Editorial: War and Famine in Africa

This number of ROAPE is devoted to the twin issues of war and famine in Africa — more specifically to famine and how war, among a number of factors, impinges on it. While the attention of the northern hemisphere has been focused on the increasing threat of nuclear annihilation, the population of much of Africa has been concerned with staving off famine. Compared with the immediate horrors of starving to death, the threat of nuclear destruction seems remote and more a matter for the superpowers. In fact, the issue of increasing nuclear militarism in the 'north' is highly relevant to the future food security of the world. There is little doubt that the southern hemisphere would suffer greatly from the 'nuclear winter' produced by nuclear war in the 'north' — with the reduction in heat and light received from the sun having disastrous consequences for food production and thus producing worldwide famine.

But, as Shindo points out in this issue, it is also relevant to the present food security of those countries, mainly African, now experiencing drought and famine. This is because the militarisation of the 'north' permeates all aspects of its advanced industry so that military production and technology are intimately linked to its industrial production processes. Transnational investment in the 'south' will thus inevitably introduce the militarised dimension into patterns of industrial development in the southern hemisphere, forcing it to become increasingly dominated by the need for ever more sophisticated military hardware. This is already glaringly obvious in areas such as the Middle East, but military spending in the developing countries in general is taking up an increasing proportion of state budgets. And it is hardly a coincidence that this should be happening precisely when the world's poor are finding it increasingly difficult to avoid starving to death. Military spending and military rule in much of Africa diverts resources away from the improvement of agricultural productivity. It also diverts resources away from food imports when they become necessary to feed drought-stricken peasants.

Of course, it is not at all clear that if African governments suddenly reduced military spending and diverted resources to agricultural investment there would progress in increasing food output and avoiding famine. Numerous other questions concerning strategy choices, questions of distribution, the role of the state, class struggle and so on, remain to be overcome. The pages of ROAPE have been full of accounts of the failures of agricultural investment schemes and of state interventions in agriculture generally. Time and again, it would appear that the principle objective of the state, however characterised, is to appropriate surplus from and ensure political control over the peasantry. Whether the state
concerned calls itself socialist or not does not really seem to make much difference. And the results are there to see. The FAO estimates that over the last decade and a half cereals production in Africa has fallen by 15 per cent per head. Net imports of cereals are consuming over 20 per cent of export revenue in some cases. And export revenue is not growing because production of export cash crops has declined — in some cases by over 50 per cent. There are now 18 African countries with food shortages and over 100 million people are threatened with famine. Further, there is no general pattern which shows that 'socialist' states have performed any worse or any better than 'capitalist' ones — save where they have been subjected to civil war or imperialist aggression and economic sabotage. What general pattern can be seen shows that the peasantry is seen as an easy source of government revenue while investment in agriculture (as a proportion of total investment) is exceptionally low given the importance of the sector to national product and tax revenues.

But economic failures in other sectors of the economy have also played their part in agricultural disaster. The decline of the rural — urban terms of trade (itself so often a euphemism for the exploitation of the peasantry) and the failure to supply sufficient manufactures and agricultural inputs to the rural areas are but two factors which have acted as disincentives to farmers to increase production for enlarged markets. Such factors are, in turn, the result of inadequacies in industrial development strategies designed around large quantities of imported inputs. In many African countries the level of industrial production is lower now than it was at the beginning of the 1970s. In the same countries, the burden of debt repayment takes up increasing amounts of foreign exchange which is not being earned by stagnant industries and agricultures. All this reduces the possibilities of offsetting immediate problems caused by drought through food imports — even where these problems are anticipated. If drought is the result of a mixture of human and natural causes, famine is the result of a variety of a number of human, social factors — not least among them being the inability of an economy to buy in emergency food surpluses through the normal channels of international trade. This ensures that people will die of hunger before some ad hoc international relief effort is mounted — often in the most incoherent and arbitrary way, as the Briefing by Wallace would indicate.

Ultimately, though, problems of drought, famine and low agricultural productivity need long-term policy solutions, not short-term palliatives. Wallace finds distressingly little attention being paid to the longer term in the work of relief agencies. Whether or not such strategies will be pursued within particular African countries depends on the degree to which the interests of the peasantry — and of the poor in general — are represented in the constellation of political and class forces which make up the state. It is clear that while in some countries richer sections of the peasantry and the capitalist farmers prosper as a result of their exercise of political power, the mass of the peasantry suffer the oppression of state power. The state attempts to incorporate the peasantry into a structure of production and marketing which serves its accumulation interests. However the accumulation which takes place is directed either to the productive interests of capitalist farming, as O'Brien shows here for Sudan, and Schoepf for Zaire, or to the consumption interests of state functionaries, or to both. The success of long-term policy solutions which back the peasantry and build upon its local knowledge and creativity, will depend too on the degree to which the peasants are able to retain control over their lives in any reorganisation of agricultural
production systems. So far the record of organising peasants from above into different types of producer associations has been far from successful. Where there have been successful instances of grass roots organised peasant producer associations of co-operatives or collectives, these have been perceived by the institutions of the state as a threat to their power and control over peasants’ lives. Incorporation and decline are usually the result.

Peasants can, of course, retreat into subsistence or they can sell their labour power to the capitalist farming or industrial sectors on a permanent basis or some combination of the two. When faced with drought, however, the subsistence peasantry are at the mercy of the state. It is the state which holds food supplies, controls the means by which these can be distributed (usually through the military) and exercises control over the peasantry by virtue of this food power. It is the state moreover which is best placed to know the full extent of a drought and therefore the likelihood of food shortages. The Ethiopian case is a very clear illustration, as Hailu Lemma shows, of the failure of the government to respond early enough by organising food supplies to the areas stricken by drought. Both political and economic reasons can be adduced for this failure. The Mengistu regime’s celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Revolution clearly took pride of place. That there was famine 10 years into the construction of Ethiopian ‘socialism’ was unlikely to aid the celebration atmosphere. And what also would have had to be admitted was the failure of the Ethiopian government to send relief aid into the drought areas of Eritrea and Tigre because they were not under government control. From an economic point of view, pressure on scarce foreign exchange made it less possible to acquire food on international markets.

The expansion of military expenditure in Ethiopia has also competed for import finance and this is inextricably linked to the pursuit of a military solution to the nationalities question. Elsewhere in Africa, especially in the south, militarisation is a consequence of the attempts by the South African regime to destabilise the independent states to the north. These are themselves racked by crises of agricultural production linked to both drought and war. It is not possible to sustain production in areas persistently bombed or subjected to take-over by government and rebel troops, nor is it possible to send food aid into stricken areas when supply lines are blocked by saboteurs’ activities. Whether faced with South African backed insurgents, ultimately operating as proxies for the United States, as in Angola and Mozambique, or by national liberation movements, as in Tigre and Eritrea, or by movements seeking the overthrow of tyranny, as in Sudan (see Scott’s Briefing), governments are inexorably pushed into increases in their military budgets. Nor have regimes based on the interests of small cliques of bureaucratic and bourgeois strata been immune from military spending. Precise data are very difficult to obtain, but what data there is shows that defence budgets are way in excess of those for agricultural investment.

The international response to the famines in Africa has been to do too little too late, often for the wrong reasons — as so many of the contributors to this issue show. Famine only becomes an issue when it is possible to show starvation on television long after the rains and the harvest has failed. Although warnings are given, no-one heeds them. In the case of Ethiopia it is possible that the West may have considered the famine a means of toppling the Mengistu regime. And Soviet resources have been concentrated on supplying the Mengistu regime with
military hardware to fight the liberation movements, whose success would itself threaten Soviet naval interests in the Red Sea region. This is another instance of the way in which the cold war nuclear militarisation of the north impinges on the Third World's ability to secure food supplies.

The contributors to this issue offer no formulae as solutions to the catastrophe that faces so many people in Africa today. Their various writings indicate the multiplicity of factors and causes which have helped to bring about the disaster confronting so many millions. Indeed, as the contribution of Gartrell make clear, only a holistic and multivariate analysis — looking at such factors as the role of imperialism and imperial capital, the incorporation of regions into the international capitalist division of labour, the nature of dependency, the role of the state, the character of class forces ranged against the poor, the ecological and technical factors relating to how peasants adapt to their environment and how 'development' alters that environment, etc. — can even begin to provide some of the answers which will be needed to remedy the present situation. Wallace's eye-witness account from eastern Sudan also raises serious questions about the way in which the international relief effort works (or does not work). She notes that the relief agencies are aided by public pressure on governments which result from the pictures of starving people seen on television. The consequence is that everything is focused on the immediate and little attention is paid to the long-term development projects which might secure food supplies in the future. Resources of many agencies are wasted on peripheral activity and bureaucratic procedures, aid does not always go where it is needed, food is allowed to be used by the state as a political weapon to defeat a liberation movement rather than feed the hungry.

The editors have no easy solutions or formulae either. What is happening to the poor (essentially the rural poor) of much of Africa is horrifying, the source of great pain to anyone concerned with the development of that continent. It gives us no satisfaction that as long ago as 1979/80, in a special issue on 'The Roots of Famine' (ROAPE 15/16) we stressed the role of human agency in producing hunger, most especially the role of class exploitation and state oppression in expropriating the peasantry. That theme is reiterated throughout the pages of this issue, most particularly by Bush and Mamdani. It gives us no satisfaction either to note that so little was done since the '70s to prevent, or mitigate, the effects of declining agriculture, drought, desertification and famine. It can hardly be claimed that there were no warnings or no analyses about the economic costs of development strategies which increased dependency on capitalist firms from abroad, on imported inputs such as petroleum-based fertilisers, on the rich at the expense of the poor and on export commodities at the expense of food.

If we have no solutions any more than does anyone else, the present tragedy would indicate that the answers can only be found by focusing — at least in part — on the role played by those forces which have been of particular concern to ROAPE over the last decade: the role of imperialism in disarticulating African social formations in the process of converting people to wage labour, export commodity production and economic domination by transnational corporations; the role of a rising internal bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie concerned to divert surpluses from the peasantry to their own pockets, often with the aid of the state; the role of the state sector, either as an agency for property or as an interest in its own right, in subordinating the rural producer to a regime of control and
extraction; the role of development strategies focused on giving priority to linkages with, and dependence on, the international market rather than on internal exchanges and self-sufficiency; all these, in whatever form, remain part of the 'problem' as much as are factors such as drought and war. And the need to focus on food production, incentives to rural producers, respect for the adaptive ability and production potential of the poor (rather than prescriptions for liquidating peasants in accordance with some 18th and 19th century European formulae) must be part of the 'solution'.

We hope that this issue will open ROAPE's pages to contributions which will begin to address such questions. And we hope that this discussion will occur in Africa rather than in Europe. It is perhaps appropriate that as this issue was in preparation, one of our overseas editors, Mahmood Mamdani, should be stripped of his citizenship by the Ugandan government. This would seem to be the result of the analysis of famine which he made to a Red Cross conference in Kampala and which was attended by the Minister of State for Security. The full text of Mamdani's speech is published here. It would seem that it is evermore dangerous to understand that that famine is a social and class phenomenon, not simply a natural disaster. We must concur with Mamdani's emphasis on solutions which seem to 'revive the creativity and initiative of the people'. And we ask readers to write to President Obote at State House in Kampala urging him to restore Mamdani's citizenship and, by implication, the right of all Africans to speak up for the peasantry.

As we were in press, we received a Briefing on the Sudan Coup which overthrew the Numeiri dictatorship. Numeiri's fall from power stems from the failure of his regime to feed its people, and from its insistence on forcing a military solution to the problems of relations with the South. As we write, reports are appearing predicting serious famine in the Sudan. This is the legacy of an economic strategy which followed the dictates of the World Bank and the IMF (see ROAPE 26), and an agricultural strategy which backed agribusiness against the peasants. The contribution by O'Brien in this number, and our special number on the Sudan (ROAPE 26) now take on an added interest. But perhaps most interesting of all in this context is the rise of the Sudan people's Liberation Movement under the leadership of John Garang. Philippa Scott's Briefing show the role played by this movement in the overthrow of Numeiri and offers some assessment of its future under the 'new' regime.

Peter Lawrence, Francis Snyder, Morris Szefel
Hunger and Weapons: the Entropy of Militarisation*

Eiichi Shindo

The author argues against the view that hunger in the 'Third World' and nuclear militarism in the developed world are two separated phenomena. The increasing militarisation of the Third World is directly related to famine-induced hunger suffered by its populations. Military expenditure 'crowds out' expenditure on agriculture, while the militarisation of the developed countries' economies results, via the mechanisms of investment and trade, in the militarisation of Third World industrial production. This further distorts their economies and leads to the entropy of famine.

The Hungry Third World

When delivering an appeal for the abolition of nuclear weapons, based on the Hiroshima experience, to a United Nations university symposium in Cambridge, the Japanese representative, Shingo Shibata, was somewhat taken aback by the response from Third World delegates that the anti-nuclear movement was a movement of the First World, and that what was important to the Third World was a solution to the problem of hunger.

Insofar as one concentrates attention on the problem of nuclear possession and nuclear proliferation, i.e.: on the militarisation of the nuclear powers only, it is true that the nuclear problem and hunger are bound to seem like the phenomena of two separate worlds. Our common sense about the causes of hunger also inclines us to the view of nuclear weapons and hunger as the separate phenomenon of separate worlds, in which hunger is a phenomenon unique to the Third World.

According to this common sense view, hunger is caused exclusively by the vagaries of a cruel nature, in particular by the drought which affected the Third World, especially Africa, continuously during the 1970s. Attention should however be directed to the fact that human factors not only are involved in that hunger but also constitute a structural cause of it, that cause being intimately linked to the behaviour of the advanced world.

For example, Japan, the 'forest-eating worm', which since the 1970s has been consuming half the world's lumber imports, has continued cutting down the

---

*This is a shortened version of the Japanese original which appeared under the title 'Ue to heiki — gunjika no entoropi', Sekai, November 1984, pp.241-261. The translation is by Gavan McCormack.
forests of South-East Asia, turning the land to desert. This constitutes a basic cause of drought. The multinational Western food companies like Delmonte or Nestlé are also turning once rich agriculture export countries into starving agricultural import countries by buying up and enclosing large tracts of developing countries' land, having the inhabitants grow luxury food items for the advanced countries, and promoting agricultural laws and advanced country-type food systems which deepen dependence on the advanced countries. While glancing afar at the hunger of the Third World, we in the First World can indulge in a consumer life of such luxury that we purchase even paper tissues by brand name.

Another Myth
Quite apart from looking to the 'outside' for the human causes of the hunger of the developing countries, it is also possible to look for them in the 'inner' elements of the countries themselves, especially in the special character of their political-economic systems. The classic example is the view which sees the socialist system as being the main cause of hunger.

According to this view, the inefficiencies peculiar to socialism cause hunger in that people who have their land taken away from them by the state when the land is nationalised under socialism lose the will to produce. Famine in Tanzania and Mozambique, as well as food shortages in Poland and the Soviet Union, are ascribed to the same cause. And in general this is correct. In both Ethiopia and Mozambique, productivity and harvest are greater in 'household farms' than in 'state farms', and the central governments fall into the evils of 'socialist' bureaucracy and become unable to take into consideration the voice of farmers on the spot.

But a number of objections would have to be entered if, for this reason, we seek to attribute the cause of famine to the socialist systems. We know of various important cases within the same socialist system where famine has been overcome, while we also know that famine is common among developing countries outside Africa which have chosen the capitalist system under neo-colonialism.

But, despite this, so far as the African continent is concerned famine and socialism go hand in hand, like the two sides of a coin. Why is this?

Two Common Factors
The affinity between famine in Africa and the socialist system stems from at least two common factors apart from the 'inefficiency' of the nationalised 'Animal Farm'. First, most of the new states which established their independence from colonial rule oriented themselves towards the socialist system. Secondly, these new states which oriented themselves towards the socialist system became to a greater or lesser extent enmeshed in war and changed into 'heavily armed' states.

May we not then see the famine which engulfs the newly emerging 'socialist' states of Africa as due not so much to the 'inefficiency' inherent in the socialist system as to the large number of refugees produced by war, and to economic crisis deriving from insufficiency of national capital being directed to production for the civilian sector as a result of the transition to the 'heavily armed' state? Our hypothesis — that famine is the product of war and the transition to the
'heavily armed' state — becomes clear if we focus on Ethiopia and Mozambique, the two African countries with the biggest famine populations.

In Ethiopia after the revolution of September 1974, military expenditure, compared with before the revolution, soared by 300 per cent to 1977 and 600 per cent to 1980 (at constant prices). In conjunction with this, weapons imports in 1978 were running at 70 times those of 1973. These increases went step-by-step with the increase in hunger.

As for Mozambique, when the Mozambique Liberation Army overturned Portuguese colonial control in 1975 military expenditure was a mere 7 per cent of government expenditure. By 1978, after three years, it had increased four-fold to over 28 per cent, and it has not declined since then. Weapons imports as a percentage of total imports have increased nearly three-fold from 7 per cent to 18.8 per cent.

The simple statement of the Mozambique farmers — 'Life was fine for two or three years after independence, but became hard here about three years ago' — should perhaps be understood as indicating this process by which the newly emerging 'socialist' state is transformed into an 'armed state', rather than a systematic weakness inherent in socialism. Only then will we grasp the significance of on-the-spot reports that what the farmers of the hunger-stricken newly emerging 'socialist' countries of Africa lack is not so much the will to work as the means to work — ploughs and hoes.

The Conditions of Independence

Many new emerging countries, after casting off the yoke of colonialism or neo-colonialism, chose the socialist, rather than the Western capitalist system. Unfortunately for these newly emerging states, enormous difficulties had to be faced as a result of adopting the socialist system and trying to break free of the world capitalist system.

First, no sooner has independence been gained that the advanced Western countries, particularly the former sovereign power and the multinationals, try to intervene in the 'new authorities' of the newly emerging country with the aim of seizing their still remaining rights and interests. When this happens, the advanced Western states, in order to maintain the international political and economic order which favours the advanced countries, a polarised order, become a counter-revolutionary force, or a force for the frustration of the revolution, together with the supporters of the 'old regime' that still survive at a stage when the new authority is being formed. Witness the classic cases of the Russian and Chinese revolutions.

Second, the newly emerging states start off pregnant with peculiar elements of confusion inherited from the colonial system. In the case of the African countries, the element which has to be stressed among these is that the new governments start off with an inheritance of a variegated racial and tribal mosaic, and therefore these new 'socialist' states with their weak power bases find themselves caught up in a situation of fierce civil war.

On top of this, the rapid social change that stems from the choice of a socialist system produces fierce clashes with the traditional local value system and reduces to tatters the threadbare national mosaic. The Ethiopia-Somalia war is one example: a combination of the effects of the Eritrea and Ogaden-Somalia
liberation struggles.

The third point to be made is that revolution and counter-revolution on the part of the African states extends beyond national frontiers. So far as Africa south of the Sahara is concerned, there is confrontation between the group of revolutionary states made up of Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and the counter-revolutionary force centred in South Africa. For example, South Africa has given military assistance to two counter-revolutionary forces in Angola since that country's national independence — UNITA (Angolan National Union for Complete Independence and FNLA (Angolan National Liberation Front), and has kept fanning the flames of counter-revolution, while it has provided military assistance to various anti-government struggles and continually cast from outside the coals of war and counter-revolution in Zimbabwe.

Of course, these South African moves were, on the one hand, a response to Soviet and Cuban moves in support of the revolutionary states and, on the other, they were also reinforced by the continuing support of the advanced countries of Europe and the United States for the counter-revolutionary forces.

Thus, no sooner are the newly emerging states independent (or have their revolution) than, facing war internally and externally, they have to strengthen their military power in order to cope with war and to maintain their power. In other words, while being engulfed in war, the newly emerging states are for that reason led along the path to heavy armament — and famine. This is the heavy burden that must be borne by the new states just after they establish their power, or at an early stage when they possess only a weak power base.

Although the revolution promised freedom from hunger, because of this 'delicate balance of initial conditions' (Wallerstein), its fruits turn out to be completely the opposite.

Civil War and Heavy Arming

It could in fact be said of all the newly emerging African 'socialist' countries afflicted by famine that they are states ravaged by civil war, in all of which the degree of militarisation is being intensified.

FAO (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation) emergency food aid is concentrated on 24 countries south of the Sahara. If Guinea-Bissau, which is struggling with a food crisis of similar proportions, is added to these, 13 countries, or over half of the 25, are spending more than 15 per cent of their government expenditure on military items (18 countries are spending more than seven per cent). If countries are counted in for whom the cost of weapons imports exceeds that of (ordinary) military expenditure, and which is often covered by loans, the number of 'heavily armed' states amounts to 24. Nearly all of these militarised states are, in one way or another, in a state of war.

For some years now, for example, military expenditure as a percentage of government expenditure has been running at about 30 per cent in Mozambique and Chad and 40 per cent in Ethiopia, while in Cape Verde, Somalia and Uganda, weapons imports amount to between 30 and 60 per cent of all imports and cost far more than the total (ordinary) military expenditure.

The reality of famine as something which affects 'heavily armed' states
irrespective of differences of system is in striking contrast with a different reality in the case of those countries, also in Africa, whose military expenditure is relatively low and which have been freed from famine. The logic by which famine affects 'heavily armed' states irrespective of system becomes clear when one considers the case of Kenya, once regarded as 'dux of the capitalist class' in Africa. There, military expenditure has risen since 1977 from 10 to 16 per cent, while the cost of weapons imports in 1981 was equal to 70 per cent of total military budget. It is arguable that the process of becoming a 'heavily armed' state has been the direct trigger for turning it into a famine state.

The affinity between famine and weapons becomes even clearer if we move our attention from south of the Sahara to a world scale, taking in South and Central America and Asia. In all 12 of the 'famine powers' which contain the largest famine-affect population, including India, Nigeria, Brazil, Philippines, military expenditure amounts to more than 7.5 per cent of government expenditure, while in seven of them it exceeds 15 per cent of government expenditure, while in seven of them it exceeds 15 per cent on average. Eight are under military regimes or regimes which are under strong military influence. Furthermore, Brazil, which has relatively low levels of military expenditure, is, with India, changing from a weapons importer into the great weapons exporting country of the developing world.

**Opportunity Cost and Military Government**

The logic of heavy weaponisation leading to famine can be amplified in the following way.

First, in that increased military expenditure blocks expenditure on the civilian sector that is more urgently necessary than anything, it is accompanied by huge 'opportunity costs'. In extreme cases, this takes the form of famine. Without any doubt it makes the allocation of resources to the civilian sector, increasing food productivity, irrigation works, and health and welfare more difficult; it prevents economic development and creates the basic conditions for famine.

Second, 'heavy weaponisation' leads to the relative strengthening of military power as the group in the country's domestic power relations which is armed. This in turn lends extra force to the process of ballooning military expenditure. Completely contrary to the argument of the modernisationist development economists who hold that, because the military is almost the sole coherent bureaucratic organisation in developing countries it functions as the proponent of modernisation, so that the military triggers off the energising of the developing country's economy, the opportunity costs of militarisation are increased under the military regime. Actually, one-third of the famine countries of sub-Saharan Africa, and more than two-thirds of those of other 'famine powers' are under military regimes or heavy military influence. Regimes from Brazil and Thailand to Ethiopia and Uganda which took power by military *coup d'état* thereafter without exception increased their military expenditure by between three and six times.

But it is not just that heavy militarisation increases the opportunity costs of militarisation or strengthens the power of the military. In accord with the

---

*A term used in economics indicating what is lost by not allocating resources for an alternative use (i.e.: not allocating resources for an alternative opportunity foregone)* ed.
established economic theory of heavy militarisation itself, the economies of the
developing countries are eroded and the man-made conditions for famine are
generated from within. According to the classical theory, military expenditure
and militarisation are understood to function in both developing and advanced
countries not as blocks to economic development but as stimuli. First, military
expenditure, like other public investment, creates effective demand* since it
produces consumption and employment in the ordinary civilian sector. Secondly,
investment in military technology stimulates technological innovation in the
ordinary civilian sector, strengthens the technology base of the domestic
economy, and contributes to economic development through a technological
linkage effect. In fact, contrary to this hypothesis, the peculiar character of the
contemporary armaments industry is such that it is bound to function always as a
blocking factor, never making any contribution to the economy of the developing
country. The militarisation of the developing countries also distorts the
development of healthy democratic politics and serves to reincorporate the post-
indepedence developing country in the polarised hierarchical system of
advanced country control.

Why is it that the militarisation of the developing countries becomes a factor
blocking their economies? And why do developing countries become militarised?
And finally, why is it that when the developing countries invest a certain amount
of their energies in military matters this serves to reinforce their dependence on
the advanced countries?

The Rotting Economy — The Significance of the Deformed Weapons
Economy
The point to be made at the outset is that the contemporary structure of
militarisation produces a dual distortion. First, militarisation operates not just at
the centre of world politics, as in the past, but extends to the periphery. This is
especially evident in the dramatic escalation of Third World military expenditure.
For example, although Third World military expenditure in the 1950s amounted
to no more than 5 per cent of world military expenditure, it reached 19 per cent in
the 1970s and 25 per cent in the 1980s. Now, while the average annual growth
rate of military expenditure is only 1 per cent among the advanced countries, it is
nearly 10 per cent in the Third World. The expansion of militarisation to the
periphery is sustained by the export of weapons from the centre.

While weapons transfer to the periphery formerly accounted for only an
extremely small proportion of weapons exports from the centre (20 per cent in
the 1960s), now the opposite situation prevails and it constitutes the bulk of them,
80 per cent. For this reason, while in 1962 the total of major ordinary weapons
imports of the Third World, at 1975 fixed prices, was $1,700m, it rose by 500 per
cent to $9,300m in 1980, and the proportion of weapons among the total of Third
World imports increased dramatically.

Secondly, within this change in the structure of militarisation, the character of
military power is changing from labour intensive to technology and capital
intensive. Because of this, the following patterns of negative influence within the
economy, that is, the civilian economy, of developing countries which are
oriented towards militarisation, are bound to increase.

*Effective demand is backed by holdings of money. Eds.
It produces a rapid escalation in the cost of weapons production, thereby making it necessary to divert vast resources to armaments. For example, the cost of a fighter-plane, at current prices, escalated by 15 times between the beginning of the 1960s and today, that of tanks 20 times. Because of this, according to the US Congress, if the current trend in weapons procurement prices continues, the current budget of the US Air Force will by the year 2036 be sufficient to buy only one fighter plane.

Government expenditure on a hitherto unprecedented scale is necessary today in order to reinforce military power. This substantially diminishes the opportunity of investment in the agricultural sector that is crucial to the ‘survival’ of developing countries.

The fact that the conditions of famine are created in developing societies to the extent that they increase their military expenditure is shown in the accompanying table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agriculture as a percentage of GNP 1960-73</th>
<th>Agriculture as a percentage of government expenditure, 1973</th>
<th>Military spending as a percentage of government expenditure, 1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9 (1967)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although about 50 per cent of GNP is produced by agriculture, between 10 and 50 per cent of government expenditure goes to the military, and government investment in the agricultural sector is only a fraction of what goes to the military. Furthermore, almost without exception, the countries on the Table, from Afghanistan and Bangladesh to Senegal and Upper Volta are today affected by severe famine.

And, because of the shift towards technology-intensive military power, the increase in military spending is unable to help relieve the Third World’s growing unemployment problem. To the extent that military power becomes technology-intensive, weapons are mechanised and a large force of soldiers becomes unnecessary. This is evident in the fact that, even in developing countries which
HUNGER AND WEAPONS

possess considerable military power, the number of soldiers is relatively few, in many cases remaining at the level of less than 10 per 1,000. Even in the case of a developing country that has been able to build up its own weapons industry, it is only the final, weapons-assembly stage that is labour-intensive. Therefore, unable to generate significant employment, the tendency rather is to reinforce the conditions of unemployment and famine.

So far as employment is concerned, today's technology-intensive weapons have come to need technicians familiar with high technology in order to operate and maintain the complex weapons. Since developing countries do not have such military technicians they have to look for them in the advanced countries. In this respect too the opportunity cost of militarisation escalates.

The transition to technology-intensive military power strengthens the tendency towards weapons systems, pushing the rest of the economy into deeper straits as a result. Nowadays, increasingly, weapons cannot function by themselves but only as part of a large-scale system. For example, for a bomber to have any significance as war material there has to be an aerodrome with a reinforced runway of much greater length than usual, and missile defences. Such an aerodrome also needs a control tower equipped with advanced electronics. The bombers also need a large military infrastructure — a network of high-speed military roads, battleships co-ordinated with the bombers, and port facilities and a telecommunications network for the battleships. The expansion of such military infrastructure means the certain destruction of existing traditional infrastructures such as the Mekong Delta canal system or the Brazilian Amazon forest resources. For the construction of such an infrastructure, investment which should be going to subsistence agriculture has to be diverted in large quantities to the military sector.

Besides, when a developing country undertakes the role of forward base for an advanced country by beginning to produce weapons, this involves a fattening of the 'base-type' or 'war type' economy through an extraordinary expansion of the secondary industrial sector and explosive growth of the tertiary, base-oriented service sector. Either way, all that happens is that the distortions suffered in the rest of the economy are accentuated, the local agricultural base is destroyed, and the underlying conditions of famine are strengthened. The situation would perhaps not be so serious if the cost of weapons imports was made up only of the price of the weapons. Since contemporary weapons are technology-intensive and highly systematised, the import cost of a bomber or a tank does not exhaust the cost of the weapons system. For example, the price of the planes amounted to less than half of the total purchase price of $1,000m paid by Iran in 1975 for 80 F14s from Grumman. About $500m of the purchase price of $1,200m for seven AWACS (early warning planes) went on the cost of parts and accessories, training, service and maintenance. And since the cost of importing weapons, once one buys a weapons system, extends to the cost of spare parts, service and maintenance, the importing country is bound to become more dependent on the advanced countries. It continues to depend on the armaments industry of the country from which it purchases. Consequently, weapons imports become much more expensive than their actual 'price'. This puts pressure on the finances of poor developing countries, creates large deficits on trade account, and thus reinforces dependence on the advanced country.

Furthermore, the imported weapons and weapons systems, unlike ordinary
machines for civilian use, make little contribution to expanding the productive
capacity of the developing country and therefore the export capacity. Moreover,
because excessive weapons imports put pressure on the government’s finances,
and investment in the agricultural sector is inadequate, the volume of food
imports has to be increased. The import of weapons from the advanced countries
is not just a matter of weapons; it also makes necessary accompanying imports of
food.

Regression to Monoculture
How can developing countries solve the dilemma brought on by increased
weapons imports? They tried to solve the dilemma by playing their last trump
card, that of increasing their export strength by increasing the output of
domestic raw materials such as oil or copper or increasing the production of cash
crops such as coffee, pepper, cocoa and peanuts. It is the logic of increasing
coffee production to buy weapons.

But the industrial structure of the developing country is bound to be distorted by
the increased production and export of mineral resources and cash crops. The
actual consequence is that the developing country society is made to regress to
the structure of monoculture that prevailed under the colonial system. This
undoubtedly undermines the economy of the developing country and leads to
famine, in the following pattern.

Subsistence sector development crucial to survival — grains and rice — is
blocked. Basic food supplies then have to be imported and food self-sufficiency
becomes a practical impossibility. The result, ironically, is that the effort to
eliminate the deficit in trade and finance actually increases the same deficit and
depthens the trade and finance dilemma. Examples of this can be seen first of all
in the OPEC countries, and also in resource exporting countries from Peru,
Malaysia, and Philippines, to Nigeria, Zaire and Zambia. Once prosperous grain
exporting countries become grain importing countries.

Fully Domestic Production to Export
Not all developing countries are confronted with such a predicament arising from
weapons imports. Those states among them which are advanced in
industrialisation commonly adopt two strategies for resolving the dilemma.

One is the move towards domestic production of weapons, and beyond that to
export of weapons. These may be described as the second and third phases of
developing country militarisation. These two stages are, in the industrialisation
of developing countries, the stages of development from import substitution to
export promotion.

But, unfortunately for the developing countries, consistent progress in the
direction of domestic weapons production does not necessarily help alleviate the
conditions of Third World famine. This is because, as we have already stressed,
contemporary military power is changing to a capital intensive model. The
domestic production of weapons has become something which consumes vast
quantities of raw materials.

In fact, to the extent that the domestic production of weapons involves devouring
the developing country’s scarce resources, the flow of capital is reduced to the
subsistence sector which is crucial to staple food production, and that sector
becomes weaker and is de-developed.
Furthermore, even if large amounts of raw materials are exploited and domestic production of weapons is successfully undertaken, the military technology which is developed does not have much multiplier effect on the ordinary civilian sector. Since military power is high technology intensive it is quite remote from the indigenous technology of the traditional society of the Third World and cannot meet the requirements of local industry. In other words the weapons industry is a mere isolated oasis floating in the economy of the developing country, lacking any positive linkage with the infrastructure of the civilian economy, especially the agricultural sector.

Soldiers who learn how to drive a truck while in the army can use that skill in civilian life. But technicians who learn aviation dynamics or missile propulsion technology cannot use those skills in irrigation works or in the rudimentary machine or chemical manufacture sector that is indispensable to the developing country. Surely we can see that this is half of the reason why India, which with 200,000 technicians employed in the weapons industry stands at the forefront of development of a domestic weapons sector, is also, for that very reason, developing into a famine power with a starving population of 20 million people.

Yet many developing countries are today trying to develop a domestic weapons industry in order to reduce the economic and political costs of weapons imports. Those countries that succeed in doing this then move to adopt weapons export policies, in order to ameliorate the ‘dis-economies of scale’ associated with domestic production, i.e. inefficiency stemming from the narrowness of the domestic market. As of 1984, there were at least 42 countries that were domestically producing at least one kind of weapon. More that 21 of these, including China, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Egypt and Israel, have embarked upon arms exports.

It is true that the developing country can plan to go beyond domestic weapons production to become an exporter. But, even if it succeeds in doing so, the weapons themselves have become high technology-intensive, and the speed of technological innovation is extremely rapid — it takes between five and ten years to change from one generation of weapons to the next — the developing countries with their weak technology base are unable to keep up with such rapidly advancing waves of technological development. Instead, so far as the core elements of the contemporary weapons industry such as the engine and the electronics are concerned, they become more dependent on the armaments industry and economy of the advanced countries.

Even when the developing country reaches the stage of having a weapons export capacity, under continuing licensed production arrangements it is unable to go beyond the stage of technological dependence in which parts and semi-processed goods are imported from the advanced countries and assembled. This is evident even in the case of China, which is at the most advanced stage of domestic weapons production. Throughout the 1970s it remained at the level of licensed production, importing power units for fighter planes from Britain and turbo jets from Rolls Royce. Since then, as part of the entente with the United States, China has promoted agreements on co-operation in military technology with the United States, and military technological dependence on the United States has replaced that on Britain.

The fact that the design to become a weapons exporter leads rather to increased
imports of weapons and technology is given further impetus by pressures from the armaments industries of advanced industrial countries like the United States and France. The armaments industry of the advanced countries promotes sub-contracting arrangements, or direct investment, in the developing countries, in order to take advantage of their cheap labour. Such sub-contracting arrangements are today particularly developed in the electronics sector. Many parts and semi-processed goods are assembled using the low wages of the relatively low ‘country-risk’ countries, including the developing countries known as NIC’s* — South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Mexico — and then re-exported to the advanced countries.

Then there is the flow of direct investment, including a trend in the armaments industry towards production under so-called vertical joint production arrangements. Arms production itself, being closely tied up with state secrets, may not necessarily be easy to promote. The trend towards direct investment has recently developed very rapidly, both because it has become difficult to draw a clear distinction between military and civilian and because the level of dependence on advanced country technology for repair and maintenance has increased rapidly as a result of technological complexity. As a result, if one takes the case of the largest multinational armaments enterprise, Rockwell Ltd., over 20 per cent of its profits in the late 1970s were generated abroad; it had over 120 subsidiaries in 30 countries including Brazil, South Africa and Hong Kong; currently it is expanding into Egypt, Kuwait, Nigeria, Zaire and China.

At all events, when the developing country, driven by internal domestic pressures, tries to transform itself into an arms exporting country, the outcome is that it becomes assimilated, as an arms importer, within the groupings of the advanced countries’ arms industry. This reality becomes clear from the fact that the biggest Third World arms export countries — Taiwan, Pakistan, South Korea, Argentina, and (former) Iran, have been at the same time joint producers, subordinate to the arms manufacturers of the advanced countries, and also the largest arms importing countries.

**Increase in Accumulated Debt**

The move on the part of developing countries from domestic weapons production to weapons export reinforces their economic dependency on the arms industry of the advanced countries, and through such ties also reinforces their political dependency on the advanced countries.

But this does not exhaust the negative effects of the move to domestic production and the export of weapons. The industrial structure of the developing country is distorted, substantial debts to the advanced countries are incurred, and these accumulated debts reinforce dependency on the advanced countries.

Developing countries that promote the import of weapons increase their indebtedness to advanced countries in order to make up for the consequent shortage of foreign currency reserves and to compensate for the revenues on civilian trade which are lost to arms imports.

As of the end of 1983, the total indebtedness of the developing countries was $810bn. The total volume of arms imports in the same year was about $30bn. It

*Newly Industrialising Countries.*
seems that between 25 and 40 per cent of the accumulated debt of developing countries is accounted for by weapons imports. The largest debt countries — Brazil, South Korea, Argentina, Egypt (formerly) Iran, and socialist Poland, are (or were) all 'heavily armed' developing countries moving into the third stage of developing country militarisation — weapons export.

The conditions for a worsening of accumulated debt are aggravated in the case of the so-called 'middle developed countries' which are striving to 'catch up' with the advanced industrial countries by stepping up the pace of their industrialisation. This is because the very act of 'catching up', like that of entering upon domestic weapons production, is bound to deepen economic dependence on the advanced countries which are overwhelmingly superior on the basis of their advanced technology and abundance of capital.

The following facts are known about the relationship between accumulated indebtedness and famine. First, many of the developing countries which are militarised and troubled by vast accumulated debt are either major famine countries with starving populations of over 10 million, like Indonesia, Brazil, Philippines and Pakistan, or if not yet major famine countries, are nevertheless states in economic depression with unemployment and inflation rates in double figures, like Egypt, Argentina, Algeria, Peru, or Morocco.

Second, while the new sub-Saharan 'socialist' countries in Africa, which have broken away from the Western capitalist system, are afflicted by famines, they are relatively free of the pressures of accumulated debt. Not only are these 'socialist' states still at a stage of pre-industrialisation, but they are also influenced by the fact that loan conditions in the case of loans provided for weapons export by socialist countries including the Soviet Union are advantageous to the recipient country, as in the 2 per cent interest 10 years' repayment terms that have applied to Peru after 1978.

Third, the expansion of accumulated debt has been promoted by the positive credit provision policies mainly by the advanced Western countries. For example, since the mid-1970s the US president has been empowered to loan the sum of approximately $20bn per year to developing countries that want to buy weapons but lack funds. Twenty to 30 per cent of US weapons supply is covered by this kind of government-provided credits, the remaining 70 to 80 per cent coming from loans from the multinational banks of the advanced countries.

In this sense, the militarisation of the developing countries is being encouraged and promoted in the interests of the governments, finance capital and the armaments industries of the advanced countries, and the underlying conditions of famine thereby aggravated. It becomes impossible to see the militarisation of the advanced countries, concentrated around nuclear weapons, and the economic crisis of the developing countries symbolised by famine as the separate phenomena of two different worlds.

**Distorted Politics: Third Stage Military-Industrial Complex**

The negative influence of militarisation on developing countries is not confined merely to the economic sphere.

As we saw above, the transition to heavy militarisation imposes a huge burden on the finances of the developing country. It pushes it in the direction of a structure specialising in the production of commercial goods such as cash crops and mineral
resources for the Western consumer. At the same time it creates the conditions for famine in the villages and strengthens the causes of unrest in the social order. These elements of social unrest are greatly magnified when the rapid industrialisation of a developing country commencing with import substitution policies is promoted in conjunction with the move to a superstructure of heavy militarisation.

To promote the policy of import substitution, the developing country tries by means of foreign or state capital to develop industrial bases to produce domestically goods hitherto imported from the advanced countries. At this stage, the causes of conflict between the capital and labour in the urban industrial sector are sharpened as large numbers of village people are mobilised into the cities and the process of dissolution of the villages is encouraged. Conflict is generated too between the industrialised urban core and the still basically agrarian periphery as the traditional village-focused social order is destroyed.

