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Structural Transformation and Economic Development in Africa

By Peter Lawrence and Yao Graham

Structural Transformation and Economic Development in Africa was the title of a three-day consultative meeting held in Accra in July 2015 which brought together trades unionists, civil society organisation activists and academic researchers from across the continent and beyond to frame a new agenda for the structural transformation of African economies. The meeting was jointly organised by Third World Network-Africa and the International Trades Union Confederation (Africa) in collaboration with ROAPE. Participants came from over 20 different African countries covering all the regions of the continent, from Trade Unions (TUs), universities, colleges, civil society and international organisations. They were joined by a smaller number of a similar group of people from outside Africa.  It was a unique opportunity for linking researchers and practitioners in a discussion of the issues involved in developing strategies for effecting changes in economic structure. The main focus was on strategies that would generate employment, especially in the growing urban agglomerations across the continent, in the face of the dominant neo-liberal paradigm, increasingly seen as having failed to generate structural change and economic development. This report offers a flavour of the issues discussed, though it cannot reflect that lively debate conducted, thanks to simultaneous translation, in both English and French, to enable the widest participation from all over Africa.

The concept note outlining the purpose and background to the meeting noted that it was taking place at a time of global economic and financial crisis when Africa faced the ‘inter-related challenges’  of creating jobs, transforming its ‘primary commodity export-dependent political economy’ and generating social and economic development which fulfilled ‘the needs and aspirations of Africa’s working peoples’. The meeting therefore had two objectives. The first was to construct ‘a more concrete alternative economic development policy narrative, building on existing trade union critiques of, and alternative perspectives on, decades of neo-liberal economic policy in Africa.’ The second was to put together a set of ‘issues and perspectives’ for a ‘five-year agenda for policy research and advocacy’ by both ITUC-Africa and the trades union movement on the continent. Taken together these objectives are part of a longer term project to support TUs across Africa in playing a greater role in constructing, and campaigning for, alternative strategies which challenge the neo-liberal paradigm and lead to structural transformation and employment generation.

On the first day, we had a series of presentations (by Jomo Sundaram, Kodjo Evlo, W.Baah-Boateng, Adebayo Olukoshi and Praveen Jha) providing some historical and contemporary context. The presentations showed how African economies have fallen behind other country groups and remain dependent on primary product exports over a period when prices of these commodities have been falling leading to a considerable fall in Africa’s terms of trade and share of world exports. In contrast inter-African trade has been rising as has its trade with Asia. Within this primary product export dependence, minerals have played an increasingly important role. While there has been greater diversification in the exports of developed countries, African exports have further concentrated in fewer products. The liberalisation of world trade has not helped African agriculture as exports have declined and Africa is now a net importer of food as, despite the ideology of liberalization, developed countries’ agriculture continues to be heavily subsidised. The liberalisation of trade, forced on Africa through ‘structural adjustment’ programmes, has had equally negative effects on the continent’s attempts to industrialise. And despite the pressure to liberalise, this had not stopped the ‘tariff bias’ against countries such as those of Africa which find still high barriers against exporting to developed countries compared with the tariffs between the countries.

“The liberalisation of world trade has not helped African agriculture as exports have declined and Africa is now a net importer of food as, despite the ideology of liberalization, developed countries’ agriculture continues to be heavily subsidised…”

The pressure for financial liberalisation has not had the results predicted for it by the neo-liberal strategists. There are few emerging capital markets on the continent, net capital flows into Africa have been negative, and African economies are given high risk ratings which means that returns have to be very high to justify those perceived risks of investment. The emphasis on independent central banks having the sole task of targeting inflation rather than employment and growth, has been accompanied by the decline in development finance and its institutions in favour of private foreign investment. This is largely concentrated in minerals and therefore in a few countries is still only 2% of total world foreign direct investment for Africa. Such investment tends to go with and augment the economic cycles rather than counter them. Foreign aid has not reached the amounts promised at the 2005 Gleneagles G8 meeting and once debt service is deducted, aid flows have been relatively small. Remittances have been a growing source of hard currency inflows but against that has to be put the flight of capital as private African wealth is invested outside Africa

The various structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) have helped undermine the State in Africa and therefore reduced the possibilities for the emergence of a ‘developmental state’, credited with much of the success of the East Asian economies. Marketization, de-regulation, tax reduction and the handing over of economic management to the Central Banks has reduced the capacity of the State to intervene and shape economic development and conduct demand management economic policies. More recent years have seen African economies growing on average at around 5% per annum in the early 2000s, though the recession in developed countries following the financial crisis of 2007-8 saw a slowdown in African growth rates and a fall in commodity prices. Growth has been accompanied by increasing inequality with the top 10% having 30- 40% of total income while the bottom 20% have between 5 and 10% of the total. In real terms per capita income is less than it was during the 1970s generating an increase in poverty rather than the reduction which was supposed to take place, especially after the introduction of SAPs.

SAPs are but one of the reasons for Africa’s position and trajectory. African governments’ development policies have lacked a long term strategic vision and been influenced by ideologies not applicable to the continent’s realities. While the 1960s and early 1970s saw some relatively high growth rates, the 20 years following the first oil crisis of 1973-4 was a period of economic decline, often with negative growth. Only in the last 15-20 years have we observed a return to high growth rates, although these are uneven and have begun to decline again in recent years. Overall, Africa’s share of world GDP and trade, always low, has fallen further to around 2% and 4% respectively. High inflation and the growth of parallel foreign exchange markets, fiscal and balance of payments crises and unsustainable debt levels characterised the period of decline. One contribution summarised the causes of decline as related to poor and inconsistent development policies, insufficient capital accumulation, weak productivity growth, limited structural transformation, weak or non-functioning institutions, poor infrastructure, poor market systems, poor governance, an unstable political environment or, generally, an unstable  socioeconomic environment and an unstable international economic environment.

“Africa’s share of world GDP and trade, always low, has fallen further to around 2% and 4% respectively. High inflation and the growth of parallel foreign exchange markets, fiscal and balance of payments crises and unsustainable debt levels characterised the period of decline…”

After independence African governments engaged in development policies that were based on growth models that emphasised the importance of investment, especially in the manufacturing sector, in order to shift the economy away from dependence on primary commodity exports in the context where it was believed that there was a long term tendency for the terms of trade to move against primary commodities in favour of manufacturing exports. In the absence of a strong private sector, there was the need for the State to play an important role in mobilising capital for investment in the economy. Yet the nature of the state itself needs interrogation. The issue of SAPs should not be separated from the social and economic context in which a new power alliance developed between finance ministries and the IFIs such that finance ministers were effectively in charge of government and were responsible to the IFIs rather than their own democratic institutions. They then presided over the dismantling and retrenching of the state, such that capital now cannot do without the state but requires a state that subsidises rather than regulates capital. And with the global process of financialisation, capital itself is dominated by financial corporates, which again ally with finance ministries and the IFIs.

Some of the liberalisation policies implemented through (SAPs)  have worked in their own terms, such as the removal or moderation of price and foreign exchange controls, the latter addressing the problem of exchange rate overvaluation. The restoration of more sustainable fiscal and external balances has also been relatively successful while other policies have resulted in public enterprise reforms and restructuring.  While the World Bank has tried to show that those countries which carried out more SAP policies have done better than those which did not, much of the serious research in this area has at best shown that the effects of SAP adoption have had little or no relationship with growth, while there is research which has shown the relationship to be negative.  Following SAPs there has been a tendency for GDP growth to outstrip employment growth and for shares of employment in services to increase while shares of employment in agriculture fall, with their being very little change over time in the share of employment in manufacturing.

The current phase of global capitalism has seen the the rise of finance capital as the most important factor of production, the demise of the developmental state and  the weakening of labour as a class. Structural transformation has to be about a rise in the contribution of the non-agricultural sector that is not at the expense of the agricultural sector, and a transition from low-productivity to high productivity. The best countries in terms of growth in the last two decades (India and China) have seen worsening of labour markets and livelihoods amidst a period of jobless growth. Trade unions have to collaborate with other social groups, and widen the scope of its own activities within its own countries. In particular, it was stressed that it was important for TUs to engage with the informal sector, which accounts for the largest fraction of the working population.

The discussion following the presentations emphasised the importance of being clear and specific about the Structural Transformation (ST) – an oppositional/alternative response to SAPs – that Africa needs. This means making fundamental changes to the structure of production in African economies in African rather than western international agency terms. New phrases like “Africa rising” among others are just fads that are unlikely to lead to any transformation. A related issue of why import substitution and export promotion has not worked in Africa was also discussed. It was noted that there is no universal strategy that works. Even though there are commonalities, it is important to look at concrete national situations and specificities. At present, there is a lack of critical discourse on this. It is important for Trade Unions (TUs) to use their mass mobilization activities to mobilize the new generation of Africa youth to take up the challenge of critical discourse for the appropriate paradigm and policies for the continent’s transformation.

Clarification was sought on the characteristics of Africa’s recent growth. Some countries have relied on intensive extraction of different kinds of natural resources while others had used financial innovations like the M-Pesa in Kenya. Discussion around the SAPs argued for critical thinking not just of SAPs in their context, but also of policies that were simply a rehash of previous policies with the SAP label. It is important to investigate the issues behind the failure of institutions to inform specific policy alternatives to SAPs. It was noted that in the 1980s, the labour movement was a strong voice against SAPs and came with up well debated positions. It is important to revisit these positions and refine the arguments.

The issue of the characteristics of successful cases of structural transformation came up for discussion. Fundamental considerations such as whether and what role globalization and financial liberalization will play in such transformation should be investigated. The role of MNCs in the current crises was highlighted as an issue that needs careful research and analysis to inform our transformation strategy going forward

The current paradigm has placed the economic structure first and left the society behind and this has led to social unrest. The SAPs have destroyed both the quality and quantity of jobs while creating a high number of insecure jobs. The labour movement has not been strong in fighting agriculture and land issues. The current conversation on exploitation of resources that lead to environmental degradation takes place between governments and MNCs. TUs have been fatally wounded by SAPs: numbers have shrunk and unions have become polarized. However, they remain the most credible representatives of the people. Another issue that came out during the discussion is whether, given the continent’s economic history, there is any potential role for international trade and finance. It was stressed that core finance has to be national because international finance will not be appropriate. Finally, it was widely agreed that quantitative/macroeconomic measures, complemented with qualitative measures of livelihoods, should be used in measuring progress in structural transformation.

The next part of the meeting moved on to the question of structural transformation and employment generation and the policies required (this session was led by Peter Lawrence).  Originally it was thought that manufacturing would provide the key to such transformation by maximising linkages within and between sectors, generating more employment and a bigger market for the output of the final consumer goods sector.  However, manufacturing in Africa has been limited to the production of last stage consumer goods or the first stage processing of minerals.  A strong capital goods sector producing machines to make both capital and consumer goods and to make manufactured goods for export, has not developed to effect structural change.  While the economic and technical issues relating to manufacturing are well understood, the key question has been why African economies have not developed strong manufacturing sectors, which was to be the agents of change. The absence of a capitalist class has meant the need for a developmental state, but states in Africa have rather been rent-seeking and bureaucratic than concerned with accumulation for development. It is unlikely, but possible, that an accumulating capitalist class will develop out of the small and medium enterprise sector so it will be with the state where the burden of agency will fall.

“A strong capital goods sector producing machines to make both capital and consumer goods and to make manufactured goods for export, has not developed to effect structural change…”

The limited, and largely capital intensive, manufacturing that has developed, has not created as much employment as it originally did in the developed countries. The median share of employment in industry across African countries is 7%, while the median share of industry in GDP is 21%. Hence the importance for structural change and employment generation is increasingly accorded to the service sector and to investment to transform agriculture. The question of why manufacturing has not developed is explained by neo-liberals in the adoption of import substitution strategies of industrialisation, the high costs of ‘doing business’, uncompetitive wages and low skill levels, the low level of development of the banking system thus causing credit and investment constraints, lack of export orientation,  excessive public ownership and slow rates of privatisation. Indeed the resistance to SAPs and therefore the delays in liberalising African economies have been a major factor in slowing transformation. Critics of this view point out that structural adjustment programmes effectively deindustrialised African economies and lost the experience gained over two decades of initial industrialisation. A programme which rehabilitated and protected African manufacturing in the same way as had happened in early industrialisation in Asia would have been more effective than liberal market-led programmes which put enterprises out of business.

