Democracy, Civil Society and NGOs

Most of the material in this issue is concerned with one of two major, topical debates in Africa. By far the greatest volume of wordage in the 1990s is around the dramatic shifts, actual and protected, toward 'democratisation' - the first of our concerns. The second is with the dramatic increase in the role of NGOs and whether the implications are 'progressive' or not.

Democratisation and International Agendas

Several of our offerings on the first topic echo progressive commentators in the continent to the effect that the mere existence of multi-party competition and elections do not alone guarantee genuine democracy, and that what is also required is a widespread and complex process involving the strengthening of civil society.

Any realistic assessment of the prospects for fostering democracy and civil society must, however, take into account the broader international forces which provide the context for these processes. Here one can isolate two major dimensions, each of which embodies contradictory influences in relation to democracy. First, the global political economic context facing Africa in the 1990s is one that has seen a widespread shift to structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in most African countries; and indeed the shifts to multi-partyism has been in part on the back of leverage exerted through aid. But the political changes are generating demands for and expectations of a better social and economic deal from many interests, demands which have little prospect of being realised as the new regimes are even more likely to follow the austerity policies associated with SAPs. But this set of contradictions also shapes the context for the second of our concerns - the role of NGOs. As the second stage of SAPs increasingly recognise the need to provide some, admittedly minimalist, welfare safety-net, they are turning, given their own anti-statist logic, to NGOs to provide this.

The second and more explicitly 'political' dimension of the context for democratisation in Africa is a new international order which has contradictory, post cold war currents: the energetic, if selective, promotion by the west, via political conditionality and other means, of pluralist democracy, on the one hand, and the reassertion in a modified form of US ambitions to be the, now unimpeded, world policeman, on the other. At a recent conference in the US a paper (Volman, 1992) was presented that offered a sobering assessment of the
implications of the latter current for Africa: from the perspective of ‘security policy’ democracy poses the threat of opening a pandora’s box of ethnicity, conflict and instability. It remains to be seen how correct is its implication that the Clinton Administration will not imply much change from the Bush doctrine:

... with the end of the cold war the US is now threatened by the turmoil and dangers in the developing world and must be prepared to deal with a world that, for all our hope, remains a dangerous place – a world of ethnic antagonism, national rivalries, religious tensions, spreading weaponry, personal ambitions and lingering authoritarianism (President Bush, National Security Strategy, 1992).

The underdeveloped world’s growing dissatisfaction over the gap between the rich and poor nations will create a fertile breeding ground for insurgencies that have the potential to jeopardize regional stability and our access to vital economic and military resources (General Alfred M Gray, US Marine Corps Commandant).

Again, this set of contradictory forces has implications for the role of NGOs, as can be seen in its starkest possible form in Somalia today, where it is the NGO-US military axis which is trying to take over the running of the country. There may be little immediate alternative means to prevent further starvation and deaths – though some would contest even that. But therein lies the tragedy and the future danger: that this is all there is.

The Role of NGOs

It may be more useful to concentrate our further remarks on the less well-worked terrain of the NGOs rather than the familiar territory of civil society – although indigenous NGOs are certainly one of the institutional forms that can deepen it.

One category of NGO, the Christian missions, already played a considerable role in colonial days, providing education and health and other services. After independence, more specifically development-oriented NGOs have entered many African countries, and in more recent years indigenous development NGOs have emerged alongside more established welfare groups. Today, NGOs come in all shapes and sizes, and generalisation is difficult. Some northern NGOs are barely disguised agents of the home governments’ foreign policies – although quite what those policy goals are in the post-cold war era cannot just be presumed. Others have their own agendas – the fundamentalist proselytising of the far right US Christian and some Islamic bodies, for instance – for which welfare or development activities are a means or a blind. There also emerged what have been described as the ‘third generation NGOs’, espousing an alternative approach to development to those of official donors, one which is more ‘people-oriented’.

However, the stated or implicit aims of NGOs are likely to be less determinant of their actual role than changes in the global political economic context. In particular, the era of SAPs with its bias against the state’s involvement in de-
development, its undercutting of general welfare subsidies, and the general lack of confidence in official aid channels, reinforced by the reliance in Africa on NGOs for food relief distribution often in situations of conflict or state breakdown, has seen a great increase in the NGOs activities and the channelling of growing proportions of official aid through them. This enhanced role of NGOs in the 1980s has been noted and discussed. A World Development (1987) supplement provided one of the most useful compilations of views on these trends, but its exploration of their implications is mainly from the perspective of the NGOs themselves:

1. Southern NGOs have the basic responsibility among NGOs for leading the development process in Third World countries and the expertise to do so. However, both northern and southern NGOs share a responsibility for ensuring that a climate exists in which development can take place.

2. Relations between northern and southern NGOs must be based on an equal partnership incorporating a new sense of transparency, mutual accountability and risk-sharing. A ‘code of conduct’ for use by both in forging a more productive, collaborative relationship should be considered.

3. The crucial links between micro and macro level policies must be recognised. The ‘third generation’ of NGOs should facilitate these linkages.

4. The heterogeneity of NGOs is their strength and should be maintained at all levels – local, national, international.

5. NGOs should diversify their sources of financial support so as not to be dependent on any one source. New sources of funding should be sought, especially local funds in the South.

6. Funding agencies should recognize that the NGOs need long-term support to facilitate institution-building and the formulation of overall strategies. Project grants are insufficient.

7. Though financial transfers remain crucial, information and technical and organizational skills will be increasingly important resources in the future.

8. There must be much greater attention among NGOs to the preservation and accumulation of knowledge. Research, dissemination and training should be an integral part of NGO programs.

9. Networks can be a valuable tool for strengthening the NGO movement. Increasingly exchange of experience and expertise will have great benefits, particularly among southern NGOs in promoting their self-reliance.
10. NGOs should take on even more active roles in development education and advocacy. Northern development educators and advocates should incorporate much more input from southern NGOs to ensure the validity of the picture they portray of the Third World development process and priorities. There is great potential here for North/South partnership in building constituencies to support development and in influencing government and donor agency policy.

Like the pieces by Lecomte and Fowler, issues of the relations with home and host governments and with indigenous NGOs, are offered as the crucial agenda issues in that collection. But before such issues can be addressed, the more general question of the global determinants of the role in which they are likely to be in a New World ‘Order’ has to be explored. Fowler here offers a soberingly realistic point of departure for a discussion of NGOs’ role. It is hard not to agree with his projections that both Northern and indigenous NGOs will become even more agents for and thus dependent on official aid in the years ahead, thus putting paid to aspirations of Northern NGOs being vehicles for completely alternative strategies, and to those of self-financing for indigenous NGOs.

His insistence on thus seeing NGOs’ role as now constituting a subsidiary but essential element in a reshaped international socio-economic system is also well taken. Certainly, too, their role in the SAP-type of system within Africa has much more to do with providing a minimalist welfare function rather than of generating development. Duffield’s 1991 view of how far this process has gone in conflict areas, is now very much confirmed by events in Somalia. He also draws out one of the several ambiguities about the present role of NGOs: that the welfare system is woefully inadequate in scale and inappropriate in many of its forms, but at the same time it is all that offers survival for many people.

Recognition of those likelihoods does not, of course, eliminate both sets of NGOs from being one of the vehicles through which the appropriateness of these ‘welfare’ measures and their possible reform should be debated. Like, for instance, some of the deliberations of a recent international forum from 46 countries, 13 of them Africa, of NGOs in Washington:

1. Organisations resolved to begin or accelerate planning for national meetings of NGOs, trade unions, women’s groups and other civic organisations to decide on actions against and alternatives to SAPs . . . NGOs should complement trade unions in their ‘front line’ role as the biggest mass organisations confronting SAPs. NGOs should recognise their own limitations, in that they can lead only a segment of the community. We must associate with all progressive forces in society.
2. The challenge for NGOs was like David facing Goliath, and agreed on the urgent task of breaking the Bank and Fund’s stranglehold on information in order to help people develop alternative policies based on local priorities rather than the global agenda of the elite.

3. NGOs were being called on to help implement social programmes - ‘but who decides what kind of programmes these will be’? Participants agreed that they had no role in decision-making either on the adjustment process itself or on these social programmes . . . that government promises of aid for very poor people were pure politics: ‘this is a method to forestall and weaken opposition, not a sign of intent to provide real assistance.’

4. Access to national economic data and to learn from each others’ experience. Pooling resources would help overcome individual poverty and subordination to the agendas of foreign NGOs and also avoid an over-dependence on foreign financing that reflected Africa’s general plight.

However, it is important to avoid the ‘illusions’ which Fowler’s analysis revealed in pursuing such dialogues between North and South, and to recognise that such efforts are at best ‘reformist’.

The Editors would like to thank Hussein Adam and Berhane Woldegabriel for their invaluable insights and comments.

STOP PRESS

As we go to press an urgent appeal has come from our Angolan editor, Antonieta Coelho, on the murder of university teachers and students by the UNITA death squads. She says, 'in the last two months Angolan academics, Fernando Marcelino and his wife Miete, his sister, a nun, Dilar Marcelino, Zaida Daskalos and David Bernardino were murdered in selective killings by UNITA. Our lives are at serious risk and we wonder who will be next. We need urgent and strong international action to bar the way to ethnic fascism, war and to prevent more murders of Angolan intellectuals.' She goes on to say, 'it was not the first time that members of the University Agostinho Neto were murdered, in crimes with evident political connotations'.

"From 1975, Angolan university teachers, researchers and intellectuals and expatriates resident in the country, as well as university students, have been murdered, especially in Huambo, Bie and Huila, by death squads linked to UNITA and to the forces of apartheid which practice selective homicide on ideological grounds. Their murders deliberately targeted everything they represented, as members of the progressive and humanist forces of Angola.

We appeal to the United Nations and the international community to undertake their responsibilities to effect the Peace Accords for Angola and the respect of human rights which include the urgent and complete demilitarisation of UNITA and the dismantling of its terrorist groups.

We appeal to the solidarity of all universities, research centres, professional organisations of intellectuals all over the world to press their governments to produce statements against the selective murder of Angolan intellectuals by death squads and, generally, against the systematic violations of human rights in Angola."
Distant Obligations: Speculations on NGO Funding and the Global Market

Alan Fowler

This article offers speculative answers to two inter-related questions of strategic importance for non-governmental development organisations (NGOs). First, what is the long-term scenario for their funding, particularly for NGOs in the poorer countries of the South and especially in Africa? Second, what, if any, is the likely relationship between NGO financing and the rapid growth of a global capitalist market? Answers to these questions are arrived at using a simple model of the various sources of NGO finance and information on their trends. Two conclusions are that, for the foreseeable future, Southern NGOs will remain dependent on surpluses derived from Northern economies in which official aid will become dominant; and that NGOs will increasingly function as a component of an international system of social welfare because this role serves the international reproduction of capital.

An ancillary conclusion is that poorer states, although nominally sovereign, will act as local governments in a new international order because their ability to function is essentially determined by foreign aid. These findings suggest that NGOs will have to (a) revise current notions that they operate as agents of popular transformation and facilitators of countervailing power, (b) review their position within the future political-economy of poor Southern states and (c) recognise that the self-financing of Southern NGOs will remain an illusion unless Northern donors significantly change their funding practices. Overall, NGOs need to make a radical reappraisal of their development strategies and roles, as well as taking strategic decisions on how to secure the autonomy of their funding base.

Introduction

The following pages speculate on where will non-profit organisations (NGOs) involved in world-wide poverty alleviation and promotion of social justice obtain the finance for their work in the years to come? This question needs to be asked today because the work of NGOs, while growing rapidly, are directly dependent on global economic and political systems that are currently undergoing rapid change.
Intrinsic to development NGOs is the fact that the costs of the development services they provide are not met by income from the clients they serve — the poor, marginalised, oppressed and deprived inhabitants of the South. In one way or another, therefore, NGOs must cover their costs by tapping into surpluses generated by the for-profit capitalist market economy, an economic system that is displacing all others as it expands across the world and penetrates deeper into countries of Eastern Europe and the South. Effective management and leadership of NGOs therefore requires a strategic view on how the growth of a global market may influence the volume, world-wide distribution and ‘quality’ of the surpluses that non-profit organisations in North and South must access in order to maintain themselves.

Predicting the future is always a contentious exercise, and this article does not set out to identify a number of inviolable future truths. Instead, by reviewing trends, it offers speculations on a key issue — the nature and security of the NGO resource base. The analysis is taken further by identifying some implications of funding trends and the strategic decisions that NGOs could take in order to secure their position.

A simple framework for analysing NGO financing in the North and the South is presented and explained in part two. Part three details likely changes in the major sources of NGO income identified in the model. Part four places these trends within the context of arguments that aid will be maintained because it serves market expansion. The consequences of aid dependency for the sovereignty of governments in poor countries of the South are discussed. Part five speculates on implications arising from the evidence and discusses how NGOs may deal strategically with them.

To highlight and sharpen the analysis, discussion concentrates on the poorest countries of the South, most of which are in Africa, where the effects of NGO services on state functioning can be expected to be the most acute and potentially contentious.

The Structure of NGO Funding

A basic premise of developmental NGOs is that they serve a client group that is not in a position to meet the full cost of the services they receive. While the market provides for those who can afford it, those who cannot must look for services from the state or other institutions, such as NGOs, that obtain their income from other sources. The work of NGOs is therefore critically dependent on economic processes external to the client group. Or, put differently, NGOs rely on access to a financial surplus that is generated outside of the client’s immediate economy.

Figure 1 identifies the primary sources of NGO financing in the North and the South. Northern NGOs derive their income from (a) gifts made by the general public, (b) from the state through grants financed by general taxation, and (c) from self-financing through money generated by investment or enterprise. In
the South, sources of NGO income are more diverse because in addition to the previous three, resources can be made available by Northern NGOs and governments.

Each of these sources has a distinctive quality, that is a set of conditions or expectations that influence what the NGO can do developmentally and how. For example, gifts from a Northern individual intended to sponsor a child in the South come with very different demands and expectations than a World Bank grant for NGO participation in a programme designed to mitigate the unwanted social effects of structural adjustment. Additionally, each source also has different dynamics in terms of growth or shrinkage in volume. While other factors, such as ideology and history, contribute to NGO functioning, the proportions of funds used from these diverse sources significantly shape and steer what a NGO is, how it operates and what it achieves.

The concern of this article is to map out likely trends in the relative amounts of funds available to NGOs from these different sources and then consider what implications these changes might have for the NGO community in the North and the South. For example to analyse how changes in funding structure will influence interactions between NGOs, impact on their role in society and affect NGO relations with Southern governments and with the official aid system.

As figure 1 shows, speculations on future trends require an appraisal of the function of development aid in a globalizing market economy. In making this assessment, parallels are drawn with historical developments in countries of Europe and North America as a way of illustrating how global economic and social processes might influence the evolution of NGOs internationally.
Trends in NGO Funding
What is happening to the quantity and quality of NGO financing in the North and South? To answer this question, information is needed on the principle sources of NGO income identified in figure 1; three in the North and five in the South. In each case, where possible, trends and perspectives in financial volumes are described, followed by considerations of quality in terms of the degree to which an NGOs funds are tied or untied. In other words the degree to which the giver ascribes particular conditions to their use. We begin with Northern NGOs which raise some US$6.3 billion per year from all sources.

Distant Obligations: Funding for Northern NGOs
Northern development NGOs are society’s recognition of the plight of those in the South and a concern to do something about it; looking at how society, through its financial resources, enables NGOs to fulfil an international obligation to those in need is the subject of this section.

The Gift Economy — Quantity
Organised public giving for those in need — philanthropy, voluntarism, charity, altruism, call it what you will — has been part of the social landscape in Northern countries for almost 300 years (Whitaker, 1974). Initially, voluntary organisations established to protect the very poor and destitute — products of the industrial revolution and urbanisation — arose from a Christian moral imperative within the richer classes. This obligation was slowly taken up by the poor themselves through schemes and organisations for mutual assistance. Incrementally and sometimes forcibly, self-help was taken over by governments in order to secure its control by the economic and politically powerful elite rather than through workers’ mutual support. In other words, public welfare became a government issue to protect the growth of a capitalist economy. For example, social insurance introduced by the Britain’s Liberal government in 1929 was meant to replace mutual insurance and unemployment relief. This move was designed to curb the growth of popularist, local government initiatives in this area. In short, the modern welfare state is, in part, a product of political reforms leading to state-financed welfare that protected capitalism by ensuring that the underclass associated with the evolving market economy did not fulfil Marx’s revolutionary predictions.

The state’s takeover of the original task of voluntary organisations did not mean that they disappeared. In fact, present economic reforms in the North are stimulating a re-emergence of non-profit organisations to provide social services. But progressively, and especially since World War II, NGOs are no longer the preserve of a privileged class relying on the philanthropy of a small number of the rich. Today, development NGOs, numbering some 2,500 (OECD, 1990), are staffed by career professionals relying on the resources of an increasingly affluent section of the population. Galbraith denotes the class of people supporting NGOs as a ‘contented’ majority, a group that he argues
are less inclined to care for the new underclass in their own countries, let alone abroad (Galbraith, 1992). What, therefore, are the long term perspectives for the gift economy and NGOs?

A comparative study of the US and Scandinavian countries undertaken by Alan Wolfe tries to answer this question by analysing how modernisation in the capitalist mould changes people’s moral attitudes towards distant and intimate obligations (Wolfe, 1989). Distant obligations are responsibilities to those who are spatially or temporally (for example, next generations) separated from an individual. Intimate obligations are to those towards immediate family, many of which are now catered for by state benefits. His basic premise is that the morality of modernism is a product of a welfare state and the market economy — themselves identifiable moral systems — whose interplay combines to erode and undermine the values of voluntarism, a spirit of solidarity and a society’s attention to distant obligations. Disregard for the environmental inheritance of subsequent generations is a present day example of this phenomenon. In this sense, modernity undermines an important dimension of civil society (Wolfe, 1989:19-23). Or, put another way, a society’s moral guidelines and their regulation become dominated by markets and states, at the cost of other, necessary, civic values such as mutuality.

In Wolfe’s view, the United States’ experience of market-dictated individualized social relations, with its emphasis on personal welfare provision, leads to a slow, unsteady, decline in people’s behaviour informed by distant obligations. The country no longer manifests the de Tocquevillian ideal of a vibrant civic life providing regulation and direction for mutually beneficial social relations. While voluntarism and charity may still be strongly encouraged American virtues, their implicit moral code is less likely to be translated into an individual’s behaviour pattern (Wolfe, 1989:86-94). His works, surprisingly, indicates that there is not an a priori inverse relationship between the level of public giving and levels of state welfare financed from taxation. In other words, individuals who are able to be philanthropic are not necessarily less inclined to be so if the public provision of services require high levels of taxation (Wolfe, 1989:170).

In distinction to the personalized basis of welfare provision in the US, Scandinavian countries have stressed the opposite. High levels of state welfare are an expression of the value placed by society on mutual obligation. But the Scandinavian experience indicates that the welfare state’s extensive take over of the moral obligation for another can also undermine mutuality leading to ‘... a decline in a sense of individual moral responsibility’ (Wolfe, 1989:181). The welfare state’s actions inevitably give rise to an emphasis on a citizen’s individual rights and benefits, rather than their individual responsibilities and obligations.

Overall, Wolfe’s finding support Galbraith’s pessimistic position on the future ability of citizen’s in the North to identify with those who are distant in time or space, arguing that an untrammelled market economy, as in the US, or
highly developed welfare states as in Scandinavia both lead to an erosion of personal responsibility (Wolfe, 1989:257).

Further, evidence from Britain indicates that public donations do not simply increase to fill the gap when a government reduces the funds available for social welfare. A recent study on charitable giving in the United Kingdom shows that the size of the gift economy in financial terms did not grow in 1990-91 over previous years. In fact, the proportion of gross income spent on charity declined from 0.85 to 0.6 per cent between 1987-88 and 1990-91 (Charities Aid Foundation, 1992). In another analysis, Jon van Til concludes that the third, or voluntary, sector’s future scenario is likely to be one of continuity with the past rather than a radical change to ‘good luck’ or ‘hard luck’ situations where external social, economic or political circumstances conspire in favour of, or against, voluntary organisations (van Til, 1988:187-193).

Overall, a significant increase in public support to NGOs cannot be expected. Taking inflation into account makes it likely that the levels of resources from the gift economy will be more or less stable in real terms. One product of this situation will be continued competition between Northern NGOs to maintain or increase their share of funding from a source that is not significantly expanding. Who will win in this game?

Recent evidence from The Netherlands suggests that NGOs who can shorten the perceptual difference between giver and beneficiary are more likely to touch the sense of distant moral obligation that Wolfe sees being eroded in Northern societies. Identification with an individual in the South is one way of making a distant obligation more immediate. Child sponsorship organisations, for example, have a natural advantage in this regard as the growth in funding for Foster Parent’s Plan in Holland demonstrates. This organisation’s income from private giving has doubled from 54 to 110 million guilders between 1986 and 1991 (Onze Wereld, 1992:9-11).

Communication and use of the media is the second variable that appears to determine an NGO’s share of the gift cake, dramatically helping, for example, *Artsen zonder Grenzen* (Doctors without Borders) to gain the most recognition amongst the Dutch general public in 1991, but at the cost of 37 per cent of its gift income! After individualizing and communications, the problem at hand can make the third difference to the public’s motivation to donate to NGOs. In Holland, medical issues have given way to environmental concerns in an ability to attract donations. This move probably reflects the immediacy of environmental concerns in the country.

What does the foregoing mean for the future gift economy in the North? In the period 1979-1988, NGO disbursements, excluding official contributions to them, rose by 59 per cent, from US$1.7bn to 4.2bn. At constant 1980 prices this is an increase of 46 per cent to US$2.9bn. If the past growth rate is maintained, which is seriously open to doubt, by the end of the century NGO funds from the gift economy will be in the order of US$8bn nominally. A more likely
picture will be a stability in real terms or at best very modest increases in
direct gifts to NGOs for development purposes. We are looking at probably
some US$6bn being nominally available to NGOs from the general public by
the year 2000.

The Gift Economy — Quality
The public's expectations of what NGOs do with their money largely depends
on the way it is raised. Child sponsorship is probably the most extreme form
of tying aid, but the last few years have seen all NGOs educating their spon-
sors on the need to see the child as part of a wider community. In this way the
NGO gains flexibility in how its goes about its development work. Fund-rais-
ing by the Red Cross or Comic Relief in Britain is not individualised to a
named recipient, although the categories of its work and intended beneficiar-
ies are well publicised.

In all cases, however, the public is not determining the precise methods, the
projects, the locations, the specific outcomes to be achieved by their gift. For
NGOs, therefore, the gift economy provides reasonably flexible, semi-tied aid
that it can use in ways they believe to be most cost-effective.

Official Aid — Quantity
The 1980s have seen an increase in the amount of funds, raised from general
taxation, being allocated to development aid and to NGOs. This trend is set to
continue. Before discussing the reasons for this, information is needed on the
orders of magnitude involved.

In the period 1975-1988, the level of total overseas development assistance has
increased by 43 per cent from US$ 27.3 to 48.2 billion. At constant 1980 prices,
the real growth is 11 per cent, from US$27.3bn to 30.8bn (World Bank,
1990a:214). Of this sum, some 4.7 per cent is now being made available to
NGOs in the North and South. From 1980 to 1988, the amount of official funds
allocated to NGOs rose nominally from US$1.04 to 2.13bn, i.e., by 105 per
cent. At 1980 values the growth amounts to 53 per cent. The rate of growth of
official aid to NGOs outstrips almost five-fold the growth in ODA itself, con-
firming a policy shift in favour of NGO financing from public funds. By 1988,
35 per cent of the total of US$6.3bn disbursed by NGOs was derived from the
general taxes levied by OECD governments (OECD, 1990:15-18).

These averages mask wide differences between countries in the proportion of
official aid that goes to NGOs and their relative dependence on those funds.
For example, 12.7 per cent of Swiss aid goes to NGOs while figures for the US
and Canada are 10.7 and 7.6 per cent respectively. At the other extreme, Aus-
tralia allocates 0.8 per cent and Japan 0.7 per cent of ODA to NGOs. In terms
of NGO reliance on aid, Belgium NGOs are 88.7 per cent funded by their
government, while at the other extreme Irish NGOs only depend on the state
for 1.4 per cent of their financial resources. In Britain in 1980 official grants
amounted to 2.8 per cent of NGO disbursements, the proportion growing to 4.1 per cent in 1988 (Smith, 1987). These figures exclude emergency assistance channelled through NGOs.

The reasons for increased official aid to and through NGOs are well documented and will not be dealt with in detail (Mansoni, 1985; Hellinger, 1987; Vukasin, 1987; OECD, 1988; Salmen, L. and Eaves, A., 1989; Williams, 1990). Suffice it to say, that spurred by analysis and arguments from the World Bank, since the early 1980s donors recognise that NGOs have a number of potential comparative advantages and distinctive competencies over Southern governments in programmes dedicated to poverty alleviation and the provision of services that are relevant and accessible to poor people (Fowler, 1988). More recently, it is also argued that NGOs have a positive role to play in democratisation to the extent that they strengthen civil society and in so doing increase the capabilities of citizen's in the South to hold politicians and public servants accountable for their actions (World Bank, 1989:15; Clark, 1991; Fowler, 1992a).

There are no indications that the growth of official aid to NGOs is going to diminish. Looking a emerging trends, a World Bank paper concludes as follows:

... NGOs ... have also been strengthened by a growing flow of finance from bilateral aid agencies, and official agencies (now including multilateral agencies such as the World Bank) are more supportive of NGOs than ever. The current level of official enthusiasm is likely to subside, as working with NGOs becomes more routine and NGO limitations become more visible. But processes already in motion among the official aid agencies will provide NGOs with substantial additional resources and opportunities (World Bank, 1990b:29, emphasis added).

This prediction is born out, for example, in the case of Britain's official aid agency, the Overseas Development Administration (ODA). The first conclusion and associated recommendation of a recently published study by an internal working group is that there is scope for increased collaboration with NGOs in the implementation of the ODA aid programme (ODA, 1992). A number of ideas are advanced for how this could be realised. One suggestion is that country programme managers consider NGOs for delivery of aid funds allocated to bilateral programmes.

It is difficult to predict what sums of official aid will be available to NGOs in the years to come. For example, it is not completely clear whether the new Global Environmental Facility to be made available through the World Bank for development work to protect the environment will be really additional aid that NGOs could access. Nevertheless, there are reasonable grounds to argue that, proportionally, governmental aid to NGOs will account for at least 50 per cent of their disbursements by the year 2000. In nominal terms, by the decades end we are looking at official aid to NGOs in the order of US$6bn, a virtual tripling of 1988 levels.
Official Aid — Quality

There is a broadly held position within the NGO community that official aid has a number of potentially negative quality aspects when compared with funds from the gift economy. Specific areas of concern relate to the operational limitations of tying aid through the project mode of funding and constraints on NGO autonomy.

For NGOs, official aid has a number of quality drawbacks because it is almost always allocated on the basis of specific preplanned projects, a mode of intervention that suffers from severe limitations in realizing sustainable development (Hirschman, 1967; Lecomte, 1987). Yet despite this reality the project mode of funding is not going to disappear and is now becoming more logically framed in its definition. Project aid relies on a mechanical cause and effect paradigm that many observers argue can not be truly participatory. An extensive review of the practice of participation by governments and NGOs persuades Peter Oakley that the project mode of development action leads, irrevocably, to participation being treated in an instrumental fashion, as a cost-reducing input. To realize people's empowerment, participation requires terms of engagement between the intervening entity and a community that in practice the project paradigm does not allow (Oakley, 1991).

If donor internal working methods remain unmodified, the interface between official aid agencies and NGOs can also hamper an NGO's ability to follow participatory practices that they have already proven to be effective. In other words, if not correctly structured, collaboration between NGOs and official aid agencies can negatively affect precisely the comparative advantages that donors want of NGOs in the first place. A World Bank assessment of collaboration with NGOs identified internal Bank procedures as an impediment to NGOs being able to do what they are good at (World Bank, 1990b:19-22). The same holds true for bilateral agencies, in part because the staff of NGO desks, especially those based in Southern countries, have no real insight into the NGO community, nor adequate time to deal with them properly (Dreesman, 1987:56).

In addition to the problem of participation, official aid stresses and steers NGOs towards a concentration on economic material improvement at the cost of the social and political dimensions of change also needed for sustainability, equity and empowerment. As observed by Charles Elliott:

... the greater the dependence of Northern NGOs on government funding through co-financing, the greater institutional weight is likely to be given to modernization-type projects — and the more difficult the organisation is likely to find the rest of the spectrum (Elliott, 1987:59).

In a nutshell, official aid as project funding will not empower in the full sense of the term, i.e., structural, rather than on-off, changes in political and economic relations that benefit the poor within the exigencies of a market economy. Unless their practices change markedly official aid will remain
most effectively directed at infrastructural development and apolitical activities that do not have to be people-centred in order to succeed.

Finally, NGOs pride themselves on being autonomous entities, but the greater the volume of tied government funds they utilize, the less will they be able to solely decide how to achieve their mission. With justification, official donors allocating public funds will expect and require NGOs to conform to norms of accountability and apply practices that can stand up to public scrutiny based on best practices as government professionals see them. Indeed, a cynical view would be that the diversion of bilateral aid to NGOs is because donors can demand audit, evaluations and other reporting controls from them that they cannot ask of (corrupt) recipient states. With NGOs, a loss of sovereignty does not arise, they just compromise their institutional independence.

Self-financing — Quantity
A third source of NGO income is provided by directly engaging in the market economy. This avenue for fund-raising is a fast-growing area for a number of UK charities. Two types of market-based activity are already being exploited: shops and international trading. There are some 5,500 charity shops with a combined turnover of some £200 million per year, and their number is increasing rapidly. Oxfam (UK), for example, already has more retail outlets than well known UK high streets stores such as Dixons (The Independent, 27 July 1992, citing a report by Corporate Intelligence Research). And, from selling second hand goods, a number are moving up market in terms of what they have to offer and in their promotion and advertising.

A related, but distinct, enterprise is the promotion of fairer trade by directly importing items from the South at better prices to producers for wholesale or retail sale on the home market. Trade-related operations can be NGOs in their own right or subsidiaries operations of NGOs with wider agendas. TradeCraft Plc and Twin Trading (UK) are examples of the former, Oxfam Trading an example of the latter.

The proportion of income raised from these sources varies significantly. Oxfam’s commercial income, at about 30 per cent of annual turnover, is probably the highest (Giles, 1990:78). Overall, however, direct commercial operation remains a very, very small part of Northern NGO incomes, partly due to the historical antipathy of NGOs towards commercial profit-making, which for many years was seen, ideologically, to be the cause of poverty in many countries, not a potential solution to it. The present stress on micro-enterprise as a basis for sustained improvements in people’s livelihoods may be changing Northern NGOs’ perceptions of the market, but it has yet to have a significantly impact on practices in relation to the sustainability of their own income and work.

A recent variant on market-oriented fund-raising that is difficult to categorise is revenue derived from public gambling. NOVIB, a Dutch NGO, is party to
the promotion of a national lottery from which it hopes to gain untied income. Although the mechanics are presently in dispute, Britain's recently proposed national lottery is intended to benefit all the country's charities, some of which already raise about £280 million in this way (The Independent, 31 May 1992). In how far people's gambling to support charities will reduce overall direct giving remains to be seen. But such a trend could be interpreted as another example of Wolfe's argument that the moral basis for voluntary action is being weakened by the market's emphasis on individual interest and reward.

Another ambiguous type of market-based funding comes from donations made by commercial corporations, sometimes referred to as 'social responsibility' finance. For NGOs, corporate funding is a market-derived gift; for enterprise, gifts to NGOs are a form of strategic investment in their public image. Present levels of corporate disbursements to NGOs are difficult to ascertain as are their trends. There is presently no indication that this type of finance will have major significance in the future scenario of NGO funding.

Overall, the potential for raising income from the market through investments and trade is far from exploited by the Northern NGO community. OECD-wide, it is doubtful that this source accounts for even 1 per cent of NGO revenue.

Self-financing — Quality
For all its shortcomings in terms of poverty creation, the market offers high quality, untied, funds for NGOs. Income from investments, for example, do not of themselves come with any expectations or demands about how they will be applied. If correctly legally structured, revenues from an NGO's engagement with the market offers the most positive prospects for pursuing empowerment goals and maintaining autonomy.

Southern NGOs
Southern NGOs have, theoretically, access to a wider range of funding sources. In practice however, the economic situation of poorer states precludes Southern NGOs exploiting what should be an extra advantage in fund raising and retaining autonomy. In fact, as will be shown in this section, Southern NGOs are in a very dependent position with respect to the North from which they are unlikely to escape.

The Gift Economy
Most Southern countries contain complex traditional patterns of social relations providing mutual support; in Wolfe's terms, they benefit from extensive systems of intimate obligation. The moral foundations and institutional structure of intimate obligations are culture specific. Recognition of distant obligations to past and future generations tends to be strong in many African cultures, but less so towards others as citizens. Appreciation of distant
obligations in Asia are frequently informed by spiritual values and in Latin America by catholic teaching and political ideology. These modes of expression are not the same as a gift economy that provides funds or voluntary labour to service entities, such as NGOs. In this sense, 'in many places [in the world] the term “philanthropy” has little resonance' (McCarthy, 1989:32).

In poorer countries, especially those of Africa, reciprocity in social and economic relations still provides a very significant system of support to those in need. But this system has little to spare for formally organised and registered NGOs providing development services. As a hang over of their colonial history and subsequent role in the post-independence state NGOs are expected to provide to, not to be provided for, by the population or the government.