Here I would like to direct attention to two ways in which the rise of the military is promoted as the trend towards domestic weapons production develops in combination with the trend towards an industrialisation that usually begins with import substitution policies: first, as a mechanism to oppress and coerce those at the periphery who rebel against the existing order; second, as a mechanism to embody and display, both at home and abroad, the nationalism that sustains the legitimacy of authority. In the name of state security and regional stability, the military is entrusted with the tasks of military containment of the social disturbances arising from the changes in the social system accompanying rapid industrialisation. The unification of state and military organs proceeds in accompaniment with this, and the political system changes into one which gives priority to the military.

The heavy militarisation of developing countries is in general advanced through the rise of the military; this in turn deepens the causes of disintegration in the developing country's society; and this, ironically, make the military even more necessary as agents of 'crisis control'.

The fact that nearly all developing countries whose economic prosperity is praised, like South Korea, Brazil, or Malaysia, are under either military governments or strong military influence, and that the trend for the suppression of human rights within such countries is being encouraged, well shows the historical conjuncture of interrelatedness between the militarisation and industrialisation of developing societies. And the fact that the core element in military power which is being strengthened in these developing countries is counter-insurgency weaponry, including the helicopter, is symbolic of this conjuncture.

The Military as 'Economic Power'
After power in a developing country has either been seized by the military or else been subjected to its strong influence, and when industrialisation is pursued under military direction, it usually happens that the army, in order to strengthen its economic base, uses state capital to set up state-run enterprises which it then turns into the props of its own economic power. The army 'becomes bourgeois'.

The 'military-industrial complex' in which the state, army, and industry become fused when the domestic production of weapons is undertaken in a developing
country is a peculiar Third World 'Complex' different from the Euro-American or Soviet models.

In some cases the multinational enterprises of the advanced countries, whose participation is sought for the sake of their capital and technology, become midwives to the military-industrial complex of the Third World. These midwife multinational enterprises are not armaments or aircraft companies but are from the mixed civil-military terrain, especially the electronics sector, and so the reality of the influence of the advanced country multinationals is not so obvious. For example, civilian multinational enterprises like C.M.I. Ericson, Phillips, GE and Siemens, strengthen their approaches to the military by capital participation in Brazilian state enterprises, and engage in capital and technological cooperation in the mixed civil-military sector that revolves around military electronics and that includes nuclear power plants and aviation traffic control. By their collusion with the Third World's 'military supply' national policy companies, they fatten the Third World's military-industrial complex and further the militarisation of developing countries.

The complexes of the Third and First Worlds cooperate with each other across national frontiers. The web of the symmetrical mutual dependence becomes more fine-meshed as it spreads in extent. As a result that states of the Third World become more and more cut off from their people, and the people mere 'spectators' unable to participate in the affairs of state. The state becomes a 'theatre state' (in a sense different from that in which Geertz uses the term).

Without adopting the framework of dependency theory, we should note that the army, transformed into the wielder of economic power, functions to suppress rather than to represent local popular forces. Since even industrialisation is responsive to the demands of the international capitalist order controlled by the advanced countries the army serves, under the guise of developing country nationalism, as the defender of extreme order in the interests of the advanced countries and their multinational enterprises. In this way too, therefore, although the developing countries plan for independence from the advanced countries, the opposite result ensues; dependence is deepened. This may be called the entropy of Third World militarisation.

Yet it is not just that weapons cause famine by distorting the economy of the Third World or give rise to repression by distorting its politics. The economics of the First World as well as of the Third World are undermined, and the vitality of the world economy as a whole is sapped.

The Path to Depression in the Advanced Countries: The Pitfalls of Armaments Keynesianism

It was pointed out quite some time ago that there is an inverse proportion between rates of increase of military expenditure and economic growth, and that the rate of economic growth declines to the extent that the proportion of military expenditure to national budget increases. This is commonly explained as the 'crowding out' effect of capital. In other words, that the application of a considerable proportion of government expenditure to armaments reduces the amount that should be going to civilian needs which are thereby 'crowded out' and reduced so that economic growth as a whole is blunted.

But, although many commentators have noted this phenomenon, narrow
armaments-first-ism thinking still prevails among those defence ideologists and decision makers, including business leaders, who talk of perfecting 'front-line equipment'. Take for example this statement by Yoshihiro Inayama, chairman of Keidanren: 'There is something queer about the notion that defence expenditure is bad. The economic efficacy of military expenditure is no different from the economic efficacy of expenditure on public investment. In fact, when you consider space development etc as spin-off effects of defence production, are they not much greater than those from public investment?' (Mainichi, 29 April 1984).

In other words, now because of the recession and administrative reform (he believes that) defence expenditure ought to be increased. The armaments-first-ism seems to have achieved strength through the recent economic revival in America, where vigour was first demonstrated in armaments.

Such reasoning overlooks the 'uneconomic' character of the transformation wrought by military power. In fact, the economics of the advanced countries are affected by essentially the same problem as the Third World.

The change in character to technology-intensive military power causes a change in the character of the armaments industry itself, which becomes extremely cut off from basic heavy chemical and machine industry centred civilian industry as it changes to an advanced missile electronic basis. This may be seen in the following way in the case of the aircraft, the centre of the armaments industry. To withstand the vibrations of sub-sonic flight, titanium type metals and beryllium alloy have come to be used as constituents instead of duralumin or copper plate. Old piston type engines have been replaced by high temperature, high speed rotating turbine jet engines. Inside the plane, electronic equipment like the computer and radar has been installed to make possible automatic control and wing variation. As for weapons, these have developed to become like containers of electronic machinery. Basic civilian industries like steel, non-ferrous metals, automobiles and chemicals, which used to be closely related to armaments, have now almost no connection with armaments; they have been completely dropped from the armaments industry.

The reality of the change can also be seen in the composition of weapons procurement expenditure. Until the Korean War, procurement of ordinary weapons such as tanks, warships, rifles and ammunition accounted for between 60 and 70 per cent of weapons procurement expenditure. Since then it has dropped to a mere 20 per cent, while procurement expenses for new weapons — planes, missiles, electronic communications equipment, etc — has come to account for between 60 and 90 per cent. The glamour enterprises of armaments are no longer Ford, GM, US Steel, but the aircraft and advanced missile industries — Boeing, McDonnell, United Technologies.

So, to the extent that capital and technology is poured into armaments, investment in the basic heavy and chemical industries of steel, automobiles, chemicals, is retarded, leading to a reduction in productivity and an increase in prices, so that international competitiveness inevitably declines. Furthermore, since the factors of capital and technology relating to military power are huge in scale, to the extent that armaments are stressed huge budgets and lucrative research and development funds have to be diverted to them; large deficits are accumulated and for this reason too the productivity and competitiveness of domestic civilian industry declines.
A spate of negative economic effects flow from this. First, the overseas flight of capital. To escape from the disadvantageous conditions stemming from the high cost of production in the domestic market, and to secure greater profits, entrepreneurs began to invest in the low-cost overseas market. Next, goods imported from overseas suddenly increase in volume as the competitiveness of domestic industry declines, and this affects especially the domestic civilian sector whose competitiveness is low. The result is that large numbers of unemployed are generated in these weak sectors as foreign goods replace domestic goods. This affected the United States in the 1970s. It was the 'uneconomic' effect of militarisation.

By Way of Conclusion: Extrication from Closed Thinking

Obviously, insofar as one limits oneself to a consideration of the nuclear position in the context of the advanced countries and military systems, the nuclear question and hunger must seem like the mutually unrelated phenomena of different worlds. The Third World riposte that the anti-nuclear movement is just a First World movement may then seem to make sense, while the argument for the nuclear deterrent as something which makes possible the preservation of peace can keep on being presented as correct. People may therefore join with strategists in adopting the theory — and perhaps the morality — that peace is being maintained through nuclear weapons and military power. To the extent that we develop our arguments about nuclear weapons around the costs accompanying the use of nuclear weapons, that theory of the strategists will be bound to continue having a solidly realistic sound to it.

However, the queerness of the theory — and morality — concerning nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence comes from the fact that both strategists and pacifists define the problems of war and peace in terms of military systems. They concentrate exclusively on the costs of using nuclear weapons. This could be called the pitfall of closed military thinking. It is centred in the northern hemisphere.

But would not the fallacy of the theory and morality of what the nuclear strategists call 'nuclear peace' become clear if we were to cast off our First World-centred, closed military thinking? We must extend our perspective instead to the south, and to the negative economic impact of weapons, and to the costs, not just of using nuclear weapons but of continuing to maintain them.

The militarisation of these developing countries, as I have tried to show, is prosecuted within a continuum of militarisation in the industrial structure, from the import of weapons through their domestic production to export. This works a transformation in the structure of finance and trade of the developing country, distorts its structures of production, and promotes the entropy of famine.

Bibliographic Note

Komatsu So, 'Sengo shihonshugi no hatten kozo' (The development structure of post-war capitalism), Part I, Keizaigaku Ronshu, March, 1983.


On Militarisation and Third World debt, see IMF *Annual Reports*, and *Financial Statistics*, IMF, Washington, annually, and monthly respectively.

On Arms Transfers to the Third World, see R. Vaeyrynen, 'Economic and Political Consequences of Arms Transfers to the Third World' *Alternatives*, VI (1980); Minoru Sekishita, 'America teikokushugi to buki yushutsu' (American Imperialism and arms exports), and Ryusuke Takita, 'Dai san sekai' he no buki yushutsu to 'shinsukuminchi-shugi' no tenkai' (Arms export to the 'Third World' and the development of 'neo-colonialism'), *Keizai*, January 1979.


**Eichii Shindo** teaches in the Department of International Relations of the Tsukuba University in Japan.

**Gavan McCormack** teaches History at La Trobe University in Australia.
Sowing the Seeds of Famine: The Political Economy of Food Deficits in Sudan

Jay O'Brien

After escaping the ravages of the Sahelian famine of 1968-73, Sudan has begun to experience famine in the current drought. This paper examines recent commercial and subsistence patterns of food production in Sudan in relation to shifting structures of accumulation in order to account for Sudan's rising vulnerability to famine. It argues that the combination of the cumulative effects of capitalist agricultural expansion with the ascendancy of policies of 'trilateral co-operation' under Arab foreign capital during the 1970s set Sudan firmly on a course toward chronic and increasing food deficits. Peasant producers face a rapidly declining ability to meet their consumption needs, including food, through direct production at the same time that rain-fed capitalist agriculture is being reoriented toward increased export production.

As we go to press severe famine threatens to spread throughout this country which is expected to provide both for its own population, and for a million refugees from the surrounding region.

The drought and famine which devastated the Sahelian countries and Ethiopia in the 1960s and 1970s left Sudan relatively untouched. This good luck did not result from favourable rains in Sudan. In fact, as Nicholson (p.136/7) has shown, much or all of Sudan had low precipitation figures for most of the years from 1965 to 1973. Sudan's central zones — apart from the areas immediately bordering the Nile — showed mean precipitation departures of between 0.25 and 0.85 below normal for 1968, 1970, 1971, 1972 and 1973, comparable to the deficits experienced in most of the drought-stricken areas of the Sahel. In addition, the effects of unfavourable timing and pattern of rainfall in relation to plant growth were reported by cultivators to have further damaged yields in some areas. Observers in Khartoum saw transport planes taking off from the capital to deliver relief food supplies to Darfur toward the end of this period and noted increases in the numbers of beggars from that area on the streets of Khartoum. Some rural enterprises, such as the Habila Scheme in Southern Kordofan, enjoyed large supplies of seasonal labour from drought-stricken areas of western Sudan in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Yet, starvation does not appear to have been a major problem in Sudan in those years.

This paper argues that the conditions which were responsible for Sudan's good fortune derived from a pattern of agricultural development during the 1960s which was rare in Africa and indeed in the entire Third World, based as it was on
the expansion of capitalist food production supplying internal markets rather than on expansion of export production. Since the early 1970s, however, a two-pronged attack has been transforming the earlier pattern and setting the stage for possible future famine. The World Bank, IMF and other external agencies have placed renewed emphasis on policies favouring expansion of export production, a peculiar brand of 'smallholder' projects and, under the rubric of 'stabilisation' plans, have carried out a frontal assault on the purchasing power of the Sudanese population. At the same time, Arab capital has promoted Sudan as the potential 'breadbasket' of the Arab world and begun to intervene in various ways which have the effect of reorienting agricultural production in Sudan from local to foreign Arab markets. This paper argues that these changes have been creating conditions in Sudan which leave its rural population, especially in the northern savanna zones, increasingly vulnerable to the drought-induced famine which had by 1983 begun to affect many Sudanese.

The Expansion of Capitalist Food Production
The large-scale expansion of domestic food production in Sudan got its start with the political ascendancy of the agrarian bourgeoisie following independence and the concurrent decline in profitability of the cotton-producing, pump-irrigated agriculture which had served as the basis of the initial accumulation of capital in Sudanese agriculture in the colonial period. The recession in world cotton prices which set in during the late 1950s threw into sharp relief the disadvantages of having large amounts of capital tied up in the infrastructure of irrigated agriculture. In this context agrarian capitalists began to search for more favourable investment opportunities.

Partially mechanised sorghum production in the central rainlands provided an equal opportunity. As a last colonial act, the British had established a highly profitable, state-supported pattern of mechanised production of sorghum in government-leased tracts of the fertile central clay plain. This pattern involved low levels of fixed investment and ecologically damaging cultivation practices which produced high rates of profit.

Rapid post-independence expansion of capitalist agriculture boosted internal demand for commercial food crops to feed the large seasonal wage labour force, which was paid partly in kind. Such payments played a key role in keeping cash wage rates from rising as demand for seasonal labour soared. The absolute size of Sudan's potential internal market was already relatively large by African standards due to the great size of the country. An extensive railway system built by the British originally for strategic and administrative reasons provided relatively efficient means of transporting workers to the primary labour markets and moving grain to those same centres for use in wage payments. Thus capitalist production of sorghum enjoyed a buoyant internal market for its product which in turn provided a key to controlling wage rates and the labour force as a whole.

To support the pattern of investment dominated by rainfed, mechanised agriculture which began to emerge in the late 1950s, the agrarian bourgeoisie in power used the facilities of the state to aid this sector, often at the expense of the mostly government-operated export (cotton) sector.* This class used its increasing

*The research that documents this process has been carried out by T. Ali. see Bibliographic Note at end.
control of the government to channel imports of machinery and spare parts, priority provision of fuel, etc., to private capitalist agriculture, often at the expense of government-operated irrigated cotton schemes such as the Gezira. The result was that by the Mid-1960s private rain-fed farming dominated capitalist growth in Sudan. This growth received a further boost in 1968 with the ‘Agrarian Reform Movement’, which nationalised the private cotton pump schemes on generous terms, thus free agrarian capital to invest in sorghum production just at the time that the World Bank initiated its first project for assisting mechanised farming in Sudan.

The effects of these and related policies of the period on the export sector were severe. As noted by the ILO’s 1976 Mission report (p.467), there was a significant reallocation of government expenditure away from economic services to defence, security and general administration, with economic services declining from 30.4 per cent of total current expenditure in 1961/62 to 14.3 per cent in 1972/73. During the same period development expenditure fell from a ratio of 35 per cent to current expenditure in 1955/56, and the special level of 95 per cent in 1963/64 (when several large new projects reached completion), to a ratio of only 18 per cent in 1972/73 (ILO, 26). In the 1960s and early 1970s, according to the ILO (p.467), ‘development finance has been treated more as a ‘residual’ after growing current expenditure needs were met ... The level and pattern of the Government's development expenditure has in fact been influenced more by the availability of external project assistance than by the availability of domestic resources.’ Starved of resources, the export sector declined. Between 1960 and 1970 Sudan’s export revenues increased by only 0.8 per cent per year, and from 1970 to 1976 they decreased by 9 per cent per year (WB 1978b:86). Neglect of the irrigation infrastructure in Gezira and other cotton schemes led to massive deterioration and to declines in yields (see WB 1978a: Annex 9, 24).

Lack of resources and insufficient maintenance were not the only problems faced by the cotton schemes and the export sector in general. As export revenues declined the central government sought to make up the declining revenues by increased taxation of foreign trade. By the mid-1960s taxes on imports and exports accounted for 45 per cent of all central government revenues (ILO 1976:468). Tax revenues grew in relation to non-tax revenues (e.g. government shares of cotton receipts), reaching 81.4 per cent in 1975/76, and were weighted heavily towards indirect taxes, which comprised 71.1 per cent of tax revenues in 1975/76 (WB 1978a: Annex 8, 3). A development tax of 10 per cent was levied on cotton in 1967. As a result, the total implicit rate of taxation of cotton, the principal export, rose to 26 per cent in 1972/73 as compared to an implicit tax rate on sorghum, the principal crop produced by private capital and marketed internally, of 12 per cent in 1972/72 and 10 per cent in 1974/75 (WB 1978a: Annex 7, Table 1) * Clearly, the export sector was being made, by indirect as well as direct means, to bear the burden of sustaining the state in an era of private capital accumulation in rain-fed agriculture.

However, the hegemonic agrarian bourgeoisie took no significant steps to resolve the contradiction of the switch to a pattern of internally oriented growth from a structure of acute export dependency. Growth continued to depend on export

*Implicit taxation of cotton in 1973/74 fell to 19 per cent, reflecting higher producer prices occasioned by a drastic reduction in cotton acreage that season as part of an abortive diversification plan. Cotton was restored to its normal dominance in the following season. The heavy burden borne by cotton was not reduced until the elimination of some of the taxes under World Bank insistence in 1978 (see WB, 1978a).
revenues to finance imports of agricultural machinery, fuel and luxury consumption goods, and Sudan's import bill soared at an annual rate of 7.8 per cent between 1970 and 1976 — as export revenues declined by 9 per cent (WB, 1978b:86). The balance of trade and payments deteriorated rapidly, financed primarily by foreign borrowing. The external public debt rose from US$308m (15.3 per cent of GNP) in 1970 to $3,097m (37.2 per cent of GNP) by 1980 (WB, 1982:138), and amount to $6,300m in December 1982 (A Sudanese Economist in ROAPE 26, 1983:66). Foreign reserves were insufficient to pay for even half a month's imports. By 1979 debt service had risen from 10.7 per cent of export revenues in 1970 to 33 per cent (WB, 1981:158), a figure expected to reach 51 per cent in 1984 (ROAPE 26:69).

Pursuit of capitalist growth led by expansion of good production for the internal market without solving the problem of export dependency to finance the imports involved thus paved the way for a crisis of massive proportions, which is discussed below. For a period of about 15 years, however, this strategy adopted by the Sudanese agrarian bourgeoisie resulted in a pattern of growth which differed sharply from the export-led growth pattern which has dominated in African and other Third World economies since colonial times. In a recent study of the agricultural production performance in 35 sub-Saharan African countries between 1961-65 and 1976-80, Hinderink and Sterkenburg (1983:2) found only two countries which showed a substantial growth in per capita food production at the expense of export crop production. These were Sudan and Botswana, in both of which per capita food production rose from an index of 100 to 112 while overall per capita agricultural output was virtually stagnant. Only five other countries in the study showed significant growth in per capita food production, and among them only Ivory Coast showed a greater increase in food production than in export production. Four other countries showed stagnation in food production as well as in overall agricultural output per capita, while output in the remaining 23 countries failed dismally to keep pace with population growth.

**Impact on Rural Populations**

The overall structure of Sudan's rural economy led peasants to become oriented toward the production of food crops on their own plots, supplemented by seasonal wage labour, rather than toward the production of export crops as happened in the savanna zones of West Africa. Peasants did produce export crops, especially sesame, but generally within the framework which did not involve large-scale dependency on high-risk hybrids but was dominated by the criterion of self-sufficiency in grain. This situation protected Sudanese peasants and pastoralists from famine in several ways, despite unfavourable rainfall and poor or failed crops during the period of the Sahelian famine. Many were able to maintain food reserves from their direct production. Slow development of rural market-orientation inhibited capitalist social differentiation from developing to the extent of undermining the ability of most people to produce substantial proportions of their subsistence requirements directly. This went significantly beyond simple food production to include—through maintenance of bush and forest fallow and other resources — the ability to provide other consumption needs, such as animal protein, vegetables, fuel and building materials, directly rather than through the market. When all else failed, there were plenty of opportunities to find wage labour, which usually included as a conventional component payment in the form of food — thus insulating seasonal labourers from some of the impact of price inflation. In addition, many cultivators produced
sufficient grain surpluses in good years to maintain reserves, in the form of livestock as well as grain stores. Such reserves were a regular aim of production in many communities and helped to enable peasants to survive frequent low yields due to fluctuations in rainfall.

These conditions can be attributed to the orientation of the most dynamic sector of the economy to the internal mass market and the overall dominance of agricultural development by large-scale projects employing seasonal wage labour rather than by peasant cash crop producers as in most of the areas in West Africa hit hard by the famine. It was also important that there was considerable room for expansion before the point was reached that capitalist agriculture and peasant agriculture came into significant direct competition over land. Many pastoralists were displaced from their pastures by the rapid expansion of the 1960s and 1970s, but either found open land to cultivate instead or maintained sub-optimal herding units through heavy reliance on seasonal wage labour to supplement herding incomes.

Crisis and Struggle
The effects of incorporation of rural populations into the wage labour force and the growing encroachment on their lands by spreading capitalist agriculture began, by the mid-1970s, seriously to inhibit the ability of the rural masses to meet their subsistence needs, especially for food, through their own direct production. Forest and scrub rapidly began to disappear as new schemes were cleared, commercial charcoal-making expanded to meet growing urban demand for fuel, and people, especially pastoralists, displaced by the schemes sought new land on which to settle. Capitalist agriculture expanded by at least five million acres in the 1960s and 1970s, and most of the land taken had previously been prime seasonal pasture of nomadic herds. The pattern of capitalist farming in the rainlands itself deepened the predatory nature of its expansion. Tracts of hundreds of thousands of acres were clear-cut with World Bank assistance, reducing humidity and cloud formation and increasing soil salinity, and the farms were 'mined' for quick profits before the soil gave out due to erosion and nutrient depletion. With the help of World Bank loans to the investors and technical facilities provided by the state, capitalists whose farms were exhausted in an average of five to seven years moved on to new fields.

The displaced pastoralists fought unsuccessfully, if sometimes bloodily, to retain access to their grazing lands. Ultimately defeated, they sought new pastures, moving into areas already used by other pastoralists or small-scale cultivators, or else shifting to increasingly marginal ecological zones. Bloody conflicts over land ensured, particularly in Blue Nile, White Nile, Upper Nile and Southern Kordofan Provinces (see el Medani 1978; O'Brien 1980). Pastoralists are thus often the direct agents of the depletion of fallow and scrub and generally receive the lion's share of official blame for Sudan's current rate of desertification, estimated at about 10km per year. As conflict rather than co-operation has come to dominate most relations between settled and nomadic, herds have come to be barred from agricultural fields, which thereby lose the fertilising benefits of their manure (c.f. Franke and Chasin 1980:46).

Cash needs began to increase rapidly as more and more people came to depend on markets to supply their needs for building materials, cooking fuel and other important items of consumption. As cash needs rose and rural producers felt
increasing pressures to maximise cash returns to their labour time, ecologically important fallow and crop rotation practices came to be abandoned or attenuated — even where fallow land continued to be available. Again here, pastoralists tend to be most vulnerable and first blamed. As the economic viability of herding units has been undermined and urban markets for meat have expanded, herding practices have changed in ecologically damaging ways. Where most herds were previously composed of at least two or three different species of livestock which make complementary and undamaging demands on grazing lands, single-species herds — especially of sheep, which yield the greatest cash returns, or goats, which are easiest to maintain — have recently come to predominate. Where integrated herds had to be moved frequently so that each species could find its preferred food, these herds tend to be kept in a pasture until there is nothing left for them to eat there, resulting in the disappearance of the best grasses (see Sgrb 1977). Pastoralists whose herds decline below ecologically determined minimum sizes necessary for subsistence no longer find alternatives to the herding way of life, and instead maintain small herds while supplementing their incomes through wage labour — thereby further contributing to the overstocking of pastures.

Cultivators also become participants in the process of destroying delicate ecological balances. A vivid example was provided by a village in Blue Nile Province where I conducted research in the late 1970s. Located in woodland savanna, this village had depended on surrounding forest and scrub for convenient sources of firewood and building materials. In 1975, urban merchants had begun to truck wage labour into the area to make charcoal, setting up operations less than 200 metres from the houses of the village. As the villagers saw the forest visibly retreat from their homes and began to have to walk farther afield for their daily wood supplies, they decided that they might as well get some of the profit from the decimation of the forest and began to make charcoal for sale on their own account. Elsewhere in Sudan I have been told of similar processes of deforestation of whole regions already accomplished.

Expansion of cash needs has also led to basic changes in crop selection and rotation practices, some of which have been damaging. In Blue Nile Province, as an example, long-standing cropping patterns involved a primary alternation of sorghum and sesame, supplemented by small amounts of millet which was cultivated primarily because of the protection it afforded to sorghum against the parasitic weed strega. As a crop it was too labour-demanding and vulnerable to birds to cultivate extensively under conditions of market integration. But in the 1970s, both the most prosperous and the poorest farmers were dropping millet cultivation altogether and suffering declining yields in their other crops as a result. For the rich, a crop from which they derived no profit was of no interest, and they could always clear new lands when yields fell. For the poor, all labour had to be devoted to producing food for their families to eat immediately, and the returns from sorghum cultivation were much better than from millet. Yields have consequently declined drastically in many areas, forcing even greater dependence on markets, both for income and for consumption, and resulting in still further disregard for any concerns other than the short-term need to feed a hungry family (or, for the rich, to turn a profit). At the same time, the expansion of capitalist agriculture into new rural areas has provided new opportunities for wage employment that have made it increasingly difficult for kin-based production units to retain the labour of junior members.
In response to these conditions, seasonal wage labourers became increasingly aggressive in pursuit of higher cash wage rates. Increasingly, workers came to refuse payments in kind and to seek the highest available cash piece rates. By the mid-1970s, this pressure on wage rates, combined with growing problems of externally induced price inflation, deteriorating export performance and general fiscal and balance-of-payments problems, brought on a crisis of the agricultural labour force as a whole.

Heavy external pressure was also brought to bear on Sudan. Beginning about 1972, the World Bank became more insistent in pressing its arguments about Sudan's 'comparative advantage' lying in cotton production for export and against the policies which the government had pursued toward diversifying production in the irrigated schemes — including growing more import-substitution elite food crops such as wheat and rice. The World Bank's Third Mechanised Farming Project of 1978 halted Bank support for further expansion of this type of agriculture. At the same time, the Bank offered Sudan a massive 'rehabilitation' programme — currently its largest undertaking in Africa — to rebuild and reorganise Gezira and other cotton-exporting irrigation schemes.

The IMF imposed an austere 'stabilisation plan' on Sudan in 1978, involving drastic currency devaluations, removal of government subsidies on food and other consumption items, a moratorium on new development projects and other draconian measures. By 1984, the value of the Sudanese Pound had declined from US$2.87 in 1978 to less than half a dollar, and living standards of urban workers as well as rural producers had sharply declined.

Foreign Arab capital began, following the October War of 1973, to promote Sudan as the potential 'breadbasket' of the Arab world. Arab oil exporters agreed to guarantee Sudan's mounting debts, provide short-term balance-of-payments support and development aid in return for Sudan's acceptance of the stringent terms of the IMF stabilisation plan and Arab access to Sudan's agricultural resources for direct private investment. Saudi and other Arab capital, mainly private, took over further expansion of rain-fed mechanised farming with the aim of using the sorghum and other products to feed livestock and poultry for export to oil-producer markets. Saudi Prince Mohamed el Faisal has a 99-year lease on 1.2 million acres in Blue Nile Province, and other concessions to foreign investors have reached several million additional acres. Mohamed el Faisal's Faisal Islamic Bank has also become one of the most profitable in Sudan.

These foreign influences played an important role, but the reorientation of Sudanese agriculture during the 1970s and 1980s was not simply imposed on the Sudanese. The combined crises resulting in the early 1970s from the policies pursued by the hegemonic agrarian bourgeoisie brought about intense internal struggle among the fractions of the Sudanese bourgeoisie and their allied power blocs. Foreign intervention gave a decisive advantage in these struggles to the import-export oriented commercial bourgeoisie, which captured control of the state by 1972 and has been gradually — and not without spirited opposition — consolidating its hegemonic position since, through altering government policy (e.g. the landmark 1972 Investment Act liberalising conditions for foreign investment) and establishing itself as the commercial agents in Sudan of big foreign Arab capital. The fact that Nimeiri has been President continuously since 1969 seems to have obscured the nature of this power shift for many analysts,
despite the fact that the nationalist policies adopted early in his regime have been systematically dismantled since 1972.

Retrospect and Prospect
The two contrasting patterns of peripheral capital accumulation referred to correspond to what de Janvry (1981) has termed 'articulated accumulation' and 'disarticulated accumulation'. Capitalist expansion in Sudan during the 1960s occurred on the basis of a pattern of articulated accumulation in the sense that the leading sectors of the economy, under the control of the hegemonic agrarian fraction of the bourgeoisie, produced for and therefore made their profits from the internal mass market. Under such conditions famine represents the collapse of purchasing power and is thus very bad for business.

Patterns of disarticulated accumulation stand in stark contrast, because the welfare, or lack of it, of the producing population has little direct impact on the profitability of export production. The logic of capital accumulation within such a dominant pattern thus leads to the marginalisation of producers as consumers; profitability within the system does not depend in a significant way on the purchasing power of the domestic workforce. Wages figure only as a cost of production which can be kept as low as prevailing social and political conditions allow without damaging profitability in marketing the products.

As I have argued elsewhere policies adopted by the Sudanese government since the mid-1970s, such as mechanisation of cotton picking, which are nonsensical from a strict cost/benefit standpoint, do make sense in terms of the logic of disarticulated accumulation. Such measures represent components of a new programme aimed at halting the rising tide of agricultural wage rates that characterised the mid-1970s and aimed at resisting the efforts of rural workers to integrate themselves into consumer markets to make up for their losses in subsistence production.

Faced with rising prices for a widening array of necessary consumption items for which they must pay cash, but unable to increase their wage incomes sufficiently to meet these needs, rural producers have been making adjustments which threaten to exacerbate their difficulties in the long term. Increasingly in direct competition with capital for land, peasants and pastoralists adopt equally ecologically damaging practices which further reduce their abilities to provide for their own needs directly. As their crop yields decline and they come to buy a growing proportion of the food they eat, they lose the ability to maintain food reserves — whether in the form of grain or livestock. As they alter their crop selection to maximise cash returns rather than direct consumption requirements, they incur greater risks of crop failure in times of unfavourable rains and, in the long run, further impoverish their soil (cf Franke and Chasin 1980). As the surrounding forest and scrub recede, they also lose natural sources of food they used to fall back on in times of shortage. As more operations in the capitalist farms are mechanised, the main demand for seasonal labour is increasingly concentrated in a short peak season, increasing wage-competition among workers and reducing their ability to compensate for village crop failure through agricultural wage incomes. In short, agricultural growth on the basis of a pattern of disarticulated accumulation in the conditions of the 1980s makes rural producers in Sudan dangerously vulnerable to starvation as the result of drought. Indeed, the prospect becomes more likely with each passing year that cultivators
in some of the more northerly parts of Sudan's savanna zone may face starvation as the result of even relatively minor drought. In fact, by 1983 back-to-back poor harvests due to poor rainfall had depleted the grain reserves of even the more prosperous peasants in at least Kassala, Northern and Southern Darfur and Northern Kordofan Provinces, thus driving up grain prices to the extent that a bowlful of unprocessed sorghum was going for as much as Sudanese £6 in the markets near Gedarif at the end of the 1983/84 harvest season. Unreplenished for several seasons, the formerly vast grain stores of the big crop merchants were reduced to badly deteriorated sorghum, which they could nevertheless sell at fantastic prices to hungry peasants. People began to starve. (Jan. 1984 — One bag or sorghum was selling for £140!).

For months the Nimeiri regime successfully covered up the presence of these appalling conditions in the Sudanese countryside, and Sudan failed to appear on the lists of countries affected by the current African famine. In the meantime, there were incidents of hungry peasants attacking the granaries of merchants in El Obeid and Gedarif — who responded by hiring armed guards to protect their granaries — and unrest mounted, most notably in the south where guerilla attacks became frequent. In response, Nimeiri played his tried and true Libyan and Ethiopian menace cards and the Reagan administration responded appropriately with US$166.5m in US military aid in fiscal 1984 and a request for $190.7m in 1985, and by sending American AWACs to Sudan three times in 13 months (Africa Report, March 1984:39). Finally, Nimeiri requested emergency food assistance on his visit to Washington in early 1984. The Reagan administration submitted a request for 70,000 tons of grain for Sudan in a supplementary Appropriation Bill, but approval was delayed by the debate over aid to the contras in Nicaragua. By late 1984, the FAO listed Sudan as one of the twelve countries hardest hit by the famine and conservatively estimated that over a million of its people were at risk of starvation. It remains to be seen how many Sudanese farmers will be wiped out or how many will die. What is already clear, though, is the devastating consequences for rural communities of supply side, export-oriented solutions to Sudan's capitalist crisis.

Bibliographic Note

A preliminary version of this article was presented at the annual African Studies Association (USA) meeting in Boston, 8 December 1983. Thanks are due to the participants in the symposium 'Food in the Sudan' for their helpful comments. Thanks also to John Bruce, Jim Faris, Richard Franke, Ellen Gruenbaum, Ronald Mason and Bill Roseberry for reading and commenting on earlier drafts.


---

**1986 ROAPE CONFERENCE**

The Biennial ROAPE Conference will be held on 27th and 28th September 1986 and will be organised around the theme of **POPULAR STRUGGLES IN AFRICA**.

Contributions are invited for thematic sessions and/or for plenary discussions. We are keen to hear from readers about ideas they might have for subjects on which the conference could focus (by immediate return post please) but will welcome offers of papers and contributions on such themes as:

- democracy and socialism
- women’s struggles
- peasant movements
- working class action
- post-colonial revolutionary strategy
- popular consciousness and ideology
- the emerging left in Africa
- coping with poverty/repression/war/famine
- liberation movements

To complement the ‘macro focus’ of the last conference, we are keen this time that papers should, as far as possible and where appropriate, turn to the ‘micro level’ and examine popular action and consciousness not only at the level of organisations and formal pronouncements but also in small group action and struggle. It is hoped that the conference will yield not only a perspective of how poverty, war and famine (for example) affect particular social formations but also how villages, small groups or grass roots popular organisations struggle against and cope with such crises and catastrophes. This will, of course, depend on contributions.

A final decision about which themes and which contributions will be featured at the conference, and how it will be structured will depend entirely on the nature, quality and number of contributions on particular topics.

In order to maximise time for discussion, it has been decided that authors will NOT present their papers at sessions. Instead, abstracts and papers will be pre-circulated, a group of papers comprising each panel will be introduced and surveyed by a discussant and the authors will then be encouraged to participate in discussions with the audience. We intend to circulate all abstracts well before the conference to all participants. Papers will be circulated where possible to participants who wish to attend particular thematic sessions. DEADLINES for contributions are:

1. Suggestions for subjects, expressions of interest: IMMEDIATE.

Please write to the ROAPE office, 341 Glossop Road, Sheffield S10 2HP, England.

Selected papers from the 1984 ROAPE Conference on *The World Recession and the Crisis in Africa* will be published in 1986. Details in our December issue.
Food Crisis and Class Formation in Shaba
Brooke Grundfest Schoepf

This article explores issues of agricultural change as they have been played out in the Lufira Valley in south-eastern Shaba. It indicates some of the interconnections between peasants, the State and capitalist class interests, showing how measures taken in favour of capitalist enterprise contribute to deepening underdevelopment of the peasantry. It also casts doubt upon the assumption that capitalism — monopoly, state or private — can lead to development of productive forces in agriculture. A re-examination of this issue is pertinent in view of recent Left criticism of 'underdevelopment' theory and the notion that African development is being advanced by national bourgeoisies.

Zaire's agriculture — including food production — has been in crisis for at least two decades, since the peasantries of several regions, finding themselves poorer than before 1960, embarked upon armed struggle for a 'second independence'. Their fight was interpreted in Western circles as a class struggle, one which would upset plans for neo-colonial domination. Despite the lack of a revolutionary strategy, 'it took a combination of fighter-bombers from the United States, the enlistment of white mercenaries, and the Belgian-United States paratroop drop on Stanleyville to defeat it' (First 1970:459).

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the Mulele-led uprising. Throughout Zaire peasant resistance continues: dispersed, sporadic, muted by fear of reprisal and lack of both overarching strategy and effective organisation. In the face of political crisis in the Mobutist state, armed intervention again became necessary in 1977-78. More recently Western development policy has virtually abandoned support for peasant agriculture while openly legitimating further support for the dominant class in the name of development.

The Policy Environment
Although Zaire now imports an increasing share of its food, development of the country's vast resources to provide self-sufficiency is a realistic goal. Repeated proposals have been put forward to stimulate increased production; some of these have involved peasant development, the goals of which also include raising peasant incomes and diminishing rural exodus. However, peasant development is constrained by several interrelated variables, including lack of government support, bureaucratic disregard for the peasant condition, a political economy grossly distorted by Zaire's role in the world economy and managed by an emergent bourgeoisie hell-bent on rapid accumulation. One aspect of this
management is the attempt to strengthen the state's administrative control over the peasantry and to systematise surplus extraction by means of obligatory cultivation and — until recently — controlled product prices.

Not surprisingly, development projects frequently fail to meet their stated objectives and some actually add to the burdens of those whom they should serve. Even the extracted surplus seldom benefits the state, since much of it is turned into private pockets. Many planners privately acknowledge the futility of peasant development programmes in the present Zairian political environment. Without control over the outcome of their work, both expatriates and nationals are 'just doing their jobs'.

The latest policy initiative, termed liberalisation, institutionalises domestic and international support for large-scale capitalist agriculture. Although such support has been present throughout the history of the regime and although members of its ruling clique possess large agricultural interests, liberalisation represents a new departure in legitimacy. It involves decontrolling agricultural prices, lifting import duties on farm inputs and machinery, creating new sources of agricultural credit, and turning over public resources, including state research stations and experimental farms to private owners. This means that measures already taken informally and in contravention of the law are now rendered legal. The policy is justified — not only by the Zairian state bourgeoisie but by their advisers in the Western funding institutions — by the notion that private initiatives will lead to increased output, capital formation and productive re-investment.

Privatisation draws legitimacy from the view that since capitalist and peasant agriculture are discrete, unrelated 'sectors', policy measures favouring capitalist interests will not affect the peasants — or, alternatively will provide employment for surplus rural labour. Seldom is it acknowledged that policies favouring large farm interests simultaneously tend to worsen the already miserable condition of the peasantry. When a major share of resources are allocated to capitalist agricultural development, peasants, as a class, are not just neglected. They are harnessed to provide the dominant class with capital, labour and land. In this manner the 'underdevelopment' perspective is applicable within a developing national class system.

Current Peasant Perspectives

Obligatory cultivation was a means devised by colonial planners in many areas of Africa to coerce peasant labour. In Zaire this hated form of administrative control lasted right up to independence despite the fanfair which surrounded the paysannats schemes. Planting obligations were re-introduced early during the Mobutu regime and further strengthened by decree in 1976. Plans were also made to consolidate peasant villages and fields for more effective control. In the south eastern Shaba copperbelt the crops that must be grown are foodstuffs — particularly cassava — imposed in an effort to provide cheaply for urban consumption needs, another colonial 'survival'. In the area studied the road network and heavy military presence facilitate the implementation of constraining measures, as extracts from field diaries indicate:

In one village an elderly peasant complained he had been fined by the agricultural moniteur for refusing to sell maize at the decreed minimum price. Friends urged his silence: 'You never know who can be listening' (1975).
In another large, consolidated village the government Secretary warned peasants at a public meeting that fines and jail sentences awaited those who sold at prices above the minimum. He also warned that barter is illegal (1976). Another official reiterated the proscription of barter, preferred by many peasants to sales, even following liberalisation (1983).

In still another village, a student reported that peasants consider the moniteur a police judiciaire agent. Charged with agricultural surveillance, his visits result in fines. Peasants often flee when he appears in the village (1974). In 1979 this situation was deplored by an Agriculture Department official as an hindrance to agricultural development. The policy remains: the official has gone (1983).

Chiefs continue to function as intermediaries in the system, profiting from the labour of prisoners put to work on their fields (1975, 1976, 1977, 1981). They sometimes direct their policemen to use corporal punishment and the practice is considered normal by officials (1976).

