In this long-read, Husam Osman Mahjoub examines the growing and profound influence of the UAE and Saudi Arabia in the region over the years, and Sudan in particular. He argues that war in Sudan drives the final nail into the coffin for the democratic aspirations of the peoples of the Arab and African region. Husam Mahjoub explains that understanding the positions and actions of these countries is crucial for appreciating and, more importantly, working towards stopping the war that erupted on 15 April last year between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
By Husam Osman Mahjoub
Following the fall of dictator Omar Al-Bashir in April 2019, Sudanese main political forces cautiously used terms like “axis” and “sponsors” to allude to the interventions of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) in Sudanese affairs. These two words allow the political forces to be perceived as siding with the Sudanese people’s rejection of the two countries’ counter revolutionary efforts, while also avoiding arousing the ire of the two countries out of opportunism, fear, or political realism.
Contrary to their measured approach to the UAE and KSA, these Sudanese political forces address the negative roles of other regional countries without similar reservations. This distinction arises from the established history and geography, in the case of Egypt and Ethiopia, or the clear support for Islamic political movements, including backers of Sudan’s former regime, as seen in Qatar, Türkiye, and Iran.
However, the growing influence of the UAE and KSA in the region over the years, and Sudan in particular, challenges the objectivity of any analysis of Sudanese political affairs that neglects their profound role.
Understanding the positions and actions of these countries is crucial for comprehending and, more importantly, working towards stopping the war that erupted on April 15 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The UAE’s pivotal role as the primary supporter of the RSF becomes particularly relevant, as the militia heavily relies on direct UAE support to sustain its devastating war.
There is consensus that the strategy of the UAE and KSA in the region (loosely speaking, the Middle East and North Africa) is driven by economic hegemony, political expansion, and countering threats from Islamic political movements and Iran. But a closer look indicates that their fear of democratic regimes in the region precedes other considerations.
Despite shared objectives, differences arise in the UAE and KSA’s responses to this perceived risk. The shifts in their respective positions towards Sudan since the December (2018) Revolution underscore the nuanced variations in priorities, goals, and means between the two countries.
The Arab Spring – One Risk, Multiple Responses
The eruption of the “Arab Spring” in Tunisia then Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria in 2011 stirred unease among the Arabian Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Their state-sponsored media initially struggled to navigate the chaos, torn between the conservative policies of these countries and the predominantly sympathetic sentiments of the Arab street. Notably, Qatar’s Al-Jazeera Network openly embraced the uprisings, aligning with the broader political Islam movement.
For KSA and the UAE, the Arab Spring posed an existential threat to their ultra-conservative monarchies, built on clan and tribal foundations, suppression of freedoms, inequality, discrimination, and military reliance on the United States.
After Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak stepped down, the flames of the Arab Spring spread close to the UAE and KSA in Bahrain in the demonstrations of February 2011. The Bahraini authorities met them with force, resulting in the killing of several peaceful demonstrators on February 17. Saudi and Emirati military and police forces intervened crossing the King Fahd Causeway, which connects the island of Bahrain to the eastern coast of KSA, to suppress the protests, and restore “order” and the Sunni King’s control over the rebellious masses with a Shiite majority.
Simultaneously, limited protests emerged in Oman between January and March 2011, prompting a cabinet reshuffle by the Sultan. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, including KSA and the UAE, pledged financial aid to Bahrain and Oman to address economic grievances fueling the unrests.
Despite interventions in Bahrain and Oman, dissent persisted in the UAE and KSA. The UAE cracked down on 132 Emiratis (many of whom were Islamists) who petitioned to reform the elections of the Federal National Council. In Saudi Arabia, particularly in the mostly Shiite Eastern Region, protests erupted, met with a harsh government response that resulted in numerous deaths and arrests throughout 2011.
The handling of protests in Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia varied due to diverse geostrategic and political considerations. Crucially, changes in leadership within the Houses of Saud and Nahyan, marked by generational shifts and internal competition, played a decisive role. The ascent of Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) and Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) to power significantly influenced regional and global dynamics.
MBZ and MBS – Game of Thrones
Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, UAE’s founder, passed away in November 2004. His eldest son, Sheikh Khalifa, succeeded him, but with a noted disinterest in direct governance. This allowed Zayed’s third son, Sheikh Mohammed (MBZ), to rise as the de facto ruler, gaining global acceptance as Khalifa’s health declined.