While individuals give of their time to Southern NGOs there is little in the way of a gift economy for them to rely on for their financial needs. There is also little realistic prospect that in the poorest countries of Africa and Asia enough people will produce sufficient surpluses and be motivated to establish a meaningful gift economy. The prospect remains that throughout this decade and into the next, Southern NGOs will not be able to count on funding from the population at large to cover their costs above that which they may recover from some of those they serve.

Income from the Southern State

Figures have not been collated for the funds that Southern governments make available to NGOs. But there is no indication that the poorest states in the South provide anything but minimal finance to them, if at all. India's ability to include NGOs in the countries five year plans, providing funding for them through Voluntary Action Cells located in many ministries is not a financial possibility for smaller, poorer, and less stable countries. In fact, most governments in the South regard NGOs as an important source of additional national income and an important fount of much needed foreign exchange. Where Southern governmental finance is made available to NGOs it is for projects and programmes, seldom, if ever, for institutional costs which have to be raised through other means or by judicious accounting practices.

As part of adjustment, governments are shedding or reducing many of their social obligations, with NGOs being expected to fill the gap without relying on state subsidy. General taxation and user charges are not providing anywhere near the level of revenue needed for governments to provide the social services needed by the majority. Even radical political reform to reduce the substantial skewing of income distributions to be found in many countries of the South will not do much to improve the long term situation of the majority because the economic base of poor economies is so small relative to population size. In sum, it is highly improbable that Southern NGOs will be able to count on income or state subsidies raised by taxes on indigenous economic activity to cover the full costs of their work.
Official Aid

A new phenomenon of official aid in the late 1980s is direct funding to Southern NGOs, most often through decentralization which delegates the necessary authority to local missions. The donor shift to direct funding is subject of debate and dispute within the NGO sector. Issues of concern to Southern NGOs are: (a) the way that relations with their governments may be influenced if the perception arises that they are competing for the same funds; (b) an ability to maintain effective autonomy with respect to the state’s development priorities and approaches is also a concern, as is the worry that (c) NGOs will implicitly become part and parcel of donor decision-making on national aid strategies without being engaged in the process. How relations with their Northern counterparts may be altered, and the gains and losses in terms of advocacy and lobbying on structural issues are also being seen as potential hurdles to directly receiving greater amounts of official aid (Mills, 1988). These worrying factors are in addition to the quality limitations of official development finance already discussed.

Whatever the conclusions arising from the direct funding debate, donor policy is going in this direction, although the speed and scale of change is difficult to assess. A donor survey carried out in Kenya, a country well endowed with local NGOs and official aid agencies, found that direct in-country funding amounted, in 1988, to about US$35mn. While possibly an extreme example, the direct disbursement was calculated to be approximately 10 per cent of the external aid used by the NGO community as a whole, including the churches (Fowler and Bauer, 1989). The majority of official aid reaching NGOs in Kenya still comes via northern NGOs as intermediaries. But only a few survey respondents did not expect their agencies to move towards greater direct funding. Germany did not, nor did The Netherlands, both of which have strong co-financing NGOs funded from their exchequers. These NGOs benefit from a significant political lobby at home that could be used to lobby against direct funding.

If the policies and trends in official aid to NGOs detailed above are correct, a reasonable assumption would be that a growing proportion will be directly disbursed in Southern countries by the donors themselves. Moreover, as Southern NGOs grow in size they may have to look for direct official aid as their financial requirements move beyond what Northern counterparts can provide. This situation has already arisen in South East Asia (Beets et al, 1988). Overall, it appears probable that greater direct funding can be realised without a decrease in the amount of official aid channelled through Northern NGOs. But this does not mean that such a move will not have implications for North-South NGO relations, or on relations between Southern NGOs and their governments. Speculations on what these implications may be are elaborated later.

Kenyan evidence indicates that about 10 per cent of the US$2.13bn in official assistance to NGOs is given as in-country aid in the South. Policy indications
suggest that this proportion will increase. Together, the predicted growth in official aid to NGOs, combined with a greater proportion to direct funding, make it likely that the amounts of finance available to Southern NGOs in-country will grow rapidly and substantially in the next ten years. If, conservatively, bureaucratic reform in government aid agencies allowed a doubling of their direct disbursements to 20 per cent of their NGO total by the year 2000, the sum involved would grow to about US$1.2bn in nominal terms. In other words, a five fold increase from present levels.

The shift to direct funding presents Southern NGOs with both opportunities and risks. The principle opportunity is to diversify funding, so reducing vulnerability. Aside from the issue of autonomy, new risks involve correctly managing the added and different organisational demands of dealing directly with the official aid system and the potential friction with Southern governments as aid is diverted.

Northern NGOs
The majority of financial resources available to Southern NGOs are provided by their Northern counterparts. If the Kenyan example is anything to go by, of the US$6bn disbursed by NGOs, 5.4bn is on the basis of North-South transfers within or between them. If previous assessments of future trends are correct, a growth in NGO funds to about US$12bn in nominal terms can be expected by the turn of the century; half will come from the general public, half from government sources. When the amount allocated via direct government funding is deducted from the total, Northern NGOs will have access to about US$10.8bn per year.

Information on the division of total NGO funds between local and foreign organisations world-wide is not readily available. Data, again from Kenya, indicates at present two-thirds, one-third division of the total in favour of foreign NGOs. In 1988-89, the average annual budget of a Kenyan local NGO was about US$448,000, while that of foreign NGOs amounted to US$870,000 (Fowler, 1992b). Whatever the global situation, however, indications are that the trend is towards a North-South division of NGO labour that will increase the share of funds for Southern NGOs. The evidence for this comes from the, still unfinished, NGO partnership debate.

The expanding role of NGOs in development during the eighties has led to extensive discussion within the NGO community on the present and desired nature of North-South relations. This has occurred under the rubric of and search for ‘partnership’. It is beyond the scope of this paper to detail the background to the partnership discussions or the issues involved and the positions being taken. The paper published by the International Council on Social Welfare provides a good summary of the partnership debate (ICSW, 1988), and a critical analysis is provided in Fowler (1991).

As formulated in partnership guidelines issued by the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, the desired division of labour should lead Southern
NGOs to take on more and more responsibility for development in their own countries, with Northern NGOs slowly moving away from operational functions to supportive and advocacy roles (ICVA, 1988). While there is no evidence so far to show if this policy is happening in practice, if there is a change in roles it is likely to be in the direction spelt out by ICVA for both practical and political reasons.

On the practical level, slowly but surely, Southern NGOs are developing institutionally. And, although the situation differs between Asia, Africa and Latin America, indigenous NGO capability is growing, leaving less and less justification for Northern NGOs to undertake development for local NGOs rather than with them. Politically, charges of Northern NGOs perpetuating a neo-colonial development model will remain while they dominate within NGO communities in the South, as they do in terms of resources, even if not in terms of numbers in many countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Overall, the share of funds available to Southern NGOs within the NGO total is set to increase substantially.

Self-financing
The record on self-financing for Southern NGOs, for at least their institutional costs, is not promising. Even the bigger, well established NGOs of southeast Asia, have difficulty in covering their core costs (Beets, et al., 1988:52). This situation pertains despite more than a decade of discussion on NGO self-reliance and the perpetuation of this mythical goal in funding negotiations. The reality is that Northern donors are just not prepared to provide the funds necessary, as endowments, or for investments, or for enterprise, that will enable Southern NGOs to achieve organisational security based on finance derived from their own economies. As a consequence, the vast majority of Southern NGOs are for a substantial degree dependent on, and remain vulnerable to, external aid. The principle reason for the perpetuation of the contradiction between rhetoric and practice in terms of the self-reliance of Southern NGOs is, in my view, the fear of Northern agencies to actually forego control of the development process. Accountability is the usual reason cited for the inability of Northern NGOs to actually help their Southern partners gain true autonomy. The root of the problem is lack of a mutual trust that can only arise between NGOs from positions of mutual strength.

Mutual strength calls for the institutional development of Southern NGOs that is severely lacking in many countries. This is an area that again suffers from a difference between rhetoric and practice. Few donors provide institutional development finance with their project funds. Consequently, Southern NGOs scramble from project to project in order to maintain cover for their overheads. The ability and resources to make long term plans for and actually undertake institutional development is just not there. Therefore, the evolution from dependence to independence to inter-dependence of North-South NGO relations is just not happening to the degree urgently needed.
Interdependence based on mutual strength seems to be a necessary precondition for donors to contemplate allocating the resources needed to ensure partner self-financing. We are a long way from fulfilling this condition. There is little likelihood, therefore, that Southern NGOs will derive an income from their own market economies.

Trends in NGO Funding — Summary

If present policies are not modified, NGO resources will grow from US$6.3bn to US$12bn in nominal terms by the end of the decade. Of this, the share of tied aid, i.e., that coming from governments, will increase from 35 to about 50 per cent; semi-tied aid from public giving will be static in real terms and income from investment and enterprise will be minimal. Trends in North-South partnerships combined with donor policies aimed at more direct finance to Southern NGOs will lead to a rapid increase in finance available to them. There is little likelihood of Southern NGOs gaining significant resources from their local economies, clients or governments, leaving them dependent on external aid.

Table 1: Trends in NGO finances: prospects at the end of the century

**Official Aid and the Global Market**

The collapse of centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe and their rapid adoption of market-based economics signal the end of an era of international debate and conflict about the system of political economy best able to provide for the material needs of most citizens. And, in one way or another, NGOs are intimately tied to the world’s political economy because they must be free to raise their funds from surpluses generated by and allocated from actors in the expanding market; from individuals as gifts, from government tax revenues, or from NGOs’ own investments or enterprise.
Analysis of the preceding sections indicate a growing dependency of NGOs on official aid, unless they take steps to counter this trend. A key question therefore, is what are the prospects for the continuation of foreign aid? Three arguments can be advanced for the view that aid will be maintained, although for political or moral reasons it may be increasingly concentrated on specific countries. Government aid is likely be sustained on moral and bureaucratic ground, and because its supports and protects a globalisation of the market. One likely outcome of continued aid may be the creation of an international system of social welfare, in which NGOs will play an important part. This phenomenon is already being signalled in relation to the provision of relief in situations of conflict or drought (Duffield, 1992).

**Aid in Service of the Globalizing Market**

The strongest argument to be made for the continuation of official aid comes from the dynamics of market expansion and the political imperatives associated with it. This line of argument draws global parallels with the contribution of state welfare to historical processes of capital reproduction experienced by countries of the North.

The emergence of private charity — the gift economy — leading to a system of state welfare that protected capitalism has already been briefly described in relation to Britain in the 18th and 19th century. The overseas dimension to this story is the two-fold contribution of colonial expansion to the development of market-based economies with liberal politics and universal welfare.

First, state and merchant capital's expansion in search of resources and comparative advantage enlarged a government's revenue base by allowing extraction of surpluses from peripheral economies directly, and via taxes levied on companies with overseas interests. Second, social dysfunctions of the market — such as a large, impoverished underclass — could be exported to the colonies whose inhabitants had no political voice. In other words, the living standards of most West Europeans and North Americans could be improved by the policies of national governments because of their systemic ability to appropriate surpluses from the South; a dominant position that remains today, operationalized by transnational companies, their commodity chains and investment patterns (Wallerstein, 1988; UN, 1992).

Unfortunately for countries of the poorer South, today there is nowhere to export the dysfunctions of market growth going on within them. The danger is, therefore, that the pauperised underclass in the South will, for the foreseeable future, be excluded from the benefits of market development. One recourse people have against exclusion is revolt — a prospect that the North, on economic, political and humanitarian grounds, would want to preempt. As in the North 100 years ago, the provision of charity and welfare are ways of placating a potentially revolutionary underclass, so protecting external investments and the regimes that enable their productive use. Continued provision
of aid to the South may also mitigate migratory pressures as poor individuals and families seek to escape their lot by moving Northwards.

Overall, there are grounds to argue that whether Northern politics swings to the left or the right, the globalisation of the market on which all governments and politicians rely creates an implicit justification for aid. There are firm long-term prospects for continuity in aid funding at least at existing levels with a greater proportion being diverted to NGOs. A position confirmed by other studies (Stokke, 1988:15-18).

**The Globalization of Social Welfare: Nation States as Local Governments**

The foregoing analysis has a number of implications for governments of poorer Southern countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa whose economic prospects for the 1990s — real GDP per capita growth of 0.5 per cent — are globally the worst of all (World Bank, 1990:16).

During the 1980s, the functioning of some African governments has only been made possible by external aid. In Mozambique, for example, per capita aid is almost 60 per cent of GDP (World Bank, 1990a:178). So little government revenue can be drawn from the local economy of Uganda that counterpart funds arising from donor commodity aid and balance of payments programmes amount to almost 70 per cent of Treasury income and hence the government's recurrent expenditures. A similar situation exists in Tanzania, Liberia, Malawi and Sudan, to name but a few. Even with substantial external support, government provision of social services in many countries is erratic, shrinking and of declining quality, with NGOs providing a greater proportion simply because the government does less. In Kenya, NGOs provide 40 per cent of the health care services and almost all the family planning activities. And in Tanzania, the government has recently returned to NGOs the hospitals taken into government after the Ujamaa Declaration (Mushi et al, 1992).

Where a Southern state depends on external aid rather than the national economy for its existence it effectively becomes a local government in the global political order. Sovereignty is meaningless in a situation where primary governmental functions — security, economic management, the selection and implementation of public policies — cannot be minimally guaranteed or undertaken unless externally negotiated and financed.

The propping-up of impoverished Southern governments will be a feature of international aid in Africa and a number of Asian countries for the rest of this decade and beyond; a global system of social welfare. And welfare for the world's poor will be allocated to the institutional actor thought by the North to be best able to deliver. The threat to the legitimacy of Southern regimes if they fail to provide services to their citizens may set NGOs and poor Southern governments against each other in competition for aid.
NGOs in the Internationalisation of Social Welfare

The implications for NGOs of the evidence and analysis presented so far can be summarised in the following speculative statements.

Speculations

If present policies are maintained:

1. In response to the greater availability of aid to the sector, the size of the NGO community will continue to grow rapidly, but faster in the South than the North, giving rise to problems of collaboration, self-regulation and quality control.

2. NGO financial resources will be increasingly tied as a larger proportion comes from general taxation via official project aid. As a result of 2, (a) the NGO capacity for engendering true empowerment of the poor will be reduced; (b) the autonomy of NGOs will be jeopardized.

3. Unless the capacities of Southern NGOs are substantially increased through institutional development, they will collapse under the weight of the projected growth in funds available to them.

4. The combination of eroded sovereignty of poorer Southern governments and diversion of official aid to NGOs as instruments of global social welfare will heighten tensions between them, requiring a collective renegotiation of institutional arrangements for which NGOs are ill prepared.

5. Relations between Northern and Southern NGOs will become more complicated and strained as the South gains greater access to alternative funding via direct official aid.

6. Financial self-reliance for Southern NGOs will be no nearer in the year 2000 than it is today.

7. There will be a move from comparative advantage to competitive advantage between NGOs and between NGOs and poorer governments as access to external aid become more critical for their functioning.

If these negative speculations are correct, Northern and Southern NGOs will have to devise long-term strategies to avoid them. What could these entail?

Increase untied aid

To protect autonomy and an ability to promote true empowerment, NGOs will have to increase the proportion of their untied resources. The strategy to achieve this lies in the direction of the market, through greater investment and enterprise.
Diversification of funding sources, such as lotteries, in response to social and economic changes in the North will need to become part and parcel of NGO strategies. Building up internal capacities and linkages to organisations specializing in trend analyses is one route to continued innovation in tapping the gift economy.

_Avoid mortgaging funds: be serious about partner self-reliance_

Unless Northern NGOs are serious about turning rhetoric into practice, they will have to accept long term dependency relations with their Southern counterparts, dropping the myth and negotiating stance of self-reliance. Ongoing interdependence is a mortgage on future funds and works against the emergence of an independent NGO community in the South. As in the North, Southern NGOs must be enabled to engage in market-based income generation. Northern NGOs need to devise strategies allowing this to happen because official aid will not be available for this purpose. If they do not operationalise existing policies on self-reliance, Northern NGOs are destined to see their Southern counterparts become adjuncts and tools in donor-directed development with all that this implies for their autonomy and sustainability, realisation of the distinct values of the voluntary sector and the pluralism needed in a strong civil society.

_Rationalise relations: build strategic alliances_

There is a broad consensus that sustainable poverty alleviation requires community-based development complemented by appropriate policy reforms in the North and the South. It is not necessary or necessarily cost effective for an NGO to take on all these roles. Strategic alliances between like minded NGOs with complementary skills both within and between the North and the South are needed in order to rationalise efforts and use of resources.

The ongoing collaboration between an increasing number of NGOs needs to be continued and reinforced in order to harmonise policy positions on issues effecting NGOs as a whole, nationally and internationally.

The track-record of consortia such as ICVA internationally and NGO councils and associations nationally, is not encouraging, to a large degree because they are not adequately backed or recognised by NGOs themselves. As a result few forums exist that can legitimately articulate NGO positions and engage in dialogue with governments and donors. And those that do are often financed by or initiated by donors, including multilateral agencies such as UNDP. The existence of competent representative bodies that reflect NGO opinions and can demonstrate NGO support is not a luxury or ‘overhead’, but a necessity in the negotiations that must take place as NGO-state roles evolve. Their institutional development should be part of a long term strategy. In sum, changes in the international context means that the time has arrived for a radical reappraisal of NGO funding and development strategies and roles.

_Alan Fowler_ is at the University of Sussex, Brighton, UK.
NGO Funding and the Global Market

Bibliographic Note


Sierra-Leone: Contradictory Class Functionality of the ‘Soft’ State

Jimmy D Kandeh

While the ‘soft’ state may be metaphorically descriptive of the malleability, hegemonic impotence and functional incapacitation of the post-colonial state in Africa, the class functionality of state softness remains ambivalent and problematic. Although a soft, institutionally fragile state with multiple informal points of entry is generally conducive to processes of class formation at the top, it is doubtful whether such an impaired apparatus of political domination can be reproductive of long term ruling class interests. And because the class whose formation is made possible by institutional fragility lacks a hegemonic ideology and is largely parasitic and unproductive in its modes of consumption and accumulation, it is inherently incapable of leading a genuine capitalist, populist or socialist transformation of African society. This incongruent, stultifying duality in the class functionality of the soft state is at the centre of the problem posed by the contemporary political and economic retardation of African societies.

That the dominance of Africa’s ruling classes is at best tenuous suggests that they have not been able to secure the uncoerced compliance of subordinate strata to their rule. In virtually every African state, repressive apparatuses, rather than popular representative institutions, are the primary instruments of ruling class dominance. These apparatuses have been selectively staffed, often along ethnoclientelist and personalist lines. In both intra-ruling class feuds and clashes between ruling classes and subordinate agglomerations, the violence and intimidation of these apparatuses function to silence and limit counter-regime activity, popular or otherwise.

The pervasive, self-serving authoritarianism of sub-Saharan Africa is in large measure the impress of the class project of the state bourgeoisie. At the core of this project are attempts to patrimonize state offices and resources. State patrimonialization deprives public institutions and agencies of the resources and autonomy to respond to societal needs, interests and aspirations. It erodes the relative autonomy and effectiveness of the state and forecloses ideological, institutional and material concessions to subordinate classes. But while privatization of public offices and resources may facilitate the material formation of Africa’s ruling classes, it cannot ensure their long term reproduction and may in fact threaten it.
If patrimonial authoritarianism defines the post-colonial experience in much of Africa, this condition is largely made possible by state malleability. State softness in terms of malleability invites neo-patrimonial forms of authoritarian rule which in turn foster the functional contraction of the state. Mitigating to the establishment of hegemony, these processes expand rather than narrow the ideological and material distance between classes. And while subordinate class agitation and politics may be stifled and delegitimized, the impoverishment and discontent generated by the parasitism and attendant ruthlessness of the state bourgeoisie effectively serve to undermine the reproductive dominant class functionality of the state. The soft state, in other words, has a contradictory class functionality not because it obviously lacks the capacity to optimally reproduce ruling class interests, but because it is for the most part ruled by a parasitic, non-hegemonic class.

**Autonomy, Hegemony and the Soft State**

The soft state is in many respects the political corollary of the underdeveloped economy; both are fragile, incoherent and disarticulated entities. States, defined in terms of their formal attributes of territoriality, sovereignty, nationality, institutions of rule and a legal order, differ on the extent of their sovereignty and degree of cohesion. As the most superordinate institution of domination in society, states generally seek hegemony, security, legitimation, autonomy and revenue (Young, 1985). The capacity to respond to these imperatives of statehood, however, differ markedly among states. The degree, for example, to which states are relatively autonomous (both internally and externally) varies from country to country and across historical periods (Skocpol, 1979). And although state autonomy is said to promote system maintenance and stability, most states lack this relative autonomous capacity. The same holds true for the ability of ruling classes to establish their hegemony in the ideological apparatuses of society and the state. Both the absence of a hegemonic ruling class and the lack of relative autonomy by the post-colonial state are central to any discussion of state softness in Africa. At least two senses of the relative autonomy concept can be related to class. One usage ascribes state autonomy to situations in which state power is used by key functionaries to pursue objectives other than those of dominant classes. This condition describes a state that can act independently of ruling class interests and manipulation (instrumental autonomy), thereby ensuring that the interests of subordinate groups are minimally realized. Autonomy of societal groups from the state can enhance or diminish the latter's relative instrumental autonomy but in most cases this autonomy is frequently eroded by a ruling class that is incapable of maintaining its political domination 'without squeezing dry the arteries (resources) of the state' (Joseph, 1984:26). This relationship between state and society or between political and economic power is, in the words of Bayart, crucial because

Where there is a greater distance between accumulation and power, there develop autonomous indigenous business classes distinct from the bureaucracy (as in Nigeria,
Kenya, Senegal and Cameroon) and capable of strengthening civil society. Elsewhere, on the other hand, the state is in total control of the channels of accumulation and either uses them for patronage and political manna (as in Ivory Coast, Gabon, Zaire and Sierra Leone) or simply appropriates them (as in patrimonial dictatorships) (1987:116).

A second formulation of relative autonomy equates it with the capacity of a state to pursue objectives that are antagonistically opposed to dominant class interests (structural autonomy). Structural autonomy, however, is at best transitional:

...the possibility of relative structural autonomy depends significantly on the extent to which a given mode of production and class structure are established. When the structure is indeterminate, or the dominant class is considerably weakened due to internal or external crises, the possibility of state autonomy is enhanced (Hamilton, 1982:10-11).

The indeterminacy and fluidity of the class structures of post-colonial African societies left open the question of the possible structural autonomy of the post-colonial state; that is, a state that can pursue a 'cabralist' project distinct from and opposed to ruling class interests. Structural or antagonistic autonomy, however, is not crucial or necessary to the establishment and maintenance of hegemony.

In any discussion of state autonomy, it is pertinent to identify the social configurations regarding which the state is said to be autonomous. The metropolitan bourgeoisie, the ruling class under colonial rule, still represents a formidable fraction of the dominant class coalition in Africa but it is misleading to continue to identify this element as the ruling class in contemporary Africa. The dominance of the external estate undoubtedly persists in the manifold interests and interventions of the IMF, transnational corporations and the rules governing international commercial, financial and information exchanges. But whereas the colonial state in Africa was arguably less instrumentally autonomous of the metropolitan bourgeoisie than of any other class, the post-colonial state has functioned less (instrumentally) autonomous of the state bourgeoisie than of any other class. The two most important social categories of which the post-colonial state is autonomous, both instrumentally and antagonistically (i.e., structurally), are the working class and peasantry. The state in colonial and post-colonial Africa neither sought to embody nor promote the interests and aspirations of workers and peasants. Rather, the articulation and organization of populist grievances was discouraged, outlawed, and violently suppressed. The soft state may not be able to respond to the needs and aspirations of subaltern masses, but it surely has the repressive capacity to dictate the outcome of its encounters with oppositional forces.

If the soft state is a state lacking in internal relative autonomy, the state bourgeoisie is the class in relation to whom the state is the most bereft of autonomy. This class owes its position as much to its control of the means of
compulsion as it does to whatever control it may have over the means of production. It consists of top politicians, leading bureaucrats, key parastatal officials, prominent traditional chieftains and professionals who either occupy important leadership and government positions or can directly access public offices and resources. Still in the process of formation but showing signs of closure, the state bourgeoisie is not only the product of the soft state, its activities also help undermine state institutions. The untramelled venality of this class is the primary cause of the soft state's functional retreat or contraction. But if the predations of the state bourgeoisie incapacitate the state, an enfeebled state is neither in the interest of dominant or subordinate classes.

The fact that the state bourgeoisie does not possess a hegemonic ideology with which the masses can identify and around which societal cohesion and political legitimacy can be built, seriously undermines its long term reproduction as a class. The strength, persistence and force of bourgeois rule, we are told, derives not from the 'violence of the ruling class or the coercive power of the state apparatus, but in the acceptance by the ruled of a conception of the world which belongs to the rulers' (Fiori, 1970:238). Hegemony is a much abused concept but in its Gramscian usage, it is generally considered to have a dual meaning: on the one hand, it describes 'a process in civil society whereby a fraction of the dominant class exercises control through its moral and intellectual leadership over other allied fractions of the dominant class'; on the other hand, hegemony refers to 'a relationship between the dominant and dominated classes' in which the dominant class successfully uses 'its political, moral, and intellectual leadership to establish its view of the world as all-inclusive and universal', thereby shaping the interests, values and needs of subordinate classes (Carnoy, 1984:69-70). It is this second usage that is the most germane to our discussion of the state bourgeoisie as a non-hegemonic class.

Three Gramscian perspectives link ruling class hegemony to the state. In one perspective, hegemony resides in civil society and is to civil society what domination is to the state. The hegemony of dominant classes is mediated in and through society while their direct domination is exercised through the state. A second conception views hegemony not as the opposite of coercion but as a 'synthesis of consent and coercion' (Carnoy, 1984). Hegemony, on this view, is reflected in both society and the state: the hegemony of dominant classes as expressed by state apparatuses is 'political hegemony'; dominant class hegemony in civil society is 'civil hegemony'. What separates political from civil hegemony are the coercive apparatuses of the state, which may be a requirement for political, but not for civil, hegemony. A third interpretation equates the state with civil society. Anticipating Althusser, for whom 'the state is neither public nor private' but is rather 'the precondition for any distinction between private and public' (Althusser, 1971:185), all political and ideological superstructures (from political parties to the family), are analyzed as 'hegemonic apparatuses' of the state.
The state as an extension of the hegemonic apparatuses of the dominant class (the second interpretation) is perhaps the most illuminating of the three perspectives. Soft states are generally characterized by a civil hegemonic void. Control of the state by the state bourgeoisie neither reflects nor ensures hegemony in society. The consolidation of dominant class hegemony in state apparatuses and the reproductive functionality of these apparatuses, is largely dependent upon the degree to which this hegemony is also exercised in society. The implication here is that it is hegemony in civil society, rather than domination in state apparatuses, that ensures the long term reproduction of ruling class interests.

Hegemony, therefore, implies consent and for a ruling class to be hegemonic, the ideology it espouses must be firmly established in both state apparatuses and in society. Although hegemony does not preclude the use of coercion, the excessive reliance on the coercive apparatuses of the state to ensure social compliance is indicative of the absence of civil hegemony. In most cases where the state is not hegemonic, civil society either represents a hegemonic void or civil hegemony is disarticulated in state apparatuses. Contrary to marxist orthodoxy, the state under these conditions is anything but an extension of the hegemonic apparatuses of civil society. The colonial state represents a classic instance of an apparatus that set out to dominate society even though the authority and leadership of its ruling class had no foundation in the colonized society. Given this inherited disjuncture in state-society relations, it is not surprising that most African states have been unable to establish durable, legitimate institutions that are unwedded to the parochial, immediate, formative interests of contemporary ruling classes.

The state-society divorce in the post-independence period is thus part of the problematic of the soft state. In the words of Goran Hyden, a leading exponent of the soft state thesis,

The dilemma facing African leaders is that because the state is not structurally tied to society they are not in a position to exercise systemic power. They lack the more subtle institutional means that are at the disposal of a government in societies where the state is firmly rooted in the productive system of the country and where, therefore, it can be used to shape the system at large. Seen in this perspective, the image of the African leader as being extremely powerful is mistaken ... it is difficult to call the African holding state power a 'ruling class'. They are not the carriers of a hegemonic 'bourgeois' culture and prefer to act as patrons of their respective home communities (1983:36-45).

While the soft state metaphor does capture an important dimension of state reality in Africa, it can, as in Hyden’s formulation, be potentially misleading, especially when its usage fails to take into account the class implications of state softness. The critical question, it would seem, is not whether the state is soft or hard but who, as Fatton puts it, benefits from state softness. What are the implications of state softness for processes of class formation? What are the hegemonic possibilities of a soft state and are soft states inherently prone to authoritarianism?
In response to some of these questions, Fatton contends that the softness of the post-colonial African state is 'more a symptom of ruling class interests than institutional weakness and fragility'. According to him,

To characterize the state as being soft is to miss the class relationships and class struggles that provide the social context which molds and shapes the state itself. Thus, if the state in Africa is relatively weak in terms of its capacity to impose its authority on all sectors of society, it is nonetheless powerful enough to unleash its violence against particular groups and classes. The relative impotence of the state to enforce its own rules is biased impotence. It is an impotence that consistently favors and enhances the power, interests, and status of the well-off and privileged classes (1988).

State softness invites not only authoritarianism, it also creates myriad opportunities for class formation, a fact underscored by Nelson Kasfir in his study of 'magendo' operations in Uganda, Sara Berry in her work on 'unproductive accumulation' in Nigeria, Richard Joseph in his analysis of 'prebendal politics' in Nigeria and Crawford Young in his many accounts of the parasitism of Mobutuism in Zaire. Although state softness implies the absence of ruling class hegemony, it neither denies nor suggests (contrary to Hyden) the absence of a ruling class. A soft, fragile state is more conducive to state-directed processes of class formation than a strong, relatively autonomous state. What fatally undermines the hegemonic project of the state bourgeoisie is its mode of appropriation and consumption which tend to be both unproductive and parasitic. In the words of Lonsdale,

Modern African regimes, overcrowded at first with power, have used force to narrow the ranks of their collaborators. Many have stifled productive effort in the process. They have strangled the ambitions of independent capitalists who might become their rivals; they have neglected the peasants on whose labours they depend. Nobody today is being liberated by the process of state formation, save for the growing army of bureaucrats (1981:155).

Formative and Reproductive Class Functionality

To claim that a state acts in a particular way so as to reproduce ruling class dominance is to offer a functional explanation of state behaviour; that is, the nature and character of what is explained (state behaviour) is said to be uniquely determined by its effect on what explains it (ruling class interests). But the fact that a state functions as a class apparatus provides no guarantee that it can act to optimally reproduce ruling class interests. The extent, for example, to which the actual form of a given state guarantees state interventions which are optimal for the ruling class as a whole is historically variable and structurally problematic. The class functionality of any form of state is not given and the capacities of states to realize the hegemonic projects of their ruling classes vary markedly. Soft states are, in this regard, inherently incapable of realizing the hegemonic projects of their ruling classes.

Soft states are formatively functional but reproducitively dysfunctional.
Formative ruling class functionality refers to the capacity of states to create conditions and pursue policies that facilitate the material and ideological formation of the ruling class. This condition is usually transitional and marks the period during which the ruling class is being formed as a 'class in itself'. The mercantilist state was formatively functional to the emergence of the bourgeoisie but had to give way to the more autonomous capitalist state so as to ensure the long term reproduction of eventual bourgeois dominance. The contemporary African state exhibits all the consumptive trappings of 18th century European and 19th century Latin American mercantilist states; what it lacks, among other things, is a hegemonic ruling class capable of leading a transition to industrial capitalism or socialism. This hegemonic disability notwithstanding, soft states are still capable of disuniting subordinate class forces, albeit not by the force of ideology, representative institutions or welfarist policies but by intimidation, violence and systemic repression. By providing and multiplying illicit opportunities for parasitic consumption and in respectively organizing and disorganizing dominant and subordinate classes, the soft state is in the final instance 'overdetermined' by the short term formative interests of the state bourgeoisie.

Reproductive class functionality differs significantly from formative class functionality. Unlike formative functionality which often occurs in the absence of ruling class hegemony, a hegemonic class is a prerequisite for the state's reproductive functionality. Reproductive functionality describes the capacity of states to successfully define, embody and project the interests of ruling classes as universal and legitimate. The absence of ruling class hegemony severely limits the reproductive functionality of soft states while formative functionality diminishes their relative autonomy. Under such conditions, state policies generally tend to be functionally incompatible with long-term ruling class interests. The parochial exclusionary logic of state institutions, the parasitism and estrangement of ruling classes, and the ruthlessness and violence of coercive apparatuses, are among the many processes that are typically dysfunctional to the establishment of ruling class hegemony.

