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Central to this issue are problems of the class analysis of under-developed African societies, in particular the nature and relationship of Africa's exploited classes. Material is drawn for the most part from Tanzania, Senegal and Ghana, and also, more briefly, from Kenya, Zambia and Ethiopia, but the specific area instances are secondary to the general analytical issues to which they direct attention.

It must be conceded that the analysis of class relations in Africa remains under-developed. Governments and politicians, bureaucrats and academics have officially declared African societies to be classless. Class analysis has been deemed by them inappropriate. More than that, it has been seen as divisive. African socialism promised to maintain or restore the supposed classless society of the pre-colonial past. Since there were neither exploiters nor exploited classes, nor any fundamental cleavages in society other than those artificially created by alien and subversive groups, African regimes could thus legitimate themselves as representative of the needs of all the people, and they could suppress those who questioned the united purposes of the 'nation'. Like African socialism, development under the direction of the state, was to be above class. Meanwhile, capitalist exploitation of African societies continued, often with little or no hindrance from African regimes. Indigenous classes acquired a share of the profits of capitalism and consolidated their commitment to it. Socialism came to mean little more than an active role for the state in subsidising private enterprise and sharing the booty extracted from the producers.

Under the cover of offering an authentic, African solution, the ideology of African socialism was used to put the study of Marxist method beyond bounds. Conventional social science teaching supported this. Economists denied the political implications of what
they were doing. Political scientists identified conflicts and cleavages among parties, factions and individuals, but kept them separate from any analysis of the class relations. Sociologists emasculated the concept of class by assimilating it to the study of stratification. Populations were surveyed and ranked according to their access to opportunities and rewards, and interviewed about the ways in which they judged one another's status. Classes became classifying categories, separated from the relations of production and exploitation which constituted them. In all these cases, it was declared that empirical evidence and the resources of science had shown that if class was important elsewhere, it was not, at least as yet, important in Africa.

All too often, Marxist analyses, in attempting to correct these tendencies, mechanically transposed to African societies schema of the class relations characteristic of Western capitalism, and its development from European feudalism. These Marxists tended to proceed by assertion, from some inexorable historical precedent, rather than through the analysis of African societies and their relations to the rest of the world. Marxist analysis cannot proceed from textbook definitions of classes removed from their history and their society. It is not a matter of a theory or a model claiming universal validity. Marxist analysis requires examination and analysis of the material conditions which determine the possibilities for and obstacles to revolutionary action by the exploited classes. It demands a political analysis, in terms of class struggle, of the steps necessary to fashion the conditions under which a class, in alliance with other classes, can transform its own situation and end its exploitation. It is not a matter of disputing, say, the relative revolutionary capacity of workers as against peasants in the abstract, but of examining the relations of workers and peasants to their exploiters and to one another, in order to identify the conditions under which the struggles of the exploited classes may converge in opposition to the entire system of exploitation.

Class and Production
Marx begins to discuss a formal definition of the term class in the final chapter of Volume 3 of Capital, though the manuscript breaks off before the discussion is complete. But by then he had demonstrated the continual tendency and law of development of the capitalist mode of production. Thus though the discussion of class as a concept is not dealt with in Capital exhaustively and explicitly, and the method needs to be reconstructed from Marx's analysis of specific situations, in their context, it is clear that an adequate analysis of class requires initially an analysis of production. Marx writes: 'What constitutes a class?' and the reply to this follows naturally from the reply to another question, namely: 'What makes wage-labourers, capitalists and landlords constitute the three great social classes?' Under capitalism the tendency 'is more and more to divorce the means of production from labour, and more and more to concentrate the scattered means of production into large groups, thereby transforming labour into wage labour and the means of production into capital. And to this tendency, on the other hand, corresponds the independent separation of landed property into the form of landed property corresponding to the capitalist mode of production.' In other words, the starting point in the question of
which classes exist, if any, turns on an analysis of a specific mode of production at a given time.

All too often Marx's work has been used as the basis for an economistic conception of social class which has located class at the level of relations of production only. This has been done in a way which has reduced social relations of production to the ownership or non-ownership of the means of production. There are severe limitations to this method. In the first instance, there are bases of exploitation other than direct and private ownership of the means of production which involve exploitation of labour, and too economistic an interpretation of these will obscure the forms of exploitation. Furthermore, ownership is intended in any case to convey the idea of a social relationship. That includes not only the control and appropriation of the surplus by one social group from another, but such political, ideological, legal and other forms that accompany them. Thus relations of production are never simply 'economic relations'.

The wage relationship under capitalism depends on the existence of institutions such as private property and contract, on a legal apparatus for defining these institutions, on police and armies for enforcing them, and on religious and political ideas which sanction them, and which justify the inequality and exploitation which is part and parcel of capitalist society.

The starting point of class analysis is that it must be related to a given mode of production and an historically determined social formation. This means that it is essential to consider social classes in a specific society or social formation at a distinct juncture in time. Marx, as mentioned earlier, took up the concept of class only after he had analysed the process of the production of capital and its circulation (volumes 1 and 2 of Capital). The concept of classes under capitalism thus arose theoretically on the level of the concrete analysis of a specific mode of production, namely capitalism.

Capitalist relations of production were imposed on Europe, and on the rest of the world, by a long process of violent struggle. Peasants were excluded from their rights in land, beggars and vagabonds rounded up and forced into wage labour. Craftsmen and traders were subjected to the domination of merchants and in this way displaced to leave the road clear for capitalist manufacturers. Capitalism united the peoples of the world in subjecting them all to its own requirements. The nature of these requirements varied from one place to another. Colonies were plundered by soldiers and traders. Colonial people were enslaved and indentured, and transported to work on the plantations and in the mines required for the development of capitalism. Thus capitalism developed in some cases by eliminating non-capitalist forms of production, in other cases by adapting them to the requirements of capitalism, and in yet others by developing new forms of production to serve its needs.

Any real society, capitalism included, consists of more than one mode of production. There are co-existing and overlapping modes, though one is dominant. It therefore presents more classes than any 'pure' mode of production. Examined abstractly the capitalist mode proper
involved two classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. These are the fundamental classes, of the dominant mode of production. But since a concrete society is composed of various modes of production, the social formation includes more than two classes. Marx wrote of England that it was indisputably more highly and classically developed in capitalist economic structure. Nevertheless even here the stratification of classes does not appear in its pure form. Middle and intermediate strata even here obliterate lines of demarcation... This co-existence of modes of production is all the more central for our analysis because of the way in which capitalism penetrated Africa. Class analysis for an African society must therefore proceed from the identification and analysis of the co-existing modes of production, and from an investigation of the process of interaction or articulation between the modes. This will require an analysis of the relations of all classes in a specific formation.

Co-existing Modes of Production

This is the analytical framework within which the article by LeBrun and Gerry* describes a study in progress on the nature of the urban working class in Senegal. To analyse the condition of labour they found it indispensable to examine processes and relations of production which characterise not only the capitalist mode of production in Senegal, but also subordinate forms of production existing at the margin of the capitalist mode. In countries of developed capitalism petty commodity production has largely disappeared or is residual. In countries of under-developed capitalism, the capitalist mode leaves the production of numerous commodities to the petty commodity sector. This is because they are essentially unprofitable for the capitalist mode which is oriented either to production for export, or to production of commodities for consumption by the favoured strata of the population who have adopted western consumption standards. It is this latter production which, in part, maintains the local ruling classes who in their turn favour the continued penetration and domination of foreign capital. Industrial capital, using capital intensive methods of production, employs only a small proportion of the urban population. Since capitalist industry is export-oriented it is little concerned with the purchasing power of the internal Senegalese market. In this situation the capitalist mode profits in numerous ways from the prolongation of petty production. It is that sector in turn which produces cheap mass consumption goods for wage-earners. This in turn, helps to maintain low wage rates and a system of cheap and casual labour.

An analysis of class formation and class consciousness must accordingly proceed from the impact of these co-existing modes of production on one another. Some petty producers emerge as small capitalists, though often only with the help of the state. Others are proletarianised, but only intermittently, as casual and unstable

*Importantly, this article draws on writing by Marx on petty commodity production and the transition of small commodity to capitalist production, which is as yet almost unknown in English. This is the unpublished chapter of Capital which became available in German in 1933, has since been translated into French and Italian, but is as yet unavailable in English.
labour, since the strategy of industrial capital affects the rate of industrial employment and the rate of formation of a proletariat. Workers only intermittently proletarianised have one foot in the capitalist mode and the other in petty production; their class consciousness and action will in part be a reflection of this.

The importance of this account is not only that it proposes to analyse class from an articulation of the co-existing modes of production, but that this analysis is situated within an analysis of the relations of an African economy with international capitalism. This is likewise the thrust of Shivji's article on the differentiation of the peasantry and worker-peasant class alliance. Classes and their formation are inseparable from the system of production in which they exist, but the system of social production is itself historically determined. The distinct class features of African societies are the consequence of the forms of capitalism induced in these countries. Shivji argues that in matters of class, of social differentiation, in the society at large and in the countryside, the emergence there of capitalist relations, and their extent and form, must be related both to the domestic class structure and to the international class structure, and thus to each of these respective systems of production but especially their inter-relationship. There is a global class structure to be taken into account in analysing the nature of classes in power, and the nature of the exploited classes. There are crucial distinctions to be made between the 'classic' form of capitalism that developed in Western Europe, and the forms of capitalism which imperialism imposed on the underdeveloped periphery of the world economy. The social formations of under-developed capitalism are a consequence both of Africa's pre-capitalist history and of the impact of external forces which distorted the development of the forces and relations of production.

Perhaps the most familiar aspect of the class formation of societies subjugated by imperialism has been the absence of an African bourgeoisie: a class which like its European counterpart could manage through plunder and mercantile activities to channel itself into industrial capital. Any process towards the development of 'national' capitalism was arrested by these countries coming into contact with advanced capitalism. An attempt has been made in certain of the literature to maintain a distinction between a national and a comprador bourgeoisie, a national bourgeoisie being that faction of the bourgeoisie whose interests are linked with the nation's economic development, and which thus comes into contradiction with the interests of big foreign capital; and the comprador bourgeoisie being that faction of the capitalist class whose interests are linked to foreign imperialist capital. The distinction is irrelevant in a period marked by increasing interpenetration and internationalism of capital and consequently, of mutually dependent capitals. A consequence of the failure of an independent African bourgeoisie to develop is that propertied and exploiting classes go in search of some accommodation with foreign capital precisely because they are unable to compete with it. The Kenya variation of this phenomenon is described in Colin Leys' Underdevelopment in Kenya, reviewed in this issue by Geoff Lamb.
Underdeveloped capitalism has important repercussions for the nature of the exploited classes. In the same way that it does not only dissolve but serves to conserve petty commodity production in the urban areas, underdeveloped capitalism preserves non-capitalist modes of production in the countryside. Lenin wrote about the development of capitalism in Russia, that merchant capital—distinct from industrial capital—was not a sufficient premise for the rise of capitalist production, since it 'did not always break up old modes of production and replace it by the capitalist mode.' The formation of the latter depended entirely on the stage of historical development and the attendant circumstances. As Shivji argues, capitalist development has meant the conservation of old forms to serve new ends. Capitalism in its underdeveloped forms does not destroy pre-capitalist relations and set in motion an unprecedented development of productive forces. On the contrary, the old modes have been co-opted to serve new ends. Peasants continue to produce under non-capitalist modes even as they are co-opted into the international economy.

It is thus crucial to analyse the countryside not only to detect domestic exploiting classes, but also the ways in which the African peasant is exploited by external dominant classes, and through what kinds of market and state mechanisms. Shivji has recounted in an early version of his *Silent Class Struggle* how he has fought a prolonged battle with those who see the capitalist class in the Tanzanian countryside in the shape of a 'handful of farmers owning two landrovers and a tractor', when the fundamental contradiction in Tanzanian society is not to be found within the rural peasantry, but in the relation of the economy with international capital. An investigation of the forms of exploitation of the peasantry will reveal how domestic classes, perhaps through their control of the state and state-marketing, share in the appropriation of the surplus. Contradictions between rural producers and the state and its marketing system could be more central than those within the countryside itself, between rich and poor producer; but the prime contradiction of them all could be with the international bourgeoisie, through the system of unequal exchange.

This issue also carries an article which takes issue with the labour aristocracy thesis argued for Africa some years ago by Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul in a valuable book of *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa*. As he made clear in a conference paper, John Saul has thought better in the intervening period of the use of the labour aristocracy concept. In part this is due to the problem of maintaining the empirical distinction between two projected poles of the working class: one only partly proletarianised and close to the peasantry in that the bulk of their subsistence is arrived at from outside the wage economy; and the other as an upper stratum which forms part of an elite or sub-elite. Additionally there is the problem that the so-called co-optation of the more established sections of the working class would be rendered difficult if not impossible by the limited capacity of the neo-colonial economic system to deliver the necessary pay-offs. Jeffries shows from a study of a section of Ghana's working class, that there has been a considerable over-
estimation of the gap between the living standards of organised urban workers and the peasants, and at the same time a gross under-
estimation of the gap between the workers and members of the political class and the bureaucracy. He argues, as has related material on Nigeria, that far from the working class identifying with any ruling group interests, it tends to act as the catalyst for the expression of popular grievances against the ruling interests. But while African workers like any others have shown a capacity for militant action in defence of their economic and political demands, militancy falls short of revolutionary practice. The overthrow of a system of exploitation requires the convergence of the specific struggles of particular exploited classes. Once a social formation is understood and treated as the scene of more than a single mode of production, the possibilities for the convergence of the separate and combined struggles of the exploited classes against their exploiters can be understood and seized.

Class and Development
Finally, it is our contention not only that class analysis is indispensable for understanding the present condition of the continent, but that 'development' strategies themselves have an essential class content. For the perpetuation of underdevelopment—the distinctive form of capitalism experienced by countries subjected to domination by foreign capital—requires the presence of domestic classes whose interests converge with those of foreign capital and will enforce their political dominance. Government structures and policies accordingly reflect the interests, needs and preferences of the groups which control decisions about the shape and direction of the economy, and which subordinate the interests of other groups to their own. On the one hand, as most generally in Africa, the nexus between government and foreign capital can be extremely close, guarded by the interests of a ruling class which uses state protection to entrench itself as an enthusiastic auxiliary of foreign capital. On the other hand a government, as in Tanzania, may initiate policies intended to diminish the foreign stake and to constrain the growth of those domestic forces concerned to perpetuate that relationship. However exceptional and assertive this policy, the critical factor, in Tanzania, as elsewhere, remains the nature of the class or classes in power.

In Tanzania the Ujamaa policy was projected as a strategy for the development of agriculture which would prevent the emergence of a class of capitalist exploiters in the countryside, and would be part of the overall social transformation of the economy. Such a transformation would require the construction of an integrated industrial base capable of producing the capital goods needed for production to meet the consumption needs of the mass of the people, and capable of generating appropriate skills and technology. Samir Amin's article in RAPE 1 described the requirements of self-centred development which establishes the dominance of production for mass needs, and the importance of the building of political consciousness to carry through this process. Our scrutiny of the workings of the Ujamaa policy to date shows that the production role of Ujamaa villages has not been conceived as part of an integrated strategy striking at the roots of the dependent export crop economy. Furthermore, that
while the pre-requisite of an integrated economic plan to meet the needs of the mass of the people requires the control of that economy by the masses—for only then will resource use, planning and investment be switched to these goals—the method of implementation of the Ujamaa policy is in danger of building up considerable rural opposition. Productivity for independent and self-centred growth can be released only where the mass of people are willing to mobilise themselves, and this they will be willing to do only within non-exploitative forms of social organisation. We argue that bureaucratic enforcement will act as a barrier to the release of peoples' productive abilities and people will not plan and manage or participate in development where bureaucratic controls and bureaucratic interests dominate the lives and work of workers and peasants.

We focus attention on this question with detailed reports from and about Tanzania, because it appears to us that a critical juncture has been reached in that country's struggles. Tanzania remains one of the few countries on the continent where an alternative was conceived to the neo-colonial condition, where the possibility of transforming the economy in the countryside, and from below, was not only asserted by radicals but confirmed in official policy documents, but where the outcome appears to hang in the balance, and will be decided in the course of struggle between contesting class forces.

The material about Tanzania is carefully documented and probably the most revealing of any published about recent developments in that country. Not that the analysis of class forces contesting for dominance is complete or uncontroversial. As Raikes points out, while Tanzania, like all states in Africa, is a class society and the ruling ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ entrenches itself more deeply with every passing year, the analysis of this class, the nature of the state, and of the relationship of domestic ruling classes with exploiting classes outside the continent, is as yet only partial. The term bureaucratic bourgeoisie has been used to describe the situation in which there is present, as in Tanzania, a weak petty-bourgeoisie whose ruling sections come to possess the instruments of the state, through which they wield economic power. The control of the state becomes the single decisive factor, hence the identification of the group as a bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Raikes suggests that insufficient attention has been paid to the specifics of a bureaucratic ruling class, and the differences in its aims and modes of operation from those of a capitalist bourgeoisie operating in a market economy with the assistance of a bureaucracy that is subordinate. Subsequent issues of the Review will explore these issues in examining the nature of class conflict and of the state in Africa.

Bibliographic Note
In Marx's *Capital*, especially Chapter 6 of volume 1 on Wage Labour and Capital and the final chapter of volume 3 will be found some of the elements necessary for constructing the concept of class. Marx's political writing like *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* and *Class Struggles in France* are important for the handling of capitalist social formations in their historical context, and Marx's use of the concepts of class struggle and class. For Lenin's description of social classes as historically determined see *Selected Works*, volume 3, page 248 especially, Lenin's *Development of Capitalism in Russia*, especially chapter 3, discusses the transition to capitalist social relations on the

UNIVERSITY OF ZAMBIA, LUSAKA: POSTS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

A new degree programme in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences is in its first year of implementation. Among the innovations being introduced are: a basic interdisciplinary 'Social Science Foundation' course for all first year students; a second year set of interdisciplinary courses on the political economy of the developed world, of Africa and the underdeveloped areas, and of Zambia. These provide the grounding for programmes in the third and fourth years which combine interdisciplinary courses with specialisation in fields of study such as industry, rural development, and management, rather than in the traditional academic disciplines. Vacancies at levels from Assistant Lecturer (starting at Kwacha (K)3200) to Professor or Reader (K 6800 upwards) exist in the fields of Economics and Business, Sociology, Political and Administrative Studies, and Psychology. But applications are urgently sought not just from specialists in these fields with knowledge or interest in Africa, but also from the growing number of scholars working in an interdisciplinary way on issues of development and change.

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Peasants and Class Alliances

Issa Shivji

The conditions under which capitalism has penetrated African countries have not produced the kind of capitalist development that occurred in Europe. It is out of this recognition that an analysis must be undertaken of the process of differentiation of the peasantry. While some ranks of the peasantry protect their interests by fraternising with the bureaucracy, the poor peasantry is exploited by both internal and external dominating classes. The concept of the worker-peasant alliance thus grows from an analysis of both the working class and poor peasantry in relation to other classes, from their role in social production, and their objective interests in conflict with imperialism and its local class allies. At the same time class struggle and class alliance require indispensably a political ideology and political organisation based on proletarian class consciousness.

The introduction of cash crops to the Tanganyikan economy by colonialism set into motion the process of differentiation within the peasantry. While it is true that commercial agriculture for a territorial or international market offered new opportunities for inequality within African societies, it must be remembered that commodity-production although a necessary condition for, is not in itself, the distinguishing feature of capitalist relations. As Bettelheim argues one must always investigate the class relations behind the market-forms or plan-forms to determine the nature of systems. The commercial agriculture that was initiated and developed during colonialism (and even after independence) was part of the process of integration of the colonial economy into the metropolitan capitalist structures. In this fundamental respect the development of agrarian capitalism in Tanganyika has to be distinguished from the kind of capitalist development in the European countries that Marx described. This was
not that youthful capitalism all out to destroy the pre-capitalist relations and to set into motion an unprecedented development of the productive forces. It cannot be compared even to the development of agrarian capitalism in Russia that Lenin welcomed. Both the internal structures of Russia and the international capitalist structures of that time are qualitatively different from what one finds in the under-developed countries today. In this regard, Marjorie Mbilinyi appears to accept too enthusiastically not only Lenin's method (which is a legitimate exercise) but even his conclusions about the progressive nature of agrarian capitalism in Tanzania. She argues

Capitalist development means the breaking down of traditional pre-capitalist relations of production and modes of production—is that a bad thing? Most affirmatively, no.

And in a footnote on commodity-exchange she says,

I would argue, however, that the development of commodity-exchange is a necessary step, on whatever basis, in the transformation of pre-capitalist production systems into capitalist or socialist ones.

The problem with these statements is that they are 'lifted' above the very process of history and the stage of development of particular societies and turned into universal (ahistorical) truths: something which would have never occurred to either Marx or Lenin. As Lenin (1916) once put it: 'The whole spirit of Marxism, its whole system, demands that each proposition should be considered (a) only historically, (b) only in connection with others, (c) only in connection with the concrete experience of history.'

Taken historically the development of capitalism and widespread commodity-exchange in the now developed capitalist countries was no doubt progressive both as opposed to the previous mode (feudalism) and because it revolutionised the very process of production thereby enabling the development of the productive forces by leaps and bounds. By an increase in the overall productivity it freed the labour from land to work in the factories: it proletarianised the peasantry. But this was (and is) precisely not the case in Africa because of the very historical situation under which capitalism came to Africa and the nature of its contemporary relations with the developed capitalist countries.

Underdeveloped Capitalism
In many African and other 'third world' countries the so-called capitalist development has in fact meant the conservation of the old forms—in some cases feudal and semi-feudal—to serve the new ends. In a number of them, agrarian capitalism has in fact failed to 'free' labour from land in the classical sense, to any appreciable extent: rather it has resulted in greater pressures on land and disguised unemployment and underemployment. The following description by Sweezy still remains largely true:

Under the domination of imperialism, industrialisation advances very slowly, too slowly to absorb the steady flow of handicraft producers who are ruined by the competition of machine-made products from the factories of the
advanced regions. The consequence is the swelling of the ranks of the peasantry, increased pressure on the land and the deterioration of the productivity and living standards of the agricultural masses who constitute by far the largest section of the colonial populations. Imperialism thus creates economic problems in the colonies which it is unable to solve.

In hardly any of the black African countries has a genuine independent rural bourgeoisie developed, certainly not in Tanzania. In fact Mbilinyi herself notes elsewhere in her paper that unlike Lenin's rural bourgeoisie who managed to 'accumulate both merchant and industrial capital and where owners of large factories and large commercial enterprises' the so-called Tanzanian 'rural bourgeoisie' are 'more likely to invest in trade or shops or buses.'

The accumulation of capital as commercial capital is in fact the distinguishing characteristic of many underdeveloped economies, and brings out the basic dependent nature of an underdeveloped bourgeoisie. The externally-oriented, commercial economy acts like a 'sucking pump' for all capital, in whatever sector it may originate. In Tanzania, petty trade, transport, shops and real estate, are the economic activities that the rich peasants immediately enter into as soon as they have made some cash in the agricultural activity. On the other hand, the national bourgeoisies in the developed countries played a crucial role in the development of capitalism there. This is precisely what is absent in many underdeveloped countries.

In short, therefore, the progressive effects of the development of capitalist relations cannot simply be transposed from the developed capitalist societies to the underdeveloped ones. Colonial (and now neo-colonial) capitalism in Africa had all the 'evils' but hardly any 'benefits' of capitalist development. Paul Baran has put this succinctly:

Thus in most underdeveloped countries capitalism had a peculiarly twisted career. Having lived through all the pains and frustrations of childhood, it never experienced the vigour and exuberance of youth, and began displaying at an early age all the previous features of senility and decadence. To the dead weight of stagnation characteristic of pre-industrial society was added the entire restrictive impact of monopoly capitalism.

Similarly one has to analyse the effects of commodity-exchange in the context of a historically determined system of production. Thus whether or not the development of commodity-exchange is a 'necessary step... in the transformation of pre-capitalist production systems into capitalist or socialist ones' is a non-issue in this context. The truth is that the society that Mbilinyi is analysing is neither pre-capitalist, nor capitalist (developed) or socialist; nor is it being transformed from pre-capitalist to either capitalist or socialist. It is an underdeveloped capitalist society within the world capitalist system. The question therefore should be: what is the role of the development of commodity-exchange in this underdeveloped society.

Classes in Power
The consequence of the failure to frame the question in some such way is the failure to relate the whole question of rural differentiation
and the so-called emergence of capitalist relations to both the territorial and international class structure and the respective systems of production. This is quite common among many researchers of Ujamaa Vijijini in Tanzania. In some cases agrarian capitalism as such is held out as the enemy and the policy of Ujamaa is seen as a socialist attempt against it. In this type of analysis the failures of the ujamaa programme at the level of implementation become 'mistakes' or bureaucratic blunders rather than an integral part of the very system. Such analyses also fail to grasp the global class structure and the nature of the class in power. Worse still, in some cases it is taken for granted that by showing the presence of rich peasants (kulaks) in the village committees it is proved that they also control the state at the national level. But this may not necessarily be the case. The extent of links between the members of the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' and the kulaks and those sections within the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' which represent the interests of the kulaks is a matter of specific investigation and analysis. These interests may find greater or lesser expression in terms of national policies, depending on the stage of the general class struggle and the balance of forces among the various factions of the ruling class at a particular time. But these are concrete questions which have to be analysed in terms of the ongoing process of short term political developments.

All the recent studies show that the process of peasant differentiation has marched apace, the policy of ujamaa notwithstanding. In the most commercialised areas like Kilimanjaro there is even substantial landlessness. It is interesting to note that the recently taken-over farms in that area belonged almost exclusively to the white settlers and the majority of the farms were handed over to the co-operative societies virtually controlled by the African kulaks. The sisal estates around Geita and Morogoro which were taken over were all, except for two, handed over to the Tanzania Sisal Authority. Among the two exceptions, one was converted into an ujamaa village while the other was given to the University Faculty of Agriculture.

Given the official policy of ujamaa, it is not surprising that the interests of the kulaks do not find open recognition in the national policies; not even in terms of encouragement for the 'progressive farmers'. In practice, as Van Velsen has shown, the kulaks protect their interests by fraternising with the bureaucracy and controlling the local level organisations. But of course that does not make the exploitation and domination of the poor peasant less bad. He finds himself at the exploited and the oppressed end of both the internal and the external dominating classes. It is this objective situation that makes the African peasant potentially the most reliable ally of the working class in their struggle against the local dominating classes and imperialism. To quote Nga Tabiso:

... The African peasant does not exist in isolation: his mode of production is integrated in the world capitalist system. The African peasant who has undergone colonialism and now is part of the world capitalist system, is therefore, different from the classical peasant, though at the same time sharing many characteristics with the latter because of his mode of production. The classical small-owner was the predecessor of the capitalist: his aspirations were to become a capitalist and therefore he found himself the ally of the bourgeoisie.
In the African case, on the other hand, he is objectively exploited by the international bourgeoisie: this begets a limited solidarity among peasants. Therefore, the peasantry forms a reliable ally of the working class, albeit its mode of production does not allow it to seek for an alternative system, based on radically opposite relations of production. This is what limits the revolutionary potential of the peasantry, whose most radical ideology cannot transcend the bounds of populism based on private ownership: ('land to the tiller'). Hence, it cannot be a leading revolutionary force but only the main force in alliance with the working class, the only class which can fight for revolutionary goals.

That brings us to the question of the worker-peasant alliance.

The Worker-Peasant Alliance

The question of the Worker-Peasant alliance has been thoroughly misunderstood, distorted and misinterpreted by radical academic writers. Since it is a very important political question, some of those misconceptions starting with the 'labour aristocracy' theorists, have to be dealt with, however briefly.

The 'labour aristocracy' theorists who have argued that the peasantry rather than the working class in Africa constitute the revolutionary class have misconceived both the theory of labour aristocracy and the nature of the African working class. The revolutionary potential of the African working class is not based on their income but on the role they play in the process of production. In the neo-colonial situations in Africa, the working class not only plays an important role in the process of production but a very strategic one too, notwithstanding their small numbers. Even in the independence struggle the workers were in the forefront. Certainly since independence and particularly after the Mwongozo Declaration, the Tanzanian workers, for instance, have waged the most political struggles. There has been no example in Africa where the peasants have played a leading revolutionary role while the workers have sided with the dominating classes. It is a complete confusion therefore to identify the whole working class (as Arrighi does) as a labour aristocracy. In Arrighi's formulation even the 'elite and sub-elite', who should be included in the petty bourgeoisie, become part of the labour aristocracy.

