EDITORIAL

SOCIALISM, DEMOCRACY AND POPULAR STRUGGLES

In Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique successful political mobilisation during the people's wars depended on combining a nationalist and anti-colonialist struggle against the Portuguese with a social struggle against the distribution of power and resources shaped by colonialism and reflected in relationships between chief and subject, old and young, women and men. After liberation Frelimo and the PAIGC attempted to begin the building of socialism. Two new studies by Rosemary Galli and Jocelyn Jones (Guinea-Bissau: Politics, Economy and Society) and by Bertil Egero (Mozambique: A Dream Undone) describe how the party and state became distanced from rural communities, the lack of democracy and the adoption of policies inimical to peasant interests. Three of the articles in this issue of the Review extend this critique through studies of gender struggles and of rural development strategies in Mozambique, and of the abandonment of a rural community by party and state in Guinea-Bissau. A further article raises the question of socialists' responses to peasant struggles in the very different context of Nigeria.

One form of popular struggle closely linked to people's war is gender struggle. In Mozambique, as Stephanie Urdang established in an earlier Review (27/28, 1984), women's participation was essential to the armed struggle and with Frelimo's support, the war provided them with opportunity to construct new gender relations based on equality rather than subordination and complementarity. Signe Arnfred argues that once independence was achieved Frelimo became preoccupied with establishing and building its authority and that of the state. In this process Frelimo and the OMM misconceived both the position of women in the different societies of Mozambique and failed to develop an adequate strategy for women's emancipation. In line with ideas longstanding in the socialist movement, they saw the emancipation of women as an outcome of the eradication of traditional oppressive practices, the modernisation of economy and society and the involvement of women in production.

The OMMs conception of women's emancipation has led them to promote patriline and the nuclear family and in this way provided 'tacit support for male power'. As a result the OMM and Frelimo have alienated some women, especially those mobilised in the war, as Arnfred's interviews in Mueda describe. 'Nowadays nobody respects women . . . nobody defends our lives and our needs' says one veteran. Women have turned to 'defensive gender struggles', notably the revival of initiation rituals which Arnfred interprets as providing 'free space for the women'. Women are, however, well aware of the limitations of this strategy and the need for
'offensive gender struggles' to claim new rights. Such struggles are illustrated in
the Maputo Green Zone vegetable cooperatives, almost all of whose members are
women. Their experience in running their cooperatives, in carrying out and
managing production democratically, 'creates new relations in the family', as
women's involvement in the war had done earlier.

Frelimo's relationships with peasants also changed after the war as the Briefing
by Otto Roesch illustrates for the lower Limpopo Valley. Roesch is mainly
concerned with recent shifts in rural development policy arising from South
African destabilisation and from the failure of the 1977-82 agrarian strategy
(discussed by Raikes in Review 29, 1984). This strategy was based on large scale
capital-intensive state farm agriculture. It neglected cooperatives and undermined
the development of socialised production which reduced Frelimo's once high
support among peasants. Since the Fourth Congress of Frelimo in 1983, policy has
changed increasingly under the direction of the IMF. Peasants and capitalist farms
now receive greater priority in the allocation of capital and inputs. Producer prices
have been increased where they have not been left to the market and consequently
official consumer prices have risen sharply.

In the lower Limpopo Valley, state farm and cooperative sectors have virtually
collapsed as a result. Seeds, oxen, tractors and consumer goods are still scarce.
Mine workers bring in consumer goods from South Africa to sell locally and have
begun to invest in motor transport. Roesch describes 'a resurgence of traditional
rural culture' amongst the peasantry, including magical practices, Christianity and
heavy drinking. He notes the formation of a 'new class alliance' of capitalist
farmers, merchants, mine workers, and bureaucrats who each control access to
certain scarce private and public resources and, as the 1976 election results
showed, to local political office. Consequently 'the whole idea of private enterprise
has come to assume a legitimacy in both official and popular political discourses
that it previously lacked.

Lars Rudebeck's article provides an unusual case study of the erosion of party and
state in Guinea-Bissau, by concentrating on a single northern village (Kandjadja)
which he has visited five times since 1976. In 1976 the village and its six smaller
neighbours had active and directly elected base committees, meeting frequently.
Kandjadja's own committee of five (two of whom were women) included some
PAIGC activists drawn from local leading families, notably the Ture family which
was dominant in the pre-war period. A secular school with 200 pupils and a nurse
had been provided by the state, and a people's court functioned. So also did a
people's store, but lack of any attempt to promote cash crops or peasant
cooperatives meant that little of its stock could be bought by villagers. Over the
next five years all of these collapsed and were replaced by local markets and by
local institutions rooted in prewar structures of authority (the Ture family, Islamic
education etc.). The 1980 coup in which President Luiz Cabral was overthrown
by his Prime Minister, Joao 'Nino' Vieria, was thus popular in the village. 'Luiz
Cabral, he had no mercy on us Africans... Nino, he will help us have schools and
other necessary things'. The pattern of central neglect continued, however, during
the 1980s until by 1986 contact with the centre had become minimal and 'inputs
from outside close to none'. Political authority lay with Kaba Ture, a PAIGC veteran
and successful farmer, and the Ture family in general; three of the six-person base
committee belonged to it. The state now exercises no authority in the village; but
neither do the villagers exercise any influence over a remote and undemocratic state.

Bjorn Beckman describes and contributes to the debate in the Nigerian left on the position socialists should take towards the rural struggles which have been taking place since the mid-1970s. He argues that the peasantry is not a 'spent force' marginalised by the development of rural capitalism and incapable of contributing to future agrarian development. He concludes, therefore, that a strategy of intervening in struggles only on behalf of poor peasants and rural labourers against rich farmers is misconceived. It misunderstands the contemporary position of Nigerian peasants, the extent of rural differentiation and the closeness of the economic and political ties between poor and rich peasants. Premature intervention on behalf of poor peasants may split them not from the rich, on whom they may rely for economic assistance and political leadership, but from a possible worker-peasant alliance.

Instead Nigerian socialists should support grievances of peasants as a whole, and of communities, notably where these arise from the impact of state intervention and of foreign capital primarily in the form of land alienation. Within this framework they should also struggle for limited democratic goals, such as increasing the influence of poor peasants within cooperatives and other rural organisations. Beckman sees an 'all peasants line' as essential to - though not the leading element of - the process of building strong democratic forces in Nigeria, and bringing about the control of state power by these forces.

All these papers argue that socialism cannot fulfill its fundamental promise of democracy if it suppresses popular initiatives and struggles by peasant communities, women - and wage workers. This raises questions as to what conditions are necessary if socialists are to be able to provide the material base and technological capacity for the transformation of agrarian relations to offer a standard of living and of human dignity commensurate with the promises of revolution. ROAPE's 1989 Conference will focus on issues concerning the relations of democracy and socialism - for details see News & Notes in this issue.

Bassett's paper reminds us that strategies of agrarian development as implemented by the World Bank in northern Ivory Coast are not fulfilling their promises either. Bassett describes the complementarity thesis by which the World Bank justifies the continued promotion of commercial crops on the grounds that food crops will benefit from the inputs, mechanisation, services, subsidies and markets provided for a 'commercial lead crop', in this case cotton. He argues that the thesis - and its opposite, that export crops and food crops must inevitably be in competition - can only be considered in relation to other particular conjunctures, such as government's agricultural pricing policies and the structure of rural households. Neither argument can have any general applicability. In the Ivory Coast the programme has demonstrably failed to achieve its technical objectives. The massive subsidies provided to a tiny minority of farmers, however, must alert us again to the threat of the development of agrarian capitalism through the intervention of the state and foreign capital. These are real threats to the peasantry and, once established, an agrarian bourgeoisie is a difficult enemy to dislodge, as Beckman reminds us.

Morris offers a critique of several recent studies by social historians of South Africa on the processes of accumulation of capital, of the dispossession of rural
communities and of various forms of rural resistance. These historians have generally focussed on the experiences of people in particular localities and some have drawn on fascinating interviews with former sharecroppers and labour tenants collected by the African Studies Institute at the University of the Witwatersrand. Morris asks what is the wider theoretical significance of their studies. He discovers a retreat from Marxist analysis, from the concern to situate events within a theory of transitions (plural) to capitalism and of the nature of capitalism in the countryside to an 'historical phenomenology'. Morris raises important methodological questions concerning the relations of micro-studies to macro-analyses and of people's own understandings to the social processes which shape their experiences. Morris's own research, like the more recent work by social historians, has brought out the importance of share- and labour-tenancy in the development of agrarian capitalism in South Africa, as Tabitha Kanogo's *Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau* (James Currey 1987) has done for Kenya, Robertson's *The Dynamics of Productive Relationships* (reviewed in this issue) brings out the historical and contemporary importance of share-cropping in other parts of Africa. How is this history to be incorporated into a theory of the transitions to capitalism - or should we reject any such general theory in favour of a focus on historical contingency?

Empirical studies of the development of capitalism farming in Africa, like studies of the peasantry, have forced Marxists to reconsider how they conceptualise the development of capitalism - as did the classic debates in Germany and Russia at the turn of this century (outlined by Hussein and Tribe in *Marxism and the Agrarian Question*). Debates about the transition to capitalism have important implications for how we envisage the possibilities for agrarian reconstruction today and, in South Africa, in the future. Do socialists look to collective or cooperative forms of agricultural production or to freeing peasant enterprise? - questions posed in different ways in this issue by Beckman's article on socialists and peasant politics and by the studies of agrarian policies in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau since independence.

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Women in Mozambique: Gender Struggle and Gender Politics

Signe Amfred

Women in the War: Towards a New Gender Identity

The liberation of women is a fundamental necessity for the revolution, a guarantee of its continuity and a condition for its success (Machel, 1973).

In his opening address to the first conference of the Mozambique Women's Organisation (OMM) in 1973, Samora Machel, President of Frelimo, affirmed that women's emancipation was an integral aspect of revolutionary struggle. In 1973 Frelimo was still a liberation front engaged in armed struggle against colonial rule. The northern part of Mozambique was a battle ground and the first OMM conference had to be held in the Frelimo camp at Tunduru in southern Tanzania. In the OMM's present national secretariat in Maputo, a photograph of the participants of this first conference can be seen. Peasant women and women guerilla's are lined up outside the meeting hut, amongst them Samora Machel in battledress. The non-hierarchical atmosphere depicted in this photograph is in marked contrast to the more formal arrangements on similar later occasions.

The participation of women in the war was massive. In 1967, at the request of women themselves, a women's detachment of the guerilla army - Destacamento Feminino - had been formed. Part of its task was to inform and mobilise the peasant population. To support this work, a broader non-military organisation of women was needed. This was the origin of the foundation of the OMM in 1973.

Between 1981 and 1984 I worked as a sociological consultant of the OMM. In 1982 I was sent to Cabo Delgado, the oldest war zone, to find out among other things how the experience of war had affected the lives of women. I was surprised how many of the women I interviewed had taken an active part in the war in one way or another. Most had grown food for the army or had transported goods and weapons. Viewed in isolation, as concrete tasks, these do not seem very different from what peasant women normally do in their everyday lives: growing food and carrying burdens on their heads. But during the war it had been different: women were travelling long distances, staying away from home for many days, and they were doing so on equal footing with men! That was really new, corresponding to the equally new ideas of gender equality introduced by Frelimo.

New also was the structure of authority within which these tasks were carried out. In their normal daily lives, women are subordinated to patriarchal family authority, whether it be of a father, an uncle, a husband or a brother. Their lives
are circumscribed and their gender role is defined by their position in the family. During the war, however, the family was not the ultimate source of authority. On the contrary. If there were conflicts between women and the male members of their families, if their husbands would not permit them to be absent to carry out their tasks of mobilisation or transport, women could call in Frelimo. A new authority was at work, an authority which, when necessary and for the time being, supported women against men. This was described to me by Habiba (in Mueda, Cabo Delgado), an impressive woman now some 50 years old and formerly the provincial representative of the OMM:

During the war we held meetings, we mobilised women to transport war material, to grow food and to cook for the soldiers. Women volunteered but sometimes husbands tried to prevent them from participating in the tasks of war. When that happened, we called in Frelimo. I remember a case of one man who was beating his wife. We tied his arms behind his back and took him to Frelimo. Frelimo told him that he shouldn't fight his wife for it was better to fight the Portuguese together. The man became a soldier and the woman continued her war work. During the war women were respected because we were organised. Men and women were equal. There was no division, no resentment. One week the woman was away, another the man. When the woman was away, it was the husband who did the housework and looked after the children. Men and women worked together for the same goal.

Before the war, men and women had led separate lives with a clear division of labour and different rules of conduct. During the war they came together on equal terms as Mozambicans in the struggle against the Portuguese. In this process, gender relations changed. Some women developed a new concept of themselves as women: new aspirations, new goals. A new female identity was emerging. Take the example of Cecilia, a nurse at the hospital in Pemba, provincial capital of Cabo Delgado. She had been in Destacamento Feminino during the war:

When I was a child it never occurred to me that I should be educated, that I should become a nurse. I thought I would go to school until the fourth grade, and then I would marry and stay at home with my husband and children just like my mother had done. She was always at home, working the fields and looking after the house and the kids. That was what she did. But since I was in the armed struggle, everything has turned out differently for me. I have been to places which otherwise I would never have visited. I have come to know many different people and I've seen other ways of life in other provinces. These are things that I would never have known. All of this has been very important to me and it has changed my life. Formerly, although practices varied in each province, men kept women at a distance: men and women worked separately. Now we work together. My husband doesn't prevent me from working outside the home, or from participating in OMM meetings. But he was in the war like myself and that of course is important. You still find many men who do not understand the necessity of women's liberation and who won't allow their wives to work outside the home.

Another example was Maria, now an agricultural worker on the state farm at Nguri, Cabo Delgado:

During the war I was in Destacamento Feminino which sent me to a medical centre. I married but my husband left me. After the war, I knew that I could not be satisfied by going back to the village and living the life of a peasant woman. So when I heard of this state farm being started, I came here at once to enlist as a worker. After work I go to school at the factory. I want to continue my health education and become a nurse.

Three points emerged from my discussions with these veterans of the war. First, the conditions of war had challenged the relations between women and men and created the possibility for new gender relations and new female identities. Secondly, these new relations had been established through women's gender struggle: through confrontation with the male members of their families. Thirdly, women engaged in this struggle had been supported by Frelimo.
After the War: Abandoned by Frelimo and the OMM

After the war, Frelimo found itself in a totally new situation for which it was badly prepared. Independence came sooner than expected as a result of the overthrow of the fascist regime in Portugal. The Portuguese army had, in fact, learned about democracy and peoples power (poder popular) from the African liberation movements it was fighting and put these lessons into practice in its home country. Portugal withdrew from its colonies in 1974 and in 1975 Frelimo gained power in Mozambique.

Fighting a liberation war is very different from building a nation state. The political centre moved from the bush in the north to the capital city in the south. It was a confusing situation: how was Frelimo to manage the complex tasks of creating a new nation? Rather than popular mobilisation and collaboration with the peasantry, the focus now was on the creation of national institutions and the structures of economic and political power. In this process, different people and new ideas had to be relied upon. Most of the guerilla fighters had been illiterate peasants, barely able to speak Portuguese. Habiba and others like her were removed as representatives of the OMM and replaced by girls educated at the mission schools, literate but without political fervour or experience. The idea of peoples power which had been developed during the war was insufficient as a political base in this new situation. Shortly after Independence, at the third Frelimo Congress in 1977, the Liberation Front was transformed into a Vanguard Party in the marxist-leninist style and ideological/theoretical tradition. Similar changes took place in the OMM. At its second Conference in 1976 policy towards women was restructured along the lines of the classical theories of women's emancipation (for a discussion of this see below).

What happened to the women in the north who had been active in the war but had not had the opportunity, like Cecilia or Maria, to establish a different life? Habiba explained:

During the war, Frelimo had said: 'Women have always suffered: we must fight for women's emancipation: women too must be liberated'. But it seems that all that mobilisation was just to fight the Portuguese, for now it has all gone. During the war, women's problems were discussed but now nobody talks about that kind of thing. At that time we struggled to change the division of labour between women and men. Men and women worked together. But now men behave just as they did before the war. Nowadays nobody respects women. There are OMM representatives at all levels of the state, but they do nothing. Formerly the OMM was important, it had influence, but this is no longer the case. Nobody defends our lives and our needs. Our Mother doesn't protect our interests any more. Previously, when a quarrel was brought to the people's court, our Mother would deliver the judgement. But today our Mother, the OMM representative, doesn't even appear in the people's court. It is the men who make the judgements. The daughter is in prison, but the Mother doesn't care. I think the Mother is dead. But where did she die? Was it in the District or in the Province, or did she die far away in the capital? I ask because I do not know. The daughter is suffering because the Mother died.

In the rural areas of the north, gender relations returned to the situation before the war. Men took back what they had lost of patriarchal power. According to women, they took back even more than they had had. Cabo Delgado is an area of matrilineal descent. In the case of divorce, for example, women remained in the house with their children while the husband left. Goods and household utensils were divided between them. By 1982 these practices were changing. As a peasant from Mueda explained:

During the war Frelimo said all those things about women's emancipation, but today a husband can divorce his wife for no reason at all, and he'll stay in the house and keep all
the goods that they have acquired together, even the capulanas (a piece of cloth used as a skirt) of his wife. She will have to leave the house with nothing at all. These days no woman is respected. We are at the bottom and the men are sitting on top of us.

I was impressed by the insight and anger of these women. They clearly felt that men had taken the upper hand in the gender struggle and that women were losing out; that women had been forgotten by their one-time supporter, Frelimo and even by their own organisation, the OMM. They felt that the OMM, their own organisation, had ceased to exist.

Women Defending the Initiation Rites

I was impressed but I was also puzzled, for these same women were defending the initiation rites! Indeed, a focal point of their reproach to Frelimo and their anger with the OMM was the political campaign to repress these women's rituals. This appeared to me an outright contradiction. As far as I knew - and certainly that was the position of the OMM - women's initiation rituals were the supreme expression of male dominance and female subordination. In these rites performed at puberty, I had been told, young girls were submitted to various humiliations in the course of which they learned to accept a subservient attitude appropriate to their subordinate position in a male dominated society. How then could it be that these strong and politically conscious women would defend them?

The explanation of this apparent contradiction emerged slowly through my conversations with the women, and indirectly as my direct questions didn't help me much in understanding their position. When I asked about the humiliating and oppressive aspects of these rituals, the women did not seem to grasp what I was talking about; and when I asked why they wanted to continue practising them, I found their answers useless: 'because it is our tradition, because we have always been doing it.' One answer however was different. One woman said: 'the drum is our only opportunity for playing.' In the initiation rites there is a lot of drumming and dancing. During the rituals, the girls who have reached puberty stay for weeks in a hut outside village territory where they are visited by adult women but which no man may approach.

I gradually came to see the importance of the initiation hut as a kind of free space for the women: a gendered space for them to meet on their own without men. I was never present at an initiation ceremony, but on some occasions during my work in Cabo Delgado in all-women meetings arranged for the sake of my visit, issues of marriage, divorce and love were discussed and the atmosphere could reach unexpected heights of laughter, with dancing and sexual pantomimes and jokes about the men. What I saw was a collective female gender identity, strong, self-confident, full of laughter. In their daily lives with men these women might be subdued and oppressed, but here, among themselves, they were not. Thus I began to understand why women who had experienced the war defended the initiation rites. The rituals instruct young women in the rules of decent female behaviour: self-control, downcast eyes, respect to men and elders, always ready to provide a husband with food and hot water for his bath. But the rituals also provide adult women with the opportunity to get together under circumstances that permit a very different behaviour: disrespectful, non-subservient, mocking men.

I came to see the initiation rites as the ritual celebration of a shared female gender identity. A focal point of the rites is the confirmation of the sexual maturity of the
girls. Having passed the rituals they should be familiar with their own potential for sexual care and pleasure. This sexual self-confidence seems to be an important base for the strength of these women. Its existence and reproduction depend on the initiation rites. No wonder that the women saw them as important and indispensable, especially when traditional women's rights, such as divorce, were under attack.

During the war the initiation rites had been infrequently performed, partly because social life had been completely disrupted, but also because women had needed them less in the war situation of changing gender relations and new demands. In their new gender organisation, the OMM, women had been on the offensive in the gender struggle, seeking to establish new gender relations and a new gender identity, with gender equality as the ultimate goal. The idea of gender equality in this context is new, new not as a contrast to oppression, but because the traditional construction of gender identity did not rest on any notion of equality but rather on ideas of complementarity between women and men and the separation of male and female spheres, whether this be in the sexual division of labour or in the concept of different capacities.

The gender dimension of society was fundamental, men and women inhabiting different spheres in the complementary social duality. In pre-war Cabo Delgado it seemed to me that this had been the basis of such power as the women had held. This situation, however, had been changed and challenged by the war, the gender spheres broken up, men and women had been set on the move for new identities and new relations. But the war came to an end. The political atmosphere changed. The support to the women's struggles dispeared, whereas the men were able to take advantage of the new situation. The women continued fighting, but now it was a defensive gender struggle, aiming to maintain at least their traditional rights and the sources of power they had had in the past. The important point is that in this political context the past is not simply one of 'oppression', nor is the future an obvious 'progression'. Women in Mozambique may have a lot to gain, as the experience of war demonstrated, but they have something to lose as well.

Matriliny

The initiation rites are not the only example of what women have to lose. Women's defence of these rites is stronger in the north of the country than in the south. In the south, the rituals have virtually ceased. This seems to have happened for two reasons: first, the south is more involved in the money economy; men have been wage workers for generations, predominantly as migrant workers to the South African mines; secondly, in the north (roughly north of the Zambezi River) matrilineal systems of kinship prevail, while the southern societies are patrilineal. Matrilineal societies are not, of course, matriarchal. Authority in the family is the prerogative of men, as uncles and brothers. But this also means that women are primarily defined in their roles as sisters rather than wives. As a sister, a woman is surrounded by her own kin for at marriage a man comes to live with his wife and is only accepted as a husband if he behaves well and has shown that he is capable of making her pregnant. Divorce is easy for both partners, but at divorce a woman stays in the house with the children and her husband must leave.

Matriliny and matrilocality is a source of social authority for women. But this is not how Frelimo and the OMM see it, and they do not defend it. In fact, Frelimo and OMM promote patriliny, not explicitly but as a product of their general policy
which is centred on the promotion of the nuclear family. Ever since the second OMM Conference in 1976 the ‘family as the basic cell of society’ has had a central position in OMM policy. It is conceived as a monogamous unit in which parents -not a woman and her brothers - have authority over their children. A woman is expected to be closely attached to her husband and, for example, to follow him if he is transferred to another job. Matriliney does not meet the requirements of this policy. It doesn’t produce the small, mobile, nuclear family functional to a modernising society.

Frelimo and OMM are equally opposed to divorce. But to women access to divorce is crucial. In the matrilineal areas women’s right to divorce is one of the ways in which they avoid a polygynous marriage. When a husband starts to consider taking a second wife, the first wife will often initiate divorce proceedings. In the northern matrilineal areas, polygyny is less common than in the south. Under the new family law, divorce is in principle available to women but Frelimo and the OMM preach against it on the grounds that it disrupts family life. When women use their traditional rights to divorce, they are blamed for lack of respect for the institution of marriage and for being altogether loose and promiscuous. This angered the women in Cabo Delgado:

Attitudes towards divorce began to change after Independence because Frelimo doesn’t want ‘unjustified’ divorces. They say that the children won’t know their father. The village Party Secretary doesn’t like divorces, he punishes people who want to divorce. They have to do community service in the village. For instance, the Party house was built in this way. In the old days women divorced much more easily.

The men are like colonos. They want everything. They marry two women. Then the first one says: ‘Look my friend, I don’t want to put up with this’. But the husband doesn’t listen. He brings everything to the other woman’s house. You say that this is too much, and go to the Party Secretary in order to get a divorce. But he says: ‘No, you cannot have a divorce. Go back to your home, you must not disrupt your family’.

It is invariably women who want to divorce who get the blame, not the polygynous husband. Polygyny, of course, is against the policy of Frelimo and the OMM, but men are rarely rebuked for it and the Party often turns a blind eye to it.

The Gender Policy of Frelimo and the OMM

I have argued that during the war Frelimo and the OMM supported peasant women in the promotion of their gender interests. Since then they have either failed to provide support or have directly opposed the gender struggles of women. There are, of course, many other examples of their direct and indirect interventions but these may serve as points of departure for a discussion of gender policy in the context of the socialist principles of Frelimo.

Frelimo is a vanguard party based on a worker-peasant alliance. It represents the interests of peasants and workers at the level of the state. The state is the people’s state. The OMM is ‘an arm of the Party, a link for communication between the Party and the people’ (OMM 1981). Class struggle is an important concept in Frelimo ideology. It is seen as the struggle of the people, united under the leadership of the Party against ‘internal enemies’ (Machel 1980), ‘aspirants to the bourgeoisie’ (Maputo 1983) and other similar opponents of nationalist socialist interests. Class struggle does not mean the struggles of peasants and workers against the state. This kind of struggle is not conceivable, as the state and the Party themselves represent the interests of the labouring classes. The function of Trade Unions is not to formulate the specific interests of their members. Strikes are not
allowed. The role of Trade Unions in the socialist state is to 'organise work, practice discipline, promote increased productivity and encourage creativity and innovation' (Maputo 1983). The trade unions are seen as democratic mass organisations and their function - rather like that of the OMM - is to be a link for communication between the Party and the people.

Similarly, specific gender interests are not acknowledged: the antagonistic contradiction is not found between man and woman, but rather between women and the social order, between all exploited women and men and the social order (Machel 1979:139).

The necessity of struggle between women and men is not acknowledged; women's demands are condemned as the 'radicalism of the petty bourgeoisie' (OMM 1979:20).

This conception, however, fits facts rather badly. There are specific gender interests. You cannot miss them when you listen to peasants and workers. Gender struggle is a fact of women's lives, especially in the period of social and political turmoil in Mozambique during the war and since Independence. The previous structure of gender relations has been shattered: women as well as men are fighting to defend their old rights and privileges or to gain new ones. The problem is that while Frelimo and the OMM do have women's emancipation and the construction of new gender relations on their agenda, they do not acknowledge that these will not emerge without struggle. Gender struggle is not (just) disruptive and destructive. On the contrary. It is the means through which gender relations change, as class struggle is the means through which the relations of production are transformed. Women do not gain liberation without struggle, nor can they gain it as a gift from above. Women's liberation can only be achieved through their struggles as gender and class subjects. It is, therefore, much to lament that women do not have their own organisation through which to voice their own interests and concerns. The OMM is an arm of the Party, and the movements of the arm are decided in the head, in the all male leadership of Frelimo. The policy of OMM is the policy of Frelimo.

The socialist project of women's emancipation - like the socialist project in general - is a project of modernisation. It is based on the rational, industrial exploitation of the riches of the earth; the small-scale peasant farmer must be turned into a wage worker on a state farm or maybe into a member of an agricultural cooperative. The emancipation of women is to arise as a consequence of their integration into new forms of social production on equal terms with men. The two initial paragraphs of the 1976 OMM programme for action reflect this project. It is stated that the OMM must:

1. ensure that all women become engaged in production (in the factory or in the agricultural cooperative), in the planning and organisation of work and social life, in the creation of the new man (sic) and the new society;

2. organise the struggle against the old ideas which constitute the obstacles to the full participation of women in public and social life as citizens, in economic life as free producers and in family life as true companions and revolutionary educators (OMM 1979: 78).

In Mozambique both of these tasks are problematic. I shall begin with the second. The basic problem here is that emancipation is seen as a unilinear process. In the past there has been nothing but the oppression and enslavement of women. The OMM described their role in 'the old society' as being 'to serve men - as an object
of lust, as a procreator of children, and as workers without pay' (OMM 1979:89). Emancipation lies in the socialist future. This gives no recognition to the degree to which women in the 'old society' maintained spheres of autonomy and collective gender identity. The defence of these sources of strength in the past must, therefore, be condemned as reactionary, against modernisation, an obstacle to progress. It does not acknowledge what women know in their bones: that the process of modernisation favours male power. This may or may not have to be so but it certainly has been so. Through wage labour, however arduous it has been, men have gained access to money income denied to the vast majority of women and this has increased their power in the family. In the process of urbanisation, many women have lost such sources of economic independence as they had previously had and have become financially dependent upon men. The nuclear family, advocated as the basis of women's emancipation, is the site of the dissolution of collective gender identity for women, the erosion of women's previous rights in marriage and the individualisation of male power. These tendencies correspond marvellously to the Christian mission morality of father right and female subordination, opposition to initiation rites and to women's control over their sexuality.

The political programme of modernisation and the exclusion of gender struggle often amounts to a tacit support for male power, whether intended or not. If women are to gain at all from the processes instituted under socialism, a defensive and an offensive gender struggle is indispensable.

The OMM's obligation to ensure women's participation in production is largely beside the point in the Mozambican context. The vast majority of women are already engaged in social production; indeed, the number of 'economically active women' exceeds that of 'economically active men' in Mozambique.

Here again the most important struggle is rather a defensive one of not becoming marginalized in the modernization process. It has not been women's lack of engagement in productive labour but rather patriarchal authority which has confined them to domestic life. The limitations on women's autonomy in the 'old society' have been described, as well as its strengths. The emancipation of women in Mozambique must lie in breaking these boundaries, the boundaries of patriarchal authority and the confines of domestic life.

For the family remains the dominant social and economic institution in Mozambique despite the inroads of capitalism. It is far from becoming merely a unit of consumption and reproduction. According to the 1980 National Census, more than 75% of the economically active population are working in family agriculture, 94% of all economically active women work in a family context, predominantly as farmers but including some 10,000 - 20,000 traders and artisans. Thus the vast majority of women are engaged in family production and spend their entire lives in the sphere of the family.

The socialist policy towards women described above is characteristic of other marxist-leninist vanguard parties and their women's organisations. But we need to explain the particular way in which Frelimo and the OMM have implemented these strategies in the Mozambican context. Why, in particular, did Frelimo withdraw its support from those women who had fought the war? These women were, by their very example, 'fighting old ideas'; they were engaged in social
WOMEN IN MOZAMBIQUE

Production; they were following the route to emancipation defined by Frelimo. Why were they abandoned?

The answer seems to lie in the changed relationship between the party and 'the people' and the focus on the construction of the state. During the war, Frelimo stressed the need for daily collaboration with the people. Following Independence, the priority was to extend the authority and control of the party and the state. This change took place, in most cases, without any overt alteration in political rhetoric as may be understood from the following illustration of the ways in which the meaning of the expression 'the principal task (tarefa principal) of the revolution' as a strategy for women's liberation has been transformed.

In his opening speech to the second OMM Conference in November 1976, President Machel said:

The decisive factor for the emancipation of the woman is her engagement in the principal task, the task which transforms society. At that time (i.e. during the war), it was the struggle for liberation. What then constitutes the principal task in the present phase of the revolution? The principal task of the present phase of our process is the following: the construction of the material and ideological base for building a socialist society. Thus for the implementation of this strategy, which has as its objective the construction of socialism, the principal task is production and the principal form of action is class struggle (Machel 1979:23).

Production, in its turn, means fulfilling the plan. This is how it was put by the Secretary for Ideology of the Central Committee, Jorge Rebelo, when talking to the OMM in 1981. He advised the OMM to:

concentrate its activity on what constitute at this moment the two principal tasks of all citizens - male and female - of the RPM: the increase of production and productivity so as to fulfil the plan for 1981 (PEC/81) and participation in the defence of our country (OMM Maputo, 1981).

More specifically the OMM was advised to investigate how women could participate in voluntary labour and in the maintenance of public buildings. In addition, women were asked to be active in the control of the new ration system, in the fight against contagious diseases, and for education, hygiene and cleanliness. Finally, it was stressed that the role of women as mothers and educators in the family was fundamental.

These activities, no matter how useful and necessary they may be from the point of view of the state, have little potential for altering gender relations. They constitute no challenge to male family authority. They provide no grounds for gender struggle.

The Extraordinary Conference of the OMM, 1984

In 1983 the preparation for the fourth Frelimo Party Congress revived, for the time being, the old Frelimo ideals of popular democracy and peoples power. Political debate was held throughout the country and people participated enthusiastically. The Party Congress itself became a forum for critical interventions and discussion and radical policy measures of various kinds followed. Frelimo decided that an extraordinary OMM Conference should be held in 1984 to discuss women's social situation as a basis for the revision of current policy on women's issues. The Conference was to be preceded by a nation-wide campaign to collect information and views on women's lives and problems, especially in relation to family structure and customary practices important to female gender roles. The instruction issued by the Frelimo Central Committee to inaugurate the Conference preparation
campaign marks the policy shift very clearly:
being a matter of concern to the whole society, the liberation of women is, in the first place,
the task of women themselves. No one can liberate a woman. Women must take over the
struggle for emancipation themselves (The Co-operatives of Maputo, 1985).

For the first time since the war, women were mentioned as the subjects of their
own emancipation. A Secretary of the Central Committee (then Minister for
Information), Jose Luis Cabaco, presided over the OMM national meeting at the
start of the campaign. He criticised the abaixo (down with) policies which had
prevailed hitherto: Abaixo lobolo, abaixo polygyny and abaixo initiation rites which
had been the catch words of OMM/Frelimo gender politics since Independence.
This kind of campaign, Cabaco said, is of no use when nothing else in society is
changed. Polygyny and bride price are parts of a social structure, you cannot just
do away with things like that without understanding their context and if there is
nothing to replace them with. Before embarking on a policy of social
transformation at least one must understand the society which has to be
transformed. He stressed how important it was that the OMM brigades being sent
out in preparation for the conference should listen and learn and not, as had
become increasingly the practice of Frelimo agents, tell the people how they ought
to behave.