The JMPR (party youth wing) has been out on the paths collecting fines from people not carrying their party cards to work in the fields (1976). Now the JMPR is fining people whose tax stamps are not in order. Since the stamps issued to the collectivite were insufficient for the population: Catch 22 (1977).

Minor chiefs can find themselves victimised along with the peasants by officials, the military and traders — particularly those with political protection (1975).

A chief reports the proceeds of his vegetable crop confiscated by soldiers at a roadblock when he returned from the railhead (1976).

A former co-op director reports failure of his church-sponsored organisation as a result of military harassment. They frequently took produce and cash, then sent him to jail (1975).

Buses carrying women on their way to Lubumbashi with huge headloads of vegetables are regularly stopped and passengers turned out by soldiers levying an unofficial tax. Now the bus drivers have systematised the collection. They pass the hat before reaching the barricade and all passengers contribute their tithe. The driver takes his cut and hands the money out to the soldiers.

The wife of chief discovers that her vegetables (produced with prison labour) are selling 1,000 per cent mark-up in Lubumbashi's Kenia market (1977).

Traders in the area complain of high overhead costs incurred at military checkpoints. They stress the need to form partnerships with officials (all years). One trader reports a standing arrangement with the military commander (1977).

Producing for market under conditions of extreme self-exploitation, the peasants, beneath the veil of entrepreneurial production for market, are reduced to the status of 'home-workers' (Amin 1974). The peculiar form of peasant production which emerged during the colonial period out of the wreckage of the kin-based societies in the area profoundly transformed their production systems and the content of social relations. However, the peasants have not been passive here or elsewhere in Zaire; the 1960s were not their only moment of resistance (Jewsiewicki 1980; Lemarchand 1979; Newbury 1984a; Schoepf and Schoepf 1982).

**Peasant Initiatives**

Despite the unfavourable environment, peasants in many small communities in the Lufira Valley have attempted to increase household production in order to pay taxes and purchase tools, consumer goods, health care and education. When they have had a choice in terms of available markets they have not opted out; most are firmly committed to market production within the prevailing constraints.
Co-operatives have been initiated throughout the area with seed-money loaned by the Catholic Church. The one we studied, in a consolidated village of 2,500 inhabitants, had 40 men and women members. In addition to purchasing inputs and marketing crops, it operates a tractor ploughing service (members first), a truck and a grain mill—instituted at the behest of the women. The machines are, for the most part, locally maintained although the machine shop at the parastatal farm will occasionally make spare parts unobtainable otherwise. It also sells the co-ops imported fertiliser now that the Maize Programme's outreach project has ended (see below). Collective fields have expanded as the members' understanding of their common interest increased. When young people asked to join, the elders helped them form their own co-ops instead, so that there are now three small groups in the village, each with about 40 men and women members. One of the juniors' groups runs a poultry project and all three are involved in crop diversification and capital construction: clearing, stumping, draining and irrigating collective fields.

The co-operatives have introduced agricultural change by gradually modifying the local farming system—including technology and social relations of production. Their own accomplishments and the church loans have made it possible for them to survive. The members' solidarity and the leaders' commitment have kept the co-ops from being a vehicle for enrichment of the wealthier among them. Neither of these are automatic assurance of success and in fact these peasant groups have worked very hard at consciousness-raising. They are helped by traditions which value adult autonomy and consensus decision-making, and which support the participation of women in public life. Women in this part of the valley are said to be 'owners of the land' and once had important religious roles now eroded by Christian teachings. Life is far from idyllic however. As there is no way for them to circumvent the constraints of the wider environment, they, like other villagers, remain prey to traders, officials and the military whom they serve as a means of primary capital accumulation.

**Price Policy in Practice**

The confiscatory crop prices used by colonial and neo-colonial states in Africa as a means of extracting surplus from the peasantry are an acknowledged disincentive to increasing production for sale. While government officials continued to repeat the colonial view that peasants are target-earners and only produce for market if coerced, it is clear that they had other reasons to hold the line on peasant prices. Not only are many officials heavily involved in trade, but should the peasants actually be able to obtain significantly increased returns, there is reason to doubt that a market equilibrium, bringing reasonable consumer prices, could be achieved. However, they were under pressure from the international community to 'free' the market.

For example, in 1981 the US Consul General in Lumbumbashi described his efforts to have maize prices decontrolled by the Governor of Shaba Region. The latter, however, expressed his support for no more than "limited price increases", citing the heightened danger of urban unrest resulting from vertiginously mounting food costs. Officials are aware of the rioting which has taken place in countries acquiescing to IMF-imposed austerity measures. Since the state is also under pressure from both employers and the IMF to hold the line on wages, they see themselves as operating "between the hammer and the anvil" (BGS interviews, 7 August 1981; B. Schoepf 1982b).

Actually, Zaire's price policy was based on political expediency. With rampant
inflation reaching 100 per cent in some years, real incomes of workers and peasants have declined drastically. Both wages and farm prices have moved upward in monetary terms in order to placate these classes and salaried employees as well. Maize prices paid to producers rose 30-fold between 1975 and early 1983. The price of locally made printed cotton cloth stocked in the village shops rose in exactly the same proportion. Palm oil — not produced locally due to the seven-month dry season — was 40 times dearer, while hoes and cutlasses were once again being made by village smiths since many cultivators could no longer afford to purchase industrially made implements.* Urban consumers in Lubumbashi were no better off. In 1974 when the minimum monthly wage was 18 Zaires, a 50kg bag of maize meal cost Z13.50. In 1983 consumers were lucky to obtain it at Z350 per bag — nearly twice the minimum wage at Z180. Government officials and the military were served at the mining company mills where they were charged Z182 per bag.

In May 1983, while maize was being harvested, prices were decontrolled; naturally these rose, on the farm, at the mills and in the markets. Some bargaining between the peasants and traders occurred. For example, peasants of the North Shaba area around Kongolo were asking Z2.50 per kilogramme while traders offered Z2. In the village we studied, peasant co-operative leaders asked for Z4 at the village and Z4.50 delivered to town. A trader with whom I rode back to Lubumbashi commented that he would obtain Z6 per kilo for large quantities at the mill. Either way he stood to gain, with net profits calculated at 25 to 30 per cent, but he would make most by doing his own transport. In North Shaba his profit would be slightly higher (30-35 per cent) if the Z2 offering price held (BGS fieldnotes 8 May 1983).**

To the peasants Z4 per kilo sounded like a great deal of money until they began to evaluate their crop results which had been badly affected by the bizarre rainfall pattern of the 1982-83 season. The most frequent pattern in this area is a five-month rainy season from mid-November to mid-April, with no more rain until some storms in late October followed by a short dry spell. Families with adequate labour — or access to tractor services — to prepare and sow fields early generally obtain better yields than those who cannot plant until late November or December. In November 1982 unusually heavy rains flooded many of the fields already planted, although in the better-drained fields, October-planted maize did well. December rains were much too heavy; field preparation and planting ceased while the young plants surviving in many November-planted fields washed out and rotted. People replanted, even though it was late in the season, in hopes of

*In Zaire, import substitution industrialisation now includes the local manufacture of agricultural implements by a multinational firm in association with national capital behind the hedge of tariff protection. However, peasants, who perceive the local product as inferior and over-priced, are again resorting to local craftsmen. The latter derive their steel from damaged motor-cars abandoned along the road. Since the automobile springs are too narrow to make wide-bladed hoes, the local product is less efficient than the old model, and constitutes one more element in declining production.

**Trade-transporters’ operations in an environment of scarcity (of fuel and spare parts) and official harassment contribute to the monopsonistic character of agricultural marketing. Large traders are able to make expensive deals with agents of the state who bargain with various bidders for control of trading zones. Many officials trade in produce themselves or through relatives. The problem of harassment prompted the co-operative president to offer the trader a lower price so as to avoid risk (BGS interviews 1981, 1983; Lemarchand 1979; Newbury 1984a).
getting some kind of crop. Then from February 14 to the latter part of April, no rain fell at all. Drought-weakened maize fell prey to charbon, a black rust disease which entered the area for the first time in adult memory. Then light rains came at the end of April, normally a dry period when maize cobs should have been drying on the stalks.

As a result of this unusual rainfall pattern, even those who had been able to plant early obtained disappointingly low yields of between 2 and 4 tons per hectare instead of the five to seven tons averages of recent years. Most peasant families, who because of labour constraints plant only 0.5 hectare of maize (and the obligatory 0.6 hectare of manioc) had no surplus to sell above family food requirements and thus are not able to take advantage of producer price increases. Many were short of maize and short of cassava, as well. Yields of the latter crop, which the government forces peasants to cultivate, have been diminishing since crop diseases entered the area in 1980.

The labour requirements of cassava are heavy, requiring field clearing each year in secondary-growth forest and the preparation of metre-high ridges. Because planting must be done during the heavy rains, the cassava planting decree limits the amount of labour that can be devoted to maize. However, caloric yields from cassava per area planted are quite high and the crop normally provides a hungry-season food reserve to tide people over until the new maize crop ripens. In 1983 the cassava crop required labour but did not produce a food reserve. The poorest families, including the elderly and households headed by single women, the vast majority of whom do not belong to co-ops, faced both food shortages and indebtedness. It is among this group that the death rate generally rises unless food relief in the form of remittances from urban family members becomes available. Due to general economic crisis and the continuing skewed pattern of urban and industrial growth characteristic of neo-colonial economies most village families have little hope that urban migrants can help them to the extent necessary. ‘African solidarity’ has been seriously eroded in the past decade so that in fact neither mutual aid nor patronage pass automatically through kin ties any longer. Networks must be carefully maintained by exchanges of favours and clientship demands counterprestations.

The conjunction of unfavourable ecological factors, including climate and disease in this year, is admittedly unusual. Nevertheless rainfall patterns are locally erratic and poorly distributed in at least one year out of five. Peasant strategies must allow for family survival in years of poor harvest when neither remittances nor labour migration are possible alternatives. The 1983 experience indicates that low crop prices are but one constraint to peasant agricultural development and that peasant leaders in the Lufira Valley are correct when they opt for farming strategies incorporating crop diversification rather than mono-cropping, even of a major crop staple. They are also correct in insisting that they must have labour-saving technology if they are to benefit from higher produce prices by cultivating larger areas.

State-sponsored Technology Transfer
All government-sponsored agricultural projects in the area involved food production. These included a World Bank-funded cattle ranching project, an FAO chick hatchery, an urban vegetable farm run by the Chinese and a CIMMYT-
assisted* National Maize Programme (PNM). This last was a project designed to bring green revolution technology to Zaire. Explicitly aimed toward raising peasant maize production and incomes, it was selected for intensive study.

The first two projects provided animals and advice for those members of the bourgeoisie who have acquired large ranches and/or begun poultry raising in Lubumbashi. The Chinese project grows European vegetables used by the bourgeoisie employing unskilled labour. The Maize Programme is no longer active in peasant development in the Lufira Valley. Now that its international support has ended, the Zairian research staff is minimally active, while the large INERA (Institut National des Recherches Agronomiques) farm has been converted to a Presidential domain run by Israeli technicians and produces poultry products for sale to the Lubumbashi bourgeoisie.

The PNM devised a locally adapted package of high-yielding maize seeds bred on their station, high density planting, and imported fertilisers supplied on credit to be repaid at harvest. The technology package was aimed at 'small farmers' using hoe cultivation. By 1975 PNM extension agents had achieved outstanding yields of up to seven tons per hectare on fields lent by peasants for demonstration. The researchers were elated at the results and saw no limits to increasing production. The more fertiliser was added, the higher the yields their new varieties produced. They envisioned field upon field of maize planted in orderly rows marching across the red clay soils of Shaba, Kasai and — why not — all of Africa? (fieldnotes 1975).

Despite the results they observed with their own eyes, peasants remained sceptical. Throughout the Valley they badgered the PNM for tractors, for in their experience, labour resources were stretched to their limit in peak seasons. Women, particularly feared that increased labour requirements — especially in weeding — would interfere with gardening on which their families depended for a varied diet, and which cash from maize sales could not replace (B.G. Schoepf 1975b). Many feared becoming indebted to the government as a result of input purchases should harvests fail. Village elders expressed their distrust at a public meeting when one man said, with evident support from the others: 'We have been developed and developed so many times that we don't believe any of the promises. We are tired of being developed. Even you (he pointed to the PNM extension head) we don't believe you'll stay ... We think it's all a show (fieldnotes 1975).

The peasants proceeded cautiously planting 0.2 or 0.3 hectare of PNM maize at first, integrating the plots into their existing crop cycle which spreads out labour requirements across the year and provides several different sources of food and cash. The locally designed solutions are similar to the optimum strategies derived from computer modelling using linear programming techniques on the basis of field data collected by Claude Schoepf. He concludes that technology which increases labour productivity throughout the cycle and still offers subsistence security is necessary for peasant agricultural development (C. Schoepf, forthcoming).

*CIMMYT is the acronym for the Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Mais y Trigo, an international research institute concentrating on maize and wheat improvement. Funded by grants from international donors it operates collaborative research programmes in various countries. Its Zaire programme ran from 1972 to 1977.
Easing labour requirements — by reducing necessary labour time and the amount of human energy expended in drudge labour — is crucial to expanding peasant production. Zairian peasants (and salaried workers, as well) for the most part use hand-held hoes and cutlasses for working the soil, while head-load transport remains common. Malaria, shistosomes and intestinal parasites — all common, particularly from the onset of the rainy season — reduce the vigour of the labour force. Thus community-based rural public health is an essential element of increased production. A 'green revolution' project which seeks to provide a limited technological solution to what is essentially a set of interrelated socio-political, economic, ecological and technical problems is, as the peasants perceived, an exercise in futility, notwithstanding the fact that maize yields per hectare under favourable conditions can be increased markedly. The obduracy of this interrelated set of 'bottlenecks' in peasant production systems leads many Western planners back to the large farm strategy. Despite its serious limitations, the PNM represented a new departure in government agricultural activity in the area for it did not seek to compel peasant compliance. Its technology was available on a trial basis and peasants were able to collaborate voluntarily in field testing.

Those accepting the PNM technology were obliged to follow the directions of the extension agent. This sometimes caused problems as when one young agent insisted that a man chop down a mature mango tree in order to grow maize in continuous rows. Fruit trees, inherited as private property, may belong to persons other than the current user of a field. The man's refusal was interpreted by the extension agent as obduracy and caused the latter to exclude this cultivator from the programme. In one instance, peasants were able to alter the PNM planting methods to follow their own system. Supported by a Zairan agronomist in the programme, they insisted on growing maize on ridges built upon vegetal debris of the previous year rather than cultivating on flat fields. Their experience with soil maintenance techniques is well-adapted to local conditions. The expatriate methods are effective in temperate climates where organic content, soil texture and drainage may not be a significant problems.

A new programme designed for the Lufira Valley will not be voluntary. Zaire's Man and Biosphere (MAB) programme has included 50,000 hectares of peasant lands in its Ecological Reserve. Peasants will be forbidden to hunt, fish, cultivate, fell trees on or burn over the land on 17,000 hectares at the centre of the reserve. When chiefs of affected communities in the valley protested the MAB plan, they were ignored or dismissed as 'uneducated' and 'obdurate' by an official who refused to recognise the presence of peasants farming in the area (fieldnotes 1981; B.G. Schoepf 1983).

Class Conflict Over Land
Community leaders are particularly concerned that once evicted, peasants will forfeit claims to these fertile alluvial lands resulting in proletarianisation and misery for those evicted into Zaire's labour surplus economy. Their fears are not unrealistic, for such was the aftermath of the first ecological research programme. The community most intensively studied by an interdisciplinary team from the University of Liege was the first to be expropriated in the creation of what is now the parastatal CEPSE farm. Subsequent expropriations have brought the area of monocropped maize fields to 4,000 hectares. While land per se is plentiful in the valley, fertile alluvial lands are scarce and in the large
consolidated village are the subject of bitter conflict on occasion, particularly when outsiders, generally petty bourgeois government employees, seek to obtain fields. Furthermore, as villagers are acutely aware, land acquisition is currently high on the agenda of resource-grabbing among the emergent bourgeoisie. Large farms are being carved out in nearby communal domains by members of the state bourgeoisie and roads are being built to reach them. The Ecological Reserve boundaries were re-designed to avoid encroaching on those lands, and lands belonging to a parastatal farm and commercial foresters. The latter, producing industrial charcoal, destroy more than 10,000 hectares of forest each year.

The bourgeoisie and the parastatals claim that as they rather than the 'backward', 'traditional' peasantry are contributing to national development, their activities must be supported by the state and not hampered by ecological concerns. The MAB proposal, ignoring the limitations of the area's ecology, includes a plan to force peasants living on the reserve's outer 33,000 hectares to cultivate larger fields of designated food crops. An unstated function of the planners — people appointed on the basis of personal relations rather than by virtue of their specific professional training and experience relevant to their designated duties — is to facilitate the resource transfer taking place. That is, these government agents and their university collaborators are helping to legitimate the unfettered acquisition of public resources to a set of powerful actors who straddle or shuttle between positions in the government, the parastatals, trade and private or multinational firms. These are the same agents responsible for peasant underdevelopment and pauperisation.

Villagers in the Lufira Valley are aware to some degree of the basis of their condition. However, it was a trader who supplied insight into the latest twist in the land grabbing process noted by other students of Zaire (Lemarchand 1979; MacGaffey 1982; Newbury 1984b; Schoepf and Schoepf 1981; B. Schoepf 1983). According to this informant, land acquisition will not be used productively on a large scale any more than it was most of the 1974 acquereurs; rather, it will be used as a means of primary capital accumulation in the following manner:

The President announced the creation of an agricultural bank, ostensibly for peasants ... A big wheel takes an empty farm and corrupts the expert who supplies him with a favourable assessment of the farm's value ... He gets three millions at the SOFIDE bank which he gives to his brother-in-law who trades in gold and diamonds to make the money yield the most rapid profit. Even this would be alright if he then invested the profit inside the country. But the big men are not investing ... all the profits go out and they are convinced that this the best course ... Consequently, the country has no economic future (BGS interviews 1983).

This is a predictable outcome of the liberalisation/privatisation strategy designed by Western advisors and implemented in the context of the Mobutist state. Recognition of this may hasten the Mobutist state's demise. As the next section will argue, the peasants will not be the winners soon.

Discussion
This article presented examples of two types of peasant-oriented food crop production development projects which took place during the 1970s. The international agricultural project proved to be of limited applicability for two reasons. One, because the professionals neglected the adaptations made by local cultivators to local ecological conditions and two, because they ignored the wider political economy. The first problem is designed to be met by a farming systems research strategy — which nevertheless cannot isolate the fields from their
The locally run participatory project supported but not dominated by an outside non-governmental agency is more directly transformative. Nevertheless, its vulnerability to outside forces beyond its control is patent, while its limited transformative success is possible only in relatively homogeneous communities. The study village is only relatively homogeneous, for its people are differentiated on the basis of wealth, occupation, education and ethnicity as well as age, sex and rank in what remains of the pre-colonial socio-cultural structure. The young chief is now an elected Commissaire du Peuple. He, along with the trader-transporters, the bar owners and the miller, are the community's wealthiest stratum. The government workers also form a stratum distinct from the peasantry. Yet the major conflict was still between the peasants and outsiders, with the small upper stratum not only supporting but leading the protest. By 1983 another project providing solar electricity to the enterprises of the latter was evidently aimed at their co-optation, once again in the guise of 'development'. Along with the reintroduction of communal elections, it signals a return to the 1950's colonial strategy based on the creation of a rural petty bourgeoisie (cf Demunter 1975; B. Schoepf 1975; Schoepf and Schoepf 1981, 1984). The growth of this class is enhanced by policy supporting 'progressive farmers' and thereby prompting ethnic clienteles to serve as a barrier against class conflict.

Zaire's rediscovery of outworn development policy is not an isolated event. In the design for Sub-Saharan Africa promoted by the World Bank (1982) and USAID both types of small peasant oriented food production support are being shelved, as is community health support (B. Schoepf 1982a). Instead, macro-economic policies are designed to streamline the state bureaucracies, expand the economic infrastructure and rationalise management through a reinvigorated partnership between national and multinational capitals (Mkandawire 1983; B. Schoepf 1982b). Promoted in the name of free enterprise it will in fact increase monopoly control of agriculture.

In Zaire this partnership cannot achieve efficiency so long as the state continues to depend upon a clientelist redistributive system, for the spoils of office draw upon resources needed for the economic infrastructure. Despite its success in 'performing ... functions associated with the pre-industrial state: the accumulation of resources and the creation of a dependent workforce' (Newbury 1984:114) the Mobutist state has created chaos in the economic domain of modern capitalism. This, rather than its demonstrated inability to provide the people with food, health care and public services, is at the heart of Western disaffection. The financial community continues to search for reliable replacements to implement its fin de siecle programme. Replacements are sought among the state bourgeoisie which has emerged and prospered in the Mobutist period, becoming a conscious class-for-itself and now seeking permanence. No mere change in leadership will end endemic corruption, however (Schoepf and Schoepf 1981; Nzongola 1984), nor could a new bourgeois state neglect the repressive function of the Mobutist regime.

In agriculture the scenario calls for export crop production on locally owned large farms, with input supply and marketing handled by agribusiness. Export crops generate foreign exchange needed to service foreign debts and attract new loans for capital construction projects. Production will be carried on by some of the
FOOD CRISIS AND CLASS FORMATION IN SHABA

vast pool of labour pauperised by the process described above: ecological disaster, land alienation, demographic accident and unequal exchange. This surplus labour will be remunerated below the cost of its own reproduction. Since mass deprivation inherently gives rise to unsteady states, Zaire's condition is more than an epiphenomenon, as Ruth First pointed out in 1970. We may go farther and suggest that Zaire's tragic condition is a harbinger, a paradigm for African neo-colonial development, with the masses condemned to 'zones of non-existence' (Ilunga 1984).

This article was presented as a paper at the ROAPE Conference on the World Recession and the Crisis in Africa. University of Keele, Staffordshire, England, 29-30 September 1984. Data was collected while the author, an anthropologist, was employed at the Universite Nationale du Zaire in Lubumbashi as a member of the Rockefeller Foundation's field staff (1974-76) and the US Fulbright Programme (1976-78). A grant from the Rockefeller Foundation supported field research undertaken jointly with Claude Schoepf. Grateful acknowledgement is made to the above institutions as well as to the US Agency for International Development and Tuskegee Institute. Together they made possible further research visits in 1978, 1979, 1981 and 1983. Other papers have been written in collaboration with Claude Schoepf. However, I alone am responsible for error of facts and interpretation in this paper.

Bibliographic Note


The Politics of Famine in Ethiopia

Hailu Lemma

In the last few months the media has presented us with the stark human tragedy and the prospect of even more starvation and dehumanising conditions inflicted on the peoples of Ethiopia. There are several factors, both external and internal, that have contributed to such human catastrophe. The West has often used food-aid as a political weapon. It is clear that relief aid has been withheld from starving children in order to weaken governments opposed to Western Interests. On similar grounds some UN agencies who have tried to help Third World countries have seen their funds withdrawn. The Western media and charity organisations are not going to escape blame, mostly because of their failure to publicise the famine properly; the scale and urgency of the tragedy were known to them much earlier. The approach of the Soviet Union and the Left is equally deplorable; they have done little or nothing. To sit aside and blame the West while millions are starving to death lacks any 'socialist justification'. The Ethiopian government must bear heavy responsibility, although it has been anxious to cover up its faults in the wake of the public outcry, framing the famine as a natural disaster. The political and economic reasons are conveniently ignored. This is all very well to raise relief aid to relieve starving victims; for the starving nothing is too late. The high defence spending and the obsession to end the civil unrest by military means has crippled the agricultural sector. The extent of the crisis and the human tragedy is thus not entirely due to natural causes; it is mostly man-made and preventable.

Ideally, every government has the responsibility to see that the interests of its people are best served and protected from such 'man-made' or 'natural' calamities. The experience of Third World politics has shown that amidst the East-West ideological struggle, unsympathetic and undemocratic military governments have come and gone without addressing the real problems facing rural populations. Even in the best years, poverty and under-nourishment have festered unchecked. The poverty of Ethiopia is no exception; very many African countries are experiencing the same situation. Out of the 28 African countries affected by drought, Chad, the Sudan, and Mozambique respectively are the next worst affected countries. The situation in the Sudan is compounded by the influx of refugees from Ethiopia and Chad and the political and economic blunders of the Sudanese Government. According to Sudanese agricultural experts, the desert in the Western regions is now spreading into the Savannah by about five miles a year. Poor land management and widespread forest clearing is said to
have contributed much towards such large-scale desertification (The Guardian (London) 20/2/84). In Mozambique, rainfall has broken the drought situation recently, but the civil war and the external interference by the South African government is hindering the distribution of food and seeds much needed for the next crop. A similar situation occurs in Angola and Zimbabwe. The story goes on; famine is very much a human product.

Many believe that the chronic food crisis and famine situation in Ethiopia, and the column of refugees trailing across a dusty and inhospitable terrain are victims of multi-faceted civil unrest, high defence spending, under-financed agricultural sector, poor management and other problems of food distribution and transportation. It must be pointed out that during the last famine of 1971-74, the FAO annual reports did show that enough food was produced in the country, while millions starved in the northern regions of Tigray and Wollo. Starvation, therefore, must be seen as an economic, social and political problem and not only as a problem of food production and drought. It has become evident that what were generally considered 'natural disasters' are not strictly natural any more. For instance, because of the civil war, pests have been breeding unchecked in the lowlands of Ethiopia. The extensive destruction of forest for more land, firewood and building materials has enhanced desertification and rapid soil erosion. What we normally call 'natural causes' are therefore attributable to the influence of man.

No one can escape blame, either for the current crisis in Ethiopia, or for the crisis to come. The scale of the human tragedy and the appalling pictures of emaciated children have highlighted the inability of the Ethiopian government to feed its own people, and how the East-West ideological struggle has deprived the starving from the surplus food overflowing in Western granaries. This is all the more serious because most of the famine victims outside the well-publicised stations such as Korem or Mekelle, particularly those that are trapped in the civil war, have little prospect of getting much of the food flooding in lately.

The West and its Food Aid
On the front page of The Observer (London) of 28 October 1984, Dr Charles Elliot, the former director of Christian Aid accused Britain and the United States of deliberately withholding aid in the hope that a disastrous famine similar to the one that brought down Emperor Haile Selassie 'would bring down the regime again'. The charge that Western governments have often used food as a political weapon is not new. In the wake of the 1983 famine disaster that affected more than three million people, Mr Shimelis Adugna — the then commissioner for the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) run by the Ethiopian government, dissatisfied by the limited response he got from the West, said that he was certain that "Western governments would have responded more generously if Ethiopia was not a socialist country." (The Guardian, 15 April 1983). Withholding relief aid from starving children because they live under an unacceptable government is morally and socially wrong.

To make matters worse, major contributors to the UN organisations which help poor countries have withdrawn or threatened to withdraw on the grounds that such agencies have failed to serve their political interests. Recently the US and UK have withdrawn from UNESCO. Next on the US list is UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) (see Africa (London) September
1984, No.147). The US-led attack through the IMF and World Bank, has dried up the fund allocated to Third World countries. Currently World Bank development aid is constricted to three-quarters of its proposed budget (see The Observer 23/12/84). The Western donors, in particular the US, have cut back savagely the aid fund to the IDA (International Development Association) which has been the main source of aid to poorer countries. What is more, the IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development), an organisation that encouraged farmers in poorer countries to grow their own food, has been forced to curb its activities as a result of the indifference shown by both Western and OPEC member countries. Geoffrey Lean, a reporter for The Observer (28/10/84) predicted that very soon new development projects, which the poor countries are calling for, are likely to close down.

The West has the moral responsibility to pay back Africa a fraction of the prosperity it reaped over four centuries. The slave trade, apart from the humiliation and sense of inferiority it inflicted, had depopulated Africa and ruined its agriculture and development. The scramble for Africa during the colonial period provided the natural resources, cheap labour and market place which were, undeniably, the backbone of Western industrialisation and prosperity. Equally important is the sophisticated operation of the neo-colonialist system. Currently, the progress and stability of African countries has been dependent on world market forces, engineered to suit Western multinationals and governments. In the World Bank, for instance, the US and UK have each 21 per cent and 8 per cent voting power respectively, while all World Bank presidents have been US citizens. The IMF and World Bank, therefore, show very strict control of aid flows, particularly against countries not in tune with Western codes of practice. Financial aid for agricultural development is very difficult to come by. High interest credits to buy expensive and unwanted weapons are however easy to obtain from East or West. All this has had important repercussions.

First, rural agricultural development is severely under-financed. Obsolete agricultural tools and lack of modern technical facilities/support have impoverished the farmers. Besides, chronically unable to cope on their own, governments look for help increasingly to foreign powers, East or West. For instance, in order to get some funding from either the World Bank or the IMF, poor countries are forced to adhere to standard capitalist prescriptions; that is, the devaluation of local currency, cuts in all public spending and sales of national assets to multinationals. Such drastic measures coupled with high defence spending and ever diminishing national reserves have inflicted sharp falls in living standards, mass unemployment and the 'wholesale mortgaging of national resources' (Africa Asia (Paris) December 1985, No.12). Secondly, apart from emergency 'food hand-outs', the financial aid which is pocketed by government banks is used to sustain unpalatable governments which, to all intents and purposes, serve the interests of their foreign creditors. Thirdly, much of the African countries' national assets are diverted to pay debts or buy Western commodities for urban consumption (whisky, cars, fuel etc). It is important to note that the food aid which the West ostentatiously donates only serves to distort tastes, swell the profits of multinationals and discourage local producers. Instead, state and private farms are encouraged to harvest cash crops whose real purchasing power is drastically reduced in the face of high fuel costs, high inflation, high interest rates and a strong US dollar.
The West must soon plough back some of the 'colonial debt' by transferring some of its technological know-how into developing the rural agriculture. Food handouts can only serve the interests of self-righteous hypocrites, spending billions on nuclear stockpiles and 'Star War' technology while fellow humans starve to death due to lack of simple technical support. It is equally ridiculous to contemplate plans for turning the 58 million tonnes of surplus grain into plastics and other industrial uses when millions are dying in more than 28 African countries. There is no better situation than the African endemic food crisis to show global solidarity. The present international aid race to save Ethiopian famine victims amidst ideological differences has indicated that both East and West could co-operate to use their satellites and high technology to help long-term projects, such as weather forecasting, identifying development areas, drilling wells and irrigation schemes, crop selection, soil and forest conservation.

If there is the political will, many UN agencies such as FAO and WFP (World Food Programme) have the expertise and early warning systems to forecast such disastrous famine situations. Because of the political differences between Western donors and the 'Marxist military government' of Ethiopia, most UN agencies failed to prepare adequately for a foreseeable disaster. Peter Cutler (a research fellow with the Food Emergency Unit at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine who witnessed the total chaos that compounded the food distribution) laid much of the blame at the feet of UN agencies (see *The Guardian* 30/10/84). Senior UN officials concede that they have been watching it grow and develop for some years, and despite their repeated calls for more immediate aid, prediction of the scale of the disaster and hence their pledges were well short of the amount of food needed.

**The Media**

The Western media also cannot escape the blame. They were quite indifferent to the horrifying stories until very late in the day. At one time last summer, a relief worker from northern Ethiopia was turned away by a major Fleet Street paper, who told her that 'Famine is not big news any more'. At the height of the famine (that is since summer 1984) hardly anything dramatic was reported until the mid-October BBC and ITV television coverages. In contrast however, the media paid much attention to the 10th anniversary (12 September 1984) of the Ethiopian regime. For instance, *The Times* alone had feature articles on two consecutive days (September 10 and 11). The political and economic performance of the military junta's 10-year rule were favourably reported. Apart from a few passing comments about the drought situation, it concluded by saying that 'Many problems remain, but Ethiopia has now moved into an era of significant economic expansion ...'

Most observers were however shocked by the extravagance and questioned the wisdom of spending millions (some estimates put it at $200m) on celebration, at a time when the country is beset with poverty and massive starvation unparalleled in recent history. But as Henry Stanhope, a Diplomatic correspondent to *The Times* (September 12) pointed out, the criticism was "unlikely to surface publicly in Britain, however, as the Government tries to warm up Anglo-Ethiopian relations ..." In the meantime, the famine was rampant; people were dying in thousands. But no one dared to touch it! Citizens of Western countries should have been made aware much earlier. The response, after the TV coverage, is
further manifestation of how the media plays an important role in galvanising public opinion.

The Relief Agencies

The relief agencies, with all their generous food handouts, are turning a blind eye to the people of Tigray and Eritrea who are outside the Ethiopian government-controlled area. Every relief agency working inside knows that the country is torn by bitter, drawn-out and multi-faceted civil wars. Food distribution, subsequently, is inhibited by war and politics. In a special report to *The Christian Monitor* 28 July-3 August 1984), David Kilne has amply demonstrated how politics have hindered emergency food reaching the hungry. His findings clearly show that only one-ninth of the entire American famine relief fund raised annually ($9m in total) goes to rebel-held areas, even though most relief workers admit privately that more than half of the seven million famine victims live outside the government-held areas.

The disparity of aid is more scandalous when one adds up the relief aid donated by Europe and UN organisations. As Stuart Holland, Labour’s Shadow Minister for Overseas Development, pointed out (*The Guardian* 30/10/84): ‘thirty times’ as much aid goes to the Ethiopian government side, and only about 5 per cent of what is needed to prevent wide-scale deaths goes to guerrilla-held areas. A Dutch Inter-church Aid monitor, Frits Eisenloeffel, who spent more than a month (summer 1984) inside Eritrea said that up to one million people were starving then, badly affected by a fourth year of drought. He conceded, writes Kilne, that food aid to Eritrea was “pathetically little in the face of the vast and increasing necessity”.

As George Galloway, the general secretary of War and Want put it “To pretend that the relief effort in Ethiopia is going well is to render a disservice to those people in Ethiopia who are most in need” (*The Guardian* 30/10/84). Currently, several thousand famine victims are dying in Eritrea and Tigray, but little food is reaching them. Nor is their plight given any publicity for fear of Ethiopian government reprisals. If Western donors continue to pretend that those starving people outside the Ethiopian government control do not exist, then one is forced to believe that political interest, and not principle or compassion, matter most in the Horn of Africa.

Most relief agencies knew only too well about the grave situation that bedevilled this region. But as Kilne found out, ‘several agencies — including the UN-sponsored WFP — refused to work with non-government bodies’. But as Jim DeHarport — a Catholic Relief Services (CRS) official — conceded, most of the relief work inside Ethiopia does not reach the majority of famine victims. He was quoted as saying that:

We’re concerned that the government would be very upset, if we worked directly with the Eritreans. That could jeopardise our ongoing work in the rest of Ethiopia. We try to work everywhere there is need. But when we discussed Eritrea work, it just seemed like the trade-off — helping in Eritrea versus endangering our other work — was simply not worth it. People are dying out there in Eritrea, but we just don’t know how to get around these political roadblocks. I wish I knew what the answer was.

Some of the British and American charities including Oxfam and World Vision, who are faced with a similar situation, have conceded to send aid, but quietly without annoying the Ethiopian government. Some organisations who have
decided to go public, because they feel their mandate to feed the hungry anywhere should outweigh any 'political roadblocks', include the Dutch Interchurch Aid (DIA), Christian Aid and War on Want of Britain, and America's Lutheran World Relief including Grassroots International and the Mennonite Central Committee.

The relief workers in Korem and Mekelle should know only too well that the Ethiopian government is using the food hand-out as a political weapon. Many observers, including some relief field workers, question whether the much publicised resettlement scheme (of up to 1.5 million) is genuinely voluntary and out of humanitarian concern. Many suspect that it is primarily motivated by security reasons: by eroding the grassroots support, the government may be planning to starve away and weaken the rebels in the north. Many relief officials who at first thought that the resettlement was voluntary were shocked and protested when they watched people (mostly adults) from their own feeding centres being herded at gun point by soldiers and political cadres, against their wills and without regard to whether they were whole families or not. Save the Children Fund, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Catholic nuns, Oxfam and other relief workers concede that many who would otherwise be in the feeding centres such as Korem, Alamata, Mekelle and Adigrat (mostly in Tigray province) have fled back into their villages, and that the further north you go the more brutal the methods become (The Times and The Guardian 7/2/85).

Previous resettlement schemes have already failed totally. Resettling highlanders into hot and malaria-infested lowlands in such large numbers, and without proper shelter and other necessities, is doomed to fail, going on previous experience. Hostility to the huge influx of new settlers is already aired by local farmers. In the district of Tadelle, West of Shoa province, the farmer associations have protested to Addis Ababa officials about the limitless flood of new arrivals who have more than doubled the indigenous population of 8,000 farmers (The Times 5/2/85). Reports are already coming from Sudan (see The Observer 20/1/85) indicating that thousands of the Ethiopians resettled in Asosa, near the Sudanese border are fleeing into the Sudan. The refugees told reporters that there was not a single doctor in the camp where 21,000 peasants, malnourished, sick and weak from the famine and long journey from the north, were dumped hurriedly. They also said that rations were one cup of grain twice a week. According to Sudanese officials, in the first two weeks alone more than 800 ‘resettlers' have already fled from the camp. One evacuee claimed that up to 300 people, who were trying to escape, were burned alive by a bush fire set off deliberately by Ethiopian troops.

There is no need to displace people in such a politically explosive situation. Independent missions sent by Dutch Interchurch Aid (DIA) (see Gayle Smith 1983: Counting Quintals. DIA Pub.) and other agencies who have preferred to be less public (such as Oxfam), have affirmed that pilot projects (in irrigation, forestry and soil and water conservation) run inside Tigray in co-operation with the local charity, REST (Relief Society of Tigray), have remarkable successes. These projects have demonstrated that, if there is the will and the right programme and co-operation, food output can be increased even in these drought areas. Bombing and displacing people on the one hand and resettling schemes on the other are wholly unconvincing. They only add fear and confusion.

There are also reports that many families have been refused food because they do
not possess membership in a recognised peasant association (see *The Guardian* 24/11/84, REST press release 30/11/84 Khartoum). As a result of such inhumane treatment, thousands are trekking back up to the north into Western Tigray and The Sudan. Up to 500,000 people are expected to be displaced into the Sudan. The relief agencies have the moral responsibility to put pressure on the Ethiopian government to accept a truce in Tigray and Eritrea offered by the guerrillas so that food can be fairly distributed in the villages where it is most needed. In a country torn by civil war this move is even more vital at a time when the Military Government has all the reasons for wanting people to congregate into camps and towns where it can punish those who do not co-operate with its role in the civil war (e.g. *The Guardian* 5/12/84). Otherwise, mass graves and mass exodus on a scale unknown are inevitable. Already all the grim signs are there; cholera and other outbreaks are reportedly killing up to 60 people a day in some of the less congested lowland camps, according to Oxfam sources (*The Times* and *The Guardian* 24/11/85).

Hunger does not now political boundaries. Such a scandalous neglect of famine victims in the fear that relief agencies might jeopardise their well-publicised centres in Ethiopia is unethical. Such a contention is, in any case, unrealistic. Common sense will tell us that in any donor-receiver relationship, the donor always has the upper hand.

**The Soviet Approach**

The attitude of the Soviet Union is also deplorable and inhumane. As the close ally of the Ethiopian government, their military and civil advisers (estimated number is 1,500-2,000) have been watching the human disaster from their military posts in Mekelle and other northern districts. They have done little or nothing. Any sense of urgency only came too late and after the West started responding. Even so, the Ethiopian ambassador to Moscow, Mr Nesibu Taye, could only manage to persuade the Soviets to donate 'about $1m worth of lorries and other transporting equipment' while in the same period, the West — in particular the Scandinavians, EEC member countries and Americans have poured cash and grain estimated at well over $100m. Sweden alone donated about £3m in emergency funds, that is on top of the £9m aid a year to Ethiopia (see *The Guardian* 30/10/84). The EEC which is the largest aid donor gave £34m as emergency aid; and according to Mr Edgar Pisani, the commissioner in charge of development policy, the EEC had already sent last year some 117,000 tonnes of cereals and 5,000 tonnes of dairy products; in total the EEC 'food aid to Ethiopia amounted to a quarter of that country's imports' (*The Guardian* 31/10/84). What is more, according to UN official, Mr Kurt Jansson, the total aid donated to Ethiopia in the first two months of the current famine appeal (October-November 1984) amounted to 165,162 tonnes, but the break-down country-by-country was somewhat sketchy. But as shown above, the aid given by the Soviets in the same period was fairly negligible. This is even more startling when the break-down of the top 10 UN aid donors was made available for the following two months — December-January (see *The Times*).

