The African Jigsaw

Jan Burgess and Gary Littlejohn

In 1991 ROAPE addressed the key issues confronting Africa: its place in 'the new world order'; the struggle for resources; its dialogue with various fundamentalisms; and – running through them all – the search for democratic solutions to its development crisis. In our first editorial of 1991 we took stock of the dramatic changes sweeping the global political economy and their significance for Africa. We discussed the implications of the ending of the cold war at a time of deepening recession and continued restructuring. We considered the implications of approaches to world events in the US, Japan and Europe and the consequences of the collapse of stalinism in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Most of these changes, we argued, posed serious challenges – and many dangers – to Africa struggling to cope with debt, economic decline and political crises.

What has changed in the past 12 months? In a post-Soviet world, even the small space for manoeuvre that non-alignment once provided for African countries has all but disappeared. For all the talk of the US as an imperialist power in decline, its hand rests even more heavily on the third world since the Gulf War than it did before. Deep as our dislike is for Moi's authoritarian regime in Kenya, the sight of the US ambassador in Nairobi so contemptuously attacking it in public is indicative of the new imperialism. For the present, it is clear that Africa faces becoming even more peripheral to the international capitalist economy.

In this first issue of 1992, we step back from this global perspective to consider aspects of how the process is imposing itself on the ground in various parts of the continent. Among several salient contributions, Tickner's analysis explores the mechanisms by which IMF stabilisation measures have taken over agricultural pricing policies in Mozambique; Sachikonye and Stoneman discuss, in different ways, the impact of the IMF and World Bank interventions in Zimbabwe; Babalola assesses the impact of international capital on the agricultural economy of Oyo State in Nigeria; and Samoff offers a trenchant critique of the way in which 'a financial-intellectual complex' uses research to justify and impose aid policies. The welter of evidence provides few hopeful signs; that is the pity of it.

The editors who founded ROAPE never thought that we would be here this long. Some hoped that the need for a critique of development, of global impe-
rialist pressures on Africa, of corruption and despotism, might become less appropriate over time. It is a source of regret and no little anger among us that it seems more rather than less necessary now. Over the years this journal has been run by individuals typing copy, pasting up in the kitchen, involving the help of our children (some of them now ready to take over from us!). Some of our editors have been jailed and one, Ruth First, was murdered in Maputo by apartheid's death squads. Yet we have survived with the support of friends and readers. We still run on a shoe-string although you might not guess it from the improved look of the journal and its contents.

For 18 years we have depended on subscriptions and donations and voluntary labour. We have in that time supported many institutions which wanted to receive copies of ROAPE but could not afford it. Unfortunately, the crisis in Africa has meant that the number of individuals and organisations asking for assistance has grown steadily. Many of the issues we send to Africa need to be supplied free. We need the continued help of our friends and readers to be able to keep doing this and to survive this period of crisis. We need readers to subscribe not only for themselves but on behalf of friends, organisations and students in Africa. We would welcome and appreciate this kind of help.

We also need more feedback from our readers. We receive many more contributions than we can ever publish. Are we publishing on the issues our readers want to see explored? Should we be looking for other (different) material as well? Should we move to four issues a year? What should be the role of ROAPE as it approaches the end of its second decade? We need some sense of what those many people who have travelled with us through these last 18 years see as the form our contribution to Africa's struggle for independence, development and democracy should take.
Social Differentiation in the Communal Lands of Zimbabwe

Ben Cousins, Dan Weiner & Nick Amin

While Zimbabwe's smallholder production expansion is well documented, very little is known about social differentiation in the communal lands where most black smallholders live. This article draws on a growing body of post-independence survey data, as well as the authors' research and field experiences, to analyse the structure and dynamics of communal land social differentiation. Utilising a framework which focuses on reproduction and accumulation, four primary social classes are identified: petty-commodity producers; worker-peasants; lumpen semi-peasants; and the rural petty-bourgeoisie. We then propose specific processes which may promote and/or constrain rural class formation and speculate about possible impacts on communal land agrarian politics in the 1990s. Class categories and associated processes are presented as hypotheses for further investigation and discussion, rather than as firm research conclusions.

Agrarian Reform & Social Relations of Production

The contradictory nature of the 'peasant miracle' is central to post-independence debates on land and agrarian reform. In Zimbabwe, where smallholder production and marketed surpluses rose rapidly during the 1980s, many households, particularly in unfavourable agro-ecological locations, depend on food distributed by the state. Drought relief and food-for-work programmes are now permanent features of Zimbabwe's rural landscape. The achievement of Communal Land (CL) household food security remains elusive.

As most analysts now acknowledge, increased production, productivity and high levels of marketed output have been achieved by only a minority of black smallholders. Uneven agricultural development, manifested both socially and spatially, is intensifying in Zimbabwe's CLs (Moyo 1986; Cliffe 1988; Weiner 1988; Amin 1991). Central to the agrarian question, then, is the nature of the production system in the CLs (where the vast majority of Zimbabwe's rural population live), the trajectory of contemporary agrarian change and, the politics associated with rural class formation. Given announcements by government that post-Lancaster Constitution agrarian reform will involve the trans-
fer of a further six million hectares of land from the commercial to the resettlement sector, understanding CL social differentiation has much more than academic significance.

Some studies refer to processes of proletarianisation and accumulation, implying that the inequalities found in the Communal Lands are due to the development of capitalist relations of production (Amin 1991); others retain the notion of a ‘peasantry’, implying that production relations are pre-capitalist in nature and are ‘articulated’ with the dominant capitalist mode through exchange relationships (Ranger 1985). The labour reserve thesis is still influential and generating important debate (Bush and Cliffe 1984; Bush et al 1986; Bonnevie 1987; Weiner and Harris 1991). The ‘black box’ of the social relations of production and exchange in the Communal Lands has begun to be unpacked with some of the essential elements laid bare (Mosley 1983; Ranger 1985; Dopcke 1985; Bessant 1987; Phimister 1988) (see note 1).

**Post-Independence Empirical Research**

What does recent research in the Communal Lands of Zimbabwe tell us about the evolving patterns of social differentiation generally? Amin (1991) sur-
veyed 67 households in Chirau CL (natural region II) and Magondi CL (natural region III) during 1987-88, an average rainfall season. Survey results indicate a highly skewed distribution of agricultural means of production (land, cattle, implements) and income from crop sales and off-farm wages, and high levels of correlation between these different indices of inequality. Households with lower levels of agricultural production were more likely to have members employed locally as wage labourers, and less likely to contain migrant workers in skilled occupational categories. They were more dependent on wage labour to secure their subsistence than households with higher levels of ownership and agricultural income. Amin employed a number of criteria to classify households into at least three strata: poor (22%), middle (60%) and rich (18%). Indeed, most 1980s empirical research indicates high levels of CL social stratification.

Coudere and Marijsse (1988) interviewed 200 households in the Mtoko CL (natural regions III and IV) in July 1985. They found that the richest 20 per cent of households earned 50 per cent of total income. Wage income earners tended to be the wealthiest members of the community, and widows with little or no wage remittances were the poorest. Access to land was the most important variable explaining differences in aggregate agricultural production, accounting, in statistical terms, for half of all the variation. During the same agricultural season, Jackson et al (1987) interviewed 600 households in all five natural regions. The wealthiest 10 per cent of the population earned 43 per cent of total income and controlled 40 to 60 per cent of the marketed produce. The poorest 50 per cent accounted for only 10 per cent of all crop income. Although crop incomes were greater than remittance incomes for the sample as a whole, ‘farm incomes in households with remittances [were] 1.33 times higher (in contribution to per capita income) than in households not currently receiving any remittances’ (p.66).

Bonnevie (1987) interviewed 72 households in Mangwende CL (natural region II) in 1983, a severe drought year. As a result, in this normally high potential area, only 17 per cent of total income was earned on the farm. Fifty-seven per cent of total income came from wage remittances. According to Bonnevie (1987:133) households with migrants holding ‘permanent’ jobs ‘tend to combine this position with extended agricultural activities and this expansion depends crucially on the use of hired labour.’ During the first half of 1984, Weiner and Harris (1991) interviewed 417 households in ten CLs in all five natural regions. They found that households with access to wage income tended to sell more crops and hire more labour. Households with wage-earners had mean incomes twice as large as those without. Access to land and draught power were also closely associated.

In a 1986-87 survey of 251 households in three CLs in Masvingo Province (mostly in natural region IV), Adams (1991a; 1991b) examined patterns of rural wage labour utilization and provided some very interesting observations on gender and class interrelationships. She also found that households which
hired labour were generally the wealthiest in the community. Some female-headed households were able to hire labour due to access to migrant labour remittances; in her survey population, female-headed households hired more labour than male-headed households. Some female-headed households had relatively successful farming operations and were members of the CL elite. Female-headed households without access to remittances and sufficient agricultural means of production, however, tended to be the poorest members of the community and the source of casual labour. For the sample as a whole, 'casual workers comprised 75% of those [households] who had 0.5 hectares of land or less, and included the few cases where no land at all was held by the household' (1991a:315). It is also significant that 60% of casual workers came from households that owned no cattle. Based on these observations, Adams concludes that female-headed households are not a homogenous group and that those that receive the bulk of their income from casual labour 'have largely been ignored by policy makers [and] cannot be defined as farmers at all' (1991a:297).

Jackson (1989) found a concentration of livestock in the hands of a small proportion of the rural population. Central Statistics Office figures (CSO 1986) and Jackson’s data show that 44-54 per cent of cattle are held by the top 10 per cent of the population; another 15-20 per cent are marginal stock owners. Weiner (1988) also found large inequities in access to livestock in all natural regions. Muchena (1989) surveyed livestock exchanges between households in the low potential Buhera CL (natural region IV). One-third of the sample did not have sufficient draught and relied on borrowing or hiring of animals.

What generalisations can be made on the basis of the research summarised here?

There is a pattern of uneven development, both socially and spatially, with highly unequal access by Communal Land households to productive resources. A group of households which regularly produce surpluses for sale is emerging, particularly in highveld locations. Many households, on the other hand, are unable to reproduce themselves through their own efforts, and are dependent on the state for drought relief grain handouts or food-for-work programmes. This is most pronounced in low potential agro-ecological zones, where two-thirds of the Communal Land population live, and where resource degradation is a serious problem (Whitlow 1988).

Some rural households are using income from off-farm employment to invest in agricultural production. Households which are female-headed due to male migration, and receive steady remittances, hire more labour and purchase more inputs than female-headed households with little or no access to remittances. The socio-economic status of women is not homogenous.

Households with members engaged in skilled and permanent off-farm wage labour tend to be the wealthiest members of the community. These households often produce and market more crops and have greater access to agricultural capital. They also hire more labour for agricultural and domestic tasks. Some house-
holds have also accumulated agricultural capital from previous employment and/or through their position as lineage elites.

Access to land and ownership of sufficient draught power are also associated with higher levels of agricultural production. Livestock ownership is highly skewed and land holdings are unequal, although to a lesser degree. Households with access to remittances, draught power and land of moderate to good quality are the primary CL agricultural surplus producers.

The rural labour market is dominated by casual labour and piecework rather than fully proletarianised labour. It is not uncommon for a household to hire labour in and out in the same year. Casual workers tend to come from households with smaller than average holdings of land and cattle.

Absolute landlessness is not that high in the Communal Lands, but many arable plots are small and on poor soils. Near landlessness is widespread and growing. The "communal tenure" system appears to still offer secure access to the basic resource of land to a majority of rural-based households. The precise extent of landlessness is difficult to measure and may be more visible in the growing urban and peri-urban population than in the CLs themselves.

Remittances, Accumulation and Reproduction

Classical schema for analysing agrarian differentiation made use of the categories 'poor', 'middle' and 'rich' peasants. The complexities in applying this schema to southern Africa, and more generally with the concept of a 'peasantry', are widely recognised (Bernstein 1977; Levin and Neocosmos 1987). Within the southern African region, conceptualising the structure of rural households necessitates some understanding of how cyclical labour migration impacts rural source regions. This is the basis for the composite labels 'worker-farmer' (Cooper 1980), and 'peasantariat' (Parson 1981; Leys 1986), and for the notion of an 'intermediate' class status (Palmer and Parsons 1977). It also accounts for the popularity of the term 'semi-proletariat' in many analyses. The framework proposed here tries to capture the complex articulation between off-farm income and household production, consumption and exchange.

At the heart of marxist theories on the political economy of capitalism is the question of 'reproduction'. A major difference between non-capitalist modes of production and capitalism lies in the distinction between simple reproduction, where producing units engage in both production and (usually limited) exchange primarily in order to recreate themselves as producers, and expanded reproduction, in which surplus production is invested back into the production process. Expanded reproduction transforms the production unit rather than merely recreating it. The logic of expanded reproduction, or capital accumulation, is what underlies the dynamic and transformative power of the capitalist mode of production (see note 2).
This crucial distinction does not imply that non-capitalist societies never produce a surplus, do not engage in trade or have no markets of any kind. Rather, it makes central "the relation of the surplus to the way that production is organised over time." Only in the capitalist mode is the continual reinvestment of surplus to transform the conditions under which commodities are produced a necessity, and undertaken only so that more or cheaper commodities can be produced for exchange. As a result, production under capitalism is directed to the creation of exchange values, whereas in non-capitalist societies use values predominate, even when markets and developed circuits of trade exist.

Simple, or petty commodity production, is a case in which reproduction of the producing unit does not take place outside of commodity circuits. The logic of expanded reproduction is constrained by the fact that the labour process is based on unpaid household labour. "Self exploitation" places limits on the extent to which a surplus can be generated and invested back into production. It is only a capitalist enterprise, premised on the separation of direct producers from the means of production (i.e. a class of 'free' wage labourers), that can produce the volume of surplus required for this distinctive economic logic to fully unfold.

A growing but still controversial body of literature (Scott 1986) designates contemporary 'peasants' as petty commodity producers, constituted by the contradictory combination of capital and labour within the same production unit (Gibbon and Neocosmos 1985; Bernstein 1986; Levin and Neocosmos 1987). Is there a logic of simple reproduction at work in this type of enterprise, because structurally there is not the same necessity for capital accumulation as in capitalist enterprises proper, as Friedmann (1980) suggests? Or as Deere and de Janvry (1979), Gibbon and Neocosmos (1985), and Bernstein (1986) seem to imply, is there a 'latent' logic of expanded reproduction within petty commodity production whereby accumulation of a limited kind can occur on the basis of exploitative relations within the household? Bernstein (1986:22) says the following about the dynamics of petty commodity production:

> In terms of the enterprise as a whole, and its fortunes (reproduction, decomposition, transformation), its distinctive combination of class places can help explain the contradictions petty commodity producers often confront between reproducing themselves as labour (daily and generational reproduction) and capital (maintenance, replacement, and possibly expansion of the means of production). Reducing levels of consumption (and increasing or limiting numbers of children according to specific circumstances), in order to maintain, replace or expand the means of production (i.e. accumulation) is an expression of this contradiction.

In this view neither simple nor expanded reproduction necessarily dominates. The extent to which either dominates, and the degree of stability of production relations, is a contingent outcome of such factors as conditions of competition within the wider economy, political struggles over access to resources, the gender division of labour and gender specific struggles in the home, the role of the state, etc. Another strength of the 'petty commodity production'
theoretical framework is that it locates rural producers within capitalist commodity production circuits rather than in some unspecified space beyond them.

Rural production in Zimbabwe became oriented towards commodity production before the first settlers arrived and accelerated during colonisation. Consumer goods purchased as commodities began to replace local use-value production. Elements of the means of production (manufactured hoes, ploughs, commercial fertiliser, hybrid seed) also became commoditised over time. The imposition of taxes by the settler state meant that wages and rural production had to fund not only the simple reproduction of the rural population but also make a contribution to state revenue. These processes have continued, probably at an accelerated rate, during the post-independence period. Access to money has become crucial to reproduction strategies in rural Zimbabwe. Rural production in the CLs must thus be conceptualised as involving the creation of both use values and exchange values, as having, at least partially, the character of petty commodity production.

Contemporary and historical research has shown that some petty commodity producers in Zimbabwe are capable of producing a surplus over and above the amount needed for simple reproduction. If this surplus is invested back into production and so extends the material base of the production unit (for example, through the cultivation of more land, the expansion of herds of livestock, the use of productivity-enhancing tools or equipment, the intensification of production through irrigation or the application of higher levels of chemical inputs, the hiring of labourers, etc), then expanded reproduction has occurred. The investments which make possible the production of a surplus may, however, be derived from wage income as well as the sale of produce.

Now if we take up the question of the inequalities and identified processes found in the Communal Lands and analyse them in the context of this reproduction/accumulation framework, the following typology emerges for Zimbabwe. This conceptualisation only begins to define the configurations of a contemporary rural class structure.

- Households able to reproduce themselves from rural production alone (agriculture plus non-agricultural production; e.g., craftwork, beer brewing, construction, etc.);
- Households able to reproduce themselves from a combination of rural production and wage labour;
- Households unable to reproduce themselves, from whatever source, without external assistance from either other households (usually within the same kinship network) or from the state (usually in the form of drought relief);
- Households which regularly produce a surplus, invest in the agricultural means of production and hire significant amounts of wage
labour – these households are engaged in expanded reproduction. Sources of capital for initial investments may include the proceeds from agricultural sales, agricultural credit, remittances from wage employment, or profits from trading or other business enterprises.

This typology needs to be located within the dynamics of capitalist development in general. Capitalist production is premised on the penetration of commodity relations into every aspect of social and economic life creating conditions for a ‘reproduction squeeze’ (Bernstein 1977:166). Bush et al (1986) have pointed out that a dual crisis of production and reproduction is experienced by households in labour reserve economies when increasing unemployment and deteriorating conditions of rural production coincide. This places immense strains on conjugal relationships and increases the vulnerability of women in particular (Murray 1987; Maboreke 1990). Thus, women who were once producers and reproducers have been stripped of their productive roles and left to carry out the task of reproduction without the means of so doing’ (Bush et al 1986:295). However, as Adams (1991a; 1991b) has aptly demonstrated, women do hold various class positions in the CLs. The situation described by Bush et al is most relevant to widows, and women with limited access to remittances and agricultural means of production.

The intersection of lineage structures, gender relations, and generational cycles, with processes of capitalist development are critically important for assessing the extent to which CL social differentiation is developing into an identifiable structure of classes with distinct and conflicting interests. But how should we characterise these household ‘types’ in class terms? What are the important processes through which this structure comes into being? How large are these strata relative to one another and what are the dynamics associated with class mobility? How important are local factors, such as culture, environment and history? Does social differentiation take different forms in different places? Placing the concepts of simple and expanded reproduction and the variable means through which these are achieved at the centre of our analysis, the class identities of the different categories of household are conceptualised as follows:

Type A households are petty commodity producers. These households meet a significant proportion of their simple reproduction needs from the direct consumption of use values as their production is not fully commoditised. Petty commodity producers have the capacity to engage in expanded reproduction, but their ability to sustain capital accumulation is severely constrained;

Type B households are the most difficult to identify since they combine elements of the proletarian and the (partially commoditised) petty commodity producer. The term ‘semi-proletariat’ is preferred by many analysts, but this has tended to lead to a neglect of the rural production side (Levin and Neocosmos 1987). We designate these households as worker-peasants in an attempt to capture the duality of their class determination (see note 3).
Type C households are the most marginalised and impoverished, and are insecure with respect to both rural production and wage labour. Because of their predominantly rural location, and thus, some ability to achieve simple reproduction through agricultural production, we designate them a lumpen semi-peasantry. More women than men fall into this category;

Type D households have moved beyond simple reproduction and into (relatively) sustained accumulation, often through combining incomes from various sources, both urban and rural. Although some proportion of their rural production is still used for 'subsistence' i.e. as use values, this is much less important than for type A households, and a surplus is regularly produced. On the other hand the size of most of these rural production enterprises (measured in terms of land area cultivated, numbers of livestock sold, or numbers of labourers employed) is still limited. They are only petty capitalists and clearly not an ‘agrarian bourgeoisie’ in the classical sense. Urban or urban-linked income of these households tends to be from salaried employment of the petit bourgeois type, or from small trading or transport businesses. This category – which also includes persons/households which have accumulated agricultural means of production through previous employment, or in the case of some ‘master farmers’ through agricultural sales – is, therefore, termed a rural petit bourgeoisie.

Using these definitions we can begin to identify some key processes at work and examine the interaction of class identity with other kinds of collective identification (lineage, gender, age and community). Two types of processes are analysed: those that enable or promote increased differentiation and those that constrain or reduce differentiation. The final section speculates on the relative strength of these countervailing forces.

Processes Promoting Differentiation

Broadly speaking, four interrelated processes are enhancing social differentiation within the communal areas:

Differentiation is taking place because unequal access to land, livestock, technology and agricultural capital results in widening gaps between households with differential capacities to produce an agricultural surplus. The distribution of land is usually less skewed than other assets such as livestock and technology. To understand why this is so, and the role of property relations in fostering differentiation, requires an examination of the ‘communal’ land tenure system and its place in the larger political economy of Zimbabwe. This discussion is presented later where we argue that property relations are a major ‘brake’ on differentiation processes. It is relevant to note here, though, that an initial inequality in land holdings can contribute to a process of increasing differentiation.

In the CLs today, older persons sometimes have larger plots because more land was available for allocation when they were younger. Lineage elites also
tend to have access to (relatively) more land. Land is also not invariable in quality over time; applications of organic matter from sources such as kraal manure can considerably improve water holding capacity and long term nutrient status, and applications of fertiliser have carryover effects on fertility from one season to another. Thus households with greater access to these inputs are more likely to improve their soils over time, or at least arrest the decline in fertility that takes place with continuous cropping.

In respect to livestock, owners of cattle herds containing enough draught animals are not constrained by the need to borrow or hire draught and are in a better position to plough on time (Muchena 1989:269). Large herds produce more manure, a valuable input to cropping in areas with sandy soils. Owners of large herds are the only ones in a position to consider regular sales of cattle. The larger the cattle herd the more milk for home consumption will be produced; this can be a significant contribution to household nutrition.

Owners of ploughs are not constrained in their farming operations by having to borrow or hire equipment for ploughing. Scotchcarts are important for transport of manure and other inputs, harvested crops and firewood; in addition, owners can hire them out for cash (Scoones and Wilson 1989:28). In cotton growing areas, the ownership of knapsack or ultra-low-volume (ULV) sprayers is important.

Working capital is needed every year for the purchase of crop inputs. Transport is also a significant cost for marketing crops. Households able to finance these costs themselves from their own resources are advantaged, and the same is true (although perhaps to a lesser extent due to large debt burdens – see Drinkwater 1987:9-10) of the minority who are able to regularly obtain credit in the form of a loan from the Agricultural Finance Corporation (CSO 1986:4). Recently, the AFC has reduced its lending to resource poor black smallholders (Weiner 1991), further enhancing social differentiation.

Differentiation is proceeding through an articulation of agricultural production with a range of non-agricultural economic activities. Inequalities in wage labour incomes contribute to inequalities in ownership of the means of agricultural and livestock production, in both the short term (the purchase of inputs for annual cropping activities and the hiring of local wage labour), and the longer term (investment in tools, equipment, livestock). Independence has meant greater and more secure incomes for a layer of wage earners with strong linkages to the CLs, but has not brought an expansion of employment opportunities commensurate with the growth of the rural population. There are thus relatively fewer places for formal wage labour in the economy as a whole, and the differentiated character of the labour market means that only a minority are able to invest significant sums of remittance money into an expanded agricultural base (Weiner 1991:67).

Given the growing scarcity of jobs, prospects for wage labour employment for the younger generation are greatly enhanced by education. This partly ex-
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explains the continuing demand for improved access to education on the part of rural communities and the willingness of rural households to invest considerable sums of money each year in schooling.

 Petty trading, transport and service enterprises, in both rural and urban areas, are also investment opportunities. Persons who succeed in making a profit may invest in agriculture as a diversification strategy; these persons/households are more likely to produce a marketable surplus. Another economic option for rural households is petty commodity production of non-agricultural goods: craft production, clothing manufacture, beer brewing, brick making, etc. These are part of the diversification strategies of petty commodity producers wishing to escape reliance on risky agriculture and, in some case, are survival strategies of the lumpen semi-peasantry. Given the structure of gender relations many of these activities are dominated by women (Helmsing 1987:7) who can secure income which is under their own control. They are also attractive to female headed households without access to remittances although the possibilities for significant levels of profit are limited (Maboreke 1990:23). Nevertheless, a small group of households (less than 10% according to Helmsing, 1987:10) are very dependent on non-agricultural petty commodity production.

Two other forms of economic activity which households, often from the lumpen semi-peasantry, engage in are prostitution (ensuring cash circulation) and local wage labour. Local wage labour is predominantly carried out as poorly paid casual work and tends to be dominated by young and/or single people or by Mozambican refugees. Depending on its regularity, local employment may reduce the amount of labour available to a rural household for its own production, and thus contribute to differentiation.

Differentiation through ‘economic’ processes intersects with differentiation by location, gender and generational cycle. Differentiation by agro-ecological region is now well recognised (Moyo 1986; Weiner 1988; Amin 1991). Another aspect of location is distance to urban centres and formal sector employment; proximity to jobs offer greater opportunities for weekly rather than monthly (or even less often) visits to the rural homestead by migrant workers, with the advantages of greater labour inputs into agricultural production and the diversion of a greater proportion of cash income into the rural base rather than into urban expenditure.

Some female-headed households, particularly widows and divorcees, hold less land, produce lower crop yields and own fewer livestock than male headed units (Avila 1985). Although we have already made the point that CL women hold many class positions, the ‘correlation between the destitute, “poor peasant” families and ... women-headed households’ that Bush et al (1986) point to is relevant to Zimbabwe. Thus a ‘feminisation of poverty’ (Murray 1987) is under way in the Communal Lands.

The prospects of a young man finding a formal sector job have become dim-
mer and the prospects for young women are even worse (young couples also tend to have less land). In 1991 net new jobs accounted for only 10 per cent of the one million school leavers since independence (Stoneman 1991:6). Thus the strategy of capitalising an agricultural base through savings from wage employment is becoming less viable over time; the agricultural base is deteriorating as well (Whitlow 1988). Many worker-peasant households now must face the prospect of joining the ranks of the lumpen semi-peasantry in the countryside or the lumpen proletariat in town. A minority of the rural young with comparative educational advantages, and/or more than the average inherited land and livestock resources may, however, be in a position to accumulate capital from rural production. This will, of course, sharpen the emergent class distinctions.

Access to resources are skewed by political capture at the local level and this contributes to social differentiation. Access to productive resources are subject to political capture by powerful individuals and groups. Kriger (1988:318), investigating intra-community struggles during the liberation war, refers to '... deep resentment against the ruling families' monopoly of powers in land allocation and local judicial functions, and their abuse of them to favour their own friends and close kin'. Despite provisions in the 1982 Communal Lands Act that granted land allocation rights to the state, lineage elites are still allocating land in many communities.

Scoones (1990) describes fierce political struggles in the contemporary period around access to key ecological resources such as vleis (dambos), often centred on assertions of lineage 'ownership'. Cousins (1990a) produced several case studies of instances where political power resulted in preferential access to development funding. These involve actors with positions on such bodies as District Councils, VIDCOs, grazing scheme committees, and a farmer's co-operative.

How do these political struggles for access to resources articulate with the emergent class structure? The literature cited above provides evidence of uneven access according to membership of a dominant lineage, residence in an advantaged village, location in a privileged district, and membership of a tightly-knit group of cattle-wealthy and 'progressive' households. It is clear that social identities other than 'class' are operating.

There is also a fair amount of evidence that in many cases, relatively powerful political positions (e.g. the post of kraalhead, local party committees, VIDCOs, grazing scheme committees, area farming committees, and councillors) are dominated by wealthier households (Leys 1986:266; Cousins 1989:364; Otzen et al 1988:125). Thus within units such as lineages, villages, or districts, a power elite who are likely to belong to a group of would-be rural accumulators often benefit disproportionately from 'resource capture'.

The [political] structure ... contributes to class differentiation. In a poor [agro-ecological] region with a more or less egalitarian land tenure system, holding public office and
the resulting contacts with the formal sector are the main vehicles of social advancement. Informally, the office gives privileged access to government services (education, advice, jobs, funds). These resources then generate additional income and ultimately make the office-holder the centre of a patronage network (Otzen et al 1988:125-126).

When political power and economic status are mutually reinforcing the prospects for social differentiation are undoubtedly enhanced.

**Constraints on Differentiation**

How are these three differentiation processes constrained: property relations (the communal tenure system); lineage relations and ties of kinship within rural communities; and the structural problems facing CL producers, including those attempting to engage in expanded reproduction.

**Property Relations**

Ranger (1988) and Cheater (1990) point out that 'traditional tenure' is largely a colonial construction, invented because it was useful to the shapers of the labour reserve system. In the post-independence era the Communal Land Act of 1982 vested power to allocate land in the hands of elected District Councils, and directed Councils to 'have regard to customary law and grant land only to those people who have a customary right to it'. The central state, as did its settler-colonial predecessor, has retained the right to intervene and reallocate land according to the dictates of land use planning; this was seen by state technocrats as essential to the conservation and management of the natural resource base. Rather than introducing clarity, however, these redefinitions of 'communal tenure' have served only to muddy the picture. Struggles around land allocation practices continue, with District Councils, Village Development Committees, chiefs and kraalheads all vying for authority.

Does the available evidence on 'private' transactions (Cousins 1990b:25) mean that a 'market' in land is emerging in the CLs? This may be true in some areas, but if so it is not yet the kind of market in which freehold titles are traded as commodities. At present, these transactions are taking the form of a negotiated entry into the collectivity of the 'community' or the village which brings with it the property rights and obligations held by other members of that collectivity. New members become subject to demands for cash and labour contributions when community projects such as woodlots, community gardens, and grazing schemes are undertaken. They are expected to observe *chisi* days (when no agricultural work is done), and adhere to the agreed rules pertaining to when herding should start after the crops have been planted.

In short, individualised property rights are still hedged in by a wide-ranging set of social obligations in which the interests of the group are articulated. Individual ownership is embedded in a larger 'communal' tenure system in which rules governing access to and use of the commons are still important. In some areas individualisation of tenure has not progressed very far and com-
Community control is more directly asserted, often through the medium of the kraalhead. Either way, access to larger amounts of arable land for purposes of agriculturally-based accumulation is constrained.

Lineage Relations and Ties of Kinship

Scoones and Wilson (1989:67-68, 76) suggest that the dominant form of production presently found in Shona speaking regions is what they call the ‘shallow patrilineage’, with poor affines sometimes attached. Their judgement is that ‘richer partners are constrained in their attempts to exploit their position, because, in the long term, they too may become dependent on others and generosity is a good insurance . . . social factors blunt the effects of inequality.’ Despite some ambiguities with regard to the types of relationships involved, we concur with this judgement and feel that kinship ties are an important ‘brake’ on social differentiation. This process, however, varies greatly over space; the commodification of agricultural means of production, including labour, is an ongoing, but nonlinear and uneven process. Locally contingent processes are important in determining the extent to which lineage relations still operate.