What resulted were intense and very lively discussions which involved the whole
country for months, even in the midst of war, drought and famine. Once again it
was demonstrated that when people, in this context mainly women, are allowed
to speak out on the basis of their own felt needs and concerns, not in isolation but
as part of a national movement and with the prospect of changing their own lives,
amazing reserves of social energy are let loose. Thousands of discussion meetings
and group interviews were held (I took part in the whole process at central level
in the OMM and as a member of brigades at other levels. Some of the points in this
article are based on the analysis, currently in process, of the mountains of data
that were accumulated). The preparation for the Conference allowed discussion
of the traditional sources of female strength to be linked to new perspectives on
breaking down women's confinement to the family. For the first time the
'defensive' and the 'offensive' gender struggles could be seen to be intimately
connected. Women grew in strength and confidence during these months and the
OMM learned a lot.

Shortly before the national Conference was to be held - a conference delegation
from a remote province had already arrived in Maputo - the Party Central
Committee postponed it for six months. They had obviously become nervous about
what was going on; things seemed to have got out of control. When the Conference
was finally held, in November 1984, it was indeed well controlled. The President
himself presided over all the plenary meetings with the Party's second in command,
Marcelino dos Santos, at his side. The only two women in the front row of the
platform were the OMM General Secretary, Salome Moiana, and Mozambique's
only woman Minister, Graca Machel. The rest were all men of the Political Bureau
or the Government.

Few delegates from the floor got a chance to speak at the plenary sessions. Only
during the one day of group discussions (the Conference lasted for five days) were
the keen atmosphere of discussion and the fervour of the preparation period felt.
The intense preparation could have produced guidelines for a powerful movement
for social change, but this was not the case. The final resolutions of the Conference.
are neither radical nor precise. In retrospect, the aspects of gender struggle at the Conference seemed quite clear. The men, feeling threatened, had mobilised what they could in terms of dark, solemn suits to carry the paternal authority of the Party.

The General Union of Cooperatives in Maputo (UGC)
In striking contrast, women are organising elsewhere though not in association with the OMM and not along the lines of classical socialist theory of women's emancipation. An organisation of agricultural cooperatives in the Maputo Green Zones (Zonas Verdes) consists mainly of women. It is not a women's organisation; for that there is only the OMM. But more than 95% of these cooperative farmers are women. They produce vegetables for the local market. The UGC was created in order to fight for the interests of the cooperatives as productive units and the interests of the cooperative farmers as people and producers, but the cooperative members don't hesitate to put forward their views on women's emancipation. The striking thing about these views is that they combine the defence of women's traditional economic position with the struggle for a new gender identity. They understand women's situation from their own point of view and not from that of the state.

The growth of the agricultural cooperatives in the Maputo Green Zones is impressive. Initiated in 1980 following the establishment of the Gabinete das Zonas Verdes (GZV, under the Ministry of Agriculture), the number of cooperatives has increased from 7 to 181 in 1987, with 10,500 members - 9,500 of whom were women. This growth arises from a clear policy directive from the GZV to support cooperatives without patronizing them and to cater not just for the needs of production but also for the needs of producers by ensuring their access to social services, such as creches. In this process, democratic structures have been built up in each cooperative which, in 1982, formed a Union - the UGC. This enabled them, some years later, to leave the GZV and to establish an independent organisation. According to the President of the UGC, Celina Cossa, herself a cooperative farmer, the UGC has from time to time been in fierce confrontations with Frelimo, the Ministry of Agriculture and other government institutions which have tried to intervene and control their activities. But because of the Union's autonomy and democratic structure, they have been able to resist these external pressures. For these reasons, the women in the UGC are very conscious of their achievements and very clear about the basis of them. A document they prepared for a seminar in Maputo in 1986 states:

In the first place it is important to be aware of the fact that the majority of these thousands of women (i.e. the women who joined the agricultural cooperatives) were people without any kind of prospect for the future; they had no paid employment and they had been deprived of the opportunity of contributing to the upkeep of their families by farming their family land because of the shortage of land in the city since the vast influx of population. These women were, thus, condemned to live in a state of complete economic dependence on their husbands which, in any part of the world but especially in Africa, is a bad thing for a woman.

In colonial and pre-colonial days, women could only achieve social recognition in their capacity as members of their families, and in the last analysis, as the property of their husbands... but in the cooperatives and in the Union, women are working, women are taking part in the decision making process, women are running the cooperatives themselves, and enjoying the fruits of their own labour in total equality and democracy. In this way, the cooperatives are breaking definitively with the social basis of women's traditional subservient status.
All this creates new relations in the family because a woman, contributing to the upkeep of
the family in an equal or even more important way than her husband, and in a way that is
socially recognised, stops being just um ser familiar (a family being), she becomes um ser
social (a social being) (UGC 1986).

The women of the UGC take their point of departure in what used to be their
strength: a certain degree of economic self-sufficiency, their importance in
maintaining the family at least in terms of producing food. This economic strength
is essential to women and they do not want to lose it; it is ‘a bad thing for a
women’ because a husband's power over his wife thereby increases.

Taking part in cooperative production, however, serves not only to maintain a
degree of economic independence. It also means that part of a woman’s productive
life is now spent outside the institution of the family. Here she makes decisions
and directs: in the family this is the privilege of men. She achieves a social existence
as a person in her own right, not merely as a member of a family, an appendage
to a man. In the cooperatives, women are producers, not wives. This in turn creates
new gender relations in the family.

The cooperative women in actual fact combine the ‘defensive’ and the ‘offensive’ gender
struggles: they struggle to maintain old gender positions and rights, which are threatened
by development and modernization, and at the same time they are fighting to break the
confines of traditional women’s lives. The experience of the UGC women provide a basis
for reflections on the possible combination of gender struggle and gender politics in
Mozambique, as did the example of the women in the war. In both cases, the women are
acting as subjects, collectively and organised, for changing their own lives. On the other
hand, when this is not the case, gender politics and gender struggle seem to fall apart.

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Kandjadja, Guinea-Bissau 1976-1986
Observations on the Political Economy of an African Village
Lars Rudebeck

Recent work in both Mozambique (Egero 1987) and Guinea-Bissau (Galil & Jones 1987) argues that in both, the transition to socialism has been halted or undermined by three basic failures: to create a peasant-based strategy of rural development; to sustain popular participation (people's power); and to ensure that the state represented the interests of workers and peasants. The leadership have failed to recreate after independence the political alliance with the peasantry that successfully supported the anti-colonial liberation struggle. Instead, there has been a centralisation of power and an erosion of party and state at local level, with policies and institutions working to benefit a growing petty-bourgeoisie, at the expense of peasants as producers and as consumers of state services. Rudebeck provides us with a vivid illustration of these processes for a single village in northern Guinea. He was able to visit Kandjadja at regular intervals from 1976 and compares for each visit the condition and functioning of local political institutions, health, education and the people's store, and the nature and level of production. From this he draws in sharp outline a picture of neglect by the state and erosion of the party, in favour of institutions and relationships based more on pre-war social and political structures. Since he was also part of the team whose work is reported by Egero, he makes a direct descriptive comparison with the situation in Mueda, a former 'liberated area' in northern Mozambique.

Introduction
Kandjadja is a village of some two thousand inhabitants, located not far from the river Farim, in the sector of Mansaba, region of Oio, in northern Guinea-Bissau. It is the central village of a section comprising also twelve other smaller villages spread in the forest, with altogether some eight thousand inhabitants, Kandjadja included. The distance on foot from Kandjadja to the highway connecting Farim, the regional capital, with Bissau, the national capital, is about twelve kilometres. The total distance to Farim is a little less than twenty kilometres northeast. The town of Mansaba is about twenty kilometres southeast. The distance to Bissau is about one hundred kilometres on the highway, once the twelve kilometers of bad
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track road through the forest have been covered. Thirty kilometers north is the border with Senegal's Caramance region.

My first stay in Kandjadja was less than a year and a half after the PAIGC leadership first officially entered Bissau after eleven years of armed struggle for independence. During most of that struggle the section of Kandjadja had been located within territory fully controlled neither by the liberation movement nor by the Portuguese colonial army. Most of the inhabitants had fled to Senegal where they had settled on a semi-permanent basis in the Casamance region. From their settlements most of them had supported the liberation movement in various ways, including contributions in money, rice, transportation of provisions to the border. A few hundred had remained at home, living 'in the forest' and working directly with the guerrillas.

In February 1976 most of the inhabitants had already returned from Senegal -around 4,500 according to the local officials. The majority lived in provisional houses close to a functioning but insufficiently flowing well, less than one kilometre away from the actual site of the village to which they had not yet been able to return as the deep well had caved in during the war. In material terms, the situation was thus semi-transitional and quite difficult. Socially and politically, however, all the signs were present of a stable and functioning community having survived structurally almost intact the turmoil of war, exile, decolonization and return.

Kandjadja 1976

We have no state here. We ourselves are the state. What can the political commissar do without the base committee? What can the committee do without the people? Here in Kandjadja, if we really want to, it is all of us together, all men and all women, who are the committee.

These words spoken in 1976 at one of the weekly citizens' meetings by the party-appointed political commissar for the section of Kandjadja, were bold. The commissar actually maintained that people's power had taken the place of state or other political power in Kandjadja. The state had already become superfluous at the very first moments of independence. Maybe the commissar, whose name was Malan Sana, did not intend us to take his words literally in the theoretical sense; but at the very least he wanted to say that political authority in newly liberated Guinea-Bissau was exercised under popular control, that the country could not be governed against the people's will and interests. And this did reflect commonly held beliefs and aspirations at the time, in turn reflected in an active and busy political atmosphere with high levels of popular political participation.

The political commissar lived in the village of Kandjadja but was in charge of 'political work' in the entire section, including at that time six smaller villages in addition to the central village. There was in each one of these a directly elected 'base committee'. As everywhere else in Guinea-Bissau, this committee had five members, of whom at least two were women. The base committee have continued to be defined as cornerstones of the institutional order of independent Guinea-Bissau. In a constitutional sense they represent a hybrid form, elected as they are by all adult citizens while simultaneously viewed as base level organs of the single party, PAIGC. The Kandjadja committee functioned also in fact as the committee of the whole section, in view of the dominant position in the local community of the central village. It organised regular weekly or sometimes
bi-weekly citizens' meetings in order, for instance, to initiate or discuss such
important practical community tasks as the construction of an entirely new village
at the site of the original well - 'where the ancestors live' - the manufacturing of
bricks for a new people's store or for the mosque or the work of the school.

The political commissar linked Kandjadja and the other levels of the political and
administrative structure, both by regularly visiting Farim and Mansaba, the central
towns of the region and the sector, and by listening to the national radio broadcasts
from Bissau. He worked, at the same time, in close association with the elders of
the community, who combined at this time the roles of carriers of traditional
authority and the political legitimacy of the PAIGC which had been forged through
the anti-colonial struggle. The elders dominated the committees elected by the
people under party surveillance. The two leading members of the committee had
been PAIGC members for ten and eleven years respectively. The vice-president,
Nanju Ture, who was around seventy years old, was a member of the Ture family,
foremost among families in Kandjadja. The apparent symbiosis, in a political sense,
between traditional and revolutionary authority reflected at the local level the
alliance at the level of the whole country between the peasantry and the radical
'petty bourgeois' leadership of the liberation movement which had made the
victory over colonialism possible.

There was also a 'people's court' for the section, set up by the PAIGC during the
struggle as early as 1968. In practice, the court was little used at Independence,
villagers preferring to use the elders as they had in the past. As everywhere else
in Guinea-Bissau at the time, the court had three elected members. Its main task
was defined as settling conflicts among the people while trying to achieve a
synthesis between traditional customs and the modern ideology of the liberation
movement. The president of the court, Mamadu Ture, explained that so far the
court had not been forced to settle any case in formal session. According to him
the very existence of the court served to keep the people on the straight path.

Order was thus maintained in Kandjadja by the local elders in association with the
PAIGC. There were no outward signs of dissatisfaction with this order.

Within agriculture, the basis of the livelihood and economy of the people, post-war
recuperation had begun. People grew food crops such as millet, rice, manioc and
also some onions, pepper, beans, maize, or 'baguidj' (local spinach). They sold
groundnuts to the local branch of the state owned 'people's store' which had taken
the place of the private store run by a Portuguese merchant during colonial times.
By buying the groundnut harvest at a fixed price for export by the state, the
people's store maintained a link between the peasants of Kandjadja and the world
market. The groundnut cash earnings were very small and in 1976 rarely exceeded
the equivalent of $25 (official rate of exchange). In many cases they were much less.
The store manager also sold a number of basic goods at controlled and often
subsidized prices; for example, rice (at that particular time, from China), cloth,
suchs, soap, sugar, cooking oil, cigarettes, etc. The store was much better stocked
than it was to become toward the end of the 1970s and onwards. In view of their
limited cash incomes, however, it is clear that most of the villagers had only limited
chances of buying these goods.

The peasants also had indirect access to the world market by way of Senegal,
where they could buy consumer goods with whatever CFA francs they were able
to gain by selling crops or labour. I have no estimate of the magnitude of this trade.
CFA francs could also be used inside Guinea-Bissau. By exchanging them privately, above the official rate of exchange, goods for sale inside Guinea-Bissau, often subsidized by the state, could be had at very advantageous prices. Such trade, on the other hand, did of course pose a serious threat to efforts by the central authorities to collect a surplus from peasant agriculture.

Nothing was done or even contemplated in Kandjadja in 1976 with a view toward transcending the traditional mode of peasant family agriculture. Each family produced on its own, with its own tools and with traditional methods, on its part of the communally owned village lands. There was no trace of political preparation for producer cooperatives or other modern forms of economic cooperation, although at the national level producer cooperatives were vaguely proclaimed to be the long term goal of the region.

Most other production was done on a subsistence level within the family households of several generations living together. But there were also a number of specialised artisans including potters, a blacksmith, a bee-hive maker, shoe-maker and a maker of fishing gear - all of whom produced items for sale. The one who earned most cash was probably a woman potter who claimed to be able to form and burn ten clay pots a day, worth together about $3 when sold in Kandjadja.

The school was probably the most revolutionary institution in Kandjadja of 1976, but mostly in an ideological sense. Three young and highly motivated teachers, two of whom had lived with the guerillas since their childhood, taught a little over two hundred students. Around 120 were divided between the four grades of the elementary school, while the remaining 80 or so belonged to a preparatory group. This means that only approximately a quarter of the young people of school age actually went to school (close to half, if the preparatory group is included). Although quite an achievement in the local context, this was well below the reported national average of ninety per cent, which most likely was heavily inflated.

The training was a combination of conventional subject matter and political teaching on the history and significance of the struggle for national liberation. Great efforts were made to involve also the parents of the children in the work of the school. Parents were constantly told to send not only their sons but also their daughters but the number of girls among the students was much less than the boys.

In spite of the dedicated work carried out by the teachers, it seemed that the modernistic and ideological message of the school was somewhat out of tune with the cultural aspirations of the community and with the actual transformation the local society was undergoing. There was also a different type of school in Kandjadja - the Koranic School, run on a completely voluntary basis. The teacher was a young man of around twenty, the same age as his colleagues of the state school, enrolled at the same time as a student in the second year of their school. The people of Kandjadja called the state school 'the school of Europeans' or 'the whites' because that is where 'modern' or 'European' things are taught. The Koranic School, which gathered every evening at sunset a number of boys to study the holy texts, is often called 'the school of the marabout' (local saint).

In the field of health, in 1976 the PAIGC regime had put a nurse in place in one of the huts of Kandjadja. Three mornings a week she received patients to whom she gave advice, cloroquine and aspirin (when available), or general care. Serious cases could be sent, on foot, to the two small hospitals of Mores or Mansaba, both at
KANDJADJA seemed, therefore, to be on its way toward material and social recuperation within the pre-existing framework. But there were no visible signs of any innovative developments in the sphere of production. The political activities of the PAIGC were not negligible. They were not, however, directed to restructuring agricultural production in ways that would put an agricultural surplus at the disposal of the state or the national economy yet to be constructed. Politics seemed to remain at an ideological and organisational level.

1977
In November 1977 I was able to return to Kandjadja for a short visit. The most spectacular change then was that the whole central village had been moved to the site of the old well which had been re-dug together with a new well. This return to 'where the ancestors live' had been the project foremost on the agenda of the committee in early 1976. The huts of the earlier provisional site had been replaced with houses of sun-dried bricks, set along straight lanes and surrounded with vegetable gardens. All had been done with local resources, without any material support from the state. The political commissar and the members of the base committee were justifiably proud of the work carried out 'by the people of Kandjadja'.

The people's store, under a new tin roof provided by the state, was still well stocked. The people's ability to buy the goods was, however, as limited as before. I was able to observe an event illustrative of the paradoxical relationship between the central and the local levels of Guinea-Bissau that had developed three years after Independence. A military truck suddenly arrived straight from Bissau. The only business of the two soldiers in charge was to buy rice sent to Guinea-Bissau by US Aid and then distributed for sale (although intended to be given away by the US donors) in the countryside by the Guinean authorities. The villagers of Kandjadja could not afford to buy the US gift, however, while there was at the same time a severe shortage in Bissau. Hence the private expedition of the soldiers who bought most of the Kandjadja store and returned it to the capital.

The evolution already underway in early 1976 thus remained firmly on its course in late 1977. It had even advanced considerably. Superficially, the political situation appeared unchanged, but the following remark on the President of the Republic, Luiz Cabral, foreshadowed perhaps the coup d'état of November 1980: 'That one, I saw him once in Mores. I don't like him. He is white. We should have an African president.' The remark was made by one of the elders of Debukunda, a small neighbouring village. The allusion was not to the colour of the skin of the president, but to his culture which appeared Portuguese to the old man. In fact Luiz Cabral was born and had lived most of his life in Guinea-Bissau, although of Cape Verdean parentage.

1981
On 14 November 1980, Prime Minister Joao Bernardo ('Nino') Vieira, legendary guerillero of the liberation movement, was brought to the presidency of a provisional Revolutionary Council as a result of an armed coup d'état carried...
through with a minimum of direct violence. The constitutional President of the Republic, Luiz Cabral, was imprisoned for a year and then allowed to leave the country. A few other persons were removed from their posts, but on the whole the members of the national leadership remained as before. The coup was an expression of the structural crisis the country had been sinking ever deeper into since the first years of independence. The crisis was marked by a growing economic and political gap between, on the one hand, state power resting on aid and credits and wielded by the 'petty bourgeois' leadership and, on the other hand, the peasant producers left largely on their own. The new regime promised more rural oriented policies, a stop on wasteful investments in industrialisation projects out of touch with local realities, and a freer political climate. It is also generally agreed that President Nino is 'closer to the hearts of the people' than Luiz Cabral was. Real changes were small, however, as they were bound to be, given that the objective structural conditions of development in Guinea-Bissau could not be changed by a mere reshuffle within the existing leadership in Bissau. In March 1984 elections were held for a new National Assembly. Two months later the country returned formally to civilian government with Nino Viera as the constitutional President of the Republic. Our task in this context is not to analyze 'the 14th of November' but only to note it as an important background event for the people of Kandjadja as well as all other Guineans. Was the political drama staged at the central level reflected at the local level in Kandjadja?

One year after the coup I was able to return to Kandjadja. Outwardly very little had changed since 1977. Some material improvements could be seen, notably the presence of cattle. During the war, the Portuguese air force had gunned down the animals of the peasants from the air in order to scare people from supporting the guerillas. In 1981, there were cows again in Kandjadja. This was a kind of victory. Other signs of relative progress were the whitewashed walls of the new people's store and, most strikingly, the almost finished construction of an impressive mosque in locally produced bricks. Thanks to the rains, there would probably be enough to eat in 1982.

Politically, however, important changes had taken place. Malan Sana, the political commissar, was gone: 'We asked him to take a rest. He has returned to his native village.' I was told that this had happened several years ago. The old base committee had been dissolved after 'the 14th of November'. An assembly of the people had elected Kaba Ture to be the president of a new committee. Kaba Ture was an active member of the PAIGC during the struggle and also a leading member of the highly respected Ture family of Kandjadja. He is one of the most successful farmers of the section.

Malan Sana was not a native of Kandjadja. He had been sent there by the party. Kaba Ture is also a PAIGC man, a patriot who has devoted his life to the struggle for liberation. But his authority in Kandjadja is locally rooted in the traditions and power structure of that community. He does not look upon himself as the carrier of national political authority, but as a local leader. In fact, he tells me that Kandjadja has been cut off from national politics for years. Only rarely do they have any contacts with the authorities of the sector of the region, not to speak of Bissau. Thanks to some progress in agriculture, the people manage but,

... the rest of the country shows no interest in Kandjadja. Our people live so far away. Many are born here and reach the age of fifty without ever seeing Hensaba (at twenty kilometres' distance) and much less Bissau. All they know is here and Farim. They don't
belong to the party, don't take part in politics.

Since the new committee was elected a year ago, it had never met formally. With Kaba Ture as the chief, there is no apparent need. What can be done at the local level gets done anyway, without access to the modern political system. The other levels seem to fade out of the picture. And how can you listen to Radio Bissau without batteries, anyway?

The weakness or absence of the state was notable also in the fields of education and health. The school had only two teachers (none of the three of 1976 remained) and no more than some fifty pupils. It is true that a new school house had been built, but it was much smaller and less functional than the three provisional buildings of 1976. In fact, it had only two small rooms. One of these was now being used by the Koranic school which thus had been put symbolically at par with the state school. In health care, the regression was total. A small house that had been built to serve as health post was abandoned. Its roof had fallen in, empty medicine bottles thrown in a corner. The nurse had left long ago, nobody sent to replace her.

This deterioration was, however, balanced by visible advances within peasant agriculture. There were even four ploughs available in the village, three private and one provided by 'the state'. There was also a mechanical device for cleaning groundnuts which had been provided by the state (before November 1980). Satisfaction was expressed that seeds had been received from the state in time for the rice planting season of 1981. This was credited to the new regime as a sign of its willingness to support the rural people. Kaba Ture compared the two PAIGC regimes of before and after November 1980 in the following words:

Luiz Cabral, he had no mercy on us Africans. He was interested only in his own belly and in his own country, Cape Verde. Nino, we think he will have some mercy on us Africans, that he will help us have schools and other necessary things.

But the beautiful mosque was being built with local labour and local bricks, without any presidential support whatsoever, while the scantiness of the school was explained by the lack of water necessary to make the bricks. Still, in 1976 brick houses had not even been seen as necessary for teaching, as straw mats had been used for the walls of the three spacious and comfortable provisional buildings then in use. It is worth noting, too, that earnings from two fields collectively cultivated by the youth had financed those parts of the mosque which had been brought from outside the village, most importantly mortar and a large carved double door in wood. This, however, had been done through communal work according to custom and tradition, and had nothing to do with modern cooperation. Kandjadja, one year after 'the 14th of November', thus offers a contradictory image. On the one hand, a striking demobilisation of the political structures and official social services born of the struggle for independence. On the other hand, a certain autonomous regeneration and dynamism of the locally rooted culture and economy.

1984

In December 1984, I returned to Kandjadja for another brief visit. What I was able to learn then strongly confirmed my interpretation of 1981. Kaba Ture was securely in charge of the section which had by now been enlarged to include ten smaller villages plus the village of Kandjadja. Committees were said to exist in each of the villages with the Kandjadja committee serving as before both for the section and the central village. No political commissar had been sent to replace Malan, which serves to illustrate central acquiescence with local authority. On the other hand,
nothing was done by the state to support local development. The school was as scanty, physically, as three years earlier, the number of teachers and students the same. No official health service functioned to complement traditional medicine. The regional authorities were well aware of the problem. Still nothing was done, I was told. Seriously sick people had to be taken all the way to Farim by donkey or ox cart.

The only indication of a central authority presence discernable had occurred in March 1984 when deputies for the Regional Assembly of Oio had been elected. These would in turn elect a number of deputies for the National Assembly among themselves, according to the system of indirect elections in force. In Kandjadja the election had been managed by Kaba Ture. The voters had been presented with a list of candidates for the sector of Mansaba, among them Kaba Ture himself and one other candidate from Kandjadja, in addition to candidates from all the other sections of the sector. The number of candidates was identical with the number of representatives from Mansaba sector to be elected. The voters were asked to vote either NO or YES for the entire list. According to Kaba Ture, some ten NO votes were cast in Kandjadja in March 1984. An important innovation imposed by the local committee, without any involvement on the part of the state, was the decision to levy a local tax beginning in 1984 to provide financial resources for common needs such as the school, or the road leading through the forest to the Farim-Bissau highway etc. The rate had been set at 100 Guinean pesos for married men and 50 pesos for married women, then the equivalent of $1 and 50 cents respectively.

Economically the situation had improved. Harvests had been good in 1982 and 1983 and food thus sufficient in 1984. A few farmers, among them Kaba Ture himself, had even started to bring some of their produce all the way to the large Bandim market in Bissau, thus contributing to the growth of a national Guinean market. Only the other day, the manager of the people's store had hitch-hiked to Bissau with a load of pumpkin which had brought him 400 pesos.

The people's store itself was poorly provided. Only by chance would some villager find something there these days which he or she needed. Beyond the rolls of cloth brought in to be exchanged for the groundnuts soon to be harvested, only some radios (but almost no batteries), sports shoes of smaller sizes, shaving mirrors and a few other things were available on the shelves. The meagre supply of goods reflected perhaps the trade liberalisation measures agreed upon between the government of Guinea-Bissau and the International Monetary Fund in December 1983 which aimed, among other things, at scaling down state participation in retail trade while encouraging private commerce. In the case of Kandjadja, liberalisation so far mostly meant that most of the market, as before, was left to the unofficial international trade carried on by 'dyula' traders going back and forth to Senegal. The people's store was next to paralysed which would force the villagers to trade more outside, possibly also with Bissau, depending on conditions.

1986

When next I visited Kandjadja in January 1986, the tendencies noted above were strongly confirmed and the gap between central state authority and local society seemed to be widening. Thanks to the presence in the village of a new chairman of the section committee of the youth organisation JAAC (Juventude Africana Amilcar Cabral), I was able to gather some detailed organisation and other data.
The JAAC chairman, nephew of Kaba Ture, was Malan Ture, a man in his mid-twenties who had lived with his parents in Senegal since the time of the independence struggle until their return together at the end of 1984. He had tried to activate the youth organisation in various ways, one of which was the carrying out of a local census. This showed Kandjadja itself had 2016 inhabitants in January 1986 while the eight original village of the section had 5656. Five new villages had been added in 1985, but not yet counted; their population was thought to be about 2500.

According to Malan Ture, each of the thirteen villages had its own base committee, with the committee of Kandjadja functioning, as before, for the entire section. Thus it had six members (rather than five), as it included both Kaba Ture, chief of the section, and Binta Ture, a woman of the same family, as village president. The member in charge of cultural matters in 1986 was the same man who in 1976 had been the president of the committee. The JAAC sectional committee had five members, of whom one more besides Malan Ture belonged to the Ture family. The sectional court of justice also had five members, two of whom were members of the dominant Ture family: the president of the court, Nakasse Ture, and again Malan Ture. Two women were named as president and vice president respectively of the women's organisation UDEMU (Uniao Democratica das Mulheres). We see that the formal political structure was in place. Everything indicates, though, that it derived most of its authority from the local standing of the Ture family rather than from the PAIGC and the state of Guinea-Bissau.

The actual absence of party and state is a striking feature of Kandjadja in the 1980s - visible in sheer physical terms, as well as notable in all kinds of comments made by villagers in interviews and conversations. In 1986 the school was as dilapidated as in 1981 and 1984, official health services completely absent. The track road leading to the highway was in somewhat better shape than before. When asked if this was because the state had put in some efforts, an old hunter catching a ride with the unexpected visitors from Bissau forcefully answered: 'not at all. Nothing but the strength of the people has brought this improvement.' The theme kept recurring in interviews and conversations:

All we have is the people's own strength and our fields. During the war we worked for the party. We collected money where we lived in Senegal. We carried food and ammunition on our heads to the frontier. But now the state and the party have forgotten us. They have left us in a hole. Not the president himself (Nino), but the rest. All we have is the people's own strength. We need some support from the state too.

The people's store had been closed down in 1985 as part of the state's conscious liberalisation policies. People did not miss it. The store was offered for sale at an approximate price of 300,000 pesos ($1750). It was highly doubtful if anybody in Kandjadja was able (or willing) to buy it at such a price. So far, anyway, nobody had shown any interest. The doors of the whitewashed, tin-roofed house in the middle of the village remained locked. Thus the only retail goods available were those offered by the 'dyulas'. During the approaching groundnut harvesting season, the state company SOCOMIN would temporarily bring in some goods to Kandjadja to barter for the export crop. Then the store would close again, awaiting private initiative.

The state school was in bad shape with only one teacher left. He was a native of Quitafine in the far south, of Balante ethnic origin, sent to work among Mandingas as part of a national policy to transcend 'tribal' divisions and strengthen 'national'
sentiments. A stranger in Kandjadja, he did not even speak the language of his Mandinga pupils whom he was supposed to teach in Portuguese, a language they in turn do not know. His only way of communicating with the children was to use the few who know some Creole as interpreters. Material problems were also serious: books, crayons, writing paper, pencils - everything was lacking; even the school house itself was falling down. As before, the two small rooms were shared between the official school and the Koranic school. The number of children attending was dwindling with twenty-four children left in first grade, less than twenty in second, only one in third, and about seven in fourth.

In neighbouring Dabukunda, the village elder and president of the local committee told me that only one child out of about one hundred of school age went to the state school. He explained that the parents do not want to send their children to 'the school of the whites', where they learn 'bad things' and 'become white' in the cultural sense. The parents prefer the religious teachings of the Koranic school, more in accordance with their culture. In vain, the president said, does the committee do all it can to persuade the parents to send their children to school.

Kandjadja in 1986 is not a stagnant community. People are politically organised, they produce, consume, trade, communicate over long distances, study, organise cultural activities; over the ten year period from 1976-1986 they have improved their material level of life. But the limits are narrow, restrictions strongly felt, inputs from outside close to none. The school is run down, the health post abandoned, the store closed. Whatever dynamism there is, it is not 'national', Guinean, but rooted in the local economy, inserted in its own regional context cutting across colonial/post-colonial state frontiers, nourished by age-old Mandinga cultural consciousness, but not linked to creative innovations supported from outside.

In 1976, the people themselves expected much more. In 1986 they are disappointed. After liberation from colonialism, they supported the PAIGC goal of creating a people's state, based on people's power, i.e. a state that would help them achieve 'development' in the sense of material security and human dignity. According to their own analysis, 'the people's strength' alone, although essential, is not sufficient for this. 'Some support' from more broadly based authority, a 'state', is also necessary. Under what conditions can such support be expected from the wielders of state power?

The question can be turned around too, and posed in the perspective of national policy makers in Bissau. Why is it that whatever development there is in Kandjadja and the thousands of other villages seems to be moving in directions contrary to those foreseen in the heads of planners and in official documents? No producer cooperatives, except the communal fields organised to finance the mosque; ever increasing interest in the Koranic school - at the expense of the state's 'modern' education; isolation of the Balante teacher in a Mandinga community instead of the breakdown of 'tribalism'; the state retail store so completely 'lacking in strength' that its final closing appears quite logical; the old power structure flourishing inside the new shell; dependence on trade ('smuggling') across the Guinea-Senegal border for such simple things as, for instance, notebooks and pencils to be used in the school; willingness to pay a local tax for locally defined purposes; failure to achieve some kind of local financing of modern health services.
Regardless of whether the question is posed from a local or central point of view, the answer is political. The villagers do not get the 'support' they deem necessary because they do not influence, let alone control, state power - or for that matter any other power outside their own community. The Bissau policy-makers, on the other hand, do not reach the villagers with their plans and wishes because the social basis of the power they have is elsewhere. Thus they do not formulate their plans and actions in concrete and democratic cooperation with the villagers.

The Future At the moment of writing this text (February 1987) important changes are underway in Guinea-Bissau, likely to affect also Kandjadja decisively in spite of its relative isolation. At the central level, policies of planning and state controlled economic development are being limited or outright abandoned. Within trade and agriculture, private initiative is going to be encouraged. Foreign trade is being liberalised, the official value of the Guinean peso adjusted toward its value on the world market. Seen from the angle of Kandjadja, these policy changes will probably facilitate development along the lines already underway according to local dynamism. Agricultural production is likely to increase, especially if credits are made available. At least in the short run, production may also become more diversified. Some merchant may well be tempted by the prospect of buying the former people's store. Some peasants will get rich, others will remain poor. And who knows? Maybe some state or party official with local connections will in coming years be able to profit from the agricultural potential of Kandjadja by investing on favourable terms in land, labour and modern means of production. What remains to be seen is whether all this will contribute or not to the inclusion of Kandjadja in a larger unit, led by a state able to legitimise its power by providing the people with the support necessary to development. Perhaps the basis of state power thus legitimised will in the longer run have to grow within wider frameworks than that provided by the post-colonial state of Guinea-Bissau.

Brief Comparative Note: Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique
Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique are, of course, different from each other in important respects; one country is small, the other large. Internal differentiation with regard to culture and class differs between the two. Internationally, Guinea-Bissau is being spared the kind of ruthless aggression and destabilisation South Africa subjects Mozambique to. But there are also important similarities: common Portuguese colonial heritage, armed struggle to achieve decolonisation, successful political alliances for this purpose between 'petty bourgeois' leaders and the peasantry, efforts to transform the liberation movements into 'vanguard' parties on principles of 'democratic centralism' after independence. It is also significant that neither are culturally and economically integrated nations but highly plural societies, arbitrarily carved out of their regional and historical context by colonialism. In both of the countries official post-colonial ideology, born of the liberation struggle, poses people's power as a necessary goal and condition of development. But the major part of the financing of the two states does not come from the productive work of their peoples. They do not manage to mobilise any surplus from the peasant agriculture which comprises the great majority of their populations. Thus they are not popularly based in this most fundamental sense.

The case of Kandjadja has given us an illustration of the mechanisms of the deadlock in the context of Guinea-Bissau. Another comes from recent work on
Mozambique which allows us to widen the perspective and indicate a possible road of fruitful enquiry.

