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Editorial

This review is published with the express intent of providing a counterweight to that mass of literature on Africa which holds: that Africa's continuing chronic poverty is primarily an internal problem and not a product of her colonial history and her present dependence; that the successful attraction of foreign capital and the consequent production within the confines of the international market will bring development; and that the major role in achieving development must be played by western-educated, 'modernizing' elites who will bring progress to the 'backward' masses. We hold these perspectives to be inaccurate and mystifying and with regard to the last it should be clear that while the African revolution needs leaders and cadres, the record suggests that the leaders who inherited power at independence have all too often borne out Fanon's description of them as 'spoilt children of yesterday's colonialism and of today's national governments, [who] organise the loot of whatever national resources exist' — primarily on behalf of foreign interests, of course.

As a counter to this perspective, our task will be to examine the roots of Africa's present condition. In simple terms, we propose to ask: why is Africa's productive potential not realised? Why are most of its people still poor? Why is the continent still dependent, its future still controlled by outside forces? But merely providing an alternative analysis could be just as emptily 'academic'. It is hoped therefore that our contributors will also address themselves to those issues concerned with the actions needed if Africa is to develop its potential. Though we are aware that these questions of tactics and strategy can be answered finally only by those struggling in Africa itself, we hope that this journal will provide a forum which will assist in sharpening analysis and in facilitating the fruitful accumulation of experience.
The task at hand calls for analysis of the crucial issues and in this we can propose no better guiding principle than Mao's dictum: 'No investigation, no right to speak'. But analysis requires a method, and the method must derive from a theory of social change which focuses on the agents of change. Amilcar Cabral understood how this kind of theory was a necessary 'weapon' and echoes Lenin's phrase that 'there can be no revolutionary struggle without a revolutionary theory'. These two tasks of acquiring the tools and applying them to make an analysis should not be seen as an end in themselves or the separate task of full-time intellectuals. They are necessary in the practical business of working out a strategy for carrying on the struggle.

The analysis of Africa is in its early stages though the revolutionary practice of the struggle in Guine-Bissau and Mozambique is beginning to yield valuable insights about the tactics of armed struggle, about mobilisation and about patterns of grass-roots development. Saul's piece on the peasantry in Africa brilliantly sets out some of these points.

In spite of such promising beginnings it cannot be said that even among radical students of Africa there is a consensus about the diagnosis of the ills, much less about the appropriate cure. Hence one point of departure of this Review is that it does not presume to offer a 'line'. Appropriate analysis and the devising of a strategy for Africa's revolution must be encouraged and we hope that the provision of this platform for discussion will assist that process. Ultimately the specific answers will emerge from the actual struggles of the African people, on the continent and throughout the world. A periodical prepared at a distance can at best hope to perform a small holding operation by initiating debate, until the political climate in at least one part of the continent allows enough of an opening for a radical journal to 'come home'.

The Ideological Perspective
Having said that this Review will not be given over to the narrow promotion of some dogmatic formula or be a mouthpiece for any political faction, we should stress that we do have an ideological perspective. We are not content to be merely eclectic, mixing collections of bits and pieces of wisdom from all parts of the political spectrum. Though we do not have at hand a completely worked out analysis we do have a common starting point. We are not neutral about the kind of method that offers the best chance of coming to terms with the realities of African underdevelopment. The perspective of the Review will be in this sense Marxist — not in offering a blueprint for some future society, nor in supporting a particular type of regime, as popular usage mistakenly might indicate, but in using a method which analyses a situation in order to change it. This approach sees the changing patterns of production as holding the key to changes in all societal relationships. It analyses the changing relations of production and the role of state power in reproducing them in order to identify the emerging contradictions. Identifying these contradictions indicates not only the essential character of the social formation requiring to be changed, but
equally the opportunities that will have to be seized in order to transform society.

There are two major components to such analyses. Identification of the social relationships, especially the class relations, associated with certain modes of production highlights the systemic roots of the problem: whether it be the general nature of Africa's underdevelopment or something as specific as the presently raging famines. But class analysis involves a second stage: the identification, on the basis of the particular position and interests of the different classes and the strata within them, of the likely allies and opponents in the struggle to transform an underdeveloped society, and it is here that Saul's piece in this issue makes its contribution.

Applied to the African context, our method first requires recognition of the existing relations for what they are: whatever populist myths about 'African socialism' may be in vogue, Africa is dominated by capitalist relations. Moreover the development of its capitalism has two critical peculiarities. Unlike the national capitalist systems that emerged, driven by indigenous forces in Europe, North America, and Japan, in Africa the process was initiated from outside, when capitalism had reached the advanced and expansive stage of imperialism. But the capitalist relations that thus developed were not simply those between the African people as a whole and the external powers or specific exploiters. Africa's integration into the global system of capitalism brought about changed internal relationships which have developed into the characteristics of 'peripheral capitalism'.

We must therefore seek to comprehend African reality at a number of levels. We must reject the orthodoxy of bourgeois social science which sees each national economy, state and society, and often even each of their separate problems in isolation; in this view international forces are at most the 'context' for national development and never the source of exploitation and dominance. However, we must not simply see Africa as the reflection of imperialism. There is a need to develop theoretical insights into the specificity of the social formations that underdeveloped capitalism gives rise to, in response both to the pre-capitalist history of Africa and to its integration into the international capitalist system. Such an approach sees the dynamic of African societies as a complex result of internal and external forces which distort and limit the development of the forces of production under capitalism. In this we are, at least initially, at odds with a position, claiming the mantle of Marxist orthodoxy, which holds that the distortion of so-called peripheral capitalism is no more than the natural and inevitable concomitant of all capitalist development, and that the potential of peripheral capital is only as limited as the potential of capitalism itself. Our profound disagreement with this position does not mean, however, that we reject it out of hand and we hope that this position will be the subject of a critical debate in these pages. Certainly the increased internationalisation of capital does at least open up the possibility that peripheries can in future no longer be geographically defined.

In this issue Samir Amin's paper offers us in outline a summary of
his basic model of the workings of the international system as a whole, presented at length in his recent two books. It provides us with an ideal starting point: a general view of international capitalism, identifying the crucial differences in the dynamic of accumulation at the centre and at the periphery: Differences which promote development in the metropoles and inhibit it in Africa. It is our hope that his work, which represents the most significant African contribution to the debate on underdevelopment, will be studied widely and discussed critically.

Though committed to the analysis of Africa in a global context, we do feel that this involves more than a discussion of alternative general theoretical frameworks of how production and accumulation occur at the centres and extremities of capitalism. We therefore hope to encourage contributions which explore this international dimension of Africa at a more detailed and historically specific level. As a journal published outside Africa, it is appropriate that among the questions on our agenda should be: What is Africa's changing position in the international division of labour and between the shifting spheres of influence of different capitalist and non-capitalist states? What are the strategies of imperialist powers and of monopoly capital towards the continent?

Africa & Imperialism in the 1970s
It is often forgotten that work on African problems can be done in Europe and North America, and not only by burrowing into colonial archives. Investigating the economic, political and military initiatives of the metropoles is of vital importance and we will seek out such work for publication in future issues of the journal. Indeed the second issue will concentrate on one new crucial dimension that is having a critical impact on Africa — the emergence of the Transnational Corporation. The very rapid spread of these corporate giants is just one of several related trends that are changing the terms of Africa's involvement with the capitalist centres and also changing the expectations, aims and methods of the power holders of capitalism towards the continent in the 1970s.

In Africa the 1960s were a period of dramatic change — even if the limited consequence of 'flag independence' is acknowledged and if the continuation of economic dependence is realised. Nor was the basic change in the political economy a mere change in the ties to the colonial power from a direct to an indirect, neo-colonial one, or the mere acquisition of a share in state power by certain privileged indigenous classes. The achievement of independence involved the exposure of African economies previously closely tied to the old metropolis to competition of capital from other centres. In particular, there was a strong assertion of American investment and influence throughout the continent. At the same time, capital from the US and increasingly from transnational corporations did begin to cast a few of the more well-endowed African countries in a new role within the international division of labour: as a base for some limited extractive and manufacturing industrialisation instead of
the mere supplying of raw materials.

But the 1970s are bringing further changes in the forces bearing on Africa, the consequences of which have still to be seriously assessed. The specific new forms through which the centres of economic and political power will now impinge on Africa have to be studied in order to flesh out the skeleton of centre-periphery relations that is obtained from an analysis like Amin's. The world as a whole seems to be entering a different phase whose dimensions are still only taking shape. Here, we can only indicate some of the main directions of change, whose implications for Africa it will be one of our major tasks to explore.

It is of primary importance to locate the centre of power within the changing capitalism system itself and to assess the significance of shifts that are taking place in it. The US's hegemony of the capitalist world, established firmly in 1945, has been undermined by the successes of the Vietnamese people in resisting US imperialism and by the emergence of Europe and Japan as alternative centres seeking to gain their own privileged access to strategic raw materials, overseas markets and new fields of investment. This shift in power relations among capitalist states together with the related detente with the Soviet Union and China, have led to a redefinition of spheres of influence. While the consequences of this process on some areas of the world are relatively clear — thus US monopoly over Latin America remains unchallenged, while some economic and military role for Japan in South East Asia is clearly assumed — where Africa figures in the calculations and deals between the US and Europe and between the western and socialist powers is still difficult to discern. The American build-up in Africa since independence has by no means given them the kind of monopoly they have in Latin America. The stake of American investors in Africa went up almost four fold during the 1960s to reach £3.5 billion in 1970, but the flow of private and public capital from the US was still less than that from Europe, while the Common Market's trade with Africa was almost ten times greater than that between the US and Africa.

Some see in this multipolarity a chance for African states to play off different powers against each other. Economically there may be a prospect of getting better terms for investment and trade by playing off Japan, Europe and America. Militarily, there is a hope that a weakened US may be forced to maintain a low profile and allow a neutral zone to emerge in Africa and the Indian Ocean. However at first glance it seems more likely that the emergence of Europe and Japan as viable alternative centres in the capitalist world will lead to an intensifying struggle, which may be played out most brutally in Africa, precisely because it is not exclusively tied to one of the centres. The US is unlikely to give up its foothold in Africa while the prescription for its national economic ills, offered by many experts, calls for an aggressive campaign for overseas markets and investment to produce a larger surplus and consolidate the country's balance of payments. At the same time, there are signs of increasing American (and even European) military interest in Africa, especially
its Eastern coast, and in the whole Indian Ocean area, which will remain vital throughout the 1970s as a supply route for oil supplies.

Sub-imperialism
It is in a military context that another fundamental change in the shape of the contemporary world can be noted. One strategy that is being employed by a US state that wishes to avoid becoming over-extended again as with Indochina, is to look to local medium-sized powers to keep trade routes and fields for future investment open against the threat of internal disorder or of radical regimes. A pattern of sub-imperialism appears to be deliberately fostered where the provision of military advice and training plus massive supplies of weaponry will largely, but not exclusively, take the place of direct intervention by a US force. The candidates for this role of 'deputy peace-keeper' are those larger countries, often with mineral riches, that are proving capable of some semi-industrialisation through foreign capital. On Africa’s borders, Israel has played this role vis-a-vis the Arab countries, but Iran, recipient of two billion dollars of military equipment last year, is increasingly cast in this role in the Middle East and Indian Ocean. Brazil’s assumption of this role in Latin America is not irrelevant to Africa for that country has developed political and military links with Portugal and South Africa. Within Africa the fact that South Africa presents such a suitable possibility for maintaining the economic and military status quo in the Southern half of the continent has led the Nixon government to move towards closer support of the white regimes. But black regimes can serve the same purpose; Nigeria and Zaire have the size, the developed natural resources, and strong American influences to make them ideal for these purposes, while Kenya economically, and Ethiopia militarily, have been the target on a much less significant scale, of similar developments in Eastern Africa.

Transnational Corporations
This preliminary balance sheet of the major external trends at work in Africa would not be complete without some further mention of the phenomenon of the transnational or multinational corporation. The activities of these giants are so pervasive but so little understood that they make an appropriate focus for our second issue. But the current strategies they are employing and their overall political and economic influences on the African continent must be briefly assessed in relation to the changing power structure that we have been considering. In fact our previous discussion of the calculations of the different capitalist powers was an oversimplification. For when we talk about the USA or Japan in this context we are not referring to the intentions of a whole people so much as the actions of states which in turn reflect the interest of certain classes or interests based in the metropoles. Moreover, it has certainly been true that the more monopolistic sections of the bourgeoisie in the capitalist centres have an even more decisive influence over the state in foreign policy than in domestic matters. But here again, events are making for change. Part of the lesson of Vietnam for the large companies was that military intervention was a very cumbersome
and not always efficient tool for securing their freedom to operate. On the other hand, the penetration of the Soviet and Chinese markets by straight business deals, together with the growing size and international scope of corporate activity go to make the multinationals less committed, in every way, to using the metropolitan state as their sole instrument. The transnational corporations are in fact the major entities in the increasing international competition that we noted. But in their battle for control of the business environment they are becoming, as one writer put it, "quite opportunistic about their associations with the nation state" — both that from which they originate and those where they are prepared to do business. Thus in Africa we may well be entering a period where centre-periphery relations, even in the realm of political power, may be much more mediated through dealings between international corporation and national states than between states or between international and local businesses. These giants have no racial or ideological compunction about carrying on business in the white dominated states of Southern Africa and in the countries that oppose them as well; about dealing with neo-colonial or nationalistic regimes; about joining forces with local businessmen or with state enterprise. The struggle for full liberation takes an open politico-military form in certain circumstances, but it also has to be conducted on a continuous economic plane in the specifics of dealing with the multinationals in all their guises.

The emergence of the transnationals, the slackening of US domination, growing intra-capitalist competition and the delineation of new spheres of influence between the capitalist and socialist powers — those are the major new contradictions at work in the present historical period which have to be grasped if Africa's future is to be understood in its full global setting. But these are also dimensions that have to be taken into account in analyzing more concrete local issues. The kind of combined insight gained from looking at specific national or local relationships against a backcloth of the broadest global trends that we are here advocating is necessary to grasp what is to be done about some immediate problem — even one due to seemingly natural causes like the famine that we feature in one section of this issue — or to decide what choices of economic and political strategy a given movement or national government should make, as well as for answering the grand question of "which way is Africa going?" It is to this task of understanding, and countering, the debilitating consequences of a capitalism which stems from external domination and exploitation and is combined with internal, underdeveloped and equally exploitative structures that this Review is dedicated.

Class Struggle
We suggested earlier that the approach we wanted to foster should not stop short with the identification of the existing problem, even if seen in all its political and economic, its global and internal, its general theoretical and historically specific complexity. Class analysis should also be indicating the prospects for transformation and in particular isolating the class alliances that will have to be generated.
and the approach to their struggle with the entrenched interests maintaining underdevelopment.

The answer to the question of what is to be done to change Africa's capitalist underdevelopment, has appeared in the most straightforward manner in Southern Africa. There has been a broad consensus about the need for the mass of the African population to wage armed struggle against colonial or racist regimes. Out of that situation have emerged not only valuable lessons for the mobilisation of popular forces throughout the continent, but also a specific determination on the part of the liberation movements and the peoples, notably in Guinea, Angola and Mozambique, not to settle for token independence and continued economic domination. Recent events however may be creating a situation more closely resembling that elsewhere in the continent where the need for armed struggle is not so generally accepted and the enemy is no longer simply a non-African colonial or racist regime. The coup in Portugal, itself clearly the result of the struggle of the peoples in the colonial territories, does not yet guarantee the complete independence for which the liberation movements have fought. The new regime may contain some progressive elements, but Spinola (whose very limited reformist intentions are made clear in our Briefings section) represents other national and foreign interests who will strive to salvage their stake in the colonies. In fact they can do little in the face of the popular solidarity and success of the movements in Guinea (although they will clearly try to hive off the Cape Verde islands with their air base and staging post for South Africa) or even in Mozambique (despite all the talk of a settler UDI in a partitioned southern corner). However, Angola — the richest prize for western capital with its oil, iron and other mineral potential — presents other opportunities. In seeking to promote a neo-colonial solution, such interests can work on the existence of nationalist movements whose commitment is not, like MPLA's, to fight for economic liberation from capitalist domination. Chief stage director in this alternative scenario is clearly not some Portuguese colonial figure, but independent Zaire's President, Mobutu Sese Seko. It is apparent that he is now prepared to play in Angola the sub-imperialist role for which he has been so carefully prepared by his US mentors, and this in order to promote some form of independence which will allow the continued exploitation of its people and resources. This transformation of a colonial war to an anti-capitalist class struggle serves as a reminder that liberation is still on the agenda for most of the African continent.
Accumulation and Development: a theoretical model

Samir Amin

In this article Samir Amin sets out the core of his model of the global accumulation of capital. In it he defines two distinct patterns: one applying to development at the centre, the other to dependent development in the periphery. Central development is characterised by the dominance of economic activity to satisfy mass consumer needs and the consequent demand for production goods. The power of the masses is enlisted in a 'social contract' which allows the establishment of a limited economic viability, at a national level. However, the internationalisation of productive capital increasingly threatens that stability. The peripheral systems are dominated by production of luxury goods and exports and the consequent lack of importance of internal mass markets. This leads to growing inequality, technological dependence, political weakness among the oppressed — in sum, marginalization. Restructuring of these economies requires a break with the international economy, and self-centred development which establishes the dominance of production for mass needs, though there are particular difficulties for individual countries attempting such a break and ultimately a solution can be found only if such changes take place internationally. Policies for the difficult period of transition must first and foremost focus on the need to build the political consciousness necessary to complete this process.

The aim of this paper is to show that there is a fundamental difference between the model of capital accumulation and of economic and social development characteristic of a self-centred system and that of a peripheral system. In bringing out this difference — which we regard as absolutely fundamental — I shall attempt to situate, within this framework of general theory, questions of social structure, and other important problems of the contemporary world, including the social (among others unemployment, under-development and marginality), and the ideological and political
(particularly the problems of social consciousness, class consciousness, planning, mobilisation of resources and men, education and its social role).

The diagram below sums up the difference between a self-centred system and a peripheral one:

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<tr>
<td>'mass' consumption of capital</td>
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<tr>
<td>exports</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consumption of luxury goods</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goods</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Main peripheral-dependent relation</td>
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The economic system is divided into four sectors which may be considered both from the point of view of production and from the point of view of distribution of the active population engaged in the above-mentioned productive activities.

**Self-centred System**

The determining relationship in a self-centred system is that which links sector 2 (the production of 'mass' consumption goods) with sector 4 (the production of capital goods intended for the production of sector 2).

This determining relationship has been the characteristic feature of the historical development of capitalism at the centre of the system (in Europe, North America and Japan). Thus it provides an abstract definition of the 'pure' capitalist mode of production and has been analyzed as such in Marx's *Das Kapital*. It can be shown that the development process of the USSR, like that of China, is equally based on this determining relationship, although in the case of China the sequences of this process are original.

Marx, in fact, shows that in the capitalist mode of production there is an objective (i.e. necessary) relation between the rate of surplus value and the level of development of the productive forces. The rate of surplus value is the main determinant of the pattern of social distribution of the national income (its distribution between wages and surplus value which takes the form of profit), and hence that of demand (wages being the source of demand for mass consumption goods and profits being wholly or partly 'saved' for 'investment' purposes). The level of development of the productive forces is expressed through the social division of labour: the division of the labour force, in suitable proportions, between sectors 2 and 4 (sectors 2 and 1 in Marx's reproduction model).

This objective relation, though fundamental to *Das Kapital*, has often been 'forgotten', for example in the debate on the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. The argument very often put forward, that the increase in the organic composition of capital may be offset by increases in the rate of surplus value, is no longer valid once it becomes clear that the contradiction between the productive
capacity of the system and its capacity for consumption — inherent in the capitalist mode of production — is constantly being overcome and that this reflects the objective nature of the relation between the rate of surplus value and the level of development of the productive forces. As we have explained on a number of previous occasions, this theoretical model of capital accumulation is infinitely more informative than all the empirical models subsequently put forward: (1) because it reveals the origin of profit (which calls for a theory of value) and removes any absolute quality from economic rationality, thus lowering it to its proper status of rationality within a system and not rationality independent of the system, as authoritatively shown by Piero Sraffa; (2) because it shows, in this way, that economic choices in this system are necessarily sub-optimal, revealing the ideological — and non-scientific — nature of the marginalist concepts of 'general equilibrium', and (3) because it shows that 'real wage' cannot be 'just anything', thus giving an objective status to relations between social forces.

The objective relation in question is seen in the cyclical fluctuations of economic activity and employment. An increase in the rate of surplus value over and above its objectively necessary level leads to a depression due to insufficient effective demand. A reduction in this rate slows down economic growth thus creating labour market conditions which favour capital. As we have shown, the pattern of this adjustment — which in fact corresponds exactly with the history of capital accumulation from the industrial revolution of the 1930 depression (a period characterised by the trade cycle) — is more complex as a result of the secondary effect of wage variations on the choice of techniques, thus reflecting the sub-optimal nature of the economic system. A tendency towards full employment (which does not exclude and in fact implies a permanent narrow margin of unemployment) and wide cyclical variations in employment are characteristic features of this system. The internal changes which have taken place in present-day capitalism have rendered this adjustment mechanism useless. The monopolisation of capital on the one hand and the organisation of workers at country level on the other make possible 'planning' aimed at reducing cyclical fluctuations. If the working class is prepared to stay within this framework, i.e. that of the system, in other words, if for all practical purposes capital and labour accept, under the aegis of the state, a 'social contract' which relates increases in real wage to increases in productivity (in given percentages which have been worked out by technocrats), a state of permanent quasi full-employment can be ascertained. Obviously there is the exception that certain sectors of society may cause disturbances by refusing to abide by the 'contract': this could be the case of small and medium firms which would be mostly involved in the amalgamation process and which could — particularly in the relatively backward spheres — hold sufficient political power to blackmail society. There is also the exception that external relations will escape this type of planning. However there is increasing contradiction between the world-scale nature of production (which is characterised by the increasing importance of multinational companies) — and the traditional national character of both
capital and labour institutions. Social-democratic ideology, which is expressed in this type of 'social contract', thus does not extend beyond the national boundaries.

Despite the schematic nature of this model, which is inevitable since it is an abstraction from reality, it nevertheless describes the core of this system. In this model, external relations are left out, meaning not that the development of capitalism took place within a framework of national autarky but that the main relations within the system can be understood without including such relations. In any case, the external relations of the developed regions as a whole with the periphery of the world system remain quantitatively marginal, compared to the internal exchange within this region. In addition, these relations, as we have shown, spring from primitive capital accumulation and not from extended reproduction; hence the model is able to leave them out. The historically relative nature of the distinction between mass consumption goods and luxury goods is also clearly brought out here. In the strictest sense of the term, luxury goods are those for which the demand originates from the part of profit which is consumed. The demand which stems from wages increases with economic growth — the improvement of productive forces. Although in the early history of capitalism this demand was made up almost exclusively of necessities — food, clothing and housing — nowadays, at a more advanced stage of development, it is increasingly aimed at the consumption of consumer durables (cars, kitchen electrical appliances, etc.). However, this historical sequence of mass-produced goods is of decisive importance for an understanding of the problem in hand. The structure of demand in the early history of the system speeded the agricultural revolution by providing a market for food products intended for internal consumption (historically, this transformation of agriculture took the form of agrarian capitalism). In addition, we know the historical role of the textile industry and of urban development (hence the saying 'when the building industry is all right, everything is all right') in the process of capital accumulation. On the other hand, consumer durables — whose production is highly capital-intensive and requires a lot of trained labour — appear late on the market when productivity in agriculture and in the industries producing non-durable goods has already passed the crucial stages.

Peripheral Model
The model of capital accumulation and economic and social development at the periphery of the world system is not in any way related to the one we have examined above.

In the periphery the process began when under an impulse from the centre, an export sector was created. This was to play a determining role in the creation and shaping of the market. We shall not get very far by repeating ad nauseam the platitude that the products exported by the periphery are mineral or agricultural primary products. These are obviously products in which a
given region of the periphery has a particular natural advantage (abundant supply of ore or tropical products). The underlying reason which rendered possible the creation of this export sector must be sought in the conditions which make the establishment 'profitable'. There is no pressure for central national capital to emigrate as a result of insufficient possible outlets at the centre; it will however emigrate to the periphery if it can obtain a better return. The equalisation of the rate of profit will redistribute the surplus arising from the higher return and use the export of capital as a means to fight the trend of a falling profit rate. The reason for creating an export sector therefore lies in obtaining from the periphery products which are the basic elements of constant capital (raw materials) or of variable capital (food products) production costs lower than those at the centre for similar products (or obviously of substitutes in the case of specific products such as coffee or tea).

This is therefore the framework for the essential theory of unequal exchange. The products exported by the periphery are important to the extent that — ceteris paribus, meaning equal productivity — the return to labour will be less than what it is at the centre. And it can be less to the extent that society will, by every means — economic and non-economic, be made subject to this new function, i.e. providing cheap labour to the export sector.