In subsequent years, MBZ worked diligently to strengthen his position, sidelining potential rivals, particularly his brothers. In 2016 he replaced the head of the security apparatus, his brother Hazza, with their brother Tahnoun. MBZ then appointed his son Khalid as Tahnoun’s deputy in 2017. Khaled became crown prince in 2023, effectively shifting Abu Dhabi’s succession line from Sheikh Zayed’s sons to MBZ’s descendants.
In Saudi Arabia, two consecutive crown princes passed away leading the way to Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz becoming crown prince of King Abdullah in 2012.
Nothing distinguished Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), Salman’s sixth among twelve sons, from the hundreds of brothers and cousins of the third generation of the Saudi ruling family.
King Salman ascended the throne after King Abdullah passed away in January 2015, his son, MBS, succeeded him as minister of defense, and the first ever Deputy Crown Prince Muqrin assumed the Crown Prince briefly before he was relieved “at his request” in April 2015.
The second generation and most of the third generation of Al-Saud princes were officially bypassed when Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, a strongman close to the United States (having overseen anti-terrorism efforts), was appointed crown prince. MBS was appointed Deputy Crown Prince.
The deepening relationship between MBZ and MBS (widely understood as a mentoring relationship) became evident during Operation Decisive Storm, the Saudi-led Arab coalition’s intervention in Yemen in March 2015 launched by MBS against the Houthis. This military venture marked a significant milestone for the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and set the stage for their later involvement in the current war.
MBS, seeking to consolidate power, assumed crucial portfolios within Saudi Arabia, strategically involving some of his brothers and those close to him. Historically, some of these portfolios, such as the oil sector, were judiciously left to Saudi technocrats outside the hands and conflicts of the royal family.
Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE diversified their weapons sources, strengthening ties with global allies such as France, Russia, China, and South Korea, beyond the traditional partnerships with the United States and Britain.
The alignment between MBZ and MBS in regional and international affairs reached new heights, leading to a major crisis with the blockade of Qatar in June 2017 by KSA, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt. This crisis had far-reaching implications, impacting the region’s geopolitics and global economic interests, and confusing America, strategically allied with all these countries.
There were speculations about military plans to invade Qatar (like Bahrain earlier), involving a significant role for the RSF. Taha Osman El-Hussein, a former chief of staff of President Al-Bashir who later became an advisor for the Saudi government, was suggested to have facilitated the RSF participation.
Simultaneously, Mohammed bin Nayef was finally “removed” from his position, and MBS was appointed crown prince in June 2017. MBZ played a pivotal role in these changes by what Mohammed bin Nayef described as, “An Emirati plot … to help aggravate the differences within the royal court,” and promoting MBS to the administration of then-US President Barack Obama. His efforts were crucial in convincing President Donald Trump of MBS’s potential as an agent of change in the region early in Trump’s presidency.
The Falling Star – the Egyptian Spring
The strategic significance of Egypt, both in terms of its size and political and cultural influence, compelled the UAE and KSA to closely monitor the transformative events at the helm of power in the country. The prospect of the most populous Arab nation empowered with the belief in their ability to shape the country’s destiny through democratic means posed a considerable threat to the authoritarian status quo, something the UAE and KSA were determined to contain.
Fearing the potential disintegration, chaos, or emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood (despite their accession to power through democratic elections), along with the threat of strengthening the currents of political Islam in the region and in the two countries particularly, the UAE and KSA collaborated to thwart the democratic experiment in Egypt in cooperation with Egypt’s “deep state” institutions.
They directly supported the Egyptian army leadership and the nomination of Ahmed Shafiq for the presidency. They supported Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and the opposition “Rebellion” movement against President Mohamed Morsi until Sisi seized power. They provided political and media cover for the Rabaa Al-Adawiya Square massacre, which Sisi committed against masses of people, the majority of whom were Muslim Brotherhood supporters. These events inaugurated an era of repression and terror that has continued since 2013.
In exchange for Saudi and Emirati financial support, Egypt made significant concessions, ceding the strategic Tiran and Sanafir islands to Saudi Arabia and opening its markets to Emirati and Saudi investments and hot money (funds that are moved between economies to make short-term gains).
However, the aftermath of these arrangements paints a bleak picture. Egypt, a decade after the coup, resembles a repressive kleptocracy, where power is concentrated among a select few, including the president, his family and military leaders. Millions live under widespread repression and violations of freedoms and human rights, with more than 60,000 political prisoners.
