A central concern of this Journal is to bridge the area between radical scholarship and practical politics. But one area where a long span is needed at the moment is in the discussion of imperialism. Indeed, the word has virtually dropped out of intellectual discourse in the attempt to develop a ‘proper’ Marxist framework to replace the mechanistic ‘crudities’ of dependency theory. The term has certainly not dropped out of popular discussion of the present state of Africa, however. Rather, there one of the ‘crudities’ to be overcome is to avoid explanations of the present predicament that so entirely attribute it to outside forces, thus fueling a kind of ultra-left fatalism, that nothing could be done. Our return to the theme of imperialism is a call to bridge this gap and to update where Africa fits into global patterns. But our position is that for imperialism to maintain its grip on the neo-colonies the role of the indigenous governing classes has also to be brought into the equation.

Several contributors to this Issue deal with imperialism — admittedly not by reformulating theory, but at a level that the American Marxist, Paul Baran, had in mind when he talked about ‘imperialism having an address’: i.e. it needs to be understood not just at an abstract level, of the working out of a certain logic of capitalism, but, as the actions of specific actors operating from concrete locations. The Debates piece by Zwingina does in fact deal with the more general level when it argues that Africa cannot expect any significant scale of aid in the present crisis as US imperialism in decline accords the continent a low priority. Further debates along these lines would be valuable — both in questioning the current dynamics of Western capital and US foreign policy, and also as to whether and how any ‘disinterest’ affect involvements in ‘strategic’ areas like southern Africa and the Horn. This discussion prompts two questions: whether any disinterest is necessarily shared by the European Economic Community (EEC), and thus the implications and extent of US-EEC contradictions; and whether any ‘neglect’ should not be seen as an opportunity to be seized.

Other pieces deal with the main international institutional forms of economic imperialism, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), and the current stabilisation medicine they are forcing down the throats of African countries. Davies and Saunders juxtapose data about economic and health in a careful assessment of how stabilisation measures affect children. In the most considered and measured tones they are objectively showing that the IMF kills! Two short but lively Briefings document the effects of stabilisation measures in Sierra Leone. Parfitt’s highlights attempts to turn Sierra Leone into a conduit for sanction busting for Pretoria in the event of sanctions being imposed against that
regime. Hoogvelt points to the devastation which IMF conditionality has brought on Sierra Leone: wiping out small savings, intensifying poverty, and producing a process of involution.

Seddon’s article on Morocco’s annexation of Western Sahara deals with a second important institutional level of imperialism — the role of regional bullies in what some have termed ‘sub-imperialism’. As we write, this protracted conflict seems to be entering a new stage with major Polisario offensives against the Moroccan defensive walls. This article is thus especially timely. It builds on and updates other detailed accounts like Hodge’s useful volume, to offer a comprehensive survey of the origins, stages and present state of the conflict, the international involvement in it, and the impact on Morocco, which we hope will give an overview of an arena we have recently neglected.

In keeping with our opening statement that ‘imperialism’ should not be seen as a purely ‘external’ phenomenon, we publish two interesting and provocative discussions about a third level, the state in Africa, which has to be one of the key mechanisms giving the forces of imperialism some purchase over African peoples and economies — whatever other forces are expressed through the state. Charney’s contribution puts this kind of perspective back into the debate on the state by reasserting a view of it which had gone out of fashion — that it is ‘neo-colonial’ — and seeks to spell out rigorously what that implies for its social character, the forms it takes, and its style of rule. He does so by an imaginative synthesis of much earlier work bringing together insights from the French as well as the English-language material. Forrest’s Briefing offers an opposed and challenging perspective. He usefully takes the reader through a very comprehensive survey of different positions about the class character of the post-colonial state and then casts doubt on all of them for assuming that a state always reflects some coherent ‘class’ interests rather than its own.

Lionel Cliffe
Alfred Zack-Williams

CONFERENCE OF SOCIALIST ECONOMISTS

NEITHER MILTON NOR KEYNES
A NEW SOCIALIST ECONOMY

★ CSE CONFERENCE 1987 ★
SHEFFIELD POLY. JULY 10-12

Theories and strategies of socialist intervention

PLENARIES
Pacific rim economy ★ Union strategies at British Telecom ★ Jobs from Peace ★ A Ministry for Women ★ Flexible specialisation ★ A new economics ★

WORKSHOPS
Local economic intervention ★ Social ownership ★ Theories of development ★ International labour & capital ★ Value and state theory ★ Technology ★ Gender, race and labour market restructuring ★ Quantitative Marxism

DETAILS/BOOKING: CSE, 25 HORSELL RD. LONDON N5 (607 9615)
The purpose of this article is to assess the likely impact of stabilisation policies on the health of children in Zimbabwe. It begins with a discussion of some of the general methodological issues involved in this kind of measurement before going on to outline Zimbabwe's recent stabilisation experiences. It considers how policies adopted have affected, first, general determinants of health status and, second, specific health sector inputs. Finally it attempts to assess the extent to which these factors have affected the health status of children.

At independence in 1980 Zimbabwe, inherited a typical underdeveloped economy further distorted by racial inequalities. These inequalities were reflected in the disease pattern of the black majority. The predominant health problems are nutritional deficiencies, communicable diseases and conditions related to pregnancy, childbirth and the new-born period. They particularly affect two vulnerable groups of the population: young children and women in the child-bearing years. Malnutrition underlines much of the morbidity and mortality. In pregnant women it is an important factor in causing low birth weight with its attendant morbidity and mortality in the early months of life. In young children, as well as being an important cause of mortality in itself, it forms the basis for the frequency and severity of many infections: the most important are diarrhoea, and the immunisable diseases of measles and tuberculosis. Other communicable diseases such as pneumonia and other respiratory infections, tetanus, meningitis, whooping cough and malaria also constitute important causes of childhood disease and death.

The health of children is determined by many factors. It is useful to distinguish between those factors, such as provision of hospitals, immunisation programmes and medical personnel, which lie inside the health sector and those, such as levels of real income, educational standards and food subsidy programmes, which lie outside it. By making this distinction it immediately becomes clear that stabilisation policies are likely to affect the health of children both indirectly, by affecting the general economic environment, and directly, by affecting the health sector. Although the direct effects may be the most immediately obvious, the indirect effects are likely to be most important — unfortunately they are also the hardest to identify from available data. It is particularly difficult to separate out the impact of stabilisation policies from that of other concurrent influences on the economy. In Zimbabwe at the same time that stabilisation policies were being operated there was also a severe drought which clearly had an impact on health and nutrition levels. So even if it is possible to provide evidence of a particular change in health status, such as weight for age, it is extremely difficult to ascribe such changes to a
particular source. It is impossible even to determine the relative importance of alternative influences.

It is relatively easy to achieve rapid improvements in health as measured by the standard quantitative indicators, but sustained improvements in the quality of life are more difficult to produce — and also more difficult to measure. For instance, certain indicators, such as infant and young child mortality rates, may be rapidly improved by selective primary health care interventions targeted at these high risk groups. But there is little evidence to suggest that improved nutrition levels can be maintained by the application of this technical package in the absence of more general improvements in access to resources. In the context of stabilisation policies, we will argue that changes in patterns of health service provision consequent upon reductions in the overall level of provision can maintain health status levels as measured by ‘health indicators’ (which are in reality disease indicators), but that this masks a fall in the quality of life — which is more dependent on inputs from outside the health sector. This has important implications for overall health status in the long term.

Establishing how stabilisation policies impact on health status involves us first in a specification of what stabilisation policies have been introduced. We then attempt to establish what the impact of these policies has been on the general economic environment, particularly on health inputs. For the impact which operates through the health sector itself, we then have to establish how government health sector programmes have been affected by the policies. Finally we try to establish how both these types of change — inside and outside the health sector — have impacted on the health status of children, before offering some brief general conclusions.

Adjustment and Stabilisation Experiences

Macro-economic Background: Table 1 gives some of the aggregate indicators of the economy since 1974. The growth rate of GNP in constant price terms (Row [6]) was negative through the late 1970s. In the first two years of independence, 1980 and 1981, this downward trend was strongly reversed. However, there was then a dramatic turn-around, with zero growth in 1982 and negative growth in 1983. This decline in the economy appears to have ended in 1984.

Three distinct phases can be identified in Zimbabwe’s post-independence experience: the post-independence boom of 1980/81, the recession of 1982/83 and the recovery which started in 1985. This periodisation is also useful in discussing official attitudes towards stabilisation and adjustment issues. In the boom, there was expansion of Government spending on social services, minimum wage increases and a generally optimistic view in Government as to how fast it could go in redressing the inequalities inherited from the past. By late 1982 however, this mood had changed and Government, under the stimulus of an IMF stand-by credit, began to try to follow a fairly standard stabilisation package, the main components of which included devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar, restrictions on Government credit expansion and a wage freeze.

We will discuss the relationship between stabilisation policies and health status of children within this periodisation. But it is important to note that, on the basis of other indicators, a slightly different picture emerges. Inflation rates (Rows [13] and [14]) moved into double figures from 1981 onwards, so that there is no noticeable periodisation of the post-independence period. Although wage employment (Row
Table 1: Main macro-economic indicators for Zimbabwe 1975-1984

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>6.49</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>6.99</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>7.41</td>
<td>7.63</td>
<td>7.85</td>
<td>8.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Product (FC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Current Prices</td>
<td>Z$m</td>
<td>1902</td>
<td>2064</td>
<td>2069</td>
<td>2257</td>
<td>2651</td>
<td>3226</td>
<td>4049</td>
<td>4609</td>
<td>5081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Growth Rate %</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant 1980 Prices Z$m</td>
<td>3130</td>
<td>3104</td>
<td>2882</td>
<td>2656</td>
<td>2898</td>
<td>3226</td>
<td>3645</td>
<td>3646</td>
<td>3522</td>
<td>3599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Growth Rate %</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP (FC) Per Capita Z$</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Growth Rate %</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation %</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment '000</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>1033</td>
<td>1012</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>1038</td>
<td>1046</td>
<td>1033</td>
<td>1039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of Trade Z$m</td>
<td>-23.6</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>-103.2</td>
<td>-324.9</td>
<td>-309.0</td>
<td>-205.5</td>
<td>-18.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current Account Z$m</td>
<td>-87.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>-8.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>-73.9</td>
<td>-156.7</td>
<td>-439.3</td>
<td>-532.8</td>
<td>-457.0</td>
<td>-148.1</td>
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<td>Capital Account Z$m</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>173.7</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>310.2</td>
<td>518.4</td>
<td>292.7</td>
<td>266.2</td>
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<td>Gross Public Debt of Central Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>External Z$m</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>223.7</td>
<td>353.3</td>
<td>414.8</td>
<td>514.2</td>
<td>841.4</td>
<td>986.5</td>
<td>1435.7</td>
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<td>Domestic Z$m</td>
<td>601.8</td>
<td>710.4</td>
<td>779.4</td>
<td>926.1</td>
<td>1129.0</td>
<td>1428.5</td>
<td>1584.4</td>
<td>1639.9</td>
<td>1866.5</td>
<td>2311.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Z$m</td>
<td>695.6</td>
<td>788.5</td>
<td>867.9</td>
<td>1149.8</td>
<td>1482.3</td>
<td>1843.3</td>
<td>2098.6</td>
<td>2481.3</td>
<td>2853.0</td>
<td>3746.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of External in Total %</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>38.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Net Borrowing Z$m</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>281.9</td>
<td>332.5</td>
<td>361.0</td>
<td>255.3</td>
<td>382.7</td>
<td>371.7</td>
<td>893.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Borrowing/GDP %</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Government Budget*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Expenditure including Maturing Debt Z$m</td>
<td>517.9</td>
<td>576.8</td>
<td>754.3</td>
<td>847.9</td>
<td>994.8</td>
<td>1162.1</td>
<td>1623.2</td>
<td>2273.7</td>
<td>2624.1</td>
<td>3054.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Receipts Z$m</td>
<td>422.7</td>
<td>481.5</td>
<td>522.7</td>
<td>628.2</td>
<td>593.0</td>
<td>687.2</td>
<td>1139.3</td>
<td>1541.8</td>
<td>1894.0</td>
<td>2117.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deficit excl. Borrowing Z$m</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>201.6</td>
<td>219.7</td>
<td>351.8</td>
<td>474.9</td>
<td>483.9</td>
<td>731.8</td>
<td>730.1</td>
<td>937.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deficit/GDP %</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Until 1980, figures refer to year ending June 30; from 1981 they refer to calendar year. For Row [30], figures for 1975 through 1980 are based on average GDP for the two years.
[15]) picked up marginally at independence, there appears to be a long-term structural problem of chronically stagnant employment. Similarly, although the Balance of Trade (Row [17]) moved into deficit in 1981 and 1982, slightly preceding the recession we have identified above, its deterioration had in fact started from 1978, again suggesting that a structural rather than contingent process was at work. The same is true of the current account balance.

The Central Government Budget shows a similar trend. Expenditure (Row [29]) between 1980 and 1984 grew at an average rate of 24 per cent per year, but it had grown at an average annual rate of 17 per cent in the five years prior to independence. There was thus an acceleration of an already existing trend, rather than the establishment of a new trend entirely. In this case, however, we can recognise that the reasons for the expansion were different; prior to independence it was the increasing cost of defending the regime; post-independence it was largely the expansion of social expenditures.

Thus, the extent to which the movements noted are the result of cyclical as opposed to secular or structural factors is unclear. The impact of independence was generally beneficial, particularly as it involved the removal of sanctions. This meant not only that previous quantitative restrictions on trade were relaxed but also that there was a direct improvement in the terms of trade as the premia paid on imports and the discount on exports were removed. At the same time, improved inflows of foreign assistance, the ending of the war of independence and a generally more optimistic mood in the country all contributed to an up-turn. But whether or not this up-turn was superimposed on a longer-term downward trend which it did not fundamentally alter is not certain. The evidence provides some prima facie support for such a view, but it would require a much more detailed analysis than can be undertaken in this paper to establish the case with any certainty.

Stabilisation and Adjustment Policies: The main instruments of stabilisation policy used since independence are summarised in Table 2. By and large these constitute a very orthodox stabilisation package. The most significant issues for us were the removal of subsidies, the wage freeze and attempts to restrict the growth of government expenditure. It is not the purpose of this paper to examine the efficacy of these measures merely their effect on health. However, they do appear to have worked in improving the invisible account, and many of the controls have subsequently been relaxed.

Impact on General Economic Environment and Health Inputs
Two of the most significant components of stabilisation policies in Zimbabwe have been the freeze on wage increases and the removal of subsidies on food. Both affect real earnings, and would thus be expected to have serious direct consequences for nutrition. Stabilisation policies have also affected the government's ability to provide welfare services, which are an important part of the social wage. In the 1982 Census Zimbabwe's total population was estimated to be 7.55 million. Of these, there were 4.28m (56.7 per cent) in communal lands, 1.57m (20.8 per cent) in commercial farms and 1.67m (22.2 per cent) in urban areas. We will thus look at each group in turn as we would not expect stabilisation policies to impact equally on each of these groups, nor uniformly within groups.

Incomes, Prices, Subsidies and Nutrition: Zimbabwe inherited an extensive system
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A Balance of Payments and Exchange Rate Policies</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.1 Devaluation</td>
<td>8 December 1982</td>
<td>Explicit devaluation of 20% against basket of currencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January 1983-1984</td>
<td>Zimbabwe dollar allowed to depreciate a further 5%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1983-1984</td>
<td>Agreement that value of Zimbabwe dollar will not be allowed to rise against major trading currencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.2 Restrictions on New Non-concessional Foreign Borrowing</td>
<td>From 23 March 1983</td>
<td>Part of IMF Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.3 Balance of Payments Controls</td>
<td>27 March 1984</td>
<td>Temporary suspension of remittances of dividends, branch and partnership profits; Temporary reduction of emigrants' settling-in allowances; Acquisition of the blocked external securities pool; Release of Blocked Funds of Companies and Individuals; Temporary suspension of all income remittances; Control of Government external expenditures;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B Price and Wage Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.1 Cuts in subsidies &amp; increases in administered prices</td>
<td>May 1982</td>
<td>Beef 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 1982</td>
<td>Fertilizer 12%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October 1982</td>
<td>Steel 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December 1982</td>
<td>Electricity 22%-49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 1983</td>
<td>Maize meal 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September 1983</td>
<td>Railway Tariffs 10%-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Beef 30%-55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Maize meal 40%-45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bread 25%-30%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Milk 50%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vegetable Oils 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.2 Wage Freeze</td>
<td>January 1982-September 1983</td>
<td>Wage increases not allowed to exceed half the annual in the Consumer Price Index as part of IMF agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C Government Budget Policies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.1 Restriction on Government Credit Expansion</td>
<td>From 23 March 1983</td>
<td>Part of IMF Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.2 Restriction on new recruitment by Government</td>
<td>1983/84</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>D Monetary Policies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>D.1 Interest Rates</td>
<td>February 1981</td>
<td>Bank Rate raised from 4½% to 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September 1981</td>
<td>Bank Rate raised from 6% to 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 1984</td>
<td>Post Office Savings Bank rates raised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From 23 March 1983</td>
<td>Part of IMF Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.2 Restriction on Domestic Credit Expansion</td>
<td>From 23 March 1983</td>
<td>Raised for Building Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.3 Minimum liquidity ratios</td>
<td>28 March 1984</td>
<td>Raised for Commercial Banks &amp; Accepting Houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 May 1984</td>
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of price controls and subsidies. After independence, more emphasis was put on the use of the system to keep the cost of basic food items low. Two forms of subsidy were used: the government met the deficits of the various agricultural marketing boards, which arose because the prices at which the Boards bought from producers were higher than those they charged to consumers (both sets of prices were under direct government control); the government also paid a direct subsidy to certain private producers of basic foodstuffs.

Table 3: Level of Subsidies and their Pattern over Time (ZS thousands)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>To Marketing Boards</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>9619</td>
<td>25730</td>
<td>33289</td>
<td>36518</td>
<td>41630</td>
<td>39283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy</td>
<td>4110</td>
<td>10354</td>
<td>18329</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>31682</td>
<td>39329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>9662</td>
<td>5110</td>
<td>22910</td>
<td>86000</td>
<td>36719</td>
<td>43731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soya</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>4608</td>
<td>1608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>11638</td>
<td>9173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>25310</td>
<td>42150</td>
<td>74528</td>
<td>122518</td>
<td>127676</td>
<td>133715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>To Private Firms</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakers Flour</td>
<td>6663</td>
<td>8500</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edible Oils</td>
<td>5700</td>
<td>6200</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize Meal</td>
<td>20156</td>
<td>64800</td>
<td>49186</td>
<td>28000</td>
<td>22000</td>
<td>15000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opaque Beer</td>
<td>1048</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
<td>_</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>33567</td>
<td>79900</td>
<td>51125</td>
<td>28000</td>
<td>22000</td>
<td>15000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Food Subsidies</strong></td>
<td>58877</td>
<td>112050</td>
<td>125653</td>
<td>150518</td>
<td>149676</td>
<td>148715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As % of current</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Because of the growing burden this placed on the budget, government sought to bring them under control before the IMF agreement was arranged. However, it was only under that agreement that there was an actual reduction. Table 3 shows how food subsidies have moved over time. The reduction in the level of subsidies relative to current expenditure began in 1982/83 with the removal of some subsidies and the reduction of others to processors of basic foods. There was some attempt to minimise the impact on prices by delaying permission to increase retail prices. Nevertheless, there were price increases over the 1982/83 period, of some 100 per cent for maize meal, 25-30 per cent for bread and 25 per cent for edible oils.

The subsidies to the marketing boards are slightly more difficult to analyse. The figures given refer to the sum allocated in the central government budget to meeting the accumulated losses of the marketing boards; they may therefore be referring to losses made some years previously. Government's contribution to these losses will therefore show up in the budget only with a lag of some years. However, despite such attempts by government, increases announced in 1982-83 in the consumer prices of these products, as summarised in Table 2, were beef 69-95 per cent; milk 50 per cent. Apart from the direct effects of the removal of food subsidies, the raising of controlled prices of electricity, railway tariffs and fertilizer also had an influence on the general price level, albeit with some lag.

The combined effect of these price increases can be gauged from the movement of the consumer price index (CPI) during the period. Between August and September 1983 the CPI for low income urban families rose by 15.6 per cent, while the index of
food prices for this group rose by 27.0 per cent in that month. Clearly, the attempts
to reduce and remove subsidies contributed significantly to the rise in the cost of
living. This inflationary impact was reinforced by the 1982 devaluation and
subsequent depreciation of the Zimbabwean dollar. Although it is difficult to
quantify, the fact that Zimbabwean production is highly import dependent means
that a fall in the value of the dollar is fairly rapidly translated into higher domestic
prices.

**Effect on Urban Households**

1) Wage Earners: Since independence Government has adopted a policy of
administered wages, particularly for the low paid. There were minimum wages for
particular sectors before independence, but Government introduced economy wide
minimum wages in July 1980. Table 4 chronicles how these have subsequently
moved. Obviously the number of workers on the minimum varies from sector to
sector; the only wage distribution data available unfortunately uses too wide a
grouping to be able to tell how many workers are on the minimum, but it seems that
for the majority of workers the minima are significant. Between January 1982 and
September 1983 the minimum was not raised. This was a direct consequence of
stabilisation policies; Prime Minister Mugabe acknowledged this in January 1984
when he said, 'We were given up to January last year not to increase wages, but we
have gone beyond that because we realise that our economy can't handle that
burden' (Herald, 4 January 1984). The increase in September 1983 was stated to be
in compensation for the increases in basic food prices. However, as can be seen, it
did not fully compensate for previous inflation. The table also shows that although
nominal minima have been raised fairly regularly there has been an erosion of the
purchasing power of the minima since 1982. In other words, there were fairly
substantial gains made between independence and January 1982, but these have not
subsequently been maintained. It seems that Government has retreated from its
initial optimism as to how far legislated minimum wages could be used in the face of
stabilisation imperatives.

Table 4: Chronicle of Minimum Wage Changes (Legislated monthly minima in Z$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Domestic Workers (a)</th>
<th>Agricultural Workers (b)</th>
<th>Industrial Workers (c)</th>
<th>Mining Workers (d)</th>
<th>Low Income Workers (e)</th>
<th>Domestic CPI (f)</th>
<th>Industrial CPI (g)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1980</td>
<td>30 (c)</td>
<td>50 (e)</td>
<td>65 (f)</td>
<td>75 (g)</td>
<td></td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 1980</td>
<td>85 (c)</td>
<td>110 (f)</td>
<td>120 (g)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>102.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1981</td>
<td>85 (c)</td>
<td>115 (f)</td>
<td>120 (g)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>117.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1982</td>
<td>105 (c)</td>
<td>115 (f)</td>
<td>125 (g)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>117.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1983</td>
<td>105 (c)</td>
<td>110 (f)</td>
<td>120 (g)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>117.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1984</td>
<td>143 (c)</td>
<td>125 (f)</td>
<td>143 (g)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>117.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1985</td>
<td>196.9</td>
<td>184.2</td>
<td>196.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>196.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes
(a) for those workers who also receive payments in kind;
(b) for those who do not receive payments in kind;
(c) benefits to be added to cash wage but value of benefits not specified;
(d) from this date mineworkers not paid in kind;
(e) from this date three grades of domestic workers were recognised with the minimum rising
   by $2.00 for each grade. $50.00 was the lowest grade.
Table 5: Movements in Average Earnings for all Sectors Excluding Agriculture ($ per annum)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Nominal Average Earnings $</th>
<th>CPI 1980</th>
<th>Real Earnings Index 1980(1) $</th>
<th>Instantaneous Rates of Growth: Nominal Earnings %</th>
<th>CPI %</th>
<th>Real Earnings %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979(1)</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>2163</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979(3)</td>
<td>2057</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>2125</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980(1)</td>
<td>2297</td>
<td>100.2</td>
<td>2292</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980(3)</td>
<td>2510</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>2554</td>
<td>111.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981(1)</td>
<td>2668</td>
<td>110.3</td>
<td>2419</td>
<td>105.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981(3)</td>
<td>2847</td>
<td>114.0</td>
<td>2498</td>
<td>109.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982(1)</td>
<td>3210</td>
<td>122.5</td>
<td>2620</td>
<td>114.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982(3)</td>
<td>3388</td>
<td>127.3</td>
<td>2661</td>
<td>116.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983(1)</td>
<td>3564</td>
<td>146.4</td>
<td>2434</td>
<td>106.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983(3)</td>
<td>3709</td>
<td>169.5</td>
<td>2188</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984(1)</td>
<td>3886</td>
<td>178.4</td>
<td>2178</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Only the first and third quarters are shown as the fourth quarter figures are distorted by annual bonuses.

Table 5 shows how average earnings have followed a similar pattern as minimum wages, although lagging slightly behind, so that the downturn in real average earnings was in the third quarter of 1982. The disaggregation of movements in real earnings into movements in nominal earnings and the price level demonstrates quite clearly the forces lying behind it. The operation of the wage freeze can be seen clearly from the drop in the rate of increase of average earnings after 1982(1); in the same period, the price level rose, largely because of the removal of subsidies.

Thus we have a fairly clear picture of the position of wage earnings improving considerably after independence up to 1982, but their position being eroded thereafter, caught between the two blades of wage freeze and subsidy removal, both introduced explicitly as part of a stabilisation package.

2) The Informal Sector: Estimates as to the size of the urban informal sector in Zimbabwe are very crude, but it is estimated that there are probably in the order of 0.5m people in the sector. They are affected by stabilisation policies both as consumers and as producers. As consumers it is clear that the impact is much the same as that on wage earnings; they find their real income declining as subsidies on food are removed. Many informal operators are at the lower end of the income scale, so are likely to spend proportionately more of their earnings on food. This means that increases in food prices affect them more severely.

As producers the informal sector operators depend mainly on low income earners for their market. Falling real earnings in the formal sector will therefore reduce their market. Furthermore, to the extent that the formal wage earnings change their pattern of expenditure towards food as their real income levels decline, those non-food producers in the informal sector will find their market shrinks even further. As against these adverse effects, there is the possibility that the informal sector is able to increase its market share vis-à-vis the formal sector in times of economic stagnation. If formal producers are adversely affected by, for example, more stringent credit policies, it is possible that the informal sector is able to benefit. However, a priori this seems likely to be a marginal effect compared to the shrinkage of the overall market.
Since it appears likely that the informal sector is adversely affected by stabilisation policies both as consumers and as producers, we may be fairly certain that the overall effect on real incomes in the sector is negative.

**Rural Households**

1) Communal Areas: The main effect of stabilisation policies on the income of communal land dwellers will be through the increase in food prices resulting from the removal of subsidies. Whether or not this benefited a household would depend on whether it was a net producer or a net consumer of food. For net producers rising food prices would lead to a rise in real income; for net consumers it would lead to a fall. Assessing the overall impact therefore requires some idea of the degree of stratification in the communal lands. Some indication is given by the results of the National Household Capability Survey 1983/84, which showed that about 6 per cent of households have no access to land; that 50 per cent of the land is controlled by about 20 per cent of households; that approximately 50 per cent of households have no cattle; and that about 10 per cent of households own half the cattle. The process of rural differentiation was greatly accelerated by the drought.

The remarkable rise since independence in the contribution of communal producers to marketed output, particularly of maize and cotton, has been taken by some to imply that communal households are in general becoming more productive. However, this phenomenon is entirely consistent with increasing stratification, since progressive concentration of the means of production (mainly land and cattle) in the hands of fewer households will lead to a rise in the marketable surplus, even if overall production does not rise.

This growing stratification means that a large and growing stratum of people have to depend increasingly on remittances from family members in wage employment. With no increase in the absolute number of people in wage employment and with stabilisation policies causing a fall in real earnings of those in jobs, clearly there is a fundamental contradiction which is manifesting itself as a growing layer of increasingly impoverished households.

Thus, although there is no data for rural income distribution, we can see that there exists a significant group of households who would have been made worse off by stabilisation policies and who would have found that the buffer traditionally provided by remittances was increasingly being eroded. Other things being equal it can be expected that the nutritional status of young children in these households would have deteriorated during the period 1982/84. However, in practice, this group seems to have been somewhat protected by the Drought Relief Programme and the Children's Supplementary Feeding Programme (CSFP) introduced by Government.

2) On Commercial Farms: The 1982 Census showed that there was approximately one-and-a-half million people living on commercial farms. In June 1982 there were 265,780 wage employees, some 70,000 of whom were either casual or contract workers. These latter workers — who form an increasing proportion of the workforce particularly in plantation areas where work is seasonal — generally receive less than the equivalent of the minimum wage for permanent workers. The minimum wage for agriculture at that date was $50 per month; the available wage distribution data show that 84 per cent of the permanent workforce earned incomes
between $50 and $75 per month.* This suggests that the wages of farmworkers are
determined primarily by legislation and that in the short-term, stabilisation policies
which affect the profitability of commercial farms will not affect nominal wages (in
the longer term, of course, such policies may affect the level of employment in
agriculture). Thus (unlike the case of communal farmers) it is not of direct
consequence to commercial farmworkers whether or not the removal of subsidies
led to an increase in producer prices of agricultural goods.

We can conclude that these families are primarily affected as consumers.
Loewenson has demonstrated that food prices for farmworkers are considerably
higher than for urban consumers.** The effect of the removal of food subsidies has
therefore affected this group at least as seriously as urban workers. The wage freeze
between January 1982 and September 1983, referred to earlier, applied also to
agricultural workers. This restriction of nominal wages, coupled with the price
increases, undoubtedly led to a fall in the real earnings of this group.

Social and Welfare Programmes: The foregoing discussion has looked mainly at
factors affecting real earnings. Stabilisation policies also affected the ability of
government to provide general inputs into the social wage. We discuss three of
these — resettlement, education and water development — below. It should be
emphasised that our discussion concentrates essentially on the funding of these
services. It does not demonstrate how far the changes in funding were reflected by
changes in the provision of real services. Nor do we look at how usage of the
services was affected by the stabilisation policies. It is well established that poorer
households, for a variety of reasons, make less use of social services even when
they are provided free.

Resettlement Programme: The land question was central to the liberation struggle.
Government introduced a resettlement programme after independence in order to
try to deal with some of the more stark aspects of rural underdevelopment and
inequality. This programme required government funding both for purchasing land
for resettlement and for providing some infrastructure and support for resettled
households. Securing adequate funding has always been difficult, with a result that
resettlement has in practice been double edged. On the one hand a number of
effectively landless people have been resettled, albeit onto marginal land for the
most part. On the other hand, because of poor technical support and preparation
compounded by the drought and the lack of adequate infrastructure (e.g. stores,
transport and health care facilities) settlers are in many areas acknowledged to be
the worst off in terms of health and nutrition status.

In the 1983 Budget, in the middle of the IMF period when government was
attempting to curtail expenditure, the severest cuts fell on this resettlement
programme. Expenditure on land acquisition was cut from $28 million in 1982/83 to
$6 million in 1983/84. It has been suggested that the slowing down of the
resettlement programme allowed for a rethink of the whole approach. This may
well have been the case and it was undoubtedly true that some changes in approach
were required. It was also true that there were a number of reasons other than lack

*CSO, Wage distribution of Employees in Agriculture (June 1982) and Other Industries
(September 1982), Harare, mimeo, July 1983.
**R. Loewenson, 'Farm Labour in Zimbabwe: a comparative study in health status', Health
of funding for the slow progress of resettlement. However, it is important to note that the primary reason for the cut back was a fiscal stabilisation issue.

Education: Apart from its intrinsic contribution to welfare, education probably impacts on the health of children in two ways. First, expenditure on education and accessories detracts from expenditure on nutrition and health. Second, education probably contributes in the longer term to better health behaviour.

From the point of view of the first impact, the Government’s removal of fees for primary education undoubtedly accounted for a substantial rise in the real incomes of households with school-age children. (It should be noted that this did not mean that primary education was free, since there were other costs of both a pecuniary — e.g. uniforms, transport to school — and non-pecuniary — e.g. loss of child inputs into household production — kind.) Subsequently, however, under the pressures of funding the rapidly expanding system, government has had to raise the cost to parents of schooling. In some cases, mainly in the rural areas, this has been done both by requiring parents to provide labour inputs such as, for example, helping to build new classrooms. This can detract from time spent in household production of food. In other cases, schools have been allowed to charge levies. This puts pressure on parents to reduce family expenditure on other items, including food. There is no systematic evidence on the extent to which this has occurred. It has been suggested that the Children’s Supplementary Feeding Programme (discussed below), which provides a meal at some schools, has substituted for rather than complemented home meals. This is an indication of the fine balance which poor households have to make between alternative calls on their resources. Insofar as general education makes a contribution to better health behaviour, Zimbabwe’s phenomenal post-independence expansion in school enrolments must be highly significant. Total numbers at school grew from 892,668 in 1979 to 2,727,162 in 1985, an average annual increase of over 20 per cent. The bulk of this expansion has been at the primary school level. There has also been some progress made in adult education. The impact that this will have on health is likely to show up only in the long run.

Water Development: Since independence there has been a programme initiated by government — under the impetus of the UN International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade — to improve water supplies and sanitation in the communal lands. Improved water supply and sanitation by themselves probably have little direct impact on health in the short-term, but they indirectly contribute by, for example, reducing time spent in collecting water, allowing more time to be devoted to productive activities which may contribute to improved health and nutrition. In 1984 about one-third of the communal area population had access to improved water sources; this proportion appears to have risen slowly in recent years and is continuing to do so. Between 1982/3 and 1983/4 there was a rise in the expenditure on the rural water supply in Communal Areas followed by a subsequent reduction. The main reason for this fall was the completion of the programme to reconstruct facilities destroyed during the war, and cannot therefore be attributed to stabilisation policies. However, the share of expenditure funded by donors rose dramatically over the period, so that the amount of government resources going to rural water development has fallen sharply. It is arguable that this is an example of how aid donors have cushioned the effects of stabilisation policies in particular areas.
Health Sector Impact

Post-Independence Health Sector Programme: At independence Zimbabwe inherited a health care system which was inappropriate and inequitably distributed, typical of that in any developing country service, but compounded by racial inequalities. In 1980/81 the average annual expenditure per head for the beneficiaries of private sector medical aid societies was $144 compared with $31 for the urban population using public services and $4 for the rural population. This ratio of 36:8:1 indicates the inequities that existed in the health sector. The average rural figure of $4 per person per year concealed further disparities, for only districts surrounding urban areas were relatively 'well served'. These disparities were paralleled by those in distribution of health care personnel and access to facilities. In 1980/81 in the publicly funded services 44 per cent went to the urban-based sophisticated central hospitals serving only 15 per cent of the population while only 24 per cent when to primary and secondary level rural health services for the majority of the population.

Given this inheritance, the health sector is one of the areas in which there has been a major government thrust since independence, with both a qualitatively new approach and a number of specific new programmes being introduced. This general approach is stated in documents such as the Ministry of Health's (MOH) 1984 Equity in Health which 'advocates the adoption of the Primary Health Care (PHC) approach whose key components are appropriateness, accessibility, affordability and acceptability of the care provided'. This new approach embraces the following changes and programmes (for references see Bibliographic Note):

a) Free health care: Since September 1980, to those earning less than $150 per month, the vast majority of the population.

b) Hospital and rural health centre building and upgrading: By January 1985, 163 rural health centres had been completed and a further 23 were under construction. A number of provincial and district hospitals and rural clinics have been upgraded.

c) Zimbabwe Expanded Programme on Immunisation (ZEPI): Immunisation against the six major childhood infectious diseases and tetanus immunisation of pregnant women was greatly expanded in 1981. Since 1982 the percentage of children between 12 and 23 months who are fully immunised has risen in rural Zimbabwe from 25 per cent to 42 per cent in 1984 and in Harare City from 48 per cent to 56 per cent in 1983 and to approximately 80 per cent in 1986. Recent data from Manicaland Province show that 63 per cent of this age group are fully immunised.

d) Diarrhoeal Disease Control Programme (DDCP): In February 1982 diarrhoeal disease control was declared a priority by government. The major components of this programme have included improved case management — mainly by oral rehydration therapy (ORT), epidemic control, improved nutrition with emphasis on prolonged breast feeding, and improved environmental hygiene through water supply and sanitation (see above). Although hard data are not available, questionnaire responses and interviews conducted in October/November 1984 suggest that the number of attendances for diarrhoea at health care facilities has decreased. Although the evidence is sometimes conflicting, on balance data show that there has been a significant increase in the percentage of rural mothers who can prepare a correct solution for ORT.

e) National nutrition programme: Soon after Independence a Department of National Nutrition was established, whose activities include nutrition and health education with particular regard to breast feeding and weaning practices, growth monitoring and nutrition surveillance using child health cards and supervision of the Children's Supplementary Feeding Programme (CSFP) and food production plots. By June 1984, 80 per cent of children aged 1 possessed a growth card (as against 71 per cent in 1982) and 83 per cent had been weighed at least twice in the first year of life (58 per cent in 1982) although only 35 per cent of Harare mothers could consistently and correctly interpret the growth curves. The CSFP was initiated in November 1980 by a number of NGOs and taken over by the MOH a year later. A daily energy-rich supplementary meal was supplied to (predominantly undernourished) young children in communal areas. The programme operated between 1981 and 1985,
covering the height of the drought. At its peak over a quarter of a million children in over 8,000 communal area feeding points received food.

f) National village health worker programme: The National Village Health Worker Programme (VHW) was launched in November 1981 to train village selected and based multipurpose basic health workers. Of a projected eventual 15,000 VHWs about 4,000 had been trained by June 1985. Related to this programme was the Traditional Midwives Programme (TMP), designed to upgrade the skills of household level women operatives in identifying at risk pregnancies, basic midwifery, elementary hygiene, and basic child care.

g) Child spacing: The Child Spacing and Family Planning Council (CSFPC), a parastatal established in 1981, superceded the voluntary government assisted Family Planning Association. Largely as a result of its activities Zimbabwe has the highest rate of contraception usage in Sub-Saharan Africa.

All these programmes and others already in operation required some expansion of government expenditure. Table 7 shows how the Vote Allocations and the actual expenditure of the Ministry of Health (MOH) changed over the period. The expenditure implications of the new approach to health care are dramatically illustrated by the growth rates immediately after Independence. In current price terms there was an immediate expansion of 44.7 per cent; in real terms 27.5 per cent. The Ministry’s share of the budget rose to 5.1 per cent, showing that there was a relative shift in emphasis. This growth continued into the next budget year (the fact that expenditure rose more in real terms than in current price terms is a reflection of the changing salary composition of the sector). Thus by fiscal year 1981/82, the MOH’s actual expenditure had almost doubled in real terms.

