In their piece, Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong discuss Ethiopia as a model for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), contrasting positive Chinese engagement and infrastructure investment on the African continent with the West’s negative media depictions and limited support, while highlighting Ethiopia’s significant economic growth and industrialization.
By Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong
In the late 20th Century, there was a “tendency of [Anglosphere] media to focus almost exclusively on the negative side of the African experience,” with Africa “seen as the one part of the world for which the future was likely to be far worse than the past.”[1] A UK business journal famously labelled Africa “The Hopeless Continent.”[2] A quarter century later Western media still frame Africa negatively.[3] Dominant depictions are built on a patronizing racism that has its roots in the colonial and neo-colonial relationship between the West and Africa. Chinese activities on the continent are similarly judged by Western entities to be uniquely negative,[4] influencing some African media to do the same.[5] The consistent Western deprecation of the Chinese presence in the continent reflects both Yellow Peril and Red Menace ideologies mobilized to confront what the US government regards as its “only peer competitor.”
Western media promote, for example, a “Chinese debt trap” claim; yet, studies have shown that China holds only an 18% share of Africa’s external debt[6] and that among 19 African countries in debt distress in 2017, the share of these countries’ external debt to China averaged just 15%.[7] Moreover, after the G-20 created the Debt Service Standstill Initiative in 2020 to supposedly relieve heavily indebted states, China
became the most significant debt relief country in this initiative. It suspended $5.7 billion in debt payments, contributing to more than half of the total global debt moratorium. Through this action, 45% of debts owed by the poorest countries to China was suspended. In contrast, the UK had no suspension of payments on its commercial loans and still recovered $3.2b in debt from countries that applied for the debt standstill initiative.[8]
China renegotiated or wrote off more than $78b in loans for foreign infrastructure projects between 2020 and early 2023.[9] After obtaining China’s debt relief in 2023, Ethiopia requested other G-20 countries to also suspend the country’s debt payments.[10]
Compared to Western media coverage, “Chinese reporting on the continent is more abundant, positive and diverse.”[11] Western media focus mainly on corruption and ineffectiveness of African leaders, civil wars and terrorism. Chinese media report on a wide range of socio-economic topics and are positive about Africa’s development potential and its wider global and regional connections beyond the West. Chinese officials and scholars affirm that “China needs Africa as much as Africa needs China”[12] or even that “China needs Africa more than Africa needs China.’”[13] China calls Africa “a continent of opportunities and a promising land for investors.”[14] China and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) benefit from solid African diplomatic support, but China also reciprocates; thus, in 2022 it launched an “Initiative for Peaceful Development in the Horn of Africa” and in 2023 upgraded its relationship with Ethiopia from a “strategic partnership” to the rare level of “all-weather development cooperation.”[15]
No Chinese leader has pronounced, as did French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Senegal in 2007, that Africans have “not entered history” and are not oriented toward the future or progress.[16] Even as Trump in 2018 termed African states “shithole countries,”[17] Xi Jinping framed African states and peoples as equals, distinct from the hegemonic dehumanization in western media.”[18] From 2014-2020, he made ten trips to Africa, while in 2017-2022, there was only a single, brief stopover in Africa by a US president, in Egypt.[19] Although one can find examples of internalization of western stereotyping, in large part Chinese merchants who live on the African continent are equally positive in their perceptions of African development and potentials for economic partnership. Chinese who work closely with Africans[20] and Chinese managers at industrial enterprises in Ethiopia we interviewed, regard local workers as reliable, adaptable, quick-learners.[21]
Ethiopia as a BRI Model: Industrialization through infrastructure building
Among Africa’s 54 states, 52 are part of the BRI, but there is no African country that Chinese officials have been more positive about than Ethiopia; they regard it, as an idiom puts it, “the only one and no number two” (独一无二). Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous country. It has a Japan-level population, but is growing at 2.5% per annum and with an average age of 18.8, while Japan’s population is shrinking at -0.5% per year and has an average age of 49.[22] Despite an ongoing civil war in 2022, Ethiopia’s GDP grew by 5.3%, versus 3.6% for all of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).[23] Though GDP growth does not capture the entirety of human development and wellbeing, at the junction of world and especially developing country economic stagnation, this level of GDP growth is welcomed. Addis Ababa is the “capital of Africa,” hosting the African Union, UN Economic Commission on Africa, and African Center for Disease Control, plus Africa offices of many international organizations, such as the United Nation Development Program.