Sierra Leone, one of the poorest countries in the world, is paradigmatic of the soft state. The state in Sierra Leone is soft not only in the sense of its malleability but also in terms of its functional contraction. State enfeeblement in Sierra Leone is, in large part, a function of its malleability. Both processes are intimately connected and are crucial to understanding the contemporary state of the human and social condition in Sierra Leone and much of Africa. The state bourgeoisie, the ruling class in Sierra Leone, lacks a hegemonic ideology and is parasitic, consumptive and unproductive in its mode of accumulation. The activities of this class have severely eroded the relative autonomy and effectiveness of the state and nowhere, perhaps, are the baleful consequences of ruling class formation more apparent than in Sierra Leone. A case study of Sierra Leone should, therefore, help throw light on some of the issues raised in discussions of the nature and implications of state fragility.
Generalizations From the Case Of Sierra Leone

The class structure of contemporary Sierra Leone encloses at least five different strata: a dominant class coalition (state, comprador and metropolitan fractions), a petty bourgeoisie (small-scale merchants, middle-level public employees, intellectuals, teachers, students, etc.), a working class (lower-paid semi-skilled and unskilled labourers), a peasantry (small-scale subsistence and cash crop farmers) and, a lumpenproletariat (panhandlers, transients, prostitutes and the permanently unemployed). The peculiarity of this structure is that its class boundaries are fluid. Increasingly, members of the state and petty bourgeois strata are respectively being ‘hurled’ into the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie and the working class. Elements of the peasantry, working class and the petty bourgeoisie are becoming lumpenized in large numbers while the position of intellectuals remain ambivalent. Intellectuals with privileged access to public offices and resources have been at the vanguard of state despoilation and are to be considered members of the state bourgeoisie, while those without such access are largely petty bourgeois or middle class, at least in expectation if no longer in reality. Access to and control of public offices and resources positionally differentiate the state bourgeoisie from the petty bourgeoisie. Within the dominant class coalition, the distinction between state and comprador bourgeoisie (Lebanese and indigenous businessmen) is blurred by the growing complementarity of interests between these two fractions.

At independence, the Sierra Leone economy was and is still dominated by the metropolitan and comprador fractions of the dominant class coalition. The ‘extraversion’ of this economy clearly imposed limits on the external structural autonomy of the state. But this constraint notwithstanding, the state bourgeoisie has been able to manipulate the conditions of its dependence in ways that have enhanced the fortunes of its key elements. The pull-out of BP Minerals from the diamond industry and the closure of the iron ore mines at Marampa were not unconnected to ongoing disagreements between the political leadership of the state bourgeoisie and representatives of these metropolitan interests. Typical of the tension in metropolitan-state bourgeoisie relations has been the APC Government’s fitful relationship with the IMF. Cognizant of the negative political fall-out of IMF conditionalities, the APC regime under Siaka Stevens was on many occasions unwilling to enter or implement agreements with the IMF. On the issue of ending petrol and rice subsidies, Stevens had this to say:

*Those are dangerous areas. What they (IMF) want us to do is raise prices of those essential items at one fell swoop, now that people are experiencing difficulties from rising prices. If you do that now, you will be in difficulties. They are asking us to commit political suicide* (West Africa, 4 March 1984)

Stevens was not the least oblivious to the vulnerability of his government to external pressures. As he put it,
We owe them, I think about $5 million; they say we should pay them now otherwise they won't come to talk to us. Where are we going to get $5 million now? They know we are hard-up, they know we don't have money, which is the reason we have gone to them for help. Then they say, if you don't pay me, I won't give you. It is a bit hard.

The economic dependence of the post-colonial state and its ruling class constitute both a limitation on relative autonomy and a source of material opportunity for all three fractions of the dominant class coalition. But as Kasfir observes, the post-colonial African state...

...inevitably becomes less effective in generating public revenue and therefore less able to maintain the positions out of which patronial control can be sustained. Without a source of external resources — or a locally controlled bonanza — patronial organization must squeeze subordinate classes in order to continue. Consequently, where the opportunity occurs patronial states are likely to become more dependent on transnational corporations and international lending agencies. Demand for patronage, then, allow additional points of entry by external capitalist forces into African economies (1984:15).

Foreign businessmen, willing to bribe the appropriate authorities, are often able to engage even in those activities (smuggling, black market operations) declared illegal by the Government. Thus Madame Monique Joubert, a Dutch businesswoman, claims to have smuggled vast quantities of gold and diamonds out of Sierra Leone with the help of Siaka Stevens. According to Madame Joubert,

People happened to like me and I got friendly with Siaka Stevens and the rest of them. He stayed in my house all the time in Belgium and we travelled together. Siaka Stevens got the state of luxury and money. I even had a Sierra Leonean passport (West Africa, 15 June 1987).

Although dependent on external sources of revenue and graft, the state in post-colonial Sierra Leone exhibits greater relative instrumental autonomy from the metropolitan bourgeoisie than its colonial antecedent. Both metropolitan and state fractions share a common interest in exploiting the labour and resources of Sierra Leone. Lacking state power, however, the metropolitan bourgeoisie is at the political mercy of the state bourgeoisie. Largely on account of this political vulnerability, the metropolitan bourgeoisie has become a vital source of patronage wealth for specific members of the state bourgeoisie. Metropolitan clientelization of elements of the state bourgeoisie does not, contrary to mainstream dependency theory, invariably contract the sphere of relative (external) instrumental autonomy but may in fact, under conditions of competitive metropolitan clientelization, enhance such autonomy as the state bourgeoisie plays the interests of one metropolitan patron against the other. Current conditions in Sierra Leone and much of Africa are, however, such that the choices for the state and its local bourgeoisie are severely circumscribed by the collaboration among aid donor countries and institutions.

Relations between the comprador and state bourgeoisie are also subject to the
Sierra Leone and the ‘Soft’ State

parasitic logic of state bourgeois consumption. According to Jamil Sahid Mohammed, a former key comprador patron of successive governments in Sierra Leone,

As for political power, this does not exist. Of course, it is a fact that economic power will be recognized by the politicians, but it is not correct to say that I have political power. I’m recognized in the country, yes, but I am not a politician. I have been with all the regimes that have existed in this country and I have been in the good books of all of them. If I were a politician, I would have been criticized by one or the other (West Africa, 1 March 1985).

Mohammed’s disclaimer aside, his extensive economic interests (which at one time included diamond mining and marketing, banking, insurance, fisheries and light manufacturing) were largely made possible by his close association with top political leaders. Under Siaka Stevens and in the first two years of the present Momoh government, Mohammed not only attended cabinet meetings (even though he held no ministerial post), had a say in cabinet appointments, and frequently refused to surrender foreign exchange earnings to the government, he was also allowed to maintain a well-armed 500-strong personal security force consisting largely of Palestinians.

The complementarity of comprador and state bourgeois interests was brought into sharp national focus during the preparations for the 1980 OAU summit meeting in Freetown. The bulk of OAU contracts went to Lebanese patrons (Tony Yazbeck, J. Matter, Nahim Kadi) of prominent state bourgeois elements. In explaining the economic dominance of the Lebanese in Sierra Leone, Siaka Stevens remarked: ‘People say the economy of Sierra Leone is controlled by the Lebanese. But this is not the only part of the world where the economy is controlled by foreigners’ (West Africa, 11 March, 1985). The award of protection, government licenses and contracts to Lebanese patrons created opportunities for the state bourgeoisie literally to extort these patrons. Unlike the metropolitan fraction whose interests in the mining and light manufacturing sectors cannot be peremptorily suspended or taken over by the state, Lebanese compradors are involved mostly in forms of activities that are either illegal or highly vulnerable to the caprice of political authorities. Thus, Lebanese compradors today constitute a veritable source of parasitic wealth for the state bourgeoisie. As many a Lebanese would say, the government is ‘in their pocket’.

The 1987 alleged conspiracy to oust the Momoh government, in which Jamil Mohammed was implicated, abruptly severed Mohammed’s stranglehold over the economy of Sierra Leone while creating new opportunities for competing metropolitan and comprador interests. The discontinuance of formal links between Mohammed and the Sierra Leone government did not significantly lessen the economic dependence of the state and its bourgeoisie on comprador and metropolitan elements of the dominant class coalition. Rather, the departure of Mohammed was demonstrative of the relative instrumental autonomy of the state from elements of its dominant class fractions. But while
this autonomy is possible in relation to individual elements of dominant factions, it shrinks considerably within the context of the overall structural reliance of the state on these class fractions. The soft state may be instrumentally autonomous of specific metropolitan and comprador interests, but it is not structurally autonomous of, or antagonistically opposed to, these interests.

Perhaps by far the most difficult class boundary to delineate in Sierra Leone is that separating the state bourgeoisie from elements of the petty bourgeoisie. The fact that the post-colonial state bourgeoisie grew out of the colonial petty bourgeoisie compounds this problem since it is quite possible for individuals materially and ideologically to straddle both class positions. The disparate nature of the elements often lumped under the petty bourgeois label also contributes to this imprecision and sense of fluidity at the margins. Materially closer to the working class than to any of the three fractions of the dominant coalition, the petty bourgeoisie ideologically and aspirationally identifies with the dominant classes. Numerically and economically marginal, the petty bourgeoisie in post-colonial Sierra Leone is arguably the most indeterminate of class categories. Whereas education, involvement in commerce and employment in the administration of the colonial state largely determined the composition of the petty bourgeoisie under colonialism, the transformation of some of its politically leading elements into the state bourgeoisie has been influenced less by education, commerce and employment than by control over, and access to, public offices and, resources. As a class, the petty bourgeoisie today is anything but a privileged stratum.

If some elements of the petty bourgeoisie have undergone significant changes since independence, the same cannot be said for the working class and peasantry. Workers and peasants continue to be impoverished while their impact on public policy has declined steadily. Prior to the 1970s, labour organizations enjoyed high visibility and exercised considerable influence in urban centres. This influence was made possible by the liberal, accommodationist mood that characterized the early years of independence. That Siaka Stevens was able to mobilize the popular support of the labour movement in his successful bid for political power attests to the independent political role of the labour movement during the 1960s. Such was the relative autonomy of the labour movement that even when labour leaders were, as was often the case, clientelized by key politicians, such demobilizational strategies did not always succeed in silencing labour agitation. To the degree, however, that such practices expand the material and ideological distance between rank and file members of trade unions and their leaders, they serve to disunite the labour movement, diminish its autonomy and stifle its development.

Co-opting and clientelizing labour leaders has not for the most part ensured the acquiescence of rank and file trade union members. In a June 1981 memorandum to the Government, the Sierra Leone Labour Congress noted how

some of the conditionalities that follow IMF loans, such as devaluation of the domestic currency, restrictions in public expenditure and removal of subsidies on items such as
transport and food (which hit the poor hardest), restriction on bank lending, and 
encouragement to foreign investors, are all positive processes of underdevelopment (Taju-

To address some of the debilitating effects of these processes, the Labour Con-
gress called on the Government to institute effective price controls, reduce the 
staff at Sierra Leone's embassies, establish state farms to produce food (espe-
cially rice), reform the tax system, enforce tighter controls on foreign ex-
change allocation and surrender obligations and, encourage small businesses 
and farmers.

Government's reaction to the above demands was to declare a state of emer-
gency, dismiss workers who failed to report for work, question the legitimacy 
of the labour movement and its demands, and detain without trial the entire 
leadership of the Labour Congress. In this manner the 1981 labour strike, like 
so many others before and since, was suppressed without addressing its un-
derlying causes and adopting policies to redress the conditions that give rise 
to such unrests. In the words of James Kabia, Secretary-General of the Sierra 
Leone Labour Congress,

It is an indisputable fact that in Sierra Leone and in the majority of African countries, 
where trade union rights have been wickedly trampled upon, the struggle between the 
government and the central workers' organizations have been created by widespread 
corruption, financial mismanagement and the intolerable escalating prices of basic food 
and other essential commodities, which have stepped outside the reach of the average 
salary/wage packet. In Sierra Leone, socio-economic problems cannot be solved by 
throwing trade unionists into prison. (Taju-Deen Report, 1982:36-37).

State relations with the peasantry have also been consistently exploitative and 
repressive. All three fractions of the dominant class coalition benefit from 
peasant expropriation. Metropolitan exploitation of the peasantry occurs 
mainly through unequal exchange while exploitation by the state bourgeoisie 
is mediated by the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB) which 
functions as a tax collector among export producing peasants. In the case of 
the comprador bourgeoisie, exploitation stems from the economic asymmetry 
between the small farmer and the licensed buying agent of the SLPMB, the 
majority of whom are Lebanese. Externally financed aid projects, ostensibly 
designed to improve the lot of small-scale farmers, generally widen rural dis-
parities by disproportionately benefiting politically connected farmers. And 
when, as was the case in Pujehun during the 1983 'Ndorgbowusu' defiant 
campaign, peasants attempt to articulate their grievances and assert their right 
to choose their political representatives at the centre, they are often ruthlessly 
silenced, uprooted and displaced by a scorched earth policy that is all too 
reminiscent of the punitive expeditions of the conquest phase of colonial occup-
ation. Through policies of demobilization and departicpation, the political 
leadership of Sierra Leone has sought to stifle and deny the capacity of subor-
dinate classes to make demands on the state. Complementing the organic-
statist inclusionary rhetoric of one-party rule are sustained attempts by the 
ruling class to disunite, disorganize and marginalize subordinate
agglomerations. Minikin pointedly surmises this process of peripheralization when he notes that 'the national leaders in Sierra Leone feared the implication of mass participation in politics ... instead they directed the energies and attention of the people into local-level politics which became a safety valve preventing the tensions implicit in mass participation from bursting into the national arena' (1979:129).

Since social development takes a backseat as the quest for personal enrichment intensifies, the state becomes less able to meet the minimum welfare needs and developmental aspirations of society. Widespread impoverishment, shrinking social services, dilapidated infrastructure, a rapidly deteriorating educational system, and a grossly mismanaged economy, are among the many outward signs of the effects of ruling class parasitism. In short, the effects of ruling class formation are functionally incompatible with the long term reproduction of ruling class interests.

Lacking internal relative autonomy from the state bourgeoisie, the state in Sierra Leone is also without a hegemonic ruling class. Attempts to ideologically vindicate ruling class dominance, from the SLPP's 'one country, one people' to the APC's one-partyism, have been generally belied by the parochial and self-seeming character of state bourgeois dominance. The most recent attempt by the ruling class to articulate a legitimating ideology is the current regime's 'constructive nationalism' rhetoric. As a belated attempt to provide ideological camouflage for APC parasitism and authoritarianism, constructive nationalism is anything but what the state bourgeoisie has come to embody and promote. The ethnic selectivity, corruption and ineptitude of Momoh's 'new order' undermine, rather than promote, the construction of a unitary, cohesive and patriotic social order.

Closely related to the ideological phantoms of ruling class rule are sustained efforts to exploit and manipulate historical and cultural symbols. Symbols are important to processes of legitimation particularly in instances where governmental performance lags behind reasonable societal expectations. Edelman contends that 'the governments which most often outrage their citizens or force unwelcome changes in their behavior plainly have the greatest need for reassuring symbols' (1967:9). In Sierra Leone, Hayward and Dumbuya have shown how political leaders manipulate symbols with a clear view to emphasizing their power, evoking ties to the past and projecting an image of charisma and leadership. The memories of past warriors, heroes and nationalists like Bai Bureh, Madam Yoko and I.T.A Wallace-Johnson are frequently exploited in an effort to link incumbents to the heroism of the past. Contrary, however, to Hayward and Dumbuya's submission that 'the extent to which some regimes succeed in maintaining their legitimacy despite violence, corruption, and fraud demonstrates the power of symbols' (1983:649), symbols embody and express, rather than create, legitimacy. Invocations and manipulations of national symbols cannot offset public perceptions of policy failures,
ruling class aggrandizement and the systemic disjuncture between governmental performance, on the one hand, and societal norms, interests and aspirations, on the other. It is this functional retreat of the state, in part a consequence of its malleability, that ultimately limits its class functionality.

Conclusion

The failure of those who wield state power to promote the development of their societies and articulate a vision for the future is a failure to optimize the ruling class functionality of their states. Kasfir's observation that the patrimonial state 'inevitably becomes less effective in generating public revenue' (1984:15) underscores both the material fragility of Africa's ruling classes and the malleability of the state that is at their command. As Joseph notes,

> When the state itself becomes the key distributor of financial resources ... and this in the absence of any socialist or even state capitalist ideology ... all government projects become the object of intense pressures to convert them into means of individual and group accumulation (1984:24).

It is precisely this narrow, immediate, formative preoccupation of the state bourgeoisie that deprives the soft state of any real reproductive dominant class functionality.

Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this essay was presented at the 32nd Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Atlanta, GA, November 2-5, 1989.

Jimmy Kande is in the Department of Political Science at the University of Richmond, Virginia.

Bibliographic Note


Surviving in an Economic Recession: 'Game Play' in a Nigerian Factory

Olajide Oloyede

The economic crisis in Nigeria has been widely commented upon yet very few empirical studies of the subtle but complex responses by shop floor workers exist. These have tended to concentrate on workers' militant action neglecting the equally important aspect of how workers actually cope. This article focuses on the strategy shop floor workers adopt in dealing with the recession as experienced by them at the workplace. It describes and analyses this strategy and concludes that it has the immediate effect of weakening further the solidary nature of shop floor lateral relations.

After the collapse of oil revenues in 1981, Nigeria was confronted by a severe economic crisis which generated numerous articles and papers by social scientists and economists, preoccupied with analysing the economic policy of the IMF-influenced structural adjustment programme (SAP) and political scientists, some of whom have been concerned with the effect of the crisis on workers and their response to it in the form of strikes and work stoppages; very few have been by sociologists or offered a sociological analysis of the subtle, yet complex and profound ways in which workers' actions reflect their experience of the recession. Indeed, few publications go beyond casual observations and general commentaries. Specific shop floor responses have been noted in passing, but scarcely examined.

The most consistent treatment of the recession and workers' response to it from the academic left are the works of Yusuf Bangura and Bjorn Beckman (1989; also 1989a, 1989b). Both have used case studies to offer illuminating analyses of the effect of the Nigerian government's structural adjustment programme on workers, concentrating on the politics of the response. Yet their focus on workers' response to the crisis is heavily weighted on workers' oppositional action. There is, however, an urgent need to look at how shop floor workers have been coping with the stringent management measures for dealing with the recession. We should ask: what strategies are being adopted by shop floor workers to cope with such measures?

Primarily, this is a study of how shop floor workers 'actively deal' with the recession at the workplace. I focus on the strategy these workers adopt for survival in the factory and look at the implications for the lateral relations at
work; that is, the relationships among shop floor workers which are autonomous and sustained by the work experience and often form the basis for challenging work rules as well as powers of supervisors and management.

I have to a considerable extent relied on Burawoy's (1976) analytical mode employing the concept of game play in the analysis of my observations because of the obvious capacity to explain shop floor activities which do not pose any general or explicit challenge to management. This article draws from a six month participant-observational study carried out in 1987, working on the shop floor apprenticed to a machine operator for five months.

The Company

The company is a subsidiary of a Dutch electronics multinational. It started its operation in Nigeria in 1955 and, by the 1960s, became the leading company within the electronics industry and by the mid-1970s one of the biggest electrical and related equipment firms in the country. It owed its growth to the demand for electronics and electrical equipment generated by the oil boom. The company also expanded other areas of its activities and got a substantial share of government lighting contracts leading to increased automation and the introduction of new machines to enhance productivity and quality. New factories were built to manufacture radio, television, lamp, refrigerator and plastics. The overall production labour force increased enormously to almost 1,400 but as the recession set in, the company experienced a downward slide bringing the number down to 600 at the beginning of 1987.

Effect of the Crisis on the Company

The company was hit by the foreign exchange scarcity of the early 1980s when the governments of Shagari (1979-83) and the short-lived Buhari military regime (1984-85) introduced a series of stabilising measures. The lack of foreign exchange affected the supply of industrial inputs and, like virtually all other manufacturing/assembling companies in the country, experienced a massive contraction in production. There was a serious shortage of essential raw materials such as argon gas for its lamp-producing activities and materials for plastics moulding. The extent of the contraction becomes clear by looking at the level of its production activities between 1980 and the first half of 1986.

The table shows that production in all the five factories fell sharply from 1981 to 1982, and lamp production declined more rapidly than other activities. The fall in overall production continued, reaching 30% of the 1980 production level in the first half of 1986. The picture of the lamp factory was different. In 1983, the company was able to import the necessary raw materials for the factory and the production level recovered to 65% of its 1980 level. The lamp factory's share of the combined production rose from 20% in 1982 to 85% in the first half of 1986.
Table 1: Production Activities in the Company (1980=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All factories</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamp factories</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Internal Memo, March 1987

These figures indirectly reflect the further weakening of the low purchasing power of the populace which meant that demand for such items as consumer electronics goods declined drastically. The falling exchange rate of the naira made imported and locally assembled and ‘manufactured’ consumer electronics highly expensive, far beyond the reach of average Nigerians and even of a big section of the middle class. The overall company sales dropped by 30 per cent in 1981 and by mid-1986, they had dropped by 80 per cent. Lamp sales, were however, on the increase.

The drastic drop in demand resulted in a huge stock of ‘unconsumed’ electronics goods in the company warehouse building up to a ‘consumer electronics mountain’. Consequently, the company decided to cut back on production in 1981. Subsequent drops in production resulted from a combination of falling demand and raw materials shortage. Management emphasised to the workers that the latter was chiefly responsible but this, as I shall show, was not the case.

Adjustment Measures in the Company

Examining the company’s books gave a clear picture of the impact of the economic crisis on the company but also served as evidence that some of the shut downs were strategic rather than to direct effects of the economic crisis. Such a statement is, however, simply a first approximation. In practice, the distinction is not clear cut: shut down as a strategy is, in the final analysis, an effect.

The impact of the economic crisis on the company was reflected in its annual turnover but more worrying for management, was the drop in trading profits. In 1981, the annual turnover of the company was 34,463,436 naira. This increased slightly to 34,896,790 naira in the following year and dropped to 24,954,221 naira in 1983. The corresponding trading profit was 4,778,847 naira in 1981 dropping very sharply to 698,496 naira in 1982 and significantly increased to 2,671,468 naira in 1983. There was clearly an increase in turnover in 1982, but this was not because of any increase in sales but because the company marked up the prices of its products. For example, hi-fi equipment increased in price three-fold while refrigerators increased by 80 per cent, all within a year. The increase resulted also from the saved overheads during shut downs when there were cuts in production and temporary and perma-
nent lay-offs of workers. The sharp fall in trading profits in 1982 was as a result of the devaluation of the currency. However, in 1983, the profits picked up sharply despite the undoubtedly unimproved exchange rate and increasing costs. The explanation for this is the twin strategy adopted by the company in the first quarter of 1982 when the precarious nature of the company was becoming evident. What were these strategies?

The twin strategies adopted by the company as adjustment measures to the economic crisis, were cost management and, emanating from this, productivity increase. The first measure was introduced in 1982 when the management could not secure import licences for the year. It involved cuts in overheads — factory shut downs, wages and salaries freeze, withdrawal of allowances etc — and a drastic reduction in the workforce which in fact was a common form of adjustment in all companies.

The second strategy was adopted in 1984 after the complete shutdown of the radio factory and particularly when lamp production became central in the company's production activities. The company did not diversify, rather, it concentrated on the production of lamps. Measures were introduced to increase productivity of the workforce which entailed more tightening of labour discipline, tighter control of defects, control of the rates of absence and worker-hours lost etc. There is a close relationship between these measures and the level of profits; the decrease in production in 1982 proved profitable, as reflected in the 1983 figures and this influenced management's introduction of some of the measures contained in the second strategy.

Shut Downs

The first shut down by the company was in 1982 when the lamp factory was closed temporarily. The management expected a shortage of raw materials because they were not able to procure an import license. It was feared that the raw materials in stock would not last three months if production continued at full capacity. Management felt that if production was to continue at 50 per cent, then, there might be a possibility that the company would survive the initial 'shock' of the recession which was calculated to last six months. It was therefore decided that the lamp factory should be shut for a number of weeks (Minutes of a management meeting, November 1981). The shut down was thus part of the strategy to cope with the recession.

The first shut down lasted two weeks. Other shut downs were to follow in 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986 and in mid-1987. The 1983 shut down involved only the lamp factory and it lasted five months but subsequent shut downs, especially 1984 and 1985, were mainly the radio, television and plastics factory. For example, the radio factory closed in 1984 and had not reopened by 1987. Accompanying these shut downs were temporary and permanent lay-offs of a number of shop floor workers. In the lamp factory, the number of shop floor workers decreased from over 300 in 1980 to slightly above 230 in 1987. Between 1982 when it fell to 125 and in 1983 to 105, the internal posting of work-
ers from other factories within the company increased the number to its 1987 level.

Explanations for some of these shut downs could also be sought in the 'weak' market. Nevertheless, there was evidence (as contained in the Minutes of the company's management meetings) that suggested that the aim was to save 'overheads' which, apart from the usual running costs of the factories — electricity, maintenance, cleaning, etc — also included savings on salaries and wages and, bonuses. These were achieved mainly by halving them during shut downs, a practice which was prevalent within the industry.

Labour Control

In a previous paper (Oloyede, 1990) I argued that the particular structure of control practices in the factory does not have an automatic relation to the economic crisis, though the crisis did make it easier for management to pursue its goals of increased control with the objective of achieving increased productivity. To a very great degree, the control practices derived from changes in the character of production technology.

Ironically, the increase in demand for household lighting and lighting in general was brought about by the economic crisis. The frequency with which power cuts occurred increased enormously as the National Electricity Power Authority (NEPA), the central electricity generating authority, could not, owing to serious financial handicaps experienced also by other public utility corporations, purchase the necessary parts needed for many of its broken down generators and grids. Inevitably, the frequent power cuts shortened the lifespan of the incandescent lamps which meant increased sales, and therefore an expansion in the residual market for lamps.

The management was quick to realise the expanding market and devised a strategy to consolidate and increase its market share which was judged by the sales department to be between 35 and 45 per cent (the company was the dominant lamp manufacturer in the country). This necessitated the expansion of lamp production and productivity. To achieve this objective and to maximize whatever could be gained in the market, management sought to control labour more effectively. There were stricter applications of time-keeping and far more formalization of work discipline and job demarcation which enabled management to move and re-allocate the shop floor workers. The movement of workers from one factory to another or internal posting was not a planned management strategy, but part of a series of ad hoc arrangements which eventually became well worked out in 1984.

The practice started with the first temporary shut down of the television factory during which some shop floor workers considered 'exceptional' were moved and re-allocated to almost similar jobs in the radio factory. It continued after other temporary shut downs affecting both 'skilled' and 'unskilled' shop floor workers. Some 'apprentice' technicians from the television factory
were moved and re-allocated to the unrelated job of machine operators in the lamp factory. Between 1983 and 1986, 63 shop floor workers, two-thirds of them women, were moved and re-allocated to other jobs and of these, 50 were to the lamp factory where almost half of the workforce were retrenched between 1982 and mid-1983.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Company</th>
<th>Duration of shutdown</th>
<th>Section affected</th>
<th>Reason for shut-down</th>
<th>Payments (methods)</th>
<th>Workers' opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEPNL (Philips)</td>
<td>2 wks '82</td>
<td>Lamp factory</td>
<td>raw mls</td>
<td>full salary</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 mths '83</td>
<td></td>
<td>raw mls</td>
<td>full salary</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanyo</td>
<td>4 mths '84</td>
<td>All sections</td>
<td>raw mls</td>
<td>half salary</td>
<td>U.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 mths '82</td>
<td></td>
<td>raw mls</td>
<td>half salary</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaycee</td>
<td>5 mths '84</td>
<td>PH factory</td>
<td>raw mls</td>
<td>third salary</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 mths '86</td>
<td></td>
<td>raw mls</td>
<td>1 mnth</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bright Star</td>
<td>4 mths '86</td>
<td>Battery</td>
<td>raw mls</td>
<td>1 mnth</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 mths '87</td>
<td>Lamp</td>
<td>raw mls</td>
<td>1 mnth</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: PH = Port Harcourt factory (a state capital in the southern part of the country); U.R. = Union Resistance; raw mls = raw materials shortage

The initial success of the internal posting and re-allocations did not meet with any opposition from the workers and the house union, as it provided something better than being made redundant, convincing management to adopt it as part of the measures in the implementation of their objective of raising productivity. While the number of workers internally moved and re-allocated was obviously not very large, it was significant because it enabled management to meet its objective of a productivity increase without any extra 'labour cost'. Company records did not show that those re-allocated got an increase in pay or any special allowance.

Associated with this internal posting was a greater work discipline by supervisors and quality control personnel. Formalization was taken even further than in the mid-1970s when 'new' technology was introduced. Some policies were introduced to deal with what management considered to be laxity on the shop floor. Supervisors concentrated more on their role in the production tasks and a number of rules were introduced to curtail bad work; penalties for defects and poor time-keeping. The key people in its implementation were the quality control personnel and the production manager who justified work discipline thus:

*With the recession and limited resources (raw materials) available for production, the company must prevent waste and to ensure that, there must be firm control. Workers must be at work in time and make sure that they avoid any costly mistake when they are*
on their machines. In fact I have to constantly check on their work more than I used to, otherwise they may make expensive mistakes.

Since 1984, a firmer approach has been adopted to the management of the workforce in general and not only to that of the shop floor workers. For example, in 1983, after the first shutdown of that year, management issued a warning against 'loitering' during work hours; this control of 'movement' included a discouragement of the practice of receiving and entertaining visitors in factories or offices. Office workers could only communicate on the phone with their visitors if the time of visit fell within the lunch break. For the factory workers who had no access to a phone, they could only meet their visitors in the reception hall by the gate and this was during their lunch hour. All such visitors had to sign their name on a special register against the name of the person being visited.

The adoption of a firmer approach in managing and controlling shop floor workers did not lead to management abandoning the collective bargaining agreement. It made management/worker relations more formal and replaced customary regulations: there was stricter application of jointly agreed negotiations between management and the Precision Electrical and Related Equipment Workers Union (PEREWU), the industrial union to which the workers belonged.

More importantly, the process of tightening up of labour discipline involved a redefinition of disciplinary procedure and personnel. The factory manager, his deputy, and the production manager took charge of work discipline, yet issues concerning the shop floor were dealt with formally by the personnel department directly. One aspect of the formality of disciplinary procedures was the degree to which they specified a system of oral and written warnings prior to the ultimate sanction of dismissal.

Setting out disciplinary procedures in a written document is widespread in Nigerian industries. Formal procedure in Nigeria started in the 1970s and when unions were reorganised in 1978, the government issued a decree which effectively reconstituted the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) as the sole central union. This reconstitution saw all the house unions grouped into 42 industry-based unions which became affiliated to the NLC. The government provided funds for the NLC and made dues in industries compulsory. The industry-based unions negotiate directly with their counterparts on the employee side. Workers had a certain amount automatically deducted from their monthly wage which was then paid to the union. In the light of the adjustment measures in the company, what was the response on the shop floor? What strategy did the workers adopt to deal with these measures?

Shop Floor Strategy: 'Game Play'

Whatever strategy shop floor workers adopt in dealing with the measures that management are likely to introduce will be influenced, not only by manage-
ment's application of such measures, but also by the precarious economic situation of the company. This is likely to generate a consciousness of insecurity, which may exert a greater influence on the strategy to be adopted by shop floor workers. To the extent that it does, the strategy adopted may not be oppositional but survival-oriented. Here, each worker will be concerned with their position in the company. Thus, there may be the tendency for them to acquiesce in whatever adjustment measures management may introduce however stringent. Equally, measures introduced by management regardless of the precarious economic situation of the company, may have the potential for management-worker confrontation. Yet, it is plain that the potential for conflict may not erupt overtly. Indeed, there has only been limited and sporadic interruption in the workplace and this, it seems, is indicative of the consciousness of insecurity that has been generated by the recession.

In the factory there was great concern for individual survival. This manifested itself in the strategy adopted on the shop floor: 'game play', which took the form 'to be seen working' or in the language of the shop floor workers, 'eye service'. The reward was not to achieve greater earnings as in Burawoy's 'game play' explanation, but for security of tenure in the company.

'To be seen working' has its origin in the factory in 1982. This was the year of the first shut down and the first within the company. It was also the first within the electronics and related equipment industry and it shocked the workers who, though aware of shutdowns and closures in other industries, never envisaged their company, by virtue of its pre-eminent position within the industry, shutting down any of its factories. As a long time worker put it:

I still don't know why we became the first electronics company to close down and make staff redundant like on the second occasion. Everybody knows that we are the leaders and we in the company have the confidence that our company will survive but the confidence just disappeared after the first close down, especially after the second one which was longer than the first and which involved many staff redundancies. Every staff have to pull themselves up and each of us became like a tortoise in its shell [the analogy to the tortoise in its shell is very instructive; it powerfully encapsulates the attitude on the shop floor].

The second shut down firmly established 'the game' as a significant part of shop floor culture; a culture in which strategic individual and economic interests complement each other. Yet it was not so much the shut down and the accompanying redundancies that established the 'game play' on the shop floor but, more so, the composition of the redundancies. In the first exercise, up to 20 per cent of those affected had put in over five years work while about 30 per cent had put in about five years and the rest had under five years working experience in the company. Apparently, the company did not adhere strictly to the principle of 'last in, first out' and the realization of this seemed to have caused anxiety among the workers.

Their anxiety became even greater with the awareness of the statistics of the second redundancy exercise which accompanied the five months shut down.
It became obvious that years of service was not necessarily the criterion of redundancies. What was more significant was the number of workers with less years of service in the company unaffected by the redundancy exercise. This seemed to have confirmed the earlier suspicion held by the workers about diligence being the far more important criterion of redundancy. Management considered those who were deemed to carry out their ‘work well’ as worth keeping. This meant not only the workers ‘seen working’ but also more importantly, those who had low ‘worker-hours loss’. In the words of the personnel manager:

_There are many things which we put into consideration when we are about the embark on a redundancy exercise. One includes how well staff have been applying themselves in these troubled times. You see, we consider this important because some members of staff particularly the older ones might think they have been with us for so long and therefore could afford to relax in the work which they do. And moreover, most of them think that as older members of staff, they have to go last during a redundancy exercise. Of course, this is a factor, but we have to consider other things too._

It is likely that the belief that diligence was a key factor prompted an increased attachment to the machines just so that the workers could be seen working. An outcome of this was that personal security of tenure within the company became more the individual shop floor worker’s priority. Once the workers resumed work, there was minimal interaction or exchanges; individual workers wore very serious looks which disappeared during the lunch break and after work. In the beginning, I found this rather strange but eventually got to understand the behaviour. It was apparent that putting on a serious look conveyed a hard-working attitude. Each shop floor worker, therefore, did all they could to ensure this not only by putting in more effort but more importantly from their perspective, to be seen doing that by the management. Thus they were engaged in a game of survival and effectively established it as a very important part of shop floor culture. But how exactly was the game played?