Sender has put forward another novel argument to throw doubt on the possible worker-poor peasant alliance. This is to argue 'strong links between that minority of the Tanzanian population which has had access to wage employment and the proto-kulaks in the rural areas', thereby suggesting that the workers, who are supposed to be the ally of the poor peasants, are in fact linked with the peasants' exploiters, the kulaks. To avoid confusion it is necessary to distinguish between at least two types of 'links'. Firstly, there is the question of the historical link as a result of the origin of the kulak-capital, and secondly the question of the link because of the place occupied and the role the social groups play in the on-going systems of production.

Several Tanzanian studies definitely establish one thing: that the original capital for kulak-farming come largely from outside the agriculture sector, mostly petty trade, transport or wage employment. This is quite understandable. The structure of the colonial economy meant that substantial amounts of accumulated 'cash'
could only come from those sectors predominantly integrated in the cash economy—wage employment (in the plantations, mining, commerce) and trade being the more important ones. Secondly, (and this is a less important reason) large farmers or kulaks almost by definition would mean those producing for the market and in particular agricultural cash crops for export; coffee, cotton, tea and so on. But as Hill has argued, producing for the market necessitated a certain amount of innovation and understanding of the market-relations. This would readily come from 'three sorts of people in African society in the early twentieth century... its leaders, who often had greater political awareness and more knowledge of the outside world than most other members of society; those who have travelled widely as traders, migrant labourers, or in other capacities; and those who in one way or another had detached themselves partly from the society, perhaps through education or conversion to Christianity.'

The fact that wage-employment was one of the sources of kulak-capital does not therefore mean that in the existing system of production kulaks and workers have identical class interests. The argument is fallacious. The origin of developed capitalism, for example, lay in the small-commodity producer, the classical petty bourgeois. But this was precisely the class of people who were crushed and increasingly proletarianised by the development of capitalism. The fact that to-day's capitalist arose from the yesterday's petty bourgeois (so to speak) does not make him an ally of the to-day's proletarianised petty bourgeoisie. Nor does the fact that to-day's African bureaucrat can trace his class origin to yesterday's African peasant make him the poor, exploited peasant's bosom friend.

The second limb of the argument which asserts that 'in many cases' (Sender's phrase) the people in wage employment are also the so-called proto-kulaks is more serious. Here there are a number of questions at both the empirical and theoretical levels that have to be answered and clarified. Firstly, what is the extent of the wage-earners who are also kulaks, that is rich peasants employing labour? Secondly, what is their predominant activity—working for wages or as rich peasants employing labour? Thirdly, what is meant by wage-earners here: Are the salariat or the petty bourgeoisie included? Sender's formulations appear to suggest that this distinction between the bourgeoisie and the workers is not always maintained, and that can be very misleading. Again there is no satisfactory answer to the first question, phrases like 'in many cases', 'some proportion' (Mbilinyi) are not very useful. As for the second question it is not even posed.

More crucial than even the lack of adequate empirical data are the theoretical questions. Let us for instance look at this problem of 'overlap' between workers and kulaks that Mbilinyi mentions:

We are... led to the problem of class or stratum categorisation—is a blue collar semi-skilled worker who runs his farm on the basis of hired labour, all at the same point of time, a member of the proletariat or the rural bourgeoisie (assuming he is among the rich peasant strata at the rural location of his farm)?
The existence of such overlap is an indication of the degree of uneven development found in underdeveloped economies. It would appear to be crucial to understand the complexity of class and strata formation in Tanzania in order to act properly to arrest the development of capitalism and transform the economy along a socialist path. (My emphasis.)

Classes in Struggle

In a class society, classes are hardly ever very clearly demarcated and there are all sorts of what appear to be intermediate groups, and strata and even 'overlaps'. Rather than expect the classes to be clearly demarcated, the better way of looking at them would be in terms of the 'core' and 'fringes' of the various classes. However, it must be remembered that these overlaps are not the links between classes or 'bridges' giving identity of material interests to the two different classes. Identity of interests or contradiction arise from the role the 'cores' play in the production process and are part of the very system of production.

Thus when the contradictions between the large social groups (classes) become most intense and the class struggle is at its highest stage of open struggle for state power, these 'fringes' are forced to take political positions in favour of one or the other important classes which characterise the system as a whole. It is in fact the existence of these fringes and overlaps which petty bourgeois sociologists use to assert that there are no fundamental contradictions between the exploiting and the exploited classes and that there is merely a continuum or a continuous hierarchy of interests without any qualitative break. In the so-called 'peaceful' stages of the class struggle this type of views gain ascendancy but it is only a partial truth which becomes a complete lie in a revolutionary situation when the opposed classes are locked in fierce political battles.

As regards the specific question of the overlap between the workers and the rich peasants (and peasants generally) in Tanzania, one has to determine its extent so as to find out if this is merely a remnant of a dying tendency having historical roots, or is in fact a tendency which is reproduced by the very logic of the system. As is well known Tanzania had the system of migrant labour which was both produced and encouraged by colonialism in its own interests. Immediately after independence, various measures were effected to abolish the system of migrant labour. Nevertheless, one would expect that it lingers on to some extent. Freyhold's study appears to indicate that increasingly the trend is against migrant labour and towards the formation of a permanent proletariat. She argues that the 'workers are no longer migrants, that they are unlikely to leave their urban jobs to return temporarily or permanently to farming and that they do no longer rely on rural areas to supplement their incomes and feed their wives and children.' In the neo-colonial situations in Africa the migrants who move to town from the land, on failing to secure a job, join the 'lumpen-proletariat' rather than resuming their lives as poor peasants.

Finally, the most crucial and the central aspect (explicit or implied) of the arguments we have discussed above is its political conclusion. Both the 'labour aristocrats' and the 'kulak-worker-link' theorists are
challenging either the revolutionary potential of the African working class (proletarian messianism), or the possibility for worker-poor peasant alliance under the leadership of the proletarian ideology, or both. It is here that they completely fail to grasp the essentially political nature of both the class struggle and class alliances. In this respect, the analysis of the working class and the poor peasants in relation to other classes, the place they occupy and the role they play in the system of social production reveals that they objectively stand opposed to the interests of imperialism and its local class allies. This of course does not mean that either the workers or the poor peasants would simply spontaneously embrace each other. Such spontaneity has certainly nothing to do with the theories of Marxism-Leninism. It is here that the leadership of the proletarian ideology embodied in the proletarian party becomes most crucial and decisive. For the proletarian ideology does not exist in vacuum. It is the proletarian party which is the seat of the proletarian ideology. The proletarian party therefore is the very organiser and developer of the class instinct of the exploited classes into their class consciousness. It can therefore be seen that the leadership of the proletarian ideology is an indispensable factor in the political alliance of the workers and poor peasants.

Those who have attempted in practice to participate in the struggle have clearly found that the workers more than the peasants have been in the forefront providing leadership. Again Guine's example is most illustrative. Cabral sums up the Guine experience as follows:

Many people say that it is the peasants who carry the burden of exploitation: that is true, but so far as the struggle is concerned it must be realised that it is not the degree of suffering and hardship involved as such that matters: even extreme suffering in itself does not necessarily produce the prise de conscience required for the national liberation struggle. In Guine the peasants are subjected to a kind of exploitation equivalent to slavery; but even if you try and explain to them that they are being exploited and robbed, it is difficult to convince them by means of an unexperienced explanation of a technico-economic kind that they are the most exploited people; whereas it is easier to convince the workers and the people employed in the towns who earn, say 10 escudos a day for a job in which a European earns between 30 and 50 that they are being subjected to massive exploitation and injustice, because they can see.

It is the lack of political understanding of the theory of class struggle and class alliances which is responsible for the confusion of the labour aristocracy and the worker-kulak-link theorists.

This article is an extract from Issa Shivji's forthcoming book Class Struggles in Tanzania, to be published jointly this year by Heinemann Educational Books and the Tanzania Publishing House.

Bibliographic Note:


Petty Producers and Capitalism

Olivier LeBrun and Chris Gerry

This article offers a preliminary theoretical framework for an analysis of labour in urban Senegal. The writers' studies of petty commodity and commodity production in Dakar—arising from which they propose to analyse the process of class formation and the class position of various sections of the urban labour force—require at the outset an analysis of the dialectical relationship between the dominant capitalist mode of production and the subordinate forms of production in underdeveloped countries. The term form of production is deliberate. Mode of production seems to the writers inappropriate, since it refers essentially to a totality which is self-sufficient at both the superstructural level and at the economic base. Forms of production exist at the margins of the capitalist mode of production, but are nevertheless integrated into and subordinate to it. This article sets out to examine the processes and relations of production which characterise certain subordinate forms of production.

In rural society one can distinguish forms of production which are different at the level of appearances. There exists production for personal domestic consumption (hut-construction, manufacture of household utensils, etc) as well as artisanal production of articles ordered by peasants for their own consumption. In the latter instance the articles are sometimes made with tools and materials by no means traditional as in the case of rural smiths who produce spare parts for agricultural machinery. This petty production was and still is closely related to agriculture, rural artisans (smiths, woodworkers, jewellers, potters, leatherworkers) being at the same time peasant producers.

Traditionally, Senegalese artisanal production, apart from activities
like weaving, is organised along caste lines. Castes are 'groups of individuals able to concretely trace their descent from a common ancestor, and who exclusively exercise the same profession.' [N'Diaye, 1970, our translation]. Most occupations have their caste, with their own particular rules and appropriate rites; the knowledge of the craft is passed from father to son, and many artisans today use the tools left to them by their forefathers. Apprenticeship has no limited duration, its length depending entirely upon the decision of the master. The end of the apprenticeship is the occasion for ceremonies, the form of which varies from craft to craft.

Urban Petty Production

Petty producers similar to the above-mentioned type are also found in Dakar and other urban areas of Senegal. Several distinct forms of production can be distinguished. First there are those whom Lenin (1899) defined as artisans, namely those who have contact with the market only as purchasers of the means of production, producing articles to the direct orders of clients who consume the articles themselves. Examples of this type of petty producer in Dakar would include some jewellers, shoemakers and weavers. Secondly, there are petty producers who, though still satisfying individual clients' orders produce for the market as sellers of commodities. This form of production is noticeably dominant among others of Dakar's jewellers, shoemakers and basket-weavers. The smiths producing aluminium-ware in the Rebeuss district of Dakar arrived there from the mid-1930s, and were mainly former rural smiths; they are a good example of caste-organised artisanal production which has modified its means of production through the production of new articles for a wider market. They are currently more oriented towards the market than to the satisfaction of individual orders. Thirdly there are traditional petty producers who are now more or less subordinated to commercial capital. A striking example is the case of the weavers at Dakar's Artisans' Village, an establishment created by the state. The weavers produce for individual tourists' orders and purchases, for local petty commerce, and for large orders negotiated by the Senegalese Artisans' Board (a public institution which manages the Village). The prices asked for these large orders are usually unknown to the weavers, and the remuneration to the producers for their articles is annually fixed by the Board. Initially, guaranteed prices and supplies of raw materials were arranged, and no workshop rents were asked. More recently, the guarantees have been suspended and the weavers forced to purchase their thread on the open market at double the price obtained when the Village was created. Workshop rents have also been imposed. A certain number of master craftsmen and their apprentices have left, either to return to their villages as artisan-peasants, or to attempt to reintegrate themselves into urban independent weaving, where something approaching perfect competition obtains.

Certain branches of petty (including artisanal) production, since they are essentially artistic production, are experiencing a revival and certain changes in forms of production due to the development of the tourist industry. Thus existence of assured markets in tourist areas favours the organisation of group production and certain mass-
production techniques. This inevitably involves a differentiation between various types of petty producers, who, according to the degree to which they have become attached to clients, contacts or markets, themselves develop unequal levels of productivity. This is in contradistinction to purely artisanal production which is generally characterised by the absence of such differentials. The articles produced for such special markets are inevitably adapted to the tastes of foreign consumers, leading to a de-personalisation of art.

The Penetration of Capitalism

Many other types of petty production are fundamentally a product of the penetration of capitalism and its socio-demographic manifestations, namely the urbanisation process and the transformation of rural living conditions. The penetration of capitalism created the conditions which permitted these branches of petty production to appear and evolve. (1) The capitalist mode of production created a potential market for mass consumption goods for African civil servants, for Europeans and Lebanese, for African wage-workers, as well as for the continually growing mass of rural-urban migrants, which market could not be satisfied either by internal capitalist production or imports from the metropolis. (2) The means of production (raw materials and the instruments of labour) to enable these mass-consumption goods to be produced were supplied by the capitalist mode of production. For the greater part the means of production introduced and currently in use in such branches of petty production as vehicle repairs, tailoring and construction, were and continue to be supplied by the capitalist mode of production (trowels and cement for masons, sewing machines and cloth for tailors, vehicles and fuel for transport). (3) Most of the skilled workers who initiated this petty production were themselves trained in capitalist enterprises in French Africa or in the metropolis itself. Many others were trained locally by French or Lebanese artisans.

According to a forthcoming study [LeBrun & Dieng], many of the self-employed Senegalese masons, tilers and carpenters received their training in the large French construction companies which operate throughout French Africa. Dakar, being the former capital of French West Africa and operational centre of most French colonial enterprises in the region, supplied and still supplies many skilled workers to French-speaking West Africa. Another study [Gerry, 1974] concluded that, from its sample of some 130 self-employed furniture-makers and mechanics, 70 per cent of the former and 55 per cent of the latter had spent on average more than half their working lives in wage-employment.

Two Distinct Forms

We can distinguish two fundamentally different forms of petty production in Dakar from the point of view of their objective and subjective situations and the position they occupy in the social formation. On the one hand there are those petty producers characterised by the accumulation of wealth as the principal end-result of their productive activities. Their relations of production are capitalist ones; the employees are wage-workers and produce surplus-value. The accumulation process is manifested through the increase in the size
of the productive unit both in terms of labour utilised and means of production employed. We will later examine the different transitional forms which exist between essentially capitalist petty production and that which is not capitalist. The capitalist petty producer has been alienated from the articles he produces through contact with the market; from the moment he makes a profit, it is of little interest to him what he produces. On the other hand there exist petty producers, the main result of whose productive activity is simply the reproduction of their means of subsistence and their social relations of production. This form of petty production includes artisans (those producing to order according to Lenin's definition) and petty commodity producers who are unable to accumulate. These two groups, although they produce exchange-values, have not entirely submitted to commodity alienation. They relate personally to the nature of the product they create, seeing their production as being specifically for customer consumption; they are consequently concerned about the intrinsic quality of the article, from whose production they gain important personal satisfaction. However, most petty commodity producers find themselves increasingly more concerned with the price offered on the market (which may not supply sufficient reward for the labour-time spent on high quality work). The distinction between artisans' and petty commodity producers' respective concerns with use-value and exchange-value is not fundamentally a matter of personal pride and concern for quality; it reflects their objective relations with the market for their products and increasingly, therefore, involves the dissolution of all values into exchange-values. Contact with the market can here be seen as the corollary of the increasing domination of bourgeois relations of production, both within the forms of production in question, and outside them:

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand... has left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash payment'... (and) has resolved personal worth into exchange-value.

(Marx & Engels, 1848)

So the subjective attachment of the artisan to the articles he produces, so much stronger than that of the petty commodity producer, reflects in subjective terms the fundamental objective distinction between himself and the petty commodity producer. The artisan is principally oriented towards the production of use-values, whereas the petty producer of commodities is primarily occupied with the production of exchange-values, and both have little choice but to maintain themselves as such.

However, it is clear that many petty producers aspire towards wage-employment; 60 per cent in the ILO/IDEP study were anxious to have such employment. Their apparent motives for doing so were usually a function of their current lack of clients and consequent low and unstable remuneration. Indeed some were even prepared, so they claimed, to take a reduction in earnings in order to have the relative stability of wage-employment. Others indicated that stability of employment could enable them to eventually build their own house, and possibly return to self-employment with an adequate fund of savings. The UNESCO study deliberately made a distinction between those who had always been and still were petty producers...
(27 per cent), those who had been laid off by capitalist enterprises (61 per cent), and other ex-wage-workers who had themselves taken the initiative to set up in wage-employment (12 per cent). Both the motives behind these aspirations towards wage-employment, and the individual work-histories of those concerned, will have a crucial bearing on the process of differentiation generally and within specific occupations.*

The distinction between artisans and petty commodity producers is often highlighted by the nature of the product in question. Thus the producer-vendor of foodstuffs (akara, pasties, kebabs, and various cold drinks) produces for the market rather than for the client-customer, whereas furniture-makers, often using modern machinery may well deal exclusively with individual clients' orders. Consequently, it is within each trade that the process of differentiation between artisans and petty commodity producers must be analysed. The artisan often starts to produce for a market by accident; an order is not collected, and a casual purchaser or passing trader buys the article which has remained in the workshop. This is quite common amongst furniture-makers, tailors and cobblers, so much so that cobblers, when dealing with higher-priced repairs, demand an advance equal to the total cost of the raw materials, plus some part of the remuneration for labour, before the repair is commenced. This avoids the enforced stocking of unsold or uncollected articles which are difficult to sell profitably, mainly due to the existence of competitive footwear, produced within the capitalist mode of production, whether foreign or indigenous.

In cases where a relatively sure—though inevitably highly competitive—market exists for mass consumption goods (some clothing, footwear, and both traditional and modern styles of jewellery), petty commodity production is often more developed. The marketing of such articles is done either by the producer himself at his workshop (or occasionally a separate store) or through the intermediary of petty traders (banabanas). Petty commodity production is particularly developed in the activities which bourgeois economics calls services.

*But the impact of contemporary capitalist production upon petty producers is of over-riding importance. Compared to the petty producers of Europe during the Industrial Revolution, those of contemporary urban Senegal may have rather different possibilities of changing their individual conditions of life and labour, and may view these possibilities differently. The reason for this, we suggest, is that most urban Senegalese petty producers are confronted with a developed capitalist mode of production under which relative surplus value prevails, whereas European petty producers faced an emergent capitalist mode of production, wherein absolute surplus value was the rule. This distinction is crucial: in the case of early capitalisms, the sole or principal means of increasing the rate of surplus value was the lengthening of the working day. The limits to this were mainly those of working class organisation and resistance. But under advanced capitalism 'rational' labour processes and advanced technology enable increases in labour productivity to be made in other ways. The fact that petty production is faced with these advanced methods and technologies operating in the same exchange economy effectively blocks the transition of petty commodity production to capitalist commodity production, thus restricting and transforming the forms of social differentiation possible within an underdeveloped country.
such as transport (privately-operated communal buses, taxis), garages, bars and restaurants.

Social Relations of Production

Concerning the social relations of production which characterise artisanal and petty commodity production, the principal aspect is the direct domination of the individual and his own direct dependence, indispensable to the appropriation of surplus. Relations of personal dependence are of a paternalist type. The apprentice is closely tied to the master-craftsman since the latter often provides housing, food and clothing, in addition to furnishing him with some skills. Even when skills only are obtained from the apprenticeship, (this being increasingly the case in contemporary Dakar), the degree of dependence is still considerable. In traditional artisanal production, the apprentice is practically always a member of the master’s family. According to the Dakar studies, 73 per cent of jewellers’ and between 91 and 100 per cent of shoemakers’ apprentices were close relatives of their masters, whereas for the modern activities, the levels were much lower: for tailors’ apprentices between 43 and 53 per cent, plumbers’ apprentices 33 per cent, for those of mechanics and metalworkers 28 per cent, for furniture-makers’ apprentices 21 per cent, and for those of public transport drivers (*cars rapides*) only 6 per cent were close relatives. The artisan tends to view his apprentice as his child, all the more so since many are entrusted to him by relatives and close friends, and alongside his own children. However, his attitude towards his apprentices can vary between the extremes of training apprentices virtually as family-members or of treating them as labourers at his command. Apprenticeships last several years, sometimes ten or more, the duration being a function of the master’s evaluation of the apprentice’s abilities, but rather more importantly of the absorptive capacity of the labour market. Apprentices receive occasional pocket-money, especially at religious festivals. Once the apprentice has attained a certain age and competence, it is customary for him to be paid more regularly and substantially, thus theoretically making the transition from apprenticeship to journeyman. In fact, however, most apprentices are released as soon as they are old enough to command this more substantial remuneration. The journeyman is not really a wage-earner; he receives a certain share of the profits from each order, and both he and the apprentices are usually permitted to use the means of production for their own profit during slack periods, and they themselves produce articles for casual sale, or more rarely, to order. Indeed, we encountered a case where a tiler worked as a wage-earner for his own employees whenever they had work and he had not; nevertheless, the relations of production had left their mark in terms of status and remuneration, for he demanded and received 5000 francs a day, whereas he normally paid them only 3000 for the same work.

The exploitation of apprentices and journeymen is masked by social illusions that one day they could become petty producers themselves, or perhaps even big entrepreneurs. Both artisan and petty commodity producer live under this type of illusion, all the more so since some of them do manage to become wealthy. Success stories, such as that of N’Diouga Kébé, the unlettered boy from the poor background,
who has become one of Senegal's millionaire-entrepreneurs, permit the perpetuation of this illusion.

Technical relations of production
The technical relations of production which characterise artisanal and petty commodity producers are characterised by the domination of the producer over the means by which labour is realised as exchange-value; these means consist primarily of the instruments of labour, but also the materials worked upon. Thus the ability of the artisan or petty commodity producer to create his products is closely linked to the skills involved, learnt principally through apprenticeship. However, the technical relations of production in the industrial labour-process are characterised by the domination of the means of production over the worker, labour being subordinated, turned into a commodity and alienated by its subjection to capital. Indeed, workers are denuded of much of their skills, these being progressively taken over either by machines, or by so-called specialists. In this labour-process, any worker with a minimum of training is capable of producing.

By contrast the petty producer himself effects the whole process of transforming his chosen raw materials and is in control of the production-process, deciding when and how he shall work, what tools he shall use and in what manner, and he has no need of others to tell him what should be done. The apprentices and journeymen perform the same or similar work, under his direction. In some cases, those of certain tailors, metalworkers and makers of aluminiumware, production for the market, albeit on a small scale, implies a certain degree of uniformity in the articles produced, a larger scale of purchasing and stocking of raw materials, the use of more productive techniques, and the appearance of relations of production different from those obtaining in artisanal production. This represents the beginnings of a technical division of labour—that of manufacturing. The more significant technical division is between the owner of the means of production, who occupies himself more and more with organisation, buying and selling, and his journeymen and apprentices, who perform the greatest part of the productive work. To this technical division of labour there corresponds a new social division of labour; the owner of the means of production, himself performs progressively less productive work and appropriates surplus-labour, thus heralding the evolution of real wage-relations. The phenomenon characterising certain units of production in urban Senegal is clearly explained by the marxist concept of the formal submission of labour to capital. As Marx (1933) writes:

The artisan who was mastercraftsman vis-a-vis his journeyman is now no more than an owner of capital, whereas his journeyman does nothing more than sell his labour-power (...). Capital dominates the labour-process such as it is, based upon the labour-processes developed by different ancient modes of production. Capital thus dominates a pre-existent and determinate labour-process, such as artisanal labour...

(emphasis in original).

In this form of production the principal feature consists in social relations which enable surplus to be appropriated in the form of
surplus-value. There are no longer the social relations of direct domination which act at the superstructural level. Production is principally oriented towards the accumulation of wealth.

Transition to small capitalist production
The transition from petty commodity to small capitalist commodity production is characterised by an increase in the number of workers and the quantity of means of production. It is important to understand how this transition takes place: it appears that personal relations play a considerable role in the process, and it is through such relationships that state orders and/or aid can be acquired. Access to bank-loans is often another decisive factor in the evolution of small capitalist commodity production.

There exists a large degree of differentiation between petty producers, often manifest in the number of workers used and the value of the means of production. Certain petty producers have very expensive modern machinery, which they may have obtained second-hand from former employers. Generally, petty producers’ workshops are very poorly equipped: of 26 workshops owned by carpenters resident in the peripheral Dakar district of Grand Yoff, 21 were mere wooden shacks. The carpenters interviewed used on average one journeyman and between three and four apprentices. Half of the workshops used no journeymen at all, but only 15 per cent had no apprentices. In other districts near the city centre, such as the Medina, much better equipped workshops were to be found; there, however, differentiation among producers was even greater.

Proletarianisation
We shall now examine a process of transition towards the opposite pole, namely the process of proletarianisation. This is a process which in the context of the urban areas of underdeveloped countries partially and/or intermittently draws sections of various types of petty producers as well as unemployed and migrant peasants, into direct relations with industrial capital. We do not imply that the petty producers will of necessity become wage-workers en masse or in any permanent capacity. The nature of the proletarianisation process in conjunction with peripheral capitalism differs considerably from its historical form in the course of the development of the central capitalist mode of production.

The process of proletarianisation among artisans and petty commodity producers takes several different forms. Thus there can be subcontracting by commercial or industrial capital; the domination of commercial capital without subcontracting; the organisation of petty producers by the state; and temporary casual work undertaken by petty producers for wages when their earning-ability is restricted by the narrowness of the market and their increasing numbers. The sub-contracting system dealt with in the UNESCO study (LeBrun & Dieng) is one of the most striking examples of the process of proletarianisation in Dakar (particularly in the construction sector). In certain activities such as concrete-reinforcing, tiling, painting and bricklaying the construction companies, rather than engage wage-workers, employ tâcherons. These are petty producers who do piece
and contract-work for industrial capital using their own journeymen and apprentices as labourers. The labourers receive very low remuneration, and the system permits the construction enterprises to lower their production costs, since there is virtually nothing to pay for the labour-power obtained, no pension-schemes or social benefits of any kind to which they must contribute. Thus the tâcheron and his dependent labour play a role similar to that played by women and children in industrial revolution Europe. This system also modifies the relations of production between the petty producer and his apprentices and journeymen; whilst the former’s role becomes more and more that of a foreman and supervisor, his workers are integrated into a capitalist production-process where they produce surplus-value for capital. Sometimes chain-subcontracting takes place: thus at one building site, an enterprise had contracted to build a small housing estate, and yet supplied only a site-manager, a carpenter, and two labourers to unload the wagons. Each group of two houses was subcontracted to a single tâcheron. Many such petty entrepreneurs further subcontracted part or all of their contracts to other tâcherons, at half the price they had themselves received. In the event practically all the work was performed by journeymen and apprentices receiving little or no remuneration, whilst the original subcontracting tâcheron acted merely as an intermediary and profited from his privileged position and personal-professional contacts.

Another indication of this process of proletarianisation is the bringing under merchant control of many of the relatively more advanced and successful shoemakers of the Medina district of the city. The majority of these shoemakers are in a state of continual and serious indebtedness to their Lebanese suppliers of materials. These petty manufacturers of traditional and tourist footwear use imported plastic-backed fabric, crêpe and glue for their production, all of which can only be obtained from these merchants. One merchant has recently invested considerable amounts of money in several attempts to organise petty shoemakers into collective manufacturing groups; at present they are organised in family production groups of master craftsmen and apprentices along caste lines. Thus far, few such attempts to completely subordinate petty commodity production to commercial capital have been successful. Since the market for articles of mass-consumption is as yet unorganised, merchants are unable to exclude petty producers. Nevertheless a process of concentration and proletarianisation through the intervention and penetration of medium commercial capital into the process of petty production, though limited to a few individual cases at present, seems a distinct possibility in the near future. This is so despite the fact that considerable opposition can be expected from the giant footwear corporation BATA, which operates not only in Senegal, but throughout West Africa and other parts of the world.

Industrial capital plays another role in the proletarianisation process, outside of the subcontracting system. In a sample of casual workers in Dakar, we found that some 35 per cent were skilled, and it is these workers who, no longer able to use their skills in independent petty production, and consequently unable to generate a reasonable and stable income, attempt to do so by selling their labour-power as
day- or temporary-workers within the capitalist production process. However, the possession of such skills does not necessarily mean that such workers use them in their casual employment; indeed many skilled workers (carpenters, masons, tilers, etc.) frequently work as labourers. This is an indication that entry into petty production is not entirely free, nor is the perpetuation of the petty producer as such, a certainty.