This is not the place to go into the history of the shaping of the periphery to the requirements of the centre. I have done so elsewhere, distinguishing between the various stages in the development of capitalism (stages of mercantilism, competitive industrial capitalism without the export of capital and monopolistic financial capitalism with capital exports) on the one hand, and on the other, distinguishing analysis for the different regions of the 'Third World' as a whole (America, Black Africa, Asia and the East). Let me only add that once society is subjected to this new function — becoming in this sense dependent — it loses its traditional character since it is not the function of real, traditional societies (i.e. pre-capitalist) to supply cheap labour for capitalism. All the problems related to changes in the so-called traditional societies should be looked at afresh within this framework without reference to 'dualism', i.e. the so-called juxtaposition of an autonomous traditional society with an expanding 'modern' society.

Although at this stage this model does not show any actual linkage between the export sector and 'the rest of the country', it reveals society as bound to supply cheap labour to the export sector. The main link which characterises the process of capital accumulation at the centre — expressed by the objective relation between the wage rate and the level of development of the productive forces — disappears completely. The wage rate in the export sector will, in this case, be as low as the economic, social and political conditions allow it to be. As regards the level of development of the productive forces, it will in this case be heterogeneous (whereas in the self-centred
model it was homogeneous), advanced (and sometimes very advanced) in the export sector and backward in 'the rest of the economy'. This backwardness, which is maintained by the system, is the condition which allows the export sector to benefit from cheap labour.

Under these conditions the domestic market, born out of the development of the export sector, will be limited and distorted. The smallness of the internal market explains the fact that the periphery attracts only a limited amount of capital from the centre although it offers a better return. The contradiction between the consumption and production capacities is completely removed on a world scale (centre and periphery) by a widening of the market at the centre, the periphery — fully deserving its name — merely fulfilling a marginal, subservient and limited function. This dynamic process leads to an increasing polarisation of wealth at the centre.

However once the export sector has expanded to a certain size, an internal market makes its appearance. In comparison with the market emerging from the central process, this one is (relatively) biased against the demand for mass-consumption goods and (relatively) in favour of the demand for 'luxury' goods. If all capital invested in the export sector were foreign and if all the return on this capital were re-exported towards the centre, the internal market would in fact be confined to a demand for mass-consumption goods, and the lower the wage rate, the smaller the demand would be. But a part of this capital is locally owned. In addition, the methods used to ensure a low return to labour correspond with a strengthening of the various parasitic internal social classes which serve as conveyor-belts: latifundists in some places, Kulaks in others, comprador commercial bourgeoisies, state bureaucracies, etc. The internal market is thus mainly based on the demand for 'luxury goods' from these social classes.

The peripheral model of capital accumulation and economic social development is thus characterised by a specific interconnection which is expressed by the link between the export sector and luxury goods consumption. Industrialisation through import substitution will start from 'the end', i.e. the manufacture of products corresponding to the more advanced stages of development of the centre, in other words consumer durables. As we have already pointed out, such products are highly capital intensive and users of scarce resources (skilled labour, etc.). The result will necessarily lead to a distortion in the allocation of resources in favour of these products and to the disadvantage of sector 2. This sector will be systematically handicapped: it will not give rise to any 'demand' for its products and will not attract any capital or labour to ensure its modernisation. This also explains the stagnation in subsistence agriculture, whose potential products attract little demand and which does not acquire a share in the allocation of scarce resources to enable any serious changes to be made. Any development strategy based on profitability (the structure of income distribution, the structure of relative prices and demand being what they are) necessarily leads to this type of systematic distortion. The few
industries set up in this way and within this framework are not likely to turn into growth poles but will on the contrary increase the inequality within the system and impoverish the major part of the population (found in sector 2 in their capacity as producers), permitting at the same time a further integration of the minority within the world system.

From the 'social' point of view, this model leads to a specific phenomenon: the marginalisation of the masses. By this we mean a series of mechanisms heterogeneous in nature which impoverish the masses: proletarianisation of small agricultural producers and cottage industry workers, rural semi-proletarianisation and impoverishment without proletarianisation of peasants organised in village communities, urbanisation and massive increase of urban unemployment and underemployment, etc. Unemployment in this case differs from unemployment under the central model of development. Underemployment, in general, will have the tendency to increase instead of being relatively limited and stable, cyclical variations apart. Unemployment and underemployment thus have a role different to that under the central model: the high level of unemployment ensures a minimum wage rate which is relatively rigid and frozen both in sectors 1 and 3; wage does not emerge both as a cost and an income which creates a demand, vital to the model, but on the contrary only as a cost, demand itself originating elsewhere: from abroad or out of the income of the privileged social classes.

The 'externally propelled' nature of this type of development, which perpetuates itself in spite of the increasing diversification of the economy, its industrialisation, etc., is not the original sin, a deus ex machina foreign to the dependent peripheral model of capital accumulation since it is a model of reproduction of its functional social and economic conditions. The marginalisation of the masses is the very condition underlying the integration of the minority within the world system, the guarantee of increasing income for this minority which ensures the adoption, by this minority, of 'European' patterns of consumption. The extension of this pattern of consumption ensures the 'profitability' of sector 3 and confirms the social, cultural, ideological and political integration of the privileged class.

At this level of diversification and reinforcement of underdevelopment, there appear new mechanisms of the domination/dependence type; cultural and political mechanisms as well as economic ones: technological dependence and the domination by transnational companies. Sector 3 in fact calls for capital-intensive investments which only the big transnational oligopolies are in a position to embark upon and which constitute the material basis for technological dependence.

At this level, more complex forms of the structure of ownership and economic management also make their appearance. Experience shows that the participation of locally owned capital — however subservient — in the process of industrialization through import
substitution is quite common. It also shows — at least in the big countries — that a large enough market created by the development of sectors 1 and 3 may make possible the creation of a fourth sector. The latter is frequently brought into being by the state. But the development of a basic industry and a public sector does not in any way mean that the system evolves towards a complete self-centred type since this sector 4 is here used not for the development of sector 2 but for that of sectors 1 and 3.

The analysis thus brings us back to the fundamental question: development for whom? To the extent that we regard development as meaningful only in so far as it integrates the masses and serves their interest, the model of dependent peripheral capital accumulation is a dead end. A strategy of development for the masses should adopt as its initial basis a fundamental review of priorities with regard to the allocation of resources, which presupposes a rejection of the assumptions of profitability within the system. The meaning of a strategy for transition is to be found entirely in this. Transition is nothing more than the historical period of revision of the model, of altering its priorities, of the gradual evolution from a relationship of 1-3-4 to one of 2-4. It should be looked at from this point of view and not simply from that of "forms" of the economy: industrial diversification versus a simple export; public ownership versus foreign capital, etc.

The changeover from the peripheral model (based on sectors 1-3), to the model of real, autonomous, self-centred development (based on sectors 2-4) constitutes the essential element of transition. The integration into the world system of countries that have become underdeveloped originates from a specific contradiction of this system which tends to become the main one. On the one hand it has created objective conditions of a need for development, felt as such by the people of the periphery; on the other it has barred the way for these countries to attain capitalist development which has been the historical answer to the problem of accumulation of capital, the pre-requisite for socialism. That is why this specific contradiction has become the main contradiction. That is to say the one through which the need for a change in direction to transcend this system shows itself.

This is nothing more than an additional expression of the law of unequal development according to which systems are destroyed and transcended first of all not at the centre but starting from the periphery which constitutes the weak link in the chain — where the most intense contradictions become evident. Striking examples of this general law can be found in history, particularly that of the Mediterranean and European world. The oldest Eastern civilisation (Egypt, Mesopotamia, etc.) were transcended by forces which started from their Greco-Roman periphery. Likewise in their turn, the civilisations of classical antiquity were destroyed and transcended from their barbarian periphery where the civilisation of feudal
Christian Europe was to develop more freely and more fully. To be more precise, the principal contradiction is not the fundamental contradiction of the system, which still remains that of the level of development of the productive forces opposing the restrictive nature of the forms of social organisation. The principal contradiction would not exist without the fundamental one. The former only explains where dissolution occurs, the latter, the essence of the system in the last resort.

The transcending of the system takes a considerable but variable period, namely the period of transition. This is the length of time which separates capitalism from complete socialism. To continue the historical parallel, the early centuries of the Christian era can be considered as a period of transition from the social patterns of Mediterranean antiquity to those of feudal Mediaeval Europe.

Criteria and Strategies of Transition
I therefore define transition by the gradual change of given, concrete, historical conditions — those of the present periphery, already integrated into the world system and structured as a dependent periphery — and of the capitalist development model, depending on a national, self-centred development which moves into socialism, transcending capitalism.

The historical experience of the USSR, although it includes useful lessons like all experiences in history, cannot be transposed to the present-day Third World. Not simply for reasons of 'ideological' choice: for example because the results obtained, i.e. the national economic, social and political structures of the present-day Soviet Union, would be considered non-socialist and that one hoped to avoid similar 'distortions' in comparison with a socialist plan differently defined. If in fact the building of a national, non-dependent society such as the USSR is today was possible in the Third World, powerful objective forces would act in this direction to make it perhaps an 'objective historical necessity'. I think that this is not the case because such a goal is objectively impossible for underdeveloped countries in the last third of the twentieth century.

At the beginning of this century, Russia was not a peripheral country but a backward central capitalist one. Her structures were different to those of underdevelopment, i.e. those of dependent capitalism; marginalisation, for example, was unknown. So the 1917 Revolution merely enabled the process of accumulation of capital to accelerate without fundamentally changing the capitalist accumulation model. This acceleration took place because of the abolition of privately owned means of production in favour of state ownership. History has shown that it was possible, given the conditions in Russia, to accomplish the task of accumulation of capital in the same way as capitalism would have done but on a different property basis. This is reflected in the Soviet theory of socialist revolution which reduces it to the overturning of property relations which — through
suppression of private property — allows their complete harmonisation with the level of development of the forces of production — i.e. the level implied by the industrialisation objectives. This theory leads to an economistic ideology of transition, formulated in well-known terms: the priority of heavy industry over light industry, of industry over agriculture, the unrestricted imitation of Western technology, the definition of models of consumption with reference to those of the West itself, etc. The whole spectrum of dogmas is summarised in the ambiguous formula: 'catching up in all fields with the production of advanced countries'.

Since England was the birthplace of industrial capitalism, all other developed countries have at some stage been 'backward' in comparison with it. But none of these countries had ever been peripheral in the sense that we have defined it. Gradually the Continent and North America caught up, and in the case of the USA and Germany, overtook England in ways largely analogous to those of the English model. Japan eventually arrived at the same model of fully developed capitalism, but already the conditions of the transition exhibited several interesting characteristics, notably the central role of the State. Russia provides the latest example of a similar capital accumulation model, original only in the sense that state property was not only a transitory form but its definitive form, i.e. probably irreversible. In this lies the basic ambiguity of its genesis (the socialist revolution) and the special character of its present system of national state capitalism.

In any case, in all these models the transition period has been characterised by the submission of the masses. They are reduced to the passive role of reserve labour, progressively transferred to the growing 'modern' sector being established and then expanded until it has absorbed the whole society. The kolkhoz and administrative oppression have fulfilled this function just as the Enclosure Acts and the Poor Law did in England.

Now, this road is barred to the countries of the present periphery precisely because of the advanced development of marginalisation, the considerable and increasing gap between the modern technology set up by ruling capital and the necessity for an immediate improvement in the conditions of the masses, etc. These are the alternatives: either dependent development according to the model above, or self-centred development, necessarily original in comparison to those countries already developed. It is in this direction that we discover the law of unequal development of civilisations. The periphery is forced to transcend the capitalist model (even if it is state capitalism). It cannot catch up with it.

In fact as a result of specific imbalances (which result in marginalisation) and which derive from the periphery's integration as a periphery into the world system, it is forced radically to revise the capitalist model of resource allocation. It is forced to reject the rules of profitability. Indeed, decisions based on profitability and based on the relative price structure necessitated by integration into the world system, maintain and reproduce the model of increasingly
unequal income distribution (hence marginalisation) and therefore, in turn, enclose it within the peripheral resource allocation model. The task of restructuring the system of resource allocation must therefore be broadly considered outside the rules of the market, by a close understanding of the expression of needs in nutrition, housing, education and culture, etc. In doing this, the periphery is forced to overtake capitalism and break through to the invention of a socialist civilisation, to end the alienation of humanity.

All the technical problems in the strategy of transition must be re-examined from this fundamental angle. In particular the links between agriculture and industry, light industry and basic industry, labour intensive methods and capital intensive methods, must be included within this framework. The problem hence is to combine the most modern installations with immediate improvements in the 'poor' sector (sector 2 of the model) where the major part of the population is concentrated. That means to use modern techniques for the immediate improvement of productivity and of the conditions of the masses. It is only this immediate improvement and this alone which will enable the release of productive forces, enterprise and initiative and the mobilisation of the masses in the usual sense of the word. Mobilisation here obviously demands the spread of specific forms of real democracy at every stage: in the village, the region and the state.

The particular combination of modern techniques and immediate improvements in the conditions of the masses demands without any doubt a radical reappraisal of the direction of scientific and technological research. Imitating the technology of developed countries is not an answer to this particular problem in the present day underdeveloped world. This is the main reason for autonomous scientific and technological research in the Third World.

Seen in this light, the concrete strategies of transition appear above all as those of self-reliance. Self-reliance, which must be understood on different levels, and which must democratically respect the true popular social groups which constitute the nation: the village, the region (and especially in Africa, regions which truly correspond to cultural and ethnic homogeneity), the state and, eventually, groups of states. The level of development attained may force one country for a time to consider only the most elementary levels of concrete, transition strategies so that transition must be seen in very long perspective. It is within this framework that we place the question of 'small countries'.

Vietnam is an example of how even in a small country — and at that under the most difficult objective conditions imposed by war — a strategy of self-reliance can be the first effective stage in the transition. This long term perspective of transition does not, however, merely signify the 'failure' of the rapid development that one clearly desires. It bears out the fact that the problem of underdevelopment can only be definitely overcome within a radically changed world system, a global socialist society. It is quite appropriate to describe the task of transition thus: transition from the
capitalist world system, based on hierarchies of nations, to a world socialist system, which cannot be made up of relatively isolated and autarkic 'socialist' nations. Here the true solidarity of the peoples involved in the struggle of reshaping the world comes to the fore, due to the limited immediate prospects for progress in the Third World where the conditions for transcending advanced capitalism express nothing more than the present weakness of the forces of socialism at the centre of the system.

This formulation of the problematics of transition allows us to understand the restricted framework of the debate before the sixties. Transition demands much more than the extension of public ownership at the expense of all private property, or that of heavy industry, etc. If such an extension of the public sector and of heavy industry is not accompanied by a radical change in economic decision-making, possibly involving a partial sacrifice of the objective of maximum growth, it risks perpetuating the model of dependent development at the periphery, albeit in new forms. As we shall see, this is the spontaneous tendency of the present system. The problematics of the evolving relationship between trading and non-trading elements within the transitional structure constitute an essential framework for effective debate, as do also the problematics of the evolving relationship between centralisation and decentralisation, between power and democracy, etc.

Transition under present conditions of inequality between nations reminds us that development which is not merely the development of underdevelopment in its 'classical' form, or in some 'new' form, is at one and the same time national, socialist and popular democratic, according to the plan through which it finds expression. Therefore a strategy can be considered one of transition only to the extent that the objective of the 'maturation' and development of socialist consciousness is not sacrificed for that of rapid economic progress at any stage.

New Forms of Dependence
An analysis which is based on the conditions of transition, defined from this model of the growth of inequality between nations, enables us to identify the reasons for the failure of the development policies carried out in the Third World and to clarify the direction of the spontaneous tendencies of the system.

Is a different road to development possible? A superficial examination of the results of the last twenty-five years might suggest so. Some Third World countries have in fact, during varying periods, enjoyed high growth rates within the present world system. Based on externally-oriented development, itself conditioned by the external demand for one raw material or another (sector 1) and the investment of foreign capital (sectors 1 and 3 of our model), these 'miracles' have had the adverse effect of causing stagnation in other Third World countries, and these are the great majority. Moreover in all these apparently fortunate experiences the specific characteristics of underdevelopment (growing internal inequality and the
consequent distortion of resource allocation, marginalisation and dependence, etc.) have not been reduced but become more and more pronounced.

Economic ‘planning’ thus emptied of its content appears as an empty shell; a technique which reveals itself to be ineffective. One can in fact plan only self-centred development. Discussion of the model of accumulation at the centre has indicated the basis on which national economic policy can be founded, and which is essential for ‘indicative economic planning’, for the ‘managed economy’ of advanced capitalist countries. We must remember that this basis is on the one hand an advanced stage of monopolisation and on the other the social-democratic consciousness of a highly organised working class. Nevertheless the ‘managed economy’ approaches its limit in the growing contradiction between the global nature of production and the national nature of the ‘social contract’.

The Soviet Union’s model of accelerated capital accumulation has developed economic planning techniques in the specific conditions described. Here we have described the essential characteristics of strategies of transition which must be self-centred and which can form the basis of a third type of economic plan.

On the other hand, the attempt to ‘plan’ a dependent and externally oriented development strategy is absolutely meaningless. For it is useless if the conditions are ‘favourable’ and powerless if they are not. Such attempts are probably a result — a minor result, of course — of technocratic alienation and the slavish imitation of the methods of developed countries in a way which is most often a caricature of these methods. The hopelessness of such planning, finds complete expression in the finding — valid for Africa, Asia and Latin America — that results (in terms of growth) have been almost totally independent of ‘forecasts’ and ‘plans’. The insufficiencies of such methods and techniques and those of administration (more often called upon to explain the inability of departments responsible for the plan to effectively direct the economic life of the country) are all only superficial aspects of a basic impotence. The problems originate elsewhere. The action of dominant multinational firms whose decision-making centres are outside the underdeveloped countries where they operate, reduces economic planning to the forecast of the probable behaviour of these firms and of the response of the ‘traditional’ economy and of the small and medium-sized enterprises to this. At best the plan is thus reduced to a forecast of inconsistent behaviour and of possible bottlenecks which may result, and is without power to act effectively. Or it is limited to building traditional public sector programmes in conjunction with a rate of growth which it cannot control.

The critique of the ineffectiveness of economic planning under these conditions is common today. So much so that its abandonment has been openly recommended in favour of the simple reintroduction of calculating profitability ‘per project’. This policy, systematically advocated particularly by the IBRD does not solve the problem, it merely confirms the hopelessness of the expectation.
Can spontaneous development of this type at least create the conditions of its own transcendence within the system? If so, it would definitely appear to be the first and historically necessary stage. But there are serious grounds for doubting this since the model on which it is based is a model of the reproduction of these self-same conditions. This intensification of dependent peripheral development is moving in a direction already apparent today, which will tomorrow undoubtedly determine the principal characteristics of 'advanced' underdevelopment. Technological domination necessarily results from the priority of development in sectors 1 and 3 because these sectors must be competitive on an international level no matter whether they are export or 'luxury' goods, the preference for which indicates the adoption of Western forms of consumption. Such indirect domination may take the place of direct control of industry by foreign capital.

Indeed, in the first stages of the formation of peripheral economies, since the technological gap at that stage is still small, dominant central capital, in order to guarantee the efficient running of the system for its benefit, must directly control the modern sectors whose advance it ensures. Means of direct political control are equally necessary at this stage as under colonialism proper or as with the direct interventions in the 'semi-colonies' of South America and certain Asian countries. At an advanced stage of peripheral development the reproduction of the system can be guaranteed without directly controlled investment or direct political intervention merely through technological domination based on an increasing technological gap and combined with the existence of local social classes and strata, integrated through their consumption patterns (therefore their real interests) and through the ideology which usually accompanies it (renunciation of patriotic nationalism, the reduction of all ideology to consumerismo, etc.). This is precisely the major significance of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. Under these conditions the burden of investment can be borne by local 'savings' — private and above all public. Thus the development of a public sector, which may become very important and even dominant locally, is quite compatible with the continued dependence of the system as a whole with respect to the developed world. This dependence is guaranteed by the interplay of local social forces, even if this occurs in a state-capitalist system claiming to be 'socialist'. Even at a very advanced stage, one can imagine the development of a sector 4, i.e. heavy industry, which acts merely as a local prop for dependent development in general. In such a case, this sector generally takes the form of a public sector, as in Brazil for example.

The political theory of sub-imperialism addresses a very real problem raised here: that of inequality in peripheral development. For it is conceivable that in the global hierarchy certain peripheral regions may 'benefit' through geographical concentration in their territories of industries of sectors 3 and 4, producing not only for their 'national' market but also for those of neighbouring areas, sustained principally for the purpose of providing cheap labour.
reserves. Such perspectives are not only evident in some large Third World stages (Brazil is the prime example, but one should examine in this light the role that India might be called upon to play) but even on a more modern scale in the Arab world and in Black Africa. In Africa, perhaps more than anywhere else, direct and brutal colonization has broken down the whole of the pre-colonial structures and particularly the networks of African continental inland trade and hence the complementary relationships between different regions of this vast continent. One can see how the re-shaping of Africa into an externally oriented, dependent economy was carved into the very geography of the continent by coastal concentration and development and by the simultaneous impoverishment of the interior. The resulting massive migration has in its turn further accentuated regional disparities. Furthermore, political balkanisation, rooted in the process of unequal dependent peripheral development, has created the conditions for smaller 'sub-imperialist units' within a system which, as a whole, is dependent.

Even in its embryonic 'future' forms dependent peripheral development, whether more or less regulated or unregulated by pseudo-planning, is necessarily characterised by increasing marginalization. The population problem of the contemporary Third World originates from this growing marginalization. The population explosion, an undeniable fact, is not in any way the \textit{cause} of the increasing misery of the masses in the Third World as is claimed in the simplistic reasoning used by the current neo-malthusian world campaign. The self-centred development of the countries presently developed has likewise been accompanied by an extraordinary population explosion. In spite of the very real 'costs' of rapid population increase, which are so much emphasized, the centre has nevertheless solved this problem by a no less prodigious increase in wealth. The benefits of such population growth, both in the strictly economic terms of higher population density (external economies of infrastructure, etc.) and, undoubtedly also in terms of the social psychological effects of the energies released by the conflict between generations, has been decisive. There is incidentally no example in human history of a radical transformation in social structures which has not been accompanied by powerful demographic fluctuations. The population explosion in the Third World is an expression of its maturity, that is of its need for further development, just as it reveals the contradiction between this need and the strangulating effects of the present world system. Marginalization is a manifestation of this contradiction, which must be ascribed to the model of externally oriented dependent development and not to the population explosion. Here one finds one aspect of the problem of the inequality of development on a world scale, i.e. one of the factors which reveals the necessity for transcending capitalism and which is experienced more strongly in the periphery than at the centre.

This objective need for transcending the system can obviously become a reality only if it is accompanied by a change in social consciousness. Thus the problematic of transition necessarily leads to that of the development of social consciousness.
Social Consciousness at Centre and Periphery

The problems relating to political and social consciousness cannot be approached correctly without reference to the general model of development proposed, which distinguishes the central model from the peripheral model and allows the correct definition of the problematics of the social forces concerned.

This framework in fact reminds us that unemployment and under-employment in the peripheral system do not take the same form and do not fulfill the same functions as at the centre. While unemployment at the centre has well-defined contours and is easily quantifiable, the same cannot be said for the periphery. Here marginalization manifests itself not only by identifiable urban unemployment but also by underemployment, job mobility, and self-employment in very low productivity activities, these being the only means of survival for many sectors of the population. The divisions between different kinds of employment and underemployment are blurred and changeable. Quantitative delineation therefore implies special definitions, different from those currently used in developed countries. Various important social phenomena, such as the organization of redistributive interdependence, cannot be analyzed in terms of the "relics" of traditional society (ethnic and village interdependence, etc) but must on the contrary be re-interpreted as the means of resistance and survival in the conditions of peripheral capitalism, even if they are organized in "traditional" ways. The same goes for many other "poor" economic activities, particularly crafts, services and small businesses.

Social, political and especially class consciousness cannot be located or understood in the abstract without any reference to the objective social system in which the social groups in question are found. Consciousness can only be that of becoming aware of reality. Such new awareness enables social groups to conceive of effective action, be it by accepting the roles allotted to them within the system, be it by changing its structure.

In the central system, it is true that the consciousness of belonging to a social group (the proletariat, for example) does not by itself define class consciousness. It can lead to a "reformist consciousness" — social-democratic class consciousness — which constitutes as we have seen an objective condition for the functioning of the central system at this time. At the periphery; on the other hand, social consciousness of this type is not possible since the objective functioning of the system does not integrate the masses but on the contrary forces them out and marginalizes them. Consequently an awareness of the process of marginalization must lead to a rejection of the system. The question posed here is thus whether in fact, in any one country at any one time, marginalized groups or sub-groups attribute their plight to the objective functioning of the system, or on the contrary to strange social or even supernatural forces. The latter would obviously limit their capacity to act in order to change the system and would restrict their political action to the level of unplanned revolts. The answer to this, the only valid question in our opinion, will obviously differ according to the group, the place and the time.
It is in this theoretical context that one must place all the social, ideological, cultural and political problems of the contemporary Third World.