The availability of a large urban and better educated labour force suggests African economies are ripe for manufacturing development. A strategy based on the processing of domestic resources in agriculture and mining generating a capital goods sector which can make producer goods and an active science and technology and research and development policy to adapt imported technologies to local needs provides a convincing way forward to produce basic goods for mass consumption. However, simply reproducing the industrialization path trodden by the now industrialized (or post-industrialized?) economies may not be the way forward. Identifying economic activities of the future, as advanced capitalism itself changes with new forms of social organisation, the growth of non-marketised networking activities, the growth of self-employment and the shrinkage of the traditional industrial wage labour force. The increasing preponderance of low wage jobs in the service sector also reduces the potential for the growth of markets which may also subvert an industrialisation strategy based on a mass consumption market.

In the discussion it was stressed that the nature of transformation needed is different from the superficial transformation being discussed by some African leaders as they simply represent a rehash of the neo-liberal ideas borrowed from the West.  Rather the structural transformation should place a premium on higher value manufacturing, value addition in agriculture and progress in the higher end services rather than just buying and selling. A related issue was the first steps of this structural transformation. It was noted that in general, this depends on the specific state and issues. For most countries, the important first step is to have an agency in place with the powers to drive the necessary changes.  For those with such an agency, perhaps the most important first element is infrastructure. From there on, much depends on the strategy determined.

Sometimes the issues become confusing as some countries are successful because they have paid lip service to SAPs, but followed different policies. Even the World Bank didn’t always follow the neo-liberal model, largely because even orthodox economics was discovering market failure. Stretching this issue further to touch on the future of capitalism, it was pointed out that there were subtle forms of recolonization of Africa through adoption of policies made abroad without realization of the implications. It is therefore important for trade unions to take these up through education and mass conscientisation of the working masses to enhance the mobilization against capitalism and neo-liberalism.

On the prospects of transformation outside of existing linkages the case of the boom in Chinese mineral consumption came to the fore. It was noted that while this has intensified commodity dependence, it could be turned into a strategy for transformation. There is a difference between Chinese demand for minerals and the West’s demand based on the purpose of the demand.  Chinese may demand raw materials for production which is used to drive transformation.  On the other hand, most of the demand from the West could be seen as being for speculative purposes.

The meeting went on to address specific policy issues around the various economic sectors.  Starting with the agricultural sector (Sam and Qondsile Moyo, Jomo Sundaram), its dominant features are food insecurity and malnutrition, low  productivity of both food crops and livestock together with an unstable domestic supply,  fluctuating and uncertain world food prices and supplies,  food aid dependence, low wages and family farm incomes, continuing dependence on agricultural raw materials exports accompanied by poor terms of trade, African countries as net food importers and limited inter-sectorial linkages and diversification of industry with a shift towards a low wage informal sector.

Policy focus has been on low agricultural productivity usually explained by the small scale family farming structure and its resistance to innovation. Therefore we have seen the promotion of larger scale farming with economies of scale in production and marketing. This is especially exemplified by the large scale land grabs by foreign capital, enabled by a less interventionist state. There is a growing labour reserve as well as a growing domestic middle class market for higher value food crops. However priority is not given to increasing domestic food production to meet this rise in demand, nor to generating higher levels of employment and income which would increase such food demands even further.

Instead the IFIs support policies which centre on specialisation in improving the ability of African farmers to specialize in competitive traditional and non-traditional export crops with the consequence that food grain production is limited and so grains are imported using the orthodox economic argument of comparative advantage, especially reinforced by the required currency devaluations. Policies which previously supported agriculture to ensure domestic self-sufficiency, supported prices and marketing and subsidised inputs, have been stopped. Domestic production of agricultural inputs as part of import substitution strategies, were either privatised or closed down and substituted by imports. Rural livelihoods have deteriorated as social welfare transfers have been replaced by narrow poverty and livelihoods strategies thus reducing effective demand for food. Increasing inequalities have developed as large scale commercial farms and more successful family farms have been absorbed into agribusiness contracts. There are continuing social issues which affect agricultural output and enable gender inequalities such as customarily and statutorily defined patriarchal relations, women’s access to land depending on male family members and clan authorities, and gender discrimination in decision-making, access to assets, credit and technical support constraining productivity.

“Policies which previously supported agriculture to ensure domestic self-sufficiency, supported prices and marketing and subsidised inputs, have been stopped while domestic production of agricultural inputs as part of import substitution strategies, were either privatised or closed down and substituted by imports…”

Yet there are over one million family farms in sub-Saharan Africa with arable land of between 0.1 and three hectares engaging 75% of the population in farm and related non-farm activity contributing 80% of the food produced and distributed. 25% of the population is undernourished and in extreme poverty as a result of food insecurity derived from unpredictable and low output. Family farms face labour constraints, generational and gender inequities, with consequent inequalities in income. Diversification of labour activity employs underused labour and spreads risk as does rural out-migration to low informal sector wage employment and unemployment. Current policy undervalues family farm labour and employment but actual and potential employment capabilities are high as is the impact on poverty – research showed that every 1% growth in per capita agricultural output leads to a 1.61% growth in incomes of poorest 20% much greater than for manufacturing and services and every 1% increase in agricultural labour productivity reduced the number of poor by 0.6-1.2%. Emphasising the role of the agricultural sector would reduce rural poverty and also urban poverty by reducing rural-urban migration.

Policies are required to change this situation and begin a process of agricultural sector transformation, mobilising the potential of family farm agriculture and therefore supporting demand for farm inputs and implements produced locally. Such policies would move away from the land-extensive family farm production towards a more intensive agro-ecological sustainable land utilization system, prioritizing food sovereignty. They would include supporting agricultural markets and agro-industries through subsidies and protection and more generally allocating a greater share of investment resources to family farming. Transformative investments would be directed to productivity-enhancing technologies, irrigation, accessible markets, rural infrastructure, social welfare and the encouragement of small and medium sized enterprise in rural areas largely related to agricultural production.  A strategy of developing regional cooperation towards collective food sovereignty would help an overall strategy of food self-sufficiency and limit the necessity for food imports.

In the discussion, there was some emphasis on the role of TUs in acquainting themselves with the realities on the ground through research and interaction with various segments of society and in pushing for policies on social protection and its finance. The important role of land tenure and ownership was seen as crucial point. At present land is mostly owned by big corporations, tribal lords and governments. The state has become a conduit in transferring land from peasants to corporations. Land for productive purposes should be taken seriously. Contracting arrangements between big corporations is leading to takeover of agricultural production.  The retreat of the state has limited the capacity of African peasants and farmers to respond to anything.  We should be thinking about different ownership arrangements conducive for the transformation we have in mind.

Another important issue is the disappearance of rural development studies and labour studies from academic units within our universities. Agrarian studies have been killed by neoliberal agenda. How can we put rural studies and labour studies on the research agenda? The discussions also touched on the effect of climate change. New studies are revealing things that we did not even know. The task of adaptation is important and it is crucial to have a unified view.

Presentations on the industrial sector centred on two issues, the first on the specific case of the mineral sector and employment (by Yao Graham), and the second on the role of TUs in pressing for industrialisation (by Trywell Kalusopa). For the mineral sector the issue of the proportion of the value chain captured by the mineral economies is central to the development of domestic industry and the generation of employment. SAPs had reduced mining labour forces as privatised companies shed jobs. They also prioritized production for export rather than increasing the share of the value chain through further industrialisation.  This seemed to pay off as after 2000 commodity prices sharply increased, especially after the second Iraq war. The resulting increased mining activity has generated more jobs while at the same time forcing people off the land. However an increasing proportion of these jobs are casual and therefore precarious. Research suggests that employment generated by manufacturing creates many times more jobs than does mining, although the mining industry emphasises the jobs created indirectly from mining investment. Miners themselves are relatively well paid but ancillary jobs are not, while there is wage discrimination in favour of expatriate workers and that has been the subject of protests organised by TUs.

Mining corporations emphasise the benefits to tax revenues from mining, although research shows that while mining companies have seen very large increases in profits during the price boom, government revenues have not increased even proportionally as tax regimes tend to be regressive with companies paying lower tax rates as profits rise with the result that the tax revenue gains are overshadowed by the repatriation of profits. Competition between countries anxious for mining DFI (Direct Foreign Investment) generates a race to the bottom in which the gains from mining to the producer countries are reduced. Policy therefore must be directed to developing a knowledge-driven pan-African mining sector which acts as a catalyst for wider industrial and manufacturing development with forward linkages into mineral beneficiation and manufacturing, backward linkages into mining capital goods, consumables and service industries and ‘side-stream’ linkages into infrastructure and skills and technology development. Mutually beneficial partnerships between the state, the private sector, civil society, local communities and other stakeholders would mobilise for this strategy. The issues surrounding the nature and capacity of the state and the political leadership are clearly central to the success of such coherent strategies, however well thought out they are at the technical level.

“Policy therefore must be directed to developing a knowledge-driven pan-African mining sector which acts as a catalyst for wider industrial and manufacturing development with forward linkages into mineral beneficiation and manufacturing…”

One of the challenges for TUs in an age of increasing global integration in production, is to ensure that working people regain some control over the state, control that has been effectively ceded to a combination of corporate and IFIs mediated by domestic elites.  The trades union response needs to continue to challenge the prevailing development orthodoxy especially by forming strategic alliances with other actors of civil society and faith-based organisations, enhance the exploitation of existing policy space through regional TUs, use continental and international TUs to deal with supply chains and outsourcing, advocate inclusive development imperatives that are pro-poor and employment rich, increase  policy space for a developmental state and explore how such a  state could enhance structural transformation and what are the key institutional relationships to the success of developmental states.

Trade Unions need to mobilise and campaign for a people-led industrial strategy which involves production primarily based on domestic demand and human needs and the use of local resources and domestic savings with a “horizontal” integration of agriculture and industry. They need to develop a strategic, selective de-linking from neo-liberal globalisation and the preparation for a negotiated re-linking to a fundamentally different global production and distribution system centring on South-South cooperation. Also proposed was an industrial policy on science and technology based on harnessing the collective knowledge and wisdom of the people, the forging of strategic alliances and networks with progressive forces at national, regional and global levels, redistribution of wealth and opportunities from the formal to the non-formal sectors of the economy, women’s rights as the basis for a healthy and productive society, an education system that addresses the needs for sustainable human development by improving technical, managerial, research and development skills and the promotion and redefinition of an ethical developmental state.

Further research is necessary to highlight and critique the role of private sector and multinationals in industrial policy, to examine the emerging issues around regional industrial policy in the context of regional integration and national policy imperatives and to audit trade union responses to industrial policies at national, continental and global levels.