Ethiopia is however seen as the BRI model country in Africa for reasons more directly related to key aspects of the Initiative – infrastructure building and industrializing investment. As a Kenyan analyst has put it, “China is the only major country that has proven quite interested in going into fragile situations to do some infrastructure projects in Africa,”[24] while Western states have scaled back such activities.[25] By 2017, Chinese firms had 50% of Africa’s internationally-contracted construction market.[26] China also provides financial wherewithal for infrastructure-building, with more than one-fifth the value of external loans to sub-Saharan Africa coming from Beijing.[27] In 2006-2018, China lent Ethiopia US$14.83 billion, 82.2% of it for 70 mega-projects (22 in transport and communications, 35 in power, 13 for sugar factories and urban water supply).[28]
An Ethiopian business journal stated in 2020 that “Ethiopia is the leading country in sub-Saharan Africa with the highest number of Chinese contracted projects.” It averred that “Almost all big buildings, roads and dam projects throughout the country are being handled by Chinese contractors.” Local firms are not thought to be equipped to complete mega-projects, but Ethiopians do participate. A China Communications Construction Company manager in Addis has noted:
We have 800 local engineers and thousands of local workers. We have created over 5,000 job opportunities. We have close to six subcontractors, particularly in road, building and finishing works. We usually work hand-in-hand with local grade-one contractors. If we win bids, we subcontract part of the project to them. If they win, they subcontract it to us because they need knowledge and technological capacity. [29]
In fact, contrary to Western media portrayals, not many Chinese work at projects in Ethiopia. There were fewer than 6,000 in 2021, among the 15,000 Chinese then-reported as living in a country of 127 million people.[30]
Ethiopia as a BRI Model: Industrialization through manufacturing
China is important to Africa’s trade pattern. Using the problematic category of “Sub-Saharan Africa” (SSA), one-fifth of its total goods exports go to China, with metals, minerals, and fuel some three-fifths of that, although Ethiopia exports none of these. China is also the largest source of imports in Africa, mainly manufactures and machinery.[31] Many imports are used in Chinese infrastructure and industrial projects, especially in Ethiopia.
China’s proportion of the stock of SSA’s FDI is still small, at 4.4%. [32] Its share however is growing, while the UK and US shares have diminished: they had 17% and 15% of FDI stock in Africa in 2004–08, but only 6% percent each in 2014–18. From 2016 to 2020, China also contributed 20% of the value of greenfield (entirely new) FDI in Africa, more than three and four times the US and UK shares.[33] Moreover, little of the US’s aid to Africa promotes industrialization.[34]
Despite scholars contending that “Several features of Ethiopia make it a ‘perfect storm’ for Chinese investment,”[35] the country has been central to China’s industrializing investment in Africa. African leaders emphasized at the 2022 AU meeting that industrialization is key to mitigating poverty and must be sped up.[36] When the BRICS countries met in 2023, Ethiopia was asked to join and Xi Jinping said China would “support Africa in growing its manufacturing sector and realizing industrialization and economic diversification.”[37] Already by 2017, China was said to be involved in 12% of Africa’s industrial production.[38] Some 13.4% of its stock of investment in Africa in 2021 was in manufacturing – with 37% in construction and 10% in mining[39]-but manufacturing’s importance is increasing, especially in Ethiopia. In 18 key African states in 2000-2010 and 2010-2018, manufacturing’s average annual value-added growth was 5% and 4.3%; while in Ethiopia it was 7.8% and 16.8%. Average annual growth in manufacturing jobs in the 18 states was 4.8% and 4.9%; in Ethiopia it was 11.2% and 6.9%.[40]
Some 3,000 Chinese firms operate in Africa; 70% of them private.[41] The proportion is similar in Ethiopia[42]. While state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate in construction, Chinese firms in manufacturing are mainly private. SOEs are large and experienced, but private firms vary in size, background and focus: many are small-to-medium and family-owned and thus more vulnerable to such destabilizing factors as epidemics, civil wars, and sanctions.[43]