The existing tenure system results in a clustering of kin-related families within the same village under the authority of a ruling lineage. Inter-marriage with families in neighbouring villages is common. These characteristics of the social system mean that ‘households’, however defined, are not the only relevant level of social organisation as far as production and reproduction are concerned. Networks of kinship, dominated by the patrilineage in Shona and Ndebele areas, are important as a source of cooperation in agricultural activities (ploughing) and support in times of need (for payment of school fees) (Cliffe 1986:38). The continuing importance of these relationships for ensuring access to draught animals has been well documented (Muchena 1989). Lineage property relations ameliorate the effects of the highly skewed distribution of livestock, and are one of the bases of ‘community’ support for projects such as grazing schemes. Important questions remain as to the net effects of borrowing cattle from wealthier relatives when labour on the lender’s crops is expected in return (Amin 1991:14).

Structural Constraints on CL Production

All producers in the CLs continue to face a number of difficulties which in large part spring from the inherited, and as yet untransformed, and discriminatory features of the larger political economy. Despite some notable improvements in the supply of support services, the following factors constrain accumulation of the few while constituting a generalised ‘oppression’ of the majority: growing unemployment; location of most of the CL population in semi-arid and drought-prone regions; population pressure which is near (or in some cases exceeds) ecological carrying capacity; inadequate development of irrigation potential, particularly for small-scale schemes; poor transport systems and input supply services; the continuing bias of agricultural re-
search towards the large scale capitalist sector; and authoritarian modes of extension work which result in the ignoring of local knowledge and an often inappropriate focus and content in technical recommendations (Scoones and Cousins 1989; Derman 1990).

To a significant extent, then, class formation within the Communal Lands is constrained by the fact that rural households remain embedded in a larger agrarian political economy, where the interests of large scale agricultural capital are well represented and opportunities for small scale producers are restricted.

Class Structure and Agrarian Politics

Given these countervailing forces, some promoting differentiation and some constraining it, what has been the outcome of ten years of post-independence ‘development’? What is the shape of the emergent ‘class’ structure in the Communal Lands? How might this structure influence agrarian politics in the 1990s? (see note 4).

- Conditions for agricultural petty commodity production in the CLs have improved, particularly in the better endowed regions in the north. Non-agricultural petty commodity production, which is not a major income generator, is found in all agro-ecological zones; non-agricultural petty commodity production is becoming more integrated into simple reproduction needs in regions where unemployment is growing and the natural resource base is deteriorating. Nationally, therefore, the number of petty commodity producing households in the CLs is increasing;

- Real formal sector wages rose immediately after independence but have subsequently fallen, and the number of jobs has remained static in a period when the number of job seekers has risen annually. Remittances have remained critical to many rural households, particularly those in the more drought-prone regions. Worker-peasants are, therefore, still an important but declining proportion of the total in the CLs;

- The combination of unemployment, environmental degradation and drought is responsible for a ‘reproduction squeeze’ for many of rural households; in some regions relative over-population is stretching the resource base to the limit increasing the number of households falling into the ranks of the lumpen semi-peasantry. A significant proportion of these are female-headed and relatively young households, and in general this trend is more marked in the semi-arid regions of the country;

- The increase in the number of accumulating households, the rural petit-bourgeoisie, is limited but real. While some with salaried jobs
or income from non-agricultural enterprises are investing part of their total income in equipment, crop inputs and cattle and employing a certain amount of wage labour, the numbers engaging in expanded reproduction in the full sense are smaller than might be expected. This trend is more pronounced in the high potential areas, which are also closer to major centres of formal employment. Privileged lineage elites, established male ‘master farmers’ and households with access to steady remittances from skilled and professional employment are well represented in this group. Some petit-bourgeois households are female-headed.

What are the prospects for these rural strata now that Zimbabwe is entering the era of structural adjustment and trade liberalisation and promising a massive land redistribution programme? Continued deterioration in the real producer prices for many marketed agricultural commodities could have a negative impact on petty commodity producers and the rural petty-bourgeoisie. Growing unemployment will likely send many worker-peasant households into the ranks of the lumpen semi-peasantry while others rely more on petty commodity production. Members of the lumpen semi-peasantry, who presently make up a large proportion of the rural proletariat, will become increasingly urbanized as rural simple reproduction possibilities remain bleak. Petty commodity producers will constitute what some might call a ‘middle class’ in the CLs, particularly in favourable agro-ecological locations and in regions close to urban (and peri-urban) markets.

We also believe that given the current structure of rural production, the potential for qualitative upward mobility for most households – for sustained expanded reproduction – will continue to be constrained. But this is not necessarily the case for all, particularly if agrarian reform efforts accelerate in the 1990s. Indeed, the Zimbabwe government recently announced that the selection process for ‘post-Lancaster Constitution’ land resettlement will favour CL households with access to agricultural capital who are perceived to be good farmers.

Regardless of the socio-economic status of resettled households, agrarian property relations will be a crucial issue in the 1990s and women’s rights to land should be of particular importance. A draft paper on land reform produced by the National Farmer’s Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ), the body which supposedly represents all CL farmers but in reality speaks for the wealthier households (Bratton 1990; Weiner 1991) addresses the question of future property relations. The NFAZ calls for ‘a long term commitment from government to allow the communal and resettlement sector to transform and advance in the same manner as commercial agriculture was protected to make it what it is today’ (NFAZ 1989:2) (In 1991 the NFAZ and the Zimbabwe National Farmer’s Union combined to form the Zimbabwe Farmer’s Union). Individual rights are regarded as essential, and for both arable and grazing land, communal tenure is emphatically rejected. The strong support given to the
The notion of state regulation of land transactions is interesting. This is not a proposal for a free market in land: the ‘transfer of the permit to use land will always pass through the state’ (NFAZ 1989:9). It may be that the model NFAZ has in mind is the development of capitalist agriculture in Rhodesia, where the state supports emergent farmers and regulates the market, and where a ZANU (PF)/NFAZ alliance plays a similar role to the Rhodesian Front/Commercial Farmer’s Union alliance of the pre-independence period.

While government reviews its agrarian reform policy, including the legal status of ‘communal tenure’, various interest groups are engaging in power plays around the redefinition of property rights. The chiefs, for example, are agitating for a return of their powers of land allocation, and bodies such as NFAZ and the other two farmers’ unions are making their views known. World Bank consultants are being requested to make recommendations; predictably, these favour a transition to a land market and titling (Bruce 1990). On the other hand, government sponsored symposia on land reform have come out in favour of a form of ‘communal leasehold’ tenure, ‘democratisation’ of land allocation and collective resource management by means of elected village committees, and restrictions on the rights of those in urban employment who do not cultivate the land allocated to them (Republic of Zimbabwe 1987).

The outcome of these power plays is far from clear. A decisive move towards individual titling and market transactions, if accompanied by access to more and better quality land and other resources, may enable the rural petty-bourgeoisie to consolidate their privileged position and ‘take off’ into sustained capitalist production. In the absence of decisive interventions, the ambiguities inherent in the current property regime may be manipulated by elites and emergent rural accumulators to their own advantage. The commons could be increasingly exploited by households with larger herds, while arable land becomes more and more ‘privatised’ by means of loaning arrangements, exchange of use rights for cash or payments in kind, and outright sale of right of access. The ideological element in ‘communal tenure’ may come to predominate while the material reality is that of growing commoditisation.

This assumes that the rural majority who are not in a position to attempt a strategy of expanded reproduction, and whose continued access to arable and grazing land is critical for their simple reproduction, succumb to the manipulations of the rural petit-bourgeoisie. But another possible outcome is that the struggle over the meaning of ‘communal tenure’ is not decisively resolved in favour of the elite, but instead reflects an uneasy stalemate. Property relations may continue to be a major constraint on class formation.

The potential also exists for a more democratic property regime. Increased access to the nation’s resource base, through greatly expanded resettlement programmes and accompanied by real agrarian reform, is necessary. Cliffe (1988) has suggested that democratically controlled village committees may be the most appropriate institutions for controlling land. Clearly the imposi-
tion of any system from above which leaves local power structures in place is unlikely to be effective. Democratisation can only be effective if it involves the mobilisation of a potentially active citizenry.

What are the prospects for this scenario in Zimbabwe in the 1990s? While there were signs of popular discontent with the slow pace of resettlement in the 1980s, and continued instances of squatting demonstrate that land hunger is a serious problem, no large-scale rural protest movements against current government policies have emerged. Rural politics appear to consist of interfactional struggles over access to development funding and positions within the ruling party amongst the rural elite, and 'hidden struggles' to resist the more debilitating effects of ill-conceived land use planning and villagisation programmes on the part of the less powerful. A discourse of class struggle has yet to emerge, and notions of democratic control of resource allocation and use are at best embryonic.

It may be that the demand for a more democratic regime will only be expressed in the countryside when notions of economic democracy become a focus of struggle in a distant, yet not unconnected locale, the urban work place. The crucial link may be the first part of that hybrid category, 'worker-peasant'. But if our analysis is correct and this class stratum is declining in terms of numbers, then an alliance with the growing numbers of lumpen semi-peasants will be critical. The common rallying point could well be the call for a more democratic land tenure system, as well as greater access to other productive resources – and jobs. In the context of this political-economic scenario, the politics of petty commodity producers should prove to be critical.

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Endnotes

1. The initial version of this article included a section entitled 'Commodity Production and Differentiation in Historical Perspective' which could not be included due to space constraints.

2. Simple and expanded reproduction are being used here in a somewhat different sense to that of Marx in Volume II of Capital, where both terms refer to capitalist reproduction. Rather, the distinction marks the emergence of a unique 'logic' of production under capitalism (see the discussion by Giddens 1981:117-125).

3. Given our rejection of the label 'peasant' this designation may seem quixotic, but the more accurate 'worker-petty commodity producer' is simply too clumsy to use; we thus use the label advisedly as a shorthand form.
4. Using detailed (and location-specific) survey data to categorise households in terms of the typology outlined in a rigorous manner is a difficult task given the complexities involved and the notorious problems with collecting reliable information. Operationalising these class categories would involve deciding what level of income, from all sources, is sufficient for 'reproduction', and what level of reinvestment in agricultural production qualifies as 'expanded reproduction' rather than simply renewal of the means of production. There is a degree of arbitrariness in these decisions which makes it all the more important that the criteria used be made explicit.

Bibliographic Note


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Structural Adjustment and Agricultural Pricing in Mozambique

Vincent Tickner

One of the main components in the structural adjustment programmes being introduced in Africa is that of agricultural price policy. This usually involves rises in producer prices, price deregulation or the tying of domestic producer prices more closely to international prices, or a mix of these approaches. Mozambique is currently being subjected to a virulent version of structural adjustment involving these types of price policy changes, while in the midst of a destabilisation war, and despite an already much weakened economy. This article looks at the development of agricultural pricing policy in Mozambique and the application of price policy changes under structural adjustment and draws out some of the points to be learned from the experience.

Structural Adjustment and Agricultural Pricing

One of the main planks of most 'structural adjustment' programmes involves agricultural pricing policy. Structural adjustment policies in relation to agriculture have been increasingly criticised from a number of perspectives (ROAPE 27/28, 41, 43 and 45/46, Tickner 1987, Commander 1989, IDS 1983, Lawrence 1986).

Most proponents of structural adjustment programmes start from a neo-classical position, assuming that the predominant forces in any agricultural marketing system are demand and supply as reflected in the price structure, and that pricing is a major, if not the predominant, mechanism by which the sub-sector can be influenced. Accordingly, most structural adjustment programmes have had a significant component related to agricultural pricing policy. The main characteristics of the pricing programmes are usually a mix of the following:

- The initial promotion of higher official producer prices for prices fixed by government, ostensibly as an incentive to crop producers, but often fuelling inflation;

- Replacement of pan-territorial state fixed pricing by zonal/regional pricing and limited regulation or even complete deregulation of prices;
• Elimination or reduction of state involvement in price fixing, because of limited state capacity either to analyse prices, or to take good decisions on them, or subsequently to control them. Little or no effort has been put in to strengthen the state's capacity to do these things;

• Where the state continues to intervene in pricing, to get it to base domestic prices primarily on import and export parity based calculations, in order to tie such pricing more to world markets. The alignment by governments of their domestic prices to such parity calculations is then often used as a benchmark of their compliance with the structural adjustment programme, regardless of the dubious nature and reliability of the calculations;

• Elimination or reduction of subsidies that modify the pricing structure;

• Elimination or reduction of fiscal extraction from the marketing system, particularly from export crops, to promote export crop production, as well as the reduction of state capital accumulation.

Besides these direct interventions in the pricing system, structural adjustment policies in relation to exchange rates, market privatisation, credit restraint, and import/export liberalisation have often had a substantial impact on crop prices, although this impact rarely appears to have been measured or analysed.

The underlying objectives of these policy measures, beyond the usual neoclassical desire to return to the true opportunity costs of production, eliminate 'distortions' and assert the advantages of non-regulated markets (even if they are highly imperfect) appear to be:

• To integrate further national economies into the commodity markets of the international capitalist economy creating a greater dependency linkage;

• To weaken the participation and influence of the state in the agricultural marketing system, and its capacity to accumulate capital from that system, thus enabling international capital to have a stronger hold over such economies;

• To promote the position of private producers and intermediaries, with little effort to differentiate them, on the sometimes dubious assumption that their participation in the marketing system will be more efficient than that of the state.

Development of Agricultural Pricing in Mozambique

Before 1975, the colonial government in Mozambique intervened substantially
in agricultural pricing. Minimum prices and fixed warehouse-door prices were set for cereals, soybeans, groundnuts and seed cotton for several decades. Fixed consumer prices were also set for flour, bread and milled rice. The Mozambique Cotton Institute (IAM) and the Mozambique Cereals Institute (ICM) had monopoly purchase of these crops. Prices reflected quality and regional differences, with the marketing margins fixed by the administration. Prices for tea, sugar, copra and sisal, which were grown on large private plantations and marketed by them, were geared to international market prices.

At independence, many of the Portuguese administrative class fled the country, leaving the IAM and ICM short of professional staff. From 1976-78 these Institutes were merged into a department of the Ministry of Agriculture, DINECA. The colonial system of fixing prices was maintained but grading distinctions were simplified. Fixed prices, rather than minimum prices, were established for unbagged crop purchase at the village level, from intermediaries and at local warehouses. Ex-warehouse, wholesale and consumer prices were also established, and prices were also set for cashewnuts, beans, and oilseeds.

Following the 3rd Frelimo Congress in 1977, national prices were gradually established, and in 1979, a National Salaries and Prices Commission (CNSP) was established to decide on administered prices from proposals prepared by line ministries. Also, in 1978 responsibility for agricultural marketing for the peasant and cooperative sectors was transferred to the Ministry of Internal Trade (later incorporated within the Ministry of Trade). The data base and analytic capacity for price proposals was very limited and no regular system of fixing prices was established. Decisions were mainly influenced by concern for an adequate return for producers, while also keeping down consumer prices, particularly for basic foods, sometimes by subsidies. Existing price levels, producer responsiveness and estimated producer and marketing costs strongly influenced pricing decisions. International prices were taken into consideration sometimes, but usually only as a secondary guide. During this period little detailed analysis of the impact of prices was undertaken.

In 1981 the agricultural marketing parastatal, AGRICOM, was set up. It contributed to price proposals, but did not participate in the decisions to fix them. A concern for the economic viability of the new parastatal did, however, lead to greater consideration when fixing prices on cross-subsidisation, relative prices for different crops, and the economic impact on AGRICOM.

Fixed prices continued to be set irregularly, and not always annually. They were usually adhered to, but in some areas intermediaries offered higher prices to producers to capture volumes, particularly for those food crops where such intermediaries could also gain the added value through processing, such as maize. Some plantations also paid higher prices for food crops in order to secure food supplies for their workers. Crop prices during this period largely kept in tune with basic goods prices. In 1982 more consideration was
given to producer incomes and the availability to them of basic consumer goods, which was then becoming a major problem.

From 1983 Mozambique's agricultural development must be seen in the context of the intensified destabilisation war of RENAMO's - strongly directed and aided by South Africa. This, along with agro-ecological factors and shortages of basic consumer goods, contributed to the development of parallel markets, and higher prices. The 4th Frelimo Congress (April 1983) emphasised the need to give greater support to the peasant sector in agriculture, and the role of pricing in this. Deteriorating military and economic circumstances, however, led the Frelimo government to sign the Nkomati Accord with South Africa and to join the World Bank and the IMF in 1984. Accordingly, Mozambique's structural adjustment policies began in 1985.

**Mozambican Structural Adjustment Programmes**

Although the main impetus for the structural adjustment programme in Mozambique has come from the IMF and the World Bank, other international agencies, such as IFAD and UNDP, and bilateral agencies, such as USAID, DANIDA and SIDA, have also pressed for structural adjustment policies in relation to agricultural pricing. The degree of collusion between them is unclear although the IMF and World Bank have worked very closely together in recent years (IBRD 1989b). Similarly, it is difficult to get a clear picture of what private negotiating pressures (as opposed to their public postures) these agencies have exerted. It would appear that USAID has often adopted the most extreme positions in pressing for changes in the agricultural pricing system, followed by the IMF, then the World Bank with other agencies following.

Crop prices were not changed during 1984, but detailed discussions were undertaken with international creditors and the Club of Paris, to whom an Economic Action Programme (PAE) for 1984-86 was presented. This can be seen as a kind of preparatory structural adjustment programme, envisaging unspecified reforms of the pricing system to the advantage of peasant and private producers. In September 1984, a group of experts for the Club of Paris pressed for price reforms and deregulation but did not get down to specifics. Deregulation of fruit and vegetable prices, that had only been fixed since 1980, had already been contemplated. In May 1985 these prices deregulated along with those for cassava, sweet potatoes and corn-on-the-cob, as a first price liberalisation measure, while increasing substantially the fixed prices for other products. They were able to maintain consumer prices for cereals and flours in the large cities, largely through food aid.

The World Bank's first major document on the economy (IBRD 1985) in June 1985, commended these initiatives but pressed for higher producer prices and adequate marketing margins while hinting at the need to adjust domestic prices to international prices, particularly for export crops. The 'grossly over-valued exchange rate' was stressed. The focus on macro-economic reforms,
probably reflected the predominance of IMF stabilisation measures being introduced. The World Bank advocated decentralisation of price-setting and minimum guaranteed floor prices, with continuous upward adjustment of prices in the interim. The Nordic countries, who had given major assistance to agriculture, commissioned a study of crop pricing (IDS 1985), which indicated that although price did influence the market, other factors such as the availability of consumer outlets, transport and the war were often more important.

During 1986 the government did not alter crop prices further, the destabilisation war continued ferociously, and the recorded marketed production reached its nadir. In October 1986 an IMF Report (IMF 1986) recommended ‘the immediate pricing policy should include adjustments of prices of those products that are below import parity to import parity levels . . .’ and ‘exchange rate and pricing policies will be the centre-piece of the adjustment and recovery effort’. They specifically advocated raising producer prices for export crops, adjusting swiftly to changes in exchange rates and costs, reviewing subsidies on basic staples, but also maintaining price flexibility.

Towards the end of 1986, the Frelimo government formulated its first proper structural adjustment programme, the Economic Rehabilitation Programme (PRE) to cover the period 1987 to 1990 (RPM 1987). This programme focused on the devaluation of the Metical, credit restrictions, raised interest rates, raised income tax, and a reduced government budget. It was anticipated that these measures would stimulate production. In relation to pricing it was envisaged that bureaucratic procedures in their determination would be reduced and a gradual deregulation of prices would take place, with frequent adjustments to allow for the impact of the devaluations. It was also envisaged that producer prices would be 'determined' by international prices adjusted for internal costs and converted at the official exchange rate.

In early 1987 the government set new producer prices, not radically altering the system, but increasing them substantially. With the heavy devaluations that took place in 1987, these prices had to be adjusted markedly. Clearly, the Frelimo government was reluctant to introduce sweeping deregulation of prices. Neither it, nor the IMF/World Bank had developed coherent strategies on agricultural price policy at that point. Presumably negotiations were quite intense, because the World Bank financed a study (Francisco et al, 1987) to evaluate the impact of the deregulation of fruit and vegetable prices, as a prelude to further discussions on price deregulation and linked to the second rehabilitation financing parcel to be decided in November 1987. The study made the most of the limited data base and a detailed interview programme, but suffered from being a post-hoc, rather than a before-during-and-after study. It indicated that the price deregulation had initial positive effects on market supplies, but that by 1987 these had slowed down, and that a number of other factors strongly influenced the market. It showed that the impact of the price liberalisation was mixed, that other measures, the intermediaries involved and their resources, all had an impact on developments, while some of the
other results of the measures worked against price liberalisation. Their recommendations focused on other structural supports needed to stimulate and balance the market, rather than on pricing policy. To some extent fruit and vegetables, because of their perishable nature and their seasonality, are a special case, and it is risky to extrapolate from them to other crops.

The World Bank got its own consultant to write a report summarising and interpreting the Mozambican study (Larson 1987); this was selective in what it chose to emphasise, pushing for further deregulation of prices - as did the evaluation team for the second rehabilitation credit (IBRD 1987). This work, along with the first major Agriculture Sector study (IBRD 1988a), undertaken in July 1987 but for which the final version only appeared in May 1988, provided the basis for the first major formulation by the World Bank of the agricultural pricing policies to be adopted in the structural adjustment programme.

The November 1987 IBRD evaluation (IBRD 1987) gave the first clear statement of the structural adjustment policies to be adopted under the PRE in relation to agricultural pricing. There were aimed to 'increase incentives for production' by three main methods: reducing the number of agricultural products subject to fixed or regulated prices; regularly adjusting fixed producer prices in line with international prices adjusted for internal distribution and processing costs, converted at the prevailing official exchange rate; and replacing multi-level price fixing with a minimum producer price system for some crops to increase flexibility in pricing. The World Bank advocated even more deregulation of prices and further regular price adjustments. It indicated that the minimum producer price strategy should be implemented over the 1988-90 period, with priority given to cashew nuts. These measures were specifically designed to 'improve incentives for participation in marketing by private sector'.

In September 1987 the government introduced a policy innovation announcing pre-planting producer prices, which they have done each year since. The impact of announcing pre-planting prices has not been systematically monitored, but the consensus of a number of intermediaries interviewed by different researchers since then has been that in certain areas and for certain crops, it has influenced sowing patterns. In March 1988 they announced local warehouse-door and consumer prices for the coming campaign, cutting out other intermediate prices for most products.

The World Bank Agriculture Sector Study (IBRD 1988a) gave considerable attention to pricing. By May 1988, some of its criticisms and recommendations had already been implemented. Much of the analysis in the report focused on the use of parity pricing calculations for determining internal prices. The report maintained that the government 'intends to move towards using international border prices as the principal reference in setting agricultural producer prices rather than domestic costs of production'. Although recommending
further deregulation, the report indicated that the Mozambican government wished to retain some controls on essential food staples in limited supply and on products where trading monopolies could easily develop. It indicated that the government wished to retain fixed prices for maize and rice to protect producers, and because of the substantial food aid in these products coming into the country.

The report recognised that price liberalisation is a sensitive topic in Mozambique. It suggested a number of criteria that might be used in determining for which products prices might be deregulated and their phasing, and proposing specific products for deregulation, including wheat, soybeans, sorghum, beans and potatoes. The report obviously saw the limitations of further forced deregulation and tried to select products for price deregulation that were not so sensitive in order to assuage the push for deregulation, while at the same time following the main World Bank line and advocating it.

Pre-planting producer prices for 1989 were posted in October 1988, followed in April 1989, by other prices. In February 1989, the government prepared with IMF and World Bank staff in 'Mozambique: Policy Framework Paper 1989-91' (IBRD 1989a). This document reiterated the price policy objectives of November 1987 and added several new ones: many crops (groundnuts, sunflower, mafurra, cashew, copra and cotton) would be removed from the fixed price list; government would 'establish a minimum price system, to be initiated during the 1988-89 agricultural season'; price policy for sorghum, soybeans and meat would be studied in 1989; 'government intends to use international border prices as the main reference for setting domestic producer prices and, during 1989, the Directorate of Agricultural Economics in the Ministry of Agriculture will develop simple models to estimate farmgate prices based on world prices. These models will be used as a guide for future price adjustments, with the objective of bringing the domestic relative price structure in line with that implied by international prices'; 'producer prices will be announced at the beginning of the planting season and would be based on the exchange rate expected to prevail during the marketing season'.

In April 1989 the Finance Minister publicly denied that Mozambican price policy was dictated by the IMF, maintaining that the government only discussed macro-economic issues with the IMF, and that decisions on price levels were purely internal (MIO 1989). He did not, however, assert that the IMF had no influence on price policy. The World Bank evaluation in April 1989 in relation to the Third Rehabilitation Credit (IBRD 1989a) reinforced the relationship between administered producer prices and border prices but admitted that there was currently limited scope for further deregulation, particularly because of the war.

A letter to the Finance Minister from USAID of June 1989 (reproduced at the end of this article) (Schlotthauer 1989), exemplifies the crude ways in which USAID directly linked policy reform to its aid. It also shows how USAID staff
are have been pushing for price reforms to facilitate the dumping of yellow maize (which the US produces) on Mozambique and the creation of yellow maize dependency in the country. In 1988-89 over half the maize pledged as food aid was yellow maize, of which about 65% was from US aid. Producer price policy is a marked part of policy reform conditionality. They even set out a programming of benchmark objectives for price deregulation through to 1992, that ends with the complete deregulation of producer prices for all domestically produced agricultural commodities.

The World Bank Mozambique Food Security Study (IBRD 1989c), the first draft of which was prepared in June 1989, acknowledged that the destabilisation war inhibited the further deregulation of prices. It suggested that official prices should be based on parity prices based on the average exchange rate expected to prevail during the year, that prices should be reviewed at approximately six-month intervals and be adjusted if the exchange rate differs significantly from what was anticipated.

It is clear that during 1989 the pressures on Mozambique to link administered price levels to international parity prices, to be followed by complete price deregulation, increased markedly. The Mozambican government responded to these pressures by stabilising minimum producer prices for beans, sorghum, sunflower seeds, mafurra, groundnuts, copra, cotton and cashewnuts for the 1989 marketing season. In September 1989, the CNSP announced new pre-planting prices for the 1990 season. Interestingly, rather than being strongly linked to parity prices, for most crops they were a simple (approximately 15%) increase on 1989 prices. The motivation seems to have been primarily one of trying to keep inflation down through controlling the level of producer prices.

In January 1990 the CNSP established consumer sales prices for groundnuts, beans and sorghum leaving intermediate prices between minimum producer prices and consumer sales prices to be regulated by the market. Only maize prices, processed crop rice and sunflower were fixed at all stages in the marketing circuit. In May 1990, maize prices were again altered, establishing only the minimum producer price, but making maize flour a regulated price following established percented margins for distributors.

Analysis of the Forces Involved

How can we analyse the changing positions of different organisations concerning Mozambican agricultural pricing policy? It would appear that, despite some pressures from within the Ministry of Finance, the Frelimo government would have not moved along the path of price deregulation had it not been forced to do so. It is also clear that in 1985 and 1986, different international agencies had no clear strategies on how to link crop prices to international prices or their deregulation. The Mozambican government, seeing the direction which pressures were taking, appears to have pre-empted some of
them by undertaking some deregulation measures and increasing producer prices of fixed price crops.

More specific pressures on agricultural pricing policy have steadily been applied from the end of 1987. The World Bank appears to have been the major force in articulating the strategy, programming price deregulation measures, and introducing methodologies for calculating international parity-based price calculations. Yet it has left a certain flexibility in the programming of the implementation and, although advocating regular price adjustments to exchange rate changes, has not formulated clear approaches on when and how this should be done, nor on the degree to which producer prices must be linked to international prices. It would appear that some of the technicians of the World Bank working on these issues, coming closer to Mozambican difficulties and circumstances, have tried, while staying within the policy objectives of the World Bank, to limit further price deregulation to some comparatively minor changes.

What is not clear is how much the World Bank, IMF and USAID are imposing their conditionality in negotiations. From the Schlotthauer letter mentioned above, it would appear that USAID is pressing hard its conditionality in relation to pricing policy, even establishing compliance targets for the next few years. According to discussions with Mozambican officials and others involved with pricing policy in Mozambique, the IMF has been maintaining more rigid positions on price deregulation than the World Bank in the last few years, but has not established clear strategies for implementation. During 1989, however, there was a marked tendency for such organisations to include comparisons of border-price based calculations for producer prices with official prices as a measure of how much Mozambique is following its structural adjustment obligations.

How has the Mozambican government responded to this? There appear to be struggles on these issues within the government. Some forces are ready to go along with these structural adjustment proposals; some to go so far, but to retain some control of certain prices; while others have been looking for room for manoeuvre to retain some state influence over agricultural pricing. The external agencies have often tried to get the Mozambican government to 'own' the reforms being pushed on them to make it more difficult later to back-track (Marshall, ROAPE 47). The 5th Frelimo Congress in July 1989 to some extent tried to play down discussion of the impact of the PRE that had come up in many local level discussions in preparation for the Congress. The Frelimo Government is in a difficult position, with a fierce destabilisation war still unresolved, a severely weakened economy and substantial foreign debt. It appears reluctant to present the Mozambican people with a full analysis of the current pressures of international capitalist forces on Mozambique. At a certain level many Mozambicans do understand them; even in 1987, ordinary Mozambicans dubbed PRE the 'Programme for the Rehabilitation of Exploiters'. Until the strikes at the beginning of 1990, there had been few signs, how-
ever, of organised, well-analysed resistance to the programmes, and even now much of the resistance remains comparatively disparate.

Impact of Structural Adjustment Agricultural Pricing

What has been the impact of these structural adjustment measures on agricultural production and marketing, particularly the price policy measures? It is hard to measure with any precision. Even the World Bank admitted (IBRD 1989a) that 'it is difficult to establish quantitatively the likely impact of the program'. The liberalisation measures in marketing have meant that a number of private intermediaries no longer provide data on marketed volumes. No reliable systems have yet been established for monitoring the development of actual prices paid for agricultural products and their derivatives in different parts of the country. USAID has been the only organisation to maintain regular price monitoring of certain products in Maputo, although for four months in 1989 the Ministry of Agriculture's statistical section did some monitoring.

The impact of the structural adjustment policies forcing the reduction of budgets for government departments, aimed at reducing the power of the Mozambican state, has further weakened the resources for monitoring. For some time the Ministry of Agriculture had been asked to evaluate the impact of announcing pre-planting prices on producer response, but they have not had the personnel and resources to do so. To some proponents of structural adjustment this does not matter because they treat it as axiomatic that their prescriptions are the right ones, and that the power of the state over the economy should be weakened. It makes it even harder for the Mozambican state to make more finely tuned interventions in the economy.

It is also difficult to isolate the impact of price policy decisions from other measures and other influences on the economy. An early evaluation by SIDA (Hermele 1988) indicated the difficulties of implementing the PRE in the face of continuing destabilisation. It looked at how much the PRE is a 'structural adjustment programme', and how much it is only 'an effort to set prices right, make market mechanisms work, and tailor the state's role to its capacities' (p.16-17). It showed that even the IMF was doubtful as to whether the policy measures would be sufficient to yield sustainable growth over the 1987-90 period, given the level of the war.

In mid-1990, in an interview with the local Sunday newspaper, the Minister of Finance admitted that it was unlikely that their structural adjustment programme would succeed in circumstances of a continuing war. Hermele's report also indicated 'only slight growth for industry and none for exports, with a minor improvement in peasant marketing' was anticipated for 1988. The PRE plan had envisaged a 21% increase of the volumes marketed by peasant producers in 1988 when the actual increase was just over 5%. The study suggested that the price increases had been too drastic, substantially reducing demand and that more attention should perhaps have been given 'to distribu-
tion and storage problems as well as softening the impact of price increases in order to safeguard a market.' It indicated that the Ministry of Trade wanted a number of criteria applied in price setting, including 'border prices’, African regional prices and the effects on peasant terms of trade. The report recommended:

less obsession with export generation and more focus upon the overall economic consequences of price policy changes on the global socio-economic situation of the production unit which in the countryside is invariably the family household (p.28).