The traditional versus modern debate, in general juxtaposes in an absolute manner these two terms which it defines; the second by reducing it to its historically specific form (capitalist and Western) — thus incidentally denying the possibility of the further development of a global capitalism, which is truly universal (but not tending towards homogeneity); the first, without reference to particular peripheral societies, situating the 'traditional' in a pre-capitalism (non-Western) which no longer exists. For where are the 'traditional' societies today? Reduced to the role of supplying cheap labour to the modern sector (sectors 1 and 3 linked in the way that they are), the so-called 'traditional society, which comprises a majority of people, no longer exists in its traditional form. What does exist is pseudo-traditional, that is to say, a transformed tradition, deformed and oppressed. Moreover, based on African experience, it is clear that social reform movements with a 'traditional' appearance, such as the religious protest movements with a prophetic character; the theocratic movements for the reorganisation of local power like those of the West African Muslim brotherhoods (the Mourides in Senegal); the establishment of 'sultanates' in Nigeria, or Sudanese Mahdism; the evolution of certain centralised monarchies in animistic Africa such as the Wolof or Dahomean kingdoms, are all a response to the problems of integration into the expanding global system. They are all movements for reform within the peripheral system. Phenomena which sociologists too often analyze in terms of 'relics of the past' such as 'tribalism' or the close interdependence of the village, family, clan or ethnic groups among urban immigrants, are too rigidly classified and demand a critique of this dualistic and mechanical approach. Their rigidity is understood when one realises that these pseudo-traditional forms merely obscure a substance that is 'modern', though poor, and that they merely represent ways of surviving in the dramatic conditions of marginality.11

The concept of marginalization poses very serious problems: concern over the forms it assumes (and their effect on social consciousness) and concern with its boundaries (always blurred and ill-defined). Empiricist observation of social phenomena in these areas has often led to hurried conclusions in our opinion. The concept of the 'culture of poverty'12 and the analogies between this concept and that of lumpen-proletarianization are an example of oversimplification which requires a critique. At the other extreme, the concept of a 'labour-aristocracy' in underdeveloped countries involves an equally debatable analogy.

Of course at elementary stages of industrialization as is widely known in Africa, the 'working class', strictly speaking, can appear 'privileged' and close to the petty bourgeoisie in social status and awareness. The policy of international corporations accentuates this characteristic.13 Notably in certain tropical African regions, the retarded impact of colonialism (the late development of sector 1) and the persistence of certain pre-capitalist structures not penetrated by the processes
generating a peripheral society (these structures hence continuing to be concentrated in sector 2) limit the impact that the growing modern sector (1 and 3) can have on such a society in transformation. In simple economic terms, this means that the supply of cheap labour for the growing modern sector is limited so that in the latter remuneration be less bad than would otherwise be the case. But the acceleration of the process of peripheralization indicates that at more advanced stages the conditions of this proletarian core of the 'modern' sector deteriorate in relative and often absolute terms. New potential alliances then appear between this core and the marginalized mass, henceforth semi-proletarianized in the full sense of the word, which are based on an objective community of interests, deeply influenced by the direct effect of open unemployment on the salaries of those with relatively permanent employment. From that moment objective conditions are ripe for a real strategy of transition, opening the way for a transcendence of capitalism.

FOOTNOTES

1. This model is a brief summary of my work published under the title Accumulation on a World Scale, (Forthcoming, Monthly Review Press).
3. I do not claim that this outline includes every aspect of the problem of 'civilizations' — the theory of which remains to be done. The work of Pelletier and Groblot (Matérialisme historique et histoire des civilisations, Paris 1969) is the first stimulating opening in this field. Likewise, for the Arab world, see Ahmad el Kotsy, 'Nationalism and Class Struggles in the Arab world', Monthly Review, July-August 1970.
5. All the problems concerning pseudo-tribalism in Africa must be revised from this point of view. Necessary authentic democracy demands the integral respect of social reality. It is only by respecting it that it can be positively integrated into a process which enables transcendence. The bureaucratic denial of reality blocks evolution and enables a treacherous and negative reappearance of this reality which is officially denied.
6. See article by Urs Müller-Plantenberg 'Technologie et dépendance', Critiques de l’économie politique, No 3, 1971, which defines precisely the kind of technology which can solve the problems of the present-day underdeveloped world.
7. As acknowledged by the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) at a meeting in Lima of 77 countries, October 1971.
8. This is why the crisis in the system is revealed in the field of international monetary relations (the current dollar crisis, etc.). Triffin, Le système monétaire international, Paris 1969, expresses this awareness arguing in favour of a utopia — that of a supranational monetary authority, which assumes the contradiction is resolved.
9. This stage has not been reached in contemporary Africa where direct foreign investment remains the prime mover. That is why the expression of neocolonialism has never seemed to us a scientific one. We prefer neoimperialism (for lack of a better word) which only applies to very advanced underdeveloped countries like Brazil.
11. The excellent Senegalese film by Ousmane Sembène Le Mandat, is a lively scientific demonstration of this theory, better than many pretentious sociological analyses.
12. Oscar Lewis, The Children of Sanchez, started this school of thought.
Development or Exploitation: is the Sahel famine good business?

Claude Meillassoux

If the drought can be seen as an act of nature, the same cannot be said for the famine, which is largely the result of a policy of agricultural exploitation carried out for the benefit of the great powers in the Sahel. This famine crudely reveals that what is called development or aid is nothing other than a policy of exploitation. Furthermore, this famine offers the opportunity for a radical transformation of the traditional modes of agricultural production, promoting the establishment of a highly productive system of capitalist agriculture that is not only oriented towards the satisfaction of industrial needs, but also capable of supplying food to capitalist countries.

The doctrine which the capitalist powers openly claim to govern their actions is that of the so-called liberal laissez-faire economy. Government only intervenes on the economic level, and with increasing violence, to maintain 'law and order', to clear the way for private interests, to reconcile these interests where they conflict with each other, and eventually to liquidate any backward sector, even a capitalist one, whenever it obstructs the development of another more advanced sector. Such governments are naturally subservient to those whose economic and financial interests are most powerful.

It stands to reason that the capitalist states are incapable of pursuing policies towards underdeveloped countries, whether through aid or any other means, which differ in principle from their own, i.e. whose driving force is not the satisfaction of private interests. Since such governments are subordinate to the interests of capitalist enterprises, the development they can offer to underdeveloped countries is necessarily that of capitalism. Since it involves concentration of
enterprises and the polarisation of decisions, capitalism, wherever it is put into practice, leads to uneven regional growth, as manifested in Europe itself for more than a century.

How can one possibly expect a capitalist regime to miraculously discover the means whereby the economic and social inequalities that separate us from the underdeveloped world are levelled out, when capitalism helps only to increase these inequalities even within capitalist countries themselves? Between industrial countries and dependent countries, capitalism — champion of free trade — inevitably favours the former. The increasing gap between rich and poor is a perfectly logical phenomenon, organically linked to the process of capitalist development. Only countries that have applied strict protectionism have been able to develop in competition with the most advanced industrial nations. The development of the United States dates from the rejection by the American settlers of the free trade imposed by the British. Similarly with the Germany of Fichte or the Japan of the Meiji, the USSR and contemporary China. Even though such protectionism is not a sufficient condition for development, it is a necessary one. There is not a single case of a country that has become developed in the orbit of capitalism within the framework of an open market policy. It is therefore an illusion to believe that as long as a profit economy dominates the politics of the great powers they will be in a position to instigate the 'take-off' of backward zones. Quite the contrary, they can only prevent it. The aim of the intervention of capitalist nations in the economies of underdeveloped countries is not the 'development' of these economies, still less is it the granting of aid; it is rather the exploitation, under the cover of humanitarianism, of resources and men. *Exploitation and not 'development' is the key word to describe the relationship between these nations;* all the so-called techniques of development are, in this context, no more than techniques of exploitation designed to expropriate wealth. Neglect of this fact leads to a total lack of understanding of the so-called phenomenon of underdevelopment and in particular of its increase and persistence. Although capitalist states are proficient in manipulating prices and monetary rates to increase this exploitation, surplus value is produced not by unequal exchange but by the exploitation of labour.

In the workings of colonial exploitation, i.e. each time a capitalist state dominates other populations, the profit comes, not only through the introduction of more efficient means of production, but also through the crude transfer of value from one sector of production to another according to the process that Marx described as the primitive accumulation of capital. This is achieved by running an economy of despoliation, on the one hand exhausting the soil and/or other raw materials, and on the other, over-exploiting the rural population.

This long preamble, which to some will merely be a reiteration of well established ideas, is indispensable to an understanding of how capitalist powers evolve their policies towards subsistence agriculture. Colonial profit stems from a transfer of labour value to capitalism through the maintenance of self-sustaining domestic agriculture. Economists have concerned themselves very little with the conditions
under which labour power is itself produced and reproduced, though this is the very labour power that is used by colonial agriculture or industry. Like other 'natural' resources, labour power is thought of as unlimited, to be used at will, and without any concern for its reproduction. Yet this production and reproduction of colonial labour power takes place within the domestic economy through the production of subsistence, 'the basis of all production'.

These same economists don't seem surprised by the fact that this sector of subsistence production, while known for its poor productivity, is yet capable of providing cheap labour or products. There is, nevertheless, a paradox here that needs to be explained: if, because of its poor productivity, the productive sector of subsistence requires more hours of work to produce and reproduce the labourer, his labour power, when sold on the labour market or used in the production of agricultural export goods, should demand high wages or high prices. Quite the opposite happens, and the workers from the rural sector, including those that migrate to Europe, are paid, directly or indirectly, at rates inferior to those of European workers. Similarly, agricultural products are bought at ever decreasing prices. In both cases labour power is bought for less than its value, at a cost which would have been exceeded had it been produced under the conditions of capitalist reproduction, i.e. if all the workers and their families were fed and maintained within the market economy and were entirely dependent on wages and their social complements.

This over-exploitation of labour lasts as long as the self-sustaining agricultural community persists as a productive and reproductive unit of labour power, mobilising for this purpose all the able-bodied members of the community. The relations of production within domestic communities are not capitalist; still, since these communities sell their products to the capitalist market, they find themselves within its range of circulation. The labour power supplied by the worker from such a community, whether to agriculture or to industry, is the product of the labour power of all the men and women belonging to the community. The work of women in particular is essential to the reproduction of labour power, not only through their contribution to agriculture but also their preparation of food and general domestic work.

The preservation of a domestic mode of production has, in certain states like South Africa, become a deliberate policy; to delay its disintegration, laws of capitalist production are not allowed to function in the 'reserves'. Sale of land is prohibited (one man, one flat), and so is the development of agricultural wage payment. In other African areas 'natural' non-institutional reserves are created through sheer economic neglect; one such example is the valley of Senegal which fulfills the same role for France as the Bantustans do for South Africa and with the same effects on its population.

In the present state of agricultural production in Africa, export agricultural goods are still cultivated in association with the domestic economy, which directly or indirectly provides subsistence for the workers and/or provides these workers themselves. Either the same
domestic unit produces the subsistence and the cash crop or it finds supplies of subsistence and/or workers from more remote communities. As long as they manage to produce enough to supply labour power for agricultural export or a mobile migrant labour force for industry, these communities are hardly an object of concern to the developers. But the extraction of surplus from a mode of production with such limited means usually results in the exhaustion of the factors of production. The increase in labour productivity, necessitated by demand within the capitalist sector, is paid for by destructive methods of cultivation and a depletion of the soil resources. In view of the fact that land restoration becomes necessary, capitalism is now faced with a contradictory situation. Such restoration requires capital outlay, but this means a gradual modification of production within the subsistence sector, and this would tend to reduce or eliminate the transfer of labour value based on the preservation of this mode of production.

In addition, as soon as the domestic subsistence economy, through the use of capital, enters into the sphere of capitalist production, it immediately reveals its low productivity and collapses into bankruptcy. The subsistence economy under a capitalist regime is thus, in effect, unable to withstand any such transition. Either it remains outside the capitalist mode of production or it "takes off" directly into a highly-productive agriculture capable of producing at the actual costs of factors of production what the domestic economy produced below cost through over-exploitation. This modern agriculture involves a high level of labour productivity and creates unemployment for an important percentage of the rural population. If an equivalent number of jobs does not open up in the industrial sector the rural exodus creates a sub-proletariat that, once it surpasses a certain number, raises social and political problems.

All the 'improvements' brought to the domestic subsistence economy are inoperable within the framework of a profit economy. On the contrary, they help only to precipitate its downfall. Therefore, before the difficult conversion of agriculture is undertaken, capitalism will exhaust the productive capacities of the domestic economy, leading to a shortage of food. Not until disasters occur — such as that which has just struck the Sahel area — will another agricultural policy emerge. The famine thus offers a convenient opportunity for this qualitative jump towards a new, highly efficient, capitalist agriculture in which productivity will, it is hoped, exceed the dwindling 'colonial' profit being destroyed by the policy of over-exploitation carried out until now.

Within the framework of self-sustaining economy and with the means they have at their disposal, the agricultural communities have been struggling to allay the inevitable periods of drought that have always struck these regions. In the Sahel region millet granaries were constructed to contain enough stores for four or in some cases even more years of consumption. Architectural techniques, materials, and the management of agricultural products were all selected and modified to meet predicted shortages.
Colonisation and later neo-colonisation, despite the infinitely superior techniques at capitalism's disposal, despite the research projects involved, despite economic calculations and plans, have however done nothing to improve the situation as present events bear out. Colonial and neo-colonial exploitation have, on the contrary, contributed to a constant deterioration of the conditions of agricultural production.

Several factors are responsible: the head tax levied immediately after harvesting forces the peasant to sell his produce, making him part with quantities of foodstuffs essential not only for storage but even for his basic needs. He is then forced to buy back provisions during a time of need at higher prices and on credit. This crude fiscal policy, which still operates, encourages speculation and the formation of a parasitic social class which withholds grain stocks that could otherwise do much to alleviate the misery of the starving.

The promotion of cash crops and the indifference of the authorities towards subsistence agriculture have caused the peasants to over-exploit the land, regardless of whether they wanted to maintain both types of production or to increase their revenues from cash crops in order to buy their food. In any case, they set aside an ever increasing proportion of the land for cash crops so that a proportionately decreasing amount remained available for subsistence farming. In so doing, the peasant finds himself more dependent on the market for his food supply. But the question of the commercialization of subsistence products has never been given the importance, interest, or investment devoted to cash crops. The production of food has deteriorated without measures being taken to remedy it, except for the periodic importation of rice for the urban populations. This increased dependence on the market means that the peasant is left totally at the mercy of the availability of reserve provisions and of price fluctuations. In addition, the introduction of a money economy eventually destroys the system of barter whereby the peasant can obtain a product directly in exchange for his own. Because of the price and monetary policies imposed by international capitalism, the money the peasants have in hand from the sale of their produce depreciates, and this in turn causes them to produce more and thus to further exhaust their means of production.

Less land set aside for food production and decreasing returns from that land mean increasing dependence on an unorganised subsistence market. Seasonal taxes causing grain speculation at the expense of the farmers' reserves, together with falling prices, are elements that make the agricultural economy extremely fragile and especially vulnerable to severe climatic disruption. It is therefore not sufficient to look to natural phenomena to explain the causes of the present situation; not surprisingly statesmen try to silence social scientists under the pretext that the famine is a problem for hydrologists and agronomists only.

The present famine has initiated the destruction of the African peasantry. And this in turn will bring about a profound trans-
formation of the social conditions of agricultural production in the Sahel and its bordering zones. Paradoxically, while these regions seem doomed by nature, the forces of international capitalism eagerly survey these lands as a future source of meat, grain and market-gardening produce for the capitalist countries.

The peasant who consumes only what he himself produces is clearly a parasite as far as capitalism is concerned. He is tolerated only if he produces his own labour power and offers it on the market, whether by cultivating produce for export or selling his services on the labour market; and this toleration lasts only as long as the land he occupies does not acquire speculative value. Viewed from the perspective of a world-wide food shortage, these African lands, left until now to the indigenous peasantry, become an asset. The logical consequence of this is the eventual dispossession of the present occupants in the interests of an agriculture that yields higher returns. This transformation, already in evidence in the case of the present famine, is taking a more precise shape.

In a propaganda film against hunger, the UN showed as examples of future agricultural developments in Africa a European-style farm and a ranch fully equipped with modern implements, both of them in Kenya. More and more thought is given to the problem of enclosing lands in the Sahel to the profit of international cattle breeders. In Senegal, attention is drawn to a project in which market gardens have their water supplied by bore-holes 300 metres deep (necessary investment: 600,000 CAF francs per hectare). Obviously these projects are not within reach of the African peasantry. The introduction of capital investment presumes a radical change in the social conditions of production.

Nevertheless, it is predictable that any capital invested in this type of capitalist agriculture will be presented as impartial 'aid' to fight the spreading of the desert, the drought, etc., although the products will in the main be destined for Europe, the United States and Japan. Conversely, the projects put forward by African states for the protection of entire regions will be left dormant under the pretext of high costs or technical problems; in fact the real reason for their rejection is that they will not be profitable to international capital. The famine encourages the capitalist transformation of the area. The virtual disappearance of the nomads leaves room for stock-farming and the hiring of labour. The reduction of the peasant population offsets the threatened unemployment due to the increased productivity on the capitalist farms. It will also reduce the subsistence needs of that population. The debts accumulated by peasants ruined by the drought accelerate expropriation either to the benefit of a new class of landowners (bureaucrats and local merchants), or to the profit of international finance. Enough peasants remain to prevent this transition taking place overnight, but the trend has started. In this light the 'aid' to starving populations takes on a tragic aspect, for behind the humanitarian disguise given to all these operations there is a reality that needs to be presented more bluntly: what interest have the capitalist powers in saving these populations? The above remarks demonstrate that a correct analysis of capitalism
suggests that this interest is very slight. It is limited both to slowing down the rural exodus towards the towns, where difficult social problems may emerge (though on the other hand the labour market is fed with cheap manual labour), and to containing the anger of the people. Within the framework of the capitalist system, considered objectively and without emotion, the famine in Africa offers the prospects of a cruel but nevertheless lucrative future.

Editorial Note

Meillassoux's analysis of the Sahel famine recalls this comment on the Irish famine of the 1840s.

"Officially, it was declared that no deaths from starvation must be allowed to occur in Ireland, but in private the attitude was different. "I have always felt a certain horror of political economists", said Benjamin Jowett, the celebrated Master of Balliol, "since I heard one of them say that he feared the famine of 1848 in Ireland would not kill more than a million people, and that would scarcely be enough to do much good". The political economist in question was Nassau Senior, one of the Government's advisers on economic affairs."

Capitalism or Feudalism?
the famine in Ethiopia

Lionel Cliffe

The famine in Ethiopia, as in the Sahel, is not simply a 'natural' disaster but has social and economic origins. Moreover, the suffering is not simply the compounding of the effects of food shortage by the harsh burdens borne by tenant farmers. While southern Ethiopia, where famine is now beginning to strike, had a feudal land system imposed in the 19th Century, the northern provinces where the famine first hit has a system where there were lords of the land but no landlords and peasants had the security of access to land even though they paid 'tithes'. The commercialisation and mechanisation of agriculture in the last generation has eroded those rights. Landlords are becoming capitalist farmers and a landless class is growing. The famine is accelerating these processes, just as it is exacerbated by them.

Observers in Ethiopia have been more ready than those in the Sahel to see the famine as more than simply a result of drought. Some have recognised that the 200,000 deaths were partly a consequence of the handling of the famine by an Ethiopian Government that tried to ignore and cover up the situation. Others have stressed as one of the non-climatic factors the crippling burden on peasants who must give up as much as 75 percent of their produce to the landlord. However, government indifference and the plight of the tenant farmer have to be seen not simply as legacies of the dead hand of a 'traditional' feudalism. They must be understood in the context of new relations of production in the rural areas arising from the onset of capitalism. Admittedly this process is having its changing impact on a different pre-existing social formation than that found in the Sahel, but Mellissaux's conclusion is just as valid. The 'development' process in Ethiopia has equally led to the increasing 'marginalisation' of much of the peasantry, and the drought conditions have dramatically accelerated their impoverishment.
Capitalist Development
The process has been recent in Ethiopia; a money economy only grew up after the Second World War. Since then this country has been the recipient of larger doses of 'aid' and foreign investment than most countries in Africa. Primarily this has been military; US military assistance up to 1970 was $150 million, as much as in the rest of the continent. Increasingly, aid went also into building up an infrastructure of roads, urban facilities and some higher education. With the groundwork thus laid, foreign business has begun to pour in, especially from the 1960s; half of all industrial activity is in foreign hands. In this process agriculture has in general been neglected to an even greater extent than elsewhere in Africa; public expenditure on agricultural development has been less than 10 percent of that on defence and internal order. Such efforts as were made were based on the view expressed by Haile Selassie in introducing the last development plan, that 'the rapid development of commercial agriculture is the only way to get the relatively quick increase needed in agricultural exports'. It will clearly be essential to induce more foreign private investment and to impart the needed managerial and technical skills'. This development of commercial agriculture has come about in two ways: in the lowland areas new plantations or settlements under the control of foreign capital have been set up — often displacing the pastoral peoples who had access to this land as grazing; in the settled highland areas Ethiopian landlords have used their control over peasant lands to launch themselves into commercial farming. In both areas the large-scale, technologically modern forms of agriculture have required a large labour force (as have the commercial, industrial and other urban enterprises) — though widespread mechanisation dictates that much of the labour is only needed seasonally.

The process of commercialisation of existing agriculture has in turn guaranteed that the labour required is in fact available. More than a third of the tractors introduced in the country, with government subsidies, are found in the traditional farming areas; Bondestam estimates, based on conservative assumptions, that 200,000 members of peasant families have been replaced in the process by 1970. But for this replacement to occur other qualitative changes in the social relations of production — the peasants' rights of access to land and the nature of the exploitative relation between peasant and landlord (now turned capitalist farmer) — must have begun to take place. Uprooted from the land, a class has been created of those who must seek to sell their labour as a 'commodity' — on nearby farms, on new plantations, as migrant pickers to another province, as workers, or often would-be workers in the towns.

Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production
In the South, tenants have simply been driven off the land. A classical form of feudalism had been imposed by the conquest of these areas by the Amharic ruling class in the 19th Century; the military rulers appointed by the Emperor were granted estates, the biggest measured in millions of acres. As well as making room for their own commercial ventures, the whole peasant economy in some of these areas has been given over to the money economy; rents becoming
payable in cash and smaller commercial farmers and money lenders forcing out the poor tenants who cannot meet their obligations. It is into these areas that famine has spread this year: caused not simply by failures of the rain but by this expulsion of tenants, whose numbers and hardships are compounded by the failure of crops, increased food prices and the threat of being bought out or forced out when they can no longer make ends meet.

In the northern areas, including the parts of the provinces of Wollo and Tigre that were first and most seriously affected by the drought, the land system was different and the process of capitalist change has taken on more complex forms. In fact these areas are not marked by 'pure' feudal production relations. There is indeed a proportion of peasants in these areas that pay heavy rents to landowners (some 150,000 tenants out of a population of 3 million in Wollo Province) and their situation as tenants has worsened the effects of the natural disaster. But Wollo and Tigre Provinces are in fact the least plagued by such landlordism, and only one other province, Gojjam, has a higher percentage of owner-occupied land. Some 60 percent and 75 percent respectively of holdings are completely unaffected by tenancy agreements. And yet in these areas, too, the central feature of the famine has not been one of farmers merely being left without food until the next harvest, but one of complete destitution. People have come flocking to the towns and camps to seek food, according to a BBC report, having 'sold their cattle, the wood from their houses, and their lands'.

The Roots of Famine

To see how this creation of 'free' labourers has come about in the non-feudal areas it is necessary to understand the land tenure arrangements that operated in the north and the relations that different property holders had to the land and to each other. Land was not 'alienable'; it was not a 'commodity'; the notion of being able to dispose of land by sale would not have been comprehended, partly because currency did not come fully into circulation until after the Second World War. Land could be cultivated, and the right to work a piece of land, the right of 'rist' was something that an individual family derived from its membership in the community (usually a lineage). In the more densely populated highland areas there was competition for access to land, which depended on influence and patronage. This pattern is sometimes incorrectly referred to as 'communal' land ownership, similar to systems in many other parts of Africa. In addition, there was another set of rights in the land, the so-called 'gulf' rights. These were handed over by the state to the church or to local chiefs or notables who were thereby empowered to appropriate a 'tithe' from the cultivator of the land. In this situation 'when an individual collects tribute as the assignee of the state, it is difficult', as one legal authority (Dunning) put it, 'to distinguish "tax" from "rent"'. Nevertheless this pattern did differ from classical feudalism and from the system imposed on the conquered southern areas of Ethiopia, in that the peasant, although having to offer up his surplus production, had rights of access to land independent of the feudal chiefs. It was only a few migrants, or
in some areas Muslims, or others not members of the Orthodox Church — those who were not part of the community — that had no land. Such people, and the minority who with recent overcrowding did not have plots big enough to survive, were the only ones who contracted actual tenancy arrangements. But no one willingly gave up their 'rist', for as the Ethiopian analyst, Tesfai, has remarked, 'to be landless is to be sub-human'.