By any standard the size of the Soviet 'emergency aid', particularly to a close ally, is negligible. Even poorer countries who have their own severe economic problems have given generously; Algeria alone has donated the same amount, that is, $1m (see *The Morning Star* (London) 18/1/85).
Table 1: League Table of Top Ten UN Aid Donors for December 1984 and January 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Tonnes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>54,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>53,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP (World Food Programme)</td>
<td>41,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Germany</td>
<td>28,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>27,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>22,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>17,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam (UK)</td>
<td>6,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Assistance Secretary-General for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia, Mr Kurt Jansson, press release (AFP), 7 February 1985.

Note: The total aid donated by UN countries between October 1984 to January 1985 shows deliveries of 407,689 tonnes. The Ethiopian Relief officials denied these figures and claimed that they have only received 138,804 tonnes.

To be so mean publicly, makes no economic and political sense, more so when the Soviets have already armed the Ethiopian regime with massive military equipment at an estimated cost of $2-3bn. Such lopsided commitment from the Soviet Union is not new; but it has never amused Ethiopian relief officials. For instance, in the wake of the 1983 'European famine-appeal tour', when Mr Aduga was clearly frustrated by the limited responses — mainly from Canada (45,000 tonnes), West Germany (4,000 tonnes), Italy (10,000 tonnes) and EEC (20,000 tonnes) — he made it public that 'the Socialist States have given next to nothing in the way of assistance' (The Guardian 15/4/83). He was transferred to a lower job (Commission for Children's Affairs) soon after his return. Many believe that the Soviets were angered by the criticism.

The news coverage about the current Ethiopian famine inside the Soviet Union is very disheartening. As a cover up the Soviet media has always reacted by accusing the West and the drought for the African famine in general, in the familiar style the 'Soviet Academy of Science in Moscow likes to put it' (Africa, September 1984). They have been reluctant to reveal the full extent of the human catastrophe. Instead, as Western correspondents reported from Moscow (eg: The Guardian 31/10/84) they showed well-fed schoolchildren on their TV screens just a week after the first harrowing pictures were shown on British televisions. This is not good enough. Unless they speed up their help, both on long- and short-term rural developments, their stay will soon be unwelcome. For the starving, portraits of Lenin or socialist slogans without food mean nothing. Supplying $2-3bn worth of military hardware without even paying attention to the human tragedy is an act of treachery to the basic principles of communism and a mockery of the ubiquitous posters proclaiming 'long life to proletarian internationalism'.

Left Myopia
The views of many Western socialist groups and forces are over-simplified. Many
Leftist apologists tend to lay the blame on 'external forces'. The united conspiracy of capitalist and anti-socialist forces from the US, Western and Middle East countries in blocking aid to 'Marxist Ethiopia' is loudly over-stated. Little emphasis is placed on analysing the internal political forces and economic record (see also Marxism Today, January 1985 issue). The fact that the Ethiopian government spends most of its budget on 'defence' while agricultural and rural developments have regressed to record levels because of lack of finance — all in the name of national integrity — is unwittingly justified. This does little justice to the plight of the millions who die because of disastrous internal political and economic policies. In recent years government state farms have shown a rapid decline in food production, sometimes by as much as 25-35 per cent on previous years (Rene Lefort 1983: Ethiopia: An Heretical Revolution? Zed Press, p.126). Over a longer run, between 1969-71 and 1980-82, Ethiopian food production per head had fallen by around 18 per cent (World Development Report 1984, World Bank table 6). Every year there are more and more plots uncultivated. This is so because of the civil war, which is severely disrupting the community life of millions of peasants and because of the little material incentive and low morale of peasants and workers alike. The net effect on the overall performance of the Ethiopian economy has been disastrous. According to a joint ILO (International Labour Organisation) and UNICEF report (1982), food output per head over the six years preceding the current drought situation, had fallen by about 5 per cent. What is more, ‘incomes and the productivity of labour in the countryside are extremely low and hence both the marketable surplus and the internal rate of savings in agriculture are insufficient to finance either its own expansion or the development of the rest of the economy’ (see extracts in The Guardian, Third World Review 9/11/84).

For many, the dissatisfaction and social unrest resulting from an endemic shortage of food supplies due to worsening transportation facilities, and the failure of domestic political and economic strategies, are conveniently overlooked. To be contemptuous of Western capitalist policies and conspiracies is one thing, but to gloss over the weaknesses of Third World repressive and military governments because they brand themselves ‘socialist’ or ‘Marxist’ is another matter. It is now time to come forward with concrete or identifiably socialist measures. One wonders under what kind of socialist justification the Left can sit aside and blame the West while millions are dying now for lack of food.

The unconditional support for the Ethiopian military junta on the grounds of its socialist rhetoric and/or international solidarity is truly naive. One wonders why the BBC TV crews were not allowed to film about the famine situation until a month or so after the 10th anniversary celebration (12 September 1984). Even local people in towns like Addis Ababa were kept in the dark. Permission to travel outside the capital city was suspended until September 16; according to David Ottaway, this was ‘apparently to prevent any disruptions of the celebrations by government opponents’ (The Guardian 14 September 1984). Or was it one of the familiar excuses to suppress bad publicity in the wake of its colourful celebrations? In the end it all amounted to one thing; no critical analysis of the severity of the famine was allowed to surface publicly until later.

By the time the Ethiopian government responded with a rather belated sense of urgency (The Guardian 2 November 1984) — that is, months after the outbreak
of massive starvation, and some weeks after the Western public outcry — it was already too late for the dying millions that would have been saved otherwise. Spending millions buying arms in such a dire situation is socially unjust. Calling for ‘socialist solidarity’ is even more obscene when much of the Soviet-made military hardware for 1983 alone (at a cost of about $20m) comes from Israel’s Lebanon campaigns. In October that year one shipment to the Ethiopian port of Assab was reported to contain about $6m in military equipment. Ethiopia was happily trading most of the large amount of small arms, ammunition and spare parts from seizures during the Israeli invasion of Palestinian camps in Southern Lebanon (Africa Confidential, Vol.25, No.25). This is all done in the name of national integrity; all at the cost of starving millions, and all at the cost of Palestinian comrades who died in the cause of self-determination. The unique relationship between Israel and ‘Marxist Ethiopia’, which an Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman admitted exists (see The Observer, 6/1/85), is mind-boggling.

The Israeli government, with the help of international Zionist organisations, has secretly airlifted up to 20,000 starving Falashas — a black Jewish community who have been victims of famine and oppression (see The Guardian and The Times, 3-10 January 1985). This amounts to total sell-out of this tiny minority group (total population is about 30,000) and a hopeless and frightening prospect for the other ethnic minorities who have already been alarmed by re-settlement schemes far away from ancestral homes. The Government’s indifference to and contempt of minority groups has allowed the Israelis to woo most of the Falashas out of their wretched homeland. It is a tragedy to watch the Israelis use the famine to fulfil their Zionist dreams. What is frustrating is the fact that the ‘rescue mission’, code-named ‘Operation Moses’, costing up to £300m (compared with the £25m raised since Christmas 1984 by British charities) could have only succeeded because of the attitude of the Ethiopian officials. The rescue mission is indeed more of a political victory to Zionism and the weak Israel coalition government than it is to humanity or even to the stranded Falashas, both in the Sudan and Ethiopia. It is hard to imagine what the feeling of other dying Ethiopians would be when they are pushed aside because they are Gentiles! Undoubtedly many Falashas will find their sudden change a mixed blessing as they soon confront racism, cultural shock and resettlement schemes in highly explosive West Bank Arab towns and villages such as Kiryat Arba near Hebron.

Equally, the humanitarian nature of the scheme to resettle northern Ethiopian farmers into the southern lowlands which has the full backing of the Soviet officials is very doubtful. As mentioned earlier, dumping famine-stricken people on malaria-infested regions with no shelter, no medical facility and little food could not possibly have been motivated on humanitarian grounds alone. The entire resettlement programme by way of appearing sympathetic to the hungry is a cunning way of weakening the aspirations of oppressed nationalities. Many observers are worried that the scheme to transfer people is primarily intended to undermine the base of the guerrillas who control most of the country north of Wollo Province.

In the early years of the revolution, the outcry for equal democratic rights for all oppressed nationalities was very high on the agenda. But soon after the military consolidated power, the promises and prospects of democratisation were ruthlessly reversed on the pretext of threatened imperial sovereignty,
particularly in the wake of its unsuccessful military operation to suppress the Eritrean right for self-determination. This has escalated social disorder. The discontent soon spilled over into neighbouring Ethiopian provinces — notably Tigray. Now every nationality except the central Showan Amhara group is under suspicion. Surely the entire population cannot be guilty of treason. Who is to blame here?

The nationality question was particularly made to look trivial when an equally ambitious military junta of Somalia ('socialist' tool) intervened physically in the Ogaden, the eastern region of Ethiopia inhabited by Somali ethnic groups, which was part of the colonial heritage, annexed into Ethiopia by Emperor Menelik in the 1880s and 1890s during the Scramble for Africa (see Addis Hiwet 1975: Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution, ROAPE, Occasional Pub. NO.1, pp.7-13). Such intervention was widely opposed on many grounds; above all by the African nations who have equally intricate boundary problems. Besides, the world progressive forces condemned the intervention as disruptive at a time when their imagination was gripped by the spontaneity of the Ethiopian revolution. The fact that the Cubans have been quite reluctant to be involved in Eritrea (The Times 10/1/85) is however a warning to many who would have liked to give unqualified support.

**Internal Weaknesses**

The Ethiopian military government, which has failed to pay any attention to the hardships of the rural community, has much to answer for. Ten years ago, Emperor Haile Selassie was accused of ignoring the last famine victims of northern Ethiopia. As a result, up to 200,000, mostly children, sick, old and poor, starved to death. In the meantime, Haile Selassie was renowned for his lavish life style and feeding pets on silver plates and spoons. What is more, money in millions was poured into celebrating his 80th birthday while famine victims watched the lives of their children drain away painfully. Indeed, his inevitable downfall came as no surprise.

Today, 10 years after his overthrow, the people are still under the same miserable conditions. For most northern farmers, apart from the socialist rhetoric, the so-called 'radical' or 'Marxist' military government is doubtless not different in deeds from the previous administration. The living standard has gone from bad to worse. The input into the agricultural and industrial sectors has been negligible. Unemployment and prostitution have reached an all-time record. According to Ethiopian eye witnesses, many are forced into such shameful activity through the inability of their families to support them. To some high school children, prostitution has become the only source of income, while for rich tourists — in particular for the many Middle East 'petrocrats' flocking lately — it has provided a very pleasant and cheap night outing (see Tsehay Berhane Selassie: 'In Search of Ethiopian Women', Change No.11, p.17). Moreover, house construction is not keeping up with the soaring demand. Going on personal experience, young people are unable to make family life, and it is not unusual to see unmarried people in their mid-30s and 40s in the city. The irony is that while those who can afford to are encouraged to build their own houses or are staying in hotels, waiting to be allocated in the few flats the government is building, many of the urban poor are still living in appalling conditions.

Except for its military spending (the highest *per capita* in Black Africa), the
military government of Colonel Mengistu cares little for the neglected rural population. As indicated earlier, up to $200m have been, yet again, wasted for constructing offices, extending the Red Square, erecting huge portraits and propaganda, preparations for the military parades and other celebrations of its 10th anniversary. The controversial shipment of half a million bottles of whisky from Britain (in the wake of the huge public outcry and fund raising fever) to replace what has already been consumed during an all-out celebration is morally evil and unacceptable. There was no immediate urgency for such waste when over five million famine victims were wilting away in the midst of dusty barren fields crying for a few grains to survive. Besides, crops growing in the few highland areas, which were not beset by the much publicised drought, were being devastated by a pest known as ‘the army worm’. This creature was moving in thick bands or waves of scores of kilometres wide across the highlands to which the wind blows most. It devours all foliage within its reach, that is, eating everything green in sight. Most relief workers who watched the devastating plague conceded then that most of the sowings of summer 1984 were totally destroyed leaving no time for a second planting. Peasants were caught unprepared. Nor was there any attempt by the government to combat it, although the same pest was reported in southern Ethiopian provinces earlier in April and May before it was carried northwards with the prevailing wind. Whereas the government of neighbouring Kenya was showing every effort to fight the pest, the Ethiopian government was more concerned with preparing for the lavish 10th anniversary celebrations. By September 1984, this plague had exacerbated the famine situation and resulted in the total collapse of food production, despair and a massive exodus of highlanders to join the lowlanders already displaced by the drought. It is no wonder, therefore, that such self-inflicted hardships are manifested in widespread civil unrest. The history of civil unrest is not new; it is as old as the history of famine in Ethiopia (Redda, ROAPE 27/28).

Military suppression, no matter how ruthless and intimidating it be, has never solved or narrowed the depth of resentment. Instead it has, as always, increased the misery, the chronic food shortages and epidemics. The more the government steps up its military activity, the more people are displaced and the more armed resistance spreads rapidly. What is needed is a political and economic solution. It is important to note that, in Tigray and as well as northern Wollo not a single working factory exists.

The Ethiopian government is well known for the way it pays lip service to countering the drought and famine in northern Ethiopia and Eritrea. For instance, the 1988 May Day speech of Colonel Mengistu is one fine example. The short-sightedness of the military leadership in tackling the situation is clear from the speech:

Compatriots, there is drought in some regions of our country. This has brought famine among some of our people in the villages. The situation tests our goal. We started off by saying that we will at least satisfy our food needs. The situation was favourable (but) our desires have not been fully realised. Our drought is a drought of work, drought of willingness and creativity, of science and technology. Even so, it is unacceptable that we cannot at least satisfy our food needs. It is a mystery that we are starving when we have a land which can even produce surplus for other countries and we have sufficient manpower. We need to get out of this shameful situation (applause: passage omitted on significance of May Day)...

The national military service programme is not at all like the distorted meanings given to it by
REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

those who do not wish our revolution well and have no public concern. Its detailed application will be issued in a proclamation. Basically, every Ethiopian between the ages of 18 and 50 will participate in national military service and the service will recruit nationals between the ages of 18 and 30. Those fulfilling the recruitment requirement will then be sent to the field to serve for two years ... (SWB, ME/17323, May 1983, BBC).

Instead of taking firm action to direct the human resources into production and revitalize the agricultural sector, which he himself admits has failed to satisfy the chronic food shortage, he has introduced the National Military Service Programme. This is obviously contrary to the needs of the weak and hungry. The call-up of the entire working population to military service at a time when the top priority should have been to reverse a long-running decline in food production provides a rather implausible argument. It has left many important and fundamental questions unanswered. Amidst the strong opposition to the conscription both in the rural and urban areas (on 4 August 1983, UNHCR officials in Khartoum reported a steady influx of 100 people per day fleeing national service), and a discontent inside the northern command (government troops are demoralised and are unable to see the wisdom of continuing a seemingly endless war — the 'Vietnam Syndrome'?), the first batch of 50,000 conscripts and 900 officer cadets have been assigned to the northern front soon after the first graduation in October 1984 (see Africa Confidential Vol.25, No.29). How is it possible to woo the youth into the army when the casualties are very high and the rewards are negligible? In the last offensive code-named 'Operation Red Star' Ethiopian government casualties were reportedly as high as 30,000; that is not to mention the countless civilian deaths. Above all, as indicated earlier, the state of insecurity because of widespread terror and forced conscriptions, and the difficulties of labour recruitment and poor farm management have resulted in food shortages. For instance, Humera — one of the largest state farms in Ethiopia had 45,000 hectares under cultivation before 1974, but exactly after 10 years (1984), it had had no more than 6,000 (Africa Now, September 1984). How is then the rest of the rural community to be encouraged to farm more when it is constantly harassed, scared or in some cases bombarded mercilessly?

What is more, the whole fabric of peasant life has remained unchanged. Prolonged cultivation, poor land-use, the destruction of forest, have never at best favoured more than a marginally sufficient rural economy. The normal diet, even under normal circumstances, did not provide all the nutritional elements necessary for a vigorous healthy life.

In fact, the Ethiopian who is likely to be affected by famine is unlikely to have the desirable nutritional status even during so-called 'normal' times and so for him the margins of survival are quite narrow (Tadesse 1976, p.60 in A.M. Hussein (ed.) Drought and Famine in Ethiopia, IAI, London).

A general nutritional survey of 1958 had also indicated that the leanness so characteristic of Ethiopians was due to a daily calorific deficit of around 400 calories per person. One cannot help wondering if Ethiopian people are the 'Wretched of the Earth'. The stamp of such utter misery is still very vivid; the smallness, the short, slim and sturdy physical stature of the human and animal population as a whole, is perhaps one of the few bio-physical adaptations this region has had to undergo.

The obsession of the military government with seeking a military rather than
political solution has dried up the entire national wealth, taking up to 55 per cent of the total government expenditure (see J.F. Petras and M.H. Morley in ROAPE 30). Since 1978, the forced conscription of peasant militia (up to 100,000 at a time) to suppress the civil unrest in the north, has failed on seven occasions (see R. Luckham and D. Bekele and L. Cliffe, ROAPE 30). Instead, it has created havoc, destroyed villages and crops, leaving most villagers hungry and demoralised. Food prices, unlike other commodities (eg: clothes and salt) are deliberately kept low to ensure that the military and urban elites are fed properly. Add to this crisis the failure of rain in the last four to five years and the devastating plague, and it will come as no surprise that these ailing and war-haunted peoples fall victim to such unprecedented famine.

To reiterate the above points, the blocking of aid in the hope of bringing a political change favourable to the West or lying low and watching humanitarian work being abused for political ends is no less than total abdication of responsibility. Because of such callousness, countless famine victims are dying, more so outside the government-held areas. For most famine victims, where the food ration does reach, it is either too late or too small. Most of the blame rests on internal governmental policies; no one can hide the fact that famine has been worsened by the political preoccupations of the military junta. To entirely blame the West or other external factors such as IMF, the World Bank, the Multinationals, the media etc., is to apologise for the callousness of the Ethiopian government. The point is well illustrated in the recent horror story that surrounds ‘Bnet’, Ethiopia’s largest relief camp. The entire 60,000 famine victims were forcefully evacuated and the temporary shelters (grass huts) were deliberately burned down by the army in three consecutive days (see The Guardian and The Times, 2/5/85—5/5/85). The Ethiopian officials advocated at first that such a move was necessary so that people could go to their villages and take advantage of recent rains. What they failed to realise was quite the obvious; these people had nothing left behind to live on. Besides, nurses working for ‘Concern’ — an Irish relief organisation — warned against such a crude tactic on the ground that the people were fairly undernourished and a lot of them were not fit to survive the journey. Inevitably, the fiasco did not last long. As soon as the few of the survivors trekked back into the camp, many of the sick children were reported missing, and a lot of bodies were found on the routes leading to the camp. Surely, this is an act that should never have happened. To say the least, bombing hungry people scattering in search of food, as reports showed (eg: The Guardian 29/11/84, The Times 20/12/84, The Observer 23/12/84), summarises the insensitivity and state of mind of the ruling junta. The recent controversy surrounding the gunpoint arrest of an Australian merchant ship (the Liberia registered Gold Venture) at the Ethiopian port of Assab, carrying 6,000 tons of grain and other relief supplies (total estimate is $1.2m) destined for the famine victims the government cannot reach (see The Guardian 19 January 1985), is another fine example. For Colonel Mengistu and the ruling junta, sovereignty at all costs comes before people. If the peasants are discontented because they are starving to death, what is unity for? The Land? The People? And how is unity be be maintained? No-one disputes the principle of unity if based on fair and equal distribution of resources.

It is obvious, therefore, that the recurrence of famine in recent years cannot be singly blamed on shortage of rainfall. Indeed, drought is an important factor, but
cannot be attributed to the 'deeds of nature' alone. What it does is worsen the existing harsh conditions. The phenomenon of humanly-caused desertification due to hydrological imbalance, created by careless and unchecked forest clearance and overgrazing is well documented. The outcome is that Ethiopia has suffered severe deforestation and now has only 3 to 4 per cent of its land area covered with trees, as verified by Maie Ayoub: UNICEF information official (The Morning Star Friday 2 November 1984). This in return has triggered and accelerated severe erosion in the mountainous and populated areas of the Northern Provinces as a whole. The prolonged undernourishment, total lack of rural development projects (irrigation, cottage industries, roads, etc), high military spending and never-ending civil unrest, total lack of basic education and medical care are together the major underlying causes of the miseries inflicted on the Ethiopian peasants. Famine in Ethiopia is not, however, inevitable; it is mostly man-made and preventable. The human disaster should be a warning to other African countries. The Ethiopian crisis is no exception.

Bibliographic Note
All the information regarding the current famine situation is easily accessible from the major Fleet Street Papers (eg: The Guardian, The Times and The Observer) dated from mid-October 1984 onwards. Apart from news, the leader comments, reviews and letters contained quite lively and controversial views about the origin of the current crisis in Ethiopia. The September issue of Africa and Africa Now magazines have dealt with the East-West conflict in the Horn of Africa and an overall assessment of the Ethiopian government's performance leading up to the 10th anniversary celebration. The January issue of Marxism Today has an article by John Sender and Sheila Smith on 'Famine': What can the Left give? It criticises the profile of the Left in the midst of massive public response to the famine.

For the history of Ethiopian famine and an overall assessment of recent famines, A.M. Hussien (ed) 'Drought and Famine in Ethiopia' International African Institute (IAI), London 1976, has a useful collection of papers. An IAI special report 6. (ed) Davud Dalby, .R.J. Harrison Church and Fatima Bezzaz: 'Drought In Africa' 1977, has interesting collection of paper on the cause and evidence of major climatic shifts in the Sahel-Ethiopian drought zones. Most of the evidence and discussion is based on meteorological, geo-morphological and historical records. 'The Review of African Political Economy' (ROAPE) has published some work on the Ethiopian famine and politics. Jon Bennet and Kirsty Wright in ROAPE 26 and 30 respectively, have provided an insight into the famine conditions in the less publicised regions of Tigray which are outside the control of the Ethiopian regime. A Redda (ROAPE 27/28 special double issue) has also done a briefing on the famine situation of northern Ethiopia. Here the history and origin of current famine (post-1974) in particular the effects of the civil wars in today's appalling crisis are outlined. The famine of the early 1970s was examined by Lionel Cliffe in the inaugural of ROAPE and in Liam Nolan, The Forgotten Famine (Mercier Press, Dublin 1974). A useful collection of papers on the conflict and East-West power struggle is presented in ROAPE 30 and 31.

Several other important works can be found in many recent publications, but the two important studies one is compelled to study are: A. Sen, Poverty and Famine: 'an Essay in Entitlement and Deprivation (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1981) which also has an interesting chapter on the Ethiopian Famine of 1974-75, and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) report of 1982 on Socialism from the Grass Roots. This report, based on the field experience of an ILO team of 20, local and international experts, led by Dr Griffin of Magdalen College, Oxford, has perhaps one of the most provocative analyses of the current economic performance and food crisis in Ethiopia.
Briefings

DROUGHT AND FAMINES

We need little reminder of the horrific human suffering which famine in Africa has brought. Until recently, the plight of six million in Ethiopia was constantly shown to us by the media but there has been little mention of 100,000 dead in Mozambique, more than 2,000 in Chad, 1.5 million at risk in Mali and two million in Burkina Faso, not to mention loss to crop production and cattle: Niger expects to lose 60 per cent of this year’s cereal crop, Ghana had a shortage of 179,000 tons in 1983 and Mauritania has 40-90 per cent cattle loss. A similar picture can be drawn for the countries of southern Africa where Zimbabwe and Botswana in addition to Mozambique have varied in their ability to combat drought for several years. But instead of simply documenting the countries where famine dominates people lives, we need to explain why drought becomes famine and why certain sections of the population, and why some communities rather than others, suffer most from it.

We should again need little reminding that it is the poor who suffer most from drought. It is the poor who have to sell their cattle more quickly than the larger cattle owners — sales which are usually to the richer peasants at very low prices. It is the poor too who leave their smaller holdings of land as persistent drought denies opportunities for growing crops or grazing their emaciated cattle. And it is the very poor, the destitute, those without cattle or access to land or the wherewithal to plough that suffer most of all. In southern Africa this group most frequently comprise women whose men migrate to work and don’t or cannot remit adequate earnings to keep the household from dire poverty and an unending struggle to produce barely enough to permit their own physical reproduction or that of the community as a whole — as in the labour reserves of South Africa.

In Botswana, one way of reducing the scale of impoverishment in the rural area has been to promote a series of Labour-Based Relief Projects (LBRP). These are labour intensive, village organised projects financed by district and central government, which usually involve the building of latrines, market stalls and some roads. Village Development Committees organise the participation by villagers on rotational basis — two weeks at a time, so that in theory everybody gets the opportunity to work. By mid-1984 between 35,000 and 40,000 people
were participating in these projects and not surprisingly one estimate put women at 80 per cent of the participants. Although these projects have managed to put much needed (though still inadequate) levels of cash into the rural economy, they remain a stop-gap measure and need to be oriented much more towards the regeneration of food production. Funds moreover, need to be much more readily available for easier access to draught power. The latter is crucial because evidence reinforces the notion that the poorer households have suffered greater cattle losses and crop failures than the wealthier rural population. There is much rural differentiation between a rural salariat and those with access to regular paid employment (thereby also giving access to cattle and food) on the one hand, and those who are becoming increasingly devoid of even the basic wherewithal to farm on the other.

Out of a 1983 total of 82,000 rural heads of household in the whole of Botswana, 70,250 produced no crops at all and 7,840 produced less than 250kg in total. Only 850 — i.e. 1 per cent — were self-sufficient, producing enough for all the family's needs, about 1,500kg of grain. The figures for 1984 will be even more dramatic. The numbers involved in family labour fell between 1981 and 1983 by 26 per cent, and the hiring of labour in the same period fell by 36 per cent, thereby reducing the opportunities for the very poor to earn income locally. This was further exacerbated by South Africa's restrictions on the hiring of Batswana for work in the gold mines.

Those households with only small holdings of cattle also suffer more during drought. The death rates in herds up to 10 increased from 30 per cent in 1982 to 54 per cent in 1983. This compares with an average for all herds of 17 per cent. Smaller herds also suffer more from 'distress' — the need to slaughter or sell because of the inability to graze or feed the cattle which in turn exacerbates the poor peasants' inability to grow crops in any year because of the lack of draught power. There is also a dramatic correlation between numbers of cattle held and the levels of crop production. In 1983 the top 11 per cent of households, those with more than 60 cattle produced 51 per cent of total crops — more than double the average yield. In contrast, the bottom 75 per cent with less than 30 cattle obtained only 35 per cent of total production.

Drought clearly accelerates the permanent impoverishment of the most needy among Africa's peasantry and in southern Africa the most affected by the socio-economic processes and ecological decay that drought brings with it are women. In a small sample of 24 households in north-west Botswana 15 were headed by women with dependents. Nine of these 13 households were without any access to draught power and only three had more than 10 head of cattle; nine had no agricultural implements at all and nine spent 50-1,000 Pula a month on the purchase of food. Three did not have access to any cash for additional food and were dependent on access to casual labour — unlikely in times of drought — begging or the goodwill of relatives and neighbours. Evidence that widowed, estranged or de facto single women carry a disproportionate burden in southern Africa's rural areas can be generalised elsewhere in the region and certainly to Zimbabwe (R. Bush and R. Leys, Drought and the Peasantry in Zimbabwe forthcoming).

Droughts Become Famines

Attempts to explain the effect of drought and the mechanisms by which drought
becomes famine have been little theorised. Of course we know that famine is not
the outcome of only 'natural' ecological disaster. Instead, it is increasingly
recognised that to understand how, for instance, a drought becomes a famine we
need to introduce into the analysis a number of political, social and economic
issues and actors. In fact, it is the interaction between people and their natural
environment (the way that they respond to, create and shape their 'eco-system')
that determines the possible causes and effects of famine.

Famine is not the result of a decline in the availability of food. As Sen (Poverty
and Famines, Clarendon, 1981) has rightly stressed and documented empirically
there was not such a decline in overall availability of food per head in Sahelian
countries during the famines of 1973 (in fact Senegal and Mali continued to
export cash crops); indeed, neither was there such a decline in the 'great' Bengal
and Bangladesh famines. The concern with aggregate supply and demand for
food — both national and international blurs a number of crucial issues, most
important of which is the failure to account for changes in the distribution and
allocation of food: i.e. shifts in peoples' ability to purchase food. The Food
Availability Decline (FAD) approach to understanding the onset of famine
(focusing as it does on a reduction in the total amount of food available in the
country as a whole) does not recognise that famine is discrete about which social
groups it affects most. Such an approach says little about who is dying, where
they are dying and why. It fails to answer the cruelest irony: 'why is it that
producers of food are the first and most seriously affected by drought and famine
and why do so few town dwellers die from hunger while rural areas are
decimated by starvation and death?'

A partial answer to some of these questions has been offered by Sen. Because
FAD ignores the 'causal mechanism of starvation' and it does not focus on 'the
relationship of people to food' we need instead to examine peoples' entitlements
to food and their access to food for themselves and households. The differential
impact of drought results from individuals' (classes') differential ability to
'command commodities in general and food in particular'. This inability is clearly
determined by a host of factors — changes in market conditions, the ability of a
peasant to maintain an adequate income to purchase food or inputs for the
production of food and for non-agriculturalists to maintain an income or access to
an exchange commodity which will entitle them to food, changes in overall
national and international economic climate which may introduce local austerity,
perhaps cutbacks in employment benefits or relief measures and so on. This
approach to understanding why certain groups are more affected than others at
times of drought or changes in the general economic climate of a particular
country puts centre stage the notion that, 'if you have not got much to exchange
— or what you have is not in demand, then you cannot demand much in return'.
Moreover, you will constantly lose out to those who entitlement to food or ability
to command access to it perhaps through wealth or status, is greater than yours.
In short, it means that if as a peasant producer you suffer crop failure not once
but in successive years, you lose access to food and also the ability to purchase
food with cash; peasants in drought-affected areas are thus marginalised from
the market as a means of relieving starvation and attracting food from elsewhere
(Sen, p.161).

Poverty and Famine has probably done more than any other single publication to
situate an empirical account of a number of famines within a rigorous theoretical
framework for explaining them. The emphasis in Sen's account though is too much on the conjectural, immediate cause and outcome of famine: on issues directly linked to the distribution and circulation of food rather than on the interrelationship between the short term changes in peoples’ entitlements to food — for whatever reasons — and the longer term social and economic underdevelopment of agriculture in Africa and elsewhere. It is only by recognising the connections between the long term social and ecological decay and the immediate reasons for mass starvation and famine that a more meaningful and adequate analysis of ways to prevent future famine can be made.

Crisis of Social Reproduction
In southern Africa the relationship between the conjunctural and long term causes and effects of famine should now be well known. Social, economic and ecological decay in that region of Africa was promoted by the creation of labour migrant economies and underdevelopment of African agriculture by discriminatory settler state pricing policies, overcrowding and infertile barren land which could not and cannot adequately sustain rural households. Such has been the character of this underdevelopment that there is now a crisis of 'social reproduction' in much of southern Africa: a crisis of reproducing the physical household unit — however defined — in South Africa resulting from the policies of the racist state.

Because of drought the burden on women is even greater as they are forced to fetch water and firewood from further afield as these necessities become scarcer. Where this underdevelopment of African agricultural production has not been characterised by the establishment of labour migrant economies, in West Africa, for example, a dependence upon the production of cash crops rather than food production for local consumption has integrated African countries into the 'Global Farm'. The West's demand for luxury food items and cash crops for international commodity markets has reduced available land for the production of food, increased the use of marginal land and dependence on artificial fertilisers and reduced incentive for local food production. The machinations of agribusiness and other international agencies together with the compliance of local African governing elites provides the 'encouragement' for local states to promote export oriented agriculture, a process exacerbated by the distribution of international aid: only 16 per cent of the total given to Sahelian countries in 1975 was directed to the promotion of rain-fed food crops.

Of course, in southern Africa the long term pattern of agricultural underdevelopment is now exacerbated by persistent acts of destabilisation. Despite the Nkomen accord the MNR in Mozambique continues to undermine relief work in the hardest hit areas of drought limiting the effectiveness of the distribution of food and the rehabilitation of infrastructure needed to help in the distribution and production of foodstuffs. Similarly in Angola, UNITA rebels and the SA army of occupation in the south of the country ensure that the Luanda government have to spend scarce resources on defence and the repulsion of the invaders rather than on investment in agriculture.

At a macro level, the February 1984 Lusaka meeting of SADCC established that the total cost of drought 1982-83 in the region for Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe was US$920.9m. This figure includes an estimated US$574.4m representing direct agricultural losses and US$345.5m 'associated
costs' but there is no estimate of the long term effects that will inhibit recovery: the overall loss to herds, the differential impact of herd losses on small herdsmen who thus become permanently impoverished or on farmers dependent on ox-drawn ploughing who now cannot till enough ground or sustain yields.

A fuller appreciation of why a shortage of rainfall, even over many years, should have the effect that it does (namely starvation of many while a few continue to have access to and control over supplies of food; and that those who have access are normally the wealthier and the town dwellers rather than producers of food) requires us to do more than grasp the immediate changes in peoples' entitlements to food and other resources. We need to grasp the relationship between the long term underdevelopment of agriculture and the immediate short term determinants of famines. We need also to recognise the myriad set of relationships between the states most affected by famine and their particular insertion into the international capitalist order: for example, their relations with agribusiness, the IMF and World Bank. We need also to examine the specific local and national relations of political power. As one recent commentator has suggested: 'drought cannot be meaningfully conceived in isolation from the specific character and state of food systems as a reflection of social systems' (Pierre Spitz 'Drought and Self-Provisioning', UNRIST Working Paper, 1980).

We need a composite picture of food systems and how and why they change over time. In Botswana we need to seek the socio-economic forces which have undermined peasant production well before the rains failed. We need to ask how commodity production and class polarisation has promoted agricultural underdevelopment and enhanced the political and economic strength of the cattle barons. It is important that 5 per cent of cattle owners own half the national herd of three to four million cattle. And 25 per cent of cattle entering the Lobatse abattoir (estimated to earn him R33m in 1983) are believed to belong to one man — perhaps the largest land owner in the world, with some 8-9,000 hectares and a financial benefactor of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party. And the Tribal Grazing Lands Policy — a rural development strategy intended to reduce the burden of over-grazing and enforce more efficient husbandry practices — has been welcomed by Botswana bureaucrats with ranching interests (see L. Picard, 'Bureaucrats, Cattle and Public Policy — land tenure changes in Botswana', Comparative Political Studies, 13 (13) 1980; and on ecological decay, L. Cliffe and R. Moorsom in ROAPE 15/16, 1979).

How drought becomes famine and how the poor carry the main burden of such crisis can only be determined by understanding the immediate conjunctural factors in terms of the historical process of agricultural development. And this, in turn, must be situated in the partial and differential incorporation of particular states and social formations in the international order, the 'global farm' and its international agencies and enforcers.

Ray Bush
University of Leeds

* * *
REFUGEES AND HUNGER IN EASTERN SUDAN

It is now (March 1985) two months since I visited eastern Sudan and wrote down my immediate impressions of the refugee situation there. Unfortunately, there seems to be no reason to amend what was written then because circumstances have not improved. In Sudan the crisis is marked by a lack of planning, the use in the field of inexperienced and poorly brief staff, a growing refugee population that is not receiving minimum food, shelter and health requirements, and a lack of fuel which hampers some relief efforts and highlights how wastefully that resource is used (fuel was available for the visit of George Bush and other diplomats, for agency meetings and for international staff use). The focus of effort is still on how to cope today, so that decisions are made hastily and implemented quickly without adequate preparation or care. An example of this was the recent decision to move thousands of people from Wad Kowli: the need to do so and plan for it had been clear for a good three months but in the event the move was sudden and unplanned.

Inside Eritrea and Tigray the essential causes of this mass exodus have not changed. The Ethiopian army has launched several offensives in Tigray (in February and March 1985) which has been well documented. The bombing continues unabated in Eritrea and independent eye-witness accounts describe bombing of civilians, their villages, markets and crops. The resettlement programme forces many to flee their homes in fear of forced removal to areas under Ethiopian government control. And, in spite of an improved response to requests for food to be sent into Tigray and Eritrea, and promises of transport provision, donations still only meet a fraction of the need and hunger forces people to march for many days across harsh terrain to look for food. Some are dissuaded from making the march by news of the appalling conditions in the camps in Sudan; they remain home and often they die.

For many years refugees have been crossing the border into Sudan from Eritrea and Tigray as a result of protracted war, drought and famine. Before the present emergency there were 4-500,000 refugees in eastern Sudan. Over 100,000 were settled in 26 camps, the rest were living in the towns or small Sudan villages, the majority in poverty. While a number of national and international agencies have been working the camps for some time (providing medical care, primary education, some income-generating projects, improving water supplies) the long term goal that these camps should become self-supporting has in the main not been achieved. Poor rainfall in agricultural areas where refugees were allocated land, limited opportunities to work as agricultural labourers or workers in the towns (for those camps where people were expected to be wage earners) and the general poverty of eastern Sudan have severely limited the economic achievements of these camps. Some were certainly quite successful and on the way to being self-supporting. In others, the population, often predominantly women and children, has continued to be dependent on rations for survival. For the majority of refugees who have found a place to live outside the camps there is no international assistance whatsoever, except for limited handouts for those in dire need in the towns. Sudan has always discouraged refugees from coming to the towns, so although many still come there is almost nothing in the way of support for them. They, plus the thousands living in rural areas of eastern Sudan, share with the Sudanese the limited facilities provided by the Government. The situation in eastern Sudan was already one of poverty, overstretched resources,
limited opportunity, with many refugees barely eking out a living. This situation has dramatically worsened since the drought of 1984 affected eastern Sudan severely, and estimates are that more than 80 per cent of the harvest failed. This has meant a shortage of food, dramatic price rises in grain (from S30 pounds in 1984 to S140 pounds by January 1985), a drop in the price of animals because people are selling their livestock to try and raise money for purchasing grain; and also a sharp drop in income for those who depend on seasonal agricultural labour for their survival. There was little or no money to be earned because the crops did not mature. Even without an influx of new refugees the situation would have been critical, with hunger hitting both refugees in the camps and the refugees and Sudanese populations in the countryside. It is estimated that by March 1985 all the existing camps should be receiving food rations: many of them are in desperate need of food immediately, though few are receiving what they need. The existing refugee population is thus affected, and their health and nutrition will undoubtedly decline over the coming months without massive injections of food aid. The drought is hitting hard at this already marginal and poor population.

Current International Interest
But current international interest is not in these refugees — indeed I encountered both journalists and agency workers who were unaware of the nature of the existing refugee population. Many appear to think that almost all refugees are Tigrayan, because they are the majority coming in now, while in fact the estimates are that there are 400,000 Eritreans in eastern Sudan. For the first time in years, eastern Sudan and the refugees are in world media focus, and the concern is only with those crossing the border now. The towns of Kassala and Gedaref are teeming with people from Europe, America, Australia — ‘experts’, consultants, journalists, film crews, agency staff, people from international organisations. There is constant movement; departures and arrivals of the people who have come, for a variety of reasons, to see the incoming flood of refugees and the new camps. At times the overwhelming impression is of a party or a circus; combis, Landrovers, Range Rovers pulling up, releasing their be-camerared or clip-boarded crews who ask only “Where are the camps?”, “What is the death rate?”, “How many are coming across each day?”, before getting back into their vehicles armed with minimal information and disappearing at speed to find the refugees. Not all journalists are as crude or ill-informed as one US TV crew, who drew up in front of us in Gedaref, jumped out and without asking who they were talking to demanded where the nearest camps were, how to get to them and where it would be good to film. When asked what they were looking for, what angle or story they wanted, back came the answer, “the worst refugees”, “the newest refugees” and “the falashas”. When no-one could help them with their last request, they left to look for them themselves, totally unconcerned that this is a highly secretive, security issue in the Sudan. They were told of the implications but they had come for that story which, it appears, “the American people have a right to know”.

While some of the media people I encountered were both sensitive and well-informed, many were not; they lacked background information, political data and understanding of the situation in the Horn historically and currently; they are here looking for a good story. And the horror stories abound in the east of gross insensitivity, the search for sensational pictures and tragic deaths, the closing in
of outsiders on dying people. Those pictures, of course, abound — the constant procession of weak and starving people to one of the five cemeteries in Wad Sherife to dig with a stick a grave to bury a child, a wife, a parent; the mother who refuses to understand her child has died and tries to feed it; the woman wrapping her son in a shroud — and this is part of the story. But why is the first question always "What is the death rate?", "Show me the dying" and not "What is the daily food situation", "Why is there no food coming into the camps", "Why is the water supply so poor after so many weeks" and "Why are people deteriorating after they arrive in Sudan where they came for international help?"