The IMF Report (IMF 1988) prepared in November 1988 also suggested that the growth rate in 1988 would ‘be much less than projected’ (p.6). The World Bank Reports (IBRD 1988c; IBRD 1989a) indicated the negative impact of the war on economic recovery and how this particularly affected individual provinces besides climatic variations. Most of these evaluations by the World Bank and the IMF, however, focus on how much the structural adjustment prescriptions have been implemented, rather than the impact on the economy or specific sub-sectors of the economy. They are also highly selective in the items they choose to measure, and how they measure them. It is clear that they are nervous about the socio-economic impact of the structural adjustment programme on both urban and rural populations, as the World Bank has agreed to a social welfare support programme that is intended partially to alleviate the negative effects of the structural adjustment programme, although their implementation of this programme in 1990 appeared to be moving slowly. They are back to tinkering, rather than admitting the negative consequences of such programmes, and modifying them. Instead they seem intent on pressing ahead with the structural adjustment programme (IBRD 1989b:21).

Little in terms of really systematic evaluation of the impact of the PRE has been undertaken. The Ministry of Agriculture looked at the impact of the PRE on the family sector in November 1988 (DEA 1988), primarily at the rural terms of trade for agricultural producers. That study, along with the SIDA/AGRICOM study of September 1989 (SIDA/AGRICOM 1989), showed that after a slight upturn in 1987 in the rural terms of trade subsequently appear to have deteriorated for peasant producers. It is very hard to quantify this with any certainty, but the estimates made for 1989 put peasant producer rural terms of trade in official prices at about 70% of 1980 levels. When actual prices paid to producers for crops and the actual prices of basic consumer goods in rural areas are calculated, however, the rural terms of trade for crop producers are often even worse. To some extent this deterioration in rural terms of trade is not as great if the parallel market prices of the 1983-86 period are taken into consideration. It would appear, however, that despite deteriorating terms of trade rural producers have at least been able to obtain some basic items that they could not get before (Adam & Cruz e Silva 1989), and have increased their crop sales. This is unlikely to be sustainable, unless producers receive real increases in farmgate prices.

An indication of the national trend for recorded marketed agricultural pro-
Recorded Marketed Production for Selected Agricultural Crops 1980-90 (in thousands of tonnes)

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<td>27.3</td>
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<td>80.8</td>
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<td>18.1</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>31.7</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dried Cassava</td>
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<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>14.8</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<td>25.5</td>
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<td>12.5</td>
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<td>37.5</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>28.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seed Cotton</td>
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<td>16.7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>31.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>11.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
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<td>9.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) First Estimates made in March 1990 by AGRICOM
(b) SEA estimate
Sources: DNE, AGRICOM, SEA

A study undertaken by the Centre for African Studies in Maputo in July 1989 (Adam & Cruz e Silva 1989) looked at rural markets and prices in seven districts in seven different provinces. This study came to the following major...
conclusions in relation to recent changes and the impact of the recent reform
measures:

• that rural marketing is often now more active, with private traders
more active, but that this is highly influenced by the security cir-
cumstances in the area;

• that commercial establishments in rural areas have plenty of cer-
tain types of consumer goods, but that some basic goods, such as
sugar, salt, soap and used clothes are still lacking;

• that the purchasing power of most crop producers has been re-
duced;

• that 1989 official producer prices, particularly for cereals, were
good but that for producers who used purchased inputs returns
were not adequate for maize and rice;

• that the legal marketing margins for many products, cashewnuts
excepted, were insufficient to cover marketing costs, and that ac-
cordingly intermediaries were paying producers less than the mini-
imum prices in many areas, and selling to consumers at higher
prices;

• that many intermediaries did not want the state to reduce its role in
crop wholesale marketing for cereals, as they did not have the re-
sources, storage facilities and operating capital to undertake these
tasks.

It is difficult to isolate the impact of the price policy measures from other
factors and other structural adjustment measures, but in any case the actual
impact of the measures has not been anywhere near what was anticipated.
Both rural and urban consumers appear to have seen their purchasing power
deteriorate, the only group really to benefit being some traders with transport
access and other resources. Many smaller traders would still appear to suffer,
however, from the deterioration of both the marketing infrastructure and se-
curity. Although the official administered prices being set are higher, many
producers, particularly of cereals, are receiving actual prices for their crops
that are much lower than official prices (except where urban agglomerations
or factories can take up output). Rather than being the great stimulus to agri-
cultural producers that it is said to be, price liberalisation or the raising of
official producer prices appear to be having a marginal impact.

Weaknesses of Current Structural Adjustment Pricing
What are the weaknesses in the current structural adjustment pricing policies
being applied in Mozambique? First, a fundamental weakness is that the pro-
gramme is being introduced as if the destabilisation war being perpetrated
against Mozambique is a minor irritant rather than the predominant factor currently disrupting and weakening the whole economy and society. The World Bank/IMF have grudgingly acknowledged the role of the war in slowing down the programme but are reluctant to admit that any economic programme in present circumstances is unlikely to succeed. Some people see their astigmatism as being natural in organisations which constitute the economic wing of the attack of international capital on any socialist development. The destabilisation war is not just being supported by South Africa. Members of the CIA and other US organisations have been gaining influence within RENAMO (Africa Confidential 7 July 1989). It seems highly unlikely that the US government does not coordinate their military, aid and commercial activities, with their known influence on World Bank/IMF policies.

Second, a stated aim of the structural adjustment programme in Mozambique is to stimulate agricultural production and promote agricultural producers. However, the exchange rate changes, import liberalisation and credit squeezes being applied in the current programme, given present ‘market imperfections’ and difficulties, are squeezing those sub-sectors using imported inputs, unless they are being specifically aided, as the private sector is. Moreover, after initially bringing parallel market and official prices in line, the actual prices paid to producers have declined in real terms.

Third, although there is some recognition that pricing changes without other structural supports to reduce market imperfections and rehabilitate the marketing system and infrastructure will not work, the pressures are still to liberalise the pricing system, while the other supports are not as forthcoming as they need to be, and take longer (particularly in a war) to implement anyway. This issue of the timing and scheduling of structural adjustment policies has been criticised elsewhere (Commander 1989). The lack of synchronisation means, in the case of Mozambique, with present ‘market imperfections’ and the war, that both producers and consumers are being disadvantaged, and that only certain traders are temporarily benefiting from the situation.

Fourth, in Mozambique (as in other countries), international parity-based methodologies for determining agricultural prices have been pressed in adjustment programmes, with a pseudo-scientific value given to these calculations which has led them to be used as benchmarks, even though the calculation methods are often faulty. A number of objections to these methodologies and their rigid application can be raised:

- International prices are not neutral, but reflect the distortions of international commodity markets, particularly for wheat, maize and rice, which major exporting countries subsidise, contributing to lower world market prices. This gives producers in those countries a comparative advantage over Mozambican producers on top of the comparative advantages from not having suffered war for 25 years, having a more developed production technology, and operating in more developed economies;
The international prices often used for parity price calculations fluctuate markedly both during any year and over several years, particularly those for oilseeds. Little attention has been given to actual export prices from different potential supplies, quality and variety differences in these price calculations;

Projecting international prices to the period at which Mozambican producer prices are meant to operate is difficult, and the World Bank Commodity Projections are currently an unreliable basis for doing this. The World Bank’s evaluation (IBRD 1988d), plus comparisons of their 1988 and 1989 projections with actual prices, show that projections just one year ahead diverge markedly from reality;

Over-simplified freight rate calculations are often used that do not allow for the variety of rates and forms of transportation that occur in reality;

There has been little effort to compare the import prices of products into Mozambique coming from different likely sources;

The exchange rates used in the conversion of landed prices and export port prices from foreign currencies to Meticais present problems, with Mozambican devaluations still running at a minimum of 30% a year, and the currency still appearing to be ‘overvalued’;

The marketing cost components used in the parity price calculations are based on marketing cost calculations that have a weak basis. If the full marketing costs between producer and end-user/supplier are considered, many of the producer prices arrived at would be ridiculously low. The argument that in such cases it is not economically viable for Mozambique to produce these products, or it should only produce them for a pittance, ignores all efforts to develop the country’s enormous productive potential and generate a minimal income for its inhabitants;

For those products that have a processing component in the calculations, particularly export crops, inadequate attention has been given to the real transforming capacity of the Mozambican industry and how this compares with other industrial capacity;

Minimal attention has been given to the points in Mozambique to or from which such parity price calculations could or should made. To have much utility, such calculations should test for applicability to different locations;

The way in which import parity calculations have been attempted to date neglects regional pricing. This may be because the people pushing parity pricing only see it as a temporary measure anyway, in their desire to press on with fuller price liberalisation;
No attention has been given to comparing parity prices arrived at with the actual prices being paid to Mozambican producers. A growing divergence between posted prices and the actual prices paid to producers gives such comparisons an increasing salience;

Parity price approaches focusing on individual products detract from a concentration on relative prices between crops and the aggregate response. The crude application of parity approaches in structural adjustment programmes in other countries in Africa has sometimes led to prices of individual crops being increased, with a resulting increase in marketed production for the crop concerned, but a decline in alternative crops produced by these producers. Complementarity between different crops produced by different types of producer in different regions in Mozambique is currently poorly understood.

Lastly, the lack of attention given at the beginning of such programmes to the setting up of adequate price monitoring systems or the evaluation of the impact of price policy changes, when the outcomes are so uncertain, reflects the ideological basis of such policies aimed to weaken any control or accurate knowledge that the state might have over the workings of deregulated market prices and marketing systems, rather than a genuine concern to develop the economy.

What Can Mozambique Do?

It is clear that the Mozambique government is still being heavily pressed by external agencies, but priority approaches to pricing policy need to be:

To establish regular and reliable price monitoring systems, both for actual prices paid to producers in different areas and actual prices paid by end users in rural and urban areas;

Use calculations of border prices as parameters and guide-lines for establishing minimum producer prices, allowing for the distortions and limited reliability of the data, but resist the pressure to make these methodologies the dominant ones in determining producer prices, or to use these calculations rigidly as the benchmarks for Mozambican compliance with structural adjustment programmes;

Develop a greater capacity to evaluate production costs, rural terms of trade, factor input/output ratios, producer response motivations and complementarity between different crops;

Concentrate more resources on rehabilitating, as the war permits, the marketing infrastructure (feeder and secondary roads, transport modes, storage and collecting outlets) in order to reduce high marketing costs and allow more intermediaries to operate;
• Adopt an active structured policy that differentiates intermediaries and which supports disadvantaged intermediaries (including marketing cooperatives and producer associations and new entrants) in playing a fuller role in the marketing system, contributing to price competition;

• Ensure that food aid is distributed and sold in Mozambique at prices that do not distort the functioning of the re-emerging agricultural marketing system, as has been happening in some instances in 1989;

• Consider the introduction of temporary subsidies, possibly specific transport subsidies or local food reserve subsidies, while exploring alternatives to pan-territorial pricing for different crops;

• Gradually develop fora and institutions enabling producers, intermediaries and end-users to play a more structured role in discussions and negotiations leading up to pricing decisions (as in Zimbabwe);

• Keep reviewing agricultural pricing policy in the context of the overall agricultural marketing system.

Appendix
Below are extracts from the letter of 9 June 1989 from the Director of the USAID Mission to Mozambique to Dr. Abdul Magid Osman the (Mozambican Minister of Finance), USAID reference number 89/369:

Excellency,

Over the next few months USAID will offer to negotiate with your government two important agreements related to the food and agriculture sector. One agreement is a three-year, $50 million program to continue the financing of agricultural inputs for family and commercial farmers. The second is also a three-year program, estimated at $100 million, to finance food imports for commercial markets. The purpose of this letter is to indicate some policy matters related to these programs that I would like to discuss with you in detail. Because of U.S. food aid procurement requirements, reaching agreement on an additional 30,000 metric tons of wheat, rice and corn is particularly urgent. I have therefore been instructed to seek agreement on an accelerated basis of a PL-480 Title II Section 206 Agreement which is included herewith as Attachment 3.

...I hope we can meet in the near future to discuss this linking of economic resources and effective policies. In particular, I would like to pursue with you the following three topics which are raised in your Policy Framework Paper and which directly affect the timing, relevance and impact of US assistance.

1. Producer Prices. USAID's analyses indicate that you have already made significant progress toward increasing producer prices to an import-export parity level. Your PFP states that the Ministry of Agriculture will develop models to institutionalise the practice of linking farmgate and world prices in order to maintain adequate incentives for domestic production. I am particularly interested in discussing the transition process from fixed factory gate prices to minimum floor prices and, eventually, to market determined prices.

2. Marketing Policies. Policies governing the marketing of crops have increasingly been liberalized to allow wider scope for private traders and producers to market domestic products. As we have found with private participation in the distribution of agricultural inputs, this should increase the flow of domestically produced food to the markets of the country and help AGRICOM focus its efforts on areas beyond the reach of private traders.
I am interested in your plans to integrate these newly liberalized producer markets with regulated consumer markets, particularly for maize, beans and rice. Our informal surveys of markets costs generally will not exceed fixed consumer prices close to production areas, but that margins will be squeezed as one moves toward urban centers particularly Maputo and Béira. Your earlier suggestion to me to deregulate the price of white maize and subsidize imported yellow maize may be an effective way to address this issue. A similar strategy might also be employed with domestic lima beans and imported pinto beans. We have analyzed the general principles involved in this strategy in a paper appended as attachment 2 and agree that, while a number of unknowns need to be addressed, it could entail significant benefits in promoting food security and increasing food supplies. I hope we can develop some concrete ideas on how this strategy might be implemented.

Signed,

Julius Schlotthauer, Director

Bibliographic Note


The first major evaluation of the impact of structural adjustment price policies was: A. Francisco, A.M. Ribeiro, M. Pancas, B. Baptista, ‘Estudo do Sistema de Mercadade Horticois e Frutas e Impacto da Liberalizacao dos Preços’, Maputo, Novembre 1987, the first draft of which was re-interpreted for the World Bank in Donald W. Larson, ‘Structure and Performance of the Fruit and Vegetable Marketing System of Mozambique’ Preliminary Report, August 1987.


South Africa: Political Violence, Reform and Reconstruction

Mike Morris & Doug Hindson

The endemic violence sweeping South Africa is often said to be the fault of apartheid. If the point being made is a moral one then this is obviously true. However, if a holistic explanation rooted in material, social and historical processes is being sought then two questions have to be addressed: why is this occurring now when apartheid is in demise rather than 15 or 20 years ago when it was at its peak? Furthermore, why in a society where whites historically have dominated and oppressed blacks, often violently, are black people killing each other rather than whites? Posing these questions recasts one's whole way of looking at violence; that the roots of violence should be sought in the effects of the disintegration of apartheid rather than its continued implementation.

Violence and the Disintegration of Apartheid

We are offering an explanation that is located not only in divisions within the black population (this is only part of the answer), but also in a treatment of the divisions within society. In essence, the power of the state and the cohesiveness of white society has enabled the latter to be buffered from the more serious elements of violence and destruction. Because of the socio-spatial distribution of power in the city, the wealthier classes and groups are able to displace the struggle for residential space and resources into the more vulnerable zones of the city, on its peripheries where land allocation and control is weak, either due to apartheid's legacy (as in the black townships) or due to weak property relations as in the case of tribal areas and squatter camps near the metropoles. Simultaneously the state has ensured that a whole series of resources continues to be supplied to whites and, increasingly, to coloured and Indian areas. Hence the conflict over resources has been deflected, displaced and confined to the black areas, so that instead of the conflict taking place over the distribution of resources generally, it is taking place over the distribution of the marginal resources left over for black residential areas whose inhabitants are rapidly expanding but with no parallel expansion of resources being made available to them.

The harsh reality is that racial, ethnic and class antagonisms held in check under classic apartheid have resurfaced in the climate of liberalisation and de-
racialisation. Many argued that the dropping of such discriminatory laws would produce more stable urban African communities and, in general, a peaceful re-ordering of urban society in ways conducive to further economic growth. Likewise neo-liberals argued that the deregulation and deracialisation of entrepreneurial opportunities within cities would lead to the de-politicisation of issues central to much of urban society and result in rapid economic growth. Others have stressed that the withdrawal of the state from the provision of urban amenities and the creation of black local governmental structures will allow urban black residents the opportunity to create their own residential communities, which will be substantially more harmonious and socially integrated.

However, it is manifestly clear that the beginnings of a post-apartheid urban society are not and will not be characterised by such optimistic developments. Contrary to the expectations of many ordinary people and the predictions of a number of liberal social scientists, the gradual erosion of apartheid institutions and the abandonment of its policies has led to an escalation of social tensions and increased, not decreased, violence throughout the country. Along with the collapse of apartheid and the changing role of the state has come an ever increasing level of social chaos. Declining urban economic growth, rapid urbanisation and the growth of shackland residential areas have been part of the very process which has caused massive social dislocation, upheaval, violence and a general heightening of political conflict within the urban metropolitan areas. Along with the often very violent conflict between contending political organisations and ideologies within the urban black population, have come antagonisms within particular residential communities, clashes between residents of shanty-towns and neighbouring residents of formal townships, and discord between a unionised working class, the emergent black middle class and the ever growing black underclasses.

The old mode of regulation of classic Verwoerdian apartheid was based on blatant and crude class and racial antagonism held in check by overwhelming state force and bureaucratic control over all aspects of the social, economic and political life. Racial and class antagonisms of South African society were successfully contained and suppressed by economic expansion and political repression. The crisis that emerged in the late 1970s shattered the effectiveness of the old structure and ushered in the process of restructuring along new lines. Economic decline and political decomposition unleashed tensions in forms which were no longer socially controllable. As apartheid broke down, social antagonisms increased and the state's capacity to exercise control over them decreased. Alongside the collapsing old mode emerged new social divisions, class relations and nascent forms of political regulation. Consequently major struggles erupted over the breakdown of the old institutions and structures of classic apartheid as well as the attempts to institute new forms of regulation.

Endemic violence, however, was not a necessary consequence of the collapse of apartheid. There could have been different ways of moving from apartheid,
difficult as this might have been, that would not necessarily have produced the same conflicting results. However the particular way in which the state tried to reform apartheid in the 1980s sharpened and inflamed the antagonisms inherent in apartheid. 'Orderly urbanisation', without major state sponsored infrastructure programmes, exacerbated the material basis of conflict in black society. Relegating political rights for Africans to a minor say in local township affairs fundamentally politicised the conflict over the allocation of urban material resources.

F. W. De Klerk's historic 2 February 1990 initiatives abandoned P. W. Botha's reform programme in favour of a new system of inclusion/exclusion where race is no longer the institutional basis for inclusion. Powerful forces in the state and capital are trying to pursue a 50% solution - to reconstitute the society along lines that are increasingly non-racial but will continue to exclude a very large section of the population from the major resources and power centres of the society. A new highly divisive path is emerging from the ashes of the disintegration of apartheid creating very deep new social and class antagonisms. Major conflicts and extreme antagonisms are constantly emerging over the allocation of social resources as old state apparatuses, ways of controlling conflict, bureaucratic rules and organisational methods coexist with new social forces, forms of organisation and differential strategies.

Furthermore, especially in KwaZulu but also elsewhere, the real possibility of the demise of the homeland system directly threatens the homeland elite of chiefs and legislative assembly members. Many chiefs, Inkatha central committee members or KwaZulu Legislative Assembly members benefit in a substantial way, either directly or through patronage, from the institutions and offices of the KwaZulu government. In the rural areas these people exercise enormous influence over those directly under them - Indunas and headmen - who in turn are able to exercise coercion in the areas of their jurisdiction.

The larger conflict being played out now is essentially about which racial groups, social classes and strata will have their interests best secured in a future political and economic dispensation. Within this context the struggle between whites and blacks over access to material resources in the urban areas becomes displaced into the black residential areas because of the cohesiveness of white society, the maintenance of administrative control and efficiency of service delivery in the hands of essentially white local government structures, and the power of the state to contain the violence.

The disintegration of apartheid has been accompanied by, and given rise to, a variety of economic, social and political processes which shape the contours of the violence: rapid urbanisation, increasing class differentiation, struggles between geographically and socially distinct urbanising communities over scarce residential resources, and major political struggles between competing power centres. The roots of the violence must be sought not in the implementation of apartheid forms of social control but in the collapse of these forms; not in the continued maintenance of apartheid but in the attempted institu-
Rapid Urbanisation and Changing Social Divisions

Classic Verwoerdian apartheid was essentially concerned to contain the process of urbanisation amongst Africans. 'Reform', as initiated by P.W. Botha in the 1980s, accepted the inevitability of urbanisation but attempted to channel the process in an 'orderly' manner. Hence by the late 1980s, the proliferation of shanty-towns and squatter communities around the metropolitan areas. Rather than compress classes, as in classic apartheid, reform facilitated class differentiation. Hence the transformation of the sphere of social reproduction of Africans from the old townships, which obstructed class mobility and locked all classes into one geographical/social space in favour of the emergence of socially demarcated residential areas with differential access to urban resources.

Notwithstanding the abandonment of formal apartheid there is still a powerful residue of economic inequality rooted in the past that is strengthening further social differentiation. New social divisions have begun to emerge within the black population based on differences in employment opportunities, income and access to urban residential resources. The old racial divisions of the apartheid period have been overlaid by increasing class differentiation within the black urban areas. Whites, coloureds, Asians together with a small minority of the African population, now occupy the middle and upper classes while the African majority is distributed overwhelmingly into working and marginalised class positions.

Rapid urbanisation has led to a reallocation towards the cities and massively increased pressure on urban social resources. It has sparked off a struggle for space, land and residential resources, leading to the mobilisation of communities along new lines based on emerging social divisions – race, class, age, language and ethnic origin. These provide the basis for mobilisation and cross-cutting lines of fracture.

Until recently, state reforms have accentuated rather than dampened conflict. Economic liberalisation has not been matched by political incorporation of the mass of the people into the national democratic process. Furthermore liberalisation and de-racialisation has been occurring in the context of economic decline since the late 1970s and has led to the resurfacing of class, ethnic and other divisions. This is partly because these processes have opened opportunities for some and given vent to aspirations long suppressed under apartheid without removing all major sources of grievance. They have yielded economic and political concessions to new middle strata of the population (including a relatively privileged working class) while excluding or marginalising the impoverished and dispossessed. The struggle for new economic and social positions by the poorer and more marginalised sectors of black society, within
shifting and uncertain social and economic contexts, is one of the fundamental roots of the violence.

Under classical apartheid access to township resources were strictly allocated by township managers and Bantu administration officials using bureaucratic rules and regulations; in the reform era black urban life became increasingly an individualised struggle. The uncertainty this produced led to shanty-town occupants being reconstituted as collectives and pitting themselves against formal township residents. The discrimination and violence of a biased state machine in the allocation of resources became replaced with a more anarchic and arbitrary process of allocating urban resources.

Instead of coming up directly against state officials implementing influx control laws, urbanising communities have increasingly found themselves locked in violent conflict with each other. The very poor shanty-town residents seem to fall into endless internecine wars. Simultaneously internal conflicts within these settlements are deflected outwards to attack the still poor, but relatively better off, township residents in order to gain access to basic urban necessities.

In many areas, attacks launched from the squatter camps by vigilantes and warlords on township residents have been crude 'booty' gathering raids, with houses being plundered and consumer items carted off to the shanty-towns.

In a similar vein the marginalised hostel dwellers, the poorest and socially most isolated sectors of the black urban community, have been locked in conflict with shanty and township residents. Accelerating inequality in urban life has thus set in train major struggles, often violent, as different social groupings vie with each other for de jure and de facto rights to occupy land and gain access to social resources.

For example, in the first upsurge of Durban violence in Inanda in 1985, the main targets were Indian and African traders, councillors and the visibly wealthier. Since then the antagonism has been recast as a fight between communities that differ in terms of their access to the resources of residential life: land, housing, water, services. It has become a conflict between townships and squatter camps, between the poor and the extremely impoverished.

In this context, minute variations in access to resources generate intense conflicts. The social divisions founded on these differences in material conditions may seem marginal, but they become the defining barrier between those isolated on the margins of urban life and those integrated into it. The demise of apartheid has not eliminated the insider/outsider distinction; it has merely altered its shape, form and mode of enforcement.

Social divisions also underlay the upsurge of conflict in the Transvaal, between hostel dwellers on the one side and formal township dwellers and squatters on the other. The hostels have historically been marginalised and socially isolated from the surrounding townships. Temporary migrant workers in the hostels, especially the older, more traditional men, have seen themselves as outsiders in a hostile environment resulting in strained relations with
the permanent township. In the early 1980s the unions built their organisational base in the East Rand through the recruitment of migrants in the hostels. This brought trade unionism into the social and economic life of these workers and acted to break down their marginalisation from other township dwellers. Hostel dwellers became organised at the sites of production and reproduction but by the mid-1980s the unions ceased to use the hostels as an organising base and depended solely on workers coming to union offices and organising at the point of production. The divide between production and reproduction reasserted itself creating an organisational vacuum.

This went hand in hand with increasing economic decline and the accelerating retrenchment of the lower echelons of the workforce. This affected hostel dwellers, who are in any case amongst the poorer sectors of urban society, more than any other sector increasing the level of unemployment. A whole stratum of single unemployed men with no jobs and no registered home, living as accepted squatters in someone else’s hostel room came into being. This, combined with a reliance on a younger, articulate and more skilled shop steward leadership, led the unions to lose touch with the needs and fears of the ordinary hostel dwellers who became more and more threatened by the political, social and economic processes of a rapidly changing urban environment.

There is also evidence that many (but not all) Xhosa speakers in the hostels, less attached to the land in the Transkei than in KwaZulu, moved out into the shanty-towns, either with their original families or with new found urban families. This was in contrast to Zulu speaking hostel dwellers, who had stronger links to subsistence agriculture and traditional structures in KwaZulu, preferring to remain as single migrants in the hostels. Wretched as they might be the hostels became the only toe-hold these single men had in the urban areas. Within black urban society the hostels increasingly became ethnically introverted, organisationally isolated and socio-economically marginalised, essentially belonging to another time – that of apartheid.

It is an ironic twist to South African history that the most exploited sector of black society should be the most threatened by the demise of apartheid. Given that the disintegration of apartheid also meant a move away from the institutions of migrant labour and hostels, this was perceived by hostel dwellers as the destruction of their entire urban survival base. Unless their fears could be allayed and an appropriate system to replace hostels put into place, they had no other alternative but to fiercely resist anything they perceived as a threatening invasion of their space. The possibility of the transformation of the hostels into family units beyond their economic reach was the most fundamental threat to their urban umbilical cord. How hostel dwellers reacted to this situation depended on how the issue was approached organisationally. Yet the unions had already abdicated their role by abandoning the organisation of the hostels and the civic organisations were dominated by township residents.

In the Transvaal the ANC grossly underestimated the potential for mobilisation by Inkatha because it operated on the assumption that the urban black
communities were socially homogeneous. Inkatha saw the possibility of remobilising in the Transvaal by using the precarious position of hostel dwellers, the organisational vacuum in the hostels and the ready-made Zulu traditional base as bridgeheads. Mobilising on the basis of language and ethnicity, Inkatha have played on the isolation of hostel dwellers to drive a wedge into the fault lines between them and township residents. Under warlike conditions, the hostels became strongholds, with hostel dwellers resurfacing to haunt COSATU and the ANC as the warriors and cannon-fodder of Inkatha.

**Political Reform and Competing Power Centres**

The political causes of the violence must be more deeply conceptually grounded than simple political rivalry between Inkatha and the ANC. What is involved here are three interrelated issues: the breakdown of the previous mode of regulating the political cohesion of the society; the changing role of the state in containing the antagonisms generated by apartheid; and the emergence of competing power centres at all levels of society struggling to establish new forms of political hegemony.

In South Africa, the use of violence to impose the policies of apartheid has been ingrained in the practices of the state over decades, especially through the agency of township administration, control over housing, pass laws, and the direct role of the police. Black people's exclusion from national democratic processes and their experience of state repression has legitimised violence as a means to effect social change. In the 1980s the breakdown of the political controls which were integral to apartheid's urbanisation policy led to the resurgence of political opposition and organisation on the part of the black urban population against the local government structure of the apartheid state, the community council system. Since they lacked a social base of support and depended almost solely on the apartheid state for their survival, in many instances they were destroyed or seriously weakened.

But this did not produce a cohesive integrated political opposition in the black townships. The weakening of state control in the aftermath of the township uprisings of the mid-1980s led instead to the formation of competing local centres of power within the black residential areas. In Natal these often took the form of youth structures (allied mostly to the ANC) and warlords (allied to Inkatha) as well as a range of other more minor political groupings and factions. This gave rise to local, regional and national struggles for hegemony in the urban areas between these competing power centres. This struggle occurred both in opposition to the state (in its local and central interventions) as well as between different political groupings within these urbanised and urbanising communities.

In Natal, Inkatha became the object of attack from those forces allying themselves with the ANC. However, in its early years, Inkatha was supported by the ANC but by the late 1970s, internal struggles within Inkatha over its future
direction and role resulted in distancing itself from the ANC. The conflict between the politics of ‘loyal resistance’ versus ‘national liberation struggle’ led to a major split between the ANC and Inkatha by 1979. Using its homeland base and the bureaucratic power accorded to it as the KwaZulu government, Inkatha then sought to build up an alternative political organisation in Natal to overshadow that of the ANC. This brought it into direct conflict with the ANC and its supporters who regarded any other purported representative of the ‘oppressed’ as a potential enemy.

There has also been long-standing animosity between the urban youth and Inkatha. Inkatha came out very strongly against the 1976 uprising, clashing with KwaMashu school children in 1980 and the University of Zululand students in 1983. In 1985 Inkatha took its revenge on the urban youth by letting its forces loose on the black townships of Durban. If Inkatha had simply restored law and order the older residents of these townships would have undoubtedly swung behind them and supported bringing the youth into line. However, because Inkatha used this as an opportunity to establish its hegemony through force and thrashed most youth found on the streets, this served only to increase the antagonism between them and the youth, alienated many older residents, and effectively left the youth in charge of urban politics.

Inkatha, as the homeland political force governing KwaZulu, was deeply embedded in township administration, the KwaZulu Police and the South African Police. Such agencies were perceived to be part and parcel of the apartheid regime as extensions of the central state and were attacked in the mid-1980s. While in the rest of the country most black township administration apparatuses collapsed, in Natal the local government power structures were linked to the administration of the KwaZulu homeland system and tied into the highly structured, disciplinarian and relatively powerful Inkatha movement. Inkatha’s role in township and homeland administration gave it access to considerable resources for political recruitment. Thus the youth-led uprisings in Natal, which only started late in 1985, did not confront merely a fragile and compromised local expression of the central state. They confronted local government structures backed by a political movement with a social basis of support and bolstered by the considerable administrative and repressive machinery of a homeland government.