During the autumn of 1983 I had the opportunity to take part in a field study of the problems of people's power in the district of Mueda, the historical cradle of Frelimo's struggle for Mozambican independence. More particularly, I was able to observe and study how the peasants of Ngapa, a sub-district of Mueda, just south of the border between Mozambique and Tanzania, withdrew from the communal villages of the state in order to set up autonomous villages of their own which they called cooperatives, in the middle of a forest.

Our joint report describes the background conditions of this process of 'disaggregation'. There are some striking similarities with conditions in far away Kandjadja. With regard to the feeble presence of the state and the lively unofficial trade across the nearby northern frontier, it does not appear exaggerated to state that the social and economic life of the sub-district was out of the control of the Mozambican state at the end of 1983. The situation was serious too, with regard to the satisfaction of basic material and social needs. People lacked clothing and other fundamental necessities. The schools did not function well, not only for material reasons but also because the parents distrusted them and did not always send their children there. Health services were totally insufficient. Transportation except by foot almost non-existent. There was a lot of resentment among the peasants for these reasons, expressing itself in the form of political cynicism and distrust of party and state authority.

The 'disaggregation' of the communal villages was explained to us in opposite ways by the peasants on the one side and most party and state officials on the other. The basic reason given by the peasants was that they wanted to live close to their best lands so as to avoid long and tiring daily walks. In the view of most party and state officials, on the other hand, the problem resulted fundamentally from a resurgence of reactionary and tribal political power, rooted in collaboration with the colonialists and in backward traditions - tendencies to be fought with all means available - including, if necessary, open force.

In the autonomous villages we were able to note a tendency of merging between the customary power of the elders and the formal structure of cooperatives established in an effort to legitimise the breakaway settlements in the eyes of the authorities. But we found nothing substantial to support the accusations of 'tribalism' and 'reactionary' opposition against the regime. The crisis in Ngapa arises from the incapacity of the state to resolve the immediate and basic problems of the inhabitants. Party and state are seen as sources of promises never fulfilled. In moving away from the communal villages of the state, the peasants are simply trying to take care of their own problems of life and development as well as they can.

In concluding our report, which deals also with one more case of 'disaggregation' closer to the central town of Mueda, we emphasised that the building up of people's power, in Frelimo's sense, depends most importantly upon the type of relationship established between the people and their leaders. Wherever people's power became a reality during the armed struggle, it resulted from a social process in which the people took an active part in discussing and resolving their own problems. Such social relations do not come from the sky but arise from common goals and interests. They require concrete efforts on the part of the leadership to
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listen and act together with the people in order to resolve the various problems of development. The real difficulty comes at the moment when party and state officials no longer share these problems or when they find ways of resolving them only for themselves.

Whatever the differences between the situation of the people of Kandjadja and the people of Ngapa, it is hardly a coincidence that they express themselves almost identically when demanding at least 'some support' from the state whose power they have been instrumental in establishing through the struggle for liberation and colonialism.

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This article has been published earlier in German and in the Bissau periodical Serondo, in Portuguese.
PEASANTS AND DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLES IN NIGERIA
Bjorn Beckman

This article discusses the role of the peasantry in the political strategies of the Nigerian left. It begins by looking at the way in which some socialist-oriented organisations and writers have approached the peasant and agrarian questions. The paper discusses the political and economic implications of some of the positions taken, including 'fighting the kulaks' and 'eliminating middlemen and money-lenders'. It stresses the limited scope for left intervention on the side of the poor peasants in confrontation with the rich in the foreseeable future. Beckman argues that the democratic transition may be jeopardised both economically and politically if such intervention is pushed prematurely. There is a need to focus on the broad middle ground within the peasantry for purposes of political support and agricultural development. The paper recognises the growing internal differentiation and class contradictions within the peasant communities but it suggests that such divisions can only be effectively addressed after the consolidation of democratic state power. There is, therefore, the need to mobilise peasants politically for the national democratic cause on issues which unite rather than divide them. The encroachment on peasants lands by state and capital is one such area of common concern. There is also a wide scope for democratic struggles for more equitable distribution of public services on a community basis.

Questions of political strategy are closely linked to different assumptions about the productive capacity of the peasantry and the logic of the agrarian transformation that is taking place. To some, the peasantry is a spent force. To others, its ability to meet national needs depends on far-reaching state intervention and reorganisation on cooperative or collectivist lines. This article questions the feasibility and even the need for such intervention, argues that the current 'agrarian crisis' does not provide evidence of peasant production having outlived its usefulness or being able to respond to new commercial opportunities and technical innovations. Although capitalist investment may create pockets of more advanced farming, the scope for generalising such development is limited. National economic growth and mass welfare will continue to depend on the performance of the peasant economy. The latter also stands a better chance of sustaining economically the political transition as the socialising of large-scale capitalist agriculture is fraught with major difficulties.
The Peasant and Agrarian Question

What is the peasant question in the context of Nigerian left politics and debates? First of all it is a question of the material conditions of the peasantry, being the most oppressed mass segment of the society. Radical writers have documented how Nigerian peasants have been exploited through feudal and colonial capitalist domination, forced labour, taxation and marketing boards. In recent times the emphasis has been on the threat posed to the peasantry, especially peasant land rights, by the advance of capitalist agriculture and state development projects, with or without the participation of foreign agri-business. Peasants, it is argued, are increasingly subordinated, proletarianised and marginalised. There is massive discrimination against the peasantry and, in particular, the poor peasants, in state provision of inputs, credits and services. Those who benefit are instead a new class of farmowners, businessmen, civil servants and army officers or the top layers within local society, rich peasants and those which the World Bank labels 'progressive farmers'. There is a process of 'kulakisation' and capitalist transformation at the expense of the generality of the peasantry. Peasants are discriminated against in terms of access to public services, education, health services, water and roads. They are disadvantaged in the market place where they are exploited by state marketing agencies and middle men.

The Socialist Working People's Party (SWPP) calls for mass struggles to protect peasant land interests against the rise and growth of the kulak class. Fighting the kulaks is part of the party's programme for a united front of left and democratic forces. Some demands are standard: reorganised cooperatives, mechanisation, reduction in taxes, improved access to credits, inputs and consumer goods. Others are more distinctly working class: the same minimum wage for agricultural workers as demanded for all other workers. Price policies should be such that 'neither the farmers nor the consumers are cheated'.

The Socialist Party of Workers, Youth and Farmers (SPWYF) outlines the gains to the peasant farmers that socialism will bring. Capitalist farming shall be abolished and debts to money lenders cancelled. Land shall be under peasant control and they shall own and manage their own cooperatives, credit institutions and supply stations for machine services and inputs. There shall be free medical services, education and social security. Rural areas will be supplied with the same amenities as in the urban areas. Peasants will participate in management of agricultural and rural development policies at the level of the state.

The primarily Kano and Kaduna based Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) has a tradition of peasant struggles against aristocratic ruling class oppression in the northern Emirates from the late colonial period. It swept Kano State in the elections of 1979 and 1983 and captured the governorship in Kaduna State in 1979. Taxes symbolising feudal oppression were abolished and an ambitious programme was pursued for the provision of rural services, electrification, water supplies and adult education. Inquiries were undertaken into the land complaints of the peasants. The party was joined by socialist intellectuals from different parts of the country. It disintegrated into various factions and was banned with all other parties when the military took over at the end of 1983.

A group of Zaria radicals, mostly of the Bala Mohammed Memorial Committee (BMMC), supporting one of these factions, has formulated an agrarian strategy in the face of Nigeria's deepening economic crisis. Peasants ('and other rural producers'), according to this group (the BMMC), should be given control over
productive resources, basically land 'which should be controlled by those who live and work on it'. There is a sharp attack on middlemen whose 'predatory positions' in all transactions are largely the reason why someone who could survive on his farm earnings in 1960 can hardly do so today. 'Middlemen of all shades should be eliminated'. There is emphasis on the setting up of democratic structures at the village level, including village councils and agricultural committees with representation of heads of households but also school teachers and youth associations. The councils should have powers to allocate land and the committees should 'organise agricultural activities' and distribute inputs and credit. These bodies should send representatives to higher levels to participate in the administration of State Agricultural Production Agencies which would take over existing state projects. The Agencies would decide whether such projects should be operated by peasant cooperatives or as plantations owned by government and farm workers.

Ikenna Nzimiro, a veteran socialist politician with a background in the Biafran Communist Party and currently a special adviser to President Babangida, has published widely on the agrarian and peasant question. His most recent book, The Green Revolution in Nigeria or the Modernization of Hunger (1985) is primarily a critique of the strategies pursued by various regimes since independence, especially the 'Green Revolution' of the Second Republic. It was, according to Nzimiro, a revolution for the rich, the middlemen, compradors and kulaks. As a result of widespread land alienation the very basis of peasant production has been undercut. He advocates a socialist path of cooperative development, drawing on the experience of the Soviet Union. For this he wants to set up an elaborate structure headed by a Directorate of Peasant Organisations ('located at the Office of the President'), charged with the recruitment of peasants into cooperatives and communes. The latter should be based on traditional village organisation, lineage and kinship groups and, at a higher level, the clan. They would be supervised by state agencies with cadres trained in a School of Political Orientation. However such revolutionised peasant organisations would not be sufficient: 'State farms are needed for the production of food and raw materials for the industrial base of the nation'. These would also be models to show the peasants the advantage of mechanisation. The State farms would organise 'large collective farms', as was the case in the Soviet Union.

The Question of Power and the Worker-Peasant Alliances
Who is going to do all this? The peasant and agrarian programmes of the Nigerian left as sampled here are of a tall order. They presuppose major changes in the balance of political forces in society, although some do so more than others. They differ in character and time perspective and are therefore not strictly comparable. The SWPP offers a transitional programme for a phase of unity with non-socialist, democratic forces. The SPWYF, on the other hand, lists what a socialist future has in store for the peasantry. The BMMC in turn has a programme for rural democracy with no specific socialist or anti-capitalist class orientation, comparable to SWPP's 'struggle against the kulaks' or SPWYF's 'abolition of capitalist farming'. Yet it can be inferred that the BMMC programme assumes democracy for the mass of the peasants, not for the rich who dominate existing cooperatives. The class character of Nzimiro's centrally constituted and supervised peasant organisations is obscured by their presumed basis in traditional lineage, kinship and clan
organisation. The impression is also that revolutionary class power in this schema comes from the top, not from within the peasantry.

What is the role of the peasantry in the arrangement of political forces capable of addressing peasant welfare and agricultural development? On the one hand, forces within the rural communities themselves struggle to advance their interests; on the other hand, forces from outside intervene in local struggles, tilting the balance in favour of one or the other while pursuing their own distinct interests. What combination of forces, for instance, will be able to protect the land rights of the peasantry against capitalist penetration from without as well as from the growth of capitalist class forces from within (kulakisation)? Who will fight the power of the rich peasants and prevent them from hijacking cooperatives, credits, inputs, tractor services etc. as they have done in the past? What forces will ensure that new genuine cooperatives are democratically constituted in a way as to enable them to serve the interests of the mass of poor peasants? How can the cancellation of peasant debts be enforced? By what political mechanisms will it be possible to eliminate middlemen and ensure that food prices are fair both to farmers and consumers? Not to speak of the tallest order of all: how will capitalist farming and political domination and exploitation be abolished?

The agrarian and peasant programmes of the left must be discussed in terms of political forces, local, national and international, which can sustain them. It presupposes an understanding of the development of contradictions and class forces, both within and outside the rural economy. How do the contradictions facing the peasantry relate to the activities of state and capital? How do peasants respond, resist, accommodate? What is their place in the agrarian transformation that is taking place? Are peasants archaic and redundant or are they a dynamic force in that process? How homogeneous is the peasantry? How far has internal differentiation developed? Are divisions taking on a class character? What is the relation between rich and poor peasants? What is the political significance of such differences? How far has the process of land concentration and land alienation gone? Is there a landless rural proletariat? These are some of the questions which need to be addressed if we are to evaluate agrarian and peasant programmes in terms of their welfare and production objectives as well as political feasibility.

The way such questions are answered also carries important implications for the strategies of the Left for impressing itself on the administration of state power. A common formula is to speak of the ‘alliance of the working class and the peasantry’ as the foundation of such strategies, adding various other categories - youth, students, progressive intellectuals, market women etc. in supportive functions. In the case of the SPWYP such an alliance is incorporated into the name of the party. For the SWPP the worker-peasant alliance is part of a united front of left and democratic forces. The PRP Left is less specific. Bala Usman, referring to the Green Paper on the State of the Nigerian Economy, calls on ‘workers, peasant farmers, artisans, teachers, professionals, retailers and capitalist industrialists’ to take full control of the economy.

The formula of the worker-peasant alliance is of long standing in socialist political theory. Its meaning in a contemporary, neo-colonial African context has not been much explored. It presupposes common interests of the allying classes rooted in the contradictions that confront them. The general orientation of the platform is often described as national democratic, referring on the one hand to the struggle for national emancipation in a context of imperialist domination, and on the other
hand, to the struggle to ensure that national development is for the common people. What does imperialism mean in the context of the peasant economy? What is the basis for peasants joining an anti-imperialist platform? On what grounds can peasants be expected to support a political movement which is hostile to private capital accumulation?

The class basis for the struggle for state power must be established. Sections of the left occasionally indulge in wishful thinking about 'revolution from above' with the help of progressive elements in the armed forces and well-placed progressives within the state apparatus. Backed with the full powers of the state, such progressives hope to mobilise the peasantry for the revolutionary transformation of society. Some put hopes in the ruling class adopting a revolutionary agrarian and peasant programme in order to save its own neck from the inevitable wrath of the masses. This is what Nzimiro does when concluding that 'the ruling class in Nigeria has no choice but to save the starving millions of this country', threatening a French Revolution style bloodbath if it does not.

An All-Peasant Line

The argument of this article is that the unequal and oppressive relations which exist within the peasant communities cannot be effectively challenged until democratic forces are strong enough to impress themselves on the administration of state power. The scope for fighting the rich peasants (the kulaks) and for protecting the interests of the poor peasants and farm labourers is limited in the foreseeable future. The main reason is that power relations within the peasant communities are heavily weighted against the latter. Democratic forces both inside and outside are likely to be too weak to effectively challenge these relations. Premature attempts to do so are likely to be counter-productive and push the politically and economically dominant sections of the peasantry into the fold of the bourgeoisie, carrying with them wide sections of the peasantry over which they exercise influence. There is therefore a need to approach peasant grievances more on a community than on a class basis. The worker-peasant alliance needs to take its point of departure in the grievances which are shared by the vast majority of the peasants. This is an 'all-peasants line', as distinct from one which focuses on the specific problems confronting poor peasants and farm labourers.

An all-peasants line, however, with its low-profile on the internal divisions of the peasantry does not preclude democratic struggle to push the specific interests of the poor peasantry also within the constraints of such a strategy. Democratic forces can continue to press for the widest possible distribution of whatever state resources that can be made to go to the peasant communities. The democratisation of cooperatives and other agencies involved in such distribution can be pursued on egalitarian rather than on class lines in order to limit confrontation with the rich peasants. There is a wide scope for such non-class egalitarian struggles against the present open pro-big peasant ('progressive farmer') line pursued by the state with World Bank backing. It should be possible to achieve the objective of constraining such state support for the rich peasants by making the 'common peasant farmer' rather than the poor farmer the focus, even if this is a mystification in a highly differentiated peasant community. I speak of 'constraining' to emphasise the inevitable limitations of such a non-class, all-peasants strategy in addressing the specific needs of the mass of poor peasants. There is also scope to fight for types of state policies which are less discriminatory (less pro-rich) by shifting the
emphasis to public community services, away from economic services which are normally appropriated on an individual basis and therefore favour the more powerful. For instance, communal water supplies are less discriminatory than the provision of tubewells and electric pumps to individual farmers. Generally, feeder roads, rural health services, primary schools are less discriminatory than tractor hiring units and rural loans schemes.

The central focus of an all-peasants line, however, must be on the contradictions which confront the peasantry as a whole. The key issue here is the threat posed to peasant land rights by state or state-backed large-scale capitalist intervention in direct production. It is an issue that can unite the peasantry including its upper strata on an 'anti-capitalist' platform; that is, an anti-big, anti-foreign, anti-non-peasant capital. This is of course not just a peasant issue. The blocking of the current capitalist offensive is vital for the national democratic project as a whole. It is a matter of preventing the bourgeoisie from developing a solid agrarian base of its own from where it can obstruct the democratisation of society. National dependence on a large-scale private capitalist sector for essential supplies of food, industrial raw materials and export earnings will make the democratic transition even more vulnerable to ruling class blackmail and sabotage. Experience from elsewhere, (e.g. Mozambique) suggests that it is very difficult to reconstitute production once the old owners have left, especially if such production units have been heavily dependent on preferential access to scarce resources. There is nothing 'unprogressive' in seeking to block such large-scale capitalist expansion when its profitability is essentially based on preferential access and monopoly rather than on genuine productivity advantages over small-holder production.

There is thus a wide scope for all-peasant democratic struggles against state discrimination in the allocation of resources in favour of those new, non-peasant ruling class farmers. This also creates a bridge to the socialist aspirations of the working class forces in the national democratic movement. Close involvement by foreign agri-business in the capitalist agrarian offensive also helps in linking up with the anti-imperialist demands of the movement.

Misconceptions about the Peasant Origins of Agrarian Crisis
The all-peasants line presupposes that the productive capacity of the peasant economy can be expanded to meet most of Nigeria's agricultural needs. How does this rhyme with Nigeria's widely lamented 'agrarian crisis'? Is it not a crisis of the peasant economy? Since the early 1970s, the country has experienced a dramatic decline in agricultural exports, a fall in food output per capita, and a meteoric rise in food imports, with a peak of two and one-half million tonnes of cereals annually in the early 1980s. The supply of raw materials to domestic agro-based industries collapsed, the cotton based textile industry being the most serious case. With the slump in the oil market, the crisis took a new turn. Cereal imports were banned or phased out. Manufacturers were deprived of imported raw materials or made to pay for them at SFEM rates.

The crisis is widely attributed to the incapacity of the peasant economy. A wide range of reasons are circulating: poverty, 'archaic' technology, fragmented holdings and declining sources of family labour among others. Low incomes are seen as inherent in peasant production or as a result of outside pressures. Thus Nzimiro and Ladipo argue that peasant production is 'archaic', incapable of a reliable output. The peasant economy as constituted has exhausted itself. It either has to
be fundamentally reorganised through massive state intervention (Nzimiro) or replaced by more advanced forms of agriculture (Ladipo). Others, as we have seen, emphasise external causes of peasant decline: colonial and post-colonial exploitation and oppression. Peasants have been alienated and marginalised. There is an atmosphere of doom. Watts ends his monumental study of the northern Nigerian peasantry by suggesting that what we now witness may be 'a final act of historical elimination'.

While such views may have virtue in exposing the anti-peasant policies of the state, I believe they misrepresent the dynamics of agrarian development and may easily encourage new anti-peasant policies. As I have argued elsewhere, the decline in export production is largely attributable to a radical shift into production for domestic markets. The high levels of food imports cannot be taken as evidence of any 'failure' of domestic food production. An open door policy on food imports plus the appreciation of the Naira through domestic inflation and an inflexible exchange rate caused Nigerian markets to be flooded with cheap imported grains. Nigerian and foreign grain traders and millers ensured that Nigerian food producers were undercut. Consumers had good reasons to prefer the imported food. It was cheaper, more easily prepared or ready to carry. Yet despite this flood of imports, there was a simultaneous rapid expansion in domestic commercial food production. Imports only covered part of the increase in commercial demand which may have grown at the rate of ten per cent per annum. In fact, the period of the oil boom and its aftermath has been a busy and dynamic one for wide sections of the Nigerian peasantry, particularly in areas with favourable conditions for rapid response to the new market situation. This was the case, for instance, on the old cash crop frontiers in Funtua, Gassu and Gombe, where the World Bank, cleverly, also decided to make its first big fertiliser push, expecting a quick success for its 'rural development' strategy. But vast new areas in Kaduna, Niger, Plateau, Benue and Kwara, only to speak of the states I know best, were pulled into the new food frontier. While increasingly joined by a new set of large-scale commercial farmers coming from outside, the backbone of this expansion was peasant small-holdings although, as we shall see, many were not so small. The class of prosperous big peasants, the kulaks, grow in numbers. The peasantry eagerly absorbed the subsidised inputs distributed by state and World Bank sponsored agencies. Now maize varieties spread like bush fire in areas which had hardly seen maize before. The commercial demand for new inputs continued to be high even when subsidies were drastically cut in the mid-1980s. 'Marginalised' is as inappropriate as 'uncaptured' to characterise the Nigerian peasantry. Of course, there are areas where commercialisation has not gone far. There are also areas which are physically marginal and increasingly becoming so, especially in the far north. There are also peasants who have been dislodged and marginalised as a result of irrigation reservoirs and large-scale land appropriation by state and private projects.

Despite such anti-peasant developments the peasantry as a whole continues to be centrally placed in this social formation. It provides the bulk of the daily food of a non-agricultural population which may be up to 40 million (apart from feeding itself). Its commercial surplus has not only provided the historical basis of 'original accumulation' for Africa's largest bourgeoisie. It continues to finance a wide range of private investments in commerce, transport, housing, cottage industries and education.
Is the Peasantry a Spent Force?
What about the superior productivity of capitalist farming? Is not the peasantry doomed to be replaced by more advanced forms of production? This may well be so, but the paths are not as clear as they once seemed to Lenin. In an important discussion of capitalism and peasantry in Nigeria, Gavin Williams argues that there is no unequivocal logic suggesting that peasants are made redundant by capitalist farming or transformed on such lines. In large parts of the industrialised world, family farms with little or no wage labour continue to hold their own. The process of concentration of production and proletarianisation of labour on ‘typical’ capitalist lines is not the normal fate of peasantries. He discusses the miserable performance of state and large-scale private capitalist farming in Nigeria and other parts of Africa and points to the special circumstances which have provided for success in places like Kenya and Zimbabwe, including monopolistic access to land and state enforced labour supply. Williams’ argument may not satisfy those like Ladipo who find evidence of superior performance by capitalist agriculture in the Ivory Coast and Cameroon, places close enough to the Nigerian scene. Such evidence may suggest that another set of more serious agrarian capitalists could deliver the goods also in Nigeria. The present advance of capitalist agriculture in Nigeria may suggest that a significant move in such direction is already on the way. The reliance of such capitalists on privileged access to resources and state protection may not be different from other sectors of the modern economy. Especially in the case of some industrial crops like sugar cane, oil palm and tobacco, large-scale plantations may have major advantages. Even so, outgrowers schemes or contract farming by small-holders may be equally or more efficient.

The crucial argument in favour of peasant production, however, is different: for the foreseeable future the bulk of Nigeria’s (and Africa’s) peasantries will have very little other productive openings outside agriculture. It is therefore essential for both economic growth and mass welfare that their productive potential is allowed to develop to its fullest capacity. Discrimination in the allocation of resources, including land, in favour of capitalist farming is obstructive of this, however spectacular productivity increases obtained by individual ‘modern’ enterprises. Such productivity will depend on access to superior technology and organisation which cannot be made generally available. Discrimination in favour of pockets of socialist agriculture is, of course, equally unhelpful to the mass of people, whether producers or consumers, as demonstrated in the case of Mozambique.

Social Differentiation and Class Formation in the Peasantry
When I speak of the peasantry as the backbone of Nigeria’s economy, I do not refer to some mythical pre-capitalist ‘peasant mode of production’, characterised by subsistence-orientation and disinterest in profits, innovations and commercial enterprise. Nor do I refer to an ‘amorphous’ peasantry made up of ‘typical’ peasant farmers on their ‘average’ holdings. We deal with a peasantry with a long history of commercial incorporation into local, regional and global markets for produce and labour, a peasantry which has been exposed to a range of shifting political regimes, including slavery, feudal exactions, colonial taxation and pervasive state intervention in markets and in relations of land and labour. Communities have been affected very differently. All, however, have had their internal relations shaped by the mode of commercial and political incorporation. Social differentiation and class formation have been structured by interaction with a
wider political economy, including labour migration, trading, and other non-farming activity. Most are highly differentiated communities with people on the verge of starvation at one end and those well protected by property and external connections at the other. They are class societies because differentiation provides the basis for relations of appropriation through transactions in land, labour, water, ploughs, tractors, crops and money. There is a cumulative logic which reinforces the class nature of differentiation as wealth and power accumulates at the upper end. The number of rich peasants primarily relying on hired labour is growing, supported by the interplay of farming and trading. As accessible land becomes more scarce and land prices rise, rich peasants are in a better position to sustain large holdings, even in the face of disintegration caused by inheritance. Poor peasants, on other hand, are squeezed as high land prices prevent them from adding to their own meagre lots. It is true, as Hill argues, that expansion and contraction is related to the availability of family labour as determined by the biological cycle of the household. However, the commercialisation of land and labour places serious constraints on such a 'self-adjusting' process. Rich peasants compete more effectively in markets for land and labour. The children of poor peasants are more likely to be pushed off the land. The children of the rich may also leave as farm surplus pays their way into education and business. Surplus feeds into an increasingly diversified pattern of accumulation beyond the rural economy. At the lower end, poor peasants depend for their survival on wages they earn from more prosperous neighbours, labour migration, remittances from family members working elsewhere etc. Of course there is mobility; individuals whose fortunes rise and fall. But as in all class societies such fortunes are heavily weighted on the basis of class position.

Does it mean that the peasantry is being dissolved and polarised into a rural proletariat and a rural capitalist class confronting each other? Gavin Williams argues convincingly that this is not the case. Polarisation is restrained at both ends. Poor peasants cling to their land and earnings from farm labour help them to do so. Rich peasants face constraints in access to land and labour and invest their way into other classes. The survival of the peasantry, however, is primarily ensured by the middle peasants who do not depend on selling their labour and whose resources for appropriating labour are limited, although the incidence of labour hiring is certainly increasing, both as a result of the decline in access to family labour and the growth in commercial labour supply. Williams suggests that there is no clear evidence of growing inequalities. This may be so, although data are scanty and inconclusive. The evidence is good enough to sustain his argument against an imminent polarisation and disintegration of the peasantry, but it does not help to clarify the nature of changing class relations within the peasantry. The accelerated commercialisation of labour and land relations enhances class contradictions within the peasantry, without necessarily causing disintegration and transformation into 'pure' classes of wage workers and capitalists.

Why an Anti-Kulak Line is Not Feasible
If class contradictions within the peasantry are growing, why advocate a non-class, all-peasants line? The political logic of the argument has been indicated above; here are some supporting observations, first about the diffusion of the class contradictions themselves. Rich and poor peasants live together in communities which are integrated by complex relations of family, clan and communal identities.
Much farm labour is recruited from outside this immediate community. Those selling labour from within are primarily ‘young men’, a transitional (if widening) stratum whose class identity is not clearly defined as they supposedly (even if this is an illusion) are on their way into something else. There may not be much of the proverbial communal solidarity, although it may be occasionally mobilised in a land dispute with a neighbouring village or for some road work. However, there are strong bonds of dependence which tie members to each other. Poor peasants depend on the better-off for loans of land, crops, money, bulls, seed etc. The terms of such transactions are not fixed but depend on the nature of the personal relations between the parties. The closer the relationship, the lesser the effective rent or interest paid. Both ‘clients’ and ‘patrons’ have an interest in such relations. ‘Good patrons’ may help if you need to deal with the government, if your child is sick, or if you look for work and education outside. ‘Good clients’ can be relied upon to help out during peak farm operations or mobilised in contests for power and authority. Authority goes with wealth, but wealth may not be enough. Legitimacy is added if consideration is shown for less fortunate brothers. Leadership in community organisations and cooperatives is invariably in the hands of the rich peasants. When asked to send a representative to a higher forum, villagers choose someone whose social standing is high. A ‘good farmer’ is someone whose output is high, although he may not touch the hoe himself.

It is difficult for democratic organisations to break into such relations of authority and dependence. Premature attempts to organise poor peasants may meet with little sympathy from the supposed beneficiaries. These may be anxious not to be identified with outside trouble makers, forfeiting the sympathy of their betters on which they depend. If they confront exploitative relations, poor peasants put to risk the modest ‘security’ they may have achieved in carefully cultivated patron-client relations. They are unlikely to take that risk unless they are convinced that the political forces that back them from outside are strong enough and capable of offering a genuine alternative. Democratic forces from outside, by fanning class struggles within the peasantry, risk alienating many more than the rich peasants who are being targeted. The struggles may also disrupt production, especially as much of the commercially available surplus comes from the upper strata. The democratic issues arising from the class contradictions within the peasantry cannot be effectively addressed until democratic state power has been consolidated.

Money-Lenders and Middlemen
Money-lending is pervasive in the peasant economy. There is no distinct class of money-lenders, although some rich peasants and traders are engaged in it more systematically than others. It is an activity that follows patron-client networks. Peasants at all levels borrow money to pay for urgent outlays, for production, social obligations, emergencies. The further up the scale, the more will borrowing be linked to investment, e.g. buying land and inputs, hiring labour. The further down, the more it will be linked to problems of survival, borrowing crops during the hungry season before the new harvest. In the context of existing social relations, ‘cancelling of debts to money-lenders’ is unpracticable and utopian. Money-lending is exploitative but in the foreseeable future there are no political forces capable of providing an alternative to those exploitative relations and the crude ‘social security’ provided by patron-client relations.
Money-lending and crop trading are closely linked through the system of pre-harvest cash advances. Can the middlemen be eliminated? This demand has been formulated in a particularly poignant manner in the Green Paper on the State of the Nigerian Economy produced primarily by members of the BMMC (PRP) group. Middlemen buy cheaply to hoard and to sell dearly:

By parasitically sucking those who produce and those who consume, these middlemen prevent the growth of the internal market for domestic agricultural products.

The Green Paper calls for the complete elimination of all middlemen 'of whatever type' and the 'systematic reorganisation of the whole system of domestic distribution and commerce in foodstuff and all commodities derived from agricultural products.' As well documented in Clough's studies of grain marketing in southern Katsina, crops are handled by a wide range of traders, many of whom also are producers. It involves inter-rural wholesalers, urban merchants and retailers in rural and urban markets. Crops are stored over time and moved over long distances in response to 'changes, within and between seasons and in the supply and demand for food in different places'. The belief that a 'handful of middlemen' are responsible for the problems faced by producers and consumers is a mystification. Although some conspicuous middlemen may be identified, only a small part of the total volume of crops in storage and circulation is handled by such 'big shots'. The belief that middlemen can be replaced by integrated associations of producers and traders is likely to cause disruption in production and trade and will be of no benefit to consumers. It is likely to lead to new forms of monopolistic constraints and enhance profiteering by a new class of middlemen: the functionaries of such state sponsored organisations. This does not rule out a useful role for marketing cooperatives.

Cooperatives and Input Distribution
The Left has criticised various state schemes involved in the distribution of production inputs and services (fertilisers, tractors, extension, credits) for discriminating in favour of non-peasant farmers and, within the peasant communities, in favour of the rich. Some have argued that more support for cooperatives will help democratise distribution. Others maintain that cooperatives cannot be expected to perform such democratic functions as they themselves are instruments of the rich peasants. Some therefore propose elaborate new organisations which should look after the interests of the mass of the peasantry. Whatever their formal structure, such new organisations, however, are likely to reflect the balance of power within the peasant communities and the society at large. Reorganisation will serve little purpose unless that balance has shifted significantly in favour of the poor peasants. The scope for organising the poor peasants (in opposition to the rich) or for intervening on their behalf is very limited. But this does not rule out useful democratic struggles. First of all, cooperatives and other peasant organisations, while dominated by the better-off, can serve general peasant interests in redirecting such inputs, services, and credits away from the non-peasant farmers, the businessmen, military officers, civil servants, who are appropriating a growing share of such public goods. This struggle can be pursued on an all-peasants platform without challenging the dominance of the rich peasants in such organisations. Clough has shown how rich peasants played a leading role in community protests against the way in which fertilisers were
distributed in the Funtua A.D.P. There is scope for democratic struggles for reform within peasant organisations in order to widen access, again without confrontation on class lines, emphasising more equitable distribution. It may do little to alter basic inequalities in power and access to resources. Yet, the use of input distribution to reinforce the power of the already powerful may at least be restrained. The undemocratic nature of most cooperative organisations does not prevent them from being a useful arena for democratic agitation and politisation. An All-Peasants Front Against State and Capitalist Land Grabbing Large-scale land alienation to private companies and settlers was discouraged by the colonial state, fearful of political costs and satisfied with the commercial performance of the peasantry. The state established legal prerogatives in land but they were not enforced for agricultural purposes on any significant scale. The late colonial period and early post-colonial period saw some scattered private and state plantations (groundnuts, oil palm, rubber), but it was only with the accelerated commercialisation of food production and the drive for new industrial crops that land became a major political issue. The current import squeeze has reinforced the pressure on land as agro-based industries (textiles, breweries, flour mills, feed mills, vegetable oils and detergents) have been forced to look for domestic supplies of raw materials. River Basin Development Authorities have been given wide-ranging powers to acquire and develop land under irrigation and for rainfed agriculture. They have served as intermediaries for capitalist 'tenant' farmers, companies and individuals who have secured long-term leases on such state schemes (Amale 1986). State irrigation schemes, even when intended for peasant small-holders, have caused havoc to peasant communities, creating fresh openings for capitalist penetration. World Bank sponsored 'rural development' schemes (ADPs), also designed for small-holders, have been magnets for capitalist farmers who have bought up land in scheduled project areas in expectation of special access to project resources. Project officials have established themselves as large-scale farmers in their own right.

Private capital has entered agriculture also independently of state schemes but with state financial and legal backing. The Nigerian Agricultural and Cooperative Bank has invested heavily, especially in poultry and maize farming. Central Bank regulations have pushed commercial banks into rural lending and the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme has bolstered commercial investment. The Land Use Decree of 1978, ostensibly introduced to protect farmers' land rights, has greatly facilitated the alienation of peasant lands for private projects.