Production was organised around the work-flow system after the introduction of ‘new’ technology in the mid-1970s and this entailed the movement of production materials (in pieces) from one machine to the other along a conveyor belt. The pieces at the end of the line became finished products and were set on trolleys which were moved to a section of the building where they were subsequently packaged. Each operator sat by their machine doing the necessary tending.

It is in sitting and tending to the machines that the game was played. Sitting and tending machines are characteristics of work in a work-flow system; operators spend a great deal of time doing this. In such a system, workers are relieved for a certain period. What is significant here is that the workers seldom asked to be relieved by a ‘general’. Part of the reason for this has to do with the ‘power’ which the generals had come to possess in the crisis period. This ‘power’ was conferred on them as a result of the tightening of shop floor discipline, a component of which was the recording of time off the machines;
time-offs were recorded as part of individual worker-hours lost. Since the generals' major function was to relieve workers, it may have been considered natural that they be given the responsibility to record the time-offs and this they did. The record sheets were handed over to the time recording clerk at the end of each day's work. These were filed away and usually retrieved for performance appraisal which served as a basis for management's notion of working well. Generals thus assumed an important role in work effort. While they had this power, they did not appear eager to exercise it. This may be because their survival was not significantly dependent on the record of time-off they produced.

Apparently, for this reason, operators took less time off or none at all. The number of time-offs per day fell by almost 80 per cent since the practice of recording them started when the average per worker per day used to be five or six minutes. It then became one or two per day with some workers not taking time off for two or three days in a week. On our machine, the average time off per worker per day was one and, per week, between three and four minutes. It was crucial that they were not only seen to be physically working, but statistically recorded since, in their judgement, less time off in their work record stood them, at the very least, in good stead to be unaffected by the redundancy exercise. 'To be seen working' thus became a vigorous individual pre-occupation; directed towards one goal, relative security or tenure. As expressed by one of my colleagues which sums up the general feeling:

A good record is good for your security. I always think of my job all the time. I don't want to lose it so I have to show good record.

This game also took expression in another form: 'self-imposed product control' which involved a serious attempt by individual workers to avoid at all costs their defective pieces. It was in attempting to avoid defective pieces that the implications of the game play for shop floor relations become very apparent.

Defective products were written off by management but this practice was, in the context of economic crisis in the country and raw material shortages faced by the company, considered wasteful and expensive. For this reason, management took it especially seriously if there were too many defective pieces and products. Management also felt that their objective of cost management might be compromised if they were to allow too many defective pieces and products. The factory manager put it this way:

When we have large numbers of defects, it means that we are undermining our objective to save costs. There is a level to which we can allow defects and in fact we believe that constant attention on the part of the workers is what is needed to significantly lower defects. This is very crucial and we take it seriously.

The workers were therefore constantly warned of the implications of not paying the necessary attention to avoiding their machines producing defects.
While the implications were not made clear to the shop floor workers, it was assumed it meant just one thing — dismissal.

The awareness of this made them develop a 'safe attitude': effort was made to give the impression that their attention was 100 per cent. While they did put in substantial effort to reduce the number of defects, it was the very 'high profile' given it that constituted the game. For example, constant attention was needed to make the production flow, but in the context of the game, extra attention was paid to the machines to avoid defects while at the same time the production manager's or the quality personnel's attention were consciously drawn. To the extent that the workers increasingly attached themselves to their machines to avoid defects, they were involved in controlling products. In this regard, one can safely assume that both management and workers' interests coincided: for management, cost was saved, for the workers, and very crucial for tenure, even though uncertain, they were seen not only doing their job, but doing it well.

In adopting the game play strategy as their response, the workers were not so much concerned to take a collective oppositional posture to the management's adjustment measures but simply to cope individually with them; this required a degree of mental effort on the part of the individual worker — a more or less protracted and laborious effort to find and to keep their job. The coping behaviour has the essential quality of dynamism but it suggests that the workers were blasé about management practices. This strategy may be interpreted as a rational behaviour in a climate or uncertainty. The underlying assumption in this regard is that each worker is rationally pursuing their self-interest and personal values against others rationally pursuing their own self interest and their own personal values. The consciousness of insecurity forms the basis of the intentional nature of the workers' response and their capability to decide and act on the basis of rational calculations of benefit and cost. The benefit in this case being individual security or tenure and the cost, perhaps, the further weakening of collectivism which the individual pursuit of security may bring about.

Game Play and Shop Floor Relations

It is clear in the foregoing description of the game play that where activities within an organisation require the active cooperation of individuals in achieving certain goals (for example in ensuring less defects), there is a natural tendency for consent in production to emerge. Burawoy explains how consent is manufactured upon playing the game and it is this game which is responsible for and generates harmony at the workplace. Games, according to him, are the spontaneous, autonomous, malevolent creation of workers. They arise from the workers' initiative search for the means of enduring subordination. Once the game is established, it assumes a dynamic of its own but, Burawoy stresses, there is no guarantee that it will continue to reproduce the conditions
of its existence. On the contrary, it is possible that playing the game will tend to undermine the rules that define it. Playing the game generates a common interest in the outcome of the game and its continuity:

*Any game that provides distinctive rewards to the players establishes a common interest among the players — whether these are representatives of capital or labour — in providing for the condition of its reproduction (Burawoy, 1979:85).*

When the labour process (the relationship among the workers in their production activities) becomes organised into some form of game which involves the active participation of both management and worker, then the interests of both are coordinated.

In playing the game, the workers did not have a level of production which they targeted for the purpose of securing their position in the factory but there was no established level of effort either; what was important was the prevention of defects. But, precisely because defects were inevitable, the workers had room to manoeuvre and the act of manoeuvring was itself a form of game. The workers were aware that there was a certain number which management considered acceptable though they did not know what it was. Nevertheless, the fact that this magic number existed allowed the workers to exhibit behaviour that seemed to indicate enormous effort while in the real sense, extra effort did not appear to be put in. The workers were genuinely concerned about defects not only because of their implications but also because the magic number was unknown. The game was thus, also, played around the magic number. But it was not regulated by management even though it seemed to serve management ends in that workers put in effort to avoid defects which, to some extent, lowered production cost.

The immediate effect of the game play, most evident from the product control aspect of it, was an increasing orientation towards self-survival and a corresponding further weakening of the solidary bond. The solidary nature of the relations on the shop floor was never particularly strong, and this can be traced back to the mid-1970s when work was restructured following the automation and introduction of new machines in the factory (Oloyede, 1990). The effect of this was, to borrow from Burawoy, ‘to constitute the shop floor workers into individuals’ becoming increasingly so as the workers engaged in the game on the shop floor.

In engaging in the game, the individual spirit became predominant over the collective spirit, further inhibiting collective confrontation of issues that were of immediate concern. Not only was there an increased weakening of the solidary bond, conflict increasingly became distributed laterally as well (conflict may be inevitable in a system of production in which one piece passes from one machine to the other, that is, the workflow system). As Burawoy remarked, endemic to the organisation of work is lateral conflict. Such a lateral conflict may become accentuated in a context of game play where the individual worker is concerned with personal security.
The evidence from the present inquiry shows that the game play generated conflict which usually arose when defects passed from one machine to the other. In such cases, the concerned operators tended to argue it out between themselves as to whose machine was responsible and whether one was paying attention or not. There was also the conflict between the quality control men and the operators whose relationship was ambivalent; the quality control men were 'feared' but not respected, accepted but not tolerated. Apparently, they were accepted because they were also employees, though employed to do a different task. In a paradoxical way, their task coincided with the second aspect of the game: 'product control'. The quality control men checked product quality, the operators equally ensured quality but for a different purpose: individual 'tenure' in the company. The operators strenuously avoided defects because the statistics of it was assumed to be translated by management as lack of attention or 'effort'. The quality control men were not tolerated because their task in ensuring product quality meant that whenever there was stoppage because of defective pieces, time spent in putting back the machine to normal was recorded against the operator whose machine it was. Obviously, this, within the context of the game, did not endear them to the machine operators. Hence, the conflict between the two groups.

Conclusion
In this article, attempt has been made to show how shop floor workers deal with measures introduced by management in response to the economic crisis. The workers adjusted to, rather than opposed, the measures. This was by playing the 'eye service' game in which individual survival was the objective. Such a response was adopted because of the consciousness of insecurity generated by the precarious nature of the company and also, though not pursued here, a weak class solidarity among the workers which allowed for an individual coping strategy rather than a collective one of opposition — like strikes or work stoppages. However, there is the tendency for strike activity to fluctuate with the general economic cycle and that, industrial organisations in economic difficulties would likely experience less industrial action.

Bibliographic Note
Beyond the House of Hunger: Democratic Struggle in Zimbabwe

Brian Raftopoulos

In 1980, after more than a decade of armed liberation struggle, ZANU-PF took power in Zimbabwe. The new government under President Mugabe became increasingly repressive, seeking to force opposition either into alliance with ZANU, or into silence. This authoritarian process appeared to be culminating in a formal one-party presidentialist state, de facto one-party rule having being achieved in the late 1980s. This article describes the process and analyses growing opposition to it, both from within ZANU and from groupings within civil society — notably students, workers, peasant communities, and the petty bourgeoisie. In part one (which appeared in ROAPE 54, July 1992), the role of the petty bourgeoisie is examined, especially its private sector component. Part two below describes and interprets peasant discontent and worker opposition.

Land, Labour and the Popular Classes

Historically, the labour movement in Zimbabwe has been weak, and characterised by divisions on racial lines; sectionalism; low national density; political factionalism; and elitist and undemocratic structures (Wood, 1988). After independence, workers used the new environment to vent their accumulated anger at the wage levels, discriminatory practices and repressive labour dispute mechanisms inherited from the colonial period. The strikes — around 200 in all — also indicated the levels of expectations and the very real will for change amongst workers. The labour movement, plagued by its legacy of problems, could not fully connect with the rhythm and intensity of the strikes. The workers themselves concentrated on the immediate issues, with little or no long-term conceptions of their actions, which were thus largely short-term and defensive. The State’s goals were to end the strikes, resume production levels, establish communication links with the workforce, and reassure employers that while eager to rectify the injustices suffered by labour, it was in no mood to undermine the settler colonial relations of production. Thus while workers were able to exploit the temporary receptiveness of the State to labour issues, this receptiveness was always ambivalent.

As the divisions and lack of centralised authority of the unions became more evident and the employers recovered from their initial defensive stance, the
changing balance of forces produced less than sympathetic State responses. The use of the State's coercive machinery against striking workers characterised its commitment to gradual reformist labour policies within existing production structures. Accusations have been made against 'selfish' and 'irresponsible' workers, whose role in the struggle has been questioned, and whose 'privileged' position vis-a-vis the peasantry has been invoked. For the labour movement the task of becoming more effective has centred around three issues: developing autonomy from the State while remaining able to use it to advance the interest of labour; developing broader alliances with other sections of the popular classes; and mobilising membership from the workplace by providing effective union leadership on issues affecting workers.

The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was initiated by ZANU (PF) in 1980, to create a central trade union amenable to a corporatist solution to labour issues. Before this, five trade union centres had already combined to form the United Trade Unions of Zimbabwe (UTUZ), which failed to gain recognition from the new State, which was reluctant to have to deal with a labour confederation formed independently of the State and whose political affiliations were more towards ZAPU and ZANU (Sithole). Despite vigorous protests, the labour movement proved too weak and divided along regional and political lines to prevent the formation of the new centre.

During the early and mid-1980s, the imposed leadership of the trade union struggled for credibility amongst workers. Moreover, its lack of a democratic base and dependence on outside funding, compounded by the State's delay in the introduction of a check-off system, led its members into a series of corrupt practices. The State's disdainful attitude was clearly shown by its failure to allocate any of the 20 seats formerly reserved for whites to representatives of the labour movement. It felt strong enough to dismiss labour to the sidelines, 'speak' for the labour movement annually through the announcement of the minimum wage and through the Labour Relations Act, and to make strikes effectively unlawful.

By the late 1980s relations between the State and the labour movement began to change. The latter, having removed the more corrupt elements in its leadership, also applied itself more carefully to democratic accountability. Moreover, cracks in the State's attempted corporate strategy were becoming apparent. While minimum wage legislation has improved the purchasing power of agricultural and domestic employees, for workers in commerce and industry the minimum wages, at 1989 prices, have dropped to 13% below their 1980 purchasing power level. This decline, however, must be assessed along with the phenomenal increase in social expenditure since 1980. Significantly, the drop in purchasing power has also affected the professional groups such as nurses and teachers, who in 1990 conducted the longest strikes in post-independence labour history. Along with other urban groups, these professionals have also suffered from the housing and transport crisis and the escalating
cost of living.

The growth of union activity in the public sector reflects the expansion of employment in public administration, education and health, from 128,200 in 1980 to 220,300 in 1989. Moreover, public sector unionism has not been significant hitherto in the overall labour movement, largely because under existing legislation trade unions have not been allowed to exist in this sector. However, the erosion of professional status and earning power has been an important recruiter of these sections of the labour force to union activity. While there is definitely an opportunity for the growth of a broader labour movement composed of a wide cross-section of occupational groups pushing at the very least for more welfarist policies, there is however the danger, and in the short-term the more likely prospect of professional workers supporting more individualist programmes promising the return of elite status and greater social mobility. The support of sections of the professionals for ZUM thus had more to do with bread and butter issues than opposition to a one-party state. Such a development could cause further divisions in the labour movement, particularly given the inability of the current industrialisation process to create large numbers of jobs in the formal sector.

The autonomy of the ZCTU has been further demonstrated by the increasingly critical position of the movement on economic and political issues. It criticised the new Investment Code in 1989 claiming that it demonstrated 'much more pertinently than ever the government's avowed commitment to capitalism', and attacked the government's structural adjustment programme at the May Day 1991 celebrations, saying it would increase the hardships of the poor. On the political level, the movement has criticised government's response to the student movement's struggle against corruption and the one-party state. Links between the student and labour movements have begun to grow, although they still remain tenuous.

The labour movement has grown in stature and independence. ZCTU now has 29 affiliates with a membership of about 200,000; with the Organisation of Collective Cooperatives of Zimbabwe (membership 250,000), unionised labour amounts to almost half a million. The State now cultivates its support; ZANU (PF) tried to persuade the movement to back it in the 1990 elections, and one of the ZCTU vice-presidents was appointed Deputy Minister of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare after the election. For the most part, however, the movement has resisted this recent attempt at cooptation, with ZCTU declaring its neutrality in the elections. As the corporatist strategy has crumbled, the new adjustment programme, with its attendant liberalisation of labour relations, has led to an emphasis by the State on attempting to control unions through the market mechanism. It remains to be seen how effectively the unions will be able to operate under these conditions.

The labour movement has made important strides over the last ten years, but still faces enormous problems in mobilisation, organisation and engaging in
the process, with other classes, of challenging the structural adjustment ortho-
doxy. Peta and others' recent study of five unions in Zimbabwe noted that:

half of the number of workers we interviewed did not know anything about unions at all. Of the other half, many of them were members of the union some time in the past but resigned because they said they no longer had confidence in the union, or that the unions are powerless, or that they were useless anyway.

Unions continue to face obstacles such as lack of education of members and leaders, and a serious inadequacy of means of communication to develop a public sphere through which working people may come to recognise themselves, their problems and their common interests. Moreover the SAP is presenting labour with increasing problems. In addition to the increasing threats of retrenchment, plummeting real wage levels, deregulations of labour laws, decontrol of prices, removal of subsidies and the implementation of cost-recovery measures in health and education, the labour movement also has to face a State ready to use coercive measures now that its corporatist strategy has broken down.

Thus in a recent strike by semi-skilled railway workers for higher wages, the employer dismissed 4,000 workers, and the State suspended the operations of their union, ZARU, appointing the Zimbabwe Transport Union Federation to act as an agent union representing the members of the suspended body. Although, after negotiations, most of those dismissed were reinstated, the episode indicated the State's intolerance of what it considers widespread 'worker indiscipline', which could result in a major collision with ZCTU still struggling to develop its autonomy. The strike also displayed divisions in the workforce, between the more craft based artisan unions seeking to fight for their own interests outside the more general unions dominated by the semi-skilled and unskilled workers. This trend has already been apparent in other parastatals and could grow under the increasingly defensive conditions of SAP. Finally, the State's use of the Transport Union Federation to split the unions over the strike exemplified the differential relationship of unions to the State. Such factors are likely to present the central union body with serious strategic problems.

However, one of the most fundamental issues that will determine the trajectory of the labour movement will be its ability to deal with the rural-urban linkages of the labour force, and hence the land question. The cumulative effects of land expropriation, labour migration and changed cropping systems have made the wage relation a critical factor in the survival of rural households. In ensuring food security, such households have been forced to rely on diversified income sources, especially remittances from urban wage employment. Urban wage earners, faced with low wages, inadequate pensions and welfare payments, and a risk of unemployment, maintain their access to land as some guarantee against unemployment, old age and retirement. A fundamental aspect both of the cost of reproduction of labour power and of the mobilisation of labour thus relates to the land question. The leadership of the
labour movement may now be taking the rural-urban alliance more seriously, and linking such an alliance to future political strategy. Secretary-General Tsvangirai of the ZCTU observed in an interview that:

*The workers will always have a role, since they are the producers. They should not advocate workerism because 80 per cent of our population are peasants. What they should do is to try and link up workers and peasants into strong structures to advance their interests. That’s the only way we can draw the ruling party away from the right wing and convert it to our own purpose.*

This statement expressed very clearly the labour movement’s dual strategy of establishing an autonomous presence while wringing as many concessions as possible from the State and ruling party.

This raises the problem of worker consciousness. In both the liberal and certain strands of the radical historiographic traditions, the grand trajectory of proletarianisation and progress has raised the ‘modernist spectre of backwardness’ when discussing rural linkages. Cheater’s critique of such models in the Zimbabwean context, though ending up in a retreat into relativism, does make important points about the problems of applying linear models of proletarianisation to Zimbabwean workers. For any strategy to successfully mobilise ‘workers-peasants’ the idea of placing such producers on a linear continuum of consciousness will have to be shelved. As Ferguson has warned, it is the complex reality between the ‘stick figures’ of migrant labourer and permanent urbanite that needs to be understood more clearly. It is this reality that raises major strategic and organisational problems not only for the labour movement in Zimbabwe but for any force on the left envisaging a peasant worker alliance.

**Democratisation and the Land**

While the legitimacy of the ruling party has been eroded among the petty-bourgeoisie and labour in the urban areas, its rural support has remained relatively strong, consolidated through measures designed to improve the livelihood of the rural population. These included rural resettlement; a rapid expansion of education and health facilities; provision of extension, credit and marketing services; and an expansion of roads and of water supplies linked to a policy of growth points and district service centres. The land question remains however a fundamental problem in Zimbabwe.

At present land is distributed thus: large-scale commercial farmers 1.5m hectares; small-scale commercial farmers 1.5m; communal area farmers 16m; and resettlement land brought by the government 3.9m. This represents a fall in the percentage of land controlled by commercial farming, including settler farmers and multinational-owned agro-industries, from 42% in 1980 to 29% in 1989. The resettlement programme has been relatively limited, with targets being reduced, and only some 51,000 families being resettled in 1982-88. Support for communal area farmers, has led to high increases in production, but
has also accelerated the process of differentiation. To a great extent, poor and middle peasants are forced into selling their labour power, as they face extreme pressures in meeting the reproduction costs of the family from their own subsistence production. Women face the brunt of this hardship, for while they constitute the majority of the communal farmers, few have powers with regard to land use rights. For the majority of communal area farmers, land productivity for most crops and livestock remains well below the level attained by large-scale commercial farmers and less than 25% of such farmers have contributed to the increased performance.

It is clear, therefore, that agrarian policy for the majority producers has been confined to an incremental set of measures, defining the land question largely in terms of resettlement and increases in State services. The concern with continuity of production and the need for foreign exchange, so often argued by white communal farmers, has kept attention focused on immediate balance of payments problems rather than long-term structural considerations.

Continuing hardships, inequalities on the land and escalating unemployment brought the land question to the fore once again through the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.11) Bill of December 1990. The Bill gives the State extensive powers to acquire land in local currency, at a price determined by principles of compensation specified by Parliament. Initially, the Bill was aggressively advocated by the Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement in a series of blunt confrontations with commercial farmers. At one such meeting he informed them that:

"The responsibility of this Government is to get land and give it to the landless. We will go ahead with this programme . . . and the status quo where vast fertile tracts of land are owned by the few individuals will not continue."

There seems little reason to believe that the State will move substantially beyond its existing policy of gradually supporting small black farmers, cooperatives and State farms without risking major falls in production, employment and exports in the established white-dominated commercial sector. Four factors support this argument. The SAP places primary emphasis on production for export and foreign currency earnings, and the State is highly unlikely to depart from this trajectory. State and Party officials have been purchasing land in increasing numbers, with one estimate placing the number of commercial farms owned by blacks at a figure of 300. Recently, emergent black commercial farmers stated their intention to form a separate organisation to press for their own interests. Given these developments, serious land redistribution may soon run counter to the interests of these groups except insofar as such redistribution increases their own land ownership. There are indications from the various farming bodies, and signals from the State, that any future reform must be less concerned with need than with proven farming ability. Finally, no new financial impetus for land reform was given in the 1991-92 Budget, with only Z$15 million allocated for land acquisition, and Z$22 million for infrastructure development of resettlement areas. It remains to be seen
how far the government utilises accumulation from the healthier parts of the economy to stimulate growth in the underdeveloped sectors. Moreover, this is not just a technical question of resource transfers, but relates to the balance of social forces within the country and their capacity to organise for the mobilisation of resources in their interests.

Also important is the lack of organised pressure from the bulk of the peasantry not represented by existing farmers’ organisations. The post-1980 years saw the breakdown of war-time mobilisation and local committees and the concentration of government energy on the implementation of top-down initiatives in local government. Rural and District Councils are heavily dependent on central grants and decision-making. VIDCOs and WADCOs intended to become vehicles for active participation and involvement remain an insignificant part of the planning process. Peasant responses where they have occurred thus far have tended to be localised and under the hegemony of an elite-led national organisation or planning machinery. Where the State’s provision of social services has failed, NGOs have tapped into the needs of peasants and in many cases initiated their own agenda. Squatters have sometimes been able to overrule a minimal State presence in certain areas, and peasants have been able to impose their demands, at certain times and with the backing of Party leaders. However, this kind of intervention has not been unambiguous, sometimes concealing the patronage of aspiring politicians and the accumulative manoeuvrings of aspiring entrepreneurs.

Finally, the course of producer and marketing cooperatives has been littered with obstacles. Yash Tandon expressed the central fallacies in the State’s perception of collective cooperatives. He has criticised both the planning model that subordinates the human factor to the demands of production, and the expectation that cooperatives would simply follow the production experience of large-scale commercial farms without taking into account the peasant demands and the current realities of Zimbabwe’s agrarian problem. As a result, members of the collectives have become labourers, much as on capitalist farms, in conditions of low productivity and income levels, and their morale has been seriously affected. Many members regard the farms as the property of the government, with their real interests concentrated on the two to four acres of land given to each on the farm.

Against such odds the constraints facing the majority of rural producers are formidable. Cliffe is correct when he writes that, supported by the struggles of urban workers, peasants in Zimbabwe ‘can only look to the small but significant minority of radicalised politicians and civil servants who are still seeking to act out some of the democratic and liberating aspirations of the nationalist struggle’. It must also be acknowledged, however, that as the resettlement programme reaches a levelling off in terms of production gains, pressures on the land are likely to produce other interest groups amongst the peasantry. The forms of opposition that could result from such pressures is a complex issue, relating to the complexity of land demands being pursued. Demands
could range from landless, mainly young, households seeking communal area land allocations, to black urban and rural-based elites seeking freehold title to land in growth point areas, on to commercial farms seeking to retain land rights. We must wait to see the responses arising from such differential demands.

Conclusion
Whatever attempts are made at radical transformation in Zimbabwe will, to a significant extent, depend on the determinate factor of external pressures from international capitalist relations. While domestic political movements will attempt to negotiate problems between desirable objectives and the constraints of ‘feasibility’, the pressures from international capital will continue to be applied in order to ensure conditions under which the only ‘feasible’ option is a deepening structural integration into the international division of labour. Serious efforts to ensure national sovereignty over decision-making will have to confront the lethal effects of these corrosive pressures. The 1980s witnessed the destructive onslaught of neo-classical theory in the malevolent form of structural adjustment. To obtain the necessary international finance, developing countries have been forced into a long-term debt servicing burden from which they have no chance of extricating themselves. Out of the attempted implementation of these doctrinal distortions, African countries have on the whole emerged weakened, in the sense that the latter have increasingly lost their sovereignty over the determination of national policies. There is no reason to believe that Zimbabwe’s fate with structural adjustment will be any different. Moreover, the collapse of Stalinism has given more legitimacy to those forces, national and international, who have been trying to ‘kill the dream’ of radical alternatives in southern Africa.

While any perceptions of Zimbabwe’s future must be punctuated with question marks, the most realistic picture to present must be based on a critical assessment of the existing social forces in the country and their relation to the international balance of forces. From the above analysis of the Zimbabwean situation it is fair to say that, as elsewhere on the continent, even as objective conditions cry out for a radical democratic denouement, the popular forces remain relatively weak. However, there are also indications of a strengthening of certain popular organisations, like the labour movement, and the potential for radicalisation of sections of the petty-bourgeoisie, as eroding economic conditions present increasing dilemmas about the future. Yet a most problematic aspect of the equation remains the party that will lead the necessarily harsh and lengthy battle against capital in Zimbabwe. ZANU (PF) remains the dominant party force in the country, and at present there are no viable alternatives to the left of the political spectrum. Moreover, it is not even clear what such an alternative force could be expected to carry out under the present constraining conditions, in the country and within the region. As matters stand there have been increasing signs of the rightward drift of the ruling
party. The 'left' within the Party as well as outside of it has grown increasingly isolated, and without an opposite pole of attraction. Yet it is also clear that there are strong dissenting voices within the Party on the question of democratisation. Nevertheless, there is a vacuum in terms of alternatives, into which imperialism, an unfashionable word, continues in its current mood of triumphs, to press its own disastrous imperatives for the future. In the darker visions of the omniscience of imperialism it has often seemed that there is no significant role for African interventions, and that all the continent appears to do is to plug into international circuits. It has never been easier to slip into such a fatalistic position as at present. Yet imperialism has never been such a totalising presence, and African interventions have played their role in the dramatic changes of our dramatised century, not least in the struggle for Zimbabwe. It is, therefore, with an embattled optimism that the future needs to be faced.

Brian Raftopoulos works at the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies; he wishes to thank his colleagues Lloyd Sachikonye and Sam Moyo for valuable comments on this article.

Bibliographic Note


66 Review of African Political Economy


Errata — 'Social Differentiation in the Communal Lands of Zimbabwe' by Cousins, Weiner and Amin published in ROAPE 53. The Editorial Working Group recognises that cuts were made to this article which changed the sense of their argument. This was due both to last minute changes by the authors and unapproved cuts by the editors. We do apologise and publish their comments:

1. Awkward or misleading omissions: the introduction is considerably shorter and reads somewhat awkwardly. A sentence stating that: 'In the paper, we draw implicitly on recent historical research that is of relevance' was originally followed by references to the work of Mosley, Ranger, Dopcke, Bessant and Primister; these references now appear in the published text following a sentence referring to analysis of 'the social relations of production and exchange'. This is potentially confusing, as is the footnote which refers to a section in a previous draft of the article discussing this historical research at some length. A sentence on page 15 referring to rural prostitution as 'one mechanism whereby cash circulates from men to women' was omitted and this paragraph now reads awkwardly. In the final paragraph the phrase 'democratic agrarian property regime' was replaced by 'democratic regime'; clearly these are two different meanings.

2. Deletion of qualifying statements: a number of statements were deleted which make is clear that we approach the issues of class mobility and class politics rather cautiously, acknowledge the possibility of local variations and contingent outcomes, and are aiming to initiate a debate. Missing from the conclusion on page 19 is the statement: 'The following is necessarily an impressionistic judgement, given the uneven nature of the available data base and recognising the existence of local variations unique to particular places. The class categories identified in this paper, and the tendencies outlined below, are presented as hypotheses for further investigation rather than as firm research conclusions. We offer the following as a preliminary statement to generate additional discussion on the nature of Communal Land social differentiation.'

3. A paragraph describing the work of Pankhurst on gender and class relations in Zimbabwe was omitted from the text. The only major source in the article now dealing with these issues is the work of Adams; this significantly weakens both the literature review and our attempt to highlight these relationships throughout the text. The deletion on page 15 makes the text read as if the ideas which follow are our own rather than being drawn from the work of these two authors.
Debate

Political Violence in South Africa: A Rejoinder to Morris and Hindson

Rok Ajulu

In 'South Africa: Political Violence, Reform and Reconstruction' (ROAPE 53), Morris and Hindson have sought to provide an explanation for the present political violence which goes beyond the simplistic notion of 'black on black'. They pose two fundamental questions. First, why is this violence occurring now when apartheid is in its demise rather than when it was at its peak? Second, why in a society where whites historically have dominated an oppressed blacks, are blacks killing each other? On this basis, they construct a thesis which broadly argues that the roots of violence should be sought in the effects of the disintegration of apartheid rather than its continued implementation.

Unfortunately this argument is flawed, not because of the attempt to situate the explanation of violence in material, social and historical processes, but because the way in which the questions are posed and some issues emphasised that are basically incorrect. At the risk of oversimplification, let me attempt a brief summary of the salient features of Morris and Hindson's argument.

The central thrust of their argument revolves around three propositions: that the institutions of apartheid were inherently contradictory and prone to disruptive dislocations; that 'classic' apartheid, based on crude class and racial antagonism had through political repression held these contradictions in check; and finally, that the breakdown of 'classic' apartheid has rendered the state incapable of exercising control, thus setting in motion the exaltation of social tensions. The disintegration of apartheid, they assert, has given rise to a variety of economic, social and political processes - rapid urbanisation, increasing class differentiation, the growth of massive residential slums, a general heightening of political conflict within the urban metropolitan areas - which have shaped the contours of the political violence.

This is generally true. The collapse of the apartheid state's ability to rule in the old way has indeed opened up a massive area of potential conflict, exposed the inherent contradictions of apartheid and intensified the struggles over resources. However, the specific manner in which the conflicts have unfolded dictates that these questions should be posed in a slightly different way: Why isn't the struggle over resources taking place between the historically dispossessed blacks and the privileged whites? And why is the political struggle over marginal resources within the black community expressed in such hideous violence?

Their answer to the first question is that 'conflict over resources has been deflected, displaced and confined to the black areas' (p.43) The answer to
the second question is to be found in a number of passages scattered throughout the article:

Black people’s exclusion from the national democratic processes and their experience of state repression has legitimised violence as a means to effect social change (p.49) within both the youth and warlord structures, violence has become institutionalised as a means of maintaining internal social cohesion and meeting basic material needs. Leadership within these structures have a strong vested interest in the perpetuation of violent conflict (pp.51-52)

Within South Africa generally, but particularly in the black community, violence as a means to achieve hegemony has become socially acceptable. Violence has been used by both the state and the liberation forces as a means of retarding or securing political change (p.54)

Ironically, starting from entirely opposed ideological and political premises, various right wing commentators have arrived at rather similar conclusions: that a culture of violence, in which killing is a means of achieving political objectives, is the norm within the black communities. It is not surprising that this atavistic inter- necine ‘tribalism’ has been used to feed on white fear of a future majority rule.

It is true that the collapse of apartheid institutions has exposed its contradictions and escalated social tensions. However, it is certainly not the case that the struggle over marginal resources within black communities assumes such violent proportions simply because this is the manner in which politics has come to be conducted there. A different explanation of the violence, situated very much within material, social and political processes, is still possible, without recourse to such cultural stereotypes.

Morris and Hindson, I suspect, find themselves in this well trodden cul de sac precisely because they fail to conceptualise correctly the nature of the reconstruction of the post-apartheid state, or more precisely, the type of state the existing ruling class is hoping to replace the apartheid state with.

Post-Apartheid State: Whose State?

The central questions in South Africa today are to whom does a future South African state belong, and what are they capable of doing with it? It is in attempting to answer such questions that the annihilation we have witnessed over the last two years might be better understood. Allister Sparks, the doyen of South Africa’s liberal journalism, recently captured the gist of the reconstruction of the apartheid state as follows:

Before transferring power, the Nationalist Party want to emasculate it. It is trying to negotiate a kind of swap it will give up the right to run the country its way in exchange for the right to stop the blacks from running it their own way (The Observer, 18.9.92).

White fears that a black majority would use state power to redistribute resources and reverse privileges necessitates paralysing a future South African state and preventing it from intervening in the economic sphere. The protection of private enterprise, economic power and white privilege requires that the role of a ‘democratic’ post-apartheid state be restricted to purely political matters. As Szefelt (1992) aptly puts it, ‘economic justice must be rescued to equality of oppor-
tunity and expressed through market forces. It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the most interventionist states on the continent is now more concerned to privatise public corporations and extol the virtues of 'self-regulating market forces'. Yet over the last 40 years it has treated the market with disdain and arrogance, intervening in every facet of the economy to guarantee economic hegemony for the ruling class and privileges for the white nationality.