Table 6: Central Government Budget Allocation to the Ministry of Health 1978/79 to 1985/86

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Vote Allocation</th>
<th>Actual Expenditure</th>
<th>Actual Growth Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Current Prices</td>
<td>1980 Prices</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Z$m</td>
<td>Z$m</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Budget Share</td>
<td>Budget Share</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Z$m</td>
<td>Z$m</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978/79</td>
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<td>1979/80</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>108.9</td>
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<td>117.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>159.4</td>
<td>118.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>183.7</td>
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The Experience of the Health Sector during the Stabilisation Phase

Effects on the Ministry of Health Budget: We thus have a situation in which the new Government embarked on a number of initiatives to redress the inherited inequalities and biases of the colonial health system and found itself committed to expanding rapidly the resources allocated to the health sector. We know however that from mid-1982 onwards the Government also found itself facing increasing stabilisation problems in the economy and that, from 1983 on, it tried to follow an orthodox IMF-type stabilisation programme. This programme included as one of its explicit elements attempts to curtail government borrowing. Let us now see how far these impacted on the health sector.

Table 7 demonstrates the impact of these policies on the MOH’s overall expenditure. It shows how the real growth of 47 per cent in the 1981/82 budget was
turned into a real decrease in expenditure of 9.1 per cent in the 1982/83 Fiscal Year, the year in which the IMF Stand-by Credit came into operation. It is significant that in this year there was a discrepancy between the allocation — made before the Agreement — and actual expenditure. This restraint continued at least into FY 1984/85, so that the Ministry's expenditure has hardly grown at all in real terms since 1981/82. The Ministry's share of the budget was also cut in this year, and has subsequently remained at this reduced level.

It is important when assessing the impact of these cuts/constraints on the aggregate level of spending to recognise that changes in the level of spending may imply changes in the pattern. Table 8 provides summary data on the pattern of the MOH expenditure over the period according to two criteria. Firstly, according to the service: here it can be seen that there has been a rise in the share of preventive services and a fall in that of medical care services. This change does not follow any pattern which ties in with the stabilisation period in any obvious way, and probably reflects the impact of the changed philosophy of the MOH after Independence.

The second pattern shown in the Table is according to use. It can be seen here that there has been a steady rise in the share of the Ministry's budget allocated to salaries and allowances. This mainly reflects increasing personnel but also rising wages in the sector. Again, there seems to be a steady trend, rather than a pattern which correlates clearly with stabilisation policies. However, it should be noted that, because of the politics of government budget cuts and the unwillingness of governments to fire salaried employees, one would expect the share of salaries in the budget to rise in a period of reduced expenditure.

There has also been a steady decline in the share of the Ministry budget allocated to Grants. There are two significant recipients of these grants. Firstly, the Parirenyatwa Hospitals Board of Governors, which was responsible for the administration of the main hospitals in Harare. Their share of Grants fell from 47.9 per cent in 1980/81 to 30.3 per cent in 1982/83, primarily as a result of the removal of the Harare Central Hospital from their portfolio; the MOH assumed responsibility for this hospital, which accounts in part for the increases in both salaries and services. Since 1982/83 the Parirenyatwa Board of Governors has increased its shares of Grants to 34.4 per cent. Measured in constant 1980 prices their grant has moved from $21.5m in 1980/81 to $23.3m (1981/82), $12.8m (1982/83), $14.8m (1983/84) and $15.8m in 1984/85.

The second, and more important, recipients of MOH Grants are the local authorities, missions and voluntary organisations. These bodies are important in the provision of health care services at the local level, particularly, as far as child survival is concerned, in outreach programmes such as ZEPI, DDCP and the CSFP. Their share of the Grants rose from 49.3 per cent in 1980/81 to 62.9 per cent in 1982/83, but has subsequently fallen back to 58.4 per cent in 1985/86, mirroring the movement of the share going to the Parirenyatwa Board of Governors. There has been a noticeable decline in the resources going to these organisations from the Ministry: in real terms their grant has moved from $22.2m in 1980/81 to $35.9m (1981/82), $26.5m (1982/83), $23.3m (1983/84) and $24.4m in 1984/85. This fall in real resources has constrained the ability of these organisations to continue their contribution to health care. Many rural based mission hospitals had to limit their outreach work during 1984 and 1985 because of financial constraints, which particularly affected their travel.
Table 7: Ministry of Health: Internal Allocation of Expenditure 1979/80 to 1985/86 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Admin &amp; General</th>
<th>Allocation of Service</th>
<th>Allocation by Use</th>
<th>Salaries &amp; Allowances</th>
<th>Grants</th>
<th>Supplies/ Services</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
<td>Medical Care Services</td>
<td>Preventive Services</td>
<td>Research</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1979/80</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1980/81</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1982/83</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1983/84</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One of the more obvious effects of the Ministry’s attempts to restrict its expenditure was the undermining of the operation of the free health care system. When this was introduced in September 1980 the maximum income for users was set at $150 per month. This ceiling has not subsequently been raised, presumably because of the cost implications of doing so. Furthermore, more effort is made now than previously to ensure that beneficiaries’ incomes do not exceed the ceiling. At the same time, however, nominal wages have risen, so that people have been excluded from the service, even though their real incomes have not risen. Thus, in September 1982 when the minimum wage for industrial workers was $105 per month, about 42 per cent of industrial workers earned less than the $150 ceiling. For July 1986 the minimum for industrial workers has been raised to $158, so that none qualify for free health care.

Those who did not qualify for the free service have been affected by rising charges for some services. Recent data on perinatal mortality rates in the Harare area (Greater Harare Maternity Unit) provides some suggestive evidence that the recent increase in maternity fees for those earning over $150 pm may have raised the perinatal mortality rate (PNMR). The PNMR is much higher amongst those mothers who have received no ante-natal care (unbooked) as compared with those who have (booked). For the GHMU between January 1985 and April 1986 the PNMR for booked cases was 43.8 per thousand live births while for unbooked it was 261.0. Thus any factors leading to a rise in non-booking would significantly and quickly increase the GHMU average PNMR. Fees were increased from $10 to $20 on 1 October 1985. Since it is known that most pregnant women in Greater Harare book late in pregnancy (between 20 and 28 weeks) those who might otherwise have booked at the time that fee increases were introduced would only have delivered early in 1986. Thus if there was an impact we would expect it to manifest itself by an increase in the non-booking rate by the first quarter of 1986. While these are early figures, there has indeed been such an increase which appears to be statistically significant despite the small sample. For the GHMU, the average unbooked rate between January 1985 and January 1986 was 7.4 per cent of all deliveries. Between February and April 1986 it rose to 9.9 per cent. However, for the Harare Maternity Hospital the rates for the same periods changed from 8.9 per cent to 12.2 per cent (both these changes are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level). The HMH acts as a referral centre for those complicated cases at the clinics in the GHMU area. A very high proportion of unbooked cases presenting to the clinics in labour would be regarded by clinic staff as complicated and would immediately be transferred to the HMH, thus increasing dramatically the unbooked rate for the latter.
The Role of Foreign Aid: Foreign aid has played an important role in mitigating some of the effects of the reduction in resources allocated by government to the health sector. Although the total amount of aid going to the sector has not been large in comparison with the overall MOH budget, it has been significant in relation to the funding allocated to specific projects. We give below two examples.

In the Expanded Programme of Immunisation in 1983 18 per cent of the budget came from bilateral and multilateral aid donors. WHO provided US$85,000, UNICEF US$325,000, SIDA $1,210,500, SCF(UK) $65,000, EEC $30,000 and SKF $12,000. While 18 per cent may appear to be small in relation to government’s contribution, it would undoubtedly have offset any self-imposed reductions introduced as part of the stabilisation package. Unfortunately we have no data for other years to test whether the aid contribution actually increased in response to the stabilisation policies.

The funding for the CSFP came in the first year (1981) from various national and external voluntary agencies. In 1982 SIDA assumed the dominant funding role, and continued to provide a major financial input into this programme and the food production plots which it spawned. Later in the programme a substantial proportion of the food came from the World Food Programme as part of the drought relief assistance, while UNICEF contributed in the area of personnel training and evaluation. Although we have no figures, the CSFP which was introduced initially during the reconstruction period following the liberation war and was subsequently continued as part of the drought relief exercise, was a very costly programme. It was largely externally funded through the MOH with small contributions from NGOs. Here then is an example of foreign aid initiated before stabilisation policies but nevertheless crucial and timely in allowing government to mount a massive relief programme at the same time as attempting to restrict its own expenditures.

What Has Happened to the Health and Nutrition Status of Children?

In this section we attempt to review the status of children’s health by examining mortality, morbidity and nutritional levels over the period under review. Once again it is necessary to emphasise that there is very little consistent and comprehensive data, particularly for mortality and morbidity. Further, time series data on these is virtually non-existent.

Mortality: Pre-independence estimates of infant mortality rates vary, but it is agreed that for the African population as a whole the IMR was of the order of 100 to 150, with the consensus average being about 120. Sanders gives an estimate of 120 to 150, with wide disparities between urban and remote rural areas.

Since independence the only IMR derived from a nationwide survey is 83, a figure calculated from the 1982 Population Census. There is no other data, but it is generally agreed by most workers, on the basis of small studies and casual observation, that the IMR has declined significantly since 1980. This, however, does not provide an adequate basis for correlating changes in the IMR with stabilisation policies. Data on child (1 to 4 years) mortality is even more scanty. The Census calculations, however, suggest that there too there has been a fall since before independence.

Morbidity Rates and Pattern of Disease: The Childhood Morbidity and Mortality Survey conducted in August 1983 shows the most important causes of death for
children under the age of 5. This data is shown in Table 9. As can be seen, diarrhoea and respiratory tract infections each cause 27 per cent of deaths; combined they cause 48 per cent. Measles and prematurity/neonatal tetanus/other neonatal causes each cause 15 per cent of deaths. Malnutrition is hardly ever cited as a cause of death but is acknowledged to be an important associated cause especially in the cases of diarrhoea and measles.

Table 10: Causes of deaths of children 0 to 4 years old 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>% of deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Diarrhoea</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Measles</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pneumonia</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Neonatal tetanus</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Prematurity &amp; other neonatal Causes</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Upper Respiratory Tract Infections (URTI)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. URTI/Diarrhoea</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Fever/Diarrhoea</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Meningitis</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Others</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diarrhoea alone and with other causes (1 + 7 + 8) 27
RTI alone and with other causes (3 + 5 + 6 Kwashiorkor/URTI) 27


Other data on child morbidity is either hospital based or very fragmentary. However, the morbidity pattern closely parallels the above pattern of mortality with the addition of certain communicable diseases such as the immunisable diseases of whooping cough, tuberculosis, diphtheria and poliomyelitis, and malaria, schistosomiasis, various intestinal parasitoses, and skin and eye diseases.

The pattern of disease described above is typical for an underdeveloped country, and is in essence no different from that described for Zimbabwe before independence. However, no reliable rates for the incidence or prevalence of these diseases are available, nor again are there any time series data.

Health Sector Programmes, Stabilisation Policies and Child Mortality and Morbidity: It is difficult to be anything but speculative about the precise impact of the health sector interventions described in Section IV on child mortality and morbidity, given the paucity of data. Notwithstanding this, the above noted aggregate declines in mortality and morbidity can nonetheless be attributed with some certainty to these interventions. However, even if disease specific data were available it would be impossible to disaggregate the summative impacts so as to apportion impact to individual programmes separately. In addition there will be time lags between intervention and impact, more so for some interventions than for others. For example, in the case of diarrhoeal disease mortality and morbidity, nutrition interventions will have a longer lag than ORT case management. Finally, even the actual or expected benefits of these interventions — individual and summative — might have been offset by the drought which lasted from 1982 through 1984.

Nevertheless, it is likely that certain programmes have had a rapid positive impact on child survival and morbidity, the most important being the ZEPI, DDCP and also the CSFP, particularly in the context of the drought. Some reduction in deaths from
diarrhoea would be expected to have resulted from increased usage of oral rehydration therapy as well as a smaller proportion from protection against measles by immunization. Similarly measles deaths would also have been reduced by improvement in immunisation coverage and neonatal tetanus deaths might have been reduced slightly by immunisation of pregnant women and more hygienic child birth practices resulting from the TMP. Some reduction in deaths from pneumonia and other respiratory infections as well as meningitis has probably resulted from greater accessibility to health care. Also some positive impact on perinatal and neonatal deaths may have accrued from the TMP. Malaria deaths may have experienced some reduction as a result of better access to health care especially through VHW-administered treatment.

However, any significant impact on deaths resulting from pneumonia and other respiratory infections, prematurity and other neonatal causes, and meningitis as well as deaths resulting either directly or indirectly from malnutrition (not cited as a cause of death) would require improvements in nutritional status of both children and mothers as well as reductions in levels of crowding and further improvement in access to health care. Indeed even a sustained reduction in deaths from diarrhoea and measles would also require the above more general improvements as well as improved environmental and personal hygiene in the case of diarrhoea.

It is impossible at this stage to predict the likely longer term impact of the above health sector programmes on child health. Those programmes which incorporate preventive or promotive components (e.g. ZEPI, Child Spacing, VHW and TMP) will, if they continue to expand, have a summative and cumulative positive long term effect. The VHW programme, and even such programmes as the rural health centre building programme, will also lay the infrastructural basis for sustained health sector interventions in the future.

The Health Sector Impact section demonstrated that there were some aspects of health care provision — notably the free health service — which had actually been reduced because of stabilisation policies. However, it seems that their main effect was to slow down the growth of health sector interventions and particularly the MOH's ability to fund such interventions. Thus, while it is true that there has been a reduction in mortality and morbidity from the expansion of certain health care programmes — most noticeably ZEPI, DDCP and possibly also VHW and TMP — the question is whether the improvement in these outcomes would have been greater had their expansion not been constrained by the imposition of stabilisation policies. We have already discussed how in 1984/85 the rural ZEPI's expansion was adversely affected in the mission sector by the slow or non-increase in funds allocated for travel for outreach. The DDCP is less reliant on transport; however, the increase in knowledge about ORT has been not only through the VHW and TMP programmes (which have not been adversely affected by stabilisation policies) but also through health care facilities, since preventive measures are now integrated with curative at all levels of the health sector. Those stabilisation policies which have reduced either the provision (e.g. by slowing down the rural health centre building programme) or the utilisation (e.g. by disqualifying people from free health care) of such facilities will have adversely affected the spread of DRT knowledge. The same applies to imumisation. Finally, the slowing down of infrastructural development as a result of stabilisation policies will have longer term effects on all aspects of health care programmes.

Thus, despite the paucity of data, particularly of a time series nature, it is possible to
see that stabilisation policies have had a negative impact on child mortality and morbidity through their effect on health sector interventions. However, it is likely that their indirect impact on health through the general economic environment and, in particular, real incomes, will be more significant. This impact will in part be mediated through the effect reduced incomes have on health facility utilisation. However, the main impact will be through their effect on the nutritional status of children. Both mortality and morbidity are significantly influenced by nutritional factors; we now consider the nutritional status of children in Independent Zimbabwe.

Nutritional Status: In the following discussion we define our terms as follows: ‘wasting’ means less than 80 per cent of the standard weight for height ratio; ‘stunting’ means less than 90 per cent of standard height for age; ‘underweight’ means less than the third centile or less than 80 per cent of standard weight for age. It should be noted that the surveys referred to sometimes use the Harvard standard and sometimes the NCHS.

In 1983 a World Bank Report summarised available data on nutrition, gathered from 18 nutrition surveys undertaken at various times and seasons between 1980 and 1982, using different methodologies and anthropometric standards. Allowing for these differences, it concluded as follows:

Overall, using weighted averages to reflect sample sizes, we see a picture of 21 per cent of the under-five population with second or third degree malnutrition based on weight for age. Using a weighted figure from Bindura which probably reflects a better cross sample of the population, 23 per cent fall in this category. This is roughly comparable to Cameroun, Lesotho and Liberia, lower than Sierra Leone at 31 per cent and higher than Togo at 15 per cent and Egypt at 9 per cent (the number of second and third degree cases of malnutrition combined in North Africa, the Middle East and Latin America is 15 to 20 per cent). Stunting is seen in 28 per cent of Zimbabwean children (30 per cent in the cross community Bindura sample), considerably higher than the 9.1 per cent in Togo, the 18 per cent in Liberia and the 21 to 24 per cent in Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Cameroun and Egypt. Wasting is found in 9 per cent of Zimbabwean children (12 per cent in Bindura), which generally is at least triple all of the above countries. The surveys summarised were all carried out before the prolonged drought had affected Zimbabwe.

In 1982 the Ministry of Health carried out a survey of 1,776 children. This showed the proportion of underweight children aged 0 to 3 to be 18-22 per cent in non-urban areas and 10 per cent to 11 per cent in urban. Wasting was found in 9 per cent of non-urban and 13.5 per cent of urban children. Thirty six per cent of children below 4 were stunted in non urban areas and 16 per cent in urban.

A MOH survey conducted in July 1984 showed 48 per cent of rural children between 12 and 59 months of age to be underweight. Despite the methodological problems and the fact that these surveys refer to children of different ages, the rise in the prevalence of undernutrition from the 18-22 per cent reported in 1982 to the 48 per cent reported in 1984 is so marked that it seems reasonable to conclude that there has been a deterioration in the nutritional status of (at least non-urban) children in Zimbabwe.

Loewenson has shown that there appears to have been a reduction in measured levels of both chronic (as evidenced by prevalence of stunting) and acute (as
evidenced by underweight and wasting) forms of undernutrition between 1981/2 and 1983. These reductions were observed in commercial farming areas, communal areas and mining areas. Additionally since equivalent reductions were observed on commercial farms which had initiated health projects as well as those which had not, it seems likely that these reductions in undernutrition were due not to health sector interventions but rather to a general improvement in living conditions. Loewenson's surveys covered the period of economic boom which we have identified in the previous section, and thus coincides with rising real earnings. Unfortunately there is no equivalent data for the later period when, as we have shown, stabilisation policies reduced real earnings for both wage workers and many communal households. However, given that she has shown — as have studies in other countries — that rising real earnings were correlated with improved nutritional status, it may well be that the reverse will also be true.

Thus although the two MOH surveys referred to show a decline in nutritional status, other studies are more ambiguous, and there is little evidence that changes in the nutritional status of young children in rural Zimbabwe have followed any discernible or consistent pattern since Independence. This is somewhat surprising given the fall in real incomes resulting from the drought and stabilisation policies. The most plausible explanation of this inconsistency is in our view the impact of the Drought Relief Programme — which involved food distribution — and the CSFP. Both of these programmes were, as noted previously, externally assisted.

A paradox, which some authors have commented on, is that while Zimbabwe has relatively low mortality rates as compared with other underdeveloped countries, its levels of undernutrition are high — especially in view of its overall food surplus. This is explained in the World Bank Report by a combination of factors: Zimbabwe has a relatively safer infection/disease environment; water supply and sanitation are better than in many countries; and rural Zimbabwean culture places a high premium on cleanliness and tidiness.

Given our earlier observations about rural stratification, we would add that it is probable that undernourished children come predominantly from the lower strata and that disparities in mortality rates are likely to be quite wide, but that these rates, even in this group, have been reduced by relatively good and rapidly improving immunisation coverage, spread of knowledge about ORT and better access than in many African countries to curative health care.

Conclusion
This paper has reviewed child health and the economy in Zimbabwe from the immediate pre-independence period through the periods of post-independence economic growth, recession and drought, imposition of stabilisation policies and up to the recent beginnings of economic recovery. It has attempted to show how stabilisation has affected the general economic environment and how this in turn may have influenced childhood mortality and morbidity. Similarly the effect of stabilisation on a reoriented and rapidly expanding health sector has been examined and the likely impact on child health assessed. Although data is inadequate and patchy, some general conclusions may be drawn.

First is the obvious need to improve the collection of relevant data, gathered regularly over time so that changes and their likely causes may be monitored but, given the stratifications in society, also be disaggregated. Second, there is evidence
that young child mortality and some areas of morbidity in Zimbabwe have improved despite drought, recession and stabilisation policies. Our impression is that these improvements have resulted mainly from an energetic expansion and reorientation of health care provision. The adverse effects of drought and stabilisation policies have respectively been offset by aid-supported relief feeding programmes and particular health care programmes. On the other hand, economic recession and stabilisation attempts have reduced real incomes for large numbers of rural and urban households since the immediate post-independence boom. This reflects itself in discrepantly high levels of childhood undernutrition which seem to have remained static despite the health care drive. In our view this apparent inconsistency only expresses a fundamental shortcoming in what is becoming known as the 'selective health care approach', where targeted technical interventions can rapidly reduce mortality but more basic causes of undernutrition and ill-health are not addressed. These basic causes are rooted in economy and society and are unlikely to be amenable to short term technical solutions. Indeed these selective health care interventions, often aid-supported, particularly when delivered through 'vertical' programmes, may have the effect of delaying the development of the material and human infrastructure necessary to begin to address the fundamental causes of childhood ill-health. This is not to eschew the need for such important and effective components of primary health care such as immunisation and oral rehydration therapy: rather it is to insist that the PHC approach should also incorporate a longer term strategic goal of equipping communities to improve not only their survival chances but also their health and quality of life through social and economic development.

Lastly, with regard to the debate on adjustment policies, this paper presents some arguments that orthodox stabilisation policies impose an unacceptable burden on the poor. It is argued by some that there is a conflict between orthodox stabilisation policies and longer term development strategies. If this is so, then the burden may not merely be unacceptable, it may also be futile, for the quest for short term stability may hinder the growth of infrastructure necessary for longer term social and economic development.

Bibliographic Note
Morocco and The Western Sahara

David Seddon

This article offers a detailed summary of the stages of the war that has been waged since the end of Spanish colonial rule in Western Sahara. It documents the forms of struggle used by the Polisario Front in its efforts to end the enforced division of Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauretania in 1976, and, after 1979, the efforts of Morocco to incorporate the territory. It also offers a summary of the international political dimensions of the struggle — the diplomatic and military aid Morocco receives from the West, especially the USA, and the support of some OAU members and in the UN for the rights of self-determination of the Saharan people. It concludes with an assessment of the impact of the war on Moroccan politics, society and economy.

THE WAR IN THE SAHARA

Moroccan Blitzkreig and Occupation: 1975-76

On 15 October 1975 a United Nations investigative mission, which had visited the Spanish Sahara in May, reported that the majority of the Saharan population favoured political independence and the end of Spanish colonial rule. The next day, the World Court at the Hague ruled in favour of self-determination for the Western Sahara. In response to this ruling, King Hassan, who had brought the case to the World Court in the first place, hoping to secure a judgement in favour of Moroccan sovereignty over the Territory, and was already poised to intervene in pursuance of Morocco's claims — staged the 'Green March', in which some 350,000 Moroccan civilians were recruited to cross the frontier into the Spanish Sahara at the beginning of November, as 'a demonstration of the popular will in Morocco to reclaim the Sahara'.

While public attention was focussed on the Moroccan-Saharan border at Tarfaya near the Atlantic coast, as a consequence of the Green March, Moroccan forces moved into the territory from the northeast to crush the Polisario (the popular liberation front which opposed Moroccan irredentist claims as well as continued Spanish colonial occupation) and to seal off the border with Algeria. Ground forces supported by aerial bombardment overwhelmed the resistance organised by the Polisario and during the remaining weeks of 1975 forced both them and the civilian population of several settlements in the northeast of the territory to retreat into the desert. The camps in the desert were then systematically bombed. Phosphorous and napalm were used. The small Sahraoui army (SPLA) in the north was rapidly confined to the small area running from Guelta to the Algerian border.

In the meanwhile, a tripartite agreement between Morocco, Mauretania and Spain
was signed which involved a commitment by Spain to withdraw by the end of February 1976 and hand over the territory to a joint Moroccan-Mauretanian administration. But the Moroccan regime was not prepared to wait that long, and moved quickly to secure military control of as much of the territory as possible. Between November and December 1975, the Moroccans invaded the Spanish Sahara and took control of several key towns as well as the so-called ‘useful triangle’ in the northwest which included El Aiun and the phosphate mines of Bu Craa. The Polisario forces, small and relatively poorly equipped, were no match in this blitzkreig for the Moroccan army and airforce (See Appendix).

In January 1976, the Spanish abandoned Villa Cisneros (Dakhla), the main town in the southern part of the territory; and the Moroccans moved in. On 27 February 1976, near Bir Lahlou, the Polisario announced the formation of the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).

Moroccan forces in the north were unable to cut the Polisario off entirely from its rear bases in Algeria and many refugees went eastwards to establish camps in the area of Tindouf; others continued to remain within the territory in smaller refugee camps. A large concentration formed at the Polisario’s provisional capital, Guelta-Zammour, which was sheltering some 25,000 Sahraoui refugees by March 1976. Throughout the first months of 1976, the Moroccan airforce bombed the refugee camps; the use of napalm against civilians was confirmed by the International Red Cross Committee in January 1976 and by a team of Swiss doctors in May (c.f. Mercer 1979:10). In mid April, following the signing of the ‘Rabat agreement’ which divided the western Sahara unequally between Morocco and Mauretania, Moroccan forces made a major assault on Guelta-Zemmour. The battle lasted five days and ended with the fall of the Polisario strongholds.

**Guerrilla War and Escalation: 1976-78**

By April 1976, the Moroccan forces had established garrisons in most of the small outlying settlements of the Moroccan controlled zone, as well as securing a firm hold over the larger towns. The Polisario, recognizing their inability to meet their overwhelmingly stronger adversaries head-on, and deprived of their earlier strongholds within the territory, began to develop a new strategy of guerrilla warfare in the desert. Given the greater strength of the Moroccan forces, they focussed on Mauretania. The Mauretanian army, which was rapidly built up from about 2,000 in 1975 to 12,500 men by 1978, not only had to defend scattered outposts in the southern zone of the western Sahara (known as Tiris el Gharbia) but also had to combat Polisario raids deep into Mauretania itself. The airforce initially consisted of a few reconnaissance and transport planes, augmented in 1977 by Agentinian Pucara JA-58 fighter-bombers. During the second part of 1976 and the first part of 1977, Polisario attacks were remarkably effective, and on two occasions raids into Mauretania reached the outskirts of Nouakchott, the capital, and enabled the Polisario forces to shell the presidential palace. Attacks on the mining centre of Zouerate in May 1977 and on the railway between the mines and the Atlantic port of Nouadhibou threatened to bring the iron-mining industry to a halt.

On 13 May 1977 the government of Ould Daddah signed a defence pact with Morocco under which 9,000 Moroccan troops were to be deployed in Tiris el Gharbia and Mauretania over the following year. A Franco-Mauretanian agreement was signed in September 1976 and widened in scope in January 1977 to allow French military personnel to be sent to Mauretania. In December 1977 and into 1978
the French, from their base in Kakar, bombed Polisario forces besieging the Mauretanian post of Ben Lanouar, near Nouadhibou, using napalm, phosphorous and explosive rockets. In 1978 French military personnel in Mauretania were increased for 'defensive' purposes, while military training schools were established under French and Moroccan officers.

In the meanwhile, French assistance to Morocco was increased, notably in the form of jet strike aircraft and a Crotale anti-aircraft missile system (at the cost of some $200 million) designed to counter any possible Algerian military involvement. But, in fact, the Algerian airforce, with a significant number of its 200 combat planes based at the ready in Tindouf, did not intervene in the military conflict.

The air attacks certainly inflicted setbacks on the the Polisario guerrilla forces and forced them to reduce their daylight raids. But the offensive against Mauretania
continued and undoubtedly contributed materially to the growing economic and political crisis in Mauretania:

To the costs of the war were added devastating droughts and a dramatic deterioration in the terms of trade due to spiralling oil prices and a slump in world demand for iron... As the economic crisis drifted almost beyond control in 1977-78, the country's technocratic elite, in business and government alike, recognised that peace was a precondition for recovery... On 9 July 1978, the armed forces seized power in Nouakchott. Two days later, Polisario announced a "temporary halt in military operations in Mauretanian territory as a 'gesture of goodwill' to the new regime" (Hodges 1984: 102).

One year later, frustrated by the Mauretanian regime's failure to withdraw from Tiris el Gharbia, the Polisario lifted its ceasefire and attacked the village of Tichla. This prompted an immediate response: on 5 August 1979, the new Islamic Republic of Mauretania signed a peace agreement with the S.A.D.R. in Algiers, in which it 'solemnly declared that it does not and will not have territorial or any other claims over Western Sahara (and) decided to withdraw from the unjust war in Western Sahara'. In a secret addendum, the new government undertook to 'put an end to its presence in Western Sahara and to hand over directly to the Polisario Front the part of the Western Sahara that it controlled within seven months from the date of signing of the present agreement' (Sahara Libre No. 88, 22 August 1979). But the secret addendum was never in fact implemented. Moroccan troops were gradually withdrawn from Mauretania but Moroccan forces seized control of Dakhla and on 14 August Tiris el Gharbia was proclaimed a Moroccan province under the name of Oued ed Dahab (Arabic for Rio de Oro).

Polisario on the Offensive: 1978-80
After the coup in Mauretania, the Polisario were able to give undivided attention to their war with Morocco. Given Moroccan control of the majority of settlements and the strength of the Moroccan airforce, Polisario had recognised early on that 'though it could recoup these piecemeal, it could never hold them for long since it had no air cover'. Instead, its major tactic has been the lightning strike by the highly mobile force, typically a couple of all-terrain vehicles carrying machine guns, recoilless cannon, rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns (Mercer 1979: 11; cf. Howe 1978: 86). Officially, Polisario maintained that 80 per cent of its weapons and equipment were captured from the enemy; but both Algeria and Libya now supplied weapons and equipment and the Polisario forces were equipped by early 1978 with a range of relatively sophisticated weaponry from Kalashnikov automatic rifles at one end to SAM 6 and 7 missiles at the other.

The death of Algerian President Boumedienne in December 1978 was followed by a major campaign during 1979-80 named the 'Houari Boumedienne Offensive' in his honour. For the first time during the war in the Sahara, larger Moroccan-held towns and bases were assaulted and their defences breached. One of the main targets of the Polisario guerrilla offensive was the phosphate mining complex at Bou Craa, which is linked by a vulnerable 96 km. conveyor belt to the port at El Aïun, seriously affecting production.

As the military successes of the Polisario forces became more frequent, the Moroccan army was obliged to abandon many of the smaller, more remote outposts they had occupied in the early months of the war. A gradual process of retrenchment began, and the defences of the more important towns were heavily reinforced. Thousands of fresh troops were sent south to the Sahara. By September
1978 the Moroccan armed forces numbered some 80,000 men, supported by over 60 combat planes, armoured cars, tanks, transport planes and helicopters (Mercer 1979: 12).

Rather like the Soviet troops in occupation in Afghanistan, control was limited by the end of the decade to the larger centres where troops, equipment and weaponry were massed in overwhelming strength; But the Moroccans remainder of the territory. "Moroccan energies, after the initial phase, were concentrated on defence fortification, the main posts being ringed with concentric trenching and barbed wire. From time to time, a large contingent crosses the open desert, either on a supply run or to help another post under siege by the Sahrawis" (Mercer 1979: 12).

In this situation, reports of demoralisation, indiscipline and corruption among the troops of the occupying army and of general antipathy towards both the war and the Moroccan regime which initiated it, not surprisingly, were common. Late in 1977, for example, the Algerian press reported that a battalion of the Moroccan army had mutinied and attempted to join the Polisario, but had been caught near Haouza and destroyed by Moroccan airplanes.

Taking advantage of its ability to mount its attacks from an effectively 'liberated' zone, the SPLA continued to attack Moroccan positions and installations in the Moroccan-occupied areas of the Western Sahara. Even as the army of occupation began to further strengthen its defences in several places.

**Moroccan Forces on the Defensive: 1981-86**

In August 1980, after several costly failures, the Moroccan armed forces succeeded in gaining control of a strategic pass near the border with the Western Sahara and the construction of a continuous defence line southwards to Smara, 60 miles away, was initiated. By March 1981 a 'wall' of fortifications, heavily defended and equipped, had reached Smara; by mid-May 1981, it had been extended to Bou Craa, and by May 1982 it had reached the sea to the south of Boujdour. The 'wall' consisted of sandbanks, between six and eight feet high for the most part, protected by barbed wire and minefields, intermittent artillery placements and observation posts, and equipped with electronic ground sensors and radar equipment to detect movement up to several miles in the desert outside. The 'wall' was manned along its entire length, with protective dug-outs and more elaborate underground quarters for the troops concerned. This defence perimeter over 250 miles sealed off an area of some 17,000 square miles, roughly one sixth of the Western Sahara — the 'useful triangle' of the northwest of the Western Sahara. Moroccan armed forces maintained a permanent presence only in one other region, a heavily-fortified enclave of a few hundred square miles around the towns of Dakhla and Argoub in the south. The rest of the Western Sahara was abandoned in November 1981, following a devastating Polisario attack on Guelta Zemmour during which its 2,600 strong Moroccan garrison suffered serious losses, and the shooting down of five Moroccan aircraft in the space of ten days by ramp-launched SAM missiles.

Even as the Moroccan forces constructed their defensive 'wall', the build-up of weaponry and equipment in the occupied areas continued. By 1978, the military budget had reached $760 million, nearly 14 per cent of national expenditure. In 1979 the war was estimated to be costing between $2 and $5 million a day (Thompson & Adloff 1980: 292), while by 1980, the US Embassy in Rabat was reporting claims that 'Morocco's defence-related expenditure actually diverts no less than 40 per cent of
the consolidated national budget' (Hodges 1984: 105). A significant proportion of this war expenditure relates to the cost of maintaining a large army with all its equipment and requirements in the Western Sahara, but an important proportion of the budget has gone on the purchase of arms and equipment from abroad. These now (1984) include; tanks, armoured personnel carriers and armoured reconnaissance vehicles, artillery, anti-tank weapons (both guns and missiles), anti-aircraft defences, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, air-to-air missiles, air-to-ground missiles, and electronic and radar defence systems. A very significant proportion of the more advanced weapons and equipment was built in France or the United States (see Appendix).

Despite France's acknowledgement in 1979 of the right to self-determination of the Western Sahara, France has remained Morocco's principal arms supplier: delivery of 50 Mirage F-1 aircraft and 25 Alpha-Jets began in 1980. This ambiguous policy has continued under the Mitterand government, despite the French Socialist Party's long-standing relations with the Polisario (c.f. Seddon 1986a).

French arms supplies to Morocco in recent years have been on a large scale and span the entire spectrum from light arms to heavy weaponry to a Crotale anti-aircraft missile system. These armaments include 60 Mirage F-1CH jet interceptor aircraft, 24 Fouga strike planes, 24 Alpha jet tactical support aircraft, 40 Puma troop-carrying helicopters, and 400 VAB armoured personnel carriers. The total value of French arms sales to Morocco between 1974 and 1981 is probably in the range of $1.5 — $2 billion, not including weapons supplied through military credit. French military support has included France's willingness to accept large Moroccan arrears in payment (Damis 1982: 7).

After the fall of the Shah of Iran and Somoza of Nicaragua in 1979, President Carter dropped an earlier ban on the sale of certain kinds of aircraft to Morocco and agreed a multi-million dollar arms package for Morocco. In January 1980, the Pentagon announced plans to sell $232.5 million worth of Northrop F-5E jets, OV-10 'Bronco' counter-insurgency aircraft and Hughes helicopter gunships to Morocco; and in March 1981, a State Department official told Congress: 'Morocco is important to broad American interests and occupies a pivotal strategic area. We intend to maintain and reinforce our historically close relationship with reliability and consistency as our watchwords' (quoted in Hodges 1984: 113). Congress raised the level of military aid to Morocco from $30 million in 1980 to $45 million in 1981 and Secretary of State Alexander Haig approved, early in 1981, the sale of 6 OV-10 'Broncos' and 108 M-60 tanks to Morocco. US assistance was intensified after the Moroccan disaster at Guelta Zemmour in October 1981. In 1982, a joint US-Moroccan military commission was established by the US Secretary of State, and the Reagan Administration planned to treble its Foreign Military Sales credit to Morocco from $30 million in Fiscal Year 1982 to $100 million in FY 1983. US military instructors arrived in Morocco to join French instructors in training special troops in counter-guerrilla operations and to teach anti-missle tactics to Moroccan pilots. In May 1982 Morocco signed an agreement giving the US Rapid Deployment Force transit facilities at Moroccan air bases. In July 1982 it was revealed that the US was supplying anti-personnel cluster bombs to the Moroccan airforce (New York Times, 22 July 1982).

The justification for the large scale military aid provided to Morocco by the United States, in the words of the Reagan Administration's official budget request to Congress in 1985, is that 'it helps to maintain the stability of a pro-Western country' which has played 'a moderating role' in the Arab world vis-a-vis Israel and since 1982 has 'agreed to access and transmit rights in certain contingencies to assist the
deployment of US forces to Southwest Asia’ (cited in Western Sahara Newsletter, No. 4, September 1985). Foreign Military Sales which involve loan arrangements, dropped from $39 million in 1986; also allocations under the International Military Education and Training Programme increased between 1984 and 1986. In 1986 the entire security package assistance was worth $74 million — slightly more than the $66 million allocated to Morocco for development and food aid.

Other important sources of arms sold to Morocco have included Austria, whose government in 1977 sanctioned the sale of 102 Kurassier type tanks and in 1985 a further 50 similar tanks to replace those captured by the SPLA, and South Africa. The Moroccan army in 1984 has some 80 Ratel 20 Armoured Personnel Carriers manufactured in South Africa. In the past year South African officers have visited the area under Moroccan occupation to inspect the equipment provided by the Pretoria government and the military training schools and to review the ‘wall’ defences; this visit was one indication of the important relations that exist between South Africa and Morocco. Spain also supplied arms to Morocco until mid 1977, albeit on a relatively small scale.

But, despite arms build-up within the occupied territories of the Western Sahara, particularly since 1981, the Moroccans remain essentially on the defensive. Throughout the last five years, the SPLA has been able to keep the Moroccan armed forces on full alert by selective strikes and thrusts, both against the ‘wall’ and through the Moroccan defences.

Against the persistence of the SPLA and its ability to penetrate the Moroccan defences in unpredictable sorties and lightning attacks, the Moroccan armed forces have basically two responses — the airstrike and the further strengthening of the defensive structures surrounding their occupied areas. As the anti-aircraft weaponry of the SPLA has been significantly improved over the past few years by the acquisition of new artillery and ground-to-air missiles and by experience and training in the use of the equipment, so the airstrike has become a costly and only partly effective tactic. Consequently between December 1983 and May 1984, two new ‘walls’ were built, by an estimated 30,000 Moroccan troops. A fourth ‘wall’ was built around the Moroccan base at Dakhla in the south. During 1985 the construction of a fifth ‘wall’ to run south and southwest from near Amgalla to south of Dakhla on the coast was initiated. This new structure — a 600 kilometre long barrier of sand, stone, artillery, manned positions and radar — is designed to encompass the enormous Oued ed Dahab area (former Tiris el Gharbia) and thereby enable the effective annexation and control of the southern part of the Western Sahara.

