid Movement with events 1 and 3 show, in my opinion, a serious lack of awareness of the politics of the region.

In the famine of the early 1980s, some 100,000 people died of starvation. This was not a simple natural disaster but purposefully caused by Renamo (Mozambican National Resistance
Movement), anti-Frelimo (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) government armed groups manipulated by South Africa. Mozambique suffered severely from the de-stabilisation activities of the apartheid regime. This de-stabilisation was also a fundamental cause of the civil war, which ultimately necessitated the intervention of the United Nations. In short, all three events have been inseparably and structurally intertwined in Mozambique and are outcomes of the de-stabilisation policies of South Africa. However, most Japanese have recognised these events as totally separate, and this principal deficit of the Japanese understanding of Africa has hampered quick response on the part of the Conservative (Liberal Democratic) Party government. In the case of The Campaign Against Famine, the first indication of interest was signalled by an article in *Asahi Shinbun*, a national newspaper, on 2 April 1984, which reported starvation in Mozambique. Written by a special correspondent in Maputo, the article ventured a analysis of the disaster against a background of failure of socialist agricultural policies, the sabotage activities by the anti-government armed groups in addition to drought. Other newspapers and television stations followed this news, which gradually developed into a large scale humanitarian campaign. The campaign was a historical event for the Japanese people in the sense that they recognised the tragedy in Africa as their own issue almost for the first time in Japanese history, although the campaign was at least partly initiated by the Japanese government which aimed to establish a new and more active position in the continent. A number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were born and developed their activities by means of the campaign.

However, it is also certain that the campaign established a one-dimensional image of Africa to the Japanese public by continuously showing starving African children through the mass media. Most of the campaigners focused attention on the emergency relief aid, without deeply analysing the political, social and economic structure of the famine. The conventional stereotype image of Africa as an uncivilised continent was replaced with the equally degrading stereotype of Africa as a 'starving continent'. Thus, most campaigners neglected to consider the necessary relationship between famine and the de-stabilisation activities of South Africa, which was an indirect military intervention utilising Renamo for the purpose of defending apartheid. Consequently, Japanese people did not seriously address the issue of apartheid until 1988. Japanese society, in and outside of government circles, failed to introduce sanctions or show active support for the Anti-Apartheid Movement — not even in 1985 when the endless civil riots against apartheid made the South African state go beyond a no turning back point. It was not until 1988 when it was disclosed that Japan became South Africa's number one trading partner that anti-apartheid measures were beginning to be taken seriously.

The majority of Japanese government and industrial circles responded to international condemnation by then reducing the volume of trade with South Africa. This was not a humanitarian consideration nor a long term foreign strategy but rather a short term trade consideration that motivated governmental and industrial leaders to react. What they feared was a trade war between Japan and the US, and between Japan and Europe deriving from trade imbalances might flare up because of these issues with South Africa. In other words, for the Japanese leaders the 'international community' was regarded primarily as Europe and the United States. As a consequence, the government directed industry to reduce 'voluntarily' the volume of trade with South Africa.
Many NGOs criticised the pragmatic posture of government and industry demanding a much more pro-active stance against the apartheid regime. However, even among the NGOs there existed two problems. First, most understood apartheid as an extreme case of racial discrimination in a far-removed country of authoritarian rule and this resulted in passing over the socio-economic structures which underpinned apartheid. Second, because of such a tacit understanding or misunderstanding they more or less missed the international dimension, of apartheid, i.e., apartheid is a threat to regional and world peace. As a consequence, Mozambique did not draw sufficient attention from the Japanese public, even among those who rose against apartheid, despite the fact that it was a prime victim of South Africa’s destabilisation policy resulting in the loss of one million lives!

The Decision-Making Process of the Dispatch of SDF

Until the government finally announced its decision to participate in ONUMOZ by dispatching the SDF on 26 March 1993, government circles were split over the issue. Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and his close associates, the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono in particular, took a cautious attitude. In contrast, the foreign ministry and some officials in other ministries, supported the SDF dispatch from the very beginning. On 13 October 1992, the Security Council of the UN made a decision to send an observer mission to Mozambique. One month previously, the Foreign Ministry opened a meeting in Tokyo with all the Japanese ambassadors stationed in Africa. It was suggested then that Japan might be requested to participate in UN operations in Mozambique.

On 16 December the Security Council decided to form a ONUMOZ mission of 7,500 persons. On 15 December a high official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the press that Japan should participate in ONUMOZ. By January 1993 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defence Agency started technical investigations for the possible SDF’s operations in Mozambique, without the final decision of the government. On 16 February the Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Ghali, visited Japan and virtually asked Miyazawa to send the SDF to Mozambique to participate with ONUMOZ. (A week before, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Koji Kakisawa urged Kono that Japan should send SDF to Mozambique).

This series of bargaining between the political leadership and the bureaucracy gives us a rather paradoxical picture; passive politicians and active bureaucrats. Yet we should note that the activeness of the bureaucracy is more concerned with fulfilling UN bureaucracy requests rather than concern for Japanese citizens who are afraid of Japanese military involvement in international conflicts.

The current direction of UN bureaucracy seems to stabilise the post-cold war world order, but under the hegemony of leading powers. In such a context the issue of ONUMOZ participation may be understood by the Japanese foreign bureaucracy as an issue of Japanese involvement in the co-operation and struggle among leading Western powers over the hegemony in the post-cold war order. One of the important duties of the foreign affairs bureaucracy in post-war Japanese diplomacy was to follow the intention of US foreign policy. Now it seems as if Japanese bureaucracy has tried to co-ordinate Japanese foreign policy with Japanese UN policy as much as possible, sometimes rejecting the resistance of the political leadership.

In fact Miyazawa and Kono repeatedly
indicated their negative feeling over the SDF dispatch. Miyazawa emphasised the insufficiency and uncertainty of the information on Mozambique by asking a ministerial official, 'Do we have an embassy in Mozambique?' Such an attitude was maintained as late as 23 February when the government announced that it would send an investigation team to Mozambique to gather basic information on the situation there. In fact not a single Japanese diplomat was permanently stationed in Mozambique at that time and every diplomatic and consular matter on Mozambique was dealt with by one of the eight diplomats of the Japanese Embassy in Zimbabwe who were responsible for both Mozambique and Angola. When the team returned to Japan and submitted a report on 22 March, the government suddenly announced the participation of SDF in ONUMOZ, based on the report. It was after this decision that the cabinet announced its intention to establish a Japanese embassy in Maputo from 1 May 1993.

Behind such hasty decision making, it can be seen that some political leaders and elements of the bureaucracy wanted Japan to be recognised for its active contribution in the international community prior to the Seven Nations Summit Conference in July 1993, where it was forecasted that Japanese isolation might be intensified by the member states due to the trade imbalances. It was also suggested that Japan, wishing to become a permanent member of the UN Security council, felt the necessity to be recognised for its contribution to African nations which shared a third of the member states in the UN General Assembly.

What Japan Can and Should Do

If we really wish to restore peace and democracy in Mozambique, our first priority should be to maintain a ceasefire between the two parties, particularly Renamo, notorious for its past atrocities. And to that end, it is absolutely necessary to eliminate external intervention, above all material supply from South African sources. It is in this context that Japan can and should successfully contribute to regional peace by pressuring South Africa not with its military but with its economic influence. Such a peaceful action will contribute much more effectively to restoring peace in the region, than sending 53 soldiers.

Second, even after restoring peace and accomplishing a democratic election, Mozambique has to tackle enormous tasks: resettlement of 1.7 million refugees, continuous food aid to a population of over one million suffering from starvation, and demobilising 110,000 soldiers. In particular, normalisation of social services (such as education and health services) is urgently needed. It is also in this field that Japan can achieve its most effective contribution.

The Japanese government recently has tried to search for an autonomous policy of development assistance to Africa more independently from other Western countries. In October 1991 the Japanese Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (a major banking institution for the official development assistance under the Economic Planning Agency) publicised a policy paper over the World Bank's approach to structural adjustment. Although the paper conceded that structural adjustment lending had some positive results, it indicated the limit of market mechanism in the least developed countries and posed several questions of the adequacy of major approaches adopted by the Bank, such as deregulation, privatisation and import liberalisation. In particular it criticised that the Bank adopted the same adjustment measures in sub-Saharan Africa where the 'indigenous private sector is very much underdeveloped'. The paper
recommended, instead, some other policy measures for fostering industry, emphasising the necessity to learn lessons from the experiences of development strategies in East Asian countries.

The advocacy of the East Asian Model of development was repeated when the Japanese Government sponsored the Tokyo International Conference on African Development in October 1993 in order to 'establish the importance of African development as one of the central themes of the international agenda in the post-cold war era'. According to the information note in February 1993 prior to the conference, one of the themes was on the 'Asian experience and African development'. However, when the first preparatory meeting was then held in March 1993 it came to conclude that there 'was no such thing as an Asian development model'.

At the final declaration adopted at the Conference, while it was emphasised that 'no one model of development can be simply transferred from one region to another', five policy factors were actually listed which were believed to have contributed to successful performance of East and South-East Asian experiences, education, and early implementation of land reform.

We may recognise in a process of twists and turns a rather contradictory attitude of Japanese government which tries to establish a more autonomous policy of development assistance by modestly praising an Asian development model, while at the same time searching for maximum cooperation with other donor countries, by stressing the different conditions between Asia and Africa.

At this Conference Mr Tsutomu Hata, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, summarised the Japanese position for Africa in five concrete policy measures:

- to contribute to progress in the political process, to democratisation in particular;
- to assist economic reforms in cooperation with structural adjustment programmes;
- to assist human resources development;
- to pay attention to environmental problems;
- to put emphasis on effectiveness and efficiency in ODA.

He also pledged several new or continuing grant schemes, such as $650-700 million of non-project type grant assistance, $250-300 million grant for exploiting underground water resources, and the African Youth Invitation scheme.

For the most part we see in this statement few drastic changes or a new development philosophy of the Japanese government. The general tone of the entire conference was to put an emphasis on self-help and in the final declaration it was alleged that prime responsibility for development rests on Africans, which was similar to the World Bank's structural adjustment thinking.

Hata also stressed that the Japanese involvement in ONUMOZ was a good example of the Japanese contribution to the political progress and democratisation in Africa. Yet, it seems doubtful that Japan will succeed in obtaining support from the international community to get a permanent seat on the UN's Security Council by dispatching the SDF to Mozambique. First of all the domestic opinion over the SDF dispatch overseas is still divided. On 28 January 1994 the US Senate adopted a resolution that Japan should not become a permanent member of the Security Council unless it could fully participate in any UN's military operation. Above all, the UN's peace keeping operation (PKO)
has traditionally been supported by non-member states of the Security Council for assuring the neutrality of the UN operation in the conflict. To utilise the participation of PKO for the purpose of getting a seat in the Security Council may look like putting the cart before the horse.