The economy is in crisis, reliant on IMF loans with harsh conditions, and the aid flow from the UAE and KSA has dwindled. Between 2015 and 2022, Egyptian external debt skyrocketed to over $160 billion, while internal debt worsened.
As the UAE and KSA applied economic pressure to influence Sisi’s economic policies and to grab the assets of the Egyptian state, the country faced challenges to its historical regional role. The UAE’s support for Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Sudanese RSF Militia, coupled with Egypt’s concerns over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and militia presence, have strained Egypt’s national security.
Hot Sahrawi Summer – the Libyan Spring
Muammar Gaddafi’s relations with the UAE and KSA were historically tense. Libya has been of comparatively lesser importance than Egypt in terms of geographical proximity, small population, and political and cultural influence. However, Libya’s oil wealth and Gaddafi’s sway in Africa could not be overlooked by these Gulf nations.
In February 2011, when anti-Gaddafi demonstrations erupted demanding an end to the rule of the dictator who had governed Libya since 1969, the authorities confronted them with extreme violence that resulted in the killing of many civilians. NATO countries seized the opportunity to intervene militarily in March 2011, ensuring the country entered a period of chaos from which it has not emerged.
Some of the results of the campaign were disastrous for the coalition, especially the killing of the American ambassador in Benghazi in September 2012. But external interventions escalated, and some countries began supporting various militias and groups with weapons, funding, political support, or active engagement in combat within Libyan territory, as in the case with the UAE and Egypt.
Currently, control in Libya is divided between Khalifa Haftar’s militia, and the UN-recognized government, alongside numerous militias and foreign actors. Haftar received substantial support from the UAE and Russia (and to a lesser extent Egypt, the KSA, Jordan, and France). On the other side, the government with its Islamist background found backing from Qatar and Turkey. Various foreign militias, including Russian Wagner, Sudanese RSF, and militias affiliated with the Sudanese armed movements from the Darfur region play complex roles in the conflict.
The UAE, with its mastery in political, financial, military, and logistical support, has been a central player in aiding Haftar’s militia (along with the Wagner and RSF militias) since the start of the second Libyan civil war in 2014. Violating arms embargoes, the UAE supplied Haftar with weapons from Russia and China, a strategy mirrored in its support for the RSF in Sudan before and after the April 15 2023 war, with the participation of Haftar and Wagner militias.
Today as Libya grapples with ongoing instability, the hope for peace seems distant. The UAE hopes to have taught the Libyan people and the peoples of the region a lesson about the consequences of dreaming of a radical transformation, a lesson most Sudanese wrestle with now.
Where the Jasmine Blossomed – the Tunisian Spring
Tunisia holds immense symbolic significance in the Arab Spring, being the first, fastest, most peaceful, and most successful in achieving a democratic transformation. Despite its geographical distance from the Gulf states, Tunisia shares stronger cultural ties with them than Libya, though less than Egypt. Recognizing Tunisia’s strategic importance for Western Europe and America and the maturity of its civil society and political life, the UAE and KSA adopted a more cautious approach compared to their interventions in Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Bahrain.
Former President Moncef Marzouki and other Tunisian politicians have alleged that the UAE and KSA aimed to liquidate the Arab Spring, with Emirati money flowing provocatively during Marzouki’s rule. Reports suggest UAE involvement in Kais Saied’s “coup” against the democratic process in July 2021, effectively ending the wave of democratic transformations called the Arab Spring and installing a civilian dictator, in what appears to be a continuation of the pattern of Tunisia’s presidents before the Arab Spring, Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine.
The Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and the UAE
The Janjaweed militia is rooted in the Sudanese state’s history of arming supportive tribes against rebels in the peripheries. Musa Hilal emerged in 2003 as Janjaweed’s highest commander when his forces fought the rebel movements in Darfur.
Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) overthrew Musa Hilal and became the leader of Janjaweed’s new mutation, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which was established in 2013 under the supervision of the Sudanese Security and Intelligence Service.
The militia and the army committed atrocities and serious human rights violations that led to International Criminal Court referrals for senior regime officials, including President Al-Bashir.
The conditions resulting from the civil war in Darfur led to Musa Hilal’s, and later Hemedit’s, control over the Jebel Amer region, where gold mining has produced commercial quantities through traditional methods since around 2010.