Ruling class assault on peasant land rights has opened up a new frontier of popular struggles in Nigeria. Land alienation has met with peasant resistance, most dramatically in Bakolori, where large numbers of peasants were killed by the police in 1980 after many months of militant opposition to a state irrigation scheme. The confrontation of the peasants of Tau in Gongola State and the Al-Hilal company is a recent example of a new type of conflict between land grabbers and a displaced local population.

The threat to peasants' land comes primarily from outside the peasant communities, from state agencies and from private individuals and companies backed by the state. Foreign consultants, management agents and suppliers are closely involved. It creates an opening for a broad alliance of local class forces opposed to such penetration. Some rich peasants are, of course, busy striking their own deals with the penetrating forces, taking advantage of state legal protection
and finance to grab land at the expense of the community. Some have graduated into a class of large capitalist farmers, with 'Certificates of Occupancy', signed by the Governor, deposited as collateral with the banks. Some new farmers that descend on the peasantry from vantage points in business and public office can claim local roots and are able to draw on local patron-client networks. Loyalties and battle lines are therefore not clear cut. Even rich peasants, however, are resentful of outside capitalist farmers because of their superior access to the state and would at least find it difficult to oppose an all-peasant line of defence against such outside encroachment. Some may even offer leadership.

Dangers and Limitations of the All-Peasants Strategy: Conclusions

Will not an all-peasants strategy play into the hands of bourgeois class forces within the peasantry? Will not such forces grow stronger with time, making them even more difficult to dislodge? Does the strategy not mean abandoning the poor peasants who are both most oppressed and most likely to ally with the working class? It is true that bourgeois forces are likely to grow stronger. The problem is that forces capable of dislodging them at an earlier point are not strong enough. Premature attempts are bound to backfire. Yet, the development of bourgeois forces generates simultaneously their own counter forces. As contradictions intensify, the identity of the poor peasants as an autonomous social force grows. This may smack of a 'let contradictions mature' type of wait-and-see position, of which Marxists are often accused. The scope for immediate struggles, however, is wide. The fight against state and capitalist penetration on an all-peasants platform, apart from protecting peasants land rights, serves a vital role in obstructing the incorporation of the commercially oriented peasantry onto a bourgeois political platform. It goes hand in hand with the containment of the rising agrarian bourgeoisie.

Why not allow capitalism to have its course? If large-scale capitalist agriculture is allowed to expand, will it not facilitate the transition to socialism? Accelerated proletarianisation strengthens anti-capitalist forces in the countryside. The socialisation of large private plantations can provide a point of departure for socialist agriculture. Such a 'capitalist road' to socialism, however, is bound to further depress the conditions of the peasantry. The capitalist sector depends on special access to scarce resources. The peasantry will be correspondingly deprived. Dependence on large-scale capitalist agriculture also increases the vulnerability of the revolutionary process. A landed bourgeoisie is unlikely to offer cooperation and can cause much obstruction. It will be difficult to uphold productivity on collectivised plantations. An all-peasants line, on the other hand, seeks to protect the income and commercial potential of a broad peasant middle ground. It stands a better chance of cushioning the revolutionary process, both economically and politically. It is not a question of 'abandoning' the poor peasants in order to accommodate the better off. I see it more as recognising the limited capacity for democratic state intervention on the side of the poor peasants, especially in the early stages of a transition. It does not rule out, as I have tried to show, efforts to promote poor peasants interests, for instance, in the distribution of public goods and services. There is an unlimited scope for persistent democratic struggle in these fields without pushing the rich peasants into class confrontation where they are bound to rally large sections of the peasantry on the side of the bourgeoisie.

The carefully studied experience of such limited struggles can lay the basis for
more decisive attacks on rural inequalities and exploitation, once a wider political
basis for such intervention has been created through the control of state power
and strategic economic sectors by the democratic forces.

Notes
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Development Theory and Reality: The World Bank in Northern Ivory Coast

Thomas J. Bassett

The 'complementarity thesis' is that food production will benefit from the promotion of an export crop. Critics of this thesis maintain that export crops compete with food crops. Bassett argues that outcomes can only be understood in the light of the specific agrarian and political-economic contexts in which such policies may be applied. The case of cotton in northern Ivory Coast demonstrates the issues.

In the wake of two major famines in sub-Saharan Africa within the past fifteen years, one would think that the old export-oriented models of agricultural development would be replaced by new approaches emphasizing food crops. A review of the World Bank's development trilogy for sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 1981; 1983; 1984) suggests, however, that the old models still prevail. In these reports, the Bank maintains that most African countries have distinct comparative advantages in export crop production, and consequently, that governments should raise export crop prices to encourage producers to increase their output.

In response to its critics (Lappe & Collins; Mkandawire; Payer) who argue that the expansion of agricultural exports often comes at the expense of domestic food production, the Bank alleges that a 'complementarity' exists between export crop and food crop production. Indeed, in Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, the first and most controversial report of its trilogy, the Bank recommended that rural development projects seeking to promote food crop production "should be built around a commercial lead crop".* In this view, food production is seen as benefiting from the 'trickle down' effects of improved packages, agricultural mechanization and institutional arrangements developed in favour of exports. In sum, according to the World Bank, food crops should grow in the shadow of export crops.

Both the World Bank and the 'food first' advocates exaggerate (to opposite extremes) the impact of export crop production on food crops. Lappe and Collins,

*The term "commercial crop" can refer to both food and non-food crops produced for either the domestic or world market. The prominence given by the World Bank to commercial crops as foreign exchange earners suggests that when the Bank refers to commercial agriculture it means export agriculture of both non-staple food (e.g. fruits, coffee) and non-food crops (cotton, rubber). In this paper, food crops refer to staple foods like corn and rice.
for example, discuss the relationship between hunger and Third World agricultural systems in terms of food crops versus non-food crops. In their view, fewer people would be hungry if land devoted to export agriculture was planted in food crops for domestic consumption. The World Bank argues, conversely, that food and export crops are neither competitive nor substitutes in production but are complementary and merges the two sub-sectors into a 'dynamic agriculture' in which both food and non-food crops benefit alike. In taking these extreme positions, both groups fail to examine what is actually taking place in peasant farming systems in which exports are given priority over food. The food first approach will not consider the possibility that people are perhaps better off nutritionally as a result of export crop production. Similarly, the World Bank appears to be blind to the conflicts and transmutations occurring in agricultural systems in which commercial crops vigorously compete with food crops. What is needed, clearly, are analyses of peasant agricultural systems in different agrarian and political-economic contexts in which the repercussions of agricultural policies can be examined.

The following discussion focuses on the World Bank's complementarity thesis in light of the results of a Bank-funded rural development project in northern Ivory Coast that expressly aimed to integrate food crops into the Ivorian cotton development programme. I argue that the complementarity between food crops and cotton is weak due to a number of institutional and technical constraints which give rise to food and export crop competition rather than complementarity. This article also attempts to advance the food crop/export crop complementarity/competition debate by arguing that it is a question which can only be answered in the context of (1) a government's agricultural policies and its interventions in the export crop and food crop sectors, (2) how rural households respond to these policies and interventions and (3) a host of agro-ecological and socio-economic variables which can facilitate or constrain increased agricultural output.

The Complementarity Thesis
The World Bank discusses the complementarity thesis in Accelerated Development in a section on agricultural price policies. To improve the balance of payments situations of African economies, the Bank supports a policy of increasing producer prices for export crops as a means of encouraging exports and increasing foreign exchange earnings. In light of the apparent decline in per capita food production in sub-Saharan Africa during the 1970s, the Bank defends its promotion of export crops by arguing that actions taken in their favour will also benefit food crops. Indeed, the major premise of the complementarity thesis is the notion that 'the benefits of a changing, dynamic agriculture are not restricted to a single crop or set of crops. When change accelerates, the productivity of the whole farming system also increases' (World Bank 1981, 63).

A complementarity between crops is said to exist in at least four areas. First, food crops grown in rotation with export crops supposedly benefit from the 'after-effects' of fertilizers applied to the 'commercial lead crop.' Second, food production is believed to benefit from technology introduced to intensify export crops. Third, food crop producers would benefit from institutional arrangements such as extension, input supply and marketing services created for export crop producers. Fourth, the Bank argues that if households become involved in export production to the extent that they experience food shortfalls, this is not necessarily
bad. Food deficits in export cropping zones are viewed positively since they are considered to be an impetus for the development of local and regional food markets.

The co-authors of *Accelerated Development* continue to defend the complementarity thesis in various forums. For example, Elliot Berg (1984) has argued that there are 'strong empirical and analytical reasons for believing that food and export crops are complementary, not competitive.' Please and Amoako (1984) argue that the 'evidence suggests that domestic food production and export production are complementary not substitutes.' Rolf Gusten similarly denies that any trade-off exists between the two and concludes that 'food crops versus export crops is an imaginary confrontation.'

According to Gusten, the soundness of the complementarity thesis is based on 'strong correlations' of computations performed for forty-five sub-Saharan African countries. The evidence that they present appears to be ambiguous at best. It is indeed strange that the co-authors are currently espousing the strength of data which they previously admitted (in a footnote in *Accelerated Development*, pp.62-63) was rather weak. Unless there were errors in the initial analyses and a reworking of the data has taken place, one must assume that the co-authors have, over time, tended to inflate their originally inconclusive evidence.

In the absence of a sound empirical basis for their position, the authors appear to have fallen back on 'trickle down' theory to support the complementarity thesis. Specifically, they continue to argue that 'a dynamic agriculture will progress on all fronts, food and non-food alike' (Berg 1986, 56) and that 'if the efficiency of the institutional and other arrangements established to increase export agriculture could be increased, this could, in addition, result in increased food output' (Please and Amoako, 1986, 134). Yet one cannot assume that a dynamic export crop sector will automatically have a positive effect on food crops. This is clearly an empirical issue which must at the very least examine the position of food crops within the export-oriented farming system in question. On a more general level, one must also consider the political-economic context of state interventions in the agricultural sector to appreciate the institutional constraints placed on rural producers from expanding food crop production. In short, unless peasant farmers have the incentives and capacity to intensify food production and, secondly, African states are both committed to and capable of promoting food crop development, it is unlikely that any improvements will be made in this area despite the dynamism of export crop production.

The Development of Cotton in Ivory Coast
Along with Chad and Mali, Ivory Coast is one of the top three francophone African producers of cotton. It is grown in the northern and central savanna regions of the country where an estimated 45% of the cultivated area is in cotton. In 1985-86, there were close to 110,000 growers cultivating cotton on an average field size of 1.3 hectares. It is an entirely rain fed crop that is little mechanised. Tractors are used by less than 1% of the growers and account for just 4% of the cotton area. Animal traction is employed by 13% of cotton growing households on 25% of the area. Manual techniques predominate with 86% of growers using short-handled hoes on 70% on the cotton area.
Figure 1 illustrates the geographic distribution of cotton in Ivory Coast. Eighty-one per cent of the cotton is cultivated as a single cycle crop. In the area of two growing seasons, cotton is often planted as a second cycle crop preceded in most cases by either corn or peanuts. In 1985 cotton was grown as a second cycle crop in 19% of the total cotton area in Ivory Coast.*

Cotton was promoted (by force) as an export crop by French textile interests and colonial officials as early as 1913. However, yields and total production remained extremely low throughout the colonial period. It was not until the early 1960s that

*A single cycle crop is one that is grown without another crop preceding or following it in the same field during the agricultural year. In areas where two crops are grown successively in the same field, the first crop is called the "first cycle crop" while the second is referred to as the "second cycle crop". In those areas of central Ivory Coast where cotton is grown as a second cycle crop, it is usually preceded by corn on 65% of the area or by peanuts (34%).
the French Company for the Development of Textile Fibers (CFDT) in collaboration with the French Cotton and Textile Fibers Research Institute (IRCT) introduced a new cotton variety which responded well to fertilizers and pesticides. Between 1961 and 1985, yields increased tenfold while total production of seed cotton increased by a factor of fifty. In 1973, the Ivorian state took a more active role in cotton development by joining with CFDT in forming the Ivorian Company for the Development of Textile Fibers (CIDT) in which the Ivorian government owned 55% share in equity to CFDTs 45%.

The Ivorian government has been interested in promoting cotton for essentially two reasons. The first was and still is largely political. During the 1960s, household incomes in the south were seven times higher than in the north. In an attempt to reduce this disparity in regional incomes and thus to maintain political stability, the state promoted cotton as the cash crop of the savanna. According to Marcussen and Torp, this income levelling objective has only partially succeeded since the regional inequalities in income were 5:1 in the late 1970s. A second and continuous concern of the Ivorian state has been the economic role of cotton growers in the expansion of the industrial sector in which the state is a major investor (52%). The objective has been for cotton growers to furnish the essential raw material at subsidized rates to the nation's nascent textile industry. In 1983, cotton producers subsidized the fiber purchases of three textile firms to the amount of $9 million.

How does the state and CFDT manage to transfer these surpluses from peasants to their enterprises? The most important mechanism is the intervention of the parastatal (CIDT) in the organisation of cotton production and marketing. In an arrangement not unlike contract farming, peasants must sign up with CIDT extension agents in order to receive subsidized inputs and credit. Cotton growers must then follow a rigorous cropping calendar which involves the close supervision of extension agents at certain periods in the agricultural calendar (e.g. land preparation and pesticide applications). The Ivorian marketing board (CAISTAB) fixes the price for cotton at the beginning of the year and CFDT enjoys a marketing monopoly. Between 1976 and 1979, cotton growers received 20-25% of the F.O.B. price for cotton. Through its marketing contracts and its role in controlling cotton extension and ginning, CFDT continues to profit from the expansion of cotton in Ivory Coast (Campbell 1984).

In summary, the Ivorian state in conjunction with foreign agribusiness promotes yet taxes heavily peasant cotton production to subsidize the expansion of the industrial sector. This extraction of surpluses from commodity producers blocks the emergence of enterprising agrarian capitalists who might invest in agriculture. The state must, therefore, step in to transform the agricultural sector through its various rural development programmes which are often financed by the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique and the World Bank.

**The Cotton Areas Rural Development Project**

The World Bank became involved in the Ivorian cotton and food crop development programme when it approved a loan of $31 million for the Ivory Coast Cotton Areas Rural Development Project (1975-1981). Although including many components (from improving village water supplies and feeder roads to constructing a new cotton gin), the major thrust of the project was to promote the combined improvement and expansion of cotton and food crops in the savanna region. It was perceived by the World Bank and the government of Ivory Coast as a new...
stage in the Ivorian cotton programme due to the new emphasis placed on the intensification of food crops as well as cotton. Three specific goals of the food crop/cotton component were (1) an increase in cotton area by 20,000 hectares, (2) an increase in the improved food crop area by 60,000 hectares and (3) an increase in the number of oxen for animal traction by 16,000 head. The project was managed by CIDT, which in 1978 was designated the rural development agency of the savanna region.

In the Bank's final evaluation of the project, it was noted that cotton area and production had increased far beyond project estimates. For example, the area under cotton had increased by 50,000 hectares rather than the projected 20,000 hectares. The number of oxen teams operating in the area also surpassed project estimates by 64%. However, when it came to food crops, the Bank could not determine with any assurance that an intensification of production had taken place. The criteria used by CIDT to determine 'intensification' were so general that its food crop data were misleading. For example, extension agents simply asked cotton growers how many hectares they had in food crops and then recorded this area as 'improved.' The Bank itself admitted that a 'clear competition' between crops existed during the project period. Citing the case of rice, the Bank noted that the monetary return to rice producers was greater (by 20%) than the return per person day for cotton growers at the beginning of the project. However, by the end of the project, cotton had become the more remunerative crop. The combination of high subsidy levels for cotton and the depressing effect of cheap rice imports on internal food markets dissuaded farmers from intensifying rice production. In fact, given the existing subsidies to cotton producers and rice consumers, it made economic sense to grow cotton and to buy rice (Eponou 1985, 178).

What went wrong? Why wasn't the complementarity thesis borne out? By examining more closely those areas in which, the Bank argued, one would find food crops benefiting from actions taken in favour of the commercial lead crop - in this case cotton - we can see the weaknesses of the complementarity thesis.

Complementarity No.1: The Trickle Down Fertilizer Hypothesis

According to the Bank, food crops should benefit from the 'after effects' of fertilizer applied to cotton in the crop rotation pattern. Two points can be made in regard to this supposition. First, the Bank assumes that farmers alternate food with cotton in their crop rotations. On the basis of a farming systems study undertaken with a randomly selected sample of thirty-eight households in the village of Katiali*, I found that in only 25% of the cases ('Rotation 2') were food crops alternating with cotton (Table 1). In more than half of the cases ('Rotation 1'), food crops were not cultivated until the fifth or sixth year. Although some fields were cultivated for as long as ten years, most were put into fallow after the seventh or eighth years due to declining soil fertility and the excessive labour demands involved in weeding. In a small percentage of cases, the rotation pattern excluded cotton ('Rotation 3'). This last but least common crop succession pattern was the dominant rotation in the early 1960s before the intensification of cotton took place in the region. What

*Katiali is a village of more than 1800 people from three different ethnic groups, roughly half Senufo and half Dyyula with the Fulani comprising a distinct minority. Lying approximately 60k northwest of Korhogo, the Katiali region lies within the transition zone between the sub-humid guinea and drier soudanian zones.
is significant here is the displacement of food crops from the head to the end of the rotation in more than half the cases. Cotton benefits from both natural soil fertility and chemical fertilizers while in just 25% of the cases, food crops benefit from the residual effects of fertilizers. Peltre-Wurtz and Steck observed similar changes and trade-offs in crop rotation patterns south of Kassere in the Boundiali region.

Table 1. Major Crop Rotation Pattern, Katiali, Côte d'Ivoire (1981)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rotation 1</th>
<th>Rotation 2</th>
<th>Rotation 3</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>cotton</td>
<td>cotton</td>
<td>food</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
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<td>3rd</td>
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<td>4th</td>
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<td>food</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>food/cotton</td>
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In the central and western cotton growing areas where cotton is grown as a second cycle crop, food crops (corn and peanuts) apparently benefit from the after-effects of fertilizer applied to cotton in the preceding year. For example, Ahn and Gillonneau (pp.26-40) note the dominant crop rotation pattern in the Katiola region as a three-to-four year succession of corn and cotton (first and second cycles respectively) after an initial crop of yams at the head of the rotation. The corn crop reportedly captures some of the fertilizer used on cotton the year before. In the cotton growing areas of southern Togo, Schwartz (pp.14-15) observed a similar complementary relationship between corn and cotton planted successively in the same field in an area of two rainy seasons. The plateau region in which this occurs accounts, however, for less than 10% of the total cotton area in Togo. In sum, although there are instances in which food crops appear to benefit from the after-effects of fertilizers applied to cotton, this appears to happen on only a small percentage of the total cotton area in these two countries.

Second, in making its case for the trickle down fertilizer hypothesis, the Bank assumes that the after-effects of fertilizers applied to tropical soils are always beneficial. In northern Ivory Coast, it has been shown that the quantity and type of fertilizer used in the cotton programme tends to accelerate the acidification of the savanna soils (Sement 1980). One result of this process is the proliferation of weeds after just two years of cotton cultivation. The responses of cotton growing households to the increased labour demand associated with the weeding problem depends on their access to productive resources. The increasing recourse to herbicides (21% of cotton area, 10% of corn and 24% of rainfed rice area in 1985) reflects the attempts of some households to deal with the weeding bottleneck.

A number of other reasons can be cited which might help to explain why more than half of the households in the Katiali region are not following the Bank's ideal crop rotation model. First, peasant farmers note that it takes more than one year for the residual effects of cotton fertilizers to build up in the soil as in 'Rotation 2'. They therefore wait until the third year before planting food crops. Second, households employing ox-drawn ploughs must spend more time clearing their fields, especially in uprooting trees, than households farming manually. Since oxen are most often used in cotton fields, peasant farmers prefer to grow cotton in the same field year after year to save labour that would have to go into clearing another field. Third, food crops are in most cases intercropped in the area, some food crops
might be planted later in the rotation because the weeding problem is partly reduced. Fourth, it is possible that the use of herbicides allows farmers to obtain good food crop yields late in the rotation. Finally, the dominant crop rotations might reflect the attempts of cotton growers to obtain the highest yields possible by taking advantage of natural soil fertility and fewer weeds earlier in the rotation. Whatever the reasons, and they are sure to vary among regions and groups throughout sub-Saharan Africa, cotton has replaced food crops at the most favoured place in the crop rotation in northern Ivory Coast.

Complementarity No.2: Commercial Cropping and the Mechanization of Agriculture
The second argument advanced by the World Bank in support of its complementarity thesis asserts that food crops benefit from technology introduced to expand export crop production. One of the more successful components of the Cotton Areas Rural Development Project was the expansion of animal traction within the cotton growing areas. The question that needs to be asked, however, is to what extent have food crops benefited from ox-drawn cultivation.

In terms of area under cultivation, animal traction has generally benefited cotton more than food crops. For example, households going from manual to ox-drawn cultivation increased their cropping area, on average, by 1.3 hectares. Most of this additional area (81%) is planted in cotton. Moreover, the adoption of animal traction has not led to any increase in labour productivity. Households farming manually or employing oxen cultivate, on average, 0.8 hectares per active worker (Kientz, p.11). It is likely that the major factors constraining increases in productivity have to do with seasonal labour bottlenecks in the farming system.

In contrast to the productivity obstacles faced by ox-plough farmers, the recent introduction of small, twenty-five horsepower tractors through CIDT's Intermediate Motorization Programme has led to increases in both food output and area cultivated per active worker. Labour productivity, on average, doubles with the adoption of these tractors, increasing from 0.8 to 1.7 hectares per active worker. According to CIDT, in 1985-86 the average area cultivated by small tractor owners amounted to 25.8 hectares. Forty-five per cent of this area was in cotton and the remaining 55% in food crops.

At this time, tractor owners comprise less that 1% of cotton growers and account for less than 4% of total cotton output. Due to expensive start up and maintenance costs and the requirement that potential tractor owners must have at least eight active workers in their 'household', very few households qualify for this particular programme. Those that do qualify enjoy substantial rents in the form of government land clearing subsidies ($35,000 for clearing thirty hectares) and duty free tractors (8% of tractor cost). The land clearing subsidy alone is more than triple the cost of the tractor itself ($10,000) and represents an extraordinary subsidy to the relatively wealthy progressive farmer. It appears that these fields are being abandoned after seven to eight years of intensive cultivation due to the problem of soil acidification. In the end, the heavy subsidization of the programme, high tractor maintenance costs and the agro-ecological limits to its sustainability are all likely to curtail the expansion of this programme in the near future.

Complementarity No.3: Export Crops and the Creation of Regional Food Markets
The World Bank argues in a Panglossian fashion that even if households engage in export production to the extent that they experience food shortfalls, this is not necessarily bad. In fact, food deficits in export cropping zones are viewed in a positive light since they are seen as contributing to the development of local and regional markets for food crops. Here again, the Bank makes erroneous assumptions about the organisation of food production and marketing.

A study of food purchases by the heads of thirty-eight households in 1981-82 in Katiali revealed that five and one-half months of the daily caloric needs of the residents of these households were purchased. Sixty per cent of the total caloric value of the food purchased was in the form of rice which originated in Burma, Thailand and China - not from regional or national markets.

Complementarity No.4: Services and Subsidies for Export Crops Also Benefit Food Crops
The fourth and final element of the World Bank's complementarity thesis posits that extension, input supply and marketing services established for export crops also benefit food producers. In the case of northern Ivory Coast, CIDT's intervention in the agricultural sector is clearly biased towards cotton. For example, cotton growers receive free seeds, pesticides and between 1977-1983 free fertilizers. CIDT also offers a guaranteed price, a well organised market and easy credit to cotton growers. None of these incentives were provided to food producers over the project period. Although 'improved' food crop packages were available for corn and rice from extension agents, yields were not significantly higher than local intercropped varieties. On the basis of this clearly unattractive food crop package alone, it is not surprising that farmers were not eager to adopt it.

Other institutional biases favouring cotton over food crops were apparent in discussions with various people involved in food crop development. Interviews in the summer of 1986 with CIDT extension agents at the village level, with officials at the Ministry of Rural Development and CIDT as well as with economists at the World Bank's regional office in Abidjan, made it clear that CIDT is not committed to the development of food crops. Since they do not contribute to its profits and it is possible that their development will lead to a decline in cotton output, most informants agreed that it is simply not in CIDT's interests to promote food crops in the cotton growing areas. In at least one case, CIDT refused to extend credit to rice growers in the Samatigulla area of northwestern Ivory Coast unless they agreed to grow cotton as well as rice. When the peasants refused to grow cotton, CIDT extension agents ended their work in the area.

As part of its national food self-sufficiency programme launched in 1984, the Ivorian government has begun to encourage the intensification of food crops by offering free seeds and not-so-guaranteed prices for rice (80FCFA/Kg) and corn (40FCFA/Kg). A recent study on farming systems in the Korhogo region indicates that less than 16% of a sample of 120 households were utilizing the food crop packages promoted by CIDT. In addition to the unimpressive yields and relatively high monetary costs associated with this 'modernisation programme', another reason why the food crop programme has not taken off is because traditional food grains such as millet and sorghum are excluded from CIDT's extension programme (Eponou, pp.175-76).
Uneven Development and Agrarian Change

The idea that a 'dynamic agriculture' will benefit food and non-food crops alike is argued by the World Bank in Accelerated Development on the basis of convincing evidence based on nearly fifty farm management studies that in most areas a substantial expansion of export production was superimposed on the traditional farming system in such a way that the level of food production for subsistence was maintained (World Bank 1981,63).

The evidence cited by the Bank is reportedly contained in John Cleave's African Farmers, an intriguing comparative study of labour bottlenecks in agricultural systems in which cash crops have been introduced into subsistence-oriented farming systems. What is illuminating about Cleave's study are the many examples in which the labour demands of commercial crops conflict with those of subsistence production. The complex adjustments made by farmers to these competing labour demands is reflected in changes in crop mixes and ratios, labour allocation patterns and different factor combinations. It is only after such adjustments have been made that a semblance of complementarity can be detected in some of his case studies. In the end, one is impressed not by the complementarity of food crops and export crops but by the synergetic effects of labour bottlenecks on the transformation of the entire production system.

There are, however, major differences in the responses of peasants to labour bottlenecks in Cleave's case studies to those of cotton growers in Ivory Coast. In northern Uganda, Tanzania and Sudan, the priority given to food crops by farmers resulted in the late and staggered planting of cotton. Consequently, cotton yields were lower in these situations than if it had been planted within the dates recommended by extension agents. Cleave concludes, paradoxically, that cotton growers 'successfully integrated' cotton into their farming systems by 'ignoring technical recommendations'. In the case of Ivory Coast, CIDT closely regulates the conditions of cotton production through its control over inputs and marketing. Cotton growers must follow the cropping calendar recommended by CIDT extension agents if they wish to continue receiving their services and subsidies in the future. The planting, pesticide spraying and harvesting dates, in particular, are closely monitored by extension agents and followed by growers. Through such interventions into a largely subsistence-oriented agricultural system, CIDT's cotton programme exacerbates existing labour supply tensions by fostering new conflicts in the scheduling of labour time between food crops and cotton.

The results of a labour allocation study conducted in 1981-82 and the summer of 1986 revealed the existence of four peak labour periods in the agricultural calendar. Bottlenecks were observed at the beginning of the rainy season during the preparation and planting of fields, midway through the rainy season during the weeding of fields, and towards the end of the rainy season during the harvest of upland and lowland food crops and cotton. A fourth peak period involving mainly women was observed during the swamp rice transplanting period of late July, early August.

The severity of these bottlenecks and the responses of peasant farmers to them depends on a number of factors. Environmental conditions such as the distribution of rainfall and soil quality can strongly influence the acuity of bottleneck periods. Adjustments to these peak labour periods largely depends on the socio-economic standing of individual households. Households with access to many active workers or to cash that will enable the substitution of capital for labour will be in a better
position to cope with bottlenecks than resource poor households. Some adjustments that have been particularly widespread have involved (1) the abandonment of certain labour intensive crops like yams and millet, the labour requirements of which conflict with those of cotton, (2) crop neglect such as skipping or delaying certain tasks like weeding and harvesting food crops, (3) the decline in area cultivated by women as the area in cotton per active worker increases and (4) technological innovations such as the adoption of animal traction and the use of herbicides. In contrast to the World Bank's thesis, the transformation of the farming system is taking place not as the result of a complementarity between food crops and cotton but due to conflicts generated by the uneven development of crops within the farming system.

In Ivory Coast these conflicts are heightened by high rates of outmigration of young men from the savanna to the forest region. According to Fargues, between 1975 and 1980 half of the men in the age group 20-29 had emigrated from rural areas in the north, mainly to the coffee and cocoa growing regions around Segueule, Bouafle and Daloa. Demographic surveys undertaken in Katiali in 1981 and 1986 show a similar loss of active young workers, especially males in the 22-35 age group. The absence of this important segment of the agricultural labour force severely undermines the capacity of households in Katiali to cope with peak labour periods.

The most important question is, however, what has been the impact of the intensification of cotton on food output? According to the available data, per capita food production in northern Ivory Coast has either stagnated or declined since the 1960s. The unreliability of CIDT's crop production data makes it difficult to determine specific rates of change by crop and region. Most of the available data are aggregated at the national level. The World Bank (1981, p.167) reports that per capita food production in Ivory Coast declined by 0.9% between 1969-1979. For cereal production, Ridler (p.415) notes that per capita production declined from a base of 100 in 1974-76 to 77 in 1983. Eponou's data on food production for 1984 based on the crop yields of 120 households in eight different villages throughout the Korhogo region is the most reliable source of information for a specific year in the cotton growing areas. Rainfall was generally good to excellent that year (CIDT, p.23). Taking into consideration that portion of the harvest selected for seeds and lost to pests, Eponou calculates that sufficient food was available to the residents of the average household based on its subsistence production. Working with a sample stratified by cultivation technique (i.e. manual, animal traction and tractors), his findings should be representative of households of different income status. According to Eponou, food security was only an issue for those cotton growing households farming less than three hectares - an area well below the average 5.20 hectares of households relying on manual techniques.

On the one hand, Eponou's data seem to support Cleave's contention that subsistence production is maintained in agricultural systems that have experienced an expansion in export crop production. Yet his data also indicates 'frequent' grain purchases by the households in his study. Specific quantities of grain purchased and the caloric value of these foods are not provided. Nevertheless, there appears to be a contradiction between the claim of household food self-sufficiency and the observation of frequent food purchases by these same households. This subsistence paradox can be explained in a number of ways. First, as Eponou points out, due to the high subsidy offered to rice consumers up until 1984, rice producers were better off selling their grain at one point in the year and buying subsidized...
My own data on rice and corn purchases in Katiali in 1981 and 1985 suggests that socio-economic status, ethnicity and insufficient food production were important variables in the pattern of food purchases. Table 2 shows the varying importance of rice and corn purchases for a sample of thirty-eight households in Katiali for 1981 and 1985-86. The caloric value in consumer man equivalents of only bulk grain purchases are shown*. In 1981 each household bought on average seven sacks of rice (50kg per sack) and two sacks of corn (100kg per sack). For the average household, these purchases represented the equivalent of five and one-half months of daily food consumption for each of its residents. Grain purchases in 1985-86 were one-third the 1981 level. The average household purchased three and one-half sacks of rice and one-half sack of corn. These purchases represented close to two months of the daily food needs for the residents of the average household.

*Staple foods purchased at local markets in smaller quantities than 50 and 100 kilogram sacks are important especially for Dyula households. The results of a household budget study conducted with seven households show that the Senufo spent, on average, 9,188 FCFA on local food purchases while the Dyula average amounted to 36,825 FCFA. It is likely that poor households, often cannot afford to buy an entire sack of grain, account for the bulk of these local food purchases. However, with such a small sample size, one cannot draw any conclusions on this point.
These average statistics for the entire village mask important differences in the degree to which staple food purchases vary among ethnic and economic groups. Senufo households purchased less food than Dyula households in both years. The Senufo bought, on average, 68 and 39 days worth of food in 1981 and 1985-86 respectively. Grain purchases for the Dyula fulfilled 192 and 67 days of household food needs during the same years. These average statistics also conceal the strains that staple food purchases place on middle income and poor households whose purchases are significantly greater than those of relatively wealthy households. Such differences in ethnicity and income status are variables that play important mediating roles in the capacity of households to adjust to the inroads made on subsistence production by their involvement in the cotton programme.

Figure 2 shows the seasonality of food purchases for 38 households in Katiali in 1981 and 1985-86. It is interesting to note the similarities and differences in the peak purchase periods represented in the graph. In both years, a peak is noticeable during the dry season months of March and April. The dry season is a period commonly reserved for celebrating week-long marriages among the Dyula and for performing ‘ritual’ funerals among the Senufo which last for a minimum of three days. Both events involve the consumption of large quantities of food. For example, one Dyula household purchased 10 sacks of rice (50kg per sack), two sacks of millet (100kg per sack) and two sacks of corn (100kg per sack) for a marriage ceremony in April of 1985. In all, 38% of all bulk food purchases in 1985 were for major cultural events (funerals, marriages and the Moslem fast period of Ramadan). This recourse to the market for meeting ceremonial food needs indicates that some households are not growing sufficient food for these occasions. Thus, one might argue following Eponou that although the development of cotton has not been at the expense of the subsistence requirements of individuals belonging to cotton growing households, it has made a significant inroad into the ceremonial portion of household food stores. By viewing a household’s food needs within its large socio-cultural context, the case of Katiali suggests that one must be careful about generalizing about the issues of ‘food security’ or the ‘needs of simple reproduction’ when evaluating the impact of expanded commodity production on household food needs.

The peak during the months of June, July and August in 1981 reflects at least two tendencies. First, the problem of pre-harvest food deficits among middle and low income households forces these households to purchase grain on the market. Second, food purchases during this period are made by high and middle income households to feed off-farm labourers the obligatory midday meal. The third peak visible in the month of September (1985) coincides with the beginning of the harvest labour bottleneck. Bulk food purchases during this labour intensive period are aimed at feeding both household and non-household agricultural labourers.