The Japanese government did not send SDF to participate in ONUMOZ as a deep consideration or sympathy for the Mozambican people. Japan was more concerned with its strategic position in the Western world, particularly with its relationship with the 'seven member states'. Japan wanted to be recognised for its contribution to the world community under the post-cold war world order. In other words the issue was understood by the Japanese leaders more as a North-North co-operation and/or struggle over the post-cold war hegemony rather than as a North-South problem.

Makoto Sato, Faculty of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan.

The 1993 Lesotho Election

Roger Southall

The first free general election to be held in Lesotho since independence in 1966 took place on 27 March 1993. The result was an astounding clean sweep of all 65 parliamentary seats by the opposition Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), and a subsequent handing over of power by the military regime, latterly led by Chief Leabua Jonathan, had secured a narrow victory in the pre-independence election of 1965 with 31 seats (and 41.6% of the vote) compared with the 25 seats (and 39.7% of the vote) won by the BCP. The balance of 4 seats in the then 60 seat National Assembly was won by the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), which advocated executive authority for the recently installed King, Moshoeshoe II.

Since its foundation in 1952 the BCP had mobilised around a radical nationalist platform which had alienated conservative forces, notably the influential Roman Catholic hierarchy and the majority of chiefs. Together, these elements had worked closely to promote the BNP as a bulwark against communism and as a guarantor of good neighbourliness with South Africa, upon which the economy of the enclave was critically dependent for the continued export of migrant labour to the mines. It was by harping upon the threat which a BCP victory represented to rural household incomes, which were heavily dependent upon migrant remittances, that the BNP initially obtained the support of the majority of women voters.

The BNP was supremely confident of being returned to power in the election of 27 January 1970. However, as the results came in it became clear that it was the BCP which had secured a majority, the BNP having alienated key segments of its support base by its neglect of rural (especially mountainous) areas, its suspension of district councils and its battles (over constitutional prerogatives) with the King.
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Background to the Election
Lesotho proceeded to independence under the BNP, which led by Chief Leabua Jonathan, had secured a narrow victory in the pre-independence election of 1965 with 31 seats (and 41.6% of the vote) compared with the 25 seats (and 39.7% of the vote) won by the BCP. The balance of 4 seats in the then 60 seat National Assembly was won by the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), which advocated executive authority for the recently installed King, Moshoeshoe II.

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proclaiming the election to have been marred by violence, and enjoying the support of South African advisers and the backing of the security forces, Jonathan declared a state of emergency and suspended the constitution. Subsequent analysis indicated the BCP to have received 49.8% of the 306,529 votes polled and to have won 36 seats, in contrast to 42.2% and 23 seats for the BNP, and 7.3% and 1 seat for the MFP. The next ‘election’, held only in 1985, saw the return of 65 BNP members to an expanded House of Assembly following a boycott of the polls by all the parties of opposition.

The intervening years had seen a comprehensive breakdown of the Basotho body politic. Following the 1970 election, some hundreds of opposition supporters had been dismissed from the civil service; the BCP had split over whether to participate in an appointed National Interim Assembly; a bungled 1974 attempted counter coup had been followed by the flight of key BCP leaders (including Mokhehle) into exile into Botswana; and Jonathan turned the international alignments of Lesotho’s parties upside down by refusing to acknowledge Transkeian ‘independence’ in 1976, establishing diplomatic contacts with Eastern Bloc regimes, and building low key relations with the ANC by providing sanctuary for a substantial number of refugees. In contrast, in the late 1970s, the BCP launched a Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) which depended upon covert South African goodwill to launch destabilising operations (mainly from QwaQwa and Transkei) against the BNP government. The latter responded by strengthening the military, and stressing its role as apartheid victim following South African Defence Force (SADF) strikes into Maseru, the capital, in 1982 and 1985.

By now the military’s grip was in any case being loosened as post-February
1990 South African developments made their mark. A series of strikes by trade unions challenged the ban on political activity; human rights organisations and independent newspapers called for investigations into abuses; radical activists struck up links with the ANC; and critically, the international donor community (upon whose largesse the Lesotho Government had become increasingly dependent) pressed hard for a return to civilian rule.

All this resulted in the establishment of a National Constituent Assembly (NCA), appointed from army officers, civil servants, prominent persons and recognised politicians (including Mokhehle, back from exile). This was charged with devising a new constitution as a prelude to the holding of a general election. However, a series of compromises set the scene for the virtual re-adoption of the 1966 constitution, this including the retention of the FPTP electoral system, whose mechanics so often work to squeeze out third and smaller parties from any political scene.

The Electoral Framework & Result

The election was preceded by a fresh delimitation of boundaries (last conducted in 1985) for the now 65 seat lower house of parliament. Subsequently, although the complications of the registration process led to the election twice being postponed, some 740,000 voters were registered, this number representing perhaps around 90% of the potential (over 21 years old) electorate. Under the supervision of Commonwealth supplied Chief Electoral Officers, this provided for constituencies of between approximately 12,600 and 10,400 voters.

The election was contested by a total of 242 candidates drawn from the BCP, BNP, MFP and an array of ten other minor political parties. Only the BCP and BNP ran candidates in each of the 65 constituencies, although the MFP, which fielded 51 contenders, alleged that 14 of its would-be candidates had been denied registration on various technicalities. Otherwise, only the Patriotic Front for Democracy (which linked a number of radicals from the university to mainly trade union activists associated with the defunct Lesotho Communist Party) and Ha Re Een Basotho (a rather diverse grouping of the private sector oriented petty bourgeoisie at odds with the two major parties) put up a significant number of candidates (17 and 13 respectively).

Taken together, the candidates were overwhelmingly drawn from the territory's commercial and professional petty bourgeoisie, albeit with a significant rural presence, and with the BCP candidates (as in previous elections) displaying a higher than average level of formal educational attainment than those of the BNP. More surprising, however, given the significant female presence in occupations like nursing, teaching, commerce and even the chieftaincy, was the major parties' almost total exclusion from their slates of candidates of women: the BCP put up only three women candidates and the BNP two. Only the MFP — never likely to obtain more than a handful of seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate Occupations (declared)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Politician</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade Unionist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trad. Healer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Assembly Election Regulations, Form 3A: Particulars of Nominated Candidates (adapted)
under the most favourable of circumstances — fielded a respectable quota of women (12 out of 51 candidates), but then, as indicated by 44 of its candidates declaring themselves to be full-time politicians (suggestive of their having no other formal occupations), its candidacies were regarded as valueless by those with political weight and ambition.

Although there was some discussion concerning Lesotho’s relations with a democratic South Africa, the essence of the campaign was defined by the return of the BCP and BNP to their old fight. Hence whereas the BCP largely rested its case upon the need for the historical wrong of 1970 to be righted, the BNP, now led by Sekhonyana (following Jonathan’s death in 1987), claimed that whatever its mistakes in the past, it enjoyed a monopoly of experience of how to run the country.

Most observers expected the BCP to win a free and fair contest, for although the party had a history of fragmentation and internal feuding, and had sullied its reputation by the LLA’s alleged fraternisation with South African security forces, the BNP’s record was associated in the minds of most with authoritarianism, abuse of human rights, and widespread corruption and incompetence. And led by Sekhonyana, who had remained Finance Minister after the coup, and with the highly unpopular General Lekhanya as one of its candidates, the BNP was further identified with the military, which was known to strongly favour the former ruling party’s return. It was this widely known preference which fueled widespread rumours that the army would either rig the election or simply decline to hand over power to a victorious BCP. Other questions concerned the contested status of the monarchy (as the former King, back in Lesotho as a private citizen) continued to receive the support of the MFP, and the political leankings of the civil service, which following 1970 had been recruited, supervised and schooled by the BNP.

It was these various considerations, along with suggestions that its years of office gave the BNP a substantial financial advantage, which prompted expectations of a closely run contest. Simply no one, including the BCP, expected the total rout of the BNP.

Unable to accept the extent of its defeat, the BNP issued immediate complaints concerning irregularities in the polling and registration procedures, alleging a ‘crude attempt to “fix” that there has been a fair election’. Subsequently Sekhonyana issued a statement protesting a ‘neo-robotic outcome’ which had failed to take into account the constituency strengths of the parties (in other words, the BNP had been defeated even in its presumed strongholds). These and other dissatisfactions led to the party’s leadership launching an application to the High Court on 1 April to prevent the military handing over power to the BCP. However, not least because a large team of UN and other international observers had unhesitatingly declared the election as having been free and fair (despite various logistical problems which had occurred at a large number of polling stations, many of which had failed to open on time), the High Court rejected the BNP application out of hand. Mokhehle was sworn in as the new prime minister the following day.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seats Won</th>
<th>Votes cast</th>
<th>Share of votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>394,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>118,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFP</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,953</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: J Lucas, Report on the Election of Members to the National Assembly of the Kingdom of Lesotho, 27 March 1993
Analysis and Prospects

Various questions present themselves. Why did the BCP win and by such an overwhelming margin? What interests did the parties represent? And what are the prospects for Basotho democracy in the context of a rapidly changing southern Africa?

Why the BCP Won

The basic fact of the BCP's triumph actually requires rather little explanation in that the large body of voters accepted that Mokhehle had been unjustly denied in 1970, and that the BNP should be punished for that injustice as well as for its blatant and brutal abuse of power over the 20 year period of its rule. This explains both the impressive turnout (around 70% of the registered electorate), as well as the impressive determination of people, thousands of whom stood patiently for up to twelve hours in long queues, to record their vote. Nor did the BNP's close connection to the army win it many friends during the period of military rule. In this sense, the 1993 election was simply the culmination of the aborted contest of 1970. However, beyond this, there seem to be three major reasons why the BCP won by such an overwhelming majority.

The first is that the BCP was much better prepared than the BNP. From the moment that the exiled leadership had returned to the country, it had been laying the groundwork for victory. Party structures were put in place in every constituency following the retraction in May 1991 of Order No. 4 of 1986 which had banned political activity, and candidates had been selected in most cases months before the election. Numerous meetings had been held at local level, in urban and both lowland and mountainous rural constituencies, and Mokhehle himself had held mass meetings in each of the country's ten administrative districts. Most importantly, BCP campaigning had focused around not only the necessity of repudiating the BNP, but also the whole process of voting (how to register, how to actually vote, and its symbolic meaning) — a strategically astute approach amongst an electorate which had not only been denied free choice since 1965, but whose size had more than doubled since 1970, and a substantial majority of which had never voted before in their lives. Hence it was that the BCP became widely identified with the democratic process itself, and overcame — for this election, at least — its legacy of internal feuding and division.

In contrast, the BNP had remained divided following the struggle for the leadership following Jonathan's death, with the victorious Sekhonyana — widely deemed arrogant and immensely corrupt — remaining highly unpopular in some quarters, especially amongst certain key party 'notables'. Furthermore, with its operations still heavily centred around the chieftaincy, BNP candidates were selected by the leadership much more than they were in the case of the BCP. Indeed, in a number of constituencies local BNP cohorts were severely alienated by Sekhonyana's heavy handed imposition of his own nominees. It was symptomatic of their different styles that whereas in the country areas the BNP campaigned in vehicles, BCP activists walked or travelled by pony. For its part, the MFP seems to have scarcely campaigned at all, except in person of its leader Victor Malebo, who seems to have been largely responsible for the selection of that party's candidates.