The system of 'gult' was formally amended in 1966 when the collection of a crop-share by the 'gult' holder was replaced by a series of taxes payable in cash to the central government. But in practice the 'balabat', the chiefs who generally held the 'gult', have become the tax collectors and in the process profited on the transaction by collecting the same share and converting it into a less than generous cash equivalent for tax. Similarly, as we shall see below, the position of those peasants who are tenants has not been improved by the few measures that have been introduced to reform landholding. Far more profound changes in the situation of the northern peasants have come about through changes in the economic conditions than through these administrative and legal enactments. The last generation has witnessed the final spread of a cash economy to the remote rural areas. Peasants can no longer remain purely subsistence farmers when they are being pressed to pay their taxes and tithes and sometimes their rents in the form of cash; imported commodities — clothing, ploughs and hoes — have become purchasable necessities; the officials and notables need to extract cash to maintain their patronage and influence and their superior life style, and to take advantage of new commercial farming and trading opportunities. These trends towards commercialisation must have also eroded the rights of 'rist': the influence of those who are wealthier in the competition for 'rist' will have been increased by the patronage they can now purchase; 'gult' holders and better-off 'rist' holders now want to cultivate more land in order to take advantage of market sales or at least to provide amply for their progeny in conditions of land shortage. As a result less influential claimants to 'rist', and those who were tenants, have gone to the wall. Exactly how these processes have occurred, and to what extent, has not yet been fully documented. But that they have happened is clear. A sizeable landless class has been created — official surveys indicate some 375,000 landless families in Wollo Province, of whom only 150,000 are able to get tenancies.

In addition, Tigre and Wollo Province provide a large share of the estimated 30,000 cotton pickers who go each year to the Lower Awash valley, and of the 50,000 coffee-pickers in Kefa. Many others go further south.

This rootless population is just the more deprived section of a peasantry which in these Provinces has been subject to land shortage coupled with official neglect in the Plans. These pressures occur within a social structure that still does provide some partial protection against total impoverishment through the persistence of 'rist', but which in turn produces fragmentation of landholding (almost half of the family holdings in Tigre are less than an acre) and thus
fairly general impoverishment. But the old system is no longer strong enough to offer the safeguards, no matter how highly unequal, that it used to provide. The holding of 'rist' did not allow alienation of the land through sale, contract or even gift. Land was allocated through the customary procedures of the community which recognised that all members had some right of access. Clearly the very fact that the starving can and do now sell their land and that it is bought by better-off peasants and officials confirms the erosion of the old system of rights.

The famine, sparked off by the failure of rain, is thus a product of this complex set of factors operating not on an unchanged, feudal pattern of landlord exploitation of tenant-peasants but on a transitional situation produced by the impact of the harsh, impersonal relations of the money economy. The circumstances that this has created in the northern highlands combine almost all the worst features of capitalism and feudalism: the authoritarianism of the officials persists; the extraction of surplus from the peasants has taken on new forms and has, if anything, been intensified; 'involution' (the downward spiralling reproduction of ever worsening conditions) has occurred because of land shortage and neglect; at the same time new commercial opportunities have benefited the few at the expense of the security of the poorest peasants.

What is to be done?
In so far as these features of the political economy of capitalist development in Ethiopia are responsible for the famine deaths, they also pose questions as to how 'people can be put back on their feet', as one charitable appeal put it. One can expect little from any long-run plans formulated by a government that ignored the starving for so long, and less of the chances of any effective plans being carried out. It is now possible to see that the government's cover up, which included killing 17 students who tried to draw attention to these conditions, was not due primarily to the particularly authoritarian character of 'the old aristocratic figure' (London Sunday Times) of the Governor of Wollo, or to the Ethiopians' 'ancient pride', or the government's fear of losing face before the 10th OAU Summit or before a growing number of tourists. These were the kinds of explanations naturally offered by the international bourgeois press. The 'government', both nationally and locally, comprises officials who have special rights in land through which they have always exploited the peasants it was their 'job' to administer. These same authorities are now benefitting from new commercial ventures, from converting tenants to labourers, from buying up and otherwise acquiring new lands and generous government support in pioneer farming areas. The whole history of land reform is a good illustration of how purported efforts to improve the lot of the peasants are manipulated or blocked. In the mid-1960s measures which would have reduced the statutory maximum rent to 50 percent, from 75 percent of production, were rejected by a Senate made up mainly of landowners. The tax reforms which have formally abolished 'gult' have been implemented in a manner to worsen the peasants' burden. Even the 1972 draft Tenancy Proclamation, itself a result of pressure from
'enlightened' foreign interests and a new generation of technocrats, more interested in ensuring 'stability' than in the vested interests in land, 'does not touch the fundamental issue of landownership' but only 'specifies the forms of tenancy relationships' (Stahl). As for the prospects of implementation, 'arbitration would be in the hands of officials and committees in which landowners would predominate'.

The indifference and narrow class base of the government is further emphasized by the latest Development Plan, which looks solely to mechanized farms in the hands of foreign companies or the officials and notables themselves. In fact, the only concrete plans so far announced are proposals to settle some of those in the starvation camps on new land, measures which would merely shift but not remove the roots of the problem of peasant impoverishment.

Doubts about the possible implementation of plans for land reform, settlement, or peasant improvement, stem not just from the established class interests of those in power. These have long ensured that opportunities for development tended to be open only to the privileged in a grossly unequal society. Now, in addition, the intensification and spread of capitalist relationships further disadvantage the peasant. This has been the lesson of one of the few schemes in the country which has sought to improve peasant farming, the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU) in southern Ethiopia. With typical liberal 'fairmindedness', the Swedes who launched CADU sought to develop a 'minimum package' of improvements expressly designed to benefit small farmers. Indeed, after 1969 they excluded large farmers from the credit scheme altogether. In fact, though, the services provided by CADU (the communications, the marketing arrangements, the new techniques) have also been a boon to the large, mechanized farms and their expansion in the area has resulted in the eviction of large numbers of poor, tenant farmers, precisely the group that the scheme sought to benefit (Stahl). The Swedish Government has now made land reform a condition of further aid. Meanwhile, the spread of the drought to the southern provinces is already speeding up the expulsion of tenants and even of 'free' peasants. Although land conditions and the extent of mechanization are different in the north, the CADU experience makes clear that projects may well further impoverish the smaller peasants, even if they are conceived with the best of intentions, so long as they do not take account of the changing social context of the commercial transformation of a basically unjust structure.

An awareness of this social and political context, imposed on the climatic and soil conditions in the drought provinces, also makes clear that no simple plans for the input of seed, tools or other farm supplies, for credit, irrigation, or resettlement, however well-conceived and competently prepared, offer any hope without some change in the basic social relations of property and power. Furthermore, this analysis also makes clear that the proposed Tenancy Reform will not be a sufficient guarantee to prevent further starvation. It is utopian to argue, as did a London Times correspondent, that 'in the Ethiopian (political) context, some security of tenure, some limit of rent would be a radical concept' and might therefore
make the 'difference between life and death' to the average peasant. The point is rather that the new Proclamation, no matter how big a step, is not enough in the socio-political context of Ethiopia. It offers far too few concessions to the peasant to protect him from the effects of the spread of commercialization — even in the south where the developments are slightly less rapid. Moreover it only deals with one aspect of the problem in the north due to its different land tenure system. The poor peasants and landless of Wollo and Tigre need protection from the market economy, and not just from the landlord. The involution of their partially disrupted social structure spells disaster for a large minority, insecurity and gradual impoverishment for the majority, and new rich pickings for the small privileged class. The peasants' need is for a range of agricultural improvements within a land reform which remove the insecurity of tenancy, remove the burden of tithes and other feudal burdens, but which at the same time preserve the security formerly derived from the fact that everyone in the community had access to land. Perhaps this could be achieved through some form of co-operatives, although that would require a social revolution and would clearly only be possible with a radical change in the basis of political power in Ethiopia. Without it, injections into the current system may well worsen the problem.

The recent upheavals in the armed forces and the massed protests of workers, professional groups and students have already led to a change in government and will probably prompt other reforms. Their extent is not yet clear, but the new government's first actions and its social complexion indicate that one can expect little more than a possible limitation of the economic and political power of the landlord class in favour of the technocrats, foreign business and the pervasive US presence. The prospect of some fundamental social revolution in the countryside, which would eliminate landlordism and allow for a pattern of technical advance in agriculture that would not displace the peasantry, will depend on the peasantry themselves and their taking their future into their own hands. This has been happening to some extent in the last few years: peasant risings in various provinces have been an even more closely guarded secret than the famine. It remains to be seen how quickly these peasant movements can spread and how far they will be linked with, and be given, clear political focus by the workers, students and other progressive forces that are finally emerging as a result of the shattering impact of capitalism on feudalism in Ethiopia.

SOURCES


African Peasants and Revolution

John S. Saul

Are peasants like a 'sack of potatoes', divided and demoralised, or can they become a revolutionary force? While most of the world's oppressed are peasants and their discontent generates the 'steam of revolution', a 'piston box' is needed to transform it into power. This may be provided either by forms of extraordinary and direct oppression or by organisation and political leadership. In practice it will almost always require both. John Saul examines the range of peasantry in Africa and, using the contrasting experiences of Mozambique and Tanzania, discusses the methods and circumstances which may transform peasantry into the mass base of revolutions.

In the past, many social scientists have been reluctant to utilize the term peasant with reference to African cultivators. More recently, a body of literature has emerged which, in seeking to theorize the most important trends in rural Africa, has found the notion of the peasantry to be a particularly illuminating one. Some brief reference to this latter emphasis, and to the rationale which sustains it, will need to be made here. But the main thrust of this paper lies elsewhere — in a discussion of the conditions (socio-economic, ideological, organizational) under which the African peasantry, so identified, becomes a force for radical transformation of the status quo of colonialism and neo-colonialism in contemporary Africa. It is worth emphasizing at the outset that the latter is no mere academic concern. In the two concrete situations which we shall explore — these being the Portuguese colony of Mozambique and the independent country of Tanzania — it is the conscious attempt to engage the peasants in precisely such revolutionary activity that has been one of the most striking features of recent political and socio-economic developments there. In Mozambique, the success of this strategy has been crowned by the presentation of a particularly dramatic challenge to Portuguese colonial hegemony. In Tanzania, the ultimate effectiveness of that country's challenge to neo-colonialism is more open to doubt, but the intense interest of the effort to construct a new, socialist Tanzania on a popular base of active and self-conscious 'workers and peasants' cannot be denied.
Peasants and Revolution

Revolutionary theory has evinced much scepticism concerning the peasantry - a scepticism rooted in the classics of Marxism and, most dramatically, in Marx' own oft-quoted description of the peasants as being merely like a 'sack of potatoes', divided and demobilized. Yet peasants in the twentieth century have become a revolutionary force in ways that Marx, necessarily, could not predict. There are those who cling steadfastly to the classical view, of course - arguing that the proletariat, by virtue of its participation in the centralizing and collectivizing logic of modern industry, remains the sole and indispensable guarantor of genuine revolution. Those who, like Nigel Harris, press the point most fiercely, are aided in so doing by a definition of socialism (the end-product of any such genuine revolution) which excludes every existing country from that category. Others, less concerned to ignore the claims of, say, a country like China to revolutionary achievement are, concomitantly, more charitable towards the peasantry. Indeed, Malcolm Caldwell, vigorously criticizing Harris' position and making, among other points, 'the simple factual assertion that the peasantry played the decisive role in the Chinese Revolution', has gone so far as to conclude:

... we may be sure that the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America themselves alone can transform their own lives. Since the vast majority of these people are peasants, the future must lie in their hands, whether it accords with one’s preconceived theories or not... In the world of today, the poor, the dissatisfied and the unprivileged are peasants: therefore 'the peasants alone are revolutionary for they have nothing to lose and everything to gain'.

It is not necessary here to exhaust the general debate being rehearsed (and, it would seem, unduly polarized) in the exchange between Harris and Caldwell. As a first approximation, it is sufficient to remind ourselves of Trotsky's dictum: 'Without a guiding organization the energy of the masses would dissipate like steam not enclosed in a piston box. But nonetheless what moves things is not the piston, or the box, but the steam.' For one cannot examine the course of recent history without affirming that peasants have provided much of the steam for revolutionary challenge to the status quo in this century. Why should this be so? Many Marxists emphasize that the expansion of the international capitalist system into less developed areas of the world has been such as to displace certain crucial contradictions of that system from its centre to its periphery. And even a growing number of non-Marxist thinkers seek for answers to such a question in an understanding of imperialism. Thus, Eric Wolf, summarizing the lessons drawn from a careful survey of peasant wars of the twentieth century, concludes that the historical experience which situates such wars 'constitutes, in turn, the precipitate in the present of a great overriding cultural phenomenon, the world wide spread and diffusion of a particular cultural system, that of North Atlantic capitalism.' Moreover, we shall see that it is precisely a concern with the historical emergence and further evolution of capitalist imperialism which is crucial to an identification of the peasantry (and other relevant actors) in an African setting.

Nonetheless, many misgivings expressed by Marx and others about the peasantry's likely contribution to revolution, also have some validity. Parochialism cuts deep in the rural areas; the outlines of the
broader exploitative environment, world-wide and territorial, which
oppresses him, are not easily perceived by the peasant and as a result
'... aggregate of small producers' constitute themselves only with
difficulty as a group capable of 'a shared consciousness and joint
political action as a class'. Even if peasant political action (rather
than apathetic resignation and or preoccupation with quasi-
traditional involvements closer to home) is forthcoming it may still
prove either to be quite localized and isolated in its spontaneous
expression, or else be forced too easily into channels of mere
regional and ethnic self-assertiveness by a territorial leadership which
divides in order that it may continue to rule. Moreover, most
twentieth century revolutionaries aim at some kind of socialist trans-
formation of the existing system, this being, ultimately, the only
effective response to imperialism. The peasants' temptation to seek
a resolution of the contradictions which confront him either by
shoring up 'traditional' aspects of the peasant economy or by
attempting 'petty-bourgeois' solutions which would further service
his isolation — a redistribution of land designed to guarantee his
own individual tenure and possible economic aggrandizement on
that basis, for example — may make him a risky ally for such an
enterprise.

This seems all the more likely to be the case when one considers
the findings of Wolf and of Hamza Alavi — that it is the middle
peasant rather than the poorest of peasants who is 'initially the
most militant element of the peasantry'. Yet counter-revolutionary
results are not inevitable. Alavi does observe that 'when the move-
ment in the countryside advances to a revolutionary stage they (the
middle peasants) may move away from the revolutionary movement'
since 'their social perspective is limited by their class position'.
Nonetheless, he suggests that this is only true 'unless their fears are
allayed and they are drawn into the process of co-operative
endeavour'. Moreover, poorer peasants, who have an even greater
stake in structural transformation, gradually can become mobilized
for action as well — and carry the revolutionary process further.
Indeed, what is demonstrated by the introduction of various qualifi-
cations to the more roseate picture of the peasantry painted by
Caldwell is merely the need to avoid falling back on romantic
illusions about the inevitable and unequivocal spontaneity of peasant
involvement in revolution. It becomes clear that if peasant action is
to service such a revolution — to manifest full confidence and a
sense of efficacy, to acquire effectively national focus, and to set in
train a comprehensive transformation of society — political work
must come to mediate it and help to define its thrust.

We return by this route to Trotsky's metaphor: a 'piston box' is
also necessary in order to harness the steam of peasant discontent.
Again, one of Wolf's formulations is suggestive: 'Peasants often
harbour a deep sense of injustice, but this sense of injustice must be
given shape and expression in organization before it can become
active on the political scene; and it is obvious that not every callow
agitator will find welcome hearing in village circles, traditionally
suspicious of outsiders'. Like Wolf, we must be 'greatly aware of the
importance of groups which mediate between the peasants and the
larger society of which he forms a part'. However, this emphasis too would be misleading if the capacity of the peasants to play an active role in the process of politicising their grievances were to be understated. In fact, the vital contradiction between organization/leadership on the one hand, and participation/spontaneity on the other, is not one that can be evaded or suppressed — both aspects are essential. If effective methods of political work are used, it is merely a contradiction which can be resolved, over time, in a manner that contributes to further revolutionary advance.

In recent times, 'people's war' has been the technique which has most satisfactorily realized this goal, this effective blending of both leadership from above and spontaneity from below. Selden has stated this point clearly with reference to Vietnam and China, and his formulation is worth quoting at length.  

Out of the ashes of military strife which enveloped China and Vietnam in protracted wars of liberation emerged a radically new vision of man and society and a concrete approach to development. Built on foundations of participation and community action which challenge elite domination, this approach offers hope of more humane forms of development and of effectively overcoming the formidable barriers to the transformation of peasant societies. In the base areas and consolidated war zones in which the movement enjoyed its fullest growth, the redefinition of community began in the resistance to a foreign invader and continued in the struggle to overcome domestic problems of poverty and oppression. People's war implies more than a popular guerrilla struggle for national independence; it impinges directly on the full scope of rural life. In the course of a people's war, local communities defined in response to the imperatives of defense and social change may be effectively integrated in national movements. The very intensity of the war-time experience contributes to rapid development of consciousness and organization. In people's war peasants cease to be the passive pawns of landlords and officials or to fatalistically accept the verdict of a harsh natural environment. Where the primary resource of insurgent movements is man (sic), and where active commitment is the sine qua non of success, the sharing of common hardships and hopes creates powerful bonds among resisters and between leaders and led. In the new institutions which emerge locally in the course of the resistance, to an unprecedented degree peasants begin to secure active control of their economic and political destinies.

We shall see that this is precisely the pattern that has emerged in Mozambique in the course of the liberation struggle against Portuguese colonialism. In Tanzania the situation is more complicated. There the leadership (or one section of it) has also made some effort to forge 'new bonds of unity in which the very definitions of leader and led are recast and the beginnings of a new social base are created'. But it is doing so in cold blood as it were — from within the framework of established structures, rather than in the heat of a convulsive upheaval. It is obvious that the making of a peasant-based revolution under such circumstances presents anomalies — and, as we shall see, it is indeed proving to be a difficult task.

African Peasantries

Who are the peasants in Tanzania and Mozambique, then? Indeed, 'are African cultivators to be called peasants?', as a well-known article on rural Africa once asked.  

It is worth noting that this has been a subject of some controversy in the literature, though it is a
controversy which easily degenerates into a mere word-game. In the first instance, the debate has seemed most concerned with the nature of 'traditional' Africa; moreover, the latter has all too often been ossified and discussed by social scientists as some kind of 'anthropological present' in a manner which can foreclose discussion of the real present of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Even with reference to pre-contact Africa, there may have been more peasant-like dimensions of the rural situation than has sometimes been assumed. But the more immediately relevant argument of a number of recent writers is that, whatever the case for an earlier Africa, the incursion of imperialism and particularly of formal colonialism has gradually forced a large proportion of rural dwellers in Africa to take on the characteristics of a peasantry. As Woods and I have argued elsewhere, this way of construing the majority of rural Africans is important, firstly because it fits neatly within the kind of broad analytical framework which seems best suited to identifying and explaining the overall patterns of change and development in contemporary Africa. Secondly, the concept quite accurately pinpoints characteristics of rural Africans which bear a family resemblance to peasant characteristics as identified elsewhere; it thus enables students of Africa, and political activists there, to collect data and theorize experience alongside others concerned about the problematic of the peasantry in other parts of the world. These two points can be briefly documented.

The key historical factor in defining the shape of contemporary Africa has been its forced insertion, as a dependency, within the broader Europe-centred imperial system. And, as Woods and I wrote, 'despite the existence of some pre-figurings of a peasant class in earlier periods, it is more fruitful to view the creation of an African peasantry . . . as being primarily the result of the interaction between an international capitalist economic system and traditional socio-economic systems, within the context of territorially defined colonial political systems'. Ken Post has described the process of 'peasantization' in West Africa in similar terms, citing Trotsky's 'Law of Uneven and Combined Development' and emphasizing the economic, the political and the cultural dimensions of the process which subordinates 'communal cultivators and such pre-colonial peasants as there were' to that broader system:

Whatever their differences, it is true to say that all the colonial powers in Western Africa greatly extended the market principle to the point where the impersonal forces of the world market dominated the lives of millions and imposed a state where none had been before or to supersede indigenous ones. The African quest for western education and the issue of assimilation amply demonstrate the presence of a new 'great' culture. It would appear, then, that many of the conditions for the existence of a peasantry were suddenly created, but from outside and quite independently of the processes of internal differentiation in origin, though the internal factors had important influences upon the final form of these conditions.

In validating this perspective, Post is particularly concerned to demonstrate that 'surplus' is extracted from the African rural population within such a structure by the 'levying of taxes and other dues by the state', for example, and by unequal terms of exchange for agricultural produce. Finally, Derman has made closely
related points — with reference in particular to the role of the state in peasantizing cultivators — when he criticizes the views of those anthropologists who continue to withhold the term 'peasantry' from such rural dwellers and instead see them as 'subsistence oriented cultivators in the process of becoming farmers'! In Derman's view, this ignores the fact that 'the state — both colonial and post-colonial — remains highly exploitative of the rural peasants or cultivators. African peasants are coming to form an increasingly subordinate segment of the population, a trend which began during the colonial era'. This too is a suggestive perception — and is entirely accurate.

Balancing the fact of such structural subordination within the wider political and economic systems of Africa is a second feature, one which is equally necessary in order to confirm the peasant character of such cultivators (particularly in comparative terms): 'the importance to the peasantry of the family economy'. Woods and I wrote:

Thus peasants are those whose ultimate security and subsistence lies in their having certain rights in land and in the labour of family members on the land, but who are involved, through rights and obligations, in a wider economic system which includes the participation of non-peasants. The fact that for peasants ultimate security and subsistence rests upon maintaining rights in land and rights in family labour is an important determinant shaping and restricting their social action. It is also the characteristic which peasants share with 'primitive agriculturists', though not with capitalist farmers. For while the capitalist farmer may appear to depend upon his land, he is not forced to rely upon these in the last instance; he has alternative potential sources of security and investment. What the peasant does share, in general terms, with the capitalist farmer (though not with the primitive agriculturists) is his integration into a complex social structure characterized by stratification and economic differentiation.

In Africa it is also possible to keep the term 'peasant' flexible enough to include pastoralists since they 'are subject to the same kind of political and economic forces as their predominantly agricultural brethren and since their productive economy (in as much as it involves rights to, and control over, family herds) is based on a similar kind of homestead principle'. And, more controversially, to include migrant labourers. The latter inclusion is justified by the stake which such migrants retain in, precisely, the family economy. While some peasants will seek to guarantee the surplus demanded by the broader social structure by means of attaching a cash-crop component to their basically subsistence-oriented cultivation, others will seek to do so by periods of time spent labouring in mines, plantations and urban centres. But they will do so without relinquishing their family's claim to an agricultural stake in the rural community. The logic of the migrant's position within the overall system remains the same as that of the cashcropper — at least in the short run, while both remain peasants.

Note the latter phrase. It is important, for the logic of continued capitalist penetration should be, of course, to phase out the African peasantry even as it creates it. At the one end of the spectrum peasants who start to generate surpluses in the sphere of cash-
cropping may become, in time, capitalist farmers. And migrants (as well as those who start to sell their labour power locally to supplement their subsistence agricultural activities) may become, in time, more definitively proletarianized. In short, these two tendencies can chip away at the peasantry, pulling it in different directions'. At the same time, the pace at which this apparent ‘logic’ now works itself out must not be overestimated. The realities of Africa’s continuing dependence means that peripheral capitalism in Africa tends to produce merely further underdevelopment rather than a total capitalist transformation of countries there. As a result, and as Colin Leys has written in demonstrating the increased rate of peasantization in Kenya (itself one of the most seemingly dynamic of dependencies in Africa):

Analytically speaking, the peasantry in Africa may be best seen as a transitional class, in between the period of primitive cultivators living in independent communities and that of capitalist development in which peasants are restratified into capitalists and proletarians; but under the conditions of growth of neo-colonialism it seems clear that in Kenya at least the stage during which the peasantry itself goes through a process of development, and develops its own pattern of relationships with the elite, may be fairly prolonged. 17

It could be argued, therefore, that the African peasantry is not composed of peasants quite like those in earlier, historically more progressive, capitalist systems (as analyzed by Barrington Moore) 'over whom the wave of progress is about to roll'. 18 Perhaps this will give them more of an opportunity to shape their own futures. 19

Two main points follow from the analysis thus far presented. There is a peasantry in Africa — large numbers of rural Africans caught, by international capitalism and colonial and post-colonial state structures, between subsistence cultivation and the fates which capitalism might eventually hold in store for them. In this reality of common ‘peasant-hood’, there is the potential grounds for ‘shared consciousness and shared political action’ against the broader structures which have come to dominate and exploit them. The multi national corporations and the national elites (along with their representatives in the rural areas themselves) would be the legitimate targets of action to redress such a situation. It is in this reality that there lies the promise of a peasant revolution and possibly the seeds of socialism — a promise to the analysis of which we will return in the next section.