**Dissolution—Conservation**

It follows from the above analysis that there exists a mechanism of dissolution-conservation in petty production. Generally speaking, it is the dissolution aspect which dominates that of conservation in developed capitalist countries where petty production is residual and is limited to certain well-specified areas of activity or has even largely disappeared. In Europe this dissolution mechanism operated during the period of transition, which, due to the industrial revolution, led to the establishment of a self-sufficient capitalist mode of production. In the countries of the periphery it seems that it is the conservation aspect which dominates. In Senegal we can see the two poles of this contradictory process.

The production of numerous commodities ('goods and services' in bourgeois terminology) is left to petty producers; this production is currently unprofitable for capital to engage in. This is because of the capitalist mode's orientation towards the production of exports for metropolitan consumption and/or transformation, and the production of commodities principally destined for consumption by the more favoured strata of the underdeveloped country's population. This latter production of consumption commodities permits the maintenance and reproduction of the local dependent ruling class, which in turn favours the continued penetration and domination of foreign capital. This orientation towards the world market together with the satisfaction of the local dependent ruling class clearly demonstrates how the so-called peripheral capitalist mode of production is in reality a bridgehead for central capitalism in the periphery. Hence it is nonsensical to speak of the 'dependency' of a 'peripheral capitalist mode of production' upon that of the centre, either in the general or the technological sense. In the periphery, industrial capital uses much the same technology as in the centre, namely capital-intensive techniques; this permits profits to be maximised. The result is an increase in labour-productivity and consequently a slowing-down of the growth of industrial capitalist employment, all the more pronounced since the growth in labour productivity exceeds that of the accumulation of capital.

Since it uses an essentially capital-intensive production, industrial capital only employs a very small proportion of the urban active population in underdeveloped countries. Consequently the market for the commodities produced by industrial capital is very small, despite income-redistribution from wage-earners to their dependents. Only petty production is capable of satisfying the largest part of the consumption requirements of the urban masses (clothing, footwear, housing and furniture, household effects, transport, repairs and cooked food). This is the principal factor in the conservation of
petty production. However, conservation does not take place in a static sense; workshops and petty enterprises are developed and transformed, regress and disappear. In fact, this internal growth is almost exclusively involutionary, taking place against a backdrop of restrictions, constraints and distortions imposed by the dominant capitalist mode of production.

Subordination

If the capitalist mode of production conserves petty production, it does so by subordinating it. There are different degrees of subordination to capital. In a general way, as we have shown, all petty producers are subordinated to capital through the market both with regard to their backward linkages (materials and equipment) and to their forward linkages. Through the price system there operates a large transfer of value from petty production (where the organic composition of capital is low) to the capitalist mode of production (where it is high). The capitalist mode of production profits in numerous ways from the existence of petty production. Cheap goods and casual labour are supplied to capitalist enterprises (both industrial and commercial), and cheap mass-consumption products are supplied to wage-earners and their dependents, permitting the maintenance of low wage-rates. This is particularly profitable for export-oriented capitalist industry in the periphery, which is little concerned with the purchasing power of the internal market. The subordination of petty production to capital can, however, take much more direct forms than those which operate through the market. Certain capitalist enterprises no longer take on additional maintenance men such as carpenters, painters and masons, and even dismiss existing ones; instead they subcontract work on an individual basis thereby reducing the enterprise's production costs. In this way wage-earners can become self-employed craftsmen; indeed, some have become successful petty capitalists, though the predominant trend is in the opposite direction. As Lenin (1899) puts it:

The development of forms of industry, like that of social relationships in general, cannot but proceed very gradually among a mass of interlocking, transitional forms and seeming reversions to the past.

Capitalist enterprises have an interest in encouraging the dissolution of petty production which is competitive with their own production. In Dakar, two particular cases are revealing. A report on the 1968 situation of certain firms prepared for a ministerial council meeting stated:

The increase in competition in foreign markets, and the competition from local secret and illegal production of shoe-soles (using independent piece-workers for the cutting of rubber and foam) has led BATA to ask for a revision of the protection agreement from which it currently benefits.

The report went on to suggest the banning of piece-work which adversely affected both the traditional artisans and the giant firm BATA. Another example is that of SOTRAC (Société des Transports du Cap Vert) whose profitability depends to a great extent upon the disappearance of Dakar's car rapides, mini-bus-type vehicles for
public transport, owned and operated by private individuals, and which create considerable employment both directly (drivers and the fare-collecting apprentices) and indirectly (mechanics, body-workers, vulcanisers). Senegalese urbanisation policy, developing rapidly alongside tourism, is in part responsible for the destruction of Dakar’s shanty-towns and the consequent problems created for petty producers whose incomes depend on the maintenance of such areas. It is also important to note that the modification of local tastes and fashions and the imposition, through supplies made available on the market, of articles which cannot readily be produced or copied by petty producers, acts as another means of destroying certain types of petty producers, as Lebrun (1973) has pointed out.

We have seen that there are different forms of petty production, ranging from the artisan who works exclusively to order, to the small capitalist enterprise where a formal submission of labour to capital exists. What these different forms have in common is their subordination to the capitalist mode of production. On the one hand, a certain but limited number of petty producers emerge as small capitalists. Some of these are the recipients of token promotional aid from the State. Failures among them highlight the contradiction facing governments, for the foreign capital which blocks the possibilities of local capitalism, and restricts it to specific activities, is the capital which dominates and controls the state both economically and ideologically. On the other hand, there are large numbers of petty producers who, due to the dominant role of foreign capital, only formally have possession of their means of production. Among these, we must distinguish between those who continue to subsist through their petty production, and those who are progressively proletarianised through the temporary sale of their labour-power. The former are not proletarian, since they retain some attachment to their materials and instruments of labour, as well as relative control of the labour-process. They have the illusion of ownership. Since they are not subjectively directly exploited by capital, they are not aware of their objective interest in the disappearance of the dominant mode of production, and this lack of consciousness is compounded by their hope of becoming capitalist themselves. They remain attached to family, religious and ethnic relations. They do not constitute free labour-power; they are not separated from their means of production or their relations of personal dependence. The contradictions between classes is masked and the development of class-consciousness retarded. Those who casually sell their labour-power are further advanced in the process of proletarianisation, since they do produce surplus-value for capital. However, they are not all completely severed from their means of production and relations of personal dependence. They produce surplus-value directly, but intermittently and in an unstable manner. They have one foot in petty production and the other in industrial capitalist commodity production. As far as consciousness is concerned, they are hardly more advanced than those who have remained entirely within petty production. Their lack of consciousness of their objective conditions can be explained by the severe competition generated among and between permanent and temporary workers in capitalist industry, by the belief that transition to capitalist self-employment is more than possible, and
by the obscuring of objective reality by the dominant secular and religious ideologies. All these elements have a divisive effect on the development of class consciousness.

The deteriorating conditions of life and the declining possibilities for the Senegalese petty producer of engaging in productive activity are inextricably linked to the domination of these subordinate forms of production by the capitalist mode of production. The continuance of such forms of production simultaneously favours the reproduction and expansion of the capitalist mode of production and presents it with severe problems. The probable evolution of the articulation between the dominant mode and the subordinate forms of production is at present unclear. The problem must be analysed from the aspect of these forms of production; however, it is clear that the answer lies squarely within the framework of class-struggle, and not that of academic theorizing.

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Sembene Ousmane’s Xala (1974) is the most recent work of the Senegalese author which tells the story of the Senegalese businessman who spends a fortune in order that his religious leaders might cure him of the impotence with which he is afflicted. His sexual impotence symbolises the social powerlessness of the Senegalese petty business-bourgeoisie.

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Ujamaa and Rural Socialism

P.L. Raikes

Tanzania's policy of Ujamaa Vijijini aimed at bringing peasant producers together in villages for co-operative production. At first the policy was voluntaristic, stressing that the peasants themselves should initiate, control and run their villages. More recently the 'frontal' approach has resulted in administrative coercion and compulsory villagization. Some of the problems of rural planning and ujamaa implementation are closely connected with the absence of a concerted strategy for the transformation of the economy. Without such a strategy even the most democratically-run villages of full producer co-operation will maintain dependence if they continue to be deployed for export crop production. As serious: the increasingly bureaucratic implementation of the policy has acted as a barrier to political mobilisation and to the release of productive forces. Ujamaa was intended to be pursued politically, through the education and mobilisation of peasants; instead it conforms with the interests and methods of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

Transformation from a state of underdevelopment and dependency towards socialism and self-reliance can be briefly defined as the convergence of resource use and the needs of the mass of the people. This implies both the transformation of the economic base to make it capable of performing this task and the control (not simply legal ownership) by the masses of the means and processes of production. The transformation of the economic base requires the construction of an integrated industrial base capable of meeting demand for mass consumption goods and means of production, and still more importantly of generating its own skills and technology. This in turn requires as a pre-requisite, the democratic control of the economy by the masses, for only in this case will it be possible for planning and
investment to aim at these goals. It need scarcely be said that such a transformation will require detailed long-range planning. The markets for many if not most of the new final and intermediate products will only emerge during the process of transformation and could not thus be justified through economic calculations based on the pre-existing economic structure and market demand, restricted and distorted as this is by low and maldistributed income. It is also vital that such planning should specify the quantity and sequencing of physical commodity flows to minimize problems of over-supply and of resource bottlenecks. Again it plainly requires very careful planning for the productive utilization of surplus and the strictest control on any unproductive forms of expenditure.

**Socialist Transformation and Agriculture**

The role of the rural sector in such a transformation is of vital importance. Since it is by far the most important productive sector in the economy, it must provide most of the surplus to be used in development. This will take two main forms; food for the rapidly increasing urban and industrial population, and raw materials for the growing industry. These two functions have been sufficiently discussed by both western and socialist economists alike, to need no further elaboration. Western economists have also stressed the need to provide foreign exchange through the export of primary agricultural produce. This will also clearly be a function of agriculture in socialist transformation at least in the early stages. The vital difference however is that while western economists treat export production as something to be maximized, thus in effect reducing food and raw material production to constraints, socialist economists put the stress the other way. Reliance on primary export production is something to be reduced as rapidly as possible both by the strictest economy in minimizing all non-vital imports and by the rapid building of local productive capacity.

Since the industrial sector is to be the area of major growth, investible surplus must be transferred from agriculture to industry, and this implies that production and productivity in agriculture must be raised as rapidly as possible, and at least initially through methods which do not require major diversion of investment funds to agriculture itself. It has been shown time and again that in the absence of major social reorganization, large scale mechanization schemes tend to constitute a drain on surplus rather than a contribution to it, and thus for the most part, they can not be considered an immediate priority. This certainly does not mean that mechanization must be shelved indefinitely. But the evidence from Tanzania's Settlement Schemes and State Farms should be eloquent testimony that prior to the achievement of major changes in social relations of production they are likely to constitute a drain on surplus.

The technical aspects of this problem have been noted by a number of Western economists. But constrained by existing social organizations, they have concluded that development must be concentrated in the rural areas, since 'traditional' agriculture is not capable of generating surpluses rapidly, and that emphasis should be concentrated upon intermediate technology. But this totally ignores precisely
the most important way in which surplus can be increased and productivity stimulated. It has been shown time and again that tremendous resources of productivity and creativity can be released in peasants and other producers once they take control of their own production process and control democratically its planning and implementation. The testimony of the Chinese and North Vietnamese experience is sufficiently impressive in this context, but there is also abundant evidence from experience and controlled experiments by social scientists and educators. All this points in the same direction; given non-exploitative social organizations and suitable political assistance and education people can mobilize themselves for tremendous feats of productivity and creativity, but they cannot be mobilized 'from above' while exploitative or authoritarian social relations continue.

One very important implication of this mode of development is that it need not, and indeed cannot, come from 'squeezing the peasantry', the standard method for surplus extraction in capitalist countries, and in Soviet Russia. Nor need it imply neglecting the supply of social services to the rural areas. Surplus can be increased either by increasing production or by the reduction of consumption. The former in many cases requires the improvement of social services to improve the health and skills of the rural labour force. With suitable social organization the level of social services can be increased along with increasing surplus generation through judicious combinations of self-help and least cost methods. It scarcely needs saying that none of this can be achieved while the peasantry is coerced by bureaucracy and exploited through unequal exchange.

The Place of Ujamaa in Socialist Development
It is now clear how ujamaa villages can contribute to socialist development. Democratically controlled and planned producer cooperatives are precisely the social organization which can produce this release of productivity and creativity for the fueling of a socialist transformation. But it is vital that they should be integrated into such a socialist transformation. For without this, production and exchange relations with the rest of the country and with the rest of the world remain unchanged. Little is gained if even the most democratic and productive ujamaa sector continues to concentrate on the production of export crops. They may achieve increases in productivity and income, but these will be negated in the long run by declining terms of trade, and perhaps through the increased unproductive surplus absorption of a non-socialist marketing structure. Still more importantly, maintenance of a dependent export-dominated structure of the economy makes almost impossible the transformation of production within the rural economy. The scope for rural development must remain limited so long as it remains tied simply to primary production. But the development of small-scale industries in the rural areas, which can play an important part in socialist development, requires socialist transformation and planning no less than the development of basic industries, and for similar reasons. At present local markets for the produce of such industries are restricted not only by low and poorly distributed incomes but by the poor organization of marketing and distribution, especially since a highly dis-
proportionate amount of energy and effort is expended on the marketing and distribution of high income consumer goods. It is certainly unrealistic to expect any such developments to arise without careful planning, and through dependence on the existing market.

It is no less obvious that successful ujamaa development within socialist transformation requires that the policy be implemented democratically and through political mobilization rather than administrative action. The latter may well achieve the concentration of the population in nucleated villages, but it will certainly not provide the release of productivity required for a major investment drive. In the absence of an overall political commitment to socialist transformation, a number of the apparently socialist aspects of policy are robbed of much of their meaning and purpose. It should be stressed however that this is not simply a matter of the technical correctness or otherwise of the policies or of the technical competence of the planners. The present structure in Tanzania clearly reflects the preferences and consumption patterns of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie which controls almost all aspects of government decision-making. Two major areas in which dependency and under-development are maintained are in the continued emphasis on primary exports, and the complementary emphasis on the import or final-stage processing of high income consumer goods. These are plainly in the interests of the western capitalist countries and firms which benefit from such a structure, but they could not be maintained if they did not also reflect the interests of local decision-makers.

Agricultural Strategy and Planning
Since Tanzania has no long-range industrial strategy and no material-balance planning to specify requirements for the size and sequencing of commodity flows, any attempts to influence the direction of agricultural production must necessarily operate in something of a vacuum. Thus, it has been the stated policy of the country since the Arusha Declaration to reduce dependency on export production and to concentrate on production for the domestic market. This does not seem to have had very much effect on patterns of production. So far as one can distinguish trends during the past six years, complicated as they have been by variations in climate, the main tendency seems to have been diversification among export products with at best moderate success in maintaining even the previous growth of products for the domestic market.

But this is hardly surprising, for without overall planning, it was by no means clear to policy makers what domestic products should be produced, to the extent that some even defined this as meaning localized self-sufficiency in subsistence food crops—a strategy reminiscent of post-war colonial government policy for African agriculture. Many of the industries set up in the period relied very heavily on imported raw materials or semi-manufactures, and even when there could have been planning for local raw material supplies (as in the case of rubber for the tyre factory) little effort was made to achieve this.
There is certainly a clear need to increase food production for the local market, and to improve the quality of foods consumed by the mass of the people, but this can scarcely be achieved so long as the market mechanism continues to favour the production of export crops. It should be stressed moreover, that this is not simply the result of market forces in a very poor country, though this is an important factor. The price difference has been exaggerated by the fact that far more attention has been paid to operating an efficient marketing system for export crops, with the result that marketing margins are very high for food crops, and even increasing consumer prices have hardly been reflected in increased prices to producers. If price policy were to be the chosen method for achieving this change in direction, then the present marketing structure is a very blunt instrument for its implementation, to say the least.

In such a situation, the setting of targets and priorities means relatively little. There is no reason why physical quantities should even be specified in the absence of overall commodity-flow planning, and no clear methods specified for their achievement. This was recognized in the Second Five Year Plan, which did not specify overall crop priorities, but each Region was expected to produce lists of crop priorities, which in the absence of any clear criteria for their selection turned out to be simply lists of crops on which the extension service had previously lavished most of their attention. Not surprisingly most of them were export crops. Where they were not, most of the extension resources continued to be concentrated upon export crops, as was agricultural credit.

One must however record at least one attempt to increase production of food crops through non-market methods, the setting up of state farms to produce grain crops and improved seeds. Unfortunately these were not very successful. Haste in planning and a bureaucratic style of implementation seem to have been the major reasons for their lack of success. In a more general context, their major failure was the lack of any integration with local ujamaa or peasant farming.

In the area of price policy, there have been attempts to make consistent choices over agricultural prices, but these have not been consistent in the sense of fitting with any overall planning framework, since there is none of sufficient specificity. Consistency in this context means the lesser aim of trying to ensure that the direction of any price change does reflect government planning priorities, and thus involves marginal changes from the existing somewhat arbitrary price structure. Its actual working out and implementation is much complicated by a bureaucratic system of levies and costings designed to limit co-operative marketing margins. This is necessary in the absence of either competitive or internal control on charges set by co-operatives. Within the limits set for them, price setters for agricultural produce in Tanzania seem to do a reasonable job. But since they are far from clear as to the criteria under which they are working and since there exist no overall priorities, it is clearly impossible to derive a consistent set of prices. It is not clear that the resultant set of relative prices is superior to what might be arrived at without controls.
But lack of integrated policy has not been the only problem, for many
of the institutions set up to implement socialist agricultural policy
have defined their functions in rather bureaucratic terms. Marketing
boards and co-operatives could operate as powerful and useful
mechanisms for implementing a socialist production policy. They
have of course been hamstrung by the lack of overall direction, but
in addition, they have demonstrated clearly that socialism does not
derive simply from state ownership of organizations so long as
control resides in the hands of a few. Food crop marketing through
official channels has been bedevilled by high costs resulting from in-
efficient organization and failure to work out a rational storage and
transport system. One of the major failings has been that the Market-
ing Boards (now 'authorities') have been seen largely as a means to
buttress a not-very efficient set of marketing co-operatives. These
latter are commonly considered to be organs for the development of
socialism, but in fact they have often operated as a means for the
enrichment of those who control their running. Some have indeed
been the sort of association of small capitalists in restraint of
competition which would be called a cartel elsewhere. But even
where most of the members have been ordinary peasants, the latter
have not managed to achieve control of their co-operatives. This is
partly due to lack of education and to the traditional way in which
accounts are presented (if at all) which makes them hard for even the
educated to comprehend. But even more importantly, there has
been little effort to try to involve the peasants, and in some cases
active efforts to prevent members from expressing their dissatis-
faction with incompetent and corrupt committees. Government
action when poor running causes losses has normally taken the
bureaucratic form of trying to ensure the financial viability of the
co-operative, even where this has to be achieved at further loss to the
ordinary members by extra levies on produce sold.

Finally, and most importantly of all, the ujamaa policy has not as yet
led to any major increases in production, productivity or surplus
flow from agriculture. Partly of course, this can be attributed to the
relatively short time period since its inception, and to the lack of
integrated planning mentioned above. But there are important aspects
of the implementation of the policy which are also responsible for
this lack of success. In particular, the increasingly bureaucratic im-
plementation of the policy has definitely acted as a barrier to the
release of productivity mentioned above.

Ujamaa Policy and Implementation
The policy of ujamaa as outlined by President Nyerere clearly stated
that 'Ujamaa villages... will be created by the people themselves and
maintained by them. It must be done by their own resources'. This
stance was further reinforced by the Mwongozo (Guidelines) which
stressed the principle of self-planning by the people: 'It is not correct
for leaders and experts to usurp the peoples' right to decide on an
issue just because they have the expertise.' In reality however, the
implementation has from the start been characterized by administra-
tive rather than political or voluntary initiatives.

Initial statements about ujamaa can be clearly seen to derive in part
from the experience of the earlier Village Settlement Programme. Hugely over-capitalized and bureaucratically run, this ambitious programme to transform Tanzanian agriculture by setting up nuclei of "modern" farming, failed even to achieve its primary objective. The lesson was obvious; the mechanized methods were uneconomic, given the existing social relations of production, and in any case far too expensive to be extended to more than a minute proportion of the country's farmers. More importantly, authoritarian leadership sapped the initiative and will to work of the members, who treated the schemes as government farms. The new ujamaa villages were to be different in every respect; organized and run by the peasants themselves and without large-scale investment from the outside. In identifying the causes of failure of the Settlement Schemes, it was generally assumed that these arose from errors of judgement. This was true but partial, since it ignored a number of general tendencies of bureaucracy which are likely to occur in any development scheme which is administratively implemented regardless of its initial direction.

Given the initial conception of ujamaa, it is clear that it was intended to be implemented politically; that is through education and mobilization of peasants. A major part of this would have lain in showing peasants how co-operation and self-planning could be relevant to their specific situation and could improve their standard of life in areas which they considered relevant. This required not only a clear grasp of the principles of producer co-operation, but considerable knowledge of, or willingness to learn about, the specific technical and social conditions in each part of the country. This would have been a vast undertaking, and given the limits on manpower, a rather slow process, at least initially.

In the event, this turned out not to be possible. There simply were not enough trained political cadres at any level. Nor, since TANU is a mass party, were local political leaders altogether clear about the aims of ujamaa. The majority of potential policy implementers in the rural areas were various government officials, not only in numbers, but in terms of access to funds for policy action. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the interpenetration of government and party in Tanzania has had some success in its desired goal of politicizing administrators, but it has also led to the adoption of bureaucratic styles by political leaders. Thus it emerged quite rapidly that though ujamaa was to be implemented by the peasants themselves, it was also a government policy and as such the responsibility of government staff whose success and capabilities were to be judged in terms of their achievements in implementing ujamaa. Once this step had been taken, a number of changes in the emphasis of the policy became all but inevitable. There is a natural tendency for administrators to redefine broadly stated goals in terms of more specific and measurable objectives, for this simplifies the measurement of success. This dictated a concern with villagization and with the number of villages started, rather than with the degree of communality, economic productivity or internal democracy of the villages formed. The latter are inherently hard to measure, and the more so given the specific conditions surrounding the early implementation of ujamaa.
In the first place, there was some doubt about the precise meaning of communal production. The policy had initially been defined in terms of 'traditional ujamaa', which very broadly implied various forms of communal and reciprocal labour exchange on land held by individual households. This was viable so long as most production was for subsistence consumption, for under such a situation differentiation in farm size was largely limited by family food requirements. With the introduction of cash cropping, there began a steady erosion of this type of reciprocal help, for farm size and labour availability now became important constraints on income. Labour exchange on the basis of farm requirements would benefit the rich, while exchange on an equal basis supplied inadequate labour for the requirements of the larger farmers who increasingly began to hire labour. Thus communal labour for ujamaa villages required communal land-holding, something which required careful political education for peasants both large and small, if they were to give of all or part of the private plots on which their livelihood depended. More particularly of course, the larger farmers plainly stood to lose, and this could have led to some difficult choices in view of their considerable local political influence. The discomfort would have been the greater since by training, inclination and previous practice, the administrators were accustomed to work through precisely these local leaders and specifically through 'progressive' (large) farmers. This had been a stated objective of colonial agricultural policy, and was largely continued through the first six years of independence. Concentration of advice, credit and membership of co-operative and other local committees upon such groups had led, in many areas (and especially the richer ones) to the emergence of fairly small and tight groups of relatively wealthy and influential peasants and capitalist farmers whose relations to government staff were much closer than those of the mass of the peasantry. Thus in order to implement a policy of rural producer co-operation in the more highly populated areas, staff would have had to act against precisely the group which they had been holding up as an example of modernity to the rest of the population. Since the degree of 'communality' is in any case hard to measure, it is scarcely surprising under the circumstances that administrators tended to place more emphasis elsewhere.

The extent of internal democracy is even more difficult to measure, especially since one of its major forms of expression is likely to be criticism of the activities of administrators. It might be thought that at least economic viability is relatively easy to measure, but few government staff receive training in economic evaluation, while the whole financial practice of governmental bodies militates strongly against it. The very mode in which government accounts are presented makes it almost impossible to evaluate the economic viability of any government-run project. This is still more the case when government inputs are provided for a non-government institution. Finally the democratic self-development of peasants is something antagonistic if not incomprehensible to bureaucratic modes of thought. Most administrators have imbibed liberal doses of elitism and 'modernization' ideology with their education, during the colonial period, and this has been reinforced by their job-training
especially for extension officers). This tells them that they are the bearers of modernity to a traditional peasantry, who will resist their innovations through conservatism and ignorance. Acceptance of the 'traditional-modern' framework leads to an uncritical attitude towards all 'innovations' since they are by definition 'modern'. Thus failure by peasants to 'adapt' leads not to critical scrutiny of the innovations and of their relevance but is seen simply as further evidence of the ignorance and stupidity of the peasants, and so often leads to the use of more coercive and heavy-handed methods of policy implementation. This in turn gives rise to further peasant alienation, expressed either as apathy or as passive resistance (frying cotton-seeds, planting cassava upside-down), once again misinterpreted as dumb stupidity. 'Resistance to innovation' thus certainly exists but as a function of the self-reinforcing antagonistic relations between peasant and bureaucrat rather than as a result of 'traditionalism.' This should not be seen simply as a result of faulty education and of the imposition of an incorrect 'model'. Such notions correspond closely with the self-interest of the bureaucrat as a member of the educated class, and this mode of operation is one of the means by which he maintains his superior status both in his own eyes and in those of the peasants. Thus education, training and class interest coincide to produce a distrust of peasant capabilities and a mode of operation likely to reinforce this.

Villagization Policies
In brief, the implementation of ujamaa through government administration set in train pressures for its redefinition which removed the emphasis on the co-operative and democratic aspects, and placed the stress on villagization. This was both more congenial and more comprehensible to the average administrator. Indeed villagization was a longstanding policy dating from colonial times when its major purpose was control of the population as well as the provision of services. In fact, as is well known, there was a move away from nucleated settlement during the colonial period. Colonial administrators tended to attribute this to the Pax Britannica and to less need for self-defence, and to the development of cash cropping and the consequent desire of farmers to live on their larger holdings. But a major motive was the avoidance of colonial control and exploitation. Since living in villages increased the chances of being called for forced labour and of being assessed for tax, as well as the imposition of a myriad of irksome regulations, there was good reason for this. Moreover although a good deal of the legislation was repealed at independence, the relation between peasant and bureaucrat had already been formed so that similar forces still operated, though perhaps with lesser force.

Since administrators measured success largely in terms of the number of villages set up, and saw the purpose of these largely in terms of the nucleation of population for provision of services and the extension of control, this naturally directed attention towards the less developed and populated areas of the country. This had the further advantage for staff that it avoided troublesome questions about the transfer of land already in cultivation (especially by larger farmers). Since it was clear that self-initiation of villages could be a slow process and since the chosen mode of implementation was administrative,
there had to be specific incentives to get peasants to join ujamaa villages. One incentive could have been careful planning and education to show peasants how they could develop themselves through co-operation. But this required knowledge, skills, time and patience which were not available. Moreover a substantial number of administrators were themselves doubtful whether it could work. In the event, the simpler incentives of carrot and stick prevailed.

The Planning Process
There is no question that the successful planning of several thousand ujamaa villages in a multitude of different ecological and socio-economic situations would be a mammoth undertaking under any circumstances. In the event, it was made even harder by a tendency to ignore the views of the only people who had any first hand experience of those conditions; the peasants themselves. There was no time for this, and few administrators considered their views to be valuable. So planning teams and experts laid out plans of varying degrees of complexity. Sometimes they consisted merely of production targets. In other cases, they included physical plans (especially to get dwellings lined up tidily). Sometimes they were primarily budget plans enumerating the various forms of assistance to be provided by government and the Rural Development Bank. In very few cases however were plans made which included assessment of feasibility (primarily labour availability at peak periods) or of economic viability. Even where the former was assessed, the calculations tended to ignore the amount of time which villagers would spend on private plots, while the latter was very hard to assess given government accounting methods and the importance of inputs provided from outside the village. In many cases there emerged a process which von Freyhold has called "planning as bargaining". Administrators present villagers with a plan which is primarily a set of production targets, and make the allocation of physical inputs and social services dependent upon acceptance of this plan. The villagers know that to argue the merits of the plan is likely to displease the bureaucrat and reduce the likelihood of their getting assistance. Consequently they tend to accept the plan even if they knew that they cannot fulfil the targets (and may have no intention of doing so). This has a number of adverse effects upon village organization. If the villagers feel that the plan is not feasible, they are not likely to take it seriously, especially since they come to learn that much of their material income depends on acquiescence rather than productivity. The effect on the administrators is similarly adverse. Those who really try to do a conscientious job become frustrated with the peasants, and may in future attempt more coercive methods. Those who want a quiet life continue the charade. In all cases dependency rather than self-reliance is the likely result. Having in this way rather generally set the scene, the variety of ujamaa villages can briefly be discussed under a few main categories.