A second reason for the BCP's superiority would seem to have been the greater political commitment and experience of its candidates. This is difficult to document as yet (a survey of candidates has yet to be processed), but interviews informally suggest that, whereas BNP
candidates rather passively assumed categories of support (notably amongst women), their BCP candidates actively mobilised around a cause they fiercely believed in. Furthermore, BCP candidates would seem to have had long histories of personal involvement in community projects or in political struggle, many of them having been directly involved in the party's travails since the early 1970s. Importantly, too, whether by study abroad, work on the mines or by having experienced life in exile in Botswana, BCP candidates (as a group) evinced a considerably less parochial world view than those of the BNP. All this culminated in a sense of conviction which readily transmitted itself to the voters.

However, the third reason for the extent of the BCP's triumph was that the FPTP electoral system amplified the party's popular vote in terms of the number of seats it won. Ironically, the party leadership had publicly predicted a clean sweep, but in private had expected to lose between ten to fifteen seats. Had a system of proportional representation been adopted, the BNP's proportion of the vote would have translated into about thirteen seats. Instead, the relatively even spread of proportionate party votes throughout the country denied them any representation. Meanwhile, the derisory proportion of the vote going to the smaller parties confirmed the two-party nature of Basotho politics.

Prospects for Democracy
The one sided nature of the BCP's victory clearly poses awkward challenges for Lesotho's fledgling democracy. These go well beyond the opposition parties' complaints about the result, which they continue to ascribe to manipulation and fraud, for the monopolisation of representation in the lower House by the governing party could work to isolate the BCP when the novelty of the change of regime wears off, and the new government has to confront the country's manifold problems. Opposition representation in parliament could have provided for expression of popular discontent, as well as requiring the government to justify its programmes and actions. Meanwhile, the refusal of Sekhonyana to accept nomination by Mokhehle to the Senate, on the grounds that the elections were fraudulent, constitutes nothing less than a determination to delegitimise the new government.

Whether or not the latter succeeds in establishing a democratic culture, as its manifesto proclaimed, will depend in large part on whether it pursues its promises to root out corruption from the civil service, build civil society and respect human rights, overhaul the legislative edifice that buttressed the rule of terror and dictatorship in Lesotho, enact a Bill of Rights, restore local councils and depoliticise the security forces. Democratisation may also rest heavily upon whatever success the new government may enjoy in providing jobs and benefits within a context wherein Lesotho's appeal to international donors and organisations seems bound to decline as the relative attraction of a non-apartheid South Africa increases. None the less, what does bode well is the contrast of the Lesotho of the early 1970s with the same country of the early 1990s: the substantial growth of the trade union movement, the withdrawal of the Catholic Church from the political arena, the networking of various non-government organisations with a small, activist Basotho intelligentsia, and not least, the development of an independent press, all indicate the emergence of a civil society, with links throughout the region, which would ensure that any government seeking to reimpose dictatorship would face more obstacles than did the BNP in the wake of Jonathan's coup. In addition, the extent of the landslide towards the BCP
may well have served to convince the military, key elements of which were reluctant to withdraw, that any re-intervention in the foreseeable future would prove immensely problematic.

Finally, much depends on what happens next door. The BCP has adamantly rejected any suggestion of Lesotho's integration into even a democratic South Africa, looking forward instead to good neighbourly relations founded upon mutual respect for the sovereignty of each country. Yet it has remained conspicuously silent on such issues as Lesotho's future as a dependent labour supplier to a country with a huge domestic surplus of labour. What does bode well, however, is that although the BCP has historically been more closely connected to the Pan-Africanist Congress, the leadership is now pragmatically acceptant of the likelihood of an ANC led government in South Africa, and eager to establish cooperative relations. Meanwhile, whereas Pretoria was previously strongly hostile to the BCP, post-1990 developments have robbed Lesotho of its former politico-strategic significance, rendering it less threatened by deliberate external destabilisation.

It is scarcely to be expected that a model liberal democracy should emerge upon the basis of a labour reserve economy which since independence has known nothing but authoritarian rule. None the less, the 1993 election has provided an opportunity for the consolidation of a more decent, rights respecting and freer society.

Postscript
Less than ten months after its return to the barracks, the Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF) again intruded into national politics when, following Prime Minister Mokhehle’s rejection of an immediate pay demand, fighting broke out in Maseru between rival military factions in which at least four soldiers were killed and a number of civilians injured in crossfire. Life in the capital was severely disrupted for some two weeks, and only returned to normal after a peace was brokered by the dramatic — and historic — intervention of Presidents Mugabe and Masire of Zimbabwe and Botswana acting jointly with President De Klerk of South Africa and Nelson Mandela, President of the ANC, complemented by Commonwealth, OAU and diplomatic efforts all designed to prevent the crisis developing into a coup. Lesotho was thereby returned to an uneasy peace — albeit still faced by the problems of an incomplete demilitarisation.

The military’s withdrawal from government had been propelled by the democratisation process in South Africa and pressure by Western donor governments. It had also been facilitated by a deal whereby, in exchange for being allowed to return to Lesotho and to resume political activity, the BCP’s exiled leadership had agreed to extend indemnity to the army for any crimes committed during the period of its rule. The new constitution also provided for the existence of a Defence Commission, whose effective function was to protect the interests of the security forces against any assault by a new civilian regime.

The Mokhehle government faced the additional problem that, apart from having to deal with an army which had historically viewed the BCP as the enemy, there was an urgent need to make some provision for the ex-guerillas of the demobilised LLA. But how to achieve this when even though numbering only around 2,000, the military was too large for a country without enemies? Mokhehle, Minister of Defence as well as Prime Minister, sought to manage this situation by securing employment for members of the disbanded LLA by a private security company, and then paying the latter to
provide guards for government ministers.

The army was further reminded that its interests were in decline when, in November, the government announced a 160 per cent pay increase for parliamentarians. This seems to have sparked unrest at Makoanyane army base in Maseru, when junior officers demanded the dismissal of four senior officers (variously accused of BCP sympathies or guilty of cautioning against rash action against the government). That the government felt extremely vulnerable was then indicated by its confirmation of the retirement of the officers concerned. At this point Sekhonyana, still not reconciled to his thumping defeat at the polls, stirred the pot by accusing the government of plotting against the army and calling upon his supporters to arm themselves for self-protection.

It was against this tense background that in mid-January 1994 Mokhehle received an unsigned letter from members of the RLDF which demanded improved allowances and an immediate 100 per cent pay increase; and it was his negative response to this letter, insisting that military salaries would need to go to review with those of other public servants, which then precipitated the crisis.

The appearance of armoured cars upon the streets of Maseru signalled not an attempted coup, but an apparent trade union tactic by elements of the military to impose their wage demand. The fighting which subsequently broke out between different factions was then described by diplomatic sources as reflecting differences between a minority sympathetic to the BCP and rebels who favoured the BNP. This may have had some basis in fact. More likely however, is the suggestion that the fighting, which took place between different units, resulted from the fragmentation of the command structure (the dismissal of the four senior officers in late 1993 had been preceded by Ramaema's retirement after the election), as well as strategic differences within the military about how to handle the new civilian government.

The powerlessness of the government in the face of the fighting might well have encouraged a seizure of state power by either of the factions had it not been for international involvement. While western governments made clear their support for the government. Mokhehle appears to have appealed to both South Africa and the front line states to despatch a peacekeeping force. The South African Government, with more than enough problems of its own to worry about, was less than keen, but issued a warning through Foreign Secretary Pik Botha, that well-known champion of other people's democracy, that a military government would not be tolerated. This, together with the prospect that the meeting of Mugabe, Masire, De Klerk and Mandela might agree to the arrival of a contingent of troops from Botswana and Zimbabwe (which Mokhehle might then use to demobilise his own truculent army), seems to have been enough to secure a truce, backed by an appeal from opposition parties to SADC that Lesotho be allowed to resolve its own problems through domestic mediation.

The mini-summit of presidents, which met with Deputy Prime Minister Selometsi Baholo, resolved on the appointment of a task force, to focus upon 'all aspects' of the situation in Lesotho. This may provide Mokhehle with the muscle over the longer term to get to terms with the army, and even to return its status to that of a police force (as it was until the mid-1970s). He is also thought to have been strongly encouraged to combine a reduction of the size of the army with its integration with the LLA. This will require all the political
skills at his command. But also indicates that, for the foreseeable future, the need for the BCP government to remain exceptionally wary of the military will remain a constant factor in Lesotho’s turbulent politics.

Roger Southall is Professor of Political Studies at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa.

Bibliographic Note

Angola: Enough is Enough!

Bill Minter

The following ‘Policy Framework on Angola’ was drafted by the Washington Office on Africa in September 1993 and circulated for endorsement to a wide range of organisations; it was presented to administration officials in December. There has been no sign, however, that the Clinton administration regards the Angolan issue as more than a peripheral concern, and the dominant tone of official thinking still reflects no urgency in finding ways to step up pressure on Unita.

Any serious engagement with Angola would require not only the diplomatic efforts now under way, but also commitments to escalated pressure on Unita and to provide resources for an adequately equipped UN presence to monitor any new agreement. There is little sign of seriousness on either front.

UN action, and indeed any White House involvement in what are regarded as marginal foreign policy concerns (Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and certainly Angola), has largely been discredited over the first year of the Clinton administration. Some foreign policy pundits even fault Clinton with paying too much attention to such issues.

On Angola in particular, it is telling that there is no apparent effort to enforce the arms embargo voted by the UN Security Council in September, despite blatant violations particularly through Zaire. The mentality of this administration instead still seems to be summarised by the remarks of former Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen in a December television debate on Angola. Asked about putting more pressure on Savimbi, Cohen responded, ‘I think it’s more important right now to influence the government of Angola, despite the fact that they’re in the right and they have a legitimacy, to be willing to make concessions to bring about national unity and national reconciliation.

It is possible that negotiations under way in Lusaka may reach a new agreement, with concessions on both sides. But unless there is a change in this mentality, with a recognition that sticks as well as carrots are required to curb Savimbi’s prospects for implementation are precarious.

The war raging in Angola since late 1992 is one of the world’s most serious and most neglected humanitarian crises. As many as 1,000 are dying each day, agricultural production is para-
skills at his command. But also indicates that, for the foreseeable future, the need for the BCP government to remain exceptionally wary of the military will remain a constant factor in Lesotho’s turbulent politics.

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Since the long-delayed official recognition of the Angolan government by Washington in May 1993, the US has remained involved in both humanitarian and diplomatic efforts in Angola. It is reported that US officials in Luanda recognise both the humanitarian crisis and the primary responsibility of Unita in returning the country to war. But there are many obstacles to drawing the logical conclusions in Washington.