The top import destination for the gold produced in the areas under the militia’s control was, and still is the UAE. The UAE remained a center for money and gold transfers to and from Sudan for the benefit of the Sudanese government, its security services, and armed movements. This role is notable considering the economic blockade imposed on Sudan since the 1990s, which paralyzed the Sudanese banking system’s dealings with international banks and markets.
It is the same role the UAE, and Dubai in particular, is known for playing with countries under economic sanctions or political turmoil (like Iran, Syria, and Russia). Dubai provides a haven for these funds to enter, be laundered, and transferred.
Dubai’s markets, especially luxury real estate and upscale malls, provide protection and spending venues for many leading figures in those countries, even those that do not enjoy (officially) friendly relations with the UAE.
The UAE has allowed RSF front companies to provide weapons, supplies, and financing services to the militia, and to carry out smuggling, gold exporting, and money laundering operations with Russian and African companies linked to the Wagner militia and African governments.
Tradive General Trading (registered in the name of Al-Goney, Hemedti’s brother) is one such RSF company registered in the UAE. It was sanctioned by the US and the UK after the outbreak of the war, along with Al-Junaid (owned by Abdul Rahim Dagalo, another brother of Hemedti, and his deputy) among other companies. The UAE’s awareness of the RSF’s extensive operations prompted its engagement with Hemedti.
The UAE fostered connections between the RSF and its allies, the Haftar and Wagner militias. The UAE coordinated the RSF fighters’ participation in the fighting in Libya with Haftar. Black Shield, a UAE-affiliated security company, recruited young Sudanese to work with Haftar’s militia in Libya.
Beyond financial contributions, the UAE played a transformative role, modernizing the RSF and reinventing Hemedti’s as a well-groomed, resourceful, populist leader. The UAE provided training, consulting, public relations, and media services through various companies, contributing to the militia’s evolution into a sophisticated organization.
The Rapid Support Forces and the Yemen War
The RSF’s pivotal involvement in the Yemen War marked a significant juncture in its trajectory and Sudan’s contemporary history. The collaboration between Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) and Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) prompted Omar Al-Bashir’s government to sever ties with Iran and join the Saudi-led Arab coalition in Yemen strategically aligning itself with the Gulf states in an opportunistic manner given the hostile relationship between them and the regime for a quarter of a century.
Originally, the Sudanese forces comprised members of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF. Gradually, an increasing number of fighters originated from the RSF, fostering independent ties with the UAE and KSA, distinct from the Sudanese army and state.
The UAE has assimilated the RSF into its military system, increasingly reliant on mercenaries through contracts with notorious companies and figures such as Erik Prince, the American founder of Blackwater, which was involved in the killing of civilians and other violations in Iraq. Prince participated since 2010 in developing an elite force responsible for the UAE Presidential Guard, and for conducting military operations in Syria and Yemen. This force included mercenaries from apartheid-era South Africa, Colombia, Morocco, and other countries.
Expanding this system during the Yemen war, the UAE established bases in Eritrea (Assab) and Somaliland (Berbera), offering its domestic and international facilities to RSF personnel. Estimates suggest the RSF deployed around 40,000 troops to Yemen, funded by substantial payments from the UAE and KSA. These funds not only enhanced the RSF’s power and influence, but also attracted tens of thousands of Sudanese youths, including the very young, to join its ranks.
Hemedti’s wealth and influence received another boost as he engaged in the Khartoum Process, a European-African initiative combating “illegal” immigration. This involvement contributed to his tacit international acceptance, further solidifying his stature amid complex geopolitical dynamics.
Bashir’s Last Tango
Al-Bashir’s skill in clinging to power and playing on the contradictions of regional and international politics reached its final stages when he shifted alliances by abandoning Iranian ties and aligning with the Arab coalition in Yemen.
He lost many strategic advantages due to the deterioration of his regime’s state of affairs. Popular opposition escalated with the emergence of younger generations of opponents who planted the seed of the December Revolution in its grassroots forms, especially within the resistance committees and professional groups. These groups were inspired by the Arab Spring revolutions and took advantage of the spread of social media. Internal conflicts at the heart of the ruling National Congress Party and the Islamic Movement, along with the transformation of the regime into a kleptocratic dictatorship further away from the comprehensive Islamic ideology exacerbated his situation. The dire economic conditions after the 2011 independence of South Sudan and the drying up of oil revenues added to the pressures on Bashir.