From the late 1980s Inkatha increasingly turned to the shack dwellers for recruitment as it lost ground within the formal townships of Natal. Since shack dwellers have no de jure rights to land, de facto control is established through their own capacity to defend a piece of ground. In these circumstances, shack dwellers turn readily to local squatter leaders and warlords with whom they trade obedience and levies, tribute and other payments for residential security. These warlords have looked to Inkatha and the KwaZulu authorities to uphold their de facto rights to land, sought aid from the homeland structures to provide amenities and services in their areas, and act to consolidate their control in the shanty-towns. This has been mutually beneficial since rapid
urbanisation over the past five years has eroded Inkatha’s traditional base of support in the rural areas. Consequently, through the integration of these warlords, the shanty-towns in Natal have become a new social basis of support for Inkatha. Although shack dwellers have gained little material support from this relationship, they have received no material assistance from any other quarter either. Consequently, even the vaguest of promises of future possible material benefits maintains the solidity of their support for the these authoritarian clientilist structures.

In Natal many of the shanty-town warlords enforce quasi-military discipline. Families supply conscripts for *impi* raiding parties in return for protection against similar raids by the neighbouring youth. Strict control is exercised over all community resources – land, shack sites, shops, liquor sales, schools, creches and water supplies. A hierarchy of warlords, lieutenants and area headmen are supported by sometimes extortionate levies, tribute and other payments. The warlords depend on sub-lieutenants to exercise control, ensure community discipline, stifle dissent and extract payments. The warlord authority structure is fraught with internal rivalry, intrigue and disloyalty. Lieutenants continuously fight for favour or attempt to form their own squatter communities. Consequently many of the shanty-towns are constantly involved in violent internal power struggles. These bids for power, and the chronic incapacity of the warlords to meet the basic material needs of their communities, breeds dissent amongst ordinary shack dwellers. Attacks against relatively better off neighbours in formal townships become a convenient outlet to deflect such internal dissent.

In the formal townships, as well as in some squatter areas, ANC aligned youths have formed civic defence organisations. These organisations act as armed units in times of conflict with neighbouring communities. The youth organisations vary from politically disciplined community defence and security organisations to outright criminal gangs; from comrades to ex-comrades turned criminals, and hence called *comtsotsis*. Like the warlords, the youth organisations often obtain levies from residents and seek to underpin their power by securing urban development for their communities: extra land, improved residential infrastructure, housing and services. However, irrespective of the ideological aspirations that gave birth to them, since the youth and civic structures face similar obstacles in addressing their communities needs, they remain vulnerable to conversion into warlording, corruption, criminality and extortion. This is particularly the case in shanty-towns. The blunt compulsion of the material forces governing shanty-town life that inevitably rise to the surface and act as a corrupting influence can be illustrated from the Transvaal and Natal where in some shanty-towns land is allocated by shacklords only to ANC members.

Within both the youth and warlord structures violence has become institutionalised as a means of maintaining internal social cohesion and meeting basic material needs. Leadership within these structures have a strong vested
interest in the perpetuation of violent conflict and aggressively oppose any attempt to dismantle their power structures. Consequently such institutionalised violence is likely to continue even after national and regional peace settlements are secured. Only the most politically informed, disciplined and most fully integrated into the larger political organisations can be rapidly brought under control by the ANC or Inkatha.

The violence has also become intractable partly because of the relationship between the local and national organisations involved in the conflict. On its own, no side in a local conflict can win a conclusive victory because its powers and capacities are determined in part by its links to the larger organisations or state agencies. Equally, agreement at the national level can easily be undermined by the outbreak of violence at the local or regional level making it exceedingly difficult to secure and maintain peace. Where organisational relationships are diffuse and non-existent, the logic of the local socio-economic and political dynamic tends to dominate. On the one hand, to gain power locally the ANC, Inkatha and, increasingly the agencies of the central state, are forced to operate through the local warlord or youth centres. Equally, local power groups turn for support to regional and national organisations: Inkatha and the homeland or national government on the one hand and the ANC national structure on the other. This tends to inject national conflict into local situations and fans the flames sparked by local issues. Yet national organisations have little control over local centres of power and hence the national organisations cannot rein in their local forces when national peace initiatives are taking place. It is this complex interrelationship between local, regional and national centres of power that has made the National Peace Accord so imperative, but also difficult to implement.

The breakup of apartheid, viewed from the perspective of organisational and social forces, is not a simple process of replacing one social system with another. Old elements, ideologies and strategies remain and social forces committed to the previous order still operate, consciously and unconsciously, alongside and clashing with the new elements. Furthermore, the strategies and policies adopted by organisations under previous social, political and economic conditions do not just disappear, nor can new policies and strategies be simply added. The inherited historical legacies weigh heavily on organisations leading to major confusion, organisational incoherence and brutal conflict, as groupings within the state, Inkatha and the ANC struggle to maintain an old line within each organisation or assert their hegemony over each other.

Having lost social and political control of black urban life with the disintegration of apartheid, the state has had to intervene in very specific ways to reimpose order. Under classical apartheid the existence of a grand socio-political construction, bolstered by a battery of consistent and interlocking legislative mechanisms, enabled the state to maintain social order through direct repressive interventions. The absence of a socially accepted grand plan,
the radical shifts in state policy under De Klerk and the dependence on local interventions have created dislocations between the local and national levels of the state and within and between branches of the state. The situation is further complicated by the break up of some state departments and the weakening of executive control over others. Notably, the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards have been dismantled and not yet been replaced by effective local government in the black residential areas. The transition from confrontation to rapprochement between the government and ANC has produced internal tensions and divisions within the army and police elements of which are increasingly operating in terms of their own agendas.

Contrary to the processes of negotiation and rapprochement between the government and the ANC, the police often continue acting in terms of established past practices – intervening through support for warlords, gangs and the KwaZulu police. In many rural areas, because they are domiciled residents under his jurisdiction, KwaZulu policemen must submit to the control of a chief. They are obliged to khonza (pay homage to him). The reality of this is that the chiefs thereby exercise control over policemen in many areas, often used by them in an arbitrary and illegitimate manner. On the chief’s instructions, policemen raid houses of the chief’s opponents, violently harass and arrest innocent people who are then often released by the local prosecutors. Consequently, the role of the KwaZulu police often feeds directly into the local struggles between various competing power centres and, rather than re-establishing order, exacerbates the violent conflict.

In Natal there are numerous accusations and increasingly substantiated evidence that the local police and the military are not impartial. In the Transvaal there are strong indications that right wing elements within or linked to the police are behind some of the massacres. Recent evidence has emerged that senior ranks within the military have given financial support to Inkatha for political activities and paramilitary training. This indicates that state intervention in the violence has, at times, been centrally directed and planned from senior levels within some branches of the security forces. However it is not clear that these elements are part of a strategy of the De Klerk regime, nor that they have, as yet, regrouped as a cohesive alternative to this regime within the executive levels of the state.

The point stress is that it is the break up of the cohesion of the state and the decomposition of central power and legitimacy that provides the context for these clandestine interventions by branches and individuals of the security forces at local and national level. There are many, rather than a single, ‘third force’ operating. Notwithstanding the devastatingly greater practical efficacy of the ‘third forces’ that emanate from the state, they are similar to other violent forces operating outside the ambit of the declared policies of either the ANC or Inkatha. Such forces are able to operate effectively because of the social and political decomposition of society that allows them to act as conjunctural catalysts. Furthermore they have an ambiguous relationship to
the national players (the ANC and NP and Inkatha) because each of these has relied in part on their services to secure power in a period of uncertainty.

Within South Africa generally, but particularly in the black community, violence as a means to achieve hegemony has become socially acceptable. Violence has been used by both the state and the liberation forces as means for retarding or securing political change, though the capacity to exercise force as well as the actual deployment of violent instruments by the state, has far outweighed that of the liberation movement.

Today ANC carries the weight, particularly within the youth, of decades stressing that liberation would only come from the 'barrel of a gun' and that power could only be seized and not negotiated. This historically inherited legacy of armed struggle, dovetailing with the stress of a few years ago on 'ungovernability', reinforces the tendencies within ANC (and particularly SACP) ranks which naturally equate violence with militant political action. Having as yet to construct a cohesive political organisation within South Africa, the ANC is especially vulnerable to competing and contradictory pressures from its membership and potential supporters, making it difficult for the leadership to exert authority over the youth within the townships.

Inkatha reconstructed its Natal power base in the mid-1980s by capturing the shanty-town residents through the efforts of the local warlords. It re-established its power base in the Transvaal and, in the process reasserted itself nationally through the coercive and violent operations of hostel dwellers in the black residential areas. Peace accords were reached in places between Inkatha and the ANC regional officials, only to be overturned by Inkatha-aligned chiefs and headmen. Apart from the uncontrollable character of many localised warlords, hostel leaders, local Inkatha officials and councillors, different structures of the KwaZulu state operate in opposition both to other sectors of the homeland state and the central South African state. The hierarchical and violent warlord structures, coupled with a stress on a strict tribal traditionalism, have reinforced powerful disciplinarian forces within Inkatha which equate political consent with the forcible imposition of ideas.

It is not surprising therefore that struggles between competing centres of power at the local level, whether it be ANC comrades or Inkatha warlords, draw instinctively on this culture of violence as they strive to impose their hegemony and social control over residential life. Gaining political hegemony becomes equated with driving one's opponents out of a township, hostel or shanty-town.

The breakdown of black social life, the absence of socially regulative mechanisms and the spiralling culture of violence has also spawned apolitical violent forces: gangs, crime syndicates and mobsters. These are peopled with many who months previously were ranged on either side of the political divide. The gap between an Inkatha leader using an impi against ANC youth, and a warlord using an impi predominantly to settle scores, extort protection
money and accumulate ill gotten wealth is extremely small. One man's booty is another man's theft. Likewise many of the youth activists, often living in the bush, with no means of support and no official quartermaster, have drifted into crime as a way of subsisting. What is done out of desperation today easily becomes routine tomorrow. Others have fallen foul of the violent and arbitrary justice meted out by kangaroo courts administered by their own comrades and have fled headlong into the arms of the governmental authorities, state-sponsored vigilantes and criminal gangs. Many of the ill-trained and violent kitskonstabels operating in the black townships a few years ago were previously prominent youth activists. Likewise the justly dreaded gang of criminals operating in the Durban townships - the amasinyoras - has its genesis in disaffected youth who learnt their morals and craft in political violence. Others are simply youth who have no way of distinguishing between violent coercion, criminality and politics since they have grown up with the conception that the end justifies all means and they determine the ends. The violence feeds upon these tendencies and blurs the crucial distinctions between crime and other forms of social and political struggle. With the passage of time, political violence against the state and competing political organisation is degenerating into outright crime.

Solutions
It has been our argument that violence arises out of the context of collapse of an antagonistically structured and repressive society. Furthermore that the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s increased the potential for violence by creating new lines of social antagonism and failing to address the legacy of disadvantage inherited from the period of apartheid. Our discussion of solutions is directed at the broader macro level: urban reconstruction, growth paths, redistribution and national reconciliation of the competing power centres. In so doing we can view the same issues from two different angles - that of urban reconstruction and the redistribution of material resources, or that of the class divisions and alliances such a path implies.

It follows from our analysis that a path of reconstruction which accentuates class distinctions, that is to say the neo-liberal path currently dominant, cannot form an acceptable or viable point of departure for a process of stable social reconstruction. For it entails accentuation of the economic polarity between most whites and most blacks and therefore a perpetuation of the primary antagonism that characterised apartheid. This is simply likely to lead to the continued destabilisation of South Africa. Furthermore it would also further accentuate the class divisions currently rupturing black urban areas and perpetuate the violent antagonisms that have characterised the reformation of apartheid.

Neo-liberal reforms hold out the prospect of continued massive growth of the urban marginal population, and thus continued conflict on the urban peripheries. Moreover under neo-liberal reform, only a relatively small component
of the growing African population could find places within the expanding professional, salaried and skilled waged classes. Yet this section of the black population provides the greatest opportunity for leadership, stability and political reconciliation. Unless they are given opportunities in the society, they will remain highly unstable. A constructive alliance between these strata and the urban dispossessed is essential if a new growth path based on economic growth, redistribution and social stability is to be pursued.

However, an alliance cannot be built if the antagonisms over the distribution of marginal resources are not addressed by state policy. Since a neo-liberal growth path will accentuate social division and antagonism it is likely to be dependent on the coercive power of the state to keep the dispossessed in place. This in turn will perpetuate the situation whereby the 'middle and skilled working strata' would be highly vulnerable to informal coercive pressures from the mass of the dispossessed African population.

If neo-liberalism is no solution, equally we would argue that the idea that South Africa can be reconstituted as a classless society must also be abandoned. Stability and prosperity will be based on expanding massively the new middle layers, especially of the wage and salaried classes in a productive form, as well as the redistribution of resources to the marginalised urban poor in a way which unleashes their productive capacity rather than allowing isolated consumption binges. In this process there are three sides to the problem that must be tackled: job expansion in the formal sector; state reproductive expenditure to redress disparities; measures to release the productive potential of those excluded from the formal sector.

We must therefore proceed from the position that to some degree class division will replace racial division rather than racial divisions being replaced by a classless society. Consequently, we need to rescue the concept of class differentiation from its association with reformed apartheid and neo-conservative reform. In so doing we have to be willing to accept the process of differentiation between classes and, by recognising different interests, construct working relationships between classes around different elements of urban reconstruction. In other words, adopting an approach that recognises the continued existence of class contradictions but which attempts to contain the excesses of the market/private property system, rather than trying to eliminate them. This would enable the creation of new or modified institutions within which new dispensations are thrashed out over a range of issues from wage and working conditions to housing, transport welfare and so on. Within these new or modified structures a new kind of accommodative/conflictual relationship between the major classes and groups would be developed. They would become forums for the sorting, formalisation and monitoring of agreements (pacts) over such things as wages, productivity and the use of surpluses; reinvestment (industrial strategy) and redistributive programmes (housing, health, education, transport, infrastructure, welfare).

Attempts to tackle the consequences of rapid African urbanisation thus far
have been confined to measures to promote residential differentiation within the black areas on the basis of shrinking financial resources. This has been a major contributor to violence in the black residential areas, which we have conceptualised as a form of displaced conflict. To relieve the pressure on scarce residential resources in the black urban peripheries it is vital to renegotiate the cities. What this means is that the cities must be opened up to the black middle strata residually and their social resources opened up to the black population more widely. Part of the resolution of the urban residential conflict requires a redistribution of resources through city-wide accords: the distribution/access to urban social resources from white to black urban society, but in ways that are not threatening, sparking off armed confrontation or flight.

Opening space economically, residentially and politically has to be done through negotiation in tripartite or multipartite structures at national, regional and local level to thrash out dispensations, similar or comparable with the process of negotiation which takes place in industry between capital, unions and the state. It should, in other words be done in a manner which presupposes de-racialisation as a principle; involves participation of all concerned parties (white local government and business, white residential interests, black urban residential interests); entails a redistribution of residential social resources; implements tax and expenditure systems which reduce class residential differences without radically undermining existing residential configurations; opens up new spaces residentially in the city centres for further middle strata expansion; and finally, releases and redeploy urban residential resources for black urban development in the metropolitan peripheries.

Whether or not the violence subsides will depend not only on the national and local peace pacts currently being negotiated by the parties in conflict, but also on whether the development programmes that accompany political agreement address the foundations of social antagonism and reduce social divisions or continue to accentuate them. While these peace and development agreements may begin in the black residential areas, their chances of success will be limited if they are not part of a larger process of city-wide, metropolitan and regional reconstruction in which planning and management of the total resources base is undertaken in an integrated approach and in which economic reconstruction and redistribution are linked in a single approach spanning previously racially fragmented communities. It is not sufficient to put together the political parties in conflict – Inkatha, the government and the ANC; other major organised interests with a stake in a local area or region (business, the unions, the churches) have to be institutionally drawn into the process.

A crucial dimension of the negotiation process is cooperation to bring the actions of the police, the military, the armed wing of the ANC, Inkatha impis and other violent structures in the townships under control. It is not enough to
cease hostilities; society has to be demilitarised, people disarmed, and the law enforced against all who oppose this in the interests of maintaining their own private access to arms and coercive power. The warlord and youth structures in the black residential areas have to be dismantled or converted into local political or civic organisations which contend for power through democratic means. Agreement to cease violence must include agreement on the rules of democratic political contestation. As many commentators have argued, the development of political armies can only lead to further destabilisation. Nevertheless there is clearly a need for neighbourhood self-protection activities which should, in their conception and from their inception, be decoupled from political mobilisation.

Equally, the police/security judicial/penal apparatuses need to be reformed so as to disentangle themselves from their apartheid heritage. Investigative procedures must be freed from the police, who have no credibility and are often as much part of the problem, and placed in the hands of special investigators under the direct control of the attorney-general. If the law enforcement institutions are seen to be concerned with implementing justice rather than simply riot control, then we believe that there is a possibility of fostering growing cooperation and possibly eventual integration of the civic protection structures and the state security forces. Given the existing antagonism in many areas this will mean the establishment of monitoring/liaison structures which include the parties in conflict and those seen to be impartial, such as unions and business.

To succeed, negotiations over violence in the black residential areas need to be part of the renegotiation of a whole city and its resources. Equally, negotiations over violence nationally need to be part of the renegotiation of the nation's resources and how they are deployed.

It is widely held that political violence is the main stumbling block to political settlement and economic revival. While it is also true that the violence has become a major obstacle to political settlement in South Africa, it would be false to think that overcoming the political violence will automatically or easily pave the way for economic revival and social resuscitation and vice versa. The violence in the urban areas is now well and truly intertwined with the broader political issues at stake in negotiating a new South Africa as well as the economic and social issues of reconstruction. On the basis of our analysis it is clear that political settlement must be coupled with and followed by an agreed path of social and economic reconstruction.

This is not to argue the violence can only be solved if all its many dimensions and causes are simultaneously addressed. It is clear that the decisive point is the new set of political rules and the new political and constitutional system. But if the focus is only placed on these issues then we will have simply negotiated ourselves into the 50% solution, and new social and economic fault lines will reassert themselves with a vengeance.
Conclusion

Post-apartheid South Africa is at the crossroads: it can either sink into destruction, instability and violent chaos, or can be restabilised. While none intentionally seek the former, if we do not pursue a solution which situates the violence in the broad social, economic and political forces at play, then these will reassert themselves and constantly undermine the best intentioned piecemeal solutions. The scale of destruction will increase, feeding off the localised sectarian and parochial interests of different social forces and individual actors, and maintain the downward spiral of death and devastation.

The basic lines of division over the future social structure of South African society have been set by a conflict over whether the new South Africa would tend towards egalitarianism or elitism. In tackling the violence we can adopt an integrated national solution – ‘growth through redistribution’ – which reorients state interventions towards a radical redistribution of social resources and power, attempts to mute the contradictions, temper the antagonistic relations, but which, unfortunately but necessarily, still maintains some of the existing social divisions.

Regrettably we have to concede that restabilisation can also take place in other less palatable forms. The one most favoured by the neo-liberal solution is what we have called the 50% solution, which will redivide South Africa into two nations, institutionally structured not by race but by class, and where the white population’s hold on social resources is maintained but a place is made for the new black middle class and a small well-off stratum of the working class. The rest of the society will be abandoned to the margins of social life, where the minute variations in access to social resources will take on ever increasing significance, giving rise to accelerating violence. This will surely result in an increase in class and social divisions, sharpening the antagonisms, and only be stabilised by increasing statism, as a new government, whatever its racial or political hue, is forced to hold it all together by authoritarian means. This could take a variety of forms, including the clientelism so often found in the rest of Africa. This would enable capital to maintain supportive relations with the marginalised through direct political patronage relations in the shanty-towns of the urban periphery, thereby establishing an alliance of a de-racialised, but still predominantly white, capitalist class, the black middle class, and the dispossessed against the working class. We will have shaken off apartheid only to find ourselves back in a new form of authoritarianism.

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Bibliographic Note

The analysis presented above is based mainly on fieldwork done in Natal by the Urbanisation and Violence Project located at ISER (University of Durban Westville) and CSDS (University of Natal), and from secondary sources such as the Financial Mail, Weekly Mail, Sunday Tribune, Sunday Times, Natal Witness and Vrye Weekblad. We have also drawn from various affidavits by victims of the violence and their representatives. This paper was originally presented to the Economic Trends Research Group in September 1991 and appeared in a longer version as Economic Trends Working Paper no 3.)
Debate

The Intellectual/Financial Complex of Foreign Aid
Joel Samoff

The apparent link between research and policy seems to be a healthy situation, not a problem. Researchers have long complained that decision makers pay too little attention to research. 'Finally they are listening to us', say the academics. In practice, however, that perception is deceptive. First, the common view that competent policy makers base their decisions on a careful review of relevant research is simply inaccurate. Second, policy makers who are largely guided by research focused on the issue to be decided do not necessarily make better decisions. The research that is deemed relevant is generally instrumental and relatively narrowly gauged since it takes the existing patterns of economic, political, and social organisation as givens. Third, the conjunction of development assistance and research transforms both research and its role in the policy process, to the detriment of both.

In development as in most other policy making arenas, research enters the decision making process in two principal ways. First, the research to which decision makers have been exposed during their education and socialisation informs the frameworks within which policies are considered and decisions made. That is, long after their schooling has been completed, decision makers draw on their academic learning (and of course their practical experience) to formulate questions, select the proposals worth pursuing, specify evaluative criteria, and make decisions. That indirect influence may be very subtle and is often not apparent to the decision makers themselves.

Second, research enters the policy process as justification for decisions already made. Especially in the public discourse of a bureaucratic environment, where decision makers are charged to emphasise rationality and de-emphasise politics and favouritism, the claim that research supports a particular course of action is the most powerful defence against all challengers. Put crudely, in the policy shoot-out, the gunfighter quickest to draw the research pistol and best supplied with research ammunition is most likely to emerge victorious. Even a slow draw with limited ammunition may insure survival.

That research influences policy indirectly and that research is used to justify decisions are not necessarily problematic. In the contemporary development business, however, the same agencies are increasingly responsible for decisions, funding and research. That conjunction of funding and research has a number of undesirable consequences for both research and development. A recent major international conference, little known outside the circle of those most directly involved in third world education but likely to be a point of reference, and perhaps legitimacy, for many years to come, provides a useful vantage point
Debate: The Financial/Intellectual Complex

Education for All

With appropriate substance and ceremony a distinguished group of educators and political leaders met in Jomtien, Thailand, in March, 1990, to declare their support for making education available to everyone on the planet. At the World Conference on Education for All, sponsored by UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, and the World Bank, some 1,500 participants from 155 governments, 20 inter-governmental bodies, and 150 non-governmental organisations adopted by acclamation a World Declaration on Education for All and a Framework for Action. As the conference title suggests, the central tenet of the preparatory documents and the resolutions adopted by acclamation is that it is imperative that all people have access to basic education, both because [basic] education should now be considered a right of citizenship and because development, however conceived, requires an educated populace. This is indeed a noble goal, with which few would disagree, though of course many countries do not have the means to achieve it rapidly. But why? Why should everyone be educated? And why assign the highest priority to basic (primary) education, rather than, say, adult education, or teacher education? There are many answers to those questions, but the answer that seems the most important in the 1990s, especially to those who disburse funds to support African education, is that research shows that investing in primary education yields the best return. That is, support for this focus on primary education rests on the claim that research has persuasively demonstrated that investing in primary education promises the greatest progress toward development (however defined).

What is most striking here is not the substantive conclusion, for its life-span is likely to be short. Like other general understandings that are characterised as definitive and unimpeachable and that are for a moment passionately presented and defended, this one will be revised and displaced by a new truth, advocated just as ardently. Rather, it is the implicit consensus on research as the principal determinant of education policy that is remarkable. The Jomtien resolutions are but a single example of the privileged position of research, or more accurately, claims about research and its findings, in the discourse on education policy. Whether research informs and guides policy or rationalises and justifies policies adopted for other reasons, claims about what research shows constitute the core of the discussion. Without the claim of research support, policy proposals lose credibility. Similarly, policy critiques that do not cite supporting research are easily ignored. Prospective participants in the policy debate must demonstrate an adequate supply of relevant research simply to enter. This formulation - 'research shows that ...' - and its synonyms are ubiquitous. Among the large number of possible examples are ['emphasis added']:

- Substantial evidence from research supports the proposition that within broad limits (between 25 and 50 pupils) changes in class size influence pupil achievement modestly or not at all (World Bank, 'Education in Sub-Saharan Africa', p.40);
- The increasing body of evidence on the payoff in various amounts and kinds of teacher training indicates that for primary school teachers pre-service training that consists of
more than general secondary education and a minimum exposure to pedagogical theory is not cost effective (p.40);

There is strong evidence that increasing the provision of instructional materials, especially textbooks, is the most cost-effective way of raising the quality of primary education (p.42).

The very ubiquity of the 'research shows ...' claim reflects a very striking contemporary phenomenon: the emergence of a financial-intellectual complex, spawned by the development business. I am concerned here with the childhood of that financial-intellectual complex, and especially with the rapid growth of its influence. I want particularly to highlight the ways in which its assumptions, standard operating procedures, style and language structure the education and development discourse, specify the legitimate participants in discussions of education policy, entrench misunderstandings, accord official status to shaky propositions, and nurture a fascination with flashy but ephemeral understandings.

I shall not focus directly on the substantive content of education policy, but rather on the ways in which the conjuncture of external assistance and the privileged position of research conditions and constrains that content. While the relationships and practices I discuss here occur in much of the third world, they are most sharply visible in Africa, due to the historically limited ability to participate in research-focused discussions and challenge their findings.

Post-colonial Africa has faced a continuing tension between the pressure to expand education on the one hand and the absolute shortage of funds on the other. The pressure for expansion reflects popular demand, the widely shared belief that progress requires a more educated populace, schooling's unique contribution to individual and communal social mobility, and education's critical role in establishing and maintaining the legitimacy of the current regime and the state structure itself. The lack of capital to invest in education reflects the historic underdevelopment of Africa, other claims on public funds, the vagaries of the global economy and declining terms of trade, governments' limited ability to manage an effective tax system and, for much of Africa, expenditures to establish and maintain a very high standard of living for a small affluent upper stratum of the population. Convinced of its necessity but unable to fund the expansion of education, African countries turned to external agencies for assistance. Over time, it has come to seem not only obvious but unexceptional that new initiatives and reform programmes require external support, and therefore responsiveness to the agenda and preferences of the funding agencies. Currently, nearly all African countries rely heavily on foreign assistance for the education development (capital) budget; some also receive significant foreign support for recurrent education expenditures.

Sometimes that relationship is aggressively manipulative. The funding agency may make the provision of support conditional on the adoption of specific policies, priorities, or programmes. At other times that relationship is less directly influential. The funding agency may, for example, finance research intended to support its preferred programmatic orientation. Or African educators may tailor their requests, more or less explicitly, to fit within the funding agency's agenda. Occasionally the paths of in-
fluence are far more circuitous. A desire to win support for a high priority goal in one project may promote a willingness to accommodate to a low priority goal in another.

Note that I focus here on support for particular education projects, since historically project lending has been and generally continues to be the principal form of external assistance. The more recent provision of support to specific sectors and to the economy as a whole—a common feature of structural adjustment support—intensifies and compounds external influence. In this form, the external advice on which funding is dependent refers not to more narrowly defined projects but instead to the entire education enterprise or to the national economy as a whole. Effectively, having concluded that local decision makers have fundamentally mismanaged their responsibilities, the external agencies offer general and rapidly disbursed support in exchange for broad control. This broader form of external assistance impels a demand for broader expert knowledge. The expertise required goes well beyond, say, curriculum development and teacher training. The relevant experts are those who can understand and manage production, finance, international exchanges, and national planning as well as social services. This call for broader expertise comes at a moment of severe economic crisis, precisely the time when African countries are least able to supply expertise and experts at the level and scale and with the credibility and legitimacy the external agencies demand.

However direct or indirect the influence, the presumption that education reform requires external funding situates foreign assistance and thus a dependent support relationship at the centre of education planning. Whatever the initiative, it must accommodate to the nature and content of that relationship.

Many African countries solicit support from several external agencies, seeking to limit their dependence through diversification and diplomacy. Occasionally it is possible to secure funding from one agency for a project rejected by another. By the end of the 1980s, however, a remarkable convergence in the orientations and priorities of diverse national and transnational funding agencies became apparent. A review of the education sector studies commissioned by a wide range of national and transnational agencies during the last half of the 1980s showed a striking commonality of orientation, approach, and priorities (Samoff 1992). Increasingly, the World Bank has come to be the lead agency in setting the education and development agenda.

Several factors have contributed to the World Bank’s interest in and ability to assume this role. By the end of the 1960s the World Bank’s senior leadership charged both operations and support staff to focus on poverty and the poor and to stimulate and enhance development. As Robert McNamara and others regularly pointed out, the immiseration of the poor was not in the interests of the affluent. Drawn from both funds it controls directly and funds it can mobilise from other sources, the World Bank’s resources for supporting projects and financing the research that has come to play a critical role in shaping the agenda far exceed the resources available to most other agencies. The World Bank’s significantly expanded professional staff enables it to command expertise far more directly and extensively than is possible for other agencies. Indeed, the
education level, analytic abilities, and years of experience of the individuals employed directly and indirectly by the World Bank are truly extraordinary. That professional staff also extends the range of settings in which the World Bank can assert the initiative and not simply react to the circumstances.

In addition to its command of expertise, the World Bank has become pivotal in the communications among the national and assistance agency education policy makers. Its library of documentation and the ability to access it far surpass the comparable capabilities of other agencies and African governments. It is not uncommon for one agency to learn about another agency's activities through their mutual interactions with the World Bank. That the World Bank and IMF often pursue congruent or parallel agendas in this arena permits the World Bank to employ the leverage generated by the conditionalities imposed by the IMF.

Choosing Among Alternatives: (Some) Research Prevails

In both national and international discussions of education policy many competing voices and claims clamour for attention. Advocates of radical innovation challenge the reformers who in turn chastise those who insist on the preservation of what they regard as enduring values, goals, and practices. All participants in these debates point to practical experiences they consider to have confirmed the desirability and utility of whatever programme they are advancing. At the same time, in part because nearly all educators are optimistic about the developmental and liberating possibilities of schooling, education policy discussions often reflect and revolve around a pervasive sense of failure. What has education failed to accomplish, and what to do about it? That sense of failure and frustration is particularly intense in discussions of African education. The rapid social transformation and improvement in the standard of living that were to have followed decolonisation have yet to materialise in most countries. Even worse, the education systems that were to initiate and sustain that transformation by developing new skills and technologies, innovative ideas, and enduring new values, in practice most often still do not reach all of the school age population and are unable to provide sufficient schools, teachers and textbooks for those they do reach.

How, then, to choose among alternative policies? Where failures abound, success stories are scarce, and available resources are scarcer still. Which policy directions are to be pursued? It is in this process of specifying education strategies, both large and small scale, that funding becomes a principal determinant. In the contemporary context, research becomes the visa required to cross funding's frontier. The prevailing understanding, indeed faith, that education is a complex undertaking whose organisation and management are best left to relevant experts, limits popular participation in discussions of education policy and privileges those among the experts who are most successful in characterising their recommendations as supported by relevant research. In the face of an unmet and in most places still expanding demand, the absolute shortage of funds advantages those who are most successful in attracting external resources to support their recommendations. Together, research and funding constitute control, sometimes challenged and occasionally deflected but rarely rejected.
The organisation, orientation, and rhythm of the funding agencies condition the sorts of development projects they will support, establishing a particular role for research. In general, the disbursers of funds prefer certainties to tentative propositions, large projects with obvious impact to more numerous but far less visible small projects, and projects with clear short term outcomes to projects whose implementation is likely to be uneven and slow and whose consequential outcomes may be years into the future. Within those agencies, professional advancement is often a function of the rapidity with which projects deemed successful are developed and funded. Even though at the abstract level education reform is understood to be a complex process that may take a long time to come to fruition, project managers who have little concrete to show after a few years’ work are unlikely to be promoted very quickly. For similar reasons, while project managers may recognise the advantages of small scale projects, since they also understand that each small project may require as much preparation time and administrative effort as a single large project, their general inclination is toward the apparent economies of scale. Those project managers who are most successful in moving money relatively quickly may be little concerned with long term outcomes, since they are likely to have assumed different responsibilities when the longer term consequences of the projects they funded become fully visible.