Any serious engagement with Angola would require not only the diplomatic efforts now under way, but also commitments to escalated pressure on Unita and to provide resources for an adequately equipped UN presence to monitor any new agreement. There is little sign of seriousness on either front.

UN action, and indeed any White House involvement in what are regarded as marginal foreign policy concerns (Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and certainly Angola), has largely been discredited over the first year of the Clinton administration. Some foreign policy pundits even fault Clinton with paying too much attention to such issues.

On Angola in particular, it is telling that there is no apparent effort to enforce the arms embargo voted by the UN Security Council in September, despite blatant violations particularly through Zaire. The mentality of this administration instead still seems to be summarised by the remarks of former Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen in a December television debate on Angola. Asked about putting more pressure on Savimbi, Cohen responded, ‘I think it’s more important right now to influence the government of Angola, despite the fact that they’re in the right and they have a legitimacy, to be willing to make concessions to bring about national unity and national reconciliation.

It is possible that negotiations under way in Lusaka may reach a new agreement, with concessions on both sides. But unless there is a change in this mentality, with a recognition that sticks as well as carrots are required to curb Savimbi’s prospects for implementation are precarious.

The war raging in Angola since late 1992 is one of the world’s most serious and most neglected humanitarian crises. As many as 1,000 are dying each day, agricultural production is para-
lysed in many areas by ongoing combat, and thousands of displaced people are pouring into government-held urban areas. Diplomatic hopes for a renewed cease-fire have been repeatedly disappointed. The international community has deplored Unita's resort to war and called on all parties to continue negotiations, finally imposing a mandatory arms and oil embargo against Unita. But the slow international response has failed to bring effective pressures to bear to restore peace. Despite what former United Nations Representative Margaret Anstee called 'a conspiracy of silence by the international media', it is urgent to mobilise support for active implementation of effective policies.

Premises
Any lasting solution to the conflict in Angola must build on the May 1991 Peace Accord and the legitimacy of the elections carried out under its terms in September 1992. Whatever adjustment may be necessary to achieve future settlements, they must be designed to reinforce the trust that millions of Angolans put in these guarantees of peace and democracy, rather than to entrench the cynicism aroused by the violation of these agreements by force. Respect for the democratic verdict in Angola is a test case for South Africa, Mozambique and indeed the entire continent. And it is a measure of the credibility of the US and UN commitments to the democratic initiatives they endorse.

While no party can escape blame for incidents reinforcing mistrust, primary responsibility for the relapse of Angola into vicious warfare lies with the leadership of Unita, which systematically evaded the Peace Accord's provisions to disarm and demobilise and use its military advantage to re-ignite war after refusing to accept election results regarded as generally free and fair by international monitors. The United Na-
Africa. These supplies are funded partially via sales of diamonds by Unita. The arms and oil embargo approved by the United Nations Security Council in September must be implemented urgently. It is an essential prerequisite for any credible policy of negotiations and a guarantee for implementation of any new settlement that is reached. To be effective, it requires, at minimum:

- allocation of intelligence resources to identify states, companies and individuals involved in delivery of supplies to Unita;
- pressure on Zaire and on diamond merchants involved in purchasing diamonds originating from Unita-controlled areas of Angola;
- technical assistance to Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe in identifying overflights of supply planes between South Africa and Angola;
- insistence on full co-operation by the South African authorities in preventing flights, including those from the nominally independent homeland of Bophuthatswana.

Like all embargoes, such measure could not be 100% effective. But it is critical that symbolism be followed up with practical measures which will force the Unita leadership to take the alternative of good-faith negotiation more seriously.

The US government should reiterate, at high levels, its warnings to Unita not to attack US and other oil installations in Cabinda and off-shore at Soyo. It should also make clear that it will not recognise the legitimacy of Unita's acquisition of territory by force, nor recognise any government that might be established on that basis.

While such statements have been made on several occasion by US representatives, Unita may continue to doubt US commitment unless new statements are accompanied by evidence of stepped-up contingency planning for protection of these installations. The United States should also initiate or expand sharing of intelligence data relevant for defence with the Angolan government.

The US government should express its willingness to support a greatly expanded United Nations presence in the case of a renewed settlement.

All parties are agreed on the necessity of such an expanded presence, the lack of which is generally agreed to have been one of the failures in 1992. As specified in the points agreed at the Abidjan talks of May 1993, it is necessary to ensure genuine disarmament, full demobilisation of partisan military forces, a policy of no reprisals and completion of the second round of presidential elections. A clear declaration by the US pledging necessary resources would be an incentive to a renewed settlement.

The US government should continue and expand active support of UN and other efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to Angola. It should also immediately initiate programs of development aid in conjunction with the Angolan government and non-governmental organisations, in those areas of the country where security considerations permit. Plans for both private and public-sector economic co-operation, through trade and investment, should not be held hostage by the war.

It is urgent that obstacles to the delivery of aid to war-affected zones be removed. Additional resources should be allocated to city residents immediately, including large numbers of persons displaced by the war, as well as others in areas where security does not impede assistance. There is urgent need for medical and other services as well as food aid.

While any comprehensive program of
development or economic co-operation must await abatement of conflict, there is significant scope for programs aimed at relatively secure areas, particularly the coastal cities as well as Lubango and the surrounding agricultural area in Huila province. In particular, the US should play an active role in assisting the nascent Angolan non-governmental organisation sector, and should consider support for health, education, informal sector development and other programs in accessible urban areas.

The US government should stress to both parties the urgent imperative for respect for the laws of war, particularly concerning attacks on civilians, kidnapping, summary executions, and lack of respect for humanitarian relief operations.

While responsibility for renewed conflict and attacks on civilians lies primarily with Unita, both sides have been guilty of serious human rights abuses in the course of the fighting. Both the Angolan parties and the international community have the responsibility for establishing mechanisms for investigating, exposing and ending such practices.

The US government should recognise that stability in Angola depends on completion of the democratic transitions under way in Zaire and South Africa, and urgently address itself to the obstacles threatening those transitions.

While activities in Angola set a bad precedent for Zaire, South Africa and Mozambique, delays in installing democratic institutions in those countries in turn promote continued conflict in Angola. US policy on Angola must be accompanied by effective action to promote the departure from power of Mobutu in Zaire, and to ensure that violence and other obstacles do not block the transition to elected democratic institutions in South Africa. A policy of complacency toward threats of violence by those threatened by democracy will enhance the prospects of escalating region-wide conflict in southern Africa in the future.

Bill Minter, Washington Office on Africa.


Ethnicity, Society and Conflict in Natal

Gerhard Maré & John Wright

In September 1992 a conference was held at the University of Natal in Pietermaritzburg. This Briefing is a slightly amended version which sets out the issues raised by that conference.

The holding of the conference needs to be understood in the first instance against the background of events in Natal in the 1970s and 1980s. Life in Natal (the area enclosed by the provincial borders, including KwaZulu) since the early 1970s has been under of the rule (albeit partial) of Buthelezi. That rule was initially benign, and carried hope for some that a South African liberation politics could be revived inside the country; that it would not be crushed by the state before meaningful advances could be made; and that it would not ‘sell out’ to the incorporative strategies of apartheid. Activists in the labour movement even thought it possible that through the involvement of some of the bantustan politicians a measure of space could be created for the first tenuous steps in (re-)organising the working class. That position of guarded optimism was strengthened...
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by the approval which the ANC gave at long distance to Buthelezi's unfolding project. More immediately, it seemed justified by the practice of people such as Barney Dladla and Professor Sibusiso Bhengu, the former through his contacts with the working class and the fledgling trade union movement during and after 1973, and the latter through the content he gave to the notion of 'cultural liberation' and the empathy he had for students, that political force which became potent after June 1976.

The existence of a 'Zulu nation' — a culturally distinct group within the larger South African context, whose pride and confidence in its distinctive history played a positive role in contemporary struggles such as the Durban strikes in 1973 (the cry Usuthu was frequently shouted by marching workers), was part of the 'common sense' of the time. It was through the development of Buthelezi's personal and class project that the dangers of a politically-mobilised ethnicity became increasingly clear. Remember that John Saul published his important article on the 'dialectics of tribe and class' (1979) during this period, commenting on the ambiguous role that ethnic mobilisation played, and also on the lack of theoretical clarity about the status of ethnicity within societies in Africa.

However, the ambiguities which had characterised the politics of Buthelezi and of Inkatha in the 1970s had been resolved for all but the staunchest of the (qualified) supporters of Zulu ethnic mobilisation by the end of the decade. Inkatha had now been in existence for five years; the leaders of the movement had broken with the ANC; both Dladla and Bhengu had been expelled from the political arena that Buthelezi now dominated totally (Dladla had died of a lung condition and Bhengu was in exile); and the class politics of the movement (not the class membership) was clearly that of an aspirant ethnic bourgeoisie in alliance with big capital. Moreover, Inkatha's specific ethnic project could be seen to be fragmenting both a broader ethnic identity in the Natal region, and also the emerging national identity which manifested itself in the struggles and organisational forms of the 1980s, based as these struggles were on a commitment to 'non-racialism' (more often, in practice, to 'multi-racialism').

By the second half of the 1980s, incidents of previously sporadic, violence had become endemic in certain districts and townships in Natal, and the numbers of the people killed in them were rising dramatically (see, for example, Aitchison, 1989). In parallel, Inkatha's ethnic mobilisation, within narrow parameters of what was acceptable behaviour for a 'Zulu' person became more strident. At the same time, its strategy of looking beyond the KwaZulu bantustan to try to shape a political alliance around the notion of a federal state of Natal achieved its high-point with the holding of the Natal-KwaZulu Indaba in 1986.

This was the broad context in which, early in 1991, a group of academics at the University of Natal in Pietermaritzburg and in Durban started planning a conference on the significance of ethnicity in the politics of the Natal region. The more immediate context had several facets: first, the fragmentation of the USSR, and the rise of ethnic tensions in eastern Europe and southern Asia; second, the unbanning of opposition movements in South Africa early in 1990, and the consequent widening of political discourse in the country (where previously ethnicity had been a 'dirty' concept, closely associated with the divide-and-rule projects of apartheid governments, now it became easier to engage in public discussion about its relation to politics in South Africa, in the past, in the present, and also in the period beyond apartheid); third, the outbreak of violence on
the Witwatersrand in mid-1990, which was almost universally interpreted by the media in simplistic ethnic terms — as a resurgence of African ‘tribalism’, as Zulu-Xhosa conflict. Ethnicity/tribalism, as distinct from ‘race’, was put up front in the public consciousness through media usage with a salience that it had not had for some years (during the period of ‘reform’ politics in the 1980s, euphemisms about ‘groups’ and ‘first and third worlds’ had characterised the ‘discourse of domination’: see, for example, Boonzaier and Sharp (eds), 1988).