Self-Initiated Villages
A number of villages were initiated by the peasants themselves, or by groups of TANU Youth League members seeking to form co-operative farms. While these were often assisted (though sometimes obstructed) by government and party officials, they were and are genuine attempts
at self-reliant co-operative development. Examples of this type of village would be Litowa and other villages of the former Ruvuma Development Association, Mbambara and other TANU Youth League initiated villages, and a number of other villages scattered around the country. They have had their problems, one of which seems to have been excessive reliance on the leadership of individuals of strong personality. There is nothing wrong with this in itself. But if strong communal institutions are not built, this dependence can lead to great problems when the leader leaves the village for whatever reason. In general however, such villages, together with some others formed under joint peasant and party initiative, seem to have been the most successful in building the basis for self-reliant co-operative communities. Attitudes of administrators have been varied and ambiguous, but in general they have tried to extend the area of outside control, often with rather negative effects on the development of the village. Nevertheless, such villages remain the core of ujamaa policy and express its self-reliant facet.

Ujamaa through Signpainting
The easiest way in which officials could achieve the growth of ujamaa was by changing the titles of existing villages and settlement schemes. In most cases where 'traditional' villages 'went ujamaa' there were some minimum requirements for communal production, though often not very large. In the cases of settlement schemes, there was often already some 'communal' production, in that crops were cultivated at village level by machinery, for reasons of economies of scale. In such cases no change was required. Thus Upper Kitete Settlement Scheme became Upper Kitete Ujamaa Village without any substantive change to its mode of operation. It has been a showpiece settlement (close to the main tourist routes) and continued so as an ujamaa village. In both cases, it has received a far more than proportionate share of available resources for agricultural investment.

Villagization through Material Inducement
Perhaps the most common way of building ujamaa villages through administrative action was to offer various material inducements for people to join, in the form of social services, subsidies or grants of equipment or even food. The provision of services was a perfectly logical extension of the definition of ujamaa in terms of villagization, for economies in the provision of services are the major real advantage from nucleation of the population. Nor is there anything inherently wrong with the provision of needed items of equipment or of material inducements if properly used. Problems arise however when one considers how they have sometimes been used, and what they are an incentive toward.

In the first place, they may substitute for, rather than supplement any viable plan for how the village is to improve the level of living of its members through increased productivity. Related to this is the fact that when equipment is provided free of charge, it is likely to be used by the villagers as if it was a free good; rational from their own point of view but often very wasteful socially. In particular it may be used to substitute for available labour resources rather than complementing them for greater production. This merely reflects the fact that if
villagization *per se* is the goal, then the administrators are not likely to be over-concerned with the economics of the exercise.

But the allocation of resources also constitutes a method by which control may be exerted, not simply to get people into villages but to secure their acquiescence in government policy once there. This relates to the whole process of 'planning as bargaining' and induces dependency, as indeed it is intended to. Villagers come to depend for their livelihood as much on government assistance and handouts as on production and turn their attention to manipulation of the officials (as they see it) rather than trying to form a viable community. This leaves them extremely vulnerable when the aid eventually stops, as was demonstrated on all those Village Settlements whose assistance was terminated when the programme ceased.

This is not to say that material assistance should not be given. Of course it will be necessary. But more moderate levels of assistance in conjunction with careful planning could give far better results both in terms of short-term viability and in laying the basis for long term development. Even in the case of social services, political mobilization with careful planning and the use of low cost methods could allow their provision at a fraction of the money cost. This would rely on the labour of the villagers themselves and not, as is all too often the case, on hired labour. Sadly enough it is quite common for even unskilled labour to be hired for the construction of social capital in *ujamaa* villages. This is a sure sign that efforts to mobilize the villagers have failed; that they cannot even be bothered to work on social services for their own villages. Here one can clearly see how such a policy not only wastes surplus directly, but may distort the choice of technique. Self-reliant use of the peasants' surplus (off-season) labour would emphasize cash saving techniques, while employment of hired labour at official minimum rates may make a more capital-intensive technique preferable. Briefly then, the provision of government assistance as a material incentive to join *ujamaa* villages, can have markedly negative effects on self-reliance, productivity and internal village democracy if it is used as a bribe for getting villages to join and to secure acquiescence in bureaucratically derived plans. This leads to the reproduction of the Village Settlement pattern and is as wasteful and alienating.

The Use of Coercion

Coercion is recorded as having been tried initially and without success in Handeni District, and there have been other instances, almost invariably in poor and underpopulated areas of the country, where the inhabitants are considered to be more than usually 'backward'. Perhaps the most striking and depressing example of proposed coercion was the call in March 1973 by the Regional Commissioner for Arusha for the compulsory villagization of the Barabaig, a pastoral people, most of whom live in Hanang District. The Barabaig, whose grazing area has been enormously reduced both during and since the colonial period by a steady incursion of farmers, were considered to be lawless, and the stated purpose of villagization was the maintenance of law and order. When criticized in the press, the policy drew forth expressions of support demonstrating the most
abysmal ignorance of the nature of transhumant pastoralism and some crassly colonialist identifications of the Barabaig as ‘ignorant and barbaric’ people whose minds were ‘small’ and ‘undeveloped’.

Indeed there seems to be evidence of an increasing trend towards coercive methods in dealing with pastoralists. This appears to be based on the old colonial misapprehension that pastoralism is a ‘lower’ form of production than agriculture, rather than (as in fact), simply a form adapted to lower and more variable rainfall. In particular, there seems to be an assumption that transhumance (‘nomadism’) is the result of some traditional and irrational love of ‘vagrancy’ rather than a perfectly rational response (and indeed under present conditions, the only one) to low and marginal rainfall. All over the world, transhumant pastoralists migrate in variable but well-prescribed patterns between wet and dry season grazing. The reason is that wet season grazing is only available during that season, while the dry season area is invariably not sufficient for a whole year’s grazing. Misled by colonial racist rubbish about ‘noble savages’ and the supposed superiority of ‘nilo-hamites’, people are apt to miss the point that colonialism stunted and distorted the development of pastoral areas and peoples even more than was the case with most agriculturalists. Major actions were limitations on stock, movements and alienation of important dry-season grazing areas together with veterinary policies designed mainly to safeguard settler cattle. The resulting systems maintain a formal similarity with those of the pre-colonial period, but are in reality the product of a process of under-development. Helping the Masai, Barabaig and other pastoralists to adjust and develop their mode of production is an important task and one which will require considerable ingenuity, since the technical answers are by no means fully known. Even more certainly such a task cannot be achieved without the willing and enthusiastic cooperation of the people themselves, and this will not be aided by contemptuous and ill-informed remarks about their way of life, still less by attempts to force them into ujamaa villages which would bear more resemblance to strategic hamlets.

Kulak Ujamaa
In recent years there has begun to emerge another mode of ‘ujamaa’ development as some far-sighted rich farmers have learned that they can turn ujamaa to their own advantage. In particular this has been used as a method of getting access to land, and as such has been characteristic of high density areas, and areas adjacent to them. Groups of wealthy farmers have formed ‘ujamaa villages’ which are closer in nature to joint stock companies, by dint of which they have been able to get hold of land previously used for other people or purposes. This appears to have happened in parts of Hanang District, with farmers from Mbulu District as prime movers. A number of the ujamaa villages in Kilimanjaro District seem to be rather similar cases, their objective being the abandoned farms of settlers. Sender (1973) has described the same process at work in the Usambaras, where the formation of ujamaa villages acted as a powerful means of access to previously reserved forest land, instigated largely by rich and powerful farmers. This particular development seems to have been mainly characteristic of highland and contiguous lowland areas,
but is also at work elsewhere, with ujamaa serving as a means to get credit and government grants of machinery.

These various 'ideal-types' seem to me fairly accurately to portray some of the general trends in ujamaa implementation, although most villages are an amalgam of more than one. Only the first type can be considered to be fully within the policy as originally stated, though under certain circumstances, the second and third categories may develop towards ujamaa. So long as assistance is not used as a tool of bargaining there is no reason why it should inhibit the growth of internal democratic institutions and thence to genuine ujamaa. Against this, there is a clear tendency on the part of administrators to try to extend the degree of external control of villages. This is not unexpected given the attitudes of bureaucrats towards peasants, and the fact that the major function of bureaucrats and the justification for their existence is control and administration. This control is achieved by the imposition of plans from the outside, usually without effective discussion with the villagers, except perhaps a few 'leaders'. Another means of control is through the implementation of national or local policy objectives, though as already shown there is no firm or consistent basis for many such objectives. The use of credit and grants of money and equipment are obvious means of control, especially since in many areas programmes for ujamaa take the form of export cash crop programmes, as in Chunya (tobacco), Kigoma (cotton), Usambaras and Njombe (tea). Finance for these schemes comes largely from the World Bank, and to a large extent the villages follow the pattern set up by the early tobacco schemes and the Village Settlement programme. That is, they set out to build small islands of 'improved' farming, based on high-valued export crops and with fairly intensive supervision of the production process. The major concession to ujamaa has been to limit the growth of large private farms.

The Frontal Approach to Ujamaa
For the first few years after the enunciation of the ujamaa policy, regions and districts chose their own targets for the number of ujamaa villages to be set up each year. Very generally, the poorer regions spent more time, effort and money on ujamaa than the richer. Over the past three years, policy has changed towards the frontal approach in which whole areas or districts are enrolled in ujamaa villages in a series of major campaigns. In November 1973 it became policy for all peasants in the country to be compulsorily enrolled in ujamaa villages within three years. The various regional and district 'Operations' have been combined within 'Operation Tanzania'. This appears to be a drastic change in direction from early ujamaa, though it serves partly to legitimize what was already an increasingly dominant aspect of policy implementation. For if it was hard to achieve local initiative in the setting up of individual villages, it is almost impossible in a campaign involving many thousands of people. This is still more so when (as seems usually the case) villagization involves moving large numbers of people from the areas they previously inhabited, to others considered more suitable—and moving them over a sufficiently short period that they can harvest their old crops and clear and cultivate new plots. Sometimes there seem to be good reasons for the
move, as in the case of Rufiji, where much of the population of the lower Rufiji valley was moved onto higher ground after floods which had caused widespread death and havoc. Sometimes the reasons for movement are far less clear and seem to derive more from notions of ‘starting afresh’ than from any major advantages of the new areas. In almost all cases, they require major adjustments of production patterns for which neither administrators nor people are prepared. Planning experts have tended to underestimate enormously the complexity of planning production in new settlements, and have in few cases made effective efforts to secure the full agreement of the people, though they have often been able to secure verbal agreement from a few leaders. In Dodoma, the first year’s production plans were largely a failure, and their estimates of water needs and availability were often mistaken. In Rufiji, many villagers continued to cultivate their valley plots in spite of having to walk considerable distances to do so. Ambitious plans for communal cultivation failed for lack of weeding labour, and in subsequent years emphasis shifted toward private production. About the other operations, Chunya, Mbozi and Kigoma, little information is as yet available, except newspaper accounts that movement into villages proceeds apace. But in all cases, the really hard task comes after the people have been moved into villages; to develop viable production systems which are not dependent on government subsidy.

The Frontal Approach is sometimes compared to the forced collectivization of agriculture in Russia during the 1930s, but nothing could be more misleading. Whatever one thinks of the Soviet forced collectivization, and the methods used, it had a clear purpose in squeezing more surplus out of the peasantry for the transformation of the economy in a massive industrialization effort. The policy was successful in the first years in increasing the surplus transferred. But the social costs and retardation of agricultural development were so enormous that the policy was reversed and more political means sought for achieving collectivization. This lesson was clearly learned for no other socialist country attempted enforced total collectivization, including a number of regimes which clearly had no general aversion to the use of force. In Tanzania there is as yet no plan for the overall transformation of the economy, and many of the ujamaa villages are entirely integrated into the previous dependency pattern through the production of expert crops. Still more seriously, the ujamaa policy, far from generating or squeezing more surplus out of the peasants, appears to be a major drain on surplus, and likely to become more so. Fortunately for the Tanzanian peasant, there simply do not exist the means of control and force to implement such a policy.

The Forces of Bureaucracy

It is clear that ujamaa policy as initially projected could play an important role in providing the organizational form and political mobilization for a major effort to increase the generation of surplus. However, the building of ujamaa villages alone could not be considered a fully socialist agricultural policy outside a broader framework for transformation. Even the most democratically-run villages with full producer co-operation continue to maintain and sharpen
the dependence of the economy if they are deployed for the production of export crops. And yet in the absence of a clearly stated policy for transformation and an accompanying plan for the production of raw materials, food and for rural industrialization, it is hard to see what else they could do. Those who accuse the World Bank of distorting the emphasis of ujamaa (as I have done on occasion) perhaps misplace their own emphasis. Continued export cash crop production certainly leads away from socialist transformation. Since ujamaa has merely a vague emphasis on production for the domestic market, without supporting action to develop that market, its own emphasis has remained largely oriented towards export crops. World Bank credit has simply reinforced this trend.

It is also clear that the lack of strategy for transformation has allowed the gradual distortion toward the bureaucratic goal of villagization for the extension of administrative control, and more reasonably, for the provision of social services. Emphasis on transformation of the economy could have checked this tendency since its emphasis would have been on the rapid generation of surplus and increases in productivity. This would have severely limited the amount of resources which could be used to lure peasants into ujamaa villages and would have forced concentration far more on the potential increases in productivity from co-operative production. This would have necessitated much more careful planning and the involvement of the peasants themselves; the only people capable of providing the information on which the planning could be based. It would also have dictated a very different attitude to the peasants since their discontent could not have been bought off by the supply of material goods. In short, those trying to persuade peasants to form ujamaa villages would have to be able to assure them of improvements to their standard of living through their own efforts, and to be able to show in detail how this could come about. Since this would entail discussion of what the peasants wanted and what might obstruct their achievement of such goals, it would necessarily amount to a political approach, and would lay a firm basis for broader political education.

But it would be unrealistic to describe what might have been as though in a political vacuum. The ujamaa policy was changed to conform more closely with the preconceptions and interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who controlled its implementation. Their judgement cannot be considered neutral concerning the question of socialist transformation of the economy. Just as they tend to distrust the intentions and capabilities of peasants so they distrust the major political changes which would have to occur before and during a socialist transformation. Large numbers of democratically controlled ujamaa villages would pose a real threat to their status, and the next logical step—to form democratically elected local councils of village leaders—would go further to threaten their control.

These forces have to hand theories of development which define development as something brought from the outside by 'modernizers' to a 'traditional' sector, duly implemented in the face of the irrational resistance of the latter by a development-oriented administration.
Development is defined as the extension of administrative control and it is hardly surprising to find that even mobilization and politicization are seen to be administrative tasks to be implemented from above. Yet the long-term future for ujamaa depends on the peasants themselves. Some may succeed, against the odds, in building viable and self-reliant co-operative communities, and will then realize that without a planned economy they can not go far beyond increasing agricultural productivity. If the present trend in expenditure on unproductive sectors of the economy continues, they will also probably find themselves paying, through increased levies and margins on their crops, for more closely controlled village development elsewhere. On the other hand, those in the more controlled villages may begin to comprehend and express their alienation and dissatisfaction in more political terms. The Mwongozo provide a good basis for this, though relatively little is said about the structural bases of economic and political exploitation. But this may be too optimistic an assessment. There are many linkages of kinship and patronage in rural societies which obscure overall political tendencies and guide action into manipulative channels. Similarly, government assistance can be manipulated to secure acquiescence.

POSTSCRIPT—EARLY 1975
This paper was written in late 1973 for an East African audience, and there has been no time for the complete re-writing which would be needed for its presentation to a wider audience in 1975. I have no basic disagreement with what I then wrote but would like to add brief notes on more recent developments and on the direction in which I think analysis is needed.

Developments in 1974
The bureaucratic distortion of ujamaa into villagization has been more rapid in 1974 than previously. President Nyerere's orders in November 1973 that the whole rural population was to be living in villages by the end of 1976 was widely interpreted to mean that it would be even better if they could be moved before that period. 1974 saw an unprecedented number of 'operations' in most districts. In most places, even the word 'ujamaa' has been dropped in favour of 'development' villages, and requirements for any communal production have given way to the block-farming of the earlier village settlement programme.

The implementation of the policy has revealed some of the more frightening recesses of the bureaucratic mind. In few cases has any trouble been taken to find out about or to plan for the local environment or system of production. There is considerable variety in the type, size and planning of villages, but so far as any common direction can be discerned it is that villages should be built along roads, at high density and usually with the houses in straight lines. This has been done regardless of whether the roads pass directly through areas of fertile soil or easily available water, which they often do not since road-builders tend to look for gravelly soils and to avoid crossing water courses where possible. People have often been moved from their previous areas of cultivation to new land of unknown quality.
Force has been liberally used in the movement of those who will not go 'voluntarily' and in the destruction of houses outside the prescribed areas (to make sure that peasants do not move out of the villages and back to their old homes). In some cases this has involved absurdities like the destruction of houses which are as little as ten yards out of the prescribed straight line. In others people have been moved over 20 miles from their previous homes. The removals have been accompanied by a mass of directives, orders and laws to cover other aspects of life and agricultural production. Because of drought, the disorganization of the distributive system, and probably villagization, 1974 was a year of food shortage which had to be alleviated by major food imports. While primary producer prices for food crops have been raised (though no more than all other prices), the main thrust of policy for increased food production has been through the law. Colonial laws dating from the 1930s, specifying minimum acreages of food and cash crops have been re-activated and penalties imposed for contravention. The drinking of locally brewed (but seldom bottled) beer has been forbidden except at the weekends. In some areas rural markets have been closed except at weekends, to give more time for cultivation, disregarding the fact that since they operated on a rotational basis this implies the closing down of some markets and in consequence more time must be spent by peasants going to more distant markets to buy or sell. In some areas the rural (or even urban) Tanzanian must carry an identity card (kitambulisho) stating that he has fulfilled his allotted acreage and/or has a job and/or has attended literacy courses and/or has permission to travel outside his village. Without this, he can in some cases be refused entry to or put out of a market, bus or even private vehicle. Needless to say, not all, or even any, of these regulations are in operation in all parts of the country. Nevertheless, their incidence is quite widespread.

It is hard to say at present what the result of all this activity will be, since the main harvest of 1975 has not yet come. It seems unlikely to call forth the desired increases in production, and there are some indications that officially marketed production of crops may fall as peasants defer investment in permanent and export crops for fear that they may be moved again and decide to maintain home stocks of food crops against that eventuality.
The outlook for a planned socialist environment within which to set rural policy does not seem good. At the regional level, planning has been carried on by at least fifteen different expatriate teams from different countries and agencies (in one of which the author has been involved), operating under widely differing assumptions and almost entirely uncoordinated from the centre. With the national Five Year Plan due for publication in less than four months, it is still impossible to get any but the vaguest (and unofficial) estimates of the funds available for expenditure in various sectors and regions.

Notes for Analysis
The paper attempts no very deep analysis of the nature of the bureaucratic ruling class or its activities, and none will be attempted here. This note simply indicates what I feel to be important lines to follow. It is perfectly clear that Tanzania is a class society and that the ruling 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' entrenches itself increasingly with every year. Analysis of this class was initiated several years ago, and ranged between the qualified optimism of Saul and others, who felt that there was at least sufficient chance of progressive developments to make 'optimism of the will' a reasonable basis for analysis, and Shivji, who felt that the bureaucratic bourgeoisie was already fully entrenched. Since it clearly is entrenched, the ground has now shifted to a discussion of how directly self-conscious the bureaucratic class is, and how closely its actions mirror its immediate class interests.

One view is that the actions of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie do very closely mirror its class interests. Thus the most recent villagization operations are seen as a deliberate attempt to distort policy and to wreck socialism as represented by ujamaa. I feel that this view is oversimplified and invalid. In the first place, it is not entirely clear that it distorts official policy as presently expressed from the highest levels. More importantly, any socialist aspects of ujamaa (initially utopian socialist or populist rather than marxist) had already been effectively eliminated some years ago. What remains can hardly be considered threatening to the bureaucracy since it involves the steady accretion of bureaucratic controls over most aspects of the economy and society. At a more subjective level, this supposedly clear and self-interested attitude seems not to portray accurately the opinions of most bureaucrats on villagization. These appear to range between a militaristic enthusiasm which enjoys the display of power involved in the move to villages and a resigned pessimism which considers that 'politics' is the ultimate cause of all problems (shauri ya siasa bwana).

I have no intention of offering the alternative, more subtle, analysis which I think is needed. It seems to me however that two points are important. Firstly, insufficient attention has thus far been paid to the analysis of the specifics of a bureaucratic ruling class in Tanzania and its differences in aims and modes of operation from those of a capitalist bourgeoisie operating in a market economy with the assistance of a subordinate bureaucracy. The second and related point is that the rather simplistic view cited above fails to take account of the self-mystification of the bureaucracy by its own ideology. In
spite of the veneer of socialism, this has its roots so deep in modernization theory and the various suppositions which accompany operation within a bureaucratic hierarchy, that sane and intelligent men can really believe that the present compulsory villagization operation and the re-imposed colonial regulations, will achieve socialism and/or development. Nor can this false consciousness be considered entirely and directly self-serving since it is hard to see that the policy serves the economic interests of anyone in Tanzania, cutting as it does at the productive base which provides the entire surplus on which the class exists. Certainly it does serve to entrench the bureaucracy more deeply as the master of Tanzania but it does not necessarily contribute to its economic well-being.

Bibliographic Notes:

On Tanzania policy declarations see:


On class relations in the countryside and in Ujamaa implementations see:

On recent developments see:

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Peasants and Bureaucrats

Andrew Coulson

This account of the sequence of Ujamaa policy implementation from 1968 to 1974 is the second half of an article prepared in Tanzania which asked: 'Can a government bureaucracy bring about development?' It traces chronologically the rise and decline of the strategy of Ujamaa and self-reliance, and complements Raikes' analysis, and Tabari's review.

President Nyerere has often argued that development cannot come from outsiders, that people can only develop themselves:

The ujamaa village is a new conception, based on the post-Arusha Declaration understanding that what we need to develop is people, not things, and that people can only develop themselves. No-one can be forced into a ujamaa village. For if these things happen—that is if an outsider gives such instructions and enforces them—then it will no longer be an ujamaa village.

In the same policy paper Freedom and Development he also explained that many mistakes had been made and that it was very important that the right lessons should be learnt from these mistakes:

When we tried to promote rural development in the past we sometimes spent huge sums of money on establishing a settlement. In other cases we just encouraged young men to leave the towns for a rural area and then left them to their own devices. We acted on the assumption that there was a short cut to rural development in these rural areas. All too often, therefore, we persuaded people to go to the new settlements by promising them that they could quickly grow rich there, or that Government would give them services and equipment which they could not hope to receive either in the towns or in their traditional farming places. In very few cases was any ideology involved; we thought and talked in terms of greatly increased output, and of things being provided for the settlers.

He also emphasised that ujamaa living would have to start—as in
China—with small groups of people rather than large villages:

The policy is, in fact, the result from learning from the failures which we have had and from the successes of those small groups which began and grew on a different basis.

And he writes about a possible village with only 7 members:

... the decision to start must be made by the people themselves—and it must be made by each individual. For if a group of 20 people discuss the idea and only 7 decide to go ahead, then that ujamaa village will consist of 7 people at the beginning, if 15 decide to start, then it will begin with 15... There is no other way forward, because... 5 who come in unwillingly can destroy the efforts of 15 who want to work out a new pattern for themselves.

Such statements as these coming out in a Presidential paper will amaze anyone who reads the newspapers in 1974. For by then the approved size of a village was 300-500 families, more than a million people had moved to new villages in one Region alone (and similar movements had occurred in most other regions) and most of them had moved within the space of a few months, and the newspaper reports proved that many of these moves were not voluntary.

How was such a complete change from the 1968 statements possible? The only way to understand this is to examine historically how the ujamaa programme developed. The following is a summary of the most important changes in the way ujamaa approached:

April, 1962. Publications of the President's pamphlet *Ujamaa—The Basis of African Socialism*, proposing that all development must be based on the attitude of mind (Ujamaa) of the 'traditional' African extended family.

December, 1962. Nyerere's inaugural address as President: 'The first and absolutely essential thing to do, therefore, if we want to be able to start using tractors for cultivation, is to begin living in proper villages... For the next few years the Government will be doing all it can to enable the farmers of Tanganyika to come together in village communities'.

1962 and 1963. A mass (about 1000) of spontaneous settlement schemes sprang up all over Tanzania. About half of these were under the leadership of the TANU Youth League, and about a third of the total tried to grow sisal. They had the enthusiasm of pioneers. The Ruvuma Development Association which inspired many of the ideas in the President's 1967 papers dates from this period.

1963–1965. Problems of the spontaneous schemes led to a belief that change must be planned. The bureaucracy could not supervise so many projects, and agriculture proved tougher than many settlers had expected. So the Government abandoned the spontaneous schemes, and concentrated on supervised settlement schemes of which there were never more than 40.

but never published) had made it clear that the 40 settlement schemes had been a disastrous waste of resources, being over-capitalised, badly planned, and through spoon-feeding the settlers (e.g. by providing them with too much free food).

January, 1967. The Arusha Declaration put the emphasis on self-reliance, at a national level (gifts and loans will endanger our independence), and at a local level (hard work is the root of development).

September, 1967. The President's Paper, *Socialism and Rural Development* made Ujamaa the official policy of the country (Tanzanian socialism must be firmly based on the land and its workers. We shall achieve the goals we have set ourselves if the basis of Tanzanian life consists of rural economic and social communities where people live together and work together for the good of all). It was implied that the peasants themselves would start the villages.

1968. A few villages were started, but often (as in Handeni and West Lake) they were started by enthusiastic local politicians using force or threats of force. In October, therefore, the President issued the paper *Freedom and Development*. (No one can be forced into an Ujamaa village).

1969. In March Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1969 directed that 'All Government policies, and the activities and decisions of all Government officials, must therefore be geared towards emphasising the advantages of living together and working together for the good of all'. This policy change was fully reflected in the Second Five Year Plan for Tanzania which started in July 1969. From this time on all Government Departments started placing as many of their projects as they could in ujamaa villages.

The Regional Development Fun was made available for financing small projects in ujamaa villages. Government staff could therefore promise provision of services to any group willing to work together and call itself an ujamaa village. The Government staff thus became the main initiators of ujamaa villages. But this method of starting villages broke any link that might have existed between success in production and receipts of aid—many unproductive and rather uncommitted villages received lots of aid. 1969 also saw the start of Operation Rufiji, whose idea was to move the whole population of the lower Rufiji floodplain into higher ground not so near the river, and the banning of the Ruvuma Development Association by the Central Committee of TANU, ostensibly for acting as a focus of opposition to the Party but perhaps for being too self-reliant and acting independently of the Government and the Party bureaucracy.

1970. Concerned about the number of new villages, and their apparent lack of organisation and planning, the President sent Presidential Planning Teams to the areas where there were many villages. Many members of these teams lacked local experience (though they were all Tanzanian), and they only had time to stay for a few days at most in each village. The plans they produced therefore consisted (mainly) of over-enthusiastic targets, and long lists of 'aids'
to be given to the villages by Government departments. Three of the planning teams were sent to Dodoma where Operation Dodoma was conceived to solve the problems of Dodoma Region by moving all the people in the region into planned villages near water supplies. Under the dynamic (but somewhat authoritarian) leadership of the Regional Commissioner, Dr. Klerruu, 750 villages were started in Mtwar Region.

1971. Over 30,000 Gogo families moved into 190 villages in Dodoma. The villages were very large, two villages having more than 500 families. The Government ploughed 21,000 acres for them by tractor, but cultivation and harvesting were to be individual. Dr. Klerruu, was transferred from Mtwar to Iringa, where, by the end of the year, 629 new villages had been started (there were only 22 in December 1970). He attempted to confront the African capitalist maize farmers of Ismani, and one of them shot him on Christmas Day, 1971.