Some observers of course, were very shaken by what they saw, the patience and courage in the face of a death the people have been trying to evade for several years of drought; the sorrow of those who know they will die and wish now they had stayed at home to die on their own land instead of in a land of strangers; the hunger and the need. And some, most notably a Central TV crew and an Australian TV team, have visited the home country of these people and will be able to tell the story of this exodus and why it happens. But few I fear will be able to help the public in the West understand what is happening here and why; they do not appear to grasp what it is they are looking at. They will just add to the endless record of apparently incomprehensible human misery in the most startling way they can find. For those who do not take the time (and some are in Sudan for the first time, staying for three to four days) to learn, to understand, to analyse so that they can help to explain, then surely the least they can do is to stay away and allow a people that has suffered for so long, some remaining dignity and privacy. While an aware media presence is important to inform the world, what I saw in the east often verged on voyeurism, turning many of the visits into the equivalent of 'game viewing'.

And this was true not only of the media people. Everyone expected me to go to the new camps on arrival in Kassala and Gedaref. In Kassala the 'star attractions' are Tukul Baab and Wad Sherife, in Gedaref it is Fau 1, 2 and 3, and Wad Kowli. 'Do you want to go to all of them?' 'Which would you like to see first?' 'I am not going to the camps on this trip'. Incredulity. Is it possible to be in eastern Sudan in January 1985 and not go to see the camps? The pressure on me to go was great, and increased over the week. But I came to look at education and employment projects, neither of which exist in the new camps.

Priorities and Politics

I, like others who are involved in long-term income-generating projects, or development oriented work, found that no-one in the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) had time for subjects like education or employment in the camps. This contrasted sharply with the attitudes of refugee organisations, the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), the Commission for Refugees (COR) and many individual agency workers all of whom have already been approached by refugees from these new camps asking for classes, asking what will happen to their children's education. While many are too sick and passive, other are well enough to be concerned and anxious for the future. Since many were involved in literacy classes and their children were at school before they left, it is a major concern. REST are trying to start classes within the next month in some of the camps, COR are anxious that once the situation stabilises they will simply not be able to meet the massive new demand for schools. But for the UNHCR issues of education and employment are
not a priority. Yet this is the co-ordinating agency, the main funding agency and such an attitude highlights the lack of planning and the lack of any coherent perspective about what should happen in these camps. The entire focus is on the immediate moment. Out of a very sizeable and expandable staff, no-one has the responsibility to think ahead or to think beyond temporary food, water, health and shelter needs.

The entire staff are working on these issues. There is endless activity. UNHCR and COR cars are in constant motion on the roads, showing people around from USAID, the US State Department, FAO and elsewhere. International and national agency cars also ply these routes and meetings are held. A great deal of scarce time and petrol is clearly being expended but the question must be asked, to what effect? If the priorities are food, water, shelter, medical care — as they must be at present — why, despite all the feverish activity, are these necessities so dramatically scarce? In most camps medical teams from the Save the Children Fund, International Rescue committee, Medicines Sans Frontieres and Swiss Red Cross, are working hard, but under conditions in which their patients lack the food and water necessary for existence. The situation is not helped, either, by the inexperience and lack of regional knowledge of such staff. Medical care in such circumstances can only be effective in a limited way.

Why, when there has been a constant stream of Western visitors since October 1984, are there thousands of refugees without even minimal food and water? Why were no advance preparations made by UNHCR to stockpile rations and prepare water supplies when the situation had been foreseen for so long and when there had been warnings for over a year of a massive influx of refugees to Sudan if massive food aid was not given to Eritrea and Tigray? Why, when it is now so fashionable to talk of Early Warning Systems, was nothing done until some weeks after the first new refugees arrived? It is now necessary for staff in international organisations to explain why they were unprepared and then unable to mobilise essential supplies quickly enough to save lives and why it was possible for a situation to arise in which so many people were forced to become refugees. ERA and REST have repeatedly approached donors for food supplies sufficient to hold this population in their own homelands as well as to help build new communities and enable others to return home to farm when the rains eventually come. Why were such supplies not forthcoming? The two agencies also asked the Ethiopian government to agree a ceasefire so that the bombing of villages and food convoys would end and they could start helping the stricken population. This has been refused and the bombing of hungry civilians and refugees continues. Only 2-5 per cent of food requests have been met, mostly by international agencies. There are many political questions which must be asked and answered.

The political decision to donate food to the Ethiopian government but to deny it to those not under its control is the major cause of the current exodus into eastern Sudan. The reasons given for this are various — the need to work only through UN recognised governments, the need to maintain good relations with Addis Ababa to ensure the continuation of other projects, and the need to avoid giving aid to ‘terrorist’ (the last despite the UN granting of federated status to Eritrea in 1952 and despite the Ethiopian abrogation of that status in 1962). In effect, governments and many organisations have denied food to refugees for political reasons. Many continue to supply food to Ethiopia despite evidence that some of that food is sold by the army or finds its way into the store of private
shopkeepers. Some support a programme in which people are forcibly removed from famine areas in war zones and resettled in areas under Ethiopian government control. Continuation of aid is justified on the grounds that the humanitarian considerations have priority. Why then is aid to Tigray and Eritrea also not humanitarian rather than ‘political’? The question is all the more pressing as new waves of refugees from the resettlement camps around Asosa have begun to arrive in the Blue Nile area of Sudan.

Whatever arguments and excuses are advanced, it is an inescapable fact that had the world acted sooner and sent food when it was first requested, the emergency would not have happened on the present scale. It is just not good enough that UNCHR, its donors and other international organisations were not prepared for the moment when the trickle of refugees became a flood. It is not good enough for politicians to avoid answering questions about how this happened. It is not good enough that now, several months after the start of the crisis, and despite feverish activity, justifications and excuses, the refugees still do not receive adequate rations, have no decent water and continue to deteriorate and die in the camps. It is not even good enough that they should be attended in their grief and dying by a welter of Western journalists, experts, consultants and observers.

Tina Wallace
World University Service
THE SUDAN PEOPLES' LIBERATION MOVEMENT (SPLM)
AND LIBERATION ARMY (SPLA)

Background to the Present Situation in Southern Sudan

Today, the Southern Sudan is once more a bloody war zone with several thousands of southerners, predominantly from Upper Nile (capital: Malakal) and Bahr el Gazal regions (capital: Wau) having grouped together under the umbrella of SPLA/SPLM 'which has been founded to spearhead armed resistance against Numeiri's one-man no-system dictatorship and to organise the whole Sudanese people under the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), a movement which belongs to the whole Sudanese and which will fight tirelessly for their Unity, Peace and Progress (Garang, March 1984).

With the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 and the issuing of the Permanent Constitution in May 1973, most southerners truly believed that at last adequate and comprehensive provisions existed whereby a lasting peace, political stability, economic development and social progress could be established for the benefit of all citizens in the South after the ravages of the 17-year civil war (1955-72). The Addis Ababa Agreement laid down in clear terms the guidelines for the creation of both political and administrative organs (the People's Regional Assembly and the Higher Executive Council (HEC) respectively) for the people of the Southern region, which, for the first time was granted regional autonomy within the framework of the Democratic Republic of Sudan: Juba being the capital of the South. Throughout the latter part of the 1970s serious discontent with the system began to accumulate, particularly since 1981 when Numeiri, for the second time in under two years, unconstitutionally dissolved the Southern Region Government.

The decision in May 1983 by Numeiri to divide the South into three regions — Upper Nile, Bahr el Gazal and Equatoria, each region being headed by a Governor, appointed by Numeiri, and aided by a Deputy Governor and five regional Ministers, was seen as yet another blatant act of aggression by the Central Government and one designed to further weaken the South in all aspects, thereby resulting in further social and economic inequality, not only between North and South but also between the three Southern Regions. Such an act was warmly welcomed by the Equatorians, who had long protested that the Dinka of Bahr el Gazal and Upper Nile Regions had dominated Southern politics, jobs, and therefore the wealth of the Southern economy. It is now apparent, however, to the original advocate of re-division, General Lagu, and many Equatorians, that re-division was a disastrous mistake with no economic benefits to be gained for the majority of Southerners.

The dissolution of the Regional Assembly and Governments in 1980, 1981 and 1983, as well as Numeiri's unsuccessful attempts to redefine the boundaries between North and South, so that the oil rich area around Bentiu, the fertile lands of Renk, together with the nickel and uranium deposits all fall into northern territory aggravated still further the already tense relations between Khartoum and the South.

There has been considerable disparity in the number of development projects which have materialised in the South as compared to those in the North since 1972. Not only is there considerable agricultural potential in the South but also a variety of minerals, which if utilised sensibly would bring substantial economic benefits to the Sudanese people. These include nickel, copper and uranium, gold, together with considerable reserves of oil having been discovered around Bentiu (which Numeiri originally
announced as being situated 450 miles south of Khartoum). However, it quickly became apparent, not only to Numeiri, but also to other interested foreign parties that the significant quantities of oil lay predominantly in the South. Thus oil and its exploration immediately became a burning political issue, especially given Northern plans to construct a pipeline from Kosti to Port Sudan and the building of an oil refinery in Kosti. The other major project in the South which has aroused further mistrust amongst Southerners, particularly the Nilotics — Dinkas, Shillukis and Nuers, is the construction of the Jonglei canal from Bor to Malakal by the French company CCI which began in June 1978 and was due to be completed by the mid-1980s. Many Nilotics view the construction of the canal as a very real threat to their way of life and feel that the North and Egypt will be the main beneficiaries of such a scheme.

With the soaring of the political temperature, not only in the South but throughout the Sudan during the past four years, so Numeiri, in his desperate attempts to remain in power imposed an ever-tightening grip upon life throughout the country, with daily arrests and detentions without trial. The declaration of the State of Emergency on 29 April 1984 gave unlimited powers to the armed forces, police and civil authorities and removed all previous constitutional checks which might have protected individuals from the abuse of official power. Freedom of movement was no longer possible and everyone came under suspicion of plotting to overthrow Numeiri. Three prominent Southern politicians were arrested shortly before re-division was declared — Dhol Achiul (Southern Vice-President), Matthew Ubor (Speaker of the Regional Assembly in Juba) and Bona Malual (former Minister of Industry in the Southern Regional Government and former Minister of Culture and Information in the Central Government). Forty-three Southern Sudanese detainees were arrested between December 1982 and January 1983 in Rumbek, Juba and Khartoum prisons on charges of being a threat to the security of the State.

Formation and Emergence of SPLA/SPLM May-June 1983
The intention of Numeiri to transfer Battalions 105 (Bor), 110 (Aweil) and 117 (Kapoeta) to the North for training in 1982-83 (having first disarmed the soldiers) followed by the remaining Battalions, 104 (Nasir), 111 (Rumbek) and 116 (Juba) in 1983-84 ignited the fire in the South and resulted in two contingency plans being drawn up by former prominent absorbed Anya-nya officers. The first was where a socialist government was to be established and measures taken to assist in transforming the situation in Khartoum. The second plan, in the event that Khartoum attacked first, was to regroup and reorganise to wage a protracted armed struggle for the total liberation of the Sudan. It is the second plan that has become necessary. Khartoum attacked Bor and Pibor garrisons on 16/5/83, and later the Ayod garrison attacked Khartoum forces that were sent to arrest the Commander.

In May 1983, Numeiri launched an attack on Battalions 105 and 104 at the garrison towns of Bor, Pibor and Pochala. This was to be followed by the Malou clash of the same month; the Ayod and Waat clashes of June and July 1983; the Buma capture of hostages; the guerilla warfare in Abyei and Bentiu and finally, the birth of Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. Southern military leaders defected from the National army and went into the bush and neighboring countries where they regrouped and emerged as various rebel groups, the dominant one being SPLA.
The Leadership

Col/Dr John Garang de Mabior, who undertook all his academic undergraduate and post-graduate studies in North America, defected from the National Army at the time of the Bor mutiny last year and subsequently became the Chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee of the SPLM and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA forces. During the early 1960s Garang went into exile, travelling to the USA and undertaking studies for a first degree in economics at Iowa State University. After graduating he returned to Sudan and joined the Anya-nya guerilla movement in 1970-71. Unconfirmed reports refer to him receiving military training in Israel. In 1972 he was one of the few Southerners who qualified both academically and militarily to join the National Army and from 1972-77 served as Lieutenant of units 104 and 105. In 1977 he returned to America to pursue post-graduate courses — again at Iowa State — for Master and Doctorate degrees in Economics, before returning to Sudan in 1982. He became colonel and was stationed at the headquarters of the National Army as a military planner in Khartoum. In May 1983 Numeiri sent Garang to the South in an attempt to get him to convince units 105 and 104 to go to the North. However, Garang was himself dissatisfied with the present state of affairs and defected from the National Army to join the new movement in the South which in August 1983 emerged as the SPLA/SPLM.

Political leadership comes from Joseph Oduho, a Latuka from Equatoria region, a veteran politician, and former teacher who was exiled in Uganda during the 1960s. During this time he occupied the office of President of SANU. Currently, Mr Oduho is Chairman of the Political and Foreign Affairs Committee and member of the Provisional Executive Committee of SPLM. Mr Oduho’s involvement with SPLM began in June 1983 soon after President Numeiri confirmed he was dividing the South. Oduho explains his position in joining the movement as wanting ‘to advise the new leadership, calling on my experience as a leader of the former Anyanya army. On July 11 we started to organise. We had to send runners to the villages to collect recruits. It took some time. But by the end of August we had gathered together a good body of fighting men — 1,500, including army, police and game wardens’.

Martin Majier, lawyer and former Deputy Speaker of the Southern Assembly who defected to SPLA in July 1983, completes the trio and currently occupies the post of Chairman of the People’s Justice and Administration Committee and is a member of the Provisional Executive Committee. These three men, together with Lt.Col. Kerubino Kwanyin and Lt.Col. William Nyon, comprise the five members of the Provisional Executive Committee.

Ideology, Aims and Objectives of SPLA/SPLM

Throughout their meetings and press statements, both in Sudan and abroad, SPLM have continued to emphasise Socialism as being the only ideology which can unify a country of such sharp racial, religious and tribal diversities. Its objectives are (1) ‘to wage a protracted armed struggle in order to establish a Socialist system in the whole Sudan, beginning in the south and extending northwards to end up in the capture of Khartoum and (2) to provide a consistent social democratic solution to the nationality question in the Sudan by establishing Socialism in the whole country and according autonomous status to various regions within the context of a United Socialist Sudan, not a United Arab Sudan.’ As Captain Alfred Akuec commented, no longer are people to be referred to as
"Northerners, Southerners, Easterners or Westerners, but Sudanese" thus emphasising the concept of unity. SPLA/SPLM repeatedly stressed that their immediate aim was to overthrow Numeiri and to liberate the people from the human bondage of ignorance, disease and hunger.

As to the content of SPLA’s socialism, Garang has the following comments to make: "it cannot be determined mechanically and equated with Communism as Numeiri would like the Western World to believe. The concretisation and particularisation of socialism in the Sudan shall unfold as the armed struggle and as socio-economic development programmes are implemented during and after the war and according to Sudanese local and objective conditions."

Claims by Khartoum and the Western media that SPLA/SPLM is a separatist movement have been repeatedly refuted by SPLA/SPLM leadership who stress that their sole aim is for a United Sudan. "The South is an integrated and inseparable part of the Sudan... and its further fragmentation can only be in the interests of her enemies." SPLA/SPLM began in the South with its immediate task being ‘to transform the Southern Movement from a reactionary movement led by reactionaries and concerned only with the South, jobs and self-interest to a progressive movement led by revolutionaires and dedicated to the socialist transformation of the whole country.’

Since the birth of SPLA/SPLM the Movement has always expressed its intention to discontinue Sharia law, a form of Islamic justice which they view as totally unacceptable to both Muslims and non-Muslim, upon coming to power. SPLM state in their Manifesto (31 July 1983): "Under SPLM Government there shall be separation of state and mosque and church. All religious faiths in the country shall have complete freedom to practice without hindrance or intimidation, provided that this freedom is not abused and used for political purposes. Sunday shall therefore remain a holiday and a day of worship in the South, while Friday shall continue to be a holiday and a day of worship in Northern Sudan.

Structure and Organisation of SPLA/SPLM
Since its firm establishment in August last year, the Movement has gradually become politically and militarily well organised with the setting up of four hierarchical committees whose purpose is to ensure the smooth and efficient functioning of the Movement and the implementation of its programmes. Such committees comprise a National Committee, Central Committee, Political Committee (Bureau) and the Executive Committee, together with seven working committees which were set up for the immediate commencement of activities, each committee being headed by a Chairman. When the need arises additional committees shall be formed. Because of the shortage of manpower in the early days of SPLA/SPLM and the priority nature of each committee, some had to be amalgamated under the chairmanship of one person.

Strategy
The SPLA/SPLM political programme sets out in some detail the strategy to be employed so that the Southern movement develops into a genuine liberation movement. The Manifesto provides a summary of such details, which involved the establishment of the SPLA/SPLM and its employment of guerilla tactics to bring the scattered fighting forces now in the South, together, to receive ‘further military and political training and through war and correct conduct, win the
confidence and support of the masses of the people'. SPLA camps would have to be set up 'in order to be able to regroup and politicise the fighting forces effectively. The SPLA will then work to win the confidence of Ananya II forces and bring them under SPLA command'. The use of various propaganda measures, including the establishment of an SPLA radio station has already been realised with Radio SPLA going into service last summer for an hour every afternoon. The broadcasts feature news of SPLA's latest activities, propaganda material, as well as commentaries upon recent political developments throughout the Sudan. SPLA also refer to the 'establishment of political offices in all countries to pursue external contacts for military and other assistance' together with the setting up of an institute for 'Revolutionary War Studies in a liberated area for training political and military cadres'.

Refresher military training and political orientation is required for all officers and other ranks who desert from the National Army. Once trained, the cadres from the Institute for Revolutionary War Studies shall take over the organic units, and import their revolutionary knowledge and practice to all under their command. As areas become liberated, so the 'politicisation, organisation and militarisation of the peasantry shall follow' with groups in both North and South being contacted with a view to forming a United Front, 'provided that the leadership remains armed and progressive'. The final part is concerned with the seeking and obtaining of 'intellectual, moral, military and other material assistance from any country or international organisation that is sympathetic to the aims and objectives of the SPLA/SPLM'.

Development and Expansion of SPLA/SPLM
Throughout the past 20 months SPLA/SPLM have been highly active in seeking to recruit large numbers of Southerners from all three regions into the Movement, as well as various groups from Eastern and Western Sudan — the Furs, Fung, Beja and Nubas (referred to by Southerners as 'Black Arabs'). Their efforts to obtain further members have certainly been made easier since the establishment of Radio SPLA, where previously such campaigns were undertaken by prominent SPLA/SPLM members going into the bush to recruit directly. Last summer's recruitment drive in Bahr el Gazal region resulted in boys as young as 12 years old being taken by SPLA to their training camps on the Sudan/Ethiopian border.

Until 1982, scepticism on the part of local citizens generally towards the guerrillas was considerable, but since the beginning of 1983 attitudes have changed considerably as people became more closely aware of Numeiri's intentions towards the South. The positioning of only Southern soldiers on the front line against impending guerilla attacks aroused further suspicion and distrust.

Initial support for SPLA came from a variety of Southern political opposition groups including the National Action Movement (NAM); Movement for Total Liberation of Southern Sudan (MTLSS); Equatoria Central Committee (for re-division) (ECC); Council for the Unity of South Sudan (CUSS), as well as the Congress of New Forces (CNF) which included the Fur, Nuba and Beja, and finally substantial support coming from former Anya-nya I guerillas.

Throughout last summer a number of senior Southern army officers defected from the National army to join SPLA, including Aquot Attem (Dinka), former
Anya-nya Minister of Defence; Major Kawac, formerly of the National Assembly and Regional Assembly member; Colonel William Chuol (who deserted from his command in Nasi in May 1983) and Samuel Gai Tut (Nuer and former Anya-nya military commander in Upper Nile). In addition, numerous police officers, prison officers and game warden have gradually abandoned their former positions and joined the SPLA.

Southern support for SPLA has come largely from the Dinkas of Bahr el Gazal and Upper Nile Regions, whereas support from the educated Equatorians has been distinctly lacking until very recently. Equatorians have displayed at times open hostility towards some aspects of SPLA’s activities — particularly the kidnapping of foreign workers — CCI and Chevron — which they regard as hindering, rather than helping SPLA’s cause. A significant number of overseas aid organisations have been engaged in a variety of development projects in Equatoria region, including primary health care schemes, agricultural and forestry projects, water and sanitation schemes and road construction — with some projects involving local participation. This has provided some employment for local people and a certain level of improvement in various essential aspects of life.

As hostilities have intensified over the past months, so the aid organisations have had to consider the security of their workers. Since July 1984 various organisations have been withdrawing their personnel from the three regions and with recent SPLA activities in Equatoria Region, with Juba increasingly under threat of SPLA attack, further evacuations have taken place.

With SPLA activity having now reached Equatoria Region, Joseph Oduho made a lengthy appeal over SPLA Radio on January 3 to the Equatorians to stand and fight.

These people (our colleagues) must therefore now tell those people who are going around Equatoria saying that Equatoria must rise in order to protect themselves from the SPLA. My dear brothers and sisters, the SPLA is not your enemy. The SPLA will not disarm you. The SPLA will only train you, educate you politically so that you can understand your rights ... fight for your rights. My dear Equatorians you are the most advanced people of the Southern region. You have the most highly educated people. These educated people could be the ones to guide you and guide you correctly. Some of them guided you to division, in order that they could get big jobs, which they would never have dreamt of getting in a united country. Today these people we understand are scheming, deceiving you in the countryside, throughout all the districts trying to tell you that we must fight for our home, Equatoria. I can assure you of one thing, that the problems of division have gone, as I have said ... And this is happening before you and you can see that this is the real enemy. It is not the Dinka who is your enemy. It is not the Nuer who is your enemy. It is the system that has been exploiting you for centuries which is your enemy, not your brother, the Dinkas or the Nuers. Rise up therefore and join the SPLA ... And remember, united we stand, divided we fall (Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 January 1985).

Whilst Northern Sudanese have also witnessed a significant deterioration in their way of life, they have shown considerable reluctance in providing anything more than moral support for SPLA. SPLA support amongst Southerners has steadily increased during the past 20 months, with Captain Akuec referring to 7,500 (6,000 coming from the army) having joined SPLA by March last year. Certainly numbers are considerably higher now but reports vary widely and no accurate figure is currently available. In order for SPLA/SPLM to become a reality they need to
obtain substantial Northern and Western support, as well as considerably more support from the Equatorians.

SPLA Actions August 1983-January 1985
Throughout late 1983 and up until December 1984, SPLA have confined their attacks to Upper Nile and Bahr el Gazal regions with the first major offensive following the initial mutinees in May-July 1983 taking place in November 1983. Short bursts of activity have been followed by brief periods of silence, during which time the Movement has been preparing for its next onslaught.

On 17 November 1983 SPLA captured and destroyed Malual Gahoth. After Malual Gahoth, beginning from 12 December 1983, SPLA forces occupied for seven days the Eastern half of Nasir. In mid-January 1984 SPLA captured Akobo. This preceded the next major attack in February 1984 — which lasted from 8-22 February and culminated in the bombardment of Malakal. The SPLA had warned the people of Malakal that they were coming to bomb the town on the 22nd so that when they arrived everyone had moved out into neighbouring villages. The Lutheran World Service also left just in time, the Director only having left that very morning. After the disaster of the Nile Steamer incident (between 8-9 February) in which hundreds of innocent villagers were killed, either by being burnt to death or by drowning as a result of a SPLA bazooka attack by mistake on the steamer, such a tragedy was uppermost in people's minds.

An unsuccessful attempt to bomb SPLA camps in retaliation, was followed by a brutal army attack on thousands of defenceless villagers — mainly Shilluks, in which hundreds were killed and the bodies thrown into the burning buildings. Property was set on fire, women and young girls were raped and cattle was looted. Many of the citizens fled into a nearby Church at Doleib Hill thinking they would be safe from army attacks. In the battle which followed, hundreds of villagers met a cruel death with the army hurling hand grenades into the church.

Attacks continued throughout the spring and summer in Upper Nile and Bahr el Gazal Regions. These included the destruction of the railway bridge over the river Lol, which links Wau to the North, and this has effectively isolated Wau from the rest of Sudan. There were further attacks on Nasir and Fochala in early June with SPLA claiming to have captured the small garrison town of Pibor on June 26. Since last summer SPLA forces have been stationed just outside Wau. As summer advanced so the first batches of recruits completed their initial training and were now ready to engage in SPLA activities. After a brief period of relative calm, SPLA launched another offensive at the end of August, capturing a river steamer as it sailed up the Sobat river between the town of Ulang and Nasir. SPLA claimed to have wiped out most of the 393 troops on board and managed to capture food and ammunition before blowing up the vessel.

As 1984 drew to a close so SPLA embarked on a series of attacks throughout Upper Nile Region, beginning with the capture of the town of Bailiet, 12 miles east of Malakal, followed by attacks on two Nile steamers — November 29 and December 1 — the first attack by the Cobra battalion on a steamer on its way from Juba to Kosti. The second incident involved the same battalion — 104 and 105 which ambushed the Marriekh steamer. Other incidents took place in Bahrel Gazal region where the government garrison at Rumbek was reported to be under SPLA attack. Towards the end of December SPLA activities assumed far
greater significance as SPLA moved closer to Juba.

In the early days of SPLA activity the shortage of trained manpower effectively limited SPLA's operations to Upper Nile and Bahr el Gazal Regions. However, as Southern defections from the police, army and prisons have continued, so SPLA now possess the ability to expand their activities throughout the South. January 1985 has been a very active one for SPLA, with more than 100 members of organised forces in the Bahr el Gazal administrative area defecting to SPLA forces in the area, in addition to more than 100 members of the organised forces who defected from Bor about five weeks ago. The New Year began with an attack by Battalion 104/105 on the Wankai garrison in Upper Nile. Two days later Tonga was attacked by the same units with the enemy soldiers stationed in Tonga being forced to flee into Malakal. SPLA morale was further boosted by the defection of 27 members of William Abdullah Chuol's group (who had taken refuge at the Government's garrison in Waat last November) to SPLA.

SPLA then proceeded to carry out a series of attacks in Bahr el Gazal Region; on January 6 the Rhino Battalion ambushed an enemy convoy between Kajok and Aluakluak, 42 miles south-east of Rumbek, followed by an attack on the 7th in which landmines planted by the Rhino Battalion and supported by an ambush, destroyed two Magirus trucks moving from Rumbek to Yirol. On 10 January 1984 SPLA took up positions for the first time in Equatoria province threatening to capture Juba.

Despite SPLA's repeated references to their forthcoming attack on Juba, such an operation would seem somewhat counter-productive from the economic point of view alone, since destruction of Juba would certainly result in total chaos and accelerate the already crumbling South. With significant numbers of soldiers now stationed in Equatoria Region it would be very difficult for SPLA to take control of Juba, bearing in mind its size and the considerable problems such an attack would pose on civilians in the capital.

SPLA/SPLM — Attitude to Foreign Companies/Organisations
With the release of Mrs Ursula Morsen at the beginning of March 1984, SPLA issued a statement making clear their intentions towards foreign companies operating in the South. 'SPLA would like to assure international companies such as CCI, Chevron Oil, Total Oil etc., that we have no quarrel with them. We have hit and destroyed some installations belonging to these companies only after the SPLA gave them sufficient warning. As an example we captured nine foreign workers of CCI in November 1983 but released them after three days, only warning that all foreign concerns in South Sudan should cease their operations since SPLA has declared the region as a war zone. Yet our goodwill was not heeded, as all foreign concerns in South Sudan continued to operate unperturbed.'

With the withdrawal of Chevron from Bentiu area last summer as a result of the sharply deteriorating security situation in the South, there seems no possibility of Chevron resuming operations in the South until security can be guaranteed for its workers. The recent establishment of the National Oil corporation of Sudan (NOC) in December 1984, with the close association of the Saudi Arabian tycoon — Adnan Khashoggi has added further fuel to the fire and prompted SPLA to issue further warnings to Chevron and their association with Numeiri's regime — the latest warning being on 10 January 1984, in which SPLA refer to the oil areas
as being fire-free zones and therefore they (SPLA) will not be held responsible for any eventualities that may occur to those working there. 'We demand that Chevron stops prospecting in the South for any natural resources at the present time because all areas are war zones against the regime and its army. As a matter of principle we are not hostile to companies or the individuals working for them ... The resources of Sudan must be shared or exploited in accordance with the areas in which the resources are found.' SPLA made reference to their being aware of the likelihood of development and construction of various other industries linked to the oil industry and the capability of SPLA of halting these oil operations until Numeiri's regime is overthrown. SPLA are particularly bitter that Chevron has failed to recruit its workers from amongst Southerners.

The release of the four hostages (employees of CCI) who have been held by SPLA since their capture on February 10, on 28 January 1985, including one Briton, two Frenchmen and one Kenyan has been welcomed in the West after a tense 11 months in which the exact situation concerning the hostages was unknown.

With most international organisations having now left the South it would seem likely that SPLA will possibly concentrate on mounting both road and river attacks in their efforts to bring the South to a total standstill.

Foreign Support for SPLA/SPLM

The expression 'an enemy of your enemy becomes your friend' can aptly be applied to Libya's position in the Southern scenario. The failure of Garang to secure Western support in the beginning led SPLA to accepting Libyan aid.

As regards Libya's long-term interests in supporting a black non-Muslim movement this would appear inconceivable. With Gaddafi willing to support any Sudanese group whose intention was to bring about the overthrow of Numeiri, SPLA are capitalising on receiving such help; albeit temporary. On the other hand Mengistu's support for SPLA can be viewed in quite a different way with the Ethiopian Government wishing to maintain friendly relations with the South and could therefore conceive the realisation of 'black power' in the Sudan. In order for SPLA to be assured of receiving Ethiopian support they are bound to concur with Ethiopian opinion.

Numeiri and the Western media have on various occasions referred to Garang as being a communist, no doubt as a result of the support SPLA is receiving from Libya and Ethiopia. Despite Garang's insistence that he is a socialist, seeking to establish a United Socialist Sudan, the style of the SPLA's Manifesto and subsequent verbal and written statements and reports have only served to perpetuate this notion in the West, thus ruling out any possibility of Western support.

USA, Egypt and Saudia Arabia continued to supply Numeiri with substantial amounts of military and financial aid in his war with the South. However such support, in the light of Numeiri's gross mismanagement of Sudan's economic and political situation, together with his programme of total Islamisation throughout the Sudan (much to the consternation of both Muslims and non-Muslims alike) was bound to be subjected to intense scrutiny as Numeiri's behaviour alienated virtually all groups throughout the Sudan to varying degrees.

The release from prison of the Ansar leader, Sadiq el Mahdi just before Christmas 1984, came as a surprise to the Sudanese and outside observers. Such
a move has significant political implications, with Numeiri proposing the idea of the setting up of a government of national unity which would include Southerners, with Sadiq's name being suggested as Prime Minister. Such a move can be interpreted in various ways. A likely explanation for Sadiq's release at this particular time could be to quell the rising rebellion among various Northern factions towards Numeiri's policies.

Conclusion
Having examined in some detail the crucial points surrounding the present critical and chaotic situation in Sudan, there remains one final issue to be discussed — a black non-Muslim Southerner as the future leader/President of the Sudan — can this ever be realised or is it just a dream in the minds of many Southerners? Opinions vary widely. The concept of 'Black Power' which is now firmly entrenched in the minds of an increasing number of Southerners, is regarded as a distinct possibility following Numeiri's downfall. Others take a very different view of the situation, expressing the impossibility of Sudan being led by a black — bearing in mind the intense Arab opposition both from within Sudan and from other Arab states. Such people will never tolerate a black coming to power in the Sudan. Other Southerners question the seriousness of SPLM to create a United Socialist Sudan and the feasibility of such a proposal. Instead, some form of federation/autonomy for the region would seem to be a more realistic solution to the current situation. With such fundamental differences between the Arabs and Christian Southerners, the idea of a Government of National Unity in the Sudan is likely to be totally rejected by Southerners, bearing in mind the failure of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement.

The extent to which Southerners seriously believe and intend to establish and work together to unite all people of the Sudan is highly debatable. Of course, all the time that SPLA support continues to be forthcoming from whatever group and as SPLA's morale is further boosted by their recent military victories, such ideals are fostered and nurtured very carefully; but for a United Socialist Sudan to become a reality — this would appear to be extremely remote. There is absolutely no guarantee that even if SPLM did assume power, corruption and inequality of opportunities for the majority of Southerners would disappear overnight and be replaced by rapid economic development and a more just society.

Postscript: The Coup and After SPLA/SPLM Reaction
The SPLA's reaction to the army take-over on 9 April 1985 left no doubt as to the absolute determination of the SPLA to continue the struggle. Garang's first broadcast following the coup wholeheartedly supported the popular uprising and congratulated the SPLA on its contribution to the overthrow of Numeiri, but he seriously questioned the intentions of the new regime (SWB 11/4/85). The SPLA has always maintained that their primary objective is the removal of Numeiri and his regime. To date, only the first part has been accomplished. The installation of a 15-man transitional military council (TMC) (to which a 16-man Council of Ministers is responsible) having overall control throughout the 12-month transitional period (due to expire on 25 April 1986, after which time a civilian government will be installed) is regarded by the SPLA as merely a perpetuation of the former regime in a different uniform and therefore totally unacceptable. Garang has so far rejected outright all offers, both from Khartoum and from various Southern sources, to meet the new government, referring to the 'ugly shadow of Numeiri as looming ominously over the new military administration in Khartoum'. Another major question is whether in 12 month's
time the military will actually hand over power to the civilians. Initially, military rule was to be for just six months but within a few days that period had been extended to a year. SPLA Radio, in their first broadcast after the coup raised the issue of what lies behind the take-over of power by the military and arrived at the conclusion that the 'junta, as to be expected, has isolated the leaders of the popular uprising. The professionals, trade and students' unions, who dealt the final blow to Numeiri, are now isolated from their revolution and are threatened with arrest and repression by the new regime with the same intimidation and arrogance as they did in the old regime. This is concrete proof that the people's revolution has been stolen by a gang of four generals whose interests are more in common with international and local reaction than with the broad masses of the Sudanese people who brought them to power' (SWB 11/4/85).

On April 5 the SPLM ideological committee referred to Garang as urging all the 'Sudanese broad masses, workers, soldiers, peasants, professionals and students that the main, immediate and most urgent task of the moment is the creation of steering committees throughout the country as doing that ensures our national liberation movement with the people whose specific interests we defend and represent' (SWB 17/4/85).

Garang's offer to cease military activities in the South for seven days in order for the new regime to hand over power to the civilians appeared extremely unrealistic when one considers that the army had only just taken over and was hardly likely to relinquish its new position so soon. The seven days having passed without Garang's demands having been met, the SPLA resumed activities with the latest attacks taking place in Tonj (Bahr el Gazal), Akobo (Upper Nile Region), and Waat with SPLA claiming on April 26 a further 42 defections from the armed forces to join the Movement. Full responsibility for the latest outbreak of war in the South has been placed on 'the Khartoum gang of generals' because of their refusal to hand over power to the Sudanese people after the period fixed by the SPLA.

Concerning the future of the South, distrust and suspicion for the new regime abounds amongst SPLA. While the SPLA refuses to talk with the new regime the fighting can only be expected to continue and intensify. Already the SPLA are talking in terms of advancing their operations into Zone No.2 (North) and in their broadcast over SPLA radio on April 28, warned its citizens to vacate the towns 'because SPLA would scorch the earth' in zone No.1. 'We now similarly warn the citizens in operational zone No.2 in Sennar, Qadarif, Kassala, Damazin, Rusayris, Sinja, Kenana, Kosti, Madani, Kamil, Qutaynah, Jibal and Dafur to seek alternative shelter, because all these towns and villages are on the way to Khartoum.'

Within the 16-man Transitional Council of Ministers led by Jazuli Dafallah (a devout Muslim and a leading figure behind the civil strikes), only three posts have been given to Southerners: Samuel Aru Bol — Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Irrigation and Hydroelectric Power (formerly Vice-President of the Higher Executive Council until its dissolution in late 1981); Peter Gatkuoth Kual — Minister of Transport and Communications (formerly caretaker president for six months of HEC in 1980, later Minister of Finance during the government of Abel Allier in 1980-1981) and Oliver Batali Albino — Minister of Labour and Public Services. This has been met with considerable dismay and opposition by many Southerners. Both Samuel Bol and Peter Gatkuoth were opposed to re-division, whereas Albino (former Minister of State under Lagu) is in favour. It is significant that none of the key posts, such as those of foreign affairs, finance and economic planning have been allocated to a Southerner (one of the prerequisites made by the South in their communiques to Dhabah) — thus only serving to perpetuate the suspicion which Southerners have towards the North as regards their economic and political future.

All three Ministers are associated with the former Numeiri regime and are therefore inextricably linked to the controversial issue of re-division and thus unlikely to command the respect and confidence so urgently needed if the South is to be united in its approach to solving its current problems. Only a few days after the coup, Bol, Gatkuoth and Albino, together with Toby Madut and Ezbon Mundiri formed the Southern Sudanese Political
Association which advocates a return of the 1956 Constitution for administering the country; the abolition of Islamic law (Sharia), and the opening of direct contacts with the SPLA/SPLM in order to reach a peaceful settlement (SWB 19/4/85). The remaining members of the new cabinet are all associated with Numeiri’s regime. It would thus appear distinctly unlikely that there will be any major changes in the policies pursued by the new regime for the time being, especially since the overall power in terms of sovereignty and legislative authority rests in the hands of the TMC.

With Juba having now been restored as the administrative centre of the South and the revocation of the 1983 decree of Southern re-division, the bitter rivalries and jealousies that have always been so clearly apparent between the Dinka and Equatorian ethnic groups have surfaced once again. Such jealousies can only have a detrimental effect on the number of Equatorians joining SPLA in the forthcoming months. In order for Garang’s dream to become a reality it is imperative that he attempts to secure as much support as possible while the cloud of uncertainty hangs low over Sudan’s political future. Already Garang has formed close links with the Free Officers in the Sudanese army who have rejected the military government of Siwah al Dhahab and have joined ranks with Garang.

Emergence of other Southern Groups since 6 April 1985

Since April 6 a considerable number of Southern groups suddenly appeared — all keen to participate in events leading up to the forthcoming elections. Within seven days of the coup 29 political parties and 77 trade unions had emerged but no doubt between now and next April there will be a considerable amount of consolidating of opinions which undoubtedly will bring about the disappearance of many of these small groupings as allegiances to particular policies become more clearly defined. In addition to the well established parties (Umma, Unionist and Communists), the Baathists, Nasserite Socialist Arab Party, Socialist Islamic Party and Sadiq Abdul Majid’s wing of the Brotherhood and the doctors, lawyers, engineers, university staff, bankers, insurance employees and university students were all keen to voice their opinions on the new regime in Khartoum.

An appeal from the Southern Sudanese was sent to Siwah el Dhahab on April 10 (SWB 13/4/85) in which demands were made for a return to the 1956 Constitution, cancellation of Sharia Law, an adequate representation of the South in all national institutions ‘in proportion to its size and in conformity with its distinct character’ to be ensured, the reinstatement of the Addis Ababa Agreement, direct contact to be established quickly between SPLA/SPLM and the new leadership with negotiations for a peaceful settlement, release of political prisoners and the restoration of principles of human rights and liberties.

On April 14 a lengthy statement addressed to the Sudanese masses from the Southern Sudanese Alliance was presented to Siwah al Dhahab by Dr Walter Kunijwok Ayoker, a lecturer in Political Science at Khartoum University, in which proposals covering the following areas were expounded: basic human rights; political objectives, in which direct contacts between SPLA and the transitional government are advocated ‘to achieve a lasting peaceful solution’; granting autonomy rule to regions which have witnessed only slight development; the need for the South to participate effectively in all the institutions of the central authority; the South should constitute a third of the members of the government; adoption of the 1956 Constitution; application of the Addis Ababa Agreement during the transitional period; cancellation of Islamic laws; economic plans — in which revision is required concerning the cooperation and agreements with the World Bank and IMF, ‘reforming and diversifying agricultural policy in Sudan’; Educational Rights and Foreign policy — including the ‘cancellation of the integration charter and joint defence agreement between Egypt and Sudan’. The Southern Sudanese Alliance, comprising 259 Southerners from Khartoum, has formed a committee to negotiate on its behalf. Both Lagu and Alier have declared their support for the group.