This is why the ruling class is frantically looking for some kind of 'democratic' dispensation in which property rights can be separated from the political control of a future ruling group. In the light of the shifts in the balance of forces which have been taking place since the mid-1980s, however, the old violence and repression of the apartheid state is now being conducted to this end under the umbrella of a motley collection of proxies.

It is true that the endemic violence within the black community gives the impression of a battle separate and distinct from white society, and to some degree it has developed its own momentum and pursues disparate political and economic agendas. That notwithstanding, however, it is essential not to overlook the more fundamental fact that such violence is the medium through which the apartheid state is now attempting to define the contours of a future state. To that extent, the 'conflict over resources' has not been 'deflected, displaced and confined to black areas', and if the majority of white society appears buffered from the more serious elements of violence and destruction, it is precisely because they are represented at the barricades by the repressive agents of the apartheid state.

In the ultimate analysis, political violence in South Africa is precisely about ownership, control and distribution of resources generally in the post-apartheid era. To this extent, it is inaccurate to conceptualise violence as a simple derivative of conflict over distribution of marginal resources mainly confined to the black communities. However, the particular way in which the various black proxy armies are recruited onto the side of the state is linked to the disparities in the distribution of resources that Morris and Hindson so aptly describe.

The precariousness of a democratic state of the type envisaged by the apartheid securocrats however, is not that it does not hold out prospects for continued growth. Rather, the point is that it does not hold out prospects for redistribution on a scale that would redress the present imbalances. From the point of view of the majority of South Africans, future change cannot be entrusted entirely to market forces. Perhaps that is why it also seems to need to be enforced at gunpoint.

A change which reduces economic justice to equality of opportunity is bound to leave undisturbed minority white domination over the economy. As Morris and Hindson rightly point out, this would entail accentuation of the economic polarity between whites and a majority of blacks on a scale which is likely to reduce the current levels of violence. A half a decade of apartheid, which has produced and embedded one of the most unequal distribution of resources in the world, would be replaced by liberal 'democracy', whose inherent respect for private property would only serve to reproduce inequalities.

What then is the way forward? Morris
and Hindson suggest, that:

Stability and prosperity will be based on expanding massively the new middle layers, especially the wage and the salaries classes in productive form, as well as the redistribution of resources to the marginalised urban poor in a way that unleashes their productive capacity. In this process there are three sides to the problem that has to be tackled: job expansion in formal sector; the state reproductive expenditure to redress disparities; measures to release the productive potential of those excluded from the formal sector (p.56)

And, it might be useful to add, the transformation of land ownership; housing, and education.

This indeed is the crux of the matter. What is suggested here therefore assumes an intervention on a massive scale, and yet the authors remain conspicuously silent on how it is to be brought about. If as they correctly argue 'neoliberalism is no solution' and the idea of South Africa as a classless society must equally be abandoned, then what form or type of post-apartheid state is appropriate for the tasks outlined above? Or to phrase the question differently, what agents of change can best champion intervention in the way in which it is suggested here?

The analysis and the solutions the authors seek to provide appear to collapse at this point. As they set off to 'rescue the concept of class differentiation from its association with reformed apartheid and neo-conservative reform', we are told that the willingness to accept the process of class differentiation would enable us to construct working relations between classes around different elements of urban reconstruction. This would facilitate the creation of new or modified institutions around which a new dispensation would be thrashed out. That around these new institution, a kind of 'accommodative/conflictual relationship' would be established between the major classes and groups. And finally, that these new institutions would become new forums for sorting, formalisation, and monitoring of agreements over such things as wages, productivity, uses of resources, reinvestment, industrial strategies, redistributive programmes, etc.

It is not clear to me what is being suggested here. First, would such 'new and modified structures' be part of the new state structures or merely part and parcel of the civil society? Second, are there any guarantees that the mere willingness to recognise the process of class differentiation and the continued existence of class contradictions sufficient to create an accommodative relationship between the dominant and the dominated classes in a way that would facilitate negotiations over such matters like productivity and use of surpluses, industrial strategy, redistributive programmes, etc.

Finally who is talking with whom, about what? While it is certainly necessary that cities be opened up and their resources allocated to the black populations more widely (p.57), it is rather naive to imagine that the white nationality is about to negotiate away its privileges willingly. Indeed the naivety of this position is only rivalled by its political hopelessness, and probably stems from a reluctance to debate the more crucial question of the character of the post-apartheid state, and the forms and mechanisms of state intervention capable of facilitating redistribution in the manner they have suggested above. This is probably
understandable, particularly given the recent reassertion of the market ideology which appears to have captured the initiative and shifted the terrain of the debate altogether. In the light of this, it is not surprising that the more relevant debate about the prospects of a state-spearheaded 'growth through distribution' is only alluded to in one sentence.

Because of the vested interests of the classes of property and capital, the future of the transition process remains 'too ghastly to contemplate' and the likelihood of the escalation of political violence beyond the present levels cannot be ruled out. This is precisely because, as we have pointed out, the type of the post-apartheid state envisaged by De Klerk and his team, is one which will be completely paralysed and incapable of meeting the most basic demands of the majority of the historically dispossessed in South Africa. This of course is a recipe for anarchy, political instability and probable disintegration of the new South African state. Thus the stability of the future state, and of South Africa, lies in its ability to meet to some degree the rising expectations of the black majority. I know of no way in which this can be brought about by 'market forces'. To this extent, the debates around the mechanisms and forms of state intervention cannot be fudged any longer.

Rok Ajulu is in the Department of Politics at the University of Leeds, UK.

Bibliographic Note
Sparks, A., 'Apartheid is Dead, Long Live Apartheid', The Guardian, 8.9.1991; Szeftel, M.; (1991) 'Manoeuvres of War in South Africa' ROAPE, no. 51: (and see his bibliography in that issue)

Civil Society Theory and the Politics of Transition in South Africa

Robert Fine

The recent emergence of 'civil society theory' within opposition politics in South Africa poses an important supplement to the prevailing political perspectives of the anti-apartheid movement. Civil society theory has been imported into South Africa from democratic movements in Eastern Europe, its credibility reinforced by its political role in the overthrow of the former communist regimes and its ideational role in defining a radical alternative to totalitarianism. In South Africa today there is almost no party of opposition that omits mention of the importance of civil society.

The language of 'civil society' has many connotations among which may be found: a) the negative idea of that which is not the state, b) the democratic idea of the people against the state, c) the liberal idea of pluralism and tolerance against authoritarianism and enforced homogeneity, d) the bourgeois idea of private property unrestricted by the state, and e) the national idea of a civilised as opposed to a racially defined society. The central reference, however, is to the associational life of civic, professional, trade union and other voluntary organisations. Civil society theory is an attempt to define an alternative realm of the 'public' that is beyond the private concerns of individuals but not identical with the political realm of the state. It refers to the public realm of free association which mediates between the state and the private individual: a 'third road' that is neither (as Adam Michnik once put it) 'utopian
Debate: Civil Society in South Africa

understandable, particularly given the recent reassertion of the market ideology which appears to have captured the initiative and shifted the terrain of the debate altogether. In the light of this, it is not surprising that the more relevant debate about the prospects of a state-spearheaded 'growth through distribution' is only alluded to in one sentence.

Because of the vested interests of the classes of property and capital, the future of the transition process remains 'too ghastly to contemplate' and the likelihood of the escalation of political violence beyond the present levels cannot be ruled out. This is precisely because, as we have pointed out, the type of the post-apartheid state envisaged by De Klerk and his team, is one which will be completely paralysed and incapable of meeting the most basic demands of the majority of the historically dispossessed in South Africa. This of course is a recipe for anarchy, political instability and probable disintegration of the new South African state. Thus the stability of the future state, and of South Africa, lies in its ability to meet to some degree the rising expectations of the black majority. I know of no way in which this can be brought about by 'market forces'. To this extent, the debates around the mechanisms and forms of state intervention cannot be fudged any longer.

Rok Ajulu is in the Department of Politics at the University of Leeds, UK.

Bibliographic Note

Sparks, A., 'Apartheid is Dead, Long Live Apartheid', The Guardian, 8.9.1991; Szeftel, M., (1991) 'Manoeuvres of War in South Africa' ROAPE, no. 51: (and see his bibliography in that issue)

Civil Society Theory and the Politics of Transition in South Africa

Robert Fine

The recent emergence of 'civil society theory' within opposition politics in South Africa poses an important supplement to the prevailing political perspectives of the anti-apartheid movement. Civil society theory has been imported into South Africa from democratic movements in Eastern Europe, its credibility reinforced by its political role in the overthrow of the former communist regimes and its ideational role in defining a radical alternative to totalitarianism. In South Africa today there is almost no party of opposition that omits mention of the importance of civil society.

The language of 'civil society' has many connotations among which may be found: a) the negative idea of that which is not the state, b) the democratic idea of the people against the state, c) the liberal idea of pluralism and tolerance against authoritarianism and enforced homogeneity, d) the bourgeois idea of private property unrestricted by the state, and e) the national idea of a civilised as opposed to a racially defined society. The central reference, however, is to the associational life of civic, professional, trade union and other voluntary organisations. Civil society theory is an attempt to define an alternative realm of the 'public' that is beyond the private concerns of individuals but not identical with the political realm of the state. It refers to the public realm of free association which mediates between the state and the private individual: a 'third road' that is neither (as Adam Michnik once put it) 'utopian
socialism’ nor ‘utopian capitalism’, based neither on the fetish of the state nor of private property, facing neither East nor West, but an alternative to both.

Simply stated, the rise of civil society theory in South Africa expresses a widespread conviction that there is no longer any purchase in the idea of one-party government, the conflation of state and civil society, the denial of civil or political rights in the name of economic development or the command-form of economy. The emphasis rather is on the new social movements of civil society retaining or obtaining autonomy from whatever political party is in power, pushing the state from below for beneficial social changes and nurturing the seeds of democracy, civil rights and tolerance in their own sphere of activity.

The vision behind the theory is that the associations of civil society and the political leadership of the ANC - as the future government in power - will work together for the transformation of South African society, each providing the strengths the other lacks. In opposition to etatist theories which focus on the political kingdom as the centre of all power and source of all development, civil society theory advances a ‘dual track strategy’ involving both state and civil society. Albie Sachs put the perspective well from the side of the ANC:

if good non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and open government is the main guarantee that the effects of apartheid will be overcome, then the organs of civil society are the principal guarantors that good government will exist.

While criticising the free-market rendition of civil society which has crept into the more conventional wing of the theory, Daryl Glaser offers a democratic vision of civil society which urges active use of otherwise formal rights to establish the richest possible array of voluntary activity, perhaps supported by the state ...

Freed of its naive free market connotations, the idea of an autonomous civil society is a crucial counter-weight to the ambitions of any state.

Mark Swilling has described civil society in similar fashion as the codeword for the associational life of a society that exists somewhere between the individual actions of each person (what some might call the ‘private realm’) and the organisations and institutions constituted by the state (or ‘public realm’) ...

True civil society is… where ordinary everyday citizens who do not control the levers of political and economic power, have access to locally-constituted voluntary associations that have the capacity… to influence and even determine the structure of power and the allocation of material resources.

As a theory of the left, the perspective of civil society declares that the new South Africa will be built by a combination of good government on one side and dynamic community, trade union, women’s, youth and other associations of civil society on the other. It is a perspective adopted from many distinct political starting points, including the Communist Party, the ANC, the trade union leadership, community activists and the democratic intelligentsia.

This normative vision certainly serves as an important counterweight both to the suppression of civil society that was the hallmark of apartheid and to the highly centralised, etatist visions of emancipation from apartheid which characterised the dominant commi-
nast and African nationalist currents of opposition. It gives political expression to the trade unions, youth and other social movements which bore the brunt of the internal struggles of the 1980s. It endeavours to harmonise the interests of the two major wings of the opposition: the political leadership identified with the ANC-SACP, now returned to South Africa after many years of exile, and the unions, community groups, youth organisations and other social movements which grew up indigenously within the country with more or less independence from the political leadership.

Finally, in opposition to the grim prospect of a 'new class' of officials, intellectuals and politicians running post-apartheid South Africa from above, it seeks to define the space for a radical populism committed to participatory democracy, workers control, political self-education and the autonomy of particular communities.

To understand what lies behind the self-presentation of civil society theory in South Africa, it will be useful to locate its origins in a wider political context. It should be read as an attempt to build a 'third road' distinct from the two paradigms which have dominated South African opposition politics in the post-war era. I shall call them neo-classicism and neo-marxism respectively, though more colloquially they might be named liberalism and radicalism. The relation of civil society theory to these two political paradigms shall be the starting point of my analysis.

Civil Society Bound: the Old Politics

While the strategy of neo-classicism may be formulated as that of 'reform from above' and the strategy of neo-marxism as that of 'revolution from without', the strategy of civil society in South Africa seems to introduce something new, namely, 'reform from below', based on the self-organisation and self-activity of the associations of civil society. This image, however, is only partially true.

Neo-classicism dominated opposition politics in South Africa up to the end of the 1950s, though there was scarcely a moment when it was not contested by radical forces. With the turn to armed struggle in 1960 and the ANC-SACP's adoption of 'revolutionary nationalism', neo-classicism was relegated to a subordinate position within the opposition movement as a whole. With the legalisation of the ANC-SACP in the 1990s and the latter's own turn toward negotiations, neo-classicism again reasserted its claims as the paramount mode of liberation politics.

In theoretical terms neo-classicism is a doctrine which associates the ideal state with the free play of market forces; the racially-defined and status-ridden nature of apartheid appears at odds with the rational market requirements of capital. However much capital comes to terms with apartheid, the antagonism between the free movement of capital and the racial superstructure is presented as a basic contradiction. The central proposition of neo-classicism is that the development of capital in South Africa has been accompanied by a growing need for reform as the irrationality of apartheid becomes more acute, and a growing capacity for reform as both capital and labour accumulate social power. Capital and labour are seen as having a common interest in the reform of apartheid, whatever other conflicts divide them.
The political strategy associated with neo-classicism has been to cement an alliance around a consensual programme of liberal reform from above and self-restraint from below. The candidates for such an alliance are usually conceived as the progressive wing of capital, organised labour and moderate politicians (liberal and nationalist) mediating between them. In its relation to the social movements of civil society, its core strategy is to restrain their struggles within parameters set by the project of reform from above, avoiding or suppressing actions likely to alienate the consensual alliance it solicits.

The rise of neo-marxism in the early 1960s was a response to the perceived failures of the old politics. Manifested in the turn to armed struggle, it presented itself as a break from the limitations of non-violence, legalism and reformism. Within its own language the transition to neo-marxism was presented as a progression from a lower to higher stage of political practice: from protest to challenge, reform to revolution. Neo-marxism, however, had one thing in common with the doctrine it superseded: it also subsumed the associations of civil society to its own centralised project, in its case that of revolutionary overthrow of the state. It opposed attempts to reform apartheid from below or to develop the popular organisations of civil society except insofar as they fed into the armed struggle. Neo-marxism in South Africa was not just a revolutionary strategy but a revolutionism which counterposed itself to civil society. Confounding the general question of reform with the top-down model of reform pursued in the previous period, neo-marxism ended up rejecting all partial reforms, all particular campaigns, all negotiations with the state, all participation in official bodies. At its worst it celebrated violence as the sole instrument of liberation; at its best it justified violence as a necessity imposed by the state.

In its theoretical aspect neo-marxism explains apartheid as a specific form of capitalist state based on the super-exploitation of black labour and incorporation of white labour. There have been different emphases on what was crucial to the formation of apartheid - labour control, the decline of the reserves, the threat posed by the black urban proletariat, the local conditions of exploitation in South Africa, etc - but in all cases the functional requirements of capital are seen as the major determinant of the state. Neo-marxism rejects all reforms introduced by the state as a means of ideological subterfuge, control or co-optation. If it concedes that state reforms affect the 'terrain of struggle', it is only in the sense that resistance must be directed not only at overt oppression but also at co-optation; its premise is that no real democratic concessions can be forced out of apartheid. The three basic propositions put forward by neo-marxism are that black society is deprived of all means of social self-defence, that no reform is possible or real, and that it is only possible to overthrow the system as a whole through violent revolution from below.

The common element of neo-classicism and neo-marxism was their top-down approach to theory and politics. Both formulated the relation between apartheid and capital in a functionalist mode, analysing the dynamics of apartheid by reference to the needs and interests of capital alone in isolation from the contested terrain of popular struggle. Etatist theory was identified
with the massification of black people either as victims of apartheid or as heroic protagonists of struggle. This dualism was incapable of transcending the terms of reference in which apartheid itself conceived of black people. The liberation struggle cried out for a ‘third road’. It was precisely at the time when neo-marxism was formalised as a theory by exiled intellectuals in the mid-1970s, however, that the new unions inside South Africa began to reveal in practice that black society was not deprived of all means of social self-defence, that real reform was possible and that the overthrow of the system as a whole through violent revolution was remote in the extreme. The neo-marxist intellectuals lagged behind the actuality of the labour movement. (Within the radical paradigm the state has normally been characterised as a colonialism of a special type, but also as a form of ‘racial capitalism’, ‘fascism’ or ‘Bonapartism’. The concept of ‘totalitarianism’ was rarely used, perhaps because it would have drawn attention to the parallels between apartheid and the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, perhaps because apartheid never entirely eradicated civil society).

Civil Society Unbound: the New Unions

On the margins of South African political life, there has been a long history of criticism of statist politics in both its neo-classical and neo-marxist forms, but such criticism was weakened by the defeat of the labour movement in the course of the Second World War and the subsequent marginalisation of socialist ideas. In the 1970s, however, it began at last to acquire centrality with the emergence of the new unions. In the absence from South Africa of the exiled liberation movement, the new unions had a political significance which outstretched their organisational form as unions. The break which the new unions began to make from the old politics was under-theorised at the time but provided the practical foundation for the re-birth of ‘civil society’.

The new unions initiated a process of ‘proletarian reformation’ in South Africa. There were three main elements: the self-organisation of labour in industrial unions, the struggle for partial reforms in the workplace, and the demand for legal space in which to organise. The self-organisation of workers and the struggle for reform were inseparable twins which lay at the heart of the unions’ challenge to the prevailing orthodoxies of neo-marxism.

At the level of self-organisation, ‘non-racialism’ within the unions challenged the prevailing political culture of nationalism and was coupled with an internationalism based on links with foreign trade unions and solidarity with foreign workers. The idea of ‘workers control’ broke with the formalistic notion of representation characteristic of old forms of organisation, emphasising instead participatory democracy, accountability of delegates, open debate, the education of union activists, and most of all the principle that workers should participate not only in action but in decision-making processes.

At the level of reform from below, the new unions sought to overcome the divorce of economics and politics, by relating demands for a workplace ‘rule of law’ – the right not to be racially or sexually abused, not to be arbitrarily dismissed, to maternity leave, to union representation, etc. – to ‘normal’ issues
of pay and conditions; and by emphasising the importance of trade union independence in the wider struggle for a non-racial democracy.

The significance of the new unions thus lay not only in the reconstruction of black trade unionism but in their attempt to construct a new political culture 'from the bottom up'. In this sense they represented the practical rebirth of civil society prior to its explicit conceptualisation. The unspoken premise was that there could be no revolution without reformation: without prior reformation liberation from apartheid could not lead to the constitution of freedom. This perspective was shared by some who saw reformation as the limit of their ambitions and others who saw it as a stepping stone for revolutionising society as a whole.

The limits of the new approach stemmed from the trade union form in which the new unions conceived of politics. Thus the idea of workers control, while introducing fresh political air into anti-apartheid politics, concealed the existence of an organised leadership in the unions, the trade union left, an identifiable political grouping which dominated the unions until the formation of COSATU in 1985. The trade union left tended to see unions as a pure form of working class organisation, and other forms of association – political parties, community groups, social movements, etc – as cross-class, populist, middle class dominated, etc. Form and content were confounded: the privileged status afforded to trade unions as a working class organisation obscured the political role of the radical intelligentsia within them; conversely the devaluation of other associations of civil society obscured the battle for their political leadership.

The idea of 'workers control' was a vehicle through which substantive questions of socialist politics were reduced to procedural questions of democracy or respect for trade union independence which neglected the development of a 'worker' approach to political issues. It also possessed the potentiality for inversion from a doctrine of direct participatory democracy to a justification for the silencing of opposition. A principle which started life as a means of democratic accountability could and sometimes did become a mechanism of exclusion which could be turned against the trade union left itself.

The idea of 'trade union independence' also offered a breath of fresh political air in South Africa. The unions showed that real independence from the state could not be secured merely through intransigence – refusals to compromise, negotiate, co-operate, etc. – but through the strength of their own organisation. But the initiatives which the trade union left took over labour issues were not extended into other areas of social and political life. Karl Marx summed up the perspective thus:

> Every movement in which the working class as a class confronts the ruling classes and tries to constrain them by pressure from without is a political movement. On the other hand, the movement to force through an eight-hour, etc., law is a political movement. And in this way, out of the separate economic movements of the workers there grows up everywhere a political movement, that is to say, a class movement with the object of enforcing its interests in a general form, in a form possessing general, socially coercive force. While these movements presuppose a certain degree of previous organisation, they are in turn equally a means...
of developing this organisation (Marx, 1871).

One reason was that the trade union left had its own version of two-stage theory: first build the unions, later address political issues concerning the state. Trade union independence slipped into its secondary meaning: that of independence from politics in general.

In the face of such political limitations, the trade union left was subjected to two criticisms in the mid-1980s which had superficial similarities but were in fact distinct. A socialist critique of economism was directed at the restriction of socialist ideas to the trade union sphere and called for their extension into politics. In the mid-1980s this critique was expressed in the idea that unions were the embryo of a wider workers' movement and in support for a Workers Charter or even a Workers Party. There was however considerable ambiguity over what was distinctive about working class politics, conceptions stretching from revolutionary vanguardism of a Leninist variety to a Gorzian perspective of 'structural reform'.

The nationalist critique of economism took off from the opposite premise. It was against the extension of independent working class organisation into politics, which was defined as the terrain of the national liberation movement, and against trade union independence in the economic sphere from the national liberation movement. It put forward the idea of 'political unionism' which in this context meant union recognition of the political leadership of the SACP-ANC. This critique of 'economism' was sometimes dressed in the cloth of marxism but in actuality reserved the political to the national liberation movement and the economic to a trade union movement led by the national liberation movement.

The practical outcome of these arguments was the formation of an alliance between the nationalist politicians and the old trade union left in the latter half of the 1980s, based on the idea that in the political battle for democracy the working class had no specific interests of its own. The course of true love rarely runs smooth and this particular romance was rougher than most. Nevertheless a formal ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance was effected: members of the trade union left were recruited into the Communist Party or drawn into its ambit; those who continued to oppose the SACP-ANC were generally isolated; the Freedom Charter was adopted by COSATU; the idea of a Workers Charter as emblem of an independent left was assimilated into the Freedom Charter; the idea of a Workers Party was abandoned or transferred to the Communist Party. The decline of the trade union left as a distinctive political entity and the incorporation of its core into the 'national democratic revolution' appeared as a new marriage of nationalism and socialism. In retrospect, it was to be reformulated as the origin of civil society.

The trade union left shifted the focus of opposition from often counterproductive and rhetorical challenges to the apartheid state to nurturing autonomous social institutions in civil society. This 'antipolitics' (to use the term coined in East Europe) was conceived by the trade union left as the first stage of a larger transformation of society. When the big questions of political power were thrust upon the trade union movement in the 1980s, however, the strategy faltered. The choice before the unions was pre-
sented as either 'political' or 'non-political' unionism. This was really no choice at all: it meant the assimilation of unions into the political frame of the national liberation movement and the suspension of the 'third road' project.

The Antinomies of Civil Society: Benevolence and Violence

If there was a decade of 'civil society' in South Africa, it was the 1980s. In every corner of social life popular organisation evolved: not just trade unions but all manner of youth, student, women's, community, cultural and ethnic association. There was a veritable feast of civic activity, a political renaissance which heralded the death of apartheid. The unity of this multifarious movement was for the most part expressed in the form of ANC leadership whose goal was to unify the disparate elements of civil society through mediating institutions (like the United Democratic Front and the Mass Democratic Movement) as well as through symbols of unity like the Freedom Charter and release of Nelson Mandela. To those elements of civil society which remained outside its ambit, the ANC could be in turn repressive and inviting; for those within, support for the general struggle of the ANC was to transcend local interests.

Seething beneath the surface of civil society, however, strong disintegrative forces were at work. Social and political frustrations were expressed in the distorted forms of communal and gangster violence: elders versus comrades, Zulu versus Xhosa, warlord versus warlord. Many of these associations were not remotely 'civil' in their mode of organisation or action; 'popular justice' in many instances degenerated into the ghastly brutality of the 'necklace' that was neither popular nor just and political argument sometimes degenerated into seemingly endless blood-feuds. Even within the most civil of societies, the trade unions, the pursuit of factional aims was marred by intimidation.

The violence between competing interests that was the mark of civil society was not resolved by ANC leadership. The political leadership of the liberation movement espoused a militant form of neo-marxism which stressed the hollowness of all state reforms, the impermissibility of participation in official bodies and the centrality of mass insurrection. Its slogans at home were radical: non-collaboration with the state, render South Africa ungovernable, no education before liberation, people's power and insurrection. The rhetoric of 'dual power', however, served in this context to aggravate the violence of civil society, as one group proclaimed its authority in the face of another, ANC-SACP approval was given to those who flew its flag, and unity was turned into a demand for political conformity. The state was able to exploit and aggravate these divisions because civil society was unable to create its own cohesion. The state encouraged political violence between the conflicting interests of civil society but justified itself as the only force capable of containing this violence through police measures. The unleashing of civil society thus became the ground, paradoxically, for relegitimising the state.

There is no doubt that the state was shaken by the uprising of the 1980s and the international sanctions which accompanied it and that this was the background to the change of political climate which occurred at the end of the decade. It is a myth, however, to
interpret the reform of apartheid as a clearcut victory for democratic forces, for the apartheid state survived and quelled the uprising of the 1980s.

When Botha launched his tentative perestroika at the beginning of the 1980s, almost all members of the liberation movement derided it as a fiction or tactical device, ruling out the possibility that it expressed a real crisis of apartheid capitalism and imperative for restructuring. In the event, the reform programme which triggered the urban revolt, not least because of its adverse economic consequences but also because it revealed the vulnerability of apartheid, was revived when the De Klerk government picked up the mantle of reform at the end of the decade on the basis of a far-reaching corporatist strategy. Instead of looking to a black bourgeoisie independent of the ANC-SACP, the state now looked its enemy in the face. Reform was delivered from the top down: in the form of the legalisation of liberation organisations, the release of political prisoners, the return of political exiles, the offer of negotiations for a new constitution, the deracialisation of the National Party, the repeal of most apartheid laws. This was neo-corporatism with a vengeance.

The liberation movement’s shift of strategy in accordance with these new conditions was to return to neo-classicism. The ANC-SACP abandoned armed struggle and insurrection; it began to operate openly inside the country; most of its leaders and activists returned from exile; it entered negotiations with the government; the international sanctions campaign was eased; there was a ‘discourse shift’ from that of isolating and destroying apartheid to reconstruction. Some militants resisted this turn, reluctant to surrender the heroic spirit of the 1980s, but the main body of the leadership declared its eagerness to join the search for consensus. It was not just that a change of strategy occurred in line with a change of circumstances, but rather that the change of circumstances dominated the change of strategy. In this shift from neo-marxism to neo-classicism, everything was turned on its head: insurrection into ‘elite-pacting’, armed struggle into legalism, non-collaboration into partnership, political unionism into restraint of industrial militancy, the sanctions campaign into appeals for investment. Having for decades characterised the nationalist government as absolute evil, the main body of the ANC-SACP swung into the politics of cooperation.

Criticism of the new framework came from many sources. There are a variety of far left groupings – the PAC, Azapo and a number of trotskyist organisations like WOSA – which offered revolutionary critiques of the new strategy from within the old frame of neo-marxism. The development of the ‘civil society’ perspective, however, was associated not with a total rejection of the revived neo-classical frame, but with warnings against ‘elite-pacting’, the turning of popular forces into ‘spectators’ of the negotiating process, and the subordination of social issues. In different forms, these came from the trade unions, the Communist Party and other activists and intellectuals.

Civil society theory functions here as an alternative to the neo-marxism of the far left and the neo-classicism of the elite-pacters. But could it be the case that, just as neo-marxism emerged in the 1970s at the close of the period of its practical truth, civil society theory also emerged in the 1990s after the
event, at a time when the initiative for political reform was with the government, negotiations were centralised among the leading parties, many of the community and youth organisations established in the 1980s had lost their power, the trade union left has lost its distinct political identity, internecine violence was rife (over 4,000 dead in the last eighteen months) and ethnic conflict had entered the urban areas of the Rand? Has the positing of civil society as a normative theory of what 'ought to be' come in the wake of its actual historical decline? I do not wish to suggest that civil society theory is no more than a mask for etatisation and for fitting into the current orthodoxies of neo-corporatism; but rather that there is a difficult relation between the theory and its realisation.

Civil Society and Party Politics

I want to illustrate the difficulty of this relation through a discussion of the forms of representation mediating between civil society and the state. With the worldwide decline of the 'one-party state' model in Eastern Europe and many parts of Africa, most sections of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa are now committed to party political pluralism. This has given rise to two major problems. One is the problem of transition: how is the party political pluralism of the future to be built? The other is the problem of critique: how is disillusionment with the old forms of 'Soviet' anti-parliamentarianism to avoid falling into a celebration of the western party system.

In South Africa the suppression of the party-system by apartheid as far as the black majority of the population is concerned has been long and deep, perhaps adding another significance to the concept of 'apartheid' as 'a-party'. The impact of this repression on the opposition movement has been contradictory. On the one hand, the struggle for a multi-party parliamentary democracy has been a major thread of liberation culture. On the other, this repression has been internalised in the political consciousness of the opposition in its own rejection of party politics in favour of national movements. The critique of party politics became a central theme of the South African opposition after the war. In debates between the ANC and its political rivals, each side accused the other of being a political party in disguise, sowing class divisions rather than national unity, dictating political ideas from above rather than expressing national consciousness from below. The party-form was identified with divisiveness, exclusion and rigidity; the congress or movement-form with unity, fluidity and inclusion. The only party in the movement – the Communist Party – paradoxically also subsumed political parties to national movements in the battle against apartheid.

This idealisation of national movements failed in my view to transcend apartheid's racial form of identity-thinking. Furthermore, the resulting tendency was for real distinctions between leaders and the people to be obscured by the apparent identity of the national movement with the 'nation'; for the idea of the 'people' to be turned into a formalism whose singular consciousness was homogenised by the movement which spoke in its name; for plurality of opinions to be negated by the singular notion of public opinion; for the policy choices of one party to be dressed up as the general will of the people as a whole; for definite strategies to be presented
Debate: Civil Society in South Africa  

in the language of rational necessity, etc. The effect was to restrict political argument to competing claims rationally to represent the people. The substitution of rationalism for democracy laid the ground paradoxically for political differences to be displaced onto the irrational terrain of friend and foe (this was Carl Schmitt's irrationalist characterisation of 'the political' in the 1930s prior to his joining the Nazi Party).

Important democratic practices were lost inside the liberation movement with its rejection of party politics. The idea of a party is that it represents no more than a part of the whole rather than the will of the people as a whole; its programme and practices are open to rational criticism by other parties rather than being elevated as the vox populi; its policies are capable of being revised or scrapped according to its decision-making structures rather than being set in stone as eternal principles; individuals join or support a party as citizens and not by virtue of ascribed national or racial status.

To be sure, this idea of the political party is compatible with its media-driven instantiation in modern politics, its trivialisation and massification which removes it from the real needs and concerns of individuals. In 'normal' bourgeois society the fundamental problem of representation is that political parties are sucked into the bowels of the state, undergoing a process of statification which substitutes party political pluralism for popular participation in public life. This process, however, is never unconflictual or completed so long as the party system remains intact; however arrogant and hierarchical the party bosses become, to remain a party is to leave open some space for dissent from below. Thus the history of socialist political parties has been one of constant battle for their destatification and accountability.

The statification of the party system has misled generations of critics to reject the party system as a whole in favour of some 'higher' form of political organisation. This critique has been given all number of political expressions, left and right, is the impulse which led many marxists into the cul-de-sac of anti-parliamentarism and civil society theorists into the doctrine of 'antipolitics'. The SACP theoretician, Jeremy Cronin, has posed this objection to an emphasis on political parties:

The regime hopes to present the South African situation as a relatively 'normalised' bourgeois democracy with a variety of political parties. Competing for the centre in this conception would be an ANC that hoists a flag called 'social democracy' and the NP and friends would hoist another flag called 'christian democracy'. Out on the fringes would be a series of miniscule 'ideological' parties to the left and right. But the democratisation of our society requires a broad national democratic front and not a charade of a West European democracy . . .

It would be wrong to defend 'the charade of West European democracy' against critics of its limited democratic content, but equally wrong to identify party political pluralism in South Africa with conservatism. On the contrary, the right will do its utmost to restrict any such development and impose a more authoritarian solution. In dismay at the prospect of a 'normalised' christian versus social democrat divide, Cronin loses sight of the greater evil: a government of 'national unity' in which the ANC is compelled to share power with the Nationalist Party,
at the expense of the social and democratic concerns which survive in 'civil society'. If the democratic movements of Africa and Eastern Europe teach us anything, it is that in modern society political parties are either a universal form of mediation or a felt absence where they are suppressed.

Between civil society and the state there has to be some general form of mediation, for if each particular interest of civil society lobbies the state on behalf of its own private concerns, then judgement of their claims and determination of priorities between them are left in the hands of one body, the state executive. If the state executive is not to be the sole mediation between state and civil society, then some system of political representation is essential. The state executive is in principle the representation of the state interest in civil society; the party system is in principle the representation of the private interests of civil society in the state.