In the discussion, a question was posed that given capital-intensity in mining, whether it was surprising that growth in the mining sector was not creating sufficient jobs. It was argued that mining needs not be capital intensive and this depends on what the policy-makers seek to promote. Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining is labour intensive but may not be suitable for some other purposes of transformation. For instance, getting into the last two stages of the mineral value chain requires capital-intensive technology that may not create so many jobs. But linkages with other sectors of the economy might lead to the adoption of such technologies in sectors that create more jobs. The discussion also touched on the issue of the so-called “resource curse” which is directly linked to the strategy of the SAP that emphasizes revenue generation from minerals rather than linkages and transformation. The strategies for structural transformation being proposed deal with the resource curse. Further discussion focused on the need to improve science education for effective R&D that will help adapt existing technologies/innovations in African context. The importance of intellectual property (IP) was raised and the extent to which globalization has restricted the policy space for IP. Examples of success stories only recently joined the WTO so the changing trade regimes are important. But there are new emerging powers even within this context. IP should be situated in the global trading environment. Further contributions raised the importance of linking the discussion on mining to what was happening at the AU and the African Mining Vision and also raised the question of the role of TUs in raising class consciousness and of thinking how to link activities of unions to broader society

Turning to macroeconomic and financial issues (led by Manuel Montes and Kwabena Otoo), it was noted that the liberalization policies have not resulted in an increase in net inflows of finance into developing countries, and Africa is at the extreme as a net investor into developed countries. Financial flows are dominated by portfolio flows and are generally unstable. Then there are the issues of how these flows are used and the institutions that can direct them to development-oriented productive investment. Up to the 2000s, fixed capital investment declined as a proportion of GDP, only starting to rise after 2000 and then rising much faster in the higher income African states than in the lower-income. Macroeconomic liberalisation has resulted in countries having international treaty obligations largely through the IFIs which reduce the policy space available for mobilising financial resources for development.Such factors as the requirement to maintain an open economy for financial flows, to limit capital controls  and to reduce tariffs inhibit possibilities for financing development and offering some protection to nascent industries. Illicit financial flows on the one hand and the rise of the vulture funds threatening the gains made from debt write-offs both undermine attempts to put financing onto a stronger footing. The diminished role of the state in managing demand and income distribution has added to the difficulties of financing development. Limits on taxation of those better placed to pay more, and tight monetary and fiscal policy which only has the exchange rate as a policy tool contribute to the practice of an ideology that promotes the private sector as the most efficient agent of growth and development.

The orthodox approach is to see the key macroeconomic objectives as GDP growth, reducing inflation to single digits, a balanced budget, a zero or positive balance of payments, and a stable exchange rate. Inflation targeting has become the single mantra of Africa central banks on the assumption that everything else will follow, although central banks in the West have a dual mandate of price stability and maximizing employment. Achieving these objectives involves monetary tightening, fiscal discipline, deficit reduction, monetary policy, and taxation on consumption. However, the key issue of employment has completely disappeared from the macroeconomic targets.

The discussion noted that neo-liberal policies of monetarism work for only a small class, not the majority of the people, that banking laws needed reform to remove the singular focus on inflation targeting. The dual mandate of full employment and inflation should be reinstated. Governments should focus more on domestic resource mobilization than raising funds through international bond issues and risking excessive indebtedness. Finance capital dominates and imposes neo-liberal macroeconomic policy. This needs to be challenged and means that TUs especially need to be strengthened so they can have a greater influence on policy. This is especially the case with finance for the poor where government action rather than micro-finance is the key to greater financial inclusion and where TUs can push for pension provision and pension funds to play a key role in financing development.

Moving on to the question of social policy (introduced by Dodzi Tsikata), it was clear that discussion of this aspect of development was taking place against the background of the failure of agrarian transitions and structural transformation. This has been characterized by four decades of jobless growth, the growing informalisation and insecurity of work, widening inequalities, weakening social cohesion and solidarity, weakening bargaining power of organised labour, severe social insecurity and global financial, food and energy crises.

There is no inevitably positive relationship between social development and economic growth. The AU Social Policy Framework for Africa has put social policy back on the agenda.  Policies are required to manage the distribution of income, regulate markets, enable people to fulfill their potential through education and health, and women to manage the opportunities of pursuing careers and reproduction. Improving the quality of life in terms of health, the environment, and social security; securing incomes, employment and housing that can improve material living conditions and sustaining these elements by nurturing natural, economic, human and social capital are the major social policy issues.

“Policies are required to manage the distribution of income, regulate markets, enable people to fulfill their potential through education and health, and women to manage the opportunities of pursuing careers and reproduction…”

Policy needs to be concerned with moving away from the colonial (and neo-colonial) paternalism of the ‘civilising mission’ to maintain people’s welfare towards the developmental state involving rapid economic development and the defeat of the trinity of ignorance, poverty and disease. Characteristic of this approach is a social contract with the population as a basis for social integration, developing strong links between economic and social policies, broad based policies in education, health and formal employment backed in some cases by legislation, social security laws for formal sector workers; and state pensions.

So far we have seen the relegation of social policy and its separation from economic policy. Economic policies did not have employment as a goal and governments no longer collected employment statistics and other social indicator statistics but left this to the World Bank and the UN. Given the neo-liberal framing of policy we have seen market based social policy instruments being given prominence, the influence of global and regional institutions and a less proactive role of national states. The focus has been on targeting the poor, especially the deserving poor rather than looking at the related issues of poverty and inequality. Popular means of effecting such social policy have been cash transfers, health insurance, micro-finance, school feeding and the capping of school fees, the reform of social security systems and the millennium development goals. The critique of this approach has centred on its narrow vision of social policy, the disconnect between economic and social policy, the sole focus on poverty and vulnerability; and the preference for means testing and targeting. Declared as affordable, these benefits are meagre when measured against the scale of the problems being faced by poor people.

The policy goals themselves are relatively minimal, they pay little attention to employment or inequality, the concentration on poverty-centred policies runs counter to the lack of evidence that such policies reduce poverty. Policies that are not universal upset the middle classes while stigmatising  the poor.

One important development in social policy has been the AU’s Social Policy Framework for Africa which was developed to add to regional and continental policy initiatives such as PRSPs and NEPAD and fill any gaps between these programmes and the social issues they did not address. The framework places the state at the centre of social policy and emphasises how social policy can be an instrument for improving livelihoods, especially by ensuring that its different elements, e.g. health and education, are mutually reinforcing and so rather than concentrating on any one aspect of social policy, to see it as an interrelated whole. The point is to ensure that economic development is a means to enabling a greater level of social development which will in turn impact on future economic development.

Placing employment at the centre of policies, coordinating related but different agencies is essential to ensure rapid implementation and generate maximum effect and importantly, adopting policy measures to ease the burden of the multiple roles played by women by enabling them to arrange their working hours in a manner that allows then to participate in paid employment and achieve a work-family life balance. The role of TUs and social movements is to provide leadership in rethinking and reconstructing national and pan-African social policy, and to address the situation of agrarian and urban informal sector workers and in this way to renew the link between social policy and employment.

“The role of TUs and social movements is to provide leadership in rethinking and reconstructing national and pan-African social policy, and to address the situation of agrarian and urban informal sector workers…”

Finally, it is critical to reject the idea that implementing such a social policy is a luxury that cannot be afforded until there is economic growth or a particular level of per capita income. Instead, the relationship between economic growth and the social policy package considered here can be seen as mutually reinforcing. The provision of basic social security should be seen as an investment in development leading to increased demand and expanded domestic markets and a healthier and more productive labour force. A progressive, redistributive personal and corporate income tax is the key to financing social policy but requires the political will to implement alongside the necessary rationalization and reallocation of state expenditures.

Participants agreed with the need for a broader socioeconomic development rather than separate economic policy from social policy and political development.  There was an extensive discussion of how to finance social policy on the continent. An integrated approach which includes self-financing was considered an option because it has economic capacity for self-financing and reduces dependence on donor funding. As highlighted by the presentation, social policy should also be seen as an investment not as charity.

The gender dimension of poverty was raised as a key issue. An issue was raised that the presentations did not highlight the fact that poverty has a “feminine face”. In response, Dzodzi Tsikata indicated that it was deliberate and that an excessive focus on gendered poverty ignores the multifaceted nature of poverty. As she had stressed during the presentation, a sound social policy requires a broader vision that addresses all aspects of social transformation not just social protection. Further research needed to cover informal social protection systems, the uses of social security funds, and social protection in the informal sector.

The next session (presented by Kouglo Lawson Body, Pascal Mihyo and Muddy Guiro) was concerned with the state and its role in structural transformation, defined as a change in structures and methods that can initiate genuine development. The state urgently needs to address inadequate infrastructure and build institutions that prevent political conflict and mobilise resources. It needs to act to ensure the achievement of social justice, poverty and inequality reduction, and to think through its relationships with regional and sub-regional as well as international organizations. The role of TUs in achieving these objectives is to engage with the state with well-researched and coherent strategic alternative policies. They should also analyse and interrogate visions and plans to ensure they contain the key elements of structural transformation and should closely monitor the implementation to achieve structural transformation. In addition, TUs should expand strategic alliances to other social groups in society.

A research program on these issues would try to identify formal and informal institutions of state needed to effect structural transformation and interrogate current conceptions of the developmental state; to examine and review constitutions and institutional frameworks under which these organs of state are constituted and operate especially their public accountability and how it can be strengthened both vertically and horizontally. The deconstruction of the inherited democracy module to find ways to combat the tyranny of minority and majority, the diminishing of the commercialisation of politics and the creation of a transformational leadership which serves rather than oppresses are necessary steps forward. Youth support systems through reforming education to train people to be innovative and solve problems not manage them and the creation of supportive family systems are further steps forward.

The people should be the centre of structural transformation. While the economic structure should emphasize industrial production and the transformation of agriculture (including development of cottage industries), structural transformation should also mean greater equity in income and wealth and access to resources and services. The state should remove the numerous constraints to production by adopting policies that are more inclusive and take into consideration social context. The state will need to focus on mobilising additional revenue from natural resources and MNCs especially in the areas of telecommunications and other public services. Also, there should be reforms targeted at the lifestyle of members of government in order to cut profligate spending. TUs need strong well-informed leaders who can form strategic partnerships and unite various social groups.

In a wide ranging discussion, it was noted that the network of international organisations and powerful supranational states is taking away policy space because of obligations they imposed on states. Some have also become a conduit for planting ideas of foreign entities that filter to the local level. It is therefore important to decentralise and for clear delineation issues that should be handled at the various levels (regional/sub-regional, national, community). Agencies such as the ITUC should take up research to understand how these mechanisms affect the transformation agenda.

Related to the above, some were of the view that the current African state is an oppressor of its people but weak in the international arena. The state has become too personalised by some leaders to appropriate resources for personal benefit. There is therefore the need to build the capacity of the state and build a strong bureaucracy. TUs are also becoming too personalised and this needs to be corrected before they can help rebuild the state. The TUs need to do a self-assessment of its performance and move away from being a reactive entity to be proactive and make recommendations to the state. Finally, TUs should broaden the scope of collective bargaining to seek involvement in the initial stages of formulation of policies.

It was also suggested that the state strengthens its domestic resource mobilization drive through improved taxation. However, TUs and civil society should be actively involved in this resource mobilisation.

Lastly, it was suggested that states take the issue of energy very seriously. Indigenous solutions to the energy problems are needed because there is too much universalism. We can learn from others but these lessons must be contextualized. TUs should play an active role in the discussion of the energy policy/strategy and energy alternative.

The meeting then turned to discussion of the political issues surrounding gender, class (presented by Britwum) and the mobilisation of progressive forces to effect structural change (presented by Moodley). Gender relations are dominated by a system of interrelated social structures and practices in which men dominate. Explanations that such domination is justified by women’s biological and personal characteristics are no longer tenable. Gender regimes are structured around household production, paid work, violence against women, and sexuality. Economic decline and reforms have forced a regrouping around pooled household resources exploiting women’s survival skills. The loss of male formal sector jobs has intensified the reliance of households on women’s incomes. Women’s non-household labour is concentrated in the service sector, the urban informal retail and commercial sector, and in agriculture producing subsistence food crops and processing a selling food. Totally invisible is women’s unpaid reproductive work and care in the household.

The household is an economic unit for production, reproduction and consumption in which women bear unequal burden for housework, and rationalised by the male-centred ‘breadwinner’  of classic capitalism. Women have to combine productive work with reproduction, while male household members are freed for productive work and leisure. Employers as owners of capital do not have to make any investment in the reproduction of labour, for which women bear responsibility.  Women as a heterogeneous group do not carry an equal burden of domestic work and while increased male involvement is good for altering existing sexual stereotypes, there is a long way to go.