However, the capacity of the Moroccan armed forces to man and defend this system of defensive walls extending over a vast area in the desert effectively must be questionable. Already at the end of 1984 the Moroccan forces, estimated to number perhaps 100,000 in the territory, were greatly extended. Polisario has demonstrated since then that it is still able to mount effective hit-and-run attacks on the Moroccan ‘walls’ at virtually any point along their considerable length. The effect of this is to maintain all the Moroccan troops on constant alert and to prevent any concentration of Moroccan forces and equipment, and thereby any saving in the enormous cost of sustaining an adequate defensive capacity throughout the territory. Reports of demoralisation and disaffection among the Moroccan troops in the Western Sahara have become more common, although their reliability is open to
some doubt (c.f. Marks 1986:8) and the attractions of double or even triple pay for postings in the occupied territories remain considerable in the light of high unemployment rates and the rising cost of living in Morocco. As Tony Hodges (1984a:13) has remarked:

The Saharan conflict is a classic example of a war of attrition. The guerrillas do not have to break through the Moroccan defence lines and seize El Aiun to achieve their objectives. They simply have to remain a permanent threat, forcing King Hassan to keep a high number of troops and a vast arsenal of weaponry in the Sahara, at a cost, in financial terms, that Morocco can ill afford. Polisario's strategy hinges, in fact, on the belief that Morocco will be unable to sustain this war indefinitely and that, if King Hassan does not end it, he will eventually lose his throne.

The suggestion is that, as the commitment to an unwinnable war progressively drains the resources of the Moroccan regime, the economic repercussions will become increasingly deeply felt — and, thereby indirectly contribute to undermining the present Moroccan regime. It is also conceivable, however, that the Moroccan intervention in the Sahara will become increasingly a direct political liability for the regime as casualties mount, opposition within the occupied territories and possibly terrorist attacks within Morocco develop, and international opinion moves increasingly against the military occupation.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity

The Moroccan regime has become progressively isolated through its military intervention in the Western Sahara. The ruling of the International Court of Justice in 1975, which recognised the right to self-determination of the people of the Western Sahara, was followed by two votes at the United Nations General Assembly in favour of upholding the principle of self-determination and a role for the UN in its effective implementation. The tripartite agreement of 1975 and the subsequent formal partition of the Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauretania directly opposed the rulings and resolutions of the World Court and the United Nations General Assembly. When the Swedish UN ambassador, Olof Rydebeck, visited the Western Sahara to examine how the UN might proceed, he was so struck by the scale of the Moroccan military presence, the repressive political atmosphere, the developing guerrilla war and the exodus of refugees that he advised Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim that a genuine consultation of local views was impossible. Consequently, the UN decided that the essential conditions for the exercise of self-determination were not fulfilled.

At first, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) equivocated on the issue. At summit meetings in 1976 and 1977 it decided to refer the matter to an extraordinary summit, which, however, was never held. During this period, the Moroccan government managed to dissuade the UN General Assembly and the Non-Aligned Movement from taking positions on the Western Sahara. In July 1978, however, an ad hoc committee was set up by the OAU to consider all the facts of the matter. In July 1979 the OAU summit endorsed that committee's proposals for an immediate ceasefire and the exercise by the people of the Western Sahara of their right of self-determination through a general, free referendum enabling them to choose between total independence or maintenance of the status quo. In December 1978, the UN General Assembly adopted two resolutions — one, backed by Morocco and adopted by 66 votes to 30, with 40 abstentions, appealing to states not to impede the efforts of the OAU; another, adopted by 90 votes to 10 with 30 abstentions,
The Algiers Agreement of 1979 in which Mauretania signed a peace treaty with the Polisario and the SADR and effectively withdrew from the conflict, not only served to isolate Morocco, as the only state directly impeding the self-determination and independence of the people of the Western Sahara, but also prompted the OAU and the UN to take somewhat more decisive steps. The sixth Non-Aligned summit, held in Havana in September 1979, deplored Morocco's annexation of Tiris Gharbia. In November 1979 and again a year later, the UN General Assembly affirmed the inalienable right of the Western Saharans to self-determination and independence, deplored the continued occupation of the Western Sahara by Morocco and the extension of that occupation to the south of the territory, and urged Morocco to join the peace process and terminate its occupation. Both resolutions recognised the Polisario as 'the representative of the people of the Western Sahara' and recommended its participation in 'any search for a just, lasting and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara'. Morocco refused to attend a meeting of the OAU ad hoc committee in December 1979 at which its boycott was 'regretted' and it was called upon to withdraw all of its troops from Western Sahara. The meeting repeated its earlier proposals regarding a ceasefire and referendum, and suggested sending an OAU peacekeeping force to the area. At the OAU summit in July 1980, a narrow majority of the OAU members (26 out of 50) recognised the SADR and favoured its admission to the OAU as a member state. However, Hassan promised at the next OAU summit in June 1981 that Morocco would accept a controlled referendum framed to take into consideration not only the ad hoc committee's objectives but also Morocco's conviction regarding the legitimacy of its rights. This enabled Morocco to remain within the OAU and prevented the SADR from being included, although by the end of 1980 a total of 27 African states had bi-laterally recognised the SADR, as had 8 Asian states, 10 in Latin America, and one in Oceania.

Throughout 1981 and 1982 the OAU implementation committee for the referendum was unable to make any real progress. In February 1983, pressure from Algeria and other pro-SADR states enabled the SADR to take its seat as the 51st OAU member state. But 18 other African states joined Morocco in a walkout and the OAU was thrown into disarray. Only a voluntary and temporary 'withdrawal' by the SADR enabled a summit to take place eventually in June 1983. Then, for the first time, Morocco and the Polisario were named as the parties in conflict and both were urged to undertake direct negotiations to reach an agreement on a ceasefire and the conditions for a peaceful and fair referendum under the auspices of the UN and OAU. Both Morocco and the SADR sent representatives at the invitation of the 'implementation committee' to its meeting in September 1983, but when asked to meet around the same table, Morocco refused — although the Polisario agreed. Morocco, thereafter, has consistently refused to recognise or to negotiate directly with the Polisario, although in fact an exploratory meeting had been secretly held in spring 1983 — suggesting that if formal recognition remains unlikely, unofficial meetings are not necessarily precluded.

Morocco's continuing intransigence on the matter of peace negotiations has cost it dear in international political and diplomatic circles. By mid-1984 the number of states recognising the SADR had grown to 58, and by the beginning of 1986 had reached 63, including India and Yugoslavia. In September 1985 the Non-Aligned
conference of foreign ministers in Luanda endorsed the OAU peace plan adopted at the 1983 OAU summit. In the same month the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), at its 74th conference in Ottawa, also supported the settlement terms spelled out in the OAU resolution. In December 1985, the United Nations General Assembly once again voted overwhelmingly in support for the OAU call for direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario. But Morocco once again ruled out talks with the Polisario and declared that it would refuse to abide by the UN resolution.

During 1985 and 1986, Morocco eventually agreed to participate in indirect talks under the aegis of the UN Secretary-General and the Chairman of the OAU. This concession after ten years of refusal to consider negotiations with the Polisario, must be seen as a consequence of growing diplomatic and political pressure on the Moroccan regime to compromise and as a diplomatic coup for the Polisario.

The United States and Europe

US assistance to Morocco — always important for strategic geo-political reasons — was increased from 1981. In a recent interview, Polisario’s secretary-general, Mohamed Abdelaziz:

blamed the Reagan Administration for increasing military aid to Morocco during 1981-3 just when we believed a political solution was possible. Mauretania signed a peace treaty with us and then, in a meeting with the Moroccans at Bamako, we felt they, too, were ready to make peace. The increased US aid put off that chance of peace (Guardian, 21 February 1986).

In addition to direct material aid and assistance the US has supported Morocco in international debates on the Western Sahara. As Tony Hodges (1984:111) observes:

after King Hassan’s referendum pledge at the June 1981 OAU summit, the General Assembly resolutions . . . focussed on the need for peace talks between Polisario and Morocco, a proposal which Hassan continued to reject. A new development was that the United States, under President Reagan, cast negative votes, alone among the Western powers.

In return, the value of the Moroccan regime to the US has been manifold. After the closure of the Strategic Air Command’s Moroccan bases in 1963, the US Navy retained communications facilities in Morocco until 1978. More recently, from May 1982, Morocco has granted transit facilities to the US Rapid Deployment Force, and has always allowed US warships use of its port facilities. More generally, the Moroccan regime has supported US initiatives in the Middle East — backing the initial contacts between Israel and Egypt in 1977-78 which led to the Camp David agreements — albeit often in a covert rather than an open fashion. Furthermore, in Africa, the Moroccan regime has intervened as a regional support for French and US policy — in Zaire in 1977, and to assist in the quelling of the Shaba insurgencies in 1978. Given the more aggressive international political strategy of the US in the 1980s, it is perhaps not entirely surprising that US assistance to this important locally in North Africa was increased, as it has to other client states.

As international political and diplomatic support for the Polisario and the SADR increases, however, and in the light of recent developments in other parts of the world, notably Haiti and the Philippines, it may be that the overt and the apparently uncritical support provided by the Reagan Administration for the Moroccan regime and its ‘Sahara Policy’ will diminish, and it is at least conceivable that the White House, under pressure from Congress, will put greater pressure on King Hassan to negotiate peace. It is most probable that, under these circumstances, the US will
join those who have begun to press for ‘third party intermediaries’ to initiate
discussions with the Moroccan regime and the Polisario separately. Such an
attempt to introduce ‘mediation’, will be resisted by the Polisario, who would
continue to press for direct negotiations between the two parties directly involved
as the basis for any peace discussions. Although the recent pact between Morocco
and Libya was viewed with considerable disfavour by the Reagan Administration,
and led to an undoubted cooling of relations between Washington and Rabat and a
refusal to provide credit for a Moroccan purchase of F-16s — thus revealing the
possibility of change in relations between the two governments — it seems unlikely
that the close ties developed over the past five years will be seriously endangered in
the foreseeable future. The US will remain the crucial ally of the Moroccan regime
in an increasingly critical diplomatic and political environment.

No other major power has been so clearly committed in support of Morocco, but
France has remained a major supplier of arms to Morocco, despite the French
Socialist Party’s long-standing relations with the Polisario. However, it has
maintained a policy of formal neutrality on the Western Saharan issue. It has not
recognised Moroccan sovereignty in the territory, nor has it recognised the SADR.
In January 1981, 5 French deputies, representing the country’s four major parties,
visited the refugee camps near Tindouf and Polisario-controlled areas of the
Western Sahara. France pressed King Hassan to appear more forthcoming and
flexible on the question of the referendum at the OAU summit in June 1981 and
subsequently gave its support for a referendum. Under the Socialists the French
government has proclaimed a more balanced policy towards Morocco and Algeria.
But when Polisario representatives were received officially for the first time by the
Quai d’Orsay in August 1981, the Mitterand government quickly denied that this
reception represented a change of French policy. Although the Polisario Front was
permitted to open an office in Paris in February 1982, the French government has
shown no sign of recognising the SADR.

While President Mitterand has been concerned to improve Franco-Algerian
relations he is also wary of affecting adversely the important commercial relations
with Morocco and some 55,000 French expatriates who still live there. Some within
the French Socialist and Communist Parties continue to support the cause of the
Polisario. Recent shifts in the balance of power in French politics make significant
changes of policy less likely, however, although it is probable that fear of an
escalation of the war into a regional conflict will ensure a very careful assessment
of French political as well as military support in the future. The visit of King Hassan
to Paris in late November 1985 was accorded full honours, but his request for 24
Mirage 2000 fighter bombers may not be acted upon.

In the case of Spain, successive governments have attempted to maintain cordial
relations with both Algeria and Morocco and to exploit the ambiguities in the
Madrid accords. Thus, while exporting arms to Morocco and, until 1977 to
Mauretania, Spain also recognised, in principle, the right of the Saharan people to
self-determination. After growing pressure, both from Algeria (which supported the
campaign for the independence of the Canary Islands) and the Polisario (which
staged numerous attacks on Spanish fishing boats off the Atlantic coast between
1977 and 1980), and from left-wing opposition parties in Spain, the ruling Union del
Centro Democratico (UCD) eventually recognised the Polisario in October 1978, as
‘the sole legitimate representative of the struggling Saharan people’. In May 1979 the
Spanish Prime Minister met with the Polisario secretary-general in Algiers. But
while the UCD recognised Polisario, when the Spanish Socialist Labour Party came to power in October 1982, despite its strong sympathy for the Polisario, the new government continued to maintain an equivocal position regarding the Moroccan regime and the SADR. Nevertheless, the Polisario was given permission to open offices, and there continued to be pressure for the SADR from within the Socialist Labour Party and other groups. In September 1985, however, following clashes between Polisario and a Spanish naval patrol boat following Polisario attacks on a Spanish fishing trawler, and the killing of two Spaniards, the government closed the three Polisario offices and expelled the representatives. It has been suggested (Western Sahara Newsletter No.5, December 1985) that the incident merely provided an excuse to expel the Polisario and that the decision reflects the development of a new policy of closer relations with the Moroccan regime. If such new policy is implemented, it will attract considerable opposition from within Spain itself, but it certainly seems as if the government of Felipe Gonzalez, now committed to NATO as well as to the EEC, is reviewing its earlier positions and policies on several fronts.

On the other hand, the accession of Spain to the European Community will undoubtedly serve to bring the issue of the Western Sahara more clearly before the European Parliament. Indeed, the support there for the Polisario will ensure that the next few years will witness a growing debate within Europe on the war in the Sahara. The success of the Paris Conference on 'Peace for the Sahrawi People: a European Concern' in November 1985 and the substantial presence of European Members of Parliament at the 10th Anniversary Celebrations of the SADR in February 1986 are important milestones. The next step may be a resolution in the European Parliament in favour of self-determination for the Saharan people. No European government yet recognises the SADR, with the exception of Yugoslavia, but undoubtedly there is growing support in Britain, France, Spain and West Germany among opposition parties. Developments in Europe are likely to have a significant impact on the Moroccan regime.

Moroccan Politics
Important though the pressures from outside may be, political developments within the occupied territories, and within Morocco itself, are likely ultimately to prove of decisive significance.

The Politics of Occupation
In 1963 with the creation of partly elected municipal councils and a provincial council, and in 1967 with the formation of a wider-based assembly (or Djemaa) for the whole population, the Spanish authorities began to develop the formal apparatus for a gradual progression to Saharan self-determination and autonomy. None of the councils at local or provincial level had any real power, however, and the Djemaa was (in the view of the UN investigative mission of May 1975) considerably dependent for guidance on the Spanish authorities and representative largely of the older and more conservative elements of Saharan society (Hodges 1984:82). In effect, the territory was governed as a Spanish military colony. In some towns and settlements troops outnumbered Spanish civilians.

While a minority of the population appeared willing to collaborate with the Spanish, opposition to colonial rule grew significantly during the 1960s. In June 1970, a demonstration organised in El Aiun by the Spanish authorities in support of the
province’s continued association with Spain triggered off a counter-demonstration against colonial rule and led to violence in the streets. The counter-demonstration was organised by the Liberation Organisation of Saguia el Hamra and Oued ed-Dahab — a recently formed urban-based nationalist movement led by Sidi Ibrahim Bassiri. The Spanish Foreign Legion fired on the demonstrators and many, including Bassiri, were arrested. Bassiri never reappeared and was probably murdered. The Liberation Organisation disintegrated after this event.

Over the next three years, a nucleus of Sahraoui students and intellectuals living abroad began to lay the foundations of a new movement. On 10 May 1973, the Polisario Front was born — as the ‘unique expression of the masses, opting for revolutionary violence and the armed struggle as the means by which the Sahrawi Arab African People can recover its total liberty and foil the manoeuvres of Spanish colonialism’ (Hodges 1984: 85). Ten days later the Polisario launched its first guerrilla attack against the occupying forces. Over the next two years, it staged a succession of small hit-and-run strikes, with virtually no support from outside, apart from one small consignment of arms from Libya. The extent of support for the Polisario was revealed by the UN mission in May 1975:

at every place visited, the Mission was met by mass political demonstrations and had numerous private meetings with representatives of every section of the Saharan community. From all these it became evident to the Mission that there was an overwhelming consensus among Saharans within the territory in favour of independence and opposing integration with any neighbouring country . . .

The Mission believes, in the light of what it witnessed in the Territory, especially the mass demonstrations of support for one movement, the Frente POLISARIO . . . that its visit served as a catalyst to bring into the open political forces and pressures which had previously been largely submerged (c.f. Hodges 1984: 86).

The Spanish authorities were unprepared to accept such a view. In September 1974 they created a Sahraoui Progressive Revolutionary Party, whose role was to seek independence in collaboration with Spain. In the absence of any support for this ‘creation’, the project — and the party — was stillborn. Undeterred, a further attempt was made, in March 1975, to launch a new party, the Party of Sahraoui National Unity (PUNS), but it failed to attract any real local support and when the appointed secretary-general absconded with party funds to Rabat, where in May he swore allegiance to King Hassan, the party fell apart. Before the end of the year PUNS had virtually ceased to exist. Finally convinced of the impossibility of countering the popular support for national independence, Spain appeared prepared to withdraw, and on 29 May 1975 the Djemaa was officially informed that the Sahraoui people should prepare themselves for a ‘precipitate transfer of power’ (Thompson & Adloff 1980: 131). There were several meetings between the president of the Djemaa, Khatri Ould Jamani, and the secretary-general of the Polisario, El Ouali, and in September the Polisario secretary-general met with the Spanish Foreign Minister to discuss relations between Spain and the Western Sahara after independence.

Despite all this, when Morocco met with Spain and Mauretania on 12 November 1975 to sign the tripartite agreement it was concluded that Spain should proceed immediately with the institution of a temporary administration in the territory in which Morocco and Mauretania would participate in collaboration with the Djemaa, and that ‘the views of the Saharan population, expressed through the Djemaa, would be respected’ (Hodges 1984: 96). But, in an extraordinary session of the Djemaa, held under Polisario auspices at Guelta Zemmour on 28 November
1975, 67 of the *Djemaa*'s 102 members proclaimed the Assembly's dissolution and their unconditional support for the Polisario Front, as the sole and legitimate representative of the Saharan people, and in December established a 41 member Provisional Sahraoui National Council.

On 12 December, however, the day after Moroccan troops had taken El Aiun, 85 members of the *Djemaa* met, according to official announcements in Rabat, having been joined by 10 of those who had participated in the Guelta Zemmour meeting, under Moroccan auspices. And on 16 February 1976, 57 members of the *Djemaa* met and voted unanimously to give full approval to the reintegration of the Western Sahara with Morocco and Mauretania.

Since the beginning of the occupation, the Moroccan authorities have been concerned to encourage and promote the collaboration of the Sahraouis who remained within the area under Moroccan control. The political aspect of this process involves the establishment of a formal provincial structure of government and administration. El Aiun — the region not the town — was renamed Laayoune; Smara was reorganised administratively, and Cape Bojador was renamed Boujdour. Governors were appointed to head the new 'provinces', and by early 1978 the southern portion of Moroccan Tiznit was annexed to form the new province of Tata. In April 1976, the Moroccan government organised a Council of Saharan Youth in Tangier (well away from the conflict in the south) in what has been described as 'an unprecedented and imaginative example of the Rabat authorities' campaign to enlist the cooperation of the region's youth' (Thompson & Adloff 1980:294). Most of the hundred or so delegates were former members of the PUNS or other groups prepared to envisage the development of the Western Sahara as an integral part of Morocco. Resolutions adopted at the meeting in Tangier called for the training of local administrative cadres. Two of the three governors appointed to the new 'provinces' were Sahraouis and, by the end of the decade, according to the Moroccan authorities, some 90 per cent of all *pahas*, *caids* and *khalifas* (local administration posts) were Sahraouis, while all of the 213 lower level officials (*mogaddems* and *shaykhs*) were local inhabitants (*Middle East Journal*, June 1979). In April 1977 the first Sahraoui was appointed Minister of Saharan Affairs in the Moroccan cabinet and in June he was elected along with three other Sahraouis to the new Chamber of Representatives in Rabat. When, in 1979, the south of the territory was taken over from Mauretania and renamed Oued ed Dahab, a similar process was initiated. 360 tribal 'notables' were flown to Rabat to swear allegiance to the throne and a visit was undertaken by the Minister for Saharan Affairs in October 1979, who toured the area for the organisation of municipal elections in Dakhla.

A second aspect of the process of 'incorporation' of the occupied territories involved the economic and social 'development' of the region. In a 1975 speech, King Hassan declared: 'we did not conquer the Sahara because it has phosphate deposits... but to build schools, hospitals... and to guarantee peace, well-being and prosperity' (cited in Thompson and Adloff 1980: 294), adding that the anticipated revenue from the Bu Craa mines would provide only two-thirds of what Morocco planned to spend annually in its Saharan 'provinces'. In March 1976, the Moroccan minister of finance diverted some 600 million *dirhams* for the 'development' of the Western Sahara. The measures proposed as prerequisites for the economic and social development of the region included roads, airfields, ports and broadcasting stations plus mining, fishing and tourism. Smara was to become
the administrative capital and El Aiun the commercial capital. This laid the basis for a so-called 'urgency plan' for 1977-80, one of whose objectives was to attract nomads to the towns.

The ‘incorporation’ programme intertwines both political and economic objectives. ‘Development’ serves to encourage collaboration. And it is undoubtedly the case that, despite constant disruption by Polisario, there has been substantial improvement of communications and extraordinary urban growth. These are, however, closely related to military needs rather than representing broad-based economic development. Furthermore, despite the declared hope of King Hassan that the local inhabitants should not be ‘overwhelmed by an influx of administrators and technicians from the north’ (cited in Thompson & Adloff 1980: 295), there has in fact been a massive influx of Moroccans. The rapid and dramatic growth of such towns as El Aiun and Boujdour, as a consequence of huge transfers of state funds and of associated private investment, has led to the creation of an artificial ‘boom’ within the urban areas of the region. As a result, the Western Sahara has acted as a magnet for the unemployed whose numbers have been growing at an alarming rate within Morocco. This demographic change has potentially far-reaching social and political implications. The local population is threatened with submersion under a wave of Moroccan immigrants, and their officially recognised voice in the future development of the Western Sahara under Moroccan occupation risks being drowned.

It is difficult to know what potential exists after ten years of Moroccan occupation for effective opposition from within the occupied territories. Certainly, the Moroccan authorities have always been very aware of the danger of a ‘fifth column’ of the Polisario within the territory under their control, and have done much to ensure that this danger does not develop to any appreciable extent. But, despite the undoubted collaboration of some Sahraouis, it is almost certain that opposition to Moroccan occupation still exists among the local population.

The Moroccan authorities, while encouraging and supporting those explicitly committed to integration within the Moroccan state, have also dealt harshly with those opposed to their policies. Those known or suspected to be supporters of the Polisario have been kept under strict surveillance, and in many cases subject to arrest, interrogation, imprisonment and even torture (c.f. Amnesty International reports from 1977). Under such conditions, political resistance to Moroccan ‘incorporation’ appears to have little choice but to follow the path of subversion and violence. The response of the Moroccan authorities to such a development is likely to be harsh in the extreme, but they might find a campaign of urban terrorism and sabotage difficult to cope with, particularly if the targets include Moroccan soldiers on leave or temporarily posted behind the front line in the urban centres of Saguiat el Hamra. Then the Moroccan troops would experience all too clearly the fact that the ‘wall’ has two sides, and their commitment to the occupation of the Western Sahara might well decline — despite double or even triple pay.

**Moroccan Government Policy and Domestic Politics**

Moroccan policy in the Western Sahara must ultimately be understood in terms of domestic politics. The regime not only works to create public opinion and to implement its own policies, it is also obliged to respond to the changing balance of forces in Moroccan politics. One important factor since the early days of the nationalist independence movements has been the existence of a strong ultra-
nationalism. From its formation in 1944 the Istiqlal (Independence) Party was concerned not only with the eventual reunification of the Spanish and French protectorates, but also with recuperating portions of the Western Sahara at that time under French and Spanish colonial rule. When in December 1953 an all-Moroccan 'alternative' government was formed, it included the Istiqlal and the Party Democratique de l'Indépendence (PDI) as well as independent nationalists, all agreed on the goal of a Greater Morocco. By 1956 an Istiqlal initiated 'Army for Liberation of the Sahara' (ALS) had taken over much of southern Morocco, operating as far south as the Tindouf area. Although at Moroccan independence in 1956 the ALS was formally integrated into the Moroccan army, there remained among its troops a hard core of ultra-nationalists who continued to support actively the Istiqlal's irredentist programme. In 1956, the leader of the Istiqlal, Allal el Fassi, claimed that only parts of the historic Greater Morocco had achieved their independence:

so long as Tangier is not liberated from its international status, so long as the Spanish deserts of the south, the Sahara from Tindouf and Atar and the Algerian-Moroccan borderlands are not liberated from their trusteeship, our independence will remain incomplete and our first duty will be to carry on action to liberate the country and to unify it (cited in Hodges 1984:88).

Following this speech in March 1956, the Istiqlal newspaper, Alalam, published a map of 'Greater Morocco' which included all of the Western Sahara and Mauretania as well as a substantial area of south-west Algeria and a part of northwest Mali. In March 1957, the Istiqlal leader toured southern Morocco, where he announced that 'the battle for the Sahara has just begun' (Thompson & Adloff 1980: 223).

The strength of support for the Istiqlal in Morocco was very considerable and it is not surprising that the irredentist cause was formally embraced by the government in 1957 and publicly endorsed by King Mohamed V during a speech in the southern oasis town of M'hamid on 25 February 1958, where he declared Morocco's claims to the Western Sahara between the Oued Draa and the Saquiat el Hamra, stating that 'we have decided to so orient our activities as to integrate that province into the national territory' (Thompson & Adloff 1980:233). When Mauretania achieved independence in 1960 and joined the United Nations, the Moroccan government refused to recognise the new state, and in 1963 Morocco went to war with Algeria in pursuit of its claims to Tindouf and other parts of Algerian Sahara.

After King Hassan came to power in 1961 he was frequently criticised by the ultranationalist 'opposition' parties (notably the Istiqlal) for his close relations with General Franco and his lack of open commitment to the Moroccan claims to the Western Sahara. The evidence suggests that, during the 1960s at least, King Hassan was concerned to improve relations with his neighbours and to consolidate his own position within the country less by accepting the irredentism of the Istiqlal Party than by dividing the opposition and disarming it through a combination of royal patronage and political incorporation. On 15 January 1969, a 20 year 'treaty of fraternity, good neighbourliness and cooperation' was signed between Algeria and Morocco, in which both states were committed to submit all issues between them to bilateral commissions. On 27 May 1970, at a summit meeting in Tlemcen, a joint commission was set up to resolve their border dispute, and two years later Morocco recognised its de facto border with Algeria. This rapprochment with Algeria was accompanied by a belated recognition of Mauretania; a treaty of friendship was signed between Mauretania and Morocco in June 1970. In July 1970, following a meeting with Franco in Spain, King Hassan declared that:
instead of going purely and simply to claim the territory of the Sahara, I went to request that a popular consultation take place there, assured as I was that the first result would be the departure of the non-Africans and that then one would leave it up to the people of the Sahara to choose whether to live under the Moroccan aegis or their own aegis or any other aegis (cited in Hodges 1984: 90).

After a tripartite meeting between Morocco, Algeria and Mauretania, held in Agadir in July 1973, a joint communique was issued, endorsing the United Nations call for self-determination in the Western Sahara. The text of the communique affirms their 'unwavering attachment to the principle of self-determination and their concern to ensure that this principle was implemented in a framework which guaranteed that the will of the inhabitants of the Sahara was given free and genuine expression in conformity with the United Nations decisions on this question' (cited in Hodges 1984: 91).

Throughout the decade from 1965 onwards, King Hassan faced increasing political pressure from within Morocco. After the so-called 'constitutional experiment' of 1961-1963, the deteriorating economic situation generated increasing opposition to the regime, culminating in strikes, demonstrations and ultimately riots in 1965. In June that year, after several ineffectual attempts to persuade the main political parties to join him in government, King Hassan declared a state of emergency and took full powers into his own hands. In October 1965, seven months after he had been sentenced to death in absentia for fomenting 'illegal opposition', Ben Barka, radical leader of the Union National des Forces Populaires (UNFP) was assassinated. For the next five years politics in Morocco entered a state of suspended animation, and by the end of 1969, when local and municipal elections were eventually held, 'non-political' candidates gained over 70 per cent of the votes (Seddon 1981: 276-7, 187). But the 'pressure-cooker' of monarchical control over political life 'blew' in the early years of the next decade, when two attempted coups d'etat very nearly ended the regime of Hassan II. By early 1973, the King was seeking to broaden and popularise his political constituency within the country, but a new plot to overthrow the regime involving militants of the UNFP was discovered in March 1973. This resulted in a definitive split within the UNFP, hitherto the most radical of the 'opposition' parties, and the formation of the more moderate Union Socialist des Forces Populaires (USFP), and alerted the King again to the need to create broad all-party support for his regime, and to seek a unified national strategy capable of dissolving or at least stifling serious opposition. The 'recuperation' of the Sahara provided a ready-made focus for Moroccan ultra-nationalism and a new rallying cry for the King.

So when Spain announced its policy for withdrawal from the Western Sahara King Hassan immediately warned that 'we will not accept seeing a puppet state erected in any form in the southern part of the country', and appealed to his subjects to make 1974 'a year of mobilisation at home and abroad to recover our territories' (Hodges 1984: 93). In August 1974 he declared that, if the UN held a referendum on independence, '... not only will Morocco reject it but it will be the first time that it disavows a decision emanating from the United Nations Organisation'. Following this speech, King Hassan began to deploy Moroccan troops in the south of Morocco.

The sense of national unity fermented by the King, and exemplified in the Green March which accompanied the initial blitzkrieg stage of the war in the Sahara, combined with the support of virtually all political groupings within Morocco for this 'Sahara policy', enabled the regime to permit a degree of political freedom. Municipal and provincial elections and for professional and vocational chambers
were held in 1976 and 1977. In all of these, pro-government candidates won nearly 75 per cent of the seats. The Istiqlal and the USFP objected to electoral irregularities and administrative interference, but agreed nevertheless to join the government. In the national elections in June 1977, 'independents' (pro-government) won a total of 141 out of 264 seats in the new Chamber of Representatives. Istiqlal and the Mouvement Populaire won 49 and 44 seats respectively, the USFP 16 seats and other opposition parties 14. The new government included members of Istiqlal and the Mouvement Populaire and the King was able effectively to incorporate within the government the leadership of the major part of the official 'opposition'.

The Istiqlal Party immediately threw its weight behind the King's policy in the Western Sahara, as did the other major parties. Indeed Ali Yata of the Moroccan equivalent of the Communist Party — the Parti du Progress et Socialisme (PPS) and Maitre Abderrahim Bouabid of the USFP, '... outdid Hassan in their proposals for developing the Western Sahara and in their denunciation of Algeria' (Thompson & Adloff 1980:307). Members of the OAU ad hoc committee who talked with leaders of the USFP and PPS were struck by the identity of their views on the Sahara, despite marked ideological differences between them and with the King on other issues. Even the radical UNFP excepted the Sahara when condemning the government's policies.

There must be some doubt as to how far the party leadership speaks for the party rank and file, let alone for the majority of the prudently 'non-political' Moroccan voters. Indication of 'popular support' for the war may be provided by the ability of the regime to raise very large sums of money from the public explicitly for the war effort. During 1984 and 1985, state bonds were issued, which raised 450 million dirhams ($47 million) and well over $1 billion respectively by all accounts. Other commentators have been struck by the extent to which 'the prophets of Hassan's imminent eclipse have been confounded by the advocacy on the part of all strata of Moroccan society of an ever more aggressive Saharan policy' (Thompson & Adloff 1980:289). Such views, however, are based on general impressions rather than on a detailed investigation of popular opinion, and it may well be that support for the war comes from rather specific social groups and strata, and is far less deeply rooted than often suggested. Certainly, an increasing proportion of the population is aware of the real cost of the war in both human and in material terms. These consequences have been felt throughout the Moroccan economy, which during the late 1970s and early 1980s moved deeper into crisis:

Although there has been no sign of any fracturing of the national consensus on the Sahara, the hardships which have been forced upon the country have occasioned mounting opposition. A number of strikes took place in the winter of 1978-79; textile, banking, dock and railway employees, as well as some 60,000 teachers, all came out for higher wages, and managed to organise demonstrations — which were dispersed with considerable brutality. In response to these demands, industrial and agricultural minimum wages were raised by 30% and 40% respectively on 1 May 1979, but these gains were very quickly cancelled out by high rises in the cost of basic foodstuffs later in the year and in 1980 (Sluglett & Farouk-Sluglett 1984:82).

As the economic situation deteriorated in the early years of the 1980s, political opposition to the regime has increasingly found new channels to express itself. Discontent exploded into mass demonstrations and open riots in June 1981 when the government raised the price of basic (hitherto considerably subsidised) commodities and the poor people of Casablanca took to the streets. Again, in January 1984, increases in food prices sparked off riots in several cities (c.f. Seddon 1984). To date these upsurges of popular protest remain relatively unorganised,
although various underground political tendencies, including the Muslim fundamentalist groups, were undoubtedly involved in the recent riots, and some even referred explicitly to the 'unjust war against fellow Muslims in the Sahara'. As the economic crisis deepens, however, a greater degree of orchestration can be expected in the future. It is not irrelevant, in this context, that the relatively poorly paid lower ranks of the state salariat have been involved in every major confrontation with the regime in the last five years and have shown themselves to be among the more vocal opponents of the regime within Morocco.

Rumours of a military plot and of disagreement at the highest level concerning negotiations with the Polisario, which circulated when the commander of the Moroccan forces in the Sahara, General Dlimi, died in mysterious circumstances in Marrakesh on 25 January 1983, may indicate that now, as in the early 1970s, some high-ranking army officers are not as firmly committed to the regime and its policies as might at first sight appear. Certainly, the role of the armed forces in Moroccan politics has always been ambiguous, and the King must feel concern at the growing importance of the war in the south, and the very considerable power of the higher-ranking officers.

Nevertheless, it seems that, even if the popular enthusiasm for the war in the Sahara has undoubtedly waned over the past ten years, there is so far no sign of an orchestrated and coherent political opposition to the war. Given the failure of the existing opposition parties to serve as effective channels for the expression of popular opinion, however, this is not surprising and cannot be taken as conclusive evidence of mass support. What have been increasing are the indications of widespread social unrest in Morocco, rooted in the growing inequality and poverty within Moroccan society. The deepening economic and social crisis of Morocco is itself creating conditions for political crisis. The role of the war and of the Moroccan occupation in the Western Sahara in exacerbating this crisis is significant.

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

The Cost of the War and Occupation

Estimates of the effective cost of the war and occupation to Morocco vary considerably and tend, on the whole, to be on the high side. Recently it has been argued that expenditure on 'national defence' runs at about 4,000 million dirhams ($420m) a year, while the cost of equipping the army alone has averaged nearly 1,500 million dirhams ($158m) over the last two years. In addition, three special accounts at the national Treasury, of which 97% is allocated to the acquisition and maintenance of military equipment, amount to a further 800 million dirhams ($84m) annually (Western Sahara Newsletter no. 4, September 1985). Current estimates suggest a daily cost of about $1 million.

In addition to the direct costs of the war are the expenditures associated with the occupation and 'stabilisation' of the Western Sahara within the 'wall'. In January 1978, for example, a $292m. Sahara Development Programme was announced providing for the settlement of the indigenous nomadic population and the creation of a viable economy. Spending on construction and the development of welfare facilities for the growing population of the occupied territories has also been enormous. 'Improvement' of El Aïun, the 'capital' of the Moroccan occupied territories, has cost $630m. and centres like Boujdour and Dakhla are expanding rapidly.
There has been some investment in facilities and industries capable of providing significant returns: a new port is under construction at El Aiun, at a cost of $42m., that is expected to be able to handle 10 million tonnes of phosphates by 1991, compared with 2 million at present. Mining resumed at Bou Craa in July 1982, although heavy investment was required to rehabilitate damaged installations. Exports remained well below the levels achieved before the war — in 1983, exports totalled a quarter of the 2.6 million tons exported in 1975 (Hodges 1984a: 13). In addition, it is estimated that some 2,130 metres of dikes and 755 metres of quay at the new port will land 50,000 tonnes of fish and 30,000 tonnes of cargo a year (Marks 1985: 8). The contractors are a joint Moroccan-French venture, Matrap. Other foreign investors are being attracted to the occupied territories, despite the warnings given by the Polisario that they collaborate with the Moroccan occupation at their own risk and will be liable to sabotage and attack by the SPLA. Foreign investors are, it seems, confident in the capacity of the Moroccan armed forces to secure the ‘useful triangle’.

There can be no doubt that the potential return on investments in the Western Sahara is considerable, particularly in mining and fishing. Infrastructural development and the provision of basic communications facilities are important prerequisites for the development of the territory, as well as for the maintenance of ‘security’ both from sabotage and subversion within and from attack from outside the walls. But in the short and even medium term, there must be serious doubts as to whether the returns are likely to be commensurate with the levels of investment required. For foreign investors the dangers of sabotage and attack by Polisario or their supporters must be a real consideration, despite the present apparent security of installations and operations within the defensive ‘walls’. For the Moroccan government, the very high level of investment, much of which is unproductive in an economic sense, has already had important implications for the level of investment in economic and social development within Morocco itself. Since the mid-1970s, the drain of resources to the occupied territories has meant a significant decline in the funds available for development projects in industry and agriculture and has led to curtailing of some major projects. More generally, the cost of the war in the Sahara and the maintenance of the occupation in the region are together aggravating the deepening economic crisis faced by the Moroccan regime and experienced by the Moroccan people.

**Political Implications of Economic Crisis in Morocco**

The most obvious indication of Morocco’s economic crisis is the enormous foreign debt. In 1984 this was over $11 billion and debt servicing alone rose from over $73m. in 1976 to $526m. in 1983. By 1983, over one third of earnings from exports of goods and services were being recycled out of the country to service the foreign debt. But the balance of trade deficit has also worsened during the last decade. The overall value of exports has grown slowly, from 6,200 million dirhams in 1975 to 7,300 million dirhams in 1979, but in the second half of the 1970s the cost of imports rose steeply, from 10,440 million dirhams in 1975 to 14,300 million in 1979. In the 1950s, Morocco was a net exporter of cereals, but by the late 1970s between 40 and 50 per cent of the country’s cereal requirements were imported. Earnings from remittances and tourism have failed to cover the deficit and Morocco has become ever more dependent on aid and loans.