1972. More Operations were launched in Chunya and Kigoma, and decentralisation measures implemented in July 1972 put many of the most able and experienced Government staff into the regions, where one of their main tasks was to organise Operations. However, there were problems with communal production—in some of the Rufiji villages which had been registered as Producer Cooperatives (the most advanced type of ujamaa village) there was in fact no communal production at all. The tendency in such places was to emphasise block-farming and no longer to attempt communal agriculture. These trends, were re-enforced by the Iringa Declaration (Siasi ni Kilimo) of May 1972 which was heavily technocratic in orientation—stressed the need to raise productivity and how this could be done using simple technology, but it put little emphasis on communal work.

1973. Operations were implemented over all the low-density areas of the country, with de-emphasis of ujamaa and emphasis on Development Villages or Songambele Villages (after the Regional Commissioner who started Operation Rufiji and was by then starting villages in Shinyanga). Mwalimu announced that village should have up to 500 families, and then on November 6 that 'To live in Villages is an Order'—to be carried out by the end of 1976. Meanwhile in 1973 Tanzania imported over 25,000 tons of maize. This was partly a consequence of drought, but also caused by loss of marketed production from such areas as Ismani where the operations had been implemented.

1974. The order was carried out with great speed (by October the Mwanza leaders were able to announce that in their region more than one million peasants had moved into planned villages). There were cases of destruction of property and use of force. One of the main requirements for the new villages was to be along main roads—and this was implemented regardless of the consequences for agriculture—in Karagwe where the roads run along the tops of hills people were moved from the fertile valleys where they cultivated to the tops of hills, while in nearby Kibondo where the road ran at the bottom of fertile hills people were moved from the hills to the valleys. In Mwanza houses were built on the most fertile cotton lands, and in many areas (Sumbawanga) people were moved to land around
missions or water supplies which was of poor fertility and away from the distant areas where the soil was better and from where most of surplus production came. The Rufiji move was also liable to upset the effective use of parts of the flood-plain—some of the potentially most productive land in the country. Meanwhile the country was importing 1,200 million/Shs worth of food for the period March 1974—September 1975 and on 15 August the President warned that food imports would be impossible the next year as there would not be enough foreign exchange. As food plantings fell most districts re-activated colonial bye-laws to enforce minimum acreages (in Dodoma farmers were to have identity cards issued by TANU to show that they had cultivated 6 acres for each wife and nobody would be allowed to use buses, trains or planes without the identity card). In the Western regions plans were made for 'Runaway Villagers to be sent Home'. The foreign exchange situation was deteriorating. In October the National Executive Committee members went to the Regions to assess the moves, and their likely effect on food supplies.

The conclusions from this are very simple:

1. For most of the period the initiative to start villages did not come from the villagers. It came from the politicians and from the staff. The exceptions to this were the 1962-63 period of spontaneous settlement schemes, and (to a lesser extent) the 1968-69 period after the publication of *Freedom and Development*. But in each the spontaneous movements were taken over by ‘planning’—in 1964 by planned settlement schemes and in 1970 by the Government’s ujamaa planning teams.

2. From 1968 onwards there were instances of the use of force to start villages. But between 1969 and 1971 it was largely replaced by the bait of social services. After 1971 the main thrust of villagization was threats of force.

3. The original aim was (a) to provide a happier life for people by living together and (b) to increase production by working together. But many peasants were hesitant about the first, and the second did not work (as can be seen conclusively by the fact that the Government had to pass minimum acreage laws to compel farmers to cultivate *individually*—if communal production had succeeded they would instead have been passing laws to *limit* individual production instead of expanding it).

4. But we have seen that individual peasant production has no dynamic to transform the economy. The use of force is therefore bound to fail. It will never lead to the sort of enthusiasm among the peasantry that for example has led Chinese and North Vietnamese peasants to transform their environments while waiting for the products from industry to change their techniques and uplift their standards of living. It is much more likely to lead to the sort of passive resistance which characterised the Soviet forced collectivisation from the top. (The Soviet Union with some of the best wheat land in the world is importing food to this day, 57
years after its revolution and 40 years after collectivisation was complete.)

5. The use of promises of aid or provision of social services is also bound to fail, since production will not rise fast enough to pay for the social services.

6. Increased prices paid to the producers of agricultural crops (especially food crops) have a role to play. But in the 1974 situation they cannot succeed alone, because they could only transfer a substantial amount of purchasing power to the peasants by taking it away from the non-productive classes and the workers, and these classes will not allow this. If purchasing power is given to the peasants without taking it away from somewhere else the only result will be shortages of everything that the peasants want to buy, more and faster inflation, and even more disillusionment among the peasants. This is in addition to the well-established argument that it would mean encouraging rural capitalism and class formation, and would therefore be self-defeating in the long run.

There is, therefore, inevitably a struggle ahead. The peasants have to liberate themselves—or to be liberated. This struggle may be directed in the first instance against their most obvious exploiters in the cooperatives, in order to get higher incomes for the rural producers, but also against the bureaucratic class which continues to use up the surplus unproductively. It might lead to yet another attempt to establish capitalist development, but this development would not be independent, nor could it possibly succeed, as Nyerere himself has pointed out in *The Rational Choice*. The alternatives is to build socialism from below, which means starting with small groups of politicised peasants who will have to march largely on their own. The groups of cooperating farmers have to be small enough to trust and discipline each other. The bureaucracy will have to be drastically reduced in size, and rural development will not be seen as coming about by Government staff or Government money, but by people who combine together to build a new life. Even this cannot succeed without sensible industrialisation plans. But the logic of the present situation is that the only immediate hope for socialism in Tanzania is a cultural revolution.
The Labour Aristocracy? Ghana Case Study

Richard Jeffries

Does the African working class constitute a labour aristocracy, absorbing a significant proportion of the surplus, and identifying with the elites and sub-elites in the civil service and expatriate concerns? This thesis is tested against Ghanaian material, in particular the 1961 strike of railway and harbour workers in Sekondi-Takoradi.

Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul have suggested that the economic interests and political affinities of the African proletariat on the one hand, and the post-independence elites on the other, have become increasingly complementary in the course of economic development. Both groups join in expropriating the economic surplus generated by the rural peasantry, the main (even the sole) productive force and the poorest, potentially most revolutionary class in African societies. The main polarisation of interests occurs between two economic sectors, urban and rural, rather than within one mode of production. The mass of unskilled labourers in African cities are to be regarded as peasantry temporarily engaged in wage-employment rather than part of the urban proletariat proper. As far as skilled and semi-skilled workers are concerned, on the other hand:

Higher wages and salaries... foster the stabilisation of the better-paid section of the labour force whose high incomes justify the severance of ties with the traditional economy. Stabilisation, in turn, promotes specialisation, greater bargaining power, and further increases in the incomes of this small section of the labour force, which represents the proletariat proper of tropical Africa. These workers enjoy incomes three or more times higher than those of unskilled labourers and together with the elites and sub-elites in bureaucratic employment in the civil service and expatriate concerns, constitute what we call the labour aristocracy of tropical Africa. It is the discretionary consumption of this class which absorbs a significant proportion of the surplus produced in the money economy.

(Arrighi and Saul 1968: 149)
In this paper, I shall examine the thesis in relation to the skilled railway and harbour workers of Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana. While the real income levels of this group are not nearly so high compared to the peasantry or unskilled labourers to justify their description as a labour aristocracy, they are admittedly part of the better-paid, relatively secure section of the manual working-class. Yet it is precisely this group which has consistently, thus far, proved the most radical 'mass' force in Ghanian politics. Moreover, any notion that they are generally perceived within their society as a labour aristocracy is clearly belied by the widespread support their major strike actions have received from other urban mass groupings looking to them for expression of political protest against the increasingly inequitable socio-economic structure. Railway workers throughout Africa have tended to display a quite exceptional level of militancy and radical political consciousness. Furthermore, instances such as the 1964 General Strike in Nigeria and the September 1971 demonstrations in Ghana do indicate that other workers are prepared to challenge the dominant classes in particularly galvanising circumstances.

Surplus Appropriation and Income Equality
Arrighi and Saul focus on two main dimensions of class structure, the pattern of surplus appropriation and income inequality. Their analysis refers implicitly (most clearly in its consideration of 'proletarianisation') to the social and cultural relations of workers to other classes. In each respect the term labour aristocracy seriously misrepresents the position of skilled manual workers in Ghana's developing social structure.

In the first place, it is far too simple to suggest that only the peasantry produce any significant economic surplus, and that all urban wage-earners take part in expropriating this surplus. While it is certainly true that the Ghanian economy is highly dependent on the production and export of cocoa, the transport and service industries are hardly less important to cocoa's arrival on the international market than its actual cultivation. It is simply perverse to suggest that skilled manual workers, even if in government employment, (as distinct from executive officials in the state bureaucracy and enterprises) are essentially non-productive. It is important to recognise the existence of serious economic conflict within both urban and rural sectors of production as well as between them. If the rural producers are more directly exploited by the buyers and distributors of agricultural produce, the urban poor also suffer indirectly from excessive profit-making on the part of rural-urban entrepreneurs. More important, Ghana's manual wage-earners, including the skilled workers, are opposed to the politicians and bureaucrats over the pattern of distribution of the national surplus, and over the failure to curb corrupt practices by state officials, to the detriment of both rural producers and urban poor.

Saul and Arrighi include skilled workers in that class which enjoy incomes 'three or more times higher than those of unskilled labourers'. This generalisation is based on East African experience. In Kenya and Uganda, the large majority of skilled workers are employed in capital-intensive, multi-national manufacturing enterprises. The ability and
willingness of these enterprises to pay high wages to attract and stabilize a skilled labour force results, they suggest, in a spiral process with governments and private employers becoming increasingly concerned to win over skilled workers from one sector to the other.

In Ghana, in contrast, a majority of the country's skilled workers have been employed in government industries or public corporations. In the absence of a serious labour shortage, the private industries have tended to follow government's lead in keeping wage rates down, though the wage rates for skilled workers in large-scale private enterprises have still been slightly higher than for government employees. Consequently, the differential ratio between skilled and unskilled workers' wage rates has not significantly widened since the 1920s and remains at something less than 2:1. In the Railway Administration, for example, the average earnings of skilled workers stood at NC.39 (£16.25) in 1970 compared to the national minimum wage of NC.21 (£8.75) and the actual average earnings for unskilled railway workers of approximately NC.24 (£10).

Considered as a single group, the real wage levels of skilled and unskilled manual workers underwent a serious and fairly continuous decline between 1939 and 1968.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Index of Real Minimum Wage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>1967</td>
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<td>1953</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>93</td>
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</table>


The 1950s provided a temporary exception to this tendency, with real wage rates rising back to the 1939 level and slightly above it by 1961. But a number of points need to be noted here. Firstly, the 1939 level was hardly considered 'aristocratic' for skilled workers, or even 'the bare minimum' for the unskilled, by those best qualified to judge. Captain Dickinson, the Gold Coast Government's first Labour Officer, estimated that the 1939 level 'is now on the level of 1914, and it is certain that the cost of living has risen since then', while he described the ordinary labourer as living 'in a sort of secondary poverty'. Secondly, the increase in real incomes which the railway artisans, together with other skilled and unskilled workers, enjoyed in these years did not prevent their becoming steadily more resentful...
of the growing self-enrichment and autocracy of the C.P.P. leadership. Finally, the 1950s wage increases were largely the product of successful pressurising activity by the unions on a relatively weak pre-independence government. Once more firmly in the saddle, the C.P.P. plutocracy proved unwilling to accept skilled or unskilled labour as even the most junior of partners.

The Mills-Odoi Commission estimated that between 1960 and 1966 the value of the minimum wage fell by some 45 per cent, and acknowledged that the living standards of unskilled labourers in the latter year were distressingly low. The Commission considered it doubtful whether their real incomes compared favourably with those of hired farm labourers. During 1968-71, government's refusal to grant a wage increase in spite of continuing inflation meant a further serious deterioration in the real incomes of the lower paid wage-earners. While the precise extent of this is difficult to calculate, some indication is provided by the N.R.C. Government's recent decision to double the minimum wage.

The skilled manual workers have, of course, been consistently better paid than either unskilled workers or hired farm labour, but it is highly debatable whether they have been (or are) relatively privileged compared to the mass of the peasantry. It is extremely difficult to generalise about real rural incomes, partly because of the shortage of reliable data on the subject, partly because what data we do possess indicates immense differences in income between large and small farmers, and between average incomes in the different regions. In a recent article, Keith Hinchcliffe has exposed the unjustified assumptions underlying most estimates of the average urban-rural differential. Utilising exceptionally reliable and detailed statistics on the earnings of the main labouring groups in Northern Nigeria and a highly sophisticated comparative procedure, he concludes that, with the exception of the post-secondary school educated, urban workers are very unlikely to be much better off than their farming brothers. While the following assessment is admittedly based on rough approximations, the substantial applicability of Hinchcliffe's conclusion to the case of Ghana is nevertheless clear.

Polly Hill has clearly illustrated the thoroughly capitalist structure of Ghanaian cocoa production, and the early development of a large, imported hired-labour force to work on the cocoa farms. In consequence, economic differentiation within the rural populace has already proceeded to a degree where the notion of a single peasant class is transparently inappropriate. Some indication of this is provided by Kodwo Ewusi's calculation of the distribution of income among cocoa farmers in 1963-64.

The Table on the next page clearly reveals the development of a class of extremely large, wealthy farmers some of whom earn as much as NC.12,000 per annum.

How then, to generalise about rural-urban differentials? The difficulty is compounded by the tendency for different sizes and kinds of farmer to be located in different parts of the country. If we take the
Eastern Region as the median, however, in conformity with Dr. Blair Rourke's recent observations on regional differentials, information on the relative incomes of rural and urban households is provided by a survey conducted by Mr. Dutta-Roy. This suggested an average imputed income for rural families of NC.33 a month in 1967, compared to NC.37 for urban families, and Margaret Peil's figure of NC.36 for skilled workers in Takaradi in the same year. In calculating urban real incomes, moreover, one should take into account the higher costs incurred by many wage-earners in supporting dependants in the city.

Moreover, any such difference cannot but appear trivial in the light of the huge and growing gap between the mass of low income earners and the elite of politicians and salary-earners. By 1968-71, as the Ghana TUC leadership has frequently pointed out, the differential ratio between the lowest and highest-paid employees in government service was in the proportion of 1:39. The annual income of the general manager of the Railway Administration in 1971 was NC.6,792, whereas the skilled workers' starting point was NC.402. The political elite were even more highly paid than the senior civil servants. The Progress Party government (1969-72) decided to pay its ministers NC.14,000 with additional allowances of NC.4,000. When one also considers the relatively low rate of income tax imposed on the higher income group, and the prevalence of self-enrichment through corruption, the picture is further confirmed of a Ghanian class disproportionately rich even by western standards.

Post-independence development in Ghana has resulted, moreover, in a large increase in the elite's proportionate share of national wealth. According to the estimates of Kodwo Ewusi: in 1955 the upper 6 per cent of wage and salary earners received 12.9 per cent of the total national income; in 1962 the upper 5.1 per cent received 20.3 per cent; and in 1968 the upper 4.6 per cent accounted for 24.7 per cent.

Thus neither the class situation, nor the income levels of industrial workers relative to senior officials and politicians on one hand, and farmers on the other, justify the label of 'labour aristocracy'.

Status, Mobility and Patronage
The skilled workers of Ghana are most accurately categorised as a
relatively secure section of the lower income group; their depiction as a distinct labour aristocracy serves primarily as a stratagem of governing elites to foster division in the ranks of the poor and to divert attention from the major economic inequalities. Three main income groups may be distinguished in the wage sector:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>% of Employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower (NC1-800)</td>
<td>80.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle (NC800-2,400)</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper (NC2,400 and above)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Uwusi.

This classification corresponds closely to the perceptions of most skilled workers interviewed by the present writer: they generally distinguish between 'those big men', 'comfortable people' and 'us poor'. This view reflects increasingly apparent differences in life-chances, consumption patterns and social habits. Whereas the skilled workers' income, even if twice as high as that of the unskilled worker, barely enables him to subsist on basic home-produced foodstuffs, the incomes of the middle and upper classes are sufficient to support a far more comfortable and westernised style of living, entailing the regular consumption of imported foodstuffs, beer rather than *akpeteshie* (the locally produced gin), and the possibility of affording secondary school or even university education for one's children. Since independence opportunities for individual and inter-generational mobility through government employment and private business have become more and more limited. A declining economy, combined with the over-staffing of the bureaucracy and state enterprises under the C.P.P. regime, has resulted in a sharp contraction of employment openings at all levels. The introduction of higher and more rigid educational qualifications for employment in the clerical-executive branch of the civil service, together with the abolition of free secondary school education, may be seen as an attempt by the elite and middle class to consolidate their position on an inter-generational basis in the face of a serious decline in the number of higher positions available. This has severely reduced the chances of sons of lower-paid workers entering the ranks of the elite or even the middle class. That this is widely recognised, is shown by Margaret Peil's survey of factory workers' attitudes.

In Sekondi-Takoradi the three main income groups tend increasingly to lead distinctive styles of social life and to mix predominantly with friends drawn from members of their own class. It is commonly argued that the presence of extended family and patronage ties between different strata inhibits the development of conscious class antagonisms in African society. But in Sekondi-Takoradi very few workers are closely related to members of the elite, and those extended family ties which are most regularly maintained tend to be those between members of similar educational and socio-economic status. The principle of reciprocity, of being able (or expecting one day to be able) to return equivalent favours to those received restricts both friendships and extended family relationships. Most of those workers interviewed by
the author who claimed to be related to 'big men' said that they would be far too embarrassed ever to ask such a relative to loan them money or find them a job because they knew they could do no similar favour in return. It is a commonplace of *akpeteshie* bar conversation, as distinct from the sociological literature, that the rich display unmistakable snobbery and annoyance with the theoretical obligations of the extended family when visited by lower strata relatives.

Skilled industrial workers generally enjoy relative security of employment but extremely limited mobility opportunities. Due partly to the strength of union organisation, promotion is generally based on seniority rather than, as for clerical workers, on bosses' favouritism and examination qualifications. They therefore stand to gain little from patronage, which affects them mainly in the form of attempts by government or, sometimes, TUC leaders to win over their union representatives and is therefore strongly disapproved. Nor do they have the opportunity to benefit directly from the kind of corruption so widely practised by officials in the state administration who come into direct contact with the public. They do, on the other hand, suffer directly (and see themselves as so doing) from corrupt practices on the part of the politico-administrative elite. In the Ghana Railways, for example, the skilled workers frequently attribute the Administration's failure to make a profit, and their own consequent difficulty in gaining wage increases, to embezzlement of railway finances by senior executives. Industrial workers are thus increasingly divided from the middle and upper classes (Arrighi and Saul's elites and sub-elites) by their life style and social relations, as by their lower incomes and class situation.

**Organisation, Ideology and Political Action**

Although they subsequently add a number of qualifying riders, Arrighi and Saul argue that 'considerable attention must continue to be paid to the emphasis of Frantz Fanon, who placed his hopes for significant transformation in post-colonial Africa upon the peasantry's outrage of widening economic and social differentials'. The sole basis for this view appears to consist in a simple equation between relative impoverishment and revolutionary potential, an equation which, however empirically accurate its application in identifying the peasantry as the poorest group in African societies, must be considered sociologically naive in the extreme. Post-independence political experience in Ghana has rather illustrated the severe obstacles to the peasantry's development of autonomous political organisation or a unifying radical ideology. Railway and harbour workers in Sekondi-Takoradi on the other hand have demonstrated a capacity for radical and militant action, which has gone beyond the limits of economic demands to challenge state power. This is exemplified by the Sekondi-Takoradi strike of 1961.

In an excellent and, in some respects, sympathetic account, St. Clair Drake and L.A. Lacy have suggested that this strike was essentially the reaction of a labour aristocracy, operating with a conventional economist ideology, to the austerity measures demanded by the newly radicalized socialist regime of Nkrumah and the C.P.P. Such
an interpretation, however, signal fails to account either for the
term determination displayed by the strikers in so threatening a
political environment, or for the active support they received from
other, decidedly non-aristocratic groups within the Sekondi-Takoradi
community. A more adequate account must consider, firstly, the
nature of Sekondi-Takoradi as an urban community together with
the position occupied by the railway workers within it; and, secondly,
the ideological divergence which informed these workers' progressive
alienation from the C.P.P. regime in 1950-61.

Unlike Accra (Ghana's administrative centre) and Kumasi (the trading
centre), the city of Sekondi-Takoradi owes its growth almost entirely
to industrial development, and more particularly to the location there
of the railway workshops and the harbour. The 1955 household
budget survey estimated that 90 per cent of earnings in Sekondi-
Takoradi came from wage employment, compared to 67 per cent for
Accra and 22 per cent for Kumasi. In 1961, skilled and unskilled
manual workers constituted just over half of the city's total male
labour force. This was and remains a relatively poor urban community,
dominated both numerically and in terms of general ethos, by lower-
paid manual workers, most of whom were relatively permanent rather
than short-term migrant wage-earners. These factors made for the
development of an especially strong sense of proletarian identity, and
ethos—anti-elitist, anti-corruption and anti-authoritarian. In so pre-
dominantly a working-class city, moreover, many of the other
inhabitants—the market women, the unemployed—were affected,
directly or indirectly, by fluctuations in the wage-levels of these
workers and hence by the politics and performance of the TUC.

At the economic and ideological centre of this urban community lay
the close-knit social and cultural sub-community of the largely skilled
railway and harbour workers. Mostly concentrated in the harbour
installations or the Sekondi workshops, and living in close proximity
to each other in the railway villages, the regular contact and commu-
nication between these workers facilitated the creation of in-depth
organization and a highly developed sense of power through solidarity.
Their relatively high level of education (middle-school) made for keen
awareness of national political developments, and their consciousness
of their own training and skills for an acute sense of status depriva-
tion and social injustice. At the same time, the railway workers' residential integration in the urban centre of Sekondi-Takoradi result-
ed in close social ties with other socio-economic groups and identifica-
tion with the grievances of the common people whose exploitation
by the C.P.P. elite they were able to observe at first-hand. Hence they
were inclined to see themselves as the spokesmen, even the protectors,
of the urban poor. Within the close-knit sub-community of the rail-
way and harbour workers, the radical ideas of certain leaders were the
more easily communicated and developed as the basis of a shared
ideology.

The most significant of these ideological influence has been that of
their 'strong man' hero, Pobee Biney. Biney rose to prominence
amongst the railway workers in 1946-49 as the unofficial but sub-
stantive leader of a series of audacious and successful strike actions
which, implicitly at first, and then in January 1950 explicitly, challenged the legitimacy of the colonial government structure. By this latter date his 'charismatic' status amongst the rank-and-file was so assured that he was able to declare and organise a virtually hundred per cent solid strike in support of Nkrumah's call for 'Positive Action' without the support of the official Union Executive. In the preceding period his rousing speeches at union mass meetings had served to educate and rank-and-file in a radical nationalist ideology, which might best be termed African Socialist. Biney attacked the evils of colonialism on the grounds not only of economic exploitation but also of its differentiating effect on internal social relations, its destruction of the traditional egalitarianism and sense of brotherhood of the Ghanaian people. The true people he defined as the common people, distinct from the elite of chiefs, lawyers, civil servants and other collaborators with the colonial regime. He derided the latter's cultural separatism, their 'White African' dress and manners. He was therefore strongly opposed to the United Gold Coast Convention and its leadership of lawyers who would not risk their wigs for the sake of the common man, and totally unsympathetic to the view, prevalent among some railway union and TUC officials in 1949-50, that staging a strike in support of Positive Action would be to confuse trade unionism with party politics.

This did not mean, however, that he wished to tie the Ghanaian labour movement to unconditional support of Nkrumah's Convention People's Party. On the contrary, he emphasised in his speeches the idea that the railway workers were fighting for a new, independent and more just society, not for the Convention People's Party as such. This was not merely for the benefit of clerical workers sympathetic to the U.G.C.C. It was apparent to many of his followers that he was already aware of the divergence between the aims of the Sekondi-Takoradi workers, as he conceived them, and those of many leading members of the C.P.P. Accordingly, his notion of the vanguard role of the organised, enlightened workers in leading the Ghanaian people to independence involved the corollary that they should continue to act thereafter as defenders of the original ideals of the nationalist revolution, checking degenerative tendencies in the party-become-government. The Sekondi-Takoradi rank and file were to adhere to this notion fairly consistently in 1950-61.

After their election to the Legislative Assembly in September 1951, Biney and his closest political associate, Anthony Woode, proceeded to attack the C.P.P. leadership on the issues of 'tactical action', i.e. co-operation with the colonial regime in its schedule for self-government, and the failure to introduce either a social security programme or a radical reform of the wage and salary structure inherited from the colonial civil service. Not surprisingly, Biney and Woode failed to gain renomination to their seats in the 1954 General Election. A little later in the same year, E.C. Turkson-Ocran, was dismissed from the Secretary-Generalship of the TUC. The railway worker rank and file immediately and successfully pressed for Biney's re-instatement as president of the Railway Union. In 1955 they supported his unsuccessful attempt to organise the overthrow of the incumbent C.P.P. loyalist TUC leadership. Although he resigned from the presidency in...
1956, his ideological influence continued to be felt directly through the officials he had recruited to positions of local-level leadership in the union during this period. These followers organised a break-away union in 1958 outside of, and in scarcely veiled opposition to, the new party-affiliated TUC structure instituted by the Industrial Relations Act. They were also to be the most prominent among the middle-level officials who led the strike of September 1961. In 1956-61 they were, in a sense, continuing the struggle in his absence.

The indirect influence of Biney's personality and ideological stance in these years was hardly less powerful. If, in the early 1950s, his criticisms of the C.P.P. regime's degeneration had run the risk of outpacing rank and file opinion, by the late 1950s his prophecies were confirmed. Although both skilled and unskilled manual workers had received substantial increases in real wage levels during these years, such achievements appeared to be dwarfed by the blatant self-enrichment of C.P.P. officials. Corruption and party favouritism in the allocation of State Corporation houses, market stalls and government loans, had made a mockery of the C.P.P.'s claim to be a common people's government. For the workers of Sekondi-Takoradi, the TUC's Borgwarde cars were less a sign of that organisation's growing socialist influence and power than of their supposed representatives' happy participation in the corrupt politics and ostentatious living of government leaders. The C.P.P.'s and TUC's rejection of Biney, one of the few nationalist leaders who had consistently and courageously spoken up for the common people, came to symbolise for many railway workers the basic structural and moral failings of the Nkrumah regime.

This brief historical backdrop helps provide insight into the idealistic and radical elements in the 1961 strike action. The July Budget austerity measures—demanding a 5 per cent deduction from the wages of all those earnings more than NC.336 per annum (the approximate starting wage of most skilled workers) were hardly sufficient in themselves to provoke such stern resistance as was in fact encountered. After declaring their secession from the TUC on the grounds that the TUC had failed to express the true feelings of the working class, the railway workers led their fellow-workers of Sekondi-Takoradi in an illegal strike which lasted seventeen days, in the face of the detention of their leaders and threats of military intervention. The role of the United Party opposition was marginal to the central dynamic and aims of the strike, even if it provided much-needed financial support in the later stages. More important by far was the moral and, in some cases, active support provided by other sections of the Sekondi-Takoradi masses. As one strike-leader put it, 'The support we received from all the people here was so tremendous we could not have backed down even if we had wanted to.' To some degree, this was a matter of other groups—most notably the market women and many of the unemployed—recognising their dependence on the trade, or charity, and hence the financial capacity, of the regular wage-earners. The market women also had their own specific grievances relating to the increasing domination of the market trade by C.P.P. favourites. All these were united by a common sense of resentment at the widening socio-economic and communications gap between the C.P.P. elite and the common people who had brought them to power. The salience
of this general issue and the feeling of moral solidarity it generated is well brought out by St. Clair Drake's account:

By midweek practically every activity in the port was closed down. Municipal bus drivers had joined the strike, as had the city employees who collected the sewerage daily. Market women dispensed free food to the strikers at municipal bus garages and other strategic points. There was an air of excitement and pride throughout the city over the fact that they, the people of Sekondi-Takoradi had brought business to a standstill, had stopped train service to all of Ghana, and were displaying solidarity in the fight against the budget. Morale was high. The railway workers were heroes, ... W.N. Grant, a prominent strike leader, told the crowd that if parliament did not give way to the demands of the people, they would disband that body by force.