These data covering two years of food purchases strongly suggest that subsistence production levels vary from year to year as well as among households. Although hardly an adequate time series in which do view medium to long-term trends in food production, the data so point to the need for care in using Eponou’s data in making definite statements about food self-sufficiency in the northern cotton growing areas.

**Conclusion**

To understand the failure of the Cotton Areas Rural Development Project to
promote food crops in northern Ivory Coast, one must consider its implementation within the context of Ivorian development policies and the involvement of foreign agribusiness in the agricultural sector. It is precisely within this context that we have seen how CIDT's services discriminate against food crop producers. The bias towards export crops is apparent in areas such as input subsidies, extension and marketing services and cheap food policies. On the basis of such institutional constraints alone, peasant farmers find little encouragement to increase their food crop output.

The case study also reveals a variety of social, technical and agro-ecological constraints hampering the expansion of food crops. The most important of these obstacles are: (1) the productivity failure of 'improved' food crop packages, (2) the dominance of cotton in crop rotation patterns, (3) soil acidification, (4) outmigration, (5) labour bottlenecks and (6) stagnation in labour productivity despite the introduction of animal traction.

Notwithstanding these forces operating to depress per capita food production in northern Ivory Coast, the picture that emerges from this case study is not one of a stagnant agricultural sector. Rather the development of cotton has entailed major changes in the farming systems of the savanna region in which food crops and cotton clash on a number of levels. In light of the process and structure of uneven development and agrarian change outlined in this study, one must be skeptical about 'getting the prices right' solutions favoured by the World Bank towards increasing food crop production. Although higher prices would surely be welcomed by peasant farmers, this is just one of many obstacles constraining increased food output. Contrary to exaggerated notions of 'imaginary confrontations' between food and export crops, there are trade-offs between the two as the World Bank itself has noted in the case of cotton and rice in northern Ivory Coast.

Other case studies are surely needed to test further the soundness of the Bank's theory. If the case of Ivory Coast is at all indicative one would suspect that other schemes following the Bank's prescription of promoting food crops around a commercial lead crop will also entail more conflicts than complementary relationships.

Table 3. Caloric Value of Bulk Rice and Corn Purchases in Days per Consumer Man Equivalent* by Income Group for 1981 and 1985-86, Katiali, Côte d'Ivoire

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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>135</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ave.</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>56</td>
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*CME calculated from consumer coefficients based on household members' age and sex.

Bibliographic Note
Debate

SOCIAL HISTORY AND THE TRANSITION TO CAPITALISM IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN COUNTRYSIDE

Mike Morris

Marxist analysis of South Africa enjoyed an unparalleled resurgence in the 1970s. Spearheaded by Wolpe and Legassick’s class based critiques of liberal analysis in the early 1970s, a new generation of Marxist scholars attempted to develop the appropriate theoretical concepts to locate racial categories within those of class and capital accumulation (see, for example, Legassick, 1974; 1980; Wolpe, 1972). This had a profound impact on the problematic of liberalism that had previously dominated our understanding of this society. For a time, it swept off the map of radical analytic discourse any discussion of South Africa which was not grounded in concepts and theory derived from Marxist discourse.

It was an interesting idiosyncrasy of this time that many of the leading analysts of the new generation were not historians by training. They graduated as political scientists, economists, sociologists but were all bound together by a commitment to understanding the terrain of the political economy of the society’s history. The problems they investigated, although they were historically grounded, were chosen in order to make a broad political or conceptual point on this terrain. However, to many historians, these studies were somewhat prone to over-conceptualisation paying insufficient attention to historical detail.

The conceptual richness of the discussion engendered by the South African situation produced an interest amongst British Marxist scholars that to many South Africanists seemed a trifle surprising. Indeed, at one stage conceptual battles within the British debate over the finer points of Marxist theory were fought out over various interpretations of South African reality. Disturbing as it might have been to Marxist South Africanists to find themselves the centre of a fierce theoretical controversy, it was also a tribute to the quality of the indigenous debate and analysis of this complex social reality.

Times, however, changed and partly as a result of the international theoretical and political crisis within Marxism, by the beginning of the 1980s analysis of South Africa became dominated by a new grouping of social historians. This initially promised to play a constructive role for Marxist analysis of South African society since much of the previous analysis and discussion had been done by social scientists seeking structural tendencies, macro-class forces and general
movements. It therefore required the sensitivity of a good historian to fill in much of the missing detail; correct an understandable schematising of the richness of social reality; or, as in the case of Beinart's important work on the Transkei, to reinterpret on the basis of more detailed historical work some of the conventional wisdoms.

If that had been the major contribution of the new breed of social historians, it would have been a welcome enrichment of our understanding of the social reality of South Africa, and a contribution towards the progressive development of Marxist understanding of this society. However, they did more than that. Gripped by the Thompsonian zeal that permeated British Marxist circles, they also self-consciously attempted to distance themselves from the Neo-Marxist interpretations of the previous decade. With disastrous consequences, they sweepingly assimilated the latter under (to them) the pejorative appellation 'structuralist' and, often without seriously engaging with the conceptual basis, explanation or conclusions of this work, discarded it with a few perfunctory comments on its unsuitability for historical explanation based on 'the view from below'. What followed was a new orthodoxy eschewing broad schematic explanation in favour of micro-historical analysis. With its built-in political justifications - 'the views of the masses' were finally being reflected - it also altered both the epistemological foundations of left social and political analysis and the conceptual terms of debate. (1)

Within South African academia the History Workshop has very self consciously pursued this ideal of a new form of historical explanation by seeking 'to uncover the history of the person in the street' in opposition to 'the "great men" (who) dominate history textbooks' (Bozzoli, 1987: xiv, xvii). In order to achieve this, it seems, an epistemological, methodological and conceptual reorientation was required:

In an ideal analysis we would have to start from the very basic experiential category of the individual, work through the local groups and communities in which such individuals forge their world views, and tease out the layers of ideology formation which shape that individual in the group or community of which he or she is a part (Bozzoli, 1987:2) (my emphasis).

However, whilst it is clear that this approach attempts to locate itself in a sympathetic relationship to 'the masses', this does not necessarily mean that it thereby poses a genuinely Marxist alternative which reveals and explains the process of exploitation and oppression characterising their daily lives. Nor does it mean that it necessarily adequately reflects the perceptions of these very same 'masses'. Essentially it locates itself on the wrong terrain by contrasting 'history from below' with that of 'great men' approaches. However, the latter is rejected by Marxists (structuralists as well as others not so inclined to describe themselves) not simply because it is a 'top down' view of history, but fundamentally because it attempts to reduce explanation to a micro framework based on individuals. The 'great men' approach either lapses into an abstracted idealism or an infinitely contingent empiricism. 'Views from below' based on the 'ordinary person in the street' suffer from the same flaws since they are indeed nothing other than the mirror image of the 'great men' views.

For there is no ordinary person in the street. Harry Oppenheimer and P.W. Botha also inhabit the streets of society albeit, and that of course is the fundamental issue, under very different social, economic and ideological conditions. The 'views from below' are ultimately forced into idealised conceptions of the 'person in the
street' (the 'masses' or the universal 'Joe Bloggs') or, into individualised micro explanations based on the daily experience of this or that particular person on the street. Hence fundamentally they are not a Marxist alternative to the 'great men' conceptions but similarly flawed as romantic, individualised and idealist. For they cannot grasp and reveal the totality of contradictions and forces structuring the lives of the 'ordinary people in the street'. The latter do not comprehend in a crystallised form these social forces structuring their social lives, behaviour and consciousness. If they did then we have no need of a theory of ideology, for ideology and the process of ideological structuring of individual consciousness would have no place in social reality. What Marxist analysis sets out to do is to take into account the views of the oppressed classes, as well as those of the dominant classes, and the social forces that none of them comprehend in a conscious manner, and hence produce an analysis of the totality of contradiction and forces characterising this particular society, community or event. It does this in order that the rural or urban oppressed understand in a comprehensive form the social forces they only inchoately comprehend as manipulating, determining and oppressing them, not only against their will but often outside their conscious understanding.

In contrast, as the mirror image of the great men conceptions, the view from below assumes what must instead be revealed, and seeks epistemological conclusions from the masses which they can only inchoately reveal in a fragmented form. Such a form still requires conceptual restructuring because ultimately the masses are not their own source of ideology or knowledge. Hence in contrast to the elitism that they accuse the 'great men' theories of, the new social history is simply populist. Neither poses a real Marxist alternative since they are only different sides of the same coin. The coin is counterfeit. Turn it around as much as one likes it will never reveal an alternative. The conceptual task is not to spin it aimlessly but to toss it away.

It is just as well to clear up a basic misconception at this point. This is not an argument about the usefulness of micro studies in validating certain received conceptions or indeed overthrowing them. Nor is it about the need for empirical verification, exposition and explanation. As a recent important statement on these new trends in Marxism has so clearly put it:

Micro foundations are important for macro social theory because of the ways they help focus our questions and because of the ways they enrich our answers. But there is much more to science than their elaboration (Levine et al, 1987: 83).

The reasons why the new social historians place such epistemological reliance on micro-level studies is succinctly clarified by Bozzoli:

The consciousness and culture of ordinary people are formed in their day-to-day experiences of life in a very small segment of society. The starting point of 'history from below' must be, thus, that same small segment of society in which experiences are forged (Bozzoli, 1983: 35)(my emphasis).

There is a misconception here regarding the process of scientific elaboration. The process of producing ideological subjects (i.e. socialisation) is being confused with the process of producing knowledge. The two are, however, not at all commensurate. Whilst it is true that the consciousness of people is formed in their daily experiences which are necessarily micro, specific and individualist, in no way does this necessarily entail that such micro instances are epistemologically and conceptually privileged. Furthermore, it is by no means clear that such micro
instances are necessarily individually privileged in reality, except in the very specific sense that they pertain to this particular individual or that particular community. The antecedents, the foundations of such experiences can in no sense be reduced to such individualised personal experiences. The two (i.e. the source of socialised experience of this particular individual) are of a different order and cannot be confused with each other. Otherwise all experience would be privately privileged and ultimately inaccessible to anyone other than the particular individual whose experience is being formed.

Indeed, Bozzoli half recognises the problem but retreats from acknowledging that this recognition repudiates the very epistemological and methodological approach she had earlier spelt out as the foundation stone of such social history. For she adds that

unless studies focusing on the local and small scale retain a concern for the wider processes of class formation, capital accumulation and state strategy which must impinge upon the smallest of communities in profound ways, they will degenerate into the anecdotal and parochial (1983:35).

It is not, however, simply a question of 'retaining a concern' for such wider processes, but rather of acknowledging that these wider processes are the ultimate source of structuration of such smaller communities. It is the wider process of capital accumulation and class struggle that structures the life possibilities of small communities. In a very profound sense they play out these wider social forces in their own local context, but always with the critical proviso that this is done in unique ways and forms and, therefore, without the results and conclusions being pre-determined outside these local contexts. Thus the specific manner in which these forces are instantiated in such communities cannot be grasped except through local and micro studies.

Methodologically this means that the macro processes and structural relations cannot be reduced to micro explanations, but have to be analysed on their own conceptual terrain. Likewise micro studies cannot be replaced by analysis of such macro structural processes since they have their own conceptual terrain, the results of which add to and alter our understanding of the complexity of the macro structural relations characterising this society. It is fundamentally a question of epistemological priority, and this is where the social historians and methodological individualists who place such prior emphasis on local, micro studies lead us astray. Micro-studies are clearly of major importance for Marxist analyses of South African society. However, in order to grasp the essential class forces at play in any local context, they have to be informed by the wider structural relations and social forces characterising the society so that the unique manner in which these wider social relations are concretised and played out in the particular local context can be grasped.

In this important sense there is a fundamental epistemological and methodological difference between the position expounded by social historians and that of classical Marxism. It is a question of acknowledging

the importance of micro level accounts in explaining social phenomena, while allowing for the irreducibility of macro level accounts to these micro level explanations (Levine et al 1987:75).

This is in contrast to an insistence
that the ultimate goal of science is to reduce explanations to ever more micro levels of analysis... (i.e.) to explain a phenomenon is just to provide an account of the micro-mechanisms which produce it... that in principle it is desirable not simply to add an account of micro-causes to macro-explanations, but to replace macro-explanations with micro-explanations (Levine et al 1987:75).

The epistemological retreat from Marxist theory is very apparent with regard to the new studies on the agrarian history of South Africa. Notwithstanding its empirical richness, instead of advancing Marxist analysis the shift towards a social history of the agrarian question has been a conceptually retrogressive development.

Keegan's discussion of the transition to capitalism in the South African countryside provides us with an exceptionally clear example of the epistemological underpinnings of this new historical school (Keegan, 1986a,b). His epistemological basis is 'anti-structuralist' and 'anti-theoretical'. He eschews what he calls the 'megaview' aimed at identifying 'large scale processes and transformations' because in his view it 'conceals as much as it reveals' and can 'often result in a distortion of vision'. This is because 'much public perception of rural social reality as reflected in political agitation and debate' (as found for example in 'official publications, parliamentary debates, commission reports and legislative enactments') is so encrusted with ideology as to be highly problematical as historical evidence. (1986b:xvi).

Instead he regards his work as self-consciously particularistic, micro-specific and experiential. Avoiding the 'ideologically encrusted', he opts for 'narrative, event-oriented history', 'consideration of the life experiences of individual people', 'microstudies (which) can open up whole terrains of human experience'. Indeed he goes further, taking us to the borders of empiricist absurdity, when he asserts that 'the smaller the scale of investigation the more likely it is that the intricacies and complexities of social interaction will stand revealed, stripped of schematic abstraction' (1986b:xvi-ii).

Keegan's frankness as to his epistemological foundations is refreshing. Essentially he is expounding a kind of historical phenomenology; an empiricism based on the revelations of human experience. The more personal they are, the more meaningful, the more pure and, ironically, the more generalisable as the essence of human experience of the collective mass we are viewing from below. There is also the added plus of political meaningfulness, for we are getting to the essential experience of the masses via their historical psychotherapist, the social agrarian historian.

Epistemologically, this is akin to a populist romanticism deriving its truth from some supposed untainted collective, historical experience of the masses. All else is encrusted with ideology. If only the 'historical rural people' can be made to speak, the truths of popular history would be revealed. It is the perfect statement of what the new social history is when taken to its logical extreme - the ideological representation within social science of a political populism that is likewise anti-analytical and anti-theoretical. The rural masses are wholly romanticised. In Keegan's case there is an underlying sentiment making him the modern ideologue of the historical sharecropping black peasant. Furthermore, it reduces the role of the 'social scientist', of the Marxist historian, of historical materialism, to the simple recorder of the life experiences and perceptions of the experienced reality of one's 'chosen people' - the subjects of one's study. Theoretical training and
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analytic reflection are discarded in favour of the best method of experiential reflection. The good historian is simply he or she who reflects the 'experience' from below the best.

A recent major collection from this school of agrarian history claims likewise to have 'moved beyond' the 'overviews' of the 1970s in providing us with a 'view from below'. In doing so they also claimed to have 'helped force the rethinking of key concepts' (Beinart et al, 1986:16-17).

This is simply not the case. Undoubtedly these studies have enriched our empirical understanding of agrarian history but they have also denuded analysis of that history of most of its own historically conceptual advances. There has been a fundamental retreat from Marxism and, indeed, from conceptual analysis altogether. We have witnessed a headlong flight, under the banner of social history, into empiricism and away from Marxist concepts, categories and explanation.

For one searches in vain through the introduction to this important new statement from the social historians of the agrarian question for the conceptual harvest of this new labour. After being promised so much one legitimately expects a major restatement of some of the classic categories used in previous analysis, if only to inform the presentations that follow. But they are nowhere to be found. Where is the conceptualisation of capitalism, of the implications of the transition to capitalism, of the Marxist theory of rent, of the form and necessity of different types of surplus value extraction, of the burgeoning literature in other countries on different types of transition, on the political implications for the theory of the state of the form this transition took, on the political implications this had for the peasantry, sharecroppers, labour tenants?

Let us take one of the most critical issues, that of conceptualising agrarian capitalism in the South African context. All the editors do is to distance themselves from 'a definition of capitalism simply in terms of the absence or presence of wage labour'. That is all. Instead of a conceptual reformulation we are told that 'A number of contributions to this collection make the point explicitly or implicitly that capitalism needs to be much more fully clothed conceptually and suggest some elements of the appropriate additional dress' (Beinart et al 1986:17). It is clear what the latest fashion is but how is the cloth actually being cut? Instead of rethinking this central concept, we are offered bits and pieces of ideas throughout the contributions which are so disparate that even the editors are unable to synthesise them into a coherent theoretical statement.

The new agrarian historians have particularly concerned themselves with the various forms of tenant relationships that arose in the development of agrarian capitalism. Apart from the rich material that is presented, one also legitimately expects a serious rethinking of the different social relationships enscripting the labour tenants, cash rent tenants, share cropper tenants and indeed capitalist farmer tenants. One waits in vain. Instead of a concept that sharply defines and delineates seeming similarities, we are given phrases that serve only to obscure conceptual differences - 'the tenantry' and 'tenant struggles'.

The silence from the new scholars of agrarian history on the issues which concerned the previous generation of Marxist scholars is very marked. What do we mean by capitalism? What is its specific character in the South African countryside? If we don't examine this question we have no idea of when the transition occurred, what stages it went through and when one can say that the
forces of capitalism are dominant (without meaning that they are exclusive or mature) within the capitalist countryside. Theoretically speaking, what are the basic forces driving rural capitalism? What is the role of capitalist ground rent, on which Marx spent such intellectual energy in examining the penetration of capitalism into the countryside, in the South African case? What difference does it make that landed property and capitalist farmer are one and the same category to the process of rural accumulation in the South African countryside? How is surplus value extracted under these conditions? Is exploitation of labour tenancy the extraction of archaic or absolute surplus value? What are the class relations characterising the various forms of tenant relations that blacks found themselves in? Was sharecropping a capitalist alternative from below - in Lenin's terms, an American path? What are the comparative lessons from the work that is being done on this question in Latin America utilising Lenin's concepts of capitalist transition (e.g. de Janvry 1981)? What is the effect on the form of state of the resolution of the agrarian question in the transition to capitalism in the countryside? How could a correct analysis of the agrarian question have informed political strategies in the past decades?

But this is anathema to the view of the new school of social historians of agrarian history. As Keegan shows, his conceptual explanations have little in common with the conceptual terrain of previous Marxist explanations:

This article has sought to stress the contingent factors in the transformation of rural society. There was no consistent trajectory of development or inevitability either in the spread of capitalist relations in agriculture or in the assertion of white control over productive resources (my emphasis) (1986a:650).

He then reveals his own theoretical explanation:

The role of ideology and white self-image in providing the impetus behind the reshaping of rural society was not inconsiderable, and the racially exclusive rural capitalism of today is the result of countless individual assertions of a powerful social ideal, backed up by the financial and coercive power of the industrial state (my emphasis) (1986a:650).

Black sharecropping, which Keegan regards as the more 'economically rational' method for white farmers to utilise, was eliminated because whites were generally very reluctant to admit that they were so 'degenerate' as to rely on 'Kaffir farmers'. This factor provided much of the impetus behind the drive to suppress black sharecropping by legislation, and the drive of various governments to pour large sums of capital into white farming. There was generally an intense desire by white farmers to establish greater control over productive activities on their land for 'cultural reasons, quite apart from any rational calculation of costs and benefits (1986b: 199)(my emphasis).

The wheel has turned full circle. The discarding of Marxist structural explanations has also resulted in the abandonment of the Marxist critique of liberalism. Notwithstanding the many references to class in these texts, the inability, indeed refusal, to theorise these concepts means that we are back with a primary dependence on 'race', 'white supremacy' and 'racist farmers' as our major explanatory variables. It is likewise no coincidence that Beinart and Delius's 'Introduction' (in Beinart et al. 1986) lays great store on the work of Macmillan on the agrarian question in South Africa. Their intellectual roots do indeed go back to this tradition - that of social democracy.

This is not simply an epistemological or theoretical problem. The failures of the social historians to conceptualise the agrarian question has fundamental political implications. If capitalism was not dominant - and by that one does not mean
exclusive, or full blown, or akin to the form that capitalism appears in a manufacturing enterprise - in the South African countryside by the 1920s, as many of this school are wont to argue, then what was the dominant mode of production? Furthermore, if there was no dominant capitalist mode of production in the countryside, there was no dominant capitalist class there either. One has to assume, then, that it was dominated by pre-capitalist forms of production and that the dominant classes were non-capitalist.

This has very serious implications for the theory of the South African state, for it is obvious from the historical evidence we have that the white farmers played an important and often determining role in the functions, structure and operations of the South African state post-Union. Does this now mean that the state and a series of state interventions in the countryside were non-capitalist? Or if they were capitalist, were they at the behest of an agrarian capitalist class that was not yet present? Does it mean that the bourgeois ‘revolution’ had not yet taken place in the South African countryside? In which case when did it? And how does one explain the transformation of the countryside throughout this period? The lack of a periodisation only creates even more insuperable problems which cannot be solved by retreating into particularistic empiricism and romanticism.

Nor can one avoid conceptualising the social and economic character of the South African countryside by claiming that one is concerned with ‘process rather than stasis’ (Bradford 1985:26). What is the class struggle that the structuralists stressed if it is not a process? It does not seriously confront the conceptual issues by claiming that ‘in the 1920s the great bulk of white farmers were capitalising, not capitalists, while most labourers were being proletarianised, not proletarians’ (Bradford, 1987:17). The issue that has to be faced is: what was the dominant social character of this process? It is no answer at all to invoke the fact that white farmers were capitalising. Were they or were they not capitalist farmers, whether it was in the early stages of transition or in the latter stages? Had they crossed a barrier so that the process they were involved in was governed and determined by the laws of capital or was there some other pre-capitalist reason why they acted as they did? Capitalists are always capitalising, whether they are in the stages of manufacture, competitive or monopoly capitalism. What else is the theoretical meaning of Marx’s famous exhortation ‘Accumulate! Accumulate! That is Moses and Prophets’. Likewise, capitalism is always involved in a process of proletarianising — whether one is talking of the process of enclosure in early capitalism, de-skilling as monopoly capitalism takes hold or en-skilling under the impact of automation technologies.

One of the problems of this group of social historians is that in their messianic Thompsonian task of casting out the curse of structuralism and abstract theorisation, they have left themselves conceptually incapable of tackling this problem. With the exception of Bradford, whose work clearly differs in its attempt to situate its theoretical roots with Marxism, the only references they have to the issue are a few perfunctory comments that Morris (1976) is wrong on this or that detail about the capitalist character of the South African countryside. That may well be the case but one cannot establish this by reference to historical details unless they are placed within a theoretical framework that confronts the conceptual and empirical material presented in my work (1976, 1981). One cannot have a serious discussion on the basis of throwaway comments referring to the ‘presence or absence of wage labour’.
As I have stressed, Bradford's work is substantially different. It is much more difficult to classify. Her sympathies are clearly with the social historians, as is evident from the sharpness of many of her comments on structuralist marxism, yet her analysis does attempt to ground itself in Marxist theory. She is indeed the only one in this group who has seriously attempted to address some of these conceptual issues. However, there are three problems with her attempt to grapple with the problem of characterising the social and economic character of white farming in the South African countryside.

1) Bradford operates with a highly abstracted conception of rural capitalism which assumes that it is akin to urban industrial capitalism; that the capitalist farm is the mirror image of the capitalist factory. Her defining theoretical elements are dealt with in a footnote and derived from Volume 3 of Marx's *Capital* (1972:279-90): the capitalist farmer, who has as his direct aim and determining motive, the production of surplus value, and the 'free wage labourer' who has complete freedom from restraint to sell his labour and has no other means of production upon which to base his subsistence (Bradford 1985: 26-27, n.52; 1987: 17, n.46). On the basis of this definition, she argues that the South African countryside in the earlier decades of this century cannot be characterised as being dominated by capitalist social relations since farmers were interested in cash income and farm labourers (labour tenants) were not 'free' from restraint in selling their labour power nor solely dependent on cash wages for their subsistence.

Her dependence on one quotation from Marx to establish this as the defining feature of rural capitalism is, however, highly problematic. For it ignores a vast array of theoretical and historical literature arguing that agrarian capitalism does not at all require 'that this class is dispossessed in the most extreme sense, separated entirely from their means of production' or that 'the absence of wage labour... mean(s) that the farm is non-capitalist' (Tribe 1981:65;38). As Lenin pointed out in one of his classic works on capitalist development in agrarian Russia:

Our literature frequently contains too stereotyped an understanding of the territorial proposition that capitalism requires the free landless worker. This proposition is quite correct in indicating the major trend, but capitalism penetrates into agriculture particularly slowly and in extremely varied forms. The allotment of land to the rural worker is very often to the interests of the rural employers themselves, and that is why the allotment holding rural worker is a type to be found in all capitalist countries. The type assumes different forms in different countries... but this does not prevent the economist from classing them all as one type of agricultural proletarian. The juridical basis of his right to his plot of land is absolutely immaterial to such a classification (Lenin 1964:178).

The theoretical literature on this subject is by no means as 'flimsy' as Bradford implies and one cannot resolve the issue, as she does, by reference to one quotation from Marx. This issue is discussed in great empirical and theoretical detail in the classic texts of Marx, but more particularly in Kautsky and Lenin on the agrarian question as well as more recent discussions of German, Russian, Irish and Latin American transitions (See, for example, Banaji 1976; de Janvry 1981; Hazelkorn 1981; Husain and Tribe 1983; Lenin 1962, 1964; Tribe 1981, 1983; Winson 1982).

2) As a result of their failure to confront the Marxist literature on the agrarian question, the social historians, including Bradford, misunderstand the status of much of the theoretical and conceptual discourse on different paths to capitalist development in the countryside. Consequently Lenin's theoretical statements (and other subsequent writers on the subject) are reduced to historically empirical examples of the Prussian experience. Hence one finds references to the 'German
analogy' (Keegan 1986a) and its historical non-applicability to South Africa because of this or that historical difference, as if the concept was reducible to, or equivalent to, the particular history of Germany. But it is not an analogy that is being discussed in the agrarian literature of South Africa, Latin America and Russia. If it was, then it could rightly be dismissed as an historical absurdity to equate such vastly different societies by analogical reference to Germany. What is being put forward is a theoretical equivalence, meaning that certain concepts theoretically captured by the term 'Prussian path' can be applied to the historical experience of these societies because they display certain structural features exemplifying a particular form of agrarian transition 'from above' based on capitalising landed property.

Within this process, seemingly precapitalist economic, ideological and political social relations appearing to be in conflict with those of mature capitalism are utilised to effect the transition towards capitalism in the countryside on terms most favourable to these capitalising landlords. This is precisely why Lenin described it as a brutal and painful process of transition for the rural masses since it squeezes them by virtue of their ever diminishing relationship to the land and often complete social and personal dependence on the capitalising landlord. The form that the social relationships take in this process is not that of the classic 'free' wage labourer revolving around the cash nexus, since he is solely dependent on wages for his reproduction. Instead it is encapsulated in partial access to land and wages in kind, with major struggles taking place over the amount of access to land and grazing by these rural labourers and the rights of the capitalising landlord over family members. Little wonder that the participants see themselves as still akin to 'serfs' or 'slaves' fighting for their historic right to the land. 'Primitive accumulation' does not take the form of classic England - via enclosures forcing peasants off the land - but instead ties the peasantry to the land under the strict political and ideological control of the capitalising landlord in order slowly, painfully and incrementally to turn him into a wage labourer. This is the economic and social basis of labour tenancy in South Africa. This form of struggle is hence not, as Bradford argues, a refutation of the Prussian path but precisely the perfectly explicable form it takes within the path of capitalism developing from above on the basis of capitalising landed property.

In precisely the same way, when Lenin counterposes to the 'Prussian path' the 'French or American path' he is not reducing French agrarian history to that of the USA. He is treating them as comparable since they display certain theoretical equivalences - viz. the absence of precapitalist landed property with all the economic, ideological and political consequences that accompany such dominant classes; and the consequent freer development of capitalism on the basis of small-holding agrarian property. Conceptually the French and American agrarian transitions can be treated as cases of the 'transition from below', even though historically (i.e. analogically) they have little in common. Because they fail to understand this there is a strange irony when one reads the empirical descriptions contained in the work of Bradford (and Keegan). For it is rich with examples of the existence of both the Prussian path (in Bradford's case) and the French/American path in Keegan.

3) Finally, Bradford ultimately abandons the Marxist terrain she started from and lapses back into the problematic of the social historians who are so eager to appropriate her work. For, although she sets out what to her are the defining
elements of capitalism, in the end she falls back on subjective self perceptions of labour tenants and white farmers in order to deny the capitalist character of the South African countryside. After presenting us with a labour tenant's long personal account in 1926 of how he perceived his situation, she triumphantly claims: it is clear from the above account that the tenant did not relate to his landlord as worker to capitalist. It was equally clear to contemporary farmers that although the world was being turned into a 'ghastly machine which works for profit', they themselves 'were groping about rather aimlessly in a miserable backwater of transition (1987:2).

However, we cannot solve the theoretical problem of the social and economic character of labour tenancy in South Africa by reference to accounts of whether historical participants perceived themselves as one class or another. Particularly since in this case it is not even the labour tenant who is claiming his non-capitalist character but her own interpretation of the implications of his self description. No amount of currently fashionable biographies from below can solve the problems we have isolated. In falling into this trap, she has slipped from the terrain of Marxism back into the problematic of a personalistic historical phenemenology.

Beinart and Delius (1986:17), citing Bradford as their source, claim that by the 1920s 'capitalist farmers were a tiny minority'. This has potentially startling political implications. This is particularly the case when they approvingly cite Greenberg's claim that 'the transition to capitalist agriculture was only completed in the late sixties' (Ibid: 54,n.54). When it is completed is not the issue. Rather it is when the process starts to become dominant and what the essential features are throughout this process. But this is an issue that they do not address. Instead they imply, on the basis of Greenberg and Bradford, that one cannot characterise the social and class character of the South African countryside as capitalist until the 1960s. If so, then what is the dominant mode of production in the countryside for more than half a century before 1960? What is the dominant class in the countryside during this period? What is the character of the state during this period? Basically the political implication that one is driving at is: if the 'white fanners' were not capitalist then how do you escape the old liberal explanation that racism/segregation/apartheid is the ideology of backward pre-capitalist frontier farmers?

To illustrate the politically loaded conceptual issue at hand, let us look at an analogous problem that taxed Marxist scholars of the transition to capitalism in England.

Dobb put the issue facing Marxist scholars clearly enough: if one dates the rise of capitalism as a mode of production from the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century (as is sometimes done), then Marxists are confronted with a problem. How could the seventeenth century be treated as a bourgeois-democratic revolution when it came a century and a half before the rise of capitalist production? Whence a bourgeoisie to carry through the revolution, if the capitalist mode of production was not yet in being at all? (Dobb, cited in Tribe, 1981:12).

The answer that Dobb put forward was that the sixteenth century was neither feudal nor capitalist. But this had highly problematic political implications, for what state form could possibly correspond to this?

The necessity of confronting the transition as a conceptual and as a political problem is quite clearly put by a group of Marxists debating the issue in 1948/49 in the Communist Review:

The first question arose in the concrete form: what were the predominant relations of men in production in England at the beginning of the seventeenth century? Was it feudal or
bourgeois society? Some of the points of method which emerged in the thrashing out of this question are also relevant to the question: what is a capitalist and what is a Socialist society? - where clarity is so greatly needed today.

The second question arose in the concrete form: what class controlled the State between the accession of the Tudors in 1485 (or of the Yorkists in 1461) and 1640? Did the State serve the bourgeoisie and combat feudalism, or not? The underlying questions of how we determine the class character of a given state and what is the role of the State in the transition from one social order to another are very topical indeed (the Historian's Group cited in Tribe 1981:19).

There are analogous problems that have to be faced with respect to the agrarian history of South Africa. They require confronting the central conceptual issues of the development of capitalism in the South African countryside. They cannot be resolved unless one moves beyond the empirically rich but conceptually poverty stricken work of the new agrarian social historians of South Africa. For if one cannot grasp in all its political implications the transition to capitalism in the South African countryside, one will similarly be unable to analyse the future possibilities of a transition away from capitalism either. If, as Marxist scholars, we cannot grasp the class roots of our capitalist past in the countryside, we will undoubtedly also never politically be able to identify the class forces laying the basis for a potential socialist future either(2). And that is undoubtedly as great an issue demanding clarity today as it was in previous decades.

Notes
1. Marks and Trapido (1987) is an example of this trend. One searches in vain through the massive introductory essay for any discussion - whether conceptual, analytical, definitional or even referential - of the key concepts outlined in the title. Notwithstanding its other merits, this a definite backward step not only in our understanding of these key problems of South African society, but also for the refinement and propagation of Marxist theory in the subcontinent.

2. I am grateful to Bill Freund for this point, and to Dave Kaplan generally, for many of the issues raised have emerged from our joint discussions on Beinart et al 1986.

Bibliographic Notes


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Briefing

Rural Mozambique Since the Frelimo Party Fourth Congress: The Situation in the Baixo Limpopo
Otto Roesch

INTRODUCTION
Since the Frelimo Party Fourth Congress of 1983 Mozambican agricultural policy has been undergoing a major reorientation, away from a bold strategy of socialist collectivization towards a more market oriented agricultural strategy based on capitalist and peasant family agriculture. This shift has been undertaken because of poor economic results of the former strategy and the serious economic crisis which South Africa's war of destabilization has precipitated in the country. At the Fourth Congress Frelimo recognized that unless immediate measures were taken to harness the productive potential of peasant and capitalist agriculture - a potential which had been largely neglected in favour of collective forms of production - the country would face a steadily worsening economic situation, with serious implications for Frelimo's base of popular support and for the conduct of the war against the South African sponsored terrorists of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). By turning to a more market oriented agricultural strategy, Frelimo hopes to correct the economic imbalances that have resulted from past policy errors and to induce capitalist and peasant producers to substantially increase their marketed agricultural output, thereby putting the country on a stronger productive footing, the better to resist South African aggression and ride out the economic crisis this aggression has precipitated.