Efforts in late 1983 to reschedule about $350 million of its debts owed to
commercial banks ran into considerable difficulties. In September 1983, the International Monetary Fund formally approved the programme of economic stabilisation that it had earlier recommended and made conditions for further loans: a creeping devaluation of the dirham, the rescheduling of part of the foreign debt, severe cuts in public expenditure, and the removal of subsidies on basic goods. August 1983 saw the first round of price increases, which the Moroccan government must have viewed with some trepidation given the experiences of 1978-79 and 1981, when strikes and mass demonstrations involved very large sections of the urban population in protest at government policies — and the latter instance even gave rise to violent clashes with the security forces. There was no dramatic response. But if the price increases did not immediately bring the Moroccan people onto the streets, they certainly contributed to the growing sense of desperation of the large majority whose living conditions had remained stagnant or deteriorated over the previous five years.

At the beginning of December 1983, negotiations with major US and European banks to reschedule part of the country's foreign debt were reportedly nearly complete. But the prospects for the next year or so looked grim even at that time. Just servicing the foreign debt would absorb at least 40 per cent of Morocco's hard currency income, while the visible trade deficit — which the government had reduced by around 27 per cent during 1983, largely by restricting imports and stifling domestic demand — would remain high. Officials projected that the investment budget for 1984 would decline by roughly a third compared with the 1981-85 Economic Development Plan projections. The figure for 1985 was thought likely to drop to 40 per cent below initial projections. Given this bleak outlook, and pressure from the IMF to maintain tight control on expenditure, the Moroccan government was inclined to reduce still further the 'burden' of subsidies rather than, for example, reduce expenditure in the Western Sahara, and the draft budget for 1984 contained proposals to raise prices.

Even in 1971 unemployment was estimated at around 35 per cent of the labour force in the urban areas, with half of those unemployed being aged under 24. The situation has worsened if anything over the last fifteen years. With high levels of unemployment and underemployment, very large numbers of households subsist on low incomes. Among the mass of workers and small producers, even multiple activities often fail to maintain subsistence levels of income. In 1981 the World Bank estimated that well over 40 per cent of the Moroccan population was living below the absolute poverty level. For those able during the past twenty years to improve their incomes — certain sectors of organised labour, the better situated small businessmen and the middle classes as a whole — the rising cost of living has been associated with improved standards of living. But for those unable to keep pace with rising prices, notably the 'unorganised' workers and some sections of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, the rise has meant pauperisation. The introduction to the 1973-77 national plan recognised that, in the previous five years, 'the overall improvement in living standards far from diminishing differentials in standards of living has to a certain extent accentuated the differentials', but between 1973 and 1977, food prices rose by an average of 11.1% a year, substantially faster than wages, which in any case rose significantly only for organised workers in the private sector, leaving many public sector employees (particularly the low paid), and most of those in the vastly expanded 'informal sector' worse off than before. Between 1973 and 1983 Morocco's cost of food index more than tripled. In the five months between July and October 1983, largely as a result of the August price increases, the cost of
food index rose 10.6% and the general cost of living index 8%. A second round of price increases in December 1983 and the prospect of more to come in 1984 and 1985 were sufficient to bring to a head the despair and anger that had been steadily growing over the past years. Once again, as in 1981, the urban poor and unemployed took to the streets in protest at government policies and in broader opposition to the Moroccan regime.

Since 1973, the Moroccan government has pursued 'open door' or 'liberal' economic policies oriented towards 'export-led growth'. These policies, adopted at a time of deepening international recession and growing protectionism, have not only contributed to the national economic crisis but also exacerbated the glaring inequalities within Morocco and thereby sharpened the potential for social and political conflict. The crisis of the Moroccan economy will not be easily resolved and the government certainly recognises the possibility of conflict. It was clear during 1984 that none of the 'officially recognised' political parties are likely to take advantage of the growing popular discontent to threaten the regime, but 'the degradation of economic and social conditions, amidst glaring social inequalities, has encouraged the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and other radical creeds, and generalised discontent, especially in the urban areas' (Hodges 1984a: 13). King Hassan himself identified Muslim fundamentalists as importantly involved in the mass protests of January 1984, and during the January riots a systematic policy of arrest and interrogation of known activists was adopted. The Communist Party was harassed and its newspaper \textit{Al Bayane} seized for several days running. Left-wing revolutionary groups like Ilal Amam were also targets, as were the many small Muslim fundamentalist groups. Even the USFP was suspect and some 100 cadres of the party rounded up 'for preventive reasons' in cities like Rabat and Casablanca, despite the fact that its leader, Abderrahim Bouabid, was a member of the King's cabinet. Continuing radical opposition to the regime and its policies is likely in the immediate future. Under such circumstances, it might appear that a continuing commitment to the war in the Sahara, as part of an 'ultra-nationalist' strategy, designed to maintain national unity in political life, offers the best option for the government. But the appeal of 'ultra-nationalism' may tarnish as the relationship between the economic crisis at home and the cost of the war and occupation in the Western Sahara becomes more evident. The King is, above all, a shrewd politician and may well come increasingly to recognise the dangers of such a strategy that depends on a continuation of the war in the Sahara but fails to resolve the growing sense of injustice and inequality within Morocco itself. Efforts to orchestrate a loyalist national following to ensure continuing support for the King may begin to focus more on domestic issues than on the 'recuperation' of the Sahara, but such a change in emphasis will certainly not take place over night.

For the time-being, moreover, it appears that certain foreign interests are prepared to contribute to shoring up the Moroccan regime by providing aid. Morocco's failure during the 1980s to resolve its continuing economic crisis — trade deficit up by 30 per cent, international debt of around $13 billion, and a bill for imported cereals of $400m. in 1984 — did not, apparently, put off the international bankers. Led by the World Bank, which early in 1985 provided a short-term loan of $200m., and the IMF, which agreed a new stand-by loan of $250m., they agreed to re-schedule the $1.3 billion due in 1985. It seems that they were impressed by the very severe austerity measures imposed during 1983 and 1984.

Such financial support for an ailing economy encourages the Moroccan regime to
pursue its policy of financial austerity and political repression at home and to further encourage the ‘free market’ and the production of exports as the way to promote economic growth. Apparently an annual rate of growth of 30% is envisaged! It also reduces the pressure on the government to cut its expenditure in the Western Sahara. One of the major objectives of this externally financed programme of economic liberalisation and political repression is in fact to reduce the real burden of the war in the Sahara. With new loans from the international banks to add to the sizeable aid and assistance provided from other sources, King Hassan has been able to envisage a programme of military development over the next five years involving an expenditure of $1 billion.

We have already seen how important to the Moroccan regime is the military assistance of the US, much of which is directly spent in the Western Sahara. But the entire package of ‘military aid’, around $74m. in 1986, is only slightly larger than the $66m. allocated for development and food aid. But if the US contribution is very substantial, it is dwarfed by that from Saudi Arabia. Although maintaining a relatively low political profile regarding its support for the Moroccan regime, Saudi Arabia now regularly contributes between $200 and $500 million dollars a year.

And if foreign aid proves insufficient to enable the Moroccan regime to wage war and maintain its occupation in the Western Sahara, King Hassan clearly hopes that it will be possible to raise additional resources from the Moroccan public. In March 1985 roughly $45m. were raised by the issue of a government bond and in September another effort, aimed at raising more than twice that amount from the savings of Moroccans at home and abroad, was surprisingly successful. The new bond was explicitly issued to help provide for civil as well as military requirements in the Western Sahara, but was closely connected to King Hassan’s plan to modernise the army over the next five years, at a cost of $1 billion.

For the moment the Moroccan regime has been able to raise the funds needed to pursue its Sahara policy, but at enormous cost both economically and socially. All the indications are that the war will continue without a decisive military victory and that the occupation will continue to be an extremely expensive affair. As the drain on the resources of the Moroccan economy and people continues with little sign of ending, even the international bankers, and the US and Saudi Arabi, may begin to have second thoughts and to consider whether they are themselves, by offering loans and credit on such a scale, contributing to the deepening crisis and thereby increasing the vulnerability of the Moroccan regime. A first indication of such a re-thinking may be a greater degree of conditionality on loans, with special emphasis on cuts in expenditure in the Western Sahara.

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APPENDIX: Morocco's Armed Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1984</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
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<td>13,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
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<td>6,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Para-military</td>
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<tr>
<th>Tanks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Quality</td>
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<tr>
<td>T-54 (USSR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMX-13 light (French)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-48 A5, upgraded (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kurassier (Austria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>m-60 A3 (US)</td>
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<th>Artillery</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guns &amp; Heavy Mortars — High Quality</td>
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<tr>
<td>— MIM-72A Chaparral missile launchers</td>
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<tr>
<td>— guns</td>
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| Air-to-air Missiles — AIM-9J Sidewinder (US) |
| n.a. | 320 |

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat — Mirage F-1 (France)</td>
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<tr>
<td>— F-5E/5F (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>— F-5A/B &amp; RF-5E (US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training/Liaison</td>
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<td>Helicopters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat</td>
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<td>Landing Craft</td>
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<th>Naval Bases</th>
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Source: Heller et al (Eds.)
Political Power & Social Class in the Neo-Colonial African State

Craig Charney

Using Poulantzas' mode of analysis Charney provides a framework for understanding and periodising the state, and the phenomenon of 'neo-colonialism' — often referred to, seldom defined. It shows that the neo-colonial state has a different basis for 'hegemony' — clientelism — than in the centre states, and that it is particularist not 'national'. It also explores the circumstances under which there could be a break up of the dominant class basis of and of factional popular support for the neo-colonial state.

It would be useful to reflect on the possible application of the concepts of Althusser and Poulantzas to the reality of neo-colonial states.

Jean Copans

Even experienced practitioners acknowledge that it will hardly do for a Marxist political analysis simply to ship Professor Poulantzas out to West Africa and set him promptly to work in the environment as best he may.

John Dunn

Neo-colonialism in Africa has been much discussed, but rarely defined and even less often theorised. When definitions of the phenomenon have been proposed, they have generally been descriptive rather than analytic. They refer to the absence of fundamental social change since the end of the colonial era without specifying the factors which account for the continuities, or those which distinguish neo-colonial societies from other types of capitalist social formations. Indeed, there has been surprisingly little progress since a resolution of the All-African People's Congress 25 years ago defined neo-colonialism as 'the survival of the colonial system in spite of formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries which become the victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, military or technical means'. The latest major Marxist synthesis on African history in English simply calls neo-colonialism 'the continuation of practices of domination after independence by old colonial powers'. (Freund 1984: 235)

Despite the vague definitions offered, the notion of neo-colonialism clearly refers to something real. Contrary to the hopes of some and the fears of others, in Africa the position of the dominated classes, the power of foreign capital and the international division of labour have changed little since independence. The rarity of even partly successful attempts to overthrow class domination, change the relations of production or initiate processes of accumulation is also evident. These continuities are all the more striking in view of the frequency of changes of government in many African countries, and given the social tensions and political struggles even in the states which have remained relatively stable. The issue raised by these phenomena is the nature, form and function of the neo-colonial African state.
The premise of this paper is that the neo-colonial state is a type of capitalist state associated with a particular stage of capitalist development in Africa, and produced by a given set of class struggles. It can be analysed in terms of the same criteria as other capitalist states, while taking into account the particular characteristics of African societies.

This analysis is based upon concepts drawn from the work of Gramsci, Althusser and Poulantzas. In their perspective, class domination is produced by a combination of force and hegemony. Force, by its nature, means acts of repression which inspire fear. Hegemony, in contrast, is politico-ideological leadership, which pervades the entire social formation (including the dominated classes). In developed capitalist societies, Poulantzas defines it as 'the specific characteristics of the dominant capitalist ideology by means of which one class or fraction succeeds in presenting itself as the incarnation of the general interest of the people-nation, and in so doing conditioning a specific political acceptance of its domination on the part of the dominated classes'. (1968:239) The ways hegemony is exercised in neo-colonial states differ somewhat from those in the developed capitalist countries, but the notion of hegemony remains both applicable and essential for their analysis. In my view, it represents the unifying concept permitting the comprehension of the functioning of African states, including many aspects considered paradoxical by political scientists or economists.

I propose to define the neo-colonial state as a formally independent state, in which transnational capital is the hegemonic class and the indigenous petty bourgeoisie the reigning class, whose economy remains extroverted and subordinated to the world market, and which diffuses commodity relations within precapitalist modes of production. My argument is that in the neo-colonial state, foreign capital retains its hegemony through a contradictory alliance with local dominant classes, a strategy rendered possible by the interpenetration of capitalist and domestic modes of production. The evolution of this articulation permits class hegemony and state legitimation to be maintained via lineage-type discourses rationalising an increasingly capitalist reality. Clientelist networks justified through this discourse enable African dominant classes actually to lead the subordinate classes and to contain opposition to the ruling alliance. In these circumstances, merely spreading ideas of resistance is difficult, and acting upon them dangerous; the safest strategy open to the dominated classes is to play the game of their patrons. The first part of this paper presents the operation of this hegemonic strategy. The development of relations among the dominant classes is discussed in the second part. The final section considers the conditions in which the neo-colonial alignment might break down.

**THE STRATEGY OF CLASS DOMINATION**

**The Different Basis for Hegemony in Peripheral States**

'One of the major tasks of the authoritarian neo-colonial state, inseparable from the emergence of a dominant class, concerns the formation of a civil society which guarantees the functioning of the capitalist mode of production', writes J.-F. Bayart (1978: 26). This poses squarely the question of how the hegemony of the dominant classes is maintained in the neo-colonial state. In a sense, it is a restatement of the classic question of Pashukanis: 'Why does class domination not appear for what it is, that is, the subjection of one part of the population to another?' However, it cannot receive the same response that he and other Marxist theorists formulated for developed capitalist societies.
The hegemony enjoyed by capital in the centre presupposes the generalisation of commodity relations into production and reproduction, as well as exchange. Under these conditions, commodity fetishism (the notion that the wage received for labour represents an equal exchange between possessors of two types of commodities) hides the fact that the capital relation is a social relation of inequality and unequal exchange. Social inequality is justified on the grounds of competition among individuals who are theoretically equal. The separation of the worker from the means of production corresponds to the separation of the economic and the political spheres under capitalist conditions of production, where the capital-labour relation no longer involves personal dependance or political constraint. (Poulantzas terms the separation of the economic and the political under capitalism the 'isolation effect'.)

The capitalist state thus need not appear as a class state. It is legitimated rather as impersonal, neutral and above-the-fray. It treats each citizen as a subject, not an object, legally free, independent and equal. Just as citizens are equal before the law, they are equally free to sell their labour power, and have an equal right to vote for the government, which is presented as the incarnation of the national will. Class is formally absent from the institutions of the state; it is a 'national-popular' class state. Thanks to the isolation effect, political and economic struggles are perceived as separate, often in atomised or individualistic terms, rather than in class terms. This ideology is reinforced by the action of various ideological state (or class) apparatuses: schools, the mass media, etc.

In Africa, however, bourgeois hegemony and state legitimacy cannot be founded exclusively on exchange relations, as commodity production is far from universal. A large proportion of reproduction takes place within domestic or lineage relations, rather than through commodity sales. Furthermore, much of production is organized around personal relations of direct dependence between peasant or worker and chief, merchant, marabout or bureaucrat, rather than through an impersonal market. In these circumstances, the isolation effect cannot operate, since from the viewpoint of the subaltern classes, the economic and political orders are one and the same.

Legal and political equality are likewise sharply circumscribed. Independent African states inherited bourgeois legal systems, but their writ does not run in many respects. 'Traditional' or religious authorities often have considerable power, while the law is simply ignored in a large part of the economy (the informal sector). As to formal democratic rights, in most African states these are limited or absent altogether. The role of the state in the reproduction of the labour force is also much more limited than in the developed countries; thus apparatuses such as the schools or the press have much less influence.

The Role of 'Lineage' Ideologies

In the neo-colonial state, the dominant classes maintain their hegemony and the capitalist state its legitimacy by reproducing relations of dependence organised on the basis of lineage-type discourse. The non-universality of commodity relations in these states stems from the interpenetration of capitalist and domestic modes of production. (Meillassoux 1975, Wolpe 1971.) This interpenetration, produced by capitalism's evolution in Africa, permits the dominant classes to profit from the ideologies of legitimation and state structures characteristic of the different modes of production in which they originated. As Poulantzas wrote:
Just as the structures of the state in a concrete formation present, under the domination of one type of state, structures which come from other types, these structures often participate, under the domination of one type of legitimation, in other types of legitimation; specifically, in previous dominant ideologies, corresponding to classes which are no longer the politically dominant classes. The gap between a type of state and the dominant legitimacy in a form — corresponding to different political forms — is particularly striking in the case of developing or decolonizing countries, in Africa for example, where the establishment of 'modern' states is constantly dominated by traditional ideologies. (1968: 242).

However, these ideologies are not mere illusions. They explain the codes of access to the means of production and reproduction in neo-colonial societies.

The domination of capitalism in Africa (and elsewhere) was originally imposed upon societies organised in lineage or kinship communities based upon domestic modes of production. The process began with the monetarisation of prestige goods and armaments, which set communities to procuring slaves and producing exportable products. From this time on, the heads of lineage communities were acting as agents for capital. Through the conquest of Africa, the colonial state expanded the économie de traite over the whole of the continent, extracting labour power on capital's behalf indirectly (taxes stimulating commodity production and proletarianisation) and directly (forced labour). This phase of initiation was almost everywhere finished by the 1940s, when capitalism could count on the enlarged reproduction of commodity relations through the operation of the market, thanks to the partial monetarisation of individual and social reproduction: food, clothing, tools, school fees, dowries, etc. Forced labour was abolished and taxes became less important, as 'free' labour at least partly separated from the means of production flowed towards the towns. Nevertheless, domestic modes of production and reproduction remained intact, even though capitalism was sucking more and more labour power out of them.

Despite great variety in levels of productive forces and details of social organisation, societies in which domestically-based modes of production* are prevalent share certain common features. Production, distribution of product and reproduction occur largely within the domestic household (extended or nuclear family). The economic and political instances are not separated; an individual's place in one determines his place in the other. Authority rests in the hands of chiefs (elder males); women and younger men (the 'social cadets') are powerless. Social organisation of units larger than one household is centered around lineage segments, with real or fictitious common ancestors (Meillassoux, Sahlins, Middleton).

The ideological instance is also closely linked to the economic and political spheres in lineage formations. At lower levels of productive forces, it is identical with them. The dominant class reinforces the power it enjoys via reproduction through a monopoly on sacred knowledge. This is manifest in the spiritual powers of elders, chiefs and kings, ancestor worship, etc. At higher levels (feudalism), ideology is a separate instance, operating as a hegemonic apparatus justifying exploitation (church or mosque). As P. Anderson put it, 'The super-structures of kinship, religion, laws or the state necessarily enter into the constitutive structure of the mode of production in precapitalist social formations'. (Anderson 1974: 403)

*Under the label 'domestically-based modes of production' I class together all the so-called Germanic, Slave, Asiatic, feudal and African modes.
There are two characteristic aspects of the ideologies of the dominant within domestically-based modes of production:

1) *Hierarchy*: relations of domination are ascribed to real or fictitious relations of blood or seniority; relations between different lineage communities to an order of precedence. Less developed forms base these ties on common ancestry; more highly articulate versions elaborate notions of social ranks, castes, or a 'great chain of being'.

2) *Reciprocity*: the submission of dominated groups and the offer of their labor power or surplus, in return for redistribution of other goods and protection on the part of the dominators. Thus youths and women must efface themselves before older men, serfs and vassals before their lords, talibes before marabouts.

In neo-colonial societies, the beneficiaries of systems of legitimation based upon domestic or lineage-type ideology are often different from those of pre-colonial times. The local dominant classes need not necessarily be descendants of the pre-colonial aristocracy, where one existed (though they often are). Other dominant classes or fractions may also control apparatuses of dependency based upon lineage units and discourse: bureaucrats, religious leaders, the petite bourgeoisie, landowners. (Copans 145)

Though the dominant groups may vary, however, on the bottom of the neo-colonial system are regularly found the exploited of both capitalist and domestic societies: peasants, workers, youths, women and disfavoured lineages. This is the product of the interpenetration of the two modes as capitalism develops. Younger sons, women and members of subordinate lineages tend to have the least access to land and other resources, and most often become workers. While the opportunities for social mobility open to individual members of the dominated groups vary, the general effect of political and economic organisation on the basis of lineage-type ideology is to keep them 'in their place'. (Bayart 1979: ch.7) Discussing the consequences of political machines organised on this basis, Powell notes that their function is 'to integrate actors high and low in the social hierarchy, thereby serving as a potential buffer to inter-class conflict.' (1970:416).

**Clientelism**

Lineage-type discourse enables the capitalist-dominated power bloc and neo-colonial state to achieve legitimation through the clientelist practice of power. Clientelism is a personalised relationship between two individuals or groups belonging to different classes or class factions, based upon reciprocal exchange of goods and services. These relations entail the extraction of labour power, surplus and political loyalty, in return for economic, political, military and religious services. When classes form and exploitation appears in social formations, domestic or lineage relations become clientelist relations. Clientelist strategies mask exploitative exchange behind lineage-type discourse stressing hierarchy and reciprocity. Clientelist relations are rationalised in terms of kinship or pseudo-kinship ties, mutual obligaiton, redistribution and solidarity.

The fluid and ever-changing structure of group relations within African states is the product of clientelist relations, which have permitted the subordination of domestic units in various kinds of collectivities. As Lemarchand has noted, clients may take on their patron's tribal identity, broaden the focus of their own identity or become one of many lineage-defined groups in a wider political system, depending upon the
scope and discourse of the relationships. The phenomenon can be viewed as the 'pyramiding of patron-client ties', as surplus and services are exchanged at a variety of levels (Foltz, 1962). Domestic units could thus be hooked into clan or, where they existed, pre-colonial states, by appropriate pseudo-lineage ideologies (such as the invention of mythical common ancestors). The establishment of the colonial state enabled state legitimation and primitive accumulation to take advantage of lineage ideology as well, a function that continued even as capitalism transformed the bases of production and reproduction. Domestic units were hooked into the state and capitalist production via clientelist structures of indirect rule (chieftdoms, tribes, factions, etc.), irrespective of whether the metropole's policy for the petite bourgeoisie was 'assimilation' or 'separate development'.

This clientelist practice has been carried over and extended within the neo-colonial state. Continued adherence to lineage-type strategies fulfills political and ideological functions for the dominant classes, not merely the economic function (reproduction of the labour force) highlighted by economic anthropology. They offer a way to legitimate state and class power even in societies penetrated by capitalism to the point where the reproductive function of the lineage mode has declined drastically. They also remain important in maintaining the ideological conditions for the subjection of the dominated classes even where the ideological instance has been partially separated from the political-economic by the organisation of churches or mosques. (Often in fact lineage-type religious practices exist side-by-side with Christian or Muslim practice reflecting the continuing ideological efficacy of the dominant elements within lineage groupings.) Thus, Coulon has shown that Senegalese peasants obey the state not as subjects, but as the talibes of their marabouts. This type of discourse has a popular resonance in part because it draws upon shared symbols and history, but particularly because the dominant class patrons 'deliver the goods' through clientelist mechanisms. The lineage-type discourse shows how conformity must be expressed in order to obtain satisfaction, while clientelist practices make the independent organisation of the dominated classes very difficult. 'But this argument can be taken much further', notes Flynn, 'if one emphasises their deliberate organisation and maintenance from above for political purposes.'

**Changing Forms of the State**

While the discourse and shell of lineage formations have been kept, their interpenetration with capitalism and the development of the state have transformed the material bases of clientelism which existed in pre-colonial Africa. The productive and reproductive vitality of domestic organisations has been steadily eroded by capitalism. In consequence, clientelist ties increasingly regulate access to capitalist means of production and reproduction, often via the state, according to lineage-type ideologies. the very process through which state and capital undermined the economic foundations of pre-capitalist structures created the new resources and lines of authority channeled through them. In the simple domestic mode of production, the bases of power lay in the processes of reproduction: control of surplus and women. Colonial capitalism intensified the contradictions within it, often to the breaking point, while establishing new means of domination. In turn, the domestic modes gave rise to individual and collective strategies of lineage-based access to resources within the capitalist sphere.

To understand the development of class dominance on the basis of clientelist strategies, one must consider them in relation to the evolution of productive and
reproductive relations, and the form of state or place of the state within them. In Poulantzas' terms, the state form changes with phases of the capitalist mode of production (initiation and enlarged reproduction), capital seeking different types of state intervention in the economy in each. Following Marx, he says the absolutist state corresponded to the 'initiation' phase in Europe, and the liberal state to that of enlarged reproduction. While African states can be periodised on the same basis, the characteristics and peripheral position of African societies produced rather different state forms. The initiation phase involved a 'peripheral absolutist' state: an authoritarian, foreign-controlled administration which forcibly extracted labour power and extended commodity relations on the basis of pre-existing forms of production. After World War II, the phase of enlarged reproduction permitted the establishment of a 'developmentalist' state form, symbolised by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act and the Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Economique et Social. This state intervened actively to intensify agricultural production needed by the metropole and to promote limited industrial development, on the basis of 'free' labour and a more liberal political order. It remains in existence today, despite changes of regime at or since independence.

During the initial phase, state coercion tightened the grip of pre-colonial forms of exploitation while slotting new resources into them. Forced labour and taxation intensified demands for labour time and encouraged dependence on marketed food and tools by the dominated classes. In addition, the monetarisation of dowries and other goods opened possibilities of accumulation (particularly of wives), leading elders to increase labour demands and reduce redistribution. Producers unable to meet taxes and ever-rising expenditure needs fell into debt and deeper dependence on patron creditors. Some migrated to become clients elsewhere in the countryside; others went with groups seeking work in the towns. Both trends broadened the scope of lineage clientelist ties. Thus, within the early colonial order, local dominant classes acquired a variety of powerful new means of patronage: money, access to land, jobs, and means of production, the delegated power of the colonial state to arbitrarily tax or punish.

In the phase of enlarged reproduction, expanded state intervention afforded larger quantities and additional kinds of patronage resources. State aid provided farm implements, infrastructure and credit to rural patrons and a fortunate few among their clients. Paradoxically, however, indebtedness grew: those unable to accede to crop-boosting new technology were bound ever tighter to their patrons by the loans they needed to survive. For those who joined the exodus to the towns, a search for new patrons lay ahead. The total amount of labour power for sale was determined by the push-pull of rural impoverishment and urban development, but individual access to jobs was regulated less by the 'free' market than upon the basis of lineage-type relations. The gradual expansion of franchise rights and of the local dominant classes' role in the administration permitted the crystallisation of a party system corresponding to the clientelist politico-economic order. Participation in the factional political struggles of patrons represented for members of subaltern classes a form of struggle for essential reproductive or productive goods (which explains the intensity and violence of electoral struggles despite the absence of challenges to the fundamentals of the system).

Though independence did not change the form of the state, it brought deepened class dependence. Peasants rely ever more on rural notables for land, seeds, cattle and tools, as well as credit until harvest, commercialisation and access to state
services. The myriad of ‘agricultural development’ and foreign ‘aid’ programmes only increased the resources at the disposal of dominant class patrons and the reliance of the dominated classes upon the market. The accelerating collapse of rural subsistence systems unleashed an unprecedented wave of migration towards African (and overseas) cities.

In the towns, similar relations of dependence exist on fairly similar bases, African cities recalling what Gramsci (1971:91) labelled ‘medieval-type cities’. In the informal sector of the economy, where half or more of the workforce is employed, commodity production is based upon domestic rather than exchange relations. Regulation takes place through lineage or pseudo-lineage ties which ignore the capitalist legal order — and are usually ignored by it. Workers tend to share family, tribal or caste links to the proprietor. They often go unpaid or receive only pocket money, and enjoy no protection under contracts, labour laws or state insurance schemes. (Salama and Mathias, 1984: 61-79; Hugon, 1984). In the formal sector, where employee and employer no longer share domestic ties, clientelist networks have nonetheless been reproduced on the basis of access to jobs and state power. Present local dominant classes either grew up within the bureaucracies, or took them over. In any case, they need to control urban workers and maintain good relations with the dominant rural classes. This has produced the tribalisation of access to posts and subsidies, where pseudo-lineage ideology ties the urban petty bourgeoisie to sectors of the workforce and its rural peers. To some extent exchange relations also permit the ‘isolation effect’ to play a legitimating role: even when workers have achieved class unity at the economic level through trade unions, their political consciousness remains tribal. As far as reproduction is concerned, town dwellers are far less self sufficient than rural residents. In many cities, workers in both the formal and informal sector for housing, beholden to ‘chiefs’ or landlords who can allocate plots. In other cases, state services for reproduction are particularly important: public housing, site and service schemes, school and health facilities, road and sanitation services and pensions. These resources constitute the substance of the patronage dispensed by the dominant classes through tribal political machines, the typical form of clientelism in African cities.

Thus, the ever-deepening penetration of capitalist relations and state structures in African social formations has created networks of control with a hold on members of dominated classes in town and country alike. The benefits for capitalism from such lineage-type clientelism were succinctly stated by Lemarchand (1972:148): ‘Traditional clientelism regulates political mobilisation along traditional patron-client lines and maintains a measure of cohesion among ethnic segments, meanwhile permitting the accumulation of political and economic capital at the centre.’

The Working of Clientelism in the Neo-Colonial State

The lineage or pseudo-lineage clientele networks owe their efficacy as hegemonic organisations to their capacity to mystify class conflicts and channel them so that they reinforce rather than challenge the status quo. They determine the strategic options open to members of the dominated classes. Because the patron-client tie is personal, individual members of the dominated classes must confront dominant class patrons alone. Organisation is vertical: those at the base have no possibility of communication or solidarity with other members of their class. Conformity is but
logical, since a challenge to the patron can cost dear — loss of access to vital means of production and reproduction — and individual action is almost surely futile. Moreover, the pervasiveness of lineage-type ideologies and clientelist relations helps ensure that members of the dominated classes will rarely be exposed to other ideas, or come to accept them through a consciousness-raising process of independent political participation. If a client does protest or voice a demand, he must express it in the terms and forms which the dominant classes expect — as a loyal tribal subordinate, caste brother, talibe, etc., beseeching his better. If his request is granted, the likely result is merely to reinforce his sense of belonging to the clientelist group, provoking feelings of gratitude and reciprocity. Not for nothing did Pitt-Rivers call the clientelist bond a 'lopsided friendship': inequality and ideology are both present (quoted in Powell, 1970).

The same processes — mystification and channeling — occur in relations between patrons and groups of clients in the subaltern classes. Clientelist blocs exist to compete for productive and reproductive resources; the underdevelopment of African societies intensifies the struggles. This competition is described in terms of lineage-type discourse: 'I am a Baoule, a Zulu, a partisan of M'Backe,' and so on. Clients from the subordinate classes accept the leadership of 'their' dominant-class patron, as designated by the dominant ideology, and the obligations of reciprocity which follow. Unlike the state in developed capitalist countries, which presents itself as 'national' and 'popular', the neo-colonial state is 'popular' but particularist (tribal or sub-national).

The neo-colonial state is stronger than the colonial state, because the patrons at every level are themselves Africans. Clients in the dominated classes can identify with them as part of a racial or lineage-type community, and they respond as such. They have no interest in racially discriminatory legislation or limitations upon the professional advancement or accumulation of fellow Africans; contrary to what was the case under colonial regimes, their appropriations of land do not take the form of compact, racially-reserved zones, highly visible and resented. Most important, vastly more patronage is available to them with the enormous expansion of state activity and receipts, both in local exactions and foreign aid, which has occurred since their accession to political power. All these factors render them capable of exercising a form of popular leadership quite impossible under the colonial state. These factors of course help explain why anti-colonial revolution took place essentially in white-ruled colonies.

The mass organisations of African neo-colonial regimes (ruling parties, youth and women's movements, trade unions, etc.) serve to channel demands from subordinate groups and classes within the clientelist system. They replicate and encapsulate the contradictions between dominant and dominated in the society as a whole. While they may afford terrains of struggle to members of the subaltern classes, the practice of the patron classes generally ensures that such struggles are waged in terms of the system's own lineage-type ideology. One-party states and unitary mass organisations represent efforts to preclude the development of alternative foci of organisation and communication to the official system. Put more crudely, they permit the banning of organised opposition without sacrificing the forms of democratic representation. However, multi-party states function in much the same manner as one-party states with regard to the dispensing of patronage. Usually, a single party is dominant, at least regionally, and feels its clientelist organisation strong enough to face down a legal opposition. The dominant classes
also practice patronage politics in no-party states, but directly via the state rather than mediated by political party organisation.

When insubordination does present itself, clientelism also helps the dominant classes to neutralise it. At the individual level, discontented members of the subaltern classes may respond in a variety of ways: refuse to plant export crops, join the exodus to the towns, change job or region, use alcohol or drugs, engage in crime or practice sorcery. The common element in all these responses is that they change the position of the individual without changing the system of dependency itself. Indeed, after practicing many of them, the individual needs a new patron. Even collective resistance to the system often takes place on its own terms. As Rey (1973:162) noted, 'the workers of the dominated modes of production, constrained to go sell their labour power, as well as those menaced by this eventuality, see in the dominant classes of these modes of production the principal guilty parties.' They tend to struggle to replace chiefs or patrons, rather than attacking the institutions of class society themselves. The ideological effects of lineage-type discourse may also help shape the form of messianic cults, where magical beliefs mix with political ideology, potentially co-optable in lineage clientelist terms. Likewise, they may also help limit revolt to a single clan, community, tribe or region — as in Kenya.

These final observations are perhaps the ultimate proof of the effectiveness of the dominant classes' hegemonic strategies within the neo-colonial state. They fit well with an observation of Poulantzas:

We know that the dominance of (hegemonic) ideology manifests itself by the fact that the dominated classes live their conditions of political existence in the forms of the dominant political discourse. This means that they often live even their revolt against the system of domination in the frame of reference of the dominant legitimization system. (1968:241)

RELATIONS AMONG DOMINANT CLASSES
Changing Forms of Regime
According to Leys, shortly before Kenya's independence, the former President of the Employers Federation there wrote, 'We are faced with the problem not of governing from power but of governing by example, influence, and persuasion ...' Sir Philip Rogers' remark neatly frames the question of the relationship of the dominant classes in the neo-colonial state and the hegemonic position of foreign capital. Colin Leys pointed out that a central factor in neo-colonialism is 'the formation of classes or strata within a colony which are closely allied to and dependent upon foreign capital.' To analyse the position of these classes within the state, we will again apply the criteria suggested by Poulantzas. As in the case of the preceding discussion, however, we cannot simply copy his arguments concerning class relations in the developed capitalist countries.

In neo-colonial states, the organisation of hegemony within the power bloc differs from that in the metropoles, due to their location on the periphery and to their internal class composition. In these countries there is no national bourgeoisie; the transnational bourgeoisie is the dominant force in the economy. There are entrepreneurs, but no local class with an economic base and ideological project aiming to do what national bourgeoisies elsewhere have done: organise a national-popular bloc and develop auto-centred accumulation and industrialisation. Rather, the local dominant classes are divided into many different fractions. Thus, there exist oppositions between fractions of the petty bourgeoisie involved in the administration and in the private sector, those in commerce and in manufacturing,
the intelligentsia, and the dominant rural classes. These classes may themselves be divided by ideology — tribalism, regionalism, aspirant bourgeois, compradores, socialists, etc. The concrete configuration varies markedly from one country to another as a function of the evolution of class struggles and the ways in which the modes of production present are articulated. Finally, neo-colonial African states differ from those of the centre in the larger proportion of investment, employment and consumption controlled by the state. Nevertheless, like other capitalist states, the neo-colonial state is the element which favours the organisation of the dominant classes.

Poulantzas distinguished between the 'hegemonic class' — 'the one which, in the final analysis, holds political power' — and the 'reigning class' — which holds the state apparatus, providing high political, military and administrative personnel. Together these classes constitute the 'power bloc', a contradictory unity of politically dominant classes and fractions who accommodate each other politically, economically and ideologically. Poulantzas also distinguished between 'allied classes' and 'supporting classes'. The former are linked at one specific level to the power bloc (political, economic or ideological), while opposing it at others. The latter back its dominance not because of concessions, but from a belief in the state's neutrality and fear that one controlled by the subordinate classes would be worse for them.

The alliances of dominant classes are related to changes in the form of state and of regime. The form of state corresponds to the basic configuration of the power bloc of a given state, e.g. the hegemonic class and the range of kinds of alliances it is capable of establishing with other dominant classes. In contrast, forms of regime reflect different types of representation of social classes within political institutions, parties and ideologies. These are not reducible to economic phases; they are determined by political class struggles. The form of regime corresponds to the specific configuration of the power bloc and allied classes which exists in a given social formation. The entry of an allied class into the power bloc may change the form of regime without changing the form of state. These concepts offer a way to analyse continuity and change in political regimes and state forms in neo-colonial societies, and to understand the role of the local dominant classes as intermediaries between foreign capital and the subaltern classes.

With the establishment of the 'peripheral absolutist' state, old allies became opponents and vice versa. Capital dropped the indigenous trading petty bourgeoisie, a crucial ally in the phase of penetration, in favour of white men from the metropole, forcing local traders to become feeble dependents or liberal professionals. The enemies in the wars of conquest, the rural dominant classes, became supporting cogs in the administrative machinery. The initial phases of capitalism created not just means to extract labour power, but also a new African petty bourgeoisie. Relatively few in number, the members of this supporting class depended upon the colonial state and capital for their training and positions: clerks, teachers, catechists, professionals, artisans, etc. These groups struggled against the white colonial petty bourgeoisie, who constituted an allied class, e.g. the local agents of capital and the occupants of lower state positions. The évolutés sought only the right to serve as the intermediaries of capital and the metropole, but their advances were quite limited, owing to their relative weakness as a class, and to the necessity of highly repressive state apparatuses for the forcible extraction of labour power. The hegemonic fraction in this phase was competitive merchant capital,
subject however to steady concentration over the course of the period, due to competitive struggles, crises and cartelisation.