But what we have said so far also suggests that there are peasants in Africa — these representing the wide range of variation in the way the peasantized have become involved in the broader imperial system. Or, in terms used by Lionel Cliffé, the presence of varying ‘articulations of modes of production’: different ways in which ‘historically and geographically specific and varied modes’ of production in Africa have ‘articulated’, or interacted, with ‘the increasingly dominant capitalist mode’. This variation means, in turn, as Woods and I wrote, that:

... in each territory we can distinguish a number of peasants who are differentiated according to locality, some localities being labour exporting.
some food-crop exporting, some cash-crop exporting and some with varying proportions of each... [In addition] the dynamic of capitalist development tends to introduce a further element which cuts across the differentiation of peasants by locality with a differentiation based on the degree of involvement in the cash economy. This involves... the possible movements towards proletarianization of migrant labour on the one hand and toward capitalist agriculture on the other.

Since, unlike certain other parts of the globe, African territories lacked some broadly comparable pre-capitalist structure (eg feudalism) spread over a large area, but instead comprised an extraordinary range of pre-capitalist social formations, it seems probable that the range of ‘articulation of modes of production’ which springs from capitalist incursion is, if anything, more varied in Africa than elsewhere. To elicit even a roughly common response and common level of consciousness from ‘peasants’ so diversified is concomitantly difficult.

Revolution in Africa

What of revolution, then? In Section I we quoted Malcolm Caldwell's general conclusion to his argument concerning "the revolutionary role of the peasantry": ‘In the world of to-day, the poor, the dissatisfied and the unprivileged are peasants. Therefore "the peasants alone are revolutionary, for they have nothing to lose and everything to gain"’. Significantly, the quotation which Caldwell uses here is from Fanon — and Fanon was writing about Africa. But Fanon's enthusiasm is not fully shared by others — the late Amilcar Cabral, one of Africa's outstanding revolutionaries, for example. 'Obviously', he says, 'the group with the greatest interest in the struggle is the peasantry, given the nature of the various different societies in Guinea... and the various degrees of exploitation to which they are subjected.' However, this cannot merely be left to rest there, for 'the question is not simply one of objective interest'. Cabral then proceeds:

to broach one key problem, which is of enormous importance for us, as we are a country of peasants, and that is the problem of whether or not the peasantry represents the main revolutionary force. A distinction must be drawn between a physical force and a revolutionary force; physically, the peasantry is a great force in Guinea; it is almost the whole of the population, it controls the nation's wealth, it is the peasantry which produces; but we know from experience what trouble we had convincing the peasantry to fight.

Leys, the academic observer, states a related point even more forcefully in concluding his analysis of Kenya and of revolutionary prospects there. For 'as writers such as Moore, Alavi and Wolf have shown, it generally requires a rare combination of tyranny and misery to produce a peasant revolt, let alone a peasant revolution; short of which the clientelist political structures characteristic of peasant society have a resilience that can easily be underestimated'.

Many of the grounds for scepticism about the revolutionary vocation of the peasantry which were asserted in general terms in Section I apply to Africa — in some instances with even greater
force. In many parts of the world rural dwellers are, in effect, peasantized twice over, first by the workings of some form of feudal system and secondly by the further structural subordination which arises from the insertion of that feudal system within a colonial-cum-international capitalist framework. However, exploitation and subordination are rendered more intangible in many (though of course not all) African settings because of the absence of landlords and quasi-feudal relationships at the point of direct production. This can have the result of depersonalizing and distancing the overall exploitative system, thus diffusing discontent. Secondly, population pressure on the land has not been as great in rural Africa, relatively speaking, as on other continents, and the visible threat to peasant status (especially to prospects for guaranteeing subsistence) from that quarter not quite so pressing.

Thirdly, while it is true that few but the most isolated of Africans remain untouched by the peasantization process, the unfulfilled nature of this process, its unevenness and its relative recentness, has left standing, perhaps more firmly than elsewhere, important vestiges of pre-capitalist social networks and cultural preoccupations — particularly a range of variations on kinship relationship and upon the theme of ethnic identification — which mesh closely with the survival of the subsistence agricultural core of the system. At the same time some of those who do begin to break more definitively with the attributes of peasantry do so under the influence of burgeoning petty-capitalist aspirations, rather than as moved by notions of the collective improvement of the rural dwellers’ lot. In making links with the world beyond the village such elements may find their most natural allies among the new elites who control state power.

But this — the aligning of itself with energetic capitalists-in-the-making in the villages — is only one way in which the neo-colonial state defuses the possibility of peasant class consciousness. Equally important, the quasi-traditional attributes of peasantry can also be warped in such a way as to service the functioning of Africa’s neo-colonial systems by those who benefit from them. The key, as Leys has argued, lies in the politics of patron-client relationships, broadly defined. In the first instance, peasants can be tied into the system by links with others above them in the hierarchy (these often being more privileged kinsmen) and by such small benefits as trickle down to them in this manner. In addition, politicians operating in the national arena have often come to play what is, in effect, a similar role over a broader terrain — that of super-patrons with their tribes as their clients. For ‘tribalism’ (the politicization of ethnicity which is all too characteristically a pathology of dependent Africa) does not spring primarily from the bare fact of the existence of cultural differences between peoples. Rather, it has been teased into life, first by the divide-and-rule tactics of colonialism and by the uneven development in the economic sphere which colonialism also facilitates and, secondly, by the ruling petty-bourgeoisie of the post-colonial period. The latter, too, seek to divide and rule — better from their point of view that peasants
should conceive the national pie as being divided, competitively, between regions and tribes, rather than (as is in fact much more clearly the case) between classes. Moreover, as individuals, they are moved to mobilize tribal constituencies behind themselves, using this as a bargaining counter in the struggle for power against other members of the ruling circles.  

Can African peasants come to be something more than mere pawns in the unattractive game of underdevelopment? Certainly peasants have not always been passive elements in recent African history. Their discontent often flared into overt action, revealing in the process ironies which Fanon has pin-pointed (and Kilson and others have documented):

What is the reaction of the nationalist parties of this eruption of peasant masses into the nationalist struggle? ... As a whole they treat this new element as a sort of manna from heaven, and pray to goodness that it'll go on falling. They make the most of the manna, but do not attempt to organize the rebellion. They don't send leaders into the countryside to educate the people politically, or to increase their awareness or put the struggle on to a higher level. All they do is to hope that, carried onwards by its own momentum, the action of the people will not come to a standstill. There is no contamination of the rural movement by the urban movement; each develops according to its own dialectic.  

Of course, the very diversity of peasantries also makes the 'putting of the struggle on a higher level' a crucial necessity. For different peasantries have felt, immediately, different kinds of grievances against the colonial system. The nationalist movements described by Fanon tended merely to accumulate the support of such aggrieved peasantries around the lowest common denominator of a demand for political independence, rather than generalising their grievances into a critique of imperial and capitalist reality more adequately defined. The leadership elements, so soon to inherit the established structures, had little interest in encouraging the development of a broader vision, of allaying fears and drawing peasants 'into the process of co-operative endeavour' (as Alavi suggested to be one possible denouement of peasant upsurge effectively politicized).

Instead, the mere Africanization of peripheral capitalism proceeded apace. Yet, as Nyerere has argued, this has had little, ultimately, to offer the vast mass of the peasantry:

... sooner or later, the people will lose their enthusiasm and will look upon the independence government as simply another new ruler which they should avoid as much as possible. Provided it has been possible to avoid any fundamental upset in their traditional economic and social conditions, they will then sink back into apathy - until the next time someone is able to convince them that their own efforts can lead to an improvement in their lives.  

Moreover, this latter possibility suggested by Nyerere has occasionally become a reality. The Congo of the mid-sixties providing an example — glimpsed in Pierre Mulele's activities in the Kwilu and in the People's Republic of the Eastern Congo. Of the latter Gerard-Libois has written:
... the insurrections which led to the creation of the People's Republic were first of all a revolt of impoverished and exploited peasants for whom the enemy was not only the foreign colonialist but above all those Congolese who had monopolized all the fruits of independence, and also those policemen, administrators and even teachers who served the new class and sought to imitate its style of life... The rebellion was... for all its limitations, the hope of a new independence, fundamentally different from the first, and through which the wealth of the Congo would accrue to the poorest and in which a new, genuinely decolonized African society would come into being.26

Such activities easily lost focus, and the character of the Mobutist denouement in the Congo (now Zaire) is well known. Whether more recent attempts to revive a revolutionary challenge in that country (seen in the work of the Congolese Marxist Revolutionary Party, for example) will be any more successful remains to be seen, but something of the nature of the 'steam' which does exist at the base of contemporary African societies could be discerned in Kwilu. In addition, broad trends like the growth of population pressure may come, over time, to further exacerbate such tensions in rural Africa.27

At base, then, the contradiction between the peasantry and established structures, world-wide and continental/territorial, remains. We quoted Cabral at the outset of this section. It is worth continuing that quotation, drawn from his analysis of the Guinean peasantry: 'All the same, in certain parts of the country and among certain groups we found a warm welcome, even right from the start. In other groups and in other areas all this had to be won.' Nevertheless, it has been won: in Guine Bissau the peasants have become an active agency for a deep-cutting revolution. Of course, the overall structure within which the achievement of Cabral and his PAIGC has been realized is a particularly anomalous one. Portuguese 'ultra-colonialism', even more cruel and unyielding than other colonialisms in Africa, provided precisely that 'rare combination of tyranny and misery' which Leys mentioned as being an important prerequisite of a peasant revolt. Moreover, it is obvious that anti-colonial nationalism could be used as an initial ideological rallying cry for revolution in Guine much more unequivocally than in a post-colonial situation; in Nyerere's words, it is 'another thing when you have to remove your own people from the position of exploiters'.28 Yet Cabral emphasizes again and again that, despite even these 'advantages' in Guine hard political work has still been necessary in order to realize a peasant base for struggle. How much more is this likely to be the case elsewhere in Africa?29

Cabral describes the nature of such political work carefully and suggestively in his writings. Particularly important have been the cadres who came to play the role of catalyst of the Guinean revolution. They were drawn initially from the petty-bourgeois stratum and from semi-proletarianized urban hangers-on, beginning their work as what Gorz has termed an 'external vanguard' vis-a-vis the peasants. But they have become, with time and with the effective resolution of the contradiction between leadership and participation, much more of an 'internal vanguard',29 a development which has also meant the sharing of authority with new leadership
elements thrown up by the newly mobilized peasants themselves as
the peasants' own confidence and commitment to the struggle has
grown. Obviously, a number of further questions arise from this:
How are the different peasantries likely to be geared into such
struggle (note that some provided a 'warm welcome' to Cabral and
his colleagues, others not)? What kind of 'piston box' of organi-
zation and ideology, constructed by the revolutionaries themselves,
can most effectively facilitate this process? By turning to an exami-
nation of the situation in Mozambique, similar in certain important
respects to that in Guinea, we can begin (though only begin) to
answer these questions.

Mozambique
The two questions just mentioned are not separate, however. The
Mozambican case demonstrates the importance of examining both
the nature of the peasantry as a potential base for revolution and the
nature of the presumed revolutionary organization — in this case,
the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) — in considering
recent developments there. But it is probably even more essential
to examine the dialectical relationship established between the two
— between peasantry and political organization — for it is this
relationship which has defined the forward momentum of the
Mozambique revolution.

That the peasants are an essential base there can be no doubt.
Eduardo Mondlane, the first President of FRELIMO who was
assassinated by the Portuguese in 1969, made this point clearly:

Both the agitation of the intellectuals and the strikes of the urban labour
force were doomed to failure, because in both cases it was the action only of
a tiny isolated group. For a government like Portugal's, which has set its face
against democracy and is prepared to use extremes of brutality to crush
opposition, it is easy to deal with such isolated pockets of resistance. It was
the very failure of these attempts, however, and the fierce repression which
followed, that made this clear and prepared the ground for more widely
based action. The urban population of Mozambique amounts altogether to
less than half a million. A nationalist movement without firm roots in the
countryside could never hope to succeed.

More recently, Marcelino dos Santos, FRELIMO's Vice-President,
has described that countryside along lines which are essentially
similar to those elaborated upon in this paper. Beginning with a
juxtaposition of 'two societies' in Mozambique, that which 'con-
tains capitalist relationships' and that of 'the traditional type — a
sort of subsistence economy', he proceeds to dissolve this distinc-
tion in his subsequent discussion.

But these two societies do not exist in isolation from one another; they are
entirely linked. Why? Where do these people who work in the plantations
come from? All those people who work within the capitalist sector come
from the traditional sector. And most of them do not remain permanently
outside the traditional sector because, for instance, many of them go to work
on the plantations for a maximum of two years and they then come back to
the village and to the traditional system. So that is the main link — going back
and forth. Then there are those people who do not become absorbed into
the capitalist system but who are nevertheless related to it. For instance, the
people who produce for themselves must sell their produce in the market,
mainly food like grain, cashew nuts. They are forced into the market system to find the cash for colonial-imposed taxes and to purchase commodities which they do not produce themselves. So these two societies are linked and on many levels the persons comprising the two societies are the same.\textsuperscript{31}

it will be readily apparent that dos Santos is here discussing what we have seen to be the African peasantry.

It has been an African peasantry pitch-forked into existence and sustained in its 'transitional' state by methods even more brutal than those employed by other colonialisms. Mondlane documents many of these methods in his book, discussing cash-cropping peasantries for whom the enforced cultivation of cotton and the rigging of government price schedules have introduced great hardship, and labour-supplying peasantries, even more mercilessly exploited over the years by a complex system of virtual forced labour. It is precisely the systematic nature of such repressive practices that led Perry Anderson to speak of 'Portuguese ultricolonialism'.\textsuperscript{32} Small wonder that peasants periodically had given expression to their grievances even before the mounting of a comprehensive political challenge to colonialism. Thus, in Mondlane's words, 'some developments in the countryside which took place in the period just preceding the formation of FRELIMO were of enormous importance'. In the northern region around Mueda, for example, such activity centred upon efforts to organize a co-operative and obtain better terms for produce delivered to the colonial government; when peasants demonstrated peacefully in support of this programme at Mueda town in 1960, 500 were shot down by the Portuguese.

Grievances there certainly have been and continue to be. Nor does it require any very elaborate proof to demonstrate that they provide tinder for peasant action. Nonetheless, my own experience in the liberated areas of Mozambique in 1972 permits me to speak with some added confidence on the subject.\textsuperscript{33} Travelling among the people of Tete Province with FRELIMO guerrillas, I had the opportunity to attend a number of political meetings and to hear the themes stressed both by FRELIMO militants and by ordinary peasants. A pin-pointing of the economic linkages mentioned above — forced labour, a prejudicial system of cultivation — was joined with a precise enumeration of the abuses directly perpetrated by the Portuguese administration. Of the latter, Portuguese taxation was a theme given particular prominence, its historically heavy role in the daily life of peasants being elucidated by FRELIMO cadres alongside an explanation of its importance in sustaining Portugal's ability to support economically its continued military presence. In effect, Mozambican peasants seemed themselves prepared to validate both Post's and Derman's earlier emphases — economic exploitation on the one hand, state power on the other — in defining their essentially subordinate position within previously established structures.

FRELIMO personnel also hinted at the existence of a range of variation in the response of different peasantries to revolutionary
imperatives. In fact, it was obvious to me that this has been the subject of much serious analysis by the movement, since its strategy is precisely to establish deep political roots among the people of a given area by means of careful political work prior to launching armed activity. For this to be done, considerable knowledge of the stresses and strains in the local community under consideration is necessary. So much became particularly clear from discussions which I held with cadres who had long been active in such preparatory political work (as well as in the subsequent tasks of constructing FRELIMO-type social institutions in areas once they have been liberated). But, necessarily, concrete and detailed information on these matters was not forthcoming. It was suggested to me that the work of mobilization had gone much more easily in Tete than in Cabo Delgado and Niassa ‘because the people had had more experience of exploitation’—especially of the push of labour to other parts in Mozambique and to Rhodesia and South Africa.34 This might seem to be evidence in support of Barnett’s thesis that the ‘labour-exporting peasantry’ has a ‘relatively high revolutionary potential’ compared with the ‘cash-cropping peasantry’ and the ‘marginal-subsistence peasantry’.35 But one cannot be categorical in these matters. Certainly the revolution has also advanced dramatically in Cabo and in Niassa where the latter types of peasantry are much more prominent, as well as in the cash-cropping areas of Tete itself. Similarly, in more immediately political terms, some chiefs seem to have reconciled themselves easily to the novel situation created by FRELIMO’s presence, presenting few obstacles to the political involvement of ‘their people’ on an entirely new basis, while others have defended themselves and Portuguese overrule with vigour. Historians will one day have important work to do in reconstructing more precisely such realities and the reasons for this range of variation.

Peasant ‘spontaneity’ has been important, then, and will probably become all the more important as peasants both respond negatively to such new and desperate last-ditch Portuguese strategies as the enforced strategic hamlet programme and respond positively to the promise which life in the liberated areas increasingly exemplifies for them. Nonetheless, peasant spontaneity has not been a sufficient driving force for revolution in Mozambique. It has also taken an effective movement—FRELIMO—to bring the potential peasant base into meaningful and effective existence. I have discussed elsewhere the evolution of FRELIMO itself which has determined its character as a revolutionary movement. It was not inevitably such: ‘all those features characteristic of the brand of nationalism which has facilitated false decolonization elsewhere on the continent have been present in the Mozambican context’.36 There are elements in FRELIMO who were quite prone to aim primarily at their own elitist and entrepreneurial aggrandizement under the guise of nationalism and to refuse to integrate themselves with the peasant masses, preferring instead to demobilize the latter with ethnic and racial sloganeering.

However, from the point of view of conservative members of the petty-bourgeois leadership of the Mozambican independence
struggle, there has been just one flaw in all this: in the context of a genuine liberation struggle this kind of nationalism, quite literally, does not work as it did for African leadership groups elsewhere on the continent. Portuguese intransigence meant that a stronger link with the people had to be forged in order to undertake effective guerilla warfare. It was with this reality in mind that Sebastião Mabote, FRELIMO's Chief of Operations (with whom I travelled in Mozambique), could say that the Portuguese had given Mozambique an opportunity other African states had missed — the opportunity to have a revolution. And that Eduardo Mondlane could say, shortly before his death, and only half-jokingly, that it would be almost pity if the struggle were to succeed too quickly, "we are learning so much!"

Learning, for example, the necessity of enlisting the peasants more actively in conscious support of the movement so that they would willingly undertake such positive tasks as maintaining the secrecy of FRELIMO activities in the face of colonialist pressure, as carriage of material and supply of produce, as direct enlistment in the army, reconnaissance and militia support work. But the peasants will not embrace such tasks if the leadership does not appear to present a genuine and less exploitative alternative than does the colonial system itself. They thus exercise a kind of passive veto over the movement and over those who lead it. Moreover, the establishment of participatory institutions throughout the liberated areas has enabled the peasant also to play an active role in helping to arbitrate the issue of the movement's direction. This fact became particularly important in 1968-69 when the contestation within FRELIMO's petty-bourgeois leadership — this group drawn initially from classes like those cited by Cabral with reference to Guine — reached its boiling-point. Then the progressive elements closest to the popular base of the struggle carried the day for their conception of the direction which the movement should take.

The popular base was significant. At the Congress of 1968 it was the delegates representing the people in the rural areas and those representing the army working inside the country who supported Mondlane; similarly, in 1969 when Simango broke with the movement, his defection found little or no echo in the liberated areas. It became clear that it was those who could work with the peasant as cadres — resolving in their own methods of political and educational work the contradiction between leadership and peasants participation — who had been able to consolidate their positions within the movement while others dropped by the wayside. It was also such cadres who could be expected to carry the revolution forward. For in the very process of this contestation the movement was encouraged to develop a new ideology, to move from 'primitive nationalism', as Marcelino dos Santos has termed it, to 'revolutionary nationalism'.

In short, the popular, peasant base of the struggle has become the key both to FRELIMO's military success and to its own internal clarity as a revolutionary movement. And this, in turn, has
encouraged its cadres to return to the people with even more searching solutions for the problems of the peasantry: not merely genuine democratic involvement at village, circle, district and regional levels, but also a comprehensive and practical programme of socio-economic transformation.

In our case the necessity to define a revolutionary ideology with greater precision emerged when we started to build the liberated areas, to engage ourselves in national reconstruction. As always, the task of building a society economically poses the problem of the type of production and distribution, and especially who is going to benefit from what the society produces. This life process also raised more sharply than in the classroom the deeper question of the type of ideology to embrace. So to summarize, there comes a stage when it becomes clear why everybody in the nation should accept the idea that the main aim of the struggle is to advance the interests of the working people. In the field or organizing the people we follow collectivistic ways as is the case, for example, with our co-operative movement in the liberated areas.

It is precisely here that peasants begin to be drawn into the process of co-operative endeavour (Alavi). The further radicalization of the nationalist movement, and the need to consolidate its rural base, create this kind of momentum. In the words of Samora Machel, FRELIMO's President:

... we leaders, cadres, fighters and militants must work hard to make the masses adopt and live by the collective spirit, using collective methods of production, which will make it possible to enhance the spirit of collective living thereby increasing the sense of unity, discipline and organization. Adopting a collective consciousness in work means renouncing individualism and considering that all the cultivated plots belong to us, that all the granaries and houses are ours, the people's. It means that I must unite with others in a cooperative, a production brigade. We will cultivate, harvest and stand guard together, and together we will protect what belongs not to me or you, but to us. The field is not mine or yours, but ours. The pupil in the school, the soldier in the base and the patient in the hospital all have collective consciousness. No one looks upon the school, the base or the hospital as their private property, and everyone therefore takes an enthusiastic interest in advancing the work in the school, base and hospital. As a result, progress is made, the work advances and the enemy cannot so easily attack. Where there is collective spirit we are more organized, there is better discipline and a proper division of labour. There is also more initiative, a greater degree of sacrifice and we learn more, produce more and fight better, with more determination.37

This step is in some ways more difficult than laying the initial bases of armed struggle. Joaquim Chissano of FRELIMO suspects that 'peasants are generally rather conservative and you have to go step by step. In our case there are traditional ways of co-operation, such as mutual help, and at the first stage we encourage them. Later we establish district committees to administer the area, and groups within this framework to look after agriculture. In their discussions within these committees, little by little the members come to understand the benefits of working collectively.38 In other words, given the quality of FRELIMO cadres and the general participative atmosphere in the liberated areas, striking results can be achieved. When, for example, I visited one village inside Mozambique where this process had been underway for only a year or two, I discovered division of labour which incorporated a significant proportion of collectively farmed fields, work on these being recorded in a log-book against eventual distribution of the proceeds. I found metal-workers and
basket makers who had originally worked as mini-entrepreneurs in
the village, now working as part of this collective division of labour,
their time spent also being recorded in the village book. Such dra-
matic developments may eventually inspire social scientists to write
books like *Fanshen*; for the present we must rely on twentieth-
century versions of travellers’ tales. But the latter evidence is
impressive and does begin to suggest that in such a peasantry,
increasingly well-organized and now working self-consciously against
various forms of exploitation, there can be seen some guarantee of
the continued forward momentum of the Mozambican revolution,
even after independence has been won. This is also the underlying
thrust of dos Santos’ comment in his recent interview:

I accept that (communal effort) is partly made easier by the demands of war.
But does that mean that once we have independence the approach will be
changed? In the particular conditions of fighting against Portuguese colonialism,
revolutionary attitudes are not only possible but necessary. If we do not follow
collectivist attitudes we will not be able to face the enemy successfully. In this
sense it is true to say that the internal dynamic of the struggle is such that the
conditions generate collectivist thinking. But one should also say that even if
the origins of such attitudes are partly pragmatic, it can, nevertheless, provide
a basis for the growth of real social revolution. There is certainly a strong possi-
bility that in the course of the collectivist effort a situation is created from
which it will be difficult to withdraw. If our organization maintains a true
revolutionary leadership, the special circumstances of the process of our
liberation open up real possibilities for an advance from liberation to revolution.