As well as the emergence of the Southern Sudanese Political Association (previously mentioned), a group of five Southerners headed by Dr Pacifico Lolik (former speaker of the Equatoria Regional Assembly) claiming to represent intellectuals, workers, farmers,
women and businessmen in Equatoria have made clear to Dhahab their total opposition to the latest revocation of the re-division decree.

The Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (Ananyall), a secessionist movement, is calling for the establishment of a confederal system in the south under the unity of the whole country, in addition to repealing the Islamic laws and for federal rule in the South. The extent of support for this movement is unclear.

Foreign Reaction
Of particular significance was the immediate support of Libya for the bringing about of the overthrow of Numeiri, an old-time enemy. Within the past three weeks extensive talks have have been conducted between a delegation of the new regime with those in Tripoli. Dhahab has appealed to the Libyans to terminate their support for SPLA/SPLM. Since Libya's prime objective, in supporting a group whose aim was to bring about Numeiri's removal from power, has been achieved, the incentive to support a black Christian/pagan guerilla movement no longer exists. Libya has already urged Garang to discontinue fighting. If such an action would appear extremely remote in the present circumstances. If Libya were totally to terminate her military and financial support for SPLA then this could have considerable long-term consequences for the Movement in the long term. However, in the short term, it would be quite feasible for Libya to maintain a certain level of support for SPLA while also supporting the new government in Khartoum.

Equally significant is the strengthening of relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. During the past 18 months the Ethiopian government has provided SPLA with facilities for establishing training camps and communications between Sudan/Ethiopia and abroad. Until a satisfactory agreement to both Addis Ababa and Khartoum can be reached on the Eritrea/Tigray issue, it would appear unlikely that there will be any immediate change of attitude by the Ethiopian government towards SPLA. However, the possibility of both Libya and Ethiopia terminating their support for SPLA in the near future cannot be dismissed.

Contacts between the transitional government and other Arab countries, notably Egypt, have proved positive with Khartoum keen to establish friendly relations with her neighbours from whom she will be requiring co-operation in various forms in the near future.

Reaction from the West has been cautious and a more detailed response is clearly being reserved until a more definite picture of the policies to be pursued by the new government emerges.

The overthrow of Numeiri has certainly not provided Sudan with the cure it so desperately needs to free it from its political, economic and social problems — rather it has begun to expose the level of corruption which existed within former government circles, army and state security, the power enjoyed by the State Security, intensive economic mismanagement of the country's resources, acute underdevelopment in both North and South, the sheer incompetence exhibited in certain vital areas of government and lastly the extent to which social deprivation and backwardness is prevalent amongst many groups throughout the Sudan.

Bibliographic Note
The following documents have been consulted in the writing of this article: "Appeal to the Sudanese People on the Founding of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)" by Col/Dr John Garang de Mabior, Chairman Provisional Executive Committee, SPLM and Commander-in-Chief of the SPLA Forces. (General Headquarters SPLA and SPLM, dated 3 March 1984). Nos. II, VII, VIII, XI, XIV and XVI; Manifesto, Sudan People's Liberation Movement, 31 July 1983; Letter written to H.E. the
FROM POPULAR PROTEST TO MILITARY TAKE-OVER: AN ANALYTICAL CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT EVENTS IN SUDAN

Mass demonstrations beginning on Tuesday, 26th March 1985 in Khartoum initiated a series of events which culminated in the overthrow of President Numeiry's regime in Sudan and a take over by the military. The increase in food prices which triggered the popular uprising was one manifestation of the deep economic and political crisis facing Sudan at the present time. In this analytical chronology, we attempt to document the social and political processes leading to the military take-over and to provide a preliminary analysis of the events as reported in the Western and Arab press.

Popular Protest: Spontaneous Movement
On Tuesday, 26th March 1985, the day before the departure of President Numeiry for the USA for a personal medical check-up and talks on aid for Sudan's near bankrupt economy, there were demonstrations in the streets of Khartoum. These were apparently in direct response to the increase in the price of bread and sugar-based commodities over the previous few days, following a 75 per cent rise in fuel prices a couple of weeks before. The next day, students and predominantly young unemployed persons clashed with riot police. The disturbances had begun around nine in the morning, when students congregated near the University shouting anti-government and anti-Numeiry slogans. The demonstration attracted increasing numbers as it moved towards the city centre and rapidly grew to well over one thousand. Shop windows and car windscreens
FROM POPULAR PROTEST TO MILITARY TAKE-OVER: AN ANALYTICAL CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT EVENTS IN SUDAN

Mass demonstrations beginning on Tuesday, 26th March 1985 in Khartoum initiated a series of events which culminated in the overthrow of President Numeiry’s regime in Sudan and a take over by the military. The increase in food prices which triggered the popular uprising was one manifestation of the deep economic and political crisis facing Sudan at the present time. In this analytical chronology, we attempt to document the social and political processes leading to the military take-over and to provide a preliminary analysis of the events as reported in the Western and Arab press.

Popular Protest: Spontaneous Movement
On Tuesday, 26th March 1985, the day before the departure of President Numeiry for the USA for a personal medical check-up and talks on aid for Sudan’s near bankrupt economy, there were demonstrations in the streets of Khartoum. These were apparently in direct response to the increase in the price of bread and sugar-based commodities over the previous few days, following a 75 per cent rise in fuel prices a couple of weeks before. The next day, students and predominantly young unemployed persons clashed with riot police. The disturbances had begun around nine in the morning, when students congregated near the University shouting anti-government and anti-Numeiry slogans. The demonstration attracted increasing numbers as it moved towards the city centre and rapidly grew to well over one thousand. Shop windows and car windscreens
were smashed, vehicles overturned and set on fire, and the streets blocked with chunks of concrete and other heavy objects. Three buildings suffered particularly heavy damage: a branch office of the official Sudanese Socialist Union (the only party permitted under Numeiry), the Faisal Islamic Bank (preserve of the Muslim Brotherhood) and the luxury Meridian Hotel. While students chanted 'we will not be ruled by the World Bank, we will not be ruled by the IMF', the unemployed urban poor in the crowd protested at the increasing cost of living. Truck loads of riot police eventually arrived on the scene, firing tear gas and making sorties into the crowd. Sources in contact with hospitals reported that more than six and, perhaps, as many as eighteen rioters were killed by police gun fire. Several hundreds were arrested and the government set up special tribunals to try rioters.

On Thursday, 28th March, continued violence in the streets resulted from the confrontation between mass demonstrations and state security forces. Troops and police used batons, tear gas and gunfire to put down the third outbreak of anti-government rioting in Khartoum in three days. Shops and government offices were shut and part of the city centre closed down as windows were smashed, vehicles set on fire and some offices — notably those of the Sudanese Socialist Union — sacked. Major clashes took place near the University and around the railway station, while troops posted outside the United States embassy fired tear gas and live rounds to disperse a crowd marching on the embassy building. At least five people were reported killed in Khartoum. There were reports of rioting in the west of Sudan, in Nyala, El Fasher and El Geneina; Atbara in the north and Port Sudan in the east were also apparently the scene of demonstrations. The government, for the first time, officially admitted that widespread violence had taken place. Students referred to as 'ideologists' (an official euphemism for the banned Muslim Brotherhood) were blamed for the riots and the authorities issued a list of seventeen Muslim Brothers wanted for questioning. Sudanese officials were reported as saying that 'the banned Muslim Brotherhood organisation incited job-seekers, many of them from the drought-stricken provinces, to riot on Wednesday and Thursday, after the prices of bread, fuel and other goods rose'. It was also announced that the government would 'start forthwith emptying the capital of all elements responsible for sabotage', singling out those identified as 'tramps and vagrants' in particular. Between 1,500 and 2,000 — mainly the homeless and unemployed, and many of them refugees from the countryside — were arrested between Tuesday and Thursday.

On Friday, 29th March, Khartoum returned to relative quiet, with troops on full alert but reports were coming in of disturbances in the western provincial capitals of El Geneina and El Obeyid, and of demonstrations and a strike by railway workers in Atbara, a key industrial centre in the north.

**Strikes and ‘Civil Disobedience’: An Orchestrated Campaign**

On Thursday, 28th March, after the third day of street violence had filled the Khartoum teaching hospital with the victims of army and police intervention, six hundred hospital doctors met and voted for an immediate strike. The move was designed to press the national doctors' union and other professional bodies into calling for a general strike. The doctors were also protesting against 'the extraordinary brutality shown by the security forces during Wednesday's and Thursday's demonstrations. One doctor said that 'the riot police did not even try to disperse people with sticks. They just used guns'. Some of the cases brought to
the hospital had been shot at close range and more than fifty people had been shot, while eight were received dead on arrival.

On Friday, 29th March, hospital doctors, now on strike, distributed leaflets on the streets of Khartoum describing the Numeiry regime as 'a regime of hunger' and accusing the President of 'insulting the people of Sudan'; those who had died in the three days of rioting, it was said, were 'martyrs'. During the course of Friday, while troops maintained heavy security in the streets outside, a secret meeting took place of the heads of organisations representing doctors, lawyers, engineers, academics and students; this meeting decided to call on other professionals and workers' bodies to join them in a total stoppage or general strike and campaign of civil disobedience from the following Monday. Over the weekend, government troops maintained a state of alert in the main streets of Khartoum. Security police announced that all those on the streets of the capital should carry identity cards at all times and suggested that there were as many as 60,000 'vagrants' in the city, who would need to register for deportation to the provinces. The number of those arrested during the previous week was reported as 2,642.

Meanwhile, leaflets distributed secretly in Khartoum in the name of the outlawed police officers' association, indicated that some sections of the police force were prepared to join in measures to bring down the regime. The leaflets argued that 'the police have been a tool in the hands of the dictator, Numeiry' and stated that 'from now onwards, the Association of Police Officers will do all it can to disobey any order to use force against the people of Sudan ... the police will work to bring down this dictatorial regime with all legal and illegal means'; they concluded 'we say “no” to Numeiry and “no” to dictatorship. The spirit of October is still alive'. (The reference was to the popular uprising of October, 1964, when a national strike led to the downfall of the military government and a restoration of democracy until 1969 when Numeiry came to power.) At the same time, a statement by the Free Army Officers' Organisation was distributed to foreign news agencies in Khartoum. This declared that 'the Sudan Armed Forces side with the popular revolt against hunger, ignorance and misrule, and for social justice and equality'. It condemned the existence of what it referred to as the rich, the war-profiteers and the opportunists inside the Armed Forces, and argued that the duty of the Armed Forces was the protection of the Sudanese people from foreign aggression. It called on the people to demonstrate but cautioned against damaging public property. It also went on to point out that the Army, together with other sections of the population, had suffered the effects of the rising cost of living and the cancellation of subsidies on essential goods.

In Omdurman town, a part of greater Khartoum, hundreds of women took to the streets in a large demonstration to protest against rising food prices; reports indicate that many were shouting 'down, down the IMF'. But, apart from this, there was little in the way of 'street presence' during the weekend from those in opposition to the Numeiry regime. However, leading members of the various professional associations were meeting to plan a mass rally early the following week; such a demonstration had the backing of organisations representing doctors, lawyers, engineers, bank workers, academics and students, and the president of the students' union stated that 'even the judges' committee has declared its support. The air is quivering'. The Sudanese authorities were aware of the danger posed by these meetings and, on Saturday, 30th March, the
 secretary and acting president of the Union of Academic Staff at the University of Khartoum were arrested as were four leading doctors. These followed arrests made earlier in the day of thirteen students and four others attending a meeting of the Khartoum University Students Union.

On Monday, 1st April, police used tear gas against demonstrators in the Popular Market of Khartoum and the authorities announced that the students of KUSU arrested over the weekend were members of the banned Communist Party. Commenting on the arrests, the secretary of the Sudan Socialist Union promised that Communists, Ba'athists and Muslim Brothers would all be hunted out; he also stated that the majority of those involved in demonstrations were found not to be Sudanese. He accused Libya, Ethiopia and the Soviet Union of involvement in anti-government activities taking place in Sudan, and suggested that the doctors arrested at the weekend were graduates of universities in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Leaders of the Sudan Socialist Union called on their followers to gather in Khartoum to demonstrate their commitment to Numeiry's regime.

Meanwhile, Khartoum's doctors continued their strike, refusing even to deal with emergencies; and they were joined by the Lawyers' Association. Seven hundred doctors from Omdurman and Khartoum North joined those from Khartoum hospitals on strike and the Medical Doctors' Association called on the people of the Sudan and the political organisations representing them to institute a campaign of civil disobedience with a view to the overthrow of the regime. From outside the capital there were reports of continuing disturbances in Atbara, where anti-government demonstrations had taken place over the weekend.

On Tuesday April 2nd, between 2,000 and 3,500 people attended a pro-government rally organised by the Sudan Socialist Union in Khartoum to demonstrate against communists, Ba'athists and Muslim Brothers. In a message to the crowd, President Numeiry (still in the United States) condemned 'traitors and agents' for the previous week's riots and declared that 'the enemies of the revolution will end up in disgrace and destruction'. A senior SSU official described the reports of leaflets emanating from the Free Officers Group, claiming that the army and the police would side with the people in the event of a confrontation, as merely 'rumours', and promised that 'the police and the army are standing with the government'. But the numbers at the rally were small despite ministerial directives closing many government offices with a view to releasing staff to attend the demonstration, and most of those present were brought in by buses organised by the SSU.

In a broadcast on radio and television, the Minister of Labour announced that wages were to be increased between 20 and 40 per cent, with the largest increases going to the lower paid, in order to offset the effects of the recent devaluation of the Sudanese currency and the removal of subsidies on certain commodities. But none of the efforts by the Sudanese authorities or by the Sudan Socialist Union was sufficient to prevent a massive demonstration of opposition to the Numeiry regime. On Wednesday April 3rd, vast crowds took to the streets to express their views; a report brought out of Sudan by messenger (all telex and telephone links to the outside world were cut early on Wednesday morning) told how 'thousands of middle class Sudanese protesters flooded the streets of Khartoum'. 
The demonstration was led by the professional associations and joined by bank workers, shop staff, academics and students. The protest was clearly directed predominantly against the Numeiry regime, but there were also shouts of 'down, down USA' and 'we say no to World Bank policies'. Lines of riot police began firing teargas into the crowd just after 9 a.m., but in general the police and the army acted with restraint and some police appeared even to support the demonstrators, who lifted one or two policemen on their shoulders. No deaths or injuries were reported. It seems that senior military officers met first vice-president Omer El Tayeb before the start of the demonstration to insist that troops should not be used to back up police unless the protest became violent, and that only NCOs should be deployed as they could not guarantee the loyalty of ordinary troops to the regime.

At 11 a.m., as the crowd of some 20,000 began to march on the presidential palace, the judiciary declared a civil rebellion. But the demonstration remained well organised and non-violent. Later in the day, the official news-agency SUNA issued a statement to the effect that 'a number of ideologist students staged a demonstration headed by some bank workers, doctors, lawyers and engineers this morning. They were dispersed by the security authorities. Some of the leaders and agitators were arrested. In the meanwhile, large numbers of workers joined those members of the professional associations already on strike. Shops and offices closed and transport, telecommunications, electricity and water were all very seriously affected. On Thursday, April 4th, the Sudan remained cut off from the outside world, in addition to the shutdown of telegraph and telephone facilities, the airports were closed and radio stations stopped transmitting. There were 'wide-spread demonstrations' including one in Omdurman where police used teargas to disperse stone-throwing demonstrators and the strike became, in effect, a general strike, paralysing the economic and social life of the capital, and affecting other cities also.

Throughout Friday, April 5th, the scale and extent of demonstrations and civil disobedience increased. Police and troops maintained strong guards on government buildings and other strategic installations in Khartoum, but riot police were reported as evidently unwilling to confront the large crowds of protesters. The strike extended to affect every sector of the economy, including power and water supplies. In a letter to the still absent Numeiry, the executive of the doctors' association called on him to go: 'it is our patriotic duty to ask you to step down from the leadership of the Sudanese people and leave the national and democratic popular movements to make their destiny'.

In a last desperate attempt to stem the rising tide of widespread opposition to the regime, the government promised to reduce the price of basic commodities, including bread, sugar and petrol, in some cases (that of bread) to below the price prior to the increases.

The Social Bases of Revolt
It came as no surprise that the leadership of the organised opposition was provided by the professional associations and trade unions. Doctors, academics, accountants, lawyers, judges and engineers were the groups that in the last few years of Numeiry's rule engaged in a series of individual struggles with the regime which generated sympathy and solidarity from other trade unions. In fact, it was the strike of judges in 1983 and its success (and the threat of strikes
by accountants and engineers) that lay behind the introduction of the Sharia law in September 1983 through which Numeiry attempted to increase political repression and reduce the power of the secular judiciary.

Although workers participated widely in the demonstrations their leadership was not obviously involved and did not participate in the orchestration of the campaign of opposition. The Communist Party of Sudan (CPS) explains this as follows:

The regime's opportunist tendencies had completely dominated the leadership of the workers' trade unions and the Federation of the Workers' Trade Unions, a fact that necessitated a double effort in every trade union, to either force the opportunist leadership to announce a strike or to mobilise the workers to surpass and replace the opportunist leadership. If the objective conditions for this situation involved the concentrated repression of the independent leadership of the working class movement, the expulsion of communist and democratic workers and the heavy presence of the security agents in every workers' organisation, the subjective reasons, however, lie in the conventions of our party, the shrinking of its branches and its influence among the working class, especially in the area of the capital.

The political parties were also absent, in organised form, from the popular revolt. All political parties, except the one created by the regime itself (the SSU) had been banned during Numeiry's rule. Attempts to bring them together in opposition to the regime had not met great success. Numeiry had succeeded in dividing the opposition and even stimulating splits inside the individual parties. The CPS in 1977 had called for 'a wide front for democracy and national salvation' in which all those concerned to bring down Numeiry's regime and restore democracy and to work for the salvation of the national economy could participate. Although some steps towards this had been taken during the last 18 months before the revolt, an agreement in the form of a charter of action between the political parties and the leadership of the 'Alliance of Trade Unions and Professional Associations' was only signed in the early hours of Saturday the 6th of April (just before the military took over).

The professional associations enjoyed a relative freedom of movement in the last years of Numeiry's rule; agents of the regime's security service had not succeeded in infiltrating the associations to any considerable degree. The authorities had not been concentrating their campaign of repression on the professional associations, but rather on the workers' trade unions. Taking all these factors into consideration leadership for the March Revolt could only come from the professional associations.

The Military Take-Over
At 9.35 on Saturday morning Sudanese time the Minister of Defence and army Commander-in-Chief, General Sawar al Dahab, announced on Omdurman Radio that

... the Sudan Armed Forces have been observing the deteriorating security situation all over the country and the extremely complex political crisis that has affected the country over the past few days. In order to reduce bloodshed and to ensure the country's independence and unity the Armed Forces have decided unanimously to stand by the people and their choice and to respond to their demands by taking over power and transferring it to the people after a specified transitional period.

In a second statement Sawar al Dahab declared the removal from power of the
President of the republic, his deputies, assistants and consultants and of the central and the state ministers. The constitution was suspended, and a state of emergency declared all over the country; the borders were closed, and air traffic into and out of the country halted.

Immediately after the announcement of the military take-over rejoicing people in tens of thousands filled the capital’s main streets. A large crowd went to the notorious Kobar prison (where hundreds of political detainees were held) and freed all the prisoners. The following day it was formally announced that all political prisoners throughout the country were released. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) — whose military operations had shaken Numeiry’s regime in the southern part of the country, increasing political difficulties and economic problems — declared that it had called a cease-fire.

The military takeover and the announcement of a return to civilian democracy after a transitional period had been forced upon the leadership of the army. The soldiers, non-commissioned officers and junior officers, although not part of the National Alliance (of trade unions and political parties), pressed the army leadership to withdraw the troops posted in the street to guard strategic installations; they also prevented an announcement of a state of emergency (which would have led to direct confrontation between the army and the people) and generally indicated their clear sympathy with the popular revolt. Apparently even some high ranking officers had been sympathetic to that position. Consequently there was little choice for the army leadership; either they took the initiative and seized power, thus preserving the existing leadership or resisted these pressures and became liable to replacement by a new leadership.

In fact, as has become clear afterwards, two attempts at military takeover on the 3rd and 4th of April were discovered by the Military Security Agency. According to the CPS the majority of officers did not support the two attempted coups as they saw in them efforts to renew military rule rather than to help restore civilian democratic rule in the country.

The Struggle to Restore Democracy
The strike and campaign of civil disobedience continued during Sunday 7th April. This was intended to exercise pressure on the new military government to dismantle the State National Security apparatus — the pillar of the former regime, by whose repressive practices Numeiry had succeeded in remaining in power for 16 years — and to arrest supporters of the ousted regime. Sawar al Dahab called for the ending of the strike and said that its continuation amounted to high treason. But thousands of demonstrators challenged the decision of the new leadership to ban demonstrations and marched on the army headquarters. Demands to hand over power to civilians immediately, and not after six months as had been promised by Sawar al Dahab, were strongly voiced. The demonstrators were also reacting to the new leadership’s avowed intention to continue the Islamic Sharia introduced by Numeiry in September 1983 in an attempt to strengthen his political power. (The Muslim Brothers were, until the 10th March, 1985, the main political supporters of Numeiry and had a strong hand in his policies. Their influence was reduced and their leadership arrested following the visit by the American Vice-President, George Bush, to Sudan prior to the March uprising and his advice to Numeiry to introduce some reforms in exchange for US support.)
After a meeting between representatives of the National Alliance, (professional associations, trade unions and political parties) and the military leadership on the 8th April, the general strike was called off. The State National Security was dismantled and many supporters and senior officials of the Numeiry regime were arrested.

On the 10th April a military council of 15 members headed by Sawar al Dahab was announced. Sawar al Dahab held his first press conference in which he declared that the military council was consulting with the National Alliance about forming a new government. The SPLA meanwhile warned that it would cease fire for only seven days, after which it would continue its military operations if the government were not handed over to civilians.

After a few days of joint meetings between the representatives of the Alliance and the Military Council it was agreed that the formation of a new civilian cabinet was to be left to the Alliance, subject to the approval of the Military Council. Eventually, after several days of negotiations and manoeuvre, a civilian cabinet was formed, some two weeks after the military takeover. The new army leadership agreed to restore democracy, freedom of associations and of speech, and to hold the first sessions of the new (to be elected) parliament by the end of April 1986.

However, the struggle between those (internal and external) forces concerned to abort the popular movement and/or freeze it at the level of the existing (transitional) situation and those who supported the popular revolt has not yet ended.

The popular movement has been able to press the government to meet some of its demands: the recognition of freedom to organise, the dismantling of the State Security Agency, the arrest and trial of 'clients of the ousted regime', a commitment to seek an independent position as regards relations with neighbouring countries, and so forth. However, many other problems are yet to be faced. There is the SPLA, which has not joined the Alliance and the government, and with whom no negotiated agreement has yet (at time of writing) been reached. There is the Islamic Sharia law which has not yet been formally cancelled. There is the continuing economic crisis reflected in a foreign debt of over 10 billion US dollars, the cost of whose servicing is larger than the total value of exports. Furthermore power in new regime continues to lie in the hands of the transitional military council; the civilian cabinet has very little power. Finally, the Alliance of Trade Unions and Political Parties, which virtually brought down Numeiry's regime has no 'legal' existence and its role at present is no more than that of a pressure group outside the formal power structure.

Abbas Abdelkarim
Abdalla El Hassan
David Seddon

* * *

MILITARY ATTACKS, DROUGHT AND HUNGER IN MOZAMBIQUE

In the autumn of 1983 British television splashed coverage of the drought and
After a meeting between representatives of the National Alliance, (professional associations, trade unions and political parties) and the military leadership on the 8th April, the general strike was called off. The State National Security was dismantled and many supporters and senior officials of the Numeiry regime were arrested.

On the 10th April a military council of 15 members headed by Sawar al Dahab was announced. Sawar al Dahab held his first press conference in which he declared that the military council was consulting with the National Alliance about forming a new government. The SPLA meanwhile warned that it would cease fire for only seven days, after which it would continue its military operations if the government were not handed over to civilians.

After a few days of joint meetings between the representatives of the Alliance and the Military Council it was agreed that the formation of a new civilian cabinet was to be left to the Alliance, subject to the approval of the Military Council. Eventually, after several days of negotiations and manoeuvre, a civilian cabinet was formed, some two weeks after the military takeover. The new army leadership agreed to restore democracy, freedom of associations and of speech, and to hold the first sessions of the new (to be elected) parliament by the end of April 1986.

However, the struggle between those (internal and external) forces concerned to abort the popular movement and/or freeze it at the level of the existing (transitional) situation and those who supported the popular revolt has not yet ended.

The popular movement has been able to press the government to meet some of its demands: the recognition of freedom to organise, the dismantling of the State Security Agency, the arrest and trial of ‘clients of the ousted regime’, a commitment to seek an independent position as regards relations with neighbouring countries, and so forth. However, many other problems are yet to be faced. There is the SPLA, which has not joined the Alliance and the government, and with whom no negotiated agreement has yet (at time of writing) been reached. There is the Islamic Sharia law which has not yet been formally cancelled. There is the continuing economic crisis reflected in a foreign debt of over 10 billion US dollars, the cost of whose servicing is larger than the total value of exports. Furthermore power in new regime continues to lie in the hands of the transitional military council: the civilian cabinet has very little power. Finally, the Alliance of Trade Unions and Political Parties, which virtually brought down Numeiry’s regime has no ‘legal’ existence and its role at present is no more than that of a pressure group outside the formal power structure.
hunger in Mozambique across its screens. Once again we had ‘Famine in Africa’. The image was presented of caring Westerners coming to reveal a dreadful situation that the Mozambican government had done or could not do anything about. The racist undertones of such presentations form an integral part of our media diet. The image of a ‘Marxist’ government failing is an important one being pushed by certain media as a part of efforts by certain strategists of international capital to destabilise such countries — the propaganda push to cause dissension and dissatisfaction with such governments, while simultaneously military and economic pressures create the underlying difficulties.

The reality is very different. As early as January 1983, when the first indications were appearing of the likely shortfalls in supplies, and recognising the severe economic and foreign currency constraints that the economy was under, the Frelimo Government made appeals to the International relief aid community in efforts to secure sufficient food for everyone in the country during the year. The FAO in Mozambique spread the word, and additional appeals were made around the time of the Frelimo Fourth Congress in March and April. In the ensuing months adequate support was not forthcoming, until the situation was presented as a major disaster in September and October. The politics surrounding the involvement of the international relief agencies and their delays, as well as the links with US government and other government political strategies in the area remain largely unrevealed.

The aspect played down by the International Relief Agencies and the Western media throughout this ‘disaster’ was the role of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) and armed bandit groups in the country in contributing to the hunger and starvation. Since Independence in 1975, and despite the economic and infrastructural difficulties that have beset it, the Frelimo Government has had a comparatively good record of ensuring adequate food supplies throughout the country, avoiding wide-spread starvation and hunger. It has adopted policies of retaining quantities of basic foods in rural areas to alleviate shortages in deficit districts and to overcome the consequences of climatic disasters.

In 1983, however, the MNR launched, with strong South African backing and direction, military offensives in Tete and Zambezia provinces, as well as continuing its activities in Sofala, Manica, Inhambane and Gaza provinces. It was the activity of these MNR bands, particularly in Tete and northern Manica province attacking military convoys from surplus areas going to deficit areas, and from the port of Beira to Tete that contributed so much to the hunger in Tete province. In the north of Inhambane province they similarly cut off the drought-stricken population from food supplies coming from provincial and regional reserves. When the international relief agencies joined the scene they experienced similar difficulties, but instead of denouncing internationally the role that these bands were playing in contributing to the hunger of innocent civilians in these areas, they either proposed to withdraw, or were even discussing amongst themselves proposals to distribute via these armed groups, from a supposedly non-political position of ‘neutrality’. These armed groups in the meantime showed no desire to respect ‘neutrality’ or to let the international relief agencies through to the local population in desperate difficulties.

Just prior to the signing of the Nkomati Accords in March 1984, the South
African government pushed thousands of MNR guerrillas through into Mozambique, well-equipped and armed. Support and supplies have continued to come to these groups from South Africa, through Malawi, and from other sources since then, contributing to the difficulties, particularly regarding the food supplies in Tete province. Carlos Carvalho, the Director of the National Directorate of the Economy within the Ministry of Internal Trade was quoted in April 1985 as saying that the continuing attacks have meant that it is not possible to transport food from the surplus areas of the north to the affected areas of the south. He says that in the past few months 100,000 people have died of starvation and disease in the southern provinces of Gaza and Inhambane.

During 1984 of the estimated 300,000 tons of cereals required for drought relief, only 174,000 tons (58 per cent) was forthcoming. In January 1985 there were still about 2.5 million people affected by the drought in the provinces south of the Zambezi river, and it was then estimated that the likely cereal deficits in the country over the first four months of 1985 prior to the harvests which begin in May and June, would amount to 83,000 tons. FAO data from May 1985 put the total cereal shortfall over the 1984/85 (May to April) period at 150,000 tons, and it is estimated that even if there were a bumper harvest this year the country would still be short of 300,000 tons of grain. There have been more rains this year, in some cases too much, resulting in flooding in Sofala province where 130,000 people have been deprived of their food crops, and a cyclone in Maputo province. But in the north of the country the prospects are for a good harvest, but continued attacks in Niassa, Nampula, Zambia and Tete provinces severely handicap the movement of surpluses.

Vincent Tickner
30 May 1985

UGANDA WITHDRAWS MAMDANI’S CITIZENSHIP

In the last issue of ROAPE, we reported that the Uganda government has withdrawn the citizenship of Dr Mahmood Mamdani, Associate Professor and Dean of Social Sciences at Makerere and an overseas editor of and contributor to ROAPE. The following report of the matter appeared in the Daily News (Dar es Salaam) of 30 April 1985:

The University of Dar es Salaam Staff Association (UDADA), has sent a protest note to Ugandan President Milton Obote against withdrawal of Ugandan citizenship from an Associate Professor at Makerere University College, Dr Mahmood Mamdani on April 13.

The UDASA Secretary, Ndugu Kibuta Omwamuhana, said in Dar es Salaam that the letter was delivered to the Ugandan High Commission in the city yesterday for onward transmission to Kampala.

According to Ndugu Omwamuhana, who is a lecturer at the Faculty of Law, the withdrawal of Mamdani’s citizenship was apparently caused by the academician’s public address at a Red Cross conference on March 19.

The Associate Professor is reported to have told the meeting on disaster control that the so-called natural calamities were in fact social catastrophes.
African government pushed thousands of MNR guerrillas through into Mozambique, well-equipped and armed. Support and supplies have continued to come to these groups from South Africa, through Malawi, and from other sources since then, contributing to the difficulties, particularly regarding the food supplies in Tete province. Carlos Carvalho, the Director of the National Directorate of the Economy within the Ministry of Internal Trade was quoted in April 1985 as saying that the continuing attacks have meant that it is not possible to transport food from the surplus areas of the north to the affected areas of the south. He says that in the past few months 100,000 people have died of starvation and disease in the southern provinces of Gaza and Inhambane.

During 1984 of the estimated 300,000 tons of cereals required for drought relief, only 174,000 tons (58 per cent) was forthcoming. In January 1985 there were still about 2.5 million people affected by the drought in the provinces south of the Zambezi river, and it was then estimated that the likely cereal deficits in the country over the first four months of 1985 prior to the harvests which begin in May and June, would amount to 83,000 tons. FAO data from May 1985 put the total cereal shortfall over the 1984/85 (May to April) period at 150,000 tons, and it is estimated that even if there were a bumper harvest this year the country would still be short of 300,000 tons of grain. There have been more rains this year, in some cases too much, resulting in flooding in Sofala province where 130,000 people have been deprived of their food crops, and a cyclone in Maputo province. But in the north of the country the prospects are for a good harvest, but continued attacks in Niassa, Nampula, Zambia and Tete provinces severely handicap the movement of surpluses.

Vincent Tickner
30 May 1985

**    **    **

UGANDA WITHDRAWS MAMDANI’S CITIZENSHIP

In the last issue of ROAPE, we reported that the Uganda government has withdrawn the citizenship of Dr Mahmood Mandani, Associate Professor and Dean of Social Sciences at Makerere and an overseas editor of and contributor to ROAPE. The following report of the matter appeared in the Daily News (Dar es Salaam) of 30 April 1985:

The University of Dar es Salaam Staff Association (UDADA), has sent a protest note to Ugandan President Milton Obote against withdrawal of Ugandan citizenship from an Associate Professor at Makerere University College, Dr Mahmood Mamdani on April 13.

The UDASA Secretary, Ndugu Kibuta Omwamuhana, said in Dar es Salaam that the letter was delivered to the Ugandan High Commission in the city yesterday for onward transmission to Kampala.

According to Ndugu Omwamuhana, who is a lecturer at the Faculty of Law, the withdrawal of Mamdani’s citizenship was apparently caused by the academician’s public address at a Red Cross conference on March 19.

The Associate Professor is reported to have told the meeting on disaster control that the so-called natural calamities were in fact social catastrophies.
He is said to have further argued that famine, for example, was not so much the result of
drought but the exploitation of the peasantry.

It is alleged that Mamdani’s line of argument was vehemently challenged by a government
minister who officiated at the closing of the meeting. The Associate Professor was
consequently sent a letter on April 1 to supply details of his citizenship. “The information we
have is that Dr Mamdani supplied the information and was served with a letter dated April 13
purporting to cancel his citizenship”, the UDASA Secretary said.

He said the Associate Professor was asked to surrender his Ugandan passport with seven
days and regularise his alien status in 28 days.

Dr Mamdani was born in the then Tanganyika. He moved to Uganda with his parents in 1952
and was registered Ugandan citizen in 1963.

Because of his Asian origin, he was expelled by Idi Amin in 1972. He lectured at the University
of Dar es Salaam until 1979 when he returned to Uganda after the overthrow of Idi Amin. He
was issued with a new Ugandan passport in the same year, which was renewed in January,
last year.

The University of Dar es Salaam Academic Staff Assembly (UDASA) has written
to President Obote, in his capacity as Chancellor of Makerere, to protest at this
action. Their letter notes Mamdani’s contribution as editor of Mawazo, and as the
author of Politics and Class Formation in Uganda and Imperialism and Fascism
in Uganda. It also notes the costs to academic freedom, the intimidation of
intellectuals and the parallels between this attack on an individual’s citizenship
rights with those he and others suffered under Amin.

We hope that readers will join the academics of Dar es Salaam in writing to the
Uganda High Commission and government to protect this action and to urge its
reversal.

Below follows an edited version of Mamdani’s address to the Uganda Red Cross
Conference on Disaster Prevention on 19 March 1985 in Kampala.

DISASTER PREVENTION: DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Mahmood Mamdani

I remember hearing a story, during the Sahelian famine of the ’70s, of a fat man
and a thin man. Said the fat man to the thin man, “You should be ashamed of
yourself. If someone visiting the country saw you before anyone else, he would
think there was a famine here”. Replied the thin man, “And if he saw you next,
he would know the reason for the famine!” The simple point I am trying to make
is that if you divide our society into two, into the majority prone to disaster and
that minority resistant to it, you are likely to find some sort of a relation between
the two.

Last year I was doing research in Lira District. I met a capitalist farmer in one
village. She had over 500 acres which she had bought (technically leased). I
wondered how she could buy land in an area where people observed clan rights to
land quite strictly. She replied, “The 1980 famine helped. People were in need.
For the first time, they were willing to sell land, cows — things they wouldn’t
dream of selling in normal times.” Famine, it would seem, is a disaster for the
He is said to have further argued that famine, for example, was not so much the result of
drought but the exploitation of the peasantry.

It is alleged that Mamdani’s line of argument was vehemently challenged by a government
minister who officiated at the closing of the meeting. The Associate Professor was
consequently sent a letter on April 1 to supply details of his citizenship. “The information we
have is that Dr Mamdani supplied the information and was served with a letter dated April 13
purporting to cancel his citizenship”, the UDASA Secretary said.

He said the Associate Professor was asked to surrender his Ugandan passport with seven
days and regularise his alien status in 28 days.

Dr Mamdani was born in the then Tanganyika. He moved to Uganda with his parents in 1952
and was registered Ugandan citizen in 1963.

Because of his Asian origin, he was expelled by Idi Amin in 1972. He lectured at the University
of Dar es Salaam until 1979 when he returned to Uganda after the overthrow of Idi Amin. He
was issued with a new Ugandan passport in the same year, which was renewed in January,
last year.

The University of Dar es Salaam Academic Staff Assembly (UDASA) has written
to President Obote, in his capacity as Chancellor of Makerere, to protest at this
action. Their letter notes Mamdani’s contribution as editor of Mawazo, and as the
author of Politics and Class Formation in Uganda and Imperialism and Fascism
in Uganda. It also notes the costs to academic freedom, the intimidation of
intellectuals and the parallels between this attack on an individual’s citizenship
rights with those he and others suffered under Amin.

We hope that readers will join the academics of Dar es Salaam in writing to the
Uganda High Commission and government to protect this action and to urge its
reversal.

Below follows an edited version of Mamdani’s address to the Uganda Red Cross
Conference on Disaster Prevention on 19 March 1985 in Kampala.

DISASTER PREVENTION: DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Mahmood Mamdani

I remember hearing a story, during the Sahelian famine of the ’70s, of a fat man
and a thin man. Said the fat man to the thin man, “You should be ashamed of
yourself. If someone visiting the country saw you before anyone else, he would
think there was a famine here”. Replied the thin man, “And if he saw you next,
he would know the reason for the famine!” The simple point I am trying to make
is that if you divide our society into two, into the majority prone to disaster and
that minority resistant to it, you are likely to find some sort of a relation between
the two.

Last year I was doing research in Lira District. I met a capitalist farmer in one
village. She had over 500 acres which she had bought (technically leased). I
wondered how she could buy land in an area where people observed clan rights to
land quite strictly. She replied, “The 1980 famine helped. People were in need.
For the first time, they were willing to sell land, cows — things they wouldn’t
dream of selling in normal times.” Famine, it would seem, is a disaster for the
poor but an opportunity for the rich. The former are disaster-prone, the latter disaster-resistant.

I read the book on *Natural Disaster: Acts of God or Acts of Man?* by ICRC which was handed out today. It is a good little book. But it does not go far enough. It only scratches the surface.

True, disasters are not natural but social catastrophes. Also true that they are the result of social conditions: deforestation, soil erosion, desertification. Lack of rain does not cause a famine, it is simply the occasion for it. It triggers off the famine. But, why do people cut down forests? Why do they overgraze? Why do they work the same old tired land without resting it? Is it out of malice? Or sheer ignorance? Not really. My basic point is that, so long as they look for individual solutions to what are in fact social problems, they have very little choice given the social relations they are trapped in. What are these relations? How and when were they created? Can they be changed? These are some of the questions I intend to discuss today.

**The Colonial Background**

I am going to talk about Uganda because this is where we are meeting. You heard earlier that Africa has become much more prone to disaster in this century, and particularly in the past two decades, than it ever was before. So, I want to begin with the impact of the colonial period on the major producers of wealth, the peasants, in this country.

An analysis of how this country was integrated into the colonial imperialist economy would show that there were two major forms of integration, depending on the region we may consider. The first was whereby an area was turned into a cheap labour reserve. This was the migrant labour system whereby the wife remained a peasant producing food in the village, but the husband migrated as a worker to a plantation. He was employed only part-time, the rest of the year, he returned to the village and lived off the food cultivated by the wife.

The second term of integration was whereby an area was turned into a reserve of cheap raw materials. You take the above system, with the wife producing food and the husband cheap labour, collapse the distance between the husband and the wife.

With the wife still producing food and the husband producing an export crop, you now have a cheap raw material reserve. Cheap because the family produced its own food. The cash it got from selling cotton or coffee was just to pay tax and to buy a few manufactured necessaries.

Now, in Uganda, there were quite a few cheap labour reserves at the outset of colonial rule: Lango, Acholi, West Nile, Kigezi. But in the 1920s, as the Belgians increased exploitation in Rwanda, the Banyarwanda peasants began to emigrate to Uganda. In the late '50s once again there was out-migration from Rwanda due to a political crisis. As a result, the British introduced cash crop production in Lango and Acholi in the 1920s and then in West Nile in the 1950s. Today, the only remaining cheap labour reserve is Kigezi. The rest of the country continues to be a cheap raw material reserve.