The emergence of a new form of state after World War II corresponded to important changes in class alliances. As we have noted, the commencement phase of capitalist development was finished almost everywhere in Africa. The system had become capable of reproducing itself, rendering directly coercive forms of labour control obsolete. At the same time, the hegemony acquired by metropolitan monopoly commercial and financial capital, against the backdrop of Europe's economic straits, provided means and motivation for developing export production in the colonies. Prior development, accelerated during wartime, had already created the growing numbers and power of the African petty bourgeoisie and working class, which enabled them to struggle vigorously against the existing repressive state structures. If the transition to monopoly hegemony made a new strategy of domination based on a new state form appear desirable to capital, the intensification of class struggle in the context of the postwar African politico-economic crisis (strikes, disorders, etc.) made it imperative.

As the 'developmentalist' state based upon free labour was established, the white settlers were more or less rapidly ousted from the alliance of dominant classes, the indigenous petty bourgeoisie taking their place, often in alliance with the dominant rural class. The latter now enjoyed the status of allied classes, privileged contacts of state and capital, with growing quantities of school places, posts and funds within the grasp of their patronage networks. Their struggle now became one for a place in the power bloc alongside foreign capital. Capital itself had less need for direct representation within the state, now that loyal indigenous intermediaries were available. With mass mobilisations to varying degrees occurring in many territories, and anti-colonial peasant wars in Vietnam, Kenya, Cameroun and Algeria casting long shadows, direct colonial rule began to appear more of a liability than an asset. Moreover, since investment in public works exceeded immediate returns, influential voices began to suggest putting the equipment of the colonies at the disposal of transnational capital, which were clamouing for access, rather than metropolitan governments. A prominent member of the French colonial establishment, A. Blanchet, summed up the case for change in the debates just prior to the end of French colonialism thus: 'How can it be doubted that Africans of French culture, of French sentiments, placed in a French economic system, would hesitate for a moment to choose France if one left them free to associate themselves?'

Independence in Africa thus represented no change in the form of state, but merely a change in the form of regime and the composition of the power bloc. The establishment of formally sovereign regimes in the hands of local dominant classes marked their arrival as reigning classes. Henceforth, the initiatives of foreign capital and governments had to pass through them, considerably increasing their possibilities for influence and enrichment. Yet despite greater means and new masters, the type and objective of state intervention in the economy remained the same: the enlarged reproduction of commodity production and exchange.

With the growing internationalisation of capital, the hegemonic fraction in independent Africa became multinational capital, more weakly tied to individual countries in the centre, more strongly interested in exploiting all those on the periphery within a hierarchical world economy. Due to this approach, African
countries remain extraverted, producing raw materials for the world market, with few ‘backward linkages’ or intersectoral connections. The majority of productive investment, particularly in mining or manufacturing, is still externally financed. International capital has withdrawn from retailing and direct commodity purchases in many cases, offering lucrative opportunities for African middlemen, but it has continued to cream off profits upstream in wholesaling, commercialisation, processing, shipping and services. At the level of the international economy, the World Bank and other ‘aid’ agencies act as ‘collective capitalists’. They divide up the costs of the establishment of infrastructure for the production and transport of export commodities. They also share out the costs of carrying the weakest, least profitable states to permit continued exploitation in others. The International Monetary Fund, clubs of private finance capital, and now the World Bank have increasingly used the renegotiation of African debts to negate their economic sovereignty, dictating economic policies and investment orientations.

The hold of foreign capital is reinforced by the ideologies of ‘development’ and ‘modernisation’. It is no accident that these notions appeared in the 1950s, when the enlarged reproduction of capitalism in the interests of transnational capital had come onto the agenda in the colonies and ex-colonies. Foreign investment was portrayed as the path to the development of a dualistic economy, permitting the ‘modern’ sector to triumph and eliminate the ‘traditional’ sector. The old slogan, ‘What’s good for General Motors is good for America,’ was now writ larger: ‘What’s good for General Motors (and other multinational capital) is good for the Third World.’ At the same time, through Western education and close collaboration in planning, Africans in state bodies and private firms worked closely with expatriates and international capital. They established a common frame of reference and culture, an indication of the hegemonic nature of their ideology.

In the relation between foreign and local dominant classes, the neo-colonial state offers a form of political representation to the indigenous petty bourgeoisie. This is a typical use of capitalist state apparatuses, according to Poulantzas, and the reasons he adduces apply with particular force in Africa. The state is the principal source of employment for the African petty bourgeoisie, which cannot find enough work in commerce, small-scale production or local industry. Its absorption into the state machinery helps to ensure its loyalty to the state. Moreover, its lack of independent class organisation makes it a useful servant for the economically dominant class.

However, the place of the petty bourgeoisie in the state apparatus gives it a certain relative autonomy with respect to foreign capital. This autonomy is that of the capitalist state itself, a formally autonomous instance within the capitalist mode of production. While it does not permit the local dominant classes to break the yoke of foreign capital, this autonomy can enable them to set limits to its power or bargain with it. While subject to the international division of labour they can also struggle to change the distribution of the gains or raise their country’s place within it somewhat. This marks, in fact, one of the most important differences between colonial and neo-colonial states: conflict is endemic between local dominant classes and foreign capital over the distribution of surplus and possibilities of accumulation.

The contradictions between the role of the bureaucracy as servant of foreign capital and its relative autonomy are aggravated in Africa by the interpenetration of
capitalist and pre-capitalist social organisation. As Poulantzas wrote, 'the impact of bureaucratisation is all the more important, the chances of the bureaucracy to make itself into a social force all the greater, the less the dominance of the capitalist mode of production in a social formation is clear and neat.' The fact that the petty bourgeoisie must help to organise the domination of the subordinate classes via lineage-type clientelist networks creates inevitable tension with the role it is expected to fulfil as the intermediary of capital. This conflict is frequently labelled 'inefficiency' or 'dysfunction'; and is really the direct consequence of the contradictions in the position of the local dominant classes.

Thus, there is a striking difference between the ideology of 'modernisation' (stressing the growth of a rational, efficient bureaucracy in the Weberian sense) and the particularistic lineage-type ideologies which pervade a bureaucracy heavily engaged in the manipulation of clientelist structures. In the African context, the 'neutral state' does not mean an objective, impersonal state; it means tribal balance in patronage. The need to keep the petty bourgeoisie within the dominant alliance and to 'deliver the goods' to clients in the subordinate classes also provoke the hypertrophy of the public sector so evident in African states. The excessive consumption, low rates of investment and economic 'irrationality' which mark African bureaucracies must be viewed in the light of this political logic.

Conflicts within the Power Bloc
Among the dominant classes, the neo-colonial state reinforces foreign capital's hegemonic position by conditioning the strategy of indigenous dominant classes and helping to defeat challenges to the system itself. As far as individual members of the local dominant classes are concerned, many sincerely accept one or another of the hegemonic ideologies (tribalism or another lineage-type ideology, and 'modernisation' or exchange relations). Even if they do not, before the clientelistic leviathan of the neo-colonial state, individuals who wish to advance, and sometimes to survive, will mouth the slogans of the regime.

The means of struggle available to groups within the dominant classes and factions, clientelist factions, are the bases on which class power itself is organised. They serve as both a source of control and a frame of reference for these classes. The dominant patrons cannot dismantle their own power bases, and could hardly be expected to do so. Rather, they organise their conflicts in clientelist patterns which implicitly recognise the 'rules of the game'. As Rey put it in his analysis of tribalism and the state in the Congo:

Hostility at the base in no way precludes an understanding at the summit between the political representatives of these ethnic groups. In fact, one finds the same configuration as in the case of the simple lineage system, but on a larger scale, the ethnic group replacing the lineage or group of lineages. (1971:456)

The fabric of interconnections among dominant classes due to the overlapping modes of production, along with their perception of shared interests, encourage them to limit their divisions to the distribution of the spoils, without permitting the nature of the system to come into question. Thus Bayart writes of Cameroun:

(T)he antagonism between the older and the modern segments of the elite was in fact less profound than it is usually claimed to be. Certainly, discords have been numerous and often intensely felt, particularly in rural areas. But the play of matrimonial alliances, kinship relations, a certain commonality of interests and the concern to promote the position of the collectivity had created and maintained links between the older and modern dominant groups of each ethnic group, and indeed between those of different ethnic groups. (1979:34-35)
This often remains true even for members of an aspirant bourgeoisie, who retain individual alliances with members of the dominant rural class of their tribe or lineage-type group. Like the 19th-century Latin American oligarchies, the rural dominant classes have no particular interest in capitalist industrialisation, which would replace cheap imports with dear protected goods and drain the rural labour force. Likewise, the dependence of a local bourgeoisie on the rural alliance makes it difficult for it to challenge the axis of foreign capital and rural dominant class.

These strategies are visibly at work in constitutional political struggles within African states. The survival of their political regimes depends upon their ability to reconcile the diverse fractions of the dominant classes into a coherent power bloc based upon relatively stable class alliances. Elections and parliamentary representation offer a way to permit dominant fractions to work out new hegemonic alliances. Leys described how elections both express and limit clientelist conflicts.

(The Kenyan elections) were fought almost wholly on the basis of clan and in the towns tribal support. The electorate merely "circulated the elite" — about 60% of sitting MPs were replaced — in the hope of finding individuals who would be more energetic in finding jobs and services for them. The Kikuyu ministers and their main allies were all returned. In other words, it was an election which reinforced tribal forms of consciousness, and which disturbed nothing and changed nothing.(1973:238)

Similar factional struggles take place within ruling parties or state bureaucracies in non-electoral regimes, without the utilisation of the ballot box as a measure of political influence.

The character of the neo-colonial state also helps turn aside direct challenges to the dominant classes. Individuals or groups who menace the system can be brought into the dominant alliance via patronage. Gramsci termed the process 'transformism': 'the gradual but continuous absorption, achieved by methods which vary in their effectiveness, of the active elements produced by allied groups and even of those which came from antagonistic groups and seemed irreconciliably hostile.' The phenomenon has a long history in Africa, particularly due to the ways in which cleavages in class struggles are moulded by the interpenetration of the capitalist and domestic modes. The tensions produced by the development of capitalism have been expressed in lineage ideology terms in conflicts between young and old. The 'young' are the exploited or poorly-integrated of the two modes of production: social cadets in the countryside, workers new to town, recent graduates, and people of peripheral regions. The 'old' can be considered the 'social elders': leaders of lineage communities in the countryside or cities, and groups of long-term residents of urban centres, all connected into the circuits of political and economic power. But the 'young' leaders of one era become the 'elders' of the next, both through aging, and consequent status rises, and through their integration into the clientelist networks: in short, transformism.

In the event of a crisis which menaces the very survival of the hegemonic system, the various dominant factions can normally be counted upon to rally round, despite their disagreements on other matters. Their collective interest in the maintenance of the system of domination and exploitation overrides their parochial differences. For example, Coulon says in Senegal:

The politico-administrative bourgeoisie and the marabouts have in common the fact that they are at the summit of the social pyramid and that this position is due in large part to the hegemony that they exercise upon the peasantry. Both draw a very real profit from the
economic activity of the rural masses and have an interest that the peasantry remains in a state of dependence. (1981:225)

Thus, he shows, the marabouts closed ranks behind the faction closest to foreign capital in the Senghor-Dia showdown of 1962. Likewise, he indicates how all sections of the dominant classes came together in 1968 to oppose the workers' general strike.

Even when the failure of attempts at conciliation leads to a coup d'état, the neo-colonial state itself endures. The reigning faction changes, but there is no change in the form of state or the position of the foreign bourgeoisie. The world market and foreign firms remain the ultimate sovereigns and the state continues to diffuse commodity relations within its borders. The situation resembles a game of musical chairs.

Breakdown of the Hegemonic Alignment
Despite the existence of effective hegemonic strategies based upon strong class alliances, the neo-colonial state is neither invulnerable nor immortal. It corresponds to a stage in capitalist development. While this stage may be long — Latin American experience suggests that it can continue for a century or more — it does not last forever. Moreover, its passing will perhaps prove more rapid in Africa, due to the more rapid penetration of the continent by a more powerful capitalism. To move beyond neo-colonialism would require a situation in which a new form of state is created. This could be either because old forms of domination have broken down, or because certain dominant classes have lost interest in maintaining existing alliances. At least three such situations can be envisaged, though others may well exist.

The first possible condition for the loss of hegemony would be economic crisis, which would have implications for both the subordinate and dominant classes. A crisis of subsistence could undermine the obedience of the dominated classes. The maintenance of clientelist relations and of the persuasive capacity of lineage-type discourse becomes difficult when patrons have nothing left to offer, because their resources (funds, jobs, land, houses, etc.) are exhausted. Likewise, clientelist systems can break down from excessive exactions by the dominant classes. The threshold for resistance in these circumstances, Scott has suggested, is when the actual subsistence of peasants is endangered. Yet such a crisis seems likely to provoke generalised resistance only if it is of a degree which renders unavailing individualistic alternatives, such as flight to the towns. From the viewpoint of the dominant classes, a prolonged loss of import capacity due to economic crisis can reduce the interest in alliance with foreign capital. In such a case, rural dominant classes lose their primary rationale for opposing industrialisation — cheap goods. Rather, they may favour it to make up for lost imports. There are, however, two preconditions for such a development: enough import capacity to cover capital goods, and a relatively strong and coherent aspirant bourgeoisie.

A second possible condition for change is the gradual or sudden collapse of lineage-type relations of subordination. One potential cause is economic: rapid capitalist penetration of the countryside and the complete monetarisation of the reproduction of a large part of the labour force. This process would imply the socialisation of the reproduction of the labour force, since the domestic sector would be incapable of furnishing even part of its subsistence. Given the deepening of potential domestic markets that such trends would represent and the tendency
on the part of transnational capital to redeploy manufacturing activity towards the periphery, it cannot be ruled out that a pro-industrial alliance of foreign and domestic capital might emerge in a few advanced regional centres. There or elsewhere, the disappearance of true lineage production relations could also open the possibility of a challenge to clientelist structures from below, by weakening their ideological referents. The other potential source of defiance is political: Gramsci cites the case of military mobilisation and defeat. In such circumstances, the habit of subordination on the part of the subaltern classes is broken, the prestige of patrons diminished. In all these cases, the iron logic of individualism need no longer apply to relations between members of subordinate and patron classes. Transformations of the state could then occur either through controlled participation of the dominated classes within state apparatuses responsible to fractions of the dominant classes (populism), or when 'the great mass of peasant farmers bursts simultaneously into political life' in a revolutionary upsurge, in Gramsci's phrase. The consequences are far from predetermined, however: they depend on whether the dominated classes succeed in establishing an autonomous capacity to struggle for their liberation or remain pawns of parts of the dominant classes operating through new formulae of control.

A third factor in state transformation can be the development of a corps of organic intellectuals disenchanted with the status quo. In the conditions of peripheral social formations, the function of the intellectual takes on particular importance, as Gramsci underlined:

When the impetus of progress is not tightly linked to a vast local economic development which is artificially limited and repressed, but is instead the reflection of international developments which transmit their ideological currents to the periphery — currents of the more advanced countries — then the group which is the bearer of new ideas is not the economic group but the intellectual stratum.

In Africa, the capacity of the state apparatus to employ the petty bourgeoisie continues to shrink, with the growth of schooling and the deepening of economic crisis. Worsening graduate and school-leaver unemployment could erode the adherence of educated youth to the neo-colonial order. Likewise, social crisis and class struggle can change substantially the atmosphere in schools, universities and youth groups. At least some of these ideological state apparatuses may be put into reverse gear, and begin to reproduce intellectuals hostile to the system. These circumstances might permit the appearance of organisations interested in and capable of raising consciousness among the dominated and able to develop political practices of opposition to the neo-colonial state. It is worth noting here the role young intellectuals, civilian and military, have played as catalysts of revolution in Burkina Faso and Ghana. The rapidly growing young Islamic intelligentsia would also in certain cases constitute a potential challenge to the state, though whether as a partner in a national-bourgeois alliance or as a comprador-clientelist claimant appears unclear. In any event, the breakdown of discipline among the local dominant classes would have serious implications for the stability of the neo-colonial alignment.

While it is possible to analyse some of the conditions in which the neo-colonial state would be transcended, it is not possible to predict the results. The conditions described above could lead either to a consolidation of capitalism or to an advance towards socialism. The hegemony of the dominant classes in Africa depends both upon their apparatuses of control and the state of relations among those classes, as
well as upon the degree and quality of unity among the subordinate classes. At the
decisive moment the outcome will turn not only upon the internal economic,
political and military conjuncture.

Conclusion
In conclusion, the neo-colonial state was born in a specific situation, grows in
particular ways and may disappear in certain circumstances. This essay attempts to
suggest an appropriate mode of analysis, but does not claim to offer rigorous proof
of this approach. More empirical work would be necessary to see whether this
framework really permits the periodisation and analysis of particular African
states. What is clear, however, as Copans has put it, is that:

If we need a theory of the neo-colonial social formation, of the role of the state apparatus and
of the social fields of the class struggle (the nation, ethnic groups, village communities, cities,
etc.), it is not by the idle curiosity of Western intellectuals. It is because we believe that this
elaboration of theory, this work of diffusion of analytical information, make up part of the
historical tasks of revolutionaries in the present world conjuncture. (1978:251)

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Debates

THE CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN STATE: A ‘RULING CLASS’?

Joshua B. Forrest

A number of analysts claim that, by adopting an economically exploitative and politically aggressive posture towards rural society, the state in post-independent Africa in fact is acting as a type of ruling class. In this contribution I briefly review the arguments of the principal proponents of this view, after which I present a critique of these arguments, in which I challenge the conceptual basis of the ‘state as class’ analytic school.

Henry Bernstein finds that the contemporary African state ‘... comes to be consolidated and reproduced as a class through its aggrandisement vis-a-vis civil society.’ The notions of ‘organisational bourgeoisie’ and ‘public sector bourgeoisie’ were devised, respectively, by Markovitz and Hill, who view the state as comprised of managers in control of the overarching systems of political and economic power, personally benefitting from their pivotal positions and collectively acting as a class in pursuit of interests that are in conflict with those of other social classes. Their conceptualisations may in fact be viewed as advanced versions of Fanon’s ‘administrative bourgeoisie’. Stein extends this line of argument in particular regard to Tanzania, asserting that the means of organisation constitute the actual means of production, as the monopolisation over information and technical knowledge gives rise to a fourth great ‘bureaucratic’ class intent on reproducing the state by assuring that agricultural surplus is appropriated by and allocated in its interests, resulting in the organisation of economic activity under a ‘bureaucratic mode of production.’ Stein’s analysis is largely consistent with von Freyhold’s characterisation of a local governing class of ‘Nizers’, although it differs from Samoff’s depiction of a more socially fluid and internationally influenced ‘bureaucratic class’. Brett’s presentation of a ‘bureaucratic mode of production’ in Uganda, where, he claims, the state directly and independently controls the means of production, also parallels Stein’s view, although Brett understands the state to act not so much as a class-in-itself as in the interests of the local capitalist class. More closely sharing Stein’s perspective is Thomas Callaghy, who shows that in Zaire as well — and even more so in Kenya (here relying on Swainson, Leys, Kitching, Beckman and Langdon) — a ‘political ruling class [develops] out of the patrimonial administrative state and creates an economic base for itself’ by
entering the sphere of production and ensuring that domestically generated capital accumulation is appropriated by and serves those who comprise the state.

Several critics find that the nature of the African state as a class can best be understood within the context of its economic ties to international capitalism. Amin offers a particularly determinant view of a 'state bourgeoisie' either dominated by the local business sector and together with it forming a comprador class, or asserting its economic control over the domestic economy, but in both cases dependent on and acting as a transmission belt for the industrialised world-centre of international capitalism. Shivji finds that the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' is comprised of the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie which, now in a position of state power, seeks to consolidate that power against the commercial, working class and peasant sectors but objectively acts in the interests of the international bourgeoisie. While Saul similarly views the post-independence African state as commanding a hegemonic economic position over society and acting to consolidate internationally backed capitalism, he breaks with Shivji by focusing on the significance of political struggles within the bureaucratic sector, which he interprets as reflecting a variety of political and ideological positions among competing wings of the bureaucratic elite. For this reason Saul finds that despite its connections to international capital, the class alliances formed by the state are not structurally predetermined, as they depend on which political tendency has the upper hand at a given historical moment. A more fully developed argument along this line of reasoning is suggested by Currie and Ray, who perceive the state as an arena of fractional class conflict, attempting to serve as a bonapartist arbiter of domestic antagonisms despite being limited in its hegemonic effort by societally based class interests. This emphasis on internal struggles is appreciated somewhat differently by Leys, who argues that the state reflects the particular contours of the class struggle within society, so that the political position of the state expresses the relative strengths of competing class segments. Therefore, the state is not necessarily beholden to or serving the interests of any one class, nor does the state in and of itself represent a ruling class. Nonetheless, Leys does stress that this apparent state autonomy is objectively deceptive, as the state does ultimately serve the interests of international capital, which remains the strongest economic element in post-colonial African Society. In his 1978 article, Leys in fact came closer to accepting the notion of the relative autonomy of the state vis-a-vis international capitalism.

In an earlier, well-known analysis that set the stage for the dependency framework even though it rejected the class basis of the state, Meillassoux noted that while the state bureaucracy does gain control of the economic infrastructure and attempts to use that control as a means of exploitation, it does not control the means of production and remains economically dependent on Western interests. As a result, while the bureaucracy does represent a 'new social group' that holds key political and economic power, its dependence on external forces and the fact that it was essentially created by the ex-colonial power rather than arising from a fully formed social class precludes consideration of the state bureaucracy in domestic class terms. Sklar and Schatzberg offer the reverse perspective, de-emphasising the dependency relationship while offering an especially adaptive interpretation of the state-class connection. Sklar proposes the concept of a 'managerial bourgeoisie' that reflects the 'class consolidation' of a 'newly developing private sector' and a 'preponderant yet protective public sector' devoted to the management and distribution of wealth rather than to its creation. Schatzberg writes of a crosslinked
'political-commercial bourgeoisie' that dominates a pyramidal power structure in state and society, with the state playing the critical role because of its 'access to and control over the resources' of society, even though it does not control the means of production. The fluidity of class boundaries not only allows individuals to shift in and out of the state sector and to hold multiple class allegiances, but makes possible a 'perpetual structuration and destructuration' of classes themselves. Thus, while the state holds political power and the political-commercial elite jointly control the economic resources of the country, the class basis of the state is constantly changing and depends on the specific power configurations among the personnel within the higher levels of the state and the commercial sector. This 'contextual and processual' approach is employed in expanded form by Young and Turner, who see the state as 'a congealed representation of class relations, provided that no exclusive determinism is attributed to this factor, and that the on-going flux and change produced by processes of social conflict remain within the analytical field of vision.' Kasfir has recently lent theoretical depth to this approach, arguing that a Weberian state-centred and marxian class-focused framework can be 'conjoined' to better account for the mutually supportive interconnections that typically bolster the power of both the state and the capitalist class in present-day African countries.

Finally, a particularly dynamic approach to the state-class question is assumed by Bayart, who asserts that it is wrong to argue that the high functionaries of the state constitute a dominant class precisely because they do not enjoy real control over the means of production. Rather, the Cameroonian state both: (1) makes possible the privileged positions of dominance held by the ruling elite; and (2) serves as a matrix of micro-conflicts within this elite among those whose positions of dominance are based on (a) class (born to the pre-colonial aristocracy or made newly rich in the colonial or postcolonial period), (b) power (administrative or party officials) or (c) strategic positions of economic enrichment (in agriculture, real estate, commerce, transport, industry).

With the exception of Bayart and Meillassoux, all of these analysts regard the African state as comprising, linked to or part of the dominant class, but there are several major conceptual and analytic difficulties underlying these various approaches which render problematic their utility in understanding the nature of the state and state-society relations in post-independent Africa. The first is expressed by Sklar (and adopted by many of the above analysts), who bluntly declares that 'class relations, at bottom, are determined by relations of power, not production.' This is a statement that in my view obfuscates and defuses the structural and dialectical significance of the notion of class, yet it serves as an underlying theoretical basis of the analyses of Sklar, Callaghy, Markovitz, Schatzberg and Young and Turner. These critics all explicitly recognise that the basis of the economic power of the state is political, resting in the control of the organisational superstructure of society and to some extent of key trading and marketing sectors. However, I do not find that this justifies conceiving of the state or its ruling members as a class: the fact that a group holds political and economic power does not ipso facto make it a 'class', much less a 'ruling' class, and certainly not any kind of 'bourgeoisie'.

The strength of a given class, as Meillassoux, Brett and Bayard have pointed out, in fact depends on its relationship to the means of production, which in turn determines its relative power vis-a-vis other classes. If a class does not control the means of production, then it is not a ruling class. The bourgeoisie (capitalist class)
possesses private property, is able to expropriate the product of production, controls the means of production (wage labour and privatised land), and appropriates capital through profits and rent gained from private investments. The state in Africa does not act as a bourgeoisie in any of these senses,* and because it does not exercise substantive control over the means of production (land, labour and tools) cannot act as a ruling class.** The people who make up the state do hold power at the national level, and they do seek to carry out their interests as political leaders and administrators, but they do not form a class or a bourgeoisie.

I therefore oppose the notion of 'organisational', 'public sector' or 'bureaucratic' bourgeoisie, of 'managerial class' and of 'ruling political class'. As Perry Anderson demonstrates in his study of feudalism, the state may well play a key role in assuring economic exploitation and may even appropriate unto itself much peasant wealth through, for example, extractive interference in marketing or via taxation, but this does not indicate that the state itself constitutes a social class. While it is arguable that contemporary Eastern European states may be seen in class terms, this is in light of their truly extensive control of the production processes — a situation which, as Bayart and Meillassoux have noted, African states are not close to attaining, despite the arguments of Stein, Callaghy and Hill.

A second and related difficulty is that the efforts by Sklar and Schatzberg to alter the Marxist concept of class, which they do in an attempt to clarify the empirical situations they describe, in fact renders the theoretical notion of class less meaningful. Schatzberg, for example, adeptly depicts the social fluidity within the Zairian state structure and the ways in which state, socio-economic status, ethnicity, lineage and organisational affiliations combine differently depending on the particular context. However, the theoretical discussion concerning the 'contextual' changeability of class serves only to detract from his otherwise instructive analysis and to overturn the significance of class as a socio-historically specific, and therefore meaningful, social grouping.

Similarly, Saul's interpretation of competing ideological positions among the Tanzanian state elite as representing 'class struggle' is an unconvincing reification of intra-elite debate, obscuring actual class struggle that may be occurring in Tanzanian society. Saul's view is partially shared by Leys and Shivji and reflects an unfortunate tendency among some Africanists to impose a modified Marxist framework on a social context in which classes are in fact quite difficult to locate. I am not claiming that class analysis is not relevant to a number of African social formations, but rather that, as Bayart and Schatzberg show, the extensive social fluidity within African societies renders clear identification of classes particularly difficult. This does not necessarily mean that we ought to dispense with the Marxist concept of class so much as to employ it with the analytic care that is necessary to retain its materialistic meaning as a social grouping with a particular relationship to the means of production (a relationship which must be defined) in a specific mode

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* While the state does pay the salaries of a relatively large number of public servants, its role as wage employer is too limited to embrace more than a fraction of the total working population, the overwhelming majority of whom are in the peasant sector.

** Goran Hyden's *No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective*, (1983) also argues that the state in Africa does not constitute a ruling class because it has not 'captured' the peasant producers, and because it is beholden to the competing claims of ethnically-based clans instead of acting as public servants of the nation-state as a whole.
of production (which also must be defined). Without specifying the class means-of-
production relationship and without defining the role of a particular class in an
identified mode of production, the notion of class loses its heuristic utility, its
analytic meaning, its historicity and its power of explanation regarding both
political conflict and economic change. The failure of most of the above analysts to
do this has weakened the conceptual strength of their paradigms, as 'class' is
transformed into no more epistemologically significant a term than 'group,' 'caste,'
'clique,' 'status,' 'name,' 'identity,' or 'affiliation.'

Finally, the emphasis placed by Amin, Shivji, Saul, Leys and Meillassoux on the
connection of the post-independent state to international capitalism in Africa does
indicate that domestic bourgeoisies and class conflict have not arisen in a fully
developed manner despite the continuing penetration of the capitalist market
economy. Nonetheless, in appraising the contexts of their analyses it appears that
dependency theory over-emphasises the political role of international capital and
substantially underplays the significance of domestic political factors. In particular,
the unwillingness to view the state as attempting to exploit society for itself —
instead of for a Western-based bourgeoisie — constitutes a delusive analytic
limitation. Collusion between Western capital and the African state is not a one-way
relationship, and the claim that the state is 'objectively' or 'ultimately' dependent on
or subservient to the international bourgeoisie masks both the benefits in economic
power gained by the state through such collusion and the exploitative role of the
state — qua state, not as dependent 'class' — in domestic society.

Thus, the state in post-independent African is not a ruling class or a bourgeoisie, nor
is it singularly beholden to the forces of international capitalism. It is, rather, an
institutional composite of elites who hold national political power within a given
territorial framework and who wield that power in order to advance their self-
defined organisational, political and economic interests. While class analysis
remains essential for understanding social change and political conflict in
contemporary African societies, it is a conceptual error to assume, as most of the
above-discussed analysts do, that the African state may itself be viewed as
comprising or as part of a social class.

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THE CRISIS OF HEGEMONIC DECLINE: US DISINTEREST IN AFRICA

Jonathon S. Zwingina

For the first time in the history of the United Nations Organisation a session in May 1986, was devoted to Africa's Economic Crisis. The session was at the request of the OAU Summit held in July 1985 and its purpose was to mobilise the international community in support of a recovery programme for Africa and to lay the 'foundation for self-reliant and self-sustaining development of the continent'.

It was also a first time for African states to take the initiative to do something about their economic crisis and to ask the international community for assistance. The African states came to the UN with a prepared programme, 'Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery' (APPERR), adopted by the OAU and the Economic Commission for Africa from the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action. The programme estimated the recovery to cost around US$128 billion and the African states committed themselves to raising US$83 billion or 64 per cent of the total cost, while the $45 billion balance was expected from the international community at an annual rate of $9 billion over the period 1986 to 1990. The African states also requested that their debt servicing burden of between $14.6 and $24.5 billion annually during the period be taken into account in giving any assistance, and also asked for a Marshall Plan to solve the crisis.

Although the session adopted a 'UN Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1986-1990', which followed APPPER closely, the session was itself a failure for Africa. No specific commitments were made by the developed countries. The West, led by the US, argued that the economic crisis should be solved by market-oriented reforms in Africa and that the debt problem be tackled on a case by case basis in accordance with the pace of such market reforms. The Eastern bloc, led by the Soviet Union, argued that Africa's economic crisis was a direct result of capitalist imperialism and colonialism and that the Western capitalist states responsible for such crisis should solve it.
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The position of this paper is that a 'recovery programme' for crisis-ridden Africa will not materialise because the US, which has been the motor of post-War II recovery, and of growth in the newly-industrialising countries (NIC's), is neither willing nor able to support such an economic transformation even if other nations were willing to cooperate. The paper argues that the decline in US global hegemony has led to its general rejection of international Keynesianism and with respect to Africa the US has always had less interest in its economic transformation. US attitude to Africa has been increasingly shaped by strategic concerns but such concerns are not substantial enough to lead to a change of economic policy towards Africa. Africa cannot therefore expect a serious bi-lateral or multi-lateral commitment to an African recovery programme from the US or its allies. A recovery can only come from structural economic and political changes outside trade.

US Hegemonic Decline and the Crisis of Capitalist Expansion

Although it is widely accepted that the US hegemony over the western world and the world in general has declined considerably since the Second World War, the implications of such decline are not yet fully accepted. Writers on US Imperialism, such as James Petras and Robert Rhodes argue that what has happened is a redefinition of the mode of operation of US hegemony and not a total loss of control. In fact, they argue that far from losing control of its Empire the US has simply become more resurgent in its imperial control and domination. They allude to the acceleration of the rate at which countries in the Third World, even those with relatively nationalistic governments are being incorporated into the American Imperium.

They recall how 'Japan remains firmly subordinate to American Imperialism', and declare that the US remains the protector of regional stability and the dominant political force, more than before, in the Middle East. On the economic front these two writers argue that both in GNP increases and in US share of world exports of manufactured goods, the present trends and recent projections favour the US.

However, despite their appraisal of the 'reconsolidation of US hegemony' Petras and Rhodes do admit that

... the old basis of American hegemony was cracking, that new alignments were developing and the old basis of doing business on a world scale was coming to an end.

The rejection of the 'old basis of doing business' by the US is a reflection of its changing status in the international community. At the end of World War II the US economy was three times larger than the Soviet Union and six times larger than its closest rival, Britain. By 1950 the US was producing 76 per cent of the world's motor vehicles, 46 per cent of its steel and consumed 42 per cent of global industrial raw materials produced. The US therefore had an unparalleled economic dominance in the world. It was a reflection of that dominance that the US undertook to host a conference designed to establish the patterns of post-War II economic expansion in Western Europe and the world. The deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union in 1947 and the subsequent Truman Doctrine which elevated the US to the position of the policeman of the non-communist world, merely imposed further responsibilities on the US. The cold war that intensified subsequently set the pace for a greater US role in the capitalist world. The Marshall Plan, made possible due to the cold war, was designed to rebuild Europe in order to forestall Soviet expansion as well as to deny European leftist movements the economic basis for their growth and to further pre-empt the emergence of national capitalisms independent of the
The toll which these recovery schemes took on the US economy was dramatic. US exports, which represented 14.9 per cent of total world exports in 1963, declined to 13.6 per cent in 1970, and to 11.5 per cent in 1974. The US GNP also declined from 28.9 per cent of the world's total in 1965 to 26.4 per cent in 1970 and 25.1 per cent in 1974. The US rate of growth also plummetted. The only countries which the US overtook in growth rates were West Germany and Switzerland. By the 1970s, the US was reduced from the status of a hegemonic super power to that of 'an ordinary country'.

There were several implications of this change in the status of the US. First, Nixon abrogated US obligations under the Bretton Woods system in his August 1971 speech, partly as an admission of its reduced capacity to fulfil those obligations and partly as a means of giving the US the freedom to re-assert its hegemony. Second, the Nixon/Kissinger Administration also reduced US global military commitments by adopting the Nixon Doctrine which rejected direct US military involvement in 'limited wars', like Vietnam. The direct military role was replaced by a policy of arming and training regional allies to act as 'surrogate policemen'. Third, the US adopted a policy of aid cutbacks. Between 1961 and 1977, US official development aid declined by 38 per cent in real value. US aid as percentage of GNP, (at 0.18 per cent in 1980) was then the lowest of all OECD countries, except for Italy (which is now the highest), and the US share of total bi-lateral aid which stood at 60 per cent in 1961-3 declined to 40 per cent in 1970-72.

The US withdrawal from global development assistance even extended to Food Aid, which was replaced by a Food Sales policy. US Food Aid fell from 18 million tons in 1965 to 3.3 million tons in 1974. This was replaced by a food sales policy partly designed to offset trade imbalances arising from the 1973-74 oil price hikes. But the policy of using food as an instrument of foreign policy was restated. Grant aid under the US military assistance programme was also cut back and replaced by arms sales. It declined from a massive $5.7 billion in 1952 to $220 million in 1978, representing a drastic change of policy. On the other hand the value of US weapons exports rose from $393 million in 1960 to $5.8 billion in 1978, with most of the weapons going to the Middle East, and in particular, Egypt and Israel.

The crisis of US hegemony is further compounded by its relative military decline, especially in relation to the USSR. From being the only atomic power in 1945, US military expenditure declined from 14 per cent of GNP in 1954 to 5 per cent in 1978, at which period the USSR and US defence expenditures as percentage of GNP levelled off together with the levelling of their strategic weapons. The implications of this is that the USSR became more confident and able to assist liberation movements throughout the world, and in particular in Africa. The success of the Angolan and Ethiopian revolutions would have been more difficult without Soviet and Cuban assistance. Before its hegemonic decline, the US might have considered the option of massive economic assistance to Africa in order to pre-empt revolutionary conditions maturing and thereby keeping the Soviets out. But given
the dynamics of US economic policy, the only option left for it is the ideological/military option in which anti-communist propaganda is backed up by military sales to dictators who often frustrate the 'free' market. Promoting a direct or indirect economic recovery programme as an instrument of US foreign policy is inconceivable with or without a Reagan in the White House. African leaders cannot therefore expect a 'Marshall Plan' for the recovery of their nations for the US has its own economic crisis to contend with, and has, in any case, long discarded international Keynesianism from its foreign policy options. The only role which Africa has for the US is the strategic anti-communist one, and the US response to the continent has been consistent with its post-1971 history.

US Political Objectives in Africa
It is essential to point out from the outset that the US has shown a remarkable disinterest in Africa's economic transformation. This lack of interest surfaced more clearly under Reagan but was actually there before him. And this disinterest can be said to be far more dramatic than the general US economic policy changes we have been discussing above.

In a special edition of the *AEI Foreign Policy and Defence Review* journal devoted to examining the various options open to the US in relation to Africa, only one out of six contributors were interested in helping Africa to transform itself economically. A large number of American officials who took part or were covered by that edition of the journal were merely concerned with rivalling Soviet influence in Africa. Carol Lancaster has also pointed out that 'US bi-lateral aid serves a number of US interests in Africa, only one of which is promoting development'. A look at the distribution of aid to some African countries suggests that political objectives were far more decisive than anything else. The largest recipient of US aid in black Africa is the Sudan with almost $200 million per year. This is followed by Liberia with $73 million, Somalia with $70 million and Kenya with $60 million. These countries reflect US interests especially in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. In addition, Somalia and Kenya have agreed to provide US with transport facilities in case of emergency in the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean, and Liberia provides important communications facilities.

The value of sub-Saharan Africa to US trade is also underlined by the volume of US exports to that region. In 1970, US exports to sub-Saharan Africa were of the value of $1.3 billion. When this value jumped by 266 per cent in 1978 to $3.5 billion in exports to 47 African states, this figure was still only equivalent to US exports to the Netherlands, $3.7 billion; Australia, $3.5 billion and Brazil, $3.0 billion. This relative insignificance of Africa's economic welfare to the US is also underlined by the statements of leading politicians especially under the Reagan Administration.

In 1979 testimony to the House of Representatives sub-committee on Africa, Reagan's Secretary of State for African Affairs, who was then Director of Georgetown African Studies Centre, Chester Crocker, was very revealing on what Africa meant to the US. Mr Crocker documented what he considered Africa's historical role to the US. First, he said Africa represented an obstacle in the way of getting to other stations and places. Second, Africa was only a strategic hinterland for defence elsewhere; third, Africa was a launching pad for interdiction or disruption of maritime powers; fourth, Africa was a place to hold or control in its own right, for its intrinsic value as a possession. More specifically, Chester Crocker stated that
For the US, Africa is still a geographic obstacle 'in the way' en route to zones of higher strategic priority: the NW quadrant of the Indian Ocean, including the Persian Gulf and Red Sea-Arabian Peninsula.