Ethiopia is Africa’s second largest FDI recipient and China plays a key role in its industrialization.[44] As of late 2023, China’s 1,844 investment projects in Ethiopia were 4-5 times the number of US and Indian projects.[45] Its stock of investment in 2023, at $4.8b, was one-tenth the stock of all Chinese FDI in Africa and one-sixth the stock of all FDI in Ethiopia. It is said to have created 560,000 Ethiopian “job opportunities,” mainly in clothing and textiles, building materials, plastics and metals, and engineering. In 2021, Chinese firms accounted for 60% of Ethiopia’s approved new FDFI projects, almost all in manufacturing and services.[46]
Ethiopia’s manufactured exports in 2023 were a fifth of all its exports. Chinese manufacturing exporters are based in Ethiopia’s 13 public and 5 private industrial parks (IPs), eleven of them Chinese-built and mostly housing Chinese firms. IPs have attracted FDI of US$740m since 2013 and IP occupancy rates have been as high as 80%. They have created 150,000 jobs, almost all for locals and mainly for women. The oldest IP, the Chinese-managed Eastern Industrial Park near Addis, had 26,000 workers in 2023, 5% of them Chinese and 70-80% women.[47] Hawassa IP, 275 km south of Addis was even larger and 97% of its 35,000 workers in 2021 were locals.[48] Ethiopia plans to transform all IPs into special economic zones. The first will be the Chinese-built Dire Dawa IP being completed in late 2023, 450 km from the capital, along with the Chinese-built railway from Addis to the port at Djibouti that handles Ethiopia’s external trade.[49]
Ethiopia as a BRI Model: non-economic aspects
The Ethiopia/China BRI relationship is not wholly economic; for example, educational ties are well-developed. In 2018, China had recruited 81,500 African university students and offered more scholarships to its African students than all the leading Western governments combined.[50] Already by 2017, when China had 74,011 African students, 4,883 were Ethiopians, up from 844 in 2011 and more than twice the number of Ethiopians studying in the US.[51] In 2023, Ethiopians were said to “account for the largest Chinese scholarship recipients.”[52] China was also supporting 117 Ethiopians studying at Addis Ababa University.[53]
The Luban Workshop, a vocational training program China developed as part of the BRI, is worth noting as well. It has operated since 2016 in 25 developing countries, including Ethiopia. Workshops are partly tailored to graduates getting jobs in local Chinese firms and one at Ethiopian Technical University since 2021 is paired with China’s Tianjin University of Technology. Many of its instructors are Ethiopians who studied in China. The curriculum centers on robotics and AI-using manufacturing, as well as including learning specific to IT giant Huawei’s technology. This is perhaps one reason why an Ethiopian team finished 3rd among 146 teams from 36 countries in Huawei’s 2023 ICT competition.[54]
In the BRI era, there were also intermarriages between working class Chinese male migrants and rural-to-urban Ethiopian women workers. Many couples have met in factories.[55]
Ethiopia as a BRI Model, But Not a Model for Transformation
Although Ethiopia is a model BRI country in Africa, the relationship is not unproblematic. On the Chinese side, in mid-2023, infrastructure-builders faced severe problems from the Ethiopian government’s shortage of foreign exchange and from increasing materials costs.[56] The situation for IPs since early 2022 has also been precarious, due to US sanctions imposed during the civil war with Tigrayan rebels.[57] Ethiopia’s eligibility for duty-free entry of its goods into the US under the politically-conditioned African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was suspended which, the Ethiopian government said, resulted in “millions” of workers being laid off.[58] The US move caused Ethiopia to further strengthen its ties with China and though the war ended in November 2022, the US renewed its sanctions against Ethiopian officials in fall 2023. Ethiopia remains outside AGOA, which itself may expire for all of Africa in 2025.[59] China, in contrast, now grants zero tariff treatment to 98% of products from Ethiopia.[60]
On the Ethiopian side, Chinese and other foreign-invested firms continue to pay IP workers very low wages, averaging with benefits only about US$100 a month. That is less pay than for comparable work in Bangladesh, albeit slightly higher than what workers earn at surrounding Ethiopian-owned firms. Wages of the few Chinese IP employees, mainly managers, supervisors, and trainers, are much higher, up to 20 times the local wage.[61] Unsurprisingly then, there have been strikes, such as one at the Hawassa IP in 2019.[62] These actions had achieved some positive outcomes, such as higher wages and recognition of unions – until many thousands of workers at Hawassa and other IPs were laid off in 2022 due to sanctions.