I shall describe the nature of the reforms ushered in by this shift in agricultural policy and examine some of the difficulties associated with their implementation in the Baixo Limpopo, an agriculturally important area located in the lower reaches of the Limpopo River valley, in southern Mozambique's Gaza Province. Though this shift towards peasant and capitalist agriculture has given some encouraging results, in terms of increased levels of marketed agricultural production, its longer term prospects and implications remain uncertain. This uncertainty centres not only on the problematic political and social consequences this market oriented policy shift may have for the socialist character of Mozambique's overall development objectives, but also on its capacity to promote sustainable increases in peasant and capitalist sector production. The possibility of promoting sustainable increases in peasant and capitalist agriculture will depend on the success of the current reforms in overcoming the structural constraints which
colonial underdevelopment imposed on the growth of these sectors. The massive resource drain imposed on the country by South African destabilization may however make the task as problematic for the new market oriented strategy as increasing cooperative and state farm production was for the former collectivization strategy.

A BRIEF HISTORICAL NOTE
The southern Limpopo valley, or Baixo Limpopo ("Lower Limpopo"), is one of the most important agricultural areas in Mozambique. With 270,000 people in 2,000 square kilometers, it is densely populated for Mozambique.

The colonial economy of the Baixo Limpopo was dominated by labour migration and the production of rice and other cash crops. Up to a half of adult males worked in South Africa at any given time, and their wages helped create a market economy, providing vital capital for agriculture, and stimulating demand for consumer goods. The development of cash crops came later, in the 1930's, when the Portuguese installed drainage, irrigation and flood control for the marshy plains of the valley. This allowed rice to be grown, by forced labour - mainly women, who also had to produce subsistence crops on sandy, unplanted soils.

However, it never gave rise to a fully developed commercial peasant agriculture. The quantity and regularity of the agricultural surplus produced by the family sector in the colonial period was primarily a function of state coercion rather than choice. For the vast majority of the rural population the production of agricultural surpluses always remained of secondary economic importance to migrant labour to South Africa. Low colonial crop prices and the large labour inputs involved in producing agricultural surpluses in the heavy alluvial soils of the Limpopo valley using only a hoe, made cash-cropping economically unappealing, and for most households, it was preferable to earn money through migrant labour.

This preference for migrant labour over cash-cropping as a source of money was, of course, also true for the rural population of Gaza Province and southern Mozambique as a whole. The unreliability of rainfall made agriculture a precarious undertaking. Colonial government studies of southern Mozambique estimate that the practice of traditional, rain-dependent agriculture results in a good harvest only once every four years, with more than half of all years being ones of food shortages. Until the Second World War migrant labour was virtually the only source of monetary income for the rural African population; and even as late as 1967 income from peasant cash-cropping in southern Mozambique amounted to only 12% of the annual wage bill paid by South Africa to Mozambican miners. The capacity of rural households to engage in agricultural surplus production on any sustained and regular basis was closely linked to the availability of major capital inputs, in the form of irrigation and/or oxen and ploughs. Without such inputs, cash-cropping in most of southern Mozambique was simply not viable. Peasant household production, in fact, accounted for only 20% of total marketed agricultural output in southern Mozambique.

Only for a small stratum of the rural population, which succeeded in capitalizing agricultural production through the purchase of ploughs and oxen (or even tractors), did agricultural production become the main source of income. This stratum of 'progressive peasants', known locally as machambeiros, composed little more than 5% of all rural households but became an important source of marketed
agricultural production in the colonial economy of the Baixo Limpopo, and today constitutes the core of what is now the 'private sector'. The continued capitalist development of this sector was constrained by two main obstacles. Although the colonial state wished to promote the development of a 'progressive' African agriculture, especially towards the end of the colonial period as a buffer against the advancing liberation struggle, it was intent on ensuring that this development should not be at the expense of Portuguese settler farmers who had preferential access to labour and other resources provided by the state. The African capitalist agriculture was also constrained by the migrant labour system which while being a source of capital for African agriculture, was also a drain on available labour supplies. Unable to pay wages that could compete with those paid on the mines in South Africa, African capitalist farmers, like their Portuguese counterparts, found their productive capacities constrained by a chronic shortage of labour. These shortages of labour were reflected not only in the recourse to forced chibalo labour by African capitalist farmers having assimilado status, but also in the widespread use of women and children as wage workers during peak periods of demand.

Generally speaking, then, migrant wage labour to South Africa and the existence of a colonial settler farming stratum posed a fundamental obstacle to the development of an African commercial agriculture in the Baixo Limpopo. Peasant household agriculture remained poorly developed and primarily oriented towards subsistence rather than market production, and African capitalist agriculture remained undercapitalized and constrained in its growth. Both peasant and capitalist sectors, furthermore, remained dependent on the inputs and the markets provided by the wages of migrant labour.

With independence in 1975, the economy of Mozambique entered into a phase of disarticulation and crisis. In the Baixo Limpopo this crisis had its basis in two main events; the disintegration of the colonial system of commercial agriculture; and a sharp decline in levels of migrant labour. The former stemmed, in the first instance, from the mass exodus of Portuguese settlers, who controlled all the key sectors of the national economy and nearly all positions requiring any measure of education or training. In the Baixo Limpopo, the exodus meant the loss of an important source of employment, factors of production, consumer goods, and the means for marketing agricultural surpluses. The dissolution of colonial administration ended the vital coordination and supervision of African labour in cash-cropping and the maintenance of hydro-agricultural infra-structure, and it disrupted the supply of inputs and extension services formerly provided by the colonial state. The result of this disintegration of colonial agriculture was a sharp drop in levels of marketed agricultural production in both the family and private sectors.

Beginning in 1976, the economy of the Baixo Limpopo, like that of all of southern Mozambique, suffered a further blow with the fall in levels of migrant labour to South Africa, to half or even a quarter of 1975 levels. Because of the inter-dependence of rural household production and migrant wage labour, this decline further weakened the subsistence base of the rural population. Unemployment increased dramatically, and the amount of goods and money circulating in the rural economy of the Baixo Limpopo fell, as did the purchasing power of rural dwellers for farm inputs and for basic consumption goods.
The combined effect of these events gave rise to a profound crisis of material reproduction and drastically reduced the productive capacity of the Limpopo valley. The serious floods which struck the valley in 1977 served to further cripple the area's productive capacity, destroying homes and livestock, and damaging the system of drainage and irrigation canals which lay at the basis of its agricultural potential.

Frelimo attempted to deal with this crisis through a strategy of rapid and widespread agricultural collectivization, centring on the establishment of communal villages, and on the reorganization of peasant agriculture along collective lines, through the formation of state farms and cooperatives. Collective agriculture was seen as the fastest way of solving the problems of unemployment and agricultural crisis, and of breaking with the migrant labour structure of much of Mozambique's rural economy. The goal of the strategy, as stated in the country's first Ten Year Plan of 1980, was to have most of Mozambique's rural population living in communal villages practising collective agriculture by 1990.

Between 1975 and 1983 dozens of communal villages and cooperatives were set up in Baixo Limpopo, and a large state farm sector, known as the Unidade de Producao do Baixo Limpopo (UPBL), which occupied most of the prime agricultural land abandoned by the departing Portuguese settlers. By 1982 approximately 80% of the rural population of the Baixo Limpopo, equal to more than 150,000 people, had moved into the 30 or so communal villages then in existence. At the national level collectivization led to the creation of more than 1500 communal villages by 1981, containing over 1.5 million people, approximately 15% of the rural population. In nearly all cases these communal villages contained cooperatives or pre-cooperatives, and many also served as sources of labour power for the newly created state farm sector. Frelimo's collectivization strategy did not prove very successful, due to Frelimo's decision to pursue an agricultural policy based almost exclusively on large-scale, capital-intensive state farm agriculture. The Frelimo Third Congress of 1977 officially sanctioned state farm agriculture as the 'dominant and decisive' sector of the country's rural development strategy, and between the Third and Fourth congresses (1977-1983) over 90% of all state agricultural investments were allocated to this sector. Such an emphasis on state farm agriculture was inappropriate since the basic conditions necessary for the growth of a viable state farm sector simply did not exist.

On the one hand, the labour force lacked the requisite technical and administrative skills, a problem aggravated by the state farm sector's dependence on inefficient state structures for the imported inputs it required. Poor planning, inoperative machinery, and shortages of fuel and spare parts constantly undermined the sector's economic viability. On the other hand, Frelimo's inability to re-establish local markets in consumer goods, necessary to the subsistence of wage earning state farm workers, posed a fundamental obstacle to the process of socialization that state farm agriculture was supposed to promote. Chronic shortages of food stuffs and consumer goods in the local economy obliged all state farm workers to continue relying on their individual family plots for their food needs, thereby engendering serious problems of labour instability, and labour allocation conflicts between the state farm and the peasant family sectors. In the case of UPBL, these problems were worsened by the decision to produce less familiar input-dependent European crops formerly grown by settler farmers, which compounded its technical production problems; while the practice of crop monoculture, especially
of rice, introduced problems of seasonality in labour supplies and aggravated the labour allocation conflicts with the family sector, which relied on rice as a staple food crop. As a result, chronic labour shortages during peak periods of the agricultural calendar became, and have remained, one of the principal factors undermining the viability of state farm agriculture in the Baixo Limpopo.

The decision to concentrate state investments in the state farm sector deprived other rural producers of the inputs needed to sustain commercial levels of production. The cooperative sector constantly struggled with inadequate levels of state technical and organizational support which consistently undermined the sector's productive efficiency and output, and members had to rely on their individual plots for subsistence. Membership levels steadily declined.

The private and family sectors of the Baixo Limpopo received even less state support than the cooperative sector, leaving them productively paralysed and incapable of extricating themselves from the economic crisis into which they had fallen with the collapse of the colonial economy after independence. Without technical inputs or commercial stimulus (in the form of consumer goods and higher crop prices) peasant producers and private farmers in the Baixo Limpopo had neither the means nor the incentive to continue cash-cropping, and consequently retreated into subsistence production, leaving large areas of once intensively cultivated valley land abandoned and unproductive.

The failure of collective forms of production to establish themselves as economically viable alternatives to household and capitalist production, and the corresponding retreat of peasant and private producers into subsistence agriculture, left the whole process of agricultural development in the Baixo Limpopo in a state of stagnation. Communal villages were left without a sound economic base, becoming merely collective residential rather than productive units, and the chronic food shortages which resulted from the low levels of agricultural production helped foster a rapid growth in inflation and black market activities. The inflationary pressures released by low levels of production and shortages of consumer goods fueled a continuing breakdown of the internal market - already begun with the collapse of the colonial economy after independence - with barter increasingly replacing money as the basis of exchange. The reduced levels of popular consumption which this breakdown of the market entailed, also began to undermine the high levels of popular voluntarism that had sustained Frelimo's revolutionary programme in the early post-independence period, fostering in its place a steady process of political demobilization.

The economic difficulties of Mozambique's collectivization strategy, however, cannot be explained simply in terms of Frelimo's errors in agricultural policy. They must also be seen in the wider framework of structural and conjunctural constraints within which the strategy was pursued, notably colonial underdevelopment, widespread economic collapse after independence, a succession of natural disasters, the high economic costs of supporting the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, and the crippling effects of South African destabilization. Destabilization, in the form of attacks by the MNR on social and economic infrastructure and on the rural population, became a crucial obstacle to development efforts after 1980. By 1983 the war had become an increasingly serious drain on Mozambique's limited economic resources and began to transform a difficult agricultural situation into one of deepening crisis. The growing economic difficulties precipitated by the war increasingly limited Frelimo's capacity for
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manoeuvre and experimentation, and steadily augmented levels of popular political
demobilization, with serious consequences for the process of socialist
transformation that Frelimo was seeking to promote.

THE AGRICULTURAL REFORMS OF THE FOURTH CONGRESS

In an attempt to correct the inadequacies of past agricultural policies and come
to terms with the deepening economic crisis the FRELIMO Party Fourth Congress
called for major changes to the country's economic development strategy. In
agriculture, it called for a halt to further expansion of the state farm sector and
for a 'reorganization and consolidation' of existing state farms. It further oriented
state structures to provide much greater support to the cooperative, family and
private sectors, as part of a general shift away from large-scale, centrally planned,
capital intensive development projects, in favour of more decentralized,
market-oriented, small-scale initiatives. It also made the rehabilitation and
increased use of installed industrial and transportation capacity a top priority.

Attempts to implement a programme of reforms in keeping with these orientations
have been seriously affected by the intensification of South Africa's undeclared
war against Mozambique. The large-scale economic and demographic disruptions
caused by widespread MNR attacks have crippled agricultural and general
economic activity over large areas of the country, precipitating a growing food
crisis that by late 1986 threatened the subsistence security of millions of
Mozambicans. The reforms centred on four main policy and institutional changes.
Firstly, there is a clear recognition of the current strategic importance of family
and private sector production to the national economy.

Secondly, scarce government investments are now targeted to priority regions
whose economic, military and climatic situations offer the best possibility of
positive results; most are areas whose agricultural potential was already
established in the colonial period. To obtain the best return on the investments
made, and correct past errors and inefficiencies of planning and implementation,
extensive administrative reorganization and decentralization of state structures
responsible for implementing agricultural policy has also been undertaken,
strengthening the powers of provincial governors and local officials (especially
those within the key ministries of agriculture and internal trade). These have
resulted in the creation of new regional structures, known as Unidades de Direccao
Agricola (UDAs), which have the task of planning agricultural production and
marketing in the priority regions, and are directly responsible to the provincial
directors of agriculture. They are self-financing entities which pay their operating
costs through commercial activities as suppliers of inputs and marketers of
surpluses, activities formerly handled by district institutions.

Thirdly, allocating state investments is now governed by a policy of economic
pragmatism (rather than ideological correctness). Scarcely agricultural inputs are
channeled to the most efficient producers, whether state farms, cooperatives,
capitalist farmers or peasant producers. Before the Fourth Congress, the principal
objective of investment policy was to promote the socialization of the countryside;
now it is simply to promote an increase in marketed agricultural production,
without special regard for the relations of production through which this is
achieved. Foreign investment in agriculture (and other sectors) is also being
actively encouraged.
Finally, to stimulate output by the family and private sectors, there has been a general liberalization of commercial activity. This has led to the freeing of prices for many products and to sharp price increases for those which continue to be subject to official control, but not, despite official commitments, to any increased supplies of consumer goods for peasant purchase. The private commercial sector and small handicrafts industries, are now also being actively promoted in an attempt to resuscitate national commercial networks and local petty commodity production.

In the Baixo Limpopo, these changes have given rise to a far-reaching process of agricultural re-structuring. At the level of the state apparatus the most notable feature has been the establishment of a UDA. Modeled on the UDA of the Chokwe area, the UDA of Xai-Xai was set up in 1985 as a new coordinating structure, responsible for planning and promoting agricultural development in the districts of Xai-Xai, Chibuto, Manjacaze and Bilene, which together form a new unit of regional development (i.e. a UDR). At the time of the research for this paper reorganization was still underway, and the UDA was only gradually taking control of the agricultural development process. Agricultural extension officers who formerly worked in inefficient District Directorates of Agriculture, which simply (and mechanically) implemented Ministry directives at the local level, were beginning to be incorporated into the regional UDA structure and were playing a much more active role in promoting agricultural growth. The UDA of Xai-Xai itself, however, has received very little support, and its capacities for analysis, planning and intervention remain limited. Thus if unable to make profits from its commercial activities (or at least break even), its capacity to foster agricultural development in the Baixo Limpopo will be seriously compromised.

A second, particularly dramatic, aspect of this re-structuring process has been the break-up of the former mega-state farm UPBL into six separate and smaller state farm production units. An integral part of this reorganization has been redistribution of abandoned or underutilized land belonging to the state farm sector to private farmers and peasant producers. The state farm sector in the Baixo Limpopo, which once controlled more than 26,000 ha. of land, now effectively controls only about 2,500 ha. Producer cooperatives have undergone a similar process of reorganization and a fairly large part of their holdings are now being redistributed to private farmers and peasant producers. No overall figures on redistribution exist, but the cooperatives in Xai-Xai District now cultivate only 426 ha., having controlled about 3,500 ha. before 1983. My own limited survey in six agricultural cooperatives in Xai-Xai District showed that in two cases the quantity of land redistributed exceeded 50% of the cooperatives' original land concession.

The private and family sectors have also been profoundly affected by the new policies, benefiting from access to more land and from increased technical support. In the family sector, there has been a marked increase in supplies of basic agricultural tools, such as hoes, ploughs, machetes, buckets, etc. There was not a consumer cooperative or privately owned store in the six communal villages I surveyed that did not have a reasonable supply of basic agricultural tools on sale. Though quite a number of these tools were imported, an increasing number of basic agricultural and domestic implements are now also beginning to be supplied through a promising programme to establish a small metal working industry in the area. The programme is economically very successful, employs about 200 people,
and constitutes an important attempt to link agricultural and industrial development at the local level.

The private sector, for its part, has benefited from the distribution of tractors, pumps and trucks supplied primarily by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which offered the machines on the condition that they be distributed exclusively to private producers. At the time this research was being carried out, some 22 tractors (complete with ploughs, harrows, etc.), 17 pumps and 16 trucks had been distributed by UDA in the lower Limpopo area, far fewer than the number of registered private farmers in Xai-Xai District alone (142; and 223 for the whole four districts of the region). Distribution has been made on the basis of the experience and competence of the farmer, so that larger more successful farmers usually get the machines. The implications of this practice for increased differentiation are evident. On the other hand, private farmers have also been encouraged to form associations for the collective purchase and operation of the machinery, and those doing so have been given priority over individual buyers. All farmers in the area have also been guaranteed fuel supplies for growing up to 17 ha. of crop. In exchange for this increased level of support, private producers are contractually obliged to produce a certain minimum area of cereal crop, 60% of which must be sold to the government at official prices.

Also underway is a programme to recuperate and expand the largely abandoned valley drainage-irrigation system upon which peasant cash cropping was based in the colonial period. In the context of the severe drought conditions which have afflicted the area since 1980, this programme, which counts on large-scale popular participation to (re)build the canals, has widespread popular support. Once adequately drained, the moist alluvial soils of the valley offer a far more secure subsistence base than the dry rain-dependent soils of the surrounding hills, to which the rural population had retreated after the devastating floods of 1977 largely destroyed the drainage system. As land is recovered, it is redistributed to family sector producers, who have now once again begun to work the valley lands in large numbers, though the areas being cultivated still remain much smaller than those cultivated during the colonial period. To boost production, those wishing to continue cultivating traditional valley land holdings far from the communal villages in which they live, are allowed to leave the communal villages and return to their former homes close to their land holdings. In some communal villages perhaps as much as one third of the population has done this, but for most households, costs of returning to their former homes simply outweigh the benefits of closer proximity to their fields: for most people, the communal villages are now their permanent homes.

A final very important reform is the attempt to make greater use of market mechanisms. This has centred on a liberalization of the prices of many agricultural products and consumer goods, and on a greater opening to private commerce and private enterprise generally. Price liberalization has affected all products except those considered of strategic dietary importance, though these too have increased sharply in price. Those goods still subject to price controls are cereals (rice, maize, sorghum, wheat, etc), oil seeds (peanuts, sunflower, cotton, etc) and legumes (beans). All other fruits and vegetables, including cassava, maize and sweet potato are now priced by market forces and are consequently very expensive. Liberalization has legitimized the parallel market, and reduced the gap between
market and official prices for agricultural goods, thus giving the government a greater degree of control over agricultural marketing.

This policy of greater reliance on the market has also entailed an effort to re-establish the private sector dominated colonial trading network. Here increased support has primarily taken the form of vehicles (trucks, tractors, etc.) and foreign currency credits for the import of consumer goods and equipment needed to facilitate the marketing of agricultural surpluses. Foreign currency for this programme has come from foreign loans and earnings from locally produced exports, principally cashew nuts. The supply of inputs and funding to private merchants, in fact, is directly linked to their capacity to increase amounts of marketed agricultural produce.

PROSPECTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE FOURTH CONGRESS REFORMS

The economic reforms since the Fourth Congress have had some success. Local markets, once virtually empty, now contain at least some produce for sale, most of it supplied by peasant and capitalist producers. At the same time, however, current levels of marketed production are still very low, and selling prices are (consequently) very high in relation to the purchasing power of the local population. The potential for more substantial increases in marketed production exists, but the obstacles that must be overcome in all sectors are considerable, and it is not at all clear whether Mozambique, whose economy has been all but shattered by South African destabilization, has the resources to overcome them. Any eventual 'take-off' of private or family sector agriculture, like the opening to market forces generally, may also unleash an economic development process that will not be easily contained within the parameters of the socialist development strategy Frelimo has sought to implement until now.

The State Farm Sector

Although it is perhaps too early to judge, the re-organization of the state farm sector in the Baixo Limpopo has not yet translated into greater efficiency or increased output. Similar measures have proved reasonably successful in the case of UPBL's sibling state farm (known as CAIL) further up the Limpopo valley, but UPBL has not yet overcome the basic technical and organizational problems which undermined its viability before: e.g. lack of fuel to irrigate its crops, inability to maintain its machinery operative, shortages of spare parts, labour shortages at critical periods of the agricultural calendar, etc. The production results of the 1985-86 agricultural campaign were not expected to be very good and those of the previous campaign (1984-85) were as dismal as in the pre-Fourth Congress period. Officials attributed the poor results primarily to a lack of fuel and spare parts for pumps with which to irrigate the crops (a not insignificant factor in the context of drought), and to large-scale predation by birds, whose numbers have increased significantly since the ending of the aerial spraying campaigns after independence.

The problems of labour shortages and instability of the work force, now promise to get worse rather than better as a result of the new agricultural reforms. The wages paid to state farm workers (75.5MT a day) are significantly less than the wages paid in the private sector, and since food prices have risen rapidly, they purchase very little. Unless wages are increased, or state farm workers provided with food and other basic goods at reasonable prices, the labour shortage will
worsen. The flight of labour from the state sector affects the state apparatus as a whole, for the policy shift towards the market and private enterprise has made employment in the private sector (and with international development agencies) more remunerative than employment in the state sector. Many of that sector's problems - its lack of trained cadres, absenteeism, indiscipline and low productivity - are closely linked to low pay and the need for employees to supplement pay by parallel economic activity during working hours, or through competition.

The state farm sector has remained dependent on credit and state subsidies, and without these would likely shrink even further and all but disappear. This being the case, the recent (January 1987) unveiling of a comprehensive national economic recovery programme, with its emphasis on economic efficiency and accountability, and on strict restrictions on the use of credit by state firms, does not augur well for the sector. Nor does Mozambique's current foreign debt service crisis, which has brought it under increased IMF pressure to 'rationalize' its state sector and to reduce public spending.

The Cooperative Sector

The situation of the cooperative sector is even more precarious. Only a handful of the 40 or so cooperatives and pre-cooperatives formerly in existence in the Baixo Limpopo are still fully operational, and most have ceased functioning altogether. As was the case before the Fourth Congress, the vast majority of members continue to be marginal producers, mostly old women, for whom membership offers a degree of subsistence security which the limited productive capacity of the households from which they come cannot by themselves provide. This marginal character of cooperative membership is the result of the cooperative's poor economic performance, which has stemmed largely from a lack of state material and organizational support, and a disastrous two-year experiment in forced peasant participation in cooperative production. For most peasant families the allocation of household labour to cooperative production has always constituted a waste of time and, in the context of the current drought, even a threat to household subsistence security, since the same amount of labour allocated to household production invariably gives a higher return. Very little of the increased support promised the cooperative sector has yet been delivered, perhaps because many of the cooperatives are so weak and disorganized that local authorities are reluctant to provide them with additional support, for fear of throwing good money after bad. Though a few cooperatives in the lower Limpopo valley are still holding their own, and as a result have now begun to receive increased material support, in the form of tractors and trucks, the majority are teetering on the brink of dissolution. Even with a concerted programme of support, it may well be that for most cooperatives the offer of increased support is too little too late.

In contrast to the producer cooperatives, the consumer cooperatives of the Baixo Limpopo are doing reasonably well. Present in nearly all the communal villages of the area, they enjoy widespread popular support and function quite successfully, though all could benefit from increased organizational support. Like all retail outlets in the area, however, they suffer from an acute shortage of merchandise. The increased supplies of consumer goods promised by the government in support of agricultural marketing have yet to find their way into the consumer cooperative system. The consumer cooperatives, in fact, have not yet received any significant increase in levels of state support. In general, they have been given much lower
priority than private merchants, who have been receiving trucks, tractors and other forms of support. This disparity probably stems from pragmatic considerations, since consumer cooperatives, unlike private merchants, do not play any significant role in agricultural marketing. Increased material and organizational support for the consumer cooperatives, would however sustain and foster one of the few socialist economic forms which have had any measure of success, and counterbalance the increased political and economic power of the private commercial sector.

The Family Sector
Peasant family agriculture is now the priority sector of current agricultural policy. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this new emphasis has been the current government programme of reactivating the old colonial hydro-agricultural system, gradually abandoned from the late colonial period. This has a high degree of popular support and participation, but this does not guarantee that the family sector will once again begin producing a regular surplus. The obstacles to be overcome are still many.

In the first place, commercial scale agriculture in the Baixo Limpopo depends on the careful collective maintenance of hydraulic equilibriums, centring on the cleaning and maintenance of drainage-irrigation canals, and on the coordinated use of the land by those farming it. If only a few fail to clean their sections of the canal, neighbouring plots will flood, or lack water. However, since basic subsistence can be ensured without proper canal maintenance, many refuse to invest their labour in reactivating the system completely. Furthermore, since during the colonial period canal maintenance was obligatory and enforced by fines or beatings, no sense of collective responsibility for the canals developed. This attitude persists, shown by the extreme measures sometimes advocated by local officials (and by the population itself) for dealing with people who fail to meet their community obligations: floggings, forced community work, confiscation of land holdings in the valley, etc.

The problem of guaranteeing large-scale popular participation however, is not simply a question of communal culture or political coercion, but also and perhaps primarily a question of economics. Any attempt to promote peasant cash-cropping, without recourse to coercive methods, must find a way of making it a viable and attractive alternative for rural households, not only to migrant labour, but also to subsistence production (see below). Popular participation in the maintenance of the hydraulic system will be assured only when rural households, individually and collectively, feel that they have a material interest in cash-cropping. To develop such a material base, the family sector must be supplied with the means of production and the commercial incentive necessary to make cash-cropping desirable and advantageous. Currently, however, with the exception of hand tools and animal drawn ploughs, local access to means of production continues to be limited.

One of the input shortages most acutely felt by the family sector is that of seeds. As a result, the open market demand for seed in the local economy is great and prices are consequently very high: upwards of 10-12 times the official price. Due to the 1986 dry season (April-September) maize crop failure, because of insufficient rain, the shortages of maize seed in particular were reaching critical levels. After six years of inadequate rain, peasant seed reserves were all but depleted, leaving
many households with nothing to sow for the approaching rainy season. Many rich peasants, who traditionally serve as a major local source of seed and emergency food supplies for rural households, were taking advantage of current shortages by accepting only labour or exchange in kind as payment for food and seed.

Perhaps the most important input shortage for the development of the family sector in the middle and long term is that of oxen. There are few cattle, and those who have them will only rarely sell, usually for payment in kind rather than cash. Only migrant labourers, whose work in South Africa gives them access to scarce consumer goods, are able to buy cattle. It is no easier to rent, and again payment is in kind or labour. Tractors are also scarce, and fuel shortage so acute that owners will not - or cannot - rent out machines, thus depriving the family sector of access. The sole exceptions are again migrant labourers with consumer goods.

Without access to the means for practising plough agriculture, however, it is likely that family sector production in the Baixo Limpopo will continue to remain limited. Indeed, in the absence of capital inputs, and with limited possibilities for wage employment either in South Africa or inside Mozambique, it is very likely that a large part of the rural population of the Baixo Limpopo will be forced to continue subsisting largely outside of national circuits of exchange, with a consequent continuing decline in its levels of consumption and general standard of living. Furthermore, the current policy of allocating resources primarily to those producers who have the capacity of using them most efficiently, is likely to perpetuate this stagnation and marginalization, as well as fueling rural differentiation.

The other great obstacle to any increase in family sector production is the lack of commercial incentive, especially the acute shortage of consumer goods. Unless there is something to spend cash-crop earnings on, there is little reason to produce a cash-crop in the first place. As a result, peasants have limited themselves to producing primarily for their own subsistence needs.

The importance of commercial incentives is highlighted by the economic stimulus arising from the recent increase in labour recruitment to South Africa, more than 60% between 1982 and 1986 in the Baixo Limpopo. The chronic shortage of consumer goods inside Mozambique has led to a dramatic increase in the amount of consumer goods imported by migrant workers and to the development of a flourishing import business - and a corresponding entrepreneurial stratum - based on the foreign currency purchasing power of migrant labourers. Convoys leaving Maputo for Xai-Xai, and for Inhambane further north, are often in excess of 2 km. in length, consisting mostly of trucks laden with tools and consumer goods bought by miners for shipment back to their families inside Mozambique. These goods are usually redistributed through informal systems of exchange and the parallel economy, thus serving as an important source of consumer goods for many rural communities throughout southern Mozambique. Returning miners, not local shops, have now become the main source of soap, cloth and other basic necessities. These goods have stimulated economic activity in the Baixo Limpopo, but the still relatively small quantities being supplied, and the speculative forms through which they were being distributed, placed serious constraints on the capacity of the family sector to respond more positively to this stimulus.

Migrant labourers to South Africa are increasingly taking on the character of an economic aristocracy in the countryside, with all the potential for transforming
themselves into a petty capitalist class. The current policies of economic liberalization have created a new economic space for migrant labourers, permitting them to import and re-sell consumer goods without running the risk of being branded black marketeers, as would have been the case previously. Furthermore, migrant labourers often sold the products they imported not for money, but for labour. A common standard of exchange consists of one day of labour for one bar of soap. An increasing number of migrant labourers are now also buying trucks in South Africa, which they use not only to transport the purchases of other migrant workers back to Mozambique, but also for the transport of agricultural produce and other merchandise inside Mozambique, thereby beginning to fill the vacuum left by the departure of the Portuguese settlers, who formerly dominated the country’s rural transportation system. In this regard, migrant labour to South Africa continues to be, as in the past, a major factor in fostering differentiation in the countryside.

This was nowhere more evident than in housing. Virtually all masonry houses being built in the Baixo Limpopo today belong to miners. In a survey I conducted in one communal village, 58% of all masonry houses were owned by miners (though miners accounted for no more than 20% of the economically active male population), and of the 52 houses built in the village since 1982, 42 had been built by miners. It is precisely because of the evident affluence of the miners that migrant labour to South Africa continues to be, now even more than in the past, the most sought after form of male employment.

While levels of labour recruitment to the mines of South Africa have increased over the past few years, levels of unemployment still remain high. This lack of employment opportunities, together with a lack of agricultural capital and commercial incentive, has fostered a retreat into subsistence production that is having profound social and political effects on the rural communities of the Baixo Limpopo.

The retreat into subsistence production, and the reduced levels of consumption it has entailed, have played a decisive role in undermining levels of popular political mobilization and popular support for collectivization and other aspects of past government policy. This has manifested itself ideologically in a resurgence of traditional rural culture, most notably of pre-colonial and Christian religious practices. Curandeirismo (i.e. the craft of the witchdoctor), for example, which had been put on the defensive and largely driven underground with the creation of communal villages, is now undergoing a renaissance of sorts, with banned ceremonies being performed in communal villages, and with young people still showing a willingness to apprentice to this traditional and respected profession. Similarly, adherents to the various African Christian sects, who were previously prohibited from building their churches or holding their regular services inside communal villages (being obliged to do so outside of the villages’ boundaries), were now openly defying these local government prohibitions.

On the other hand, the retreat into subsistence production also appears to be giving rise to serious social problems, as current alcohol consumption trends in communal villages throughout the Baixo Limpopo clearly illustrate. Home brewing and distillation has expanded rapidly, due to the ending of colonial restrictions and the difficulty of buying through official channels. Many unemployed or underemployed men now regularly produce their own beverages - drawing heavily on the labour power of the women of their households for much of the processing.
- or purchase them from their neighbours. Given the high demand, and the greater legitimacy which entrepreneurial activity now enjoys, production and sale has become a very lucrative activity, causing an increasing amount of peasant labour and land - especially well-watered valley land - to be turned over to the production of sugar cane, much to the chagrin of local government officials. Large quantities of modestly priced alcohol are now readily available in the local economy, and alcohol consumption has increased significantly, with damaging effects on domestic relations and productive activities, especially amongst poorer households, leading to calls for restrictions on alcohol consumption and sugar cane production by local officials. High rates of alcohol consumption, furthermore, are not very conducive to popular political mobilization: to the 'conscious participation' of the masses in socialist construction.

These negative social consequences of the current economic crisis serve to underline the urgency of finding a strategy of economic recovery capable of transforming agricultural production in the Baixo Limpopo into a worthwhile source of employment for the rural population. It is still too early to tell if the current liberalization will succeed in this regard. What is clear, however, is that without increased supplies of technical inputs and increased commercial incentive, it is doubtful that the semi-proletarianized rural population of the Baixo Limpopo can be drawn out of the subsistence mode into which they have retreated since independence, and induced to begin producing marketable surpluses on a regular basis.