Consequently, to get access to the Indian Ocean area the USAF would require staging and overflight agreements with African states or other friendly nations. At present US ties with Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Israel and Saudi Arabia probably offer adequate options, but this could change. In essence Chester Crocker was stating what amounted to the justification for US aid to Egypt, the Sudan and other strategic allies like Kenya, Somalia and Liberia. When these strategic concerns are extended to South Africa, the level of US commitment to the status quo reaches a level of obsession because of the strategic mineral, geographic and racial position of South Africa. It would, therefore, appear that the African continent does not rate high in US priorities and that the US is not likely to get to the position of offering massive assistance to African states. Given the economic situation of the US itself and its global economic withdrawal, such a possibility becomes far less likely. There is also another difficulty with US assistance being channelled multi-laterally.

The Reagan Administration from its outset desired to eliminate all US funding for multi-lateral development institutions. The justification being that multi-lateral institutions are less amenable to US control than bi-lateral aid programmes. This is the philosophy behind US withdrawal from UNESCO and other international institutions. Thus, in the absence of US bi-lateral or multi-lateral assistance African states appear to have only their ex-colonial masters and Japan to look up to. But these are increasingly being pressured into following the US line and are themselves not immune from economic crisis. We shall therefore examine the other option which is contained in the Africa's APPER programme — the trade solution.

The Problems of Trade
The trade option has resurfaced in the 1980s as the solution to economic problems of underdeveloped countries. The 1981 World Bank Report, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, advised African governments to expand their trade in traditional commodities as well as adopt export-oriented industrialisation in the long-run. Before the World Bank report, the Lagos Plan of Action formulated and adopted by the OAU at its summit meeting in Lagos 1980 also had trade as a development option and this was incorporated into the APPER document presented to the UNO in May, 1986.

Like the 'free market' debate the trade option for Africa has been prescribed in total disregard of the peculiar constraints which African economies face. In order to trade, African countries would first need to produce the traded commodities. There are a number of structural problems associated with Africa's production systems. First, there is their lateness on the industrialisation scene. The African states emerged after independence to meet a complex and also monopolised capitalist system. Large-scale and high technology was already in place and Africa merely took its place within such complexities as desired by the colonial masters which did very little to generate economic development in the colonies. Second, the relative poverty of the African countries makes them incapable of financing large programmes of capital formation. Third, African countries had no initiation, during colonialism, into the intricacies of capitalist industrialisation either managerially or technologically. Fourth, the present co-existence of underdeveloped African and developed countries makes the task of development less easy given the unsympathetic demands of the developed countries and the impatience of the mass
of the poor who struggle for change. The poor of Africa are politically conscious and do know what standards of living obtain both in the advanced countries and in the homes of the local elites. Logically, no one would expect them not to aspire to those comfortable living standards, especially if they could see how easily their elites cheated their way into them.

Finally, there is the deliberate neo-colonial and neo-imperial policies of the advanced states designed to prevent the industrialisation of Africa. For instance, the former US Ambassador to Nigeria, Mr Easum, did admit that US business had not responded to Nigerian invitations because the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation does not encourage US investments in Nigeria. This was despite a concerted government effort, backed by favourable incentives, a rich oil market, a vast market which was 46 per cent of Africa's, favourable climate for corrupt capitalist practices, and sufficient guarantees by the local political and business elites both in and out of the Army.

In addition to the above structural problems are problems associated with the decline in commodity prices. Primary commodity prices are so low, especially after IMF-imposed devaluation, that such commodities are almost extracted and exported free to the advanced countries. When the 1973 oil price hikes altered the balance of prices offered for oil, the US led the west in imposing discriminatory prices on all manufactured goods sold to oil exporting countries in OPEC, including those which did not join the oil embargo on the US.

African countries are now being asked to adopt export-oriented industrialisation, an option which ignores some fundamental problems. First, if such EOI succeeded, the problem of markets will arise just as lack of markets for secondary exports is creating a recession in the Newly Industrialising Countries and even in western Europe, the US and Australia. The rising tide of protectionism which is sweeping through the US Congress is directly related to the structure of production as well as overseas markets. The most successful EOI country in the world, Japan, is coming under pressure to moderate and limit its exports. The other more fundamental problem is the attitude of transnational corporations towards secondary production. In the US, Australia and Europe the political elites are unsuccessfully enticing, pleading and lobbying with the transnationals to invest.

The point that has to be made is that the mode of operation of capital is undergoing a structural change. Capital makes easier money speculating in the money markets, giving loans and extracting ever increasing principal and interest repayments, and it is not about to give away such lucrative ventures in favour of secondary investments whose markets are becoming increasingly uncertain. The whole concept of capitalist productivity is giving way and whether in Africa, or Australia or even in the US no level of 'free market' can easily change that. Capitalism is in a death crisis similar to the crisis of the pre-Second World War era: protectionism is coming from the back door by way of subsidies; competitive devaluation is in the ascendancy, facilitated by the IMF; and the concept of multilateralism is on the decline, thanks to Reagan. The capitalist leaders who prescribe 'free market' and EOI to Africa deserve the Biblical adage 'Physician, heal thyself'.

Bibliographic Note
DISINVESTMENT AND BLACK WORKER ATTITUDES IN SOUTH AFRICA
Laurie Schlemmer

In a highly critical article in ROAPE 34, 'Disinvestment and Black Worker Attitudes in South Africa: a Critical Comment', Michael Sutcliffe and Paul Wellings argue against the validity of certain empirical findings of mine among black production workers which suggested that some three-quarters opposed a withdrawal of productive external investment in my report on Black Worker Attitudes, Capitalism and Development in South Africa (Durban: Indicator S.A., University of Natal, 1984). They also question the view that a successful disinvestment campaign will mean diminished work opportunities for blacks in South Africa. I will deal with both issues as briefly as possible in this rejoinder.

Analysis and Interpretation of Results
The authors' sharpest criticisms are built around the assertion that I claimed statistical 'significance' for differences between subsamples in over 80 instances when in fact the results, according to their calculations, are not significant in some 75 of these instances. My response to this is quite simple. I did not claim that the differences between subsamples were statistically significant. In the whole of the original report the word 'significant' in relation to differences between subsamples is used only three times and the words 'statistically significant' are not used at all. In all other references to differences between subsamples other words were used like 'markedly', 'interestingly', etc., in order to describe the variation between subgroups in a perfectly legitimate search for recurring patterns. I delayed generalisations and conclusions to the concluding discussion.

There was a particular reason for this procedure. Because the report was intended for a general audience I did not wish to present full tabulations of results. Instead I listed subsample results and drew attention to them in a more readable way than would have been the case had I presented complex cross-tabulations. The dozens of statistical tests which Sutcliffe and Wellings performed on descriptions of observed findings are akin to knocking down a straw man; I did not make the generalisations they accuse me of. Their calculations are also inappropriate because the report states that the sample is a quota-controlled sample; their calculations require the assumption to be made of a simple random sample.

Sutcliffe and Wellings take strong exception to my statement that black employees in US companies have a slightly more favourable view of employers than other workers, despite the cautious use of the word 'slightly'. In the interview schedule there were 13 statements about employers with which respondents could agree or disagree. The following is the average positive endorsement of the seven items that were put (agreement):
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If one performs a statistical test, the standard error of the difference between the uncorrelated percentages is significant.

**The Sample**
Sutcliffe and Wellings argue that my conclusions are weakened or invalidated by the fact that the study covered only black male production workers who are 12 per cent in the black labour force. The study states very clearly that this was the target group. It was selected primarily because of its salience to the issue, and nothing was hidden. The reviewers advance no evidence to suggest that conclusions would have been different had the sample been broadened.

As it happens, however, while these results were being analysed another study which included identical items on disinvestment was being fielded among a larger sample. The sample was a random probability sample of 1,000 black adults of both sexes in all major urban areas (excluding the Western Cape — which is not likely to produce different results). A comparison between the two samples (in which different black interviewing teams were used), for the three main disinvestment items, produced remarkably similar results, which effectively deals with the issue of sample bias.

**Validity of Answers**
Sutcliffe and Wellings also imply that the survey results would have been biased by the fact that the advocacy of disinvestment is an offence. It is highly improbable, however, that anyone would ever be convicted for expressing a private opinion in a confidential interview. Of more relevance to the question of validity of answers is that not one respondent in over 1,500 interviews mentioned the fact of or the fear of legal repercussions. I can honestly say that virtually everyone interviewed was unaware of the legalities of the issue. Furthermore, if respondents consider that an issue is too controversial or dangerous they have a relatively easy way out — they can simply say 'I don't know'. This is typically what happens if one asks questions which are too controversial. In the original study among black production workers the question on support for political organisations was far more controversial than the items on disinvestment. Among the 22 per cent who did not support any organisation was an unknown level of 'evasion'. Nevertheless, 42 per cent said that they supported the banned ANC, either as a first or second choice. People who declare their support for an organisation which is banned are not likely to misrepresent their views on disinvestment for fear of consequences.

Those respondents who are honest in stating support for a banned organisation are only marginally more inclined to state their support for disinvestment than others. It would seem to me that this pattern negates the claim that evasion of controversy or legal risk influenced answers, since political choice was the more controversial issue.

**Design of Questions on Disinvestment**
Perhaps the major point of the Sutcliffe-Wellings' paper is the argument that the design of the questions biased the results. They say that '. . . in each statement investment is equated with the building of factories while disinvestment implies the closing down of factories or an inability to build new ones'. In fact the first question
only mentions money invested in factories ‘in South Africa’. The pattern of answers to this question, which preceded any of the more structured questions on disinvestment was no more favourable to disinvestment than the others. I would argue that the first probe presented could not possibly have produced biased results.

Comparison of Results with Other Surveys
Sutcliffe and Wellings refer to a poll commissioned by the London Sunday Times which established that 77 per cent of a sample of blacks in South Africa supported ‘economic sanctions’ unless the South African government eliminated apartheid. Sanctions is a complex term very confusing to poorly educated people. To the extent that it suggests pressure on the South African government it would obviously draw majority black support. More recently in September, 1985, a very thorough study by Mark Orkin of the Institute for Black Research, using a probability sample of 800 blacks, produced the following result. Only 24 per cent of respondents endorsed the following statement: ‘... (one) view (no investment) says that foreign firms only help to keep apartheid alive and exploit blacks, so foreign firms should not be allowed to remain here at all. This view is supported by the ANC, the PAC, many members of the UDF and some trade unions’. The balance either supported strictly conditional investment (49 per cent) or unconditional investment.

On Disinvestment
Finally, Sutcliffe and Wellings argue strongly against the popular wisdom that disinvestment will increase black unemployment in South Africa. Most of their points are perfectly valid except that they take little account of the effect of the campaign on business and investor confidence, both outside and inside South Africa. This effect will reduce the rate of job creation and as such will harm black working class interests. My results show nothing more than that black workers fear this consequence.

Furthermore, if, as Sutcliffe and Wellings suggest, disinvestment is likely to have only limited effect on employment growth and economic performance, it will also have little effect on the South African government once its limitations become apparent. Why would a campaign be so vigorously promoted by some and opposed by others, including the South African government if it is likely to have so little impact on the economy?

Sutcliffe and Wellings argue that the economic campaign against South Africa can include other forms of sanctions and that these can have ‘strategic and symbolic’ importance. I cannot disagree with this at all. My 1984 study was not focused on these wider options, however. It was aimed solely at assessing Black attitudes to a withdrawal or continuation of productive investment in South Africa.
Briefings

THE CRIME OF CONDITIONALITY:
Open letter to the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)†

Dear Sir,

You have done it again! You have reduced yet another African currency sheet by sheet into a roll of fine toilet paper. Your capacity for destruction is unmatched even by floods, quakes or drought.

I struggle to find polite words. A visit to Sierra Leone which was recently plagued by one of your missions, has left me shaken and outraged. Shaken by the new tidal wave of grinding, gruelling poverty; outraged by the sanctimonious economistry with which you, together with the World Bank, administer mass robbery on a scale that surpasses the wildest machinations of the criminal underworld.

The latest round of negotiations between the Sierra Leone government and the IMF/World Bank, culminated in June 1986, at your instruction with a free floating of the exchange rate for the Leone. Within seven months that inconvertible currency had devalued against the dollar and other major currencies by 80 per cent (see Table 1). Practically overnight the petty savings of millions — whether held in local bank accounts or more commonly tightly knotted in a corner of a tie-dye lappa — had vanished. It was, the people said, as if ‘tiefs’ had come in the night, ‘all de money gone’.

To qualify for an immediate stand-by loan of SDR*23 million, and a further Structural Adjustment Facility of SDR29 million spread over three years, the

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*SDR: Special Drawing Right. An internal account and reserve asset created by the International Monetary Fund in 1970. The value of SDR’s varies proportionately with a basket of five national currencies (the US dollar, sterling, deutschmark, the French franc and the yen). At present worth just over US$1, SDR’s are distributed among the participating countries in proportion to their IMF quota. Under the SDR facility, member countries of the IMF may use their SDRs either bilaterally to buy back their own currency from another member country if that country is willing to sell, or through the Fund. Under a so-called Standby Arrangement, member governments may borrow more than their quota, provided they satisfy the Fund that they observe certain key policy indicators prescribed by the Fund. This is referred to as IMF Conditionality. The original intention of the SDR scheme was to be neutral on international resource transfers. However, the allocation of a basket of hard currencies to the less developed member countries on the basis of their quota subscription of inconvertible domestic currencies has resulted in a real transfer of resources from rich to poor countries, albeit a small one.

Table 1: LE/US$ Exchange Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date, Month 1986</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st June 1986</td>
<td>5.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st July 1986</td>
<td>12.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st August 1986</td>
<td>22.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st September 1986</td>
<td>26.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st October 1986</td>
<td>28.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st November 1986</td>
<td>32.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st December 1986</td>
<td>33.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st January 1987</td>
<td>35.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bank of Sierra Leone.

government was told to embark, in addition, on a series of liberalisation policies involving inter alia: the lifting of all import restrictions; the phased withdrawal of imported rice subsidies; the immediate removal of petrol subsidies; the de-control of retail prices; the privatisation or elimination of most parastatal enterprises (including the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board); and substantial and competitive increases of producer prices for major export crops (coffee, cocoa and palm kernel). It was also agreed that during the budget year of 1986/87 no general wage or salary increases should be awarded in the public sector without prior consultation with the IMF, and that the government’s workforce should be cut by 15 per cent. As reward for its good behaviour, the government was to receive, besides the aforementioned petty cash of SDR23 million, and SDR29 million, some relief on the nation’s foreign debt which stood at about $1000 million at the end of 1986. True to form within one week of the government signing the Letter of Intent addressed to you on 14 November 1986, successful Paris Club negotiations with the official foreign creditors had taken place, as a consequence of which foreign commercial lines of credit were re-opened too.

Now it is perfectly true that, by this time, Sierra Leone’s reserves were down to four days imports; and that its debt service ratio (debt repayments to exports) ran at 300 per cent p.a. The value of its exports had dropped disastrously in the past few years due to a combination of adverse world market prices for its agricultural exports, and the ease with which its main commodities, diamonds and gold, are smuggled, leaving no trace and escaping national control. As a matter of fact, and this is admitted in the Memorandum accompanying the Letter of Intent, nearly all of external trade, which constitutes an estimated 50 per cent of GDP, plus a good deal of purely domestic transactions are subject to currency substitution, by-passing the local banking system and hence escaping the national treasury. I shall come back to this later.

For now I grant you that — as a consequence — government deficit (both foreign and domestic) had spiralled to 112 per cent of GDP by the end of 1985. You have a point when you say that without foreign exchange coming in the Government cannot discharge its foreign debt (including to past creditors like yourself: I note the interesting parallel between the Standby sum of SDR23 million and the debt arrears to the Fund of SDR23 million). It is also true that without the ability to tax the (semi)-resident but externally operating profiteers, the Government cannot continue to protect consumers with subsidies against erosion of incomes in part caused by the increased import bill for rice and petrol. And finally, it is also perfectly true that as a consequence of all this, the gap between the official and ‘parallel’ or ‘black’ market rate for the Leone had grown to about 1 to 6.

But what is your solution? Your solution is to punish the millions for the mischief of the few. The flimsy pretext of nationhood and national independence enables you to
make the impoverished masses pay for the debts incurred by the rich. It reminds me of the early days of colonialism when some African chiefs used to send their sons to the European mission schools accompanied by young slaves who would sit in school for no other purpose than to receive whatever lashings were to be meted out in punishment for the misbehaviour of their precious offspring.

You must be aware that the direct participation of the Sierra Leone masses in external trade is nil and their responsibility for the incurred debt zero. You cannot blame them for diverting an estimated 60 per cent of the country's foreign exchange earnings through diamond and gold smuggling, nor can you argue that they were the beneficiaries of their government's quantum leap in public expenditure in 1980 when — in that year alone — it committed the equivalent of all that year's GDP to the extravagances of hosting the OAU Conference.

Even indirectly, through imports of essential commodities, their dependence on the outside world is fortunately limited. I say fortunately, for otherwise there would have been mass starvation by now. But nature is good to them even if you are not! There is plenty of fish in the sea; fruits grow on trees unplanted, and recurring rainy seasons (no droughts to blame here!) make for abundant market gardens full of beans, cassava and yams. Even so, years of prostituting penetration by the world capitalist system (forever pimped by successive IMF/World Bank interventions and other donor aid policies) have laid barren some of the hitherto fertile lands and have made the people idle in their preference for imported 'white' rice, imported 'white' flour and other displacement staple foods. I draw your attention (Table 2) to the leap, following the latest IMF intervention, in the price of a daily basket of commodities consumed by the masses. Most of these are locally grown foodstuffs. Yet all of them have suffered disastrous price increases.

**Table 2: Local Market Prices (Freetown) for a Daily Basket of Commodities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>May 1986 (Le.)</th>
<th>Jan. 1987 (Le.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 cup rice</td>
<td>1.00-1.50</td>
<td>2.00-2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 pint cooking oil (palm oil)</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(groundnut oil)</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dozen small fish</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 chicken</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>80.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 cup peppers (raw)</td>
<td>1.00-1.50</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(dried)</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 bunch cassava leaf (small)</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(big)</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 cup sugar</td>
<td>2.00-2.50</td>
<td>4.00-4.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 cup gari</td>
<td>1.00-1.50</td>
<td>2.00-2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 fingers okra</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 heap cassava root</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 lb beef</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>25.00-30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 onion (small)</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(big)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 small aubergines</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 small tin tomato puree</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 bar soap</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 bunch firewood</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 gallon kerosene</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>23.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 lappa (pure wax)</td>
<td>100-150</td>
<td>300-400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(cheap)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 4 miles poda-poda (govt. operated)</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(private)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(I thank Mrs Ibi Cole and Daniel Renner for going to the market with me)
In an economy which has an 'official' import propensity of 33 per cent, a devaluation of the currency naturally has a knock-on inflationary effect on domestically produced goods. This is all the more the case when, in addition, you insist on the withdrawal of subsidies on imported rice and petrol products which together constitute 45 per cent of recorded imports.

Surely even you must understand that simplest of economic truths? Incomes on the other hand are still at pre-intervention levels. They range from Le.150/200 a month for the lowest paid houseboys, office clerks, and waiters to Le.1000 for top civil servants and consultant surgeons in the health service. But the very minimum required to feed just one family of, say, four or five for one day comes to Le.50. The nail in the coffin no doubt has been the withdrawal of rice and petrol subsidies pushing these prices up by 240 per cent and 88 per cent (leading to a 200 per cent increase for kerosene) respectively in this short six month period.

Wandering through the slums of East Freetown, I wonder how or if the people survive. A bloating sullenness hangs over what were once lively streets and markets. Taxi’s and poda-poda’s hardly go there any more (no petrol, no spare parts, no vehicles that anyone can afford). On Christmas Day I attended a church service there. The place was packed; there was devotion galore. But ‘money no dere’. All of us were summoned to the crib to place our offering for the poor of the parish. A grand total of Le.850, (about $25) was collected. Fussily, the vicar announced that a special committee would be set up to decide just how best to distribute this wealth fairly amongst the many needy. Meanwhile, on the other side of town, the tourists and the local rich were devouring their Christmas dinners in a luxurious beach hotel at — guess — Le.850 a head (wine included).

All right, so you don’t wish to hear about the immorality of immiseration. Let us therefore look at your textbook economics instead. Your pious hope is, so it says in the Memorandum which accompanied the Letter of Intent, that by bringing the official value of the Leone into line with that of the parallel market, through free flotation underpinned by full trade liberalisation, currency substitution will cease and all import/export trade will re-channel through the local currency area, and the local banking system, submitting itself to national control and taxation. You even insist on a ‘surrender obligation’ to be enforced on those engaging in external trade. Exporters may keep a ‘mere’ 30-40 per cent of the foreign exchange they earn to finance their own and other people’s imports, but for any import to be cleared from the quay proper documents, including a letter of credit, must be produced. The letter of credit is the swivel door that is supposed to ensure that all external trade will pass through the local banks.

Your ‘economic’ assumptions here are based on mind-numbing ignorance of the facts — as any illiterate Sierra Leonean can tell you. The import/export trade is almost entirely in the hands of a miniscule class of 30 big men. Some of these, incidentally, own their own banks. At the apex of this class are two giant traders, one Lebanese and one Afro-Lebanese. Below them come first some ten other very big Lebanese and Afro-Lebanese merchants and the bottom tier of this olympus is formed by some twenty Sierra Leonean traders, all men of very substantial fortune indeed. Each of these big time commercial operators has spun a web of smaller traders (suppliers/retailers) in a way that defies any laws or method of free capitalist enterprise. They organise their profiteering activities more in the manner of Mafia godfathers, extending patronage to and exacting servile obligations from their retainers depending on kinship, friendship, mood and a nebulous pattern of
mutual back-scratching. These are 'non-capitalist' social relations that have nothing to do with freely entered into contractual relations. It is these social relations that determine who gets what piece of the trade, or who will get backing for a credit line in the bank; who will be cut in on a foreign exchange allocation and at what interest or exchange rate. Furthermore, export and import trade are so intimately linked overseas that one gets the impression that this class operates as if it were one big multinational, multi-product, trading company, directing cash flows generated by one activity into the financing of another. For example, a diamond dealer's foreign exchange generated from smuggling will find its way to some other trader's import payments. The latter will pay the former in Leones whatever local cash the man needs to finance his domestic activities. Both bank the profits of their circular trade in foreign accounts held abroad. To think that surrender obligations can be enforced at any point in this well-oiled merry-go-round of finance and commerce, is naive to say the least. Already letters of credit and import bills of lading are traded as 'commercial paper': adding to the inflationary spiral.

Even the full, free convertibility of the Leone cannot establish it as a convertible currency, preferentially traded and held by anyone in the community. This is so because foreign held accounts will simply always offer greater scope for capital accumulation, spending and security. Already it is the case that in the absence of local investment demand, the commercial banks are unable to meet the increased interest rates which you insisted upon as part of the free float package (currently 20 per cent p.a). And so they are now refusing to accept new Leone deposits. Furthermore, in addition to the semi-resident class of external traders, there is a growing sub-class of bureau-political and professional elites with foreign commitments: houses, school fees and hospital check-ups abroad. With stagnant official incomes of at best Le.1000 per month you force this subclass to augment their incomes in foreign cash. Your stabilisation programme is proving to be as stabilising as a tornado. The monetary uncertainty of daily changing prices is now causing increasing not decreasing numbers of people who wish to take their money out to safety abroad. Your policies are backfiring with predictable speed. Already purely domestic transactions like the sale and rental of homes and buildings are openly priced in foreign currency. This in flagrant but understandable defiance of the new regulations.

To complement the liberalisation of trade and currency, your text book economics also prescribes far-reaching privatisation: the dismantling of bureaucratic impediments to private enterprise. In your view the market is at all times a more efficient allocator of resources than administrative flat. Hence the wish to eliminate parastatal enterprises and in particular the Produce Marketing Board. You are so right. In a society as corrupt as this one, each and every bureaucratic rule — each import/export licence, each foreign exchange allocation, each official stamp — turns into a kickback for the bureau-political class. And yes, this gives rise to severe price distortions. The ex-boss of one parastatal managed to buy a house in the poshest part of London's west end for £2 million on the proceeds — not to mention a palace he built in Sierra Leone for an estimated £3 million. I don't take issue with you here.

But the lessening/removal of administrative intervention in the economy cannot now ensure the emergence of free competition. Having grown big behind 20 years of political protection obtained through graft, the giant commercial operators have achieved monopoly positions in every sector of the economy. Their own size is all the protection they now need. For who has the resources to compete with them?
You are only making life easier for them by removing what is now no longer needed and a mere irksome duty — to dash officials.

Last but not least your stabilisation package dictates the increase of producer prices for agricultural export crops (with effect from July 1986, 100 per cent for coffee; 200 per cent for cocoa; 88 per cent for palm kernel). And this is where we come to your real intentions: all you want is your money back — and that of the other foreign creditors. There is not a murmur in the Memorandum about development, industrialisation or self-help. Apart from the carrot of yet another of the World Bank funded IADP projects* which have proven so worthless in the past, there is nothing about encouraging the production of locally grown foodstuffs, rice, yams or plantain. There is nothing that even hints at transforming this mercantile mecca into a productive self-reliant economy or restoring it to the place it once was: quite able to support itself in its natural abundance.

What beats me most in all this is that the IMF/World Bank have no qualms whatsoever in closing the bank accounts of millions while they tremble at the thought of freezing/seizing the foreign assets of a very few. But what could be simpler or fairer than that those who are (well)-known to have robbed the nation have their wealth seized abroad and returned to the homeland to pay for their country’s debts? After all you head an international organisation. The more important (in terms of voting stock) member governments of your Organisation all have well developed tax and bank auditing systems quite able to inspect the external accounts of foreigners. Since you are setting yourself up as global bailiff for international capitalism, you might as well go about it fairly and equitably.

If such a policy sounds too revolutionary, there are other, less adventurous ways to proceed. As you are probably aware, black marketeering in currency and commodities is a problem that afflicts all West African economies. It is greatly stimulated by differentials in currency convertibility and in government fiat between the independent ‘sovereign’ states. None of these small economies has a chance of survival in the modern world, but together through regional unification (e.g. the strengthening of ECOWAS), they might just make it. Such unification should start rather than end with monetary unification, as a first important step towards eliminating the draining leakages (smuggling) between these economies. If you must meddle in Third World countries, why not meddle to serve the goal of progress through regional co-operation, instead of, as you are doing now, picking off these economies and their currencies one by one?

Regional unification would also have the advantage of turning the big men in small ponds into small men in one big pond. And when that happens, then you may pull your Samuelson off your bookshelf and start talking on your favourite subject of the merits of competition and private enterprise.

Yours Faithfully,
Ankie Hoogvelt,
University of Sheffield, January 1987

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*IADP = Integrated Agricultural/Rural Development Project. Since 1973, seven IADPs have been implemented in Sierra Leone. The basic criticism of the IADP approach is that in practice less than 10 per cent of total investment is for actual agricultural production. The rest is spent on (expatriate) wages and salaries, motor vehicles and equipment. See Samura Kamara, The Genesis of Macro-Economic Problems, in D.F. Luke and S.P. Riley (eds), Economic Decline and the Prospects for Reform in Africa: the Case of Sierra Leone, Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1987.
For some helpful ideas on the subject I refer you to the work of Samura Kamara. See his articles in West Africa of 23 June/25 August and 1 September 1986, and his Ph.D. thesis West African Monetary Unification: the Case for a Common Currency, University of Bangor, Wales, 1986.

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SIERRA LEONE: WIDE OPEN TO SOUTH AFRICA?
Trevor W. Parfitt

After less than a year of General Momoh's rule and only a few months since the May 1986 elections a pall of discontent with the trumpeted 'New Order' settled over Freetown. Rumours are circulating to the effect that in reality ex-President Siaka Stevens is still controlling things behind the scenes and that Momoh lacks the political skill to combat the Pa's (Stevens') manipulations effectively. However, well informed sources point out that Stevens is currently out of the country and hint that relations between the ex-president and his successor are decidedly cool. Notwithstanding this it is becoming increasingly clear that the New Order bears a disturbingly close resemblance to the old one. Numerous allegations of corruption and mismanagement are beginning to surface. There have been reports that highly placed officials in the Ministry of Development and Economic Planning have consistently misappropriated USPL480 (food) aid by presenting vouchers to obtain rice for bogus projects so that they could make money on the black market. There are widespread suspicions about the new marketing arrangements for sugar. Until recently sugar marketing was controlled by the Sierra Leone Sugar Marketing Company and its subsidiary James International. They marketed sugar throughout the country at a cost of about Le.200 per bag. However, in April 1986, the Ministry of Agriculture and National Resources took over marketing and Minister Kargbo insisted that all sugar be sent to Freetown to his own representatives. Subsequently the cost rose to Le.800 per bag. It has also been noted that when the Ministry took over the Magbass Sugar Complex the records stated that there were 17,000 bags in the stores, whereas Minister Kargbo told Cabinet there were only 10,000 bags.

Even the elections, which were viewed as the freest and fairest in Sierra Leone's recent history, have come in for a share of the criticism. Reports of inter-factional violence have come from places such as Koidu, Koinadugu, Kailahun and Kenema. This violence was particularly unpleasant at Koidu where party goons used the local party (All People's Congress) office to beat and intimidate local voters who did not support the officially favoured candidate, S.H.O. Gborie.

The most pervasive cause of discontent is the declining standard of living. Power cuts occur on almost a daily basis in Freetown and often there is no water either. The flotation of the Leone has unleashed massive price increases (see above Briefing). Given that labourers can earn as little as Le.5 per day and that few Sierra Leoneans earn more than Le.400 per month it can be seen that the cost of living has become impossibly high for most people. It is felt that the 35 per cent pay rises promised by the government will be inadequate to compensate for sky-rocketing prices.

There is some doubt as to whether the government can deliver even this given that the state is in the throes of a desperate fiscal crisis. According to Abdullai Conteh MP, Sierra Leone owes some $30 million to the IMF, whilst other large sums are owed to Standard Chartered and Barclays Banks. Furthermore, the country had to
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import 112,000 metric tons of rice costing $30 million in 1985. In the face of these demands the government is having difficulty meeting its commitments on recurrent budget and wages are three months in arrears on average. Most of the important agricultural projects about the country are inactive because the donors have suspended disbursements due to government inability to meet its commitments on time.

In the face of deteriorating living standards unrest is growing. The army is said to be restive and there is talk of a coup attempt if things do not change for the better. Indeed, Momoh failed to attend the OAU Head of State meeting in Ethiopia due to his fears of an impending coup. According to one rumour there has actually been an attempted coup, though of a particularly inept sort. Momoh is alleged to have been drinking in the Lagoonda (a luxurious leisure complex owned by local businessman M.K. Suma) with four officers of middling rank (majors and colonels), when one of them became visibly nervous and started shaking with fright. The President became suspicious and had the man searched. He was found to be concealing a knife. Under interrogation he admitted that there had been a plot to kill Momoh and that he was the designated assassin. This revelation is said to have resulted in the dismissal of several army officers.

Even if one takes this particular account with a pinch of salt there are still sufficient signs of mounting popular restiveness to worry government. This has prompted the APC inner circle to start casting around for more funding to alleviate their fiscal crisis. One potential source of finance is LIAT Finance Trade and Construction Limited, which has its base in Frankfurt. LIAT has already involved itself in projects like running a bus service in Freetown, construction of low cost housing at Goderich, and the proposed construction of a bridge from Lungi Airport in Freetown. However, LIAT is the subject of considerable controversy. It is known that the Lebanese population dislike the company because it represents a dangerous competitor, and it has strong Israeli links. The cabinet is split between those who wish to take advantage of the opportunity presented by LIAT and those with Lebanese business connections, who therefore oppose the company. The latter group has been responsible for a series of leaks to a radical group, PANAFU (The Pan-African Union of Sierra Leone), which reveal that LIAT not only has extensive linkages with Israel, but also with South Africa.

The leaks, which are based on the findings of a West German commercial intelligence firm, reveal that LIAT has strong business links and actual shareholding by a South African company named Bophuthatswana Mankelsuertretung. The President of LIAT (S/L) Ltd, Shaptai Kalmanowitch has frequently visited South Africa (or ‘headquarters’ as it is described in company memos). Some of LIAT’s expatriate staff entering Sierra Leone are actually of South African, or Israeli nationality although they use British passports. One of them lives in the OAU Village (built to house African heads of state when Sierra Leone hosted the OAU in 1980). Apparently the South Africans and Israelis aim to entrench themselves in Sierra Leone because the country is economically weak and they think that they can easily induce the government to give Israel diplomatic recognition. They also regard Sierra Leone as a potential staging post for South African goods and services in the event of any comprehensive application of sanctions.

The Lebanese population have tried to counteract these developments. Local businessman, Jamil Mohammed, sponsored a visit to Freetown by Yasser Arafat in June 1986. Publicly, the visit was a success for the Palestine Liberation Organisation
with Momoh and Arafat issuing a joint communiqué that stressed their solidarity in opposition to Zionism and apartheid. However, behind the scenes the visit was not such a success. Arafat offered members of the Government US$8 million if they could obtain Momoh’s agreement to sign a secret protocol giving the PLO a training base on Banana Island for 300 fighters. Initially Momoh agreed to this proposal, but LIAT’s lobby in the Cabinet managed to dissuade him pointing out that it would be unwise to have such a large, well-armed foreign force within one hour’s helicopter ride of Freetown. In the end Arafat left with his US$8 million having failed to secure agreement to the secret protocol.

This has left the field free for LIAT to consolidate itself in Sierra Leone. It is trying to do this by going into joint ventures with local businessmen. The most ambitious of these ventures involves the aforementioned local millionaire, M.K. Suma, in a plan to take over the activities of the National Trading Company under the name, Forex Trading Company. LIAT and SUMATU (Suma’s company) propose the establishment of foreign exchange duty free shops to be managed by FOREX and ask to be given the NTC’s old building and its import licences for essential commodities such as sugar, milk, onions and rice. LIAT are to hold 40 per cent of the shares in FOREX, whilst SUMATU will hold 35 per cent with 25 per cent being held by the government. Initial capital of about US$5 million is to be put up by LIAT and SUMATU, the government’s contribution being the NTC building. In a memo to government signed by Suma and Gerd Zerhussen, the managing director of LIAT, it is stated that FOREX will ‘ensure a regular supply of essential and other commodities in quantities sufficient . . . to end shortages’. The memo also promises to end the flow of foreign exchange into the parallel market. In return LIAT and Suma ask that FOREX be granted:

- control of the duty free shop at Lungi Airport
- unrestricted import licenses
- export licenses for unnamed commodities
- total retention of all foreign currency earned
- a five-year tax concession from the government.

Clearly FOREX has great potential as a sanctions busting operation. It can import South African goods into Sierra Leone, re-label them and export them as Sierra Leonean produce and keep all the foreign exchange earnings without paying any tax. The pro-LIAT lobby in government is thought to be pressing for adoption of this plan and certainly the LIAT/Suma memo urges ‘Government’s immediate agreement to these proposals so that the FOREX COMPANY could take off in the next few months’.

One possibility is that South Africa intends to market its diamonds and gold through FOREX and it has been suggested that the South African company De Beers which monopolises the world diamond trade has an interest in LIAT. There is some evidence to support this contention given that LIAT have mooted the possibility of sponsoring a delegation of Sierra Leoneans including the Minister of Mines, Birch Conteh, to visit its parent company headquarters in Bophuthatswana. It is not clear whether the visit will go ahead or not, but it is clear that LIAT is eager to wine and dine a high level delegation in Sun City in pursuit of its aim to become established in the Sierra Leonean mining industry. During the weekend of 8-10 August 1986 a party of 6 Israelis arrived aboard a UTA flight having received special landing permits from Sierra Leonean immigration on LIAT’s behalf. They visited the mining areas, especially Boajibu and left on Wednesday. Several of the Israelis including a Mr and
Mrs Poulouvi and one Simonyi reportedly came to Sierra Leone through South Africa. Clearly, LIAT is very interested in the Sierra Leonean mining sector probably with a view to using it as an outlet for South African minerals.

Whilst planning these projects LIAT has continued bringing South African and Israeli personnel into Sierra Leone. One of Shaptai Kalmanowitch's top secretaries is a white South Africa, Ms Christa Nel, who was once confidential secretary in a ministry in Bophuthatswana.

It is obvious that LIAT has gained great influence in a short space of time. President Momoh himself has said 'LIAT have come to stay, and they are going to stay'. PANAFU members who have publicised and criticised LIAT's activities in Sierra Leone have been detained by the Government. At the moment it seems likely that projects like FOREX and the bridge from Lungi Airport to Freetown will go ahead. However, it would be wrong to assume that LIAT are in complete control of the government. At the moment government is preparing a Green Revolution Programme for the agricultural sector, which involves the import of 200 tractors. It has been reported that Minister Kargbo recently visited Saudi Arabia to discuss the import of tractors and yet various sources in the Ministry of Agriculture say that there have been negotiations with LIAT. This suggests that the government is bargaining with both sides (i.e. the Arabs/Palestinians on the one hand and the Israelis/South Africans on the other hand) in order to see which will provide the best deal. It remains to be seen which side will win an alliance with Sierra Leone in the final analysis.

However, it is eminently clear that the ramifications of the struggle for liberation in South Africa spread across the whole of the continent. It is also clear that the situation of economic and political crisis that faces much of Africa can make countries such as Sierra Leone vulnerable to South African penetration and subversion. This raises the question — where else has South Africa spread its tentacles?

**Bibliographic Note**

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**THE KENYA STATE, AGRIBUSINESS AND THE PEASANTRY**

Kate Currie & Larry Ray

Following the famous 'Mau Mau' revolt in 1952-56, Kenya experienced a long period of relative political stability under Jomo Kenyatta. During this period the radical and populist tendencies within KANU were squeezed out by the moderate wing whose leaders benefitted considerably from their close relations first with British firms, and later with transnational corporations, (TNCs). The Kenyatta period coincided with rising world prices for Kenyan's main exports (tea and coffee),
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which generated sufficient foreign exchange to fuel rapid economic expansion (4.5% p.a. growth in GDP 1972-80). By 1978, the Kenya state had secured a sufficiently stable political and economic base to survive the leadership transition to Daniel Arap Moi. This coincided with mounting economic difficulties, relating in part to the collapse of world coffee and maize prices; oil price increases; and growing indebtedness. Despite the expectations of many Western commentators and Kenyan politicians, that Moi would in essence be a 'transitional' President, he survived, (arguably stronger) from an alleged coup plot in 1978, an actual coup attempt in 1982 (staged by the Kenya Air Force), and a subsequent power struggle with Charles Njonjo, ex-Minister for Constitutional Affairs, and previously chief political fixer for both Kenyan presidents. That the Kenya state has survived a worsening economic situation, and successive political crises, does not mean that it will necessarily do so in the future. What it does mean, however, is that we need to examine the economic and social bases of this stability. It will be argued that this is to be found, on an organisational level, in the integration of the state with TNCs; and on ideological as well as economic levels, in the policy of creating a small-holder 'kulak' stratum of cash-crop producers.