Presumably, the US will soon lift sanctions, as for the past 120 years it has generally had with Ethiopia “a long-standing and important partnership,” in which US “security assistance” has supported successive Ethiopian regimes’ internal and external violence.[63] When sanctions end, it is unlikely that the close connection with China will be severed. It is equally unlikely however that being a model BRI country will, in itself, lead to Ethiopia transforming from a peripheral to semi-peripheral economy, as perhaps an important lesson of China’s experience is that it takes much more than foreign investment to transform an economy, let alone a society.
Barry Sautman is a Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He is a political scientist (PhD Columbia University) and lawyer (JD UCLA, LLM NYU) who primarily teaches international law, China/US relations, contemporary China, ethnicity and nationalism. One of his areas of research has been ethnic politics in China and comparative perspective, including ethnic policies, the political-economic and legal aspects of the Tibet and Xinjiang issues.
Hairong Yan is a Professor of Anthropology, Tsinghua Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences and Department of Sociology. She researches on agrarian change and food sovereignty in China and China-Africa links. She is interested in studying labor, gender, rural-urban relations, socialism, post-socialist transformations, neoliberal capitalism. Before joining Tsinghua, she taught in Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
Featured Photograph: Leader of Namibia and Lesotho stayed at Kerry Hotel Beijing during 2018 Beijing Summit of Forum on China–Africa Cooperation.
Notes
[1] David F. Gordon and Howard Wolpe, “The Other Africa: An End to Afro-Pessimism,” World Policy Journal (WPJ). 15:1 (1998): 49-59; David Rieff, “In Defense of Afro-Pessimism,” WPJ 15:2 (1998) https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/wpj/wp_99red01.html
[2] www.economist.com/weeklyedition/2000-05-13.
[3] Javier Blas, “What Has Happened to Africa Rising? It’s Been Another Lost Decade,” Bloomberg, Sept. 12, 2023; Ruchir Sharma, “The World Economy’s Biggest Problem is Africa,” Financial Times, Dec. 15, 2023.
[4] Chibuike Obuh, “The Representation of Africa in Western Media: Still a 21st Century Problem,” MA thesis, Edinburgh Napier University, 2015, DOI:10.13140/RG.2.1.3984.2326; Raphael Mweninguwe, “African Media’s Portrayal of Its Continent Raises Questions,” Media Diversity Institute, June 7, 2023, www.media-diversity.org/african-medias-portrayal-of-its-continent-raises-questions/ .
[5] Frankline Matanji, China in Africa: Representation of Chinese Investments in Africa by Western, Chinese, and African Media,” International Journal of Communications 16 (2022): 1713-1736.
[6] Gu Xuewu, et al, “China’s Engagement in Africa: Activities Effects and Trends,” Universitat Bonn, June, 2022,: 2, www.cassis.uni-bonn.de/en/publications/chinas-engagement-in-africa.