The Private Sector
Almost completely ignored by FRELIMO since independence, and prevented from occupying the prime agricultural land abandoned by departed Portuguese settlers - land that was turned over to UPBL and cooperatives - the private sector of the Baixo Limpopo has patiently waited in the wings for a change in agricultural policy, and now that it has come appears poised to fill the economic position formerly occupied by Portuguese settler farmers. The private sector, in fact, has undoubtedly been the principal beneficiary of the Fourth Congress reforms. It has gained control of the lion's share of the lands which the cooperative and state farm sectors have been unable to use and has begun to receive substantial quantities of technical inputs, such as guaranteed quotas of fuel, tractors, trucks, pumps, etc. It has also benefited greatly from the programme to re-activate the valley drainage and irrigation system, which has enabled many capitalist farmers to resume cultivating lands which have been unusable since the floods of 1977.

Private producer response to these measures has been, on the whole, quite positive. All the private farmers I spoke to showed a ready willingness to substantially increase agricultural production if provided with the means to do so. Even those who had not yet received new machinery - i.e. the majority - were quite prepared to expand production using their old tractors if provided with sufficient fuel. Some big private farmers even complained that the policy of limiting guaranteed fuel supplies to what is sufficient for ploughing a maximum of 17 ha. (i.e. approx. 1500 litres), was a constraint on their productive capacity. Nearly all farmers, however, were less than enthusiastic about their obligation to produce cereal crops and to sell 60% of the product to the government at official prices. Most would rather produce vegetables and other crops not subject to price controls, thus enabling them to earn much more money than with cereal production.
The growth of private sector agriculture, however, will very much depend on the capacity of state structures to supply the necessary inputs in sufficient quantities and on a regular basis. Shortages of fuel and spare parts are common, due to the scarcity of foreign exchange; without them, investment in tractors is fruitless, and thus also investment in crops. In Baixo Limpopo the main source of spare parts has become returning migrant workers.

With the recent increase in levels of mine labour recruitment, the number of machines to be found in the Baixo Limpopo has increased, as has their relative importance in productive and commercial activities in the area. But this technological dependence of private sector agriculture on South Africa poses, of course, a serious threat to the success of the current attempt to increase private and family sector agricultural output. The South African government's announcement on October 1986, of its intention to expel all Mozambican migrant workers from South Africa, will deal a crippling blow to the Mozambican government's current efforts to increase private and peasant sector agricultural output, and to the economy of southern Mozambique as a whole, if it is fully implemented.

A further difficulty is that of labour supplies. Due to the scarcity of basic consumer goods and the competition provided by the migrant labour system to South Africa (and Maputo), it is only with difficulty that local capitalist farmers are able to recruit the labour power they need. Few people are willing to work only for monetary wages, since money itself cannot supply the food and other necessities people need; and given a choice, nearly all men would prefer to work in South Africa anyway. In areas like the Baixo Limpopo, furthermore, where land is not in short supply, rural households simply prefer to allocate labour to subsistence production rather than sell it for wages, which cannot buy the basic necessities of life. For this reason, nearly all private farmers in the area are obliged to pay their employees, whether permanent or casual, both in kind and in money, and to do so at rates which are between two and three times the official rural wage (i.e. 150-200MT per day as compared to 75.50MT per day). Without a wage component in kind, the monetary wage can be even higher.

The current drought, however, has seriously weakened subsistence production by the family sector, giving rise to food shortages which have forced poorer households back onto the local labour market, thereby weakening the bargaining power of rural wage labourers for higher wages. Poor peasants and young men unable to find employment elsewhere make up the bulk of those currently employed by capitalist farmers. Much of this labour force, however, is unstable and characterized by a high turn-over rate. It appears that many households sell their labour to local capitalist farmers to meet short-term cash needs, only to return to subsistence production (the real basis of subsistence security) once their monetary needs have been met.

In contrast to the family sector, shortages of seed and consumer goods do not represent a serious obstacle to increased production for the private sector. Although capitalist farmers also suffer from shortages of certain kinds of seeds, their greater wealth enables them to keep seed reserves more easily, to purchase what they lack through the black market, or gain privileged access to the limited quantities of seed which state structures have at their disposal by bribery. Similarly, consumer goods shortages do not constitute any direct disincentive for capitalist farmers themselves. Being strongly market and accumulation oriented, and
possessing far greater resources to purchase the goods they need through the parallel economy - usually through systems of exchange with migrant workers, merchants and state functionaries - private farmers showed themselves to be quite prepared to increase agricultural production without any special consumer incentive, once provided with the necessary means of production and price incentives.

The increased quantity of agricultural produce now available in local markets, much of it provided by capitalist farmers, attests to the relative success of the current reforms in increasing marketed production. In the case of some crops, supply has been sufficient to enable market forces to operate, pushing prices down from the very high free (parallel) market levels formerly charged to consumers. At the beginning of the tomato season, for example, tomatoes in Xai-Xai's central market were selling at the free market price of 300MT/kg. As the season advanced and supply increased, competition drove the price down to about 80-90MT/kg, a figure which is still very high when one considers that the average Mozambican urban wage is only about 6000MT a month, but still a significant improvement over the earlier parallel market price.

The reforms also show signs of fueling differentiation in the countryside and of fostering class alliances that are inimical to the popular political structures Frelimo has sought to develop since independence. Liberalization has created obvious opportunities for personal accumulation for a variety of social groupings, such as merchants, capitalist farmers, state bureaucrats, market stall operators, and migrant labourers to South Africa. In the context of acute shortages of capital resources, furthermore, the allocation of scarce agricultural inputs and means of transport to a small number of already relatively well-to-do capitalist farmers and merchants cannot but strengthen these strata's capacity for accumulation. Already, in fact, merchants and capitalist farmers who had received state support were expanding and diversifying their economic activities and increasing the size of their work forces. Given the lack of employment opportunities, and the many obstacles to increased production by the family sector, entrepreneurial elements clearly stand to benefit from the large reservoir of rural labour power that will become available if supplies of consumer goods are increased. In general, it is those with access to significant capital resources who have the most to gain from the current opening to the market. Deregulation provides Mozambique's traditionally small and weakly developed indigenous capitalist sector with new opportunities for growth and accumulation.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of this re-emergence of the private sector was the rapidity with which a new class alliance was beginning to take shape in the Baixo Limpopo between capitalist farmers, merchants, miners and state bureaucrats. Each of these groups controls certain scarce resources - private resources in the case of farmers, merchants and miners, and public resources in the case of state bureaucrats - which enables them to trade with each other for the resources they lack. Thus, private farmers are able to obtain the seed they need by providing the state bureaucrats responsible for seed distribution with small gifts; miners are able to obtain fuel for the vehicles they import from South Africa by bribing the state employees responsible for distributing tightly rationed fuel supplies with consumer goods; merchants are able to have their fields ploughed by the tractors of private farmers in exchange for privileged access to the supplies of merchandise the merchants receive; etc. This alliance of private and state
bureaucratic interests was obviously already extant prior to the reforms, but the opportunities which they have created for private enterprise have given a strong impulse to this process, in both urban and rural areas.

The whole idea of private enterprise has come to assume an air of legitimacy in both official and popular political discourses that it formerly lacked. This is most evident in the greater public role which private farmers and other entrepreneurs have begun to assume in the public life of their communities, and their assertiveness in promoting their class interests. This was evident in the more prominent role they played in the national elections of 1986 - at public meetings, as candidates, as organizers, etc. - and in their attempts to gain control of underutilized lands belonging to cooperatives, state farms and individual peasant producers. On the other hand, many public officials whose private economic activities benefit from the contacts and resources which their public positions provide are themselves increasingly becoming involved in entrepreneurial activities, creating obvious conflicts of interest and giving them a clear vested interest in the continuation of current policies. On the whole, the private sector was clearly in the process of (re)constituting itself as a political and ideological force, actively promoting the bonds of class solidarity between entrepreneurial groupings (both inside and outside the state), and very conscious of the obstacle which Frelimo's continuing defence of the class interests of the 'povo' (i.e. the 'masses') poses to the advancement of its own class project.

The obvious danger of this renaissance of the private sector for Mozambique's long-term socialist objectives, especially the private sector's growing alliance with state bureaucrats, lies in the tendency for the state apparatus to increasingly begin serving the specific accumulation interests of these entrepreneurial strata rather than the broader interests of the Mozambican people. Economic power always has the tendency to translate into political power and Frelimo's current opening to market forces has clearly heightened the level of class struggle in the country. The challenge for Frelimo in pursuing the present market oriented strategy lies in finding mechanisms which ensure that the differentiation which such policies entail does not undermine the popular democratic character of the country's political structures. The degree to which Frelimo will be successful in developing such mechanisms and in defending popular power in Mozambique remains to be seen.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
The new agricultural reforms ushered in by the Frelimo Fourth Congress represent a significant retreat from the ambitious strategy of rural collectivization Frelimo sought to implement after independence. In the current context of drought, acute food shortages and escalating South African aggression, the primary concern of the Mozambican government has become one of increasing food production and keeping critical sectors of the economy functioning, regardless of the relations of production through which this is achieved. The watchword now is increased production, not socialization of production, and the aim of the current reforms is to induce the private and family sectors to effect this increase.

As we have seen, however, the possibility of any sustained increase in private of family sector production is directly linked to the supply of adequate quantities of capital and consumer goods, and to the organizational capacity of the Mozambican state to distribute them efficiently. To date, the Mozambican government has been
unable to supply all the necessary inputs to achieve this end, and in view of the widespread devastation being caused to the country's economy by South African destabilization, it is doubtful that Mozambique will, in the short term at least, be able to do so. A large part of the inputs needed to sustain private and family sector production continue to be supplied through migrant labour to South Africa, making the revival of production precarious and very vulnerable to any decline in levels of recruitment.

Since the Mozambican government cannot supply the inputs needed to promote agricultural growth, the possibility of any major increase in production will necessarily depend on the availability of large-scale foreign financing. Mozambique's increased openness to private foreign capital in the years since the Fourth Congress has not, however, led to any appreciable increase in levels of foreign agricultural investment, nor is it likely to do so as long as the war continues. Mozambique's reliance on external credit and foreign aid, on the other hand, has shown a steady increase since the Fourth Congress, to the point where external sources of financing accounted for more than half of the annual state budget in 1986. Foreign debt has continued to grow, totalling US$3.2 billion in 1986, while the country's capacity to service it has steadily declined: the foreign debt in 1986 equalled 168% of the GDP for that year, while export earnings equalled a mere 14.6% of the total debt services.

By crippling Mozambique's economy and increasing its dependence on foreign aid, South African destabilization has clearly limited Frelimo's capacity to pursue an independent development strategy and greatly strengthened the hand of those internal and external forces wanting to keep Mozambique in the peripheral capitalist camp. Mozambique's current dependence on foreign aid has significantly increased the IMF's influence over Mozambique's domestic social and economic policies, pushing them further in the direction of deregulation and the market than Frelimo might have otherwise been prepared to go. The new Economic Rehabilitation Programme announced in January of 1987, with its stress on fiscal responsibility, sharp consumer price increases, increased taxation, large devaluation of the currency, and new (and unprecedented) health care charges, clearly points to the imposition of an IMF 'package' on Mozambique as a condition for new lines of credit. The danger which such developments pose to Frelimo's long-term socialist objectives are evident. On the other hand, it is unclear what other choices are available to Frelimo under the current circumstances. Frelimo clearly needs to promote the market and to reactivate the productive capacity of colonial agricultural sectors just to survive the war and the economic crisis it has precipitated, and the only way it can do this is by importing the requisite inputs and paying for them through external credits and grants. The new market-oriented agricultural policies, therefore, are evidently seen in Mozambique as a necessary tactical retreat aimed at resuscitating the internal market and strengthening the country's war effort, and thus as a way of grounding future efforts to build a socialist rural economy on a firmer productive basis. As the preceding discussion has suggested, however, any real progress in this latter direction will be closely linked to the outcome of the overall struggle for an apartheid-free South Africa.

Bibliographic Note
Much of the data for this is drawn from the author's field notes and from Mozambican official sources for Gaza Province, including Aldeias Communais e Occupacao Teritorial do Vale do Limpopo no Distrito de Xai Xai. (Xai Xai: Servico Provincial de Planificacao Fisica e
Itabitacao, 1982), for basic data. The colonial background is discussed in M. Wuyts 'Peasants and rural economy in Mozambique', (Centro de Estudos Africanos, 1978). Several pieces analyse the failings of pre-1983 policies, notably:


Reviews


The specialist seeking detailed information about the growth of South Africa's independent unions after the 1973 watershed has been admirably catered for, particularly by the South African Labour Bulletin. Over the years, SALB has provided a comprehensive mixture of analytical and factual coverage which guides the observer through a maze of legislation, union activity, political inclinations and management strategies. S. Friedman's book complements the work of the SALB by providing a readable, accessible and detailed chronological account of many of the events and personalities which have dominated independent union life in the last fifteen years or so.

It is a difficult book to label neatly. It is not a theoretical piece, riven by clashing interpretations of state, class and consciousness. Similarly, it does not offer a structured in-depth analysis of either state policy or management strategy over the 1970-84 period. Instead, Friedman's adoption of a chronological approach leads him to tell a story into which are insinuated analytical insights, illustrative anecdotes, fly-on-the-wall accounts of key events, and innumerable facts. The telling of the story in terms which transcend the journalistic is the strong point in favour of the book. There is no substitute yet available in book form for the wealth of material gathered between these covers. In sixteen chapters, we are led from 1973's pre-history, briefly and adequately described, through the upsurge of 1973-74, the downturn of 1976 and after, to the period of major expansion of independent unions after 1980. The reader is necessarily bombarded with a plethora of initials as new organisations are formed, and existing unions divide and re-form. Keeping track of organisations and individuals across chapter boundaries is good fun, as are the little asides - for example, what were the reasons for Xolani Kota's abrupt and unexplained exit from SAAWU officialdom, noted on page 220? Will it remain, like Sherlock Holmes and the case of the Giant Rat of Sumatra, an intriguing mystery hereafter? Another anecdote captures one aspect of the book's style well. On page 96 we are informed that a strategy which would 'change the direction of African unionism' (the demand for recognition agreements US-style) arose out of a casual cocktail party conversation between a union activist and an American diplomat. It would appear, perhaps surprisingly to an observer familiar with any comparative industrial relations material, that the idea of recognition agreements had not surfaced in South Africa before, and that COSATU and the rest of the independent unions owe a deal of thanks to this unwitting benefactor.
There is a stylistic point about the book which this reviewer found occasionally irritating. After each substantive chapter, already stuffed with data, Friedman offers a section of notes. Though the notes are in themselves often very interesting and, indeed, sometimes contain more analytical meat than the chapter, they are not referenced to the chapter's text in any way. Consequently, the reader sometimes experiences the sensation of reading two texts in the one set of covers and spends fixated minutes trying to match the note to the main text. A properly organised bibliography should have also been provided.

That grouse aside, the substantive material is well written. A real strength of the whole book lies in the general detachment displayed by the author when dealing with the thorny issues which have divided unions in the past. The arguments about general versus industrial unions and the registration debate are dealt with even-handedly, maybe because they lie in the past and the main protagonists are generally reconciled to contemporary realities. Anyone sympathetic to black consciousness arguments might question the balance of coverage between the FOSATU tradition and the CUSA and AZAPO/AZACTU alternatives, but such a view would be ungenerous to the author. A positive aspect of the book is Chapter 15 dealing, albeit briefly, with 'forgotten' workers in the so-called homelands, the rural sector and in domestic labour.

Many readers will concentrate on the later chapters, particularly that which confronts the difficult question of unions and politics (chapter 14). Friedman counterposes the union-based and defended 'politics of mandate and negotiation' against the 'politics of . . . the rifle and petrol bomb' which grew up in the mid-1980s in the townships (page 453-54). His fear is that the former will be transcended by the latter and, in the process, 'the last hope of a democratic future' will fail. The reader sympathises with an author producing under the political constraints and real threats to personal safety which exist in South Africa. Underlaying these last 'coded' comments is the complex and ultimately paramount question to be faced by the independent unions - what will be their relationship with the wider forces for change which will challenge the apartheid state in the coming years? The neophyte in South Africa union affairs is helped by Friedman to understand the fundamental contribution made by the independent unions to a democratic tradition which offers hope to the dispossessed masses. His account of the November 1984 stayaway, though brief, charts the mixed fortunes of the independent union tradition as it became involved in community action on a wide scale, fortunes which today are still as contradictory.

The positive aspects of this book far outweigh the stylistic criticisms noted above. It fills an important gap in the South African literature and will be read with interest by both expert and newcomer alike. As always, a book dealing with contemporary events stands to be out of date by the time it reaches the reader, and the success of this treatment of the 1970-84 period should stimulate Friedman and Ravan to update his book at a suitable time in the future.

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This book contains a comparative analysis of sharecropping associated with the production of export crops in four areas of Africa: abusa contracts in the cocoa farming areas of southern Ghana, musharaka contracts with tenants on the Gezira scheme in Sudan, seahlolo and lihalefote arrangements between food grain farmers in Lesotho and sama manila in the groundnut producing areas of Senegambia. Robertson's argument is that sharecropping is not necessarily a repressive, inefficient and inequitable system of production, nor can it usefully be described as 'pre-capitalist' or 'quasi feudal'. Sharecropping is a relationship in which parties combine resources in a productive enterprise in such a way as to spread the risks of production when many factors, such as weather, markets or official policy, are not under their immediate control. It is a system by which the processes of production can be temporarily extended beyond the limits of the household. Its virtue lies in its flexibility in convening and transforming the productive resources available to the partners which makes it superior to theoretically 'more advanced' productive arrangements such as fixed land rents and wage labour.

The first chapter reviews the classical and contemporary debates on sharecropping. The negative evaluation of the first, derived from the European 'seigneurial' stereotype, had been firmly established by the mid-twentieth century. Contemporary studies have been less confident of the backwardness of sharecropping in view of its versatility, of the lack of evidence that it is an inefficient form of production (especially in comparison to the forms of production advocated in development programmes) and of its failure to realise itself in relationships of class. The key to understanding its versatility, argues Robertson, lies in 'the complex effects of time in social and economic relationships' (p.3). Time is considered as a factor in several different ways: first, as the programme of each individual contract over the farming season; second, as the cycle of reproduction of the household during which the terms of share contracts are modified according to the changing needs and capacities of partners; third, as the transformation of sharecropping contracts in the longer term in response to major changes in the structure of the economy, such as technical development, changes in land-labour ratios or world recession.

The case studies are based on secondary sources combined (with the exception of the Ghanaian chapter which was first published in the Journal of Development Studies, vol.18, no.4, 1982) with the results of recent short bursts of fieldwork. The schema and synopsis of the work are summarised in an Appendix to Chapter 2 to which I found myself continually referring. Here, the basic differences between contemporary sharecropping relationships and practices are revealed in the relative importance of labour, land and other inputs negotiated in each contract. In the Gezira, the 'basic contractual norm' concerns an annual crop - usually not cotton, the official product. In Ghana, it is the cocoa farm and its development over time. The importance of the source of seedstock, of the responsibility for pesticides, of the duration of the contract and so on are outlined.

Sharecropping, Robertson argues, is inherently inequitable 'since contracts are premised on the complementarity rather than the parity of what each party can offer' (p.269) but they can accommodate both the inequitable distribution of
resources between generations and changes in factor markets over the longer term. Under these conditions, sharecropping has often superceded wage labour or exists alongside it as a practice preferred by both partners. Each case study distinguishes key periods in the economic history of the region, including official and usually negative policies towards sharecropping, as they impinge on these and other productive relations. One of the most important issues which arises is the comparison of circumstances in which sharecropping becomes a means for the original farm worker to progress to the status of independent producer or, conversely, for sharecropping contracts to deteriorate into fixed rents and wage labour. The conclusion which Robertson draws is that there is no unilinear progression one way or the other in the history of sharecropping. Rather, the variety and complexity of the contracts are inimical to processes of class formation.

This is a distinguished comparative study by an anthropologist who crosses inter-disciplinary boundaries with inspiring confidence. It is written with the intention of vitalising the debate on the function and future of sharecropping in Africa. It is open to examinations which must range from assessments of its competence in representing the secondary sources, to the value of its contribution to the debate on the form of the development of agrarian capitalism in Africa. As far as the latter is concerned, it is utterly convincing. Each reader will no doubt pursue his or her argument with the text. For my part, the question which dogged me throughout was provoked by the very first sentence: 'The central argument... is that, given the inherent instability of the family as a productive unit, and many centuries of erratic economic growth worldwide, certain relations of production have taken root because they are flexible and adaptable' (p.1). Nevertheless, as Robertson quite plainly states, with the exception of the Lesotho case study the subject of his analysis is 'the domestic career of individual contracting parties' (p.159), not the family (or, more appropriately, the household) as a unit, unstable or otherwise. Nor is it an analysis of the consequences of sharecropping for those members of the household whose labour, capital and inputs may be contracted for: in particular, women. In the pursuit of the proposition that relations of class are neither theoretically necessary to the concept of sharecropping nor empirically present in the shorter or longer term development of sharecropping contracts, gender relations are overlooked in the very sphere in which they are most embedded in 'peasant' economies: the household.

This is not to say that the issue of gender is neglected: the capacity of women to enter into sharecropping contracts is of considerable importance. Robertson is at pains to show that sharecropping contracts are social as well as economic relationships. The capacity to enter into these contracts derives from material and human resources including relatively indefinable assets. Ranging from assessments of reliability and trustworthiness in partners, the constituents become an issue of particular salience in the Lesotho case study, partly because of the excellence of the secondary sources. The Sotho term matla refers to productive resources and also to physical energy, political influence and authority: 'Men acquire (matla) with maturity, accumulate it, share it, invest it and expend it. Women lack matla, and must acquire it through men' (p.143). Yet as a consequence of male migration and deaths on the mines, women heads of households constitute the majority of lessors of land despite ambiguity concerning their capacities in such respects. Moreover, owing to the contemporary sexual division of labour, Sotho women actually do much of the work even if it is their husbands who have nominally or actually share...
contracted. In the other case studies, the question of women's capacity is entertained more briefly, no doubt because it is uncommon: on the Gezira, for example, it has never been heard that women become lessees of land.

Robertson's perspective, then, certainly allows one to appreciate why women do not usually enter into contracts. But he says nothing about the implications for women whose labour is spoken for in contracts between men. Indeed, despite the close attention which he pays to the negotiations between contracting parties, he says nothing of how (or even if) husbands negotiate the costs - or benefits - of the contracts with wives. Yet, in Senegambia a 'basic tenet of the contract is that the samalaa does not grow his own food' (p.228). A man cannot become a lessor unless he has a wife to provide food and cook for his samalaa (who, according to Robertson, are notably choosy about the quality and quantity of food they will accept). Women do not become samalaalu, but if they accompany their husbands they are expected to assist the wives of their hosts in the preparation of food. Along the Gambia River, where women produce rice, which constitutes the bulk of household foodstuffs, samalaalu are other mouths to feed who will not, because they are men, provide labour on the rice fields. They do contribute to men's cereal crops which also feed the household. But it is men who get the additional labour, not women; men for whom an additional source of labour provides flexibility over the farming year and farming life, women who work longer and more consistently throughout the year. So, what's the deal here, as far as women are concerned? There certainly are deals, but unfortunately Robertson does not cite J. Dey's thesis ('Women and Rice in the Gambia', University of Reading, 1980, unpublished) which discusses the negotiations between husbands and wives over food and labour.

In the Ghanaian case, women are affected by the labour demands over the life cycle of a cocoa farm in very different ways from their husbands. Indeed, working for their husbands places substantial constraints upon women's capacity to develop their own material resources and a number of studies have suggested that the gender division of labour which emerged as a consequence of the introduction of cocoa as a cash crop has not been to the advantage of women. How have share-cropping contracts affected, for example, the labour expectations between spouses? However important sharecropping may have been in constraining the emergence of a rural class structure, its effect on the distribution of resources between members of a household may be equally important for understanding the form of the development of capitalism. For the best interests of the household, if these are understood to be merely those of its head (the person in a position to enter into a share contract) may not be those of its individual members. African agrarian households are not homogenous units. The success of sharecropping, measured solely by the relationships between contract partners, leaves much to be understood about the development of gender relations.

These comments, however, arise from the enterprise of Robertson's book. It is a fresh and valuable contribution to the reappraisal of agrarian relations in Africa, to the re-evaluation of farmers' technical and social skills in the management of enterprises and to the social history of peasant economies. 

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The Development of Capitalism in Africa is an ambitious book. In 133 pages of text John Sender and Sheila Smith seek to overturn conventional explanations about 'the persistence of poverty and suffering' (p.1) in sub-Saharan Africa. These explanations they divide into two parts. Firstly, there is the explanation 'based upon an anti-state, free market analysis' which 'attributes economic failure to the misallocation of resources created by state intervention and interference with the play of market forces' (p.110). Sender and Smith argue that this analysis 'ignore(s) the overwhelming historical evidence concerning the central role of the state in all late-industrialising countries' (p.130). At best, this analysis 'is pessimistic about the prospects for rapid capitalist development and argues that the form taken by capitalism in Africa is 'distorted' and structurally constrained by imperialism' (p.131); at worst, the analysis may rest on the premise that 'capitalist development in developing countries is impossible' (p.130). Sender and Smith argue that this explanation, in either form, lacks 'empirical support or logical coherence' (p.127) and only serves to direct attention 'towards foreign scapegoats and away from domestic class struggles, the absence of debate on realistic economic strategy, and a weakening of the prospects for progressive class forces' (p.110).

Contrary to these explanations, Sender and Smith propose a framework that utilises 'Marx's analysis of the origins and development of capitalism' (p.1). They argue that in this framework 'the focus of the analysis is upon internal change, in particular upon changes in social relations of production' (pp.2-3) that occur over a long period of time. For Sender and Smith, capitalist development is thus based upon 'changes in ownership and control of the means of production' (p.1). From Lenin, they recognise that capitalist relations of production may become dominant 'even in conditions where producers retain some access to the means of production and subsistence' (p.2). Given such an analytic framework, Sender and Smith attempt to demonstrate that 'the development of the forces of production in many post-colonial African economies has been extremely rapid' (p.67) due to the fact that 'the emergence of capitalist social relations of production constitutes the central dynamic process in a wide range of African societies' (p.128). The authors are aware of the problems of generalising processes of change in sub-Saharan Africa but argue that to use heterogeneity as a reason not to attempt an analysis is to deny the possibility of any theoretical abstraction.

Sender and Smith begin by characterising pre-colonial society in sub-Saharan Africa as stagnant and brutal. Stagnation was the result of attempts by ruling classes to limit and strictly control commodity trade so as to preclude its 'subversive impact' (p.6) amongst dominated classes. The focus on trade is a pervasive theme of the book. Ruling class attempts to 'monopolise the gains from trade' (p.6) resulted in coercion which 'contributed to the omnipresent brutality and wars characteristic of pre-colonial Africa' (p.7). The effect of European imperialism was to create 'a new level and sustained rate of growth of demand for the provision of African commodities' (p.9), thereby shattering a fundamental demand constraint and unleashing dynamic processes of change during the colonial period.

In fostering the expansion of export production, imperialism generated an 'array of linkages' (p.10). The most important linkage stemming from specialisation in
expanded export production was the transformation of subsistence goods into commodities' (p.10) which could meet consumption demands from both wage labour in the export-oriented sectors and from family labour. As markets for wage goods expanded, demand for both necessities and later luxuries came to be met both by imports and by 'increased domestic production' (p.13) in the handicraft sector. The demand for domestically-produced inputs for the export sector rose at the same time. As exports and markets expanded the growth of investment in the transport infrastructure was facilitated, which not only further developed national markets but also shifted consumer and producer prices, broke down trade monopolies of pre-colonial ruling classes, disrupted cultural authority and increased large-scale wage employment. Forward linkages typically took the form of the 'development of a range of industries processing primary commodities' (p.28). Taxes allowed the colonial state to intervene in the economy and increase social expenditure. While admitting that the colonial state was frequently constrained in its interventions, Sender and Smith nevertheless argue that it was able to promote 'a dynamic process ... whereby state intervention led to the growth of exports, which generated increased tax revenue, thus financing further state expenditure, which in turn promoted export growth and so on' (p.34).

Two other key changes occurred in the colonial period. Firstly, tenurial forms were transformed. Markets in land were created both as a result of 'pressures from below' (p.19) to further the process of peasant differentiation and as a result of 'pressures from above' (p.22); these generated contradictory pulls on the colonial state to placate foreign settlers and investors while at the same time maintaining indigenous class allies. The result over time was that 'it became possible to buy and sell, in a growing number of areas and on an increasingly open market, rights to the use, occupancy and unentailed ownership of land' (p.19). Secondly, Sender and Smith argue that the colonial period witnessed the formation of a class of wage labourers. This is central to their argument because Sender and Smith define capitalism as 'a form of organisation of production in which direct producers sell their labour power since alternative means of survival are increasingly constrained' (p.35). The working class arose from both those in 'servile class positions' (p.42) and from those subject to indigenous dominant classes weakened by imperialism; the source of labour supply was dependent upon the shape of the class alliances that were formed by imperialism and indigenous classes. Extra economic compulsion and direct coercion were also used by Europeans to overcome the labour scarcity which acted as a barrier to accumulation. Such coercion diminished over time. While competition amongst those seeking access to labour generated unevenness in the process of proletarianisation, Sender and Smith argue that by the late colonial period 'capitalist forces had established their position decisively vis-a-vis pre-capitalist forces' (p.52). This promoted 'radical cultural change' (p.57) which served as the basis of trade union and nationalist collective struggles. The dominance of capitalist labour markets served as the catalyst of dynamic capitalist development processes.

It is central to the authors' analysis that 'the historical evidence suggests that ... rapid and sustained accumulation in backward areas required a variety of forms of state intervention' (p.65). With independence, the capacity of the state to intervene in furthering accumulation expanded greatly. Accumulation does, however, have two prerequisites for Sender and Smith. Firstly, it requires a bourgeois class rooted in legally sanctified property rights. Secondly, accumulation requires the 'growth of a manufacturing sector' based upon 'a range of subsidies
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and protective measures orchestrated by the state' (p.68). Using taxation, exchange rate policy, foreign borrowing and concessional finance, sustained intervention by the state can thus serve bourgeois interests. It is irrelevant whether such import-substituting industrialisation is privately or publicly owned: the result is the same. It is argued by the authors that, by either ownership option in Africa, a dynamic bourgeoisie emerged in the post-colonial period. What is of crucial importance, however, is 'balance between the major macro-economic variables' (p.72) needed to sustain growth. Balance can be achieved through the generation of foreign exchange via an increase in the growth rate of exports, the provision of wage and incentive goods, the ability to attract foreign investment and the construction of a non-distortionary tax base.

Sender and Smith admit that 'no African economy in the period since independence has succeeded in resolving all of the difficulties' (p.77) implicit in such 'balance'. It is nonetheless apparent to the authors that 'remarkable rates of accumulation have been achieved in a number of cases'(p.77). 'The introduction of new techniques of production, the shift of the labour force into the more productive sectors of the economy and the growth of labour productivity' (p.93) have contributed to the rapid development of the productive forces. With a mass of empirical data, Sender and Smith argue that the evidence for this is 'overwhelming' (p.94). Infrastructural development of both a physical and social nature has occurred, manufacturing and industrial output have risen, imports have furthered the development of capital goods sectors, and labour has moved into the non-agricultural sector. Agricultural production has increased, especially in the export-oriented sector, while at the same time utilising modern inputs to further boost productivity. If stagnation has occurred, as in some countries, Sender and Smith argue that it is the result of "the adoption of policies resulting in inadequate growth of export crops . . . and . . . the failure of some African states to formulate [a] coherent or effective trade strategy" (p.129). This is the result of 'the continuing dominance of nationalistic analyses which deny 'the existence of a domestic bourgeoisie and a domestic proletariat' while focusing attention upon 'foreign scapegoats' (p.132). This 'prevents the formulation of practical domestic political interventions which strengthen progressive domestic class forces' (p.132).

Clearly, The Development of Capitalism in Africa presents a major challenge to contemporary analyses of imperialism, underdevelopment and dependency. Tightly argued and well written in a non-confrontational manner and supported by 46 tables and 24 pages of sources, the most important challenge of the book is that it does have a fundamental kernel of truth: in some parts of Africa, no matter how unevenly, capitalism is developing. Where Sender and Smith undermine their argument is by extending this truth into a sweeping generalisation.

That this is a dubious generalisation is made clear if their labour market data is closely examined. Sender and Smith claim to have 'demonstrated extremely rapid rates of growth of female and male wage employment, as well as the evidence of increased demand for wage labour by small scale employers' (p.66). If we transform their numbers into rates of growth of wage labour and compare these with World Bank data on population, labour force participation and rates of growth of the labour force, we see that this claim is, at best, ambiguous. Such an exercise reveals, for instance, that in Nigeria in the 1959-80 period, enumerated wage employment grew at 1 per cent per annum while the labour force during 1965-73 grew at 1.8 per cent per annum and in the period 1973-83 grew at 2 per cent per annum. By
1980 only 6.25 per cent of Nigeria's labour force was in enumerated wage employment. In Tanzania, in the period 1971-80 enumerated wage employment grew at 2.9 per cent per annum while during 1973-83 the labour force grew at 2.5 per cent per annum. By 1980 only 5 per cent of Tanzania's labour force was in enumerated wage employment. Similar trends can be seen in Kenya, Ghana and Zambia.

Sender and Smith provide only two numerical examples of total enumerated and non-enumerated wage employment. Their own figures on the Ivory Coast indicate that, between 1958 and 1970, total wage employment grew at 2 per cent per annum while between 1965 and 1973 the labour force grew at 4.2 per cent per annum. By 1970 26 per cent of the Ivory Coast's labour force was in waged employment. In Senegal in the period 1959-73 total wage employment grew at 0.5 per cent per annum while in the 1965-73 period the labour force grew at 2.2 per cent per annum. By 1973 only 5.25 per cent of Senegal's labour force was in waged employment.