The Project on Contemporary Political Conflict, under whose auspices the conference was held, had been in existence since 1989, and was itself a product of the dynamics outlined above. The aims of the conference were to provide a forum for academics to address a number of basic questions which the organisers felt had not been adequately aired either in academic or in political circles. To quote the organisers’ first circular: ‘From an academic perspective, ethnic consciousness is clearly one of the major factors which gives shape to the South African political scene. But to recognise it is immediately to raise a number of important questions about why this is so’. In particular, what historical forces have made ethnicity of such salience in South African society, and more especially in Natal; and, what is the nature of the relations between ethnicity and politics in Natal at the present?

Proposals for the conference generated considerable interest among academics in South Africa and further afield. Some 70 papers were offered, of which 33 were selected by the organisers. While the organisers were concerned with contemporary ethnicity and conflict in the region, they felt that theoretical, historical and comparative contributions were essential for an adequate discussion. The papers were, therefore, organised under three themes: ethnicity and theory; ethnicity and history; and, ethnicity and current conflicts. To what extent did the conference succeed in its aims? The short answer is: patchily. While it elicited some useful historical case-studies, and work on current political conflicts in Natal, it rather lacked coherence and depth in presentations and discussion.

The Major Issues

The first, and probably most important point was that relating to definition. Could we establish a common language, or ensure that we spoke about the same phenomenon? Theoretical discussion of what ethnicity is never got off the ground, and there was even doubt expressed by some participants as to whether any definitions were on offer in the papers! The reluctance to discuss this issue was surprising and difficult to explain, especially in the light of the free and uncritical use made of the term in the media. About half a dozen papers put forward definitions, but at no point was there general discussion of the issue. Some contributors clearly felt that a working definition of ethnicity was essential for their argument; others avoided definition and, in at least one case, explicitly argued against the desirability of defining it.

While the first paper on the programme, written by the historian Jeff Guy (‘Debating ethnicity in South Africa’), managed to avoid defining ethnicity, the next in that session, by Grahame Hayes and Gerhard Maré, did tackle the issue: ‘Ethnicity refers . . . to the social identity formed, under historically specific conditions, within which group boundaries (both inclusive and exclusive) rely on notions and practices of cultural distinctiveness (expressed in a specific ‘mix’ of elements), and on a strong sense of common origin and common experience (‘the past’). Through this definition we wish to capture both the
process (ethnicity as ideology) and the content (the 'quality of an ethnic group') of ethnicity Robert Thornton did the same: 'Ethnicity, at the simplest 'folk' level is the recognition of social and cultural differences in others, and the adoption of an identity by one's self'. He then discussed approaches by social scientists but returned to 'what 'ordinary' people might believe about ethnicity'. His approach was certainly about the 'definition' of ethnicity.

In session two the important (although oft neglected) gender dimension of ethnic identities was stressed, but the only definition came from David Brown: 'Ethnic identity is allegiance to a group — large or small, socially dominant or subordinate — with which one has ancestral links. There is no necessity for continuation over generations, of the same socialisation or cultural patterns, but some sense of group boundary must persist. This can be sustained by shared objective characteristics (language, religion, etc), or by more subjective contributions to a sense of 'groupness', or by some combination of both. Symbolic or subjective attachments must relate, at however distant a remove, to an observably real past'.

Historians John Wright and Tim Nuttall provided definitions (the latter drawing on an earlier suggestion by Wright). Wright's own contribution to the conference read: 'Ethnicity is here understood as having to do with the processes by which people come to see themselves as belonging 'naturally' to a group (other than a descent-group) whose members share, or believe they share, a common historical origin and a common culture, i.e. a common way of giving meaning to the world they live in.

An ethnic group sees itself as a 'people'. It has certain similarities with, but differs from, a 'cultural group', a 'racial group', and a 'nation'. Contrary to popular belief, it does not have an objective existence outside the minds of its members. Like a 'race' and a 'nation' it exists as a mental construct, as an 'imagined community'.

Both Chetty and Soni, while not offering specific definitions, discussed definitional problems. Maharaj and Byerley also suggested what ethnicity meant to them. Byerley, within an approach that sees ethnicity as functional in struggle over resources and as manipulation by 'brokers', differed most from the general approach of other theorists: 'Ethnicity may be viewed as a resource which is available for adoption and re-constitution by particular power brokers in the context of competition and conflict over scarce resources'. So while there certainly were definitions put forward, there was no constructive discussion on the differences and the implications of different approaches.

The second major issue that characterised the conference was the question of whether an ethnic group has a 'real' existence. Or does it exist rather at the level of the imaginary/imagined? Or — a third position — is this distinction between the real and the imaginary a false one? This was a fundamental issue, and closely related to the definitional lacuna, which was discussed only in the final session of the conference. It is not possible for us to offer a solution based on the discussion during the conference.

A third issue was whether the construction of ethnic identities needed to be understood historically or not. A number of contributors insisted on seeing ethnicity as always a historical phenomenon, the product of social forces which can be, and, indeed, have to be analysed historically. Others rejected this approach, complaining of a 'retreat into history' on the part of analysts, and the neglect of cultural and psychological studies. Overall there was not nearly
fourth, when is ethnicity a ‘problem’ and when is it not? Some contributors saw the mobilisation of ethnic consciousness as a defence against exploitation and aggression. Others portrayed it as an instrument of exploitation and aggression. The kinds of circumstances in which it could be one or the other did not receive sufficient analysis. A third position saw ethnicity as primarily a social identity, a ‘story’ through which some people live their everyday lives, which could then be mobilised into directed political and organisational activity.

fifth, is there such a thing as ‘ethnic conflict’? Or is it just the ‘face’ of another kind of conflict? This question was raised by the organisers in one of their preliminary circulars, but it was not directly taken up during the conference. Given the political overtones of this concept, and given the frequency with which it is used in the media, it needs concentrated attention from academics. It is also necessary to acknowledge that in South Africa we tend to focus primarily on ethnicity as conflict, which might well direct our general treatment of the phenomenon.

Finally, a crucial historical point was brought up briefly in the concluding session (it was also asked and an answer suggested in the paper by Hayes and Már), but not discussed: why is it that ethnicity has become so salient in the world at large in the late twentieth century? What has happened to other ways of claiming identities — nationalism, pan-Africanism and, in the African context, religion — or how does ethnicity articulate with these? It is pertinent to say at this point that the comparative studies that were presented did not work particularly well in terms of the aims of the conference.

What is There to Build On?
If academic conferences are to contribute to understanding, perceptions, and even policy and action, then we, the participants, are going to have to create a culture of debate and responsiveness ourselves. The motivation for participation in conferences should not be the one-off value of another item on a CV or another notch on the SAPSE pole. It is essential that we take ourselves seriously, as an intellectual community, and that a vitality, of response and engagement, on an ongoing basis, be established. Only then can we justifiably offer the popular media our ideas and (hopefully) insights.

The Pietermaritzburg conference took as its starting point the need to respond to violence and one important aspect of it — the struggle over or around ethnic identity. Despite having stated our aims prior to the conference and asking for contributions to address themselves to a specific debate, and despite selecting papers which we hoped would advance those aims, we still did not come anywhere close to an agreed position. As we have indicated, some central issues were not even confronted. This raises questions that we feel need to be addressed at the present conference.

Is there value, beyond the distribution to other conference goers, in presenting papers, or should we be satisfied with that extremely limited goal?

We have made this presentation in the hope that raising some of the more important unresolved issues from the Pietermaritzburg conference at this venue may help provide issues for discussion at the present conference.

We are looking for answers, no matter how tentative, to issues that are going to be of concern to all South Africans (and many others elsewhere) for many years to come.
Postscript

The 'Notes' above constitute a slightly amended version of a written report of the same title which the authors presented to the conference on 'Ethnicity, Identity and Nationalism in South Africa: comparative perspectives', held under the auspices of the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, in April 1993. It is not our brief to reflect in detail on the latter conference, but some general comparative comments relating to the points which we raise above may be apposite.

The Grahamstown conference was a much larger and more ambitious affair than the one held in Pietermaritzburg, and its focus considerably broader. Where the prime aim of the latter conference was to try to analyse and explain the role played by ethnicity in current political conflicts in the Natal region, the main intention of the Grahamstown meeting was to address the question of how to accommodate sectarian divisions inside South Africa at the same as fostering the development of a common national identity. To a much greater extent than the Pietermaritzburg conference, the Grahamstown one sought to draw on comparative case studies from other parts of the world. This made for one of the undoubted strengths of the conference: the active participation of several dozen academics from outside South Africa. Apart from anything else, this must rank as one of the most cosmopolitan conferences to have been held in South Africa in decades (and possibly in this country's history: most of us can have little knowledge of what academic conferences here were like before the dark age of academic apartheid set in the 1960s).

While the wealth of case studies presented certainly served to enlarge the frame of reference within which the specificities of 'ethnic' and 'national' questions in South Africa need to be analysed, it did not always make for the kind of discussion in which the conceptual issues raised above were addressed. As at the Pietermaritzburg meeting, public discussion of questions of definition were largely avoided. In private conversation it emerged that there was a marked difference of opinion on the need for this kind of discussion. Some participants, including the authors of this article, felt that it was important for some collective attempt to be made to delineate the range of meanings attaching to concepts like 'ethnicity' and 'nationalism'. Others argued that this was unnecessary, as most participants at the conference were operating within the same broad set of meanings.

Similarly, the question of the ontological status of ethnic groups received virtually no attention. By contrast, the issue — essentially an empirical one — of the relationship between ethnicity and history came up for discussion on several occasions. The consensus appeared to be firm and widespread that specific ethnics can be understood only if they are seen as historically constructed, and not as expressions of primordial sentiments. Certainly this was the assumption in the great majority of diverse case studies which were discussed at the conference.

The specific historical conditions under which ethnicity exists either as something defensive or as something aggressive were not directly explored. The trend of discussion, though, seemed to be that where ethnicity has to do primarily with the establishment of group identities it can operate as a positive force, but that when it is mobilised for sectarian political purposes it becomes something potentially destructive.

The question of the existence or otherwise of such a phenomenon as 'ethnic
At many levels, the Grahamstown conference was a rich and rewarding experience for its participants. But, as one speaker in the closing session pointed out, where the Pietermaritzburg conference had specifically tried to place the relationship between ethnicity and current political conflicts in South Africa at the centre of discussion, this aspect received less attention at the Grahamstown meeting. Analyses of South Africa's political economy, past and present, were few and far between; if anything, they tended to be submerged under the weight of often illuminating but in some ways ultimately suffocating case studies from elsewhere in the world. Further conferences on ethnicity and nationalism in South Africa, for which there will be a continuing need as political reform unfolds, will need to focus more closely on their specifically political dimensions.

Gerhard Mare is attached to the Centre for Industrial and Labour Studies/Sociology Department at the University of Natal, Durban and John Wright to the Department of Historical Studies, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg. These ‘Notes’ reflect their own views and not those of the committee.