**Conclusion**

The central defect of civil society theory is above all to repeat the illusion that the 'big' questions concerning the general administration of society can be resolved by particular, local struggles in the context of existing political organisations. The source of this defect lies in the translation of the concept of civil society from its modern sense as a violent system of competing needs and interests (as Hegel first analysed it) to a more traditional notion of civil society as a sphere of corporate association. To be sure, bourgeois civil society is a sphere of association, but it is also the realm of force, self-interest, inequality and exploitation. None of the associations of civil society, not even the most democratic, are immune to these forces nor to their 'colonisation' by the state.

In this context political parties for all their attendant dangers are the crucial means by which the particular interests of civil society are taken beyond themselves and lifted to the general interests of the state. In terms of building a 'third road' the main difficulty facing civil society theory, expressed most sharply in the concept of 'antipolitics', lies in neglecting or rejecting the question of political mediation in favour of an exclusive focus on the associations of civil society. If political parties are not democratised and socialised from below, they will still perform their mediative functions - but determined 'from above'.

The political limitations of civil society theory have been brought to public view in Eastern Europe after the fall of the communist regimes. They have been most evident in the absence of parties representing the social and democratic interests of labour in civil society. To my mind this question of political mediation between state and civil society is as crucial in South Africa as it has been in Eastern Europe, if liberation from apartheid is also to establish what Hannah Arendt once called 'a constitution of liberty'.

Robert Fine is in the Department of Sociology, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK.

**Bibliographic Note**

_Civil Society_:


(SALB = South African Labour Bulletin; WIP = Work in Progress)

Acknowledgements: I should like to thank for their extremely useful, critical and encouraging comments: Glyn Cousin, Mick O'Sullivan, Simon Clarke, Joe McCahery and the students of our South African Labour Studies course.

Social Change
Tool for the 90s

This quarterly subject index to over 200 alternative, radical and progressive publications will be an invaluable tool in your study of social and political change. Ask the folks at your library to subscribe to the Alternative Press Index, a unique guide to the other side of today's news.

Libraries: $125; individuals, non-profits and movement groups $30.


Alternative Press Centre, P.O. Box 33109, Baltimore, MD 21218
**US Aid Policy in Africa: No Room for Democracy**

*Douglas Hellinger*

Across Africa, people from all walks of life have intensified their struggle for democratic change, demanding the right at both the local and national levels to shape the political and economic environment in which they live. Meanwhile, in Washington, the foreign policy establishment continues to promote all-encompassing structural adjustment programmes as the solution to Africa's economic, social and environmental crises. This contradiction raises the central question regarding the future of the continent and the US role in it: *Who decides for Africa?*

Never has this question been more critical because, after over a decade of structural adjustment imposed throughout Africa by the IMF and the World Bank with the strong backing of the US government, Africa is in even worse shape than it was at the beginning of the 1980s. Despite the vast amounts of money that have been thrown at favourite adjusting countries - 33 nations adopted adjustment programmes during the decade - the continent's GDP per capita has sharply declined, its foreign debt has nearly doubled to US$272 billion and, over the second half of the decade, returns from exports dropped by US$50 billion, despite average yearly increases in export volume of 2.5 per cent.

And the personal sacrifices made at the altar of adjustment continue as the disaster deepens: wages are down over 30 per cent; unemployment is on the rise; expenditures on health and education are falling; health care and education are increasingly out of reach of the poor; primary-school enrolment rates are dropping; small agricultural producers are being undercut by a lack of services and credit, higher input costs and competition from cheap imported grain; and women are carrying additional burdens to sustain the family and, collectively, the entire economic and social system.

**Another Decade of Adjustment**

Only in Washington and in a few other Northern capitals is the myth alive that structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) are working in Africa, or, for that matter, elsewhere in the third world. To their credit, some of the early proponents of these policies have begun to publicly acknowledge the limitations of SAPs, if not their outright failure. Even they, however, tend to imply that the problem lies not with the content of the policies nor with the intent of the designers, but with an adverse external environment and, more pointedly, the lack of effective implementation of these programmes by African governments. Their solution, then, is for more of the same. The Bank, itself, calls for another decade of adjustment.

Any other set of development policies, after so prolonged a period of failure, would have been ridiculed and jetti-
soned by the assistance agencies. But then again, adjustment is not, after all, truly a development policy, but rather an economic prescription geared towards further opening already vulnerable economies to the unregulated extraction of natural resources and the dumping of imported food and other consumer goods on local markets. One need look no further than the US proposals within the current GATT negotiations – which mirror almost perfectly the component parts of a typical adjustment package – to receive confirmation of the real intent behind the design and promotion of policy-reform programmes.

Hence, US policy towards Africa, rather than being characterised by ‘drift and disengagement’ as some claim, has been extremely clear. It has been successful in further integrating Africa into an international economy that hasn’t served its interests and certainly not those of its poorer citizens. This is merely a continuation of a long-standing policy among Northern countries to impose their concept of how Africa should develop.

Little is new here except for the latest development fads that only obfuscate the intent and failures of current economic policies. These will come and go with the whims of the development set in Washington, leaving in their wake new ‘experts’ and organisations in the North and further confusion and waste of resources in the South. Basic human needs, integrated rural development, poverty alleviation, women in development, the environment, good governance – these are all worthy issues, but, in the end, they are defined from the outside in a way that never meaningfully engages the people themselves nor challenges the economic model in any fundamental way. The model, the ever-changing fads, the very policy framework, are elitist constructs which have very little if anything to do with the lives of real Africans struggling for a better life.

Denying Democratic Choice

What is missing from US policy towards Africa is a basic respect for the people, their knowledge and their right to collectively determine their own future. Much as in the aftermath of the Los Angeles riots, those who have the power and control the resources resist the one option most consistent with just and democratic process: building on the desires, priorities and initiatives of the people themselves. The need of the aid establishment to control is so central and inconsistent with the principles of democracy, good governance, popular participation and accountability.

Adjustment in Africa is being imposed by the new superstate: the World Bank, the IMF and, increasingly, the rules of international trade. African governments, themselves seldom models of accountability, now have even less room to manoeuvre to change aspects of their economic systems in response to demands from their citizens suffering under adjustment programmes and other ills. The new ‘poverty thrust’ of the World Bank, rather than addressing the fundamental problems in these systems, will exacerbate the situation because it is designed only to cope with pockets of social unrest and not to empower people in their communities to bring about fundamental change in their respective societies.

For the new advocates of good governance and democracy, democratic process and accountability appear to end at
the doors of the World Bank and the IMF. For when it comes to the making of the major economic decisions affecting everyone in African societies, there is little, if any, room for the perspectives, knowledge and priorities of the African people or even their governments.

Furthermore, there may in fact be an inherent contradiction between adjustment programmes and democracy. Programmes that feature as their main components wage restraint, trade liberalization, agricultural incentives which favour food exports over local food production, and the lifting of subsidies of basic food items are not likely to garner much political support outside narrow commercial circles within any country. Witness the Ivory Coast, where the Prime Minister promised in March 1992 to clamp down on the political opposition, students and 'law breakers' whose activities, he said, were threatening the country's adjustment programme. Citing the need for a 'responsible opposition', the Prime Minister stated, 'last year we went through a tough period cleansing the economy, making it healthier. Now it is time to cleanse the political environment.' Not a word was heard from our aid agencies.

On the other hand, what if an African country, through a democratically elected government or nationwide referendum, were to jettison its structural adjustment programme? It is unlikely that the international aid establishment would laud it for its commitment to democracy and popular participation. Rather, it is more likely that it would lose all access to external financing until a more 'responsible' position was taken. In fact, as the UN noted in a report last year, those Africa countries which have not implemented adjustment programmes have been 'starved of funds'.

Accountability and Democracy

As this country increasingly exercises its economic leverage in Africa through the World Bank (where it receives an apolitical cloak), the legion of economists, consultants, PVOs and Africa 'experts' trot behind, pushing structural adjustment as the solution to Africa's ills, accountable only to those who pay the bills and grant status and credibility in Washington policy circles. Unaccountable to the African people, their mistakes - 'miscalculations' here but disasters thousands of miles away - are quickly forgotten and they are called upon once again to provide their advice on how to develop Africa.

Perhaps, in the interests of public accountability - a goal which USAID, the World Bank and other donors seem to believe in so fervently - those who impart their economic wisdom so casually should have to suffer the consequences of their advice. If their prescriptions lead to improved living conditions for the majority, their professional rewards would be justified. But, if their counsel is as bad as it has historically been, they would face the wage cuts, job losses, education and health-care fees, and credit crunch they have recommended for other people. If nothing else, the experience might sensitize these development professionals to the rights of people everywhere to have a say in the decisions that so directly affect them.

And herein lies the problem. All the money in the world is not going to improve the situation in Africa; in fact, it will continue to make matters worse until we begin to listen and heed the
advice of ordinary people about what is good for their own societies. We must also be prepared to hear some of the unpleasant truths they may tell us about our aid programmes, instead of searching out 'responsible' Africans who will tell us that all is well, because it is assuredly not.

If we would truly open up the system to voices from below, we would hear a very different perspective and a call for assistance in the spirit of true partnership and respect for African people. This assistance would not be expensive, but it would be critical to helping countries become more self-reliant and less dependent on our capital, our markets and our so-called expertise. The process of looking outward for solutions has been crippling for Africa, for it has robbed the continent of its ability to build on its own resources and the creativity of its own people, to invest in sustainable agricultural practices and other local activities that have traditionally served the people at grassroots levels, and to more fully integrate their economies nationally and regionally.

Our current Africa aid legislation, which created the Development Fund for Africa, calls on USAID to help Africans take the more self-reliant path, but instead the Agency has been intent on helping the Bank push adjustment policies which undermine the legislation's basic goals. And, as is the case with the Bank, local consultation has been spotty and not very meaningful.

As for democracy, traditional definitions hold little interest for our foreign policy establishment and aid professionals. The dictionary defines democracy as a government by the people, one in which the supreme power is vested in them; it recognises the common people as the sole source of political authority. Our government and the international institutions and donors, which, according to USAID, have 'imposed a revolution from without' in Africa, certainly do not share that view. Until there is agreement on the basic definition and principles of democracy, discourse on this issue remains a diversionary, unrewarding and, in the end, frivolous pursuit.

Douglas Hellinger is Managing Director of The Development Group for Alternative Policies, Washington, DC.

---

**Senegal: The Young Farmers of Walo & the New Agricultural Policy**

**Bernard Lecomte**

In 1973 in the Sahel zone of Senegal, the drought had been particularly severe. Abdoulaye Diop, a student who originally came from the village of Ronkh, in the delta of the Senegal River, wondered what he could do to relieve the miserable conditions in which his parents were living. What, too, could be done to stop the young people from fleeing in large numbers towards the city?

Abdoulaye decided to return to live in his village. Together with some friends, he dug a canal by hand to bring water from one of the tributaries of the river to a plot of land that the elders of the village had allocated to them. As it turned out, the first swings of the pick-axes started up a peasant association that was to become one of the most dynamic in the country: the Walo
advice of ordinary people about what is good for their own societies. We must also be prepared to hear some of the unpleasant truths they may tell us about our aid programmes, instead of searching out ‘responsible’ Africans who will tell us that all is well, because it is assuredly not.

If we would truly open up the system to voices from below, we would hear a very different perspective and a call for assistance in the spirit of true partnership and respect for African people. This assistance would not be expensive, but it would be critical to helping countries become more self-reliant and less dependent on our capital, our markets and our so-called expertise. The process of looking outward for solutions has been crippling for Africa, for it has robbed the continent of its ability to build on its own resources and the creativity of its own people, to invest in sustainable agricultural practices and other local activities that have traditionally served the people at grassroots levels, and to more fully integrate their economies nationally and regionally.

Our current Africa aid legislation, which created the Development Fund for Africa, calls on USAID to help Africans take the more self-reliant path, but instead the Agency has been intent on helping the Bank push adjustment policies which undermine the legislation’s basic goals. And, as is the case with the Bank, local consultation has been spotty and not very meaningful.

As for democracy, traditional definitions hold little interest for our foreign policy establishment and aid professionals. The dictionary defines democracy as a government by the people, one in which the supreme power is vested in them; it recognises the common people as the sole source of political authority. Our government and the international institutions and donors, which, according to USAID, have ‘imposed a revolution from without’ in Africa, certainly do not share that view. Until there is agreement on the basic definition and principles of democracy, discourse on this issue remains a diversionary, unrewarding and, in the end, frivolous pursuit.

Douglas Hellinger is Managing Director of The Development Group for Alternative Policies, Washington, DC.

Senegal: The Young Farmers of Walo & the New Agricultural Policy

Bernard Lecomte

In 1973 in the Sahel zone of Senegal, the drought had been particularly severe. Abdoulaye Diop, a student who originally came from the village of Ronkh, in the delta of the Senegal River, wondered what he could do to relieve the miserable conditions in which his parents were living. What, too, could be done to stop the young people from fleeing in large numbers towards the city?

Abdoulaye decided to return to live in his village. Together with some friends, he dug a canal by hand to bring water from one of the tributaries of the river to a plot of land that the elders of the village had allocated to them. As it turned out, the first swings of the pick-axes started up a peasant association that was to become one of the most dynamic in the country: the Walo
Farmers' Association. One of the most dynamic – and most exposed. The club association stemmed from the refusal of the young people (you are young for a long time in Walo – at least until you are 35 years old!) to accept the model imposed by the State Development Company responsible for the management of the irrigation system and rice cultivation in the delta area. The young people had no access to the land that had been irrigated and drained: this was reserved for the members of the cooperatives that had been formed by the Company. And the cooperative members were their own fathers! The young men and women needed a lot of vision, solidarity and patience to become autonomous farmers. It could be said that the Association was set up as a challenge to the State and to their parents.

A little less than 20 years later there have been fundamental changes. The State has disengaged itself and transferred its functions of cultivation and management to 'peasant associations', both cooperatives that had previously been formally linked to the State, and autonomous ones. For the Walo Farmers' Association it was the long-awaited moment of becoming recognised by the administration and the aid agencies. Their leaders proudly accepted the invitation that was sent to them at the beginning of the year by the representative of the World Bank in Senegal to come to a meeting in the capital. The aim of the two-day meeting was to ‘work out the practical modalities of partnership’, as the invitation put it.

A Historic Encounter

The first meeting between the peasant organisations of Senegal and the World Bank took place in Dakar from 13 to 14 February 1991. The peasant organisations were a mixed bunch: the government-sponsored National Union of Agricultural Cooperatives rubbed shoulders with groups like the Walo Farmers' Association. But these distinctions appeared to have little importance for the Bank. The peasants were interested in a number of questions. First, money for inputs and land development or irrigation works; second, training and funds to ensure that ongoing training could be expanded; and last, closer links between the production and marketing of their produce. All that the participants could do at the meeting was to express their views, but they did so and they did get a hearing. The conclusion of the meeting was not spectacular with an agreement to allow direct access by peasant organisations to a programme financing small-scale projects. Further meetings were planned – was a partnership in the air?

Aid Agencies

Oddly enough, the subjects discussed at this historic gathering did not include its fundamental objective: the World Bank's desire to push ahead with its policy of transferring governmental responsibilities – and burdens – to peasant organisations. More precisely, to what the Bank calls ‘self-reliant farmers' associations’. Perhaps the subject did not come up because all the participants were already familiar with this policy, which had been adopted by the Government of Senegal under pressure from the IMF in 1984 and which was known as the ‘New Agricultural Policy’. In fact, within a few short years, the IMF has imposed completely new roles on both the rural people and the government.

Previously, a rice-growing peasant in
Walo who was also a member of a cooperative had his plot of land levelled and watered by the State Development Company. His job was to sow, to tend and to cultivate. The Company, exercising its monopoly, bought the paddy for him. It reimbursed itself by levying dues for the cost of the work done for the peasant - which could exceed the value of the harvest, if the latter turned out badly. The resulting shortfall was temporarily borne by the State company but the peasant saw his debts mounting and had to struggle to survive until the next season.

Under the New Agricultural Policy, the State Company no longer advances the money needed for preparing the land. The peasant has to find the funds for each season, either out of his savings, or else through a loan from the State bank. When he has overcome this hurdle, he still has to sell the paddy harvest to the government (for the time being at least) but it will probably be six to eight months before he is paid. If he wants to grow an off-season crop, he will have to borrow again before he receives the earnings from the previous harvest. And if he is thinking of land development or leveling, he will have to find a private contractor to do the job. Again, he has to go to the bank, which pays the contractor direct once the work is done.

But suppose the harvest fails? He will just have to tighten his belt. The State Company is no longer subsidized by external aid and can give him no help at all. In 1991, for example, many of the peasants in the village of Ronkh - members of the Walo Farmers' Association - decided to develop some more land. But the pump supplying the irrigation canal could not take the extra load and broke down. The State, which controlled the pump, offered no compensation to the farmers.

For the peasant organisations, the transfer of government responsibilities means primarily a transfer of burdens and risks. They still have no say on such basic questions as the fixing of prices, planning input supplies, establishing interest rates and setting up a fund to insure against disasters.

Nor is it, of course, only the peasants of Walo who are suffering from this state of affairs and trying to work out solutions. The World Bank and other donors are imposing a sort of demationalization on governments everywhere. After having financed the State companies, the same donors hope that this policy of liberalization will develop the capacity of private economic agents to take the initiative themselves. In theory, this will trigger the recovery of African national economies, which have been in poor shape over the past ten years.

But in practice, there are virtually no agricultural enterprises in this part of the world - at least in the capitalist sense of the term. So the donors now need the peasant organisations, particularly those that have already demonstrated their capacity for self-reliance.

**A Transfer That Could Be Destructive**

To put it simply, peasant associations in Senegal belong to one or other of two big families: those formed on government initiative (like the cooperatives) and those that have sprung up on their own (like the Walo Farmers' Association). The former have to extricate themselves from State control and the latter have to seek recognition from the State. Both have to expand
their capacity and co-operate with the
government and with aid agencies,
while taking care to establish or to
maintain their own independence.

This is a problem today for all peasant
associations: while the State has aban-
donated them, the aid agencies are
flattering them, without helping them.
And the present policies have a direct
effect on their size, their identity, the
range of functions they can assume,
the extent and coverage of the risks
they take, their institutions, and the
ends they pursue. We had an opportu-
nity to observe direct the effects of
these policies on the clubs of the
Association.

Size: isolated village groups cannot
cope with the new responsibilities by
themselves. They have to unite and
organise themselves, first in their own
areas and then regionally. These un-
ions and federation will attract new
groups that have not built up their self-
reliance step by step like the founder
members. Indeed, some unions are
finding that their numbers have dou-
bled or even trebled from one year to
another. The prospect of having to
deal with the government leads all
kinds of people to form groups. Be-
longing to the same federation reas-
sures member groups; it is also one
way of obtaining financial benefits or
defending their interests against the
government and the agencies. The
Walo Farmers Association has grown
from 115 clubs in 1987 to 185 in 1991,
from 15,000 members to 20,000.

Identity: A rapidly expanding federa-
tion loses part of its identity, since it is
then considered by its members as an
institution for negotiating with other
agents, rather than an something they
have built up themselves. Suddenly it
consists of a majority of new joiners,
quicker to imitate than to invent, to
demand rather than to endure. But
most important of all, when new
responsibilities, partly imposed by the
government, have to be shouldered, its
identity has to be somewhat reconsid-
ered. For instance, if the founder
groups have to perform new duties
(such as borrowing from the bank),
this can weaken the very identity of the
group. It is obliged to take on board
two value systems at the same time.
The first, which had been its strength
when it was first formed, is based on
village history and the determination
to promote every member of the
community; in short, the values of
solidarity. The second, pushed by the
government and aid projects, is
founded on profitability, individuals
taking on risks, and a move towards
free enterprise.

In Ronkh, where 300 hectares pro-
duced nothing in 1991 because the
pump broke down, who will bear the
loss? Only the peasants concerned, or
all the peasants in the village, who
harvested nearly 2,000 hectares that
year during the rainy season? Will the
second value system prevail ('every-
one takes his own risks') or the first
('each for all').

Many Demanding Duties: The groups
formed by peasants to deal with cul-
tural questions (the place of young
people in the village, for example), just
as much as production requirements,
or political action. The full name of the
Walo Association is 'The Walo Farm-
ers' Sporting, Economic, Social and
Cultural Association'. This harmoni-
ous combination of interests is now
being undermined by the government
requirement that the Association take
on precise economic functions which
are both complex and highly inter-
related, like control of the 'rice chain'


Briefing: Young Farmers of Senegal

from seed production to the sale of white rice. The Association used to have several functions that could be carried on horizontally in the village. Now it is under pressure to take up a difficult challenge: to assume functions that start in the village and go right up to the import-export system. How can it stop groups neglecting the socio-cultural functions that were the pillars of their Association 15 years ago? Economic priority is the driving force. Everyone tries to deal with the most urgent matters and to cope somehow.

In November 1990, the government suggested the transfer of a seed processing factory. The Association responded positively. It entrusted the task to the best seed technicians among its members and persuaded one of them - one of the few specialists in market gardening - to take over the running of the plant. He accepted, got the work started and then left to undergo training abroad. He put other peasants in charge of the market-gardening, and his brothers took on the family farm. Everyone in the chain is trying to do better; and activities progress, sometimes falling back, but then picking up again. Capacities expand, but how can they be reinforced properly when the challenge demands an immediate response?

Extent of Risks and Burdens: In the early years, the groups were dealing with relatively small sums of money. They received a considerable amount of assistance in the form of subsidies, either from foreign aid agencies, or from the government. They could always pay their debts a bit late if they were experiencing really serious difficulties – or natural disasters.

Today all this has changed. The members themselves borrow practically all the money needed to purchase inputs and equipment, and they risk losing everything if the harvest is poor. Neither the government nor the donors have taken any steps to cover even part of the risks of crop failure. Nor have they provided against the ever-present threat of plagues of grasshoppers, birds or rats. Furthermore, these-rice producing unions receive little help today in the way of subsidies from private aid agencies. The donors seem to think that, if the people in this region of the Sahel are lucky enough to have access to water, they ought to be able to manage by themselves after a few years of aid. The Walo Association no longer receives any external finance for training its members. And this comes just at a time when requests from members for various types of training are on the increase. The leap from management of an association to management of an enterprise means that hundreds more peasant bookkeepers will be needed in the economic interest groups (EIGs) to manage inputs, savings, loans and repayments by farmers. EIGs were set up in 1988 by the Caisse National de Credit Agricole (CNAS), a bank that has government and official aid agency links.

Who is paying for this training at present? The farmers themselves, if they can. Private aid is no longer interested in areas whose inhabitants have shed, as far as they are concerned, the 'poorest population' label. The so-called ‘self-reliant’ farmers receive few allocations from the government or official aid agencies, since they are not yet considered as full partners. Everyone wants them to be that, but who is really going to give them a leg up? And when a State technical agent wants to transfer a responsibility to the
peasants, he is only interested in the technique as such. He feels, for example, that canal or pump maintenance is all he has to teach. In fact, taking responsibility and incurring risk require that a wide range of abilities be shared among numerous decision-making centres and many peasants who have become specialists.

Reinventing Institutions: ‘The EIGs have given us new life’, said the members of one club in the Walo Farmers Association. The bank (CNCAS) was imposed on the ‘self-reliant’ clubs as they had no confidence in the ability of the clubs and their federation (the Association) to manage savings, loans and repayments and obliged the clubs to divide themselves into smaller groups, the EIGs, each of which is composed of 10 to 20 members prepared to commit themselves jointly to making savings and repayments. The method has been a success inasmuch as the amount of savings collected in this way is far higher than before. And these savings mean that CNCAS is ready to extend seasonal credit to the EIGs and make them loans for the purchase of equipment. But it is a two-edged sword. First, the ‘carrot’ of profitability is dangled, by offering credits to lots of little ‘enterprises’ (EIGs). Then it demands inter-EIG solidarity at the level of structures that CNCAS has imposed, when it sees that some EIGs have not made the grade.

Does this method ensure that the bank will be repaid and the EIG members will earn a living? Apparently not, as three years later, in 1991, CNCAS is claiming that each club must play the role of regulator and guarantor for the repayment of loans to EIGs established within it. To achieve this reform (which looks like the first one back to front), the bank is threatening to make no further loans to any EIG if the other EIGs in the same club have not repaid their debts. It is therefore playing a double game, as it creates dozens of sub-groups in the same Association, sub-groups whose concerns are most self-centred than collective. This policy can destroy as much as it can construct.

Have the EIGs really infused new life into the clubs? They have certainly played a crucial role in decentralizing responsibility and hastening the trend towards entrepreneurial structures. But at what price to the members, the clubs and to the Association itself?

Contradictions: In the Association today, ‘everyone is bustling around looking for money’. This free market mentality has spread very quickly among the members of the Association who have access to irrigable plots. The others (the majority - between 12,000 and 20,000 of the members in 1991) continue to live on their meagre rainfed crops and small animals. These non-rice growers ‘survive’. While some of them become rich, with new houses, small trucks and television sets, others, less productive or less well equipped, have greater difficulties each season to repay their debts. In order to liquidate these debts, they begin to depend on the farmers who ‘perform’ better. Certain EIGs have now been declared ‘saturated’, which means they have exhausted all possibilities of making savings and loans, whether from CNCAS or from other members of the Association.

The three types of member (the non-rice grower, the ‘performing’ rice grower and the non-profitable rice grower) have their sights set on different targets. How long will they remain compatible? For the time being, it is
Briefing: Young Farmers of Senegal

The effects of the model are all to well know: marginalization of the majority of peasants, the continuous indebtedness of others and the enrichment of a few - those few who have been sufficiently far-sighted not to work the land, enterprising enough to sell inputs, and cynical enough to entice others into debt by making personal loans.

Adapt the Model?

The members of the Walo Farmers' Association are now trying to cushion the shock of the negative effects of the model. But the success of their tactics are not yet guaranteed.

On the one hand they are trying to limit the broadening of the gap which is opening up rapidly between some members and others. In order to do this, they are restricting the amount of irrigated land that can be allocated to each farmer. And they are also negotiating with the external aid agencies for subsidies to augment the production tools of farmers who are poorly equipped.

They try, on the other hand, to tackle the debt that results from being too totally dependent on rice production.

Accept the Model?

This policy of transfer can be both constructive and destructive. For a farmers' association, even one described as 'self-reliant', the invitation to become a 'partner' of the World Bank and its followers is not without its risks.

The spirit which, from 1973 to 1987, inspired the Walo Farmers' Association went beyond the bounds of rice production and the struggle against poverty. It was an opportunity for the landless youth to find their niche in society. Most of them have now gained acceptance and are considered as potential partners by the State and by the agencies. But is this 'consideration' due to the fact that they too have espoused the doctrines of the World Bank? Are they accepted because they follow the model? In which case, what will be left of the different kind of society that they had created, based on solidarity and self-reliance.

'We'll do everything ourselves', had been the slogan of Walo who found themselves dispossessed of their land and their right to organise themselves.
They are attempting to set up savings banks and they are diversifying their cultivation with market gardening and seed production. Rather than increasing the amount of land under cultivation, they are trying to intensify their productivity.

But how can they intensify their productivity without using fertilizer (and falling into further indebtedness), when they have no livestock? And how can they find and use animals for traction, when tractors have been ploughing the land for the past 25 years.

And then should they be limiting the area cultivated by peasants at a time when so many agro-industrial companies are manoeuvring to acquire the rights to cultivate this land which is already irrigated? To adapt needs time; but time is constantly accelerating, under the pressure of the State and the aid agencies.

Reject the Model?

In Senegal, rice is a comparatively new crop. The first rice fields in the Delta are only 30 years old. Other rice civilizations have hundreds of years of experience, like Thailand, for example. Their rice production is exported at the lowest possible price (i.e. the ‘world price’), particularly to Senegal, which has a major cereal deficit. But modern agriculture has destroyed this integration. In the village today, they have another quote: ‘There are rats in the field and chemicals in the water.’

First, the peasants analyse their own history. According to them, the elders used to say, ‘there is rice in the field and fish in the water’, and the forest provided whatever other food was needed. But modern agriculture has destroyed this integration. In the village today, they have another quote: ‘There are rats in the field and chemicals in the water.’

Second, they practice integrated agriculture, combining rice, fish and compost. The family digs its own pond and they rely on help from other families rather than on money and equipment. Using organic manure and recycling wastes, they have almost entirely eliminated market dependence on inputs.

Third, they keep their rice for their own consumption. ‘So long as we have enough to feed the family, we are under no pressure to sell’, they say. The peasants also quote the old adage: ‘Don’t sell your rice before you are sure of your next harvest.’ Until recently, when there were debts to be paid, they had to sell immediately after the harvest at very low prices, facing shortages later on.

Fourth, the people have chosen to change their way of life, making it simpler. This decision goes hand in hand with the decision to adopt inte-
grated farming. 'Self-reliance is the goal, integrated farming is the means, and simplicity must be the way of life.'

This refusal of the model. Is it a strategy that could inspire also the peasant associations of Senegal?

Bibliographic Note:

US Aid to AIDS in Africa
Meredeth Turshen

WHO estimates that 6 million Africans have been infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and that 1.16 million cases of AIDS had occurred among adults and children in sub-Saharan Africa by 1991. These are cumulative figures for ten years, including cases and deaths. AIDS is the only disease for which cumulative figures are published; every other disease is reported annually and new cases are separated from that year's death toll. Although I do not wish to minimize the problem of AIDS in Africa, one should note that the effect of cumulative reporting is to amplify the problem.

It is important to place AIDS in the context of other health problems in Africa when determining types and amounts of health assistance. WHO publishes no death statistics for Africa, only random data are available. Famine and malnutrition are currently the cause of most deaths in drought-stricken parts of Africa. An estimated 100,000 Somalis have died and 1.5 million are at risk of death by starvation in that one country alone. Malaria, which like AIDS suppresses the immune system, is one of the most lethal diseases in tropical Africa; it is the most common reason for hospitalization and the most frequent cause of death of children under five years old. African governments report 80 million cases of malaria annually. There are no continent-wide estimates of deaths from malaria, but in general case fatality rates exceed 10 per cent - that means possibly 8 million Africans die from malaria each year. Like tuberculosis, another major cause of death in Africa, malaria is on the rise. An increase in the incidence of tuberculosis has been observed since 1985 in Burundi, Central African Republic, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zimbabwe - all countries with a high prevalence of HIV; 30 - 60 per cent of the additional cases are attributable to HIV infection.

African children die of many other diseases. An estimated 250,000 infants die annually of neonatal tetanus, a disease that has been preventable since 1931 when a vaccine was developed. An estimated 1.2 million African children under the age of five die each year of diarrhoeal diseases. WHO publishes numbers of AIDS cases but not AIDS deaths. If one assumes a similar rate of deaths from AIDS in the United States and Africa (about 63% of Americans with AIDS have died), then some 94,000 African adults and children died of AIDS in 1990. AIDS is a new and growing health problem, one of the many health problems in Africa. High levels of malnutrition debilitate and make Africans susceptible to specific causes of death, a phenomenon known as generalized susceptibility or non-specific mortality. Which disease is written on the death certificate is perhaps less important for aid policy makers than the fact that high levels of...
grated farming. ‘Self-reliance is the goal, integrated farming is the means, and simplicity must be the way of life.’

This refusal of the model. Is it a strategy that could inspire also the peasant associations of Senegal?

Bibliographic Note:

US Aid to AIDS in Africa
Meredeth Turshen

WHO estimates that 6 million Africans have been infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and that 1.16 million cases of AIDS had occurred among adults and children in sub-Saharan Africa by 1991. These are cumulative figures for ten years, including cases and deaths. AIDS is the only disease for which cumulative figures are published; every other disease is reported annually and new cases are separated from that year’s death toll. Although I do not wish to minimize the problem of AIDS in Africa, one should note that the effect of cumulative reporting is to amplify the problem.

It is import to place AIDS in the context of other health problems in Africa when determining types and amounts of health assistance. WHO publishes no death statistics for Africa, only random data are available. Famine and malnutrition are currently the cause of most deaths in drought-stricken parts of Africa. An estimated 100,000 Somalis have died and 1.5 million are at risk of death by starvation in that one country alone. Malaria, which like AIDS suppresses the immune system, is one of the most lethal diseases in tropical Africa; it is the most common reason for hospitalization and the most frequent cause of death of children under five years old. African governments report 80 million cases of malaria annually. There are no continent-wide estimates of deaths from malaria, but in general case fatality rates exceed 10 per cent – that means possibly 8 million Africans die from malaria each year. Like tuberculosis, another major cause of death in Africa, malaria is on the rise. An increase in the incidence of tuberculosis has been observed since 1985 in Burundi, Central African Republic, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zimbabwe – all countries with a high prevalence of HIV; 30 – 60 per cent of the additional cases are attributable to HIV infection.

African children die of many other diseases. An estimated 250,000 infants die annually of neonatal tetanus, a disease that has been preventable since 1931 when a vaccine was developed. An estimated 1.2 million African children under the age of five die each year of diarrhoeal diseases. WHO publishes numbers of AIDS cases but not AIDS deaths. If one assumes a similar rate of deaths from AIDS in the United States and Africa (about 63% of Americans with AIDS have died), then some 94,000 African adults and children died of AIDS in 1990. AIDS is a new and growing health problem, one of the many health problems in Africa. High levels of malnutrition debilitate and make Africans susceptible to specific causes of death, a phenomenon known as generalized susceptibility or non-specific mortality. Which disease is written on the death certificate is perhaps less important for aid policy makers than the fact that high levels of
sickness and death call for public health programmes that can deliver a broad range of preventive and curative health services in Africa.