The World Bank is of course not a monolithic organisation. Indeed, the divergence of perspectives and priorities of its personnel may be much broader and sharper than the policy and programmatic differences between funding agency and recipient country. At the same time, there do exist official World Bank policies that are influential if not determining in every situation. As well, notwithstanding the diversity of perspectives, there are within the World Bank widely, though of course not universally, shared understandings. Those shared understandings include a conception of development and therefore of strategies of development, a sense of the nature of the obstacles to the changes that are deemed desirable and therefore tactics for addressing them, and a vision of the appropriate role of the World Bank itself. The broad agreement on basic premises and fundamental assumptions – though, it is worth stressing again, neither universal nor unchallenged – makes it both reasonable and necessary to treat particular World Bank ideas, roles, and practices in a relatively undifferentiated manner. That sharp critiques of World Bank policies have emerged from among its own personnel and that particular project managers pursue an agenda that diverges in some respect from that of the World Bank as a whole must not obscure the general orientation, trajectory, and consequences of World Bank funding.

Quite understandably, project managers want to know what works. Especially in those agencies where the dominant perspective is economic, or perhaps econometric, ‘what works’ must be specified in explicit and quantitative terms. The assertion that ‘investment in primary education yields a greater return than spending on higher education’ provides a relatively clear guide to action. A conditional and situationally specific statement does not. The statement that ‘whether or not investment in primary education yields a higher return than spending on
higher education depends on the organisation and philosophy of the government, the interests of the particular coalition that is currently most influential in the ministry of education, the support of the party and the teachers union, and the world price of coffee. It can be used to justify a wide range of alternative, and perhaps incompatible, policies. Although many are aware of local circumstances that distinguish one setting from another, project managers simply cannot do their job if each decision is dependent on a detailed and timely analysis of the political economy of the affected district, or region, or even country.

The need to know what works both nurtures and is compounded by the tendency to generalise. To address fully the particularities and uniqueness of each setting would make it impossible to develop general principles and priorities to guide funding decisions. Since ultimately a very small group of individuals must approve all projects, adherence to general principles will be persuasive in securing approval more often than appeals to the unique circumstances of particular settings. And since the responsibilities of individual regional specialists and project managers are too broad and their tenure in office too brief to permit detailed familiarity with diverse local settings, they too are inclined to generalise, often on the basis of sorely limited evidence.

In the scientism and super-rationality of the external funding process, then, appealing to research becomes the primary strategy for establishing clear guides to action and for legitimising actions taken (in practice it may be difficult to distinguish the one role from the other). It is in this context that the importance of the claim that 'research shows . . .' becomes apparent. How are project managers to recommend particular proposals as worth pursuing? How are they to defend their decisions to support one project and not another? Consistency with general agency policies and priorities is necessary but not sufficient. Accommodation to the policies and sensitivities of the recipient country constrains the range of potential projects and may require protracted negotiations, but only in exceptional circumstances are the recipient's preferences sufficient rationale for funding a proposed project.

The prevailing rationalist and utilitarian ethos requires an affirmation in the form of 'it [this investment] is cost-effective', or 'it will work', or 'this strategy works best'. While the assessment of a senior manager with extensive relevant experience may still occasionally provide sufficient warrant to proceed, most often the affirmation of effectiveness must rest on appropriate research findings. Only some research can play that role. The specification of the sorts of research that can credibly support (or reject) the affirmation of effectiveness is another dimension of the financial-intellectual complex. The greater the role in the approval process played by individuals who consider themselves hard scientists (a self-description that in the social sciences is common among, but not limited to, economists), the greater the pressure for explicit and unambiguous research findings expressed in quantitative terms.

This demand for research combines with trends in contemporary social science to make the appropriate research relatively expensive to undertake and complex to administer. That in turn leads to an increasingly prominent role for the agencies with the
resources and professional staff most able to initiate and support an appropriate research programme. In this way, external agencies and especially the World Bank are not only sources of funds for education projects and prominent clients for research. They, and particularly the World Bank, become the principal agencies commissioning, undertaking, and managing research on education and development in Africa.

My point here is not that research has no role in decision making or that policymakers should ignore research in favour of non-scientific decision rules. Rather, I am concerned with the consequences of a largely uncritical reliance on claimed findings generated by a particular sort of research in a setting where the arbiters of research quality are also the providers of funds. My argument is that both research and funding—and, to the extent that research findings can contribute to development, development itself—are poorly served by this marriage.

**Problematic Consequences**

The manifestations, consequences and problems of this conjunction of funding and research are multiple: influencing and constraining the education and development discourse; legitimising weak propositions; entrenching flawed understandings by according them official status; seeding and fertilising theoretical and analytic fads; and, treating education primarily as technique and administration (Samoff 1991). I shall touch on each briefly, noting how they privilege a particular understanding of education and development, thereby diverting attention from and often precluding alternative understandings and perspectives. My concern is not to resolve the major debates on the nature and role of education in contemporary Africa but rather to identify the often subtle and frequently unnoticed ways in which what ought to be the subjects of policy debate come to be regarded as the normal, unexceptional, and largely unalterable features of the policy environment.

The conjunction of project support and focused research within a single institution functions to structure the education and development discourse. Within the legitimate terminology are embedded particular conceptions, orientations, prejudices and policy preferences: that terminology treats as part of the environment—what is ‘given’ and therefore does not require explicit justification and is not subjected to critical attention—important issues that ought to be the focus of policy discussion; that terminology obscures important issues and thereby far too frequently misdirects the search for understanding.

It is useful to note two widely used examples of this discourse-structuring terminology, drawn from a much larger set of terms and constructs so deeply ingrained in assistance agency thinking and documents that only their absence would be noticed. In presenting these examples, my concern is neither to develop a full critique of their use nor to defend their utility. Rather, I cite them to highlight what they assume and what they exclude. As they have become the standard, often required, language of discussions of education and development, even critical participants in those discussions may not be fully aware of the extent to which they structure the analysis and delimit explanations and thus solutions.

**Wastage** (referring to those who begin but do not complete an education
programme). Understood in this way, wastage is often identified as one of the most serious problems in African education. Where resources are limited, they are surely wasted when they are spent on projects that are never completed and when they are invested in highly inefficient training programmes that fail to train many of the trainees or that have many trainees who require several additional years to complete their programmes.

Yet, since most students in Africa who do not complete their schooling are pushed out (rather than drop out), the high attrition rate is a normal feature of the education system, not an unexpected, or abnormal, or even avoidable waste. That is, decisions about the number of places available at each higher level and the intentional design of selection and promotion procedures effectively determine the number of students who will advance. Examination results and perhaps other criteria may specify who among the students will proceed. But the threshold for promotion is a function of education policy, not individual achievement. Indeed, there may be many students who pass (score high on the examination) but do not proceed. What occurs is eviction, not drop-out. In these circumstances, if attrition is considered problematic, it needs to be addressed as such. Where concern with wastage directs attention toward individual motivation and the quality of instruction, concern with attrition requires attention to the basic assumptions and organisation of the education system.

To focus on attrition also requires attention to which students are not permitted to proceed. Are females, or students from a particular region or religion or socio-economic stratum more likely to be excluded?

Cost recovery (referring to direct payments by students and their parents for their education. In much of Africa, the absolute shortage of resources renders governments simply unable to support adequately the existing schools and precludes expanding education sufficiently to meet popular demand. In this context, cost recovery reflects the view that African countries cannot afford to provide free education and that since students and their families benefit from schooling, they ought to pay for it.

This usage, however, obscures who pays for education in Africa. In nearly all African countries the largest source of government revenue is taxes on traded commodities, especially exports. That is, the mass of the citizenry pays the cost of education through direct and indirect taxes on production, rather than through direct taxes on incomes. Imposing school fees is thus not cost recovery, but rather increasing the portion of education costs paid by students and their families. The policy issue has to do not with charging for what was previously free – since it never has been free – but rather with determining which segments of the population are to bear what portion of the costs of a public service.

Put differently, schooling in most societies has a redistributive role. To the extent that the tax burden falls more heavily on those with more wealth, tax-supported schooling that is widely accessible effectively collects money from the more affluent, including those with no children in school, to pay for the education of the less affluent. To secure a larger portion of the costs of education through direct assessments on students and their families is therefore likely to reduce the redistributive effects of public schooling.
A second consequence of the integration of project funding and development research is to legitimacy poorly supported propositions. Project managers are often prepared to accept as valid findings whose relatively weak foundations would lead most academic researchers to present them tentatively and conditionally if at all. That weaker validity standard may be satisfactory in an operational setting, where the pressure for prompt decisions exceeds the demand for very high levels of confidence. The conjunction of project management and research within the financial-intellectual complex, however, functions to obscure the caveats that were (or should have been) attached to the original research.

This process of legitimising weak propositions by granting them official sanction and ignoring their tentative or conditional character is especially clear in the use of quantitative data. That most funding agency documents do not indicate clearly the sources that support their claims about what research shows compounds the problem. Even careful and critical readers find it difficult or impossible to locate and assess the reliability and validity of the relevant research. The pressure for certainty combines with the influence of economists and the premises of contemporary behavioural science to demand quantitative data wherever possible. Data (or what the data are claimed to show) provide the most compelling support for particular policies and the grounds for rejecting other policies. Careful scrutiny of the reported data, however, often reveals that the variation from one period to the next is smaller than the margin of error. For example, a one percentage point change in the portion of the national expenditures allocated to education may be reported as evidence of the government's increased commitment to education. Yet in practice, the margin of error in both total and education spending is generally much greater than one per cent. In those circumstances it is impossible to be sure that any change has in fact taken place; a careful researcher will say precisely that. Project managers, however, may be willing to discount the data problems in order to have a clear finding that will support a particular decision. When that research is filtered through the project process and combined with other research in a general policy document - that is, when the project funding process subsumes the research - a finding of no clear relationship is transformed into a confidently presented and unqualified assertion about the direction of change. The tenuous becomes a certainty. Having been legitimates and disseminated, the assertion becomes a guide to, and not infrequently a constraint on, subsequent research.

A third consequence of the strong connections between providing funds and conducting research is to accord legitimacy and international sanction to approaches and understandings that are at best partial and at worst simply wrong. Misunderstandings are entrenched. The official overview publications of the World Bank currently have such a commanding presence in the academic arena that few authors address the issues of African development without referring to them. Even authors who reject both the approach and the conclusions of those publications seem to feel obliged to refer to them. Thus, documents commissioned by the World Bank to guide its lending operations and to present a coherent programmatic perspective to the representatives of recipient countries acquire the status of standard references
in the academic arena. That a bank commissions and publishes studies of African development is not in itself problematic. Nor is it necessarily problematic that those studies are widely cited. Rather, my argument here is that it is important to recognise the power, influence, and academic and developmental consequences of this historically unique combination of funding development projects and development research (note here the echoes of the early imperial era, when the metropolitan governments funded learned societies that in turn supported the field work of missionaries and adventurers who, like Livingstone, also saw themselves as geographers, anthropologists, and historians). In this setting, it is appropriate, indeed imperative, to address the World Bank not simply as a bank but also as an institution whose basic policies are largely determined by the interests of a few affluent countries, whose lending programme is justified by the extensive research it commissions, and whose own analyses and development agenda have come to constrain and shape the entire development discourse.

One example of the entrenchment of (mis)understandings is manifested in the current resuscitation of modernisation theory which insists now, as it did 30 years ago, that the causes of Africa's problems are to be found within Africa: its people, resources, capital, skills, psychological orientation, child-rearing practices, and more. That analytic framework is seductive and often assumed uncritically. Just as poverty is to be explained by the characteristics and (in)abilities of the poor, so the explanations of problems of African education are to be found within and around African schools. The financial-intellectual complex institutionalises this fundamental misunderstanding in the centres of financial, industrial and academic authority, entrenching it against the challenge that the primary sources of contemporary problems are to be found in the process by which African countries have been incorporated into the global economy. The international relationships are acknowledged and at the same time treated as part of the policy environment. As normal and largely unexceptional features of the structure of international interactions, those relationships are assigned a low priority in the search for explanations and strategies for change. The financial-intellectual complex’s explanatory framework and research agenda thereby largely exclude from active consideration an alternative analytic perspective that emphasises global integration, instead directing attention to things African.

It is important to note that at its root, identifying the nature, characteristics, and behaviours of the poor as the causes for poverty necessarily devolves to a genetic explanation. If the circumstances in which they live lead the poor to behave in ways that perpetuate their impoverishment, then it is those circumstances — local, national, global — that cause poverty, not something inherent in the poor. To insist that the poor are poor because of who they are, however disguised, sanitised, beautified, and situationally conditional that claim may be, is to assert a genetic basis for differences in wealth and their consequences.

The frequent discussions of educated unemployment provide a second example. The widespread adoption of this terminology is itself revealing. What is the problem here? What distinguishes the unemployment of the more educated from the joblessness of those with little or no schooling? Surely
neither the society at large nor the young people who cannot find jobs would be better off if they were illiterate as well as unemployed.

That young people who finish school are frustrated in not finding jobs, or the jobs they think they should have, is primarily a function of job creation (understood broadly) and not of schooling. That the apparently rising level of education among the unemployed is perceived as potentially threatening to the political system is problematic primarily from the perspective of those in power. Curriculum revision is unlikely to have much impact on this phenomenon. Efforts to reduce unemployment among those who finish school and to reduce their frustration and alienation, must focus on job creation (including providing tools, start-up capital, and the like) rather than on schooling. In the absence of more jobs - that is, economic growth - neither the subject content nor the political education in schools will do much to reduce the frustration or relieve the elite's concerns.

Fourth, the amalgamation of funding and research also nurtures an intense but usually ephemeral fixation on a particular understanding or strategy. Decisions in this environment require not only clarity but also simplicity. To ask 'what is the problem?' calls for the solution, which in practice becomes a succession of solutions, each proffered as definitive (or nearly so) and each ostensibly supported by unimpeachable research. This faddishness in education and development is fostered by the centralisation of communication and the antipathy to the tentative, the uncertain, and the conditional within the financial-intellectual complex. Periodic fads flourish in an environment that regards what works as more important than understanding why it works, that emphasises relatively rapid tangible outcomes at the expense of attention to the quality and consequences of process, and that prefers technical-administrative to social-political explanations and solutions.

A new insight, or perspective, or approach that captures the attention of the major funding agencies is quickly communicated to their principal consultants and African collaborators, who in turn disseminate it more widely. For a moment, often a very brief moment, it acquires extraordinary visibility and influence. It may even be enshrined as a guiding principle for particular projects. Complex problems, however, are rarely amenable to simple solutions, notwithstanding the preference for uncluttered and unencumbered understandings. New evidence is collected, new objections are lodged, new personnel assume responsibility and disenchantment sets in. The successor to the current fad is already emerging. Acknowledging that their confidence in the previous approach was misplaced seems not to make the advocates of its successor any more reserved or cautious in their enthusiasm.

We were wrong before, they say, but this time we are sure.

Hence, there is a continuing search for a prime cause for whatever problem happens to be currently specified as the most important. Periodically, it is announced that a prime cause (or its mate, a prime solution) has been identified. For example, relevant research shows clearly, it is claimed, that the quality of instruction depends heavily on the availability of textbooks and very little on class size. The canons of social science research disappear in the push for clarity and certainty. As
the marketing of the new understanding proceeds, few of its distributors are aware of the setting or the limitations of the initial research on which it rests or of the context, orientation, and deficiencies of the interpretation of that research. Subsequent research, however, generally shows that the purported prime cause is at best partial, and perhaps neither primary nor a cause. The old prime cause is discarded in favour of a new prime cause. As the fascination with a particular understanding peaks and wanes, it is not uncommon to find complete reversals in recommended policies.

A fifth consequence of the integration of education and development funding and research is the pervasive treatment of education as technique and administration. Again, the common terminology is revealing. Policy oriented research is more likely to talk about delivery systems than learning, about inefficiency than the realisation of human potential, and about returns on investment than nurturing curiosity or encouraging innovation or the creative expression of ideas and insights.

How, though, will Africans overcome their dependence on external intellectual leadership and standards if learning and creativity are not the central focus of education and development initiatives? How will assessing its schools in terms of efficiency and productivity fortify a new generation to criticise and risk departing from received wisdom? Who is best served by regarding the improvement of education largely as another of the development tasks to be organised and managed and thereby relegating to the status of by-product — for both the youngest and oldest learners — the intrinsic excitement and self-regenerating dynamo of learning?

The Costs of Certainty
The insistence on certainty in an uncertain world is neither liberating nor rejuvenating. The cascades of certainty that constitute research on education and development neither wash away ignorance and confusion nor irrigate the seed beds of local imagination and initiative. Instead, as it becomes a set of largely externally defined rules specifying acceptable courses of action, research disorients and imprisons. Even worse, the prisoners themselves become the warden and jailers.

The Mystification of Knowledge and Power Relations
The financial-intellectual complex not only consumes and commissions research, but it also specifies the types of research that it will regard as legitimate and capable of generating valid results. As should be clear from the discussion thus far, it is the behavioural science mainstream that is preferred, especially studies that seek to test hypothesised relationships through the analysis of quantitative data, an orientation that has a broad reach. Beyond its role in project proposal, specification, assessment, and approval, it is not uncommon for that preference to be employed in the evaluation of research proposals that address topics of particular interest to the development business in other, even quite distant, settings.

In that regard, it is striking that individual scholars may orient their work very differently in the academic and financial-intellectual complex spheres of operation. In the former, the relevant audience is institutional and disciplinary academic peers and university chairs and deans, while in the latter, the officials of the employing agency con-
stitute the audience that matters. They are much more likely than the general body of academics to have shared preferences about method, approach and findings. Much more easily than is possible at most universities and research institutes, funding agencies can readily terminate their relationship with a particular scholar.

One result of this process is that research, or rather claims about what research shows, elevate to the pedestal of fact what on closer examination often turn out to be limited, tentative and partial findings. Conditional conclusions become generalisations legitimately employed to influence major public policies, both directly and indirectly by providing or withholding funding. In the conjunction of funding and research, scholarship becomes a proprietary process. The investors have the determining voice in the selection of topics, researchers, and methods, limit access to source materials and often control the dissemination of findings. Consequently, the process of knowledge creation is obscured, mystifying the power relations embedded in the research and thereby in the programmes it supports. Perhaps not entirely aware of their own role, scholars become advocates not only for particular understandings of development and underdevelopment but also for a particular sort of global order.

Orthodoxy and Critical Inquiry

Equally corrosive of innovative, thorough, and reliable research is the absence within the financial-intellectual complex of the critical review and peer scrutiny of academia. Notwithstanding analysts' own experiences in higher education, little of the research that provides the foundation for broad analyses, general policies, and specific projects is reviewed critically and publicly by scholars with relevant expertise. That is especially problematic in the social sciences, since unlike the chemists and physicists intrigued by the claims about low temperature nuclear fusion, sceptical academics cannot attempt to replicate the original results of development initiatives in their own laboratories.

The external assistance agencies fund a vast amount of research in the third world, an investment that certainly exceeds the expenditures on development research by universities and research institutes. Yet, even much of that research is heavily discounted, regarded by decision makers as incomplete, irrelevant, or of insufficient quality. For example, the World Bank alone supported 272 studies of education from 1972-1982, and notwithstanding a decline in the percentage of total education project funding expended on research between 1982 and 1989, it allocated $98.5mn to support 436 studies in that period. Most of those studies, however, were never completed: only 27% between 1972 and 1982, and 42% between 1982 and 1989.

A senior World Bank researcher remarked at a 1991 conference that little of this extensive research investment yielded results that could be used to inform and guide policy making. Consequently, research that would not withstand broad exposure and critical examination entrenches selected approaches and methods, filters explanations and legitimises particular courses of action. At the same time, research whose approach is at odds with the prevailing style is readily rejected. Orthodoxy masquerades as pluralism. Obeisance to research obfuscates the decision making process, obscuring its basic assumptions and cloaking its
politics with the accoutrements of scholarly inquiry. Enmeshed in the techniques and administration of proprietary research, perceptive and well-meaning individuals lose sight of the larger issues at stake. Obliged to cast their comments in the language and form of this special sort of research, even critics are distracted. Much of the research that is conducted in the third world, even a good deal of the research supported by the external agencies, is discounted, discarded or too narrowly disseminated to have significant influence.

Accelerated Development?

The financial-intellectual complex erects an imposing edifice. The integration of funding and research is seamless. Analyses, explanations and remedies are all supported by an impressive foundation of research conducted by respected scholars and synthesised in systematic, carefully presented, and widely disseminated overviews of the state of knowledge. The reported findings occupy centre stage in academic as well as operational settings.

When pressed, academics and even operational personnel acknowledge the limitations and inconsistencies in research.

When pressed further they will acknowledge that the research foundation is far less solid than it appears; the defects are not minor. Yet few in either group are prepared to distinguish themselves by characterising that foundation as hollow and the edifice it supports as a fundamentally weak structure. The conjunction of funding and research maintains the vitality of the entire project proposal, evaluation, approval and support process, effectively obscuring its fundamental inadequacies and less consequential defects.

Two conclusions seem warranted. First, the conjunction of development funding and research casts research in a particular role. Claimed research findings become the required language for proposing and evaluating development projects. Approved methods delimit the legitimate participants in the research process and the legitimate interventions in development discussions. The research deemed acceptable legitimises particular courses of action and at the same time obscures the politics of excluding others. Second, although a vast amount of research is undertaken in this setting, the research that fulfils this role is limited in perspective and approach with little evaluation to critical review by people with relevant expertise. Combined, these two results displace the healthy scepticism of scholarly inquiry in favour of a frequently unqualified certainty. Both research and development are poorly served.

From its record thus far, and from the disabilities it entrenches, it is unlikely that the further evolution of the integration of funding and research – the consolidation of the financial-intellectual complex and the institutionalisation of its orientation and values – will improve things significantly in Africa.

In this era of political democratisation, it is time to institutionalise the accountability of those who provide development advice to those who are expected to benefit from it.

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Islam in Southern Africa: A Rejoinder to Nkrumah

Farid Esack

The Briefing 'Islam in Southern Africa' (ROAPE 52) by Gorkeh Nkrumah contains a number of errors. In addition, he omits mention of very significant Islamic players in South Africa today and uses the wrong case (Qibla) to illustrate a valid point: that Muslims in South Africa demonstrate that Islam is not the monster Eurocentric cultural perceptions tend to make it to be.

Questions of Fact

1. There are no ‘recent statistics’ available to indicate that Islam is steadily gaining new adherents. The latest statistics for Mozambique go back to 1970, for Zimbabwe to mid-1970 and for South Africa to 1980. The results of the most recent South African national census (1990), which should be significant for demographic questions of the impact of Islam on non-Muslims, are only due later this year.

2. The Cape Malay community is not ‘sometimes referred to as Cape Coloured community’ but forms a subgroup of the latter. Furthermore, the community referred to as ‘Cape Malay’ is not of ‘mixed African, Asian and European descent’ but essentially of Asian descent. It also needs to be pointed out that these categories of ‘Indian Muslims’ and ‘Cape Malays’ are increasingly invalidated by migratory patterns and inter-marriage.

3. In a paragraph dealing with ‘several important Muslim welfare organisations’ three quarters of the space is given to the work of Dr Abu Bakr Asvat. Presuming that the article wants to highlight the Islamic component in social activism this is clearly misplaced; Asvat never gave the impression of being a confessed Muslim or of being inspired by Islam. Significant as his concern for the sick may have been, he was no different from countless other doctors who offer self-sacrificing service in South Africa’s townships. The suggestion that he was a pioneer whose work is an ‘inspiration to other Muslim welfare organisations and is increasingly being imitated by
Bibliographic Note


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4. Of the six 'notable Muslim leaders in the anti-apartheid struggle, among whom Nkrumah includes the present writer, he is wrong on three accounts: While Asvat was certainly a notable leader there is nothing in his speeches or conduct to suggest that he ever thought of himself as a Muslim leader; Baba Salogie and Ahmad Timol, both activists murdered by the South African police, were not leadership figures in any political or Islamic organizational sense of the word. There is also no public knowledge of their religious commitment. The first time that they were mentioned in the South African - commercial and alternative press - was on the occasions of their murders. Martyrdom may be a legitimate means of elevation to the leadership in religious discourse but one cannot suggest that such leadership was also exercised over a community as the article does. If martyrdom were to be a criterion for leadership status then there are numerous other candidates, including Ebrahim Carelse, Abdul Karrieim, Friddie and Yusuf Akhalwaya all of whom were practising Muslims and in the case of Akhalwaya deeply committed to the Islamic worldview.

I have seen these six names together in several publications (all by non-South African writers) and in the absence of any factual scrutiny they get reiterated until their association becomes established as history.

More significantly, I resent a religious traditionalist dishonesty in claiming what is universal and appropriating it. 'Good people are actually Muslims/Christians although they themselves may not acknowledge it.' Asvat, Timol and Salogie were just good human beings. While a religious community may correctly feel proud that it has given birth to such individuals, it is incorrect for any community to claim them as a part of its exclusive heritage. The problem is further compounded when religious fundamentalists denounce these Muslim individuals for being moved by secular principles - as Qibla does - but then claims them upon their martyrdom.

The article omits mention of some of the most significant contemporary Muslim figures on the anti-apartheid scene such as Essop Jassat, Rashid Salogie, Hassan Solomon and Ibrahim Rasool. Among them they share more than a century of active engagement against apartheid and decades of banning orders, detention and exile. In the list of notable Muslim leaders forwarded by Nkrumah only Cassiem's (the Qibla leader) commitment and sacrifice is possibly commensurate with that of these figures.

5. Referring to the list of organisations, the following inaccuracies should be noted:

- The Muslim Youth Movement is not concentrated in 'Soweto, Kwazulu and Natal'. Besides the fact that Kwazulu is an apartheid description for some parts of Natal, the MYM is, in fact, rather weak in that part of Natal and has a few individuals as members in Soweto. Its organizational strength is in much of urban Natal, the Witwatersrand and the Western and Eastern Cape. It is, furthermore, the only truly national Muslim organisation with fully staffed offices in three provinces and a monthly newspaper.

- QMM is an abbreviation for Qibla Mass Movement and not Qibla Mus-
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lim Movement. While the organisation has always described itself as a mass movement, it has always referred to itself as 'Qibla' and has never adopted the initials QMM.

- The Mustad afun Foundation is a little known organisation which has received three mentions in the local Muslim newspaper, Muslim Views. It has never been mentioned in the alternative or commercial press nor in any studies by South Africans dealing with Muslims in South Africa.

- The Al-Hidayah Dawah Movement is not mentioned in any newspaper during the 1980s nor is it known to exist. It may possibly be confused with a da'wah (proselytizing) project of a local mosque committee by the same name.

More significant than these factual errors is Nkrumah's omission of what, for the period under discussion, was arguably South Africa's largest, most active and up-front Muslim activist organisation, the 'Call of Islam'. In the period 1984-89 this organisation received 1,700 mentions in South African news reports alone, convened more than 200 public meetings (where attendance ranged from 100 to 8,000) and was solely responsible for the organisation of all Muslim 'political funerals'. In May 1989 the 'Call' convened the first ever National Conference of Muslims in South Africa which, incidentally, was attended by all the (actual) organisations cited by Nkrumah. The National Convener of the 'Call', Rasool, convened the historic 1990 ecumenical conference of 250 religious leaders across the country and has accompanied Mandela abroad as an advisor on Muslim affairs. It is astonishing, to say the least, that non-existent organisations should be cited as active major 'movements' while the only movement which has received extensive coverage in ANC and other publications should be ignored.

6. Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi is not mentioned in any of the Qibla internal or mass publications. There is thus no basis for the assessment that 'QMM regards Mu'ammar Gaddafi in high esteem as an exemplary Muslim'. During the bombing of Tripoli it was left to the 'Call of Islam' to stage demonstrations outside the United States Information Centre in Cape Town and to conduct protest meetings in Wynberg and Lenasia. In Durban the MYM saw many of its members arrested in similar protests. Qibla's name does not feature in any newspaper reports covering Muslim response to the bombing.

Since its inception Qibla has been inspired by the Iranian revolution and has consistently tried to follow the line of the Imam (Khomeini). Like all fundamentalist groups, there is little scope for dual sources of inspiration in Qibla.

7. While it is correct that the Libyan-based Islamic Call Society finances the annual meetings of the Union of Muslim Councils of East, Central and Southern Africa, it is erroneous to infer that South African organisations are party to it. Two individuals, one Durban-based and the other Pretoria-based, participate in the conferences of this Union.

8. There is no proof of any Saudi Arabian or Libyan funds being channelled to South Africa via the Islamic Call Society. This story first emerged in a paper which erroneously suggested that such funds came into South Africa via the Call of Islam. Nkrumah seems to have confused this with the Libyan-based Islamic Call society. In the case
of the Call of Islam, no Libyan funds were ever received by it for any purpose whatsoever.

A Question of Substance

While it is correct that Tjy their embodiment of the Islamic ideal and the exemplification of the Islamic sense of fraternity and social justice, Muslims in South Africa have demonstrated that Islam is not the monster Eurocentric cultural perceptions tend to make it. Nkrumah's example is precisely that monster. It was the 'Call of Islam', and later the MYM which embodied principles of plurality, ecumenism, non-sexism and political tolerance.

The truth is that while religious fundamentalism may well be projected as a monster by western eurocentricism it is certainly experienced as just that by many other Muslims who do not share the religious worldview of fundamentalists. A few quotes from a typical Qibla publication 'Revolution Today, Justice Tomorrow' will suffice to make my case.

We cannot unite the oppressor and the oppressed because then we must unite the believer and the unbeliever . . . Our unity is a unity under Allah and his Rasul (Messenger).

All Muslims start off with the same kalimah (creed), the same Sunnah (Prophetic Precedent). In other words with the same ideas, values and ideals. That is, there is ideological unity. What those who profess to be Muslims have lost is a correct understanding of Islam. This has given rise to a host of 'Muslim academics'. We dare not call them 'academic Muslims' because the word Muslim does not require any adjective.

Islam declares war on racism and racialism. This is more than a mere battle of words. As proof we offer Muslims as the only truly consolidated anti-racist force in the country. This has been historically maintained for three hundred years because it is an ideological unit and not a nationality, tribe and race or class.

Islam, the Deen (religion) of the oppressed, is the ideology of liberation against which any other 'ism' pales into insignificance. These 'isms' are no threat to the Muslims at all - they are only of nuisance value.

Qibla ideology is evidently exclusive and intolerant and takes an ahistorical and essentialist view of both Islam and the Muslim community and a rather dim view of the worth of non-Muslims. It is impossible to envisage anyone committed to religious or political pluralism welcoming this kind of rhetoric. Qibla had to operate within the political space created by the UDF and its allies. The dominance of this space in the Muslim domain by the Call of Islam on the one hand and the unwelcome stridency of Qibla's Khomeini-ist rhetoric on the other, ensured that it never grew beyond a small group of Muslim fundamentalist militants with no popular support among ordinary Muslims.