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Bibliographic Note

Namibia Regains Walvis Bay At Last
David Simon

At midnight on 28 February 1994 the long struggle to decolonise all of Namibia’s territory finally ended with the ceremonial handover of Walvis Bay and 12 associated guano islands by South Africa.

The status of this sandy desert harbour enclave at the midpoint of Namibia’s coast has consistently represented one of the most vexed sticking points during Namibia’s protracted liberation struggle. The South African government had always claimed sovereignty over Walvis Bay and the islands on the grounds that they were ceded to the Cape by Britain in 1876 and therefore had a distinct legal status from the rest of Namibia. The legitimacy of this claim was vigorously contested on legal grounds, not least because the enclave was administered from Windhoek as an integral part of Namibia by South Africa from 1922 onwards.

In order to secure its own claim, Pretoria detached Walvis Bay and the islands again in 1977 when international agreement on Namibian independence seemed imminent, and incorporated them into the Cape Province. The absurdity of this arrangement was symbolised by the overwhelming right-wing white voters of Walvis Bay being included in Cape Town’s Green Point.
conflict’ tended to be glossed over: participants by and large took the easy way out and spoke of it as if it had an existence of its own. On the other hand, the broad question of why ethnicity is currently becoming so marked a feature of the world political scene came up for discussion on several occasions, most expressively, on the last day of the conference, by John Comaroff.

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parliamentary constituency in a cynical attempt by the ruling National Party to dislodge the opposition MP.

SWAPO and the international community had sought to have Walvis Bay returned to Namibia as part of the independence process. However, in an effort to avoid the issue deadlocking the negotiations in the late 1970s, UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, which set out the modalities for the UN-supervised independence process, recognised Namibia's claim to the enclave but left the issue to be resolved at a later date by South Africa and the sovereign government of independent Namibia. Throughout the eleven year delay which followed, concern was expressed that South Africa would use its occupation of Walvis Bay to strangle Namibia as part of its regional destabilisation campaign against non-compliant neighbours. The lack of control over its principal port could form a literal noose around the new state's economic jugular vein.

Although Namibian independence on 21 March 1990 was ultimately achieved only after the end of the cold war and as South Africa disengaged militarily from the region, most Namibians still felt very real concern. The new country's constitution boldly restated that Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands form integral parts of Namibia, and the SWAPO government committed itself to reclaiming them as soon as possible by peaceful means. Administratively, provision was also made in the 1991 report of the First Delimitation Commission, which divided Namibia into 13 new regions, for Walvis Bay to form part of the adjacent Erongo Region, and this should now have occurred on 1 March 1994.

Although the generally positive tenor of economic and political relations with South Africa exceeded all expectations, and no attempt was made to interfere with Namibian imports or exports through Walvis Bay, some harassment of Namibians travelling to and from the enclave did occur. The ANC repeatedly restated its position that Walvis Bay should be returned to Namibia forthwith. For some time South Africa stalled on the negotiations and the Namibian government was criticised at home for being too soft with Pretoria on the issue. Ultimately, however, agreement was reached to establish a form of condominium or joint control over the enclave's day to day administration. Thus, the Joint Administrative Authority (JAA) was installed on 1 November 1992 under a chief representative of each country. No time limit was put on the JAA but reliable sources expected it to last for three to four years.

Ultimately, it was the anomalous position of Walvis Bay within South Africa that precipitated the unexpected decision, during negotiations on South Africa's new regions at the country's constitutional negotiations in mid-1993, to relinquish control over the enclave and Penguin Islands. Orchestrated by some deft footwork from Namibian representatives, South Africa's political parties agreed unanimously that Pretoria should hand them over as soon as practicable. Once a joint technical committee had agreed the mechanics and timetable, the date for handover was confirmed.

The necessary legislation was introduced in the Namibian National Assembly only in late November by the Foreign Minister, Theo-Ben Gurirab, as hard negotiations over the new institutional structures and modalities of the transfer had continued until then. Inflated South African claims for compensation for the capital value of harbour and airport assets will not be met by Namibia. Prominent business representatives in the enclave have long argued that reincorporation held the brightest promise for its economic fu-
tance. At the same time, however, labour relations in Walvis Bay have continued to be extremely repressive. Efforts by right-wing whites in the enclave to have South Africa hold a referendum on reintegration were unsuccessful.

No less important, however, has been the struggle within Namibia over who would control the port after reincorporation. TransNamib, the parastatal multimodal transport corporation, bid aggressively to expand its domain, but countervailing interests favouring the establishment of a separate port authority ultimately won. Although details of the new arrangements were not yet available at the time of writing this Briefing, the outcome is likely to make for greater operating efficiency. Many of the South African Portnet staff in Walvis Bay are understood to be keen to transfer to the new authority, not least because they would almost certainly face unemployment on return to South Africa. Meanwhile, potential commercial investors which have already declared their interest include Lonrho and a group of Namibians with apparent backing from a Libyan bank. Little concrete is likely to happen until after the formal handover, however. On 17 February, the Namibian and South African Governments signed a historic agreement in Cape Town, in terms of which the enclave’s large Rooikop Military base and adjacent airport ‘which serves both civilian and military aircraft’ would be transferred in tact to Namibia, along with equipment worth R6.5 million, and the necessary training would be provided. The two countries’ defence ministers highlighted the new era in bilateral relations which this agreement, and the reintegration of Walvis Bay, heralded.

Their speeches stressed that the desire for peace, mutual understanding and good neighbourliness had overcome their confrontational past, and that southern African countries now needed to cooperate with one another. To mark the formal reintegration, the Namibian government laid on four days of festivities in Walvis Bay itself at a cost of some N$3 million.

The port’s new status as an integral part of Namibia is likely to boost the volume of regional trade utilising its facilities, as it forms part of the SADC’s transport diversification network. Some international trade has already been routed through Walvis Bay since Namibian independence and the end of South African destabilisation. Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines was a pioneer in this regard, having signed a contract in 1990 for the export of some 30,000 tonnes of copper per annum.

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Bibliographic Note
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The Chapter on Fundamental Rights: Civil Society and the New Constitution in South Africa

Robert Fine

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Departments. The Symposium was sponsored by the British Council. The main subject of the symposium was the projected new constitution in South Africa, though we also discussed a paper on 'civil society and fundamental freedoms' and the ANC-COSATU 'Reconstruction and Development Programme'. What follows is not in any sense a report on the many points which were debated and the many views which were expressed.

The focus of this Briefing is on Chapter Three of the New Constitution in South Africa, sub-titled 'Fundamental Rights'. This bill of rights is a big step forward for democracy in South Africa, but it is important both to subject the details to scrutiny and to place it in the context of the larger settlement.

A powerful new perspective developing in South Africa concerns the need to nurture what is called 'civil society'. This term 'civil society' usually refers to 'associational activity outside the state' and 'civil society theory' represents a commitment to democratic participation above and beyond the official forms of representative government. Civil society expresses a scepticism toward the statist politics which has dominated independent African states.

This democratic conception of civil society is distinct from the conception of civil society put forward by the 'new right' where it is little more than an argument for a limited nightwatchman state and the autonomy of the private sector in an unregulated market place. Democratic civil society is about self-activity and voluntary association independent of the state as crucial elements of a democracy. But this perspective bears its own risks in the South African context.

There is a tendency in civil society theory to assume that all things in civil society are good and all things in the state are bad. In South African civil society there have emerged institutions with strong democratic commitments — like the COSATU trade union movement and many of the 'civics' — even if their practices fall short of the promise. But we would be fooling ourselves if we did not acknowledge that civil society is also composed of institutions and associations which are anything but democratic: black ethnic groupings, warlords, gangs, white supremacists and the rough 'popular justice' of necklacing parties come first to mind. Nor is the banner of the ANC a guarantee against this or that clique presenting itself as representative of the people. Indeed, the political language of 'the people' which has played such a large role in oppositional politics in South Africa carries with it the danger of each political grouping identifying itself with the people and its rivals as enemies of the people.

Conversely, we would expect to find in the new state (unlike the old apartheid state) the convergence of at least some of the most democratic forces of society, including those pledged to national unity against ethnic division. In this vein, the Preamble to the new Constitution affirms the 'need to create a new order in which all South Africans will be entitled to a common South African citizenship in a sovereign and democratic constitutional state in which there is equality between men and women and people of all races' (see Endnote). The new Constitution for the first time gives the franchise to every person who is a South African citizen over the age of 18, including all those who were previously deemed citizens of the 'independent homelands'. More ominously, perhaps, it also contains an exclusion clause concerning 'disqualifications as may be prescribed by law' (6.c); what this will mean remains unclear.

The tendency in civil society theory to treat the state and civil society as if they were two totally distinct spheres, separated by a watertight divide, fails to
take into account that the form of the new state is crucial to the future of civil society in South Africa. The minimal requirement of the state is that it establish a constitution which will guarantee certain fundamental rights of all citizens in relation to the state: both private rights of separation — a sphere in which individuals have a right to think for themselves, say what they will and associate freely without interference from the state — and public rights of participation in the associations of civil society and in political parties old and new. The strength of the new constitution is that it goes some way to providing this rights-based framework.

The Chapter on Fundamental Rights

Chapter Three of the new Constitution on 'Fundamental Rights' sets out a wide range of rights which 'every person' shall have in relation to the legislative and executive organs of the state. One serious limitation is that these are seemingly not rights which individuals will have in relation to private corporations and interests. Every right which the chapter upholds is subject to the limitation that an individual's entitlement to that right only holds 'where and to the extent that the nature of the rights permits' (7.3). Section 33 declares that all the rights entrenched in the Charter may be limited by law, so long as such limitation is 'reasonable', 'justifiable in an open and democratic society' and 'shall not negate the essential content of the right in question'. There are no absolute rights — not even the right against torture — and no priority is given to one set of rights against another: for instance, to rights of equality over property.

Most of the clauses of this chapter begin with the phrase 'every person shall have the right...' or 'no person shall be subject to ...' There seems to be no definition of 'person', a gap which leaves open two vital questions: will those living or working in South Africa who are not citizens of South Africa possess these rights? And will impersonal, collective entities like the government itself or private corporations be excluded from the category of 'persons'? If the answer is negative on either of these questions, it will serve as a major limitation on individual rights.

The right to freedom of religion is affirmed, though it is immediately added that 'religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions' (14.2). The religious sentiment placed at the beginning of the Preamble to the Constitution is itself a case in point. It reads, 'In humble submission to Almighty God, we the people of South Africa declare that ...' In my view the people of South Africa have had their fill of 'humble submission', no matter to whom.

There are clauses which are replete with open-ended ambiguity. Section 9 declares that 'every person shall have the right to life'. Whether this will give relief to anti-abortion or anti-capital punishment remains to be seen; perhaps it can also serve as a claim on the state against death caused by poverty or malnutrition? Even more open-textured is section 10: 'Every person shall have the right to respect for and protection of his or her dignity'. How this is made to fit with, say, the right to criticise remains to be seen.