State & Transnational Corporations
The inter-relationships between local and transnational capital in Kenya have received considerable attention. James Petras (1982) cites Kenya as an example of a 'dependent development' regime in the traditional, as opposed to 'new', international division of labour. This is so, for Petras, in that Kenya possesses and defends its own political and military forces, but its economic expansion is fuelled by metropolitan financial and investment resources. Similarly, Steven Langdon (ROAPE 2) has shown how economic development in Kenya has proceeded largely under the direction of an 'insider' class grouping of a political-bureaucratic bourgeoisie, in close collaboration with transnational capital, concentrated around Nairobi and Central Province. (In contrast to 'outsiders' — the local petty bourgeoisie of traders, workshop owners and small-scale 'peasants', whose productive capacities are hindered by being undercut by international capital). Again, Van Zwanenberg (1974) and others have referred to a 'new nationalist bourgeoisie' in Kenya, as a dynamic force, that in combination with TNCs might develop new productive capabilities. From the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie that emerged in the 1960s, there has developed an administrative, managerial, commercial, industrial and intellectual elite, with a common consciousness of their status.

This should not be taken to mean that the relationships between international and local bourgeoisie in Kenya are always harmonious. Indeed we have argued elsewhere that in his struggle with Charles Njonjo, Moi was attempting to redress the balance between local and international fractions within the Kenyan bourgeoisie, in favour of the former, (Currie and Ray, 1984). Nonetheless, as the anonymous authors of *In-Dependent Kenya* suggest, '... prolonged conflict [between these fractions] is unlikely since neither the government nor the Kenyan bourgeoisie could afford to face the consequences of alienating foreign capital.' Indeed, Kenya's post-independence development strategy has been to encourage private enterprise in cooperation with TNCs. In 1962, the 'Convention on Social and Economic Development in the Emerging Kenya Nation' report *The Kenya We Want* felt that local industry would be stimulated by the importation of foreign capital, rather than by the protection of Kenyan markets.
This policy has given rise to what Langdon (ROAPE 17) calls a 'state-dependent African bourgeoisie'. Through loans provided by the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation, African businessmen have been given access to partnerships and share-holdings in TNC subsidiaries, thereby helping to ensure that these companies have important friends in any dispute with the Government. As in other dependent developing countries the state has acted as risk-bearer for local and foreign capital — by providing capital, infrastructure, tax concessions, privileges for expatriate personnel, as well as guaranteeing a sufficiently repressive political climate to avoid any serious labour disputes. At the same time, the cooperation between the state, local capital and TNCs is cemented where the latter provide technical, managerial, and marketing skills for the former. This is an arrangement that one finds frequently amongst agribusiness in Kenya. For example, Booker-McConnel provide management and marketing services for the Mumias Sugar Company, which is state-owned, and buys raw sugar largely from small-holder producers. Brooke Bond buys and markets tea from the parastatal, Kenya Tea Development Authority, which again buys substantial amounts of raw tea from small-holders. This sort of integration has advantages for TNCs — not least that they do not directly employ productive workers, (tea, sugar etc. growers), and thereby avoid labour disputes. Further, the provision of services (rather than land or plant ownership) gives the companies a large amount of flexibility.

Another example of this sort of state-local capital-TNC integration is provided by British American Tobacco (Kenya) Ltd. In 1974 BAT (K) in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture, initiated a vigorous leaf development programme in Kenya. By 1983, 10,000 contract farmers were producing 6.3m. kgs. of leaf tobacco, at which point Kenya became self-sufficient in tobacco production, and has since begun to export small quantities. This programme has been encouraged by the Government and ruling party, whose leading politicians are often present at rallies held in tobacco growing areas, recruiting farmers to the scheme. One perceived benefit of tobacco for the Government is that it has 'saved' millions of Kenya Shillings in foreign exchange. As a result of this locally grown rather than imported tobacco KSh. 251m. were saved in 1980-83 (Weekly Review 23 September 1983). Cigarette sales and company profits are a source of state revenue: in 1980 KSh. 588m. were raised in exise duty and corporate taxes (Daily Nation, 6 April 1981). The government has similarly encouraged BAT Kenya Developments Ltd. by setting up a marketing system for their poultry business. This has involved the development of a new, capital intensive poultry industry, geared to production in large-scale units, which has come into conflict with traditional systems for producing and marketing poultry (Dinham and Hines, 1985, p.109).

Links between BAT(K) and the state are close. 60% of BAT(K)'s share capital is owned by BAT in London; the remaining 40% is divided evenly between the Industrial and Commercial Development Programme, and the 'public', in reality members of the Government. Further, there is an extensive pattern of interlocking directorships amongst BAT(K) and other corporations. This can be illustrated with reference to the period 1975-80. In 1975 six directors of the Company held directorships in approximately thirty other Kenyan companies, including: Commercial Bank of Africa, National Printers and Publishers Ltd., Industrial Development Bank Ltd., National Bank of Kenya Ltd., Grindlays's Bank International (Kenya) Ltd., East African Oil Refineries Ltd., Leyland Kenya Ltd, East African Power and Lighting Co Ltd., Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd., National Housing
Corporation, and Pan African Paper Mills. By 1977 the number of outside directorships held by members of the Board had increased considerably and included: Mumias Sugar Co., Kenya Airways, Flamingo Airways Ltd., and Bamburi Portland Cement Co. Ltd. By 1979, one single director of the company held a total of 54 directorships, and by 1980, one single director held 63 directorships, including a number of parastatals: Kenya Railways Corporation, Kenya Ports Authority, Coffee Board of Kenya, and Kenya Bureau of Standards.

The list illustrates the integration of personnel amongst local companies, subsidiaries of TNCs and parastatals. BAT(K) has established itself in a pivotal position in Kenyan political and economic life from which it can derive political protection. This ranges, for example, from protection of its position as monopoly purchaser of tobacco leaf, to Government support in the face of concern amongst MPs over the ecological consequences of tobacco curing, (which makes heavy demands on small-holder wood-fuel resources). This degree of integration of personnel affords an insight into the integration of the Kenyan financial-bureaucratic elite.

Certainly this integration has experienced some strain in recent years. Under pressures from the World Bank, the oil-price inflation, and balance of payments problems (a visible deficit of KSh. 5,640m. in 1980), Moi has attempted to reduce public sector borrowing and cut back parastatal investment. This was also part of an effort to satisfy criticisms that the Government favoured state bureaucracies rather than 'genuine Kenyan private initiatives', as a Weekly Review leader put it in December 1982. It is also possible that the current 'clampdown' on 'Mwakenya', which has involved some of the heaviest controls of the press and detentions since independence is an attempt to unite the financial elite in the face of opposition to Moi from Kikuyu businessmen. Nonetheless, elite integration is beneficial to all fractions of the insider bourgeoisie, and increases the political stability of the regime in at least two ways. First, it minimises public divisions that, like the conflict between intellectuals and the Government in 1981-2, can erupt into crises of legitimacy. Secondly, it creates and maintains a sector of salary-earning bureaucrats, dependent on TNC investment, whose loyalty is secured through privileges, patronage, and a career structure.

In the years immediately following independence, there were still splits within the elite over political options and ideologies. Odinga’s Kenya Peoples’ Union offered the alternative to capitalist development in the form of an agrarian populist socialism. This split is now conveniently dismissed by KANU (and by many western commentators) as ‘tribalism’ and ‘Kikuyu-Luo rivalry’. This of course is to depoliticise the issue and create the illusion that ‘development’ and ‘nation-building’ are unproblematic goals to be achieved through technical problem-solving. Hence Moi is constantly telling unspecified ‘critics’ in Kenya and abroad that they should forget ‘foreign ideologies’ and concentrate on development issues like literacy and clean water. This illusion of depoliticised development (which is not uncommon in Africa) has its basis in the organisational form of KANU — a ‘party’ that represents the Central Province bourgeoisie but claims to represent the ‘nation’. KANU can continue to facilitate elite integration only so long as it remains the sole legal party, and so long as contracts, jobs, trading licences, etc, are awarded through a network of patronage that it can control. This in turn can only survive so long as there is an integration of transnational, local and state capital.
Small-holder ‘Kulaks’
The early economic strategy of the European settlers in Kenya was expressed in Lord Delamere’s recommendation to the 1912 Labour Commission. If the Africans were to be successfully forced onto the labour market, he said, ‘their reserves should be cut in order to prevent the Africans from having sufficient land to make them self-supporting. If the Africans had enough land... they would not be obliged to go out and labour for others.’* That is, Africans were to become rural proletarians, excluded from any viable means of subsistence. It was for this reason that they were prohibited from growing lucrative cash crops such as coffee. After the ‘Mau Mau’ revolt, and under pressure from the changing structure of the post-war world economy, this strategy was reversed, with the grudging and gradual acceptance of the still mainly British TNCs. Following the Stamp Commission and the Swynnerton plan in 1954, the Colonial Government both permitted Africans access to cash crop production, and arrested the concentration of land into plantations and estates.

Since independence, Kenyan Governments have encouraged small-holder cash crop production for a variety of reasons. In part the need for export led growth has resulted in attempts to generate foreign exchange for energy imports. Coffee and tea production have, especially during the 1970s, been important here. As a development strategy, this has been limited by Kenya’s dependence on world commodity markets, and by its relatively limited export base. In value terms fuel counted for 40% of Kenyan imports in 1981, against 26% in 1975. Coffee and tea exports together counted for 33% of Kenyan exports in both 1975 and 1981. Yet while the cost of energy imports rose by around 300% between 1977-81, the value of coffee exports fell by 41% and tea by 26% (Statistical Abstract, 1982). By 1980 the cost of oil imports was equal to the price of the whole coffee crop. As with other energy importing Third World countries, attempts to generate foreign exchange to finance economic growth have thus not been successful since the later 1970s.

Small-holder production has been of crucial importance, though, in creating the conditions for political stability. Van Zwanenberg (1974) comments that the ‘growth of an embryonic kulak class is a major factor in the strength and stability of the entire [Kenyan] system’, and warns that ‘the loyalty of this class can only be maintained so long as the market for growth expands at the rate it has done in the last few years’ (p.176). As well as contributing to Kenya’s export drive, cash cropping small-holders are to form a politically loyal middle peasantry — even though at present they remain ‘embryonic’, including about 12% of all small-holders (Dinham and Hines, 1985, p. 91).

This strategy is important because the post-colonial state derives legitimacy in part from the possibility of mass land ownership. While remaining ambivalent in its view of the historical significance of the ‘Mau Mau’ revolt, Kenyan Governments have recognised the political importance of so-called ‘land hunger’. Land has become a focus of oppositional movements since 1963. For example, Oginga Odinga’s split with KANU and Kenyatta to form the KPU in 1969 focussed on accusations of ‘land grabbing’ amongst Kikuyu leaders. The conflicts of 1981-2, that culminated in the coup attempt, involved fights (sometimes armed) over land settlement and squatting in the countryside. In May-June 1982 the press launched a sustained

campaign against corrupt 'land buying companies' that reached sufficient pitch for Moi to intervene directly and order an end to their dealing in some areas, (see for example the *Daily Nation*, June 1982). That the 1979-83 Development Plan admits in passing that many Kenyans will never own land, does not really affect arguments that land is an important force in Kenyan politics. KANU ideology is premised on the notion of a mass rural petite-bourgeoisie, deriving security from land tenure.

The state views cash-cropping as a more secure basis for continued land ownership amongst the middle peasantry than mere subsistence farming, thus there have been efforts in recent years to recruit small-holders into commodity production. This has taken place in a context of marked inequality in land ownership and rural incomes. Indeed in income terms Kenya has been judged the fifth most unequal country in the world (Dinham and Hines). In 1982, 13.16m people lived on small farms with average holdings of 1.2 hectares, 47% of which owned less than 0.4 hectares. At the same time, 3,433 large farms, with an average of 700 hectares, occupy half of Kenya's arable land (*Statistical Abstract, 1982*). The Government hopes that increased cash incomes will improve the security of small-holders, without the major political questions of economic restructuring or land reform being raised.

As a result of this policy, small-holder production accounts for an increasing volume of marketed output in Kenya. By 1980 small-holder tea production accounted for 40% of total tea production. By 1981, 12% of small farms, in contrast to agribusiness, produced 30% of total marketed output for small-holders. At the same time, the wage-labour sector in agriculture declined by 0.3% p.a. 1964-7, and 1.7% p.a. 1972-80, while agricultural output increased at around 3% p.a. This suggests that since independence, increasing numbers of people have been absorbed into the small-holder sector, where cash-crop production has become more intensive. This process (in the immediate term at any rate) tends to reduce both rural landlessness and urban drift, and thus diminishes the political threats that both of these pose.

Transnational agribusiness is central to cash crop development, in that it provides the extension services and credit that parastatals are finding it increasingly difficult to deliver. The KTDA's extension scheme has been drastically cut in the past two years, and plans to advance loans to small formers through the IADP were abandoned in 1982. Moving into cash cropping involves farmers in increased risk of financial loss, and requires new inputs such as fertilizers and insecticides. This is what the TNCs provide. Again, let us take the example of BAT(K). The tobacco company provides small producers with contracts that agree in advance of production the price, quality, and quantity of leaf tobacco to be grown. The contract involves the provision of technical advice, and loans for seeds, a kiln, drying sheds, fertilizers, pesticides, and tree seedlings, that must be repaid from the income from leaf tobacco. The Company's policy is that farmers recruited to the scheme must have sufficient land for food production and for wood fuel (a ton of tobacco requires about a hectare of wood for curing). Whether both these conditions are always met is a matter of dispute (see "The Smoking Giant", *Weekly Review* 24 May 1985).

This arrangement has considerable advantages for BAT(K). First, the farmer, who is responsible for the whole process of planting, growing, harvesting and curing, carries most of the risk. As the Company Chairman said, (1981 Company Report): 'the dispersal of growing helps protect us from the vagaries of the weather'. If the rains come too early or too late, or for too long or not long enough, the crop is ruined
and the farmer carries the loss. Further, tobacco cultivation is highly labour intensive, particularly in the two month nursery period at the beginning, and in the harvesting and curing period at the end. The peasant household both provides the labour for curing and carries the risk of error or accident. For example, the curing process requires high constant temperatures of between 90°F and 100°F for four to six days. It is not uncommon for family members to sleep round the kiln during the curing process, in conditions of high heat and humidity. The farmer thus carries the cost of curing equipment, a large part of the costs of wood-fuel replacement, supplies uncosted family labour, and carries the physical risks involved (including in addition, risks from chemical pesticides and fertilizers). If things go well, the farmer might earn sufficient cash to buy a years’ education for a child, or some basic consumer goods. If things go badly, the farmer is likely to be in considerable debt, and might face the options of either remaining in the scheme to pay off the loan, or to sell up and withdraw from the scheme.

Secondly, the contracting scheme gives the Company flexibility and protection. As sole purchaser of leaf tobacco in Kenya, BAT (K) has considerable control over grower prices, while farmers have little or no bargaining power. Since the farmers are not employed directly by the Company, the latter is protected against labour disputes or sabotage of the crop, while still exercising managerial control (through the extension scheme). Further, since BAT (K) does not own land in Kenya (except for experimental purposes), it is protected from possible nationalisation of its assets, and could, if conditions became unfavourable, move out with relatively low cost.

The development of a cash-cropping peasantry, in collaboration with agribusiness, is thus a contradictory process. On the one hand, the policy is favoured by the Government, because it dovetails with its political and economic objectives. It is premised on the possibility of a viable, property owning peasantry. On the other hand, the benefits of contract growing for agribusiness might work against these objectives, in that small-scale production can compete with the estates only so long as the household is subject to what Bernstein (ROAPE 10) calls the ‘simple commodity squeeze’. Household labour is constantly de-valourised, and the producers’ control over their means of production becomes increasingly nominal. Agribusiness preserves the traditional household structure of production. However, the extension officers effectively control the labour process, the farmer is indebted to the company, and has little scope for negotiating the price. Thus the idea that the farmer ‘sold’ his/her crop becomes something of an illusion. The producer price could be seen as tantamount to a wage. However, whereas the wage relation conceals the expropriation of surplus value, the producer price is a different ideological relation. It conceals the farmer’s subsumption to transnational capital, and the fact that ownership of productive property has become more formal than real. However, political stability and mass loyalty in the countryside are unlikely to be eroded without the organisation of political forms that express small-holders’ interests. In an atmosphere of highly restricted political debate, where even theatre in vernacular language is viewed by the Government as subversive, such awareness might be slow in finding expression.

Bibliographic Note

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1986 ELECTIONS IN THE SUDAN: TRADITION, IDEOLOGY, ETHNICITY — AND CLASS?
James L. Chiriyankandath

The April 1986 elections for the Sudanese Constituent Assembly offers a snapshot of a nation in flux. The sixteen-year dictatorship of Gaafar Numeiri had left a legacy of economic ruin, social dislocation and political confusion. Analysis of the elections and their results gives an opportunity to examine this legacy and also the impact of modern Islamic revivalism on politics. First, however, some background on the role played by tradition, ethnicity, ideology and economic interests in modern Sudanese politics.

The two main parties in the Sudan trace their origins to 19th century Islamic sects and derive much of their support from the persistence of traditional religious loyalties. The Unionists evolved out of the Ashiqqa Party, the dominant group in the Graduates General Congress, formed in 1938 by the first Western-educated urban Sudanese. Though the leading Unionists belonged to the secularly-inclined urban elite, the party’s rural strength depended upon the support of the Khatmiyya, the largest of the Sufi tariqas that dominated the religious life of northern Sudan. This often uneasy alliance of convenience arose from the fact that the Umma Party was founded in 1945 at the instance of the head of the more heterodox Mahdist Ansar, the largest of the Sufi tariqas that dominated the religious life of northern Sudan. This often uneasy alliance of convenience arose from the fact that the Umma Party was founded in 1945 at the instance of the head of the more heterodox Mahdist Ansar, the largest of the Sufi tariqas that dominated the religious life of northern Sudan. This often uneasy alliance of convenience arose from the fact that the Umma Party was founded in 1945 at the instance of the head of the more heterodox Mahdist Ansar, the largest of the Sufi tariqas that dominated the religious life of northern Sudan.

An important factor in the evolution, and maintenance, of traditional religious loyalties has been nascent capitalist development. The Khatmiyya for long enjoyed official patronage, first of the Turko-Egyptian regime (1821-85), and then of the British until the 1920s. Consequently, they drew their support mainly from the groups most susceptible to colonial influence — the riverain population of the north, and especially the trading classes in the towns. A more explicitly economic element was visible in the revival in the fortunes of the Ansar after their defeat in 1898. Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, the son of the Mahdi, buttressed his political ambitions by developing, with tacit British encouragement, extensive agricultural enterprises in the White Nile area, south of Khartoum. While providing employment for thousands of Ansar immigrants from the west, the profits enabled him to patronise influential local shaykhs and a minority section of the emergent urban intelligentsia.

Umma and the Unionists (the National Unionist Party until 1966 and thereafter its successor, the Democratic Unionists) maintained their dominance throughout the 1950s and 1960s. They won over three-quarters of both the seats and the votes in four elections. Apart from six months after independence in 1956, when the NUP ruled alone, either a faction or the whole of both parties were represented in government until Numeiri’s 1969 coup. Though active politicians were excluded from the paternalistic military regime of General Abboud (1958-64), the generals belonged to the same traditional elite groups as the Unionist and Umma politicians.
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The first significant challenge to the dominance of the traditional parties came in 1964-65 from the left-wing Professionals Front. The Front had spearheaded the October Revolution against Abboud. Though the traditional parties reasserted their supremacy at the polls, the 1965 elections saw the emergence of alternatives: ideologically-based parties and the ethnic blocs.

Both communism and modern Islamic revivalism arrived in the Sudan via Egypt in the 1940s. The nucleus of the Sudanese Communist Party was formed by a group of Cairo University students in 1946. Composed mainly of returning Cairo students and sympathisers within the Sudanese higher education system, the SCP members pioneered trade union activity among railwaymen and cotton-growing tenants in the Gezira, south of Khartoum. However, Communist electoral support remained mainly confined, geographically, to Khartoum, and classwise, to the intelligentsia. In 1965 SCP supporters won eleven of the fifteen seats reserved for graduates and three years later they won two constituencies — Omdurman South (Communist front organisations captured a fifth of the vote in Khartoum Region) and the railway town of Atbara.

The origins of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Sudan were similar to those of the SCP. The pre-independence activists were again Cairo-educated students and students and staff at the then University College of Khartoum. However, unlike the Communists, the Brotherhood confined their activities to the University and higher secondary schools until the October Revolution, after which they formed the Islamic Charter Front. The Front demonstrated the electoral potential of Islamic militancy in 1965 when it won three constituencies and two of the graduates' seats. The ICF's Secretary General, law professor Hassan Abdullah el Turabi, topped the poll in the Graduates constituency and the party took eleven per cent of the vote in Khartoum.

While the Communists and Muslim Brothers were making inroads into the urban Unionist strongholds, the politics of ethnicity was gaining ground both in the non-Muslim south and among non-Arab northerners. This trend was encouraged by economic policies that concentrated resources in the already more developed riverain regions — the Northern and Central regions and Khartoum. In the north groups such as the Nuba hill people of south Kordofan and the Beja in the Red Sea Hills felt neglected by a patronising Arabic-speaking political elite drawn largely from the riverain regions. Both the Nuba Mountains General Union and the Beja Congress were formed in the mid-1950s as pressure groups by discontented Assemblymen belonging to the traditional parties. In 1965, disillusioned with the main parties, Nuba and Beja candidates stood on their own, winning eight and ten seats respectively.

The 1969 coup thus interrupted a process of reformation in Sudanese politics. Such a process could be discerned not only in the advances made by the new forces but also in the split within Umma between the conservatives led by the Ansar Imam and a younger, modernising element represented by his Oxford-educated nephew, Sadiq. There was a shift away from politics based on deference to traditional leaders towards a more diffuse political system in which appeals were couched in terms of ideology, class of regional interests, and ethnicity, as well as traditional religious loyalty. Numeiri's years of repression only succeeded in suspending the process and strengthening or weakening elements within the developing system. His attempts to usher in a new system were dismal failures: the first was based on Nasserist socialism; the second aimed at a decentralised one-party state oriented
towards free enterprise; and the third conformed to Numeiri's own idiosyncratic version of Islamic Sharia law. All were the products of the President's own erratic personality combined with shifts in political alliances between the President and, first, the Communists, then the sectarian politicians and finally the Muslim Brothers. As such they proved to be shallow experiments.

In the months following Numeiri's fall in April 1985, 48 political groupings were established or revived. However, only eleven managed to gain representation in the Constituent Assembly. The elections passed off relatively quietly in the north, though in January and February violent incidents involving supporters and opponents of the Islamic Front had left 30 people dead. About three-fifths of the estimated 8.8 million eligible voters (all men and women over 18) were registered. Turn-out over the twelve days of polling varied considerably. In Khartoum over 80 per cent of those registered voted but the situation was very different in the three southern regions, where a civil war had been raging since mid-1983. Even going by the probably inflated official estimates, less than a quarter of those eligible registered. No polling was possible in 37 of the 68 geographical constituencies and voting was countermanded in two more owing to the assassination of one of the candidates. In an election in which the average size of a constituency was between 20-30,000, the majority of the southerners elected were returned with less than a thousand votes.

The main change in the distribution of seats was the restoration of graduates seats, which had been dispensed with in 1968. Left-wing parties and the Alliance of Trade Unions had demanded that the 'modern forces' (i.e. trade unionists and professionals) should be granted special representation, amounting to as much as half the seats. They argued that it was these groups that had spearheaded the popular unrest that forced Numeiri's ouster. However, their demand was rejected by the Transitional Military Council, composed of conservative senior officers, with the backing of the traditional parties. Instead, 28 seats were reserved for graduates of higher educational institutions.

In the election, Umma, led by former Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi, emerged as the largest group with 100 of the 262 contested seats (a breakdown of the results is given in Table 1). Umma won 98 of the 205 northern geographical seats, maintaining its historically strong position in the western regions of Darfur and Kordofan, and in the White Nile area of the Central Region — where it took twelve of the thirteen seats. The extent to which Umma's success was based on its traditional support is apparent from a comparison with the two previous occasions on which the party had won a plurality. In 1958 it won 64 per cent of the seats in Darfur, Kordofan, and the Central Region; in 1965 the figure was 61 per cent; in 1986 it was again 64 per cent. The main difference in this election was the improvement of Umma's performance in Khartoum where it had previously only ever won one seat. This time it captured a quarter of the popular vote and seven seats, including six of the ten in the old city of Omdurman. Umma was helped by the widespread belief that it would emerge as the largest party and that Sadiq, with his experience and reputation as a moderate, was the obvious choice to be Premier. However, the main factor was the influx of Ansar migrants from the west who had come to the capital in search of work, first during the period of rapid economic expansion in the 1970s, and then to escape the consequences of drought. Most had settled in Omdurman, the old Mahdist capital, with the greatest concentration in the traditionally Ansar district of Wad Nubawi.
Table 1. The 1986 Election Results (By Region)

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Abbreviations: DUP — Democratic Unionist Party; INF — Islamic National Front; PPP — People’s Progressive Party; SSPA — South Sudan Political Association; SAPCO — Sudan African People’s Congress; SNP — Sudanese National Party; SCP — Sudanese Communist Party; SAC — Sudan African Congress; BC — Beja Congress; SDFP — Sudanese People’s Federal Party; Inds. — Independents. Note: Results for the 28 graduates seats are given in parentheses. Results for two of the Bahr el Ghazal constituencies were still unavailable at the end of May 1986.

There are several reasons why the Umma vote held up better than that of the DUP. The religious loyalty of the Ansar had always encompassed a political dimension, owing to their origin in the 1880s as an anti-colonial national movement. Umma benefited from the close-knit, hierarchical Ansar religious organisation that stretched down to the villages. Although Numeiri had made a determined attempt to break the power of the Mahdi family (the Ansar Imam was killed by the Army in 1970), the national reconciliation agreement concluded with Sadiq al Mahdi in 1977 enabled the latter to return from exile and establish his position as the leader of the Ansar. Over the next few years he re-built a reformed Ansar organisation. Aware of the revivalist wave sweeping the Islamic world in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, he also promoted Islamisation, albeit of a more restrained kind than that favoured by Numeiri and the Muslim Brothers. This helped Umma hold its own against the Islamic Front.

The Unionists were the main losers in the election. One faction, the urban-based National Unionists who rejected any links with the Khatmiyya religious leadership, failed to win any seats. However, its intervention, and that of unofficial Unionist candidates, contributed to the DUP losing a number of seats it would otherwise have won. For instance, in Ed Damer East in the Northern Region, the 312 votes won by the NUP were enough to give Umma the seat. In Khartoum, where the DUP had taken eleven of thirteen seats in 1968, the party managed to win only eight of the 31 seats despite gaining 10,000 more votes than the Islamic Front, which won thirteen seats. The Unionists share of the vote in the capital fell from 53 per cent in 1968 to 35 per cent. Their loss of support among educated Sudanese was shown by the failure to take even one of the northern graduates seats.

The DUP’s 24 per cent share of the contested seats was its worse electoral performance. Several factors were responsible. Unlike Sadiq al Mahdi, the chief Unionist politicians had opted to remain in exile. Thus, when Numeiri fell, the internal party organisation was in a state of considerable disrepair. Lacking cohesion and unable to agree on a definable political programme, the party was forced to rely, to a greater extent than ever, upon the traditional following of its patron, the Khatmiyya leader, Mohamed Osman el Mirghani. Mirghani, head of the
Khatmiyya since 1968, had remained in the Sudan under Numeiri, confining himself to an active religious role. Now, only his support enabled the DUP to retain a majority of the seats in the Eastern and Northern regions and to win six of the fifteen seats in the Blue Nile districts of the Central Region. In the Gezira, the heartland of the Central Region, the position of the party's Secretary General, El Sharif Zein el Abdin el Hindi, head of the locally influential Hindiyya tariqa, contributed to its strong showing — eight of 22 seats.

The principal factor in the setback suffered by the DUP was the emergence of the Islamic National Front as a powerful force. Making a clean sweep of the northern graduates seats, with 40 per cent of the graduate vote, it also became the first 'third party' to win seats in all the northern regions. Apart from two in Kassala, the seats the INF won outside Khartoum were all in small towns, an indication of the spread of its appeal beyond the main urban centres. This represented an important breakthrough for an ideological party operating in an environment in which traditional allegiances remained strong.

The INF had been formed, after Numeiri's fall, by the majority faction in the Muslim Brotherhood, led by Hassan el Turabi. The close association of the Turabi group with Numeiri meant that it was excluded from the National Alliance of trade unions and opposition parties. However, the Brotherhood's participation in the ousted government had enabled it to function relatively freely. It was also aided by capital from supporters in the Gulf and the boom in Islamic banking in the early 1980s (in which Muslim Brothers figured prominently). Organised in cells and highly authoritarian, the political Brotherhood was paralleled by a religious wing, the Da'awa Islamia. This gave the INF rank and file a fervency and discipline unmatched by supporters of the other parties. The fact that most of the constituencies it won were clustered — in Khartoum, the Gezira and along the Nile in the Northern Region — also indicates an effective deployment of resources. Another factor that helped the Front was its popularity among sections of the armed forces, gained during the Numeiri years and through having championed the military in the war against the southern Sudan People's Liberation Movement. The INF did particularly well in the Khartoum constituencies in which military barracks were located and also won two war-torn constituencies on the borders between north and south — Abyei North in Kordofan and Kurmuk in the Central Region.

However, the roots of the popular appeal of Islamic militancy lay in the deep-seated sense of alienation felt by many Muslims faced with the impact of modernisation. Already evident in the 1960s, the process was accelerated by the drift to the towns, and the rapid spread of Western consumer values and social mores in the urban areas. The INF successfully exploited the social dislocation caused by this move from village to town — from an indigenous tradition to an imported modernity. Their use of the rhetoric of Islamic revival, with its familiar symbolism, seemed to offer a sense of security and identity to significant sections of town dwellers, particularly students and the less well off. Uprooted psychologically, as well as physically, from their traditional environment the latter sought an ideology that provided an emotional tie with the past and their indigenous culture.

In the Sudan, as elsewhere in the Third World, both the rapid pace and the weak, neo-colonial character of capitalist economic development has impeded class formation on Western lines. Along with the vagaries of Numeiri's economic policy, this partly explains why the early success of the Communists, achieved during a period of relatively steady economic growth, was not sustained. However, another
crucial factor was the repression that followed an abortive pro-Communist coup in 1971. The party barely survived and, especially among the educated youth, lost the initiative to the Muslim Brothers. Though the SCP re-emerged after Numeiri’s fall, it faced competition on the left from a variety of groups, most notably rival pro-Iraqi and pro-Syrian Baathists, and Nasserists. Its loss of influence was reflected in the elections. The Communists won only one of the graduates’ seats, and that in the south; in Khartoum their share of the vote fell to five per cent. The two constituencies they won — Khartoum II and Al Amarat and Dueim — included some of the most prosperous districts in the capital. Here many of the older generation of the educated, Westernised class appear to have been influenced in their vote by memories of their radical student days and the distaste they felt for the intolerant puritanism of the Islamic Front, the Communists’ main opponents.

In the months before the election there was serious tension between supporters of the Front and those of the Sudanese National Party, formed by the veteran Nuba politician and Christian clergyman, Philip Abbas Ghabboush. Nuba hostility towards Islamic militants had been fostered in the early 1980s by the latter’s role in implementing an official policy of forced expulsions of western and southern immigrants from Khartoum. Christian Nuba also resented being discriminated against under Numeiri’s Sharia law. In the Nuba home area of south Kordofan the SNP won more seats than any other party while Ghabboush was elected from a poor Khartoum North constituency with the support of southern, as well as Nuba, voters. However, an attempt to create an effective national electoral coalition of regional and ethnic parties from the south and west failed. The SNP was the only one of the thirteen constituents in the Sudan Rural Forces Solidarity organisation to win seats in the north. The several hundred thousand southerners living in Khartoum and other northern towns remained unrepresented. Extreme poverty, the fear of provoking a reaction from the Muslim majority, and apathy, all played a part.

Ethnic conflict among southerners also helped undermine their electoral strength. The rivalry between the Dinka, the largest tribe, and the rest had been a major factor in Numeiri’s 1983 decision to revert from a unified autonomous Southern Region to the three regions existing prior to 1972. The 1972 Addis Ababa Accord had ended the post-independence civil war between north and south and its revision provided the largely Dinka-led Sudan People’s Liberation Movement with one of its principal grievances. Fears of Dinka domination, first aroused by Equatorian politicians ousted from the Southern regional government, were encouraged by the authorities in Khartoum both before and after Numeiri’s fall. The consequent tensions were apparent in the elections. While the Dinka-led South Sudan Political Association gained a majority of the contested seats in predominantly Dinka Bahr el Ghazal, parties hostile to the SPLM and backing the 1983 division won in Equatoria. In Upper Nile the SSPA and the Sudan African Congress, sympathetic to the SPLM, each took two seats, but the military struggle between the SPLM and the smaller, mainly Nuer, Anyanya II guerilla group, favoured by Khartoum, again highlighted the ethnic conflict. As in 1968, the tribal rivalry and the low level of electoral participation (the voters included a significant number of northern soldiers), helped northern parties pick up a few seats.

The government formed by Sadiq al Mahdi in May 1986 included his Umma Party, the Unionists, the five southern parties that had won seats, and a non-party member of the National Alliance. However, the Islamic Front, the Communists, and the SNP remained outside the coalition while in the south the SPLM intensified its attacks.
An accommodation between the principal conflicting elements in Sudanese politics—tradition, ideology, and ethnicity—thus remained unachieved. In the absence of such a *modus vivendi* the outlook for the country is one of continued instability since none of the competing elements possesses an appeal strong enough to counter the other two. The trauma of social and economic change, while undermining some of the strength of traditional sectarianism, has only encouraged the rise of new divisive religious and ethnic forces.

**Bibliographic Note**

Much of the material for this Briefing was gathered from personal observation and the local media, during a stay in the Sudan from November 1985 to June 1986. For the political background I have found the works cited below the most useful:

- P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, *The History of the Sudan from the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*, (Weidenfield & Nicolson, London, 1979);
- Mohamed Nuri el Amin, *The Emergence and Development of the Leftist Movement in the Sudan during the 1930's and 1940's*, (Institute of African and Asian Studies, Khartoum, 1984);

**THE NUMBERS GAME: LEGITIMISING APARTHEID**

**John Pickles**

The cornerstone of the South African policy of grand apartheid is the territorial fragmentation of the territory and the creation of ostensibly independent Black states (variously termed Reserves, Bantustans, homelands, and nation states). The local, regional and international acceptance of these units as viable territorial regions has been of utmost concern to the apartheid regime. The state had sought to legitimise them in various ways, but fundamental has been the argument that they are agriculturally viable, productive regions.

Critics of the apartheid state have taken issue with this claim, and have argued instead that the homelands represent for the most part fringe areas whose ecological potential is severely limited, and have been severely degraded because of recent increases in population pressure. The issue has been in part whether the government's assessment of land potential is accurate. Even to enter the debate carries a risk—to debate whether the homelands have viable land or not is to carry on the debate on apartheid's terrain. But the debate now appears to be bogus in quite another way.

The 1983 *Survey of Race Relations* reprints a table dealing with land in the homelands (p.323) that was compiled from the report of Minister P. Koornhof to Parliament (*Hansard*, 8 Q Col. 778-782). The table originally had three columns, giving the amount of land in each of the homelands, then broke that down into two categories: (1) the area of land suitable for mechanised agriculture, and (2) land suitable for other forms of agriculture. Several interesting features appear when we do a little calculation and add one column to the original table. First is that according to Minister Koornhof, Bophutatswana has more land suitable for
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agriculture of one sort or another than it has land! Calculating the proportion of usable land in all of the homelands as a percentage of the total land area of each of the homelands is also telling. It turns out that for each of the homelands the percentage of agriculturally usable land against the total land area of each homeland is the same, exactly 95 per cent. So, every homeland is supposed to have the same ratio of land agriculturally usable — whether KwaZulu and Transkei in the well-watered lowveld and middleveld or the drier highveld areas of Bophutatswana, Lebowa, and KwaNdebele, or the mountain homeland of Qwa Qwa.

'The Great Homeland “Land” Lie'

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SOUTH AFRICA ECONOMIC RESEARCH AND TRAINING PROJECT: A WORKSHOP ON RESEARCH PRIORITIES FOR POST-APARTHEID PLANNING

The workshop was initially intended to be very small — just between the ANC Economic Research Unit and a few economists from South Africa, as well as a handful of individuals from Europe. However, owing to popular demand, we were forced to broaden the scope of the seminar to accommodate other research interests outside economics.
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The result was a highly successful workshop held in Amsterdam in December 1986 which went well beyond our expectation both in scope and size of participation. The South African delegation included academics as well as representatives from national and community based organisations.

Reports reaching us indicate that the seminar has sparked off a lot of enthusiasm inside South Africa particularly in progressive academic circles.

We are now busy working out the research programme and, in this respect, we want to broaden contact with academic institutions and research groups everywhere. We would particularly like to emphasize our primary objective viz. the establishment of a research and training centre in southern Africa.

Arising out of the workshop, a list of more than fifty research areas relevant to post-apartheid South Africa was identified. This list has been prioritised and woven into an overall proposed programme of research. Some of these areas appear in more than one category. This shows the necessity for integrated research as well as the overall importance of the subject.

During the workshop a number of themes which permeated a number of sessions were identified as crucial for special attention.

The first theme was that of rural and regional development. In South Africa the rural areas have not only been ignored but, in the case of the bantustans, significantly overburdened by the relocation of more than 3.5 million people. And the 'white' rural areas have been depopulated and mismanaged by the development of commercial agriculture.

The second overriding area of concern was that of women. Just as development programmes will need a rural bias, so will affirmative action-type programmes be necessary to advance the position of all women in a liberated South Africa.

The third priority trend throughout the discussion was that of ongoing education to alert people to new options (and constraints) which would be operative in a post-apartheid South Africa. This education should be integrated into organisational work now. A close two-way working relationship with trade unions and progressive organisations would therefore be important from now to raise consciousness on long term concerns in preparation for future policy making.