Seizing the opportunity, the UAE and KSA displayed pragmatic diplomacy, overlooking the regime’s Muslim Brotherhood identity. Between 2015 and 2018, substantial aid, loans, and investments from the UAE and Saudi Arabia aimed to bolster Bashir’s regime, addressing economic woes and reducing public anger.
By late 2018, Sudan’s economic collapse and Bashir’s diminishing ability to navigate crises eroded confidence domestically and internationally. December saw the eruption of widespread demonstrations, marking the beginning of the end for Bashir’s prolonged grip on power.
The Sudanese Spring – December Revolution
Sudan preceded the wave of the Arab Spring with two popular uprisings that overthrew two military regimes in October 1964 and April 1985. Popular resistance against Bashir peaked in 2013, met with brutal suppression by RSF soldiers. This marked the RSF’s role as Bashir’s lethal protector in Khartoum along with its continued atrocities in Darfur.
The UAE and KSA have always maintained ties with the traditional Sudanese political forces and “rebel” armed movements. It made sense for the two countries to confront the threat of the December Revolution with a mix of containment and assimilation tactics.
With the escalation of popular demonstrations, hundreds of thousands of protestors headed to the vicinity of the Armed Forces Headquarters on April 6, 2019. Once there, they staged a sit-in, demanding protection from the army. Fearing regime collapse, security services orchestrated Bashir’s ousting.
Al-Burhan and Hemedti assumed the leadership of a Transitional Military Council (TMC). They then began negotiations with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), representing the civilian forces, seeking a power-sharing arrangement, diverging from the public’s demand for full civilian rule.
The FFC’s strategic mistake lay in underestimating the TMC’s strength, failing to account for international and local relations that favored the military. This miscalculation hindered the FFC, backed by popular support, from fully securing power and challenging the military. Hemedti emerged as a key figure within the TMC, fostering robust ties with the UAE and KSA. Concurrently, Egypt, UAE, and KSA swiftly cultivated strong relations with Al-Burhan and other TMC members during negotiations. In the following months the Emiratis and Saudis actively engaged in the Sudanese political scene, pledging $3 billion in aid to the TMC.
Regional capitals witnessed endless meetings of Sudanese political forces with regional and international powers. Activists noticed the marks of interference from several intelligence services in meeting locations inside and outside Sudan, along with reports of bribes from the UAE, KSA, and Qatar.
At that time, relations between the UAE and KSA had begun to experience a silent tension caused by disagreements over the war in Yemen. Riyadh began to worry about Abu Dhabi’s support for the southern separatists, and the withdrawal of Emirati forces from Yemen.
This tension surfaced as discrepancies in their Sudanese approach. Several FFC leaders revealed that the Saudi ambassador to Sudan privately criticized the role of the UAE, expressing concerns about the UAE’s influence, its limited understanding of Sudanese realities, and Sudanese politicians favoring Abu Dhabi.
To bolster Hemedti’s position, the UAE facilitated a lobbying contract with the Canadian agency Dickens and Madson, led by former Israeli intelligence figure Ari Ben Menashe. This arrangement, initiated in May 2019, aimed to globally promote the military junta, securing weapons, financing, and positive media coverage for the TMC.
Further complicating the landscape, networks affiliated with the UAE, Egypt, and Russia engaged in disinformation campaigns. These networks disseminated false information and coordinated misleading content on social media platforms, favoring the military while opposing civilian forces and democratic transformation. Some of these networks had ties to Emirati and Egyptian security services, exacerbating the information warfare within Sudan.
The Khartoum sit-in massacre
Amidst prolonged negotiations and FFC’s political missteps, the military, and the UAE, KSA and Egypt sensed an opportunity to regain control and tip the balance of power in their favor. The military’s continued crackdown on peaceful demonstrators and reluctance to negotiate showcased their growing confidence. Following a successful two-day political strike, the military dispersed the HQ sit-in with a massacre reminiscent of Egypt’s Rabaa Al-Adawiya massacre.
The three countries sought to provide political and media cover for the massacre, as had happened in Rabaa, aiming to quash the December Revolution, and introducing a Sudanese Sisi; Burhan, as the Egyptians (and possibly the Saudis) desired, or Hemedti, as the Emiratis wanted.
However, the Sudanese people’s valiant resistance to the massacre in the following weeks, their ability to continue resisting, and the mobilization of millions of people on June 30 forced the UAE and KSA to bow to the storm. It was also clear that Egypt was dissatisfied with Burhan’s weakness, and perhaps his failure to kill the required number of people to put down the revolution.