In short, the 1961 strike illustrates how industrial action, sparked off by grievances which might superficially appear to have been particular to the so-called 'labour aristocracy' could take on the character and significance of an urban mass protest. For the railway workers, the strike was essentially a decisive encounter in their ideological struggle with the C.P.P.-TUC elite over the proper structure and function of the TUC. The protection of their sectional economic interests was certainly one issue. It also, however, involved wider questions concerning the nature of the C.P.P. regime, since it was Biney and his followers' conception that the TUC, or national labour movement, should speak up for the poor in general, challenging elitist and authoritarian tendencies in society as a whole. In turn, the common people of Sekondi-Takoradi came to look to the more highly organised and articulate skilled railway and harbour workers to express a generalized sense of exploitation and social injustice.

In the short-term, the strike could hardly be considered successful. While Nkrumah's subsequent purge of some of the most blatantly corrupt among the Party's leaders testified to his recognition of its significance and potential political implication, the main result was a tightening of the TUC's disciplinary control and on intensification of authoritarian measures. Nevertheless, this represented the most serious and direct challenge the C.P.P. Government had to face until the army's intervention in 1966. More important from a long-term perspective, the strike came to acquire the status of a heroic assertion of genuine trade union principles. The September 1971 demonstrations against the Progress Party regime had much of the same character and significance, and involved a quite conscious emulation, particularly on the part of the Sekondi-Takoradi workers, of the 1961 model. Such class-type protest actions should be seen not as isolated responses to exceptional circumstances but as overt manifestations of ongoing socio-political processes. The railway and harbour workers of Sekondi-Takoradi possess neither economic interests nor political affinities congruent with the elite and sub-elites of their society. Increasingly, moreover, these workers are exceptional within Ghana only in the sense that others look to them as a vanguard or spearhead, not in that they fail to share a sense of common class identity and political orientation. Nor can the Ghanaian proletariat properly be considered a radically atypical case. Adrian Peace has arrived at essentially similar conclusions regarding the structural position and political orientation of the Lagos proletariat which, he suggests, is best viewed as the political elite of the urban masses, a reference
group of political terms for other urban strata, who look wage-earners for expression of political protest against a highly megalitarian society.

In both cases one finds unionised workers expressing a generalized awareness of shared interests and shared oppression with other classes among the poor. Whether this is more accurately described as a form of mass—rather than class—consciousness, strictly defined, the practical implementations seem clear enough. If a broad-based radical movement is to emerge, then those groups which lack the organizational mechanisms for concerted political action are likely to look for a lead to those who have them, and are prepared to use them: and in Ghana, as in Nigeria, this would appear to apply to the proletariat alone.

Bibliographical Notes:

Wage and income material for Ghana and also Nigeria has been drawn from:
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Blair Rourke, Wages and Incomes of Agricultural Workers in Ghana, (Legon: ISSER, 1970).

On the Sekondi-Takoradi strike see:

For an analysis of the Lagos working class see:
Adrian Peace, 'Towards a Nigerian Working Class: The Lagos Proletariat as a Political Elite', (paper presented to the 1973 Toronto Conference on 'Workers, Unions, and Development in Africa').
Briefings

Squatter Settlement and Class Relations in Zambia—Tony Seymour

We publish below an account of how Zambia’s policy towards urban squatter settlements is financed by the World Bank, and how this is part of the attempt by international capital, and especially the United States, to ‘stabilise’ the politics of the urban poor of underdeveloped countries.

The policy of ‘upgrading’ selected squatter settlements was announced by the Zambian Government in its Second National Development Plan (SNDP) in January 1972. ‘Upgrading’ will involve legalization of land tenure in squatter areas, and the provision of normal services, such as piped water, sewage disposal, roads, and other communal facilities. This upgrading policy does not simply express charitable intentions, either on the part of the Zambian Government or on the part of the World Bank (which is providing a substantial loan to finance upgrading projects). It must be interpreted in the context of evolving class relations in Zambia—relations which include international political and economic interests.

The upgrading schemes will be concentrated in Lusaka where 40-50 per cent of Zambia’s national squatter population is settled. The growth of Lusaka’s squatter population from 1954-73 is summarized in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Squatter population of Lusaka</th>
<th>Squatter population as per cent of city population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>11,886</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957/8</td>
<td>12,361</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>11,410</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>47,107</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>91,804</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>106,596</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Economic growth in Northern Rhodesia was based on mineral production, European commercial farming, commerce, administration, and industry—activities which were heavily concentrated in the ‘line-of-rail’ region. The complementary underdevelopment of rural areas ensured both that European farmers monopolized their markets and that Africans had little alternative but to offer their labour on the line-of-rail. The colonial economy produced a disparity between the ‘line-of-rail’ and the ‘bush’ which was so extreme that by 1963,
19.6 per cent of the total population of Northern Rhodesia was living in urban areas—the highest urbanization ratio in tropical Africa.

Crown land along the line-of-rail was controlled by expatriates: either by farmers to whom it had been alienated, or by the colonial authorities. The rights of Africans to live in urban areas were conditional upon their being in employment. Pass regulations were employed to 'repatriate' unemployed migrants, while those allowed into towns had their housing tied to their jobs. Large employers, such as the mining companies on the copperbelt, provided housing directly for their workers. Other employers were allocated houses for their workers in townships built by local authorities. Some workers were not provided with housing, but were allowed to build their own huts on land owned and controlled by expatriates—either their own employers (such as construction companies) or simply landlords to whom they paid rent. In principle, colonial policy on 'unauthorized compounds' prescribed demolition of the settlements and 'repatriation' of their residents, who were presumed to be unemployed. In practice, however, some officially unauthorized settlements had been established by squatters' expatriate employers and landlords. During the Federation the existing population of about 11,000 squatters in Lusaka was tolerated, while further growth was prevented by land wardens.

Independence accelerated urbanization in Zambia. Stimulated by the dissolution of Federation and high copper prices, the expansion of industrial, commercial and administrative activities increased still further the economic disparity between urban and rural areas. Pass laws were abolished, and the new political climate encouraged villagers to seek the fruits of independence in the towns. From 1963-69 the rate of urbanization was about eight per cent a year in Zambia and close to 12 per cent in the capital city. By 1969, 40 per cent of the total population of Zambia lived within 25 miles of the line-of-rail.

Meanwhile, expatriates lost much of the control which they had previously exercised over African settlement in Lusaka. Some farmers left the country and vacated enormous areas of peri-urban land. Others, who had earlier encouraged the settlement of rent-paying squatters on their land, found that they could no longer either control settlement or collect rents; both their illegal housing estates and employers' compounds rapidly developed into true squatter settlements.

Officials of the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) sometimes encouraged and certainly condoned the formation of squatter settlements, whose populations provided a massive base of political support. On the other hand the policy of the first Zambian Government, and its attitudes towards squatters, were virtually identical with those of the colonial regime. Squatting was condemned as illegal and unauthorized, even though settlements were often controlled by the ruling party; squatters were regarded as unemployed rural migrants, though official surveys had indicated to the contrary. The Federal policy of containing settlements was abandoned, not through sympathy with squatters on the part of the Zambian
administration, but because the task was impossible given the rapid rate of squatter-settlement growth, and because city councillors feared the political repercussions of demolition.

The Zambian government of 1964 also perpetuated the colonial policy of providing housing for all urban workers. But this soon broke down in Lusaka, where the number of families on the housing waiting list of the City Council grew from 8,000 in 1965 to 21,000 in 1970. In the face of the tide of migration, Lusaka City Council not only built few new houses but offered them at rents equivalent to about half the income of a typical squatter. While the Zambian authorities in effect supplied housing mostly for middle- and upper-income earners, the colonial political economy had inhibited the development of a private market in legal low-cost housing; squatting, as almost the only alternative, accordingly escalated.

The Zambian government policy of providing housing was soon abandoned in favour of one of resettling squatters into site-and-service schemes, where the authorities would provide serviced plots on which settlers could build their own houses to approved standards with the aid of loans. But the site-and-service policy was a dismal failure in Lusaka. In 1969 the Government accepted the plan of Doxiadis Associates to resettle all the city's 16,000 squatter families within a year; but in the major scheme three years later only 600 plots had been allocated and another 1,000 were lying vacant—while the city's squatter population had increased by nearly 50 per cent. During 1970-71 it became increasingly evident to the Zambian Government that squatters' resistance to resettlement made site-and-service schemes, on their own, a poor solution to the squatter problem.

The failure of these successive policies resulted by 1971 in official paralysis on the squatter issue. The Zambian government appeared to wish that the problem did not exist, but was unable to ignore it for several reasons. In the first place, it was feared that epidemics might break out in settlements and spread to the whole city. Secondly, political pressures were building up within UNIP because of the electoral significance of squatters. Following the extension of the boundaries of the City of Lusaka in 1970 councillors became heavily dependent on squatters' votes; consequently the City Council urged the Government from early 1971 to adopt an upgrading policy.

Given that something had to be done about squatters and that other policies had already failed in Lusaka, the government turned—in the second half of 1971—to upgrading which seemed to be not only the cheapest but also the only way of improving the conditions of most of Lusaka's squatters. The idea of upgrading had been introduced by Swedish architects who visited Zambia in 1969, and was vigorously promoted from 1970 by the Social Action in Lusaka (SAIL) organization. It would appear, therefore, that the upgrading policy was adopted by the Zambian Government for reasons of practicality and did not imply a revision of earlier hostile attitudes towards squatters.
Enter the World Bank

The announcement of the upgrading policy was welcomed by the Lusaka City Council which had advocated it during 1971. But though the Council drew up plans for upgrading it was unable to implement them during 1972 because funds were not forthcoming from the Government. But the World Bank had recently decided to lend capital for housing projects in Third World cities, particularly for site-and-service schemes and (to a lesser extent) for improvements to squatter areas. In June 1973 the Zambian National Housing Authority (NHA) submitted an application for such a loan to the Bank. In September 1973 a Bank technical team came to Zambia for preliminary discussions and were told by the Minister of Local Government and Housing that 30 million Kwacha was needed to improve settlements in Lusaka alone. Early in 1974 full-scale negotiations over this loan began in Lusaka between a Bank team and the Zambian Government. The negotiations were—for the Bank—characteristically secretive, complicated, and protracted; eventually, in April, a loan of 26 million Kwacha was announced.

It is well known that development aid to the Third World from capitalist countries and organizations has been politically motivated, and that aid is sometimes directed to alleviate the discontent of potentially volatile social groups which might otherwise support revolutionary movements. Following the advent of the Castro regime in 1959, United States imperialist interests (including academics) were alerted to the dangers of a second Cuba in Latin America. In the hysterical atmosphere of the early 1960s urban squatters seemed a particularly ‘destabilizing’ threat. In 1958 squatters in Caracas had participated strongly in the overthrow of a rightist regime in Venezuela, and during the next five years many squatter areas in the city were controlled by leftist politicians. During the crisis of 1963-63, the US Government intervened to support the ‘moderate’ Accion Democratica regime against leftist urban guerillas, giving a loan of 30 million dollars through its Agency for International Development (AID) for a community development programme. Fears of a second Cuba were further stimulated by events in the Dominican Republic in 1965, when 4000 squatters fought as commandos against ‘loyalist’ forces and US marines.

Once the idea that squatters were a potentially ‘destabilizing’ threat had taken root, Third World population statistics were read in new colours. Squatter areas were often growing twice as fast as the cities themselves, and squatters were already accounting for a quarter of a third of the populations of many large cities; soon they would constitute an absolute majority.

In 1964 Charles Abrams' book Man’s Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World was published. Abrams argued that massive squatting on private land indicated disrespect for property rights, defiant attitudes towards established 'democratic' governments (which were supposed to protect those rights), and a proclivity to Communism and Castroism. Abrams proposed solutions to this political threat in terms similar to those he had earlier suggested for the US: the lower classes should be given a stake in the capitalist system through a policy of
widespread ownership of property in land and housing. Though
Third World squatters apparently constituted a revolutionary threat,
the 'tide of discontent' could be stemmed by reducing their hunger
for land and by improving their environmental conditions. Abrams'
book exerted a profound influence not only on housing planners
but also on aid agencies. Following a favourable review by the World
Bank a sequel, devoted entirely to squatter settlements, was com-
missioned by the US AID.

The policy of rehabilitating rather than eradicating squatter settle-
ments was popularized by John Turner and William Mangin. They
did not, however, recommend that all settlements should be up-
graded. 'Provisional' settlements, inhabited by the very poor--too
preoccupied with their immediate problems to concern themselves
actively with political matters'--would mostly be eradicated. Up-
grading was proposed only for 'incipient', 'self-improving' settle-
ments inhabited by those already in relatively stable employment;
the tendency of these squatters to 'identify themselves as property
owners' made them 'naturally conservative' and, it was implied, this
tendency should be encouraged. The Turner-Mangin approach was
expressed by a US AID official who wrote in the late 1960s of the
'upgrading' of squatter settlements in Peru to 'middle class status'.
The argument was a familiar one: foster social mobility and fore-
stall political instability. In short, efforts of international aid agencies
to improve conditions in squatter areas of Third World cities became
associated with a desire to control the political impact of squatters,
to 'integrate' and 'absorb' them into the present socio-political
system.

In the 1960s the World Bank, tended to oppose 'adventurous' pro-
jects concerned with social problems; it concentrated on financial
stability and opposed large current government expenditures in 'non-
productive' fields such as housing. The change came with the June
1972 report on Urbanization: it was now to lend some 700 million
dollars during 1972-76 on 40 projects in 30 cities. The World Bank's
conversion to 'non-productive' investment in housing represents an
attempt to invest in political stability. Moreover, to treat the prob-
lem of urban poverty as one of housing rather than employment is
convenient for the right, since housing is subject to relatively in-
expensive solutions: it is easier to grant land titles and supply urban
facilities than to create employment opportunities. In the case of
the loan to Zambia, it is relevant also that a decision was taken by
the US Government in 1966 to divert bilateral aid to smaller
African countries through multilateral agencies, particularly the
World Bank. The Bank is apparently implementing in Zambia the
US AID squatter policy devised for Latin America.

Class relations in Zambia
Though the Zambian Government and the World Bank share a
common pragmatism in their aid policies towards squatters, their
specific interests are different. I would argue that the Bank does
not regard Zambian squatters as 'politically destabilising'; rather, the
Lusaka housing project serves as a pilot scheme for the development
of techniques which could be used in more politically volatile
situations. In addition, Bank staff now established in offices within the NHA building in Lusaka will seek to exert an influence on housing policy and planning in Zambia beyond the present project.

The Zambian Government, by contrast, sees upgrading as a means of bringing squatter areas under its control, and of making them conform to urban building and health regulations. Moreover, close to the levers of state power are a number of Zambians who have bought large farms around Lusaka and have special interests in the restoration of legality in the field of land tenure. It is significant that, during upgrading, squatters will be expected to contribute towards the purchase of their land from private owners, even though they would have been legally entitled (under surviving English common law) to claim ownership after 12 years settlement.

During the three years since the upgrading policy was announced, it has probably been interpreted by Lusaka squatters themselves as an expression of the Government's genuine concern. But implementation of the projects may force a reappraisal of the situation, and a new awareness of divergent class interests between squatters and those in control of the machinery of state. In the first place, only selected settlements are to be upgraded; those not selected will be demolished and their residents resettled in site-and-service schemes. But since upgrading tends to exclude the poorer types of squatter settlements, Lusaka squatters omitted from the schemes will be those—from the experience of 1965-71—who will not be able to afford the cost of site-and-service schemes. In areas included in the upgrading project, strict control of settlement will be enforced and considerable demolitions will take place in the course of re-planning. Economic pressures on squatters are likely to be considerable. They will be expected to contribute sizeably to the costs of installing services, and they will also need to pay for land titles and for improvements to their housing. The financial burden which is likely to fall on squatters included in upgrading schemes is evident from the tiny allocation of five million kwacha of Zambian Government funds to upgrading for all Zambian towns during the SNDP (1972-76), by contrast with the 35 million kwacha allocated to site-and-service schemes in the Plan. As a result external financing of upgrading has been necessary, and both the World Bank loan and its reputed 6-8 per cent annual interest rate will have to be repaid.

Squatters included in upgrading schemes will also find that they are excluded from participation in formulating and executing plans; the autocratic methods of the World Bank will be the very antithesis of the 'self-help' principles stressed by advocates of upgrading within Zambia. Officials of UNIP may find themselves caught between the need to control squatters on behalf of the authorities (including the Bank) and their dependence on squatters for political support.

The political passivity of Lusaka squatters in the last decade has been associated with changes in the Zambian political economy: they have appreciated not only economic expansion but the new freedom to settle in town with their families and to improve their housing as their personal circumstances have permitted. Though underprivileged,
they have not felt oppressed, and they have hoped eventually to obtain services through the Party. But whereas in Peru the policy of aiding squatters has succeeded in 'co-opting' their political support the economic and political implications of upgrading for Zambian squatters may have precisely the opposite impact. It seems possible that urban planning in Lusaka will sharpen squatters' awareness of the latent conflicts between their own interests and those of the local and international bourgeoisie.

Bibliographical Notes:
For further reading on the Latin American material, there is a useful bibliography in W.A. Cornelius, 'Urbanization as an Agent in Latin American Political Instability', The American Political Science Review, 63, 3, 1969.
T. Hayter, Aid as Imperialism, Penguin, 1971 is indispensable background reading in the international agencies.

Famine Relief and People's War—Ben Wisner
The famine in the Sahel and Ethiopia was seen in a previous issue (RAPE I) as largely the result of the agricultural exploitation carried out for the benefit of international capital and local privileged classes. This report discusses famine in Guinea and Mozambique as part of the heritage of Portuguese colonialism, but argues that the liberation movements of these territories will fight famine effectively as part of the politics of mass mobilisation.

Famines with histories similar to those in the Sahel and Ethiopia are part of the heritage of Portuguese colonialism in Africa. Systematic impoverishment of both the land and the population of the Cape Verde Islands has left the people with no reserves, highly vulnerable to the same drought which for the past six years has played upon a similar vulnerability in the Sahelian countries. The labour power necessary for satisfying the people's needs, for protecting them from irregularities of climate, was drained away in a classic process of
underdevelopment. Cape Verdeans were exploited first as outright slaves, later as plantation labourers used to produce such export crops as sugar cane, grapes, and cotton, most recently as migrant menial labourers used to service the metropole itself. Even if no further forms of exploitation had appeared to exacerbate the problem of drought, how could the domestic economy be expected to buffer itself against natural disaster with thousands of its best workers absent? 30,000 Cape Verdeans have been moved to Portugal over the last five years alone. The Secretary-General of the African Party of Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) described the situation as follows in his 1974 New Year's Message:

In the Cape Verde Islands five years of drought and famine continue to ravage the population. The colonial authorities remain indifferent, hoping to deceive our people with talk of loans and subsidies—like drugs for a so-called 'better Cape Verde'. This, however, is already doomed to failure. The Portuguese colonial government continues to profit from the dramatic situation in the Islands, developing an effective export of cheap and super-exploited labour to Portugal and the other colonies.

Meillassoux detects the importance of a similar migrational shift of labour power in Senegal in the causal nexus underlying famine there. 40-50,000 workers from the Valley of the Senegal are resident in France as highly exploited labourers. In Ethiopia as well, 80,000 workers are annually drained from Wollo and Tigre Provinces, where the collapse of domestic agriculture was most acute. This labour is shifted into cotton and tea picking on large capitalist holdings further south. Although most of these workers return, their labour is lost to their home communities and their earnings do not (are not allowed to) spark off capitalist accumulation at home. Land shortage is the result of commercialization and rationalization of large estates via progressive elimination of traditional tenancies and the creation of a landless rural work force. Direct drain of labour power is only a beginning. In Cape Verde other burdens were superadded: A domestic economy forced to concentrate on non-food or food-export crops; internal migration to the cities; research and farm extension services focussed exclusively on the problems of the large-scale, export-oriented farm; neglect of supportive care for the rural worker such as health and education. The crowning insult in Cape Verde is that Portugal refused even to acknowledge the existence of drought and famine until the April crop. PAIGC had announced these conditions as early as 1971, but only within the last year has it been able to respond systematically to the widespread hunger, malnutrition, and disease throughout the Islands.

Mozambique has suffered from similar patterns of exploitation and neglect. In 1973, 400,000 Mozambican labourers were 'exported' by the Portuguese to South Africa. However, as in Cape Verde and Senegal, such large scale export of labour was long preceded by the systematic exploitation of the domestic farm economy for the production of export crops. This took the form in Mozambique of a concession system granting monopolies for the production, purchase, and export of such crops as rice, sugar, cotton, coffee, and copra to large companies. It was in their attempt to create a peasants' co-operative to reduce the stranglehold of one such cotton concessionaire
Sociedade Agricola Algodoeira which had control over nearly all farming in almost the whole of Cabo Delgado Province) that the peasants peacefully assembled in Mueda in 1960 were massacred. The logic of the system of exploitation dictated that the best land should go to the (largely foreign owned) plantations such as the British-owned Sena Sugar Estates. These plantations complemented the concession system, so ensuring maximum exploitation of available labour and land resources. Either a peasant provided wage-labour to the one or cash crops to the other. In this way most peasants were driven to produce their quota of cash crops (legally necessary since the 1928 Native Labour Code did not recognize subsistence farming as 'living by one's own work') in addition to food on increasingly marginal land. An I.L.O. Commission studying this system in 1961 described rapid exhaustion and deterioration of the soil under the conditions imposed.

Much damage to the land and to the food-providing ability of peasant farming has been long since repaired in the northern Provinces of Tete, Niassa, and Cabo Delgado, where the presence of FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) militants allowed the establishment of liberated areas with a vital and innovative food economy for many years (despite enemy bombardment and defoliation). The peasants of Manica e Sofala Province are not so lucky.

As the military struggle reached a climax in 1973, Portuguese forces reacted to encroachment into this Province from the north with terror tactics. They attempted to round up everyone into strategic hamlets (aldeamentos), burning huts and fields as they were vacated. Many peasants fled empty-handed into the forest. Those in the aldeamentos were bereft of all agricultural tools: machetes, reaping hooks, hoes—because the Portuguese feared they could be used as weapons. Many aldeamentos lay in infertile places where cultivation would have been difficult even with tools. As the victory of FRELIMO approached, this same area was stricken with unusual flooding and an epidemic of cholera (clearly related to the atrocious sanitary conditions of the aldeamentos). The effect was widespread death, malnutrition, disease, and absolute destitution. Such was the inherited situation. Leaders of liberation movements have faced hunger as a weapon of the oppressor and consequence of oppression, and they have faced it in a similar way. Ho Chi Minh, writing in 1945, appealed to the people to fight famine in the following words:

"Owing to the barbarous policies of the French colonialists, who among other things requisitioned paddy and forced our peasants to grow jute instead of rice, over two million people starved to death in Bac Bo in the early part of this year. Then came floods and drought."

"Famine is even more dangerous than war... In war, all the forces of the country must be mobilized and organized to fight the enemy. In our struggle against famine, we must also mobilize and organize our entire people."

FRELIMO and PAIGC are meeting a similar challenge with the politics of mass mobilization. These revolutionary organizations see the struggle with famine as one more 'front' in the overall struggle for
national liberation. In a similar way each division in the work of providing civilian administration is seen as an interdependent part of one national reconstruction process (through health, production and commerce, national culture, education, etc.). Their struggle with famine has a new look and contrasts sharply with the relief operations organized by the national bourgeoisies of some of the Sahelian states and Ethiopia. Their political approach to famine differs in four important ways from relief efforts in the Sahel and Ethiopia.

To begin with FRELIMO's and PAIGC's relief is decentralized and sensitive to specifically local needs and possibilities for reconstruction. The list of aid required for the Gorongoza area of Manica and Sofala Province provides an indication of this. It is based upon meetings of local FRELIMO cadres with the peasants and reads as follows:

The most affected zones in this area are Vila Paiva, Banda, Massara, Piro, Kanga-N'tole and Cavalo, although not all in the same way affected. The estimated number of families facing extreme difficulties is about 7,500, which adds up to 34,500 persons.

Seeds
- Maize - 1,000 bags (another 1,000 bags have been guaranteed)
- Butter beans - 300 bags
- Nhamba beans - 100 bags
- Peanuts - 100 bags
- Sesame seeds - 200 bags

Agricultural implements
- No particular needs because in this area sharp-edged tools (knives, axes, etc.) were not seized by the Portuguese.

Medicines
- There are enough medicines in stock to face immediate needs.

Food
- About 15,000 children suffer from serious lack of vitamins.

Clothes
- Men, women, boys, girls and children all need clothes. Blankets are also needed.

Educational appliances
- About 1,500 children attend the schools. Each one of them needs:
  - 1 slate
  - 2 slate-pencils
  - 1 exercise book
  - 1 pencil

Altogether 50,000 families (around 250,000 people) are facing extreme conditions in Manica e Sofala. The Gorongoza list is like the ten others from affected areas; however all lists differ somewhat in requirements for medicines, tools, clothes, and especially in the choice of seeds according to ecological potential in different places within the Province. FRELIMO is well known for its use of its military for experimenting with new crops, for diffusing innovations among the peasants by example, and for learning from the peasants' own experiments and experience. In this manner certain vegetables and cassava were established in parts of Mozambique during the liberation struggle where they had not been known before. As usual, these activities in agriculture are seen as political by FRELIMO, not as merely technical. Samora Machel writes:
If I am from the centre and am with a comrade from the north, discussing with him how to use a plot of land, how and what to plant, we plan together, fight the difficulties together and share the joy of picking the ear of maize which has grown through our joint effort. I and that comrade are united... If I am from the north and learn how to make a kitchen garden with a comrade from the south... or if I am from the centre and learn for the first time how to grow cassava with a comrade from the north, I am becoming more united with those comrades, tangibly living the unity of our country, the unity of our working class.

The ecological specificity of the request for seeds in the disaster area is a result of FRELIMO's long tradition of working directly among the peasants, politicizing even such a seemingly technical activity as agriculture. In contrast one can quote almost any observer of recent relief activities in the Sahel where the problem almost universally encountered in relief operations is knowing what local resources are available. 'The most conspicuous failure of the relief efforts from 1968 through 1973 was the failure to gather, retrieve and use information,' says the Carnegie report on Sahelian relief.

Neither FRELIMO nor PAIGC are novices in organizing the mass distribution of goods. This is a skill their cadres developed and politicized for years during the military struggle through a network of peoples' stores where basic goods like cloth, soap, salt, torch cells, etc. were exchanged for agricultural produce which either supplemented the self-produced food supplies of the militants or was traded internationally (e.g. surplus rice from Guinea Bissau, cashews, beeswax, sesame from Mozambique). The relief implementation committee in Mozambique includes FRELIMO's Deputy Military Commissioner for Manica e Sofala, a representative of the provincial administration, a member of the 'Democrats of Mozambique', a lawyer, and a parish priest. Such a committee sounds much like those formed in the Sahelian countries and elsewhere. The key to the radical difference between FRELIMO's relief organization and others is therefore to be found elsewhere: in the so-called middle-cadre, battle-tested and committed to the wellbeing of the masses.

In October 1974 FRELIMO representatives explained the intention of the planned aid in the following terms to local cadres and administrators: Food aid was, of course, meant as direct support to the people; however the intention was to associate the local population creativley in the implementation of the emergency aid programme and socioeconomic development aid. Part of the seeds will be given to the population in the form of a loan to be repaid from the spring '75 harvest to a 'revolving fund'. This fund will enable the communities to purchase better agricultural equipment in order to restore and to promote cooperative agriculture, and to improve the existing methods of farming in the future. In this way the emergency plan can have its more lasting development effect, in order to avoid keeping the population dependent from purely charitable aid.

These statements point out the second great difference between a mass-political line in relief aid and the technocratic-charitable line: The former makes little distinction among national reconstruction, rehabilitation, and relief. The danger of producing dependency on gifts is noted and countered from the start. The permanent famine relief camp filled with demoralized, pauperized individuals will not...
be allowed to develop as it has in northern Kenya, Chad, Niger and elsewhere. Operationally, seeds and school supplies are administered by the same cadres who allocate food and medicines. Unified administration here contrasts with fragmentation and competition among civil service departments more frequently encountered elsewhere.