How to make certain that this is achieved?

The main defence must be to popularize the revolutionary aims and to create
such a situation that if for one reason or another at some future time some
people start trying to change these aims, they will meet with resistance from
the masses.

Tanzania

For Tanzania, the future is now. In consequence, that country reveals
much more clearly some of the problems of peasant-based structural
transformation. The absence of ‘tyranny and misery’ of the propor-
tions offered by Portuguese colonialism means that those features
which tend to divide and to differentiate the peasantry become far
more prominent aspects of the terrain of struggle than in Mozam-
bique. At the same time, the leadership which has emerged in
Tanzania has not been moved to cleanse and rededicate itself to any-
thing like the extent of that in Mozambique. Despite the Arusha
Declaration and *Mwongozo* (the TANU Guidelines of 1971), it is
the more conservative wing of the petty-bourgeoisie which seems
increasingly to be consolidating itself, with the result that the cadre-
based methods of work which might serve to crystallize and focus
peasant discontent and positive aspirations are not so well developed.
From both points of view, Tanzania falls short; rather than a dialectic
being established between leaders and led which reinforces forward
movement, the gap between them seems to be growing.

Still, what is striking about Tanzania is that it can be discussed in
these terms at all. In most of independent Africa the break between
nationalist parties and peasantry was of a kind described above by
Fanon, often from a point even prior to the winning of independence. In Tanzania, on the other hand, an attempt has been made to resolve such a contradiction within the framework of the country's policy of 'socialism and self-reliance'. 'Peasants' were to become (with 'workers') a crucial agency for transforming established structures from within — for a 'quiet revolution', in effect. I have traced elsewhere the background to this attempt, and some of its continuing strengths and weaknesses. Here it is relevant to note three themes which have defined the rural dimensions of Tanzania's socialist project.

First, there has been President Nyerere's oft-repeated emphasis on the necessity that, territorially, the masses — 'the workers and peasants' — become responsible for their own socialist development, distrust their leaders and holding them firmly to account. Though not always clearly defined in the language of class struggle, the point was thus being made that the peasantry has an interest in confronting those elements who might work to sustain its continued subordination. Moreover, this aspiration found some reinforcement in subsequent policy initiatives. Mwongozo further called upon the people to check their leaders. It is true that this invitation was, in the first instance, taken up most actively by the workers in the urban areas; nonetheless, Mwongozo confirmed the general emphasis upon the peasants' own positive role. And the whole process of decentralizing planning processes closer to the villages in 1971-73, however much disfigured in practice, was designed to redress a situation where 'to the mass of the people, power is still something wielded by others'. With decentralization, 'more and more people must be trusted with responsibility — that is its whole purpose'.

Second, there has been a desire to pre-empt the further development of capitalist relations of production in the rural areas themselves:

... as land becomes more scarce we shall find ourselves with a farmers' class and a labourers' class, with the latter being unable either to work for themselves or to receive a full return for the contribution they are making to total output. They will become a 'rural proletariat' depending on the decisions of other men for their existence, and subject in consequence to all the subservience, social and economic inequality, and insecurity, which such a position involves.

Thus we still have in this country a predominantly peasant society in which farmers work for themselves and their families and are helped and protected from exploitation by co-operative marketing arrangements /sic/. Yet the present trend is away from the extended family production and society unity and towards the development of a class system. It is this kind of development which would be inconsistent with the growth of a socialist Tanzania in which all citizens could be assured of human dignity and equality, and in which all were able to have a decent and constantly improving life for themselves and their children.

In this respect, too, socialism was seen as a way out of the peasant condition. By becoming 'socialists' peasants would avoid the other possible fates discussed above — their continued subordination as a peasantry or their destruction under 'the wave of (capitalist) progress'. Thirdly, there has been a desire to improve the quality of rural life by raising productivity and by slowly but surely making available necessary services and amenities. Implicit was an agreement with Raikes' formulation:
It has been shown time and time again that tremendous resources of productivity and creativity can be released in peasants and other producers once they take control of their own production process and control democratically its planning and implementation.45

The mechanism chosen to realize these goals has been the 'ujamaa (socialist) village policy — an attempt to structure collective agricultural communities at the base of the Tanzanian system which would give concrete expression to the peasants' involvement in the tasks of socialist construction. In working to build rural socialism, peasants could be expected to transform themselves. Moreover, ujamaa communities, once established, could also be expected to provide more effective rallying-points for critical action by an increasingly radicalized and organized peasantry, and hence the greater likelihood of a 'real, rather than a theoretical, check upon the petty-bourgeoisie of party and bureaucracy, at local and national levels, by the mass of the population in the interests of socialist development'.46

And this on a nation-wide scale. It is true that much of the original emphasis seemed to lie on the formation of brand-new villages in marginal-subsistence areas, but this was by no means an exclusive emphasis. Already, in the first major policy paper which launched the ujamaa approach, the President made clear that in established cash-cropping areas the move towards collectivism was equally to be fostered — even if, of necessity, by more subtle and graduated means:

It must be accepted ... that socialist progress in these areas will be more difficult to achieve, for when vacant land is not available there is only one way to create a community farm; that is by individual farmers coming together and joining their pieces of land and working them in common ...

It may be that the way to start under these circumstances is to operate first on the basis of working groups, but with the individual plots retained — that is, on the basis of mutual help. This would be simply a revival, and perhaps an extension, of the traditional system of joint activity, making it applicable to existing farms and not just to land clearing or house building. By working together on their private farms, the farmers will be able to finish different jobs more quickly, or to do things which would be too difficult for any of them individually. They will then have time to do other useful things — either by themselves or co-operatively.

This first step of mutual help can be followed by others. The farmers could buy certain essential goods co-operatively — things like fertilizers for example — or they could together build a store for their coffee, or something else which is of use to them all. By doing such things together the farmers will be gradually moving towards an acceptance of ujamaa socialism.47

Reference was also made in that paper to the peculiar problems of bringing collective agriculture to 'animal husbandry' areas. In short, the initial formulation was not a crude one: it began with the firm recognition that Tanzania contained a markedly diverse range of peasantries.

The original guidelines for the policy seemed also to strongly emphasize peasant spontaneity as a key to progress. Thus Nyerere argued that 'any citizen who understands the principles of ujamaa is encouraged to take the initiative'48 and stressed again and again
that the transition to collectivism was to be a voluntary one. Discussing his paper 'Socialism and Rural Development', he noted that 'it is directed to all the people of Tanzania — or at least all of those who live in the rural areas. It is an outline of a policy of inter-linked, self-governing village communities which are of the people, and which therefore cannot be created for them or imposed on them. The paper, therefore, calls for leadership, but not for orders to be given; it directs the people along the socialist path, but excludes any attempt to whip them into it — saying clearly that you cannot force people to lead socialist lives.' But the call for leadership is equally crucial. Nyerere in fact sought the key to success in leaders who will be, arguably, those very cadres whose importance we discussed earlier, persons who 'will lead by doing'.

He specifies some of the methods of work of such people, and concludes:

The members of an ujamaa village must control their own affairs — I say it again! But the role of a leader is crucial and good leadership will make all the difference to the socialist success and the material success of such a community.

Spontaneity and leadership — with cadres who will resolve that contradiction! Let us again check both terms of that equation. In Tanzania, peasant protest was an active ingredient in the nationalist movement; moreover, the party (TANU) which gave a focus to nationalism was linked more closely to this peasant base than other parties in Africa. This was one factor which facilitated the forging of the progressive programme of socialism and self-reliance by one wing of the territorial leadership in the post-colonial period. In addition, there have been some significant peasant actions subsequent to the winning of independence — not least the taking of a number of local initiatives to establish rural collectivization in scattered parts of the country — notably in remote Ruvuma Region. In the latter case, the Ruvuma Development Association (RDA, with its small attendant organization of cadres, the Social and Economic Revolutionary Army — SERA) was established formally under the umbrella of TANU, but more spontaneously than that fact might tend to suggest. In important ways it became a prototype for Nyerere when he moved to generalize this and other 'unofficial' experiments into a national ujamaa villages policy. Moreover, the potency of such rural collectives in institutionalizing a peasant challenge to class formation — in particular a challenge to those whose power and privilege had begun to crystallize around the apparatuses of state and party — can be seen in the history of the RDA's struggle with the bureaucracy and with local notables over a number of years in Ruvuma. It can also be gauged from the fact that the RDA was dissolved by the party, possibly against the President's better judgment, in 1969.

Despite the example of the RDA, it is nonetheless clear that 'spontaneity' has been an inadequate source of rural transformation in Tanzania. A potential is there, but to trigger off peasant consciousness around a national programme of socialist reconstruction and to give this programme its local embodiment in collective units requires the sort of leadership identified by Nyerere. It could of
course be argued that in the period after 1967, when Nyerere and his colleagues launched their overall project of transforming the economy and consolidating a progressive leadership, some of the preconditions for drawing peasants into the process of co-operative endeavour did exist. Yet the inability of Tanzanian leaders to cope with the reality of a mobilized peasantry when it had sprung to life (witness the RDA experience) is suggestive of a lingering problem. Not surprisingly, they have been equally unsuccessful in becoming active agents for mobilizing such a peasantry into existence and releasing its energies elsewhere in the country where this is necessary. On balance, the trend towards the bureaucratization of the leadership (or, more accurately, its crystallization as a privileged class around the apparatus of the state) has begun to outpace any counter-tendency which would serve to transform it into a complement of socialist cadres. Raikes argues that this degeneration has in turn determined a running-down of the ujamaa policy into one marked by coercion, by the uneconomic and demobilizing reliance upon solely material incentives, and by compromise with the locally privileged who have most to lose from collectivization. Thus, even if other more radical alternative approaches existed in theory,

It would be unrealistic to paint a picture of what 'might have been' in a political vacuum. The change in emphasis of ujamaa was not simply the result of a neutral judgement... The ujamaa strategy was changed to conform more closely with the preconceptions and interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who controlled its implementation. Similarly, their judgement cannot be considered neutral concerning the question of socialist transformation of the economy. Just as they tend to distrust the intentions and capabilities of peasants and are concerned to maintain their own status in relation to them, so do they distrust the major political changes which would have to occur before and during a socialist transformation. Large numbers of democratically controlled ujamaa villages would pose a real threat to their status, and should the next logical step be taken, to form democratically elected local councils of village leaders, this would go further to threaten their very reason for existence.

This at a territorial level. The consolidation of a more radical overall tendency there would, as in liberated Mozambique, have been reflected in more adequate methods of political work at the local level as well. For despite Nyerere's emphasis, cited above, on adapting the policy to suit the situation of diverse peasantries, little has been done to follow up on this insight. Yet the need to generate detailed knowledge both of political 'stresses and strains' at the local level, and of the realities of productive potential there, is at least as crucial to those engaged in facilitating the transition to collectivization in Tanzania as it is to those engaged in mobilizing a base for guerilla warfare in Mozambique. If anything, it is even more important, for the range of variation of the articulation of modes of production is vast in Tanzania, while the necessity to give the struggle for socialism a concrete and meaningful expression at the local level is even more pressing in the absence of a direct, physical threat to the peasantry like that provided by the Portuguese colonialists.
Several writers have addressed themselves to these realities. Woods discussing a range of 'area-based peasantry in Tanzania' and Cliffe pin-pointing six different 'broad types of rural situation' which need separate consideration: highland high-density areas, medium density, cash-crop areas, marginal subsistence areas, frontier areas, settler/estate areas, pastoral and semi-pastoral areas. Furthermore, Cliffe, in a number of his writings, has spelled out some of the implications for socialist construction of this range of variation by indentifying differing strategies for engaging the peasants of each such area in collective activity. He finds one key, particularly in advanced areas, in premising strategies upon the opportunities for struggle offered by class divisions internal to the areas themselves. In the absence of such strategies, those peasants who have shifted furthest towards a capitalist posture may seize the day, as in Bukoba where, as Cliffe shows in his article on rural class formation, 'in the contemporary period when the Tanzanian government is attempting to restructure the modes of production into co-operative forms in order to avoid class differentiation, the policy was preempted by a coalition of bureaucrats and the locally privileged. They translated the policy into terms which safeguarded the existing positions of rich and middle peasants by removing poor peasants who had little or no land to so-called 'ujamaa' villages in resettlement areas'.

Nor is the latter case an isolated one: Raikes would see it merely as a further example of a more general phenomenon — the class alliance of bureaucrat and 'kulak':

Thus communal labour for ujamaa villages required communal land-holding, something which required careful political education for peasants both large and small if they were to give of all or part of the private plots on which their livelihood depended. More particularly, of course, the larger farmers plainly stood to lose, and this could have led to some difficult choices in view of their considerable local political influence. The discomfort would have been the greater since by training, inclination and previous practice, the administrators were accustomed to work through precisely these local leaders and specifically through 'progressive' (i.e. large) farmers. This had been a stated objective of colonial agricultural policy, and was largely continued through the first six years of independence. Concentration of advice, credit and membership of co-operative and other local committees upon such groups had led, in many areas (and especially the richer ones), to the emergence of fairly small and tight groups of relatively wealthy and influential peasants and capitalist farmers whose relations to government staff were much closer than those of the mass of the peasantry.

Is there added steam to be drawn upon in such a situation? The work of the Iringa Regional Commissioner, Dr Wilbert Kleru, in emphasizing class contradictions in the Ismani area, isolating the 'kulaks', taking over holdings, and releasing the energies of poor and middle peasant strata might seem to suggest so, though in the event it led to Kleru himself being assassinated by a 'rich peasant'. And Ismani is a frontier area where capitalist relations are the most fully developed in Tanzania and the least muted by quasi-traditional identifications and solidarities. Where 'middle peasants' are a more dominant proportion of the rural population than in Ismani, the precise blend of class struggle, exemplification of collectivity, and
technical innovation to be encouraged would have to be a more nuanced one. Of the need for such effective and militant local struggles, however, there can be no doubt.

But, to repeat, the methods of work which might generate such strategies have not been forthcoming. The one effort (in 1967) to develop, systematically, a core of cadres who could be expected genuinely to release peasant energies around the promise of collective action floundered on the reef of bureaucratic and political hostility to such a programme. Instead, quite dubious alternative policies have been mounted, some of which have already been mentioned: a frontal approach directed by civil servants (generally themselves from more developed regions) towards backward areas least able to defend themselves and reduced in content to mere 'villagization', rather than collective enterprise; a ceding of other ujamaa experiments (in tea and tobacco) to the purvey of World Bank experts little concerned to guarantee socialist relations of production; and so on. Meanwhile, amidst the degeneration of his policy, President Nyerere seems only to have become more shrill and desperate in an attempt to recover the ground which has been lost. His latest utterance on the subject has struck a particularly uncharacteristic note: "To live in villages is an order", in the words of a Daily News, Tanzania headline.

President Nyerere said yesterday that living together in villages is now an order. And it should be implemented in the next three years. This was a Tanu decision. And any leader who hesitated to implement it would not be tolerated because he would be retarding national development. Addressing a public rally at Endabashi, Mbulu District, Mwamili [i.e. Nyerere] said there was a need for every Tanzanian to change his mode of life if rapid progress was to be achieved. People who refused to accept development changes were stupid, if not ignorant and stubborn.

There may be more promising counter-tendencies at the base of the system, though (as noted earlier), it is workers and students who have thus far responded most actively to Mwongozo's invitation to take power into their own hands. Nonetheless, in a country so rurally-biased as Tanzania it remains true, ultimately, that 'the only available class base for revolutionary transformation would seem to be a reconstructed peasantry — even if elements from other strata of society provide much of the leadership'. Nor is it likely that the peasantry has been entirely unaffected by the experience of struggle over the direction post-colonial Tanzania will take. Difficult though it is to gauge, some measure of consciousness-raising has undoubtedly taken place in the rural areas, even if the ujamaa programme has yet to give it effective institutional expression. Indeed, Von Freyhold seems to argue that the advance has been substantial, though while society has changed, parts of the bureaucracy have not yet fully understood that the peasants have emerged victorious from colonial domination. The old vices of bureaucracy — commandism, hasty decisions without investigation, red-tape and superiority feelings — have survived and it will probably take a cultural revolution — including communal re-education through self-criticism — to readapt the superstructure to its new social base.
Whence such a cultural revolution? In Handeni, Freyhold does see seeds of growing consciousness even in the rather compromised villages which have emerged from implementation of the ujamaa policy there. Furthermore, she feels that the struggle to determine the overall direction of the system is still sufficiently alive to make the opting for a cadre-based strategy — and a consequent strengthening of a rejuvenated party over and against the 'staff' or bureaucracy — a continuing possibility. This conclusion is controversial — some would argue that it is the bureaucrats and not the peasants who have emerged victorious — but her perception as to the need 'to change the structures of communication between the villages and the outside (in a way) which could bring more knowledge, more motivation and more self-assurance to the common members of the villages' is much less controversial. In the end she returns to familiar recommendations, recommendations which recall the dynamic of developments witnessed in Mozambique.

The kind of recruitment, training and task-description needed for political cadres will in any case have to change as the party and the peasants gain more experience with each other and with ujamaa. What matters at the moment is that the necessity of cadres should be realized and that different ways of finding and educating the right kind of people be tried. Strengthening the party at its base would have to be a priority not only because peasants need political guidance but also because the party at higher levels cannot grow into a meaningful institution without confrontation with the real and concrete problems on the ground.

Here would be a rejoining of the dialectic between leadership and peasantry that we have seen to be so important. Time alone will tell whether Tanzania still retains the capacity to reverse all those trends which suggest the running-down of its socialist experiment and whether it can begin again to consolidate a peasant-base for itself along the lines thus suggested.

The two cases which we have discussed are important, but they are not entirely typical of the continent as a whole. Southern Africa is crucial in its own right; moreover, successful revolution in Mozambique (using the term revolution in its broadest sense to include a successful challenge both to colonialism and to any prospect of subsequent neo-colonialism) would also be a stimulus to developments in the rest of Africa. But, as we have seen, the colonial factor — Portuguese ultra-colonialism — has given a point and purpose to nationalism there which has fashioned it, ineluctably and in the pre-independence period, into a revolutionary ideology and a revolutionary movement — of peasants. Tanzania, though already an independent state, is also atypical in that some attempt has been made by those already in positions of authority to mobilize the peasants (and workers) to support, even to demand, radical structural transformation.

Even with reference to Tanzania, there are those who would suggest that a point has now been reached which demands a more root-and-branch, from-the-bottom-up, challenge to established structures,
and who argue, in effect, that a much less ambiguous revolutionary thrust is becoming a necessity there. Whatever the answer to this difficult question, the fact remains that the situation elsewhere in independent (and neo-colonialized) Africa is far less ambiguous and the imperative of such a straightforward challenge to established authority more clear cut, if the peasants' plight is to be alleviated. There the time has arrived where 'someone' operating outside the established structures must attempt again to convince the peasantry, in Nyerere's phrase, 'that their own efforts can lead to an improvement in their lives'. Of course, a further exploration of this prospect is not our concern here. Yet if and when mass-based revolutions do become a more characteristic feature of other parts of Africa, there will be lessons, both positive and negative, to be learned by African revolutionaries from the experience of Mozambique and Tanzania — lessons about the precise range of peasantries which exist in Africa and, most important, about the methods which might facilitate these peasantries making the revolution their own. We have begun to touch upon some of these lessons in this paper. More generally, it has become obvious that additional scientific work on the question of African peasantries can be expected to make a positive contribution to the revolutionary process on the continent.

**FOOTNOTES**

1 Karl Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', in Marx, Surveys From Exile, Harmondsworth 1973, p 239.
3 Malcolm Caldwell, 'The-Revolutionary Role of the Peasants — 2', ibid.
5 See Paul Sweezy's particularly strong statement of this point in his 'Workers and the Third World' in George Fischer ed., The Revival of American Socialism, New York 1971: 'If we consider capitalism as a global system, which is the only correct procedure, we see that it is divided into a handful of exploiting countries and a much more numerous and populous group of exploited countries. The masses in these exploited dependencies constitute a force in the global capitalist system which is revolutionary in the same sense and for the same reasons that Marx considered the proletariat of the early period of modern industry to be revolutionary. And finally, world history since the Second World War proves that this revolutionary force is really capable of waging successful revolutionary struggles against capitalist domination.' p 168.
7 Lionel Cliffe, 'Rural Class Formation in East Africa', paper presented to the 'Peasant Seminar' of the Centre of International and Area Studies, University of London, 23 November 1973, mimeo, p 1.
9 Alavi's emphasis suggests an additional point of crucial relevance to our discussion of Africa: that 'the peasantry' is not uniform. Alavi's own distinction between 'poor' and 'middle' peasant is one of a number of possible differentiations to be made among various peasantries in any specific historical setting.
14 For a general overview of this process see Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, London and Dar es Salaam 1972.
16 William Derman in his book, Serfs, Peasants and Socialists, Berkeley-Los Angeles/London 1973, suggests, following Wolf, a very broad definition of 'rent' to encompass these varying realities while maintaining conformity with certain of the literature on peasantries on other continents.
19 This fact also demonstrates the urgency of a peasant-based revolution in Africa, for peripheral capitalism seems unlikely, by its further evolution, to produce an alternative agency, a fully developed proletariat, which could underwrite a socialist way out of the dead-end of underdevelopment.
20 Cf. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Harmondsworth 1967.
21 Aimé Césaire, 'Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea' in his Revolution in Guinea, London 1969. Here he draws an explicit comparison with the Chinese case: 'The conditions of the peasantry in China were very different: the peasantry had a tradition of revolt, but this was not the case in Guinea, and so it was not possible for our party militants and propaganda workers to find the same kind of welcome among the peasantry of Guinea for the idea of national liberation as the idea found in China.' p 30.
22 The 'crisis of feudalism' which is often attendant upon the incursion of capitalism and which intensifies a number of contradictions for the peasantry will not, therefore, be so prominent a feature.
23 See the analysis in my essay The Dialectic of Tribe and Class in Kenya and Uganda, forthcoming.
24 Martin Kilson, Political Change in a West African State, among others.
26 Jules Gerard-Libois, The New Class and Rebellion in the Congo' in Miliband and Saville, The Socialist Register 1966, London 1966. Gerard-Libois goes on to note, significantly, that 'the rebellion did not find the united, effective and revolutionary organization it required, and it is very doubtful whether the brief experience of the People's Republic made any contribution to its creation,' p 278.
27 Moreover, it is also obvious that the changes in the urban areas (the activities of workers and/or lumpen elements, for example) will be important in determining the nature and extent of peasant involvement in movements directed towards radical social reconstruction.
29 This distinction is developed, with reference to an advanced capitalist setting, in Andre Gorz, Socialism and Revolution, New York 1973.
33 For a brief account of my initial impressions, see the article 'Lesson in Revolution for a Canadian Lecturer' in Mozambique Revolution, No 52, July-September 1972.
34 See also Jofre Rebelo's comment on the struggle in the province of Manica e Sofala: 'One of the most interesting developments in Manica e Sofala has been the response of the people, which has been even stronger than that in Tete, again, we believe, because of the experience of oppression which the people here have' (in 'Comrade Rebelo's Report to CFM on Current Developments in Mozambique, June 19th, 1973' in Committee for a Free Mozambique News and Notes, mimeo, New York 1973).
38. 'Chissano: within 5 years the liberated areas will be developed 10 times more than under colonialism', interview with Joaquim Chissano in Ceres, Rome, July-August 1973, p 40.
40. Thus 'President Nyerere has called on the people of Tanzania to have great confidence in themselves and safeguard the nation's hard-won freedom. He has warned the people against pinning all their hopes on the leadership who are still telling the people's freedom to meet their interests. Mwalimu Nyerere warned that the people should not allow their freedom to be pawned as most of the leaders were purchaseable. He warned further that in running the affairs of the nation the people should not look on their leaders as 'saints or prophets'. The President stated that the attainment of freedom in many cases resulted merely in the change of colours, white to black faces without ending exploitation and injustices, and above all without the betterment of the life of the masses.' This statement is from the newspaper account cited in footnote 28.
41. This includes some attack upon imperialism — the confrontation with the 'new class' of leaders/bureaucrats is implicitly this throughout, and a wide-ranging programme of nationalizations and self-reliance is part of Tanzania's broader socialist policy. Nonetheless, it seems fair to argue that the overall policy has not been sufficiently clear concerning the peasants' role in subordinating to international capitalism — especially vis-à-vis the world market system. Strategies for the rural sector have been weak in linking peasant production to a new pattern of demand brought into existence by structural change in the industrial/urban sector, the latter in turn to be facilitated by a more decisive break with dependency. Cf. Saul, op. cit. for a more detailed critique along these lines.
43. Julius K. Nyerere, 'Decentralisation' in Freedom and Development, Dar es Salaam and London 1973, p 347. Nyerere adds that 'those who cause the new system to become enmeshed in bureaucratic procedures will, as are discovered, be treated as what they are — saboteurs.'
44. Julius K. Nyerere, 'Socialism and Rural Development' in his Freedom and Socialism, op. cit. This is an important perception of trends in rural Tanzania, though Roger Woods, in his 'Peasants and Peasantries in Tanzania and their Role in Socio-Political Development' (in Rural Development Research Committee, Rural Co-operation in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam 1974) argues that involution and stagnation may be an equally prominent feature in many such areas.
45. Philip Raikes, 'Ujamaa Villijini and Rural Socialist Development', paper delivered to the Annual Social Science Conference of the East African Universities, Dar es Salaam December 1973, mimeo. This is a particularly important recent appraisal: of Tanzania's rural development policy, practice.
48. Nyerere, 'After the Arusha Declaration' in Freedom and Socialism, op. cit.
51. For example, 'leaders' were scaled off from very gross 'conflicts of interest' vis-à-vis the private sector under the terms of the 1967 Leadership Code (although familial links to 'kulaks' often remained); moreover, given the stated attempt to undermine elite consolidation and to rally the masses as 'workers and peasants', the instrumentalization of the peasants by manipulating tribalism has been significantly reduced, thus encouraging the latter to come into more direct, unmediated, confrontation with structural realities.
52. See Raikes, op. cit.; Michaela von Freyhold, 'The Government Staff and Ujamaa Villages', paper presented to the Annual Social Science Conference of the University of East Africa, Dar es Salaam December 1973; Lionel Cliffe, 'Planning Rural Development' in Uchumi Editorial Board, Towards
Socialist Planning, Tanzanian Studies, Dar es Salaam 1972. For example, as I have argued in my 'African Socialism in One Country: Tanzania', it is ... in the rural areas that manifestations of the hectoring, bureaucratic style of such a leadership are most likely to have the predicted effect of demobilizing the mass of the population, thus choking off that release of popular energies which is the program's ostensible aim', p 292.