There are several problems with the response of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to AIDS in Africa. The main problem is that USAID is setting up single-purpose programmes to prevent AIDS and AIDS alone. Yet AIDS is a syndrome of many opportunistic infections, not a single disease; and WHO has shown over the years that single-purpose programmes are wasteful of scarce resources and undermine competing health programmes. WHO has also shown that prevention and treatment need to be combined if disease control programmes are to be effective. USAID gives little assistance for treatment, even of associated infections such as tuberculosis, although African women are pleading for help in caring for the sick. Another problem is that political rather than public health criteria of need appear to guide the setting of targets for priority assistance.

A fourth problem is that little of the money allocated actually goes to Africans; most of it is distributed in the US to various non-governmental and private voluntary organisations.

An Analysis of Project Aid

USAID is giving little assistance to African health services beyond the training of some health workers, and that training is single-purpose; for example, laboratory technicians are training to recognise only sexually transmitted diseases (including AIDS), despite the plethora of opportunistic infections associated with AIDS that need diagnosis and treatment. At the very least, laboratories should be able to screen for tuberculosis as well as sexually transmitted diseases. USAID has not been integrating AIDS prevention into basic health services, favouring instead a vertical approach to AIDS control through family planning programmes and clinics for the treatment of sexually transmitted diseases. AIDS control, for example, might usefully be integrated in the Safe Motherhood Initiative. The vertical approach does not take into account that AIDS is a family disease, a disease that affects the health of several family members not seen in family planning programmes or sexually transmitted disease clinics.

USAID's assistance to the surveillance of sexually transmitted diseases is part of the evaluation of intervention projects to reduce the spread of HIV, rather than for the treatment or cure of disease. The surveillance of sexually transmitted diseases serves as a proxy for changes in HIV incidence, since few if any projects are able to demonstrate a direct effect on HIV transmission.

Second, although contaminated blood is known as a highly efficient mode of transmitting HIV (over 90% efficiency as opposed to 0.1-1% efficiency of sexual transmission), USAID gives little assistance to protecting blood supplies other than the development of new rapid screening tests for use in emergency rooms. The main recipients of transfusions are anaemic children and women treated for spontaneous or self-induced interruption of pregnancy and complications of childbirth. Women and children, you will recall, account for more than 60% of Africans with AIDS. USAID recommends, in Cameroon and elsewhere, that blood transfusions be reduced to a minimum. Evidently there is little confidence that blood supplies can be made
safe. Nor is there support for research on sources of blood supplies in African countries.

Third, having decided that intravenous drug use plays only a minimal role in HIV transmission in Africa, USAID says little about contaminated needles and syringes in medical settings. Disposable needles, which were first introduced in Africa in the 1970s, are systematically reused in medical practice, although they cannot be sterilized. USAID’s response is not, in prevailing conditions of scarcity, to supply conventional reusable syringes and autoclaves for sterilization, but rather to support research on a prefilled injection device that holds a single dose of vaccine or medication in a non-reusable syringe with an attached needle, and a device that allows only one filling of a syringe designed to be disposable. Scarce foreign exchange will be needed to import these devices.

Fourth, USAID’s main preventive strategy is to persuade sexually active adults to use condoms. USAID encourages governments to target prostitutes and their clients in these efforts. This approach relies on the classic public health responses to sexually transmitted diseases – education, contact tracing and condom distribution. There are two problems with this approach in the African setting. One, these responses have little relevance to the majority of African women at risk who are school girls and married women and do not control their sexuality. They are not in a position to impose the use of condoms on their partners. Second, many of the women marked as prostitutes are not full-time commercial sex workers. In societies in which marriage is nearly universal, in which poverty is extensive and living standards are low, in which educational opportunities are restricted, especially for girls, in which there are few job opportunities for young men, and even few for uneducated women, in which couples are frequently separated when men migrate in search of work, the sale of sexual services is likely to be common, blurring the line between infidelity and prostitution.

The outcome of this strategy of targeting prostitutes is that USAID unwittingly supports the victimisation of women. Instead of receiving consolation, praise, and the assistance they need, women are being blamed for the spread of AIDS in Africa. African women are already suffering the brunt of the AIDS epidemic, both as the majority of the afflicted population and as caretakers of both sick relations and their children. Now they are being stigmatized as prostitutes, blamed for transmitting HIV to their clients, for having ‘unprotected’ sex, for getting pregnant, and for passing HIV to their infants.

An underlying problem is the use of target groups in planning research and intervention projects. Categories such as prostitute, intravenous drug use, and homosexual mislead health policy makers by suggesting that transmission modes differ from group to group. Recent ethnographic research reveals the collapse of all these categories in the field: not only female and male prostitutes, and child prostitutes of both sexes, use drugs and perform anal intercourse, but also female and male tourists sample drugs and sex on holidays, though they were not on sex or drug tours and may not have left home with that intention.

Fifth, USAID is channelling funds through US-based non-profit and voluntary organisations, rather than as-
sisting governments and health services directly. The disbursement of funds through US organisations may create a few jobs for Americans and markets for American products, but it does not further the original purpose of foreign aid, which, as I understand it, is to help people in distress to recover their productive abilities.

USAID targets specific countries for priority assistance on criteria other than public health need. Priority recipients are political allies such as Kenya and Zaire, or countries such as Ghana that are show-cases for the monetary policies of the International Monetary Fund or, in the case of Cameroon, which has reported fewer than 500 cases of AIDS to WHO, the country of origin of the WHO Regional Director for Africa.

Finally, USAID assistance in the category 'health care financing' revolves around financial planning, which will probably be of interest to the multinational pharmaceutical industry. Assistance is currently directed to the development of a cost model that countries can use to plan transfusion services; the object is to implement cost recovery programmes — in other words, fees for blood transfusions and for HIV testing. There is no evidence of donations to help defray the costs of treating people with AIDS or with the curable diseases of concomitant epidemics such as tuberculosis.

The Underlying Policy Objectives

The type of assistance the US government is providing to Africa seems to be determined by policy considerations as much as by science, medicine, or public health. The policy considerations concern macro-economic issues of third world development, and the scientific issues appear to be limited to specific experiments in the control of AIDS, which may have application in the United States. The macro-economic issues are not confined to Africa; they include balance of payments deficits and the inability of third world countries to repay bank loans. In response to these problems, USAID supports IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programmes, which comprise a set of economic reforms that includes currency devaluation, export promotion, import reduction, and the curtailment of government expenditure. Their goal is the repayment of outstanding debts.

Since 1980, IMF and World Bank balance of payments loans have supported economic reform programmes in some 40 African countries; the minimum condition for these loans is the adoption of specific policies that shape the economic reforms. In addition to an auction system to determine exchange rates, the IMF and the World Bank require increased domestic currency prices for exports, price liberalization, and increased incentives to the private sector; both agencies treat the food production sector as a 'virtual "residual" in the programmes of most countries producing agricultural crops for export.'

Rising levels of unemployment and bread riots are but two indicators of the social damage these reforms have incurred. UNICEF has documented the impact of structural adjustment on health and health services. Currency devaluation reduces individual and government spending power for purchases of life-sustaining necessities (food, water, shelter), as well as health care. Export promotion increases workloads, which fall especially heavily on
Africa's women farmers, affecting their health and that of their children. Import reduction, especially in combination with currency devaluation, affects the flow of medical and pharmaceutical supplies and equipment into the many African countries that do not produce their own. The curtailment of government expenditure has more seriously affected health, education and welfare than other services. The IMF and the World Bank are encouraging several African governments – for example, Kenya and Ghana – to charge for health services, a burden that falls disproportionately on the poor. The net result is a decline in both health status and health care in Africa. In the words of an editorial in the Lancet, 'there is mounting evidence of deteriorating welfare conditions – e.g. as measured by infant mortality, nutritional status, and educational enrolment – throughout Africa', and 'the quality of health services overall has deteriorated...'.

Rather than use the AIDS epidemic as an opportunity to redress the underfinancing of African health services, USAID would seem to be pursuing its long-desired programme goal of population control. The agency insists on the nature of AIDS as a sexually transmitted disease, it focuses almost exclusively on the heterosexual transmission of AIDS in Africa, and it emphasizes condom use to prevent HIV transmission. Of course, condoms also prevent conception. Although USAID projects a 30 to 50 per cent increase in child mortality as a result of the epidemic, it expects the population growth rate to decline by only 1 per cent, because total fertility is so high in Africa. USAID concludes that this is not the time to diminish family planning efforts, but instead such efforts could be redoubled.

An Alternative Health Policy

The portrayal of AIDS as a sexually transmitted disease, not only exposes women to victimization, but also justifies a health assistance policy limited to health education and condom distribution, combined with HIV testing as a means of monitoring the spread of infection. The inadequacy of this approach is shown in the US where there has been a resurgence of tuberculosis linked to the spread of HIV with inner city public hospitals collapsing under the burden of caring for AIDS patients. The policy failure in Africa, where fiscal austerity programmes have cut deeply into government budgets for health, education and welfare services, is even more grave.

AIDS could usefully be conceived of as an environmental disease in Africa. A broad environmental approach would address the underlying determinants of the spread of HIV – the economic structures that create the need to migrate in search of work and in the process destroy the social and familial networks that protect people from some types of disease experience. Although African women do not advocate a return to traditional institutions of patriarchal domination, they do recognise the failure of alternative networks in urban areas to protect young girls, in particular, from the sexual exploitation that is the stigma of AIDS.

The formulation of AIDS as an environmental disease would entail a different health policy, one that calls for an investment in the prevention and treatment of common infections, including tuberculosis, sexually transmitted diseases, and malaria. Because women and children account for more than 60% of people with AIDS in
Africa, priority should be accorded to caring for them, taking their social as well as their physical health needs into consideration. Treatment implies an investment in African health services, along the lines advocated by WHO and UNICEF in the primary health care programme.

Recognition that AIDS is an environmental disease would also call for new solutions to malnutrition that address the entire food system, beginning with issues of landlessness, and not limited to improved distribution and increased consumption of food.

Because AIDS is still primarily an urban disease, an environmental approach would entail plans to accommodate rural-urban migration, which has increased under the pressure of austerity measures and structural adjustment programmes and caused African cities to grow at the rapid rate of 6% per year. Good urban planning encompasses housing, water supply, sanitation and transportation needs, as well as health care.

An environmentally oriented AIDS policy would re-examine certain development strategies that are proving detrimental to women's health. For example, the tourist industry, sponsored by national governments and encouraged by international agencies as a solution to slow economic development, has (in some cases, intentionally) promoted prostitution.

USAID needs to turn away from the search for a quick technological fix to the AIDS problem in Africa. Putting foreign aid dollars into the development of a vaccine is not likely to help Africans, who still suffer from diseases such as neonatal tetanus and tuberculosis for which vaccines were developed more than 50 years ago. Aid dollars are needed to rebuild African health services that deteriorated during a decade of neglect and are now being called upon more than ever to cope with the myriad infections associated with AIDS.

Bibliographic Note


Angola: Free and Fair Elections!

Patrick Smith

Instead of a national celebration to mark the significant achievement of the 29 and 30 September 1992 multi-party elections, Angola has been plunged into a new period of armed confrontation. Once the Uniao Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) had refused to accept the election result and its key leadership left Luanda for Huambo (its base in the Central Highlands) the stage was set for a resumption of the civil war. All that was absent in the hostilities following the polls was a formal declaration of war. In the confused pattern of events following the elections, any attempt to apportion blame for the breakdown of the political process is far from an exact science; but some key developments elucidate the issues around the resumption of major hostilities:

1. The Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) won the elections for the National Assembly and narrowly missed winning the Presidency. They had nothing to gain and much to lose from a return to war. There is evidence to suggest that the resumption of hostilities took MPLA off-guard allowing UNITA to make rapid gains. Western military observers confirmed that of the two forces, the MPLA’s Forcas Armadas Populares de Libertacao de Angola (FAPLA) appeared less prepared for hostilities and generally more eager for demobilisation. This too appeared to be the verdict of the Angolan people; they voted for the MPLA not because of their record of economic management (which is generally regarded as weak even taking the disruptions of war into account) but for their promise to deliver a consensual government of reconciliation.

2. Interviews with officials indicate there was genuine incredulity in the UNITA camp that they had lost the elections: they had been told themselves and they had been told by their erstwhile foreign backers in Washington and Pretoria that they would win. Even Savimbi appeared to believe his own propaganda. Rather than attempt to reconcile their membership to electoral defeat, the bulk of information emanating from the UNITA radio station was highly inflammatory. There had been little attempt to reconcile UNITA’s Forcas Armadas de Libertação de Angola (FALA) to demobilisation given the poor state of the economy. The reaction of the FALA troops, put in context, is also understandable; from all the information they received from their leadership, there was little economic future for them under a MPLA-dominated government.
1. The Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) won the elections for the National Assembly and narrowly missed winning the Presidency. They had nothing to gain and much to lose from a return to war. There is evidence to suggest that the resumption of hostilities took MPLA off-guard allowing UNITA to make rapid gains. Western military observers confirmed that of the two forces, the MPLA's Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (FAPLA) appeared less prepared for hostilities and generally more eager for demobilisation. This too appeared to be the verdict of the Angolan people; they voted for the MPLA not because of their record of economic management (which is generally regarded as weak even taking the disruptions of war into account) but for their promise to deliver a consensual government of reconciliation.

2. Interviews with officials indicate there was genuine incredulity in the UNITA camp that they had lost the elections: they had been told themselves and they had been told by their erstwhile foreign backers in Washington and Pretoria that they would win. Even Savimbi appeared to believe his own propaganda. Rather than attempt to reconcile their membership to electoral defeat, the bulk of information emanating from the UNITA radio station was highly inflammatory. There had been little attempt to reconcile UNITA's Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola (FALA) to demobilisation given the poor state of the economy. The reaction of the FALA troops, put in context, is also understandable; from all the information they received from their leadership, there was little economic future for them under a MPLA-dominated government.
3. The international backers of the peace process failed to anticipate the effect of a UNITA defeat at the elections. They had no fall-back position in the event of either side refusing to accept the electoral verdict; there was an informal arrangement (just two weeks before the elections) proposed by Portugal’s Foreign Minister José Manuel Durão Barroso to encourage Dos Santos and Savimbi to form a government of national unity regardless of the election result. In the event, none of the so-called troika of the US, Russia or Portugal had much leverage on the MPLA or UNITA. As the hostilities escalated there was a diplomatic vacuum enabling the South African government’s Pik Botha and his assistant Sean Cleary to enter the process (much to the frustration of the western and UN diplomats) as a ‘mediator’ until they were declared persona non grata by the MPLA.

4. The peace-keeping mission and electoral supervision was under-staffed and under-financed. The delays in demobilisation of the two armies – FAPLA and FALA – fell hopelessly behind schedule facilitating an easy return to hostilities. Despite the hopeful signs that the Angolan people and many of the soldiers were desperate for peace and national reconciliation, the demobilisation process and the military integration process had not advanced far enough to give them the confidence that it would succeed. Key indicators of success would have been provision of jobs and retraining for demobilised soldiers (from both armies) and decent joint training facilities for members of the integrated force, Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA) which would have inspired confidence in the process and given it a much needed momentum. Similarly the electoral process, while commendable in terms of the training and involvement of Angolans of all political persuasion, was inadequately supervised: 800 monitors for nearly 6,000 polling stations in a country half the size of western Europe was not enough. A comprehensive monitoring presence, such as was deployed in the Namibian elections (one independent monitor for every polling station) would have made any challenge of the election results much more difficult.

In the short term, prospects for a brokered settlement between the MPLA and UNITA collapsed as hostilities escalated after 30 October. President José Eduardo dos Santos and his circle, without reference to Savimbi and the UNITA leadership, sought a formula for compromise that would bring non-MPLA officials into a broad-based government in Luanda. MPLA officials made a sharp differentiation between a government of national unity and the idea of a coalition on a shared platform (which was being advocated by the United States’ Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Herman Cohen and South Africa’s ‘freelance negotiator’ and former dip-

---

**Angolan Election Results**

**Presidential Elections:**
- MPLA (José Eduardo dos Santos) 49.67%
- UNITA (Jonas Savimbi) 40.07%

**National Assembly:**
- MPLA 53.74%
- UNITA 34.10%

Because dos Santos fell short of the 50% + 1 vote required for outright victory under the electoral rules, a second round run-off between him and Savimbi should, under the law, be held.
MPLA officials resented the idea that UNITA, having been defeated in the elections, could gain access to power primarily because they had issued a veiled threat to return to civil war. Power sharing plans tabled by UNITA and supported by South Africa included a Governo de Transição de Interesse Nacional under which key portfolios would be allocated on an alternating basis, e.g. MPLA minister, UNITA deputy and vice versa. There were other issues too, such as resolving outstanding issues of national security (bringing the 'special forces' of both sides into the new national integrated armed forces), and finding a role for Jonas Savimbi which enabled him to play a constructive and high profile role in a national reconciliation programme.

This agenda collapsed following the resumption of open hostilities between MPLA and UNITA. Following its defeat at the elections (see box below), UNITA had launched a number of strikes against provincial centres. They took over targets in Moxico, Huambo, Benguela and Uige Province as well as the diamond producing areas in Lunda Norte. UN officials estimated UNITA controlled 30 to 40 per cent of the country by the end of October (most estimates reckoned UNITA had controlled some 20 per cent of the country before the elections); these areas include most of the Central Highlands – the home of the Ovimbundu people where UNITA's support base is strongest, and large swathes of territory in the southeast and northeast of the country. Some sources close to the MPLA claim that UNITA was believed to control up to 50 per cent of the land area of the country, although they had been unable to consolidate in many of the urban centres.

UNITA forces are understood by western military sources to have a potential strength of 15,000 (UNITA claim double this figure) with enough military hardware, ranging from AK47s to Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and armoured personnel carriers, to maintain intensive guerilla operations for at least a year. There are some indications that UNITA units have been re-supplied from South African sources before and shortly after the elections. Facing them, the government forces of the MPLA comprise the emergency police of 'Ninjas' (as Angolans call them), which are an elite SAS-style unit estimated to be at least 15,000 strong as well as some of the demobilised FAPLA units which have been hastily reconstituted as 'civilian militias'. Presumably, if the war escalates further, the MPLA would have access to the armoury of the joint forces/FAA which includes some 250 battle tanks, 300 armoured personnel carriers and 500 artillery pieces and a powerful range of mortars, assault guns and air defence systems. The MPLA would also have access to the 6,000 strong airforce which is dominated by former FAPLA forces and has an estimated 145 combat aircraft and 40 armed helicopters.

Clearly MPLA would have a technical superiority even allowing for renewed South African supplies for UNITA; outside of this, initially it was assumed that morale and discipline was better amongst the UNITA forces. The shoot out in Luanda beginning on 30 October which obliterated UNITA's command structure in the capital proved to be a great morale boost for MPLA. From the relative strengths of the two sides, UNITA is well equipped to fight an effective guerilla war, capable of denying the MPLA access to strategic zones of territory. Using this strategy,
a 'born-again UNITA' would become more like the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo) in Mozambique, fighting a more mobile and even more destructive war.

If, however, UNITA wanted to follow a strategy of national partition effectively sealing off the Central Highlands and the southeastern provinces and to run a parallel government, its position would be more problematic. Such a strategy would involve taking perhaps Lobito City and running a defensive corridor across to Luena in Moxio province. While it is capable of taking both cities, its capacity to hold them and to defend a corridor linking them (and one which bisects the country) is severely limited; any such operation would be vulnerable to air attack from the MPLA, unless UNITA was able to call on external assistance from South Africa (or more remotely from Zaïre or the Congo.)

In the event, the slide to military confrontation appeared to be inexorable. Less than a week after the elections Savimbi left Luanda for Huambo complaining of major irregularities in the polls. A thorough-going investigation was launched into the complaints (which according to western diplomats would have amounted to the reallocation of just 10,000 votes) failed to pacify Savimbi. The UN and various teams of international observers (800 working as 400 pairs to cover the vote in nearly 6,000 polling stations) pronounced the elections to be generally free and fair. Savimbi's move to Huambo carried ominous overtones and was accompanied by extremely provocative broadcasts on UNITA's Voice of the Black Cockerell radio station which threatened a return to war. Savimbi then pulled all the UNITA generals out of the FAA.

Underlying these developments was Savimbi's pre-election declaration, in private and at public rallies, that the only way he could lose the elections would be if they were rigged; this has turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Only the South African government and its 'mediators', Botha and Cleary, have maintained close relations with Savimbi; indeed there have been allegations from the MPLA of South African military support for UNITA and some western diplomats expressed concern about unauthorised South African overflights of southeast Angola in the weeks just prior to the elections.

In the month following the election, the MPLA's first response appeared muted. Their officials attempted to appear as statesmanlike as possible. They delayed publishing the election results after UNITA had raised its objections, and when UNITA started troop movements in the southeast and north of the country, MPLA struck a defensive posture. Having effectively won the election, MPLA wanted to broker a deal with its UNITA opponents who were proving unable to accept defeat. The MPLA's stance was actively encouraged by the UN which saw the possibility of the situation rapidly slipping out of control which is what happened on the four days following 31 October.

There was also the suspicion that the MPLA would not be capable of reasserting its authority. Western military sources said that UNITA forces were in much better condition; when they were demobilised they had remained close to their camps and would be able to re-form again relatively easily. In contrast, it was claimed, morale and discipline in the MPLA forces, FAPLA, had deteriorated since the 31 May 1991 ceasefire signed in Estoril, Portugal.
In the fighting that started around Luanda on 31 October, the MPLA's emergency police played a key role. The fighting centered initially on three areas: the international airport which is just two miles from the city centre, the Miramar area where several high ranking UNITA officials had their houses, and the Hotel Turismo in which a number of middle ranking UNITA officials stayed. The fighting was the worst since last year's ceasefire with more than 1,000 estimated to have been killed. The MPLA said that the fighting started in Luanda as part of a coup attempt by UNITA, which depended on using their estimated 1,000 to 2,000 forces in Luanda to knock out key installations in the capital; out of the confusion they would either try to take control of the reins of government or at least to use the ensuing confusion to strengthen their grip on the provinces in the south. But UNITA said their forces were the victims of a strike by the MPLA's emergency police which saw the opportunity to wipe out some of their senior cadres in Luanda.

In the event, UNITA came off much worse. Two of its most effective senior officials, UNITA representative on the Joint Political and Military Commission and Savimbi's nephew, Elias Salupeto Pena, and UNITA Vice-President Jeremias Chitunda were killed. UNITA Foreign Affairs spokesman, Abel Chivukuvuku was seriously wounded, and the whereabouts of former commander of UNITA's FALA Force, General Arlindo Chenda Pena – 'Ben Ben' – were unknown. Their command structure in Luanda was obliterated – 14 senior UNITA officers, including eight generals, were captured by the MPLA. One of them, General Peregrino Huambo, contacted Savimbi to discuss his preparedness to return to Luanda to negotiate with the MPLA. This move was followed by the arrival in Angola of Marack Goulding, under-secretary for peace keeping operations at the UN and former British Ambassador to Luanda.

The brokering process became much more complicated after the escalation of hostilities. Portugal, the US, Russia and South Africa became less important in the process as the UN effort, backed by the European Community countries in general, took centrestage. The MPLA pronounced South Africa's Pik Botha persona non grata in Luanda, and the British – through Ambassador John Flynn – started to play a mediating role. It provided a satellite telephone for MPLA's General Antonio dos santos Franca 'N'Dalu' to talk to UNITA's security chief General Altino Bango Sapalalo 'Bock' in Huambo. At the same time, stories began to circulate, apparently originating from a Portuguese journalist, of British and US support for UNITA's war effort – charges stringently denied by both Washington and London. Other signals from western capitals indicate British interest in Angola (limited as it is) focuses on the country's oil and diamond reserves, while US policy could become more sympathetic to MPLA following the inauguration of President-elect Bill Clinton (with the MPLA government being recognised by Washington even before a second round of presidential elections).

As discussions continued at the beginning of November, two clear options for the future of the country emerged:

* That the ongoing talks with MPLA and UNITA would result in a ceasefire, then detailed agreements on a joint security deal. This would in turn open the way to a resumption of a
political dialogue incorporating even the UNITA hardliners led by Savimbi. Working out a role for Savimbi and his close allies would be extremely difficult given the break of faith that accompanied his move to Huambo; however difficult such a deal would be to broker, it would be essential if the main fighting cadres in UNITA are to be pacified. The fact that channels of communication have remained open between MPLA and UNITA since the Estoril Agreement of 1991 is a positive sign. The difficulty is that Savimbi was not able to even contemplate losing the election and had successfully communicated this position to the key UNITA cadres who remain convinced they are fighting a just war – this time against election rigging. But some senior MPLA officials believe Dos Santos has been somewhat indulgent towards UNITA since the election; they see no need to compromise with a party and leader which lost elections certified by the international community as free and fair. Certainly, if the roles had been reversed and the MPLA was militarily challenged an election result, there would have been only negligible foreign support for them to have a continued role in government.

In any negotiations over power sharing Dos Santos will have to protect an area of centre-ground which hardly exists, outside the Angolan middle classes and in the minds of international mediators. The forces propelling the MPLA to move towards the centre are the overwhelming desire of the Angolan people for peace and the impossibility of embarking on a national reconstruction programme without a national consensus. The forces propelling UNITA towards the centre are their performance in the first round of elections; there are more than 70 elected UNITA representatives who could take up membership in the National Assembly. The more comfortable urban-based cadres in UNITA who were being groomed to run the government bureaucracy after their predicted success at the elections have some stake in the political process already and are likely to be reluctant to return to the exigencies of a bush war. The weakening of UNITA’s command structure after the Luanda shoot out may put new pressures on Savimbi to compromise having realised the array of military forces UNITA will face should it decide to continue with the civil war option.

- The option of a creeping civil war (a strategy being actively pursued by UNITA in the wake of the elections) would more likely mean a series of guerilla skirmishes rather than conventional battles. UNITA do not have the capability to pursue the second option, neither would they have the foreign backing to markedly improve their logistical position. Their occupation of the diamond-mining areas in Lunda Norte boosts their already substantial cash reserves; they will be able to augment their forces with foreign mercenaries from South Africa etc. If UNITA pursues the guerilla option, they would be markedly more effective than Renamo in Mozambique for example: they are better organised, better disciplined and better equipped. Their capacity for disruption would be considerable – even to the extent of making the country, outside of MPLA’s strongholds in the north and in the urban centres, ungovernable. In the time-honoured cliche, the alternative to negotiations now appears to be negotiations later.

Patrick Smith is editor of Africa Confidential.
The CIA, Department of Defense and Africa Scholars

The African Studies Association held its annual meeting in Seattle in late November 1992. The following two abridged documents have been issued by the Association of Concerned African Scholars (ACAS).

The US Congress has appropriated $150 million to fund international research at US universities. In 1991 the National Security Education Act (NSEA) was signed by President Bush. Known as the Boren Bill, after its sponsor Senator David Boren (Democrat, Oklahoma and chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence), the Act established this fund to support undergraduate study abroad, graduate research fellowships and institutional support for international studies programs. Students must repay their grants or work either in a related educational field or in a federal agency, with particular encouragement being given to employment in national security agencies. The program which is administered by the Defense Intelligence College of the Department of Defense. An advisory board, which is chaired by the Secretary of Defense, includes the Secretaries of Education, State and Commerce; the Directors of the CIA and USIA; and four presidential nominees. The effect of the Boren Bill is quite clear: it will draw the scholarly community into new relationships with intelligence and military agencies.

Many students of Africa have long opposed such attempts to link the scholarly community with national security agencies. Many of us recall the disastrous effects for academics of such linkages during the Vietnam era, including Project Camelot in Latin America, and the lengthy record in Africa of CIA/military interventions supporting repressive rulers and working against legitimate and elected leaders. Given the end of the Cold War, it is especially inappropriate to give the intelligence community substantial influence over the direction and priorities of international studies.

Funding from such sources will threaten the openness of scholarly inquiry and publication, the physical safety of scholars and students overseas and, cooperation between African and US scholars. This cooperation has been possible because of the firm stance that many Africa scholars, programs and centers have taken against liaison with defense and intelligence agencies. This includes the commitment since 1982 of the African Studies Association, the Association of African Studies Programs and the major African studies center directors not to accept defense and intelligence funding of African Studies. It also includes the recent statement by the Presidents of the African Studies Association, the Latin American Studies Association and the Middle East Studies Association against links with national security agencies: we strongly encourage you to revise the administration of the program to ensure that the allocation and administration of funds be managed by a federal education agency and not by the Defense Intelligence College.

We strongly recommend that the advisory panel constituted to oversee the program or evaluate proposals not include a representative from the CIA.

Editors Note: When the next session of Congress begins in January 1993 Senator Boren will be replaced by Senator Dennis De Concini (Democrat, Arizona). While
Washington admits that the NSEA program will be fully operational by the autumn of 1993, the ASA board plans to lobby De Concini plus the new members of Congress in the hope that the Clinton administration will be more open to the views of scholars.

A Greater Voice for Africa in the US: A New Analysis

Never before have the peoples of Africa so urgently needed the support of their friends in the West, and especially in the United States. Constricted simultaneously by the world economic recession, a global glut in many African agricultural commodities, the costs of militarism and internal economic and political problems, Africa needs temporary and long-term support in seeking alternatives to being discarded as the fourth world, irrelevant to the global economy and community. The need for food aid where drought and famine stalk the land is urgent and pressing. More important is the rebuilding of an indigenous agenda for development which begins with basic human needs, setting aside the simplistic formulae of the modernization models and the cold war tolerance of minority regimes.

To begin the slow and painful work for a new development agenda, Africa first needs immediate external aid for the pressing emergencies of food, health and shelter, but Africa also needs long-term hope that her plans for recovery and rebuilding will receive their deserved attention from the wealthy governors of the world economy. However, Africa has never been farther from the centre of US foreign policy agenda. Indeed, in the 1990s, the period of Africa’s most pressing crises, of the $17 billion US foreign development aid, less than five per cent ($800 million) goes to Africa. Now, Africa has been marginalized even further by the end of the cold war and the rise of a new domestic fixation in the US electorate.

In spite of the turn of the US electorate from foreign policy issues toward jobs and the domestic economy, a Clinton administration offers new opportunities for a fresh dialogue about US policy toward African nations. The principles of Clinton’s Africa campaign statements merit support: attention to human rights and democratization; reform of development assistance; strengthen UN peacekeeping efforts; and retaining sanctions pressure on South Africa. Those opportunities are more urgent because of the remnants of 30 years of US cold war policy in Africa - the rejection of democratic elections by US client Jonas Savimbi, the continued South African plays to avoid democracy and to foment ethnic strife, the banditry residual from the US and USSR arming of Somalia, the continued support of Mobutu in Zaire, and the failure to provide the UN with support necessary to contain the disastrous conflicts in Liberia (and its neighbours), Somalia, Mozambique and Angola.

Thus, there is an urgent and pressing need for a more articulate and powerful voice in the US for seeking a larger, more compassionate, and serious focus on Africa in US foreign policy and for mounting and maintaining pressure on the new Administration and the new Congress (with a new House Africa Subcommittee Chairperson). The moment has come for US citizens to muster support for the present and
Washington admits that the NSEA program will be fully operational by the autumn of 1993, the ASA board plans to lobby De Concini plus the new members of Congress in the hope that the Clinton administration will be more open to the views of scholars.

A Greater Voice for Africa in the US: A New Analysis

Never before have the peoples of Africa so urgently needed the support of their friends in the West, and especially in the United States. Constricted simultaneously by the world economic recession, a global glut in many African agricultural commodities, the costs of militarism and internal economic and political problems, Africa needs temporary and long-term support in seeking alternatives to being discarded as the fourth world, irrelevant to the global economy and community. The need for food aid where drought and famine stalk the land is urgent and pressing. More important is the rebuilding of an indigenous agenda for development which begins with basic human needs, setting aside the simplistic formulae of the modernization models and the cold war tolerance of minority regimes.

To begin the slow and painful work for a new development agenda, Africa first needs immediate external aid for the pressing emergencies of food, health and shelter, but Africa also needs long-term hope that her plans for recovery and rebuilding will receive their deserved attention from the wealthy governors of the world economy. However, Africa has never been farther from the centre of US foreign policy agenda. Indeed, in the 1990s, the period of Africa’s most pressing crises, of the $17 billion US foreign development aid, less than five per cent ($800 million) goes to Africa. Now, Africa has been marginalized even further by the end of the cold war and the rise of a new domestic fixation in the US electorate.

In spite of the turn of the US electorate from foreign policy issues toward jobs and the domestic economy, a Clinton administration offers new opportunities for a fresh dialogue about US policy toward African nations. The principles of Clinton’s Africa campaign statements merit support: attention to human rights and democratization; reform of development assistance; strengthen UN peacekeeping efforts; and retaining sanctions pressure on South Africa. Those opportunities are more urgent because of the remnants of 30 years of US cold war policy in Africa - the rejection of democratic elections by US client Jonas Savimbi, the continued South African plays to avoid democracy and to foment ethnic strife, the banditry residual from the US and USSR arming of Somalia, the continued support of Mobutu in Zaire, and the failure to provide the UN with support necessary to contain the disastrous conflicts in Liberia (and its neighbours), Somalia, Mozambique and Angola.

Thus, there is an urgent and pressing need for a more articulate and powerful voice in the US for seeking a larger, more compassionate, and serious focus on Africa in US foreign policy and for mounting and maintaining pressure on the new Administration and the new Congress (with a new House Africa Subcommittee Chairperson). The moment has come for US citizens to muster support for the present and
future of this sub-continent from which so many of our peoples and so much of our American culture, heritage and products have been drawn.