The case of TUs is a good example of the distance still to travel. Women are in a minority membership of TUs around the world, though this does vary across unions and in some African unions, women are in the majority, though in a small minority in union leadership roles with a much greater participation in subordinate roles. There are many ways in which these gender deficits can be overcome including having separate and autonomous women’s groups, separate events, special representation, quotas, access to capacity building programmes with organised family support, and building greater equality in women’s involvement into the constitutions of the unions.

The conditions for success require women to have greater levels of decision making powers, the right balance of autonomy and integration within the organisations, adequate union resources, the channeling of the energies generated in separate spaces into mainstream structures, making a strong connection between women workers’ needs and union policy and the presence of a sufficient core of women activists with the required consciousness

Finally some issues in setting  a trades union gender transformation research  agenda were highlighted: unions structures and breaking patriarchal norms and standards and understanding unions’ role in maintaining patriarchy; bringing care, subsistence and informal economy into the political economy of production; sexuality and its commercialisation and its relation to notions of masculinity; the connection between productive and reproductive resources; distilling class from gender needs; and, women’s power under patriarchy.

A constant theme throughout the meeting was the importance of unions joining with community and other progressive organisations in the very important task of mobilising those workers who fell outside the traditional private and public sector activities. The need to expand union activity into the informal sector and organise those workers around their struggles to make a living was constantly stressed. Similarly, the question of the role of the state was a regular feature of the discussions and that raised the issue of what kind of state was being called on to act and in whose interests would a transformational state be directed. This then also raised the central issue of the relationship between system, people and policies.

“there is the need for unions to join with community and other progressive organisations in the very important task of mobilising those workers who fell outside the traditional private and public sector activities…”

In the discussion it was pointed out that the cultural dimensions of the gender relations, including the role of ethnicity in social relations and how this affects women, are important and should not be ignored. In terms of incorporating women in union activities, it was suggested that there is much on paper that needs to be translated into practice. Alliances with academics could expand the range of studies relevant to unions. Gender issues should be mainstreamed into the activities of unions rather treating them as side issues. There is the need for a deep analysis of the structure of how trade unions are organized. TUs should take up the issue of violence against women. Thinking about gender locations in employment would be a way to analyse the position of women and forms of discrimination in the workplace that keeps them stuck in particular jobs.

In terms of TU activities, they should not be limited to organising salaried workers but workers in general. It is important to formalise the informal economy and recognise domestic production and see the household as a production unit. This means making the informal economy an integral part of the union membership.

For the last session, the workshop was divided into five groups to come up with ideas which addressed the following areas:

1) industrialization strategy and industrial policy,

2) agrarian policy,

3) macroeconomic, finance and investment policy,

4) employment, livelihoods and social policy,

5) trade unions, workers and political agency.

Groups 1 to 4 were tasked with making deliberations on the following thematic areas and to come up specific suggestions and recommendations:

  • What are the systemic challenges that need to be addressed in order for African countries to transform their economies from primary commodity export dependency?
  • In the specific area/sector given above, what policies or types of policies are needed to address these systemic issues?
  • What issues need further understanding for the purposes of a research and advocacy agenda?
  • How do existing gender relations shape the systemic challenges identified

 

Group 5 was tasked with addressing the following:

  • What should trade unions do to influence development policy?
  • How effective have they been in influencing development policy? What factors account for the effectiveness or otherwise?
  • What areas of trade union work should be strengthened for better effectiveness?

 

After two hours of deliberations, the groups came up with the following reports.

Group 1 on Industrialization Strategy and Industrial Policy  argued that for effective industrial development there is the need to build local and regional value chains not only for import substitution but to develop strong linkages with all sectors of the economy.

There is the need for industrial and agriculture linkages in production, marketing and finance, relations with global markets that support Africa’s industrialization, and diversification from primary commodity dependence.  This requires the development of local SME enterprises, strengthening the role of the state, R&D. strong institutions, state guarantees for SMEs on procurement and trade, energy development as an industrial input, world class infrastructure.

The policies needed to pursue these objectives would involve education and training in STEM subjects (science, technology, engineering and mathematics); finance policy that supports local enterprises industrial development with start-up capital; policies which address issues of women in the informal sector and their weak representation in business associations; petty commodity trading-domestic resource mobilization and pensions; trade policies that support industrial development and promotes trade in the regions; energy policy that supports industrial development –  for example, industrial zones for incubation of enterprise development; a possible common regional policy that supports industrial policy but pays attention to energy; government procurement from affirmative action-women enterprises; and, a policy of promoting a capital goods industry.

The following areas for research and development were identified as follows:

  • Local and regional value chains and their impact on regional integration
  • The direction of energy policy in Africa
  • The trend and potential of petty commodity producers and SMEs
  • The role of the state in breaking with the enclave economy
  • Jobs, climate change and industrial development
  • Comparative studies on late industrialisation
  • Institutional reforms
  • Taking advantage of the existing spaces at the regional and continental levels e.g. the Africa Mining Vision Process , Boosting Intra Africa Trade Continental Free Trade Area
  • The role of the diaspora skills for industrial development
  • OECD guidelines
  • Creation of a database of the community of scholars that are interested in the industrial development in Africa

 

Group 2 on Agrarian Policy raised the problem of contractionary and deflationary macroeconomic policies that depress demand for agriculture produce, increase interest rates and limit financing for agriculture.This would require macroeconomic policies that stimulate aggregate demand. The current international trade regime inhibits the transformation of agriculture and promotes the export of raw materials and foods through dumping and subsidies in advanced countries. Therefore African nations need to de-link and adopt trade policies that promote domestic production by protecting themselves. The weak land tenure system and poor support to small holder farmers requires legal reforms to enhance investment into small holders farming and enhance access to land, especially by women.

The absence of support to improve investment by farmers in land fertility, irrigation, seeds, energy, storage facilities and extension services needs new policies to increase investment in agriculture in these areas, including enhancing linkages with agro-industries. Trade unions should focus on agriculture and mobilise masses for reforms in rural and urban areas and across various sectors; they should also expand their alliance building.

The institutionalised extraction of surpluses from producers by MNCS, intermediary merchants, foreign contract farming and dominant agri-business requires the re-configuration of agriculture markets through various forms of support including strengthening domestic actors like small and medium scale farmers, agricultural marketing and services and through trade protection.  The underdeveloped agro-industries reflect the weak link between agriculture and this will require protection of markets for industries and investment incentives for domestic producers.

On gender, policies are needed that encourage women to get the finance to invest in agriculture, get the support of the extension services, and access childcare.

There is a role for academics and the TUs to mobilise existing analytical capacities on the continent and to build more capacity to investigate these issues further.

Group 3 on Macroeconomic, Finance and Investment Policy identified the challenges as a monetary policy that focuses only on inflation, a fiscal policy that grants too many concessions to foreign mining companies and other large corporations, and fails to tax appropriately, the weak enforcement of tax laws, excessive discretion in the conduct of monetary policy, investment policy that exclusively focuses on foreign investment to the detriment of local investment, over liberalisation of capital accounts, dominance of global finance capital that saddles countries with huge debt, and a gender bias that limits women’s access to finance.

To deal with these issues, the group proposed tax reforms that remove unnecessary concession for MNCs, less discretion in the conduct of monetary policy and the focus on inflation, the reform of monetary policy making processes to replace inflation targeting with growth targeting  and new investment laws that give more incentives for domestic investment. The group proposed that areas for research should include an understanding of the optimal level of inflation, an analysis of the political economy constraints to structural transformation, and of how to devolve power from the centre.

The Group that focused on Employment, livelihoods and social policy identified as challenges the current global architecture that constrain policy space, the footloose nature of global finance capital and the urgent need to regulate the movement of funds, illicit financial flows, reduced policy space due to multitude of international obligations, the concentration of women in the informal sector, the absence of the social protection, and the weak capacity of the state and lack of political will in governments to undertake.

The proposed policies for addressing these challenges include renegotiation of contracts with foreign companies, state policies that generate employment from export of primary products, building agro-processing industries to process agricultural products and generate additional employment, addressing the mismatch between education/training and the needs of industry, and regulating the movements of international capital. Suggested areas of research included the impact of government policy on employment.

The fifth group on Trade unions, workers and political agency discussed what trades unions should do to influence development policy at all four levels of policy making: local, national, regional and continental.  The suggestions were to broaden the definitions of work and worker and therefore our constituencies and field of action; to build a bigger, more inclusive, more comprehensive movement; to reframe the issues and language used. This has implications in the area of research – new topics, new sources of data/information. Then there is the need to deepen existing alliances and building new ones (academia, research institutes, civil society organizations, local authorities – traditional governments – students, women’s organisations, human rights organisations, environmental organisations, etc). Further we need to sharpen advocacy, connecting with the streets and finally to extend work to look seriously at social security issues, issues which affect workers more directly.

Then the group asked these questions: how effective have trade unions been in influencing development policy and what factors account for their effectiveness or otherwise? The consensus was that TUs have not been effective. Some reasons for this are the loss of consciousness of what unions must do and their reason for doing these; the loss of independent consciousness, of ideology, and the fragmentation of the labour movement; the influence of neo-liberalism on how TUs think, speak and act, the informalisation of work and workplaces and the reorganisation of capitalist production – more fragmented, more individualised, and more dispersed. To improve effectiveness, TU need to be more creative, proactive, adaptive and innovative. They should adopt new forms of engagement and organisation (e.g. mobile technology) and free themselves from illusions in neo-liberalism.

Answering the question of what areas of trade union work should be strengthened for better effectiveness, the group noted that TUs’ work focuses on education, organisation, negotiation, research, communication, campaigns, advocacy, administration, leadership training and production of cadres. The areas that need strengthening are research and education; using research to train cadres and raise their consciousness;  mobilisation of resources – harness what we have; mobilise more by building alliances that will add/bring more resources to the table; using technology to adopt new ways of organisation; and building the capacity for gender-based analysis in research and engagement.

In the general discussion that followed the presentation of the reports, a few issues were highlighted. It was stressed that TUs should focus on crafting a broader social policy with social protection situated in it, which will also help TUs with challenge of membership mobilisation. The issue of pensions as a source of mobilisation for investment featured prominently in the discussions at the meeting and it is important to pursue additional research in this area.

It was noted that TUs should be heavily involved in dealing with MNCs but helping countries deal with the signing of binding unbalanced agreements with these MNCs. Finally, the need for additional investment in data collection and research was also highlighted.

A closing plenary included Yao Graham of TWN-Africa, Akwasi Adu-Amankwah of the ITUC-Africa and Peter Lawrence of ROAPE, reflected on the meeting.  Bringing together academics from universities and national and international organisations together with activists from TUs and other bodies with representation from Anglophone and Francophone countries on the continent supported by ‘resource persons’ from around the world, was a major achievement and an important impetus to trades union and other activists in their own countries and regions to collaborate with academics and other intellectual resources, to counteract the neo-liberal hegemony of local ruling classes and global capital. It was equally important that ROAPE was able to support TWN-Africa and ITUC-Africa in this initiative, especially as it was founded to provide a forum for those in Africa who sought to understand and change their social formation so as to fulfill the potential of the continent and its people through the very structural transformation that was the subject of the Accra meeting.

The account of the presentations is based on notes and the PowerPoint presentations of the speakers (for full details on the panels, presentations and PowerPoint slides please visit Third World Network). Our thanks to Patrick Opoku Asuming and Prince Baah Takyi of the University of Ghana, for their report on the meeting which enabled us to include accounts of other presentations, comments of the discussants and last but not least, contributions from the floor.

Peter Lawrence is Emeritus Professor at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at Keele University and has taught in Tanzania, Uganda, and Canada and spent periods of research in Tanzania, Hungary, Spain and India. He is a founding member of ROAPE.

Yao Graham is the coordinator of Third World Network in Ghana and a member of ROAPE. He has worked for years on questions of African and international development and processes. He holds a PhD in Law from Warwick University, Coventry, UK.