The ambassadors of the UAE, KSA, UK, and US gathered a select few of the FFC leaders with Hemedti at the mansion of a prominent businessman, days before the June 30 march of millions. Their pressure led to a return to negotiations, despite the resounding success of the marches. A partnership between the civilians and the military, establishing a transitional government with a civilian presidency (Abdullah Hamdok), and a joint sovereignty council with rotating presidency was reached. Burhan would lead the first half of the transitional period, with a civilian taking over in the second half.
The UAE and the transitional period
Persisting in their efforts to liquidate the revolution, the UAE, KSA, and Egypt implemented strategies to weaken the mass movement while bolstering the military and pressuring civilian elements. Financial aid pledges from the UAE and KSA were abruptly halted, and the UAE escalated arming the RSF. In November 2019, Ari Ben Menashe inked a contract with DP World, Dubai’s ports company, to expedite DP World’s acquisition of the South Port Container Terminal at Port Sudan.
The UAE played a pivotal role in normalizing Sudan’s relations with Israel, culminating in the signing of the “Abraham Accords.” Sudan joined a US-sponsored alliance promising economic aid and loans, removal from the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, and facilitating reengagement with international financial institutions. This accord deepened Israel’s military and intelligence ties with the SAF and RSF, sidelining the civilian government.
As UAE-Egypt relations cooled, their Sudan-Ethiopia contradictions surfaced. Egypt strengthened military ties with the SAF (conducting joint military drills, deploying Egyptian fighter jets to the Merowe Air Base, and bringing the official Sudanese discourse on the Renaissance Dam closer to the Egyptian position). The UAE supported the Ethiopian Prime Minister in his war against the Tigray.
When needless military clashes occurred in Al-Fashqa on the Sudanese-Ethiopian border, the RSF notably abstained from involvement alongside the SAF. The UAE proposed a mediation that was met with popular Sudanese rejection.
The UAE’s influence through connections with wealthy Sudanese businessmen became evident, leveraging their economic interests within the UAE to shape Sudanese politics and economics. This adept maneuvering showcased the UAE’s ability to use economic relationships to exert influence in Sudan.
The coup and the war
The civilian-military partnership, ostensibly designed to share power, inadvertently granted Burhan and Hemedti more authority than outlined in its charters. With unwavering support from the UAE and KSA, they gained international legitimacy while deflecting blame onto the FFC, government, and Prime Minister for unfulfilled revolutionary promises.
The pretext of tensions between civilians and the military around transferring the Sovereignty Council presidency to civilians didn’t convincingly justify the October 25, 2021 coup. Instead, it seemed a move to eliminate symbolic civilian presence and solidify military rule.
Sudanese resilience, notably led by the resistance committees from the first moments of the coup, thwarted coup plans, rendering international support inappropriate.
Amidst chants for the military to return to the barracks, the dissolution of the Janjaweed and the famous “no negotiation, no partnership, no legitimacy”, global players, including the UN, US, and UK, sought to revive the civilian-military partnership. Simultaneously, negotiations between the military, Hamdok, and some FFC leaders and traditional political elites took place, culminating in an agreement promptly rejected by protestors.
Hamdok resigned and relocated to Abu Dhabi, hosted by the Emirati presidency, and heavily involved in international scenarios. The KSA and the US facilitated negotiations between the military and the FFC leading to the “Framework Agreement” in December 2022. The subsequent “final” political process, slated for April 2023, was disrupted by the sounds of bombings on the morning of April 15.
In the months leading up to the war, UAE-affiliated networks intensified efforts to fortify RSF’s presence on social media, laying the groundwork for the militia’s disinformation and misinformation campaigns.
At the onset of the war, a Dubai-based expert team managed RSF’s media and propaganda, portraying the militia favorably to European decision-makers. The UAE facilitated weapon shipments for the RSF through connections with Libya, Chad, Central Africa, Uganda, and the Haftar and Wagner militias.
MBZ met with the leaders of Chad and Ethiopia, garnering support for the RSF, disguising armament and supplies as humanitarian aid. The New York Times exposed in September the UAE’s covert operation to supply weapons and drones, treat RSF injured fighters and airlift the most serious cases to an Abu Dhabi military hospital.
Sudan has become an additional item on the list of tension in relations between MBS and MBZ, which includes disputes over Yemen, oil markets, and MBS’s ambitious plans for the Saudi economy, which threaten UAE’s dominant position.