Nkrumah seems to have confused a solidarity of the marginalised and the symbiotic relationship between Qibla and the PAC with a general liberation movement welcoming of Qibla's militancy.

Editor's Note

Farid Esack was the National Coordinator of the 'Call of Islam' until his resignation in October 1989. He is now a columnist on religious-political affairs for several South African newspapers/magazines who follow a broadly independent line and has published extensively on Muslims in S. Africa.
Debate: Kenya – The Road to Democracy

Rok Ajulu

The beginning of the 1990s has ushered in positive developments in the political arena in Kenya. For the first time in nearly two decades, the moving forces of our history have imposed on the political agenda the demand for democracy and political accountability. The ruling clique and its organ, Kenya African National Union (KANU), has been pushed on the defensive and forced to engage in a convoluted propaganda exercise calculated to legitimise the continued rule by the unpopular and undemocratic Moi. The political assassination of the foreign minister, Robert Ouko in 1990 has not only discredited the regime with its imperialist allies, but more importantly, has demonstrated that all is not well within KANU. The national outcry following the death in controversial circumstances of the regime's maverick critic, Bishop Alexander Muge, has once again demonstrated the unpopularity and the complete disarray within the Moi regime.

The Origins of the Political Crisis

It is tempting to attribute the present political crisis to tribalism. Yet it is also true that, like the Kenyatta regime, Moi has relied on a narrow political base serving sectarian and ethnic interests. Thus, it is not surprising that sections of the Kikuyu bourgeoisie have staked their claim to state power in the name of a ‘persecuted ethnic group’, while the Luo petty-bourgeoisie strive to defend their sycophantic loyalty to the Moi on the basis of their so-called ‘disadvantaged position’.

These, however, are symptoms and not the disease. They are a political manifestation of a bigger problem, the root of which lies in the neo-colonial character of the regime, and the specificity of capitalist development. Its main planks of support are based on certain social classes: the local bourgeoisie, sections of international capital, and ethnic loyalties cobbled out of patron-client relationships, nurtured and developed in concrete historical circumstances. If tribalism has become its most visible trademark, then this must be understood as an ideology produced and sustained under historical, economic, and political circumstances.

By the time Kenya attained political independence in December 1963, political power had already been bequeathed to local classes of property allied to metropolitan capital and willing to defend the interests of imperialism. In order to create a political space for these collaborationist and pro-imperialist classes, the militant trade union movement was ejected from the political arena in the 1950s. Its key activists were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment on trumped up charges. Thereafter, the labour movement was taken over by a new generation of moderate Africans organised under Aggrey Minya's Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions (KFRTU), later replaced by Tom Mboya's Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL), which was to prove its most effective representative. With the triumph of the moderate and collaborationist tendency in the labour movement, and the defeat of Mau Mau, the militant traditions of the 1940s and early 1950s were largely eradicated.

The contradictions of colonialism and national oppression, however, frustrated this clinical manoeuvre to wipe
out the third estate from the political arena. The weakness of the indigenous class of capital and property ensured that at independence, it could not inherit political power without the support of other classes. Hence the nationalist parties formed in the wake of our own *glasnost* of the 1960-61 period, were alliances of class forces in which no single class could immediately claim political hegemony.

Thus KANU and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), the main parties of African nationalism, represented different combinations of class forces. While KANU was the party of the advanced sections of indigenous embryonic bourgeoisie and the petit-bourgeoisie, which for historical reasons had to be found within the two nationalities, the Kikuyu and the Luo, KADU was an alliance of the weaker sections of the same classes from the minority nationalities, and for these reasons, could not compete for power on an equal footing in the then unfolding *political free market*.

But KANU was above all a mass party – an alliance of trade unions, urban working class, the lumpen-proletariat, urban traders and the peasantry, but one in which leadership had been captured by the old classes of small and big property.

It was this character of KANU as a mass party of the exploited working class and the peasantry, the nationally oppressed majority, which gave it its initial progressive image. In other words, the radical petit-bourgeoisie, the urban labouring classes, and the peasantry, despite earlier setbacks, had for a brief period imposed their demands on the party. KANU thus became identified with the radical tradition of anti-colonialism which had been the trademark of Mau Mau throughout the 1950s. It was this mass appeal which gave it advantage over KADU in the struggle for control of the independent state during the 1962-63 period. But in maintaining a fragile alliance to capture control of the independent state, the class forces in KANU merely postponed the struggle from within. Soon after political independence, the fragile alliance within KANU began to disintegrate. Class forces within KANU had been held together just long enough to capture state power; once this was achieved, the battle over the spoils of *Uhuru* had to be fought out to its logical conclusion.

Essentially the embryonic bourgeoisie which came to power on the backs of the KANU masses inherited, in comparison to other former colonies, a viable economy. Kenya as a settler economy had served as a commercial and industrial constellation of East and Central Africa. It had a well developed infrastructure, a viable import substitution industry, a large commercial and service sector and, above all, large tracts of land to be inherited from settlers. Obviously, there were lots of pickings to be had. The question then, as now, was whether these resources would be administered to benefit the people of Kenya as a whole or be mortgaged to foreign interests and a few wealthy Kenyans.

**The Traditional Opposition: Kenya People's Union, 1966-69**

The ensuing battles in KANU pitted its radical petty-bourgeoisie against its bourgeoisie over the path to economic and political independence. At the same time, the KADU embryonic bourgeoisie which was confined to the fringes of state power after independence could not just stand by and watch...
its KANU rivals take all the pickings. It was these circumstances which formed the merger between KANU and KADU at the end of 1964, a marriage of convenience based on mutual interests. On the one hand, the KADU barons wanted access to the fruits of Uhuru. On the other, the KANU bourgeoisie, locked in battle with its left over the neo-colonial policies of the independent state, required the support of the conservative KADU.

The merger of the two parties and the de facto one party system which emerged as a consequence, strengthened the position of the reactionary and pro-imperialist camp within the party. At the beginning of 1965, this faction launched its offensive, and for the next two years engaged the left in close combat. Bildad Kaggia, a veteran of the trade union and anti-colonial struggle was dismissed from the government in 1964. Pio Gama Pinto, another veteran of the anti-colonial struggle and a key underground activist during the Mau Mau struggle, was assassinated in 1965. By 1966, the pro-imperialist camp felt strong enough to force a political confrontation with the left.

The political battles of 1964-66 finally led to the formation of a new opposition party. Democratic and progressive forces had to find a new political home. The KANU 'annual' conference, the first in six years, was held at Limuru, a few miles outside Nairobi. The controversy centred around the change of the party's constitution. For example, the position party vice-president was replaced by seven regional vice-presidents, and the election results were nullified wherever the left candidates appeared to have won. In the end, the left were removed from all positions of influence in the party. Following the Limuru Conference, KPU was launched with Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and Bildad Kaggia, two veterans of the anti-colonial struggle, as President and Vice-President respectively.

Right from its inception, the KPU was attacked variously as a communist-inspired, foreign controlled subversive organisation working against the national interests, precisely the same vitriolic attacks which have now become the common currency of KANU leaders in their attacks on multi-party advocates. Nor was the KPU purely a Luo affair as Hilary Ngweno's right of centre Weekly Review never tires of reminding Kenyans. KPU drew its support from three main class forces: progressive democrats who had championed the anti-imperialist policy within KANU, the urban crowd of the militant tradition of the 1950s, and finally the landless peasantry, the striking force of the Mau Mau in the 1950s.

The new opposition was thus an attempt to revive the struggle for genuine economic and political independence. Its rejection of imperialist domination and the 'democracy of the rich' which for all practical purposes had become the undeclared manifesto of KANU after the Limuru conference, thus represented a forceful alternative to KANU. It was for these reasons that the government was determined to get rid of KPU. The story of the harassment and detention of KPU members, and finally the banning of KPU, is a familiar one. The irony is that some of those who voted for the banning of KPU in 1969, and who in 1982 voted for the de jure one party system, are now the champions of political pluralism.

What has changed between then and now?
Kenyatta's Democracy of the Rich, 1966-78

Following the banning of KPU in 1969, Kenya became a de facto one party state. In theory anyone could form an alternative political party if they so wished. In practice, however, after the experience of 1966-69, Kenyatta never allowed his popularity to be put to test. The monopoly of the political platform which KANU enjoyed as a result of these policies rendered the party useless from the point of view of those who controlled state power. The party was relegated to the background and the new class went about the serious business of accumulation in collaboration with foreign capital.

The party was polished up every five years for the purpose of elections with the people relegated into the background. The occasional promise of a school, a clinic and direct monetary rewards to influential patrons secured the votes; they then spent the next five years recovering their expenses from government coffers. Hence corruption in high places became the order of the day.

At the same time, it is important to emphasise that Kenyatta's democracy of the rich helped consolidate the position of the indigenous bourgeoisie which, for historical reasons, had emerged among the Kikuyu, particularly the Kiambu fraction. Its control of the state during 1966-78 facilitated its transition from a bureaucratic to comprador status. By 1978 a powerful politico-economic class had emerged within this group which straddled the commanding heights of the economy and politics. Although this group was largely dependent on foreign capital, it had effectively moved from traditional areas of primitive accumulation into other sectors of the economy – manufacturing, banking and finance – and to some degree, sections of it had developed in conflict with multi-national capital over areas of continued accumulation.

This period, therefore, produced a more cohesive 'looter class', the Kiambu faction of the bourgeoisie constituting its inner cabal, and the rest arranged in respective pecking order. This is not to suggest that this arrangement was devoid of intra-class conflicts. Rather these were minimised by the fact that this pecking order was extended into the political terrain. Those whose political ambitions threatened this 'civiliised order' were dealt with in mafia style; Tom Mboya and J.M.Kariuki, are probably the best known examples.

Moi's Nyayoism

It is against this background of tight control of the economic and political power by a small section of indigenous classes of property, mainly located within the Kiambu bourgeoisie, that the political posturing of the initial years of the Moi regime can be understood.

The wave of populism with which President Moi came to power in 1978 can therefore be seen as a reflection of the unpopularity of the old regime and the political uncertainty of its successors. After all, Moi was unknown quantity from the KADU days; he therefore had to seek by deception the consent of the majority. Thus he released political detainees, un-banned the University Students' Union, and even promised to do away with detention without trial. But at the same time, he signalled that nothing much had changed. By adopting the so-called philosophy of nyayo (footsteps), he
declared his intention to follow in the footsteps of the early accumulators.

During his Vice-Presidency, Moi learnt one important lesson: political power is more than a cabinet office, it is the access to key levers of the economy which constitutes real political power. The Moi clan, a bureaucratic bourgeoisie par excellence, had to rely on its control of state power for capital accumulation, the mechanisms of which included allocation of business and trading premises to itself, kickbacks from multi-national corporations, looting of parastatals, fraud and corruption.

However, Moi came to power at a time when imperialism had successfully completed the process of exporting the crisis of capitalism into the developing countries. If the 1960s had been marked by relative economic buoyancy, the late 1970s and the 1980s witnessed the exacerbation of economic crisis in the majority of developing countries, and intensification of the transfer of surpluses from the producing classes via the apparatuses of the state to the imperialist countries. Moi therefore could not satisfy the rising expectations of either the masses or the petit-bourgeois and embryonic bourgeois classes which were supposed to be the regime's class base. And because there simply wasn't much to go around, the Moi regime could do no more than loot the previous looters.

Crisis and Bankruptcy

As we have already indicated above, by the end of the 1970s, the crisis of capitalism in developing countries was full blown. In a neo-colonial economy like Kenya, despite the facade of a successful capitalist democracy in Africa, this crisis was clearly manifest by the mid-1970s. At one level it was evident in the worsening conditions of the urban working class and the peasantry, the education crisis of the second half of the 1970s and the spate of so-called illegal strikes in the early 1980s. At another level, there was official corruption and unmitigated looting of the country's resources as this 'hungry' bourgeoisie plundered the economy. These were indeed indications of a deep seated economic crisis.

It is not surprising therefore that Moi's populism soon gave way to political repression unprecedented even by Kenyatta's own murky standards. Following the 1982 attempted coup d'état, repression was stepped up and detention without trial was back as the cornerstone of the repressive apparatus. The moratorium President Moi had initiated with the university students collapsed as he herded hundreds into prisons and detention camps.

Having broken the back of the students' opposition, Moi directed his fire at the radical and progressive intelligentsia. The emergence of Mwakenya and its organ Mpatanishi at the beginning of 1985 witnessed another round of repression. While the Moi regime was forced to concede the presence of an internally based opposition, this was used to justify the repression of 1985-86 which was mainly directed at three main forces: the traditional opposition (that is, the former activists of the banned KPU), the radical intelligentsia (main activists of Mwakenya), and finally, the professional classes, mainly the progressive sections of the legal profession.

Faced with mass rejection, President Moi decided to personalise the most important repressive apparatuses of the state. In 1989 he changed a provi-
sion in the constitution which gave him power to sack the Attorney-General, High Court and Court of Appeal Judges. The much touted independence of the judiciary was thus wiped out by a stroke of a pen. The same Bill also gave the police the right to hold suspects for up to 14 days before bringing them to court, as opposed to the 24 hours previously stipulated.

Yet while the populist rhetoric of nyayo has served to maintain the illusion of continuity, it has camouflaged the qualitative shifts in class forces which has taken place at the economic and political level over the last ten years. Moi's alliance of the embryonic bourgeoisie and other trader classes has finally succeeded in removing the old accumulators from the centres of power and, to a large degree, economic control. This has indeed been an important arena of political battles between the dominant classes of property and capital, the outcome of which usefully explains the present realignment of political forces.

Increasingly alienated from the political ring, and excluded from the traditional area of accumulation, the old bourgeoisie started fighting back. This brings us to the present conjuncture and the realignment of political forces in the country, in which, under the leadership of the old bourgeoisie and the patriotic sections of clergy, the question of a multi-party system and democratic accountability have been forced on to the political agenda. This debate has been given the 'blessing' of the imperialist powers, the most recent converts to political pluralism in Africa.

What has suddenly gone wrong with the one party systems, and repressive regimes which have served imperialism so perfectly over the past three decades? The answer to these questions must be sought within the crisis of imperialism and capitalism in Africa and the third world. So deep seated had this crisis become over the last decade that imperialism has been forced to look for ways and means of containing it. Repression, it is now publicly acknowledged, cannot cope with the political crisis engendered by the failure of capitalism and neo-colonialism in post-independent Africa.

It must also be recognised that the unmitigated looting of Kenya's resources, and the unbridled corruption, which are the hallmarks of this class, has done irreparable damage to the image of capitalism as a system of production. Imperialism is therefore looking for a more respectable way of managing capitalism. Thus, the two issues: the peoples' cry for democracy, and imperialism's support for political pluralism, must not be confused; they are not the same thing. While the people seek an alternative, imperialism seeks to manage the crisis.

Multi-Party: A Platform for a Democratic Alternative

The mushrooming of opposition to Moi's dictatorship and the recent uprising in the major urban areas have highlighted very important questions demonstrating the weakness of the regime. Despite appearances, the regime is at its weakest, and now more than ever before, rules from a very narrow social base.

It has been increasingly forced to rely on massive repression to maintain a semblance of political stability. More
importantly, it has lost the support of the social classes which normally sustain a regime in power: the working class, the peasantry, and the urban sansculottes; the middle and professional classes; and now the classes of property and capital have finally broken ranks with the regime.

On the other hand, it has clearly defined the broad spectrum of classes behind the call for a Democratic Alternative. The important questions raised by these developments are the character of the struggle for democracy, the long-term interests of the classes gathered within the democratic camp, and how best to forge an alliance which can lead to a genuine democratic alternative. The answers to these questions, and the correct determination of strategies and tactics against Moi’s repressive regime, requires an assessment of the class forces assembled under the democratic umbrella.

We have already demonstrated that the indigenous bourgeoisie do not have a consistent commitment to democracy. Over the years they have perfected the art of petty rivalry over areas and fruits of capital accumulation. Consequently, they are unlikely to have a long-term interest in democracy. It is quite likely that the moment the Moi regime collapses and they are able to reclaim the old areas of accumulation, their objectives, for all practical purposes, will have been accomplished. Their sojourn in the democratic camp is probably temporary. Indeed, we can assert with a degree of certainty that it is from this class that imperialism now hopes to recruit new ‘popular’ collaborators.

However, it is the working class and the peasantry who have borne the brunt of the political and economic crisis. Their conditions are unlikely to change with a mere change of guard. Their demand for a political alternative is therefore qualitatively different from that of the classes of property and capital. And yet it is this latter class which has captured the political leadership of the democratic movement. Thus while we support the idea of maximising the class forces capable of being mobilised against the neo-colonial regime of President Moi, it is important that this time around we ensure that this indigenous class of capital is not given a blank cheque.

The experience of Kenya’s one party system has demonstrated the worst excesses of bourgeois rule. Under a one party system the people have witnessed the dictatorship of a small clique based on narrow self-interest and close collaboration with multinational capital and imperialist powers. It is a political system which has not brought the people any direct economic benefits but has instead led to the plunder and mismanagement of the economy by a small minority and poverty to the majority. It is this experience which has led to the enthusiastic embrace of the concept of a democratic alternative.

Given this background, it is not surprising that political pluralism has come to be regarded as a panacea for all the ills of neo-colonialism. It is important that we address ourselves to this question. The fecundity of political pluralism cannot be taken for granted. Historically, political pluralism was conceded by the bourgeoisie only after protracted class wars. It is equally important to recognise that the bourgeoisie only conceded it after it had developed mechanisms for taking advantage of the system. Armed with the most sophisticated ideological apparatuses (like the media and education)
political pluralism has best served the interests of the bourgeoisie.

This, however, is not to dismiss the potent force of political pluralism and its capability to create a political space within which progressive and democratic forces can organise. It merely shows that political pluralism must mean more than a right to political expression. In Kenya, we must insist that political pluralism be defined in the widest political sense to answer the concrete demands confronting neo-colonial societies; that democracy must mean more than the right to participate in elections every four or five years. It must include above all, the right of the working people to organise themselves to defend their jobs and struggle for better wages and working conditions unencumbered by state intervention. Above all, it must include the basic right to organise politically to defend these rights. Only in this way can the multi-party debate be transformed into a potent force of change for the majority of people.

At the moment, however, the classes of property and capital, the professional classes, and sections of the clergy, by virtue of their consistent opposition to the Moi regime, constitute the dominant social force. They have won popular acceptance in the urban and rural areas and, above all, have convinced the working class and the peasantry that they are the champions of their democratic aspirations. They have captured the political centre stage and assumed the vantage point from which to derive maximum benefits from political pluralism. Under the banner of multi-party democracy, this class hopes to mobilise the urban working class and rural peasantry against Moi's dictatorial regime and establish its own class rule.

Towards a Democratic Front

The above analysis suggests that in 1992 there exists a possibility of forging a united front bound together by the common objective of fighting against Moi's dictatorship. The forces for democracy are not necessarily homogeneous; the old classes of property and capital and the new converts to political pluralism, have not consistently demonstrated a commitment to democracy. Nevertheless, they share with genuine patriots, democrats and other progressive forces a basic commitment to the struggle against dictatorship.

This conjuncture, and the existing balance of class forces, enables us to maximise the class forces capable of being mobilised for the struggle for democracy. We must establish a broad front based on a minimum democratic programme representing the demands of the class forces. The Democratic Front must therefore define its immediate objectives and set out its minimum programme in such a way that it can win the popular acceptance of the majority. The Front by its nature cannot be the political home of any one single class; it must of necessity be the political home of all those class forces which are for democracy. Its basic demands must reflect the broad aspirations of the majority of Kenyans.

Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD)

Since this debate was initiated in 1990, the balance of forces have shifted further in favour of change. The government's retreat which started with the KANU Review Commission in 1989 had by the end of 1991 turned into a headlong flight. Thus by the end of 1991, the combination of internal pressure and the political conditionality
of President Moi's imperialist backers finally forced political pluralism on to the agenda.

Predictably, a number of political parties and grouping have emerged since Moi was forced to announce the return of multi-party 'democracy'. However, it was the Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD) which, since its launch in August 1991, has spearheaded the struggle for a democratic alternative which emerged as a political home for those class forces genuinely interested in a real alternative to Moi's dictatorship.

In its 'pure' form, FORD was composed of two main political forces - the traditional opposition, that is, the old left of KANU, former KPU, symbolised in Jaranogi Oginga Odinga; and the new left, the intelligentsia, university lecturers, journalists and radical lawyers. Since the December 'glasnost', and particularly the collapse of KANU, FORD has opened its doors very wide, and Odinga's 'tent' has been swamped by traditional classes of property and capital, opportunists and fortune seekers, who until very recently were Moi 'loyalists'. Indeed, the balance of forces within FORD is now in the process of tilting in favour of the old classes of property and the traditional bourgeoisie - very much like KANU in the period 1961-1964.

However, by virtue of its consistent opposition to the Moi regime, the traditional opposition within FORD has won acceptance in the urban and rural areas, and has, above all, convinced the working classes and the peasantry that it champions their democratic aspirations. And so it would seem that the content of democracy in the post-Moi period will be ultimately decided by the struggles within FORD. How far the progressive forces can determine the content of that democracy will depend to a large degree on the respective weight of their political constituency and whether or not they choose to intervene in the current process of realignment of class and political forces in our country.

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Zimbabwe: Drought, Food and Adjustment
L. M. Sachikonye

Antecedents of the Drought

Barely 15 months ago, Zimbabwe boasted of embarrassingly huge stocks of maize, its staple crop. Indeed, the Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA) chairman recommended then that maize production be significantly reduced owing to the considerable storage costs and low international prices. The Grain Marketing Board (GMB) paid Z$21 million in interest charges on the maize stocks and so argued that 800,000 tonnes kept as a strategic stock be reduced to 400,000 to lessen storage costs. In total, the GMB possessed stocks of 1.1 million tonnes in April 1990.

A year and one half later the food situation has radically changed. Diminishing stocks required replenishment through imports; in January 1992, the first consignments of maize imports totalling 100,000 tonnes began trickling into the country. The roots of the current crisis should be sought not only in gaps in official policy but also in the consequences of an incomplete agrarian reform, principally those resulting in the congestion of the communal peasant sector. As a result, food deficits have become a permanent occurrence in some districts and provinces both during maize surplus and drought years. The embarrassing coexistence of huge stocks and chronic food shortages in some districts and amongst certain strata of society has been traced back to the 1950s and 1960s (Illife 1990). Indeed, the patterns of present food crisis could be traced even further to the 1930s; even then periodic shortages no longer caused identifiable deaths as relatively brief periods of acute starvation gave way to longer periods of non-fatal scarcity. In the drier agro-ecological regions IV and V (see map on page 6), sometimes termed the ‘peripheries’, more or less permanent drought conditions and therefore food deficits have existed for many years. These include the two Matabeleland provinces, large swathes of Masvingo and Midlands province, the Zambezi and Save valleys and the northern portions of Mashonaland West and Central and of Manicaland.

Thus, while a bumper maize harvest was celebrated in 1989 and 1990, chronic food shortages were reported in many districts outside the well-endowed highveld (agro-ecological regions I to III). By November 1990, almost 2 million people (or 20 per cent of the total population) in the eight provinces were dependent on drought food relief distributed by the government. There were reports of famine conditions in some remoter villages (The Herald, 23 November 1990).

Starvation conditions existed amongst the Tonga in the Zambezi valley region of Omay, amongst the Dema in Kanyema, in Mberengwa, Mount Darwin and Rushinga, in Chivi, Zaka, Bikita, Ndanga and Mwenezi districts.
(all in Masvingo province); in Chipinge district in Manicaland, in Beitbridge, Tshitshi and Ngwunyana areas in Matebeland South. What stopped these shortages from escalating into a widespread famine in the rural districts was the availability from the government of ‘food-for-work’ programmes, albeit sporadically due to transport bottlenecks.

The Food Deficit in 1991-92

The situation worsened following a poor rainfall in most parts of the country during 1990-91. In addition, the diversification by large-scale commercial farmers to other types of crop production, particularly horticulture, further reduced the hectares formerly devoted to maize production from 285,000 ha in 1984 to 125,000 ha in 1991. The static maize price and the admonitions from the GMB to reduce the hectare contributed to the switch from food to cash crop production. In April 1991, GMB stocks stood at 655,600 tonnes in comparison with the 3-year average of 960,000 tonnes for the years 1988-89 to 1990-91 (Zimbabwe Food Security Bulletin, December 1991). By the end of December 1991, GMB maize stocks had shrunk further to 264,300 tonnes against the estimated needs of 379,800 for the months January – March 1992. Hence the recourse to maize imports from South Africa and further afield.

Which regions and sectors have been most affected by the maize deficit?

Again the poorly-endowed agro-ecological ‘peripheries’ have been hit hardest: Gwanda and Beitbridge (in Matebeleland South), Zvishavane and Mberengwa (in Midlands), Zaka, Chivi, Bikita (in Masvingo) and both Matabeleland North and Manicaland fared badly. In Mashonaland Central province, the Dema people were reportedly abandoning government resettlement schemes for their old villages to forage for food (The Herald, 11 November 1991). In Bikita, starving villagers marched to the district administrator’s office to demand delayed food rations. In the normally maize surplus Goromonzi-Kubatana District in Mashonaland East province, some 40,000 were dependent on food aid. In all, more than 2 million people required drought relief food.

The outlook in 1992 therefore looks sombre. It is unlikely that maize imports of more than 150,000 tonnes – which is only a small proportion of the approximately 1.1 million tonnes required – will be found in South Africa. Like most countries in the region, South Africa is also in the throes of a scorching drought and is predicting a shortfall of between 2 and 3 million tonnes for its own domestic consumption. The regional cereal short-fall for 1991-92 has been estimated to be 3.5 million tonnes with inadequate current cereal import programmes particularly affecting domestic shortfalls in Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia (SADCC Food Security Bulletin, 1992).

As the food security co-ordinator of SADCC countries, Zimbabwe was expected to convene a meeting with

### Dependent on Food Aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number (1990)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>523,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>403,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>397,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland C</td>
<td>198,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland S</td>
<td>176,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland W</td>
<td>98,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland N</td>
<td>61,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland E</td>
<td>17,435</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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prospective food donors to discuss the sourcing and financing of maize imports from outside the region, possibly from the United States and Argentina amongst others.

The projected Zimbabwe harvest of 1.1 million tonnes of maize in 1992 now looks over-optimistic. Rainfall in the lowveld by January 1992 was less than 50 per cent of normal with some parts of Masvingo and Matebeleland reporting less than 20 per cent of normal rainfall. In the large-scale commercial maize-growing areas of Mashonaland West, Central and North, rainfall up to mid-January was less than 65 per cent of normal and, in many places, lower. This large-scale commercial sector had only planted 78,000 hectares of maize by January compared to a total of 125,000 hectares in the 1990-91 season and 285,000 hectares in 1984. About 70 per cent of this crop had been planted late, thereby reducing yield prospects irrespective of future growing conditions. In communal and resettlement areas, less than 600,000 hectares had been planted by January as compared to 925,000 hectares last season.

Ramifications of Failed Harvests

For a country which had attempted to enhance its status as the ‘bread-basket’ of the region, the poor harvests of the consecutive droughts of 1990-91 and 1991-92 will have a long-term sobering effect. Furthermore, agriculture, as the much-vaunted 'backbone' of the economy, will need to be tempered in light of the periodic cycle of droughts - an average of two to three per decade.

The repercussions of the failed harvests in 1991-92 will include a considerable increase in food-deficit households: the 2 million recipients of food relief in 1990-91 could increase by another 2 million or so exerting tremendous demands on the government’s rickety food procurement and delivery system; enormous strain will be put on the railways carrying maize imports from Mozambique and South African ports. Just as daunting will be delivery of the maize to the thousands of villages scattered around the country, some with rudimentary road conditions. In the past two years, the problem of transport bottle-necks in food deliveries has not only caused much distress to the prospective recipients but has provoked a great deal of their ire at what they have interpreted as unnecessary red-tape and bungling by the government bureaucracy. In one instance a government spokesman admitted that food deliveries had been adversely affected by the shortage of transport; out of 368 trucks required only 140 were available (The Herald, 5 December 1990). As a consequence, food aid trickled into such remote areas as Omay very slowly. As one report described the situation:

> Although relieved that food aid could be collected at (a central collection point), the people complained that they had to travel long distances through thick forests infested with wild animals to get food. Some spent 3 to 4 days prodding donkeys to and from the collection point. Donkeys are the only means of transport for most people in the area ... The people of Omay have had poor yields because of erratic rains during the past five years (The Herald, 15 October 1990).

In Matabeleland South, unreliability of government-owned transport forced recipients to organise their own transport to ferry food from district distribution centres. Similarly in some districts in Manicaland, village local committees collectively collected money, hired transport and distributed food amongst the local people (Sunday
These local initiatives represented a response to a situation where thousands of bags of grain lay idle at GMB depots while thousands starved. It is uncertain whether the transport system will be much better coordinated in 1992. The combined pressure on rail and road delivery systems will be much more taxing than the food relief campaigns of recent years. Unless measures are taken the potential of famine-induced deaths in 1992 is going to be much higher.

A related implication of the impending low harvests is that more people will seek to be enrolled on food-for-work programmes. The eligibility of access to food relief depends on participation in these public works schemes which often involve construction of local roads and small dams, gully reclamation and brick-moulding. However, in those instances where transport bottlenecks have hampered food distribution for several months, the food-for-work programmes have been consequently suspended resulting in many instances in which villagers have bitterly complained of not receiving food even though they had engaged in the work programmes. It must be hoped that in 1992 the pressure for better organisation of these programmes will be much greater than in previous years. There is, however, no provision in relief programmes for those able-bodied people who may be too famished to participate in food-for-work programmes. The numbers of such people is likely to increase in 1992.

A more poignant impact of the failed harvests during the past two years relates to hunger and malnutrition amongst children – particularly in the rural areas. This is likely to be accentuated in 1992. In Chivi district, for example, some children have dropped out of school due to hunger; those who remained often fainted in class. Drought-stricken Matabeleland South had reportedly the highest child malnutrition in the country with 27 percent of children under the age of five malnourished. There have been occasional reports of widows starving to death; they are another vulnerable group. During the 1990-91 drought, families in the Devure resettlement scheme in Bikita district were on the verge of starvation and so subsisted on mutandabota, a kind of cold porridge made from a mixture of mealie-meal and crushed baobab fruit powder (The Herald, 3 December 1991). In Kanyemba, the Dema were forced by persistent drought and inadequate food relief to fall back on survival strategies including subsistence on roots and fruits of wild plants (The Herald, 13 September 1990). In the Zambezi Valley, the women avert hunger by collecting cereal from certain types of indigenous grasses to produce meals and ‘instead of tea and bread which they cannot afford, the women have substituted the morning meal with the fruit of the baobab tree with which they prepare porridge for the children’ (The Herald, 23 September 1991). With a widespread shortage of food forecast in 1992, these precarious survival techniques will intensify.