 

Structural Transformation in Africa

By Peter Lawrence

‘Employment, Structural Transformation and Equitable Economic Development in Africa: towards an African trade union response to three decades of neo-liberalism in Africa’ was the title of a three-day consultative meeting held in Accra in July 2015 which unusually brought together trades unionists, civil society organisation activists and academic researchers from across the continent and beyond to frame a new agenda for the structural transformation of African economies. The meeting was jointly organised by Third World Network-Africa and the International Trades Union Confederation (Africa) in collaboration with ROAPE. Participants came from over 20 different African countries covering all the regions of the continent, from Trades Unions (TUs), universities, colleges, civil society and international organisations together with a smaller number of a similar group of people from outside Africa.

The meeting had two objectives. The first was to construct an alternative economic development policy story and the second was to put together an agenda for policy research and advocacy by both ITUC-Africa and the trade union movement on the continent. The scene was set with a number of presentations assessing Africa’s position in the world economy and the challenges faced in structural transformation. The present situation saw a continued dependency on a narrow range of primary product exports; foreign investment in raw material production that amplifies economic cycles; a financial liberalization that did not have the growth generating effects that were promised;  dependence on remittances as foreign aid has failed to materialise in the quantities promised and needed; African private wealth being invested outside the continent; the small share of manufacturing representing a failure of structural transformation, the worsening situation in the labour market and the declining role of the state under the various structural adjustment programmes. Of these, perhaps the most critical was the dismantling of the State and therefore its capacity to plan and direct development. The very concept of structural transformation was subjected to closer scrutiny, especially in the discussions.

Discussion of agriculture centred on the lack of effective support for small farmers, the bias towards large scale farming and increasing numbers of land grabs. The need for trade unions to be more involved in mobilising farmers and pressing for policies to support family farming was emphasised in the discussion. The importance of manufacturing locally the equipment needed to increase productivity on family farms was another highlighted issue. For manufacturing development the absence of an industrial capitalist class suggested a key role for a ‘developmental’ state, buttressed by an increasingly better educated labour force, especially in science and technology. Capturing more of the value chain in minerals and other raw materials, thus helping to create more employment, would give many more opportunities to a labour force currently dependent on few well paid jobs.

Macro-economic and financial policies were subjected to critical scrutiny. After decades of structural adjustment programmes, Africa is a net investor into developing countries, and the years of using only one tool, the exchange rate, to regulate the economy and generate investment and exports, have failed to effect any transformation and even failed on its own terms. A range of fiscal and monetary policies were required for each of the different objectives and in the discussion the role of trade unions in educating and campaigning for more relevant macro policies was emphasised.

Moving to social policy, the view was that this needed to move away from the colonial (and neo-colonial) paternalism of the ‘civilising mission’ to maintain people’s welfare towards the developmental state involving rapid economic development and the defeat of the trinity of ignorance, poverty and disease. To do this strong links needed to develop between economic and social policies in education, health and formal employment sometimes backed by legislation, social security laws for formal sector workers; and state pensions.

The meeting returned to look at the State in more detail and the role of the trade unions in helping to push for a developmental state, eliminate the abuses of state power and the personalization of trade unions as well as of the State. This was followed by a session on gender and class, both of which cropped up in many of the other sessions. The position of women not only in the household and labour market, but also in trade unions was fully covered in this session as was the issue of confronting patriarchy everywhere. Throughout the meeting there were calls for trades unions not only to mobilise employed workers but also those without work or in precarious work with gender mainstreamed rather than treated as a separate issue. In the final session, the meeting broke up into groups to cover five main subject areas: industrialisation strategy and industrial policy; agrarian policy; macroeconomic, finance and investment policy; employment, livelihoods and social policy; and trade unions, workers and political agency. A final plenary discussed the reports of each group.

This was a very worthwhile internationalist and progressive venture which ROAPE was happy to support. Bringing together academic activists and trades unionists was a particularly valuable feature of the meeting with each learning from the other. A full account of the presentations, group reports and discussions of both in plenary, can be found at under Articles and Third World Network has uploaded a large number of presentations and reports here.

Peter Lawrence is Emeritus Professor at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at Keele University and has taught in Tanzania, Uganda, and Canada and spent periods of research in Tanzania, Hungary, Spain and India. He is a founding member of ROAPE.

Radical Agendas #2: Community Resistance from Below

By Dale McKinley

Remembering the past

Amongst the most studied and celebrated aspects of the anti-apartheid struggle during the 1980s in South Africa was the breadth and impact of community resistance (Ballard et al 2006; Buhlungu 2010).

The origins of that resistance came during the late 1970s and early 1980s when the working class, broadly conceived, was hit with a double blow. Emerging clusters of neoliberal capitalism privileged the opening up of global markets, increasing capital mobility and reorganising states to guarantee and catalyze ‘free market principles’ (Harvey 2005), while pushing for a flexible, insecure and informal labour regime (Chun 2009).

Simultaneously, a large number of unions had become increasingly opposed to what they saw as the subordination of worker interests and struggles to the macro-national liberation politics of the ANC and its alliance partner, the SACP. (Pillay 1996) These unions wanted to forge politically independent labour organizations allied to the broader working class of communities, informal workers and students that practiced workers’ control and participatory democracy (Baskin 1991).

This eventually resulted in the formation of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). Linking the strengthening of internal union (especially shop-floor) structures and democracy to the struggles against state repression on a more general societal level FOSATU reached out to communities and their unemployed and casual worker constituencies (Barchiesi 2006).

On the community front, there was the launch of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983. This brought together a wide range of community and other anti-apartheid civil society organizations, many of whom were aligned to the ANC. Key to these developments, were the worsening material conditions of the black majority and their increasingly radical resistance to the devastating socio-economic impact of the apartheid-capitalist system (Naidoo 2010). After the formation of COSATU in 1985, the terrain for a genuine people’s alliance that contained an equally genuine alternative to apartheid-capitalist oppression was fertile.

Negotiations and mobilization

Meanwhile, in the midst of widespread community and labour movement struggles during the late 1980s, behind-the-scenes negotiations between the ANC and the apartheid state were well-advanced. Negotiatory politics began to fast displace whatever ground working class struggles were attempting to occupy, in the process creating the conditions for top-down, centralized “power and decision-making” (Pillay 1996).

“…in the midst of widespread community and labour movement struggles during the late 1980s, behind-the-scenes negotiations between the ANC and the apartheid state were well-advanced.”

By the early 1990s, the strategic locus of resistance and people’s power shifted even further onto a ‘negotiations’ terrain. COSATU became involved in a parallel negotiating process, devoting much of its energies to institutionalizing bargaining agreements between unions, employers and the state. (McKinley 1997) Similarly, a range of community organizations entered into negotiations with local white councils about the provision of public services. With the core leadership and organizations of what had constituted the UDF now absorbed into the ANC itself, the remaining community organizations, after holding talks with the ANC, formed a new umbrella body called the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), which unofficially became the fourth member of the ANC Alliance (Zuern 2004).

Combined, these shifts resulted in the effective curtailment of anti-capitalist mass struggle by the broad working class. Ordinary workers and community members often had little say in key political and policy decisions which became dominated by the perceived necessity of seeking common ground with capital and the apartheid state for some kind of social contract to restructure an ailing South African macro-economy.

The post-apartheid ‘dividend’

With the transition to democracy and the ANC’s capturing of state power after 1994, a range of new political, socio-economic and organizational constellations of power thus came to the fore. This occurred alongside the rapid adoption by the ANC of a neoliberal macro-economic policy framework that profoundly reshaped not only the political economy of South Africa but the more specific struggles of poor and working class communities (Marais, 1998).

For the poor and working class, the impacts were devastating. Massive job losses were visited upon those who had been fortunate enough to be employed, this ‘experience’ being accompanied by attendant social and economic damage to already poor and vulnerable families and communities. The ANC-managed state also implemented “basic needs” policies that turned many basic services into market commodities, facilitated by a drastic decrease in national government grants/subsidies to municipalities and support for the development of financial instruments for privatized delivery (McDonald, 2000).

“For the poor and working class, the impacts were devastating. Massive job losses were visited upon those who had been fortunate enough to be employed, this ‘experience’ being accompanied by attendant social and economic damage…”

In turn, this laid the foundations for an enabling environment of patronage, corruption and factional politics as well as a huge escalation in the costs of basic services and a concomitant increase in the use of cost-recovery mechanisms such as water and electricity cut-offs. By the turn of the century, millions more poor South Africans had also experienced cut-offs and evictions as the result of the neo-liberal orgy. (McDonald and Smith, 2002) Further, the state’s capitalist-friendly land policies, which ensured that apartheid land ownership patterns remained virtually intact, has meant that South Africa’s long-suffering rural population continue to taste the bitter fruits of labour exploitation and landlessness.

It was within this transitional context that a range of new community organizations and social movements surfaced. (Ballard et al, 2006; Naidoo and Veriava, 2003) In almost all cases, they emerged in the very spaces opened up as a result of the failure of the tactical approaches and strategic visions of the main traditional forces of the left (for example, COSATU and the SACP) and ‘civic’ structures like SANCO to offer any meaningful response to the changing conditions (McKinley and Naidoo, 2004).

This ‘perfect storm’ of neoliberalism thus brought together all those inhabiting an extended and flexible ‘community’ of work and life the organizational form of which replaced the formal workplace as the epicentre of social solidarity. In response, there were some serious efforts from sections within the labour movement in the late 1990s and early 2000s, mostly from municipal workers, to forge collective solidarities and struggles. Despite this, the dominant politics and practices of the labour movement in the context of the changing composition of the broad working class and the enforced boundaries of corporatism under neoliberalism, has largely undermined the possibilities of any practical unity.

The ‘new’ social movements and community organizations have also been subject to a consistent state campaign of rhetorical vitriol and physical assaults. (McKinley and Veriava, 2010) Crucially, the various leaderships of the SACP, COSATU and other ANC “civil society” allies have most often given tacit support to the state’s repressive actions and have consistently failed to seriously engage with, politically support, or provide material solidarity to their struggles.

Catalysing division and conflict

While these community organizations and social movements do not represent some kind of homogeneous entity, and while there have been (and continue to be) substantive organizational differences and political and ideological debates within their ranks, they have become inextricably bound together by the levelling content and common forms of the neoliberal onslaught, both nationally and, to a lesser extent, internationally.

And yet, besides the highly fractured social and productive relations within poor communities, there is the additional challenge of engaging and overcoming a rising social conservatism among the ranks of the broad working class, driven by the growth of (right-wing) Christian evangelical churches and culturally reinforced patriarchy, as well as intensified ethnic and national chauvinism.

Much of this social conservatism (McKinley, 2010) has come to the political and social surface since the rise of the current South African president, Jacob Zuma, whose thinly disguised misogyny, homophobia, and open embrace of patriarchal ‘traditional values’ and religion have provided a trickle-down, socially backward ‘role model’ to the ANC’s and the left’s core constituency – the broad working class. Further reinforcement has come from the ANC-led state’s consistent championing of a narrow nationalism that has framed and encouraged xenophobia as evidenced in the eruption of xenophobic violence in 2008 and again in early 2015.

All of this has evinced a double ‘movement’ over the last several years in respect of poor communities and their struggles. On one hand, an escalating hyper-commoditized daily existence has produced a situation in which the vast majority of those residing in poor communities are engaged in a desperate struggle for social relevancy and location. The result has been an intensification of social division, stratification and dysfunction, now more than ever driven by increased competition for limited social benefits, services and productive opportunities.

“Much of this social conservatism has come to rise with the current South African president, Jacob Zuma, whose thinly disguised misogyny, homophobia, and open embrace of patriarchal ‘traditional values’ and religion have provided a trickle-down, socially backward ‘role model’ to the broad working class.”