On the economic front, section 26.1 affirms the right of every person 'freely to engage in economic activity and to pursue a livelihood'. This could serve as a limiting right in relation to social change, but the next sub-section (26.2) says that this shall not preclude measures taken on matters of economic growth, social justice, conditions of employment, equal opportunity, etc, which are 'justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom
and equality'. This would appear to be a vital exception if the 'rights' of capitalist private property to exploit labour are to be regulated.

The section on labour relations is nothing if not even-handed between workers and employers. Workers are afforded the right to strike, but only 'for the purpose of collective bargaining' (27.4) — a limitation which may be more restrictive than the present situation if this is interpreted to mean (in Thatcherite fashion) that political and sympathy strikes are ruled out. At the same time, and controversially, employers are afforded a right of recourse to lock-outs for the purpose of collective bargaining (27.5), notwithstanding the clause that states that every person shall have the right to fair labour practice (27.1). The section on the right to freedom of association (17) may have an adverse effect on labour organisation if it is interpreted in the courts also to mean a right of workers to dissociate from their unions.

The section on property extends full rights of private property to all citizens for the first time, and more contentious allows for expropriation only subject to agreed compensation or just and equitable compensation as determined by a court of law (28.3). There is also, however, an equality clause (8.3b) which entitles individuals and communities dispossessed of land under apartheid to claim restitution. This is followed up in the Constitution by a section (121) on restitution of land rights. There is also a potentially very strong clause on environment which reads that 'every person shall have the right to an environment which is not detrimental to his or her health or well-being' (29).

The sections on criminal and administrative justice, detention, arrest and prosecution are attempts to embody the rule of law and include the right to remain silent (now under threat in the UK). However, the chapter also gives the new parliament the authority to declare states of emergency 'where the security of the Republic is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection or disorder' or if it is necessary 'to restore peace and order' (34.1). Various safeguards are built into this emergency clause but its possible usage is still widely defined.

The new Constitution will set up a Constitutional Court consisting of a president and ten other judges. The mode of appointment and eligibility of applicants are being hotly debated basically between those who want more legal criteria and those who want more political appointments. The Constitutional Court will have wide jurisdiction over the interpretation, protection and enforcement of all the provisions of the Constitution, including the fundamental rights entrenched in Chapter Three. Its decisions will be binding on all legislative, executive and judicial organs of the state. Clearly, with a court of such power, its composition will be crucial.

There is a reassuringly wide definition of who can apply to the courts for relief when someone's rights are infringed or threatened; this includes any person 'acting in the public interest' (7.4). All claims concerning fundamental human rights will either go straight to the Constitutional Court or more normally to the ordinary courts of law. In interpreting the provisions of the chapter, the courts are to 'promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality', and may have regard to public international and foreign case law. The new Constitution also enjoins the establishment of a Human Rights Commission to promote respect for fundamental rights, to make recommendations to government and to investigate violations of fundamental rights. There are to be further Commissions on Gender
As with the Constitution as a whole, the chapter on fundamental rights will be in force for no longer than the life of the next parliament, one of whose tasks will be to turn itself into a Constitutional Assembly and draft a permanent constitution.

Conclusion

The chapter on fundamental rights contains an important set of guarantees for citizens of the new South Africa. It is clearly a negotiated document, which seeks to create a common ground between rival parties either by balancing one right against another (e.g. employers and workers) or by defining a right with enough vagueness to satisfy opposing interests (like the right to life and dignity). Much will depend on how it is interpreted and enforced by the Courts.

In general, I would say that this chapter on fundamental rights is a step forward, but there are three provisos which I would make. First, the present government's embrace of rights which restrict the latitude of a future democratic government for social change should make us suspicious. It is not surprising that, in the face of majority rule, the National Party has become exceedingly keen on 'rights', particularly those protecting their own property and power base.

Second, the efficacy of a Chapter of Rights hangs to a large extent on access to the courts and to effective remedies. There is a section on administrative justice (24) which guarantees that every person shall have the right to lawful and fair administrative action and be furnished with reasons in writing where his or her rights are affected, and that these reasons be justifiable. As far as civil society is concerned, perhaps what is most required is a regulatory frame-work which allows civics and other non-governmental organisations to make speedy and effective appeals where they find cases of corruption or injustice by representatives of the state or parastatal institutions. This lies in the province of administrative law reform.

Last, while a chapter of fundamental rights may serve as a support for 'civil society', that is, for an active and involved citizenry, it is not a substitute for the building of an open and participatory party system, or for an active and critical parliament which can act as a check on government. The ANC's insistence on a single vote for both local government and national government elections does not bode well for the former. Nor does the absence of investigative powers on the part of parliament (for instance, through some kind of select committee system) bode well for the latter.

As Hannah Arendt noted in respect of the American Constitution, a Bill of Rights can serve as a support for 'civil society', that is, for an active and involved citizenry, it is not a substitute for the privatisation of individual interests and the minimisation of public life. She put the matter thus:

The Bill of Rights in the American Constitution forms the last and the most exhaustive legal bulwark for the private realm against public power . . . Jefferson's preoccupations with the dangers of public power and this remedy against them is well known . . . However, the dangers of corruption and perversion were much more likely to arise from private interests than from public power . . . Jefferson was able to perceive this danger . . . What he perceived to be the mortal danger to the republic was that the Constitution had given all power to the citizens, without giving them the opportunity of being republicans and acting as citizens (On Revolution, Penguin, 1988:252).

Jefferson looked to the 'elementary republics of the wards' (a kind of fusion of
civics and local government in South African terms) to provide such an active, public space. Arendt agreed. Whether or not this is right, what they both highlight is that the constitution of a bill of rights is a compelling means of achieving this democratic end; but that even if this particular Chapter of Fundamental Rights were a better chapter, with its limitations ironed out, it can only be part of the answer, never the whole.

The history of ignored, subverted and junked constitutions in newly independent African states should make us aware both of the intimate association between human rights and state power and of the limits of a constitutionalism which focuses on rights at the expense of politics. The Chapter on Fundamental Rights will provide a vital space in which ‘civil society’ can operate, but equally it is up to ‘civil society’ to make use of these rights, to engage in a battle of ideas over their interpretation, and to defend them as part and parcel of its own self-activity and organisation.

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Endnote

The bracketed numbers which follow refer to the sections and subsections of the projected new Constitution. The text was in flux even as we were in the symposium, so some further alterations are being and will be introduced before a final draft is enacted. +
Reviews


It might appear strange to review a book which asserts that the universalist claims of modern law are no more than a contemporary myth in a journal devoted to African political economy. Peter Fitzpatrick's The Mythology of Modern Law is, however, of great relevance to our understanding of the history of colonialism and imperialism and the role that law has played in the subjugation of the African continent.

In the teaching of law there has long been a great divide between, on the one side, 'black letter' lawyers who regard law as an autonomous, coherent, consistent, gapless system of formal rules. Positivists like John Austin and H L A Hart have reflected the logical positivism that has so distorted most British philosophy. On the other side of the divide are those, like Fitzpatrick, who have long sought to comprehend the role of law within its various social, political, economic, historical and cultural contexts, and who have regarded law as something to be explained rather than a self-legitimating body of rules.

Using the novel and highly effective concept of myth, Fitzpatrick's project is to demonstrate that law, far from being unique, is merely a form of modernist rationality traceable back to the Enlightenment. Modernity, he argues, is as much about myth as scientific rationality, and particularly the myth of the development of universal knowledge, rational judgement and reasonable laws. The growth of modern society has been characterised by the rejection of 'the savages and ancestors “we” have left behind’ (p.ix). Modern law is a central part of this myth because of its promise of a supposedly rational social order in contrast to alternative, less civilised means of achieving the same objective.

Of particular relevance to Africa is Fitzpatrick's analysis of how this Eurocentric system of social control that appropriated to itself the standard of universality produced not civilisation but authoritarianism when introduced by the imperial powers into their colonies. Wrenched out of the context of a first world which possessed 'detailed and tentacular non-legal controls' (p.111), the law imported into the colonies 'conferred on the colonial administrator powers of a range and discretion that would have exceeded the most expansive appetites of the Khadi or the patrimonial patriarch' (p.111).

Central to Enlightenment thought was the creation of the alien ‘other’ against which the supposedly civilising influences of European (and later North American) thought could be measured. Like a Blakean antinomy, devalued black was set against progressive white in a process which facilitated slavery, racism and colonialism. The imported system of law had a profound affect on colonial society. It produced an autonomous individual, one who emerged as 'a negation of the world of custom where “each person sees himself as a barely differentiated part of a larger natural and social whole”' (p.139). Far from being free from the law, individual subjectivity is constituted by the law; the universal legal subject is conceived as white, male, Christian and...
capitalist and those who do not conform to stereotype are denied admittance to law's empire. Consequently, 'the abstract legal subject is free and equal with all other legal subjects, liberated from all substantive ties and immune from all determination not of itself' (p.136). The effect of such a regime, in which law played an important ideological role in addition to its capacity to coerce, was the destruction of traditional moral and ethnical codes and forms of social regulation. And, where the maintenance of non-capitalist relations was necessary to subsidise the capital exploitation through the articulation of different modes of production, the law supplied the means for creating customary law, a deformed European construction that served colonial interests. This modern autonomous, universal law tore asunder local ties of kinship, property and community.

In order to establish its mythical nature, Fitzpatrick confronts the 'myth of law's transcendence', the idea so prevalent in Western societies that law is 'like a god, at least one of a Christian persuasion, [that it] operates in a social world yet exists separate from and dominant over it' (p.9). On this basis he demonstrates how 'modern secular law takes identity in the rejection of transcendence' and that it therefore 'emerges, in a negative exaltation, as universal in relation to the particular, as unified in opposition to the diverse, as omniscient in contrast to the incompetent, and as controlling of what has to be controlled' (p.10).

What better tool could be employed by the colonialist, both practically and ideologically, against that savage, uncivilised 'other' whose exploitation and repression must be rationalised as a failure to conform?

In fact, 'Myth's basic function, in its European conception, is the conferring of identity on a people' (p.65). In order to reveal the myriad ways in which law has facilitated colonialism, Fitzpatrick paradoxically engages in what he calls 'an attempt at internal decolonization' (p.13) in which he seeks to overturn the widespread perception of law as a neutral, impartial, rational means of promoting equality.

He shows that Max Weber's argument that formal legal rationality is the result of modernity is as mythical as those forms of social control that modern secular law sought to replace. To this end he engages in an extended discussion of myth and modernity in order to demonstrate that myth is 'modernity's pre-creation. Just as chaos is the pre-creation and antithesis of myth, so myth precedes and is negated by modernity. Modernity is what myth is not' (p.28).

The fatal consequence is that 'denigratfed myth becomes the obverse of a Western world' (p.29) and that Western identity is constantly recreated and sustained in opposition to certain 'others' who persist as embodiments of contrary worlds that have gone before (p.30) and are therefore backward.