Direct, streamlined administration is a fruit of wartime experience, where cooperation and integrated planning was clearly necessary for survival. Another fruit of people's war is the ability to make a direct appeal to village meetings for opinions and decisions. Herein lies a third difference. The village meeting is also used as a vehicle for mass political education, giving a generally high consciousness of the full historical and objective conditions which underlie shared experience such as victory in a particular battle, a crop failure, the shortage of soap, or the present famine. Political education about the collective experience of famine is yet another element missing in technocratic-charitable relief aid to sufferers in the Sahel and elsewhere. Of course, consciousness is furthest developed where FRELIMO has worked longest. Saul quotes Joachim Chissano describing this process:

... peasants are generally rather conservative and you have to go step by step. In our case there are traditional ways of co-operation, such as mutual help, and at the first stage we encourage them. Later we establish district committees to administer the area, and groups within this framework to look after agriculture. In their discussions within these committees, little by little the members come to understand the benefits of working collectively.

The fourth and most important thing that is different about radical political relief concerns existing capitalist structures. FRELIMO and PAIGC are not simply providing relief as a palliative to an exploited peasantry so that they may continue to live, produce and reproduce themselves in the same relation to capital that made them vulnerable to famine in the first place. The revolutionary programmes of both FRELIMO and PAIGC aim to change the relations of production, so that exploitation is not possible. Section VII.1.a of PAIGC's Programme reads:

Progressive elimination of exploitation of man by man, of all forms of subordination of the human individual to degrading interests, to the profit of individuals, groups or classes...

On the occasion of the investiture of the Transitional Government in Mozambique, the President of FRELIMO sent a message to the nation which spelled out the process of ending exploitation:

In every factory, every department, every service, commercial establishment, in every agricultural enterprise, Party Committees must be formed to implement the watchwords of FRELIMO and the transitional Government, thus releasing the people's initiative and setting in motion the masses' creative ability...

The Government is FRELIMO's instrument at the State level, the executive arm of the People's will...

We inherited a colonial economic structure in which the productive factors did not serve our country or our people, but foreign domination. We must
combat this situation by laying the foundations of an independent economy
to serve the working masses...

Thus these movements' response to famine reveals once again their
integrated approach to liberation via national reconstruction,
financial support for the medical backpack designed and supplied
to FRELIMO and PAIGC by workers in UK (GAMMA—see
description in RAPE 2) is an excellent form of solidarity. Medicines
appear on both PAIGC and FRELIMO lists of required aid in the
famine zones, but more importantly, solidarity along these lines
supports the political, integrated approach to relief as reconstruct-
ion.

Sources of information
Additional detail of the famine situations in Mozambique and Cape Verde is
available for readers in Europe from various support organizations: Committee
for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guine (CFMAG), 12-13 Little
Newport Street, London W.C.2.; Toronto Committee for the Liberation of
Portugal's African Colonies (TCLPAC), 121 Avenue Road, Toronto 5; Friends
of the People of Mozambique, c/o Fathers of the Holy Hearts, Postbus 5, Bavel
(The Netherlands) from whose firsthand situation report from Manica e Sofala
I quoted above.

An important collection of political economic analyses and case studies is
Qui Se Nourrit de la Famine en Afrique? Comité Information Sahel (Maspero,
1974).

Information related to Sahelian relief and rehabilitation is Hal Sheets and
Roger Morris, Disaster in the Desert: Failures of International Relief in the
West African Drought (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1717
Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C., 1974) and any United Nations
Information Centre Library will have such summary statements as
'Consideration of the Economic and Social Situation in the Sudano-Sahelian
Regions Stricken by Drought and Measures to be Taken for the Benefit of

See also B. Wisner, 'Global Interdependence of Drought Response and the
Struggle for Liberation', Journal of the Geographical Association of
Tanzania, No. 8, Oct. 1973, Special Number, Studies in Famines and Food
Shortages, ed. by A.C. Mascarenhas.
Reviews


Kenya is a regional centre for multi-national capitalism in Eastern Africa controlled by a corrupt and avaricious local ruling group, an increasingly oppressive country of wealth for the few and continuing poverty and deprivation for the masses. Kenya has continued to operate, since formal independence, as an ally of imperialism, a base for the British military presence in the Indian Ocean and, in the cases of both Somalia and latterly Tanzania, as a substantial external opposition to progressive regimes.

That is perhaps a reasonable summary of the widely held ‘radical’ view. Its essential accuracy is hardly to be questioned: but its adequacy in explaining the paradoxes of contemporary Kenya is very limited. Kenya is also the territory which was subjected to more thorough penetration by colonial capitalism than any other in sub-Saharan Africa apart from the White South; the country in which fierce national and class struggles were fought from an early stage; in which agrarian and urban political movements developed to a relatively advanced stage during the colonial period; and in which the ‘progressive’ wing of the nationalist movement seemed at one stage to be well-placed in the leadership and firmly based in popular support. Yet the present challenges to the viability of neo-colonialism in Kenya, to the extent that they are discernible, seem to come less from these brave historical antecedents than from the tight constraints of the contemporary underdeveloped economy and, in political terms, from the difficulties of the Kenyan bourgeoisie in resolving some outstanding issues of clientage and succession. The continuities, in other words, appear to be more elusive than apparent, and the radical critique has not until now fully comprehended the specific significance of the changes of the last decade.

Colin Leys’s study sets out, at least implicitly, to rectify this analytical (and political) inadequacy. Underdevelopment in Kenya will without the shadow of a doubt, be the point of departure for any serious analysis of the Kenyan social formation for a good time to come.

At some risk to the complexity and elegance of Leys’s analysis, some of his major themes can be fairly briefly stated, to indicate the inclusiveness and power of his argument. The substance of independence in Kenya was a planned transition from a monopolistic colonial economy to a neo-colonial economy which would not merely preserve
the major existing metropolitan interests, but which would adapt Kenya both to the new forms of international capitalism which have developed in the post-war world, and to the political realities of nationalism and the demands of the African petty-bourgeois leadership. The major element in the initial settlement was land. By the programme for transferring settler farms in the White Highlands to African hands, a number of essential components of the neo-colonial structure were erected. The incoming nationalist leadership unambiguously embraced the principle of protection of foreign capital and full compensation (indeed of exclusively willing buyer-willing seller transfers) and received, as it were, an international certificate of creditworthiness in return. At the same time, the settlement programme proved for the time being adequate (not least in its ideological effects) in stemming the rapidly growing political problem of 'white' land and the formation of the Land Freedom Army.

With this initial bargain, the stage was set for the rapid development of the depressed economy of the early Sixties along neo-colonial lines. A substantial and continuing influx of foreign capital, the rapid movement of the politically powerful African petty-bourgeoisie into the interstices of the economy, the creation of an African 'auxiliary bourgeoisie', intimately linked to and dependent on imperialist capital, as local ruling class, the progressive exclusion of the potential 'alternate bourgeoisie' (the Asians) from effective participation in commerce and manufacturing, and the energetic subjection of peasant producers to the new requirements of the capitalist mode of production—these were some of the essential elements of the Kenyan transition to neo-colonialism.

Leys's detailed exposition of these processes is accomplished with great skill. An enormous amount of social and economic data, from published sources, original research and privileged sources has been absorbed and put to incisive use in the six chapters which form the empirical core of the book. The compression necessary to outline the economic, social and political structure of Kenya in less than 300 pages has, nevertheless, been achieved with exceptional clarity: statistics, references and classifications are there for the purposes of the argument only, with no superfluous information to render the text opaque.

The stage is set by an analysis of how, in the terminal colonial period, preparations were made for a safe transfer of power. While land was the central issue, the importance of discontent from those rising petty-bourgeois who had done tolerably well out of colonialism was also recognised albeit belatedly, in loan programmes for African traders and artisans (with US imperialism testing the waters, as it were, by providing funds through the Foreign Operations Administration, the precursor to USAID). The incoming politicians, for the most part, didn't seem to need much coaching. While Kenyatta was reassuring investors that his was 'not a gangster government', the new
Minister of Finance, James Gichuru, was telling the Nairobi Chamber of Commerce (October 1963) of the commercial bonanza which awaited them if only they would use the African businessman in 'stimulating consumer demands and setting in train the urge to 'keep up with the Joneses' which can contribute so much to our productivity (pp 61-2).

The long chapter on continuity and change in agriculture sets out the critical importance of the land transfer arrangements, but is also emphatic that

The land transfer programme did not take place in a historical vacuum. The hundreds of thousands of Africans who moved into the former European farms were part of a much larger social and economic transformation—the consummation of the switch from a variety of pre-colonial systems of production and exchange to 'peasant' production throughout Kenya (p 64).

The major part of the discussion of the agrarian question, however, is not on the characteristics of the peasant mode of production itself, but on the economic and political outcomes of the demise of white dominance in the Highlands—and in particular on the consequences of the emergence of an African large farmer class. (This weakness is no doubt partly attributable to the relative extreme scarcity of information about the characteristics of peasant production and social relations, but also seems to me to stem from a theoretical bias which pervades much of the work, and which is briefly discussed below.) Leys's argument here is really twofold. The power of the African large farmers and their political institutions has withstood both their poor productive performance and their disastrous capital repayment record by government's compliant manipulation of producer prices, rural-urban terms of trade, credit and other policy instruments, and by a recognition of their pivotal position on the part of the Kenyan bourgeoisie's overseas patrons—particularly the British government.

The effectiveness of the neo-colonial arrangements was, of course, signified in the large inflow of foreign capital—averaging some £10m a year at the end of the Sixties. Almost all of Kenya's new industrial sector, almost all of the 50 per cent increase in manufacturing output between 1964 and 1970, and almost all the doubling of the annual level of investment, was foreign owned and controlled. What this meant, too, was higher rates of exploitation, and much higher levels of surplus transfer abroad. Leys calculates a likely net export of private capital 1964-1970 of some £80m—roughly double the recorded private foreign investment in Kenya, including reinvested local profits, during the same period. In this situation, the attempts of the local ruling class to increase African equity involvement and managerial employment, and to undertake joint ventures between State and foreign capital, had nothing to do with combating imperialist domination of the Kenyan economy.

... even a [State] majority shareholding, obtained on the basis of—in effect—a take-over bid, conferred in practice only a very marginal power to influence events, because it implicitly accepted and in many ways reinforced the private-enterprise system, which remained overwhelmingly foreign-owned, at least in the urban sector. It represented a new dimension in the evolution of
As for Africanization, both of jobs and shareholding, although these were conceived of as measures for controlling the power of foreign capital, it was clear that they worked primarily to identify the government and the higher civil service more closely with the operations, interests and values of foreign capital. The results were monopoly profits, high rates of surplus transfer, low increases in employment, and a falling share of wages in national income backed up by tight control over the trade unions (p 147).

For African capitalism proper, Leys's analysis is in essence an extended but precisely differentiated treatment of different types of 'comprador' capitalist existence. African capitalists and petty-bourgeois in Kenya have this overriding feature in common: that they are forced, by the sheer weight of the neo-colonial presence relative to their own weakness, to seek accommodation rather than competition with foreign capital. This deal may vary in its terms, from the would-be capitalist becoming part of the foreign company's distribution network, to a more substantial operator using political muscle to gain access to or alliances with foreign capital at a somewhat higher level. But their subordinate status, and the clamouring of thousands of others at the gates, also drives them to seek monopolies, of however limited a kind. An agency for branded baby food, a contract to supply some commodity to a foreign-owned undertaking, a bus route and carrier's licence—this is the stuff of African capitalism in Kenya. It is, of course, no accident that the State is heavily involved here too, at every level from the issue of licences upwards: it ensures both the political underpinning of the system and the allocation of rewards to the politically favoured. It is in this context that 'tribalism' takes on a meaning other than purely ideological, as the political expression of a form of consciousness characteristic of the stage of class formation.

'Tribalism' is a form of consciousness, but more than that, it is a specific form of consciousness through which the 'comprador' regimes in many parts of Africa exercise a 'civil hegemony' complementing the coercive use of state power. In Kenya, tribalism and repression developed simultaneously in face of the challenge of a socialist, or would-be socialist, opposition. Tribalism served both to displace the emerging class-consciousness of the most exploited strata of society, especially in Kikuyu country, and to prevent the KPU from channelling emerging class-antagonism into a nationwide opposition movement (p 252).

The reference to class formation perhaps brings one to the major difficulty with Leys's study. At its simplest, it is this. The book sets out in great detail and with remarkable insight the mechanisms of neo-colonial transition and the development of peripheral capitalism's dominant foreign and local-comprador classes. But in the end it fails to provide an adequate account of the nature of the oppressed classes in Kenya and their varying relationships to and struggles against monopoly capitalist domination. Now this has partly to do with the original questions with which the author embarked on the study; clearly too there are formidable difficulties—not least, as Leys notes, because the crystallization of class forces among the mass of Kenyans has been complex and uncertain relative to the rapid and unambiguous assertion of the African bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. But the brevity of the analysis of questions of wage labour and the characteristics of the peasant mode of production, relative to the analysis of the
nature and class struggles of the class forces represented in the dominant alliance, has serious costs. It leads, in my view, not merely to a comparative neglect of political and ideological instances, but quite possibly to the strategic underestimation of the forces of change in the Kenyan social formation. Leys's discussion of political struggles points quite rightly to the power and determination of different fractions of capital in asserting their particular interests, and to the development of the Bonapartist state on the foundations of repression and populist/tribalist ideology. That these two features of State power were a direct response to the development of struggles by oppressed strata surely alludes to the crucial political feature of neo-colonial Kenya. If that is the case, then a closer examination of the conditions and struggles in which that consciousness of the oppressed began to take shape would merit somewhat more attention than they receive in the book. Without it, to take two proximate examples, both of them outside the book's time span, it is very difficult to assess the significance of such events as the recent bombing campaign by a group proclaiming its allegiance to the poor and exploited, or the response to and assassination of J.M. Kariuki—both of them suggesting, at the least, an assessment of the potential basis for 'left populism' in Kenyan politics.

The difficulty seems, in the end, to involve what Colin Leys himself identifies and discusses in the opening chapter: the shortcomings of 'underdevelopment' theory, in its versions both national-bourgeois and 'neo-Marxist' (the latter a formulation itself pregnant with petty-bourgeois ideology). The dominant themes of underdevelopment literature have been in fact static and economistic, despite a commitment to historical and non-disciplinary analysis. In the event, what tended to emerge was a gloomy acceptance of the pervasiveness and staying-power of capitalism, and/or somewhat apocalyptic prescriptions of socialist revolution as the 'only alternative' to deepening exploitation and underdevelopment, without much idea of how social formations might progress from one to the other. Leys rightly locates this problem in the 'heavily economistic character of most underdevelopment theory':

Social classes play an important part in it, yet rather abstractly and passively, not as protagonists in intensifying struggles providing its central dynamic. Political power, control of the state, is also seen to be important, but again somewhat abstractly, not as a pervasive dimension of the struggles between classes and of the structures of oppression which permit one class to exploit another, and which indeed are bound up with the very formation and development of classes. Imperialism features in underdevelopment theory, too, of course, but once more in a rather disembodied form... (p 20).

And he notes that underdevelopment theory 'concentrates on what happens to the underdeveloped countries at the hands of imperialism and colonialism, rather than on the total historical process involved, including the various forms of struggle against imperialism and colonialism which grow out of the conditions of underdevelopment'. (p 20). Leys's own study has certainly taken us very much further, to a much deeper understanding of the mechanisms of imperialist domination within Kenya in the post-colonial age, and by extension within the many other peripheral capitalist countries which
substantially share Kenya's characteristics. But his analysis has superceded those he correctly criticises without quite transcending them: the emphasis remains predominantly on what the dominant classes have done to the Kenyan masses, so that the political character and capacities of the various exploited classes and strata are present in the analysis mainly by inference. To make such a criticism, of course, is in fact to pay a very substantial tribute to Leys's work: for it is to say that the very richness and power of his own research could and ultimately should have led him to an even more important achievement. The book attacks and answers so many of the leading questions that its failure to deal adequately with the major contradiction of Kenyan neo-colonialism stands out more sharply than is perhaps fair for any author. To resolve that contradiction is ultimately, of course, a matter for the political action of the Kenyan masses: in its theoretical aspects, however (in the elaboration of which even 'academic' work is highly relevant) the limitations of ideologies of under-development become apparent, even—perhaps particularly—in the hands of such able and critical adherents as Colin Leys.

Geoff Lamb


This is the third collection of the writings and speeches of Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere. Undoubtedly Nyerere would like to go down in history as having made some substantial contribution not only to political practice but also to political thinking. He no doubt wishes people to take his statements seriously, and perhaps even to study them diligently, thus the periodic compilation of them in volume form. This volume is very varied in form and quality. It consists of 46 different texts ranging from serious discussions to mere *ex tempore* statements, an entire third of them speeches given at state banquets and lunches.

Here, as in his previous two collections, (*Freedom and Unity* and *Freedom and Socialism*), Nyerere harps on familiar themes: development, progress, freedom, justice, equality and so on. *Used* vaguely and loosely these notions have by and large become empty clichés—mere catchwords used by heads of states in underdeveloped countries to lull the masses. During the independence struggle these slogans were very instrumental in mobilising the people; now they have lost all content. In the seventies a few additional concepts are bandied about: capitalism, exploitation, socialism and indeed revolution. These words, once anathema, have entered the everyday vocabulary of Africa's heads of states, invariably emptied of meaning-ful content. True, Nyerere cannot be ranked with the more blatant dictators—particularly those of the military type. Africa today is a playground for imperialism and those who masquerade under the eminent titles of President, Prime Minister and Leader are the scum of the lumpen-bourgeoisie. Bereft of ideas that can compel some creativity in their countries so as to raise the level of the productive forces and solve at least the most insidious social problems of their peoples, these 'leaders' are at their best only in assisting international
capital to maraud freely in the continent at the same time enriching themselves by partaking in the crumbs thrown to them by imperialism, and above all unleashing a reign of terror over the people.

Nyerere is articulate, eloquent, and argumentative and he has so far maintained a more liberal atmosphere than is to be found in most areas of the continent. But this liberalism, has emanated essentially from the nature of the concrete contradictions that have governed Tanzania's developments since independence, contradictions which of late have been giving way to a set of sharper contradictions. These, as is already apparent within the country, will rid that regime of its liberalism and install the repression that is familiar elsewhere in Africa. For the important point to bear in mind is not whether Nyerere is a 'good' or 'bad' leader, whether or not he is 'better' than others. What is determinant in the last instance is the social class he represents objectively, which class interests he serves objectively, and what in the final analysis is his world outlook.

Petty Bourgeois Socialism
Essentially this book deals with the same idealistic notions of universal human progress, justice, peace and freedom, treated totally out of the context of historical development and the concrete forms of class struggle in each particular society. In the preface President Nyerere says it must be borne in mind that the book is 'a description of what we in Tanzania are aiming at, not what we are.' This is an apt disclaimer, for while the articles and speeches cover almost every aspect of social, economic and political life, yet fundamentally they are goals and aims that 'we' must work to attain. And these 'goals' are not arrived at as a conclusion of a thorough analysis of the concrete conditions—class forces— but are merely extracted from the idealization of the 'good society'. This, is one of the defining characteristics of petty bourgeois socialism. At times one can learn more from what is not said than from what is actually said. Consider for instance text 36 which is by far the longest. It is a written report to commemorate the tenth independence anniversary at the end of 1971. The author cites the various things 'accomplished' in the ten years: dispensaries, schools, co-operatives. Yet even from this text we cannot find out about the position of the economy. At the time of independence in 1961 Tanganyika—as then called—was East Africa's cinderella, occupying a super-satellite position within East Africa which the British colonialists plundered more or less as a single economic entity in which Kenya occupied, as she still does, a sub-metropolis position. The productive forces were at a very low stage even in the context of underdevelopment. In a country of just under ten million people, only about 300,000 were in wage employment, a third in sisal plantations alone; the 'industrial sector' consisted of some 300 small scale private companies managed by Europeans and to some extent Asians; cotton, coffee, sisal and diamonds contributed two-thirds of total exports and 28 per cent of monetary Gross Domestic Product. The early years of independence saw no improvement in most socio-economic fields; in some the situation even grew worse. Between 1960 and 1966 wage employment dropped by 20 per cent, prices rose by 15 per cent, and per capita consumption rose by a mere one per cent annually. The worsening of terms of trade
for raw materials brought stagnation of incomes to most rural dwellers. At the same time, the government’s strategies and plans for development floundered. Though all the conditions ‘favourable’ to foreign investment were created, not only did investment fail to arrive, but there was net disinvestment throughout the period; only 40 per cent of the planned loans and aid to finance the first five year plan materialised; a ‘villagisation’ scheme for the rural areas sponsored by the World Bank and Israel had to be abandoned only two years after it got under way.

Arusha Declaration

These factors, and others led to the now famous Arusha Declaration in 1967, which proclaimed the ruling party’s desire to build ‘socialism’ and ‘self-reliance’. Nationalisation, producer co-operatives in agriculture, combination of labour with study in educational institutions, reliance on internal resources for development—these were the main policy measures defined and pursued in the process of implementing the Declaration. Seven years later there has been no turn for the better. The economic situation has continued to go from bad to worse. Agricultural production has remained largely stagnant, so that foreign exchange reserves have been diminishing year by year, and food supplies have been getting lower. The situation was summarised by the editor of the government paper, The Daily News, on 9 September 1974:

Up to June this year, authority had been given for the spending of 70 Shs. million on the importation of dairy products, 750 Shs. million on the importation of flour, 90 Shs. million on vegetable fats and 65 Shs. million on sugar. Thus, the country’s bill alone for half a year was something like 1,050 Shs. million. This is unprecedented and indeed for a country like ours quite crushing, particularly when it is remembered that we shall continue to import food for some months to come... At the moment, our foreign exchange reserves are lowest since independence. They may continue to go down.

Towards the end of 1973 and the beginning of 1974, Tanzania for the first time saw real food shortages. The party paper, Uhuru, reported on 29 January 1974:

'The shortage of maize flour, rice and wheat flour which has been afflicting the region of Dar es Salaam since last week became worse yesterday when it became necessary for people to form long lines and to fight for packets of maize flour which were being sold in a few shops’ (translated).

Despite the proclaimed policy of self-reliance, dependence on foreign resources for development expenditure has actually grown fantastically since the Arusha Declaration, and—as always—loans were more and more necessary to offset repayment on past loans and the shortage of foreign exchange reserves. In early 1974 the Governor of the Central Bank stated that ‘the proportion of external assistance to total development resources which has been growing rapidly in the last three years is being stabilised around 60 per cent’, compared to an average of 36 per cent for the three years preceding the Declaration. The balance of trade for 1969, 1970, 1971 and 1972 registered a deficit of 121 Shs. million, a gain of 78 Shs. million, a deficit of 424 Shs. million, and a deficit of 717 Shs. million respectively. 80 per cent of current expenditure in 1972-73 went into public debt servicing.
This increasing dependence has put the country more and more firmly in the hands of the most rapacious forces of imperialism. The United States through the World Bank, IMF, IDA, various management and consultancy corporations has come to play a bigger and bigger role in the country—dominating not only public enterprises, but also ujamaa villages (through loans and technical assistance), schools, the administration. One loan necessarily leads to a second. *The Sunday News* reported on 23 December 1971 that IDA had agreed to finance a seven year 170 Shs. million project for the promotion of cotton and maize production in Geita district.

‘The success of the Geita cotton project promises an open gate to even greater IDA assistance to more and bigger cotton projects elsewhere, because there is already, in the third year of this project, a provision for the preparation of the second phase of the project (whose implementation may be in any suitable cotton growing area in the country) if this first phase shows signs of success.’

It is only with this background that one can have a proper perspective on the speeches and writings of President Nyerere. These aspects are not to be found in the volume, its comprehensiveness notwithstanding.

**Socialism?**

Tanzania is said to be building ‘socialism’ and an overwhelming proportion of the discussion in this book is on various aspects of socialist construction. But this resolves itself essentially into nationalisation and the complete control of all aspects of social, economic and political life by the government bureaucracy. Outlining the ‘achievements’ of the first ten years of independence, text 36 mentions in succession the expansion and gradual control of all marketing of agricultural produce by government controlled co-operatives and boards, the launching of the Tanganyika Development Corporation (later National Development Corporation) as the ‘industrial’ arm of the state, the formation of the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation, the banning of the trade union movement (Tanganyika Federation of Labour) and the installation of a bureaucratic and government controlled union (National Union of Tanganyika Workers), the imposition of a one-party system, etc. This conception of ‘socialism’ is especially illuminated with particular on the question of land ownership:

Land nationalization was also effected in 1962, although it passed almost unnoticed! It meant that freehold ownership of land was abolished and development clauses imposed on all leasehold ownership rights. By this Act of Parliament, and without any fanfare, Tanganyika achieved a basic socialist objective which more aggressive socialist parties elsewhere in the world had almost given up advocating because of its difficulty.

The petty bourgeoisie in Africa, always sees its own class interests as being synonymous with those of the people at large. State control is therefore taken to mean socialism. Is it any wonder that in Africa today every head of state is a socialist and is vigorously advocating nationalization and one-party rule? Senghor, Sadat, Boumediene, Nimeiry, Kaunda—and, indeed, Mobutu, Bokassa and the military junta in Addis Ababa—all these today represent ‘socialist’ regimes.
Having waged a fierce class battle against the commercial and landed bourgeoisie—which in many instances happened to be racial minorities—the fledgling petty bourgeoisie that inherited the reins of political power from the colonial rulers has come to aggregate all resources in its own hands and Imperialism has only been too glad to utilise the state machinery directly as its agent. In Tanzania, where this class of African bureaucrats, intellectuals and traders was extraordinarily weak and small due to the nature of the colonial economy, the wresting of resources from the Asian commercial bourgeoisie and the consolidation of bureaucratic rule over all aspects of life has gone under the banner of 'socialism'. In the process, a clique consisting of a few bureaucrats has been built up at the very top that commands all powers (half a dozen administrators control decision making in some 30 state corporations very central to the economy), and below it a massive bureaucratic apparatus has been erected to ensure the total control and domination of the entire population. In the early period of 1961-1968, administrative expenditure in the country had increased by 90 per cent (production by a mere third); with the proclamation of the policy of the 'decentralisation' of government administration organised by the American company McKinsey & Company, administrative expenditure increased by 100 per cent in a matter of two years. While in 1964, 43 per cent of those in wage employment had been in administration and services, by 1973 they constituted 54 per cent (reducing therefore the figure for those in production from 57 to 46 per cent).

Liberalism Eroded
The sharpening of the contradictions inherent in the system of neo-colonial production—contradictions which manifest themselves at the surface in the form of diminishing foreign exchange reserves and shortage of food supplies in countries which are agricultural exporters—has gradually eroded the liberalism that characterised the regime in the sixties. It was not at all accidental that following the serious economic crisis of 1972/73 the leadership turned sharply towards commandism and repression of the productive classes. At the end of 1973 it was suddenly decided to put all peasants in new selected settlements—euphemistically called 'development villages'. The 1974 campaign to implement this decision cost several lives and massive losses of property as peasants were forcibly moved by the army, policy and militia, into 'villages' which, in most cases, were totally uninhabited locations where families had to suffer exposure for days before they managed to build shanty structures.

Here is a sample of news items from the government paper, *The Daily News*, indicating this commandism and repression taken from the cuttings which reached us here in the Netherlands and the reader should bear in mind that the reports are government ones and are taken from a very small section.

Headlines included:
'Dodoma tough on lazy farmers'.
'Seventy lazy Mtwara peasants in court'.
'Cultivate land or go to Prison—Premier warns Geita people'.
'Lazy peasants face jail: Rungwe all out to boost production'. 
Daily News, 26 July 1974:
Addressing mass rallies at Butala Seka, Rusoli, Kome and Bwasi villages in Musoma district, Ndugu Nyerere said that Tanzanians must work hard to bring about development. He strongly condemned laziness and added that lazy people would not be left to lag behind and retard the country’s development. ‘They will have to be pushed so as to develop themselves through hard working’, he said.

Daily News, 1 August 1974:
Every family in Dodoma rural district will cultivate not less than three hectares of food crops from this year onwards, the Party’s district working committee has ruled. Heads of family with more than one wife will be required to cultivate three hectares for each wife. To enforce this identity cards will be prepared and given to all chairmen of village working committees. Nobody will be allowed to use buses, trains or planes without producing an identity card showing that he has cultivated three hectares. The committee said that villagers who will not comply with the order will not be allowed to attend cattle auctions, enter pombe shops nor participate in ceremonial dances.

Daily News, 13 August 1974:
Two hundred and twenty-two peasants in Mafia district, Coast Region, are to appear before a primary court magistrate charged with neglecting their shambas.