Finally, it needs stressing that other equally severe consequences of the 1991-92 drought include the decimation of livestock and considerable job losses of up to 40,000 in the farming sector which employs about 25 percent of the total national work force. Some 30,000 cattle have already died in Masvingo and another 60,000 are on the verge of dying; the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) has recommended 100,000 cattle from badly drought-
stricken districts be sent for slaughter. Beef exports to the European Community will be drastically reduced. The draught-power needs of peasant producers in the coming agricultural seasons will be more difficult to satisfy. It will take several years to build the already depleted national herd to reasonable levels. Although it is not certain what numbers will be involved, it is inevitable that many thousands of contract and casual seasonal agricultural workers and those industries heavily dependent on agricultural will be sacked, or will not be hired. This will have reverberations on the households of these workers and on the economic activities in the communities and villages from which they originate. Considerable pressure will be exerted on workers elsewhere to invest their remittances in the purchase of food for the extended families in the peasant sector. It is unclear whether these remittances will be of sufficient magnitude and regularity to reduce the possibility of rural starvation against the backdrop of diminished incomes and escalating food prices in the context of structural adjustment measures.

Likely Impact of Adjustment

The 1991-92 drought has occurred in the context of the 5 year structural adjustment programme (SAP) which will run until 1995. In many respects, the Zimbabwe SAP bears the hallmarks of orthodox programmes designed for other countries by the World Bank. Prominent in Zimbabwe's SAP are provisions for trade liberalisation, heavy cuts on government expenditure, de-regulation of investment, prices and labour conditions, cost-recovery measures in social services and devaluation.

The optimistic protection of 5 per cent annual economic growth between 1990 and 1995 has been falsified by the lower growth of about 3 per cent in 1991 and a substantially lower growth forecast for 1992 due to the drought. Sugar, tea and coffee exports will be drastically reduced, so will agro-industrial output. Some estimates put the value of agricultural commodities (including maize and oil seeds) to be imported in 1992-93 at about Z$1.46 million.

Of immediate interest is the extent to which specific measures affect food consumption patterns relating to the de-regulation of prices, cropping of certain subsidies and the commercialisation of the operations of parastatal enterprises. Only ten products regarded as basic consumption items still have their prices controlled: these include maize meal, bread, beef, cooking oil and fats (Zimbabwe Government, 1991:13). With respect to the staple maize-meal, only the coarser roller-meal is subsidised and therefore controlled; super-refined maize meal is not. Following the significant doubling of maize producer prices from Z$270 to Z$550 per tonne in February 1992, roller meal and super-refined meal rose by 20 and 80 per cent respectively. The Zimbabwe Millers Association have therefore forecast a fall in the demand of super-refined meal:

Super-refined prices are now more than double the price of equivalent prices of roller meal... demand is expected to reduce dramatically and barring expensive altering of mill settings, supply availability will exceed demand. There is no chance that millers will try to force consumers to buy the more expensive product (Financial Gazette, 13 February 1992).

In this food-deficit year, lower income workers and the bulk of the peasants will be hard-pressed to absorb these
considerable increases. Under-consumption with all its attendant consequences will result. Other patterns of consumer resistance (or rather consumer inability to afford new prices) are visible in the below-average purchases of milk, beef and related basic wage foods. More generally, the consumer price index of lower-income households had increased faster than that of higher-income families to pitch at 26.1 per cent in July 1991. As we observed above, the severe squeeze on workers' incomes in a context of an inflationary rate up to 35 per cent, remittances in cash or food supplies are bound to decrease substantially.

Another measure concerns the reduction of subsidies to the GMB which is charged with the transportation, storage and sale of maize. Pressure to reduce its deficit has resulted not only in maize meal increases but recommendations that it reduce the number of its grain depots in rural areas. Of the existing 74 depots, 34 were constructed after independence and meant to facilitate the collection of the peasant maize crop. The adjustment programme requires that GMB eliminates its deficits and therefore close the less ‘economic’ depots despite the public or local service they render. In bumper harvest seasons, the depots have performed an extremely useful role in ensuring that peasant maize surpluses were marketed. As one economist observed:

Closing depots in some communal areas will essentially mean that (future) communal farmers' crop will be greatly reduced. They will be marginalised and the white commercial farmers will again control as in the past ... (The Sunday Mail, 29 September 1991).

SAP does not appear to hold good prospects for peasant grain producers nor, more immediately, for those experiencing food shortages. Nor will the poor and children get succour from the reintroduction of school fees in urban centres and health charges in both urban and rural areas. Social polarisation will grow further in these gloomy conditions of drought, hunger and recession. The gurus at The World Bank and their local counterparts might not have had this scenario in mind when they designed SAP and marginalised such social interests as workers' and peasant organisations. Although the 1992 drought would have been difficult anyhow, 'their SAP' will make Zimbabwe a much hungrier society than it has ever been since independence in 1980.

Lloyd Sachikonye is at the Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies, Harare, and is an editor of ROAPE.

Bibliographic Note


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Very dry §| Dry ••--" Intsr Tropical Convergence Zone
The World Bank Demands its Pound of Zimbabwe's Flesh

Colin Stoneman

Unorthodox Policies Attacked

Zimbabwe's go-it-alone policies of the 1980s were not as socialist as the rhetoric suggested, but to a degree they were left nationalist, with a good record in the provision of education and health care, after the termination of an IMF programme in 1984. Yet these policies were remarkably successful in very difficult circumstances: destabilisation by South Africa requiring a defence expenditure of nearly 10 per cent of GDP, including fighting Renamo in Mozambique in defence of trade routes through Mozambique (even so most trade still had to take the much more expensive routes through South Africa); four years of drought; the suspension of most programme aid and all US aid after 1987, whilst Zimbabwe spent 5 per cent of GDP paying all its debts without resorting to rescheduling.

Despite all this, Zimbabwe managed an annual growth rate of over 4 per cent, even accelerating to about 5 per cent towards the end of the decade. This was two to three times faster than South Africa, or the African average, and was exceeded only by a few oil or diamond-rich countries. Meanwhile manufacturing industry grew by over a third, improved structurally, and broke into overseas export markets; Zimbabwe also acquired a reputation for success in agriculture, both commercial and peasant, regularly exporting maize to neighbouring countries (including South Africa) and fruit and wine to Europe. Even this good exporting record did not please the World Bank, which was seriously embarrassed by having a 'non-adjusting country' doing so much better than its 'success stories'. In 1987 it vetoed a loan for export promotion that it had been negotiating after the runaway success of an earlier one, and the UK and other donors began to tighten the screws and denigrate the economic record.

Orthodoxy Brings Few Rewards

Increasing rigidities and corruption, partly caused by the tightening external constraints, meant that reform of the system became ever more urgent. However, before this could be implemented, the collapse of central planning in Eastern Europe gave Zimbabwe's right the context to engineer a successful coup in which Robert Mugabe was not deposed, but marginalised. Initially the rhetoric was moderate: a five-year 'home-grown' trade liberalisation programme, phased and monitored to protect the poor and allow local industry time to adjust, was begun in October 1990. The World Bank said it approved and would support the programme financially without significant conditionality. The outcome after only 18 months is that Zimbabwe is in such deep financial trouble that it has had to accept full IMF conditionality and is now under-
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Orthodoxy Brings Few Rewards

Increasing rigidities and corruption, partly caused by the tightening external constraints, meant that reform of the system became ever more urgent. However, before this could be implemented, the collapse of central planning in Eastern Europe gave Zimbabwe's right the context to engineer a successful coup in which Robert Mugabe was not deposed, but marginalised. Initially the rhetoric was moderate: a five-year 'home-grown' trade liberalisation programme, phased and monitored to protect the poor and allow local industry time to adjust, was begun in October 1990. The World Bank said it approved and would support the programme financially without significant conditionality. The outcome after only 18 months is that Zimbabwe is in such deep financial trouble that it has had to accept full IMF conditionality and is now under-
going an orthodox structural adjustment programme; food security has been lost in pursuit of parastatal 'efficiency', and de-industrialisation has begun. The growth rate has fallen to about zero, inflation has trebled to 25 per cent and the stock market has fallen 40 per cent after rising uninterruptedly for five years.

There are at least two immediate main causes of this sorry story. One is the incompetence of the implementation of the transition policy, and another is the heavy-handed reaction of donors led by the World Bank. Both can be seen as deriving from a determination to lock the country into market policies, which has taken precedence over the more difficult business of identifying and implementing a policy which would be economically and socially optimal.

The balance-of-payments consequences of the removal of import restrictions without at least temporarily higher tariffs were predictable and predicted: outflows of currency for liberalised commodities were three times what government budgeted for. The main donors have compounded the fiasco by promising (in Paris in March 1991) US$700mn support for the first year of the programme and then not delivering it even by the start of the second year. Meanwhile, in September 1991 Zimbabwe bowed to the pressure and devalued its currency by about 25 per cent. Following earlier adjustments, this means that its per caput income has been reduced from over US$600 early last year to about US$350 now, transferring the country from the middle-income to the lower-income category.

Food Security is First Casualty

Although de-industrialisation could be the most serious long-term cost of structural adjustment, the immediate consequences could be a serious famine. Until two years ago the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) had a maize stockpile of nearly 2mn tons which would have covered the shortfall caused by the present drought. Structural adjustment has required 'inefficient parastatals' to break even, and so most of the stockpile was sold off last year, and the GMB has stopped building storage silos in outlying areas. It has also been criticised for providing inadequate incentives to farmers to grow maize – commercial farmers have reduced their area under maize to 40 per cent of the 250,000 hectares planted five years ago, leaving the shortfall to be made up by communal area farmers – which indeed have done so much more than adequately except in droughts. But thanks to EC and US dumping of
subsidised maize on the world market, the GMB's guaranteed price was above the world price until recently, preventing it from exporting profitably.

In other words, market policies would have given lower incentives. Food security clearly depends on subsidising the GMB, and ensuring that there are enough peasants farming in reliably watered areas – which can only be brought about by land redistribution. This obvious lesson will, however, be resisted, as the continuing success of the (irrigated) white tobacco farms will help bail out the economy this year, ignoring the fact that tobacco occupies under 1 per cent of the arable area and could easily be excluded even in a redistribution twice as large as is proposed.

Maize deliveries in the year to March 1992 are expected to total only half a million tons, under half the normal amount, and the amount may halve again in 1992-93 because of the severity of this year's drought, which has also decimated subsistence production. Stocks ran out in February and Zimbabwe may have to import over a million tons this year at a cost of over US$100mn. There is a serious risk of famine for the first time in 50 years. There will also be serious negative effects on the rest of the economy which tends to follow the fortunes of agriculture.

The drought will thus provide the perfect scapegoat for the economic devastation which was already beginning under the structural adjustment programme.

Colin Stoneman is at the Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, UK.

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**BAT and the Penetration of Capital into Oyo State**

Ademola Babalola

*This study concerns the movement of international capital by British American Tobacco (BAT) into the Oyo North division of Oyo State, Nigeria, and investigates the control by the company over the farmers; that this control stops short of full proletarianisation nor does it lead to a clear pattern of stratification along class lines.*

It is often believed that the injection of capital into third world societies leads to the breakdown of their pre-existing socio-economic structure and the establishment of capitalism as the dominant mode of production. Available evidence however does not support this simplistic conception (Alavi 1982). The socio-economic structures of these societies have not been passive victims of change; they have been able to accommodate and resist these changes. Moreover, capitalists and initiators of change have found it profitable and convenient to preserve some elements of these structures within new systems of production, thereby producing only a limited transformation (Meillasoux 1980). This study shows the limited transformation of the socio-economic structure of a third world sub-region as a result of capitalist penetration.

The Oyo North division lies within the savannah grassland of Oyo State, Nigeria. The socio-economic structure of the communities are basically similar. Prior to the introduction of commercial tobacco farming, the people were primarily food crop farmers. Agricultural land was communally owned and held in trust for the people by senior chiefs and clan/lineage heads. Every adult member of a clan had access to land.
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whenever there was the need, particularly for agricultural purposes. However, occupiers of agricultural land could not alienate any of their portion without consent, but they did have exclusive rights of use of the land.

Simple traditional tools such as hoes and cutlasses were used in production. As in most lineage-based social formations in West Africa, the major source of labour in agriculture was the family. Role differentiation on the farm was based on age and gender: household heads and adult male children performed the heavy task of bush clearing, weeding and the making of ridges, while the women and children planted and harvested food crops.

Members of the households also enjoyed some rights on the farms. Household heads who controlled the labour as well as the output of members of the domestic units of production also controlled surplus labour from the farms. This labour was used to feed the households and to reproduce and augment labour on the farms through the acquisition of more wives. Women who were responsible for organising the sale of food crops from the farms, sometimes made a profit by selling above the price recommended by their husbands. In addition, they had access to spices grown on their husbands’ farms and left-overs of crops which they sold to earn income.

This mode of the appropriation of surplus labour within the pre-existing social organisation of production, promoted a mutual dependency relationship between husbands and wives both on the farms and at home (Afonja 1981; Mullings 1976; Babalola, forthcoming).

BAT introduced commercial flue-cured tobacco into the Oyo North division in the 1940s when it began to blend locally produced cigarettes in Nigeria and to cure locally produced tobacco leaves to improve their quality (Kranendonk 1968). Flue-cured tobacco production, which began on a small scale with farmers of their own volition freely cultivating the crop for BAT, later developed into a contract farming system under the auspices of the company. BAT, incorporated in Nigeria as the Nigerian Tobacco Company (NTC), advanced cash loans for the construction of curing barns. These interest free loans were repayable over a period of three or four years, against a proportion of the farmers’ tobacco sales (NTC Annual Report 1975). Annually, the company provided credit facilities to the farmers in the form of agricultural inputs, such as fertilisers, pesticides and the ploughing of tobacco fields which were repayable within the crop year. The farmers on the other hand, independently handled the preparation of land and the organisation of labour for production.

In an earlier study of household relationships conducted in Igboho, one of the communities of the Oyo North division, it was discovered that contrary to the belief that the commercialisation of agriculture would make women become less subordinate economically and socially to their husbands, commercial tobacco farming has made the economic status of women to be subordinate to that of their husbands (Babalola 1987). Similarly, it was shown that while commercial tobacco farming has enhanced agricultural productivity among the farmers, it has not improved their standard of living (Babalola 1987). The present study illustrates the impact of the injection of capital into the agricultural economy on the land-use pattern; the effect of the introduction of commer-
cial tobacco farming on labour use in the agricultural economy and commercial farming and the pattern of social stratification among the farmers.

Propositions of the Study

The following propositions were investigated:

- That BAT Company succeeds in controlling the process of flue-cured tobacco production by credit agreement, thereby ensuring the appropriation of surplus value to itself (Bennholdt-Thomsen 1982);
- The control of BAT over the farmers stops short of full \textit{proletarianisation} in that separation of the farmers from the means of production is not complete, and the individualised production (geared towards consumption) of the households is not replaced by a socialised production (geared solely towards exchange) 'set in motion' by the Company (Bernstein 1979);
- The process of control by the BAT over the tobacco farmers has not led to a clear-cut pattern of stratification along class lines among the farmers.

\textit{Proletarianisation} is taken to refer to the complete separation of producers from all property which they could use for their material and social reproduction (Bryceson 1980); determined in the study by the extent to which farmers exercise control over the land they cultivate and their ability to produce food crops for their households. \textit{Class} refers to the existence of an enduring exploitative and antagonistic relationship between groups whose positions are determined in relation to the means of production.

To measure the first proposition, the concern is with the most important source of financing tobacco production by the farmers. Next, the interest is in who controls the process of flue-cured tobacco production and the object of production – that is, who determines what to produce, when to produce and how to dispose of what is produced.

For the second, the interest is in the proportion of farmers who have free access to the use of agricultural land for the production of tobacco. Following this would be the concern with the proportion who had been able to produce food crops sufficiently to feed their households.

For the third, the concern is to see whether the development of commercial flue-cured tobacco farming has led to the emergence of a land-owning group and a landless group among the farmers. Thus, the interest is also in the proportion of farmers who have free access to land for tobacco cultivation.

Data Collection

The survey was conducted in four tobacco producing communities of Oyo North division - Ago-Are, Aha, Tede and Igbohoe. A sample of 132 tobacco farmers, and local officials of both the NTC and the Flue-cured Tobacco Farmers Associations were interviewed.

Structured interviews using questionnaires drawn up in the Yoruba language were held with the farmers. The questionnaires were designed to tap information on the socio-economic characteristics of the farmers, the agricultural land use pattern, labour utilisation and capital investment by the farmers in commercial tobacco production. Unstructured interviews were also held in Yoruba with officials of the Flue-cured Tobacco Farmers Association in each of the towns of the study.
Similar interviews were held in English with officials of the NTC in the communities. These sought information on the history and development of flue-cured tobacco.

**Socio-Demographic Findings**

The socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the tobacco farmers reveal that all of them are male and constitute an ageing population group. Most are Christians and are married to more than one wife. Their educational standard is generally low and many of them were previously food crop farmers. A large proportion of them started tobacco farming in the 1970s, a period which coincided with the return of a large number of the people of the Oyo North division to their homes after the expulsion of aliens from Ghana.

The farmers depend heavily on the NTC for financial and material assistance to be able to start and continue with the production of flue-cured tobacco. They also receive financial support from friends and relatives within their communities. Despite this, rural indebtedness is not prominent among the farmers. They have been able to earn money in tobacco farming and to invest in other trades.

Although a larger proportion of the farmers signified their intention to leave flue-cured tobacco farming, virtually all of them considered tobacco farming beneficial to their households. An interesting and at the same time ironical revelation is that the plan to leave tobacco farming as well as the desire to stay on in tobacco production is highest among the older farmers. Older tobacco farmers who plan to leave tobacco farming, want to leave farming for a rest from active labour. However, among this category flue-cured tobacco production still constitutes an avenue where they can readily earn.

Almost all the tobacco farmers possess food crop farms on which their households subsist. A small proportion who previously practised one form of craft/technical work or another prior to the adoption of commercial tobacco farming are still involved in these works.

**Control of Production?**

The evidence validates the first proposition that BAT succeeds in controlling the production by credit agreement, thereby ensuring the appropriation of surplus value to itself. The heavy reliance for financial and material assistance from the NTC to start and continue production enables the company to control the process of flue-cured tobacco production and the products of the labour of the farmers. Within the social organisation it is the NTC that controls the quantity and quality of tobacco that the farmers can cultivate, and the price of tobacco leaves as it is the sole buyer of the crops from the farmers.

**Full Proletarianisation?**

The findings on the agricultural land use pattern and labour utilisation, and on the ability of the to grow sufficient food crops for the subsistence needs also validates the second proposition. The majority of the tobacco farmers - 76 per cent - have free access to the use of land for tobacco cultivation. About a quarter of those who cultivate tobacco on the land of chiefs in their respective communities only pay 'token fees' as agricultural land in the communities is still largely communally owned. Despite the conclusion that the NTC has control over the process of tobacco
production and the products of the labour, this stops short of full proletarianisation as farmers still have some control over the land they cultivate.

Moreover, virtually all the tobacco farmers possess food crop farms and two-thirds indicated that their households subsist on crops harvested from these farms. Hence production of flue-cured tobacco as a cash crop has not led to the neglect of the cultivation of food crops to meet the subsistence.

**Class Differentiation?**

The evidence on the pattern of stratification among the tobacco farmers validates the third proposition that a land owning and a landless group among the farmers has not emerged.

Agricultural land is available virtually 'free of charge' to the farmers as 76 per cent of the tobacco farmers farm their own or communal land, while a quarter cultivate tobacco on the land of chiefs for only token payments. Although there are a few cases of hired non-indigenous male labourers and a large number of hired indigenous female labourers working for the farmers, the practice of share cropping or tobacco farmers working as part-time labourers at the tobacco farms of other farmers has not emerged.

What has emerged is the ability of some farmers to earn money to feed their households and to invest in other trades. For instance, 67 per cent of the farmers reveal that they have been able to invest in trades such as large-scale food crop farming and the purchase of machinery for cutting cords and processing cassava. This provides a basis on which to categorise the farmers. They are differentiated as 'rich', 'middle' and 'poor': rich farmers were a class of farmers who could subsist through tobacco farming and invest in other productive activities; middle farmers were those who could subsist wholly through tobacco production; poor farmers were those who could not subsist wholly through household production in tobacco farming.

Consequently, although the development of commercial tobacco farming has not led to the emergence of either a landowning group or a landless group of agricultural proletariat, it has created opportunities for the accumulation of agricultural capital in the area and unequal distribution of income among the farmers. Nevertheless, going by the definition of class as an enduring antagonistic and exploitative relationship between groups, it is obvious that the commercial farming has not led to clear cut stratification along class lines, thereby validating the third proposition.

**Conclusion**

The manner of the incorporation of the farmers into production via the use of credit facilities is responsible for the lack of proletarianisation and a pattern of stratification along class lines among the farmers. The control that the farmers exercise over the land on which they grow tobacco, despite the control the NTC exercises over their conditions of production, forecloses the possibility of full proletarianisation or class stratification. A forcible seizure of land from the tobacco farmers by the NTC as in some parts of Africa would have produced a different result. The present study draws attention to another mechanism – the use of credit facilities by capitalists to facilitate control over peasant production and why it is necessary to study the peculiarities of different measures adopted by them in their
penetration of the third world before pronouncing judgement on the effects of these developments on the social structures of these societies. It does not necessarily lead to the disintegration of the pre-existing structures but varies, depending on the mechanisms employed to achieve their desired objective for surplus value and on the resistance to this offered by the people.

In terms of policy, I do not favour either NTC's mode of control or the forcible seizure of land to facilitate NTC's total control over production. It would be preferable to create conditions to enable farmers to produce freely in cooperation with each other.

There is a need for conditions to enable farmers to have easy access to financial and material credits independent of NTC to provide them with some power at the level of pricing and quality of the tobacco they grow.

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Bibliographic Note


Western Sahara
Referendum Sabotaged

David Seddon

In *ROAPE* 52 we described the plans for the UN sponsored referendum in the Western Sahara - which should have taken place in January this year - and the efforts of the Moroccan government to sabotage these plans. It now seems that Morocco has been successful in its attempts to undermine the peace process. What was planned as a carefully phased five month programme was already running several months behind schedule by December 1991, and has now been effectively postponed until the autumn of 1992 at the earliest.

At the end of the Briefing in *ROAPE* 52 we argued that if the referendum is seriously delayed, as now seems likely, and the external pressure from the international community on Morocco to conform to the agreed basis of the UN Peace Plan slackens... the occupying power will be in a stronger position to dictate the terms of a final settlement "out of court". If this occurs, the entire UN involvement will be shown to have been a cruel farce and all talk of a strengthened role for the
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United Nations in "the new world order" revealed more clearly as a smoke-screen to obscure the cynical realpolitik of the states which dominate the Security Council'.

Developments since those words were written reveal all too clearly the desperate weakness of the UN machinery in the face of the vested interests of Morocco and its backers. Throughout November 1991, Morocco continued to insist that no progress could be made on the preparations for the referendum until a further 120,000 names (predominantly Moroccan citizens) be added to the electoral register. At the same time, the Moroccan government continued to provide food and shelter to the tens of thousands of Moroccan civilians that it had transported into the occupied Western Sahara to swell the numbers of Moroccans present and to inhibit progress towards the referendum. It also restricted access to the occupied territory of the Western Sahara not only to journalists (unless officially 'approved'), but also to foreign observers and even senior political figures.

Despite these difficulties and irregularities, the newly elected successor to Mr Perez de Cuellar as secretary general of the UN, Egyptian former foreign minister, Mr Boutros Ghali, pledged himself on 21 November, in his opening address to the UN, to pursue his predecessor's peace plan.

Meanwhile, however, allegations of mismanagement and partiality within the Minurso administration were widely published in the western press, and the special assistant to Minurso in New York was specifically accused of 'financial irregularities'. These allegations were strongly denied by Mr Perez de Cuellar. In December, Minurso officials declared officially that Morocco was responsible for continual obstruction and delay of the agreed timetable and procedures for the referendum. During November and December, UNHCR together with Minurso, was supposed to supervise the return of the Saharawi refugees from their long exile in the camps near Tindouf to new, safe locations. Morocco had not withdrawn half of its army, as anticipated, from the occupied territory; nor had its troops been restricted to designated areas. Prisoners of war, who were to have been exchanged under the auspices of the Red Cross between October and November, had not been exchanged. And even the deployment of Minurso itself, which was to have been undertaken during October, was not complete. The UN secretary general's statement made at the time of the Security Council's adoption of Resolution 690 (1991), on which the UN peace plan is based, allows for a revision of the five-stage, 36-week, referendum timetable. Yet despite the delays, no new timetable had been announced, even by December, reinforcing fears that the UN was unprepared to press ahead in the face of Moroccan intransigence and was, indeed, effectively bowing to Moroccan pressure.

Repatriation had been unable to begin. Confirmation of these fears was provided when the former UN secretary general produced a draft report in which he argued for an alteration of voting criteria to enable those whose fathers were born in the territory as well as those with intermittent residence over 12 years before December 1974 to be included as voters. This would have the effect of enrolling some 30,000 extra voters, most of them Moroccan nationals. The report received the backing of the US and
France – staunch and long-time supporters of the Moroccan regime and its position on the Western Sahara. But it drew strong criticism from a number of non-aligned states as well as from the OAU, which includes the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic as a member state and which, with the UN, co-sponsored the peace plan. The Polisario Front called the report, 'partial, unjust and completely aligned with the position of the aggressor, the Moroccan colonists'.

On 18 December the UN special envoy to the Western Sahara, Johannes Manz, resigned his post, giving the difficulty of securing agreement on the voting criteria as the main reason for his resignation. A senior Swiss foreign ministry official had earlier accused the Moroccans of trying to mislead the UN and not keeping to their commitments. On 23 December, in a highly unusual move, the UN Security Council postponed the adoption of Mr Perez de Cuellar's report (proposals from the secretary general are usually approved 'on the nod'). On the last day of 1991, as the former UN secretary general's mandate formally came to an end, the Security Council – still deadlocked – voted to ask his successor to draw up a new report before the end of February.

The referendum is therefore effectively delayed until well into the year. At present the Security Council appears reluctant to contemplate measures to oblige Morocco to adhere to the original basis of the peace plan, but the threat of military or economic sanctions against Morocco if it continues to flout UN Resolution 690 remains a possibility, even if Morocco's supporters within the Security Council (notably the US and France) will undoubtedly be arguing strongly against such measures. Clearly, the position adopted in the new UN secretary general's report will be of great importance in determining the direction of future developments; but equally important will be the pressure now growing to maintain the independence and international credibility of the UN as a peacekeeping institution in the 1990s.

Meanwhile, at the end of January, in the second violation of the UN cease-fire in a week, Moroccan 'planes flew sorties over Toubazga, Dousj and Zoug in the Western Sahara region controlled by the Polisario Front. At the same time, numerous Polisario supporters were reported to have been arrested in the towns of Smara and El Aioun within the Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. In the absence of effective UN sanctions, it would seem that Morocco feels it can do as it wishes to undermine the prospects of a just and lasting settlement of the long war in the Sahara.

**Update March 1992**

The UN will pull out from the Western Sahara dispute unless Morocco and Polisario can agree on a way forward by May said Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali after taking a sharply critical look at his predecessor Javier Perez de Cuellar's handling of the dispute. Boutros has also removed acting special representative Zia Rizvi following complaints from Polisario and from the US. Polisario and Rabat have been unable to agree on an acceptable candidate to replace Johannes Manz. Polisario rejected General Vernon Walters, a former CIA officer and US Ambassador to the UN and said to be a friend of King Hassan as candidate. In his yet unpublished report, Ghali accuses Rabat of violating the cease-fire through military overflights, improving defensive works
and troop movements. The report reinforces concerns voiced in the US Congress about the obstructions faced by the Minurso team and the escalating cost of the operation. Boutros says that "fundamental differences persist between the parties regarding the question of criteria for eligibility to vote in the referendum" and that lack of progress in this area is a matter of "serious concern". By setting a target date for the "resolution of all outstanding issues" by the end of May, Boutros is ensuring that the UN does not get mired in a controversy that will damage its reputation. On the other hand, given Morocco's refusal to renegotiate the criteria, the UN deadline could leave Polisario stranded (excerpts from Africa Confidential, 6 March 1992).

In Britain, the Western Sahara Campaign and the Committee for a Free and Fair Referendum in Western Sahara have been active in canvassing and building support for the UN and OAU sponsored peace process. Similar committees have been formed throughout Europe to put pressure on national governments to make sure that the UN fully implements the referendum plan to which it is pledged. The Western Sahara Campaign has produced a seven page briefing document about the conflict in the region and the current initiatives to ensure a just and peaceful settlement. The document is supplemented by regular monthly updates on the situation in the Western Sahara. Details can be obtained from the Campaign office at 180 Brixton Road, London, SW9. The Minority Rights Group have published an updated version of their report on The Western Saharans. This is available from the Minority Rights Group, 379, Brixton Road, London, SW9.

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Zambia: Problems for the MMD
Steve Kibble

Five months after the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government in Zambia took power with over 80% of the popular vote, the first cracks in broad support for the new government may be about to appear. Rifts are apparent below the surface, symbolising a society likely to be increasingly polarised with opportunities extending for the few, but overall standards of living rapidly declining.

The MMD party is not well organised, as the Deputy Minister of Local Government and Housing, Valentine Kayope admitted. There is internal dissension, particularly in the Southern Province, and many of the best organisers have been 'kicked upstairs' to Lusaka. Public opinion appears to recognise this with poorly attended post-victory rallies. The elections for the newly-democratised local government structure in April may well show an upturn in support for Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) or even other parties. Interestingly enough, illegal street vendors being rounded up in Ndola in late January shouted pro-UNIP slogans as they were being tear-gassed by the police.

Press revelations about a cabinet minister using his position to award a contract to his own firm and about two
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Note: ROAPE has published several Briefings on the Western Sahara, in issues 11, 38, 45/46 and 52.

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Press revelations about a cabinet minister using his position to award a contract to his own firm and about two
prominent MMD leaders failing to settle debts totalling millions of kwacha have led to comparisons with the corruption of the Kaunda era and calls for greater public accountability. Certainly little has been heard of the Ethics Committee promised by the new President at his first press conference. In a manner similar to Kaunda's ill-fated leadership code, it appears to have been replaced by calls for Zambians to work harder.

Unstable Coalition

The new government is an uneasy mix of old trade union colleagues of President Chiluba, comprador business elements hoping to do well from a link up with multinational, particularly South African capital, professional and academic 'political virgins' and disgraced former colleagues of Kaunda's, many of whom were not brought to trial for alleged corruption. The disproportionate number of academics who largely started MMD have no particular constituency and little experience, but have a genuine commitment to the best possible democratic practice. They are aware of the political debts owed to business people including those allegedly corrupt, who contributed to the MMD campaign, and to the former Kaunda cronies who had the political organisation to get the vote out. Their hopes that the latter can be sidelined once the new government is on its feet may prove to be over-optimistic. The attitude of the younger businessmen who have not been doing well and who have gone into business to consolidate their economic position, possibly with hopes of opportunities from privatisation, may also prove troublesome. Chiluba has attempted to keep the academics happy by allowing them to suggest how a new constitution might work and allowed the trade unionists to control the public order and home affairs ministries (it is suggested in order to be able to police the workers, currently worried over labour legislation abandoning one union per industry). Business has been left to control the key economic and financial portfolios. How long this coalition can retain its consistency is open to question, with divisions apparent at the recent MMD conference in Mulungushi, and Chiluba experiencing difficulties in forming his Cabinet.