The Marginalization of Africa in the US Consciousness

The demise of the Cold War has freed Africa dramatically from Big Power rivalries as the engine of external interests in the continent. The Eastern European powers have turned to their own crises, and the wealthier West has become immensely disinterested in Africa. Africa is seen as full of problems, debilitated by the AIDS epidemic, short of attractive investment opportunities and inconsequential as a purchaser of western goods. Most African countries, in common with many third world economies, are besieged with debt, further collapse of commodity prices (especially relative to power to purchase goods of the industrial North), devaluation, inflation, unemployment and infrastructure, food shortages, massive health problems (cholera, HIV and the resurgent six WHO-targeted tropical diseases), and other destabilizing structural weaknesses.

These burgeoning crises are occurring in the context of major structural reorganization of the global system, its economy, polity, and military power. Because of the relaxing of East-West tensions, most of the nations of the South, and both repressive leaders and progressive movements within them, can no longer automatically use the cold war polarities to gain access to aid and support from the big powers of the North. Simultaneously, the materialist ideologies and ‘development’ through ‘the benign guidance of the market’ are being applied in Eastern Europe and the Pacific Rim. While these can correct some of the distortions of prices and of high-cost centralized bureaucracies in some African nations, many believe they are not a key to addressing the depth and breadth of the African economies and peoples. In Africa, pressures from the US, IMF, World Bank, and other western nations are felt more stringently in the states made fragile and dependent by their declining power, leading a large number of African states to accede to the economic dictates of the World Bank and IMF. Nevertheless, their response has yet to produce any significant foreign assistance or serious attention to the crises facing most nations.

At the same time, even amidst economic crisis, many African nations are offering internal change and political transformations, with democratic elections, new leadership, multi-party rule, and a clear priority on basic human needs of the population. Yet, it is not clear that economic and political support from the industrial powers for this new generation of democratic leaders will be forthcoming to assist them to maintain the fragile holds on power they have achieved. These transformations open new possibilities of calling on the US state to truly support the democratic principles it seeks in Africa that was not possible under the cold war ethos.

Africa in the 1990s has more educated humanpower for solving African problems with African experts, including scientists with advanced training. Yet, most decision-makers in the wealthier nations remain unimpressed and disinterested. Indeed, structural adjustment programs and the rising dominance of international financial agencies threaten to weaken or eliminate indigenous research capacities
because of the non-convertibility and
devaluation of African currencies, de-
creasing their purchasing power of
research resources on the world mar-
ket.

Among diverse US public - mass and
elite - interest in Africa has dropped.
The interest of US politicians has been
eroded by Nelson Mandela's release
from prison, the broad perception that
apartheid is bound for the rubbish
heap of history, and the 'donor fa-
tigue' at the seemingly endless parade
of new African problems. Indeed, the
issues facing South Africa are chang-
ing, where focus on national liberation
is being replaced by the issues con-
fronting the rest of the continent -
democracy, ethnicity, jobs, affirmative
action for correcting the discrimina-
tory past, food production, and pent-
up demand for social services and
economic opportunity.

The attention of the Western and
Japanese corporate and investment
communities have shifted to new op-
opportunities in the Pacific and Europe
as US investments and trade with
Africa declined since the 1970s. The US
foreign policy-making elites, likewise,
are riveted to global competition among
the economic powers and the transfor-
mations of the Eastern Bloc. Across
North America, we see a new re-
focusing on domestic economic and
social issues (including some interna-
tional concerns primarily of the envi-
rionment, human rights and
'democracy'). Even some of the liberal
politicians elected to the 1993 US
Congress campaigned on the new
isolationist platform to redirect our
attention more exclusively to the do-
mestic economy and to 'bring our
dollars home'.

For masses in the US, attention is
focused on declining job and economic
opportunities. The concentration of
wealth in the Northern Hemisphere
which Africans face is matched by the
greatest concentration of wealth within
the US in this nations history. Many
people are caught in a new experience
of impoverishment, decline in stand-
ard of living and quality of life, and the
prospect of downward mobility in this
wealthy nation. As in Europe, this
accentuates many of the myths of
national chauvinism and defines link-
age and support for Africa as irrele-
vant to 'our struggle', because energy
and attention are consumed by the
struggle to survive amidst US ethnic,
racial and class politics.

In the domain of popular culture, there
are important efforts - especially in
centers of African and African-Ameri-
can studies and communities - to give
new attention to Africa's complex
histories and cultures. This is a major
accomplishment in the context of the
history of gross stereotyping of Africa.
It also occurs when probably only four
or five per cent of the total US public
and private budget for foreign lan-
guage and area studies is spent for the
study of one-fifth of the global land-
mass with more nations, cultures, and
languages than any other world re-
region. There also is a slowly growing
public consciousness that Africa is
important as a major player in the
global environmental equation.

However, in much of the mass 'view-
ing market' we find continuing gross
disinterest in Africa. This translates
into poor reporting in the public and
scholarly media, and an inadequate
Western market for good educational
and media materials on the continent,
small enrollments in many college
classes concerning Africa, and the
continuing dissemination of gross ra-
cial and social stereotypes of the peoples and cultures of Africa. Images of starving African refugees flow into US living rooms, leading most to conclude that Africa is but a caricature of endless problems, bad government, incompetence, and an undesirable continent with which to link and identify.

Perhaps most striking is the juxtaposition of a mobilizing success of the friends of Africa not so long ago set against the current demobilization. For 30 years, key African-American, student/faculty, church, labor and liberal groups mobilized against apartheid, achieving one of the most remarkable changes in US foreign policy of the century - building through local and statewide actions the divestiture and sanctions movement that overwhelmed the President, Congress and the State Department with the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. This occurred against the wishes and intent of the US President, his administration and the great majority of decision-making elites in the Washington establishment. But with this astonishing national victory against apartheid, most Africanists and other friends of the continent now have laid down their arms and retreated from Africa’s broader struggles, even those of apartheid South Africa.

As Africa’s problems soared in the 1990s, most of its US supporters to date have failed to shift their attention to the broader needs and to mount any effective action on the pressing problems elsewhere in the continent. Instead, we seem to have retired from the fray and ‘gone home’ to family and work. Africa’s friends have become demobilized on a broad front - in the Congress, among churches and unions, on the campuses, and even among some Africa-focused associations and NGOs. The national organizations with which activist scholars have cooperated and been linked in legislative and pressure campaigns (Washington Office on Africa, American Committee on Africa, TransAfrica and others) are suffering financially and organisationally in varying degrees in the post-Mandela release period. Simultaneously, while many major funders have focused even more of their resources for Africa-related projects of organization inside Africa, they offer little support for initiatives to build a constituency with a greater voice for Africa in the US.

Distracted by pressing domestic issues of jobs, housing, health, education and racism on which few victories are being won, even the traditional friends of Africa in the Congress and the Congressional Black Caucus have failed to mobilize effectively on Africa’s behalf, including on emergency humanitarian assistance and conflict resolution. The surprisingly strong and successful mobilizations of US progressives and African-Americans in the anti-apartheid struggle has not translated to effective support for economic assistance for Africa (emergency or longer-term). Even African countries that have adopted Western structural adjustment, population control and democracy reforms are receiving miniscule levels of foreign assistance. In 1990-91, total US economic assistance for the 47 nations of sub-Saharan Africa only barely exceeds that of Nicaragua and Panama together and totals less than one-tenth of the combined assistance to Israel and Egypt. Many Africanists have long been critical or at least ambivalent about the motivations and impacts of US economic and military assistance.

Even most US academic specialists on
Africa, who demonstrably have strong sympathies with the particular countries and people they know and who decry the broad disinterest in Africa, have not raised a clear and present voice either for increased US linkages with the continent or for a humanitarian response to the food, health and economic crises which the external powers and the 'natural workings' of the global economy have helped to create. Rather, in spite of their studies of an economically impoverished and fragile continent irrevocably caught in a marginal position in the global system, most academic Africanists remain isolated, racially-divided in political action, professionally dispassionate, and focused on their personal interests in occupational productivity, advancement and professional prestige.

As a result of this complex juxtaposition of African, global and US forces, we find that the constituency concerned with US policy toward Africa in this critical new period is small, disorganised, disunited and largely ineffective. Clearly, a new assessment and plan of action is needed for any friends of Africa seeking more attention to Africa and a more supportive US policy in the mid-1990s, especially to speak afresh in 1993 to the new Congress and new Administration.

For further information write to ACAS, Box 11694, Berkeley, California 94701-2694

For Donald Horowitz, the key to understanding South Africa is that it is 'a racially and ethnically divided society' (p.xii). So the central concern of A Democratic South Africa? is how to engineer democracy by building incentives for candidates and political parties to create interests across racial and ethnic group lines. Drawing on extensive comparative examples, Horowitz advocates certain constitutional designs around the electoral system, presidentialism and federalism that would provide racially or ethnically based parties with incentives 'to dilute the exclusivity of their appeals' (p.157) and which would not compromise the principle that 'every vote should count for one and none should count for more than one' (p.100). Horowitz is 'one of the world's foremost experts on ethnicity' (Lijphart, 1991:92) and this work has, to date, received some very favourable comment and reviews. Heribert Adam, for example, sees it as 'one of the most sophisticated accounts of the current debates' (1991:50).

To properly assess A Democratic South Africa?, however, it is important to ask if Horowitz's starting point for thinking about South Africa is correct. Is South Africa really a racially and ethnically divided society? To Horowitz the truth about the conflict rests on being prepared to accept the 'reality' that race and ethnicity exist and are salient political phenomena, with their own effects and determinate relationships, which cannot be simply 'wished away'. But on what substantive grounds can this be upheld? Just how does South Africa constitute a racially and ethnically divided society?

The Meaning of Race & Ethnicity

To Horowitz, race and ethnicity are not essentially separate categories; both are seen to be good markers of relatedness and the basis for group formation; 'race' and 'racial' are taken to refer to 'differences demarcated by colour', whilst 'ethnicity' and 'ethnic' refer 'specifically to Afrikaners, English-speakers, Xhosa, Tswana etc.' (p.25). But just what are these differences demarcated by colour and ethnic group identity? What is the basis for group solidarity?

Here, Horowitz places emphasis on ascriptive differences based on the relationship of ethnicity (defined as inclusive of race) to family; arguing that people value ethnic affiliations as sources of 'community', 'familiarity' and 'assistance' (pp.28-29). The idea of common provenance through kinship, often established at birth, is seen to provide people with a sense of both belonging and distinctiveness that 'makes interethnic compromise so difficult in divided societies' (Horowitz, 1985:54). This, it is maintained, is because there is an innate recurrent
tendency to cleavage and 'a strong human tenancy in a common environment for people to define themselves by contrast and to seek confirmation of their collective worth' (p.40). As such ethnic identity is taken to reside within everyone; if not visibly, below the surface, in a dormant state awaiting activation in certain 'new contexts' (pp.44-48). In short, Horowitz sees ethnic identity rooted in human needs and psychological processes associated with group formation and acquiring political significance in pertinent instances.

However, the central problem with all this is that greater specification is required; for it is not clear how the constitution of ethnic subjectivity, as distinct from kinship, comes into the picture. No autonomous definition of ethnicity but rest on contestable assumptions about common human tendencies and the struggle for relative group worth. As such, the meaning of ethnic difference is not adequately answered. Any explanatory power which ethnicity might have in terms of causal determination evaporates in favour of forces of human nature and group psychology, which, taken together, serve as a theoretical vanishing point. Horowitz fails to prove that race and ethnicity are viable autonomous sociological notions. If they are not, of themselves, the source of difference, what is their specific nature? What is their part in the explanatory framework?

Moreover, there is no explicit attempt to explain theoretically the social dynamics that make for 'new contexts'. With regard to South Africa, Horowitz argues that at present, amongst Africans, ethnic affiliations have been relegated to the 'mental attic' and placed in 'deep storage' (p.40). A 'new context', however, such as the fall of apartheid, can cause ethnic affiliations, due to 'a strong human tendency' to be extracted and 'dusted off' from people's 'mental attic' (p.41). It is difficult to see how such statements meet the demands of rigorous social science; even if we assume there is something latent there in the first place, just how is ethnicity reactivated? As Horowitz's overall mode of analysis is a static one it cannot account for social change. There is, for example, no attempt to probe how oppression has been generated and there is silence instead of explanation about the collapse of apartheid, and the social forces that brought South Africa to its present moment.

Part of the problem is that Horowitz's conception of race and ethnicity is not linked to adequate recognition of the material determination of social consciousness; his explanation is located outside the realm of socio-economic structural forces. Tellingly, there is no serious engagement with the long standing race/class debate. Horowitz fails to ask who benefits from ethnic divisions. Not once does A Democratic South Africa? cite the scholarship of the 'new school' of marxist studies.

More importantly, the reason why Horowitz's reading of race and ethnicity does not provide a valid social theoretical basis for understanding South African society is that race and ethnicity cannot be made to stand as valid analytical categories; they do not have any scientific credibility, rather they are social constructions, products of the 'imagination'. In truth, race and ethnicity must be rejected as specific objects of analysis. What requires explanation is their existence as ideological notions in the everyday world. What has to be asked is 'why have
such forms of group differentiation become 'meaningful social realities' in specific situations at specific times?" (Johnstone, 1976:209). To understand the process by which racial and ethnic categories acquire 'authenticity' requires relating them to the wider social matrix. This necessitates diachronic focus on the constitution of subjectivity in the context of underlying material conditions.

Crucially, to recognise that race and ethnicity are ideological notions and not in themselves the cause of the problem in South Africa is to vindicate the non-racial, non-ethnic position. Horowitz wants to maintain that non-racialism is utopian, a dangerous illusion; 'The non-racial society is the plural society's analogue to the utopian aspiration for a classless society' (p.28). But non-racialism is not utopian, it is of the world, no less than racialism. It is an identity, an outlook, a lived experience, as much as an end-state; 'focus is on ... a struggle for change that defines the enemy as a system - not as members of particular racial or cultural groups' (Frederikse, 1990:4). In the words of the Freedom Charter, adopted at the Congress of the People on 26 June 1955, it is accepted that 'South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white'. Within the African National Congress such understanding is central to the organizational practice of building unity. Non-racialism is only utopian to those who believe that South Africa is an objectively deeply divided society. And this is a position that can only be maintained by misrepresenting the 'facts'.

Misrepresenting the Fact

Horowitz argues that the 'reality' of ethnic division is 'verified' by survey data. In chapter two, Horowitz draws on a wide range of mainstream empirical studies to bombard the reader with all the relevant 'facts' he can find to show that there are 'distinctive intergroup attitudes and orientations' (p.42) and that a non-racial society is 'not around the corner' (p.43).

The problem, however, is that Horowitz uncritically draws from research 'on demographic, attitudinal, and behavioural differences among Ndebele, Pedi, Shangaan (Tsonga), Sotho, Swazi, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa and Zulu' (p.30) without having shown how these ethnic categories are sociologically valid. Why should social attitudes be taken to coalesce around ethnic groups? Why should this automatically be the privileged viewpoint? Why not frame questions in terms other than ethnicity? Horowitz does not begin to question the process of survey construction.

The reason why the surveys cited by Horowitz categorize responses according to ethnic groups is not hard to fathom. It could hardly be otherwise in a society in which race and ethnicity have been taken as givens in political and intellectual discourse. Apartheid, especially since 1959, has been based on constructing the forms of categorisation which Horowitz now takes as valid, believing that South Africa consists 'of a number of discrete and unassimilable groups' (Boonzaier, 1989:63).

Such bias in South African social research seems imperceptible to Horowitz; primarily because, following the canons of mainstream social scientific research, it is taken that information derived from survey data has a pre-existing validity and is value-free.
In truth, empirical findings do not speak for themselves; for however simple an enumeration of 'facts' may be ... it already implies an 'interpretation' ... the facts have been comprehended by a theory, a method; they have been wrenched from their living context and fitted into a theory (Lukacs, 1971:5).

The surveys cited by Horowitz do represent a particular way of ordering and grouping people. By placing responses into ethnic categories a certain kind of interpretation is offered; one which implicitly builds on the 'master' narratives of South African history and politics which rest on discredited conceptual frameworks and privilege white socio-cultural perspectives.

Consequently, to focus on what appears to exist gives credence to dominant models of thinking and precludes historical and political understanding of how the apartheid order has constructed ethnic identities. Horowitz's use of data interpreted through the lens of ethnic terminology works to reflect and affirm a particular reading of the social order; it does not critically challenge it. By using terms such as 'Xhosa' and 'Zulu', Horowitz is not engaging in description but inscription. Horowitz's marked symmetry with apartheid is best shown by the fact that while there is much analysis of 'interracial' cleavages in terms of 'black' ethnicity we are never introduced to the term white ethnicity'. Here, Horowitz is following the National Party's line that the 'blacks' (not the whites), constitute the 'problem' in South Africa.

Tellingly, there is no attempt to tap, through qualitative research methods, the in-depth social consciousness of African people. Horowitz fails to move beyond aggregated survey data to let African people speak for themselves; 'they' are treated as objects to be defined, for whom one speaks. As such the realm of self-conscious human agency is divorced from being. Not once does Horowitz stop to consider precisely how consciousness is made and remade, to ask what shapes the boundaries of the prevailing discourse on ethnic identity, to consider how the apartheid state, through control of socializing agencies, has attempted to deny a common humanity and construct distorted identities.

Based on a preconceived process of categorisation set apart from its subjects, Horowitz fails to consider the evidence that in fact most African people have not internalized ethnic labels but take them to be partial and false. At no point does Horowitz focus on the extent to which, right across South African society, there has been opposition to apartheid. Instead, Horowitz challenges the ANC's commitment to non-racialism by attempting to show undercurrents of Xhosa nationalism within the movement. Focusing on the ANC National Executive Committee, as of mid-1989, Horowitz states that 'fully half the black leadership of the ANC was Xhosa-speaking, which means that Xhosa were overrepresented by a factor of about 2.2. Zulu were dramatically underrepresented, by a factor of more than 5' (p.54).

Quite apart from the fact that even the National Party do not seriously engage in this game (they much prefer to emphasize South African Communist Party links), the ANC's 48th National Congress in July 1991 elected a National Executive with a 34% 'non-African' membership (Africa South, August 1991). In any event, outside of Natal, the ANC holds a majority of Zulu support (Orkin, 1989:83). Moreo-
ver, all ANC campaigns are marked by non-racialism in the design of posters, make-up of crowds and voicing of aims; the history of resistance to apartheid has a strong non-racial thread.

The absurdity of Horowitz’s position is fully revealed when even non-ethnic attitudes are interpreted in terms of their presumed ethnic foundations. Horowitz concludes from an unpublished 1986 survey that ‘Xhosa responses are more South Africa, more pan-African, [and] less tied to locality’ and these ‘suggest different approaches ... perhaps different foci of identity’ (pp 51-52). Why, though, should an ‘ethnic group’ which openly rejects classifying itself in terms of ethnicity continue to be understood in terms of ethnicity? How can non-ethnic responses be attributed to ethnicity?

Clearly Horowitz’s reading of South Africa as a divided society can only be made through massive misrepresentation. Horowitz’s case for the ‘reality’ of ethnic division is far from convincing. Just because everything seems to be about ethnicity does not mean that it is so. Rather than take survey data at face value there is a need for deconstructivist empirical inquiry which grasps the deeper meanings inherent in the ‘facts’, unravels the constitution of subjectivity and recognizes that racial and ethnic categorisations have no autonomous sociological meaning.

Conclusion

The central problem with Horowitz’s work is that it is rooted in and committed to mainstream standards of western academic scholarship. In seeing notions of race and ethnicity as valid forms of social life, Horowitz remains caught within the confines of traditional ways of thinking about South Africa. Horowitz’s interpretation is not neutral or objective; by granting race and ethnicity central analytical focus his analysis serves to perpetuate certain forms of social relations rooted in forces of dominance. Horowitz writes:

‘To defer to mistaken ideas about the conflict in analyzing the conflict ... is to perpetuate illusions’ (p.30).

This is exactly what Horowitz is guilty of. A Democratic South Africa? does not, in any meaningful sense, advance thinking on South Africa. Horowitz leaves the central problem – the meaning of race and ethnicity – more or less untouched.

It is time, with the fall of apartheid, to break away from the hold of the ‘master’ historical texts and empirical studies, and reconceptualize intellectual work on South Africa, to rethink South Africa. New vision must decolonize intellectual frameworks, escape the Eurocentrism of the social sciences and move ‘others’ to the historical foreground. Central to this is the need to create space for people to develop practices of self-interrogation and critique, to develop non-racialism as a guiding principle and see how identities have been represented and constructed by the ideology and practice of apartheid. Linked to this there is a need to discuss models of direct participatory democracy and democratic socialism; to find a new pattern of democracy that through economic growth and the removal of discrimination would contribute to the lessening rather than perpetuation of identification in terms of race and ethnicity.

Rupert Taylor is a Senior Lecturer in Political Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
Bibliographic Note


The need for new direction to understanding race and ethnicity is central to F. Johnstone's "Most Painful to Our Hearts": South Africa Through the Eyes of the New School", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 16, 1, 1982. The theme is taken up in N. Alexander, 'Race, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Social Science in Southern Africa' in *South the Wind* (Skotaville, Johannesburg, 1987); E. Boonzaier and J. Sharp (eds), *South African Keywords* (David Philip, Cape Town, 1989); and R. Taylor, 'South Africa: Consociation or Democracy?', *Telos*, 85, 1990. Also see R. Miles, 'Marxism Versus the Sociology of "Race Relations"?', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 7, 2, 1984.


This biography of black South African socialist Johnny Gomas is an important contribution to South African social history which has not yet received the scholarly attention it merits. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern block Stalinism and the unbanning of the South African Communist Party (SACP) have opened a debate on socialism in South Africa, forcing the SACP to reconsider its own history. Yet, too often, the Party's own writings and sympathetic 'people's histories' have glossed over controversial issues and personalities. Johnny Gomas' contribution to the South African struggle has been unduly neglected because his lifelong commitment to South Africa's black working class frequently put him at odds with Party policy and eventually pushed him to embrace Africanism.

Musson effectively situates Gomas' long life against the backdrop of the developing liberation movement. Born in 1901 in rural Abbotsdale, Gomas and his mother moved to Kimberly, part of the broader process of black urbanisation in the early 20th century. We see Gomas' politicisation as a youth through his employment in the tailoring industry, dominated by the descendants of slaves and known for its radicalism and militancy. He apprenticed on Jones Street, ... probably the most famous political street in Kimberly ... housing the offices of the African Political (People's) Organisation, the African National Congress (ANC), the International Socialist League (ISL) and the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU). In
1919, at the age of 18, Gomas joined the ANC, ISL, and ICU. By 1923 he was a full-time ICU organiser, and in 1925, he joined the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). Although he recruited hundreds of farmworkers in the Western Cape, his priority was the urban black working class.

Gomas wholeheartedly accepted the CPSA as South Africa’s proletarian vanguard and, in the 1930s, readily followed the Comintern’s directives to form a popular front by appealing to white labour. But his political development shows several turning points. By the 1940s the CPSA’s orientation to white labour and white parliamentary politics alienated Gomas, although he still believed in the potential for ‘poorer-paid white workers’ to participate in the struggle of the oppressed. He found himself increasingly in agreement with trotskyists, while attacking them for their practical inactivity. In the late 1940s Gomas was removed from the Party hierarchy because of his continued call for black leadership, which Party officials falsely counterposed to class leadership. Yet the tension between Gomas and the CPSA was never resolved. Despite his declining role in the Party, he endorsed its electoral candidates and remained a member until it disbanded in 1950.

In the repressive apartheid era, Gomas identified with the ideas which disillusioned communist George Padmore expressed in *Pan-Africanism or Communism?* Musson writes:

The very organisation that had fought against the nationalist tendencies of blacks, had actually fortified those tendencies in people like Gomas. He now re-affirmed the position that he had had in the 1930s: that the CPSA should have carried on an uncompro-

mising struggle against the prejudices of the white workers, instead of against the embryonic nationalism of the black petty bourgeoisie and aspirant petty bourgeoisie.

He now ascribed the failure of black organisations – both reformist and radical – to their attempts to please whites. In 1959 he joined the Pan Africanist Congress, searching for the black republic he had campaigned for as a young communist.

Gomas’ dilemma was two-fold: that of a black socialist living in a period when the black working class was young and weak and white labour was racist and aristocratic, and of a socialist activist with a thirst for theory, forced to confront the CPSA’s stalinism, yet alienated from what he saw as trotskyism’s rhetoricism and lack of grass-roots activity. Despite his long membership in the CPSA, he never found a true political home.

While referring occasionally to Frantz Fanon’s work on the psychological dimensions of racism, Musson does not adequately explore the intersection of the social and psychological as manifested in Gomas’ personality, which left him an embittered and lonely man at the time of his death in 1979. In her too brief examination of the relationship between the personal and the political, for instance, she takes at face value the expression ‘the struggle was his life’, so often heard in South African political circles, and which she uses to describe Gomas’ life.

But as a social historian Musson’s skilful combination of archival research and interviews of veteran activists enables her to illuminate lesser-known areas of South African politics. Her discussion of the tension
between the CPSA and ICU in the late 1920s, for instance, goes beyond a simple racial explanation, and her assessment of ICU leader Clements Kadalie, who went to Europe in 1927, ... with the main aim of putting the ICU on the map of the world, despite the fact that he was beginning to wipe it off the map in South Africa, shows a refreshing frankness. Musson writes it as she sees it, without hiding behind jargon. Her clear writing style makes the book accessible to undergraduates and more advanced readers.

Alison Drew is in the Department of Political Science, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

Books Received

Cooie, Belinda The Trade Trap: Poverty & the Global Commodity Market, Oxfam, 0-85598-135-0, 1992 [NP].
de Coninck, John/Roger Riddell, Evaluating the Impact of NGOs in Rural Poverty Alleviation: Uganda, ODI, 0-85003-159-1, February 1992 [NP].
ENDA (Environment & Development Activities) & ZERO (Regional Network of Environmental Experts/Zimbabwe), Case for Sustainable Development


Errata — 'Social Differentiation in the Communal Lands of Zimbabwe' by Cousins, Weiner and Amin published in ROAPE 53. The Editorial Working Group recognises that cuts were made to this article which changed the sense of their argument. This was due both to last minute changes by the authors and unapproved cuts by the editors. We do apologise and publish their comments:

1. Awkward or misleading omissions: the introduction is considerably shorter and reads somewhat awkwardly. A sentence stating that: 'In the paper, we draw implicitly on recent historical research that is of relevance' was originally followed by references to the work of Mosley, Ranger, Dopcke, Bessant and Primister; these references now appear in the published text following a sentence referring to analysis of 'the social relations of production and exchange'. This is potentially confusing, as is the footnote which refers to a section in a previous draft of the article discussing this historical research at some length. A sentence on page 15 referring to rural prostitution as 'one mechanism whereby cash circulates from men to women' was omitted and this paragraph now reads awkwardly. In the final paragraph the phrase 'democratic agrarian property regime' was replaced by 'democratic regime'; clearly these are two different meanings.

2. Deletion of qualifying statements: a number of statements were deleted which make it clear that we approach the issues of class mobility and class politics rather cautiously, acknowledge the possibility of local variations and contingent outcomes, and are aiming to initiate a debate. Missing from the conclusion on page 19 is the statement: 'The following is necessarily an impressionistic judgement, given the uneven nature of the available data base and recognising the existence of local variations unique to particular places. The class categories identified in this paper, and the tendencies outlined below, are presented as hypotheses for further investigation rather than as firm research conclusions. We offer the following as a preliminary statement to generate additional discussion on the nature of Communal Land social differentiation.'

3. A paragraph describing the work of Pankhurst on gender and class relations in Zimbabwe was omitted from the text. The only major source in the article now dealing with these issues is the work of Adams; this significantly weakens both the literature review and our attempt to highlight these relationships throughout the text. The deletion on page 15 makes the text read as if the ideas which follow are our own rather than being drawn from the work of these two authors.
between the CPSA and ICU in the late 1920s, for instance, goes beyond a simple racial explanation, and her assessment of ICU leader Clements Kadalie, who went to Europe in 1927 ... with the main aim of putting the ICU on the map of the world, despite the fact that he was beginning to wipe it off the map in South Africa', shows a refreshing frankness. Musson writes it as she sees it, without hiding behind jargon. Her clear writing style makes the book accessible to undergraduates and more advanced readers.

Alison Drew is in the Department of Political Science, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

Books Received


Cooie, Belinda The Trade Trap: Poverty & the Global Commodity Market, OXFAM, 0-85598-135-0, 1992 [NP].
de Coninck, John/Roger Riddell, Evaluating the Impact of NGOs in Rural Poverty Alleviation: Uganda, ODI, 0-85003-159-1, February 1992 [NP].
ENDA (Environment & Development Activities) & ZERO (Regional Network of Environmental Experts/Zimbabwe), Case for Sustainable Development
in Zimbabwe: Conceptual Problems, Conflicts & Contradictions, 1992, 0 7974 0997 1, $25 (Box 5338, Harare)

Gefu, Jerome O Pastoralist Perspectives in Nigeria: The Fulbe of Udub Reserve.


Griffin, Keith (ed). The Economy of Ethiopia, St.Martin's Press, 0-312-07962-1, October 1992 [no price].


Hamalengwa, Munyonzwe, Thoughts are Free: Prison Experience and Reflections on Law and Politics in General, Africa in Canada Press, 0-9695307-6, 1991 [no price].

Hammarskjold, Mikael & Bertil Egero & Staffan Lindberg (eds), Population & the Development Crisis in the South, PROP, 1101-8372, 1992 [no price].


Lele, Uma Aid to African Agriculture: Lessons from Two Decades of Donors' Experience, World Bank/The Johns Hopkins University Press, 0-8018-4366-9, April 1992 [no price].


Remenyi, Joe: Where Credit is Due: Income Generating Programmes for the Poor in Developing Countries, IT, £8.95, 1-85339-079-8, 1991.
Tjonneland, Elling N: Southern Africa After Apartheid, CMI, £13/$26, 0803-0030, 1992 [mp].
URPE (Union for Radical Political Economics): Women in the International Economy, c/o Dept of Economics, University of California, Riverside, California, $11.50.

Partial Listing of Publishers

Westview Press
36 Lonsdale Road,
Summertown, Oxford OX2 7EW

ZED Books
87 Caledonian Road, London N1 9BU, UK

Macmillan Press
Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire, UK RG21 2XS

Cambridge Univ Press
The Edinburgh Building,
Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK

Africa in Canada Press
83 York Mills Road, Don Mills,
Ontario, Canada M3B 1Y2

CREDU
Institute of African Studies,
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Oyo State,
Nigeria

Lynne Rienner Publishers
1600 30th St, Suite 314,
Boulder, Colorado 80301, USA

South African Institute of International Affairs
Jan Smuts House, University of the Witwatersrand,
Braamfontein, Johannesburg,
South Africa

James Currey
64B Thornhill Square, Islington,
London N1 1BE, UK

Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
Regents College, Inner Circle,
Regents Park, London NW1 4NS, UK

St. Martin’s Press
175 Fifth Avenue, New York,
NY 10010, USA

Intermediate Technology Publications (IT)
103 Southampton Row, London
WC1B 4HH, UK

Chr Michelsen Institute (CMI)
Fantoft 38, N-5036 Fantoft,
Norway

PROP (Programme on Population & Development In Poor Countries)
Dept of Sociology, Box 114,
221 00 Lund, Sweden

CIIR (Catholic Institute for International Relations)
Unit 3, Canonbury Yard, 190a
New North Road, London N1 7BJ, UK

Hans Zell
60 Grosvenor St, London W1X 9DA, UK

Pluto Press
36 Lonsdale Rd, Summertown,
Oxford OX2 7EW, UK

OXFAM
274 Banbury Rd, Oxford, UK


Remenyi, Joe. *Where Credit is Due: Income Generating Programmes for the Poor in Developing Countries*, IT, £8.95, 1-85339-079-8, 1991.


van den Berg, Elling N. *Southern Africa After Apartheid*, CMI, £13/$26, 0803-0030, 1992 [mp].


URPE (Union for Radical Political Economics). *Women in the International Economy*, c/o Dept of Economics, University of California, Riverside, California, $11.50.

1993 Order Form

Annual Subscriptions
Three issues, starting at numbers 56, 57, or 58. The Review is published each March, July and November. Prices include postage and packaging; for airmail, add £10/$20 extra.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK and Africa:</th>
<th>Elsewhere:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>£10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>£16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>£50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>$25 / £13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>$40 / £20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institution</td>
<td>$100 / £45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Important: Non-institutional orders must be paid by personal cheques; students must send proof of status to claim concessionary rate. Orders may be otherwise delayed.

Back Issues
All titles are listed overleaf. Price code appears on the right, and corresponds to those listed below; Code 'P' is an out-of-print issue supplied as photocopy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Code 'A' (single issue)</td>
<td>£2 / $4 £4 / $8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code 'B' (double issue)</td>
<td>£4 / $8 £8 / $16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code 'C' (1990/91 issue)</td>
<td>£6 / $12 £12 / $24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code 'P' (photocopy)</td>
<td>£6 / $12 £6 / $12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Important: add 20% to cover postage and packaging. (see how-to-order, below)

Books

| Democracy & Socialism in Africa | £20.00 / $40.00 |
| Popular Struggles in Africa    | £9.95 / $19.95 |
| The New Helots                  | £8.00 / $16.00 |
| Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics & Society | £5.95 / $14.50 |
| The Long Struggle of Eritrea    | £5.95 / $10.95 |

Important: add 20% to cover postage and packaging.

How to Order...
Detach this order form, and circle in red pen the price of each item you want to order in the currency you wish to pay in. For back issues, circle both the issue number (overleaf) and the price code.

Add 20% to Books and Back Issues totals to cover postage and packaging.

Payment forms: US dollars on US banks, International M.O., or Sterling cheques
Send to: ROAPE Publications Limited, P.O.Box 678, Sheffield S1 1BF, UK.

Giro number 64 960 4008