[7] Deborah Brautigam et al, “Trump Team Bashes China but Offers No Alternative in African Nations,” The Hill, Mar.15, 2018, https://thehill.com/opinion/international/378583-trump-team-bashes-china-but-offers-no-alternative-in-africa
[8] Gu Xuewu, et al, “China’s Engagement in Africa: Activities, Effects, and Trends,” Center for Global Studies, Universitet Bonn, 2022, www.cgs-bonn.de/cms/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/CGS-China_Africa_Study-2022.pdf.
[9] Matthew Mingey and Logan Wright, “China’s External Debt Renegotiations After Zambia,” Rhodium Group, June 2023, https://rhg.com/research/chinas-external-debt-renegotiations-after-zambia/.
[10] “Ethiopia Seeks Debt Relief from Other Creditors After China, IMF official Says,” Reuters, Oct. 14, 2023.
[11] Dani Madrid-Morales, “Africa in the News: Is News Coverage by Chinese Media Any Different?” paper, Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication conference, Toronto, 2019, www.danimadrid.net/research/2019_africa_in_the_news_chinese_media_any_different_draft.pdf.
[12] Li Hongwei and Jacqueline Muna Musiitwa, “China in Africa’s Looking Glass: Perceptions and Realities,” RUSI, Aug. 3, 2020, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/china-africas-looking-glass-perceptions-and-realities.
[13] Adams Bodomo, “Africa-China Relations: Symmetry, Soft Power and South Africa,” China Review 9:2 (2009): 169-178.
[14] “China’s Win-Win Investment in Africa Set to Rise Despite Western Slander,” Global Times, Aug. 18, 2023.
[15] Karoline Eickhoff and Nadine Godehardt, “China’s Horn of Africa Initiative: Fostering or Fragmenting Peace,” Megatrends Afrika, Working Paper 1, Oct. 2022, www.swp-berlin.org/assets/afrika/publications/MTA_ working_paper/MTA_WP_01_Eickhoff_Godehardt_China_HoA_formatiert_12102022.pdf; “Ethiopia-China Economic Cooperation,” Ethiopia Ministry of Finance, Dec. 26 2023, www.mofed.gov.et/blog/ethiopia-china-economic-cooperation/.
[16] “Africans Still Seething Over Sarkozy Speech,” Reuters, Sept. 5, 2007.
[17] Josh Dawsey, “Trump Derides Protections for Immigrants from ‘Shithole Countries,” Washington Post, Jan. 12, 2018.
[18] “Full Text of Chinese President Xi’s Signed Article on South African Media,” Xinhua, July 23, 2018; “Full Text of Chinese President Xi’s Signed Article on Rwandan Media,” Xinhua, July 21, 2018.
[19] Paul Nantulya, China’s Deepening Ties to Africa in Xi Jinping’s Third Term,” Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, Nov. 29, 2022, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/chinas-deepening-ties-to-africa-in-xi-jinpings-third-term/; Blas, What Has Happened.
[20] Micah Petersen and Saleem Ali, “Chinese Migrant Perceptions of Africans: Understanding Confucian Reflexive Politics in Southern Africa,” Social Sciences 7: 172 (2018): 1-18.
[21] Yan Hairong and Barry Sautman, “China, Ethiopia and the Significance of the Belt and Road Initiative,” China Quarterly (2023): 1-26, doi:10.1017/S0305741023000966.
[22] “Ethiopia Demographics,” Worldometer, 2023, www.worldometers.info/demographics/ethiopia-demographics/; “Japan Population,” Worldometer, 2023, www.worldometers.info/world-population/japan-population/.
[23] “GDP Growth (Annual %) Sub-Saharan Africa,” World Bank, 2023, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=ZG
[24] Jevans Nyabiage, “As Coups Threaten African Stability, China Struggles to Make Headway with Belt and Road Interests,” South China Morning Post (SCMP), Oct. 1, 2023.
[25] Jon Lomoy, “Chinese Aid – a Blessing for Africa and a Challenge to Western Donors,” CMI Insight 2021:2, www.cmi.no/publications/7750-chinese-aid-a-blessing-for-africa-and-a-challenge-to-western-donors.