Ultimately, then, 'Enlightenment creates the very monsters against which it so assiduously sets itself' (p.45). It was modernist rationality, springing from the Enlightenment, that was found to be so compatible with the heyday of slavery in the eighteenth century, for example, so that:

**With its expansive claim to exclusive rationality, with its arrogation of a universal and uniform knowledge of the world, and with its affirmation of universal freedom and equality, the Enlightenment sets a fateful dimension. Being of humanity and being unfree were incompatible. The all-too-obvious contradiction between Enlightenment thought and practice is mythically resolved by the invention of racism (p.65).**

In the work of the social contract theorists and others, like John Austin, law becomes associated in modernity with order, and particularly with prop-
erty. ‘The colonial situation provides a monumental instance of law initiating and sustaining pervasive disorder even in the pursuit of its pretence to secure order... [yet] law remains mythically inviolable in its intrinsic equation with order’ (p.81). Fitzpatrick’s analysis of the mythology of modern law is a prelude to his examination of H L A Hart’s *The Concept of Law*, a positivist work of overwhelming influence in the English-speaking world. Hart distinguished between an internal aspect of law that led citizens to adopt a critical and self-reflective approach to legal rules, and an external or empirical aspect which enables the observer to identify social rules. The internalisation of legal rules leads to their acceptance as guides to conduct and hence to the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole. The aim, the Holy Grail of jurisprudence, is to reconcile the autonomy of law with social participation, the idea that law transcends society in which it originates. How Fitzpatrick asks, can law ‘sustain these deific qualities whilst rejecting transcendence?’ (p.10). The answer, of course, is that it cannot.

Law’s autonomy, so crucial to the Western conception, is itself no more than myth. The upshot of the internal aspect of law that Hart discerns from the use of rules is associated with the development of (Western) civilisation, to which law is argued to be intrinsic. ‘Law has its origins in the negation of the state of nature, its elements being a response to the inadequacies of that state’ (p.195). The crucial point is that law’s identification of itself as universal, neutral and impartial is merely a smokescreen for a ‘peculiar “western cosmology”’ (p.197). By placing Hart’s concept of law within the European mythology of origin Fitzpatrick is able to:

explain the silent oppression of linguistic philosophy along with the popular creation of meaning. All the inhabitants of the primal scene, from the savages of North America to the colonized of Africa, shared a convenient characteristic which prevented their contributing to linguistic use: they could not speak and thus had to be spoken for. In the imperial mentality which informs Hart’s account and its sources, true knowledge is brought by the European to the mute and inglorious savages (p.202).

The universal certainty and autonomy which this makes possible manifests itself in law, a system of thought that brooks no ‘other’ alternative. It is a form of rationality that, like the natural science which legal positivism sought to emulate, originates in the myth that modern technical, formal rational can render nature controllable and thereby liberate humanity. Unlike Marxism, whose decline coincided with the realisation of this contradiction, law is still a central aspect of contemporary life. The conclusion then is not that we should reject law *tout court* as a form of cultural imperialism, but that we must be aware of law’s pretensions to anything other than a limited, contradictory modernist discourse. Only by understanding the role of law in colonialism can we begin to seek forms of social organisation more appropriate to the history, culture and development of African societies.

As ever, Fitzpatrick’s work reveals great erudition, the result of extensive reading. *The Mythology of Modern Law* is an imaginative and important work that is like an iceberg in that what is visible suggests so much more that is not. This, however, may be the cause of the major difficulty with the book, namely that the sheer condensation of knowledge that has gone into its construction sometimes makes it difficult to penetrate. Nevertheless, the book is a significant contribution to our understanding of both law and colonialism, and should be required reading for anyone concerned with the protection of rights and the establishment of democracy in the developing world.
This is a summary report of three workshops held between January and March 1992 in Benin, Ethiopia and Namibia, organised by the National Research Council, on behalf of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The stated purpose of the workshops was to obtain the views of African Scholars and political activists on democratisation in Africa and how USAID might best support that process, with invited participants from over 40 African countries.

Sahr Kpundeh has had the unenviable task of editing a huge volume of contributions covering a range of issues and experiences from different regions. He has produced an organised and coherent synthesis of the three workshops, covering the main points of consensus as well as dissenting views. There are extensive quotes from individual participants but without identifying speakers (so as not to imperil personal safety).

A similar agenda at each workshop examined historical and contemporary issues of democratisation in Africa and possible future scenarios. Reflections on the past raised questions about the democratic nature of pre-colonial traditional societies, democratic values in the nationalist politics opposing colonialism, and the anti-democratic values and institutions led assertion of early African democratic values and institutions led to the view that democracy is not the exclusive property of the West and that Africa has to define democracy in its own way.

Discussions about the recent wave of democratisation in Africa examined different models of transition, focusing particularly on the role of National Conferences, most common in Francophone countries. Present challenges to democratic transition were considered, including the cult of personality, winner-takes-all practices, the role of the military, ethnicity and gender inequalities.

The question of ethnicity received considerable attention and was the most contentious issue in all three workshops. There were a range of views regarding the priority given to the recognition, and in some cases, active promotion of ethnic identity, and its impact on the democratisation process. Some participants saw recognition of ethnic diversity as a strength and an opportunity to solidify civil society. Others argued against the promotion of ethnic identities because they were seen as an obstacle to democratisation: ethnic differences needed to be resolved through negotiation. Clearly this is a vital area of debate. While it is important to recognise the diversity of ethnic and cultural identities and to move the equality of opportunity, it is dangerous to engage in their active promotion. Federalism or regional autonomy was discussed as a mechanism to manage ethnic conflict, though with fears expressed that it could lead to disintegration as in the former Yugoslavia and parts of the former Soviet Union. The current situation in Bosnia could not emphasise more the importance of giving sustained attention to issues of ethnic divisions and the urgency of finding appropriate means of resolving actual or potential ethnic conflict. Unsurprisingly, however, the workshops provided only limited practical suggestions of such measures, perhaps because of the subject's contentious nature.

Another area focused on was governance. Although the term was not defined by the workshops, the usual elements of 'good governance' included in donor rhetoric were discussed: popu-
lar participation; accountability and transparency; corruption; freedom of information. Desirable as such reforms may be, they remained vague statements with little analysis of how situations of 'bad' governance arose and how they can be changed. However, one refreshing contribution noted the need for donors to apply governance reforms to themselves. This addresses in particular the lack of accountability of the IMF and the World Bank, and calls for greater transparency both in their policy-making process and in dialogue and agreements reached with African governments.

Other interesting but unreferenced comments on governance concerned British government ministers. First, on the question of public monies illegally appropriated by African officials and deposited in Western banks, a Zambian participant said that Prime minister John Major had stated that such public funds deposited in the UK would be returned (p.39). Second, with regard to Kenya, inconsistency in application of 'good government' policies by the British was pointed out by participants: despite an initial reluctance to yield to demands for multi-party politics, President Moi had been defended by both Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd and Minister for Overseas Development Lynda Chalker as having a good human rights record (p.37).

Looking ahead to the prospects for democratic consolidation, the workshops focused on institution building. They discussed a range of political and other institutions associated with democratic society: the separation of powers, with an independent legislature and judiciary holding the executive to account; and independent press; an efficient civil service. However the key institutions for sustaining democracy were seen as constitutions, the military, independent commissions and a transnational democratic centre. The latter initiative was a concrete outcome of the workshops, aimed at facilitating a pan-African network and serving domestic groups. A provisional secretariat has been set up in Lesotho. It was thought that an important feature of new constitutions should be to enshrine human rights as well as the rule of law, e.g. rights to dissent and demonstrate.

The necessity of redefining the role of the military was evident in the discussions about the feasibility of democracy, but the question remained how. Various strategies were discussed to reduce its size and role, and donor responsibility in dealing with the military was also noted. However no mention was made of the lucrative Western arms business and the necessity of Northern governments' intervention to restrict this aspect of free trade.

Finally, with regard to the role of donors in the democratisation process, there appeared to be a healthy caution and some cynicism about the sincerity of donors' conversion to democratisation and human rights. Equally healthy was the recognition that democracy can only come from the inside and what external actors can and should do is limited. Nevertheless a list of suggestions was drawn up where donors could assist both political change and institutional change. The former included help with removing dictators (!), reducing military assistance and promoting civic groups. The latter included help with, first, constitutions and constitutional engineering and, second 'critical national institutions' for consolidating democracy, defined as the press, civil service and electoral systems.

The recognition that donors will continue to condition aid on economic and political reforms, did not prevent some participants from setting conditions for the donors themselves. If they are help-
ing to create democracy, they 'must then be prepared to respect it' (p.78). The interests of African peoples, potentially expressed by a democratic government, and those of external powers will not necessarily coincide, but 'external powers have a minimal obligation not to destabilise them, and a broader obligation to help democratic governments achieve the popular aspirations' (p.78). Let's hope the sponsors and other donors internalise this message.

Current democratisation movements are supported by radicals and conservatives alike, resulting in what one participant called the bedfellows of progressive African forces and the aid donors. However, different actors have different agendas and perhaps what is most significant about the agenda for these three workshops is what was omitted from their discussions.

Three sets of questions come to mind. First, the healthy scepticism about donors conversion to promoting democracy does not extend to an analysis of why this shift has occurred. What are the motives of the donors and their underlying assumptions? What are the links between economic and political reform? Is democratisation seen as providing improved political conditions for implementation of structural adjustment programmes? Are political reforms merely a means to the end of economic reform? If so, what happens to 'support for democratisation' if there arises a contradiction between democracy and economic liberalisation, e.g. authoritarian measures taken to implement World Bank/IMF market reforms? Further, is there a contradiction between the role of the IMF and World Bank in restricting the space for economic policy choice and democratic decision-making?

Second, the understandable assumption of workshop participants was the desirability of democracy. However, there seems to have been little discussion of, or attempts to define, different forms of democracy. Even if we assume the aim of liberal democracy, there are different versions. Contradictions could arise between forms of democracy stressed by the donors, emphasising a more limited role for the state, providing an 'enabling environment' for local capital and foreign investment, and a version based more on popular participation, a lively civil society and pluralistic debate and policy decision-making?

Third, a further assumption, and less understandable, seems to be that problems of underdevelopment are the consequence of incompetent and corrupt regimes, of the 'bad' government of different authoritarian regimes, and that democratisation is the key the development problems of Africa. Structures of inequality and injustice, both at global and national levels, were largely ignored. Principles of democracy and human rights may create equality before the law, but as Robert Archer (1993) points out, some (citizens) are more able to influence political decisions or defend their rights (p.17), and identifies several poles of inequalities. Democratisation provides the potential to challenge and change social and economic relations and structures. Yet without links to these processes, views and voices on democratisation may merely focus on what is desirable, and lack an historical analysis of existing reality and patterns of change, of both prospects for and constraints on democratic development, based on the interaction of social, economic and political forces in society.

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Reference