A New One-Party State

The overwhelming victory in October 1991 has virtually led to the emergence of a new one-party state with the previous (UNIP) government being confined to Kaunda's ethnic heartland of the Eastern Province. The election result appeared to mark the revenge of the better-educated new generation over those who had led Zambia to independence. The new government's secretariat talked of there being no room for 'illiterates in power'. Despite its win and the new climate of freedom of speech and adherence to democratic norms since the abolition of the state of emergency, the MMD government represents an incomplete break with the Kaunda period, in both personnel and constitutional terms. The MMD was always more of a coalition bound together by dislike of, and the experience of economic and human rights suffering under Kaunda rather than a coherent political party with a consistent programme. Kaunda's UNIP government fell for largely negative reasons - the price of food against a background of declining average incomes, employment (there are now 3 million unemployed) and production over the previous decade and a half, and the paralysis common to one-party states due largely to corruption. The annual
inflation rate for 1991 was 88.3% and the country had external debts of $6,500 million at the end of November 1991, having defaulted several times on repayments to the IMF.

The UNIP opposition has been largely ineffective and is still apparently stunned by its defeat with no apparent successor to Kaunda. Many of its (few) MPs are in government-owned houses and hesitate to draw attention to themselves. The role of opposition has been handed to the vigorous press, and to a lesser extent to the small Social Democratic Party (SDP), not represented in Parliament.

Hit the Poor

The government is committed to following the prescriptions of the IMF, hoping for massive loans. One prominent civil servant told me that they had no other option but to do what the IMF told them, having defaulted in the past. Others expressed the hope that the IMF would at least give them interim protection against the country going bankrupt, acknowledging the effects of structural adjustment elsewhere. Great emphasis was placed as well on aid being more appropriate to Zambia’s needs, although given the relative strength of the donor community, this too may be difficult to achieve. The new government withdrew subsidies for the staple diet, mealie maize, in January 1992 and devalued the kwacha by 30% in the budget later that same month. Prices of fertiliser are also due to rise, which will hit small peasants particularly hard. Combined with the drought in southern Africa, this appears to conflict with the expressed pro-agriculture policies of the government in which the intention is to be self-reliant in food production. Because the price of mealie meal is a barometer of social tension, the government is openly hoping that the people will ‘give us time – since they knew our policies when they voted for us’. One government minister thought that two years’ grace was the outside period they could expect. If the expected $8 billion saved from subsidies does not ‘trickle down’ or get used in social service or infrastructure, as appears only too probable, and trouble emerges on the Copperbelt or in Lusaka, there have already been worries expressed that Chiluba would resort to more authoritarian methods. The security apparatus has not been reformed and the riot police appear as eager as ever to crack a few heads as students protesting at the 30 January meeting of Heads of the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) against the continued closure of the University of Zambia, soon found out.

With this in mind the powers of the President are still considerable. Professor of Law and head of the Commission looking into constitutional reform, Lawrence Shimba, admitted that it would be difficult to get the President to agree to curtail his powers, something that also worried Fred Mmembe,
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managing editor of the Weekly Post and a key figure in the opposition to the corruption of the Kaunda years.

The government has stated its commitment to a free market, but apart from throwing open the economy to multinational and South African investment, it appears to have little idea how, blaming the previous government for 'inhibiting the people...from undertaking self-initiative efforts to adequately provide for themselves' (Minister of Science and Chair of the MMD Finance and Economic Affairs Committee, Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika). Taxation of the rich in order for the poor to have 'trickle down' incomes does not appear to represent an attractive prospect for the majority of Zambians. Truckers are already expressing their worries over what liberalisation will mean for them. There is to be some commitment to self-help initiatives such as the Mongu Production Development Trust Fund projected to attract K10 million for rural subscribers to 'contribute and participate in business and development fund raising, investment decision-making and all aspects of development implementation in their own interest' (Mbikusita-Lewanika). How far this can go towards overturning the massive problems of the Zambian people appears problematical, even with help like debt cancellation from the US and Dutch governments.

A New Morality

The government is calling for individual effort to overcome the crisis, although with some awareness of the hostile external environment. There is the possibility of an emergence of a new nationalism tied in to an ethic of hard work. The Kaunda record on tolerance of other nationalities was not ignoble according to Owen Sichobe, Chair of the SDP. Illegal aliens under the MMD have been subject to much greater pressure. Hundreds of Senegales, some working illegally in the emerald industry, have been deported, although others are said to have good links with the police. This is in contrast to the deported Tanzanians about whose treatment their government made an unprecedented protest. Rather more worrying is the anti-Asian feeling associated with Chiluba’s declaration in December 1991 that Zambia was a 'Christian nation'. To some this has given police a licence to raid mosques in a very insensitive manner (not removing shoes) in the search for illegal immigrants. It also meant a ban (quickly rescinded) on a Moslem radio programme. Asian reaction has been muted, to avoid creating a racial issue, particularly when historically they have been blamed for price rises rather than the government. The reaction from the churches in a joint statement on 16 January 1992 from the Catholic Bishops, the Zambian Council of Churches and the Evangelical Church of God to Chiluba’s statement of Zambia being a Christian nation ironically, was extremely cautious even from the ‘born-again’ evangelicals, according to their leader, Bishop John Mambo. The statement stressed the secular nature of the constitution and its emphasis on religious freedom. The influence of the tiny, but very vocal ‘born again’ Christians seems to have been considerable, but largely within the business community (‘pray with the president and get a job’), not least in the recognition of Israel immediately after the election campaign in which a good deal of US evangelical money was expended.

Lusaka – Gateway to Pretoria

Chiluba has also enthusiastically em-
braced links with South Africa ranging from help in golf and cricket coaching, tourism packages, personnel training for Zambian air stewardesses to more serious financial opportunities for South African capital. As well as allowing South Africa to open a trade mission in Lusaka, Zambia took a strong lead inside the January 1992 PTA meeting, arguing for Pretoria's increased integration with the organisation. Chiluba also openly clashed with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni over the removal of all sanctions before a democratic government was in place in South Africa. Chiluba appears to be following in the steps of neighbour Kamuzu Banda of Malawi in choosing a path of 'dependent development' which will presumably benefit those in charge of the state apparatus. One government minister observed to me that at least Banda could feed his people, an ironic statement given the famine in 1991.

One sad twist has been the call from the impoverished Western Province (formerly Barotseland) to be allowed to return (which Kaunda banned in 1966) to their historic pre-independence position as unskilled migrant labourers to the goldmines of the Witwatersrand. The fact that South Africa has been pursuing an increasingly internalised market for unskilled labour appears to be irrelevant to Environment Minister Richard Nganga who compared conditions on the goldmines favourably with those at the Nakambala Sugar Estates in Mazabuka where thousands of Western Province people are employed as migrant labourers. The government appears reluctant to sanction the reopening of Wenela recruitment offices in the West, and the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions is strongly opposed to the dehumanising conditions in the goldmines.

**Prospects**

For ordinary Zambians the future looks bleak. Despite the greater accountability, a free press and genuine debate in Parliament, the terms of relationship to the external environment cannot be altered to any great extent, nor can the internal decline of the Kaunda years easily be reversed. The literacy rate is below 70%, the infant mortality rate is 120 per 1,000 live births, there is only one doctor for every 8,000 people and one health centre for 100,000, and less than half of the population of 8 million has access to safe drinking water.

The methods chosen by the new government are likely to impact disproportionately on the poor. Democratic practice will enable Zambians to influence their choice of rulers, but the actual choices offered to them are very small. Opposition has so far been muted, and even the October elections saw a turnout of only half of the 2.9 million voters. Ordinary Zambians appear to be giving the Chiluba regime time, but being urged to work harder in a society of declining living standards and greater social polarisation and external dependence may well give this time more of a 'borrowed' quality than the Chiluba regime would wish.

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**Bibliographic Note**

Interviews with government ministers, civil servants, church leaders, political activists, and journalists conducted inside Zambia from 24 to 31 January 1992.


Is there anything more to say about famine? Have we not heard enough in 1990-1991, and indeed for almost two decades regarding the recurrence and inevitability of famine in Africa and elsewhere? There has been a peculiar familiarity in the debates. They have usually focused on the causes of famine, ranging from why the weather is not the sole culprit, to adverse international economic conditions, to the incompetence of African states and farmers. There are also the destructive human and financial costs of war; environmental crises linked to desertification; increased population pressure on given areas of land, and regimes intent on squeezing rural dwellers to keep them politically humble.

By mid-1991, drought and war in six of the worst affected African countries – Liberia, Angola, Mozambique, Malawi, Ethiopia and Sudan – has made 20 million people acutely short of food while more than 27 million are close to starvation in the whole of the continent. Translated into immediate food needs, the continent’s approximate deficit is 2.25 million tonnes, much greater than existing pledges of food from the British state and the EC: 218,000 and 400,000 tonnes respectively. Compare these pledges with the 20 million tonnes of grain stored by the European Community.

As the extent of Africa’s famine finally breaks through the more ‘glamorous’ news items commentators have begun to talk of disasters fatigue. The need for a band aid to avert more death by starvation once again (and quite rightly) has taken priority over focused debate about why famines are recurrent, why it is that the producers of food are still the first to suffer, and why knowing that a famine is imminent is no guarantee that disaster will not be as bad as before.

These are not the only questions that can be raised. There is also the question of whether or not aid should be given to regimes that have created the condition for famine in the first place? Regimes like that in Sudan have waged civil war against people in the south and unleashed armed militias in the west, disrupting production and raising prices. In seeking to preserve their regime by terror, they have refused even to accept that a disaster exists. The alternative to giving aid which props up such regimes is not to give it at all, which only adds to the misery of the starving and does not guarantee the toppling of the corrupt regimes.

Focusing on what NGOs do best, keeping people alive during crises and battling against disaster fatigue at home, has meant that broader issues of combating and preventing famine have disappeared from sight. That is not to say that there is much useful mileage in trying to establish a general theory of causation. While famines may result from underlying vulnerabilities (to the ways in which rural dwellers produce
and reproduce their livelihoods) mass
starvation in different contexts, and
across national borders, usually results
from different circumstances.

It is by shunning these familiar preoc-
cupations, and yet clearly building on
them, that J. Dreze and A. Sen have
written the finest and most compre-
hensive examination of famine and
endemic undernutrition in developing
countries yet published.

This is a big book in every sense of the
word: extensive, thorough and intellec-
tually challenging. One of its main
contributions is that it puts politics
centre stage among forces creating and
maintaining the conditions for alleviat-
ing hunger. The authors note that it
might go against the grain to write in
defence of public action - at a time
when good words are to be found only
in praise of the market - but they also
remind us that state planning and
public action were major reasons for
reducing mortality rates in western
countries. So why should we be sur-
prised that they are also central to
providing crucial social security in the
worlds poor countries?

The ideologues of the World Bank and
IMF refuse to admit that cheap public
provision of health and education, and
labour intensive production processes
in poor countries where wages are low,
are significant factors world wide in
reducing the threat of famine. Illustra-
tions of this are numerous: China, for
example, saw a general fall in mortality
rates before the much hailed economic
reforms of 1979; indeed official Chi-
nese statistics indicate a large increase
in mortality rates after 1979 coinciden-
tal with a fall in communal medical
insurance and in the numbers of 'bare-
foot' doctors. Where increases in the
provision of health and education are
linked specifically with improvements
for women the consequences for im-
proved nutrition are even more marked.
Indeed, if putting politics at the heart of
their analysis is one of the major
themes of the volume, then a focus on
women and their role in all areas
relevant to access to food and not
simply food production is another.

The authors observe the contrasting
life expectancy rates at birth in differ-
ent states in India. The state of Kerala,
for instance, a state poorer on average
than most others in India, has a
particularly long life expectancy rate of
around 70 years compared with the
Indian average of 56-58 years. Indeed,
the figure for Kerala is closer to the
figures for West European countries
and is closely associated with high
levels of literacy in general and female
literacy in particular. There is an his-
torical context within which the high
levels of literacy must be set dating
back to 1817 where a young female
monarch in the pre-colonial state of
Travancore insisted on mass literacy. It
has been sustained since by left-wing
state governments serious about pro-
viding public services in education and
health. The point is that high levels of
literacy do make people

more eager and more skilled in seeking modern
remedies for treatable ailments. It may also
have a role in facilitating public participation
in social change and in generating public
demand for social security (p.223).

The central theme that Dreze and Sen
argue is that it is possible for poor
countries to be effective in the public
delivery of the key services of health
and education which have the effect of
raising life expectancy and averting
death through starvation. Yet the au-
thors go further than simply to reduce
politics to the action of states.
Dreze and Sen’s point of departure is the ways in which public action can prevent famine. Public action here is defined broadly to include the activities of the state, ‘but also social actions taken by members of the public – both “collaborative” (through civic cooperation) and “adversarial” (through social criticism and political opposition)’ (p.vii). With this broad definition of public action the major activities of the state to prevent famine (what is done for the public) are set alongside, rather than above, what is done by the public. As the authors say, it is ‘essential to see the public not merely as “the patient” whose well-being commands attention, but also as “the agent” whose actions can transform society’ (p.279).

They do this by looking at ways in which public action can be used to combat famine and endemic deprivation. These two conditions are distinguished from each other by the transient nature of famine, as a discrete event causing widespread death, as compared with the persistence of endemic deprivation. This latter ensures that people live miserable undernourished lives where millions may be affected, suffer regular illness and die young.

These two different states of hunger do not necessarily accompany each other; you can have one without the other. For example, there has not been a major famine in India since 1943, four years before independence, when some three million died. Yet there have been numerous crop failures and substantial falls in the availability of food adding to conditions of enormous rural poverty and undernutrition. It is important to distinguish famine from deprivation but the implication that famine is an event rather than the result of a process can tend to restrict an understanding of how famines may develop. What is needed at all times is an explanation which allows for the importance of conjunctural (or trigger) events to be set alongside historical processes.

The avoidance of famine in India, China, Botswana and Zimbabwe (and other cases too, like Costa Rica, Cape Verde and Kenya) provide the empirical evidence to substantiate and demonstrate the view that effective public action can prevent famine. It is public action, moreover, largely made possible in those countries because of the relative openness of the polities, the level of active political participation and weakness of censorship. This seems a strange list. Many of these countries are also infamous for abuses of human rights and Dreze and Sen note that the record is not unblemished. In many of the countries they discuss there are extensive restrictions on political organisation and attacks on human rights. There also continue to be enormous inequalities in income and nutrition.

Kenya experienced famine in 1980-1981 after a moderate drought. After a more extensive drought in 1984 the Kenyan government was praised for averting widespread famine. It did this by speedily importing large quantities of food on a commercial basis. Those who could afford to purchase it did. Using the services of private traders but ‘gazetting’ prices fixed by government ensured some form of control over both price and distribution. The state also provided unconditional relief in the form of free food rations: ‘In August 1984, nearly 1.4 million people, or 7 per cent of the total population, were estimated to be in receipt of free food distribution’ (p.140-141).

Dreze and Sen are critical of the Kenyan government’s greater stress on price stabilisation policies rather than...
on income support to alleviate food insecurity, and the relatively small 'size of food distribution to vulnerable households in per-capita terms'. The Kenyan government, moreover, seemed to carry out simultaneously contradictory policies by seeking to stabilise prices by commercial imports of food into the most affected areas while preventing local traders moving food from surplus to deficit areas.

Another case Dreze and Sen use to highlight the importance of state actions in averting famine is Costa Rica. They congratulate Costa Rica for its social programme in the areas of health and nutrition as an 'outstanding success'. In the years 1960-1980, the country made enormous strides in reducing infant mortality; life expectancy (73 years) is now comparable with that attained in European countries.

Two factors account for these impressive trends. The first is a healthy growth in the economy, especially of exports (notably coffee), resulting in increased incomes. These have funded the rapid expansion of welfare state provision in areas of health, education, social insurance and income support. All this needs to be set against the background of what they, perhaps surprisingly, call an 'active democracy', minimal violence and progressive social legislation (p.241-242). Yet these observations are not without a caveat. It would, in their words be 'somewhat misleading' to say that Costa Rica's achievements have been a reflection of an egalitarian society and economy: 'today distribution of land in Costa Rica is highly unequal even in comparison with other Latin America countries, and approximately two-thirds of the agricultural labour force consists of landless wage earners' (p.242).

Dreze and Sen do examine other cases where the state's public action has centred around similar concerns with social security provision. Botswana and Zimbabwe are two of the African cases detailed. The common theme linking most of the cases, however, is the state's ability to afford to pay for provision (a point possibly underplayed by the authors as a problem many African states cannot overcome as easily as those they mention: compare the earnings and ability to borrow of Zimbabwe, Kenya and Botswana with Angola and Mozambique). The other common theme linking the cases is the so-called relative freedom of the national media in their 'high degree of visibility in the international press and degree of political openness'. Again, I would express concern with this argument being put forward without much qualification; even in Botswana food distribution is influenced by ruling party politics.

Central to the argument here is the evidence of, or need for, some measure of political democracy to prevent conditions of food insecurity becoming major famines. The message is simple: where people have an outlet for political opposition which can embarrass regimes in power it is more likely that the state will make provision, however limited, to prevent the emergence of famine and widespread dissent which might topple the regime. Isn't the most striking feature of Sudan's current famine the repeated refusal of the fundamentalist regime in Khartoum to recognise that famine exists? Yet how has this been possible? Only by the ruthless repression of opposition groups, by attacks on human rights, detentions without trial, torture and harassment. It isn't coincidental, that the previous famine in Sudan in 1984 occurred during the regime of dictator
Central to the entire thesis proposed by Dreze and Sen is that actions of the state, in providing public provision, before and after rather than merely during, a food crisis can effectively reduce the possibility of famine. The state clearly has a responsibility to protect peoples’ entitlements to food which it can do in a range of ways: by providing work for wages and food; supplying ‘gratuitous relief’ for those who cannot work; or by managing the storage, pricing and distribution of food. It is here that we can look in more detail at the other side of public action: the participation of the public in promoting their own ways of coping.

Entitlements

The use of ‘entitlements’ to conceptualise why famines occur has been of crucial importance since the publication of Sen’s Poverty and Famines in 1981. Because food, like other commodities, is seldom distributed free, peoples’ ability to command access to it depends upon the resources they can muster in order to acquire it.

In short, famines occur where there is an acute loss of entitlement to food by a particular group of people. This is not new and Dreze and Sen do not labour the point. What is new is the need to stress that famines, and indeed chronic undernutrition, can be avoided if public action can ensure entitlement protection and entitlement promotion.

The former is concerned with the task of preventing a decline in living standards as might occur in, say, an economic recession or in a famine. The latter refers to the enhancement of general living standards and to the expansion of basic capabilities of the population (p.16).

While this terminology may sound paternalistic, Dreze and Sen are clear that they refer to the objectives of the exercise rather than to the agency that may pursue these objectives ‘public action for social security is neither just a matter of state activity, nor an issue of charity, nor even one of kindly redistribution (but) the activism of the public, the unity and solidarity of the concerned population, and the participation of all those who are involved’ (p.16-17).

In stressing the active nature of peoples’ abilities to cope with famine and continual undernutrition, Dreze and Sen demonstrate that people who endure these two conditions do so not as passive victims but as actors, who transform their conditions of existence. This transformation may sometimes be for the worse but it can equally be for the better. The crucial point to note is that the transformation is always dynamic and creative – a process that takes place over time rather than only at the moment when famine reveals itself. This is not an argument to popularise and glamorise the peasantry, to see them simply as resourceful adapters to the environment. Neither is it simply an argument, important as it might be, to counter-balance re-
peated media images of famine victims while successes in the prevention of famine are ignored as unnewsworthy.

It is an argument which draws the reader to examine the 'African challenge' in all its variations, rather than seeing famine as universal. The experience of 1983-85 was that despite drought, many countries averted widespread death through starvation. In those countries where famine was extensive, fewer died than we might have imagined given the extent of war, the betrayal of politicians and abandonment by the rains. In Burkina-Faso, Cape Verde, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe, large scale government intervention and indigenous ways of coping averted a catastrophe.

The analysis employed by Dreze and Sen correctly forces us to examine not only government measures to offset drought but also the 'informal security systems' adopted by those experiencing a change in their entitlement to food. While it is a pity that more of their work does not focus on these systems, it follows from their concern with entitlements and the protection of living standards that Dreze and Sen are keen to highlight not only entitlement promotion but also indigenous ways of coping with hunger. Some of these include

- the diversification of crops and herds,
- the exploitation of geographical complementarities in the eco-system,
- the pursuit of 'symbiotics exchanges' between different communities,
- the development of patronage or reciprocal-gift giving,
- the recourse to complex dietary adjustments, and
- the storage of food or body fat (p.71-72).

This is an extensive although not exhaustive list and we need to ask why governments and international agencies are often reluctant to assist with the development of these indigenous ways of coping, especially when their breakdown usually results in famine. While most of Dreze and Sen's argument relates to the need for social security systems in the third world to rely on more than just the market or family to cope with entitlement failures, they also point in the direction of needing to focus on redistributive mechanisms within communities to avoid food crises. This leads to a focus which is underemphasised in the book and elsewhere in most of the literature on famine: the need for an understanding of local political mechanisms which shape the character of communities which experience famine.

This book has raised important questions about national politics and policies - away from the preoccupation with international issues which structured the explanations of the famines of the early 1970s and 1980s. It is now important to examine the ways in which local survival strategies are shaped by local political organisation; rural differentiation, household structures, gender divisions of labour and how all these processes are reproduced.

In Africa where often the actions of national or regional governments are mediated by local political actors - sheikh's and headmen, merchants and traders, we need to know more about how these groups (classes) operate, how they relate to each other and what their relationship is with subordinate classes in villages: farmers and landless who are dependent for inputs of cash and work even when local mutual assistance mechanisms operate. When they breakdown and state action to promote a safety net is inadequate,
famines take place. What leads to those processes culminating in famine and what happens then? How survival is ensured (or not) provides an agenda which still needs to be discussed.

As this article suggests, Dreze and Sen’s work is now essential reading. It has its shortcomings; one I have not pursued is its almost total neglect of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists and the distinctive relationships that result. Nevertheless by putting politics centre stage and by writing in accessible style the authors have advanced the debate on famine and food security.

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This collection of papers arose from a conference on Forced Labour and Migration held at Oxford in 1987. It includes three on southern Africa: R. Moorsom on the formation of the contract labour system in Namibia in the early part of this century; Ishemo on forced labour, taxation and famine in Mozambique, 1870-1914; C. Murray on the history of a farm and its labour in the Orange Free State over the last 100 years. T. Zeleza analyses the agrarian context of forced labour in early colonial Kenya while two papers on Tanzania deal with ‘runaway wives’ and customary law in the colonial period (M. Mbilinyi) and seasonal labour migration since independence (C. Lwoga). A. Pankhurst examines land resettlement in contemporary Ethiopia; B. Fall and M. Mbowj deal with the extent of forced labour in colonial Senegal and a further contribution from Fall covers the recruitment of labour to the salt-works in Kaolack from World War II. The final paper by C. F. El-Soth describes the adaptation of Egyptian women to life in Iraq following the sponsored migration agreement of 1975.

All of these papers are stimulating. Moorsom’s analysis of archival material (though limited to non-Portuguese sources) suggests an illuminating, if tentative, relationship between social formation including gender relations, labour migration and ecology in Ovamboland. Zeleza argues that forced labour and labour migration in Kenya have been too narrowly conceived as the consequence of ‘capitalist manipulation’ for the purposes of recruitment to white settler estates and places these processes in the context of the agrarian economy as a whole, especially the preponderance of the peasant economy, and of peasant resistance. Fall and Mbowj propose an explanation of why free labour rather than forced labour predominated in Senegal. Other papers address labour recruitment on a more local scale. Murray’s ‘intensely parochial focus on the history of one farm’ interweaves the genealogies of the black and white land owners, tenants, share-croppers, to reveal the complexity of the structural transformations of the regional economy. Pankhurst focuses on the variety of motives of resettlers and the various outcomes of resettlement schemes. Whether the subject matter is historical or contemporary, local or national, these accounts of forced labour and of ‘voluntary’ labour migration still shock the reader by the brutality or incompe-
tence of their administration.

A valuable collection of essays. But why did the editors also include, as a theme paper, J. Clyde Mitchell's 'The Causes of Labour Migration', first published in 1959 and re-published here with a short postscript by the author? The editors explain that this paper is 'a synthesis of the early debates on the causes of labour migration during the colonial phase of African history'. In this respect, it is a valuable reminder of some of the content of African studies 30 years ago. It is salutary to be reminded that at that time Mitchell felt required to refute the theory of 'a genetic tendency on the part of Bantu-speaking Africans to migrate'. But what does the re-publication of this paper contribute to this collection of essays?

Mitchell was primarily concerned with the phenomenon of circulatory migration – the circulation of workers between rural and urban/industrial areas. His purpose was to distinguish between the causalities of labour migration and return – between individual, social and economic factors. While some of this volume's case studies examine motive, circulatory migration is barely a theme of any. Was circulatory migration a much less significant feature of labour markets in Africa than it appeared at the time? Is it no longer a feature of labour markets? In his postscript Mitchell explains that he had discarded a functionalist framework as the basis of his analysis of migration but that his training led him 'to treat the wider political and economic circumstances which indubitably underlay processes of labour circulation as relatively given'. But these given circumstances were, nevertheless, very general. His paper started with the observation that circulatory migration was a familiar phenomenon 'all over the world where western civilisation has come into contact with traditional societies'. The specificities of the African experience of labour migration, whenever this contact is held to have occurred, are absent from his article: it mentioned neither internal and external slave trades (circulatory migration?), for example, nor the institution of forced labour which is the subject of several of these papers.

Some of the difference in respect of subject matter can be accounted for by the fact that Mitchell is a sociologist (then Professor of African Studies and Sociology at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland). Six of the ten contributors to this volume, however, are historians. Of the remaining sociologists/social anthropologists some, here or elsewhere, have confronted the problem of conceptualising social practices within specific histories. Murray, in particular, trained as a social anthropologist, frustrated by both the macro-functionalist/structuralist explanations of migration in Mitchell's paper (a debate acknowledged in Mitchell's postscript) and by the equally macro 'world systems' approach to the understanding of migration and household formation (such as that put forward in J. Smith, I. Wallerstein and H. D. Evers (eds), Households and World Economy, Beverley Hills, Sage Publications, 1984), has concluded that little can be understood on a macro scale without a much greater understanding of the minutely local. The 'eviction at gunpoint of 18 black families from a small white owned farm in the eastern Orange Free State in October 1979' is not an incidence of labour migration to be accounted for in general theory.

Murray's perspective is not representa-
Hanlon begins with a necessary reminder of the successes of the early years of Mozambican independence not only in health and social services but also, albeit less dramatically, in the economic field. Mistakes were made but, as he states 'No conceivable set of Frelimo errors could have resulted in a million dead and $18 billion in economic losses'. It might be fashionable to cite marxist mismanagement as the cause of Mozambique's present crisis but the devastation of South African destabilisation is the real cause.

This book however concentrates on the sequel. It looks at the way western countries, especially the US, have used the ensuing havoc produced by destabilisation to wrench political concessions from Frelimo, then to impose policies which undermined the government and opened up the country to international business and finally, in all but name, to recolonise the country. In the process, Hanlon argues, the key actors were not only the IMF and the World Bank but also, either unwittingly or deliberately, the aid agencies, including non-governmental organisations. These actors, he argues, have, on the pretext of trying to solve the problems caused by destabilisation, actually helped achieve its objects: Renamo burns down a hospital, the IMF refuse to allow the government to rebuild it, a donor funds an NGO to set up a new unit outside of Mozambican control.

In what must be a brief review it is impossible to cover the multitude of important issues raised by this book. I will concentrate on two.

First the book provides excellent evi-
dence of the incompetence of the IMF and the World Bank in failing to produce even minimally helpful economic advice, a fact which the Mozambican government appears to have used with some success to wring changes. A key question arising from this is whether such incompetence stems from technical and managerial deficiencies or from a deliberate abuse of power intended to undermine local economies to the advantage of the northern paymasters of the two organisations. The answer, which is insufficiently analysed in the book, lies in the choice of strategy which needs to be adopted to fight the problem.

Second is Hanlon's analysis of the aid industry including NGOs. In short Hanlon is somewhat selective in producing a picture of a gravy train without brakes. Having said this the abuses he describes exist and need exposing. Other problems he cites however are more complex. For instance he complains of NGOs not knowing enough about Mozambican conditions and of wasting peoples' time by endlessly evaluating their own projects. He accuses them of flooding the country with expatriates and also robbing the government of experienced cadres to replace expatriates. One solution would be for NGOs not to turn up at all but as Hanlon points out they can be an effective voice in pressuring donor governments and larger agencies.

This leads to the more important point of the political role of NGOs in the crisis. Hanlon portrays them as the unwitting dupes of imperialist governments, participating in the undermining of the Mozambique government. The position is again more complex. NGOs, or indeed aid agencies as a whole, do not form an homogeneous block. They might bicker amongst themselves as egos are battered or empires are built but they also argue over operational and ideological issues. In Mozambique a significant number of agencies tried very hard to work through and build up government structures themselves and to persuade others to do likewise; this battle was gradually lost. Partly (it is true) this was because some major donors were against such a policy - although many NGOs are more independent of their home government than Hanlon credits. Partly it was because a number of organisations were only too happy to seize on the slightest excuse to avoid operating a policy they didn't like - and their excuses became more frequent as the capacity of the government to handle the aid flows became overwhelmed and, it is also true, undermined by hostile donors. But partly it was also because the government did not do all it could to encourage the process.

Hanlon emphasises the relative lack of political weight given to the leaders of the government's emergency operations agency, the Department for the Prevention and Combat of Natural Disasters (DPCCN), and of the coordinating body, the National Executive Commission for the Emergency (CENE), which was particularly unfortunate given the exceptionally high calibre of the people in these positions. The national problem of ambiguity about the role of local government was also not helpful to sympathetic donors who might agree with 'the government' at one level only to find it frowned on at another. The signposting to specialist government services was sometimes so poor that agencies were not always aware that something could be done locally using government or nationalised services which were in
fact very efficient. At other times, as part of its laudable efforts to make expenditure on emergency operations benefit as much of the economy as possible, agencies were encouraged to use local services which simply couldn't cope with the demand.

It could be argued that such failings were not that important, that the government clearly couldn't handle every problem in the country and was right to concentrate its limited resources on long term development and, in economic terms, the far more important battle for successful economic reforms. This view would be backed up by an argument that the emergency in Mozambique is endemic; a picture is conjured of millions of people in long term difficulties for whom carefully managed long term solutions are what is needed. Hanlon seems to subscribe to this view which is certainly held in many government and Frelimo circles.

It is only partly true, however. Yes, millions of people in the rural districts have been affected by the emergency over the last nine years. But they are not the same people all the time: as war subsides in one district, it flares up in another. They need help urgently if they are to survive. Their experience will determine not only whether they live or die but also, if they live, how ready they are to go back, re-occupy and defend their lands and which side they will be on when they do. All over the country local cadres – health workers, lorry drivers, teachers, party officials – often displaced themselves, have performed feats of utter heroism to help, to reorganise, to re-motivate but have not always received the priority backing of their party and their state. If it is foreign agencies who are seen to be helping in this situation it could be because they have seen the urgency more clearly than a government preoccupied with managing macro-economic change rather than the agencies' desire to grab control.

As Hanlon correctly says, the government, given its level of dependency, has fought a remarkably effective rearguard action against the new colonisers. But it is at the local level that the government needs to concentrate more resources; it is at this level that the war is being fought and the elections will be decided.

None of which should excuse any reader in the North from a burning sense of shame at the puny size and efforts of the Mozambican solidarity movements in their countries during a decade when South African destabilisation has been so feebly opposed and its result so ruthlessly exploited by their own governments. This book will be an invaluable resource for anyone who wants to use it to improve on that record.

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