The KSA, in collaboration with the US, initiated the Jeddah platform for ceasefire negotiations between the SAF and RSF, seemingly the most viable diplomatic effort to end the conflict. KSA’s shift away from the RSF indicates a prioritization of halting the war and preserving Sudan’s unity and stability.
Egypt staunchly supports the SAF and opposes the RSF militia. Sudan’s potential collapse is viewed by Egypt as a significant threat to national security, prompting proactive diplomatic measures, trying to neutralize the positions of the UAE and RSF regional allies.
The Pariah state?
The RSF is a fiefdom operating within the entire Sudanese state more than a traditional militia, or a paramilitary group. It is run like the domain of feudal lords (the Dagalo family) and is formed as a conglomerate of military, political, economic, and media operations. The war that the RSF is waging, with the support of the UAE and others, is not a conventional war, but rather a war to dismantle the Sudanese state and subjugate the Sudanese people.
The UAE’s involvement extends beyond economic hegemonic ambitions; it was able to obtain what it wanted from Sudan’s resources with the collaboration of its Sudanese allies, friends, or clients. Shipments of Sudanese gold to the UAE have not stopped over the past years despite volatile circumstances. The UAE signed an agreement with the de facto coup government and an important Sudanese businessman to develop the new port of Abu Amama on the Red Sea, with investments amounting to $6 billion. The UAE made it clear to the local population and political forces that opposed the UAE’s efforts to take over the port of Port Sudan that it was the ultimate, political arbiter.
Just as most of the army leadership belongs organizationally to, or is allied with, the National Congress Party and the Islamic Movement, this war is not simply a war against Islamists. The leadership of the RSF is filled with cadres from the Bashir regime and its notorious security services. In addition, the UAE has previously cooperated with Bashir, his government, and ruling party.
In one of its most important aspects, this war serves the UAE’s interests in preserving its ruling regime. Any successful democratic or revolutionary experiment in its sphere of influence is perceived as a threat, justifying extreme measures, even if it means destroying a country harboring such sentiments.
It is a war that drives the final nail into the coffin of the Arab Spring, with its symbolism for the democratic aspirations of the peoples of the Arab and African region.
Despite MBS and KSA’s direct responsibility for the killing of hundreds of thousands of innocent Yemenis, the killing of one man, the US-resident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and the dismemberment of his body on the orders of MBS in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul prompted President Biden to famously pledge to make KSA a “pariah state” during his election campaign. A promise he quickly reneged on.
However, Biden and the international community at large have been hesitant to confront the UAE, despite its shared responsibility with KSA for the immense human suffering in Yemen, and despite its greater responsibility for the killing of tens of thousands of innocents in Libya and Sudan.
The diplomatic, political, and economic prowess of MBZ seems to shield the country from being labeled a major player in the RSF war in Sudan. This extends to Sudanese parties, including the Sudanese Armed Forces, whose interests have not aligned historically (nor necessarily now) with those of the Sudanese people.
However, history shows that confronting foreign parties crucial to a conflict is essential to create opportunities for resolution. Popular pressures forced many Western governments to end support for the apartheid regime in South Africa and the Indonesian occupation of East Timor.
The UAE is very sensitive to negative media coverage. On July 4, a mere four days after a flight tracker publicized the sudden surge in Emirati flights to Amdjarass in Eastern Chad, the UAE announced it had opened a hospital there.
Four days after the publication of the above-mentioned New York Times report, UAE’s media reported that the Chadian President visited the Amdjarass hospital praising UAE’s humanitarian efforts. A day later, the Emirati Defense Ministry announced launching joint military exercises with Chad in Chad.
To create any serious opportunity to stop the war, it is imperative to hold the UAE accountable for its decisive role. This involves a concerted effort to expose its extensive involvement, generate global public opinion against its actions, and compel governments and organizations allied with it to address the Emirati “elephant in the room.”
Husam Mahjoub, co–founder of Sudan Bukra, an independent non-profit Sudanese TV channel watched by millions of Sudanese people. Knowledgeable about the politics of the Arabian Gulf region having lived there 31 years, he believes that stopping the war that broke out in Sudan on 15 April requires creating popular opposition to persuade governments to push the UAE to stop supporting the RSF militia.
Featured Photograph: A protest in London outside Downing Street against the war in Yemen (7 March 2018).