Now the whole system of cheap raw material production required two conditions. One, that labour meet a substantial part of its own cost of reproduction (food
cost). And two, that labour remain the major input in production, or, to put it differently, that the technological base remain low.

**Peasant Exploitation**

The above remains the general condition of the Uganda peasantry today. The Uganda peasant is essentially trapped in two main types of exploitation. The first is exploitation through unequal market relations where you sell cheap and buy expensive. This is monopoly exploitation, whether by state or private agencies.

Let me give two examples from my own research. In July of 1984, I investigated the millet trade in Lira district. The post-harvest price for fresh millet in the village was Shs.50/- a kilo. The same kilo sold in Kampala at Shs.200/-.

Transport was usually free since the trade had access to institutional transport, may be a Red Cross lorry coming back from having delivered relief supplies! But, if paid for, transport would have cost Shs.12/= a kilo. The point is that the peasant received just 25 per cent of the final price of millet.

In December of 1983, I researched the coffee trade in Buganda. My data showed that the peasant received exactly 18.96 per cent of what the government got in the world market for the same coffee. You would be surprised by how constant this proportion has been since the colonial period, whether in the first independent government, or in the Amin period or now. No wonder the peasant considers changes in regimes as so many storms in the political sky while the hard realities on the ground remain unchanged.

To return to the peasant then, the millet producer in Lira gets a quarter of the final price, and the coffee producer in Buganda a fifth of the final price. Not much difference.

Both are super-exploited. This is why a simple shift from export crop (coffee) to food crop (millet) production would in itself mean no major difference to the peasant — unless the unequal position of the peasant in the market changes. For the market, from the point of view of the small producer, is more unpredictable and less friendly than the climate.

Whereas this first type of exploitation of the peasant is indirect, as a result of the dull compulsion of economic forces, the second type of exploitation is direct, through the use of force by the state or state-connected organisations like the party or the church. Once again, the details vary from region to region. But together, they amount to three types of forcible exactions. These may be forced labour together amounting to as much as a quarter of the peasant's total labour in certain villages. Or these exactions may take the form of forced crops, usually those for export, or forced cash contributions for the party or the church.

**The Result**

The result of this dual exploitation of the peasant, that through unequal market relations and that through direct force, is that the peasant operates with a permanent handicap: his surplus product is regularly siphoned off. His cash income is barely enough to meet immediate needs: for tax, to replenish a hoe or buy some salt or medicine. Peasants don't eat sugar any more; in many villages in the north, they can't even buy soap any more.

The point is that the peasant is forced to begin the production cycle each time with roughly same or even a worse technical base than the previous time around. Walter Rodney wrote that the African peasant entered colonialism with a hoe
BRIEFDINGS

and came out of it with a hoe. He should have added that the hoe the peasant entered with was locally produced, the one he came out with was imported.

To grasp the point better, let us look at the peasant’s labour process. It consists of three elements: land, labour and implements of labour. We have seen that the peasant has little choice so far as the implements are concerned; his technology is relatively stagnant. To get out of a crisis or to endeavour for prosperity, what does a peasant do? He uses whatever control he has, over land and over labour.

He works the tired land over and over. Why is it that periods of fallow are getting shorter and shorter in Kigezi? Or that cassava is replacing matoke and beans on Entebbe Road? (Someone talked of the introduction of drought-resistant crops like cassava during the colonial period. Imagine, permanent malnutrition as a solution to starvation?)

At the same time, the peasant has as many children as possible to maximise the labour at his disposal. For a middle-class family, a child may be just a mouth to feed for 20 years, but for a peasant family after only four years the child is also two hands to work! My point is that people are not poor because they have large families, really they have large families because they are poor!!

Of course, each of the solutions arrived at by the peasant is contradictory. It solves the problem in the short run, only to reproduce it much worse in the long run: on the one hand soil erosion, on the other, 'over-population'. The sharpest expression of this is Karamoja. I know we shall have a full session on it, but I do want to make one point here. The Karamoja famine can’t be understood without an historical analysis. Its starting point must be to understand that the Karamojong people lost roughly 20 per cent of their grazing land, in phases, through either the redrawing of administrative boundaries in the 1920s or creation of National Parks like Kidepo later. It is this fact which called forth a change in pastoral practices. No longer could dry grasslands be rested up to the annual burning. Not only was all grazing land used throughout the years without any annual burning, forests were progressively cut down to increase the grazing area.

The British saw this as a problem of ‘over-grazing’, not one of land confiscation! So, having first grabbed some land, their ‘solution’ was to grab some cattle now! This they did indirectly, by introducing simultaneously a tax and a government monopoly of buying, so that the buying price of cattle could be adjusted to the tax assessed. To make my point, the end result was a change in the whole ecology of Karamoja.

As peasants try to find individual solutions for their social exploitation, they increasingly face a twin crisis: ecological and demographic. Rationality exists in a context.

When you act, you choose between alternatives that actually exist. A peasant does the same. His decision to reduce the fallow period or to have more children is actually a judgement of what choice his circumstances leave him.

What is to be done?
I know you will discuss this issue in detail later. I just want to offer a few general remarks. To begin with, it is necessary to safeguard against utopian thinking, against looking for a solution outside the parameters of the problem by
introducing it from without. We must be realistic and find the solution internally. From this perspective, we can correctly define the role of relief or foreign ‘aid’. It can only be complementary to a local solution, not a substitute for it. Failure to understand this can even compound the problem. The ICRC book I cited earlier gives several examples. During the Sahel famine of the '70s, for example, 20 per cent of the population of Mauritania was entirely dependent on relief food by 1974!

Such assistance is not an antidote to disaster. It becomes its handmaiden. I am sure you have known doctors who made you feel that doctors need diseases in the sense that without these they would be out of business. Or that lawyers need crime? That churches need sin? In this same sense, there are relief agencies which need disaster. Only that relief is worthwhile which undermines itself in the long run; which restores the initiative of the victim, and does not strangle it; which sees victims not simply as objects to be helped, but as subjects potentially capable of transforming their disaster-prone situation.

My main point is that any strategy that claims to be a solution must seek to remove the creativity and the initiative of the people. Central to this must be to educate people about those relations which make them disaster-prone. This education must be based on investigation, concrete and independent. And it must lead to organisation, both popular and around concrete issues.

If land is taken to create national parks, we must organise for the return of the land. If labour is maimed and shackled by administrative coercion, we must organise to remove that coercion. If products of labour are appropriated through monopolistic market practices, we must organise to change these. Simply put, we must organise concretely, organise on the basis of a common education and educate on the basis of independent and popular investigation.

**   **   **   **

NIGERIA: BUHARI SQUEEZES HIS CRITICS

Few if any tears were shed in Nigeria when, on 31 December 1983, military commanders swept aside the regime of President Shehu Shagari. Many Westerners regretted the failure of Nigeria's democratic experiment, and the consequent loss of civil and political liberties. There were few Nigerians then who did not dismiss these misgivings with cynicism, even contempt.

Today, opinion in Nigeria has shifted dramatically, and for good reasons. Freedom of expression and other civil liberties have been systematically and savagely attacked. Some of Nigeria's most able, patriotic and respected journalists have either been jailed or hurled into detention without charges. These include Haroun Adamu, Rufai Ibrahim, Tunde Thompson, Nduka Irabor, Duro Onabule, and Dr Tai Solarin. Besides an anti-press law, government-owned media are now under strict control. Private newspapers too are being squeezed through newsprint import licence rationalisation. Several radio stations have been closed down, and thousands of their staff dismissed.

The new regime has lived up to its promise not to 'tolerate' what one of its chieftains called 'undue radicalism'. The right to differ, holds the regime, must
introducing it from without. We must be realistic and find the solution internally. From this perspective, we can correctly define the role of relief or foreign ‘aid’. It can only be complementary to a local solution, not a substitute for it. Failure to understand this can even compound the problem. The ICRC book I cited earlier gives several examples. During the Sahel famine of the '70s, for example, 20 per cent of the population of Mauritania was entirely dependent on relief food by 1974!

Such assistance is not an antidote to disaster. It becomes its handmaiden. I am sure you have known doctors who made you feel that doctors need diseases in the sense that without these they would be out of business. Or that lawyers need crime? That churches need sin? In this same sense, there are relief agencies which need disaster. Only that relief is worthwhile which undermines itself in the long run; which restores the initiative of the victim, and does not strangle it; which sees victims not simply as objects to be helped, but as subjects potentially capable of transforming their disaster-prone situation.

My main point is that any strategy that claims to be a solution must seek to remove the creativity and the initiative of the people. Central to this must be to educate people about those relations which make them disaster-prone. This education must be based on investigation, concrete and independent. And it must lead to organisation, both popular and around concrete issues.

If land is taken to create national parks, we must organise for the return of the land. If labour is maimed and shackled by administrative coercion, we must organise to remove that coercion. If products of labour are appropriated through monopolistic market practices, we must organise to change these. Simply put, we must organise concretely, organise on the basis of a common education and educate on the basis of independent and popular investigation.

* * *

NIGERIA: BUHARI SQUEEZES HIS CRITICS

Few if any tears were shed in Nigeria when, on 31 December 1983, military commanders swept aside the regime of President Shehu Shagari. Many Westerners regretted the failure of Nigeria's democratic experiment, and the consequent loss of civil and political liberties. There were few Nigerians then who did not dismiss these misgivings with cynicism, even contempt.

Today, opinion in Nigeria has shifted dramatically, and for good reasons. Freedom of expression and other civil liberties have been systematically and savagely attacked. Some of Nigeria's most able, patriotic and respected journalists have either been jailed or hurled into detention without charges. These include Haroun Adamu, Rufai Ibrahim, Tunde Thompson, Nduka Irabor, Duro Onabule, and Dr Tai Solarin. Besides an anti-press law, government-owned media are now under strict control. Private newspapers too are being squeezed through newsprint import licence rationalisation. Several radio stations have been closed down, and thousands of their staff dismissed.

The new regime has lived up to its promise not to 'tolerate' what one of its chieftains called 'undue radicalism'. The right to differ, holds the regime, must
give way to 'national' efforts aimed at salvaging the faltering economy through a 'War Against Indiscipline'. This, of course, is a familiar, discredited battle cry in many Third World countries. Often, it is an ideological veil for bourgeois class hegemony and repression. This is precisely what is happening in Nigeria. Major-General Muhammadu Buhari's economic policies have not differed fundamentally, if at all, from those of Shagari. Public sector enterprises are being privatised, followed by renewed attempts to subject agriculture to the complete tutelage of foreign private capital. Influential and lucrative appointments have gone to nominees of military rulers, past and present, and their allies among right-wing intellectuals and the notorious Kaduna Mafia.

Defence expenditure remains substantial; 14 officers, including ex-Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon, Buhari's number two, have recently been promoted generals, and together with the militariat, will receive new military wardrobes. Their recent salary review has also been accompanied by the acquisition of sophisticated military hardware, local and foreign. The National Security Organisation (NSO) has gained tremendous importance and notoriety. Now represented on the Supreme Military Council, it is undergoing modernisation and expansion, cashing in on the army of unemployed graduates. Contracts for 47 prisons, four of them with maximum security facilities, have since been concluded.

In contrast, the Buhari regime has distanced itself from radical intellectuals and activists; has disciplined workers on behalf of capital; suppressed activism amongst students; introduced draconian decrees whose practical application would scarcely affect the dominant classes; and intensified the exploitation of peasants, craftspeople and commoners through new and increased taxation to 'salvage' an economy wrecked mainly by the bourgeoisie. Yet the personal incomes of the rich have not been subjected to any harsh fiscal attacks, nor their shameless indulgence in tax evasion. One remembers the remarkable case of a businessman whose total tax returns had read £200 but from whose supermarket a State Government alone had made purchases worth over £10,000 that year!

It is, therefore, in this context that the significance of the current attacks on freedom of speech and other liberties ought to be understood. Buhari's vexation with the Press apparently began in January 1984 soon after the coup, when newspapers pressed for more radical changes than his regime appeared to pursue. Specifically, some carried embarrassing reports about his regime including one which linked a close associate of his with the venal activities of Shagari's Rice Task Force. These reports, said Buhari, were false. Similarly, some papers published provocative statements made by, and paid advertisements from, fugitive politicians denouncing Buhari and his colleagues. But there was an earlier and, perhaps, deeper reason which requires elaboration. Towards the end of General Obasanjo's regime in 1979, the Daily Times' Grapevine Column alleged that the Nigerian Oil Corporation (NNPC) had failed to collect about 1bn owed by its customers; and that Buhari, then NNPC's chairman, had constituted himself into the NNPC Board, Finance Ministry Ministry and the Central Bank. Subsequently, a secret inquiry established that the actual amount involved was about 100m. Then on 19 September, eleven days before the military relinquished power, the Nigerian Punch carried a sensational story, based on an interim auditor's report, alleging a missing 2.8bn belonging to NNPC during Buhari's tenure. Thenceforth an orchestrated and tantalising campaign by politicians and
the Press started, with each group pulling its ammunition from the other. Students demonstrated and demanded a probe; the nation was in a frenzy, and threat to law and order was imminent. Shagari was forced to act, and on 16 April 1980, instituted a judicial inquiry into what was then called the ‘Oilgate scandal’.

Although the inquiry found the allegation to be false, Buhari was furious with the manner in which Shagari’s regime handled the affair and the role of the Press therein. As he told three local journalists in February 1984: ‘... I was expecting Shehu Musa (Shagari’s chief bureaucrat) and those people to bring out the report of that (first) inquiry to let people know what had happened. But everybody wanted to believe that we stole that money.’ Of his feeling about the Press campaign, he said: ‘If there was no judicial inquiry in 1979 (sic) when I was in the US War College, I would have been brought up and lunched because someone said that N2.8bn was missing in a place I was (boss) for three-and-a-half years . . .’ Although Buhari’s integrity was not questioned, he had been deeply hurt by the affair; the inquiry had found several blemishes in the operations of the NNPC. In January 1984, he called for the Oilgate inquiry files, but nothing has been heard of them since.

Not surprisingly, Buhari was to snarl when asked if he would preserve press freedom and other liberties guaranteed by the now partly suspended 1979 Nigerian Constitution: ‘No. I am going to tamper with that.’ On 29 March he signed an anti-Press law officially titled Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusations) Decree 1984. This now infamous Decree No.4 empowers the regime to close any media organisation and imprison journalists for carrying any ‘message, rumour, report or statement ... which is false in any material particular or which brings’ the Government or its officials into ‘ridicule or disrepute’. The burden of proof is on the accused, and persons found guilty could be jailed for up to two years without an option of a fine. In the case of a corporate body, it will be liable to a minimum fine of N10,000 (about £9,000). These penalties are without prejudice to the right of any affected official who may institute a civil action. Trial is by a special tribunal comprising a High Court judge as chairman and three military officers. Their decision is not subject to appeal.

On 4 July two senior journalists, Messrs Tunde Thompson and Nduka Irabor, on the respected Lagos Guardian were imprisoned for one year each, and the paper fined N50,000 for an offence under Decree No.4. A three-part series of fine investigative reporting, on the basis of which they were charged, was that Major General A. Hananiya, nominated as Nigeria’s envoy to Britain (later sent but recalled following the Dikko affair), was to be substituted with someone else. This claim said the Government, was false. The Guardian hearing, however, turned out to be a trial of Decree No.4 itself. Defence lawyers at, and informed opinion outside, the Tribunal poured scorn on absurdities contained in the decree. The Nigerian people similarly condemned it, saw the journalists as heroes, and donated generously towards the upkeep of their families. But the Guardian duo have asked for all the monies to be sent to charities instead, leaving only their own salaries for their families.

Decree No.4 is, of course, primarily directed at, and has yet only been used against, journalists. But it also presents the gravest threat yet to academic freedom. In August 1984 Dr Patrick Wilmot, Nigeria’s foremost radical scholar on Southern Africa, was prevented from registering for the UN-sponsored seminar on the legal status of apartheid held in Lagos. The security
establishment had intervened at the last minute. Four months later, a radical Canadian energy economist, Dr Terisa Turner, Senior Visiting Lecturer at the University of Port Harcourt, was deported. Her publication, a damning indictment of Nigeria's oil administration, had been drawn to the authorities' attention by another academic after she had been working to set up an Energy Research Centre in Nigeria. Arnold Baker, a researcher with the UN-affiliated International Oil Working Group, was also expelled. He had been working on the enforcement of the oil embargo against South Africa.

Some commentators have been held under the State Security (Detention of Persons) Decree 1984, otherwise known as Decree No.2. This fiat permits the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, to detain any person, without trial for 'instigation of' or involvement in, 'acts prejudicial to state security or (contributing) to the economic adversity of the nation.' It stipulates indefinite detention subject to a three-monthly periodic review, and bars any suit 'against any person for anything done or intended to be done in pursuance of (the) Decree.'

Dr Tai Solarin, Nigeria's renowned and assiduous social critic, has been in detention without trial. His arrest in January 1984 followed a one-man demonstration during which he demanded the restoration of democracy within six months. A Lagos High Court Ruling in April 1984 that the detention was 'unlawful as the respondent (had) failed to establish legal justification for depriving Mr Solarin of his liberty' was immediately overruled by Decree No.2. A prolific and often vitriolic columnist on the outspoken Nigerian Tribune, Solarin is, perhaps, the most regular Nigerian journalist guest of the security agencies.

The continued detention without trial of Haroun Adamu, an editorial consultant to Punch, since January 1984 is rather bizarre. After nearly two decades in the Press, he is one of Nigeria's most seasoned and respected critics of the ruling class. Even after massive public outcry, the Government has yet to give any reason for his captivity. The authorities in Kano, where he is being held, said they wanted him to answer questions about an alleged newsprint fraud at the radical, Kano-based Triumph newspapers where he had been managing director from 1980-83. It turned out later that Haroun had lent some newsprint to Punch. This had been authorised by the Triumph Board, and is normal practice among Nigerian newspapers in times of newsprint shortages.

Although Punch long ago expressed its willingness to settle the loan and may have done so, the Kano authorities have neither released nor charged him with any offence. This may well mean, as has been speculated within informed circles, that Haroun is being held as the hostage of a faction in the ruling junta. If this is so, then it is a sad commentary on the calibre of Nigeria's present rulers especially as Haroun was a fierce critic of the Shagari regime's excesses and his health has steadily deteriorated.

The latest casualty in the anti-Press drive is Rufai Ibrahim, until recently former editor of Triumph and the acting editor of the Sunday Guardian. Aged 35, he is the son of a very senior official who, after a distinguished career of over 30 years in Nigeria's get-rich-quick bureaucracy, did not have a personal house to retire into. Rufai left Ibadan University in 1973 to go into journalism. In spite of his privileged origins, he has always been scornful of the pervasive bourgeois materialism, opportunism, and careerism of Nigerian society. In 1980 he joined
Haroun at the *Triumph* on a lower pay than his previous *Daily Times* job, and despite overtures of an attractive position in Shagari's Administration. As editor and because of *Triumph*’s often devastating exposes about the Shagari regime, Rufai was banned from presidential press briefings, and was an occasional guest of the NSO in Kano. When in October 1983 the NSO in Lagos arrested him over his official visits to Libya and Ghana to interview Colonel Gadaffi and Flight Lt. Rawlings respectively, they left him overnight with neither food nor bed.

No official reason has been given for his continued detention without trial since his arrest on 22 December 1984. It is, however, strongly believed to be connected with a light satirical piece he had written in the Lagos *Guardian* on 18 November. In it he purported to be writing a personal letter to the detained progressive ex-Governor of Kaduna State, Balarabe Musa, on the political situation in Nigeria. He briefed him on the promotions in the army, the draconian decrees, defence expenditure, the nature of key appointments made by the regime, and the disarray of the Left, among others. He told Balarabe that the book, *Muhammadu Buhari: Nigeria’s Seventh Head of State*, published by the Federal Information Ministry, ’received excellent reviews in the Nigerian press and is currently being serialised by many newspapers. You must read this biography of our leader. And let your friends there have it when you are finished with it.’ Rufai then concluded: ’Before I stop finally, I should remind you not to forget to read (George Orwell’s) *Animal Farm*, whenever you feel unable to sort out and make sense of the fragments of information that get to you.’

Subsequently, the NSO informed Rufai that he was to be invited for a ‘chat’ over an undisclosed issue; then came the arrest. His place of confinement is not publicly known, not even to his parents or wife whom he married in October 1984. According to the Lagos *Guardian*, he would only be seen when released.

Prior to Rufai’s seizure, Mr Duro Onabule, the *National Concord* editor, was locked up for criticising a minister. During a television discussion, information Minister, Group Captain S. Omeruah, had blasted the Nigerian Press as suffering from a ’bring-down (Government) syndrome’ typical of the colonial era. Onabule in response charged the Minister of displaying his ’neurotic (anti-Press) obsession.’ Omeruah’s press officer then issued a menacing and atrocious rejoinder in which he said ’it might be in the interest of the nation to have (Onabule) say his motive.’ Subsequently, Onabule was detained for two weeks, then released without charge.

These repressive actions apart, the regime has taken other apparently innocent measures to hammer home its point. In June 1984, appointments to boards of federal government-owned media together with their editors were announced. The announcement, issued directly from the Supreme Headquarters, was unprecedented. Some of the appointees were close associates of the leadership. Of greater interest, perhaps, a very able journalist was passed over by the regime for the editorship of his paper because he was allegedly considered a ’communist’. Private newspapers, on the other hand, have been subjected to drastic cuts, even starvation, in the value of import licences granted them for newsprint. Besides, some private publishers have strongly complained that the allocations were discriminatory against them both in relation to other private publishers, and the government-owned newspapers. This may well be the result of rationalisation in scarce foreign exchange allocation; but it is equally likely to be a strategy of whipping the private press into subservience or slow, painful
decline and eventual closure. Such a strategy is at least favoured by a small band of young, hard-headed and politically aware junior officers allied to the leadership.

Many journalists have simply compromised, and opposition has been generally driven underground which is ultimately much more dangerous. But Allison Ayida, the respected intellectual pillar of the erstwhile Gowon regime, has already fired the first warning shot. His anxiety about the regime becoming an instrument of group, ethnic, and geo-political interests reflects a wider unease amongst southern Nigerian opinion, informed and otherwise.    

John Maikwano
Debates

SEARCHING FOR 'THE ROOTS OF FAMINE': THE CASE OF KARAMOJA

ROAPE's special issue (15/16) on 'The Roots of Famine' tackled this urgent problem with several excellent case studies. However, the later article by Mamdani (ROAPE 25) on the recurrent famines in Karamoja district, Uganda, fails to live up to this high standard. Mamdani's mode of argumentation is based on erroneous assumptions that lead to seriously misleading conclusions, not only for the specific case of Karamoja but also for others where pastoral and agro-pastoral peoples are facing crises. Mamdani attributes the tragic Karamoja famines to colonial rule. While he is correct that the increasingly severe famines in that stricken area cannot be understood apart from the impact of imperialism, the arguments he used to support his case are partial, incomplete and often factually incorrect. Even more serious, he bases his argument on assumptions strikingly similar to those of the British colonial rulers whose actions contributed to the present crisis. The faulty assumptions are not unique to him, and the issues involved go far beyond his article.

How can we produce sound diagnoses of the roots of famine in Africa? Mamdani's article, together with the editorial comment in the same issue that '... the roots of famine are not to be found in "nature", but in the incorporation of the rural areas under discussion into the wider system of capitalism ...' suggests a worrisome trend towards countering earlier inadequate 'blame famine on the natural environment' arguments with equally partial, and hence dangerous, analyses: 'blame the whole problem on imperialism'. This article is intended as a critique of Mamdani's article on Karamoja, a comment on his mode of analysis, and thus a contribution to the wider political and theoretical debate.

The Karamoja Case: Mamdani's Interpretation

The majority of the population of Karamoja district are plains-dwelling semi-pastoral peoples divided into several distinct and often antagonistic sections. There are several small highland-dwelling groups whose mode of life has been somewhat different, but who also have been severely affected by famine. Mamdani lumps all these together as 'Karamojong', the name of one of the component plains groups, though more a satisfactory name for the inhabitants of the district as a whole is 'Karamojan'. Observers agree that the district is in bad shape; the central zone especially manifests serious erosion and declining grass cover. Famines have been increasing in frequency and severity, in recent years reaching truly tragic proportions. There is much less agreement about causes and
solutions however.

Mamdani argues that British imperialism in the early 1920s, disrupted a ‘historically evolved balance between the people and their environment’ (p.67), creating the present severe environmental deterioration. He discusses three causes: reduction of the land available to the Karamojans; the imposition of highly exploitative cattle marketing schemes and other measures of forced re-stocking; and the imposition of taxation. ‘The Karamoja problem was created in the first place by imperialism’ (p.73).

But to him, the most serious crime of the imperialists was to ‘choke the transition to an agricultural way of life.’ He argues that at the turn of the century these people were moving from pastoralism to agriculture, a transition blocked by colonial rule.

In the 1920s, the Karamojong relied on three sources for procuring food: hunting, grazing and cultivation. In that order, these three sources represent a progressive movement in the development of the human productive powers. Grazing is a more reliable source of food than hunting and agriculture is yet an advance in comparison to pastoralism under natural conditions (p.72).

He ends with a critique of ‘liberal’ perspectives that define the problem as internally generated, thus blaming the victims and advocating external philanthropy as a solution.

One can agree with him that how a problem is defined often determines the solution advanced. Ironically, Mamdani advocates one of the same ‘solutions’ that the colonial rulers long advocated: increased dependence on settled agriculture. His diagnosis shares other features with the thinking of those administrators: neglect of significant relevant factors, especially basic information on environmental aspects; neglect of accumulated knowledge on the social and economic organisation of the people; and neglect of the historical record. Most serious, he shares with those earlier British policy makers two erroneous assumptions: that colonial rule penetrated an earlier, stable status quo; and that pastoralism is a more primitive, less productive, less stable form of subsistence than settled agriculture. The inconsistency of assuming a ‘historically evolved balance’ (p.67) and a ‘period of transition from pastoralism to agriculture’ (p.72) seems to bother Mamdani no more than similar inconsistent ways of thinking bothered British officials. These assumptions are not unique to Mamdani; they still influence much thinking, and even policy-making, about pastoral and semi-pastoral peoples. The weakness of these basic assumptions can be well demonstrated by looking briefly at the specific nature of the Karamoja situation.

The Karamoja Case: Contemporary Evidence

Famines have increased in frequency and severity in recent years, but they are not a new phenomenon in Karamoja. By taking 1920 as his starting point, Mamdani ignores the historical evidence of earlier environmental fluctuations and the manner in which the people of the district coped with them. Lamphear, on the basis of oral history, has shown that the present population of the plains contains a significant element of people who migrated from the west some 250-300 years ago. These were skilled cultivators, who began to keep cattle only after settling in the semi-arid area of Karamoja. He shows how a three-pronged subsistence strategy was developed, combining hunting and gathering, crop cultivation and animal husbandry, in response to the difficult environmental
situation. The plains Karamojans were not nomads, but transhumants. They lived in permanent settlements, where women remained to cultivate cereal crops while young men moved herds seasonally to take advantage of the varying locations of grazing and water. Hunting and especially gathering became more important when rains failed. Lamphear's evidence suggests that this combination enabled people in Karamoja to survive some drought periods better than some of their western neighbours whose subsistence strategy was based more heavily on cultivation.

However, Lamphear, Barber, the Dyson-Hudsons, and Baker all agree that not even this diversified subsistence strategy could cope with the sequence of disasters that hit the area between about 1894 and 1896. Disease decimated the cattle herds; the next year locusts destroyed crops; the year after that rains and crops failed, and another disease killed much of the small stock. Famine ensued, killing thousands; others fled to adjoining richer areas, or lived for some years by hunting and gathering wild foods (a form of subsistence less subject to natural hazards). The herders of Karamoja were able gradually to reconstitute their herds through the indirect invasions of imperialism, in the form of a flood of ivory traders who in the space of a few years wiped out the vast elephant herds. Karamojan peoples traded ivory for cattle, and slowly rebuilt their herds and social systems. Thus the first British patrols found, not a stable equilibrium or 'historically evolved balance', but a people recovering from a major disaster. The consequences for the natural environment of drastic human population loss, together with reduction of grazing and browsing pressure, are unclear, but must have been considerable. Certainly the disaster weakened the Karamojans' ability to resist colonial incursion.

Baker (1977) has pointed out that the British civilian officials who took over in 1921 thought of themselves as trying to protect a stable status quo. The British attempted to isolate the district, restrict trade and penetration by outsiders. They also, as Mamdani correctly asserts, reduced Karamojan grazing lands very severely. His list of colonial actions causing environmental degradation is not so much incorrect as incomplete. To understand what happened, one needs to consider also British interference with the mobility of men and herds, disruptions of earlier trading patterns, extraction of forced labour, suppression of the Karamojan practice of armed penetration into other areas, improvement of water supplies and health measures for both human and stock populations, in fact, a whole series of ad hoc actions based on ignorance and misconceptions of the complexity of Karamojans' relations to their environment. Even this list is incomplete, for events in surrounding areas have had considerable impact on processes of change in Karamoja.

To understand what happened one needs to start (but not end) with a basic point Mamdani neglected: a fluctuating natural environment, especially the low and erratic rainfall. In most of Karamoja, there is a less than even chance for a good grain crop, one chance in three that the crop will barely suffice; serious drought can be expected one year in four (Dyson-Hudson 1966:42). Drought, however, is not synonymous with famine. Like others living in drought-prone environments, the Karamojans had developed ways of coping with fluctuations; these included diversification of subsistence sources, trade with other groups, mobility to exploit scattered resources, social mechanisms that spread risk, and forcible intrusion into others' territory when necessary. Colonial rule seriously disrupted these indigenous ways of coping. Very early after British takeover, administrators...
attempted to interfere with free movement of men and cattle to the grazing areas. Sedentary men were more readily available for forced labour and easier to supervise as administrators attempted to stamp out cattle raiding. British administration did succeed in preventing raids for some 30 years. However, the *Pax Britannica* also restricted one of the customary modes of adaptation to periods of poor grazing: forcible pushing into the richer lands lying to the west and south and replacing cattle losses through raiding neighbouring peoples. Thus the redrawing of boundaries significantly reducing grazing lands, prior to World War II, was made worse, in the people’s eyes, by restrictions on mobility and denial of their customary means of redress through force (Dyson-Hudson 1966 has penetrating comments on this aspect).

Although Mamdani discusses the loss of land, he fails to mention a crucial variable that interacted to exacerbate the process of environmental destruction: sharp increases in population. Human population increase is not presented here as an ‘ultimate’ explanation in a neo-Malthusian sense, but as a crucial factor that itself needs explanation. Absence of reliable census figures prior to 1948 make it difficult to produce a sound account of the build-up from the presumed low point of the 1890s ecological collapse. However, recent census figures show the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African Population, Karamoja District (including Karasuk area)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More recent figures are not available. As far as I know, population experts have not yet provided a definitive study to account for the phenomenal rate of increase, averaging 5.1 per cent per year from 1958 to 1969, compared to a national average of 3.8 per cent. Possible factors include: under counting in 1948 and 1959, incursion of Suk peoples from Kenya, settlement of some southern Sudanese refugees in the 1960s, effects of some slight human health measures introduced after World War II. (Barber has shown how prior to that time administrative neglect of Karamoja meant the district did not receive even the very limited health services available elsewhere in colonial Uganda).

Whatever the reasons, Karamojans lost land and were increasingly restricted in their movements as their population was increasing. Since cattle were needed both for an adequate social life and as an essential part of subsistence, more people meant that more cattle were kept on a reduced land base. The colonial government also carried out *ad hoc* measures to improve water supplies by building dams and drilling boreholes, but without sound understanding of the consequences for grazing patterns. As a result, herds tended to be kept longer near the homesteads in the central zone, further exacerbating overgrazing in that area. For the plains dwellers, by the 1960s the ratio of animals to people had probably fallen dangerously close to or below the minimum needed for subsistence, even though total herd numbers had increased and environmental degradation in the central zone was severe.
One reaction to increasing pressure on diminishing resources was renewed cattle raiding, which further aggravated problems. Raiding cannot be understood by focusing on Karamoja alone. Raids from the Turkana of arid northern Kenya have been especially devastating to Karamoja. In the 1950s and '60s, the Turkana were armed with rifles obtained from Ethiopia, giving them a great advantage over the Karamojans, who had lost their funds to the British. In the 1960s, Turkana raiding was so heavy that the eastern grazing lands became unusable, further concentrating herds in other already over-used zones. Loss of herds to raiders encouraged further raiding in retaliation. Government (both colonial and independent) then punished raiders by confiscating cattle, only worsening the vicious circle. The disturbances of the Amin period can only have made a bad situation even more desperate.

Colonial responses to the increasingly obvious overgrazing took several forms, the most important involving the cattle marketing scheme Mamdani discusses and attempts to encourage more dependence on cultivation. Mamdani is clearly correct that the marketing scheme was exploitative, a point Baker and others who have written on the subject had already established. Baker argued that it failed as a destocking measure, but became another means by which Karamojans adapted to environmental hazards, to replace pre-colonial cattle-for-grain barter. When rains failed sufficiently to threaten grazing, they sold cattle before the animals died, then used cash to buy maize meal, but at very disadvantageous terms of trade.

The 'Blockage' That Never Was
It is ironic that Mamdani should blame the colonial regime for choking a transition to an agricultural way of life, for from the 1920s on, government attempted to encourage more cultivation. Their reasoning was very similar to his; they thought of it as a more advanced, more reliable, more settled way of life. However, Karamojans, well aware of rainfall unreliability, have long resisted attempts by those who ruled over them to push them into exclusive dependence on cultivation, which, contrary to Mamdani's and British colonial officials' presumptions, is under these conditions not the most secure but the most vulnerable source of food. Baker has shown how this resistance was interpreted by the British as a consequence of the 'backwardness' and 'conservatism' of 'ignorant' pastoralists who needed the firm control of colonial rule to speed up the transition to a 'more advanced' stage. While resisting destructive measures, Karamojans have responded positively to the few colonial innovations that showed promise of improving their agricultural productivity, such as ploughs and improved strains of drought-resistant sorghum. As Baker has pointed out, governments' fundamental misunderstanding of their production system has meant that too many of the innovations introduced under the guise of 'development' were inappropriate or downright exploitative. Post-war attempts to dam streams to facilitate irrigation of crops foundered when sudden floods washed out the dams. Some success was later achieved with irrigation using the few permanent streams, but shortage of water limited the scale. Colonial planners kept dreaming of permanently settling Karamojans in controlled cultivating schemes where the number of animals allowed would be forcibly restricted. The 1958 revised District Plan talks of a need for the 'controlled introduction of progressive elements so as to increase the speed of development' of agriculture, these 'progressive elements' to come from other tribes. This scheme came to naught, but similar plans for forcible rigidly controlled
settlement of Karamojans in cultivation-based schemes in the western part of the district continued in the decade after dependence.

Thus Mamdani's urging that settled agriculture represents the best future for the Karamojans parallels colonial ways of thinking. His argument that cultivation declined during the colonial period is vitiated by his neglect of population increase and apparent unawareness of the unrealiability of acreage estimates. The expert that he quotes, the colonial agricultural officer, Parsons, noted elsewhere that for Karamoja acreage estimates were 'based entirely on guesswork' (1970:137). Thus Mamdani's use of acreage cultivated per head provides an unsound basis for arguing that cultivation declined during the colonial period. In fact, the figures he quotes taken together with the data on population increase (which he fails to take into account) suggest that area cultivated probably increased from 1948 to 1959. The 1958 Annual Report for the District states, 'There is no doubt that cultivation is on the increase in Karamoja ...' (p.111). Probably the total area planted to crops expanded in this period, but the area cultivated per person declined because the sharp increase in number of people outpaced expansion of cropped acreage.

Whether limitations on availability of arable land is the factor accounting for the failure of area cultivated to keep pace with population increase is unclear. As with so many aspects of the Karamoja situation, basic environmental and production data are incomplete or little more than guesswork. But omission of what is known only creates unnecessary confusion. Mamdani argues that the creation of Kidepo National Park deprived the Karamojans of cultivable land into which they could have expanded. Both he and Opuli-Watum (who earlier advanced this argument), do not mention that the area set aside for the game part is now infested with tsetse fly, so that cattle cannot be kept there.

Now, for those who assume sole dependence on cultivation to be a 'higher stage', inability to keep cattle is no problem. But when we recognise that rainfall in the Kidepo Valley is only slight more reliable than in the arable central belt, settlement there provides no solution to the problems of the plains-dwelling cattle herders. As Baker has said, "It is not possible, in the conditions of rainfall reliability which prevail in Karamoja, to base family security on grains and this is the critical importance of livestock for, in a year of drought, they are the difference between starvation and survival" (1975).

Creation of the Kidepo Park has probably been more directly harmful to the smaller populations of hill-dwellers such as the Napore and Ik (also known as Teuso) who previously foraged in the valley. Their somewhat different subsistence strategies should not be lumped together with the plains dwellers.

Pernicious Assumptions

However weak his handling of the specific facts of the Karamoja situation may be, the fundamental problem with Mamdani's paper is much more serious. His adherence to an outmoded unilinear model of evolutionary 'stages' leads to conclusions that, if put into practice, could prove devastating to human lives. The tragedy is that policy-makers have acted in the past on such erroneous assumption. This 'stage' view is not unique to Mamdani; it permeates many colonial reports; it is found also in Opuli-Watum's paper; it underlies the recommendations of the Bataringaya Report. The fact that Mamdani's paper was
published in *ROAPE* suggests that the editors give some credence to this position.

Yet it is flatly contradicted by the accumulated knowledge of contemporary anthropology about the course of human development. This would show that foraging (gathering supplemented by hunting) in tropical environments, under conditions of low population density, provided a more secure, reliable source of food with less labour input than many forms of simple cultivation. For this reason, when ecological disaster struck, as it struck Karamoja in the 1890s, survivors could eke out a living by gathering wild food after crops and herds have been wiped out. But foraging cannot sustain a rapidly increasing population.

Further archaeological evidence shows that historically, the transition to food production was not a matter of successive stages of herding followed by cultivation, but rather the gradual emergence of mixed economies of cultivation and herding. An increase emphasis on herding animals allowed human use of arid lands of limited potential for cultivation. As Keesing says, "historically, pastoralism thus represents an off-shoot of the early mixed agriculture and herding complexes, in adaptation to dry grasslands" (1981:136).

Rigby, an anthropologist working on East African pastoralism within an explicitly Marxist problematic, says, "... a point that has often been made but needs constant repetition ... is that pastoral societies do not represent an earlier form of production and land-use than agricultural societies, but are in fact later and more specialized adaptations of man to land ..." (1980:38). Thus there is no basis in the historical record for the widespread view that keeping animals is less 'developed' than cultivation. Karamoja provides just one example where cultivators adopted cattle-herding as they moved into a new, drier environment. Thus Mamdani's view that 'Grazing is a more reliable source of food than hunting and agriculture is yet an advance in comparison to pastoralism under natural conditions' is contradicted by evidence and theory. It also errs in omitting the importance of gathering (to be expected, given the sexist bias of the 19th century anthropology of which this 'stage' conception is an anachronistic survival).

The issue here is not the course of human development, but the harmful effects on poor people's lives of the perpetuation of outdated ideas on human development held by those in contemporary positions of power and influence. Problems of famine in areas such as Karamoja cannot be seriously addressed until we rid ourselves of the erroneous view of herding as a 'stage' from which there should be a 'transition'. Once it is recognised that herding is an essential part of a complex adaptive subsistence strategy devised by people no less evolved than their cultivating neighbours, we have cleared the way for the hard work of attempting to understand the complexities of the ecological relations, history and political economy that underlay the emergence of famine in a specific situation.

Searching for 'The Roots of Famine'

It may be the case that in difficult environments such as semi-arid Karamoja (and some of the others discussed in *ROAPE* 15/16), the indigenous modes of coping with environmental fluctuations have been especially vulnerable to disruptions by colonial intervention and capitalist penetration. But these disruptions cannot be understood without understanding the prevalent ecological relations. 'Nature' and 'political economy' are not alternative but complementary forms of explanation, both necessary. In short, we need to see in this journal more
analyses that clarify the interaction between 'natural' events (which may be responses to earlier human interventions), the local patterns of coping with the natural environment (themselves a product of history) and the process of incorporation into wider systems (imperialism in its manifold forms).