In a Manichean twist, scarce waged labour has become the hoped-for light at the end of the tunnel, the main “prize” for social inclusion and stability as against the dark and desolate recesses of utter social marginalization. Access to state-serviced and controlled social grants, which are even then most often subject to considerations of political patronage and party electoral support now represent a barely inclusivist second ‘prize’.

Simultaneously, there have been growing levels of tension and conflict that have been manifested in various forms of local, community protests and violence, most often involving the state’s police forces as well as local politicians and elites. (Alexander, 2010; von Holdt, 2013) According to one, multi-year, academic study the number of community protests increased by almost 150% from the period 2005-2008 to the period from 2009-2012 when they averaged 309 per year (Runciman, 2013).

The combined waves of protest and violence have also involved union members, mostly those occupying the lowest paying jobs in the mining sector striking over wages and working conditions. This was the case at the Marikana mine in August 2012 when 10 miners were killed in intra-union violence, followed by the massacre of 35 striking miners by police, with another 70 injured. (Alexander et al., 2012) There have also been scores of community protesters shot dead by police forces over the last several years (The Sowetan, 24 January 2014).

Cumulatively, this cocktail of constructed dysfunction, division and conflict has made the possibilities of forging common, national level political and socio-economic struggles of communities for radical change hugely difficult. Likewise, it has also vitiated much of the earlier transitional potential of meaningful anti-capitalist labour-community alliances.

New spaces, new possibilities

The good news, however, is that there are new spaces opening up. The most crucial of these spaces have been engendered by the on-going fracturing of the ANC-Alliance over the last few years which has seen a slow-but-sure loosening of the ANC’s political and ideological hegemony. This process has been catalyzed by the horrific events at Marikana. During the subsequent post-massacre strike by platinum miners, the longest in South African history, practical and solidaristic links between workers, community organizations and independent left activists were forged. This heralded possibilities both for more sustained and campaigning alliances between labour and community and an effective and principled ‘United Front’ of community, labour and independent left forces and struggles.

For, whether it be in South Africa or elsewhere, the very basis, historically, for the maintenance of a sustainable political alliance between unions and (ostensibly progressive) political parties that have hold of state power is the parallel maintenance of both a politically malleable union leadership and expanding benefits for a meaningful threshold of unionised workers. On both counts, the alliance of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP is looking increasingly precarious.

“The good news, however, is that there are new spaces opening up. The most crucial of these spaces have been engendered by the on-going fracturing of the ANC-Alliance over the last few years”

Now not only is the ANC itself riven with factional battles and drowning in a sea of corruption but the last two years have also seen the formation of a new political rival (ostensibly to the ANC’s left) in the form of the breakaway Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) as well as the expulsion from COSATU of the largest union in the country, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA). Further, COSATU and many of its affiliates have become virtually paralyzed by leadership and factional battles, these catalyzed by ever growing exposés of massive financial mismanagement and fraud (McKinley, 2014).

What is also happening is that the wage and working condition gains of all but the most highly paid unionized workers are being seriously eroded by the combined effects of the state’s neoliberal policies and the displacement of the current crisis of capitalism onto workers. In respect of the ‘other’ part of the broad working class (i.e. poor communities), the impacts are being felt even more acutely.

This is where the incipient moves by NUMSA, supported by many community organizations and other civil society formations across the country, to forge an independent and anti-capitalist ‘United Front’ of the broad working class comes into the picture. For many community organizations, workers, social movements and other left activists who have been waging various struggles over the past decade and who are not part of the long-standing ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance, the significance of NUMSA’s break is that it comes with a commitment to…lead in the establishment of a new United Front [UF] that will coordinate struggles in the workplace and in communities, in a way similar to the UDF of the 1980s. The task of this front will be to fight for the implementation of the Freedom Charter and be an organizational weapon against neoliberal policies such as the NDP [National Development Plan] (NUMSA, 2013).

Such initiatives could indicate that “the nearly 10-year revolt of the poor may be complemented by an industrial partner” (Gentle 2014) and see a rejuvenation of labour-community alliances centred on basic public services. (Ashman and Pons-Vignon 2014). Additionally, NUMSA has said that it will embark on a process to organize workers across value chains, including in the highly divided and volatile mining sector (NUMSA 2014), a move that could also herald the beginnings of organizational support for informal and casualized workers who, it is estimated, now constitute the majority of those employed in South Africa (ILO, 2015).

Since the beginning of 2014, NUMSA has held a range of meetings and conferences with an array of community organizations, NGOs and independent left forces. This has led to the launch of several provincial and local structures of the ‘United Front’ and campaigns against, for example, the ANC government’s introduction of a youth wage subsidy and its neoliberal budget. Several joint protests have taken place across the country and have often been extended to other struggles initiated by community organizations and social movements.

NUMSA’s moves to build such a ‘United Front’ remain embryonic at this stage, of course, and it must still translate stated intent into practical action when it comes to active involvement in community struggles and organizations as well as in making common cause with informal/casualized workers. Nonetheless, what NUMSA has done is to open wide the door of new possibilities not just for labour-community alliances for public services but for a broad working class-led movement to mount a serious organizational and political challenge to the ANC (alongside its so-called ‘left’ alliance partners) as well as to the state in its present form.

The key challenge now for both community organisations and the labour movement in South Africa is to occupy the new spaces that have opened and to do so independently from any political party. In order for that to begin to happen though, there must first be recognition by unions and community organizations that they are part of the same struggle: in other words, the laying of a foundation for a unity in resistance of the broad working class in opposition to neoliberal capitalism and all its associated practical impacts.

In doing so, a base can be constructed on which a parallel joint programme of basic grassroots organizing and activism can then be pursued. Such a programme needs to be grounded in a basic set of demands that speaks directly to the real living conditions and daily struggles of both poor communities and organized workers. And it must also linked to a coming together to change the face of the public sector as a means not only to deliver public services but to do so in a way that deepens and expands their democratic character and content. (Ronnie, 2013; Wainwright, 2013) In this way, the idea of a meaningful ‘United Front’ that also encompasses social forces beyond its broad working class core can begin to be translated into practice.

“a base can be constructed on which a parallel joint programme of basic grassroots organizing and activism can then be pursued. Such a programme needs to be grounded in a basic set of demands that speaks directly to the real living conditions and daily struggles of both poor communities and organized workers.”

Above all, for community and worker resistance to invent the future of anti-capitalist struggle in South Africa is going to require patient political and organizational work and activism informed by a democratic spirit of humility and openness. There is no space here for vanguardist, paramount leadership, no room for the presumption of collective “working class” consciousness and no place for the defensive and divisive promotion of narrow organizational identities and terrain.

While a longer-term goal of broad working class struggle might well be to replace capitalism with an alternative system, it is only by engaging in the kind of practical, here-and-now struggle for real changes in the lives of the public, both human and institutional, that the possibilities for more radical change can be brought into being.

Dale T. McKinley is an independent writer, researcher and lecturer based in Johannesburg. He is a long-time political activist and has been involved in social movement, community and liberation struggles for over three decades. He is the author of four books and has written widely on various aspects of South African and international political, social and economic issues and struggles.

Notes

Alexander, P. 2010. ‘Rebellion of the poor: South Africa’s service delivery protests – a preliminary analysis.’ Review of African Political Economy, 37(123): 25-40.

Alexander, P., Sinwell, L., Lekgoa, T., Mmope. B. and Xezwi, B. 2012. Marikana: A view from the mountain and a case to answer. Johannesburg: Jacana Media.

Ashman, Samantha, and Nicolas Pons-Vignon. 2014. ‘NUMSA Rupture Could Mark New Start for Socialist Politics.’ Business Day, 11 February

Ballard, R., Habib, A. and Valodia, I. (Eds). 2006. Voices of protest: Social movements in post-apartheid South Africa. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press.

Barchiesi, Franco. 2006. ‘Commodification, Economic Restructuring, and the Changing.

Urban Geography of Labour in Post-Apartheid South Africa: The Case of Gauteng Province, 1991–2001.’ Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Geographers, Palmer House Hilton Hotel, Chicago, 7-11 March.

Baskin, Jeremy. 1991. Striking Back: A History of COSATU. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Buhlungu, S. 2010. A paradox of victory: COSATU and the democratic transformation of South Africa. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press

Chun, J.J. 2009. Organizing at the margins: The symbolic politics of labor in South Korea and the United States. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Gentle, Leonard. 2014. ‘Forging a New Movement: NUMSA and the Shift in South African Politics.’ The South African Civil Society Information Service, January 28

Harvey, D. 2005. A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

International Labour Organisation. 2015. World Employment Social Outlook: The Changing Nature of Jobs. Geneva: International Labour Office Research Department.

Marais, Hein. 1998. South Africa limits to change: the political economy of transformation. London: Zed Books.

McDonald, D. 2000. ‘The bell tolls for thee: Cost recovery, cut offs, and the affordability of municipal services in South Africa.’ MSP Special Report. Cape Town: Municipal Services Project.

McDonald, D. and Smith, L. 2002. ‘Privatizing Cape Town. MSP Occasional Paper No. 7.’ Cape Town: Municipal Services Project.

McKinley, D.T. 1997. The ANC and the liberation struggle: A critical political biography. London: Pluto Press.

McKinley, D.T. 2010. ‘South Africa’s social conservatism: A real and present danger’, South African Civil Society Information Service, March.

McKinley, D.T. 2014. ‘Authoritarianism for Beginners’: The crisis of leadership in SAMWU and the union movement’, Daily Maverick, 12 September.

McKinley, D.T. and Naidoo, P. 2004. ‘New social movements in South Africa: A story in creation.’ In McKinley and Naidoo, eds. Mobilising for change: New social movements in South Africa. Development Update Special Edition 5(2): 9-22.

McKinley, D.T. and Veriava, A. 2010. Arresting Dissent: State Repression and Post-Apartheid Social Movements. Saarbrucken: Lambert Academic Publishing.

Naidoo, P. 2010. The making of ‘the poor’ in post-apartheid South Africa: A case study of the City of Johannesburg and Orange Farm. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa.

Naidoo, P. and Veriava, A. 2003. ‘Re-membering movements: Trade unions and new social movements in neoliberal South Africa.’ Research Report No. 28, Centre for Civil Society. Durban: University of KwaZulu-Natal.

NUMSA (National Union of Metalworkers). 2013. ‘NUMSA Special National Congress, December 17 to 20, 2013 Declaration.’

NUMSA (National Union of Metalworkers). 2014. ‘Resolutions adopted at NUMSA Special National Congress, 16–20 December, 2013.’30 January.

Pillay, D. 1996. ‘Social movements, development and democracy in post-apartheid South Africa.’ In J.K. Coetzee and J. Graff, eds. Reconstruction, development and people. Johannesburg: International Thompson Publishing Company: 325-351.

Ronnie, R. 2013. Personal interview, 29 November (Ronnie is a long-time unionist and political activist and former General Secretary of SAMWU).

Runciman, C. 2013. ‘An overview of community struggles in 2012: Key trends and their significance.’ Paper presented at the International Labour and Information Group April Conference, 26 April.

von Holdt, K. 2013. ‘South Africa: The transition to violent democracy.’ Review of African Political Economy 40(138): 509-604.

Wainwright, H. 2013. The tragedy of the private, the potential of the public. Ferney-Voltaire and Amsterdam: Public Services International and the Transnational Institute.

Zuern, E. 2004. ‘Continuity in contradiction? The prospects for a national civic movement in a democratic state: SANCO and the ANC in post-apartheid South Africa.’ Centre for Civil Society Research Report No. 26. Durban: Centre for Civil Society.

Letters and Memories: Ruth First and the Review’s Early Days

By Peter Lawrence

As one of the executors and trustees of Lionel Cliffe’s legacies, I have been going through his collection of papers, notes, cuttings  and other materials.  In one box I found two letters that Ruth First, another founder-editor of ROAPE sent to me late in 1975, typewritten on University of Dar es Salaam (where she had been teaching for a term) headed foolscap notepaper that I remember so well. Once over the shock, I read them with some emotion, being taken back to those early and heady days of the journal and more intensely to memories of Ruth herself. The letters present a mixture of the breadth of her knowledge of the African continent, her attention to detail, sharpness of observation, and humanity.