Daily News, 13 August 1974:
By-laws requiring people to cultivate the land and care for their farms have been operating in the country for many years (actually they were enacted by the colonialists—A.T.). After independence their enforcement was somehow neglected. They are now being revived in many parts of the country to combat laziness and drunkenness.

Daily News, 19 August 1974:
During the colonial era, the British administration tried to introduce more or less similar measures as the current by-laws. However, the major difference between those old laws and the present ones is that for the new laws, proper follow-up is being made to ensure that the recommended line of action is implemented.

The Musoma district TANU secretary, Ndugu Joseph Katubi, said yesterday that a task force of about 50 militiamen and T.Y.L. (Tanu Youth League) members will be set up in each village to ensure that each family reaches the target (i.e. 3 acres).

Daily News, 27 August 1974:
Everyone in Geita district must have a shamba and anyone who does not have any will be imprisoned, the Prime Minister, Ndugu Kawawa has ordered.

On 1 September 1974 a well-known slum area in Dar es Salaam, Kisutu—the home of the unemployed and the most lowly paid workers—was ruthlessly put on fire by the government. The Daily News next morning explained cynically and unashamedly:

As the 93 huts that made Kisutu a world of its own succumbed, the last batch of its residents rushed here and there in uncertainty, gathering their last belongings. Two men were rushed to Muhimbili Hospital after walls or roofs had fallen on them. Eye witnesses said that they were sleeping when the caterpillars began their operation.

Development without freedom
Paradoxically, President Nyerere’s book came in the midst of all this. Text 12 of the book shares the title of the book, ‘Freedom and Development’, this was written for a session of the party’s national executive committee late in 1968. It argues that freedom and development are inseparable: ‘Without freedom you get no development, and without development you very soon lose your freedom’. It was
written in the wake of many regional and district authorities using force in creating the agricultural producer co-operatives instead of using education and persuasion. Obviously by 1973 it had become clear that freedom and development could be separated and that one could have one without the other. In the effort to create 'development villages', it was decided that 'freedom' itself was a stumbling block—only force and various atrocities meted upon the peasantry would bring about this 'development'. The government paper editorialised on 23 August 1974:

Those who think they can avoid living in such villages are deluding themselves. Those who try to resist going into such villages are also fighting a lost cause. Every Tanzanian peasant will have to move and live in such villages. Anyone who refuses will be taken there by force. On this there will be no half-measures. TANU will not force anyone to become a socialist. The party will educate the people on the superiority of the socialist ideology over any other ideology. But TANU will not allow any Tanzanian—big or small—to hinder progress.

We need not labour the commandism and repression that was unleashed on the Tanzanian workers since early 1974. Beginning with Nyerere's May Day speech, a rigorous campaign to depict the workers as being 'lazy', 'parasitic' and 'exploiters', was unleashed. Under the title of Uhuru na Kazi (Freedom is Work), the campaign was the bureaucratic response to the working class upsurge which began in 1970 generally in urban areas but particularly in Dar es Salaam. Strikes, lock-outs of managers, political meetings—these became the daily feature in industries and other establishments, a workers' onslaught fuelled by the proclamation of the TANU Guidelines calling for—among other things—an end to commandism, oppression and bureaucratism in industries and other establishments.

This onslaught became an issue that the managers and bureaucrats could not easily contain and the TANU Guidelines became the first ever party document whose revision and amendment was publicly demanded by both party and government officials. At the beginning of 1974 when the Ministry of Labour began to champion the campaign for revision:

Lazy workers must be exposed because they are weakening the country's economy. In order to build Tanzania's economy the workers must be hard-working without being supervised, said Mr. Tandau. He also said that often lazy workers are the ones who instigate strikes and the time has now come to expose them. (Uhuru, 17 January 1974).

Two days later, Uhuru reported the Minister's Principal Secretary:

The government has instructed workers' committees in industries and offices throughout the country from now on to avoid and cease completely the tendency of locking out their officers illegally and said that strong measures will be taken against committee which will not heed this instruction.

The climax of all this was Nyerere's own May Day speech and the official beginning of the campaign for Uhuru ni Kazi; a campaign which totally buried the TANU Guidelines. Workers were no longer of importance for 'socialism' and 'revolution', but were referred to as
'exploiters' of the peasants, 'saboteurs' of 'socialism' and the 'revolu-
tion' and 'irresponsible' to the 'nation'.

It is significant, that this most radical document to have come out of TANU—the TANU Guidelines is not included in the book. Prob-
ably this indirectly expresses Nyerere's own later day disapproval of the document and particularly of the consequences which it gave rise to in the field of industrial relations. It is true that this docu-
ment was not Nyerere's personal writing, it was a party document. But this cannot be given as the reason for exclusion since in the past vital party documents came to be included in the President's collections. The classic example of this is of course the Arusha Declaration itself which is included in Freedom and Socialism.

These then are some of the major factors that must be borne in mind in connection with the book we have been discussing. In so far as it is a political testament of the country's President, one must have a fair grasp of the concrete political developments in Tanzania if one is to have a correct assessment of this testament.

Ayoub Tabari


In some ways this piece of work is remarkable, at least for the French reader. Colonial and post-colonial political life both at the local and the regional level is presented with impressive detail and precision: this achievement reflects the sound methodological intentions of the authors, hoping simultaneously to transcend the focus of a single arena of study (the village: the state), interdisciplinary barriers (anthropology: political science) and historical pseudo-dichotomies (traditional: modern).

This socio-political history of a Ghanaian region is the result of a change in stance; the situation is seen from the grass-roots upwards. There is also a synthesis or collaboration between different disciplines and despite the distinct authorship of the chapters, we are left with more than an interdisciplinary study, since each researcher has carefully related his work to that of his colleague. This methodological orientation is inspired by both the case-study and by work on local-level politics (that of F.G. Bailey among others). But instead of reverting to the formalism and psycho-sociology which theoretically dominates such studies, the authors present a picture of power relations in which capitalist economic development (particularly that of cocoa-production) plays the decisive role. However, this central operational hypothesis seems to have been employed unequally by the two authors, and sometimes the concrete analysis of lesser 'political' conflicts gives the impression of being just a list of 'news items', the theoretical explanation making its presence felt only intermittently. I am well aware of the considerable difference between the British approach and that of the French—for example
there is no theoretical introduction in the former, and explanation follows after a description of the events—but even allowing for this, the wealth of data deserves a more profound explanatory treatment.

Though the mass of administrative material and documents upon which the study is based makes for a doubly successful piece of research, one sometimes has the impression that the authors have lost themselves in this material, and that they are unable to link it to the socio-economic reality in anything more than a very general fashion. This is not to suggest that there is any lack of field-work, since a considerable part of the data comes from meetings and interviews. However, the interview material seems to lay more stress on the known participants in the political process than the unknown agents within the given power relations. This reaction is to some extent understandable, but I was all the more conscious of it since there does exist a recorded political reality (reports, memos, proposals and reviews) which is certainly far more lacking in the francophone context. Despite this documentary disparity, political life nonetheless consists of those who act within it and those who speak and write about it. So what do the masses in Ahafo really think? These remarks should not divert us from the descriptive and explanatory study of the historical and social reality of Ahafo. I will restrict myself to two areas—the colonial system and the mechanisms of political life.

On the former, the essential aim of the authors is to demonstrate that the social reality of Ahafo (and therefore of Ghana and even of former colonial Africa) is neither a dichotomy nor merely a mixture of the traditional (that which formerly obtained) and the modern (that which is new). This is proven more at the empirical than at the theoretical level. The crucial analytical basis is the establishment of structures of political domination to ensure a particular type of economic exploitation. From here follows a series of sometimes dovetailed, sometimes opposed, power relations between the village and national institutions (either colonial or post-colonial): thus, British power over the Ashanti and the Ahafo, Kumasi's power over Ahafo, and soon. To the extent that Ahafo was more or less subordinated and had relations with the outside world, the colonisation of the Ahafo region cannot boil down to the integration of a community of hunters into the world market.

Political authority does not intervene in order to encourage or control new or increased production; it aims to transform surplus into capital. It is in this context that the conflicts and even the nature of the political process will appear. Should this surplus be achieved at the local or the national level? Rival strategies will once again come into play between the dominant local (rural) groups, the urban groups and the (colonial or post-colonial) state apparatus.

It is within this framework that the particular nature of the British colonisation of Ghana gave a unique form to relations of power. Indirect rule is more economical than a direct military presence, yet it has the expensive drawback of encouraging conflicts between rival factions. However, indirect rule is no less colonial for all that. John
Dunn puts it well: 'The fact that the lower echelons of the hierarchy were governed indirectly was in no way intended to imply that the obedience was expected to be any less direct', (p.157). The ideological tools of domination (education and Christianity) are subordinated to the internal logic of indirect rule; that is, the relations of domination between the local network of chiefs and the peasant masses had to remain as undisturbed as possible. Until 1945 there were consequently hardly any educational institutions in the Ahafo region. On the other hand Christianity, which was not the secular arm of colonial power, was disseminated autonomously: the missions had hardly any real benefits or support from the colonial administration, which was even inclined to distrust them.

The last point on the workings of the colonial system which I found particularly interesting, concerns the style of the British administrators. Their public-school mentality, their conception of the African and of power, and their worries about health give vivid substance to the colonial apparatus, of which it was an integral and essential part.

On political mechanisms: the colonial relationship seen as a power serving economic exploitation and capitalisation is not considered by the authors to give rise to specific political configurations. Neither traditional nor modern, the crux of conflict and of intervention is seen as a sort of opportunism. The political concept of the ends justifying the means (here defined historically, which constitutes the main interest and advance of this study) does not permit the social relations in question to be better described. Here is the problematic posed in its most simple form:

Only political goals in a broad sense remain fully constant: individual and corporate advancement reckoned in terms of the economic and demographic growth of communities. An important feature of Ahafo politics is that the political structures, 'traditional' or 'modern', in terms of which this advancement is negotiated are in themselves imprecise and fluid. Whether it be the organization of a State council of chiefs or a town development Committee, political action is directed both towards the establishment of institutional norm and to the negotiation of individual status (p 40).

This ahistoric conception of political institutions is situated within a framework of demo-economic functionalism rather than Bailey's psycho-sociological variety. I recognize that the aim (the colonial view of politics) lends itself to this type of interpretation: the use of frames of reference according to circumstances, the 'traditional' reinvention of a chieftancy which if not colonial was at least more colonised than other social relationships or groups. I use the term 'functionalism' broadly, since we have been taken a long way from classical anthropological functionalism by the types of phenomena to which it is applied. Here, the maintenance of order for the benefit of the world market (commercial production) (p 89), institutionalised struggle between 'old' chiefs and dominant 'youngmen' (p 311), and clientship and control of land (p 332) are the real causes of new conflicts. The situation is complicated by the extent to which the expression and the functioning of these new relations does not determine the political form of their development. Equally so,
national conflicts are only reproduced to the extent that are transformed into internal and local conflicts over community-based problems.

This dynamic of political action seems to me to be well considered in its totality, but the empirical limitations of the research (emphasising the 'actors' or interest groups thrown up by the political process itself) and of the underlying theoretical propositions do not permit the identification of real determination of choice and of conflict. There is a background which is correctly defined in terms of political domination and economic exploitation (with all that this implies). There is also a relatively detailed picture of political life. But between these two one had the impression that the system of indirect rule could only favour functionalism, indeed 'localism'. In what terms is this functionalism (to stay within the authors' frame of reference) actually specified? The external description is relatively satisfactory (with Kumasi, the British, and national power). But in terms of the internal reality, however, the identification of the economic bases of personal political power (see table on p 320) falls back far too much upon elementary political science.

Of course, things are far from being simple. As A.F. Robertson explains:

What constitutes tradition can clearly be as vexed a question for the Ahafo chief or elder as it is for the sociologist. Chiefs and stool councils interpret and make tradition, and at the same time they are judged by those to whom they are politically responsible in terms of what is regarded as traditionally proper (p 187).

In its guiding principles, its methodology and its precision, this study seems to me to be somewhat of an advance on the literature devoted to 'modern' African political life. The theoretical ambiguities it reveals will find no magic answer in the simple use of other concepts, be they more rigorous and, for example, more Marxist. This can be reduced to an even simpler cause: the concepts necessary for this type of analysis do not, as yet, exist. They need to be developed. Theoretical models exist, which have been worked out in the context of Western society. I am thinking here for example of the work of Gramsci or Nicos Poulantzas. But the risks will be great if one tries to transpose such concepts onto the African social reality.

Anyhow, before theorising we must have many more studies of this type, but conducted in an explicit Marxist framework. In France, the backward state of research into political life in Africa during its colonial period is such that we run the risk, unfortunately, of being content to sit back and admire for a long time to come studies of the type commented upon here.

Jean Copans
Robin Cohen is a political sociologist whose book belongs to a familiar category of national-level studies of trade unions and politics in the third world. Although his is not the first book-length study of the trade unions in Nigeria, it is certainly the first to go beyond a simple narrative treatment. Cohen presents the movement as both affected by and affecting economic, social and political forces. Whilst the book falls into the 'unions and politics' category, Cohen also attempts to break away from certain precepts that have dominated such studies. He rejects, in particular, the notion that third world unions fall into a special category of 'political unionism' and that they are politically significant only in so far as they tie up with nationalist or other major political parties. Cohen is interested in the formation of a specific working class with its own distinct consciousness, forms of organisation and action, and he considers his subject partly in this light. He has chapters on the social, economic and political environment, on the convoluted history of the national trade union centres (their mergers, splits and international affiliations), and union behaviour in the economic and political fields. These are examined for the period up to the first coup in January 1966. An updating chapter covers the unions under the military, before, during and after the civil war. The concluding chapter considers the relationship of the unions to political stability in Nigeria and comments on general theories of 'political unionism' in Africa. Apart from a minor and inconclusive survey, Cohen is basically dependent on documentary sources. Charts showing the development of trade union centres and worker-oriented political groups provide an invaluable guide through a maze of names and initials.


Ukandi Damachi treats his subject within the traditional industrial relations triangle of unions-management-government. The title of the book is misleading since it is in reality a case study of Ghana with a ten-page introduction on the role of trade unions in the development process. Damachi is concerned with the problem of industrial peace in a 'developing nation'. He analyses systematically the relations of union and state, of labour and management, and other union activities under four political periods. These are the period of two-party rule following independence (1957-60), the single-party regime of Nkrumah (1961-6), the military regime of 1966-9 and the parliamentary period under Busia from 1969 to 1971. Damachi suggests the re-occurrence of the following pattern in Ghana: government control of the Trade Union Congress; consequent worker apathy and antipathy to the TUC; cautious TUC activity that
nonetheless 'sabotaged' productivity, compelling government to bring in austerity measures; and then militant union action against these, leading to a crisis. The existence of a cycle in union-government relations in Ghana is beyond doubt—even if one does not accept the way it is presented by Damachi. It gives rise to the question of whether one can meaningfully speak of four different periods, a point reinforced by Damachi's stress on the way the independent regimes repeated colonial control practices. Unfortunately, however, Damachi gives us little more than this. Based as it is on reading and a three-month field trip, it is difficult to imagine how a short book covering this long time span could do more than give a general but shallow sketch. Additionally, Damachi's theoretical assumptions are flat statements supported by argumentation. Thus, he uses a 'so-called accommodation-conflict framework' which is neither defined, explained or justified. And on page 7, when he feels the need to 'define what we mean by development', he says that this is not simply economic, 'It also entails social and political modernisation'. Full stop. This seems hardly adequate in dealing with a country in which labour-government conflict has largely revolved around differing notions of development.


R.D. Grillo is an anthropologist and his interest is in workers as a community. His book falls into a narrow but strong tradition of such studies in anglophone Central and East Africa by anthropologists of the Manchester school. His subject is the railway workers on the estate owned by the East African Railways in Kampala. His focus is the traditional one of the anthropologist, that of the cohesion and continuity of the community. The narrowness of his field is compensated for by increased depth. Whilst Grillo is able to dispose of the economic and social background of Uganda and Kampala in ten pages, he makes an intense study of the estate's inhabitants, of the industrial structure and working relationships, of relations amongst the employees and between them and their rural home areas. A chapter on social mobility deals with the stresses created by competition for promotion within the modern employment hierarchy. And one on voluntary associations concentrates primarily on the nature and significance of trade union organisation and behaviour. This is concerned with the role that unions play in the struggle for personal mobility rather than that for social mobilisation. But this is consistent with what he has shown us of the background structure and situation of the labour force. Grillo is dealing with a particular group of workers (the relatively-privileged employees of a public corporation), at a particular moment in the process of proletarianisation (they retain strong rural links, returning home with pensions on early retirement), and at a particular political moment (that of rapid Africanisation and promotion following independence in 1964-5). Although Grillo makes use of documents, the value of his study depends primarily on the traditional tools of his trade. In addition to 18 months intensive observation, which included visits to a home village area, he also used individual
interviews and life histories, and he carried out an extensive survey of households on the estate. There are numerous tables and figures. These are evidently books of very different scope and quality. Perhaps because of this they give rise to two basic questions concerning how one can approach workers and unions in Africa. By 'approach' is meant here both the world-outlook or values of the authors and the strategy or discipline with which (or within which) they tackle their topic.

First, then, the matter of assumptions. Where Damachi characterises his environment as one that is 'developing', Grillo speaks just as easily of one that is 'underdeveloped'. For both of them, apparently, industrialisation, urbanisation and modernisation implies a movement toward the institutions, practices and social psychology of liberal capitalist society. Thus, for Grillo, 'proletarianisation' means the adopting of a consciousness and activity appropriate to modern capitalist production. He assumes that large industrial enterprise will be hierarchically ordered and is concerned with how rural people adapt themselves to this new environment. Even Robin Cohen, who specifically rejects the 'crude notion of the state as neutral referee and arbiter' (p 263), is capable of adopting the capitalist market as a paradigm for social behaviour and considers the labour movement in Nigeria as one bidder in 'the permanent competition for goods, resources and services' (p 262).

Now, it is evident that industrialisation and wage employment in Africa imply the abandonment of rural practices and norms, and that in a competitive and hierarchical environment workers and worker organisations often adopt capitalist norms and behaviour patterns. To this extent the market paradigm is relevant. Grillo produces convincing evidence to suggest that the major reaction of his workers to their situation was the vigorous quest for personal promotion. Cohen portrays the entrepreneurial style common to union organisers in Nigeria (pp 119-26). And Damachi is certainly justified in stressing as part-objectives of the Ghana TUC the leadership's interest in securing its power position (p 124). So far, so good. But can one within such a framework deal adequately with all worker or union behaviour in Africa (or anywhere else for that matter)? For Grillo's subject matter, possibly. It would seem that in the case he is dealing with class crystallisation was at such an early stage that even behaviour of and within the unions was dominated by the bourgeois aspiration for personal social advancement. Moreover, he does have some concept of class and class interest. This enables him to recognise that Africanisation in the railways had 'potentially divided the community into two classes who have differences of interest and allegiance which (also potentially) are in conflict' (p 147). He gives the case of an industrial conflict in which higher supervisory staff had to opt for the white management or the African labour force: they opted for management 'and thus their class position'. Unfortunately, however, his understanding of class is limited by his general worldview. Class for him seems to be a matter of perceptions, and it is not too clear whether these are the perceptions of the subjects or those of the analyst. Thus explanation in terms of class coexists with
explanation in terms of status (perceived standing within the occupational, income and educational structures), and in terms of reputation (estimation by own community). Grillo’s failure to see a determinate relationship between class structure and status (or is it a belief that there is no social structure apart from perceptions of it?) gives his analysis an abstract and artificial air. It is not clear, for instance, why he could not discuss the above supervisor/men conflict as one of status, nor why he could not elsewhere treat the distinctions, tensions and conflicts between ‘men of above and men of below’ (in the popular Swahili phrase) as expressions of early class consciousness.

The notion of a society as variously stratified and influenced by class or other factors (in this case ‘ethnicity’) is also held by Robin Cohen. Unlike the other two, he is keenly aware that his area is neither ‘underdeveloped’ nor ‘developing’ but marked specifically by ‘dependent capitalist development’ (p 46). His book, as stated earlier, is largely concerned with showing the way and the extent to which workers in Nigeria have moved towards class consciousness and class action. But in a discussion of ethnicity, class and political power (none, unfortunately, defined), he presents the ethnic and class structures as two systems determining access to power. Given that in his social analysis he in practice treats ethnicity as a value and class as objective, one regrets that he did not explain both in terms of relationship to the means of production. One further regrets his rather idiosyncratic terminology of class—‘external estate’, ‘political class’, ‘intendant class’—for what might just as well have been called ‘imperialism’, ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’, ‘middle class’. These latter terms belong to the same Marxist set as ‘working class’ and ‘lumpenproletariat’, which Cohen also employs. Granted they are problematic, but they could have been used critically, as he does with ‘lumpenproletariat’. Now, while it is evidently of no concern to either Damachi or Grillo to treat workers as existing within an exploitative and oppressive social system, this is clearly of interest to Cohen. But by failing consistently and systematically to adopt an approach and terminology which goes beyond the worldview of liberal social science, he has been unable to show how—even potentially—workers might transform, rather than just ‘de-stabilise’ Nigeria. In the end he can only speculate on the possibility of demobilised soldiers, populist politicians and radical unions creating ‘a new political force of some considerable dimension’ in Nigeria.

Now for the matter of the disciplinary boundaries within which the three authors attempt to understand the behaviour of workers in Africa. Both Grillo and Damachi work strictly within the boundaries of their particular disciplines, each of which is bound to focus only on certain aspects of social reality. Without any question it is the industrial relations approach that is the most limiting. The belief that labour relations can be understood in terms of conflict or bargaining between two (or three) parties is mystifying enough in an industrialised country. To transfer this model to Ghana is to mystify doubly. It is only in the last sentence but one of his book—and then in parentheses—that Damachi feels the need to state that ‘It should be noted that the unions and their central organisation, the TUC, represent only the wage and salary earners in the modern sector’.
Placed at the beginning of the book, and accompanied by analogous characterisations of employers and government (and who they represent), such a statement could have indicated a minimal recognition of Ghanaian reality. One could develop from here a study of wage labour and unions in a society dominated numerically by farmers and petty entrepreneurs. But then one would have to abandon industrial relations altogether.

The approach from anthropology also implies exclusion of large parts of social reality. Grillo's meagre comments on the surrounding environment are surely due to the anthropologist's article of faith that one can isolate any community and treat it meaningfully as a social whole. This, again, is mystifying even in relation to small-scale and relatively isolated agricultural communities, the study of which gave birth to the discipline. In the case of a community of wage-earners living within a large modern city, the assumption should look transparently artificial. It becomes so, in fact, when Grillo fails to find a capitalist class in the railways because 'not even the General Manager' owns it (p. 91)! A look around Kampala would have found plenty of them, at that time mostly foreign. However, the anthropologist's interest in the whole of his part society means that he is likely to look at work, leisure, family and political life and structures. It is because of this that Grillo's analysis of union behaviour is so convincing. Facile generalisation about the role of trade unions is bound to break down in the face of his detailed analysis of the social background of union membership and leadership. He shows that 80 per cent of branch officers consisted of the relatively well-paid and well-educated clerical workers, and that the national executive consisted exclusively of this group. Factional dispute within or between unions can thus be seen as part of the struggle for personal promotion (this group being the one to benefit most from Africanisation). And the continued support by the manual worker majority for a stratum recognised as largely seeking its own interests can be seen as following from experience in the rural and extra-industrial urban environment. One looks forward with anticipation to Grillo's promised book on race and class within the railways—whilst wondering whether the anthropological perspective will prove broad enough to deal successfully with this tough theme.

In conclusion, a final word on Robin Cohen's book. In his preface he states that his subject obliged him to go beyond his own discipline, venturing into history, economics and industrial relations. His book is in one sense the record of a man forced by his material to abandon the disciplinary compartmentalisation that liberal academia demands, but unable to accept or work out a consistent marxist approach to the study of the working class and its organisations in Africa. Since nobody else has done this, the task remains before us.

Peter Waterman
The vitality of the land question in Ethiopian political life has been shown with renewed force since February 1974. Michael Ståhl’s analytical work could thus have come at no better time. Using official documents and hitherto unpublished and often neglected research reports, in addition to his own field work, the author has given us a lucid exposition of the marriage of feudalism and world capitalism and the contradiction between the strategies of the development of peasant agriculture and commercial farming. The work is at the same time a major contribution to the study of the development/under-development process.

Beside its topical importance, the book is of great use to the historian. It opens a new perspective to the study of Ethiopian history, and the few factual errors do not seriously mar the overall positive contribution. Agricultural surplus and trade are pointed out as major preconditions for social differentiation and political centralization. The gult system is described as ‘the major mechanism of surplus appropriation’ in what is sometimes known as the mediaeval kingdom, which Ståhl rightly designates Abyssinian, to distinguish it from the more recent Ethiopian empire. His characterization of the mode of production in this period as tributary, while no doubt worth further deeper investigation, can be regarded as a good start in the as yet infant state of the study of modes of production in Ethiopia. Equally useful is the model of centre, periphery and bridgehead to describe the manner of surplus appropriation in the period of Shawan dominance in the late 19th and 20th centuries, although it is difficult to believe that the transition from the tributary to the feudal mode of production had to await the imperial land grants of the post-1941 period (p 68).

In chapter 5, the land and agricultural policies of Haile Selassie’s regime are analyzed. The political objectives of imperial land grants—to buy support and to secure stability—are emphasized. Their historical importance as beginning large-scale private land ownership in southern Ethiopia is assessed. The limitations of the different land tax legislations of the post-1941 period culminating in the agricultural income tax of 1967, which all conspired to further impoverish the tenants, are clearly pointed out. Even more significant is the growing role of imperialism, with the aims, among others, of stabilizing the regime and initiating capitalist development. The result was an acceleration of the process of the country’s integration into the world capitalist system. This was illustrated by the third 5 year plan (1968-73), which gave priority to commercial agriculture. At the same time it recommended the maximum and minimum package programs for the development of peasant agriculture. The contradiction between the two strategies, because both types of farming were promoted in the same area (i.e. the ‘southern’ highlands with which incidentally the book is almost entirely concerned), is its central theme.
After a brief appraisal of the land tenure situation in the 1960s, the author proceeds to examine the package programmes in detail. The first of these was the maximum package programme known as the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU), co-sponsored by the Swedish and Ethiopian governments. In the prevailing situation of uneven land distribution and share-cropping, its credit programme could scarcely benefit its target group, the poor peasants and tenants. The unit’s other aim of promoting co-operatives was frustrated by government hostility, peasant suspicion, and the like-warmness of the management itself. On the other hand, CADU abetted, directly or indirectly, the process of mechanization with its attendant costs of eviction of tenants and some ‘owner-cultivators’ and the soaring price of land.

The minimum package projects, whose financial backers included the World Bank, were intended to utilize the experience of CADU without repeating its mistakes. Instead, they merely duplicated the CADU experience. In both units chosen for discussion, Bako (in Shawa and Wallaga) and Shashamanne (in Shawa), the programme could only be said to have failed in its objectives. In Bako the credit arrangement barred the poor peasants, who could not afford the 25 per cent cash down payment, and the tenants, who have no written lease agreements. The co-operative programme was thwarted by lack of central direction and local opposition. The overall effect of the programme was to refine feudal exploitation by encouraging a contract form of rent payment which obliged the tenant to pay a fixed sum (irrespective of crop failures or other such mishaps) and a monoculture economy. In Shashamanne, where there had already been some penetration of capitalist relations of production, there was more tenant participation in the credit programme than in Bako, although the rich peasants and landlords benefitted more. Landlords also eagerly joined the co-operatives and tried to manipulate them for their own ends, rather than meet them with hostility as in Bako.

In conclusion, the limits of imperial ‘reformism’, of which the minimum package project was a microcosmic illustration, are discussed. These range from the misleading name of the ministry of land reform and administration, entrusted with the contradictory tasks of creating landlords and limiting their privileges, to the notorious bill which aimed at regularizing tenancy rather than abolishing it—and failed to pass parliament. To the interesting case of the Henna project, which the author poses as a question in the appendix, the popular democratic upsurge of February and its sequel seem to have provided a better answer.

Bahru Zewde
The title of this section has been changed to Current Africana to avoid confusion. The original title of Radical Africana referred more to the use to which I hoped the listing would be put than to the items included in the list, and has misled a few readers. I am reluctant to attempt a list of solely radical material, as disputes would instantly arise over the selection made, and in any case no radical can afford to ignore non-radical material in constructing her or his own analyses.

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