In situations such as Karamoja we are dealing with complex ecosystems, and it behoves those who want to talk about 'the roots of famine' not to ignore the complexities. This short paper necessarily omits several that should be examined in more depth. The area in question should be set in its wider context: Karamoja has been affected by events in the Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, and the more prosperous parts of Uganda. There has been no space to look at the evidence available as to how the Karamojans themselves perceive and act on their problems, nor to consider the hostility towards governmental intervention they have understandably developed. Emphasis has been placed on the importance of cattle for subsistence and survival, to the neglect of their social and religious significance. Such an emphasis is necessarily as long as earlier erroneous assumptions about herding, such as the view that Karamojans keep cattle merely for prestige or because of their failure to complete some mythical transition to a higher 'stage', continue to circulate. But once these notions have been dissipated, a more balanced recognition of the multi-dimensional role of cattle in the lives of herding people is desirable, as Hedlund argued in ROAPE 15/16.

Famine is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. To attempts to locate its roots solely in the process of incorporation into world capitalism without attention to 'nature' or the basic environmental parameters is as simplistic as the attribution of famine solely to environmental causes. To return to the Karamoja example briefly, of course the roots of the present crisis cannot be understood without examination of the colonial period. I argued above that Mamdani failed to consider several measures taken by the colonial regime that contributed to the present crisis. But we cannot understand why the form incorporation took in Karamoja was so extraordinarily destructive without understanding the basic parameters of that physical environment. To omit factors such as rainfall, tsetse fly, prevalence of locusts, etc., is to produce 'explanations' as unbalanced as those that deal only with physical environment causes, or worse, blame the victims for having too many children.

What is clear is that the colonial regime's actions led to a situation where human populations increased, and livestock populations increased, but at a lower rate, thus reducing the margin of safety for subsistence. Their indigenous ways of coping disrupted, denied opportunities for expansion, with access to few new means of coping, denied realistic chances of moving successfully into the wider society of Uganda, subject to raiding from other peoples even worse off than they, the Karamojans have indeed been trapped in a situation of escalating environmental deterioration. This paper does not suggest a way out. But it does argue that sound thinking about such crisis areas cannot proceed on the basis of one-sided explanations.

Beverly Gartrell
Bibliographic Note

On Karamoja


On Pastoralism


On Foraging and Evolution

The radical thinking about the relative abundance and security of a foraging mode of subsistence was crystallised by the appearance in 1968 of R.L. Lee and I. DeVore, Man the hunter, Chicago, Aldine Publishing. Sahlins' paper, 'The original affluent society', in his Stone Age Economics, Aldine, 1972, discusses evidence from contemporary foragers. Non-specialists can find this new evidence synthesized in accessible but not simplistic form in Roger Keesing, Cultural anthropology: a contemporary perspective, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981.
Reviews


If there is still a need to dispel the myth that disasters like drought, flood, earthquake, desertification and even volcanic eruption are only natural phenomena and outside of human agency or control, these two books do it. Both books stress that until recently most work has concentrated too much on examining ‘trigger events’ — such as too little rain or too much — and have focused too little attention on the way in which the disasters associated with such events are fashioned by people and could therefore almost invariably be considerably mitigated. For instance, an earthquake is a ‘natural’ phenomenon with little social effect if it occurs in an unpopulated desert, but a major disaster if it occurs in an area of poor housing in a Latin American or African shanty town. Indeed, we might speak of ‘class quakes’ as much as of ‘earthquakes’ because the worst impact is generally on those buildings outside the building codes, most rickety in construction and most vulnerable to the mildest tremors.

The differential impact that disasters have on people everywhere in the Third World is an important theme for both books. In particular, Wijkman and Timberlake show clearly that in general the poor suffer most from disasters which are usually reported as ‘natural’ and so beyond the scope of state control. In fact, human agency, political action or neglect and particular patterns of development have much to do with the creations which ensure that ‘natural’ events become social disasters. After a discussion of what is understood by disasters, the authors conclude that ‘natural disasters are failures in interactions between vulnerable people and a vulnerable environment’ (p.128). It is precisely the poorest countries which experience disproportionate suffering from natural disasters, not the industrialised areas. The authors remind us that drought affects the Great Plains of the United States roughly every 20 years, but we do not read about people dying of starvation there. Although people suffer malnutrition in parts of the industrial world, it is clear that mass starvation or famine is not politically acceptable there.

The political unacceptability of famine in the United States ensures that provision is made to cover the costs of calamity by spreading it through the tax system and by ensuring government supervision of agriculture and conservation. In contrast, it must be asked why people die in vast numbers in Africa as a result of drought and famine and why the casualty roll is increasing rather than diminishing over
time. The average annual death toll for each type of disaster increased more than six-fold from the 1960s to the 1970s. Even this measure raises questions about values and perspectives. With each disaster, people in the West focus on the death toll rather than on the many more who survive such calamities but are severely, even permanently, affected and harmed and who need policy changes to prevent future occurrences. For example, between 1970 and 1979 some 230,000 were estimated to have died from drought and some 50,000 from flood in Africa while the numbers affected but surviving were estimated at 244 million and 154 million respectively! Unfortunately, Wijkman and Timberlake do not examine in enough depth measures for managing such crises which could be undertaken by the state and other agencies or what role there is for centrally directed strategies and local or ‘traditional’ measures of management and avoidance of disaster. They also need to say more about how disaster affects populations unevenly depending on how heavily and which sections of the poor are most affected. But of one thing they are sure: ‘relief work today is like bandaging a wound that is constantly growing’ (p.104), that relief work needs to be linked far more directly with development programmes, that aid should be directed more clearly to defined goals (though they do show that for the United States there is already the clear priority that aid should tie people more firmly to the tail of the eagle — and so, presumably we must analyse the nature of such goals) and that appropriate target groups for aid should be identified (presumably by their development needs rather than by their capacity to nestle more closely to that eagle).

Grainger also stresses the inadequacy of aid measures — in this case to prevent the constant process of desertification in the five main desert zones of the world. One-third of the earth’s land surface is now arid or semi-arid — the home of more than 600 million people. On the fringes of the Sahara the desert spreads by some 1.5 million hectares per year — every decade an area the size of Czechoslovakia turns in wasteland. Is this process inexorable? Who is most affected by it? In fact, desertification represents not simply, or even, the onward march of nature but rather an historical process of deforestation over-cultivation, overgrazing and wrong forms of irrigation (lacking drainage, rendering the soil water-logged, creating high evaporation rates from a high water table and so inducing the salination of the surface soil). The process eventually makes the soil unusable. These causes of desertification are the product of states and international agencies (like agribusiness, the World Bank and IMF) imposing particular patterns of development in different countries: the expansion in much of the Sahel of rainfed cash-cropping on marginal land rather than increased production of subsistence crops for local consumption. The large-scale development of groundnut production in West Africa and the Sahelian countries — production rose in Niger for example from 160,000 tons per annum in 1955 to 290,000 in 1965 — has reduced the amount of fallow land in agricultural areas and has meant that land which was once used by nomadic pastoralists for grazing is used for crop production instead. This two-fold process has had the effect of both increasing pressure on ‘sparsely vegetated lands most vulnerable to desertification’ and denying pastoralists the wherewithal to sustain their livelihood. Indeed, part of the measures introduced by governments in Africa precisely to minimise the likelihood of desertification is the settling of pastoralists — after all aren’t they to blame for overgrazing? Grainger dispels this myth. In fact, as the informed observer of pastoral systems now increasingly known, nomadic grazers ‘make the best use of marginalised arid lands’ (p.17) and nomads
(far from leading the chaotic anomic life-styles thought by governments) actually abide by strict codes of conduct which necessarily and efficiently regulate their existence. It is precisely the imposition of grazing controls and sedentarisation, and the creation of ranches, thereby reducing the mobility of herds, that reduces pastoralists' traditional strategies for survival. Governments invariably exclude pastoralists; nomads seldom make up any part of governments in Africa.

Instead of attacking a group which knows best how to resist the onslaught of desertification and drought, Grainger suggests a number of crucial measures which could minimise this persistent disaster. ‘Desertification is a man-made phenomenon’ and so ‘its control requires modifications in the ways in which man uses the land’ (p.56). Production of rainfed farming on good lands needs to be increased; the attack on pastoralists’ livelihood needs to be ended and tree and wood cover needs to be increased. All such measures need to be combined with the use of high-tech methods, remote sensing satellites to find out where desertification is most serious.

But as Wijkman and Timberlake remind us in their chapter on cyclones, quoting Bob Dylan, ‘you don’t need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows’. In this sense we do know already why measures to prevent the impact of desertification have largely been ignored five years after the UN conference of Desertification. Local governments remain uninterested. International agencies remain reluctant to promote ‘automatic’ funding to offset the impact of disasters while they continue to promote deleterious development strategies. Civil war and political unrest currently racks much of Africa limiting whatever progress some regimes may be attempting to make in ameliorating the processes which promote and the impact which follows desertification and famine.

Both books are essential reading.

Ray Bush
University of Leeds

* * *

The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing Countries by Piers Blaikie (Longmans Development Studies, 1985).

Land degradation and soil erosion have, during the last century, become an increasing concern of the Western world. This interest was turned into focused plans of research and action following the drought and dust storms of the 1930s which occurred in western North America and southern Africa. Soil conservation departments and projects proliferated throughout the USA and Africa. Many of these projects lasted for 10-25 years, establishing soil conservation as a concern of national governments.

With the recent well-publicised concern about environmental degredation, there has been renewed interest in soil conservation. Most governments in the world now have conservation sections within one or more ministries, and most foreign aid projects have soil conservation components or justifications. Many of the components of present programmes — building structures, planting trees, and restructuring livestock herds — are similar, if not identical, to the projects which began 50 years ago. It should, therefore, be useful to examine the successes and failures of these older programmes.
Until recently, both social and technical scientists defined soil erosion as a purely technical problem involving water, soils, landforms and specific agricultural, livestock, and forestry practices. All research and analysis focused on different aspects of these factors. Where failure was noted, it was generally attributed to a specific design failure, unpredictable weather, or 'lazy and ignorant' land users. That the complex set of interactions between the physical and biological worlds should also be part of complex human social-political-economic systems has only recently been proposed.

Piers Blaikie's book, *The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing Countries*, attempts to place the technical processes of soil erosion in a socio-political-economic context and ask why and how land-use decisions are made which lead to environmental degradation. Because the subject is complex and bridges more than one discipline, the book has a lot of explaining to do. Blaikie takes on the task of reviewing conservation practices and policies for those unfamiliar with them, and presents a thorough discussion of how technically sound programmes can be so socially unacceptable as to fail or even to worsen the situation on the land. The book argues that analysis must come before programme development, and that only an holistic analysis will be useful. Blaikie does not leave the reader to drown in the volume of information that such a suggestion implies. Rather, he offers an example, a simulation exercise which allows an analyst to examine the decision-making processes of households in the context of their physical and socio-economic environment in order to see which ones could lead to environmental stress.

The last half of the book is given over to an examination of the implication of the model: that 'soil degradation and erosion can be explained in terms of surplus extraction through the social relations of production and in the sphere of exchange'. Discussions of land tenure, class, and labour markets are presented. Blaikie concludes from this analysis that 'soil erosion in lesser developed countries will not be substantially reduced until it seriously threatens the accumulation possibilities of the dominant classes'. The final chapter of the book discusses the response one should have to this depressing reality.

Unfortunately, this book fails to make the kind of intellectual synthesis that its own argument calls for. The author does not appear to have integrated enough about the technical aspects of soil conservation or the history of its application to be able to make insightful criticism. He seems unaware that many instances of peasant resistance to soil conservation measures were based on the fact that the techniques actually aggravated erosion. Thus Blaikie is reduced to setting his analysis entirely within the context of the political economy of colonialism and post-colonial dependency theory, taking the land degradation problem from a purely technical definition to a purely political-economic one. His solutions are as incomplete as the incessant structure building of the 'soils men'. From his state of 'practical pessimism', he concludes that only total revolution will solve the problems, and until then the best course of action is one which 'exhorts, directs, appeals to the government to intervene in a "rational" manner'. More reports, and presumably, more computer simulations.

Blaikie appears to have borrowed the tools associated with the sciences — computer simulation and statistical analysis — without fully evaluating them. Having argued for a 'new approach' to problem definition and data collection, he fails to discuss the implications for data interpretation. Both computer simulation
and regression analysis are essentially reductionist in nature, requiring that data be separated into discrete categories. They may not be the most appropriate techniques for interpreting complex, integrated information produced by a household level of study.

Strong arguments are made throughout the book that all research has an ideological base, yet the author seems to assume that models are somehow neutral. Surely he should have taken the responsibility of discussing the assumptions inherent in his model, its limitations, and the kinds of research questions for which it is and is not appropriate?

The ultimate failure of this book is its inability to come to terms with the local conclusion of the 'bottom-up' approach which it advocates: local design and control of local projects. Blaikie dismisses as 'populist' those who suggest 'encouraging peasant initiatives based upon their own experience and improving their own material well-being'. However, he is forced to admit that small-scale, locally controlled projects are working. These projects should be supported, he states, but 'cannot ever hope to be "the answer" to conservation since they tend to run counter to all of the powerful interests discussed in this book'. The contradiction is laid bare: political economic theory suggests that problems can only be solved through structural changes in the underlying political economy, while projects initiated and run by 'local peasant organisations, rural trade unions, women's groups and other often fragmented and politically fragile institutions' are making a difference in their environment. Perhaps a holistic analysis of the household-level data would have predicted that such small groups could exist and function, resolving the apparent contradiction. Such an analysis might also suggest that there will never be one answer, but rather a variety of strategies for different geographical regions and social and political organisation.

From start to finish The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing Countries is plagued by the contradiction between advocacy of an integrated intellectual approach to problem definition and the search for a single-factor analysis leading to a single-factor solution. The tension thus created ultimately makes this a disappointing book.

* * *

Kate B. Showers
Komatsu So, 'Sengo shihonshugi no hatten kozo' (The development structure of post-war capitalism), Part I, Keizai gaku Ronshu, March, 1983.

On the relationship between armaments and employment, see for example, Seymour Melman, The Political Economy of Pentagon Capitalism, McGraw-Hill, 1970; while on the relationship between arms and the broader economy, see M. Kaldor, 'The Role of Arms in Capitalist Economies: the Process of Overdevelopment and Underdevelopment' in D. Carlton and C. Schaerf (eds) Arms Control and Technological Innovation, Croom Helm, 1977; on military production and technology, see for example, Tuomi and Vaeyrynen, Militarisation and Arms Production, Croom Helm, 1983, also Kaldor and Eide (eds).

On Militarisation and Third World debt, see IMF Annual Reports, and Financial Statistics, IMF, Washington, annually, and monthly respectively.

On Arms Transfers to the Third World, see R. Vaeyrynen, 'Economic and Political Consequences of Arms Transfers to the Third World' Alternatives, VI (1980); Minoru Sekishita, 'America, teikokushugi to buki yushutsu' (American Imperialism and arms exports), and Ryusuke Takita, 'Dai san sekai' he no buki yushutsu to 'shinsokuminchi-shugi' no tenkai (Arms export to the 'Third World' and the development of 'neo-colonialism'). Keizai, January 1979.

See, for example, D. Songhaas, 'Military Dynamics in the Context of Periphery Capitalism', Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 1977-78.

Eichii Shindo teaches in the Department of International Relations of the Tsukuba University in Japan.

Gavan McCormack teaches History at La Trobe University in Australia.

AFRICA
Where famine has hit the hardest
Some support a programme in which people are forcibly removed from famine areas in war zones and resettled in areas under Ethiopian government control. Continuation of aid is justified on the grounds that the humanitarian considerations have priority. Why then is aid to Tigray and Eritrea also not humanitarian rather than 'political'? The question is all the more pressing as new waves of refugees from the resettlement camps around Asosa have begun to arrive in the Blue Nile area of Sudan.

Whatever arguments and excuses are advanced, it is an inescapable fact that had the world acted sooner and sent food when it was first requested, the emergency would not have happened on the present scale. It is just not good enough that UNCHR, its donors and other international organisations were not prepared for the moment when the trickle of refugees became a flood. It is not good enough for politicians to avoid answering questions about how this happened. It is not good enough that now, several months after the start of the crisis, and despite feverish activity, justifications and excuses, the refugees still do not receive adequate rations, have no decent water and continue to deteriorate and die in the camps. It is not even good enough that they should be attended in their grief and dying by a welter of Western journalists, experts, consultants and observers.

Tina Wallace
World University Service
Current Africana 27 (continued)

compiled by Chris Allen

Unless otherwise stated, the theses listed below are doctoral theses. They may normally be obtained on inter-library loan, when the number below the authors name will need to be quoted. DAI=dissertation Abstracts International, Series A.

3a. Nigeria (continued)

147 Olowu, C A B  
   Local government and urban administration in the Lagos State 1968-78. Ife, 1979

148 Tuktir, M M  
   The imposition of British colonial domination on the Sokoto Caliphate, Borno and neighbouring states 1897-1914. Ahmadu Bello, 1979, 1072pp; DAI, 41,10 (1981) 4471

3b. GHANA

149 Amuah, J O  

150 Browne, A W  
   Craft industry and rural employment in Ashanti. CNAA, 1978

151 Omane, I A  
   Ghana's external indebtedness problems, w.s.r.t. corruption and suppliers credits 1960-74. Strathclyde, 1980, 421pp

152 Mubin, A K A  
   Appropriate products, employment and income distribution in Bangladesh and Ghana: the soap industry. Strathclyde, 1980, 525pp

153 Asiama, S O  
   Social analysis, urbanisation and land reform in Ghana. Birmingham, 1980, 328pp

154 Crellin, H G  

155 Bryant, J  

156 Baah-Nuakoh, A  
   Factor use and structural disequilibrium in the Ghanaian manufacturing sector. Reading, 1980

157 Ahwireng Obeng, F  

158 Campbell, J R L  
   The political economy of Koforidua. Sussex, 1981, 425pp

159 Silver, J B  
   Class structure and class consciousness: mineworkers in Ghana. Sussex, 1981, 383pp

160 Addae Dapaah, K  
   Socioeconomic and cultural aspects of housing in Kumasi. Strathclyde, 1983, 520pp

161 Edusa Eyison, E O  

162 Emudong, C P  

163 Achola, P P W  
   Education and support for political authorities and institutions among Africans in Kumasi. Iowa, 1980, 235pp; DAI, 41,6 (1980) 2778

164 Cleveland, D A  

165 Stenross, B  
Political economy of development: Ghana 1950-66, Virginia
Pol., 1980, 220pp; Ibid., 1244

Baluuah, K

Southworth, V R

Food crop marketing in the Atebubu District. Stanford, 1981,
183 pp; DAI, 42,5 (1981) 2228

Cocking, R S

The historic Akoto: a social history of Cape Cost 1848-1948.
Stanford, 1981, 331 pp; Ibid., 2254

Chaafa, G T Z

The railway workers of Ghana 1900-50. Toronto, 1981; DAI,
42,9 (1982) 4106

Abiakpor, J C W

The role of foreign direct investment in manufacturing
industry development. Toronto, 1981; DAI, 42,10 (1982) 4516

Frempong, A

Multinational enterprise and industrialisation: Ghana’s Volta

Boateng, M Y

Problem of increasing output of small cocoa farmers: the
Ashanti Cocoa Project area. Missouri, 1982, 329 pp; DAI, 43,6
(1982) 2041

Franke, C

The Kumasi cattle trade. NYU, 1982, 365 pp; DAI, 43,7 (1983)
2388

Danso Boafo, A K

The political biography of Dr Kofi Busia. Howard, 1981,
349 pp; DAI, 43,9 (1983) 3099

Opoku Afriyie, Y

The political control of public enterprise in Ghana. SUNY-

White, S P

Agro-industries in Ghana. UCLA, 1983, 403 pp; DAI, 44,2
(1983) 596

Brown, E K

Patterns of internal migration in Ghana w.r.t. the
determinants of female migration. Penna., 1983, 295 pp; DAI,
44,8 (1984) 2575

Osafo, K

1523

Dadson, W K

Government policy formation in negotiations with MNCs: the
Jamaican and Ghanaian bauxite industries. Denver, 1983,
240 pp; DAI, 44,6 (1983) 1871

Korsah, N A B

Direct foreign investment policy in Ghana 1963-81. Penna.,

Zeff, E E

Differences and similarities between military and civilian
2375

3c. SIERRA LEONE, GAMBIA, LIBERIA

Bassi, P J

M.A., Newcastle, 1977

Kimbo, M L

Problems of rural development in Sierra Leone. M.Sc.,
Swansea, 1980

Seay, A

Foreign policies of Liberia and Sierra Leone 1957-73. London,
1978

Timbo, A B

Human rights in Sierra Leone: a comparative study. London,
1979

Fowler, A

Youth employment and unemployment in Sierra Leone.
Sussex, 1979

Walton, M


Binns, J A

The dynamics of food production systems. Birmingham, 1981

Blair, J A S

Migrant miners: economic consequences of labour movement
to the Sierra Leone diamond mines. Glasgow, 1981, 669 pp

Umomoibhi, M I

Imperial and League intervention in Sierra Leone and
Liberia: boundaries, finance and labour 1890-1936. Oxford,
1982, 355 pp
REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

191 Sekgoma, G

192 Fanusie, Y
Social classes, the state and public policy in Sierra Leone 1968-80. UC Riverside, 1981, 207pp; DAI, 42,3 (1981) 1296

193 Noaman, W G
The evolution of provincial local government and administration in Sierra Leone. NYU, 1980, 234pp; DAI, 42,7 (1982) 3298

194 Jeng, A Ao

195 Dey, J

196 Beedle, P J

197 Samura, M L

198 Hayes, R C

199 Holloway, J E
The social structure of Greenville: prestige and mobility in a Liberian coastal town. Wayne State, 1980, 155pp; Ibid., 1672

200 Mehrotra, G K
Liberia's population, with special emphasis on ethnic and fertility variations. Penna., 1980, 283pp; DAI, 41,10 (1981) 4505

3d. FRANCOPHONE WEST AFRICA (see also: 17)

202 De Witte, P
La CGT et les syndicats d'AOF 1945-57. Mem. mait., Paris 8, 1982

203 Renard, M F
Financement exterieure et planification du developpement au Senegal et au mali. 3eme cycle, Clearmont, 1979

204 Gueye, B
Les relations entre le Mali, le Senegal et les etats socialistes. 3eme cycle, Paris 1, 1980

205 Bassabosc, J
Le role de la France et les interventions francaises pour la sauvegarde des pays d'Afrique noire. 3eme cycle, Toulouse 1, 1981

206 Bamouni, B P
L'unesco et l'information en Afrique noire: le cas des pays de l'entente. 3eme cycle, Paris 2, 1982, 520pp

207 Yacoubou Djibo, M
La participation des femmes africaines a la vie politique (Senegal, Niger). 3eme cycle, Paris 5, 1982

208 Zinzindohoue, A
Integration economique en Afrique de l'Ouest. Compatiblit entre CEAO, CEDEAO, ACF, CEE. 3eme cycle, Orleans, 1982

209 Yeba, C T
Trois banques interafricaines au service du developpement economique et de l'integration regionale. 3eme cycle, Orleans, 1982

210 N'Diaye, A
Les relations exterieures des etats sans littoral d'Afrique occidentale. Toulouse 1, 1979

211 Sissiko, M M
Le contentieux administratif des territoires de l'ancienne AOF. paris 2, 1982

212 Kombila, J P
Le problematique constitutionnel dans les regime politiques des etats d'Afrique francophone monopartisitse. Paris 2, 1982

213 Golan, T

214 Somerville, C M
North-South and South-South cooperation: the Comite permanent inter-etats de lutte contre la secheresse dans le Sahel. Michigan, 1982, 227pp; DAI, 48,8 (1982) 2090


Contribution à l'étude des rapports de coopération entre la France et la Haute Volta. 3ème cycle, Rouen, 1981.


Le syndicalisme au Niger et son évolution. 3ème cycle, Nantes, 1981.


120 REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

240 Djekery, S  Le conflit des frontières entre le Tchad et la Libye. 3ème cycle, Poitiers, 1980, 200
241 Khayar, I H  Aperçu sur la sociologie des élites Ouadaiennes dans la passe et l'aujourd'hui. 3ème cycle. Paris 3, 1982
242 Dono Horngar, J  La gestion de la fonction publique tchadienne. Paris 1, 1981
243 Gerry, C  Poverty in employment: a political economy of petty commodity production in Dakar. Leeds, 1979
244 Mackintosh, M M  D 37450/81 1980, 459pp
245 Amourio Obadia, R M  L'expérience multipartiste du Sénégal: élection de 26.2.78. 3ème cycle, Lyon 2, 1980
246 Cissoko, K  Le multipartisme au Sénégal. 3ème cycle, Reims, 1982, 321pp
252 Dounamou, A  Le mouvement syndical en Côte d'Ivoire. Mem. Maitrise, Paris 1, 1977778
253 Loucou, J N  La vie politique en Côte d'Ivoire de 1932 a 1952. 3ème cycle, Aix-Provence, 1976
254 Thiriot, A  La politique étrangère africaine de la Côte d'Ivoire. Bordeaux 1, 1982, 390pp
255 Tagro, A  Recherches sur les controles de l'administration en Côte d'Ivoire. Poitiers, 1982
256 Degni Segui, A  L'administration locale ivoiriennne. Aix-Marseille 3, 1982
257 Sissoko, A  Aspects sociologiques de l'integration nationale: Côte d'Ivoire. Nice, 1982
265 Guillermie, P  Guinée 1958-78. 3ème cycle, Paris 7, 1981, 472pp
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>267</td>
<td>Sekpon, A P</td>
<td>La politique exterieure du Benin. Mem. DEA, Bordeaux 1, 1980, 125pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268</td>
<td>Afouda, L</td>
<td>La RP du Benin: contribution a l'étude de l'évolution et la nature des regimes politiques africains. 3eme cycle, Poitiers, 1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>269</td>
<td>Cocou, A</td>
<td>Le travailleurs de chemin de fer au Dahomey sous la colonization: des origines a 1952. 3eme cycle, Paris 7, 1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>270</td>
<td>Monteiro, C</td>
<td>Les entreprises publiques au Benin. 3eme cycle, Orleans, 1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271</td>
<td>Ebene, S N</td>
<td>Educational policy and practice in the development of Cameroun 1844-1976, Wales, 1980, 382pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272</td>
<td>Hollier, G P</td>
<td>The dynamics of rural marketing in the NW Province, Cameroun. Liverpool, 1981, 767pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274</td>
<td>Oyono, D</td>
<td>Les relations internationales et la continuité de la politique francaise au Cameroun 1919-46. 3eme cycle, Paris/IEP, 1980, 328pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275</td>
<td>Ngueukam Tientcheu, A</td>
<td>Les strategies coloniales du lutte contre l'UPC. 3eme cycle, Paris 8, 1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>276</td>
<td>Kengne Pokam, E</td>
<td>La religion face au pouvoir politique au Cameroun. Poitiers, 1980, 706pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>277</td>
<td>Ngijol, G</td>
<td>La strategie de la longevite et de la stabilité de regime camerounaise. 3eme cycle, Paris 7, 1981, 304pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>279</td>
<td>Erik, E</td>
<td>Le Cameroun et le monde arabe de 1960 a 1980. 3eme cycle, Paris 1, 1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>280</td>
<td>Forje, J W</td>
<td>The one and indivisible Cameroun: political integration and socioeconomic development. Lund, 1981, 191pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>281</td>
<td>Koenig, D B</td>
<td>Sex, work and social class in Cameroun. Northwestern, 1977</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>286</td>
<td>Chiabi, E M L</td>
<td>Background to nationalism in anglophone Cameroun 1916-54. UC Santa Barbara, 1982, 520pp; DAI, 44,6 (1983) 1887</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3e. GUINE-BISSAU, SAHWARI REPUBLIC

287 Mendy, P M K | The problems and prospects of 'liberation education' in Guine-B. M. Soc. Sci., Birmingham
288 Chabal, P | Amilcar Cabral as a revolutionary leader. Cambridge, 1980
289 De Andrade, M | La pensee politique d'Amilcar Cabral. Mem. EHESS, 1982, 105pp
290 Hassani, M | Le Sahara occidental et le droit international. Paris 10, 1982

4. EAST AFRICA

291 Jones, T P | Marxist theories of the state and the development of the postcolonial state. M. Phil., Birmingham, 1981
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Work Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>293</td>
<td>The impact of dependency and underdevelopment on the foreign policy of Kenya and Tanzania. Dalhousie, 1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>294</td>
<td>Le système politique et son environnement: le Kenya et la Tanzanie. Louvain, 1982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 296  | Webster, J B 8026391  
     Ethnic myths in Eastern Africa. Syracuse, 1980, 469pp; DAI, 41,6 (1980) 2726 |
| 297  | Namatovu, G 8105071  
| 298  | Muzale, P J 8116364  
| 299  | Nzwilli, PV 8218825  
| 300  | Futuitt, D L 8314934  

**4a. KENYA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Work Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 301  | Low, P  
     D 36578/81  
     Kenyan government policy towards the export of manufactured goods from 1964. Sussex, 1981, 475pp |
| 302  | Kaplinsky, R  
     D 37446/81  
     Appropriate technology in the bakery industry in Kenya. Sussex, 1980, 293pp |
| 303  | Mosley, P  
     D 40854/82  
     The settler economies: studies in the economic history of Kenya and S Rhodesia 1900-63. Cambridge, 1980 |
| 304  | Lenneiye, N M  
     D 37910/81  
| 305  | Ritchie, K G H  
     D 39700/82  
     The role and relevance of non-government aid in Kenya. Aston, 1981, 463pp |
| 306  | Eglin, R W  
     D 42743/82  
| 307  | Meyerhoff, E L  
     D 43052/82  
     The socioeconomic and ritual roles of Pokot women. Cambridge, 1982 |
| 308  | Anderson, D M  
     D 43205/82  
     The peoples of the Baringo Plain, Kenya, 1890-1940. Cambridge, 1982 |
| 309  | Gachuki, D W  
     D 46375/83  
| 310  | Amia, P H  
     D 47499/83  
| 311  | Drohan, M  
     D 49443/84  
| 312  | Lietard, F  
     Le succession de Jomo Kenyatta. Mem. IEP, Bordeaux, 1982, 122pp |
| 313  | Gitonga, A K  
     L'Administration territoriale dans le strategie de developpement au Kenya. 7eme cycle, Toulouse 1, 1981 |
| 314  | Okuteh Oyugi, F B  
     L'entreprise publique au Kenya. 7eme cycle, Bordeaux, 1981, 315pp |
| 315  | Berg Schlosser, D  
| 316  | Winterford, D  
     The political economy of the urban informal sector in Kenya. British Columbia, 1979 |
| 317  | Ng'Ethe, N  
     Harambee and development participation in Kiambu. Carleton, 1979 |
The development of ethnic associations in Nairobi 1922-75. Toronto, 1979


Production, exchange (clientelism) and economic development among the Luo-Abasusa of SW Kenya. Indiana, 1980, 362pp; DAI, 41,10 (1981) 4439


Youth, underdevelopment and rural change: the impact of non-formal education policy in Kenya. Indiana, 1982, 396 (no abstract)


The pattern of economic growth and sources of structural change in Kenya 1964-78. Pittsburgh, 1981, 189pp; Ibid., 218


Demographic transition in ... Kericho District, Syracuse, 1982, 361pp; DAI, 43,9 (1983) 3112


REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY


Zeleza, P (1982) Dependent capitalism and the making of the Kenyan working class during the colonial period. Dalhousie, 1982

4b. TANZANIA (see also 5, 31)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>367</td>
<td>Miti, K</td>
<td>Socialism or nationalism: the debate about the Arusha Declaration in Tanzania (1967-74). Toronto</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>4133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>368</td>
<td>Vanderwees, G</td>
<td>Mobility and choice and technology in the development process in rural areas of NW Tanzania. Washington</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>183pp</td>
<td>1726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>369</td>
<td>Trebon, T S</td>
<td>Development of the preindependence educational system in Tanganyika w.r.t. the role of missionaries. Denver</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>262pp</td>
<td>2288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>373</td>
<td>Valentine, T R</td>
<td>Government wage policy, wage determination and the development process. Illinois</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>349pp</td>
<td>873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>375</td>
<td>Lukawima, F M</td>
<td>Tanzania's political economy of development: global, national and local aspects. Michigan</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>486pp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>377</td>
<td>Kasungu, R S</td>
<td>The potential of labour-based transportation in the improvement of the Tanzanian economy. Washington State</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>169pp</td>
<td>3058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>380</td>
<td>Amani, H K R</td>
<td>An analysis of maize-cotton farming systems for small farmers in Geita District. MSU</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>262pp</td>
<td>1541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>382</td>
<td>Kipokola, J P</td>
<td>Industrialisation in Tanzania: setting the stage for a future strategy. Boston</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>146pp</td>
<td>1511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>383</td>
<td>Steins, H</td>
<td>National planning and development. UC Riverside</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>157pp</td>
<td>2207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>384</td>
<td>Lipumba, N H I</td>
<td>Foreign exchange and economic development in Taizania. Stanford</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>270pp</td>
<td>2827</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**4e. UGANDA, BURUNDI, RWANDA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>385</td>
<td>Ede, K B</td>
<td>The making of a colonial space economy: core and periphery in Uganda. M.A., Queens (Canada)</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>171pp</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>386</td>
<td>Passi, F O</td>
<td>The development of government education policy in Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
126 REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY

387 De Cononek, J 1925-70. Cardiff, 1979
D 35509/81 Artisans and petty commodity production in Uganda. Sussex,
388 Kakumba, I 1980, 287pp
Seme cycle, Paris 2, 1982
389 Akenda Ondoga, 387
V J 388
8015630 Production organisation and labour use among smallholders in
389 Hirva, A H 389
8122078 Transportation, economic development and spatial
transformation in Uganda. Rutgers, 1981, 336pp; DAI, 42,3
(1981) 1823
391 Rwagacuzi, F Ugandan disunity, w.r.t. Buganda 1850-1966. Claremont,
8123970 1981, 185pp; DAI, 42,7 (1982) 3260
392 Taylor, T F The British cotton industry in the establishment of a colonial
8123942 economy in Uganda 1902-1939. Syracuse, 1981, 352pp; Ibid.,
393 Muvumba, J 3248
8222679 Politics of stratification and transformation of the Kingdom of
8227211 1924-70’s. NYU, 1982, 265pp; DAI, 43,7 (1983) 2461
DEA, Bordeaux, 1981, 120pp
8400552 DAI, 44,9 (1984) 2855

4e. NORTH EAST AFRICA (see also 24)

397 Oddoux, S Les aspects culturels du conflit frontalier somalo-ethiopien.
Mem. DEA, Paris 1, 1980
398 Selassie, T B The political and military traditions of the Ethiopian
399 Tsachai, B Anglo-Ethiopian relations 1934-42. Bristol, 1980
400 Akalu, A The process of land nationalisation in Ethiopia. Lund, 1982,
8223700 224pp
402 Mansfield, M The J-curve theory and the Ethiopian revolution. St. Louis,
8223700 1982, 320pp; DAI, 45,6 (1982) 2082
403 Negash, G Revolutionary rhetoric ... in Ethiopia 1974-77. Colorado,
1982, 519pp; DAI, 45,7 (1983) 2487
404 Arthur, P A The Ethiopian revolution. Northwestern, 1982, 440pp; DAI,
8305452 43,10 (1983) 3406
405 Ponsi, F T Ethiopia’s development planning experience 1957-79. SUNY-
8003239 Buffalo, 1982, 256pp; DAI, 45,10 (1983) 3726
406 Alemu, T US foreign policy toward the Ethiopian revolution.
407 Assaged, M Ethiopian revolution and war 1974-78. Denver, 1982,
8315892 357pp; DAI, 44,9 (1983) 858
408 Teeggai, A The economic viability of an independent Eritrea. Nebraska,
8124524 1981, 357pp; DAI, 45,5 (1981) 2221
409 Haile, S Self determination and the Eritrean question: a practical
410 Guadagni, M Somalia law: agricultural land from tribal tenure and
8291313/90 colonial administration, to socialist reform. London, 1980,
504pp
411 Fatoke, A S O British colonial administration of Somaliland Protectorate
8213921 1920-60. Illinois (Chicago Circle), 1982, 282pp; DAI, 43,1
(1982) 236
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Source Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 5. CENTRAL AFRICA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Source Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### 5a. ZAMBIA (see also 5, 31)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Source Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>417</td>
<td>Mwiya, M</td>
<td>Workers’ participation in management. M.A., Zambia, 1979, 331pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>418</td>
<td>Nkhata, L</td>
<td>Social stratification in colonial Zambia. M.A., Zambia, 1979, 166pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>420</td>
<td>Bwalya, M C</td>
<td>Rural development and agricultural transformation in Mpika District. E Anglia, 1980, 406pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>422</td>
<td>Milimo, M C</td>
<td>Relations between the Lozi, their subject tribes and the colonial administration 1890-1941. Oxford, 1980, 266pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>423</td>
<td>Hartmann, R</td>
<td>Traditionelle Socialization, koloniale Bildungspolitik und nachkoloniale Reafrikanisierungsstrategie. Salzburg, 1980, 248pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>426</td>
<td>Momba, J C</td>
<td>The state, peasant differentiation and rural class formation in Mazabuka and Monze Districts. Toronto, 1982; DAI, 44,3 (1983) 856</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>427</td>
<td>Mabeza, R M</td>
<td>The changing role of African women in development (Mumbwa District), M.A., Clark, 1977, 186pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>429</td>
<td>Burdette, M M</td>
<td>The dynamics of nationalisation between MNCs and peripheral states. Columbia, 1979, 526pp</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### PUBLICATIONS 1974-1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Development in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Multinational Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Classes in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Class Struggle &amp; Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>The State in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Merchant Capital/Neo-Colonialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Special Issue on South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Capitalism in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Peasants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Mining and Mine Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Special Issue on Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>New Colonialism and Military Rule: Special Issue on Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15/16</td>
<td>Special Issue on Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Debate in Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Special Issue on Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Consciousness &amp; Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Kenya: The Agrarian Question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Peasants, Capital &amp; The State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Ideology, Class &amp; Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Scandinavian Perspectives on Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>The French Connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Ruth First Memorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>The Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/28</td>
<td>Women, Oppression &amp; Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Resistance &amp; Resettlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Conflict in the Horn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Capital vs. Labour in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>The 'Left' in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Scandinavian Perspectives on Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>The Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>South Africa (3.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Conflict in the Horn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Capital vs. Labour in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>The 'Left' in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Scandinavian Perspectives on Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>The Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>South Africa (3.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Conflict in the Horn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Capital vs. Labour in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>The 'Left' in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Scandinavian Perspectives on Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>The Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>South Africa (3.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Conflict in the Horn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Capital vs. Labour in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>The 'Left' in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Scandinavian Perspectives on Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>The Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>South Africa (3.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Conflict in the Horn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Capital vs. Labour in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>The 'Left' in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Scandinavian Perspectives on Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>The Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>South Africa (3.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Conflict in the Horn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Capital vs. Labour in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>The 'Left' in Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ORDER FORM

#### Subscriptions (3 issues per year, including postage and packing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>1 yr.</th>
<th>2 yr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individuals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK and Africa</td>
<td>£8</td>
<td>£15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere</td>
<td>£10/US$18</td>
<td>£19/US$24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa/Elsewhere airmail</td>
<td>£16/US$29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back Issues</td>
<td>£3.50/US$6 each except no.29 which is £4.50/US$7.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Rate</td>
<td>£5.50/US$10 (verification needed with payment)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>1 yr.</th>
<th>2 yr.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK and Africa</td>
<td>£14</td>
<td>£25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere</td>
<td>£16/US$35</td>
<td>£25/US$60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa/Elsewhere airmail</td>
<td>£22/US$46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Back Issues</td>
<td>£6/US$12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Please start/continue my sub with issue.**

#### BOOKS FROM ROAPE

(all prices include postage and packing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never Kneel Down: Drought, Development and Liberation in Eritrea</td>
<td>£4.95/US$7.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hell Hole Robben Island: Reminiscences of a Political Prisoner</td>
<td>£4.95/US$9.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behind the War in Eritrea</td>
<td>£3.50/US$7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Socialism in Practice: Tanzania</td>
<td>£2.95/US$6.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State and Society in Nigeria</td>
<td>£3.25/US$7.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL**

### Notes
- Cheques (US Dollars, on US banks, International MO or Sterling cheques) payable to ROAPE, 341 Glossop Road, Sheffield S10 2HP, England. Phone (0742) 752671. GIRO ACCOUNT No. 64 960 4008. (Because of the fluctuation in the £/$ rate, ROAPE reserves the right to adjust rates accordingly).
- **Please include your full name and address.**