The first letter, starting ‘Dear Peter and all Rapists’ (for the sake of our reputations, this journal’s acronym was then RAPE, and as a further footnote I learned later that  when we changed the acronym, Ruth, by then in Mozambique and not party to the change, couldn’t understand the reason for it) reported that No2 had sold out in the Dar university bookshop and that they were ‘all agog for No3’. ‘Good to hear that No 4 is at the typesetters’, she added, reminding me how long the whole process used to take in the days before PCs. In the second letter we learn that ‘Joe [Ruth’s husband, Joe Slovo] arrived with 10 copies of Rape 3… All are sold out.’ She had been expecting more but whatever conference she mentions was taking place at the time, was ‘in turmoil and I doubt if I could have calculated the payments on top of everything else.’

The first letter is dominated by comments on a Briefing on Nigeria, – the one in No. 4 on the coup against Gowon in 1975 and on which Ruth had several comments and a proposal for its reorganisation. ‘Maybe I’m way out, but them’s my suggestions.’ Unless the fate of the piece has already been sealed.’ Well if No. 4 was at the printers…..The letter concludes: ‘Lousy business letter this; no time for personal life! Almost…! And typewriter will never be the same since a large cockcroach lodged in the works. Nor will I …..’ I was especially moved by a little PS to me asking about an aspect of my personal life!

The second letter is longer and ranges over many Journal business issues. Her suggestions are based on discussions she has had with the comrades at the University, not so well known then, but household names now – Shivji, Mamdani – as well as with a visiting editor. She calls for book reviews of recent works, including Shivji’s own Class Struggles  in Tanzania , but also books covering Kenya and Uganda, pre-capitalist formations, and peasants. Then she wants to know about ‘the condition of the State issue (No. 5) and counsels especially that ‘if Saul is taking on Uganda, Mamdani at least, but all of us for that matter, in the best tradition of Rape collective style of work, should see it in good time.’ Indeed the group wanted Mamdani himself to contribute to the issue. The ROAPE archives might tell us how this was resolved. Suffice to say, there was no contribution from Mamdani in that issue, and although John Saul does acknowledge Mamdani’s help in providing a pre-publication copy of his book, and also references his work very fully, even though taking issue with it, there is no indication that he saw the finished article before it went to press.

Then there is the Angola crisis, about which Ruth wanted someone to be commissioned to write. One of our editors at the time, the late Jitendra Mohan, took a very critical view, from a left/Maoist position of no foreign  interference, of Cuban involvement in Angola. ‘On Southern Africa and Angola in partic.’, writes Ruth, ‘Jitendra’s line is monstrous.’ It was certainly contentious and led to much heated debate on the EWG, until Jitendra sadly resigned. Ruth, of course had a list of people who could be approached and of the subjects that needed to be covered.

‘This is a foully typed letter’, she starts her conclusion. ‘Am booked to fly to LM [Lourenço Marques, not yet Maputo] tomorrow though the Visa has not come through. Maybe I’ll have a night or two at the airport….. or worse.’  And then there’s a PS with two other ideas covering Zambia and ‘a document from a Zimbabwean freedom fighter camp which indicts the Nkomos, Sitholes and Muzorewas, all and with emphasis. I thinks it’s usable, in part anyway.’

This second letter was written just before Ruth was due to return to the UK.  In a paragraph where she worries she may have sent all these proposals to others but doesn’t know to whom, she writes:  ‘As you can gather, I am at the end of my tether winding up this course:  Guruli [Lionel Cliffe’s successor as Director of Development Studies] has not been seen for weeks, and I shall go tomorrow without the temptation of saying what I think of his state of Creative Disorganisation.’ I recall the late Kassim Guruli, and no-one who knew him would have had organisation as his strongest point.

These letters bring back memories of the early days of ROAPE, when we struggled to get issues out (not to mention pay for them)  and when Ruth was such a part of those struggles to produce the journal, to agree an editorial position, to agonise about whether an article could be rescued, or as Ruth put it, was ‘usable.’ How important her talents as a journalist, researcher and now academic, were to making the journal happen and how privileged we were that she was on board.

Peter Lawrence is Emeritus Professor at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences at Keele University and has taught in Tanzania, Uganda, and Canada and spent periods of research in Tanzania, Hungary, Spain and India. He is a founding member of ROAPE.

The Roots of Africa’s Condition

By the Editorial Working Group

The Roots of Africa’s Present Condition

The Review of African Political Economy was established in 1974, with the aim to ‘examine the roots of Africa’s present condition’ and problems such as inequality and dependency. Yet, the Review did not seek to promote scholarly research for its own sake, but instead sought to engage with the actions required for transformation. The aim, in short, was to provide a space to help sharpen understandings and analysis of developments in order to equip movements and activists to revolutionise the continent. Empty academic research without political action, plans and projects were shunned. However, the Review would not, so the original editorial stated, propose tactics and strategy that could only be answered in the actual struggles taking place on the continent. Rather it would become a forum which could sharpen analysis and help facilitate meaningful practice.

What was happening on the continent when the Review was founded? 1974 was a key moment. The first wave of independence in Africa had already passed and the countries that had become independent offered little real liberation. As the South Africa revolutionary Ruth First, one of the first editors of the Review, had already stated, decolonisation had been a ‘bargaining process with cooperative African elites …The former colonial governments guarded its options and … the careerist heirs to independence preoccupied themselves with an ‘Africanisation’ of the administration.’

New movements were now challenging both Portugal’s colonies and the white minority regimes of Southern Africa and the limitations of the first wave of independence. Exciting political formations were on the verge of taking power in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau. The Review wanted to interrogate these revolutionary projects as part of the second wave of critical decolonisation. It also sought to understand the patterns of power and economic control that had been developing across the continent since the late 1950s.

As a fraternal voice of the new movements that were sweeping the continent, the Review attempted to analyse the progressive politics of the new forces of liberation that were emerging and interrogate those radical projects that already existed.

Some of the scholar-activists involved in founding ROAPE, including the late Lionel Cliffe, whose idea it was, had recently returned from Tanzania where they had been involved in the experiments in socialist development in the country, critically supporting – mainly through teaching, writing and influencing local activists and policymakers – Julius Nyerere’s attempts to break the colonial legacy of underdevelopment. They were joined by others who had worked elsewhere in Africa, including most notably Ruth First. They were based in the UK, but often in transit, moving between the continent and the UK. The first generation involved in ROAPE were scholar-activists not career academics, and were a committed (and diverse) political community seeking to assist the continent’s radical transformation.[1]

However, in the 1980s the desired change – and eventual move – crashed on the rocks of structural adjustment, globalisation and authoritarian state-led development. The Review remained committed to providing radical analysis of the continent’s transforming political economy through the 1980s and 1990s. While it remains based in the UK, its Contributing Editors span the continent and it sustains a growing programme of workshops and conferences in Africa.

The new website seeks to help reinvigorate scholar activism in and about Africa, and to involve new communities on the continent and elsewhere in a host of ROAPE activities, projects, conferences and events.  The aim is to develop a new audience for the Review, to generate material for both the website and for the print issue, and to build deeper and sustainable connections with scholars, students, activists and institutions who work in and on Africa.

The site holds videos of conferences, interviews with scholars and activists, regular conference reports, a blog, details about ROAPE bursaries, ongoing ROAPE projects, reviews, longer online articles and free access through the publisher Taylor and Francis to our Briefings and Debates. We have a close connection to the French language site Afriques en Lutte who have many years’ experience covering social movements and uprisings in francophone Africa, and will provide coverage of developments and struggles taking place across French speaking Africa, events that are frequently invisible to an increasingly Anglophone world.

Towards these new objectives ROAPE is working with the Society, Work and Development Institute (SWOP) at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. The aims of ROAPE are compatible with the work of SWOP and the community of researchers and students within the institute and university and the activist orientation of many of the activities and research conducted by the institute. Johannesburg is also a unique African hub for visiting researchers from the continent, with a thriving radical community of activists and scholars. ROAPE hopes to develop these connections with SWOP through a number of initiatives – ROAPE/SWOP workshops, conferences and events, seminars and launches.

These connections and partnerships build on existing relationships that ROAPE has established. ROAPE collaborates with Third World Network-Africa (TWN), a pan-African research and advocacy organisation based in Accra, Ghana. With ROAPE Africa Editor and member Yao Graham, co-ordinator of TWN, we organise conferences and workshops and collaborate on the African Initiative on Mining, Environment and Society (AIMS).

We want to develop the website to become a leading online resource for radical political economy in Africa. The 1974 editorial explained that it is to ‘the task of understanding, and countering the debilitating consequences of a capitalism which stems from external domination and is combined with internal underdevelopment and equally exploitative structures that this review is dedicated.’ This project remains ours today.

Notes

[1] Initially the people who got the Review off the ground in addition to Lionel and Ruth were Gavin Williams, Robin Cohen, Katherine Levine (now Salahi), Jan Burgess, Manfred Bienefeld and Peter Lawrence.

Egyptian Activists in Jail

ROAPE supports the campaign of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) and EuroMed Rights to gather public support for the release of Egyptian activists currently held in prison.

As EuroMed Rights writes, ‘Egyptian activists are striving for human rights, democracy and other fundamental freedoms, yet have been targeted since 2011 for their role in defending and promoting civil, political and economic rights. Due to their prominent contribution in initiating change, many Egyptian activists are being targeted, threatened, prosecuted in political trials and sentenced to long prison terms.’

In Egyptian President Sisi’s own words, ‘(…) there are many innocent people inside prisons, soon many of them will be released according to the available permissions’ (declared on television on 22 February 2015). Yet many activist remain in prison.

This concerted crackdown on political dissent must end. We support the campaign to free all imprisoned activists.

Please join us in taking action and help us get them out of prison with support and solidarity.

EuroMed Rights asks you to take a picture of yourself or others holding a sign calling upon Egyptian authorities to set them free, send it to them at egypt@euromedrights.net and tell your colleagues and friends about this campaign.

Your support will be taken to the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini and the President of the European Council Donald Tusk.

For further information visit the website here. Also you can access Ray Bush’s Briefing on Egypt through the Taylor and Francis website and other ROAPE articles on Egypt from our open access archive.

Update: Drop the Appeal Against Castel-Branco and Mbanze

Following the ridiculous case against Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco and Fernando Mbanze on 16 September all charges were dropped and both men were acquitted. However in October Mozambique’s General Prosecutor appealed against the court decision that acquitted the economist and the newspaper editor.

This is both bizarre and worrying. Amnesty International have launched a campaign to drop the appeal.

1) Please write immediately in Portuguese, English or your own language:

  • Urging the authorities to immediately withdraw the appeal against Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco and Fernando Mbanze and respect the court’s decision;
  • Calling on them to end the practice of harassment and intimidation of people peacefully expressing their views, and to uphold the right to freedom of expression;
  • Calling on them to repeal all legislation which unduly limits freedom of expression.

 

2) For the full Urgent Action, including appeal addresses and further information, please click here.

3) Please keep in touch with us about any response you receive and what you have done.

#FeesMustFall: Campaigning for Free Education

By Ashley Fataar

Since the middle of October 2015 students at universities across South Africa have been protesting over three issues. Beginning at Wits University in Johannesburg, the protest spread 5 days later to the University of Cape Town. By the end of the month universities across the country were witnessing protests unprecedented since the fall of racial apartheid in 1994.

Students across the length and breadth of the country rose up against fee hikes that would have made higher education prohibitively expensive and forced tens of thousands of them out of the system, joining the millions who are already locked out because of the cost of fees and the difficulty of sustaining themselves through their degrees.

Although the protest movement involved predominantly black students, white students also took part – the economic situation, low growth and job losses, is beginning to hit previously privileged groups as well. On many occasions black and white students linked arms in battles with the police.