[26] Irene Yuan Sun, et al., “The Dance of the Lion and Dragon,” McKinsey, 2017: 10, www.mckinsey.com/~/media/ mckinsey/featured%20insights/middle%20east%20and%20africa/the%20closest%20look%20yet%20at%20chinese%20economic%20e.
[27] “Regional Economic Outlook: Analytical Notes: At a Crossroads: Sub-Saharan Africa’s Economic Relations with China,” International Monetary Fund, Oct. 2023: 3, www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/REO/AFR/2023/ October/English/china.note1.ashx.
[28] Ethiopia-China Economic Relations.
[29] “Chinese Companies Taking over Ethiopia’s Construction Industry,” Ethiopian Business Review no. 81 (2020), https://ethiopianbusinessreview.net/chinese-companies-taking-over-ethiopias-construction-industry/.
[30] “Number of Chinese Workers in Ethiopia From 2009 to 2021,” Statista, 2024, www.statista.com/statistics/ 1321437/number-of-chinese-workers-in-ethiopia/; “Ethiopia – France begins evacuation of its citizens from Ethiopia in the face of the advance of the TPLF,” Europa Press, Nov. 28, 2021.
[31] Regional Economic Outlook: 2.
[32] Regional Economic Outlook: 3.
[33] Stephen Morgan, et al, “Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Recent Trends Leading up to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA),” US Department of Agriculture, Oct. 2022: 10, 14, www.ers.usda.gov/ webdocs/publications/104996/eub-242.pdf?v=3027.7.
[34] “U.S. Assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview,” Congressional Research Service, Nov. 7, 2023, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R46368.pdf.
[35] Amy Freedman and Naomi Bekele, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Malaysia and Ethiopia,” Indian Journal of Asian Affairs 35:1 (2022): 1-22.
[36] “African Leaders Call for Faster Industrialization During African Union Summit,” African Development Bank Group, Dec. 1, 2022, https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/african-leaders-call-faster-industrialization-during-african-union-summit-56945.
[37] “China’s Xi Pledges to Support Africa’s Industrialisation at BRICS,” Reuters, Aug. 25, 2023.
[38] Sun, The Dance: 10.
[39] “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Stock from China into African Countries in 2021, by Sector” Statista, 2023, www.statista.com/statistics/1222749/fdi-flow-from-china-into-africa-by-sector/.
[40] Hinh T. Dinh, “Industrialization in Africa: Issues and Policies,” Policy Center for the New South, 2023: 12,
www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/2023-10/RP_05-23_Hinh%20T.%20Dinh%20.pdf.
[41] Tu Lei, et al, “Africa Becomes a New Magnet for Chinese Investors Under BRI,” Global Times, Sept. 12, 2023.
[42] Yan and Sautman, China, Ethiopia.
[43] Chen Weiwei, “China and Africa: Ethiopia Case Study Debunks Investment Myths,” SOAS China Institute, Mar. 17, 2022, https://theconversation.com/china-and-africa-ethiopia-case-studydebunks-investment-myths-177098.
[44] “Investment Flows to Africa Dropped to $45 Billion in 2022,” UNCTAD, July 5, 2023, https://unctad.org/news/investment-flows-africa-dropped-45-billion-2022.
[45] Ethiopia-China Economic Cooperation; Can Ethiopia: 26.
[46] “Ethiopian Minister Commends China’s Contributions to Economic Progress,” Xinhua, July 7, 2023; “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Ethiopia,” Lloyds Bank, 2023, www.lloydsbanktrade.com/en/market-potential/ethiopia/investment.
[47] Can Ethiopia:25; Mukesh Shankar Bharti, “The Sustainable Development and Economic Impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Ethiopia,” East Asia 40 (2023): 175-194; Tu Lei, Africa Becomes.
[48] “Ethiopia’s Hawassa Industrial Park Stares at Massive Job Losses over US Decision,” Texfash, July 23, 2022, https://texfash.com/update/ethiopias-hawassa-industrial-park-stares-at-massive-job-losses-over-us-decision; Christian Johannes Meyer, et al, “The Market-Reach of Pandemics: Evidence from Female Workers in Ethiopia’s Ready-Made Garment Industry,” Sept. 7, 2020, https://osf.io/gwy5r/download.