53 The strongest statement of this position which, in fact, sees the leadership as compromised from the outset as a 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' is to be found in Issa Shivji, *Tanzania: The Class Struggle Continues*, Dar es Salaam 1973; I have argued the existence of a struggle within the petty-bourgeoisie over the direction of Tanzanian development, a struggle which nonetheless evidences the growing strength of conservative elements in 'The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania', *Socialist Register 1974*, forthcoming.

54 For an important historical perspective on rural development in Tanzania and on the emergence of a differentiated peasantry, see John Iliffe, *Agricultural Change in Modern Tanganyika*, Nairobi 1971.


56 Raikes, op. cit. Von Freyhold, op. cit. even argues that kulaks can sometimes operate within so-called ujamaa villages to advance their interests, a point which is also developed in an interesting case-study by H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen in his essay 'A Case-Study of Ujamaa Farming in Ruungwe', in Rural Development Research Committee, *Rural Co-operation in Tanzania*, op. cit.

57 For an excellent, detailed account of developments in Ismani see Adhu Awiti, 'Class Struggle in Rural Society of Tanzania', *Maji Maji* Special Publication, no 7, Dar es Salaam, October 1972.

58 Some examples of such possible strategies are presented in the final section of Rural Development Research Committee, op. cit., where both the alteration of relations of production and the expansion of productive forces are equally stressed in exploring the promise of rural collectivization.


63 Von Freyhold, op. cit. This is of a piece with my earlier conclusion which, however, now may seem excessively sanguine in light of the analyses by Raikes and others: 'the horizon of really dramatic, cumulative change remains a distant one, but there can be little doubt that in the rural areas the ujamaa policy has given a content and structure to the struggle for progress in a nonrevolutionary situation around which consciousness can crystallize and a popular base may form' (in my 'African Socialism in One Country', op. cit.).

64 Unfortunately, there is little comparative material to go on, since many aspects of the Tanzanian situation are unique on the continent; moreover, despite its title and despite its many other virtues, Derman's book, *Serfs, Peasants and Socialists*, does not take us far in understanding processes in Guiné which might conceivably be comparable, beyond his concluding sentence: 'in my view, the transformation of peasants into socialists will be far more difficult than the transformation of serfs into peasants or the transformation of Guiné from colony to independent nation'.

65 This might seem to be a conclusion to be drawn from Shivji's essay for example.
Briefings

Guidelines

This section of the Review is designed to provide background information for those concerned with the struggle for socialist liberation in Africa. This is where we shall publish significant documents issued by governments or firms which relate to the problems of Africa. This is also where we are happy to provide space for radical groups or movements who wish to make contact with other groups, or who merely wish to publicise their activities, or in the case of more recent arrivals, their existence.

Naturally we welcome for publication, topical or important policy statements from such groups, though we should make clear from the outset that we also welcome constructive criticism of such statements and we trust that in the ensuing debates there will be an exchange of ideas and experience which will lead to greater ideological clarity concerning the tasks at hand.

The statement in this issue, by the US based African Information Service, makes clear that such groups need not be in Africa, but we do extend a special welcome to those groups who are based in Africa since their problems of communication are often greatest. It goes without saying that we would respect the desire by any author or group to remain anonymous though we would of course have to check the authenticity of reports sent to us in this way.

We are very pleased that our section of Spinola may in some small way help to clear up some of the confusion sown by the recent events in Portugal. Frelimo has recently sent emissaries to Britain and elsewhere, with precisely this task, and if these excerpts can assist that effort, it illustrates precisely the purpose of this section of the Review.

What is true for the Review as a whole is also true for this section — it will succeed or fail according to whether our readers support it. We would therefore urge any of our readers to send us copies of policy statements or reports issued by Governments or other official commercial institutions connected with Africa, so long as they bring to light something of the political economy within which they emerged.

The mailing addresses for contributions are given inside the back cover.
PORTUGAL AND AFRICA

After the Lisbon Coup

We print below short extracts from Portugal and the Future by General Antonio Spinola, the new President of Portugal and formal head of the military junta which now rules over Portugal and Portuguese-occupied Africa. Despite the evidence that state power does not totally rest with Spinola, his pre-coup views are of great importance in understanding the post-coup situation and in particular in offering an analysis of the neo-colonial options sought by Spinola and his supporters. These supporters naturally include the Portuguese parts of international capital, and it is no coincidence that Spinola is a director of one of the largest Portuguese based conglomerates, Champalimaud.

Spinola's book is an attempt to reconcile the dreams of renewed imperial grandeur held by the military establishment, the landed aristocracy and the backward sections of the bourgeoisie (which, with the Church, had been the pillars of the old Salazarist ruling class), with the requirements of advancing international capital.

At present some evidence suggests that the junta is dominated by the Armed Forces Movement, a populist group of educated and mainly conscripted junior officers. While the junta provided the original basis for the restoration of some of the features of bourgeois democracy, the popular mass movement in the form of free trade unions and the socialist and communist parties has provided a renewed and stronger basis for the consolidation of an anti-fascist order. These developments have provided pressure for an end to Portugal's colonial involvement and thus for negotiation with the liberation movements.

However, Spinola cannot simply be regarded as a spokesman of the Armed Forces Movement. Rather he can be expected to push for a neo-colonial solution in all three African countries still occupied by the Portuguese. It is here that his book is of importance for it outlines the kind of 'political' solution Spinola is pressing upon the Portuguese negotiators, a solution stripped of its unnecessary grandeur (the 'Lusitanian Commonwealth') down to its barest imperialist skeleton. As we go to press it would appear that while Guinea-Bissau may be ceded to the PAIGC Government, Portugal will attempt to retain the Cape Verde Islands. It may also be that in time Portugal will lose Mozambique, or a large part of it, to a
Frelimo-led Government. It is in Angola that circumstances are most favourable to the neo-colonial solution which Spinola seeks. Angola possesses vast mineral resources — oil, iron ore and diamonds especially — with the first two being rapidly developed by foreign, non-Portuguese capital. The pressure is therefore on Portugal from local and international capitalist interests to ensure a political solution which safeguards these.

Furthermore, the divisions and rivalries within and between the liberation movements in Angola make such a solution more likely. While MPLA is struggling with some internal dissention it remains clearly the most cohesive fighting force in Angola. However, it is still hamstrung by Holden Roberto’s ‘Government in Exile’ (GRAE) with which it formed an abortive alliance last year. Though this was intended by MPLA to give its forces a base in northern Angola and support-facilities in Zaire, Holden’s group has been, as always, more intent on eliminating MPLA than on removing the Portuguese, and has failed to effect the provisions of the alliance. UNITA, which originated as a break-away from Roberto’s FNLA, constitutes yet a third movement and this existence of three separate movements threatens the possibility of a genuine revolutionary solution in Angola.

Here, the role of Zaire in promoting a neo-colonial solution may be potentially more significant than Spinola’s. A client state of the US, Zaire under Mobutu has taken on the role of an African Brazil, a sub-imperial centre with the economic and military capability to exert its influence over the political economy of surrounding countries. Angola is one country where US economic and military strategy demands Zaire play its part, as the editorial in this issue has suggested. Mobutu and Holden were earlier this year reported to have conscripted 5—10,000 Angolan refugees from the northern parts bordering on Zaire, into a readymade army. This would give Holden’s forces a semblance of strength and credibility which they have been lacking, and may create a military force of substance ready to fill any vacuum left by a Portuguese withdrawal. Meanwhile a different tactical initiative has been attempted by Mobutu with the intention of creating a more substantial neo-colonial alliance which would bring together UNITA and MPLA dissident Daniel Chipenda with Roberto. MPLA is seeking to prevent its isolation and to maintain its own unity — but it is seeking to do this through a democratic process at a National Congress of cadres rather than through bargaining between self-styled ‘leaders’. The platform that will be put to this Congress show MPLA’s clear anti-imperialist position. It is in turn this determination not to settle for a neo-colonial solution which makes MPLA the main target of the manipulations of Mobutu and of other imperialist initiatives.

Spinola and his book have to be seen in this overall context as representing the views of a section of the Portuguese ruling class which will seek to impose a neo-colonial solution in conjunction with its US allies and their African clients. How far Spinola can influence the ultimate solutions will depend partly on how far the Portuguese Left is able to build a base in the country to contain the
Right. In Africa one question will be whether the Portuguese will carry its support for the liberation movements to the point of political and economic independence and if so, whether a vacuum will be left which will allow Zairean or South African forces to step in under the umbrella of US imperialism in an alliance with white settlers and parts of the African petty-bourgeoisie.

The final and major determinant of how much success Spinola’s salvage operation can hope to achieve lies, however, in the firmness, strength and ideological clarity of the liberation movements. For Spinola’s book makes it abundantly clear that his own ‘solutions’ are the proposals of desperate men who have abandoned their dreams of glory and supremacy because the tide of battle has turned decisively against them. Those who turned that tide in Guinea and Mozambique are not likely to accept a neo-colonial solution at this late stage, but they and the Portuguese left can never forget that General Spinola represents a solution which has the backing of interests which extend far beyond the borders of Portugal. The reaction of those interests is still a crucial unknown, but who would be surprised if Dr Kissinger offered to ‘make peace’?

From this perspective it may well be that the most significant passage in the book is that which asserts that only if, in the face of a favourable (to Portugal) referendum, ‘the enemies do not give up, it is . . . certain that our friends and the independents, given this basis for a more militant attitude, would abandon their current scepticism . . . and the free world would take our side in a militant manner’. No doubt President Nixon’s trip to the Azores to meet General Spinola was a portent of things to come. No doubt, too, this meeting provided a welcome opportunity to instruct General Spinola in the arts of ensuring that ‘free’ battle-front referenda do indeed turn out ‘favourably’.

Antonio Spinola: ‘Portugal and the Future’: Extracts

Why this book?
The problem of the overseas territories has become our current top priority, since, indeed, Portugal’s future depends on finding an adequate solution for the situations resulting from the wars we are facing, which destroy lives and waste resources, and slow down the speed at which we ought to promote our development in order to bridge the gap which separates us from the countries on whose side we should be.

To reduce the problem of the overseas territories to extreme positions, and to present the country with the dilemma of everlasting war or betrayal of the past is an attitude which does not lead to the future of grandeur and unity to which all of us legitimately aspire.

Furthermore, this book comes as a moral imperative which we could not silence. We have a prosperous future ahead of us which we can and must build. The home country has been bled dry in this holding operation, and we can accept neither the idea that such
great sacrifice has been made in vain, nor that the killings of today only ensure the killings of tomorrow.

Dissent reaches the Church and the Army
As general opinion cannot be expected to maintain a clear sense of proportion, it is not wise to demand that the masses do not ask more than is possible to give them, since they will always want to have what they see in similar societies. The greater the intervention of paternalist powers in social life, no matter how clear are the explanations offered, the greater will be the tendency of the masses to consider these powers responsible for their dissatisfaction. And, in this emotional atmosphere, dissidence spreads to all sectors and begins to win dangerous positions, even in organizations where discipline used to be well established; in the Church and in the Army. What is happening is that the old discipline, the much praised respect for authority, and the unconditional identification between rulers and leaders, have given way to the notion that to rule is to serve the community; and there is an increasing aspiration within society to judge the way in which it is served.

Liberalization is the solution
There are three alternative approaches to the problem: through a chain of successive concessions, a road which leads to a point of rupture where concessions have to stop; through totalitarian repression, which speeds up violence; and through liberalization, which also has its reverse side, but which, in spite of this, we believe to be the best, if developed progressively, in a disciplined way and under the control of firm authority reinforced by its legitimacy.

This is, in brief, the set of options about which we have to make up our minds, if we want to solve the social crisis of our time.

The need to re-establish peace
From the military point of view it is necessary to recognise that the way to a prosperous future of national survival unquestionably lies in the rapid re-establishment of peace — a problem which deserves to be analysed in its multiple aspects.

In Guinea, Angola and Mozambique we are fighting a new type of war. It is a total war in relation to which the population cannot, even if it wanted to, remain indifferent. Unlike the classic conflicts in which the population was a powerful, but not decisive, factor, the population is here in the centre and is the objective of every action, and, for this reason, its commitment is absolute, and only the party which has it on its side can win the war. With the authority of experience, we think it sensible to state that the African people are with us, as is the case with the majority of the population of Guinea. But the truth is that this was not always so, and that, at any moment, the situation can change; and then this would be irreversible. Thus it would be more accurate to state that
the populations are still with us, but that they will not be with us any longer when they feel pushed away from the realisation of their legitimate aspirations to a better life and from absolute participation, at all levels and in perfect fairness, in the political and administrative life of their nation. There is no point in expecting them to feel Portuguese in a different situation; and it seems to us that the situation which is being prepared does not yet respond to this requirement. Furthermore, it must be emphasised that, given the current circumstances, our objective cannot be to win over only the people, but also the fighting masses of the enemy — and this can only be obtained through a political solution. To exclude this alternative is to rely on a military solution of the conflict and this leads us to the central problem: to find out whether a military solution of the war we are confronted with is viable.

There is no military solution

The population always surrenders to violence and identifies itself with the strongest side. On this hypothesis, we must either counterpose still greater violence to the violence of the forces of subversion, in order to make the balance of power favourable to the forces of order, which is unacceptable — or we must protect effectively the population, which would imply forces above the resources of any country. Thus the winning over of the population, either through persuasion or through violence, is out of the question.

It would be possible to ensure victory by reducing the combativeness of the forces of subversion through inducing the majority of them to support the cause of the established order, or making the interests that support them withdraw their collaboration. In either case, however, this would be a political victory, not a military one. And as it is utopian to think that these interests are going to give way while the masses show combativeness, we are left with only one solution — an essentially political one.

To attempt to win a subversive war through a military solution is to accept defeat even before it comes, unless there are unlimited resources which make it possible to prolong indefinitely the war, turning it into an institution.

Disintegration of the community

There are lines of division emerging in the Portuguese nation. From the point of view of the European sector overseas, it is noticeable that there is a move to separation arising from white attitudes akin to those in Rhodesia, which can and should be avoided. Our African populations, with ethnic extensions beyond the borders of the overseas provinces, engaged in comparisons which, although highly favourable in many respects, are unfavourable to us in one aspect which, in spite of all the rest, is decisive: they are not administered by their brothers in race. So far, they have remained on our side and have fought besides us for three reasons: first, we are still the strongest locally, which, in African circumstances, is of para-
mount importance; second, we bring them greater economic and social advantages than those available to their brothers in colour in neighbouring countries; and, third, because they still believe in the possible development towards autonomy within the context of a Portuguese community in which they remain interested. When these three reasons disappear, rebellion will win and separation through revolution will be inevitable.

Our Options

Mere withdrawal from the overseas territories must be rejected for three main reasons: because it would affect our survival as a free country; because we cannot abandon those who built their lives overseas under the protection of the national flag; and because there is no reason for total abdication in favour of friends or enemies. It would also be possible to try to hold the current situation, evolving within very narrow limits, but this route is not acceptable either, because immobility will speed up disintegration through revolution.

Portuguese community

Finally, we are left with the option of a well-balanced thesis which proposes the building of a vast Portuguese community on the basis of progressive autonomy of each part, creating in this way the foundations for a unity of a new type, which, in its initial phase, will necessarily pass through vicissitudes, but that, in the end, will become strong, and in which Brazil will be able to find its real place, instead of a place only postulated by a futile platonism. However, it will not be possible to follow this path if we remain tied by a polarized structure.

The national future

The solution of our crisis implies the acceptances of three principles. The first is the recognition of the right of the people to self-determination, and it is in the respect of this principle that we have to build, through the community, a true unity, capable of resisting the current vicissitudes. And this principle leads decisively to a progressive autonomy, in the context of an expanding role for African institutions.

The second principle, which derives automatically from the first, will allow us to consider the recourse to popular consultation. The refusal to even consider public consultation, no matter under what excuse, is an absolute denial of the constitutional concept that sovereignty resides in the nation.

Therefore we believe that a referendum results in a reinforcement of the established powers, when they act under the conviction that they interpret the authentic national feeling. And, even if the situation of our African populations seems to deny what we have been defending here, this does not make this thesis unsound; on the contrary, it
compels us to imperatively prepare them for the exercise, in the shortest possible period, of all their rights as citizens.

The advantages of a referendum
It may be objected that, in our case, as we are dealing with a war promoted by foreign interests, the referendum would always be questioned, no matter how honest it was; and therefore there would be no advantage in holding it. To this we reply that, first, a referendum must not only be held when it is advantageous.

If, before the favourable results, the enemies do not give up, it is also equally certain that our friends and the independents, given this basis for a more militant attitude, would abandon their current scepticism. And we have no doubts in stating that the free world would take our side in a militant manner when, after a period of adequate preparation, the consultation through a referendum of the African Portuguese unquestionably revealed their will to remain Portuguese under a statute of their own choice. Thus the problem consists of promoting the self-determination of the overseas populations through their integration in the Portuguese Republic which, although difficult under the present circumstances, would become easier under more favourable ones. This is feasible when the populations feel that they are not discriminated against; when their traditional institutions are allowed to express themselves, through an evolution within the Portuguese context; when they are given the opportunity of voting the laws which are applicable to their communities; when they are allowed to elect, without restrictions, their own representatives; when they are allowed to freely form their own local institutions; when their rulers are the product of these local institutions democratically formed; when, finally, feeling free to take their options, they are also able to understand that it is in their identification with the Portuguese community that the road to progress lies, as well as the road to welfare and true independence towards the neo-colonial situation which frightens their African neighbours.

A proposed political structure
Those who really believe in the integrative power of the Portuguese ideal have no reason to be afraid of a federal solution, which would be a test for our beliefs. If this is not so, whatever are the consequences, it is not national unity that is under scrutiny, but imperial unity; and contemporary values do not condone empires any longer. Furthermore, between one solution which implies the impoverishment of the nation and whose viability is very questionable, and another which seems to be more viable there is no possible hesitation. We think it feasible to build a system which guarantees the autonomy of the federal states under a central authority, if the legislation of each state is submitted to parliamentary chambers with fair representation and, in the last resort, to the arbitration of the judicial power under a constitution approved by all citizens and all different regions. After all, this idea is not new, since, in the beginning of this
century, Marnoco e Sousa and Eduardo Costa already proposed solutions which, in some of their features, resemble that designed here. Moreover, in our case, it would be highly probable that a federal solution would reinforce the cohesion of the system, through a strengthened and impartial judicial power and armed forces perfectly aware of the objectives that are to be achieved. Within this context, what is now metropolitan Portugal would also have to reorganise itself as an autonomous province, where, therefore, an individual government of its own would be necessary, distinct from the central government, and with headquarters located in accordance with the demands of the functional and political factors which condition it. Defence, Foreign Affairs and Finances should be centralized in the central government. The Overseas Ministry, whose existence is not justifiable in this new scheme, should disappear and be replaced by a characteristically co-ordinative department, integrated within the Prime Minister's office. For this it should be totally absorbed through the transference of many of its current functions to other ministries or departments, enlargement of others due to their relevance within the framework of a federation, and delegation on the provincial governments. At the top, at central level, there would be a Chief of State, symbolizing national unity, and a Chief of the Executive, assisted by Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security, and, also, a Secretary of State for the Council of Ministers and Co-ordination, and undersecretaries for co-ordination in the fields of Justice, Economy, Public Works, Education, Health and Social Security.

No matter how risky this proposal is, we cannot see any other alternative for Portugal, which, otherwise, will disintegrate, through amputation, one after the other, of its African territories.

Statement by Frelimo Executive Committee on the Events in Portugal

On 25 April, 1974, we learned from radio broadcasts about the coup d'état in Portugal by the armed forces which resulted in the ousting of the government of Marcelo Caetano and its replacement by a 'Junta of National Salvation'. This movement, according to its promoters, is intended to provide a solution to the present crisis which the Portuguese regime and society are going through after 13 years of colonial war.

The coup d'état which has just taken place cannot be seen in isolation. It is a result of the new awareness of growing sectors of the Portuguese people that the purpose of the colonial war launched by the fascist regime is to suppress the colonised peoples' aspiration to independence and freedom and is against the desire for well-being and political and social democracy of the Portuguese people themselves.
At this time we had, in the first place, the Portuguese democratic forces which for many years have been actively and courageously opposing the colonial war. This growing awareness is closely bound up with the affirmation of the unshakable will of the Mozambican people, and of the peoples of Angola, Guine-Bissau and Cabo Verde Islands, to achieve independence and freedom. This will has taken on material form in the armed struggle for national liberation, which has been steadily growing and has already reached vital regions of our country. The coincidence between the crisis of the regime in Portugal and the great advances of the national liberation struggle in Mozambique over the past two years is no accident, but additional proof of the impact of our struggle on the situation in Portugal. The determinant factor of the situation in Portugal and the colonies has been and still is the struggle of our peoples. And the fundamental issue upon which the solution of all other problems depends is the independence of the peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guine-Bissau and Cabo Verde Islands, as well as that of the remaining Portuguese colonies.

As far as the Portuguese people are concerned, to the extent that the principles contained in the proclamations that the leaders of the coup d'état have made up to now are put into force, this will doubtless be a step forward towards the establishment of democracy in Portugal. The young people who engaged in action aimed at putting an end to 48 years of uninterrupted dictatorship in Portugal, acting in line with the aspirations of the Portuguese people to realise their legitimate right to democracy, liberty and real independence, are the same young people who, when they were made to fight against our people, understood the unjust nature of the war in which they were engaged and the character of the regime which forced them to give up their lives for the defence of interests contrary to the interests of their people. The establishment of democracy in Portugal would be a victory for the Portuguese people, a victory at which we would rejoice.

For the Mozambican people, under the leadership of FRELIMO, the correct definition of who is the enemy has always been an essential point of principle. The enemy of the Mozambican people is not the Portuguese people, themselves victims of fascism, but the Portuguese colonial system. And an important section of the Portuguese army itself was made to understand that it was not defending the interests of its people in the colonial war when it felt the growing disaffection of Portuguese opinion with regard to the war it is waging in the colonies. If our struggle thus contributed to the Portuguese people's struggle against fascism and to win their right to democracy, FRELIMO cannot but congratulate itself for having contributed to this. But just as the Portuguese people have the right to independence and democracy, this same right cannot be denied the Mozambican people. It is for this elementary but essential right that we are fighting. The objectives of FRELIMO are very clear: the total and complete independence of the Mozambican people and the liquidation of Portuguese colonialism. The Mozambican people are an entity quite distinct from the Portuguese people, and they have their
own political, cultural and social personality which can only be
realised through the independence of Mozambique.