As classes were cancelled, the activists organised teach-ins and made space to help their fellow students to study towards their final exams. The students cleaned up any mess created by their occupations: they knew that the burden would otherwise fall on low-paid campus cleaners who could, in the case of black students, be their own mothers and fathers.

Many students who enter South African universities are under-prepared by poor schools in working-class townships and rural areas. As a result they struggle to deal with course-work. Furthermore, working class students have to work part-time to make ends meet. Having to deal with demanding courses between work-shifts means impaired concentration and focus which results in frustration, stress and at times academic failure.

There is a system of financial aid available. But it only provides loans or bursaries to people whose families earn below a certain income level. It means that many students who face severe difficulties are not helped.

After weeks of sustained protests across the country students won the demand that university fees would not be increased in 2016.But two important demands still remain – the demand for free quality education and the demand for an end to the hated practice of outsourcing non-academic labour, who clean, provide security and maintenance at colleges and universities.

University education has become a very difficult target for thousands of students. As a teacher in Bishop Lavis, a working class area in Cape Town, explained in October, ‘I was having a discussion with my students last week when the Wits students began protesting. They argued that even if they pass matric they can’t afford the costs associated with university or tertiary education. They argued that they were only being educated to work as till operators in super-markets or to join criminal gangs. They questioned why they should, therefore, bother with writing final high school exams.’

They are right. Winning zero percentage fee increase for 2016 does not address the issue the issue of student debt. Universities will only award a degree if all fees are paid. Those who are fortunate to get loans have to pay them off. As many students argue, the demand that fees must fall is not only that fee increases must fall but that there must be no fees at all. Even with the cancellation of the increase students from poor families will still bear the burden of paying fees.

The third demand is that universities end the hated practice of outsourcing. Students at a number of campuses have led campaigns demanding that management of their respective universities ends this practice. At two universities, this campaign has been heating up. It has been given added profile by the protests over fee increases. As I write, workers from two campuses are meeting to plan wild-cat strikes to demand that they be employed by the universities. Studies show that for the university to employ the workers directly, is the same cost.

Workers are also demanding decent working conditions. They are victimised and prevented from joining trade unions. Management refuses to recognise trade unions.

As a student speaking at a public meeting explained, ‘Let’s get rid of outsourcing. We cannot continue to tolerate the exploitation, victimisation and intimidation of outsourced workers. We cannot continue to not take responsibility when we are responsible. Forward to a living wage! The companies must go! The workers must stay!’ This is absolutely correct. Until this happens South Africa will continue to see the protests that we are seeing now.

Many students were arrested and charged in the protests that rippled across the country. Some are facing crippling bail costs, others have been evicted from their campus accommodation and face severe hardships. To connect, receive updates from various campuses, or make donations please visit the following Facebook groups:

University of Stellenbosch (Open Stellenbosch)

https://www.facebook.com/openstellenbosch/

University of Cape Town (Left Students Forum)

https://www.facebook.com/UCTLSF/

and University of Cape Town (Rhodes Must Fall)

https://www.facebook.com/RhodesMustFall/

University of Witwatersrand (Fees Must Fall)

https://www.facebook.com/WitsFMF

and University of Witwatersrand (Workers Solidarity Committee)

https://www.facebook.com/WITSWSC/

University of Western Cape (Fees Will Fall)

https://www.facebook.com/UWC-Fees-WILL-Fall

For other updates please see

Get WOKE!

https://www.facebook.com/groups/1429223964057893/?fref=ts

Ashley Fataar is a leading member of the Democratic Left Front in Cape Town and he writes for websites and newspapers around the world.

Researching Anti-Fraud Measures

By Nataliya Mykhalchenko

I have spent some time working alongside Dr. Jörg Wiegratz on a project titled ‘The Political Economy of anti-fraud measures in the Global South’. The project is aimed at analysing the various drivers, characteristics and repercussions of the anti-fraud measures in the Global South, particularly in Africa.

The main body of the project involved looking at a selection of websites of newspapers and TV stations, identifying and analysing anti-fraud measures carried out by state and non-state actors in various countries on the African continent. I managed to look at six countries: Tanzania, Ghana, Malawi, Kenya, South Africa and Rwanda. The research revealed a number of characteristics, which include: the popularization of the anti-fraud fight via awareness raising and sensitization campaigns; the use of technology (mainly in the form of computer software) as a tool in fighting fraud in a range of sectors such as the mobile and banking industries; the involvement of international companies specialising in checking the compliance of firms with regulations and standards; the use of language in anti-fraud campaigns by both state and non-state actors that creates a sense of alarm and urgency (i.e. referring to fraud as cancer), among others.

The researched material suggests that the drivers behind such initiatives include, among others, business and consumer concerns. The furthering of business interests (ranging from aims to protect brands and retain existing markets, to attracting new customers and creating an image of ‘reliable brands’) is indeed a major motivation behind some measures, especially those initiated by private actors. There is an indication that the development of anti-fraud technology tools, such as the already mentioned computer software, and the involvement of international companies specialising in checking the compliance of firms with regulations and standards, together contribute to making anti-fraud measures a profitable business. The material also shows that the anti-fraud fight is not void of tensions and conflicts. In some instances, political and economic power of those allegedly involved in fraud is used to influence the running of investigations.

I have been interested in issues relating to political-economy and this project helped me to gain a more in-depth understanding of the dynamics and features of the political-economy with regards to the anti-fraud measures. At first, I found looking for information quite challenging. Having been a POLIS (School of Politics and International Studies) student for two years, I was used to writing analytical essays with the use of a range of academic sources to back up my arguments. However, this type of research was different. The topic of anti-fraud measures is not widely researched, thus, I had to gather secondary data and analyse it without the backing of academic sources.

Nataliya Mykhalchenko is a third year International Development student at the University of Leeds. Her project was on the political economy of anti-fraud measures in Africa and is informed by the ongoing research of Dr. Jörg Wiegratz on anti-fraud measures in Uganda.

Militant Philosopher of Third World Liberation

By Trevor Ngwane

Leo Zeilig Frantz Fanon: Militant Philosopher of Third World Liberation (London, I. B. Tauris: 2015)

Fanon is the buzzword in African universities and youth-led organisations today, a throwback to the Black Panthers’ era in the USA when the African-American youth were similarly enthralled. His take on decolonisation is being revisited and found attractive by the ‘born-free’ generation. These youth never experienced first-hand the tension, excitement and dangers of the national liberation struggle. They only hear of its promise and its glory, but when they look around they find nothing promising or glorious. They ask, why is there so much inequality, poverty and suffering? Increasingly, they are turning to Fanon for answers.

But who was Fanon? Fanon was a revolutionary thinker, writing and organising in the 1950s in Algeria and across Africa. For Fanon it was not enough to celebrate the achievements of decolonization, it was necessary to push at the limits of national freedom.

Fanon wrote his main work, The Wretched of the Earth, in 1961. When spoke in his famous chapter in The Wretched of the Earth about the pitfalls of national consciousness. He described how the national bourgeoisie after independence is only too happy to accept crumbs thrown to it from the departing colonial powers. Without social reform, without political and economic transformation, national liberation would achieve nothing. He was saying to those who had fought for national liberation that you have made this independence for yourselves, ensure that the self-organisation and confidence you have developed is sustained and becomes a continuous programme of revolutionary transformation after national liberation is achieved. As Fanon wrote, ‘No leader, however valuable he may be, can substitute himself for the popular will; and the national government … ought first to give back their dignity to all citizens, fill their minds and feast their eyes with human things, and create a prospect that is human because conscious and sovereign men dwell therein.’ Fanon’s final act was to the revolutionary movement that he devoted his life but he was subversive of that revolution. Fanon was the great subversive revolutionary of national-liberation.

One of the strengths of Zeilig’s book is his attention to relatively minor elements in Fanon’s life. So, for example, right at the end of Fanon’s life he wanted to find out if a route from West Africa could be used by the African Legion to support FLN fighters in Wilaya V and VI inside Algeria. Charged with discovering such a route in October 1960 Fanon set out with a number of fighters. He kept a private journal intended for the FLN leadership on the prospects for a Southern Front. This largely unknown journal is a remarkable and revolutionary document. Fanon’s notes start with a number of points, ‘To put Africa in motion, to cooperate in its organisation, in its regroupment, behind revolutionary principles. To participate in the ordered movement of a continent – this was really the work I had chosen.’ He then gives a pan-African survey of the continent as he saw it at the time: Mali was ‘ready for anything’ offering a ‘bridgehead’ to ‘precious perspectives.’ The Congo ‘which constituted the second landing beach for revolutionary ideas’ but is now caught up in an ‘inextricable network of sterile contradictions.’ He then emphasised the need to ‘besiege the colonialist’s citadels known as Angola, Mozambique, Kenya and the Union of South Africa.’

The notebook expressed Fanon’s unbridled desire for African unity distinct from the shallow slogans that came from much of the nationalist movement in Africa. Fanon’s Africa was not the place ‘of the poets, the Africa that is sleeping, but the Africa that stops you sleeping because the people are impatient to be doing something, to speak and to play.’ Fanon restated the aims of his journey of fact-finding – a declaration of his activist determination, ‘We must immediately take the war to the enemy, leave him no rest, harass him, cut off his breath. Let’s go. Our mission: to open up the Southern Front. To bring in arms and munitions from Bamako. Stir up the population of the Sahara; infiltrate our way into the high plains of Algeria. Having taken Algeria to the four corners of Africa, we have to go back with the whole of Africa to African Algeria, towards the north; towards the continental city of Algiers. That is what I want; great lives … cross the desert. To wear out the desert, to deny it, to bring together Africa and to create the continent … take the absurd … the impossible, rub it up the wrong way and hurl a continent into the assault.’

For Fanon, as Zeilig writes, African unity was a living and breathing reality, but it had to be made real and rubbed up in a revolutionary direction. This was distinct from the hollow calls for African unity being espoused by the many of the leaders of soon to be independent states.

Shortly after the trip he made at the end of 1960 Fanon was diagnosed with leukaemia, a fatal disease at that time. Reluctantly in late 1961 he accepted treatment in the United States – a place he regarded as dangerous for black people, full of racists and lynch-mobs – and flew there in October from his exiled Tunisian base. Fanon made his last trip across the Atlantic. On 6 December 1961 he died at the age of 36 years old.

This is the story, from his birth in the Caribbean island of Martinique, to his tragic and untimely death, that is told in Frantz Fanon: Militant Philosopher of Third World Liberation. Leo Zeilig’s book about this remarkable scholar-activist, Fanon, has come at a crucial and critical moment. In it he tells the story of the man, his ideas and the milieu wherein he practiced ‘being Fanon’, that is, being argumentative, fearless, revolutionary and totally committed.

Zeilig’s account matches and is worthy of its subject matter written as it is from a committed left perspective, and persuasively facing down the political shibboleths, ideological confusions and strategic errors of Fanon’s times, in particular, those arising out of Stalinist ‘Marxism-Leninism.’ He rescues the kernel of Fanon’s thought from hostile detractors and mistaken adulators showing that it was anti-racist, anti-capitalist, internationalist and humanist.

This book is also a subtle and sympathetic engagement with Fanon’s life project: decolonisation and the plight of the national liberation movement in Africa. Fanon was its shining lodestar and exhibited some of its glaring mistakes. Everyone concerned with the project of human emancipation must read this book.

Trevor Ngwane is a writer, teacher and activist in South Africa. He is currently a researcher with the Research Chair for Social Change at the University of Johannesburg in South Africa.

For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
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For 50 years, ROAPE has brought our readers pathbreaking analysis on radical African political economy in our quarterly review, and for more than ten years on our website. Subscriptions and donations are essential to keeping our review and website alive.
We use cookies to collect and analyse information on site performance and usage, and to enhance and customise content. By clicking into any content on this site, you agree to allow cookies to be placed. To find out more see our