[49] “Chinese Contractor Says Ethiopia’s Dire Dawa Industrial Park Nearing Completion,” CGTN, June 16, 2023, https://africa.cgtn.com/chinese-contractor-says-ethiopias-dire-dawa-industrial-park-nearing-completion/; “Investors with 6B Birr Capital Sign MoU to Work in Special Economic Zone,” Ethiopian News Agency (ENA), Nov. 2, 2023.
[50] Natasha Robinson and David Mills, “Will Experiences of Doctoral Study in China Influence African Academic Practice?” International Higher Education 111 (2022): 19-21.
[51] “China Emerging as a Major Destination for African Students,” ICEF Monitor, Apr. 21, 2021, https://monitor.icef.com/2021/04/china-emerging-as-a-major-destination-for-african-students/.
[52] Chinese Scholarship Empowers Ethiopian Students Dream,” Xinhua, Aug. 27, 2023.
[53] “China Extends Grant for 117 Addis Ababa University Students,” ENA, Mar. 9, 2023.
[54] Shibani Mahtani and Joshua Irwandi, “Winning Friends by Training Workers is China’s New Gambit,” Washington Post, July 10, 2023; “Developing Nations Benefit from Chinese Expertise,” China Daily, July 5, 2023; “Ethiopia Students Finish 3rd at Global Huawei ICT Competition in China,” Further Africa, May 31, 2023, https://furtherafrica.com/2023/05/31/ethiopia-students-finish-3rd-at-global-huawei-ict-competition-in-china/.
[55] Weng Wei, “A South-South Cross-Border Marriage Between Chinese Men and Ethiopian Women,” African Human Mobility Review 9:2 (2023): 103-122.
[56] Selamawit Mengesha, “China-Ethiopia Funding Row Threatens Key Infrastructure Link,” Reporter, July 8, 2023.
[57] Ashenafe Endale, “Industrial Parks Teeter on the Edge as Export Markets Calm,” Reporter, May 13, 2023.
[58] “Job Losses Wreck Livelihoods in Ethiopia’s Garment Industry,” IndustriAll, Sept. 6, 2023, www.industriall-union.org/job-losses-wreck-livelihoods-in-ethiopias-garment-industry.
[59] “Biden Renews National Emergency Executive Order Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons in Ethiopia,” Addis Standard, September 8, 2023; Ohio Omiunu, “US Suspends Four Countries from AGOA: Reassessing the Human Rights Trade Nexus,” Afronomics Law, Nov. 6, 2023, www.afronomicslaw.org/category/analysis/us-suspends-four-countries-agoa-reassessing-human-rights-trade-nexus.
[60] Jevans Nyabiage, “In Ethiopia, China and the US Map Rival Roads to Lasting Peace,” SCMP, Mar. 27, 2023.
[61] Christian Johannes Meyer, et al, “Wages and Compensation in Ethiopia’s Industrial Parks: Evidence from a Firm Survey,” World Bank Group, 2021, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/834531617685578320/pdf/ Wages-and-Compensation-in-Ethiopia-s-I; Weng Wei, A South-South: 116.
[62] “Ethiopia Workers Strike for a Union at Hawassa Industrial Park,” IndustriAll, Mar. 26, 2019, www.industriall-union.org/ethiopia-workers-strike-for-a-union-in-hawassa-industrial-park.
[63] “The United States and Ethiopia: a Long-term Partnership,” US State Department, Mar. 14, 2023, www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-ethiopia-a-long-term-partnership/#:~:text=U.S.%2DEthiopia%20Relations, relations%20with%20Ethiopia%20since%201903; Emma Sanderson “Propping Up on Strongman After Another,” Chicago Council of Global Affairs, Aug. 21, 2023, https://globalaffairs.org/research/policy-brief/ethiopia-propping-one-strongman-after-another.