Related to the third priority is that of appropriate education and training both now and in the post-apartheid SA. It was felt particularly that there were not enough progressive economists with suitable technical skills to transform the present system into a viable equitable economy in the longer term.

A number of common strategies emerged from the sessions, including:

— introductory readers on various economic topics be produced in order to stimulate debate and make economic issues more accessible.
— comparative studies showing the experience of other countries, especially in Latin America and southern Africa.
— study of reformist programmes for post-apartheid South Africa.
— foreign aid — who is offering what, and why.
— to what extent any of the identified areas for research are already being investigated elsewhere, and if so what the orientation and nature of the research is.

As a result of the plethora of conferences on post-apartheid South Africa, there is
confusion over who is researching what. It is therefore crucial to liaise with other groups and organisations working in the same field.

Selebano Matlhape, Director, SAERTP

For more information on the work of SAERTP contact them at Paulus Potterstraat 20, 1071 DA Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

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JOURNAL OF AFRICAN MARXISTS FIRST COLLOQUIUM ON CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION IN AFRICA HELD IN ACCRA, GHANA, AUGUST 11-13, 1986, CONCLUDING STATEMENT

We are pleased to be able to include this Statement from the Conference of a journal with whom we have collaborated over the years. Their emphasis on the struggle for democratisation echoes one of the strong messages coming from the 1986 ROAPE Conference.

The Colloquium was attended by over a hundred participants from the following countries. Angola, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The following movements were present: The New Democratic Movement (NDM), The United Front (UF), The Green Book Study (GBS), The Trade Union Congress (TUC), The Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR), The Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG) — all from Ghana; SWAPO, ANC, Socialist Workers and Farmers Party of Nigeria (SWFP); Ligue Democratique du Senegal (LD/MPT); the Peoples' Union of the Cameroon (UPC). The Colloquium fulfilled the main objectives of the Journal of African Marxists which is to provide a forum for the exposition of the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism in the conditions of Africa. The meeting noted that the continent is locked in a deep and fundamental crisis of neo-colonialism and concluded that the solution is revolution and social transformation.

The view emerged that there is a need to advance the struggle for the use of scientific socialism as a guide to political and economic independence in Africa.

It was felt that a major concern of Marxist-Leninists in Africa is to struggle for the democratisation of society. Without this, there can be no progress or development. Therefore Marxist-Leninists should strengthen democratic organisations and join in political struggles in defence of human rights which is a crucial issue in Africa today. To this end we should co-operate with all progressive forces in Africa.

African Marxists should promote the causes of the labouring people — the workers and peasants, the oppressed and the disadvantaged in society for their economic, political and social rights.

The Colloquium gave serious consideration to the question of the liberation of women and concluded that this is a fundamental problem which must be advanced with all vigour. Participants recognised the need to improve the practices within existing movements and organisations with regard to the woman question. Women must be fully integrated into all levels of struggle to ensure that they take their rightful place as equals with the achievement of democratic and socialist societies.
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The meeting expressed solidarity with the ANC and SWAPO and strongly supported the campaign for mandatory comprehensive sanctions against the apartheid regime. It condemned the positions of Reagan and Thatcher on South Africa and the hypocritical attitudes of the EEC.

The meeting demanded the removal of all foreign military bases from Africa and resolutely condemned the present invasion of Angola by nazi South African troops. The stand of the frontline states against South Africa was warmly acclaimed.

The participants expressed their solidarity with the non-aligned Movement summit to be held shortly in Harare, Zimbabwe, and urged the Heads of States to take a firm stand against apartheid and imperialism.

In pursuance of all the above, the Colloquium urged the development of close co-operation between all progressive forces on the continent and the realisation of concrete solidarity in spirit and action.

In line with its international outlook, the Colloquium affirmed the need for solidarity with all socialist and progressive forces throughout the world.

The meeting warmly thanked the Ghana National Committee of the *Journal of African Marxists* for their tremendous effort in convening the Colloquium; the Ghana Institute for Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) for the use of their facilities, the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution for their participation, support and the warm message received from the political counsellor for the Economic Development of the CDR’s and through them the Government of Ghana.
THE EPLF SECOND CONGRESS
Doris Burgess & Lionel Cliffe

The Second Congress of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) took place from 12-19 March 1987 at Orotta in the Sahel region of Eritrea. It was attended by about 1500 delegates, observers and foreign guests. The EPLF was formally set up in 1977, two years after it had, informally, come into existence. This Second Congress, 10 years after the first, brought together the EPLF and the Eritrean Liberation Front/Central Leadership (also sometimes referred to as Central Command, CC), one of the three factions into which the former ELF had split, in what was called the 'Unity Congress'. This was the culmination of negotiations over three years which had brought together the two fighting forces in October 1986 under a unified command.

The Congress elected a new Central Committee. This has been enlarged from 37 to 71 with six associate members. Of the 71, seven were from the ELF/CL. And for the first time, six women were elected to the Central Committee. There were 120 nominations for the 71 places and a secret ballot was held amongst the delegates. The Central Committee then in turn elected the Secretary General and the Political Bureau from amongst its members. The post of assistant Secretary General was abolished and the Political Bureau was reduced from 13 to 9. The structural changes herald a new look, streamlined, more efficient EPLF with Isseyas Afeworki as the new Secretary General. This change at the top seems to be amicable and widely agreed, with Ramadan Mohammed Nur remaining a respected and valued member of the Political Bureau.

The Congress itself was a monumental logistical exercise characteristic of the organisational abilities of the EPLF. An amphitheatre was built into the side of the mountain, camouflaged to protect us against the daily flights of the Ethiopian Antonov's and the MiGs. Among the guests were representatives from the other two ELF factions, many of the Sudanese political parties including the ruling Umma Party, the Somali, Tunisian and Iraqi governments, and the various liberation movements operating inside Ethiopia (the Oromo, Western Somali, Sidamo) but with the notable absence of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF).

In the next issue of ROAPE (No. 39) we will bring you an interview with Isseyas Afeworki and a synopsis of the resolutions passed at this Congress.
Reviews

THE ROOTS OF FAMINE

The search for the causes of famine in Africa continues. As was to be expected, disasters in the Sahel, the Horn and southern Africa have prompted a number of publications which seek to explain these events. This debate is not new. In the heady days of ROAPE 1 for example, it was all so simple: the Sahel famine of 1973 was, for Meillassouxi, promoted by that region's unequal insertion into the world economy. The commoditisation of land and labour and the production of cash rather than food crops, impoverished west African farmers and made them more susceptible to lean years following drought. For Cliffe, in the same volume, Ethiopia's famine at that time was promoted by the disintegration of feudalism and the accompanying erosion of tenuous peasant rights which accompanied the spread of capitalist relations of production in agriculture.

Central to these, and other radical Africanist concerns in the early 1970s, was the search for coherent political economy explanations for famine in Africa. The cause of famine was seen to be anything but 'natural'. It was instead, caused by economic and political dislocation and impoverishment of peasant farmers. For the editors of ROAPE 15/16 the 'Roots of Famine' lay in two basic processes of change in African agriculture initiated by capitalism. The first was the 'decline in the food producing capability of different societies beginning in the colonial period and continuing to the present'. And the second was the 'transformation of rural production relations both in terms of the development of distinct classes and the change in the relations between men and women brought about by a new sexual division of labour' (p.1).

More recent issues of this journal have sought to add sophistication to the explanation that famine in Africa is caused simply by capitalism or colonial conquest. In particular, Gartrell (ROAPE 33) criticised Mamdani's explanation of famine in Karamoja (ROAPE 25) as inaccurate historically and simplistic theoretically. Mamdani was accused of creating an idyllic past for the inhabitants of
Karamoja by implying that famine only came to that part of Uganda with colonial contact. Theoretically, Mamdani was seen to have reified imperialism as a cause rather than exploring the interplay of environment (nature) and people's relationship with it.

Mamdani has responded to Gartrell's critique with a spirited and useful, although still only partial, defence. It is true to say that Mamdani has shifted the debate — although not in an original way — concerning explanations of Africa's famine away from the earlier contrasting positions of nature versus social causes. Like Gartrell, he has been concerned to show the complexity of causes of famine. But he disputes with her the hierarchy of that causation. He criticises her for a crude empiricism which searches only for 'maximum number of causes' and which fails to separate 'determinant from contributing historical causes'.

For Mamdani, the starting point of analysis has to be the process of production and especially the 'set of labour processes that constitute the medium of interaction between human subjects and their objective natural context'. Although this context is not immutable, but subject to historical development, 'not least because human beings adapt to and transform it in the context of their productive activity', Mamdani still seems to cling to a view of an objective reality seen, at least initially, as existing independently of people. Methodologically this is not helpful for the environment without people is meaningless. 'Nature' is not natural but is 'produced' by different social systems and Mamdani's intervention does not go far enough in indicating methodologically how we can grasp the relationship between people and their changing environment. Mamdani, moreover, accepts axiomatically that the issue of causation is itself something which can be grasped. For him it is simple. A materialist view of history necessarily gives us the equipment to uncover the primary causes of famine which, for Karamoja, was the disruption of the pre-colonial process of production, forcing 'more exclusive dependence on pastoralism than was the case before'. His concern, however, to examine changes in relations of production as the primary cause of famine in Karamoja slurs over too many questions. Despite his reservations, Mamdani too readily elevates the colonial measures of land confiscation and forceable commoditisation of cattle as the cause of famine. He fails to stress first that the creation of famine was a process resulting from class conflict, local as well as colonial, and not just a reflection of the interests of the latter alone. Second, he fails to situate the erosion of local strategies for survival in the interplay of local actions and state policy. His analysis lacks the dimension of how social formations suffering famine reproduce themselves. In this he is like other observers of famine, apart perhaps from Michael Watts, who are reluctant to grasp the importance of local strategies for coping, albeit within a context of maintaining a transformed food system. Finally, Mamdani still tells us little about the type of famine promoted by colonial contact. Don't we need to ask the question whether the causes and consequences of all famines are the same? Should part of our concern be with trying to grasp the specificity of famine in Karamoja and elsewhere? And would not this perhaps suggest the difficulty of rigidly applying a single theory of causation to famine, which is what Mamdani seems to imply in singling out changes in the relations of production as a result of imperialism?

An assessment of causes of famine in Africa is the theme of all the books reviewed here. But it is a theme posed often unproblematically, and sometimes unthinkingly, by the authors: there has been a famine and there must therefore be easily
identifiable causes to it. Written before the recent famine, the collection of essays edited by Robert Rotberg pursues in detail a theme raised in the debate between Mamdani and Gartrell: that the colonial heritage created conditions for famine and food insecurity in Africa. Just what was the impact of colonialism in East and Central Africa in promoting or restricting local food production and what effect did colonial governments have on pre-colonial food systems? The conclusions of all contributors — but for different reasons — is that colonial contact tended to ‘inhibit the natural (sic) growth of African cash crop production’ favouring instead a handful of usually inefficient white settlers in Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. For Douglas Rimmer, ‘The pull towards economic rationality was restricted by (colonial) paternalism’ (pp.146-147). But he is unconvinced whether local economies would have developed as quickly had there not been that pull — even though the result was ‘lopsided’.

The chapters by Spencer on pastoralism and colonial policy in Kenya, 1895-1921, and Palmer on land alienation and agricultural conflict in colonial Zambia, are clear documents of the often muddled, and always disastrous, consequences for most indigenous producers of those colonial measures which disrupted local patterns of farming and grazing. And the chapter on the East African groundnut scheme highlights two fundamental weaknesses in that classic case: the absence of something as simple as a pilot scheme and the overconfidence placed in the power of capital and mechanisation. In another chapter, Vail sees the essential continuity in Malawi’s political economy from colonial times to the present. It is one which may explain bumper plantation harvests while that country simultaneously records the fourth largest figures for infant mortality in Africa.

Two other contributors, Bienen and Cowen, are more equivocal concerning the impact which colonialism may have had on African food systems. Bienen argues when talking about the impact of colonialism on modern economic patterns of distribution, that we cannot assume the nature of neo-colonial links along the lines of dependency writers (p.231). He argues instead that food self-sufficiency can be produced through trade as well as through domestic food production (p.242). We are left guessing though which existing countries in contemporary Africa can do this, especially as he argues that the revenue for such imports may be generated by ‘high value commodities … produced by smallholders for export or for domestic markets’ (p.242).

Cowen’s impenetrable style makes it difficult to assess his study of the commercialisation of food production in Kenya after 1945. He has two major arguments: that nutritional dependence does not automatically follow from commercialisation of production and consumption; and that a more commercialised and capitalised agriculture allows for more direct food consumption and not less. He does show that there is no necessary link between the spread of colonialism and rural impoverishment but it needs to be said too that his focus is only on what he calls ‘middle peasant households’ and only in Central Province.

This is a useful collection to assess the differential and uneven impact of colonialism on food systems in East and Central Africa. It is a pity that only Cohen’s first chapter begins to ask questions about the need to reconstruct pre-colonial social formations in order to assess fully the impact which colonial contact may have had on food production and changes in relations between producers. But this book does go some way towards meeting Bienen’s concluding comment that ‘unless
colonial and contemporary histories are well understood the constraints on policy cannot be made clear. However, the solutions in the future will not arise by conjuring up the past and blaming it for the present' (p.245).

Lloyd Timberlake's direct concern with explaining Africa's current crisis is explicit in his title. This is a book very much in the tradition of the easily accessible and very readable Earthscan paperbacks. It is brimming over with examples of how different African countries have been ripped off by aid projects, inappropriate technology and agricultural schemes which have promoted, as in the case of Sudan, the cultivation of cash crops for export instead of the development of locally produced sorghum for domestic consumption. Project development in Africa has created 'cathedrals in the desert' according to former European Commissioner, Edgard Pisani (p.13). For Timberlake, meaningful development to prevent soil erosion and ecological decay which has hastened the promotion of famine can only come from Africans themselves. We are reminded that 'African agricultural change must be organised and come from within; slapped-on solutions from outside do not work'. He gives us examples where local organisations of rural producers in Burkina Faso, and Ndebele women in Zimbabwe, have promoted greater self-sufficiency and reduced dependency upon both international and national aid agencies.

Africa in Crisis is a useful guide for the newcomer to the worst excesses of the impact of aid agencies and the oppressive structures of the world economy which have promoted environmental bankruptcy in Africa. But the broad canvas of crisis which Timberlake paints is flawed. It is unsystematic in terms of what he regards the causes of famine and unrigorous in its assessment of the questions he raises. He covers too much, and does not allow himself enough time to be reflective about the task he has set himself. The result is a listing of the symptoms of Africa's sickness rather than a structure of causation. He concludes with the prospects that sustainable development in Africa 'will require a great deal of common sense' (p.224). Without doubt! But common sense on whose part? We know only too well that different actors in matters of local and international politics have different interests and therefore different views of what to do.

Peter Gill's A Year in the Death of Africa and Preston King's An African Winter both have a much sharper focus than Timberlake's contribution. Gill was a reporter with ITV in UK at the time that Ethiopia's famine hit world TV screens in October 1984. His journalistic account of why the famine reached such massive proportions in Ethiopia is testament to the 'common sense' view that, left to its own devices, famine will recur in Africa. Gill catalogues the persistent reluctance of international agencies to recognise the need for relief food at the early signs of drought and then, when recognised, their scrooge-like responses and their failure to get it where it was needed quickly enough. Gill shows the political skulduggery at work by the US and UK in its relations with Ethiopia using its famine victims as pawns in the broader geo-political stakes in the Horn and their eagerness to humble the Dergue. Western authorities dismissed the 'cocktail' figures indicating Ethiopian food needs and they dismissed signs of Ethiopia's sophisticated early warning system that famine was a likely event even when Save the Children Fund opened a feeding centre in Korem as early as December 1982. In the words of one official of the UN Food & Agriculture Organisation (FAO), responding to the Ethiopian Relief & Rehabilitation Committee's requests for food supplies in 1983: 'You have been telling the world of this problem (famine) in 1982 and 1983 but we have not seen the
people dying like flies yet' (p.50). (Ironically, the international agencies are now accusing the Ethiopians of under-estimating their food needs for 1987.)

Gill’s book is an indictment of international agency inertia, muddling and incompetence. He traces ‘guerilla war’ between two UN agencies, FAO and the World Food Programme (WFP). These organisations, charged with responsibility for food and agricultural matters, preferred to argue with each other rather than allocate resources to Africa speedily and efficiently. Gill generally speaks very highly of the non-governmental organisations who worked against the odds in difficult situations. But the most searching observations are unfortunately left for the all-too brief, concluding chapters. In these he highlights the relative speed with which relief was distributed to famine victims by US aid in Sudan compared with the slowness of its build up in Ethiopia. Sudan is in fact now the largest recipient of US aid in sub-Saharan Africa receiving $1 billion during Reagan’s years alone (p.165). While black Africa as a whole received $20 per head of overseas aid before the famine, Ethiopia received only an annual $6 per head. Vehemently critical of the criteria upon which aid is distributed, Gill makes the insightful comment that ‘if the aid givers failed even to keep people alive how likely is it that they would manage to improve people’s livelihood?’ (p.180). He argues that the ‘veterinary’ approach to development fails to consider the wishes of its supposed beneficiaries and that any future consensus on aid must consider the experts who are Africa’s subsistence (sic) farmers’.

Gill raises this theme too late. He also fails to examine the role played by local political structures and struggles in Eritrea and Tigray as vehicles for greater autonomy and promotion of survival strategies for combating famine. This is a glaring omission. It is compounded by his simplistic treatment of the forced resettlement of famine victims in the north to the more fertile south west of Ethiopia. He sees this as a ‘perfectly valid option for a government confronted with environmental degeneration and human suffering on a vast scale’ (p.143). He fails adequately to confront the measures used or the consequences on those forcibly moved from their homes and what has been the effect of creating ‘no go’ areas in the north where land starved of any kind of inputs will take even longer to recover.

King’s more detailed study of famine focuses less on bureaucratic bungling and more on geo-political struggles within the Horn as the causes of crisis in that region. His study look at the role of drought, war and aid in creating conditions for famine. Famine has become recurrent in the Horn because of war resulting from political difficulties and struggles for autonomy which states like Ethiopia and Somalia have been unable to contain. His detailed analysis of the impact which colonial boundaries have had on creating conditions for struggles between states — Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya — and within geographic boundaries — Eritrea, Tigray and Ethiopia — provides an added dimension to the list of causes of famine.

The Horn of Africa is war torn because of the constant struggle for its resources between states comprised of large numbers of small competing ethnic groups. For King, the military might of Ethiopia is the problem in the Horn because it desperately seeks to keep a crumbling empire together while searching for new and more secure access to the sea.

King’s is an interesting international relations perspective on insecurity in the Horn. His analysis, though, like that of Gill’s, leaves aside an examination of local strategies for coping with famine and the contribution which the social and political
organisation of movements like the Eritrean and Tigrean Liberation Fronts may have had on alleviating hunger and transforming local relations of production to increase food security. His bland statement that 'both sides are effectively responsible for the deaths of thousands because both sides place a higher value upon future political structures than upon immediate human suffering' (pp.63-4), may be even handed in the best academic tradition but scarcely does justice to the origins of these conflicts or to the different manner in which they are conducted by sides which are not equally wasteful of human life.

While informative about the extent of Africa's recent famine, these books do little to examine the mechanism whereby drought, war and aid interact to create famine. Curiously perhaps, Rothenberg's collection offers greater insight into the way in which food insecurity may create famine. Although the national story of events is admirably told by King, Gill and Timberlake we also need to know the local responses to shifts in environment and international economic pressure coming from African farmers. We need to know what has happened historically in the Horn to Mamdani's concern: the relations of production, and also to the mechanisms which help these social forms to reproduce themselves: strategies for coping with drought, social networks and shifts in patterns of migrancy and the gender division of labour. We also need perhaps to shift the focus of studies on famine away from the desire to discover only causes towards an assessment of the abilities of drought-prone communities to recover. For it must now be clear that meaningful recovery does not simply mean providing relief which will take communities back to pre-drought or pre-war situations, for arguably, it was precisely that previous limited access to resources, for some if not for others, that were the conditions that bred famine in the first place.

Ray Bush

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It is a commonplace to observe that Marxist social science has had an increasing influence on the study of Africa since the early 1970s. But this influence has had relatively little impact in the field of educational studies. Moreover, education as a social institution has received little attention in studies of the political economy of Africa (with the partial exception of South Africa). This is exemplified by this journal, whose contributors have seldom looked at education in any depth. Yet it can be argued that education plays an important part in the processes of class formation, social reproduction, economic development, hegemony and so forth, all of central concern to Marxist analysis. This role of education has had growing recognition in the West and over the last ten years there has been an expanding body of Marxist scholarship concerned with issues of schooling and class, state and ideology in the advanced capitalist countries. More recently the high levels of unemployment created by the current crisis of capitalism have made the relationship between education and employment a significant practical as well as theoretical issue for the Left. The problems in the world capitalist economy mean that such issues must also be confronted in the countries of Africa. Equally, their
The internal configurations of political and economic contradictions make education an important area for socialist research and action.

The paucity of studies taking a Marxist perspective on educational issues in Africa makes the publication of this book especially welcome. The authors are Zimbabweans who are particularly well placed to discuss the issues of education and development in their country, Fay Chung being a senior official in the Ministry of Education, Emmanuel Ngara a senior member of the University of Zimbabwe. The aim of the authors is to make a contribution to 'the national debate on socialism', particularly since the Second Congress of ZANU(PF) in 1984 which adopted Marxism-Leninism as the guiding philosophy of the ruling party. The book seeks first to provide an introduction to the concepts of Marxism and their application to the Zimbabwean situation, stressing the goal of socialist transformation. Second, it seeks to present ideas about the kind of education required for socialist development. The first part, comprised of six chapters, is entitled 'Aspects of Socialism'; the second part, comprised of five chapters, is entitled 'Education and Development'. The book is primarily an introduction to Marxist principles and their application to issues of education, aimed at an audience of 'teachers, lecturers, curriculum developers, university students and other seriously-minded Zimbabweans who are interested in studying various aspects of socialism as they relate to education and the development of Zimbabwe.' It is thus a political intervention designed to influence discussions over education in Zimbabwe by helping to disseminate an accessible and relevant Marxist perspective on the issues.

To me, this is a very important objective. One of the central tasks of socialist intellectuals must be to make complex ideas more available to a wide audience and to provoke discussion of their political implications. This is an educational task the Left in Africa has often neglected. It is one of considerable difficulty, as this book illustrates. Part One attempts to provide an introduction to key Marxist concepts such as historical materialism, class, ideology, imperialism and socialist transformation. It therefore faces the problem of any such introductory work, namely that the attempt to simplify can sometimes lead to over-simplifications which may confuse or even distort. In the event, Part One is rather uneven. Some sections are clear and well-articulated, such as Chapter Six on culture and socialist transformation; others are confusing, such as the beginning of Chapter Four on imperialism and colonialism. Also, there are theoretical inadequacies, as in the analysis of classes in contemporary Zimbabwe, and serious omissions, particularly of gender questions and of the concept of the state. However, I believe this unevenness reflects the difficulty of the enterprise the authors are engaged upon and it could fairly easily be corrected in a revised edition. There is a more important general problem. The first part of the book in its discussion of concepts does give many relevant examples from Zimbabwe (especially in the colonial era) but it fails to provide a clear Marxist analysis of the political economy of the five years since Independence. There seems to be a reticence on the part of the authors to use their own analytical framework to confront the most important question about Zimbabwe today — is it in fact in transition to a revolutionary socialist society? This reticence becomes clearer in the second part of the book.

Part Two considers the nature of socialist education and the implications of this for curriculum planning and other aspects of education. The last chapter moves away from the focus on education to a rather inconclusive discussion of socialism and
development. The four chapters on education provide a reasonable introduction to some ideas about education for socialist transformation and to the need for changes in both content (for example, by producing new textbooks) and organisation (for example, by more interaction between the school and the community). Once again there is an uneven treatment of the material. Some discussion is over-simplified, thus underestimating the ideological dimensions of theories of learning and knowledge behind curriculum development; some areas are treated superficially, as in the overly short chapter on the combination of education with production, which in fact must form the centrepiece of socialist education. There are also significant omissions. Some derive from the theoretical inadequacies of Part One. For instance, the lack of discussion of the state in the first part is carried over to the second; yet when publicly-provided schooling is the main form of education, the role of the state is a crucial area for analysis. Other omissions are more practical, such as the cursory treatment of adult literacy. Perhaps this particular omission, when we recall that adult literacy campaigns were in the forefront of educational activity in post-liberation/post-revolutionary periods in countries like the USSR, China, Cuba and Nicaragua, is indicative of the limitations on socialist education in Zimbabwe today. Its omission therefore highlights the general problem in the book's overall approach noted earlier.

The authors take as given that Zimbabwe is on a socialist path, although they are quite aware that 'the road to a socialist system of education is still a long one'. They shy away from a thorough analysis of the problems being encountered on this road. There are brief references to struggles between classes over the nature of education but Part Two provides very little discussion of Zimbabwe's actual experience since 1980 and of the social forces which are influencing the development of education. Thus much of the discussion is at the level of general prescriptions of what education should be like if it is to contribute to socialist transformation. One would like to have seen more attention given to the problems and contradictions that have actually been encountered. For example, why has the combination of education and production not been implemented in mainstream secondary education? What are the implications of the seven-fold expansion of secondary school places when employment creation is a weak element in the Government's development programme? Can the content, methods and organisation of education be radically changed when the relations of production are not being changed on a wide scale, with Government policies, for example, favouring peasant household production and offering little support to cooperatives? What are the implications for socialist education of a ruling party whose strength derives from the petty-bourgeoisie and the peasantry rather than the working class? There are many important theoretical and practical questions relating to education in Zimbabwe (and with significance for the rest of Africa) which remain unanswered here.

There may be reasons why the authors do not examine too closely the political economy of education and development in Zimbabwe since Independence. Perhaps it seemed good tactics to take ZANU(PF)'s Marxist-Leninist rhetoric at its face value and spell out what this should mean for educational practice. But to someone like myself who is outside the local political arena, there appear long-term dangers in underplaying the nature of the class struggle in Zimbabwe today and in minimising the domestic limitations (as distinct from international constraints) on present efforts towards socialist development. I believe it is more necessary to problematise the transition to socialism in Zimbabwe than to take it for granted. Thus a clearer theorisation of education as a state apparatus and as a terrain of class
struggle, coupled with a more concrete Marxist analysis of education and development since 1980, might have made the book a more helpful political intervention at this juncture.

However, these criticisms do not imply that the book is unimportant. I believe it represents an effort in the right direction and provides an example which readers outside Zimbabwe could learn from in order to make Marxist perspectives on education and development more available in other African countries. Also, there is no doubt that within Zimbabwe the book will achieve its objective of contributing to national discussions on socialism, education and development. Nevertheless, I feel it could have been a more significant 'challenge to Zimbabwe' if it had analysed more closely the current political economy and if it had provided a clearer guide to the action that the working class and poor peasantry will need to take in order to secure an education system which genuinely serves their interests in the struggle for a socialist society.

Frank Youngman, University of Botswana
July 1986


Jack Parson's book is a welcome addition to the very few books written on Botswana. A book like this one is welcome by especially the country's young and growing academic community. As a nation with its own history, culture and political tradition, Botswana is grossly under-represented in the world of literature. Not surprising though because Britain, which ruled this country as a protectorate for over eighty years, left it grossly under-developed at the time of its political independence in 1966. Physical and social infrastructure were even more inadequate than that found in other colonies. Typically, the country was characterised by the widespread poverty, inequality, ignorance and disease which persists today.

Materially underdeveloped, Botswana also exhibited academic and intellectual underdevelopment. Educational institutions came late and were left to individual groups to develop and run. There were no books written about the country except annual colonial reports. In the 1930s and '40s, the anthropologist Isaac Schapera started some work on the cultural, social and political aspects of society. Valuable as Schapera's work was, it was often coloured by information and perspectives drawn from the colonial administration's annual reports. There remains an acute shortage of literature on Botswana's political economy. Jack Parson's book is therefore a welcome contribution to literature on Botswana.

Notwithstanding these remarks, Parson's book has several shortcomings. Firstly, the title is not reflected in the contents of the book. One wonders how the 'Labour Reserve' relates to 'Liberal Democracy'; certainly Parson does not demonstrate a relationship in the book. Instead, the book tries — ultimately unsuccessfully — to range across a history stretching from pre-colonial times to the post-colonial period. The attempt to cover so broad a scope results in salient issues about the country's political economy being glossed over in sentences reading very much like official reports. Because of its brevity the book is not very informative to the reader.
who is not familiar with Parson's doctoral thesis (IDS, Sussex, 1979) and a number of other papers he has written between then and the date of this book's publication.

The book, though dedicated to the children of Botswana, is clearly not written so much for them as for a Western audience. Otherwise how does one justify over fifteen pictures (some of them on subjects like 'cattle in Central District', (p.24) and 'A Botswana man' (p.36)) in a book as short as this? Precious space is taken up by such pictures. Needless to say that they remind us of 1920s and 1930s anthropological studies in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Parson's problem comes out clearly as the book gets into the discussion of the post-colonial developments in the country (Chapter 4-7). Here government reports and research papers are irritatingly reproduced verbatim. So much so that sometimes inconsistent figures are quoted unaware from these reports. For instance, on p.89, the figure of formally employed wage earners in 1975 is said to be 53,075. Towards the bottom of the same page, the total number of Botswana wage earners is quoted as 46,905 in 1976. In the middle of page 80, 50,676 is quoted as the 1976 total for wage and salary earners. Clearly something is wrong here and these and other discrepancies could have been avoided had the author been more critical of his sources.

These central chapters also indicate a lack of familiarity with current issues relating to agriculture in Botswana on the part of the author. He does not seem to be aware of the most recent World Bank reports on the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) for instance. If he was, he would have noted the rich farmers' reluctance to invest heavily on their newly acquired ranches. During the proposal and early implementation stages of this policy many academics argued vehemently against TGLP as a rich farmers' ploy to take land away from poor peasants. However, recent research as well as the current National Development Plan, 1979-85, shows that TGLP was never that popular with the majority of the large cattle owners in the countryside. At present these very farmers are refusing to fence, introduce rotational grazing and commercialise their ranches beyond the traditional cattlepost level. Reasons given by the farmers concerned are clearly stated in the Second Livestock Development Project report of 1981. The conservative cost-sensitivity of the agrarian petty bourgeois class are also indicated in Samboma's 1982 survey of Freehold Farms in Botswana and Odell's 1980 report of Botswana's First Livestock Development Project. Hence, while it is true that the petty bourgeois farmers are over-represented politically and that they have been major beneficiaries of state subsidies and projects, it is important to analyse them as an agrarian class capable of differing and contradicting the policies of the state as predominantly defined and designed by the political elite and bureaucrats in the capital.

Theoretically, this book is ambiguous. We are told in the first chapter (p.13) that the book uses a political economy approach as its theoretical framework. This approach is not well defined to show its superior analytical power over other approaches. Perhaps we can excuse the author for shortage of space. However, despite that proclaimed framework one is often hard pressed to discern serious differences between Parson's perspective and work on the country by liberal bourgeois scholars. For example (on p.13) we are told Botswana is a capitalist society with the primary class divisions centered around some 'form of bourgeois and working class groups'. Even after this statement, however, concepts such as 'elite', 'peasantarist', 'urbanised peasantariat', etc., are employed throughout the
book. The concept 'working class' is used (on pages 13, 93 and 94) interchangeably with 'peasantariat' or 'urbanized peasantariat' or 'urbanized peasantariat'. Moreover, no distinction is made between the different components of Botswana's working class. That is, between local urban manual workers, international labour migrants and agricultural wage labourers.

The majority of the peasants in the country's rural areas are seldom mentioned in the book except as passive recipients of remittances from the 'urbanised peasantariat'. The whole concept of 'peasantariat' is confusing, unconvincing and unnecessary. It starts from a theoretical misconception that for classes to exist they must be characterised by a single source or means of income such as a wage, a rent or a profit. Yet, Marx himself acknowledged that even in the then most industrialised 19th century England, classes did not exist in their pure form (Capital, Vol.III). The idea of 'peasantariat' suggests a state of transition to pure forms of capitalism. However, the author would be well aware of the debate on the nature of contemporary capitalism — relationships between indigenous and international capitalist classes in the Third World. Concepts such as 'peasantariat' which instead of explaining tend to add confusion to the analysis of underdeveloped societies must be avoided as much as possible.

Criticism adds to a healthy development of theory and critical analysis. What might appear here a hostile attack of Parson's work is part of that healthy process.

Patrick P. Molutsi
St. Peter's College, Oxford

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The latest manuscript of a dedicated Marxist-Leninist has been a welcome counterblast to the much bandied autobiographies of school masters like Alhaji Shehu Shagari and academics like Dr Joseph Wayas. Quite aptly sub-titled 'the political economy of state robbery and its popular-democratic negation' this work forms a necessary reading for all post-1960 research on Nigeria, and was meant as an educated response to the explanation given by the Nigerian bourgeoisie about the crisis of capitalism in the periphery.

The style is typical of Madunagu who jumps into a well to swim upwards from the bottom so that he can gauge the depth of the water. Like his earlier works The Tragedy of the Nigerian Socialist Movement (1980) and Problems of Socialism: the Nigerian Challenge (1983) this too is destined to be an eye opener. The book makes easy reading and smacks of a prolegomena to a manifesto. The manifesto was alluded to in his earlier works and I would look forward to its articulation as soon as possible. The work is at once journalistic and academic, clearly meant to raise the consciousness of Nigerians. Its brevity, however, is a pity.

The first chapter deals with the Nigerian economy which he describes as neo-colonial although more recent thought labels it as peripheral capitalist. He says 'crises will succeed crises, and austerity will succeed austerity; while wretched academics will continue to search in vain for explanations in their equally wretched
textbooks'. This we know is because of the ideological blinkers self imposed by that academia which sees the side of the coin that shines most.

The second chapter is entitled 'political economy of state robbery', and presents a collage of data which one can only piece together if one thinks like Madunagu does. This chapter in itself could form the basis of a book and all it needs is a coherent theoretical framework that appears to lie hidden somewhere. Knowing Madunagu I am sure its manuscript is lying somewhere among his papers awaiting resurrection.

The third and fourth chapter could conveniently be re-labelled 'a cry in the wilderness' and joined together. Madunagu posits a charter of ten demands that must form the basis of a socialist programme. The only problem with such a premise, as Madunagu will agree, is one of praxis: the conversion of Marxist theory to revolutionary practice. Time and again the objective conditions for a revolution have been fulfilled in Nigeria. The absence of a revolutionary party precludes the fulfilment of the subjective condition and history must look at persons like Madunagy, Bala Usman and Eskor Toyo to fulfil it. In Biafra the two objective conditions were fulfilled, in that, the army was out of the barracks and there was strife in the country. The inability of Marxists like Nzimero to take advantage of this can be mercifully ascribed to the absence of a truly revolutionary party. The coup of January 1966 that brought an end to the First Republic failed for the same reason. The inability of the Peoples Redemption Party (the only socialist party in the Second Republic) to organise around the massacre at Bakalori can similarly be put down to its non-revolutionary character.

As the melodrama under the Second Republic unfolded, the need for a revolutionary party was accentuated. The governments of Buhari and Babangida have further heightened the need for us to look up to such a party. Writings of Bala Usman, Madunagu, Claude Ake, Onimode and Eskor Toyo, no matter how articulate, will fail to have a major historical impact unless the subjective conditions are fulfilled. It is a bitter anachronism that the clarion call of Madunagu has as yet gone unanswered. Little do the Nigerian socialists realise the price they have to pay for this lack of historical wisdom. The book forms a valuable piece of ammunition in the arsenal of an articulate socialist but cannot be effectively used unless the people unite under a common banner.

That must be an item in the revolutionary agenda of Nigeria that must take pride of place.

S.G. Sadri

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It is symptomatic of Namibia's plight and continued lack of sovereignty that there is no central authority charged with drawing up a truly national bibliography for the country. To date the scholar or layman seeking Namibian material has generally
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had to make his or her own ad hoc investigations or rely on the few extent bibliographies which, as Eriksen rightly points out in his introduction, are generally too narrowly focused, incomplete, insufficiently annotated or increasingly outdated. The fact that 40 per cent of the items cited in this volume have appeared since the beginning of 1980 is indicative of the increased public, political and academic concern with one of Africa's hitherto most under-researched countries.

Eriksen is therefore to be congratulated for producing this timely and invaluable guide to the range of subjects subsumed under the broad rubric of 'political economy'. Inevitably, an element of subjectivity was necessary in drawing the cut-off lines; this has been done so as to avoid major overlap with existing bibliographies, and to highlight areas neglected by them or experiencing rapid recent growth e.g. economic and social history and contemporary research.

Furthermore, compilation was guided by the objective of providing a guide for both academics and a wider audience. The author explicitly states his own position as being politically identified with the liberation struggle and academically inspired by materialist historiography and radical political economy. Such candour is all too rare, and should be interpreted as a strength rather than a weakness of the book. For Eriksen provides comprehensive coverage of the literature, specifically including pro-South African and pro-SWAPO material as well as anything in between. It is in the annotations that subjectivity becomes potentially problematic, but these are generally concise and relatively dispassionate summaries of the contents and each author's position.

Altogether, some 900 entries appear in the main sections; inclusive of other bibliographies and periodicals the total is over 1,000. Annotations are longer than in most bibliographies — and correspondingly more useful. The book is divided into 17 sections, covering respectively General and introductory; Geography, water and energy; Precolonial Namibia; German rule; South African rule; the Namibian economy; the Primary sectors; Workers and peasants under colonial rule; Women; Education and culture; Health; Namibia as an international issue; the Struggle for national liberation; Bibliographies; Periodical publications; Theses; and Conference papers. Useful additional features comprise a full author index and a list of addresses of relevant institutions and individuals. Cross-referencing is provided throughout, both between sections and different items in the same section.

Technically, the book has been well produced and, apart from the unfortunate transposition of pages 54 and 55, contains only a few typographical errors. While one may differ from the authors on the occasional emphasis or interpretation, and the range of perspectives labelled as 'liberal' undermines the utility of such descriptions, the overall impression is of a remarkably complete and thorough compendium. It sets a high standard for future scholarship in the field of Namibian bibliography and will certainly be of great value to all those concerned with any aspect of Namibian political economy.

David Simon
BOOKS RECEIVED as of 6 April 1987

21. **ON TRANSFORMING AFRICA**: Discourse with Africa's Leaders by Kofi Buenor Hadjor, published jointly by AWP (US) and Third World Communications (UK), 1987.
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