These figures do not illustrate a clear proletarianisation of the African labour force which can be generalised to encompass all of the sub-Saharan region. It is also important to note that since the onset of the 1980s recession there is also evidence of a contraction in the size of the African working class. Finally, Sender and Smith are aware that the growth of labour markets 'occurred within the context not of national markets for labour, but of isolated and fragmented markets' (p.50) where labour's was in a position to resist, for very long periods, attempts to restrict their choices to wage labour and capitalist discipline' (p.46). Given this admission and the data, it seems hard to conclude a general 'dominance of capitalist labour markets' (p.66), as do Sender and Smith.

If dynamic capitalism has become dominant in sub-Saharan Africa, it is reasonable to expect a transformation of the economic structure, with a shift to industry from agriculture. Sender and Smith correctly hold that this has been historically a lengthy process. At the same time, however, they argue that 'the advantage of later industrialisation is the possibility of importing vastly superior means of production at domestic resource costs below the costs of producing these means of production at home' (p.72). It could thus be argued that imports of technologically superior means of production can speed up structural transformation in late industrialising societies. While Sender and Smith document the growth of imports and machinery, their claim that 'a major shift has occurred in the proportion of the labour force working outside the agricultural sector between 1960 and 1980' (p.94) does not seem to be conclusively supported. Given the time period, population trends, the well-documented growth of services, and the potential of superior imports to speed economic transformation, the fact that after twenty years six of eleven countries (See Table 4.13) have in excess of 76 per cent of their labour force in agriculture does not seem indicative of a general dynamism. It could also be added that some evidence indicates that since the beginning of the 1980s the subsistence sector in many sub-Saharan societies has grown.

It is widely believed that sustained growth in industry in a developing country requires agricultural growth of 3 per cent per annum net of population growth in order to generate a surplus capable of sustaining the industrialisation process. It is thus significant that comparison of Sender and Smith’s Tables 4.26 and 4.32 reveal that, for the ten countries listed, not a single one met this target. As regards the structure of industry, two points may be noted. Firstly, Sender and Smith argue that in the colonial period the development of a range of industries processing
primary commodities' (p.28) was 'impressive' (p.29). If, however, Kenya and Senegal are excluded from consideration, these forward linkages are apparently dominated by groundnut crushing, and this in only three countries. It is open to debate whether this 'range' is 'impressive'. Secondly, the authors provide evidence from six post-colonial states which, they argue, have sustained a structural shift in industry towards capital goods. It is, however, of interest that of the six, one is referred to by the authors as 'undeveloped' (p.55) and only two have industrial sectors which contribute in excess of 25 per cent of gross domestic product. The degree and general applicability of dynamic industrialisation is thus open to question, although it is admitted that, if a sectoral breakdown by country were provided, it might be possible to argue that 'the capacity to produce capital goods grew' (p.98).

In the agricultural sector Sender and Smith argue that a fundamental change in the colonial period, which furthered the development of capitalism, was the emergence of 'powerful pressures ... for the development of markets in land' (p.28). Yet they themselves note five times in a nine page section that there were 'political and economic forces countering the emergence of capitalist forms of ownership of the means of agricultural production' (p.28). It seems quite a leap to conclude the book by claiming that 'the development of markets in land' (p.128) was a dynamic process in the colonial period.

Sender and Smith provide impressive evidence of technological change in agriculture which can be taken as a development of the productive forces. They themselves, however, admit that 'it is impossible to make unqualified statements concerning production levels and trends in African agriculture' (p.100) and that FAO figures which provide the bulk of the statistical base of analysis of African agriculture are estimates and thus must be treated with caution. The authors then go on to argue that dynamic agricultural growth is occurring in sub-Saharan Africa, using as evidence eleven tables, eight of which are culled from the FAO. This culminates in the assertion that population growth 'above 2.5 per cent per annum for at least twenty-two years in seven countries constitutes some further evidence of improved access to food and improved material conditions' (p.107). It is of interest that one of these countries is Nigeria, in a period which witnessed the Biafran War.

It is possible also to raise several other difficulties about the book such as an instrumentalist view of the state, a complete lack of attention to distributive questions, and an unclear theorization of bourgeois class formation in which external factors are of central importance in an analysis otherwise focused upon internal dynamics. Related to this last point is the unclear role given by Sender and Smith to imperialism: while the authors argue that 'the impact of economic relations with more advanced capitalist economies, through trade and formal and informal colonialism, had ensured both the growth of political demands for industrialisation ... and the expansion of domestic markets as the basis for the establishment of domestic manufacturing' (p.67), they also argue that 'between 1938 and 1958 ... the French Empire tied French Africa to the French economy in the same way that British colonies were tied to Britain' (p.84). While the use of the word 'tied' in the latter quote implies some form of dependence, the former quote implies some form of independent dynamic. A central contradiction in the authors' concept of imperialism is thus apparent here.
Sender and Smith use an aggregative definition of capitalist development, namely the emergence of capitalist labour markets as a result of the process of class formation. In such a generalisation, they miss the point: that behind such processes lie four central structural changes in the economy which historically all development, whether capitalist or socialist, has experienced. Structural change occurs in: the labour force, with a shift towards advanced technology which raises growth rates and expands the industrialisation process through the generation of a surplus; demand, with the formation of a home market capable of sustaining industrialisation. Examination of Sender and Smith's arguments and data reveal none of these to have conclusively occurred on a general scale throughout sub-Saharan Africa. It is thus the case that while The Development of Capitalism in Africa is of significance and interest, it falls in what it sets out to do: 'the identification of and analysis of change' (p.1) that has occurred throughout sub-Saharan Africa.

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In the context of the present crises in Africa, the questions of peace and development are of paramount importance and demand serious attention. The statistics are astounding: half the countries of Africa cannot feed themselves. In the past ten years, there has been a negative real growth rate in GDP in about twenty African countries. Africa has the highest number of refugees in the world. And about half of the major conflict areas in the world are to be found in Africa. How are we to understand these problems? What are the preconditions for peace and development in Africa? How are peace and development connected? These are crucial and neglected questions and it is to the credit of this book that it takes them up.

The book itself is a collection of papers presented at the United Nations University regional seminar on peace and security in Africa, held in Addis Ababa in January 1985. It is divided into four parts covering the following themes: Africa and the world crisis; conflict and instability; strategies for peace and development; and an Agenda for Action. The authors are all African social scientists, some of them well known: Samir Amin, Yash Tandon, Nzongola-Ntalaja, Michael Chege, Ibbo Mandaza; S.K.B. Asante, Emmanuel Hansen, Thandika Mkandawire, Guy Martin, Archie Mafeje and Okwudiba Nnoli.

In a thought-provoking introduction, the late Emmanuel Hansen argues the 'African perspective' on peace. He points out that nuclear peace, a major global concern today, 'is only a minimalist condition for the attainment of peace'. Nuclear peace will not put an end to peace-threatening conditions in Africa. This is true. But what is the African perspective on peace? Is there one? Hansen's answer is contentious: '...the African perspective is the consensus of a majority of African scholars on the peace problematic' (p.1). Now, who are these African scholars?
How representative or even reflective of popular views is this scholarly consensus? We are not told.

In any case, the African perspective articulated here is that East-West or superpower struggles and actions 'play a central role in maintaining' conflicts in Africa. This view informs many of the contributions. Tandon's whole point, in his chapter on 'Africa within the context of global superpower struggle,' is that 'the primary cause of the threat to peace in Africa stems from (this) superpower rivalry for hegemony.' (p.34). Hence, we are told that the Nkomati Accord which Mozambique reached, with the pain of embarrassment and humiliation, with the racist regime in South Africa represented a victory for the Mozambican people because it helped to keep Soviet 'social imperialism' at bay. Chege also views the conflict in the Horn of Africa largely in this superpower perspective. Even Mandaza's otherwise original analysis of the struggle in southern Africa begins with the ritualistic statement that 'the basis and nature of the current conflict in southern Africa have to be understood in the context of the global struggle between imperialism as represented by the United States and its NATO allies, and the socialist bloc as represented by the Soviet Union and its allies' (p.101). Why, we may ask, is the context not the struggle between the oppressed people of southern Africa (aided, of course, by their allies) and imperialism (via apartheid)?

Similar confusions arise when we consider the way out as seen by most of the authors. Tandon (p.51) says 'a power will arise from the social bowels of Africa, led by the working masses, which will stand up to the superpowers.' We are not told how this prophesy will come about. Asante (p.140) says the solution lies in an effective OAU (something like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - NATO) 'to deal with the internal and external forces which are threatening the peace and security of Africa'. An African NATO for peace indeed. Nnoli (p.231) calls for, inter alia, 'concerted African action to reconcile the rival liberation movements and thus increase their effectiveness.' In fact, Nnoli's 'Agenda for Action' is little more than a statement of such platitudes and exhortations to African states. This, incidentally, corresponds to the analytic focus on inter-state relations and conflicts in most of the chapters. There is very little of the view from below. A clear recognition of the central role of popular forces in Africa in any resolution of the continent's crises is not what informs much of the book.

Also, there is no coherent or rigorous analysis of the connection between peace and development. Peace is cast in largely instrumentalist terms in relation to development or else the connection is expressed mechanistically (and ahistorically) as, for example, 'the more an individual nation prospers . . . the smaller the chance that it will resort to war in order to procure advantages at the expense of others' (Asante, pp.124-25).

But the book has its refreshing parts. Nzongola-Ntalaja's chapter on the national question and the crisis of instability in Africa provides an insightful analysis of the issue, although one might say that his 'consistent' support for the Eritrean cause does not seem to address the fact that there have been some significant revolutionary changes in Ethiopia itself since 1974. Mandaza's chapter on conflict in southern Africa and Mkandawire's on SADCC are also useful. Mafeje has a very well-researched chapter on food security in the SADCC region. However, the chapters by Amin (The Crisis), Martin (ECOWAS) and Hansen (ECA) could have been excluded from the collection without damage to the outcome.
Altogether then, this is a book of uneven quality and readers will need to read it selectively. Perhaps its overriding positive quality is that it belongs to that small category of edited books on Africa that are wholly written by Africans. This is important. So too is the fact that a start has been made in addressing this important subject.

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NEWS AND NOTES

In 'News & Notes', we hope to bring you news that doesn't quite fit into other sections of ROAPE. During the fourteen years that we've been publishing the journal, we've had an incredible number of letters from our readers, most of them encouraging, some agitated but understanding when we were late with an issue (like with this one, no.41 - new technology caused chaos especially when the vacuum cleaner obliterated almost a whole disk! Apologies). We've managed to keep a lot of the same subscribers through those fourteen years (and a multitude not only of address changes but status as well, from student, to M.A. student and then notification that we are now a 'Dr.' ROAPE now goes into almost every major library and institution in Africa, Europe, UK, North America as well as a sprinkling in Japan, China, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Turkey, Israel, Iran as well as six countries in South America/Latin America.

Because of the foreign exchange problem in Africa, we've sometimes had to 'barter' a subscription for either a piece of cloth or a set of baskets. This is still a major problem and we'd like to thank those of you who contributed in the past and would like to urge new readers to help us keep ROAPE in Africa in the future. Obviously we'd prefer to subsidise an institution where ROAPE can be shared ( 20/$33) or, if you prefer, we have many students who also need help ( 8/$14).

Last year we moved from a damp basement to our new offices. ROAPE is entirely self-financing, mostly from its subscriptions and increasingly from its sale of books. However, we could not afford the massive expenditure of moving and so applied for and got a grant from the Sheffield City Council not only to subsidise the rent increase, but also a grant to hire our Documentation Librarian, Mercia Silva Roberts. During the year, Mercia has sorted out our substantial collection of material, most of which had been stored away for lack of space. The rich collection we now actually have is based on exchanges, review books, gifts, Jitendra Mohan's Ghana collection, the Guinea-Bissau archives from their old offices in London and a bequest from a Sheffield West Indian community leader,
Basil Griffiths. This whole collection includes books, periodicals, documents, newspaper clippings, photographs and transparencies. We also receive on a regular basis over 60 periodicals from many countries which provides a steady flow of up-to-date material coming into the library.

We have the loan of an NCR computer and are applying to various trusts for another grant to buy not just the computer but the software to enable us to start a data base. We would then hope to network with other documentation groups, researchers, activists so that this material could be shared. Future plans include a more accessible-looking journal, more book publishing, another exciting conference (see this section), slide-tape shows and more feedback from our readers. If you’re in the area and would like to visit our library to do some work or just to come and say hello, we would be very glad to see you but please phone beforehand.

Note for Contributors
ROAPE can now accept articles on a 5 and 1/4 inch disk in the PC/MS DOS operating system. Ideally, the article should be word processed on 'Word Perfect 4.1', but articles on DCA, Navy DIF, Wordstar, Multimate and a Text file in ASCII format can also be accepted. Two hard copies should also accompany your disk - which should be securely packed.

ROAPE Office: Doris Burgess, Mercla Silva-Roberts and Judy Mohan
ROAPE CONFERENCE: 22-24 September 1989
Taking Democracy Seriously: Socialists & Democracy in Africa

DEMOCRACY has recently become a central concern for the left in Africa and in the Caribbean, as we learn from bitter experience. Democracy is a contested term: as between left and right, and also within the left. Democracy has historically been given several different meanings: popular government (rule by the demos), government by elected representatives, accountability to electors.

These ambiguities of meaning have facilitated abuse of the term Democracy. They also point to the broad range of conditions required for the realisation of democratic aspirations; freedoms of speech, conscience and association; the recognition and protection of individual and collective rights; protection from discrimination on grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, gender or sexual orientation; equality before the law and in access to opportunities; competitive elections; accountability of representatives and officials to voters, constituents and members. Critical for socialists is the formation of democratic organisations of workers, of peasants, of communities, of students and of other social groups, whose policies are shaped by, and whose leaders are accountable to their members. Without these conditions, and especially the last, popular or constitutional forms of government become instruments for class exploitation and abuse of power.

Marxists originally identified democracy as the natural form of government under capitalism, as in the couplet 'bourgeois democracy'. However, workers have always been more concerned to defend democratic rights than capitalists, who have often preferred more authoritarian forms of government. Lenin redefined the 'democratic revolution' in Russia as a revolution of the workers, peasants and oppressed nationalities against feudalism and the autocracy. In colonial and semi-colonial countries, 'national democracy' displaced 'bourgeois democracy' as the historical stage en route to socialism. Bourgeois nationalist and socialist governments have, all too often, refused to allow democratic elections and failed to respect democratic rights, notably those of workers and their organisations.

Critical decisions concerning African countries often made outside their borders by multinational corporations, foreign governments and bankers. Increasingly governments have conceded control over their economic policies to the IMF and the World Bank. Democratic decision-making and popular organisations, particularly trade unions, stand in the way of the programmes the IMF and the World Bank, with the collaboration of national governments, have devised for economic recovery. In Africa, perestroika (structural adjustment) does not seem to require glasnost! The
two components of 'national democracy' need to complement one another if people are to take power over the societies they live in.

Both democratic and authoritarian government have been claimed to be best placed to promote economic growth and social development in Africa and in the third world. The evidence is hardly conclusive. The question may be rather under what conditions particular forms of government and of popular political activity further or hinder people’s capacities to provide for their needs.

Democracy requires an effective state and appropriate legal and political institutions to secure people’s rights and to enable them to elect their own governments and make their own laws. There is no single formula for democratic political institutions, and democratic forms may mask authoritarian and arbitrary government. Democracy is not achieved by promulgating a constitution; it must be renewed and fought for within workers and popular organisations, within political parties and in society at large. Socialists must take Democracy seriously, in the struggles against apartheid and national oppression and for liberation from colonial rule, in countries with one-, two- and multi-party systems, under capitalist and imperialist domination, and under governments attempting, or claiming, to build socialism.

CALL FOR PAPERS, AND ENQUIRIES TO:
Warwick Africa Social Research Unit (WASRU)
Department of Sociology
University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK

US Imperialism and Africa
In April 1988 ROAPE was pleased to be one of the co-sponsors of an international conference in Sheffield on US Imperialism in the 1990s entitled ‘Of Presidents & Present Dangers’ attended by some 500 enthusiastic activists and analysts. The logic behind the gathering in the year of the Presidential elections was first to reintroduce the notion of ‘imperialism’ onto the agenda of public discussion - a term that is not heard as often even though these recent years have been ones of unbridled aggressive action by the US. It aimed to review the concrete and current working of imperialism in this new era - the use of contras and not just counter-insurgency, the economic mechanisms of control in a debt-and crisis-ridden world, the use of the media. Offering insights into the workings of the beast were such contributions as CIA defector, who had directed their Angola task force in 1975-76, John Stockwell and other ‘whistle-blowers’ like Duncan Campbell, Chris Horrie (Intelligence and Disinformation), Robin Luckham (The Military), Susan George, Teresa Hayter and John Loxley (Dollar, Debt and Financial Crisis), Lou Kusnik, Cees Hamelink and Barbara Bush (Cultural Imperialism & Mind control), Andrew Gamble, Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Kees v.d.Pijl and John Berryman
(The World Order, Who Rules?), A.Sivanandan, Kevin Danaher, Magnus Ericsson and Ray Bush (The Politics of Food and Resources), Gerrit Huizer, Francis McDonagh (Politics, Religion and Liberation). There were also contributions from political figures on the left like Tony Benn M.P. and the veteran Paul Sweezy of Monthly Review in the US.

But these were but a prelude to the second main business - the discussion on resistance to imperialism: the purpose, in a context where solidarity often tends to focus on single campaigns, was to put on the same agenda the many struggles, their successes and shortcomings, their strategies and methods of mobilisation, of anti-imperialists around the world. Here the conference was well-served by Ngugi wa Thiong'o, the Kenya writer, talking about cultural resistance, by the Mayor of Esteli in Nicaragua and Jaime Lopez of the FLMA of El Salvador, Joema and Julie Sison of the Philippines and Elean Thomas of the Jamaican Workers Party. The high note of the last session was a rousing address by Francis Mele, Director of Publicity and member of the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress of South Africa which brought out the internationalist, anti-imperialist perspective on the struggle against apartheid, which we reprint below.

There are plans to publish a collection of papers from the conference. For further information on this and other material from the conference -video's, audio tapes, please contact Doris Burgess at the ROAPE office.

Amandla! It is with a sense of great humility and honour that I stand here to address you on behalf of the ANC. The topic that you have chosen, United States Imperialism in the 1990s is of great theoretical and practical political significance. The ANC views Imperialism in our country as more than just a theoretical question. It is a life-and-death issue. It is a practical political issue. Today I am not just dealing with the plight of our people, that is, the colonisation and conquest, national degradation, exploitation and racial discrimination. The first point I want to make is that in class terms, the oppression of the blacks in South Africa is not the result of racism, but of capitalism. The racist laws are capitalist laws but this does not mean that we should underplay racism and national oppression - more so that in South Africa the colonised differ from the coloniser, not only in culture' but also physically. The physical differences, rather than the cultural, become the basis for discrimination.

The emergence of the bourgeoisie from feudalism was a contradictory process. So was bourgeois political progress and scientific development. Whilst contributing to human wisdom and development by discovering the sea route to India, the emergent capitalist order brought with it untold misery and degradation to the African and Asian people. I'm mentioning this fact because of the geo-strategic significance of South Africa in the global strategy of imperialism. If one considers that the deep sea plain of the Indian Ocean is rich in minerals and seafood, is noted for its vast store
of sea wealth in the form of oil deposits under the sea bed, copper and nickel deposits and that the Indian Ocean is an important scene of sea traffic and trade, it is understandable why imperialism, especially US Imperialism should be interested in the workers of the Afro-Asian world.

There are more than 50 literal and hinterland states in the Indian Ocean. The Arab or Persian Gulf, which has 60% of the world's oil reserves, is significant as a naval route for oil supplies and international trade. The oil comes to the western countries and America via the Cape Sea route, that is, via South Africa. Hence the need to militarise the Indian Ocean and strengthen the apartheid system so as to protect the sea lanes which are responsible for transporting oil from the Arab countries to this part of the world.

I'm mentioning this because Imperialism tells us that they are forced to do this so as to protect southern Africa from Soviet penetration. Our plight, our suffering, our aspirations, all this is sacrificed on the altar of cold war politics. This is the morality of imperialism. President Tambo recently visited the US and talked to US Secretary of State Schultz. President Tambo told Schultz that the only way you, the US, can contribute to solving problems in South Africa is when the US together with the Soviet Union work out means and ways of helping us to destroy apartheid. It is no use for the US to say they cannot do anything, or they have to defend South Africa because of Soviet penetration.

We in South Africa are not fighting, according to them, we are doing nothing. Change in southern Africa will come as a result of the whites in South Africa. The whites will bring about change. That is, the blacks can only be liberated if Botha brings about reforms and Botha says 'look here, I can't bring reforms because the blacks are supported by the Soviet Union.' And therefore your task in this part of the world is to prevent Soviet penetration. This is the situation in southern Africa as far as cold war politics is concerned. When Reagan came to power he introduced a new term in the political vocabulary, namely 'international terrorism'. This became the battle cry in the western countries used to persecute us wherever we are. Margaret Thatcher had the audacity to call us terrorists at the Vancouver meeting of the Commonwealth. Margaret Thatcher is doing everything to rubbish and pauperise the British people. This is at the time when President Tambo is sacrificing everything, including his life, one wonders who then is a real terrorist. There is also that British tribalist, Norman Tebbit, who recently disclosed his instinctive loyalty to apartheid. Comrades, these are not random outbursts of some mad politician, this is a class war. Norman Tebbit is defending his tribe, the rich, and Margaret Thatcher, in attacking us, is also terrorising the British people so that the people in South Africa, through radio, television and the press, only hear the voices of Thatcher and Tebbit. The responsibility on our and your shoulders becomes even greater. Archbishop Tutu has said, when we attain
our freedom we shall remember our friends, and by implication, he was saying, we shall forget the Thatchers and Tebbits.

This brings me to the question of war and peace. It is a known fact that apartheid South Africa is preparing for war. What is less known is that the rich mineral resources exploited by the multinationals in South Africa and Namibia are useful for the military industrial complex in the West. In other words, apartheid is an integral part of Reagan's Star Wars programme. The South African, Middle East and Star Wars axis plays a vital part in the growing alliance between the Botha regime and World Imperialism. An alliance which, whilst strengthening the apartheid regime, also enables the policies of that regime to influence imperialist aggressive designs in our region, and perhaps in your region as well. This dovetails through the military theory and defence philosophy of the South African militarists, whose function is to prevent or suppress so-called internal disorder, that is, the national liberation movement of South Africa as led by the African National Congress, 'to strike at the source of the problem in independent Africa', (that's their terminology) and to control the sea lanes in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans in the interests of world imperialism. What I am saying is that there is a need for the powerful peace movement in this country to link its activities with our liberatory efforts because our struggle against apartheid, our armed struggle is essentially a struggle for peace.

It is usually said that apartheid is a threat to peace, but looked at from the point of view of the Angolans, Namibians and people of South Africa, apartheid is more than a threat to peace, it is a killer. Apartheid is a violation of peace. Apartheid is committing unpardonable crimes and almost irreparable damage in Angola. It is committing a triple crime against the people of Namibia. First it colonises Namibia, secondly it misuses Namibia as a launching pad to attack Angola, and thirdly it harbours, trains, feeds, finances and deploys UNITA bandits on Namibian soil to attack the sovereign and legitimate government of Angola. This is to say nothing of the destabilization of the frontline states who are the constant victims of Pretoria’s aggression.

Yesterday, I attended a one day conference in London. It was a continuation of last year's Harare conference on children under apartheid. We all agreed that in South Africa children are not allowed to be children. When children in other parts of the world are playing with toys, in South Africa they play war games. When teenagers in other parts of the world are talking about cosmetics, fashion and cinema, in South Africa they are asking themselves who was detained and arrested yesterday and today. They are now the victims. Since the state of emergency was proclaimed, thousands and thousands of children have languished in jail. You only need to see the pictures of their mutilated bodies to get a picture of the ordeal they go through. This is all done in the name of civilization and Western values.
Allow me to go on now to say a word about the role of the British people in that conflict in South Africa. First, I would like to comment on the contradictions in the utterances of Margaret Thatcher. She says sanctions don't work, and in the same breath she says sanctions will hurt blacks most - and so by implication, sanctions work. She says this at the time when the Reagan administration is calling for sanctions against Panama. By the way, we have never elected Margaret Thatcher to be a spokesperson of our people! The African National Congress has never said that sanctions will bring the apartheid regime to its knees. All we are saying is that sanctions will weaken the apartheid regime and that will make our struggle easier because we would be fighting against a weaker enemy. That will be your concrete contribution to our struggle. Your task therefore, is to pressurize the Thatcher regime to apply sanctions. In a sense, you will be contributing to the solution of regional conflicts which the Soviet Union is very much interested in. Solution of regional conflicts is not a question of abandoning class struggle or national liberation struggle. It is a question of making conditions conducive to the final solution of the problems in the interests of those who are oppressed, and your task in the solution of these regional conflicts in southern Africa is to put pressure on the Thatcher regime to apply sanctions so that we fight a weaker enemy, so that there is less bloodshed in the streets of South Africa, there are fewer lives lost and the lifespan of apartheid is shortened.

How does apartheid affect you in Sheffield? The water might be running through the taps, your children might be going to school, and you might be having a comfortable job, so apartheid is not really affecting you - one might think. That would be an illusion. I'm not talking about the activities of the South African Embassy and Consulates in this country who are poisoning the minds of the young British people with racism, South African embassies who are bribing right wing organisations and the National Front, pumping in lots of money. More generally the mere existence of apartheid is an inspiration, an encouragement to racists all over the world, and this includes Britain. That means when you support us, when you give us solidarity, you are not supporting some naked, starving, hungry blacks in the jungles of Africa. You are actually promoting your own struggle in this country because the defeat of racism, of apartheid, will weaken the racist forces in Sheffield and Britain as a whole.

When the racist regime bans organisations in South Africa, when the racist regime forbids organisations in South Africa from receiving funds from abroad, when they hound ANC activists and kill ANC functionaries in Europe, they are interfering with your own political convictions and institutions. They are actually robbing you of your right and freedom to choose your friends. They are robbing you of your right to assist whosoever you want to assist. In other words, there is a two-pronged attack here. They are attacking us in order to silence you, and Margaret Thatcher terrorises you so that you give us less support. This is the strategy
of imperialism today, against us and against you. When they harass and burn newspapers in South Africa, when they detain and arrest journalists, they are robbing you of your right to know. You have a right to know, but the racist regime doesn't allow you to know, and therefore your fight for the unbanning of newspapers, for the release of journalists in South Africa is a fight for democracy in this country.

A word on armed struggle and your role in it. By that I'm not suggesting that you are going to train in camps and be sent to South Africa. I'll just give you a story which is widespread amongst Africans in South Africa. This is how Africans define a white liberal (I'm talking about a white liberal in South Africa, not in Britain, because in Britain there are liberals in the anti-apartheid movement. In South Africa the liberals are outside the anti-apartheid struggle). Anyway, a white liberal is a man who stands on a cliffe watching a big dog - suppose it's an alsatian, chasing a half naked African. Half-naked because he cannot afford to buy clothes. The liberal screams - 'Oh God, that dog is going to tear that man into pieces'. The African turns around, takes out his big knife and stabs the dog to death. The liberal is horrified: 'Oh, what a beautiful dog that was!'

That situation is going to come as the struggle continues in South Africa. Today we are the victims of apartheid and I'm sure in the near future the ANC is going to escalate the struggle. We are dying for freedom now, tomorrow we will be killing for freedom. I'm not sure whether you will appreciate the half-naked African or the dog. You better make a choice now before its too late.

Lastly, and this is my final word. In South Africa we are fighting, we are being arrested, we are being killed for a noble cause. We are fighting against imperialism, and that includes British imperialism. In a sense, in South Africa we are fighting your battles. In fighting your battles we are doing everything to weaken international imperialism. The liberation of South Africa will definitely mean weakening of international imperialism and that will include British imperialism and that will be our contribution to your struggles in this country. Therefore, when we ask you to support us, we ask you not only to support us against apartheid, we ask you to support us against British imperialism in southern Africa. It is in that sense that we are saying - 'our struggle is your struggle' and therefore we should unite against a common enemy and this is apartheid in South Africa.
A Tribute to Dr. Emmanuel Hansen

News of the tragic death of Dr. Emmanuel Hansen in a road accident in Arusha, Tanzania, on November 13, 1987 has left all who are engaged in the fight for freedom and social justice in Africa with a deep sense of loss. The Ghanaian left in particular has suffered, in his death, a grievous loss of one of its ablest and most principled intellectuals.

Born in Accra on the 27th July 1937, Emmanuel Hansen was educated at the University of Ghana from where he obtained a B.A. degree in 1964. He went on to Makerere University, Uganda, to become a research assistant in the African Studies Program, and later obtained an M.A. degree from Makerere in 1970. Between 1967-68 he also lectured at the Department of Political Science of the University of Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. After a period of teaching and research in the United States between 1968-73, he obtained a doctorate degree from Indiana University in 1974. In 1973, he was appointed to the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana where he lectured until 1979. He subsequently lectured at the Department of Politics, University of Durham between 1980-82, and returned to Ghana to become Secretary to the government of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) from 1982-83. He resigned in 1983 following the PNDC’s historic political volte-face. At the time of his death, Emma Hansen was a consultant to the United Nations University in Tokyo and he also did some lecturing at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies.

He wrote extensively on political theory, especially on the state in post-colonial societies, military regimes, the politics of food and the political economy of African development. His book on the social and political thought of Frantz Fanon was influential within radical circles in Ghanaian universities during the late 1970s and early ’80s. In more recent years, he carried out research for the United Nations University on peace, security and disarmament, and edited African Perspectives on Peace and Development (ZED Press, 1987). In political and theoretical terms, Emma Hansen identified very closely with the Samir Amin school based in Dakar. He was also a founding member of the editorial collective of the Journal of African Marxists.
As Secretary to the PNDC in 1982-83, Emmanuel Hansen came to cooperate with some of the best known left organisations of the time. This political collaboration, while reflecting the principled position that he had decided to adopt despite strong pressures to the contrary, was also borne out of and imposed by the conditions under which we were all compelled to work in those days.

Emma Hansen himself always maintained that he was simply an academic. But I have stated elsewhere that, in my view, the most important reason why Emma Hansen holds a special place in the hearts and minds of many revolutionary intellectuals in Ghana is that he was widely seen as a different type of intellectual, one who tended to have a close relationship to relevant political practice. And if you add to these his sharp wit, political commitment and simple and approachable manner, it is easy to appreciate why he was respected by broad sections of the Ghanaian left in a way which many of his academic contemporaries were not.

After the coup of December 31, 1981, it was characteristic of Emma that, though he was living abroad at the time, he became very actively involved in the struggles to consolidate the democratic and progressive base of the new regime. He played a key role in building international connections for the regime, and rendered valuable service during the formation of the first PNDC government. Emma enjoyed tremendous respect among diverse sections of the Ghanaian left and, in recognition of his experience and commitment, it was widely felt that he had an important role to play in the December 31 ‘process’. But Emma’s experience as Secretary to the PNDC was not a happy one. He soon realised that his position was purely nominal, and that formal positions and appointments in the PNDC, generally speaking, did not really mean much. When Emma resigned from the PNDC in 1983, he complained about the highly undemocratic operation of the PNDC government and especially of the atmosphere of ‘intrigues’ which made it impossible for him to discharge his duties effectively. His resignation letter was never acknowledged, nor was his departure from the regime ever announced in Ghana. Obviously, it was not easy to put the ‘ultra-leftist’ tag on a person like Emmanuel Hansen, hence his disenchantment and resignation from the PNDC government, so early in its life, were an embarrassment better concealed.

I must also mention an important initiative in which Emma Hansen was involved towards the latter part of 1982. This was a move, co-chaired by Emma Hansen and myself, to forge closer unity between four left-wing organisations - the June Four Movement, People’s Revolutionary League of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards and Pan-Afrikan Youth Movement. These reached broad agreement on certain cardinal political and organisational issues concerning the December 31 ‘revolutionary’ process, and decided to formalise this within a united left front organisation. Meetings to that end were abruptly interrupted by the political crisis of October-November 1982.
Perhaps the most important theme to emphasise from the life and work of Emmanuel Hansen is that of the role and commitment of the revolutionary intellectual. Not every intellectual with revolutionary ideas is able to bring these ideas to the service of the masses to be what Gramsci called the organic intellectual. While it would be incorrect to claim that Emma Hansen was the embodiment of this synthesis, it is incontestable that during his lifetime Emma Hansen did take many important steps in this direction. This is the main reason why his tragic death represents a significant blow to progressive forces not only in Ghana but in Africa as a whole. It follows from this that we can pay no better tribute to Emmanuel Hansen than to re-affirm the living force of the ideas that dominated his life, which are not dead and cannot die so long as there are people who share a similar commitment, and so long as there are people working to realise them.

Chris Atim
London
BOOKS RECEIVED

2. THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA edited by Maria van Diepen, ZED Press, London.
6. THE SOCIALIST IDEAL IN AFRICA: A Debate by Carlos Lopes and Lars Rudebeck; Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala.
7. NO BLADE OF GRASS: Rural production and state intervention in Transkei, 1925-1960 by Terence C. Moli; Cambridge African Occasional Papers 6, Cambridge, UK.
11. WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, April 1988, IMF, Washington, D.C.
12. KENYA: Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review published by the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway.
14. ERIITREA: Food and Agricultural Production Assessment Study published by the Agricultural & Rural Development Unit, Centre of Development Studies, University of Leeds, UK.
24. REGIONAL COOPERATION THROUGH TRADE & INDUSTRY: The Prospects
for Regional Economic Communities in West & Central Africa published by the German Development Institute, Berlin.
26. GATSHA BUTHELEZI: Chief with a Double Agenda by Mzala published by Zed Press.
28. GHANA: Economic Crisis and the Long Road to Recovery by John Loxley published by The North-South Institute, Ottawa, Canada.
29. THE DEBT MATRIX by Roy Culpeper published by The North-South Institute, Ottawa, Canada.
30. ZAMBIA: Adjusting to Poverty by Roger Young published by The North-South Institute, Ottawa, Canada.
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