We are not fighting to become Portuguese with black skins. We are
fighting to affirm ourselves as Mozambicans, without this meaning
contempt for the Portuguese people or any other people. In this
respect, FRELIMO reaffirms its wish to fully co-operate with all
peoples in the world on a basis of independence, equality, respect
and mutual interest. FRELIMO also reaffirms that the definition of
a Mozambican has nothing to do with skin colour or racial, ethnic
religious or any other origins. Members of FRELIMO are all Mozam-
bicans who adhere to its programme of struggle against Portuguese
colonialism, for the independence of Mozambique. FRELIMO is not
a racialist organisation and it is not waging a racialist war. We reaffirm
here what we declared in July 1972 when we opened a new front:
'On starting the struggle in Manica e Sofala where an important
section of the Portuguese community in our country is established,
we reaffirm that our struggle is not against them, that our victory
can only benefit those who live from honest labour, those who suffer
from colonial and fascist exploitation. The Mozambican people
fraternally call upon the Portuguese soldiers, the Portuguese people
to join the common effort of liberation. At the same time as hailing
the growing support from white Mozambicans for the struggle for
national liberation, we wish to warn certain sectors of the European
population of Mozambique against the attempts of the ultra-racist
forces, encouraged by the neighbouring racist countries, to transform
our armed struggle for liberation into a total war between whites and
blacks. This manoeuvre has as its purpose to make the white settlers
participate actively in suppressing our people. That attitude makes
them instruments of other forces and does not serve their own
interests or the interests of the Mozambican people.'

Freedom and independence, the affirmation of our own personality
— these then are the objectives of our struggle. FRELIMO fighters
are not professional soldiers. They are the Mozambican people in
arms. They are, before all else, political militants who have taken up
arms to put an end to the daily violence of colonial domination,
exploitation and repression. It is up to the Portuguese government to
learn from past experience and understand that only through recog-
nition of the right to independence of the Mozambican people, led
by FRELIMO, their authentic and legitimate representative, will the
war end. Any attempt to elude the real problem will only lead to
new and equally avoidable sacrifices. The way to solve the problem
is clear: recognition of the Mozambican people's right to indepen-
dence. If, however, the objective of the coup d'etat is to find new
formulae to perpetuate the oppression of our people, then the
Portuguese leaders are warned that they will face our firm deter-
mination. The Mozambican people, over 10 years of heroic armed
struggle, have endured heavy sacrifices and shed the blood of their
finest sons and daughters to defend the inalienable principle of their
sovereignty as a free and independent nation. Politically and mili-
tarily tempered, encouraged by the growing successes of the armed
struggle for national liberation, more united than ever under the
leadership of FRELIMO, the Mozambican people will not retreat before any sacrifice in ensuring that their rights and fundamental aspirations triumph. We cannot accept that democracy for the Portuguese people should serve as a cover to prevent the independence of our people. Just as Caetano's era clearly demonstrated that liberal fascism does not exist, it must also be understood that there is no such thing as democratic colonialism.

At this moment it is important that all the forces in solidarity with the people of Mozambique and with the peoples of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cabo Verde and Sao Tome e Principe, continue their action for the recognition of our right to complete independence. They must remain vigilant in the face of any manoeuvres aimed at blocking the process of our total liberation coming not only from the Portuguese government, but from the regimes in South Africa and racist Rhodesia. It is also essential that the forces which support our struggle step up their assistance of every kind to the liberation movements, so that with the end of Portuguese colonialism, the aspirations of our peoples, which are those of all of mankind, may be fulfilled.

INDEPENDENCE OR DEATH
WE SHALL WIN
THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
FRELIMO
27 April 1974
RACE AND CLASS

Africa Information Services

Africa Information Services (AIS) is an organisation of Africans and Black Americans who share a commitment to Third World and anti-imperialist struggles. Upon the disbanding of the Africa Research Group (ARG), that organization's files and library were turned over to AIS on the understanding that in part its work would be a continuation of efforts to distribute information on African liberation movements and on the struggle to achieve economic independence, by the people in those parts of Africa which are recognized as independent political states. In addition, AIS plans to provide the people of Africa with information on struggles waged by Third World peoples in the Western Hemisphere.

Members and associates of the AIS are reminded that as an organization we do not define the enemy strictly in terms of race. We are engaged in a protracted struggle against Western European finance capitalism. Racism (the systematic subjection of an ethnic group and denial of fundamental human rights to most members of that group) and imperialism (the exportation of finance capital in order to dominate and control indigenous economies and peoples) are important manifestations of this system. However, we must remember that these twin evils can only be removed within the context of a broad international social revolution. The system cannot reform itself and eliminate its own foundations; racism and economic exploitation.

In all appearances on behalf of the organization our position must be clearly stated. Our struggle is against this system and not against any race of people. The enemy is defined as Western European finance capitalism for the following reasons:

Western Europe — takes into account the place of origin of the system which has oppressed our people — from the initiation of commercial slavery and the slave trade up to today. The United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Rhodesia and Israel as settler states are merely results of the expansion of Western European finance capitalism and we consider them part of the same system. The very existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other informal alliances between members of the ruling classes of these states support this view. As a people we do not have a history of oppression by the Eastern European states, most of which were at a pre-finance capital stage of development before they became socialist states. In terms of economic, political, and social policies and power, Japan has become a member of the
Western European finance capital bloc. Other states (e.g. Ethiopia, Iran, Thailand, Brazil, etc.) are appendages of this system, but their rulers lack power to become full fledged members of the decision making apparatus of this bloc.

Finance Capitalism — takes into account the development of a particular phase of capitalism which was once a liberal economic and political ideology. Small laissez-faire entrepreneurship has given way to international oligopolies and monopolies. Ingenuity in productive methods has yielded to manipulative financing schemes. The problem of equal distribution has intensified as sub classes have been created within the productive scheme. Therefore, in terms of the human developmental process, capitalism has outlived its usefulness and in struggling to survive has become more and more decadent. Racism, sexism and regional chauvinism, are tools for the maintenance of the system in that they are encouragements against the necessary international class struggle.

Thus, as a people we are confronted with a paradoxical situation. Our struggle is against an oppressive system. Most white people have been permitted to derive some benefit from the system. The creation of 'white skin privilege' has reinforced racial prejudices and contributed to the development of racism. Very often white workers struggle against the black masses rather than against the white ruling class, thereby creating a contradiction amongst the people or a secondary contradiction. The primary contradiction is between the working and proletarian masses on the one hand and the white ruling class and its agents (black and white) on the other. This is a contradiction between the people and the enemy. Unfortunately our struggle against the ruling class is often sidetracked into a preoccupation with people who are merely messengers for the system. Hence the preoccupation with 'offing the pig' while ignoring the 'farmer'. The fact that most white workers are ignorant of their own history and ignorant of who their class enemy is, imposes a more difficult task of political education on us. Black people, as a component (with other Third World peoples) of the revolutionary vanguard in America, must strive for a clear definition of the enemy and must exploit and heighten class contradictions within white society. We must reject rhetoric which unites white workers with the ruling class and which subjects us to the opportunism of the black bourgeoisie.

This is not to deny the validity of the national aspects of our struggle. Black people in America have (as do other Third World peoples in America) a separate national identity. Our common origin, the common nature of our oppression and our common cultural experiences have resulted in a unique African-American personality. Recognition of the threat that this personality could pose to the present day America, the ruling class has followed two courses. On the one hand integration has been used to dilute our political strength and to weaken our institutions. On the other hand class collaborators have co-operated in commercializing blackness in attempts to define our nationalism in very limited and reactionary terms.

For us, nationalism is a progressive force which is a prerequisite for dealing with America's class contradictions. We cannot make common cause with proponents of black capitalism, black sexism, black chauvinism, or black racism. Our nationalism must be a motor force for the destruction of negative attitudes about our abilities as a people. It must be the vehicle through which we construct institutions capable
of addressing themselves to the needs of our people. And ultimately, it must be the vehicle through which we unite with other oppressed peoples in participating in the world-wide revolutionary process.

In conclusion, we must remember that every political or economic ideology must be judged by its service to humanity — all humanity. No ideology can be considered as the ultimate answer for all future generations. The process of human development has taken millions of years. In that time there have been many changes and various systems of 'production' and 'distribution' of the necessities of life.

The system we are presently living under has proven to be insufficient for today's conditions. It is an inhuman system. Therefore it will be replaced by one which puts people above profits. However, our responsibility is to assure that the new system remains faithful to the needs of people rather than the needs of bureaucracy, and that it is flexible enough to permit any necessary changes. Human need must always be the governing criterion.

AIS address: 112 West 120 Street, New York, NY 10027.

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Reviews


The phenomena of the 'underdeveloped' world cannot be fully understood without disclosing the phenomena of the 'developed' world, and indeed, the interpretation of 'underdevelopment' itself is greatly dependent on the evaluation of the development of the advanced countries. The laws of motion of 'underdevelopment' are much more widely and deeply rooted than the actual sphere of 'underdevelopment' in a given place and at a given time. Therefore, the interpretation of 'underdevelopment' must necessarily include a historical and external element which is organically inherent not only in 'underdevelopment' but also in 'development'. (p. 15, emphasis in original)

This review does not attempt to give a definitive interpretation of the work of Tamas Szentes and the summary given cannot do justice to the complexity and depth of his analysis. But it is to be hoped that it will promote a wider awareness of this very important book, which, although difficult to obtain, is the first serious and comprehensive attempt (apart from the earlier work of Paul Baran) to develop a genuine political economy of underdevelopment. It provides an essential background to current controversies on underdevelopment and imperialism, as well as an analytical framework within which both individual country studies and the examination of specific problems (industrialization, foreign aid, etc.) can be made.

The book is divided into two parts. The first presents a critique of the basic bourgeois theories of 'underdevelopment'. The author does not attempt to give an exhaustive account of individual theories nor a history of the development of economic thought. He is concerned with showing why certain theories cannot offer a comprehensive and acceptable theory of 'underdevelopment' although he acknowledges that some of their explanations for certain partial problems do have some usefulness. In part two he presents an examination of 'the causes, substance and the laws of motion of underdevelopment' and it is with this analysis that we are here concerned.
Szentes begins with an analysis of colonialism, i.e. the specific manifestation of the world-wide expansion of the already developed capitalist mode of production:

... the socio-economic state of the developing countries is not merely 'economic underdevelopment', not just a sign of their not having participated in development, of their having fallen behind in progress, but it is the product of a specific development, which is most closely connected with, moreover derived from, the development of capitalist world economy.' (p 132)

The international division of labour established during the colonial period has undergone substantial changes, especially since World War 2. The leadership of the developed capitalist world has moved from the UK to the USA. The scientific-technical revolution has, among other things, diminished the significance of underdeveloped countries as a source of traditional raw materials. Increased state intervention, the development of monopoly capitalism and increased economic cooperation between advanced capitalist countries have widened the opportunities for investment both within and between these countries. The LDCs (less developed countries) have experienced an increasingly severe foreign exchange constraint, aggravated by domestic population pressures and unfavourable export markets. Finally, the pattern of capital exports to the LDCs has undergone substantial changes — specifically, with the scientific-technological revolution, advanced economies have relaxed their monopoly over processing industry and technology and have been prepared to see a certain kind of industrial development in LDCs. The present state of the LDCs '... bears not only the marks and consequences of the international division of labour which materialized in the colonial system, but it also reflects the detrimental effects of the recent changes in this division of labour.' (p 141)

Colonialism
The main characteristics of colonialism were complete dependence, direct economic dependence on foreign capital with some independence in the direction and structure of external trade. Foreign capital distorted the economic structure of the colony and built into it the elements of the capitalist mode of production. But it did not attempt the capitalist transformation of the economy and society as a whole and it also prevented the development of the local force (national capital) which could have carried out such a transformation. The result was thus a disintegrated (dualistic) economic and social structure with domestic capital, if it existed, playing the role of 'comprador' capital, that is, subservient to foreign interests.

The gaining of political independence made possible changes in economic relations. The most fundamental has been the changed character of political power and the disappearance of the most open, direct form of dependence. But where no attempt is made to gain genuine economic independence, dependence on other foreign sources of capital will develop a neo-colonial relationship involving military-political dependence as well.
Szentcs thus analyses two aspects of underdevelopment: the external, international aspect which, from the historical point of view, is the primary aspect, and the internal aspect which, from the point of view of future development, is increasingly important:

It is self-evident that the movement of the world economy and of international politics will continue to exert a great influence on the internal life and external relations of the developing countries, but the direction and intensity of this influence will depend to a decisive measure on the progress of the internal changes, the results of the transformation of the inherited structure. (p 163, emphasis in original)

The main qualitative features of LDCs are thus: economic dependence on foreign capitalist powers, and a systematic income drain by foreign capital and other channels whose elimination calls for changes in the world economy. Secondly, their economies are 'disintegrated', that is, there is little or no interrelationship between the different productive sectors of the economy, such integration as does exist lying in the direction of the international economy; the resultant deformed economic structures being reflected in complex internal social structures, existing pre-capitalist and capitalist social relations.

**External Dependence**

Szentcs analyses the following forms of dependence: a) direct economic dependence (key positions in the economy controlled by foreign monopoly capital); b) trade dependence, subdivided into 'relational dependence' (dependence in trade relations on a few advanced capitalist countries, resulting from direct economic dependence and colonialism), and, secondly, the overall dependence of the entire economy on cyclical changes in the capitalist world market — this latter dependence has its roots deep in the structure of the economy and is more difficult to abolish than relational dependence; c) financial dependence (foreign control of the banking and credit system, LDC dependence on advanced capitalist countries in foreign exchange matters and increasing dependence on loans and grants from these countries, which Szentcs believes is becoming rapidly more important) and, d) technical dependence (the importation of foreign technology and experts, teachers, etc.).

Arising from the various dependency relationships is the drain of income and other losses from the LDCs. This takes a direct form (capital export on direct investment and the export of loan capital), estimated to amount to perhaps $3,500-4,000 million annually, and an indirect form, arising through foreign trade and financial and monetary relations. He identifies these major indirect forms of income loss: a) the imminent inequality of exchange (the problem of exchange of unequal quantities of labour); b) the secular deterioration in the terms of trade and the unequal distribution of the benefits arising from technical progress; c) the system of transfer prices as operated by multinational corporations; d) the mechanism of manipulated and monopoly prices arising from the inequalities between advanced economies and LDCs; e) the income loss connected with the export trade and foreign orientation (net balance of shipping freights, insurance and other services); f) the income loss sustained through the mechan-
ism of foreign exchange and banking systems. The total outflow is estimated at $15,500 million, compared to an annual inflow during the 1960s of approximately $10,000 million. Szentes concludes:

This summary of the results doubtless dispels first of all the illusion that the gap between the advanced and the underdeveloped countries can be substantially narrowed down by simply increasing (or even multiplying) the amount of aid and/or by widening the market of the traditional export products of the underdeveloped countries. As long as the influx of material and intellectual resources into the underdeveloped countries is connected with an increasing outflow of resources, which follows from the spontaneous mechanism of the capitalist world economy and the structural characteristics of the underdeveloped countries, and as long as in consequence of all this the unequal distribution of the dynamic factors of growth (science, technology and the industries closely related to them) is maintained (and even increased), there is no hope of narrowing the gap, nor even of preventing its further widening.' (pp 227-8)

There is no immediate and simple solution to this problem but the possibilities for change do exist, from both internal and external efforts. The internal solution is structural in nature (and therefore political); and the international solution is political (and therefore also structural). Szentes argues that while international changes are necessary to eliminate underdevelopment completely, the survival of dependence and the mechanism of income drain is to a large extent a function of the internal structure as well: '... the internal structure of the underdeveloped countries is not only the product of the penetration of external, international forces, but ... this structure, once it has become established, will itself provide a basis for maintaining this penetration.' (pp 229-30)

Internal Dependency and Class Structure
The distorted economic structure of the LDC gives rise to a similarly distorted class structure. The penetration of western capitalist forces interrupted the natural course of the LDC's development and the patterns of change were thus determined by external forces. The transformation was not complete, however. The old did not completely disappear and the new was built not on the flattened ruins but among the remnants of the old. Modern capitalist relations became associated with more traditional conditions. But foreign capital only came into conflict with pre-capitalist remnants when they happened to fall directly within the sphere of its activity, while the growth of a national bourgeoisie was impeded and, for a variety of reasons, did not regard the struggle against pre-capitalist social remnants as its main task. Neither external nor internal capitalist forces were interested in the complete elimination of pre-capitalist formations. The co-existence of the latter with foreign monopoly capital gives rise to the distorted and heterogenous social structure.

Szentes notes that the dividing lines between social classes and strata are less distinct in LDCs than in the West and that class consciousness is influenced and offset by various forms of social consciousness (traditional religion, tribal origins, etc.). He evaluates and rejects a number of different conceptions of class and is especially critical of the concept of an urban labour aristocracy. He also argues that the rapidly growing political elite will not become a new, independent
social class. Any social group that does not own the means of production will in the long run lose its political power and thus the elite will either merge with the bourgeoisie of a developing capitalist society or will dissolve in the process of socialist development.

The main social classes are:

the proletariat, because of labour migration often difficult to distinguish in practice from

the peasantry, a social group containing a range of different interests and contradictory elements;

the bourgeoisie, distinguishing between the national bourgeoisie (which has independent local capital and supports national and democratic tendencies) and the comprador bourgeoisie (aligned to foreign capital and opposed to the above tendencies). The following sub-strata of the bourgeoisie can usually be found in LDCs: (i) the commercial bourgeoisie, (ii) the agrarian bourgeoisie, (iii) the industrial bourgeoisie, (iv) the financial and bank bourgeoisie. These different strata assume different degrees of importance in different economies. For example, the more backward the economy and the greater the impact of colonialism, the more the local bourgeoisie is confined to the fields of trade and agriculture;

feudal landlords and other leading strata of the pre-capitalist society.

The power and importance of the various social classes depends on a large number of factors, and with the gradual transformation of the economy they must adjust themselves to new relations.

Overcoming Dependency

In the final chapter of the book, Szentes examines the prospects for overcoming underdevelopment. The international solution can only be provided by the collapse of capitalism in the advanced countries, but this does not imply that nothing can be done about liquidating underdevelopment prior to the collapse of capitalism: 'Though underdevelopment is an international product, development policy still has a basically national framework.' (p 293) The elimination of underdevelopment within the national economy is an extremely complex task, involving the breaking of the monopolistic position of foreign capital and the transformation of the distorted structure of the economy and society via agricultural development, industrialization, state planning, etc.

Massive state intervention in the economy is a precondition for the liquidation of underdevelopment. This presumes state capitalism, that is, the restriction and regulation of economic spontaneity arising from the existence of private capital, the primary task being the development of productive forces and creation of an integrated national economy. State capitalism has no definite character and may develop along a number of different lines — towards some other form of capitalism or towards socialism — determined by the internal socio-political development and the class power relations of each individual country within the framework set by international political and economic relations.

Fred Nixson
University of Manchester
TERMINOLOGY: A Guide

In spite of our request to contributors to write in non-academic language, it is not always possible for them to do so. An ongoing feature of this Review will therefore be a section which attempts to de-mystify the jargon. We hope this will be of help to those readers unfamiliar or uneasy with the language of Marxist and non-Marxist academia, and we welcome comments on the effectiveness of the exercise and suggestions for improving it.

Mode of Production
The in-phrase of modern armchair Marxism, though often used to describe an economic and social formation rather than to analyse it. In Marx the mode of production is a social system characterized by a specific historical combination of relations and forces of production. The relations referred to are those of people to the means of production (machinery and equipment) i.e. in capitalist society as capitalists or workers. The forces refer to the appropriate level of technology of those machines, which in turn are clearly associated with the level of the people's educational achievement. The scientific analysis of the mode of production at any one time in history requires us to examine how far the relations of production are appropriate to the continuing development of the forces of production. Such an analysis results for example in the argument that at the present time capitalist production relations are stifling the creative energies of the workers since their product is not owned by them but by the capitalist class and is therefore alienated from them. This alienation and resulting dulling of the creative activity of those who produce slows down the rate of development of the productive forces. The resolution of this so-called contradiction in capitalism can only come through a socialist revolution in which the producers finally control the product of their labour. In other words, an analysis of the mode of production suggests the dynamic — or the process of development — of the social system.

In the underdeveloped countries some analysts have referred to the capitalist mode of production being dominant and have characterized even the most backward parts of the "Third World" as being integrated into the capitalist system. Others have pointed out that different modes of production are to be found in the underdeveloped world and their process of interaction gives us an analysis of their dynamic through their contradictions. Naturally such a process requires its descriptive term and in this case it is the "articulation" of modes of production.
Unequal Exchange
Another fashionable phrase in the modern literature. In Marx, products exchange with each other equally at their values which are based on the quantity of labour time spent producing the commodities. Labour time is both living labour (that of the worker) and dead labour (that of the machine), all machines being the addition of labour time spent in the past on them and their predecessors.

Arghiri Emmanuel in his book *Unequal Exchange* argues that the continuing underdevelopment of the 'Third World' is largely due to the fact that products resulting from smaller amounts of labour time are exchanged by the developed countries for products from the underdeveloped countries resulting from larger amounts of labour time. In this way value, which is measured by quantities of labour time, is transferred from the underdeveloped to the developed countries through international trade.

Labour Aristocracy
A concept whose relevance to Africa is hotly disputed in the literature. It refers, generally, to those better-paid and better organized sections of the working class, mainly employed by foreign-owned corporations, who see their interests lying with the maintenance of the neocolonial system dominated by international capital, rather than in an alliance with the majority of the working-class and peasantry against both the foreign and domestic capitalist class. The use of the term 'labour aristocracy' is often very loose and sometimes includes sections of the petty bourgeoisie - e.g. junior civil servants.

Secular Deterioration in the Terms of Trade
Another way of saying that the 'Third World' has been shortchanged over a long period of history and that this continues to be the pattern for trade between the developed and underdeveloped world. More technically, the terms of trade is the relationship between the quantity of exports from an underdeveloped country and the quantity of imports which it can buy (mainly from a developed country). It is argued that underdeveloped countries produce more for export and because of declining prices are able to buy fewer imports. Even now, with the so-called 'commodity boom', underdeveloped countries may only be regaining a previous position, if that, since inflation in the developed countries is passed on to them in the form of higher prices for their imports, and since most of them are importing oil at the new prices.

Transfer Prices
These are the prices which one branch of a company charges another branch for products traded between them. When these branches are in different countries, transfer pricing becomes a means of taking profits out of one country into another.
Underdeveloped countries are often more prone to this process because their industries are often only assembly plants putting together a finished product from imported components supplied by the parent company (or if the plant is state-owned, by the associate company which manages it). The parent company may charge prices which enable it to make a hidden profit on the deal and thus avoid paying profits tax and enable it to use the profits in any way it chooses. It is not surprising that so many industrial enterprises (especially those owned by the state) make 'losses' or small profits on their operations.

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Radical Africana

Chris Allen

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SUPPLEMENT: RADICAL AFRICANA No. 5
Compilation Date: June 1974

This bibliographical section continues the series of Radical Africana, which has been issued in mimeo form during the last two years. To save space certain changes have been made which will not, I hope, greatly reduce its value. The institutional affiliations of authors have been omitted, the system of starring key articles discontinued, and abbreviations used more often. Titles will be shortened where this can be done without loss of sense, and material will be carried over to the next issue when necessary, to keep the size of the review constant.

Radical Africana lists articles from journals and collective volumes, books, pamphlets, theses, conference papers, and other publications of relevance to the study of contemporary African political economy. Normally an item will be included unless it seems to me to be too technical, ephemeral or frivolous to be of value; thus econometric material, articles on curriculum reform, or speculation on the origin of the term 'Mau Mau' will usually be omitted. A special effort is made to cover material from newspapers, weeklies and monthlies. This will usually be found at the end of each country or area sub-section in section A, where shorter descriptive items are located; this is marked by a gap of one line in the text, as between items 43 and 44 in section A2. Material dealing with the precolonial period is listed only when it has theoretical significance, particularly in the fields of economic and social history.

I cover (eventually) most material in English, and a fair amount of that in French, but complete coverage is impossible, and I am always grateful for information on publications I have missed, especially those from outside Britain, France and North America. I do not at present attempt a comprehensive coverage of books and pamphlets since numerous other listings exist; instead I try to list important books and pamphlets and obscurely-published items that readers may otherwise overlook. If there is a demand for a fuller listing, please let me know. Theses are covered fairly exhaustively (though not all disciplines are listed for French theses, and some British universities are reticent about their students' work); conference papers are listed rather erratically at present (and those of the American African Studies Association omitted). Other items include lists of free publications (offprint series, etc.), and - when available - select bibliographies.

The abbreviations employed below are all fairly obvious; in addition I have reduced the commoner journal titles to their initials, thus:

AA African Affairs
ASR African Studies Review
CEA Cahiers d'Études africaines
CIAS Canadian Journal of African Studies
CSSH Comparative Studies in Society and History
EDCC Economic Development and Cultural Change
H&S L'Homme et la Société
IIAS International Journal of African Historical Studies
JCP S Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies
JDS Journal of Development Studies
JMAS Journal of Modern African Studies
MR Monthly Review
MURA Manpower and Unemployment Research in Africa (Montreal)
NLR New Left Review
RFPA Revue française des études politiques africaines
RTM Revue Tiers Monde
TM Temps Modernes
WA West Africa
### 1. General non-Africana

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